JSSA Vol II, No.

2 Shams uz Zaman

Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

Shams uz Zaman*

Abstract

Pakistan and the US have enjoyed an uneven rela onship

since the crea on of Pakistan. While Pakistan did benefit
from the US assistance to modernize its military and
defence capabili es, the percep ons are varied due to
diverging interests. Looking through an idealis c prism,
Pakistan's hopes were dampened on numerous occasions
due to the US policy which is primarily conceived through
realist perspec ve. Of late there is a realiza on that other
regional and extra‐regional players are also significant
and there is a need to establish durable rela ons with
other regional states and powers like, for example,
Russia, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian Republics as well.
Con nua on of such policies would require foresight,
realizing the role and objec ves of states seeking regional
hegemony and iden fying the limits of coopera on with
the US, which was ignored in the past.

Key Words: US Asia Pivot policy, South East Asian Treaty Organiza on,
Central Treaty Organiza on, NSG, Gwadar, Afghanistan, Asia‐Pacific.
Introduc on
Since its incep on, Pakistan has been confronted with a persistent
security dilemma of a hos le neighborhood. Indian hos lity on its
Eastern front and an unstable and unfriendly Afghanistan towards the
West shaped Pakistan's security paradigm in which the military's role
always remained significant. Pakistan's ideological and bureaucra c
preferences, coupled with the sense of insecurity, obliged it to choose
the United States (US) over a communist Soviet Union as a strategic
balancer against India amid an intensifying Cold War.

*The writer is an independent researcher holding M.Phil degree from National

Defence University Islamabad, in Strategic and Nuclear Studies.

40
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

Thus Pakistan always perceived the US as its protector against regional

threats, especially India. This Pakistani viewpoint was however not
completely shared by Washington, which always regarded India as a
valuable regional partner. Consequently, despite Indian inclina on
towards the Soviet Union, the US s ll regarded an Indian role vital in
containing the spread of Communism.¹ The simplis c asser on of
Pakistani leaders,² namely, considering US as “protector and friend”,
emanated due to a complex structure of global poli cs where “interests”
transcends “friendships”³ and inter‐state rela onships are sought to
safeguard na onal interest through astute use of statecra , diplomacy
and poli cs.

The Pak‐US rela onship has mostly suffered from this agonizing
reality leading to frequent disappointments and hiccups. The US has
mostly u lized its fiscal leverage to promote its strategic interests in the
region some mes at the cost of Pakistan's na onal interests. The
financial aid was rarely u lized efficiently due to governance issues and
corrup on, which consequently has done li le to redress widespread
an ‐American sen ments among the masses. Furthermore, due to
changing US global priori es, Pakistan became less significant vis‐à‐vis
India, thus encouraging India to perceive its role of a regional hegemon
perpetua ng instability. It therefore becomes impera ve to evaluate
converging and diverging issues between the US and Pakistan to project
the future course of Pak‐US rela ons.
The Strategic Context
Pakistan has mostly viewed its rela onship with the US through an
idealis c prism. Considering US as a mentor and protector against
threats emana ng across the eastern border from a much potent

1
Mehrunnisa Ali, ed. Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998 (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 8-9.
2
The classical example in this regards comes from the memoir of Ayub Khan, Friends
not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), in which the author narrates a
bleated account of his grievances that the basis of Pak-US relations should have
mutual friendship rather than pivoting around master-subordinate equation.
3
Jack Donnelly et al, Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), 30-32.

41
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

adversary were misplaced and exaggerated. On the contrary, the US,

dominated by the realist approach, always used Pakistan as an
instrument, which could always be abandoned later, sui ng its strategic
interests in the region. Due to Pakistan's historical es with China,
Pakistan has li le u lity for the US policy of containing China's military
and economic rise. India, which is aspiring for a defining role in global
poli cs and for its compe ve rela onship with China, thus becomes
valuable to serve as a fulcrum in US Asia Pivot policy. However, this
change in US priori es s ll does not make Pakistan redundant in the
regional context due to its geo‐strategic loca on and status of a nuclear
power.
Brief Appraisal of Pak‐US Rela ons
Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, was the first Pakistani
leader to set the course of Pak‐US rela ons. He ini ally contacted USSR
for a visit but subsequently travelled to Washington rather than to
Moscow in May 1950 on his first formal foreign visit.⁴ Ideological and
bureaucra c preferences may have altered his decision regarding the
visit.⁵ During the ini al years of independence, Indian hos lity coupled
with the Kashmir issue shaped the foreign policy choices of Pakistani
decision makers. In a bid to secure protec ve US shield against India,
Pakistan subsequently joined the US led alliances against Communism,
namely South Asian Treaty Organiza on (SEATO) and Central Treaty
Organiza on (CENTO) in 1954 and 1955 respec vely.

Pakistan sought these alliances as a defensive shield against a more

powerful and larger adversary, India, but contrary to this percep on,
Washington never made any such commitment despite India's visible
inclina on towards Moscow. Soviet overt support to India was visibly
stronger than the US support to Pakistan over conten ous issues like
Kashmir. As a sequel to this, USSR accepted the disputed region of
Kashmir as an integral part of India, and also vetoed numerous

4
Shahid Amin, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 41-43.
5
Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, “Security Game: SEATO and
CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan”,
Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Vol.49, No.1, Summer 2011, 113.

42
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

resolu ons presented in Security Council on the status of Kashmir.⁶

Although, Pak‐US defence es helped Pakistan to strengthen its defence
against India, but the US support to Pakistan at cri cal junctures and on
cri cal poli cal issues mostly remained non‐existent, be these the wars
of 1965 and 1971. In contrast, Pakistan always went out of its way to
serve the US interests in the region, even some mes risking direct
confronta on with global powers. The U‐2 spy plane incident in 1960 is
just a case in point which almost brought Pakistan and Soviet Union to
the verge of an armed conflict.
The misleading no on of US defending Pakistan probably
strengthened in the a ermath of the 1962 Sino‐Indian border dispute
during which the US openly sided with India against communist China.
Pakistani policy makers had an cipated the same level of US support for
Pakistan against India, which was never the case. Although India had
proclaimed a “Non‐aligned” status, it remained visibly pro‐communist in
its orienta on. Nevertheless, all these hopes were dampened a er the
Indo‐Pak war of 1965 when the US imposed sanc ons on Pakistan.
Subsequently, in 1971, the Soviets openly sided with India but the US
support for Pakistan was completely non‐existent, which resulted in the
dismemberment of Pakistan's eastern wing and the crea on of
Bangladesh.⁷ But even a er 1971, Pakistani leaders con nued to rely on
the US thus serving its interests in the region. This was illustrated by
Pakistani media on between the US and China to facilitate President
Nixon's surprise visit to Beijing in 1972.⁸ Nothing tangible could be
achieved by Pakistan in lieu of this diploma c favor. Realizing the fu lity
of SEATO, Pakistan finally withdrew from it in 1973. The Pak‐US rocky

