Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia

Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to

South Asia1
Hannan R. Hussain*

Abstract
This paper re-examines the centrality of Pakistan-United
States (US) ties vis-à-vis South Asia, beginning with an
acknowledgement of historical consistencies, and the
challenges posed to them in the Trump era. It then argues why
the bilateral relationship is likely to retain its centrality, based
on two cases: a case for convergence, and a case for
divergence. The first option articulates how joint pursuits for
peace in Afghanistan, and shifting economic alliances, render
Pak-US cooperation integral to the South Asian security order.
In the second case, differing counterterrorism positions –
despite a joint pursuit for stability – demand immediate
reconciliation and realignment of interests. These findings
establish the degree of importance Pak-US ties continue to
hold for South Asian stability, and warn that undermining the
relationship can starve the region of a viable alternative.

Keywords: US-Pak Ties, Convergence, Divergence, Geoeconomics,

Counterterrorism, Afghanistan Peace.

1
An excerpt from this research paper was published by the author in Express
Tribune, titled “Re-assessing Pakistan-US Centrality,” November 6, 2019,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2094137/6-re-assessing-pakistan-us-centrality/.
*
The author is Assistant Research Officer at the Islamabad Policy Research
Institute, Pakistan. His research focuses on counter-militancy and populism in
South Asia, sectarian dynamics and geopolitics in the Gulf.

@ Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

JoCA  Vol. 4 (1&2): 95-116.

Journal of Current Affairs 95

 Hannan R. Hussain

Introduction

S
pread over seven decades, Pakistan-United States (Pak-US) relations
enjoy historic centrality to South Asia. This became evident during the
1980s, when defence cooperation began to peak in Afghanistan.2
Additionally, both Washington and Islamabad demonstrated mutual
dependence in engaging with key powers: the formalisation of Sino-US ties
through Pakistan, and the latter’s communication to Delhi via Washington.3
However, with the distancing of Pakistan from US military designs in
Afghanistan – and a consequent hardline from the Trump administration –
experts on both ends of the spectrum have begun to question whether the
relationship is beginning to lose its deep-rooted centrality.
This paper argues that despite recent complications, joint pursuits for
peace in Afghanistan, shifting economic alliances, and differing
counterterrorism viewpoints are likely to sustain Pak-US centrality to South
Asia. It begins by establishing the historic basis for diplomatic and strategic
convergence between both countries, and the reasons underpinning post-
Trump bilateral discord. The paper also details India’s threat perception
within Pakistan’s foreign policy calculus, and how the former’s
confrontational role over the past four decades has shifted Washington’s
focus from Islamabad to New Delhi. It puts the spotlight on Islamabad’s
resistance to the hardline US approach, and reveals the motivations among
US experts to view Pakistan differently. Finally, the paper presents two cases
where bilateral cooperation between Pakistan and the US is most likely to
remain central: a case for convergence, and a case for divergence. In the
former, limited defence cooperation threatens to compound Pakistan’s
prospects of cross-border peace with Afghanistan, and endangers US
demilitarisation interests. Moreover, securitising South Asia’s emerging
economic order is also contingent upon consistent Pak-US engagement. In
the latter case, frequent distrust can easily undermine joint Pak-US
counterterrorism objectives in South Asia. Integrating divergent

2
Robert M. Hathaway, The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States
(Washington, D.C: Wilson Center, 2017), 36,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-leverage-paradox.
3
“Memorandum of Conversation: Hilaly, Kissinger, and Saunders,” US Department
of State, accessed July 10, 2020, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e13/72406.htm.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
counterterrorism priorities into an overarching strategy can create a strong
case for Pak-US centrality to South Asia.

Historical Consistencies in Pak-US Security Ties

Two security considerations dominate the history of Pak-US relations. First,

the view that Afghanistan serves as the engine of regional stability. Second,
the utility Islamabad and Washington afforded each other in reaching out to
key powers.

Afghanistan as a Regional Counterweight

Both Pakistan and the US have relied heavily on Afghanistan to contain the
influence of regional rivals. Washington’s extensive financial, training and
intelligence support to the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s, helped fuel
resistance to the Soviet occupation.4 The US viewed Soviet Union’s footprint
in Afghanistan as a ‘threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring
countries in Southwest Asia’, undermining US ascendancy in the Cold War.5
Pakistan’s decision to join the US covert operation, in exchange for economic
aid, left Afghanistan as the pillar of Pak-US strategic convergence between
late 70s and the mid-1980s.
A similar US approach to regional balance became evident in
October 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom signaled Washington’s
19-year long engagement in the Afghan war. Washington encouraged
President Hamid Karzai to demonstrate greater dependency on Afghan
warlords, and on frequent occasions, suggested that he distrust them.6 The
Bush Administration itself gave rise to these divisive warlords in

4
Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents
and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 145-146.
5
Kyle Tadman, “An American Provocation: US Foreign Policy during the Soviet-
Afghanistan War,” Western Illinois Historical Review 5 (Spring 2013): 31-65 (50),
http://www.wiu.edu/cas/history/wihr/pdfs/Tadman-
AnAmericanProvocationVol5.pdf.
6
Ronald E. Neumann, Failed Relations between Hamid Karzai and the United
States: What Can We Learn? report (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace, 2015), https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/failed-relations-
between-hamid-karzai-and-united-states-what-can-we-learn.

