People v.

Ador
I. INTRODUCTION 432 SCRA 1
June 14, 2004
Ong Chia vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 127240. March, 27, 2000)
Facts:
02 May
In convicting accused of murder, the trial court relied on the circumstances, namely:
1. that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene,
2. that he allegedly surrendered a handgun,
Ponente: MENDOZA 3. that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired from the gun he surrendered,
FACTS: 4. that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him, and
5. that paraffin test showed that he was positive for gun powder.
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to Issue:
Is the conviction proper?
state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7 and to support his
petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to Held:
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,
Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, 1. there should be more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven and
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7.
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
ISSUE: reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the following are the guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelant’s brief without having 1. it should be acted upon with caution;
been presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised 2. all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3. the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s decision.
4. the facts must establish such certainty of guilt as to convince the judgment beyond a
HELD: reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.
Measured against these guidelines, the conviction cannot stand for the following reasons:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied. 1. the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw accused fleeing from the crime scene
is doubtful;
RATIO: 2. the gun surrendered by the accused does not appear to be the same gun presented during
trial;
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor 3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain where the slug taken from the head of the victim
of the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in came from;
naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial compliance” with the 4. the dying declaration which mentioned only the "Adors" can refer to anyone with that family
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. name; and
5. scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused committed the crime were not
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused was not established with moral certainty.
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. PEOPLE V. DOMINGCIL – NO DIGEST
v

Cecilia Zulueta vs. CA, and Dr. Alfredo Martin

II. BASIC CONCEPTS the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
PEOPLE V. FETALINO – NO CASE DIGEST public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
ZULUETA V. CA proceeding.
Privacy of Communication.  The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
Doctrine in Nachura: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
private communications between her husband and his alleged paramour. not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of
her husband, together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs without Dr. Martin’s without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
knowledge and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
petitioner had filed against her husband. one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as
damages against her wife before the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to
be the exclusive owner of such documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made
final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. PEOPLE V. YATAR – PAGE 52 UST LAW CIRCLE
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence
this petition.
Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE:
the case is between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the court
ruled that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and that the use of
those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not constitute gross malpractice and gross
misconduct. 
Issue: WON the documents in question are inadmissible in evidence.
Held: Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
II.1 BILL OF RIGHTS The judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered FINDING
accused guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
People vs. Domantay [G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999] strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 years of prision mayor, as
Crime: Rape WITH Homicide minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him
to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as indemnity,
FACTS: P50,000.00, as moral damages, P25,000.00, as exemplary damages, and
At around 4pm on October 17, 1996, the body of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year-old, was P12,000.00, as actual damages, and the costs.
found sprawled in a bamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen
had been completely lacerated on the right side. Bernandino Domantay, a cousin of the
victim’s grandfather, confessed to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza that he killed Jennifer and
disclosed the whereabouts of the fatal weapon (bayonet) he used in the crime. He was
convicted of Rape with Homicide sentencing Domantay to death and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
However, it is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white
shirt when her body was brought to her parent’s house immediately after it was found.
There is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that Domantay sexually abused
the victim. The only circumstance from which such inference might be made is that
Domantay was seen with the victim walking toward the place where the girl’s body was
found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he simply inserted a blunt
object into her organ, thus causing the lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no
circumstance from which it might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he
was zipping up his pants, that there was spermatozoa in the girl’s vaginal canal. The
very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding of rape.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it was
Bernardino who had raped her. He confessed to the victim’s murder but not on the
matter of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death penalty shall be imposed
HELD:
We cannot find that accused also committed rape. In the special complex crime of rape
with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable
doubt.
II.2 JUDICIAL NOTICE
YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
STATE PROSECUTORS V. MURO
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
FACTS:
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for
respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB
Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the dismissal was issued.
law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge
admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him
The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is
the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice
judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, of.
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
PEOPLE V. PUGAL – NO CASE DIGEST
The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the PEOPLE V. LINTANG – NO CASE DIGEST
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
STRADEC vs. Radstock; G.R. No. 178158 and 180428; December 4, 2009;
Natural Resources; Land Ownership; Public funds; Appropriation
The petitioners stressed that this is not  just a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing  sua Facts
sponte  the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was incorporated
matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of in 1966. It was granted a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
the North and South Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway.
Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking
judicial notice on the published statement of the President in the newspaper ( Philippine Daily CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from
Inquirer and the Daily Globe)which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni). A CDCP official issued letters of
of the law. guarantee for the loans although there was no CDCP Board Resolution authorizing the
issuance of such letters of guarantee. CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when
ISSUE:
CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned and managed.
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the In 1983, CDCP’s name was changed to Philippine National Construction Corporation
newspaper as basis for dismissing the case? (PNCC) in order to reflect that the Government already owned 90.3% of PNCC and
only 9.70% is under private ownership. Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP
HELD: Mining remained unpaid.
On 20 October 2000 and 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC PNCC’s toll fees are public funds. PNCC cannot use public funds like toll fees that
Board) passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni. Previously, for indisputably form part of the General Fund, to pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to
two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for the Marubeni Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a public purpose. The toll
loans. fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the National Government, which is the
owner of the toll fees. Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by
In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities Limited Congress for the compromise amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for being
(Radstock), a foreign corporation. Radstock immediately sent a notice and demand letter contrary to law, specifically Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution. And since
to PNCC. the payment pertains to CDCP Mining’s private debt to Radstock, the Compromise
Agreement is also void for being contrary to the fundamental public policy that
PNCC and Radstock entered into a Compromise Agreement. Under this agreement, government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes.
PNCC shall pay Radstock the reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00 in full settlement of
PNCC’s guarantee of CDCP Mining’s debt allegedly totaling P17,040,843,968.00 Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines. Consequently, Radstock is
(judgment debt as of 31 July 2006). To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Radstock
to (1) "assign to a third party assignee to be designated by Radstock all its rights and cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock
interests" to the listed real properties of PNCC; (2) issue to Radstock or its assignee cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of
common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at par value which shall comprise the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning land in the
20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3) assign to Radstock or its assignee Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the
50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for the next 27 years, in the gross toll revenues of the Manila Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot
North Tollways Corporation. assign or sell something he does not own at the time the ownership, or the rights to the
ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. The third party assignee
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for reconsideration. under the Compromise Agreement who will be designated by Radstock can only
STRADEC alleged that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National acquire rights duplicating those which its assignor is entitled by law to exercise. Thus,
Government’s shares, receivables, securities and interests in PNCC. the assignee can acquire ownership of the land only if its assignor owns the land.
Clearly, the assignment by PNCC of the real properties to a nominee to be designated
Issue by Radstock is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition against a private
foreign corporation owning lands in the Philippines. The said circumvention renders
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock is valid in the Compromise Agreement void.
relation to the Constitution, existing laws, and public policy
PEOPLE V. REANZARES – SCREENSHOT