6
Safdar Sial, “Pak-US A Balance Sheet of Relations”, Pakistan Institute for Peace
Studies, Report, June 26, 2007, 3.
7
Zubeida Mustafa, “The USSR and the Indo-Pakistan War, 1971”, in Readings in
Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998, ed. Mehrunnisa Ali (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 23-25.
8
University of Southern California US-China Institute, “Getting to Beijing: Henry
Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip”, July 21, 2007,
http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2483&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupp
ort=1, accessed on September 10, 2014.

43
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

rela onship was further strained in 1977 when the US used its influence
on France to cancel the shipment of a nuclear reprocessing plant to
Pakistan, fearing that Pakistan could use this plant to manufacture
nuclear weapons in response to the Indian 'not so' peaceful nuclear
explosion of 1974. A er the Iranian revolu on of 1979, Pakistan also le
the CENTO considering it redundant. The rela onship further
deteriorated a er the US imposed sanc ons against Pakistan in 1979
over suspected nuclear ac vi es.⁹
However, in the early 1980's a er the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the US reviewed its policy in the region, selec ng Pakistan
as a strategic ally against growing Soviet influence.¹⁰ This informal
alliance lasted ll the Soviet disintegra on and, in 1990; the US
lawmakers again imposed sanc ons against Pakistan, which were
par ally relaxed to allow import of essen al military hardware in 1995.
A er the nucleariza on of South Asia in 1998, the US imposed across the
board sanc ons against Pakistan, and even India, thus termina ng all
sorts of military and civil coopera on.

The fateful event of 9/11 changed the Pak‐US equa on, and
Pakistan once again became a frontline state in the US' war against
terrorism. However, the US always remained skep cal of Pakistan's
inten ons accusing it of playing a double game and demanding to 'do
more'. Pakistan, on the other hand, also viewed the US inten ons with
suspicion and distrust.¹¹ The lowest ebb in Pak‐US rela ons was
witnessed a er the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbo abad
and the deliberate US aerial strike on Salala check post killing tens of
soldiers. Although the situa on has gradually improved over the last few
9
National Security Archives - The George Washington University, “The United States
and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb”, National Security Achieve Electronic Briefing
Book No. 333, posted December 21, 2012,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm. See also: M. Raziullah
Azmi, “Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal”, in Readings in Pakistan
Foreign Policy 1971-1998, ed. Mehrunnisa Ali (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2007), 231.
10
Ibid, 232-234.
11
Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan – US Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of
Trust and its Deficit”, Pakistan Vision, Vol.12, No.1, 2011, 24-26, 57-59.

44
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

years, Pak‐US rela ons s ll face an unpredictable future. This is due to

changing US priori es in the region with the US trying to project India as
a hegemon in the region. The off‐shore rebalancing posture of the US in
the shape of Asia Pivot Policy and its unqualified support/efforts to grant
India the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership, projects India as a
more suitable partner in comparison to Pakistan. This poses formidable
challenges for Pakistan to maintain a regional balance in South Asia.¹²
Pakistan's Geo‐Poli cal Impera ves
The strategic importance of Pakistan has always kept it at the centre
stage of global poli cs. Due to its ideological visage and geographical
significance, the following factors make Pakistan a strategically
important player for the global powers:

Geographical Proximity: Pakistan's close proximity to the Middle

East, Central Asia, South East Asia, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf
makes it strategically a very important state in the region at mes
making it indispensable for the regional and world powers. This was
clearly evident during the Cold War and, more recently, in the case of
Yemen's civil war in which Saudis and Iranians both were seeking
Pakistani support. All of Pakistan's neighbouring states, namely
China, Afghanistan and India, have remained cri cal for the polar
powers. This geo‐strategic significance of Pakistan holds some
unique geo‐poli cal dilemmas and opportuni es at the same me
which are:
Role in Containment of Soviet Union during the Cold War. The US
considered Pakistan an extremely important asset against the
USSR during the Cold War.¹³ Pakistan provided the US with bases to
conduct surveillance and intelligence opera ons against Soviet
targets which resulted in deteriora on of Pak‐Soviet rela ons. The
support to militant groups par cipa ng in the Afghan war (with

12
Khurram Abbas, “Asia Pacific: Relevance of Pakistan – A Guest Lecture by Dr.
Muhammad Khan”, IPRI, September 10, 2014, http://www.ipripak.org/asia-pacific-
relevance-of-pakistan/#sthash.42dmLXGv.dpbs, accessed July 10, 2015.
13
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
2004), 41.

45
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

support from CIA) gradually transformed the complete social

fabric of Pakistani society. The Cold War alliance enabled Pakistan
to strengthen and modernize its military alongside running a
clandes ne nuclear weapons program in response to Indian
aggressive designs.
Shortest Route to Central Asian Energy Resources. Pakistan
provides the shortest and easiest route for China and Central Asian
Republics (CARs) to trade through Gwadar.¹⁴ This route passing
through Afghanistan is approximately 2600 kilometers long
whereas the Iranian and Turkish routes are much longer with
distances of 4500 and 5000 kilometers respec vely. Pakistan's
loca on in the middle of regional economic giants, namely India
and China,¹⁵ thus holds immense prospects of becoming a 'Trade
and Economic Corridor' by developing itself into a transitory zone
and subsequently associa ng itself with other economic and
financial organiza ons like CARs, SCO (Shanghai Coopera on
Organiza on), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and RIC
(Russia, India and China) etc.
A Gateway to the Persian Gulf. Pakistan's Gwadar port dominates
the narrow opening of the Persian Gulf which is the world's busiest
oil supplying corridor and has since become a concern for the
Indian regional ambi ons.¹⁶ Amid the US policy of re‐posturing in
Asia Pacific, Gwadar Port is being seen by China as an important
strategic loca on alongside other ports in South East Asia.¹⁷ This

14
Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Prospects for Pakistan becoming a Trade and Energy Corridor
for China”, Strategic Studies, Vol.XXVII, No.2, Summer 2007.
15
Shahid Javed Burki, “China-India economic détente”, Dawn.com, undated,
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/154828, accessed on September 21, 2014.
16
Daily Times, “Gwadar Port has strategic implications for India: Indian Naval
Chief”, January 23, 2008,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C01%5C23%5Cstory_23-1-
2008_pg7_53.
17
The Express Tribune, “China confirms takeover of Gwadar port: Report”, September
4, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/ story/431304/china-confirms-takeover-of-gwadar-
port-report/.