Journal of Current Affairs 97

 Hannan R. Hussain
Afghanistan’s domestic political scene, urging Karzai to follow suit.7 The
extent to which such internal maneuverings eased Washington’s fight against
the Taliban remains unclear. But the broadening of US interests in Kabul’s
governance framework significantly influenced the leadership’s attitude
towards its people, as well as toward key regional powers – including
Pakistan.
One result of Pakistan’s Cold War cooperation with the US was an
acceleration in its military and economic competition with India. Numerous
wars took place between the two powers, and India’s decision to proceed
with nuclear tests in 1974 naturally prioritised Pakistan’s own defence
considerations. Adding to the complications was Delhi’s tacit support for the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980. Well-documented accounts reveal
that Delhi’s stated posture of non-alignment was underpinned by a robust
national consensus, which pushed for Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.8 One
of Delhi’s core rationales was to keep Pakistan’s newfound alliance with the
US at bay. Ultimately, India and Pakistan found themselves on opposite ends
of the Cold War pendulum, reflective of a polarising South Asian security
order that demanded Pakistan’s attention.
Trends in Pakistan’s regional stability support vis-à-vis Afghanistan
are evident even today. Islamabad remains skeptic of Delhi’s developmental
assistance to Afghanistan, viewing it as a build-up to India’s cross-border
provocation.9 As a response, Islamabad has pushed for diplomatic dialogue
with Kabul, consistently affirming peaceful solutions to Afghanistan’s
internal conflicts and furthering measures for regional security.
Though Pakistan and the US have deployed two fairly different
approaches to Afghanistan, both have unequivocally relied on it to bring
regional balancing goals to fruition.

7
Neumann, Failed Relations between Hamid Karzai and the United States, 12.
8
Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram Panda, “Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi’s
Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics,” Asian Survey 23, no. 3
(March 1983): 261-279 (265), https://doi.org/10.2307/2644273.
9
Nandita Palrecha and Monish Tourangbam, “India’s Development Aid to
Afghanistan: Does Afghanistan Need What India Gives?” Diplomat, November
24, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/indias-development-aid-to-afghanistan-
does-afghanistan-need-what-india-gives/.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
Allies as Mediums of Engagement

Washington and Islamabad have also depended on one another to

reach out to key powers. The US deemed Pakistan crucial to establishing
formal diplomatic ties with China.10 During the 1970s, Washington’s deep-
seated skepticism of Beijing was overtaken by its heightening Cold War
tussle with Moscow. Beijing’s contentious relationship with the Soviets
suggested a critical addition to US containment efforts. To get through to
China, however, President Richard Nixon began improving ties with
Pakistan. By the 1970s, Islamabad emerged as Washington’s primary
medium of engagement.11 President Yahya Khan’s visit to Beijing in October
1970 was seen as an opportunity by Washington to assure Beijing of non-
interference in its internal affairs (regardless of the outcome with the
Soviets), and that US Ambassadors were ready to be sent. Zhou Enlai’s warm
reception of US intent was again relayed through Islamabad, and Pakistan
became a central pivot in constant US-Sino messaging.12 Henry Kissinger’s
landmark trip to Beijing in July 1971 – to take contentious US-Sino foreign
policy issues head-on – was a direct result of Pakistan’s close diplomatic
alignment with Beijing, and its favourable proximity to Washington.
In recent decades, the US has utilised the Pakistani channel to
approach the Afghan Taliban too.13 Washington deems the Taliban a key

10
William Burr, ed., The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s
Secret Trip to China: September 1970-July 1971, National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book no. 66 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive,
2002), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/.
11
William Burr, ed., “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting between the President
and Pakistan President Yahya,” in The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and
Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China: September 1970-July 1971, National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 66 (Washington, D.C.: National
Security Archive, 2002), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-
03.pdf.
12
William Burr, ed., “Message from Zhou Enlai to Nixon, 21 April 1971, rec’d 27
April 1971, Responding to Nixon’s 16 December 1970 Message” in The Beijing-
Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China:
September 1970-July 1971), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
no. 66 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 2002),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-17.pdf.
13
Asif Shahzad and Charlotte Greenfield, “Taliban, US Envoy in Pakistan to Review
Broken Peace Talks,” Reuters, October 2, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-pakistan/taliban-u-s-envoy-
in-pakistan-to-review-broken-peace-talks-idUSKBN1WH09A.

Journal of Current Affairs 99

 Hannan R. Hussain
stakeholder in Kabul’s security framework. Initially, the Afghan government
itself called on Pakistan to encourage direct talks with the Taliban, and help
end the decades-long conflict.14 In recent years, however, Washington has
regarded Islamabad as a ‘fallback option’ whenever the former has undergone
a spike in trust deficit with the Taliban. For example, the Trump
administration’s decision to call off US-Taliban peace talks in September
2019, was a direct result of the Taliban resuming attacks against Afghan
civilian and US officials.15 Pakistan’s consequent decision to host the Taliban
in Islamabad, proved crucial to mitigating mutual hostilities and resuming
dialogue.16 It laid the groundwork for US Special Representative on
Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad’s October visit to Kabul, a month after
President Trump cancelled talks with the Taliban and dealt the Afghan peace
process a major blow.
The Trump administration has been pushing hard for a ceasefire
agreement with the Afghan Taliban in the past three years – one that
guarantees withdrawal of US military troops if the Taliban pledge not to use
Afghanistan as a future base for militant attacks.17
The kind of tangible leverage Pakistan possesses in getting the
Taliban to adhere to the US-led peace talks has been subject to speculation.
However, Pakistan’s civilian and military leaderships have been clear on the
reasons underpinning their support for the Afghan peace process (the process
including both intra-Afghan talks and the US-Taliban negotiations). Both

