Contract Law For Paralegals 2e 2013

Contract Law for
Paralegals
TRADITIONAL AND E-CONTRACTS
This page intentionally left blank
Contract Law for
Paralegals
TRADITIONAL AND E-CONTRACTS
Second Edition
Kathleen Mercer Reed

The University of Toledo, Director of Paralegal Studies
Henry R. Cheeseman
University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business
John J. Schlageter, III
The University of Toledo, Paralegal Studies Program
Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francisco Upper Saddle River
Amsterdam Cape Town Dubai London Madrid Milan Munich Paris Montreal Toronto
Delhi Mexico City São Paulo Sydney Hong Kong Seoul Singapore Taipei Tokyo
Editorial Director: Vernon Anthony
Executive Editor: Gary Bauer
Editorial Project Manager: Linda Cupp
Editorial Assistant: Tanika Henderson
Director of Marketing: David Gesell
Marketing Manager: Stacey Martinez
Marketing Coordinator: Alicia Wozniak
Marketing Assistant: Les Roberts
Production Manager: Laura Messerly
Art Director: Jayne Conte
Cover Designer: Bruce Kenselaar
Manager, Rights and Permissions: Mike Lackey
Cover Art: Yunus Arakon/iStockphoto
Full-Service Project Management: Jogender Taneja/Aptara®, Inc.
Composition: Aptara®, Inc.
Text Printer/Bindery: Edwards Brothers
Cover Printer: Lehigh-Phoenix Color
Text Font: Minion Pro
Credits and acknowledgments for materials borrowed from other sources and reproduced, with permission, in
this textbook appear on the appropriate pages within the text.
Photo Credits: Lucky Business/Shutterstock, p. 2; Scott Rothstein/fotolia, p. 28; George Doyle/Thinkstock,

p. 60; Stockbyte/Thinkstock, pp. 82, 114; NotarYES/Shutterstock, p. 136; Pixland/Thinkstock, p. 156; Siri
Stafford/Thinkstock, p. 184; Goodshoot/Thinkstock, p. 220; image100/SuperStock, p. 258; Jupiterimages/
Thinkstock, pp. 280, 328; Ryan McVay/Thinkstock, p. 302; Gina Sanders/Shutterstock, p. 350; svl861/Fotolia,
p. 382; Amy Evard, p. 4; Natalie Holman, p. 9; Allison Alger, p. 30; Sara Hall, p. 44; Rebecca Cain, p. 62; Susan
Bartel, p. 75; Brandy Spurgin, p. 84; Toni D. Mers, p. 107; Teresa J. Turner, p. 116; Denise Schmidt, p. 129; Kim
Spitzmiller, p. 138; Karen Wasil, p. 149; Della Wallace, p. 158; Heather Fauber, p. 177; Karen Billieu, p. 186;
Amy Gabbard, p. 214; Raeann Bromark, p. 222; Cynthia A. Laquinta, p. 249; Cathy D. Canny, p. 260; Fern
Burnett, p. 274; Lori Rickard, p. 282; Angel Dietzel, p. 296; Cathy Lynn Davis, p. 304; Patty Kechter, p. 320;
Stephannie M. Gambill, p. 330; Andrea Powell, p. 344; Jennifer Wallace, p. 352; Ron J. Taylor, p. 377; Tracey
A. Williams, p. 384; Kristen A. Leeb, p. 402.
Copyright © 2013, 2009 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of
America. This publication is protected by Copyright and permission should be obtained from the publisher prior
to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise. To obtain permission(s) to use material from this
work, please submit a written request to Pearson Education, Inc., Permissions Department, One Lake Street,
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458 or you may fax your request to 201-236-3290.
Many of the designations by manufacturers and seller to distinguish their products are claimed as trademarks.
Where those designations appear in this book, and the publisher was aware of a trademark claim, the
designations have been printed in initial caps or all caps.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Reed, Kathleen Mercer.

Contract law for paralegals : traditional and e-contracts/Kathleen
Mercer Reed, Henry R. Cheeseman, John J. Schlageter, III.—2nd ed.
p. cm.
ISBN-13: 978-0-13-510945-8
ISBN-10: 0-13-510945-0
1. Contracts—United States. 2. Electronic contracts—United States. 3. Legal assistants—United States—
Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Cheeseman, Henry R. II. Schlageter, John J. III. Title.
KF801.Z9R44 2013
346.7302—dc23
2012002059
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
ISBN 10: 0-13-510945-0

www.pearsonhighered.com ISBN 13: 978-0-13-510945-8
PREFACE
ABOUT THE BOOK

For students to receive the most benefit from their college learning experience, the
textbook they use in a course must have an in-depth coverage of the subject and
inspire critical thinking while keeping interest in the material high. Contract Law
for Paralegals: Traditional and E-Contracts, second edition, accomplishes this by
combining the ethical, practical, and professional topics relating to contract law
with the most contemporary cases and substantive material.
The goals of a contract law course should be to provide students with a strong
foundation in the essential principles of contracts and to ensure their familiarity
with and recognition of issues that arise in the area of contracts. In other words, the
point of a contract law course is not to make a contract law paralegal out of every
student. Instead, students finishing a contract law course should have a well-
rounded approach to contracts that will transition to their working as a paralegal
in many different areas of law.
To accomplish all of this, this contract law textbook has all of the in-depth
coverage on traditional contracts you would expect from a college-level textbook.
Part of the coverage that sets this textbook apart from the rest is that it is also up-
to-date with information about e-contracts, which are incredibly important today
when we purchase so many items online. “Old school” texts have all technology
matters segmented into a separate chapter, as if they comprise some specialty issue
that belongs in a miscellaneous category. In real life, it’s not that way, and the
organization and approach of this textbook—with e-contract and technology
matters located throughout each chapter—acknowledges that.
Within this in-depth coverage of contract law, this textbook provides numer-
ous ways for students to improve their critical thinking skills. Although important
in every academic area of study, critical thinking is especially important for those
working in the legal profession. For instance, it does the legal professional no good
to memorize the elements of a good and valid contract. The legal professional—in
your case, the paralegal—must know how to apply those elements to the client’s
unique situation. Many of the special features talked about here are designed to
help the student learn this application of law to fact.
However, what makes this textbook really different from the rest—and why
we know it will keep your interest in the material high—relates to the basic premise
of this textbook. Every paralegal, not just the “contract law” paralegal, works with
contracts and must understand contract law.1
For example, estate and probate paralegals review contracts to determine if
any part of the contract is valid after one of the parties’ death. Corporate parale-
gals draft and review contracts related to goods and services. Real estate paralegals
draft contracts for closings. The list goes on and on.
So this textbook offers paralegal students the opportunity to study the depth
and breadth of contract law while at the same time challenging them to develop
1
Recent surveys support this premise. For instance, see the National Association of Legal Assistants’ (NALA’s)
2008 Utilization and Compensation Survey at http://www.nala.org/Survey_Table.htm. Information on the many
areas of law in which paralegals are employed can be found on pages 12–14 in Section 2 of this report.
v
vi Preface
high-level critical thinking skills through a textbook containing paralegal practice

tips, robust exercises, critical thinking exercises, skill-building exercises, examples,
charts, and other innovative features.
NEW TO THE SECOND EDITION