46
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

will enable China to significantly improve its strategic posture vis‐à‐

vis US in the region, with what the US describes as China's new
'String of Pearls' strategy.¹⁸ However Chinese officials have
categorically stated that their policy is peaceful and aimed at
economic integra on.¹⁹ Pakistan, in future conflicts, can use also
Gwadar port to block Indian supply of oil from Persian Gulf in
response to an Indian a empt of naval blockade.
Important Player in South Asia. Pakistan is an important player and
a major state in South Asia which at mes is also included in the
Greater Middle East region.²⁰ The key to prosperity in South Asia
largely depends on Indo‐Pak mutually shared rela ons due to their
size and popula on. Unfortunately, so far the lukewarm rela ons
between the two big nuclear rivals have hampered any prospects
of regional coopera on and economic integra on. The Indo‐Pak
equa on is likely to remain fragile in future due to unresolved
disputes, especially Kashmir.
Human Resource Poten als. Pakistan is the second most populous
country in South Asia a er India and fourth on the Asian con nent
with immense human resource poten al.²¹ Although the current
trajectory of popula on growth in Pakistan is cited as a major
impediment to development and economic growth, primarily this
economic stagna on should be blamed on governance issues and
failure to effec vely u lize this resource poten al by successive
governments rather than a ributed to popula on alone.²² This
18
Shannon Tiezzi, “The Maritime Silk Road Vs. The String of Pearls”, The Diplomat,
February 13, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-maritime-silk-road-vs-the-
string-of-pearls/.
19
Beijing Review, “Hu: China Would Never Seek Hegemony”, April 23, 2009,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2009-04/23/content_192517.htm.
20
Mohsin Raza Malik, “Battleground Greater Middle East”, The Nation, November
25, 2015, http://nation.com.pk/columns/25-Nov-2015/battleground-greater-middle-
east.
21
Business Recorder, “Australian HC highlights Pakistan's human resource potential”,
July 20, 2012, http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/1219044. See also: Daily
Times, “Human resource real driver of Pakistan's growth”, January 23, 2012,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012%5C01%5C23%5Cstory_23-1-
2012_pg11_2.
22
Dr. Sania Chaudhry, “Capping our human potential”, The Nation, April 6, 2012, p. 6.

47
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

unexplored human resource poten al is an asset rather than a

liability and adds to its importance in the region and beyond.
Nuclear Flash Point. Pakistan is located in the extremely dense
nuclearized region of the world. Russia, China and India along with
Pakistan are nuclear powers, most sharing borders with each other.
Nuclear weapons capability qualifies Pakistan to be an extremely
important state in the region, but unresolved disputes with India
since 1947 have added to the regional complexi es, thus
projec ng the region as a nuclear flashpoint.²³ Consequently, the
region con nues to live under the fear of nuclear war between
India and Pakistan.
Afghan Neighborhood: The Graveyard of Empires. Afghanistan is
historically known as “the graveyard of empires”.²⁴ In the 19th
century, Britain and Russia engaged in the 'Great Game,' thus
venturing to establish their hegemony over Asian Rim land, but
failed to control Afghanistan.²⁵ Bri sh Empire suffered a decline
therea er. Soviet disintegra on is also a ributed to its adventure
in Afghanistan. Currently, the US is figh ng its longest war of US
history in Afghanistan. A er 9/11, the US, supported by NATO,
invaded Afghanistan and made it the nucleus of the war against
terrorism. But, the spillover of this war has affected the en re
Middle East, and the situa on in Afghanistan s ll remains in peril. It
is uncertain whether the US would face a similar fate as that of
Britain and Soviet Union in Afghanistan or otherwise,²⁶ but due to

23
Michael Scheuer, “Coming Nuclear Flashpoint”, The Diplomat, August 30, 2010,
http://thediplomat.com/2010/08/30/the-coming-nuclear-flashpoint/.
24
Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.80,
No.6, November/December 2001,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-
of-empires.
25
David Piper, “The 'Great Game' of influence in Afghanistan continues but with
different players”, Foxnews.com, June 9, 2012,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/09/great-game-influence-in-afghanistan-
continues-but-with-different-players/.
26
Michiko Kakutani, “The Choices that Closed a Window into Afghanistan”, The New
York Times, July 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/books/14kaku.html?_r=0.

48
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

geographical proximity Pakistan has again become a cri cal factor

in finding a meaningful and durable solu on for Afghanistan's
stability as and when US withdraws from Afghanistan.²⁷ In
Pakistan's percep on a stable and friendly Afghanistan would add
to its strategic depth which many scholars erroneously confuse
with the idea of territorial depth.²⁸
Ideological Significance. Pakistan is a leading Islamic na on with a
nuclear weapon capability and a large popula on. Its once influen al
image as a prospering state in the Islamic world has significantly been
tarnished due to internal problems like governance issues,
corrup on, nepo sm, sectarianism, terrorism, lack of jus ce and
rising debt. Despite these factors, Pakistan s ll maintains its stature
of an influen al state within the states of the Islamic community. This
ideological base was used as a catalyst by the US to make Pakistan a
frontline state against the Soviet march towards warm waters
through arming militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Failure
of subsequent Pakistani governments to assimilate these militant
groups back into the folds of mainstream society adversely affected
Pakistan's security paradigm. A er the fateful event of September
11, 2001,²⁹ and the historic U‐turn by Pakistani government over
Afghan policy amid the US pressure, these militant groups refused to
disarm. But despite these challenges Pakistan s ll enjoys strong
influence within the Muslim world.
Nuclear Weapons Capability. In 1998 responding to Indian nuclear
tests, Pakistan joined the elite club of Nuclear Weapon States by
overtly demonstra ng its own nuclear capability. However, these
tests only helped Pakistan and India to become defacto and not

27
Javed Hamim Kakar, “NATO wants Pakistan to facilitate Afghan stability”, Pajhwok
Afghan News, May 21, 2012, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/05/21/nato-wants-
pakistan-facilitate-afghan-stability.
28
Shams uz Zaman, “Prospects of a Nuclear Armed Iran and Policy Options for
Pakistan“, IPRI Journal, Vol. XII, No.1, winter 2012, 85-86.
29
Tom Doran, “Sympathy for the Devil”, The Huffington Post, August 27, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ tom-doran/sympathy-for-the-
devil_2_b_1831223.html.

