Petitioner Respondents Vicente D. Millora Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
Petitioner Respondents Vicente D. Millora Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
Petitioner Respondents Vicente D. Millora Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Court, a foreign
agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of
the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The official
exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of
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Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of
members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation"
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter, but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if
not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has
tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties. HTIEaS
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IF THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO A SUIT ARE THOSE OF
A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DONE BY ITS FOREIGN AGENT, ALTHOUGH NOT
NECESSARILY A DIPLOMATIC PERSONAGE, BUT ACTING IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY, THE COMPLAINT COULD BE BARRED BY THE IMMUNITY OF THE
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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN FROM SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. — But while the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently
established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities
within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions
when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy
could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign stateis a
long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with
the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the maxim — par in parem, non habet imperium —
that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A FOREIGN AGENT, OPERATING WITHIN A
TERRITORY, CAN BE CLOAKED WITH IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AS LONG AS IT CAN
BE ESTABLISHED THAT HE IS ACTING WITHIN THE DIRECTIVES OF THE SENDING
STATE. — A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The
official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of
the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of
members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation"
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him
to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
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duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo,
an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the
Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the
problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from
suit. SHAcID
DECISION
VITUG, J : p
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of
what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian
national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the
Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he
was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan
and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations
and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the
latter was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose
Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on
the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto
Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of
the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986,
upon the introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his
interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of
caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside
from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products
was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of
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over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting,
the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he
is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the
United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the
back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant's own
handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his
desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman
named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help
plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however,
was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the
defendant promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited
the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy
200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandise but for the
reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the
restaurant people to . . . place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant,
however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid.
Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's
residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to
buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some
haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant
did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come
back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with
his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn,
gave him the pair of carpets.
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant
came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the
latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas
Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom
and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's
fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that
he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to
come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his
cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his
shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant
where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete
surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-
powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers
with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20
minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the
defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the
defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the
bedroom and out from defendant's attaché case, he took something
and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took
plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and
likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the
bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why
he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially
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his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the
telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any
warrant, but the defendant told him to 'shut up.' He was nevertheless
told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him. CTDAaE
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant
invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where
he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another
$8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet
worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also
discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian
carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought P30,000.00
together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was
handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was,
therefore, nothing left in his house.
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special
appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer
pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and
Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the
motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash
the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and
the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The
motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that
the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the
complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which
could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice.
Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a
motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary
appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an
affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States
government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was
peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State
and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to
refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the
case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15
October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed
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CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989,
the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed
G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure
to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had
failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with
this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled " Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon.
Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be
ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court's resolution of 07 August 1990.
On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining
the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint
against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R.
No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals,
et al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the
theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of
Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue
of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint
contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed
acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and,
absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo's diplomatic immunity
could not be taken up. SCaTAc
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the
evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity
as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts
complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of
Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his
term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the
"Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a
two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment,
following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have
precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely
different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule ofres
judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that
renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties,
subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even while one of the issues submitted in
G.R. No. 97765 — "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit
conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" — is also a
pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765,
however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has
made this observation —
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent
himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states
that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records
on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and
duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to
present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the
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alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the
belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable,
intelligent and fair resolution of the diplomatic immunity." 4 —
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign stateis
a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with
the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit 20 and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. 21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the maxim — par in parem, non habet imperium —
that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. 22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 23
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals 26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to
account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to
the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al.
(33 SCRA 368 ): 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act
for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of
the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within
the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction." 27
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine
government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on
the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the
receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific
relations.
10. Ambassadors are diplomatic agents of the first class, who deal, as a rule
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Secretary of State, as the case may
be. (Melquiades J. Gamboa, "Elements of Diplomatic and Consular Practice, A
Glossary," Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., 1966, p. 19.)
11. Envoys are diplomatic agents of the second class. This is the title of the
head of legation as distinguished from an embassy, the head of which is
called Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Like the Ambassador,
the envoy is also accredited to the Head of State. (Gamboa, p. 190.)
12. Charges d' Affairs are either en titre or ad interim. Charges d' affairs en titre
are appointed on a permanent basis and belong to the fourth class of
diplomatic envoys, the other three being ambassadors, ministers
plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary, and ministers resident. He is the
head of the legation in his own right and is not accredited to the head of
State but to the foreign office. According to Radloric, charges d' affairs are
sometimes used to described a person who has been placed in custody of the
archives and other property of a mission in a country with which formal
diplomatic relations are not maintained. Charges d' affairs ad interim, in
contrast are usually those second in command of the diplomatic mission —
minister, counselor or first secretary, who are only temporarily in charge of
the mission during the absence of the head of the mission. He is not
accredited either to the Head of State or the Foreign Office. (Gamboa, Ibid. ,
pp. 51-52.)
21. The international law on sovereign immunity of states from suit in the
courts of another state has evolved from national court decisions with good
deal of variance in perspectives. Even though national cases have been the
major source of pronouncements on sovereign immunity, it should be noted
that these constitute evidence of customary international law now widely
recognized. In the latter half of the 20th century, a great deal of consensus
on what is covered by sovereign immunity appears to be emerging, i.e., that
state immunity covers only acts which deal with the government functions of
a state, and excludes, any of its commercial activities, or activities not
related to "sovereign acts." The consensus involves a more defined
differentiation between public acts (juri imperii) and private acts (jure
gestionis). (Gary L. Maris, "International Law, An Introduction," University
Press of America, 1984, p. 119; D.W. Grieg, "International Law," London
Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)
The United States for example, does not claim immunity for its publicly
owned or operated merchant vessels. The Italian courts have rejected claims
of immunity from the US Shipping Board, although a state body, as it could
not be identified with the American government on the ground that
undertaking maritime navigation and business as a commercial enterprise do
not constitute a sovereign act. (D.W. Grieg, "International Law," London
Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)
22. See Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812), cited in
Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law," New York, 3rd Edition (1948), p. 307.
23. United States of America, et al. vs. Guinto, etc., et al., G.R. No. 76607, 26
February 1990.
24. 182 SCRA 644.