14
Amina Khan, “Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan,” Strategic Studies 36, no. 1
(2016): 32-35, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2-
Amina_Khan_SS_Vol_36_No.1_2016.pdf.
15
“How Trump’s Plan to Secretly Meet with the Taliban Came Together, and Fell
Apart,” New York Times, September 8, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/world/asia/afghanistan-trump-camp-david-
taliban.html.
16
“US Envoy, Taliban Leadership Said to Meet in Pakistan for First Time since
Talks Scuttled,” Washington Post, October 4, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-envoy-taliban-leadership-meet-in-
pakistan-for-first-time-since-talks-scuttled/2019/10/04/e0359eda-e694-11e9-a331-
2df12d56a80b_story.html.
17
Pamela Constable, “Marathon Talks between Taliban and Prominent Afghans
Conclude with Positive - If Vague - Peace Road-Map,” Washington Post, July 9,
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/talks-between-taliban-insurgents-
and-prominent-afghans-cordial-but-vague/2019/07/09/79a7e820-a1e9-11e9-bd56-
eac6bb02d01d_story.html.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
leaderships cite a secure territorial border with Afghanistan as the
prerequisite to regional peace.18 Successive US governments have also
acknowledged Pakistan’s endorsement of a political solution to the 19-year
conflict.
On numerous occasions in the past, Pakistan too has approached the
US to get its messages across to New Delhi, especially on Kashmir. Notable
examples include President Kennedy’s 1962 Anglo-American mission,
former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 1999 talks with the Clinton
administration, and President Obama’s appeal to Kashmir settlements in his
2008 campaign.19 President Trump’s recurring offers to mediate on Kashmir
– although short-lived – were also the result of Pakistan’s consistent critique
of Delhi’s abrogation of Article 370 in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir
(IOJ&K).

The Indian Factor in Pak-US Relations

From the Islamabad-Washington alliance of the Cold War to present times,

New Delhi has been very skeptical of Pak-US relations. It deployed a non-
alignment posture towards Afghanistan during the Soviet resistance, and used
it as a springboard to win over Washington’s trust once the Afghan
insurgency proved costly for Pakistan’s sovereign interests.20 New Delhi
backed the controversial Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to undermine
Kabul’s political transitions, furthering the potential for cross-border
instability in Pakistan’s eyes.
By 2006, President George W. Bush decided to deny Pakistan a
nuclear deal, and instead signed the 123 Agreement between Delhi and

18
Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistan Says Starts Fencing Afghanistan Border in High-Threat
Zones,” Reuters, March 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-
afghanistan-border-idUSKBN16Y0KR.
19
Sumit Ganguly, “The United States Can’t Solve the Kashmir Dispute,” Foreign
Affairs, July 30, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-07-
30/united-states-cant-solve-kashmir-dispute; and, Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits
of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2009), 195.
20
Ravi Tomar, India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment (Canberra:
Parliament of Australia, 2002),
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamen
tary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP20.

Journal of Current Affairs 101

 Hannan R. Hussain
Washington – also known as the India-United States Civil Nuclear
Agreement.21 This effectively gave India access to ‘full civil and nuclear
cooperation’ at the cost of Washington’s bilateral relations with Pakistan. All
these dynamics were construed by Pakistan as an impediment to its larger
peace-building efforts in South Asia, and would later constitute a major share
of US criticism under President Trump.
A case in point is Pakistan’s willingness to balance India’s
asymmetrical leverage in South Asia by acquiring nuclear weapons. The
move continues to be viewed by Washington’s strategic community as
compelling proof of an arms race.22 The same thread cuts across on
counterterrorism fronts as well: President Trump criticised Islamabad for
allegedly hosting terrorist safe havens. He also asserted that Washington had
‘foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15
years.’23 All these developments were received warmly in New Delhi.
Since 2017, the Indian diaspora has also lobbied relentlessly to
declare Pakistan a terrorist state at the hands of US Congress. However, these
efforts proved unsuccessful.24 Indian intelligentsia has tried to deflect the
costs of India’s own contentious policies on Islamabad – such as the
militarisation of Kashmir. This was amply witnessed during the Pulwama
terror attack and subsequent Balakot airstrikes. Moreover, the advent of
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP leadership has helped bolster Indian
opposition to Pakistan’s anti-terror financing efforts at the Asia Pacific Group
(APG), compounding Islamabad’s prospects of implementing the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) Action Plan in its entirety.

21
Elisabeth Bumiller and Carlotta Gall, “Bush Rules Out a Nuclear Deal with
Pakistanis,” New York Times, March 5, 2006,
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/world/asia/bush-rules-out-a-nuclear-deal-
with-pakistanis.html.
22
Michael Krepon, “South Asia’s Distinctive Arms Race,” Arms Control Today 42,
no.9 (November 2012): 35-38, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012-11/south-
asia%E2%80%99s-distinctive-arms-race.
23
Saba Aziz, “Pakistan-US War of Words over Donald Trump’s Tweet,” Al Jazeera,
January 2, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/pakistan-war-words-
donald-trump-tweet-180102055709366.html.
24
“We Do Not Support Declaring Pakistan a Terrorist State: USA,” Economic
Times, July 12, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/we-do-
not-support-declaring-pakistan-a-terrorist-state-
usa/articleshow/54730147.cms?from=mdr.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia

Strained Relations under the Trump Administration

An Uncompromising Start

Shortly after the election of President Donald Trump in 2017, Pak-US

relations experienced sharp discord. This was led by Trump’s Afghanistan
and South Asia strategy in August, which erroneously declared Pakistan a
safe haven for violent groups operating in the region.25 Though previous US
administrations have resorted to similar positions, Trump’s direct attribution
of all violent cross-border activities to Pakistan quickly sparked discomfort in
Islamabad. The allegations provided zero evidence of Pakistan’s sponsorship
of cross-border militancy, as asserted by the premier. Pakistan’s National
Security Committee, comprising of top civilian and military leaders, called on
the US for ‘effective and immediate US military efforts to eliminate
sanctuaries harboring terrorists and miscreants on the Afghan soil, including
those responsible for fomenting terror in Pakistan.’26
From the US perspective, such accusations are aimed at maximising
public support for US military withdrawal from Afghanistan. To achieve this
domestic objective, it becomes favourable for Washington to routinely depict
Pakistan as a source of instability in Afghanistan, while negating key
considerations – such as the motivations and goals of India’s increasing
presence in the region. Limited emphasis on which US policy failures
triggered the 19-year Afghan war, and why successive administrations clung
to a militaristic solution to the Afghan conflict – seem to have drawn
minimum attention from President Trump. Instead, sacrifices by US military
personnel – in both blood and treasure – have featured prominently in the
President’s rhetoric to the US masses.
By consistently overlooking Pakistan’s counterterrorism support,
including the dismantling of Taliban strongholds and over 70,000 in civilian
and military casualties, the Trump administration is able to secure two key

25
“Full Transcript and Video: Trump’s Speech on Afghanistan,” New York Times,
August 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-
afghanistan.html.
26
Asad Hashim, “Pakistan in the Crosshairs of Trump’s Afghan Strategy,” Al
Jazeera, August 24, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/pakistan-
crosshairs-trump-afghan-strategy-170824052758366.html.

Journal of Current Affairs 103

 Hannan R. Hussain
interests. First, to sidestep rapprochement with Pakistan, as such a move
could easily invite discontent from key US allies in South Asia. Second, to
further delay US action against anti-Pakistan militant groups operating out of
Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, such as Jamaat ul Ahrar.27 Such a policy
would demand the US to take responsibility for its own counterterrorism
shortcomings, a position the Trump administration has been keen on
avoiding.

Economic Threats

The Trump administration’s suspension of security assistance to Pakistan

has also been a compounding factor in bilateral tensions. In 2017, the
then-US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signaled that the ‘amount of aid
and military assistance’ provided to Pakistan can be used as leverage
against it if US ‘counterterrorism objectives’ are not met.28 By 2018, the
Trump administration delivered on the threat: Washington halted USD 1.3
billion in annual aid to Pakistan. What the US failed to realise, however,
was that this annual aid to Pakistan was tied to the Coalition Support Fund
(CRF) – a reimbursement to Islamabad for its operations against militants.
Eliminating this assistance, thus, debunked Washington’s own
commitment to facilitating a war against South Asian militancy.
Additionally, what prompted this cancellation in aid was not the
pretense of Pakistan’s ‘counterterrorism failures’. In reality, increasing
domestic frustrations regarding US military blowbacks in Afghanistan,
sparked President Trump’s hardline towards Islamabad. This is evident across
numerous addresses made by the US President – from his State of the Union
Address to domestic rallies – where the suffering and homecoming of US
troops have been consistently invoked to appease supporters. ‘Time to bring
them [US troops in Afghanistan] home. We’ve done our job, we’ve defeated
everyone that we’re supposed to defeat. And now we are, we are policing, we

27
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan Sets Terms for Help in Anti-terror Fight,” Dawn,
August 25, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1353723.
28
Hathaway, The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States, 5.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
are now policing’, spoke Donald Trump during a campaign rally in
Minnesota.29
In order to present the promise of US troop withdrawal as credible
to voters (and simultaneously dress the Afghan war as a success),
Washington finds it convenient to label Pakistan as the host of anti-
Afghan militant safe havens. The immediate result: Deflecting
Washington’s military failures on Islamabad, including the empowerment
of the Afghan Taliban, and a fresh crop of anti-US fighter outfits. ‘Instead
of making Pakistan a scapegoat for their failures, the US should do a
serious assessment of why, despite 140,000 NATO troops plus 250,000
Afghan troops & reportedly $1 trillion spent on war in Afghanistan, the
Taliban today are stronger than before’, tweeted Prime Minister Imran
Khan in response to President Trump’s sharp criticism of Pakistan’s
counterterrorism performance.30
Judging by Pakistan’s defiance of US threats, it is clear that
coercion can no longer serve as an effective tool for Pak-US cooperation,
as underlined by experts on Capitol Hill. Pakistan’s rebuttal of Trump’s
threats also confirm that the suspended US aid made only a meagre
contribution to Islamabad’s counterterrorism losses. ‘Pakistan suffered
75,000 casualties in this war [the Afghan conflict] & over $123 bn was
lost to economy. US “aid” was a minuscule $20 bn’, tweeted Prime
Minister Imran Khan in November 2018.31 Therefore, Washington’s
economic threats, and Islamabad’s consequent resistance, have let the
Pak-US frictions grow unabated. Unlike previous US administrations, the
Trump leadership has made little effort to address these reservations
through diplomatic corridors, which suggests that the strain in bilateral
ties is the outcome of a conscious US policy.

29
“Donald Trump Minnesota Rally Speech Transcript: Minneapolis, MN Rally
October 10, 2019,” Rev, October 10, 2019, https://www.rev.com/blog/donald-
trump-minnesota-rally-speech-transcript-minneapolis-mn-rally-october-10-2019.
30
Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistan PM Imran Khan Lashes Out at Trump Tirade,” Reuters,
November 19, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa/pakistan-pm-
imran-khan-lashes-out-at-trump-tirade-idUSKCN1NO1J9.
31
Ibid.