49
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

dejure nuclear weapon states.³⁰ Pakistan is the only Islamic country

to possess nuclear weapons capability, discriminately termed as
“The Islamic Bomb”, in the west while downplaying the Indian
nuclear capability.³¹ This preferen al treatment is now posing a
serious threat to regional stability especially a er signing of the Indo‐
US nuclear deal.
Pakistan and US Strategic Goals in the Region
The founda ons of Pak‐US rela onship were mostly laid on an imperfect
premise that Pakistan and US' interests converge on all ma ers in the
region and as such a perpetual rela onship should be a natural
outcome.³² Certainly on many issues Pakistani and the US' interests
converge but, due to changing US' priori es in the region numerous
conten ous and divergent issues have surfaced which now persistently
dominate the bilateral discourse between these two states. The strategic
priori es of Pakistan and the US can separately be enumerated as
follows:

US Strategic Objec ves in the Region

Defea ng Islamic Militancy. Since 9/11, the primary US objec ve
had been to defeat the Islamic militant groups, with whom it
previously had enjoyed a rhapsodic alliance in the fight against
Communism. The US perceives militant and poli cal Islam, like
Communism, a threat to the Western capitalist system and
therefore must be contained and defeated.³³ Muslim militant
30
Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the
Non-NPT States in the Non-proliferation Regime”, Arms Control Today, Vol.33,
December 2003, pp. 15-17.
31
Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books,
1981).
32
The Express Tribune, “US interests converge with Pakistan's: Marc Grossman”, May
19, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/171954/us-interests-converge-with-pakistans-
marc-grossman/. See also: Sohail Mahmood, “The Crisis in Pakistan-US Relations”,
Spearhead Research, July 13, 2012,
http://spearheadresearch.org/SR_CMS/index.php/internationalaffairssecuirty/the-
crisis-in-pakistan-us-relations.
33
John L. Esposito, “It's the Policy Stupid: Political Islam and the US Foreign Policy”,
Georgetown University - Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding, undated, http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/135400.html.

50
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

groups ini ally were only opposed to US imperialis c policies

aimed at securing the vital energy resources of the Middle East.
Tyrannical and autocra c rulers, who mostly enjoyed western
support,³⁴ used harsh techniques against the dissident groups and
dissa sfied youth, thus pushing them towards radicalism which
enormously contributed in terrorism acquiring global dimensions.
These groups have now mutated into a structure carrying vicious
hate for western values and an extremely intolerant view for
anyone who disagrees with their ideology. They have gradually
transformed into ideologues, like ISIS, envisioning a global
caliphate premised on a puritanical and narrow interpreta on of
Islam. Defea ng terrorism and violent forms of poli cal Islam
currently remains one of the top priori es of the US in the en re
region.
Ending Wars in Greater Middle Eastern Region. A er figh ng the
longest war in its history, the US is now suffering from an imperial
fa gue. This fa gue is reflected from its waning influence and
reluctance to deploy ground troops in large numbers in Syria.
Although the US has ly announced an end to combat opera ons in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it was forced to postpone the decision to pull‐
out its troops due to worsening situa on in these states.³⁵
American announcement to end the war in Iraq without achieving
anything tangible and subsequent inten ons to pull out from
Afghanistan, leaving behind token forces for support missions,
indicate that the US government remains wary of the economic
consequences of these wars.³⁶

34
John Glaser, “Exporting Tyranny through Foreign Aid”, The American Conservative,
April 19, 2011, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/exporting-tyranny-
through-foreign-aid/.
35
Robert D. Kaplan, “Where's the American empire when we need it?”,Washington
Post, December 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120303448.html.
36
Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Rethinking 'imperial stretch'”, The Express Tribune, November
5, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/461181/rethinking-imperial-stretch/. See also:
Mark Landler, “US Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016”, The New York
Times, May 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-
complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to-say.html?_r=0.

51
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

Domina ng the Asia Pacific Region. The US focus is gradually

shi ing to the Asia‐Pacific region mainly for two reasons. First it
wants to project its power to counter the rising China
phenomenon, an objec ve which is officially dismissed and
downplayed by the US;³⁷ and second, the Asia‐Pacific region offers
a lucra ve market to the US manufacturing industry.³⁸ Therefore,
the US is not only struggling to project its off‐shore capabili es
through new deployments and alliances but also increasing its
naval presence around the region with the purpose of domina ng
the sea lanes and trade corridors.³⁹ The US also sees the rising
Japan‐China tensions over Senkaku Islands an opportunity to keep
its hold over the region and is thus pu ng its weight behind
Japan.⁴⁰
Containment of China. The US envisages an Asia of high economic
and geo‐strategic value in which China is seen as a strategic
challenger posing a threat to its interests. Containment of China in
the region thus has become top most priority for the US policy
makers,⁴¹ using India as a pivot by exploi ng Sino‐Indian historical

37
Hillary Clinton, “America's Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, November 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=ful
l. See also: Leon E. Panetta, “America's Pacific Rebalance”, Project Syndicate,
December 21, 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/renewing-the-us-
commitment-to-the-asia-pacific-region-by-leon-e--panetta.
38
UN News Centre, “Global economy risks falling into renewed recession, warns UN
report”, December 18, 2012,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43803#.USxZ4h2j2yY.
39
Aljazeera, “US military to strengthen presence in Guam”, updated June 22, 2013,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/06/201362252123311576.html.
40
Kirk Spitzer, “Big US Fleet Nears Disputed Islands, But What For?”,Time,
September 30, 2012, http://nation.time.com/2012/09/30/big-u-s-fleet-nears-disputed-
islands-but-what-for/. See also: CBS News, “Amid tensions in Asia, Obama meets
with Japanese PM”, December 11, 2014. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-
57570683/amid-tensions-in-asia-obama-meets-with-japanese-pm/.
41
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Washington's Clumsy China Containment Policy”, The
National Interest, November 30, 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/washington%E2%80%99s-clumsy-china-containment-policy-6202, accessed
on December 11, 2014.