• New contract-drafting exercises
• Updated websites and links
• Streamlined feature boxes
• New U.S. Supreme Court cases
• Updated examples from health club, cell phone, and online contracts
CHAPTER STRUCTURE
Each chapter of this textbook has in-depth contract law coverage and provides
numerous ways for students to improve their critical thinking skills. Chapters con-
tain the substantive law relating to contracts—common law, case law, the UCC,
statutory law, and the Restatement—and interesting features to help the student
understand the substantive law. Numerous examples and fact patterns give the stu-
dent the opportunity to apply facts to that substantive law.
Every chapter opens with a Case Scenario. This hypothetical case gives stu-
dents a real-world situation to consider as they read that particular chapter. As a
reinforcement, each chapter then ends by revisiting that Case Scenario and asking
questions about possible outcomes relating to the hypothetical. Students are given
information on a real case involving the same or similar facts, and they are also
given a case citation so they can locate and read the real-life case. The Case Scenario
feature gives students a frame of reference as they read the chapter, and it provides
for an end-of-chapter review of the material as well.
The Chapter Objectives feature encourages students to watch for particular
concepts in the chapter. The feature also reinforces the learning outcomes for that
chapter.
Key Terms in each chapter are boldface when first introduced and then
defined in the margin.
Contract law Cases are highlighted throughout each chapter to illustrate and
explain concepts covered in the chapter discussion. Although these cases are pre-
sented in a shorter format than the actual case opinion, the case citation is always
given so students can locate and read the case in its entirety. Case citations are also
presented in the proper “Blue Book” format for consistency with the techniques
paralegal students have learned in their legal research course.
Relevant Laws are provided in chapter discussions. This may include refer-
ences to specific state law, the Uniform Commercial Code, websites with informa-
tion, or other places where students can find additional information.
SPECIAL FEATURES
All of the special features of this textbook relate to the basic premise of this text-
book: Every paralegal—not just the “contract law” paralegal—works with contracts
and must understand contract law. In addition, important drafting features are
included so that paralegal students learn how to draft a contract so as to be ready
for their first day on the job.
Preface vii
Skill-Building Exercises
Beginning with the first chapter, students will learn to draft a contract. The Skill-
Building Exercises provide an approach to breaking down a contract’s main com-
ponents. Applying sample scenario facts, students will draft one of those
components with each chapter. Taken as a comprehensive step-by-step building
exercise, at the end of the course students will understand how all the components
they have drafted come together to make up a complete contract.
Hands-On Drafting Exercises

The Hands-On Drafting Exercise feature focuses on the bigger picture of contract
drafting. One sample case—similar to one a paralegal would work on in a law
office—is used and built on for this feature. Applying the case scenario, and using
the sample contracts in Appendix C of the textbook as a guide, students will learn
to draft entire contracts—such as a Contract for Sale of Equipment, a Business Pur-
chase Agreement, and a Real Estate Purchase Agreement.
Paralegal Perspective
One of the most interesting special features of this textbook is the “Paralegal Per-
spective.” This feature introduces students to the face of paralegals working in
many different areas of the law. Through articles written by those paralegals them-
selves, how and why they work with contracts is explained, even if they are not
employed as a “contract law paralegal.” Students will enjoy getting to know these
successful paralegals from all across the country.
Career Front
The “Career Front” special feature contains sample job descriptions for paralegal
jobs in many different areas of the law. This is a further expansion on the premise
that paralegals working in almost every area of the law work with contracts. For
instance, the job description for a paralegal working in alternative dispute resolu-
tion shows that the paralegal works to create mediation agreements and settlement
agreements. Not only will paralegal students see how and why they might work
with contracts in their future employment, but they will also begin to pinpoint the
area of law in which they might like to work when they graduate.
The Ethical Paralegal

Ethics and appropriate ethical conduct is a cornerstone of the practice of law and
the legal profession. “The Ethical Paralegal” feature introduces the student to eth-
ics situations and cases involving paralegals. This feature enforces for the student
the important concept that “ethics” is not just something contained in an ethics
course.
Paralegal Portfolio Exercise

Several “Paralegal Portfolio Exercises” contained in this textbook accomplish many
important goals for paralegal students. One is to inspire students to create various
legal documents while in school so they know how to create them for their first day
on the job. Equally important is teaching students to use the “Portfolio” feature as a
tool that will help them get the job in the first place. Some paralegal programs
viii Preface
require students to maintain a portfolio throughout their studies, with the com-
pleted portfolio reviewed and graded in a capstone course. This “Portfolio” feature
will provide tools for students to complete such required portfolio assignments.
END-OF-CHAPTER MATERIAL
End-of-chapter materials are always important in every textbook. In this textbook,
exercises are designed to confirm that a student understands the concept, can apply
it to real situations, and gets hands-on experience producing the types of docu-
ments he or she will work with in practice.
The Chapter Summary in this textbook is different from the usual narrative
style of summarizing a chapter into one or two paragraphs. Instead, the Chapter
Summary here reiterates all of the key points of the chapter. While not a substitute
for reading the chapter, the Chapter Summary is, in essence, a chapter outline. Stu-
dents will find this outline to be an important reinforcement feature that they can
use when studying for exams.
The Terms and Concepts is a compilation of all of the key terms defined in
the margin throughout that chapter. This is another important reinforcement
feature for the student.
The Case Scenario Revisited follows up on the Case Scenario from the
beginning of the chapter. The students will have already considered a hypotheti-
cal case as they read the particular chapter. Now, the Case Scenario Revisited fea-
ture asks questions about possible outcomes relating to the hypothetical case.
Students are given information on a real case involving the same or similar facts
and are also given a case citation so that they can locate and read the real-life
case. This feature provides the student with another type of end-of-chapter review
of the material.
The Internet Exercises and Case Questions are especially important
because of the many businesses we can view and contact online. In addition to
increasing students’ knowledge of business organizations, these Internet exercises
will help students increase their knowledge of locating and understanding relevant
case law.
A number of Critical Legal Thinking Cases are carefully selected to expand
on what the student has just learned and to help students apply legal theory to
practical application. While these cases are presented in a short paragraph sum-
mary, the case citation is always given so that students can locate and read the case
in its entirety. Case citations are presented in the proper “Blue Book” format for
consistency with the techniques the paralegal student has learned in his or her
legal research course. The questions at the end of each of these Critical Legal
Thinking Cases are presented in a way to encourage the kind of critical thinking
the paralegal needs on the job. Rather than asking the student a specific question
about the case, these questions are designed to help the student learn the applica-
tion of law to fact.
The Ethics Cases feature highlights real-life cases involving various ethical
values and moral principles relating to the area of contract law. These cases are
presented not just to illustrate legal ethics but rather the ethical values that form a
background for a practice in contract law. These cases are presented in a short
paragraph summary, but the case citation is always given so students can locate
and read the case in its entirety. Case citations are presented in the proper Blue
Book format for consistency with the techniques paralegal students have learned in
their legal research course.
Preface ix
The Briefing the Case Writing Assignment presents another reinforce-

ment tool for students. The feature has the added benefit of teaching students to
locate and understand real-life cases and to summarize quickly the key points of
a case, much like students will need to do for an attorney when employed as
a paralegal.
ADDITIONAL TEXTBOOK FEATURES