Held

The Compromise Agreement is contrary to the Constitution, existing laws and public
policy.
People vs. Tundag Laureano vs CA
Facts: The complainant here was raped by her father twice. The first was on [G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000]
September 5, 1997 and the second was on November 7, 1997. The first incident MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
happened while she was sleeping. She was threatened by his father using a
vs.
knife. The second raped happened after washing the dishes. Afterwards, she told
about it to her neighbor and was advised to seek the help of the police. She was COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
13 years old back then. The prosecution was not able to obtain birthcertificate FACTS: Plaintiff was employed by the Singapore Airlines Limited as an expatriate
and she herself doesnt know her exact age. The Defense agree with the judicial captain. Sometime in 1982 or prior to the expiration of the five-year employment
notice. The RTC convicted him for two counts of rape and sentenced him to contract however defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
death. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
Issue: won the RTC correctly took judicial notice about her age. defendant’s requirement. Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots
including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
Held: No. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. Under Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to
the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. terminate its excess personnel. It did not, however, immediately terminate it’s A-300
pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary
Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified.
judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the
Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that —
Plaintiff instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on
moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the
to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo.
trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1)
to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the
the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in
defense counsel’s admission thereof, acceding to the prosecution’s motion. As
the course of plaintiff’s employment “thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code” and that, since
hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally,
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract
the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the
and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore
victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or
laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction.
destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
ISSUE: W/N Singaporean laws should apply in the instant case
HELD: NO. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant’s failure to show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this case. The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice
of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the
Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do
so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before
said court. On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-
appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V. KULAIS – EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS PAGE 6