52
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

rivalry since 1962. The US endeavors to promote India as a strategic

balancer to China by enhancing its military, diploma c and
economic stature in the region. ⁴²
Pushing the “Asia Pivot” Strategy. Shi ing of the economic centre
to Asia‐Pacific is anxiously being watched by the US which is thus
rebalancing itself according to this emerging reality. The newly
cra ed policy of “Pivot to Asia” has thus drawn mixed reac ons
from the regional states.⁴³ Most view it as a move to contain China
by increasing military presence in Asia Pacific which, according to
the US percep on, would deter China from undermining the US
strategic interests in the region.⁴⁴ The US officials however have
argued that this policy is primarily aimed at readjus ng the US
economic and defence priori es and, therefore, is not directed
against China or any other regional country for that ma er.⁴⁵
Regardless of these differing opinions, it is a known fact that states
seldom reveal their real inten ons regarding their adopted policies
and the US is no excep on to this rule. Great powers always
perceive new rising power centres as a poten al threat to their
influence. Accordingly for the US, the rise of China and a resurgent
Russia now pose the biggest challenges since the end of the Cold
War. Consequently, states which are either closely aligned with
China like Pakistan or states which are not at ease with China like
India, would automa cally become key players in this new great
game.
42
C. Raja Mohan, “The New Triangular Diplomacy: India, China and America at Sea”,
The Diplomat, November 5, 20 12, http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/05/the-new-
triangular-diplomacy-india-china-and-america-on-the-high-seas/?all=true.
43
Richard C. Bush III, “The Response of China's Neighbours to the US “Pivot” to
Asia”, Brookings Institute, January 31, 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/01/31-us-pivot-bush.
44
Bonnie S. Glaser, “Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences”, in Global
Forecast 2012 – Risk, Opportunity and the Next Administration, ed. Craig Cohen and
Josiane Gabel (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
2012), pp. 23-24. See also: Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol 91, No.6, November/December 2012,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138211/robert-s-ross/the-problem-with-the-pivot
45
Leon E. Panetta, “America's Pacific Rebalance”, op cit, December 21, 2012. See
also: Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner, “Smart Shift”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.92, No.1,
January/February 2013, .
53
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons. Pakistan's nuclear

programme had been a cause of concern for the US since its
incep on. The US tried its level best to prevent Pakistan from
acquiring the nuclear weapon capability,⁴⁶ but couldn't succeed in
its objec ve. Despite the fact that Pakistan is now a de‐facto
nuclear weapons state and has undertaken adequate safety and
security measures regarding its nuclear program, the US'
apprehensions over Pakistan's nuclear program have not withered
away.⁴⁷ The US has 'made ready plans' to secure and seize these
weapons under excep onal circumstances. Consequently,
securing Pakistani nukes remains one of the top most US foreign
policy objec ves.⁴⁸
Maintaining a Controlled Level of Instability in the Region. No
unanimity exists between scholars regarding real US policy
objec ves when it comes to establishing peace and stability in
South Asia. Two hypotheses dominate the discourse. The first
hypothesis posits that a divided and rela vely unstable South Asia
best serves US interests,⁴⁹ because it provides the US with an
opportunity to maintain its influence and presence in the region
besides profi ng through sale of military hardware to both India
and Pakistan. The complex web of intelligence networks and drone
46
National Security Archive, George Washington University, “Non-Papers and
Demarches: US and British Combined to Delay Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program
in 1978-1981, Declassified Documents Show”, National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 352, July 27, 2011,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/index.htm.
47
Seymour M. Hersh, “Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear
Warheads be Kept Safe?” The New Yorker, November 16, 2009, .
48
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon's: Proliferation and
Security Issues”, Congressional Research Service Report, 7-5700, February 13, 2013,
p 19. See also: Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Pentagon's Secret Plans to
Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenals”, The National Journal, NTI, November 9, 2011,
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/the-pentagons-secret-plans-to-secure-pakistans-nuclear-
arsenal/.
49
Ejaz Haider, “Define Relation with the US”, The Express Tribune, July 10, 2012,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/406327/define-relations-with-the-us/. See also: Ashley J.
Tellis, “Stability in South Asia”, RAND Corporation, Documented Briefing, 1997, pp.
53-54.

54
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

strikes in Pakistan, thus killing the militant commanders inclined

towards nego a ons, is cited as a ra onal ac on.⁵⁰ The other
viewpoint argues that regional stability remains a topmost priority
for the US for it provides ideal strategic and economic
opportuni es for US' businesses and industry to invest in the
region. More so, stability would also reduce the risks of nuclear
escala on between India and Pakistan thus paving the way for
economic prosperity.⁵¹ The US persistent engagement with India
and Pakistan to diffuse tensions a er any crisis is cited as evidence
in this regard. Nevertheless, both these asser ons enable the US
defence industry and business to sell military hardware and invest
in the region for economic gains.⁵²
Controlling the Energy Resources. One of the key foreign policy
objec ves of the US is to control the energy resources in Middle
East and Central Asia.⁵³ Military deployments and bases in the
Middle East and subsequent invasion of Iraq were aimed at
a aining physical control over these resources which however did
not go as per plan.⁵⁴ Despite strategic defeat in Iraq and

50
Mikael May, “US Sabotaging Peace talks in Pakistan!”, The News Tribe, May 31,
2013, http://www.thenewstribe.com/2013/05/31/u-s-sabotaging-peace-talks-in-
pakistan/. See also: Mark Mazzetti, “A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood”, The
New York Times, April 7, 2013, A1.
51
Stephen P. Cohen, “The Future: US Grand Strategy and South Asia”, in The United
States and South Asia, ed. Alexander Evans (New York: Asia Society, 2012), p. 65.
52
Tom Hussain, “Arms race between India and Pakistan takes to air”, The National,
May 31, 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/arms-race-between-
india-and-pakistan-takes-to-air.
53
Mamoun Fandy, “US Energy Policy in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy in Focus
(FPIF), January 1, 1997,
http://www.fpif.org/reports/us_oil_policy_in_the_middle_east. See also: Ariel Cohen,
“US Interests and Central Asia Energy Security”, Heritage Foundation,
Backgrounder#1984, November 15, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2006/11/us-interests-and-central-asia-energy-security.
54
The Independent, “Blood and oil: How the West will profit from Iraq's most precious
commodity”, January 7, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/blood-and-oil-how-the-west-will-profit-from-iraqs-most-precious-commodity-
431119.html