Because case law is so important to today’s study of contemporary contract law, the
many important court cases provided through the textbook are easy to locate
through a Case Listing. Case citations are presented in the proper Blue Book for-
mat for consistency with the techniques the paralegal student has learned in his or
her legal research course.
A Glossary is provided at the end of the textbook to assist the student with
quickly locating terminology important to contract law.
Appendixes at the end of the textbook provide students with important
information relating to features, terms, and concepts in contract law. Appendix A
includes critical legal thinking techniques for case briefing. Appendix B contains
the cases relating to the Briefing the Case Writing Assignment. Even if the instruc-
tor does not assign these case briefing exercises, these contemporary cases are
important reading. Appendix C contains sample contracts in areas such as employ-
ment, credit card, and software, as well as a checklist for contract reviews and a
number of sample contracts. Appendix D contains selected portions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.
SUPPLEMENTS
Resources for Students
Companion Website Access at www.pearsonhighered.com/Reed. This website
contains an online study guide, including true/false and multiple-choice questions,
PowerPoint presentations for each chapter, and the web exercises.
E-Book This text is also available in electronic format at www.CourseSmart.
com.
Resources for Instructors

To access supplementary materials online, instructors need to request an instruc-
tor access code. Go to www.pearsonhighered.com/irc, where you can register for
an instructor access code. Within 48 hours of registering, you will receive a con-
firming e-mail including an instructor access code. Once you have received your
code, locate your text in the online catalog and click on the Instructor Resources
button on the left side of the catalog product page. Select a supplement, and a log-
in page will appear. Once you have logged in, you can access instructor material for
all Pearson textbooks.
Instructor’s Manual A comprehensive outline of each text chapter includes
teaching suggestions for each chapter as well as key chapter objectives.
x Preface
Pearson MyTest Electronic Testing Program

Pearson MyTest is a powerful assessment-generation program that helps instruc-
tors easily create and print quizzes and exams. Questions and tests can be authored
online, allowing instructors ultimate flexibility and the ability to efficiently manage
assessments anytime, anywhere. Educator access to MyTest is already included in
Pearson’s Instructor Resource Center (IRC) Educator suite. Simply go to www.
pearsonmytest.com and log in with your existing IRC login name and password.
PowerPoint Presentation Also provided is a ready-to-use PowerPoint slideshow
designed for classroom presentation. Use it as is or edit content to fit your indi-
vidual classroom needs.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
KATHLEEN MERCER REED is the director of paralegal studies at the University
of Toledo. This award-winning paralegal program holds prestigious American Bar
Association approval and was named a “Program of Excellence” by the Ohio Board
of Regents. Professor Reed is a graduate of the University of Toledo, holding a
bachelor’s of science in interdisciplinary studies and an associate degree in legal
assisting. She received her juris doctor from the University of Toledo College of
Law and is a member of the State Bar of Ohio. She is a member of the Ohio State
Bar Association, the Toledo Bar Association, and is admitted to practice before the
United States Supreme Court. She is the past president of the Paralegal Association
of Northwest Ohio and the past chair of the Ohio State Bar Association’s Paralegal
Committee.
Professor Reed’s legal experience includes employment with Hallett & Hallett
Law Offices of Wauseon, Ohio; with the Honorable Richard L. Speer, United States
Bankruptcy Judge in Toledo, Ohio; and with the law firm of Nathan & Roberts of
Toledo, Ohio. She has been on the faculty at the University of Toledo since 1987,
teaching in such areas as legal ethics, litigation, torts, and civil procedure. Professor
Reed arranges and supervises over 60 internship placements every year. She was
instrumental in developing one of the first paralegal courses in the country to be
offered online, through distance education.
Professor Reed has written numerous articles on paralegal issues and has
authored six paralegal textbooks in addition to this textbook and Business Organi-
zations for Paralegals published by Pearson, which she also co-authored with Henry
R. Cheeseman and John J. Schlageter, III. She is also the author of a genealogy
research book now in its third edition.
During her tenure at the University of Toledo, Professor Reed has established
two paralegal scholarship funds and arranged for the McQuade Endowment, a
contribution that established and maintains the McQuade Courtroom in the
Paralegal Studies Program. This high-tech courtroom is an integral part of teach-
ing paralegals to use the technology important to today’s practice of law.
Professor Reed is married to Thomas Reed. The couple spends weekends at
their cottage on Lake Gage in Northeast Indiana.
HENRY R. CHEESEMAN is clinical professor of business law, director of the Legal

Studies Program, and co-director of the Minor in Business Law Program at the
Marshall School of Business of the University of Southern California (USC) in Los
Angeles.
Professor Cheeseman earned a bachelor’s degree in finance from Marquette
University, both a master’s in business administration (MBA) and a master’s in
business taxation (MBT) from USC, a juris doctor (JD) degree from the University
of California at Los Angeles School of Law, a master’s of business administration
with emphasis on law and economics from the University of Chicago, and a mas-
ter’s in law (LLM) degree in financial institutions law from Boston University.
Professor Cheeseman has earned the “Golden Apple” Teaching Award on
many occasions by having been voted by the students as the best professor at USC’s
Marshall School of Business. He was named a fellow of the Center for Excellence in
Teaching USC by the dean of the Marshall School of Business. The USC’s Torch
xi
xii About the Authors
and Tassel Chapter of the Mortar Board has named Professor Cheeseman Faculty
of the Month of USC.
Professor Cheeseman has co-authored another textbook for the paralegal
market with Kathleen Mercer Reed and John J. Schlageter, III—Business Organiza-
tions for Paralegals published by Pearson. He also writes leading business law and
legal environment textbooks that are published by Pearson. These include Business
Law: Legal Environment, Online Commerce, Business Ethics, and International
Issues; Contemporary Business and Online Commerce Law; The Legal Environment
of Business and Online Commerce; Essentials of Contemporary Business Law; and
Introduction to Law: Its Dynamic Nature.
Professor Cheeseman is an avid traveler and amateur photographer.
JOHN J. SCHLAGETER, III, is an associate lecturer at the University of Toledo in

the Department of Undergraduate Legal Studies. In addition to teaching business
organizations for the last 8 years, throughout his 13-year teaching career, Professor
Schlageter has taught many courses, including Business Law, Business Profession-
alism, Law Practice Management, Civil Procedure, Litigation, Contracts, and
Introduction to Law.
Professor Schlageter has also completed Mediation Training by the Interna-
tional Academy of Dispute Resolution and has met all other requirements to
become an authorized mediator of the Academy and has taught Mediation Topics
and Techniques.
In addition, Professor Schlageter teaches Advocacy: Mock Trial and has
coached the University of Toledo Mock Trial Team in performances at both
regional and national competitions.
In all of his courses, Professor Schlageter incorporates the use of computers
and legal software and enjoys integrating skills pertaining to the electronic court-
house and automated courtroom and presentation graphics.
Professor Schlageter is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati (BA) and
the University of Toledo, College of Law. After earning his juris doctor (JD) degree,
he was admitted to the Ohio and Michigan bars, as well as the United States District
Court, Northern District of Ohio, and the United States District Court, Eastern
District of Michigan. He is a member of the Toledo Bar Association, the Michigan
State Bar Association, and the Michigan Trial Lawyers’ Association.
Professor Schlageter maintains a law practice at the firm Shindler, Neff,
Holmes, Schlageter & Mohler, LLP, in Toledo. He is experienced in the areas of
general business, litigation, employment, franchise, estate planning, personal
injury, and family law.
Professor Schlageter has repeatedly served as a guest speaker and has
presented at various seminars on subjects including electronic discovery.
Professor Schlageter, his wife, Amanda, and their children, Emma, Grace,
and Jack, reside in Sylvania, Ohio.
Professor Schlageter has co-authored another textbook for the paralegal
market with Kathleen Mercer Reed and Henry R. Cheeseman—Business Organiza-
tions for Paralegals published by Pearson.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To the Publishers at Pearson
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank the publishing team at Pearson,
particularly Gary Bauer and Linda Cupp for their support and expertise.
To the Reviewers Who Provided Feedback for the