Journal of Current Affairs 105

 Hannan R. Hussain
A Miscalculation of Pak-China Economic Ties

The Trump administration has made frequent attempts at questioning

Pakistan’s economic relations with China. In July 2018, US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo termed Pakistan’s pursuit for an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) bailout package as an attempt to payback Chinese lenders –
negating the country’s genuine quest for economic relief. ‘Make no mistake.
We will be watching what the IMF does,’ remarked Pompeo. ‘There’s no
rationale for IMF tax dollars, and associated with that American dollars that
are part of the IMF funding, for those to go to bail out Chinese bondholders
or China itself.’32
On the contrary, China’s multibillion dollar investment in Pakistan is
not subject to immediate pay-offs; it is contingent upon the operationalisation
of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is still in the
process of completion. Thus, any prospect of repayment would serve as a
bilateral initiative, independent of the IMF’s rules and procedures.33
Moreover, the reporting techniques and agreed-upon conditions of
IMF packages do not allow for allocated funds to be redirected to a third-
party upon will. There is evidence to prove that Pakistan never cited Chinese
payments as a formal provision in its documented negotiations with the IMF.
‘We have not had discussions with the authorities about any possible
intentions’, confirmed a senior IMF official in July 2018.34 Pompeo’s entire
assessment stood contradicted.
In light of these details, the Trump administration’s pressuring is a
deliberate push to limit Chinese investment in Pakistan. It also falsely
suggests that the US can coerce IMF into refusing Islamabad. Above all, the
diplomatic offensive takes an untimely strike at the long-standing Sino-Pak
alliance that has been underpinned by mutual trust and third-party
independence for decades. Advances of the kind from Washington have only
added to Islamabad’s skepticism of bilateral relations: ‘The US is trying to

32
“US’ Pompeo Warns against IMF Bailout for Pakistan That Aids China,” Reuters,
July 31, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-pakistan/us-pompeo-warns-
against-imf-bailout-for-pakistan-that-aids-china-idUSKBN1KK2G5.
33
“Fiscal, Monetary Policies in Line with Required Economic Reforms: Asad
Umar,” Express Tribune, December 12, 2018,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1865249/1-fiscal-monetary-policies-line-required-
economic-reforms-asad-umar/
34
“US’ Pompeo Warns against IMF Bailout for Pakistan That Aids China,” Reuters.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
spoil China’s biggest contribution to our future’, said one senior advisor from
the Pakistan government to the Financial Times.35

Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia

This section argues why Pak-US ties – despite Washington’s increasingly

assertive approach in above mentioned areas – are likely to remain integral to
South Asia. It outlines two potential cases: ‘a case for convergence’ – where
political conflicts in South Asia are of mutual interest. Second, ‘a case for
divergence’ – where differing positions on regional objectives make Pak-US
cooperation mandatory.

A Case for Convergence

Political Solution to the Afghan Conflict

By early 2018, the Afghan Taliban had solidified itself as a powerful entity in
Afghan politics, controlling 56.3 per cent of total districts.36 Growing
frictions with the Ashraf Ghani leadership, which the Taliban considers to be
a puppet government of the US, rendered Afghan citizens the primary targets
of aggression. In 2019 alone, 611 security incidents rocked the country, with
over 2,400 in civilian deaths. Ignoring the Taliban was no longer an option.37
Thus, US efforts to strike a peace deal with the insurgent group
became the pivot to a wider peace process. This settlement was contingent
upon joint Pak-US cooperation, aimed at securing Pakistan’s 2,430 kilometer
border with Afghanistan, and ending Washington’s longest military
engagement to date.
Initial headway between the US and the Taliban became evident in
an eight-point joint resolution, named the Roadmap to Peace, worked out in

35
“Pakistan Hits Back at US Resistance to IMF Bailout,” Financial Times, July 31,
2018, https://www.ft.com/content/ff3a6130-94ba-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe.
36
Alia Chughtai, “Afghanistan: Who Controls What,” Al Jazeera, June 24, 2019,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-
160823083528213.html.
37
“Afghanistan War: Tracking the Killings in August 2019,” BBC News, September
16, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49662640.

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 Hannan R. Hussain
July 2019 in Doha.38 It confirmed both parties’ commitment towards
institutionalising Afghanistan’s Islamic system, encouraging cohesive peace,
and inviting zero-interference from regional powers.
What ended up costing the peace effort its due credibility, was the
absence of direct intergovernmental communication between Washington and
Islamabad. Kabul had already expressed its skepticism of both Washington
and Islamabad. The Ashraf Ghani leadership accused the US of conspiring
against the Afghan government, while falsely that Prime Minister Imran
Khan was willfully interfering in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs.39
To deter future skepticism and distrust from Kabul, Imran Khan’s
meeting with President Trump in July 2019 served great strategic purpose.40
The encounter confirmed that ‘respecting Afghan sovereignty’ was
significant to both countries – a core value that could lead both the Taliban
and the Afghan government to be optimistic in the peace process. In fact,
both the Afghan government and the Taliban are on record acknowledging
that respect of Afghanistan’s sovereignty is paramount. Thus, a continuation
of direct intergovernmental communication between Washington and
Islamabad is important to dispel hostilities in peace efforts. It is also a
necessary step for injecting a positive, forward looking tone into a rather
rocky negotiation path with the Afghan Taliban.
Khan and Trump’s consensus on a ‘political solution’ to the Afghan
conflict paved the way for another crucial variable in the peace process:
Pakistan’s willingness to talk to the Taliban, and vice versa. Islamabad’s
intent to welcome the Taliban and help Washington achieve a trust surplus
with the insurgent group, was a contributing factor to the February 2020
Doha Agreement. More importantly, Pakistan’s invitation to host the Taliban