55
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

Afghanistan, the military bases in the Gulf States, Afghanistan,

South East Asia and Europe s ll provide assurance to the US for
exercising control over these regions. However, due to a rising
China and a reasser ng Russia, the strategic compe on between
the global powers is growing.⁵⁵ The emergence of new polar
powers poses a daun ng challenge for the US to establish its hold
on Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy resources.⁵⁶
Pakistan's Core Interests in the Region. Pakistan persistently faces a
geo‐strategic dilemma due to its loca on in the region.⁵⁷ Its
involvement in the 'Afghan Jihad' during the Cold War and its alliance
with the US in the war against terrorism resulted in various
predicaments (alongside a few benefits) due to high socio‐economic
cost and subsequent security problems. Pakistan's informal alliance
with the US was aimed at achieving following strategic objec ves in
the region:

Avoiding a 'Two Front War' Scenario. Pakistan is rela vely a

smaller country than India with regards to strength, size and
economy. Due to its linear shape and hos le neighborhood, a 'two
front war' becomes a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Owing to its
historical hos lity with India, Pakistan desperately needs stable
and friendly neighbors in the west which could thus provide
strategic depth in mes of war.⁵⁸ The idea of strategic depth must

55
Chankaiyee2, “The emergence of a new cold war – China and Russia against US?”,
China Daily Mail, March 26, 2013, http://chinadailymail.com/2013/03/26/the-
emergence-of-a-new-cold-war-china-and-russia-against-usa/.
56
Shams uz Zaman, “Strategic Alignments in Asia – I”, Pakistan Observer, October
17, 2012, p. 5.
57
Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the
Present (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), p. 336.See also: Rajpal Budania, India's
National Security Dilemma: The Pakistan Factor and India's Policy Response (New
Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 217-218.
58
Ejaz Haider, “Pakistan Needs Strategic Depth”, The Express Tribune, October 7,
2011, http://tribune.com.pk/ story/268921/pakistan-needs-strategic-depth/. Also: Asad
Durrani, “Strategic Depth – Revisited”, October 19, 2011,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/277418/strategic-depth--revisited/.

56
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

not be confused with the concept of territorial depth.⁵⁹ Pakistan's

quest for a stable and friendly western theatre implies that
Afghanistan and Iran should have deep rooted economic and
strategic interests in Pakistan, which resultantly could get
adversely affected if Pakistan faces a war like situa on on its
eastern border. This could thus necessitate the western
neighborhood to support Pakistan in such a scenario. Pakistan
seeks peace with India but, without the resolu on of Kashmir
dispute peace would remain an elusive term under the prevailing
circumstances. In retrospect, Pakistan's desire to have friendly
governments in Afghanistan and Iran becomes a policy objec ve of
immense strategic value. Some analysts erroneously deny the
no on of 'strategic depth' on the pretext that Pakistan has no such
inten ons in Afghanistan or for that ma er Iran,⁶⁰ thereby
implying that Pakistan has no interest in the stability along the
Western border which can thus be contested.
Strategic Ties with China. Pakistan and China enjoy historical es
over unique commonality of interests. Although, Pakistan is
considerably dependent on Chinese military and economic
assistance, this rela onship is not one sided. Pak‐China joint
research ventures have produced some state‐of‐the‐art
technologies, which have significantly helped China to improve its
own military hardware as well. Produc on of fighter aircra s,
tanks, energy projects, road and railway infrastructure and naval
ports etc. are illustra ve of this development. A er the end of the
Cold War, Pakistan became less significant in US strategic interests
resultantly bringing China and Pakistan further closer and thus
strengthening their defence and economic rela ons.⁶¹ Chinese
59
Shams uz Zaman, “Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran on Middle East and
Pakistan”, Strategic Studies, vol. XXXI and XXXII, no. 4 & 1, (Winter 2011 &
Spring 2012), pp. 182-183.
60
Peer Muhammad, “Envoy denies Pakistan seeking 'Strategic Depth'”, The Express
Tribune, May 6, 2013, p. 2.
61
Muhammd Ishaque Fani, “Pak-China Security Relations and Mutual Ventures”
Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan J.R.S.P, vol.46, no.2, 2009, pp. 83-95.
See also: Chintamani Mahapatra, “India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor”,
Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, pp. 415-416.

57
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

bilateral rela ons with India and US have also improved

considerably without fundamentally altering the Pak‐China
strategic equa on. Pakistan's offer to China for developing the
Gwadar Port and Chinese investment in CPEC (China Pakistan
Economic Corridor) is reflec ve of this reality.⁶² Thus, maintaining a
strategic rela onship with China is one of the core objec ves of
Pakistan.
Maintaining a Credible Nuclear Deterrence. Pakistan faces an
existen al threat from India since its incep on. Since 1947, India
has been in a process of gradually occupying territories principally
belonging to Pakistan notably Kashmir, Junagadh, Manavadar, Run‐
of‐Kutch and Siachen.⁶³ These territorial disputes resulted in three
major wars between India and Pakistan, besides numerous
skirmishes and conflicts including large scale mobiliza ons. The
percep on gap between India and Pakistan grew enormously a er
the la er's dismemberment of 1971, in which India played a cri cal
role.⁶⁴ Indian 'not so peaceful nuclear tests' in 1974 posed a serious
security threat, and as a consequence, Pakistan had to acquire a
nuclear deterrent of its own. Due to financial constraints Pakistan
cannot afford to engage in a conven onal arms race with India,
which is con nuously modernizing its armed forces at a rapid pace.
Thus a cost effec ve op on of maintaining a credible nuclear
deterrence, premised on the principle of minimalism, acquires a
cri cal role in Pakistan's security paradigm to deter the possibility
of Indian conven onal aggression.
Maintaining Defence Ties with the US. Pakistan had mostly
considered the US as a strategic balancer vis‐à‐vis India, and did
benefit from the US military technology from me to me.
However, this percep on was subsequently transformed in later

62
The Express Tribune, “Gwadar Port handed over to China”, February 18, 2013,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/509028/gwadar-port-handed-over-to-china/.
63
Sandhya Jain, “Pakistan finds more 'disputes' to fight over”, Niti Central, February 2,
2013, http://www.niticentral.com/2013/02/02/pakistan-finds-more-disputes-to-fight-
over-43584.html, March 10, 2015.
64
A. Z. Hilali, US – Pakistan Relationship (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005),
pp. 35-37.