Second Edition
Priscilla H. Gay, Mountain State University
James A. Rempis, Middlesex Community College
Elvira M. White, University of Maryland University College
John A. Whitehead, Kilgore College
Joe Diallsaver, Northeastern State University
Michael C. Genova, Calumet College of St. Joseph
To the Reviewers of the First Edition of This Text

Elaine S. Lerner, Kaplan University
Kent D. Kauffman, Ivy Tech Community College–Ft. Wayne
Heidi Getchell-Bastien, Northern Essex Community College
Brian McCully, Fresno City College
Buzz Wheeler, Highline Community College
To Those Providing Invaluable Assistance

The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of the following:
Dawn Knisel, for her amazing cite-checking work of every case in this textbook.
This feature will show paralegal students the proper Blue Book format for this
important legal writing technique.
Butheina Hamdah and Shahrazad Hamdah (“students extraordinaire”), for all of
their help and assistance from a student’s perspective.
Paralegals from across the country who participated in the “Paralegal Perspective”
feature. This feature puts a face on the practicing paralegal in the area of business
organizations.
To Students in the University of Toledo Paralegal

Studies Program
Tiffany Brubaker, Rachel Freeman, Cynthia Gillman, Stephanie Gurgol, and Julia
Hanson
Personal Acknowledgments from the Authors

Author Kathleen Mercer Reed wishes to acknowledge her husband, Tom, for his
inspiration and support, and the paralegal studies students at the University of
Toledo, whose spirit, energy, and joy of learning are contagious.
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
Author John J. Schlageter, III, wishes to acknowledge and thank his wife,
Amanda, and their children, Emma, Grace, and Jack, for their love and under-
standing while he worked on this project; his father, John J. Schlageter Jr., his
trusted career mentor who is always willing to share his knowledge and experience
with him; his mother, Darla Schlageter, for always believing in him; his siblings,
Amy, Kelly, Jeff, Molly, and Joseph and extended family, friends, and colleagues for
their advice, support, and encouragement; his paralegal students, for their com-
ments and contributions throughout his teaching career; and all those who have
contributed to this endeavor.
BRIEF CONTENTS
Part I Traditional and E-Commerce Contracts 1
CHAPTER 1 Nature of Traditional and E-Contracts 3
CHAPTER 2 Agreement 29
CHAPTER 3 Consideration and Equity 61
CHAPTER 4 Capacity and Legality 83
CHAPTER 5 Genuineness of Assent 115
CHAPTER 6 Writing, Formality, and E-Commerce Signature Law 137
CHAPTER 7 Third-Party Rights and Discharge 157
CHAPTER 8 Remedies for Breach of Traditional and E-Contracts 185
CHAPTER 9 E-Contracts and Internet Law 221
Part II Domestic and International Sales and Lease Contracts 257

CHAPTER 10 Formation of Sales and Lease Contracts 259
CHAPTER 11 Performance of Sales and Lease Contracts 281
CHAPTER 12 Remedies for Breach of Sales and Lease Contracts 303
CHAPTER 13 Sales and Lease Warranties 329
Part III Contract Relationships and Special Forms 349

CHAPTER 14 Relationship of Tort Law to Contract Law 351
CHAPTER 15 Special Forms of Contracts 383
List of Cases Reported 407

Appendix A IRAC Instructions for Briefing a Case and Writing Assignment Cases 415
Appendix B Cases for “Briefing the Case Writing Assignments” 422
Appendix C Sample Contracts 440
Appendix D Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 490
Glossary 492
Index 507
xv
CONTENTS
Part I Traditional and E-Commerce Contracts 1
CHAPTER 1 Nature of Traditional and E-Contracts 3
Case Scenario 3
Chapter Objectives 3
Chapter Introduction 4
Contract Overview 5
The Evolution of Contract Law 5
Modern Law of Contracts 5
E-Commerce and E-Contracts 6
Definition of a Contract 6
Parties to a Contract 7
Elements of a Contract 7
Defenses to the Enforcement of a Contract 8
Sources of Contract Law 8
The Common Law of Contracts 8
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 8
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts 9
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) 9
Objective Theory of Contracts 10
Classifications of Contracts 14
Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts 15
Incomplete or Partial Performance 15
Express and Implied-in-Fact Contracts 15
Quasi-Contracts (Implied-in-Law Contracts) 18
Formal and Informal Contracts 20
Valid, Void, Voidable, and Unenforceable Contracts 20
Executed and Executory Contracts 21
Chapter 1 Summary 23
Terms and Concepts 24
Case Scenario Revisited 24
Internet Exercises and Case Questions 25
Skill-Building Exercise 25
Hands-On Drafting Exercise 25
Critical Legal Thinking Cases 25
Ethics Cases 26
Briefing the Case Writing Assignment 26
Ethics Spotlight 26
CHAPTER 2 Agreement 29
Case Scenario 29
xvii
xviii Contents
Agreement 31
Offer 31
Special Types of Offers 35
Online Auctions 39
Termination of Offers 40
Effect of Option Contract on Offer 44
Effect of Technology on Offers 45
Acceptance 45
Who Can Accept an Offer? 45
Unequivocal Acceptance 46
Effect of Technology on Acceptance 47
Silence as Acceptance 48
Time of Acceptance 49
Mailbox Rule 49
Mode or Method of Acceptance 50
Ethics Cases 58
Ethics Spotlight 59
CHAPTER 3 Consideration and Equity 61

Case Scenario 61
Consideration 63
Requirements of Consideration 63
Gift Promises 64
Contracts Lacking Consideration 67
Illegal Consideration 67
Inadequate Consideration 67
Illusory Promises 68
Moral Obligation 69
Preexisting Duty 69
Past Consideration 69
Special Business Contracts 72
Output Contract 72
Requirements Contract 72
Best-Efforts Contract 72
Settlement of Claims 73
Contents xix
Equity 73
Promissory Estoppel 73
Equitable Remedies 74
Ethics Cases 78
Ethics Spotlight 80
CHAPTER 4 Capacity and Legality 83