38
Constable, “Marathon Talks between Taliban and Prominent Afghans Conclude
with Positive — If Vague — Peace Road-Map.”
39
Margaret Brennan, “Afghan Official Accuses Top US Envoy of Undermining
Ghani Government with Colonial Intentions,” CBS News, March 14, 2019,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-us-envoy-zalmay-khalilzad-
undermining-ghani-hamdullah-mohib-says/; and Hikmat Noori, “Pakistan PM’s
Remarks on Afghan Peace Process Stir Diplomatic Row,” Al Jazeera, March 29,
2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/pakistan-pm-remarks-afghan-
peace-process-stir-diplomatic-row-190328115121755.html.
40
Roberta Rampton and Doina Chiacu, “Trump, Pakistan’s Khan Discuss Way Out
of Afghanistan War,” Reuters, July 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-pakistan/trump-pakistans-khan-discuss-way-out-of-afghanistan-war-
idUSKCN1UH1S3.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
in early 2019 was construed warmly by Taliban officials – indicative of
Islamabad’s indispensability to the US-Taliban peace success.41 Taliban’s
tendency to steer towards stakeholders other than the US – in a bid to
welcome facilitation – gives Pakistan important space to exercise its
diplomatic leverage over the Taliban, and underline the merits of a ceasefire.
If there was any doubt about Pakistan’s ability to facilitate
negotiations with the Taliban for regional peace, it was dispelled with
Islamabad’s release of Mullah Baradar in 2018 to assist the Doha talks.42
With Pakistan’s deep knowledge of Taliban’s violent tendencies and
etiquettes of engagement, the Trump administration could appear better
equipped to pursue counterterrorism assurances, troop withdrawals, intra-
Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire. Yet, the fundamental test
for both Islamabad and Washington is the extent to which their bilateral ties
can sustain newfound momentum. Some key policy differences demand
attention.
One, the US objectives to call back its troops and defer prospects of a
full-blown Afghan civil war, is set against the guarantee that no terrorist
operations would be launched from within Afghanistan. However, what the
US misses out in its peace efforts is that the Taliban is under no pressure to
comply with the pact. There also seems to be little to compel the insurgent
group into relinquishing its pursuit for greater political control in
Afghanistan. In fact, Taliban’s reluctance to give up political control is
evidenced by in its absolute dismissal of the Afghan government, declaring
direct talks a red line.43
Only when the Afghan government and the Taliban co-exist, can the
US post-withdrawal guarantees begin to take their due course. Little suggests
that the US is trying to achieve this very objective by doubling down on the
Taliban’s domestic power tussle.44 Instead, half-hearted and largely unilateral

41
“Afghan Taliban Say Will Visit Pakistan if Formally Invited: BBC Report,”
Dawn, July 25, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1496153.
42
“Afghan Taliban Founder Mullah Baradar ‘Released’ by Pakistan,” Al Jazeera,
October 25, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/afghan-taliban-
founder-mullah-baradar-released-pakistan-181025093128441.html.
43
Jibran Ahmad, “Taliban Dismiss Afghanistan’s Peace Talks Offer,” Reuters,
December 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-
taliban/taliban-dismiss-afghanistans-peace-talks-offer-idUSKCN1OT051.
44
Anatol Lieven, “It’s Time to Trust the Taliban,” Foreign Policy, January 31, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/its-time-to-trust-the-taliban/.

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 Hannan R. Hussain
US strategies directly compound Pakistan’s desire to have a safe and secure
neighbourhood in the aftermath of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In late 2019, President Trump’s decision to call off talks with the
Afghan Taliban at Camp David marked a grave misfortune for both Pakistan
and Afghanistan. ‘If they cannot agree to a ceasefire during these very
important peace talks, and would even kill 12 innocent people, then they
probably don’t have the power to negotiate a meaningful agreement anyway,’
tweeted the President.45
Such a move could easily fuel the Taliban’s push for an ‘Islamic
Emirate’ in Kabul. The group’s long history of resisting the Afghan state is
empowered with such diplomatic slowdown from Washington, especially
when President Trump’s disengagement cites the ‘loss of US lives’ – instead
of the thousands of Afghan casualties at the centre of the conflict.46
Hence, overcoming the Taliban’s deep-seated belligerence requires
the Trump administration to refrain from taking unilateral action in the peace
process. Such action could easily disregard Washington’s concern for
Islamabad’s interests in the Afghan situation, which includes keeping the
Taliban exchange unharmed, and shielding South Asia from a violent Taliban
resurgence. Research on minority ethnic groups in South Asia – as well as
around the world – shows that the more a region is politically excluded, the
larger its potential for insurgent violence.47 The Pakistan-Afghanistan region
is no exception.
Prime Minister Imran Khan has repeatedly warned that the absence
of a peacefully settled political solution in Afghanistan could render the war
indefinite. Pakistan’s efforts to bring the Taliban back on the negotiating
table multiple times in the past four years, counters unilateral action in
Afghanistan, and serves as a testament to complete cooperation with the US.

45
Michael Safi, “Taliban Warns of More US Dead after Trump Says He Cancelled
Peace Talks,” Guardian, September 8, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/sep/08/donald-trump-says-he-was-due-to-host-taliban-at-camp-david.
46
“Getting the Afghanistan Peace Process Back on Track,” International Crisis
Group, October 2, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-
asia/afghanistan/b159-getting-afghanistan-peace-process-back-track.
47
Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups
Rebel? New Data and Analysis,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (January 2010): 87-119,
doi:10.1017/S0043887109990219.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
It is in Washington’s interests to reciprocate this approach through state-to-
state deliberations with Islamabad.