58
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

years, especially a er the 1965 and 1971 wars, during which the US
support to Pakistan was non‐existent. US maintained a
transac onal nature of rela onship with Pakistan, and imposed
sanc ons me and again when it did not feel Pakistan of much
u lity. The 1971 debacle ul mately convinced Pakistan that only
nuclear weapons could guarantee its territorial integrity against a
hos le and conven onally powerful neighbor. US sanc ons also
played an important role for Pakistan to achieve self‐sufficiency in
the defence industry to counter Indian offensive posture. Pakistani
leaders at mes endeavored to secure personal rela onships with
US policy makers, even at the cost of Pakistan's na onal interests.
This resultantly fermented widespread an ‐Americanism in
Pakistani society against the US and even a few Pakistani leaders.
This contradic on mostly resulted in mistrust between both the
governments at mes bringing this rela onship almost to a
breaking point.⁶⁵ Pakistan desires to maintain a strategic
rela onship with the US but due to ever expanding gap over
promises vis‐à‐vis expecta ons and Indian significance in the new
evolving US Asian policy,⁶⁶ Pakistan's role is perceived to become
less significant for the US in future.
Defea ng Terrorism. During the Soviet‐Afghan war, CIA and
Pakistan trained and armed Pakistani, Arab and Afghan militants to
take part in the war. However, a er 9/11 when Pakistan hesitantly
joined the US‐led War on Terror, there was a severe backlash, and
Pakistan got engulfed in a serious internal security situa on. This
situa on was effec vely exploited by hos le intelligence agencies
which fuelled the insurgencies in the tribal areas and Baluchistan,
exposing Pakistan from eastern as well as western flanks while the

65
Hassan Abbas, “How Obama can Fix US-Pakistani Relations”, December 21, 2011,
Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136978/hassan-abbas/how-
obama-can-fix-us-pakistani-relations, March 10, 2015.
66
Declan Walsh, “US shift poses risk to Pakistan”, The New York Times, May 25,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/world/asia/us-shift-poses-risk-to-
pakistan.html?pagewanted=all, March 10, 2015.

59
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

US pressure 'to do more' kept increasing.⁶⁷ Defea ng the terrorists

and militant groups has now become the top most priority for the
Pakistani government especially since the tragic a ack on school
children in Peshawar.
Resis ng Indian Hegemony in the Region. Pakistan's threat
percep on, since its incep on remains India centric.⁶⁸ A er having
fought three major wars and numerous limited conflicts, Pakistan
perceives Indian military superiority and hegemony an existen al
threat. Consequently, Pakistan has always resisted Indian
ambi ons for regional dominance and global eminence.⁶⁹ This
Pakistani policy to resist Indian supremacy is likely to con nue in
the foreseeable future as well.
Economic Prosperity. Economic prosperity and development
remains one of the principal objec ves of all the states in modern
mes including Pakistan. According to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Pakistan's economic goal is to “Project Pakistan's economy
as a source of enterprise & innova on”.⁷⁰ Although the economic
situa on has improved in the last several years, there is s ll a lot
more to be done to make Pakistan an economically viable state.
The external debt is con nuously rising and despite immense
resources, Pakistan is likely to remain dependent on the foreign aid
in the foreseeable future.
Preserving Ideological Founda ons. Pakistan was created on an
ideological basis a and majority of Pakistanis perceive religion as

67
Anwer Iqbal, “Do more mantra doesn't go well down in Pakistan: Sherry Rehman”,
Dawn, March 9, 2013, http://beta.dawn.com/news/701297/do-more-mantra-doesnt-
go-down-well-in-pakistan-envoy, See also: Eben Kaplan, “Pakistan's balancing act”,
Council on Foreign Relations”, last updated October 10, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-balancing-act/p11646.
68
Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 366.
69
Javed Husain, “India – an aspiring hegemon”, The Nation, February 19, 2013,
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-
online/columns/19-Feb-2013/india-an-aspiring-hegemon, accessed March 10, 2015.
70
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, “Objectives”, undated,
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=overview.

60
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

as playing an important role in their lives and legisla on,⁷¹ barring

aside a few excep ons.⁷² Although, in prac ce the governance,
security and social issues in Pakistan have dominated its ideological
relevance, yet in theory preserving the religious ideology remains
an important factor for the Pakistani leadership which has
frequently been reiterated in their policy statements from me to
me.⁷³
Contending Issues between Pakistan and the US. Having analyzed the
US and Pakistani priori es, the diverging issues between Pakistan and
the US can be enumerated as below:
The US sees China as a rising threat and is seeking to contain
Chinese influence in the region. Projec ng India as a new regional
power centre and deployment of forces under the umbrella of off‐
shore balancing in Asia‐Pacific, are new strategic ini a ves by the
US aimed at containing China. Pakistan being a strategic partner of
China cannot become part of this new US game plan. The Chinese
involvement in the development of Gwadar port is also seen as a
response to the US 'containment of China' policy.
Pakistan faces a con nuous dilemma in Afghanistan. Its efforts to
bring the Taliban on to the nego a on table have not yielded
desired results due to mul ple reasons.⁷⁴ On one hand the
71
Steve Kull and Christine C. Fair, “Pakistanis want larger role for both Islam and
democracy”, United Institute of Peace, January 7, 2008,
http://www.usip.org/publications/pakistanis-want-larger-role-both-islam-and-
democracy. See also: Ansar Abbasi, “84 pc of Pakistani Muslims want Sharia, says
PEW survey”, May 2, 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-22608-
84pc-of-Pakistani-Muslims-want-Sharia-says-PEW-survey.
72
Dawn, “Call to declare Pakistan a secular state”, June 28, 2012,
http://beta.dawn.com/news/730057/call-to-declare-pakistan-a-secular-state, See also:
Sonia Malik, “Secular Pakistan: 'Pakistanis should know Quaid's Aug 11
73
Kalbe Ali, “Islam should serve as unifying force: Kayani”, Dawn, April 21, 2013,
http://dawn.com/news/1024712/islam-should-serve-as-unifying-force-kayani.
74
Michael Kugelman, “If Reconciliation Fails in Afghanistan, What's Plan B?”, War
on the Rocks, March 10, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/if-reconciliation-
fails-in-afghanistan-whats-plan-b/. Michael cited that military offensive in North
Waziristan and intelligence agencies activities remain principal reasons for Pakistan to
have lost control over the Taliban.