Case Scenario 83
Minors 85
The Infancy Doctrine 85
Disaffirmance 85
Minor’s Duty of Restoration and Restitution 85
Misrepresentation of Age 87
Ratification of a Minor’s Contract 87
Parents’ Liability for Their Children’s Contracts 88
Necessaries of Life 89
Special Types of Minors’ Contracts 91
Mentally Incompetent Persons 91
Adjudged Insane 91
Insane but Not Adjudged Insane 92
Intoxicated Persons 94
Legality 96
Contracts Contrary to Statutes 96
Usury Laws 96
Sabbath Laws 96
Contracts to Commit Crimes 97
Contracts Contrary to Public Policy 97
Gambling Statutes 99
Effect of Illegality 99
Special Business Contracts 101
Contracts in Restraint of Trade 101
Licensing Statutes 101
Exculpatory Clauses 102
Covenant Not to Compete 104
Unconscionable Contracts 105
Elements of Unconscionability 105
Imbalance of Bargaining Power 106
xx Contents
Are “Mandatory Arbitration” Clauses Unconscionable? 107

Ethics Cases 112
Paralegal Portfolio Exercise 112
Ethics Spotlight 113
CHAPTER 5 Genuineness of Assent 115

Case Scenario 115
Mistake 117
Unilateral Mistake 117
Mutual Mistake 119
Fraud 120
Fraud in the Inception 120
Fraud in the Inducement 120
Fraud by Concealment 121
Silence as Misrepresentation 121
Misrepresentation of Law 123
Innocent Misrepresentation 124
Undue Influence 126
Duress 127
Economic Duress 127
Proving Fraud 128
Ethics Cases 133
CHAPTER 6 Writing, Formality, and E-Commerce Signature Law 137

Case Scenario 137
Contents xxi
Statute of Frauds 139

Writing Requirement 139
Contracts That Must Be in Writing 140
Form Contracts 144
Promissory Estoppel 145
Formality of the Writing 146
Required Signature 147
Integration of Several Writings 147
Interpreting Contract Words and Terms 148
Merger, or Integration, Clause 148
Parol Evidence Rule 148
Exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule 149
Ethics Cases 154
CHAPTER 7 Third-Party Rights and Discharge 157

Case Scenario 157
Assignment of Rights 159
Form of Assignment 159
Rights That Can and Cannot Be Assigned 160
Effect of an Assignment of Rights 161
Notice of Assignment 162
Anti-Assignment and Approval Clauses 162
Successive Assignments of the Same Right 163
Delegation of Duties 163
Duties That Can and Cannot Be Delegated 164
Effect of Delegation of Duties 164
Anti-Delegation Clause 164
Assignment and Delegation 164
Third-Party Beneficiaries 165
Intended Beneficiaries 165
Incidental Beneficiaries 167
Covenants and Conditions 169
Covenants 169
Conditions of Performance 169
Discharge of Performance 172
Discharge by Agreement 172
xxii Contents
Discharge by Impossibility 173

Force Majeure Clauses 175
Commercial Impracticability 175
Discharge by Operation of Law 175
Commercial Impracticability 176
Ethics Cases 181
CHAPTER 8 Remedies for Breach of Traditional and E-Contracts 185

Case Scenario 185
Performance and Breach 187
Complete Performance 187
Substantial Performance: Minor Breach 188
Inferior Performance: Material Breach 188
Anticipatory Breach 189
Arbitration for Breach of Contract 193
Monetary Damages 193
Compensatory Damages 193
Sale of Goods 194
Construction Contracts 194
Employment Contracts 195
Mitigation of Damages 195
Consequential Damages 197
Nominal Damages 202
Enforcement of Remedies 203
Jurisdiction in Contemporary Contract Law Cases 204
Rescission and Restitution 204
Special Cases: Wedding Rings 207
Equitable Remedies 207
Specific Performance 208
Reformation 210
Quasi-Contract 210
Injunction 210
Torts Associated with Contracts 211
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 211
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 212
Contents xxiii

Skill Building Exercise 216
Ethics Cases 218
CHAPTER 9 E-Contracts and Internet Law 221

Case Scenario 221
The Internet and the World Wide Web 223
The Internet 223
The World Wide Web 224
E-Mail 226
Domain Names 227
Domain Name Anticybersquatting Act 228
Worth of a Domain Name 231
E-Contracts 231
E-Contracts Writing Requirement 232
E-Signatures 232
Software and E-Licensing 233
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) 233
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) 233
Licensing of Informational Rights 234
Exclusive License 235
Click-Wrap Licenses 235
Licensing Agreement 236
Software and Information Access Contracts 236
Electronic Agents 236
Licensing Information Technology Rights 237
Breach of License Agreements 241
Adequate Assurance of Performance 241
Licensee’s Refusal of Defective Tender 241
Licensee’s Revocation of Acceptance 241
Unilateral Electronic Errors 241
Remedies for Breach 242
Cancellation 242
Licensor’s Damages 243
Licensor’s Right to Cure 243
Electronic Self-Help 243
Licensee’s Damages 244
Licensee Can Obtain Specific Performance 244
xxiv Contents
Liquidation of Damages 244

Limitation of Remedies 245
Online Privacy and Social Media 247
Cyber Crimes 247
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 248
Electronic Funds Transfer Act 248
Cyber Identity Fraud 248
Information Infrastructure Protection Act (IIP Act) 248
State Criminal Laws 249
Future Considerations 250
Ethics Cases 255
Part II Domestic and International Sales and Lease Contracts 257

CHAPTER 10 Formation of Sales and Lease Contracts 259
Case Scenario 259
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 261
Article 2 (Sales) 262
What Is a Sale? 262
What Are Goods? 262
Goods Versus Services 263
Who Is a Merchant? 265
Article 2A (Leases) 265
Definition of a Lease 265
Finance Lease 265
Formation of Sales and Lease Contracts: Offer 266
Open Terms 267
UCC “Firm Offer” Rule 268
Consideration 268
Formation of Sales and Lease Contracts: Acceptance 268
Methods of Acceptance 268
Accommodation Shipment 269
Additional Terms 269
“Battle of the Forms” 269
UCC Statute of Frauds 270
Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds 270
Contents xxv
Written Confirmation Rule 271

When Written Modification Is Required 271
Parol Evidence 271
Unfair and Deceptive Acts over the Internet 273
Letters of Credit in International Trade 273
Ethics Cases 278
CHAPTER 11 Performance of Sales and Lease Contracts 281

Case Scenario 281
Identification and Passage of Title 283
Identification of Goods 283
Passage of Title 284
Shipment and Destination Contracts 284
Delivery of Goods Without Moving Them 284
Risk of Loss: No Breach of Sales Contract 284
Carrier Cases: Movement of Goods 285
Shipping Terms 285
Noncarrier Cases: No Movement of Goods 286
Goods in the Possession of a Bailee 286
Effect of Bankruptcy on Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases 286
Risk of Loss: Conditional Sales 287
Sale on Approval 287
Sale or Return 287
Consignment 288
Risk of Loss: Breach of Sales Contract 290
Seller in Breach 290
Buyer in Breach 290
Risk of Loss: Lease Contracts 290
Insuring Against Loss of Goods 290
Sales by Nonowners 291
Void Title and Lease: Stolen Goods 291
Voidable Title: Sales or Lease of Goods to Good Faith Purchasers for Value 291
Entrustment Rule 291
International Trade Terms 295
Bulk Sales Law 295
xxvi Contents