A Shifting Economic Trajectory

Both Pakistan and the US have chosen to bolster economic partnerships with
powers of their choosing. The Trump and Modi administrations have been at
the centre of a robust Indo-US economic alliance, with bilateral trade
crossing USD 142 billion in 2018, steering towards the USD 500 billion
mark.48 India has also emerged as one of the largest markets for US arms and
defence equipment in the world.49
Pakistan, on the other hand, has resisted its historic reliance on US
aid, and chose to immerse in a multi-billion dollar economic partnership with
iron-ally China. The bulk of the cooperation centres on USD 62 billion for
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Its potential to generate
returns post-operations is deemed inevitable by both Chinese and Pakistani
officials. Moreover, trends in increased Sino-Pak bilateral trade – including a
USD 5 billion pledge from over 50 Chinese companies in Pakistan – dwarf
any level of financial assistance ever provided by the US.50 Pakistan’s tilt
towards China is also devoid of stringent conditions and counterterrorism
allegations, such as those communicated by Washington.
In light of Islamabad and Washington’s shifting economic
trajectories in South Asia, it is absolutely central for both countries to
demonstrate favourable recognition of each other’s independent pursuits.
Consider the Trump administration’s hardline approach to the CPEC
initiative. It is headlined by baseless accusations that Pakistani authorities are
bound to redirect IMF funds towards the Chinese. Such posturing is likely to

48
Kashish Parpiani, “India-US Relations under Trump: Guarding against
Transactionalism by Pivoting to the US Legislature” (brief no. 262, Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2018), 3,
https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-us-relations-under-trump-guarding-
against-transactionalism-by-pivoting-to-the-us-legislature-45058/.
49
“India’s Arms Imports from US up by 550%: Report,” Hindu, March 13, 2018,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-arms-imports-from-us-up-by-550-
report/article23166097.ece.
50
“Chinese Companies Pledge to Invest $5bn in Pakistan,” Daily Times, July 13,
2019, https://dailytimes.com.pk/429278/chinese-companies-pledge-to-invest-5bn-
in-pakistan/.

Journal of Current Affairs 111

 Hannan R. Hussain
toughen reciprocity from Pakistan whenever US seeks defence cooperation in
South Asia. Instead, it is in America’s interests to understand the factors that
underpin the Sino-Pakistan economic alliance. Deliberations here can also
limit US opposition to Pakistan’s future engagements with Beijing.
China’s thorough consideration of Pakistan’s economic well-being
became amply evident during its support for Islamabad’s terror regulation
case before the FATF.51 Crucial bilateral loans to offset stringent IMF
conditions also helped cultivate Beijing’s favourable image in Islamabad. As
one Washington-based expert notes: ‘The problem for America is this:
Pakistan can afford to walk away. A few hundred million dollars isn’t much
of a stick anymore.’ ‘The China-Pakistan relationship is now worth $110
[billion], with around $4 [billion] expected this year. And those billions come
easy. For $900 [million, her estimate of current US aid levels to Pakistan],
Pakistan endures a volatile, loveless affair with the US while China offers
billions without drama.’52
Thus, it is in the Trump administration’s best interests to view the
Pakistan-China convergence less as an impediment, and more as an outcome
of Pakistan’s independent economic choices - one which should invite
acknowledgement and respect, if future Pak-US cooperation is to be
prioritised in South Asia.
In terms of the Indo-US strategic partnership, Washington must take
note of the merits of Pakistan’s reservations towards a wider Indian role in
South Asia. Part of the ‘arms race’ driving US concerns in the region is tied
to India’s increasing access to defence and missile sales – a provision
sanctioned by Washington.53 Moreover, since August 2017, President
Trump’s decision to give India a broader role in South Asia – underlined by
developmental assistance to Afghanistan – puts the region in a troubling state
of affairs.54 The US wants to engage Pakistan in the easing of the US-Taliban
deadlock, but seems to be giving Delhi the open hand in Kabul through

51
“China Denounces FATF Members for Pursuing Political Agenda against
Pakistan,” Express Tribune, October 29, 2019,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2089153/3-china-denounces-fatf-members-pursuing-
political-agenda-pakistan/.
52
Hathaway, The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States, 147.
53
Dinshaw Mistry, “US Arms Sales to India,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, July 8, 2014,
https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb271.pdf?file=1&type=node
&id=34644.
54
“Full Transcript and Video: Trump’s Speech on Afghanistan,” New York Times.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
sizeable infrastructure and developmental investments. It is Pakistan, not
India, that has shouldered the weight of most of the diplomatic lobbying,
peace-seeking, and facilitation with the Taliban at the behest of the US. It is
against this backdrop that the objectives underpinning India’s stronger
economic footprint in Afghanistan, demand clarity from Washington. In the
absence of sufficient scrutiny, Pakistan’s skepticism of the US foreign policy
objectives in Afghanistan is well-founded. Moreover, only when Islamabad’s
economic ties with China are appreciated in the same light as the Indo-US
economic partnership, a culture of peace and mutual respect can compliment
future Pak-US cooperation in South Asia.