61
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

presence of the US forces in Afghanistan fuels insurgency while on

the other hand the pull‐out of the US troops would have spillover
effects inside Pakistan.⁷⁵ Pakistan is also apprehensive of the
sizeable Afghan Na onal Army which remains vulnerable to
penetra on from hos le agencies desiring to raise this
heterogeneous force to destabilize Pakistan's tribal areas and
Baluchistan. Apprehension of an Indian intelligence officer is a
proof of this bi er reality. So far the US and Pakistan have not been
able to concede to common ground in Afghanistan.

Pakistan considers Indian hegemonic regional ambi ons as posing an

explicit threat to its na onal security. Any support to India by western
states (including the US) in nuclear or conven onal area, thus by
default becomes a serious challenge for Pakistan. US' growing
coopera on with India, in nuclear, missile and defence fields, and its
unqualified support to grant India the NSG membership has thus
become a foremost concern for Pakistan owing to exis ng
asymmetries in conven onal and nuclear fields.

Pakistan's Future Policy Trends

Although Pakistan's strategic salience in the new US policy for the region
would be secondary to that of India, yet Pakistan is not likely to become
en rely irrelevant for the US in future. New trends in Pakistan's na onal
policy involve:
Further strengthening of strategic partnership with China
especially in the economic and defence fields. CPEC and
development of Gwadar Port is an extremely valuable project
which illustrates the growing partnership between both the states.
Iran, Afghanistan and even India should also be invited to invest in
the CPEC project to make the region the hub of economic and trade
ac vi es.

75
Yousaf Nazar, “US should talk to the Haqqanis”, Business Recorder, October 8,
2011, http://www.brecorder.com/articles-a-letters/single/626/187:articles/1239612:us-
should-talk-to-the-haqqanis/?date=2011-10-08.

62
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

An endeavor to improve trade rela ons with Iran while balancing

the policy inclina on towards Saudi Arabia.⁷⁶ Comple ng the Iran‐
Pakistan‐India (IPI) gas pipeline project, which is already in the
process, would significantly improve rela ons with Iran in addi on
to help in overcoming the energy crisis in Pakistan.
Cri cal re‐evalua on of policy towards the Gulf States (especially
Saudi Arabia) which now involves a more cau ous approach for
striking a balance between reality and percep on. Pakistan was
also inclined to play an important role in bridging the gap between
Iran and Saudi Arabia, which although it did not yield desired
results yet the efforts need to con nue in future as well.
Re‐evalua on of old es with Russia with the purpose of improving
the exis ng rela onship to explore possibili es of establishing joint
defence and energy projects and considering possibility of
technology transfers.⁷⁷ However, such a policy would mandate a
strong economic base and fiscal space for purchase of Russian
technology. Such transfers could be compensated by offering
Russian companies to invest in Pakistan like for example ini a ng
the TAPI (Turkmenistan‐Afghanistan‐Pakistan‐India) gas pipeline
project, expansion of steel mills etc. Russian companies have
already shown an interest in the TAPI energy project.
Pakistan was extremely op mis c to play a pivotal role in
nego a ons between Taliban and Afghan government on US
instance. However, the nego a ons could not progress due to
Pakistan's incoherent Afghan policy which alienated and
subsequently divided the Taliban into several groups. This scenario
has encouraged India to use Afghanistan as a base to support
insurgency on Pakistan's western front by employing rebellious
Taliban and Baluch fac ons. Pakistan's sole reliance on military

76
Salman Rafi, “Pakistan's balancing act between Iran and Saudi Arabia”, Asia Times,
February 12, 2016, http://atimes.com/2016/02/pakistans-balancing-act-between-iran-
and-saudi-arabia/.
77
Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan and Russia usher in new era of cooperation”, The Express
tribune, November 21, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/995578/trade-and-defence-
ties-pakistan-and-russia-usher-in-new-era-of-cooperation/

63
JSSA Vol II, No. 2 Shams uz Zaman

could keep the tribal belt along the Afghan border in a con nuous
state of peril in future as well. Therefore, a re‐evalua on of policy
towards Afghanistan seems impera ve, and there is a need to
incorporate Afghanistan in energy and economic ac vi es for a
durable rela onship.
Pakistan's economic reliance on the US is unsustainable. As the US
inclines towards India, the volume of financial aid would dwindle.
Maintaining a pragma c rela onship with the US, based on
reciprocity without compromising on core Pakistani policy
objec ves, has so far remained an unfulfilled dream but needs to
be adopted by Pakistani, policymakers. Despite the US lt towards
India, the US is likely to con nue using a 's ck and carrot' policy
towards Pakistan by asking it to 'do more' for accomplishing US
policy objec ves. Trading tangible benefits in quid‐pro‐quo
manner must never be lost sight of. Damaging one's own na onal
interest at the cost of serving US objec ves must be avoided at all
costs. US limited engagement with Pakistan is likely to con nue
due to the risks of nuclear confronta on in South Asia.
Conclusion
The Pakistan‐US rela onship greatly suffered a er the Salala a ack and
the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound. A er these incidents it was
feared that the rela ons between both the states could break down and
reach to a point of no return. However, despite visible improvement in
the bilateral equa on, the prevalent mistrust and suspicion regarding
each other's mo ves is likely to affect the US‐Pakistan rela onship in the
future. Despite normaliza on, due to renewed US priori es in the
region, the US is likely to scale down its rela ons with Pakistan l ng
more towards India. US pull‐out from Afghanistan and India's increased
presence in Kabul would not oblige the US to seek Pakistani support in
Afghanistan, and India may replace Pakistan as a strategic partner to the
US, especially in the context of containment of China policy.
Nevertheless, despite losing its rela ve significance to the US, Pakistan
would s ll con nue to be an important regional actor for other regional
players and other global powers. Pakistan thus has to look for
alterna ves while walking on a ght rope of balancing its rela ons with
the US and other regional powers/states.

64