Ethics Cases 300
CHAPTER 12 Remedies for Breach of Sales and Lease Contracts 303

Case Scenario 303
Seller’s and Lessor’s Performance 305
Place of Delivery 305
Destruction of Goods 309
Buyer’s and Lessee’s Performance 309
Right of Inspection 309
Payment 310
Acceptance 310
Revocation of Acceptance 310
Seller’s and Lessor’s Remedies 311
Right to Withhold Delivery 311
Right to Stop Delivery of Goods in Transit 311
Right to Reclaim Goods 312
Right to Dispose of Goods 312
Right to Recover the Purchase Price or Rent 313
Right to Recover Damages for Breach of Contract 313
Right to Cancel a Contract 313
Lost Volume Seller 314
Buyer’s and Lessee’s Remedies 314
Right to Reject Nonconforming Goods or Improperly Tendered Goods 315
Right to Recover Goods from an Insolvent Seller or Lessor 315
Right to Obtain Specific Performance 315
Right to Cover 316
Right to Replevy Goods 316
Right to Cancel a Contract 316
Right to Recover Damages for Nondelivery or Repudiation 316
Right to Recover Damages for Accepted Nonconforming Goods 317
Additional Performance Issues 318
Assurance of Performance 318
Anticipatory Repudiation 318
Statute of Limitations 318
Agreements Affecting Remedies 318
Unconscionable Contracts 319
Arbitration Clauses 319
Contents xxvii

Hands-On Drafting Exercises 324
Ethics Cases 326
CHAPTER 13 Sales and Lease Warranties 329

Case Scenario 329
Warranties 331
Express Warranty 331
Basis of the Bargain 332
Statements of Opinion 332
Damages Recoverable for Breach of Warranty 334
Implied Warranty 335
Implied Warranty of Merchantability 335
Implied Warranty of Fitness for Human Consumption 337
Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose 338
Warranty Disclaimer 341
Conspicuous Display of Disclaimer 341
Warranty Disclaimers in Software Licenses 341
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 342
Special Warranties of Title and Possession 343
Warranty of Good Title 343
Warranty of No Security Interests 343
Warranty of No Infringements 344
Warranty of No Interference 344
Ethics Cases 348
Part III Contract Relationships and Special Forms 349

CHAPTER 14 Relationship of Tort Law to Contract Law 351
Case Scenario 351
xxviii Contents

Product Liability 353
Negligence and Fault 353
Negligence 353
Misrepresentation 355
Strict Liability 355
Liability Without Fault 356
All in the Chain of Distribution Are Liable 356
Parties Who Can Recover for Strict Liability 356
Restatement of Torts Definition of Strict Liability 357
Damages Recoverable for Strict Liability 358
Defective Product 358
Defect in Manufacture 359
Defect in Design 360
Crashworthiness Doctrine 364
Failure to Warn 364
Defect in Packaging 370
Failure to Provide Adequate Instructions 371
Punitive Damages 372
Defenses to Product Liability 374
Generally Known Dangers 374
Government Contractor Defense 374
Assumption of the Risk 374
Misuse of the Product 375
Correction of a Product Defect 375
Supervening Event 375
Statute of Limitations and Statute of Repose 375
Contributory Negligence and Comparative Fault 376
“Lemon Laws” 377
Ethics Cases 380
CHAPTER 15 Special Forms of Contracts 383

Case Scenario 383
Negotiable Instruments 385
Functions of Negotiable Instruments 385
Types of Negotiable Instruments 385
Contents xxix
Formal Requirements for a Negotiable Instrument 389

Negotiable Instruments Payable in Foreign Currency 390
Agency Contracts 390
Agency Formation 390
Persons Who Can Initiate an Agency Relationship 390
Principal-Agent Relationship 391
Employer-Employee Relationship 391
Contract Liability to Third Parties 392
Partially Disclosed Agency 393
Agent’s Misrepresentation 395
Agency Termination 395
Labor Contracts 397
Labor Law 397
Labor Unions 397
Federal Labor Union Statutes 398
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 398
Collective Bargaining 400
Effect of Bankruptcy on Labor Contracts 400
Chapter 11 Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreement 401
Additional Bankruptcy Implications on Contracts 401
Ethics Cases 406
Appendix A IRAC Instructions for Briefing a Case and Writing Assignment Cases 415
Appendix B Cases for “Briefing the Case Writing Assignments” 422
Appendix C Sample Contracts 440
Appendix D Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 490
Glossary 492
Index 507
FEATURES
CAREER FRONT PARALEGAL PERSPECTIVES
Job Description: Alternative Dispute Resolution Amy L. Evard, Corporate Paralegal 4
(ADR) Paralegal 5
Natalie H. Holman, Litigation Paralegal 9
Job Description: Bankruptcy Paralegal 14
Allison Alger, Business Legal Assistant 30
Job Description: Collections Paralegal 30
Sara Hall Low, Health Care Paralegal 44
Job Description: Business Franchise
Rebecca Cain, Discovery Management
Paralegal 62
Paralegal 62
Job Description: Contract Administration
Susan M. Bartel, Real Estate Paralegal 75
Paralegal 84
Brandy Spurgin, Civil Rights Legal Assistant 84
Job Description: Securities/Municipal Bonds
Paralegal 116 Toni D. Mers, Trusts and Estate Paralegal 107
Job Description: Construction Law Teresa J. Turner, Real Estate and Land Use Law
Paralegal 138 Paralegal 116
Job Description: Personal Injury Denise Schmidt, Litigation Paralegal 129

Paralegal 158 Kim A. Spitzmiller, Intellectual Property
Job Description: Business Formation Paralegal 138
Paralegal 187 Karen Wasil, Compliance Officer 149
Job Description: Business Franchise Della Wallace, Environmental Litigation
Job Description: Criminal Law Heather Fauber Brinkman, Commercial Law
Job Description: Labor/Employment 282 Karen Billieu, Probate and Estate Planning
Job Description: Trust Paralegal 304 Paralegal 186
Job Description: Employee Benefits Amy Gabbard, Corporate Real Estate Transactions
Job Description: Corporate Contracts Raeann Bromark, Project Paralegal 222

Paralegal 352 Cynthia A. Laquinta, Corporate Litigation
Job Description: Municipal Paralegal 384 Paralegal 249
Cathy D. Canny, Senior Litigation Paralegal 260

INTERNATIONAL LAW Fern Burnett, Corporate Paralegal 274
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for
Lori Rickard, Advertising and Marketing
the International Sale of Goods 22
Paralegal 282
China Adopts New Contracts Law 54
Angel Dietzel, Privacy and Data Security
Signatures in Foreign Countries 150 Specialist 296
xxxi
xxxii Features
Cathy Lynn Davis, Civil Litigation Paralegal 304 Competence 75

Patty Ketcher, Probate and Estate Planning Fees 108
Paralegal 320
Making Legal Services Available 129
Stephannie M. Gambill, City/Municipal
Communication with Clients 150
Paralegal 330
Unauthorized Practice of Law 177
Andrea Powell, Contracts Specialist 344
Conflict of Interest 214
Jennifer Wallace, Commercial Litigation
Paralegal 352 Reporting Misconduct 250
Ron J. Taylor, Corporate Paralegal 377 Avoid the Appearance of Impropriety 274
Tracey A. Williams, Paralegal and Trustee Working to Improve the Legal