A Case for Divergence

Differing Counterterrorism Positions

Divergent counterterrorism positions, including selective US operations

against anti-Pakistan outfits operating out of Afghanistan, make bilateral
cooperation evermore pivotal.55 The Trump administration made it clear that
it wishes to eliminate all present and future anti-US militant outfits within
South Asia. However, Washington shows no signs of accelerating
crackdowns against Afghan-based Islamist groups that continue to target
military and civilian facilities in Pakistan.56 US willingness to falsely attribute
major militant attacks in Afghanistan to Pakistan – without ramping up
intelligence-based counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan’s East – marks
a major discord in Pak-US priorities for peace. In an important testimony
before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former United States
Institute of Peace affiliate and Pakistan expert Moeed Yusuf outlined the
merits of Pak-US cooperation:

Much of the present strategic divergence of interest between

the two sides is Afghanistan‐specific. Should Pakistan and
the US manage to work together and find a mutually

55
“Pakistan ‘Disappointed’ at Annual US Terrorism Report,” Newsweek, November
5, 2019, https://www.newsweekpakistan.com/pakistan-disappointed-at-annual-u-s-
terrorism-report/.
56
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan Sets Terms for Help in Anti-terror Fight,” Dawn,
August 25, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1353723.

Journal of Current Affairs 113

 Hannan R. Hussain
acceptable negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, a sustained
relationship beyond that would by definition be for
Pakistan’s sake alone. The basis for Pakistani perceptions
about fickleness of the US partnership, transactional nature
of the relationship, and even anti‐American sentiment would
have disappeared. 57

The underlying sentiment in Capitol Hill is that no degree of

Pakistani cooperation, even in the form of the Taliban-US peace process
facilitation, would prove adequate. This does not change the fact that
Pakistan sacrificed over 70,000 lives in a war built purely on the back of US
military designs in Afghanistan. One reason why successive Pakistani
governments have struggled to engage the Pakistani diaspora in the US, and
cultivate a favourable national image to encourage cooperation, is because of
Washington’s prioritisation of the India-US strategic partnership.58 Consider
the fact that under President Trump, both New Delhi and Washington agreed
that the ‘containment of China’ – Pakistan’s iron-ally – is a long-standing
objective.59 Delivering on this objective demands that Washington distances
itself from Islamabad. This is established by the broad-based criticism of
former US diplomat for South Asia, Alice Wells, of Islamabad’s economic
and geostrategic pivot towards Beijing.60This criticism has enabled prominent

57
Moeed W. Yusuf, Assessing US Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan: Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (United States Institute of Peace,
2011), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yusuf Testimony.pdf.
58
Ashley J. Tellis, Bharath Gopalaswamy, James Cunningham, David Petraeus,
Husain Haqqani, Manish Tewari, and Anita McBride, Review of President
Trump’s South Asia Strategy: The Way Ahead, One Year In, report (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/12/11/review-of-president-trump-s-south-
asia-strategy-way-ahead-one-year-in-pub-77939.
59
Arif Rafiq, “America is Making a Bad Bet on India,” National Interest, February
2, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-making-bad-bet-india-
119316?page=0%2C1.
60
Hannan R Hussain, “Why US Criticism of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Will Fall on Deaf Ears,” South China Morning Post, December 15, 2019,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3042057/why-us-criticism-china-
pakistan-economic-corridor-will-fall-
deaf?fbclid=IwAR38KWOTtgUPngA1wJwMSHUXFa0rE1hbrj1dYMx56N3uagi1
JtyT25LZweY.

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 Re-examining the Centrality of Pak-US Ties to South Asia
advocates of an Indo-US strategic partnership to make their case for closer
ties, at the expense of isolating Pakistan.61
The result is that neither the US nor the current Afghan government
(favourable to New Delhi) is optimally content with Pakistan’s policies,
among which lie border security, counter-insurgency measures, and
engagement with the Taliban. Thus, Pakistan’s role, at least in Afghanistan,
should be viewed as one of stability by the US. It is also in Washington’s
larger interests to make greater strides to unearth the actual sources of cross-
border dangers affecting both countries.

Conclusion

Though Islamabad has distanced itself from Washington’s containment

policies in Afghanistan, the region remains central to both countries for
achieving lasting peace with the Taliban. Kabul is yet to see a scenario where
the absence of diplomatic initiative from Pakistan or the US has furthered the
Taliban towards a potential ceasefire. Precisely for this interdependence, any
chance of stability in Afghanistan would demand consistent Pak-US
cooperation.
On the economic front, Pakistan’s strong engagement with China has
been viewed by the Trump administration with great skepticism. Baseless
accusations of Pakistan misdirecting IMF funds to China, for instance, are
likely to toughen reciprocity from Islamabad on any present or future
geopolitical challenges faced by Washington in South Asia. Thus, favourable
recognition of each other’s shifting economic alliances in the region remains
a central consideration for future Pak-US engagement.
Lastly, a major source of trust deficit between both countries is a
difference in counterterrorism priorities. This was headlined on numerous
occasions by the Trump administration, as well as by previous US
leaderships. But the fact that both nations are inherently geared towards
fighting South Asian militancy, makes reconciliation of differing
counterterrorism priorities another central consideration for regional peace.

61
“A Conversation with Ambassador Alice Wells on the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor,” Wilson Center, November 21, 2019,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/conversation-ambassador-alice-wells-the-
economic-corridor.

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 Hannan R. Hussain
In light of these three rationales, Pak-US ties are likely to withstand
policy divergences under the Trump administration, and maintain their
centrality to South Asia. Islamabad and Washington have also chosen not to
invoke any other regional alternative to the Pak-US partnership. This
confirms that all of their shared pursuits in South Asia will suffer in the
absence of sustained bilateral cooperation.

116 Vol. 4, Nos. 1 & 2