Assistant 384 System 296
Kristen A. Leeb, Corporate Paralegal 402 Candor and Honesty 320
Advertising and Solicitation 345

THE ETHICAL PARALEGAL
Billing Practices 378
Integrity 23
Disruptive Courtroom Tactics 403
Confidentiality 55
part ONE
TRADITIONAL AND
E-COMMERCE CONTRACTS
CHAPTER 1 Nature of Traditional and E-Contracts
CHAPTER 2 Agreement
CHAPTER 3 Consideration and Equity
CHAPTER 4 Capacity and Legality
CHAPTER 5 Genuineness of Assent
CHAPTER 6 Writing, Formality, and E-Commerce Signature Law
CHAPTER 7 Third-Party Rights and Discharge
CHAPTER 8 Remedies for Breach of Traditional and E-Contracts
CHAPTER 9 E-Contracts and Internet Law
The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been
a movement from status to contract.
—Sir Henry Maine
Ancient Law, Chapter 5
chapter 1
NATURE OF TRADITIONAL
AND E-CONTRACTS
CASE SCENARIO
Casey and Tom lived together for six years but never married. During their CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
time together, Tom earned a substantial income and bought a house worth
After studying this chapter, you
over $1 million. Casey gave up a high-paying job and moved in with Tom (he should be able to:
didn’t want her to work). After an argument, Tom broke up with Casey and 1. Define contract.
told her she had to leave his house. Even though they had split, Tom continued 2. List the elements necessary to form
to support Casey for another year. Then, after he began seeing another woman, a valid contract.
he refused to provide Casey with any future support. Casey has hired the law 3. Distinguish between bilateral and
unilateral contracts.
firm where you work as a paralegal to represent her in an action against Tom.
4. Describe and distinguish between
express and implied-in-fact contracts.
5. Describe and distinguish among valid,
void, voidable, and unenforceable
contracts.
3
4 Chapter 1
Chapter Introduction
Contracts are the basis of many of our daily activities. They provide the means for
individuals and businesses to sell and otherwise transfer property, services, and
other rights. The purchase of goods, such as books and automobiles, is based on
sales contracts; the hiring of employees is based on service contracts; the lease of
an apartment is based on a rental contract; the sale of goods and services over the
Internet is based on electronic contracts. The list is almost endless. Without
enforceable contracts, commerce would collapse.
Contracts are voluntarily entered into by parties. The terms of a contract
become private law between the parties. One court has stated, “The contract between
parties is the law between them and the courts are obliged to give legal effect to
such contracts according to the true interests of the parties.”1
Nevertheless, most contracts are performed without the aid of the court sys-
tem. This is usually because the parties feel a moral duty to perform as promised.
Although some contracts, such as illegal contracts, are not enforceable, most are
legally enforceable contract legally enforceable.2 This means that if a party fails to perform a contract, the other
If one party fails to perform as party may call on the courts to enforce the contract.
promised, the other party can use This chapter introduces you to the study of traditional and e-contract law.
the court system to enforce the Such topics as the definition of contract, requirements for forming a contract,
contract and recover damages or sources of contract law, and the various classifications of contracts are
other remedy.
discussed.
Amy L. Evard is a graduate of buyer may request is a contract between the seller
Saint Mary-of-the-Woods Col- and customers/vendors. I review and summarize
lege’s Paralegal Studies Program. the terms and conditions of the contract for the
She works as a corporate parale- attorney’s review.
gal for the law firm of Barnes In a case in which we represent the seller, I
& Thornburg LLP in Elkhart, draft documents for review by the attorney. Such
Indiana. documents may include purchase agreements,
deeds, lease agreements, and consents of the officers/
I work in a law firm that represents business clients in shareholders approving the transaction.
various areas of the law. A part of my job involves The attorneys rely on me to organize and
assisting the clients with business transactions (under maintain the documents that are prepared and
the supervision of an attorney) from the initial draft- received throughout the course of a business trans-
ing and due diligence stages through closing. action and to prepare draft versions of many forms
During the initial stages of a business transac- of transactional documents for their review. I pro-
tion in which we represent the buyer, I am responsi- vide efficiency and organizational advantages to the
ble for reviewing and organizing documents that attorney while providing economic efficiencies for
the seller produces. One type of document that a the client.
1
Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 1981).
2
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 1.
Nature of Traditional and E-Contracts 5
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(ADR) PARALEGAL
The ADR paralegal can be involved with contracts in early neutral evaluation, mediation,
arbitration, mini-trial, and summary jury trial in the following ways:
• Draft motion to refer case to ADR proceeding.
• Draft demand for arbitration.
• Research and procure rules governing ADR proceedings.
• Assist with preparation of agreement containing procedures and rules the parties
will use in the ADR proceeding.
• Conduct background research on the arbitrator(s), mediator(s), and/or judge(s).
• Make logistical arrangements for meeting facilities and/or hearing room as
necessary and appropriate for the ADR proceeding.
• Assist with preparation of jury questions for summary jury trial proceeding.
• Draft documents required by settlement agreement (lien releases, property transfer
documents, and so forth).
• As necessary and appropriate, conduct legal research and draft ADR contract clauses.
• Store or dispose of case documents in accordance with protective orders and/or
settlement agreement.
Source: Excerpted by permission from the National Association of Legal Assistants (www.nala.org) and the
National Federation of Paralegal Associations, Inc. (www.paralegals.org).
Contract Overview
THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW
The use of contracts originally developed in ancient times. The common law of
contracts developed in England around the fifteenth century. American contract
law evolved from the English common law.3 common law
At first, the United States adopted a casual approach to the law of contracts. The Developed by judges who issued
central theme of this theory was freedom of contract. The parties (such as consumers, their opinions when deciding a
shopkeepers, farmers, and traders) generally dealt with one another face-to-face, had case. The principles announced in
equal knowledge and bargaining power, and had the opportunity to inspect the these cases became precedent for
later judges deciding similar cases.
goods prior to sale. Contract terms were openly negotiated. There was little, if any,
government regulation of the right to contract. This “pure,” or classical, law of con- classical law of contracts
tracts produced objective rules, which, in turn, produced certainty and predictability Objective rules of forming contracts
in the enforcement of contracts. It made sense until the Industrial Revolution. that give certainty and predictability
in their enforcement.
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS
The Industrial Revolution changed many of the underlying assumptions of pure
contract law. For example, as large corporations developed and gained control of
crucial resources, the traditional balance of parties’ bargaining power shifted:
Large corporations now had the most power. The chain of distribution for goods
also changed because (1) buyers did not have to deal face-to-face with sellers, and
(2) there was not always an opportunity to inspect the goods prior to sale.
3
Note that, in the legal profession, the term common law is sometimes used interchangeably with the terms case
law and precedent.
6 Chapter 1
Standard Form Contracts Eventually, sellers began using standard form contracts that offered their
A document, usually preprinted, goods to buyers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That is, the consumer has no ability
to be filled in and adopted to a to negotiate the terms of the contract with the seller because the preprinted docu-
particular client’s needs. ment contained all of the major terms relating to the transaction. The majority of
contracts in this country today are form contracts. Interestingly, online contracting
has further increased the use of these form contracts since almost all online contracts
are governed by standard terms incorporated into the standard form contracts.
Examples: Automobile sales contracts, automobile leases, mortgages, and sales
contracts for consumer goods, credit card agreements, and software licenses usu-
ally use form contracts.
Although the phrase “freedom to contract” is often used, in many situations,
there is not an absolute ability of freedom to contract. Both federal and state gov-
ernments have enacted statutes that regulate contracts. Many of these laws are
intended to protect consumers, debtors, and others from unfair contracts.
Today, under this modern law of contracts, there is substantial government
regulation of the right to contract. For example, federal labor laws protect the rights
of workers to unionize and negotiate collective bargaining agreements with their
employers. Consumer protection laws protect consumers from certain unscrupu-
lous contracts. Equal opportunity in employment laws protect employees from
contracts that attempt to discriminate against them based on race, sex, age, disabil-
ity, and other protected categories. E-contracts are regulated by federal and state
laws that govern transactions over the Internet.
E-COMMERCE AND E-CONTRACTS

As we entered the twenty-first century, a new economic shift brought the United
States and the rest of the world into the Information Age. Use of computer technol-
ogy and the Internet increased dramatically. A new form of commerce—electronic
e-commerce commerce, or e-commerce—is flourishing. All sorts of goods and services are now
The sale of goods and services by sold over the Internet. You can purchase automobiles and children’s toys, partici-
computer over the Internet. pate in auctions, purchase airline tickets, make hotel reservations, and purchase
other goods and services over the Internet.
Much of the new cyberspace economy is based on electronic contracts and the
licensing of computer information. E-commerce created problems for forming con-
tracts over the Internet, enforcing e-commerce contracts, and providing consumer
protection. In many situations, traditional contract rules apply to e-contracts. Many
states have adopted rules that specifically regulate e-commerce transactions. The
federal government has also enacted several laws that regulate e-contracts. Contract
rules that apply to e-commerce are discussed in this and in the following chapters.
DEFINITION OF A CONTRACT
contract A contract is an agreement between two or more parties that is enforceable by a
An agreement between two or court of law or equity. A simple and widely recognized definition of contract is pro-
more parties that is enforceable vided by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: “A contract is a promise or a set of
by a court of law or equity. promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes a duty.”4
4
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 1. The Restatement is a summary of judge-made doctrines and input
from law professors, practicing attorneys, and judges. It is important to remember that the Restatement is not the
law. However, the Restatement is held in very high regard as an authority on the topic of contract law.
PARTIES TO A CONTRACT
Every contract involves at least two parties. The offeror is the party who makes an offeror
offer to enter into a contract. The offeree is the party to whom the offer is made The party who makes an offer to
(see Exhibit 1.1). In making an offer, the offeror promises to do—or to refrain from enter into a contract. The party who
doing—something. The offeree then has the power to create a contract by accept- makes an offer.
ing the offeror’s offer. A contract is created if the offer is accepted. No contract is offeree
created if the offer is not accepted. The party to whom an offer to enter
into a contract is made. The party to
whom an offer has been made.
EXHIBIT 1.1 Parties to a Contract
Offer
Offeror Offeree
Acceptance
Offeror makes an Offeree has the power

offer to the offeree. to accept the offer
and create a contract.
ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT
For a contract to be enforceable, the following four basic conditions are required:
1. Agreement. To have an enforceable contract, there must be an agreement agreement
between the parties. This requires an offer by the offeror and an acceptance of The manifestation by two or more
the offer by the offeree. There must be mutual assent by the parties. persons of the substance of a
contract.
2. Consideration. The promise must be supported by a bargained-for consid-
eration that is legally sufficient. consideration
Something of legal value given in
Example: Gift promises and moral obligations are not considered supported exchange for a promise.
by valid consideration.
3. Contractual capacity. The parties to a contract must have the ability to enter contractual capacity
into a contract. This ability is referred to as “capacity.” The legal qualification or competency
to understand the nature and effects
Example: Certain parties, such as persons adjudged insane, do not have con- of one’s acts so as to enter into a
tractual capacity. contract.
4. Lawful object. The object of the contract must be lawful. lawful object
Where the focus or purpose of the
Example: Contracts to accomplish illegal objectives or contracts that are contract is legal.
against public policy are void.
Concept Summary
Elements of a Contract
1. Agreement
2. Consideration
3. Contractual capacity
4. Lawful object
8 Chapter 1
DEFENSES TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF A CONTRACT

Even if all of the elements to a contract are present—at least on its face—there may
still be some defenses that could be raised to the enforcement of the contract. The
following are two of those defenses that may be raised to the enforcement of a
contract:
genuineness of assent
1. Genuineness of assent. The consent of the parties to create a contract must be
The requirement that a party’s
assent to a contract be genuine.
genuine. If the consent is obtained by duress, undue influence, or fraud, there
is no real consent.
writing and form 2. Writing and form. The law requires that certain contracts be in writing or in
Certain contracts must be in a certain form. Failure of these contracts to be in writing or to be in proper
writing or in a particular form to
form may be raised against the enforcement of the contract.
be enforceable.
Sources of Contract Law

There are several sources of contract law in the United States, including the com-
mon law of contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. In the electronic age today, there is the Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act (UCITA) governing Internet transactions and e-contracts.
The following paragraphs explain these sources of contract law in more detail.
THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTS

common law of contracts A major source of contract law is the common law of contracts, which developed
Contract law developed primarily by from early court decisions that became precedent for later decisions. There is a
state courts. limited federal common law of contracts that applies to contracts made by the fed-
eral government. The larger and more prevalent body of common law has been
developed from state court decisions. Thus, although the general principles remain
the same throughout the country, there is some variation from state to state.
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC)
Comprehensive statutory scheme Another major source of contract law is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
that includes laws that cover aspects The UCC, first drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
of commercial transactions.
State Laws in 1952, has been amended several times. Its goal is to create a uniform
Article 2 (Sales) system of commercial law among the 50 states. The provisions of the UCC nor-
The second article of the Uniform mally take precedence over the common law of contracts (the provisions of the
Commercial Code, which prescribes UCC are discussed in other chapters in this book).
the rules for the creation and The UCC is divided into nine main articles. Remember that the UCC applies
enforcement of contracts for the only to the sale and lease of goods—not other types of contracts.
sale of goods. Every state has adopted at least part of the UCC. In the area of contract law,
sales contracts these are two of the major provisions of the UCC:
Refers to the sale of goods under
• Article 2 (Sales). This article prescribes a set of uniform rules for the creation
Article 2 of the UCC.
and enforcement of contracts for the sale of goods. These contracts are often
Article 2A (Leases) referred to as sales contracts.
Article of the UCC that governs lease
of goods. Example: The sale of equipment is a sales contract subject to Article 2 of the
UCC.
lease contracts
Contracts for the exclusive real or • Article 2A (Leases). This article prescribes a set of uniform rules for the creation
personal property for a specified and enforcement of contracts for the lease of goods. These contracts are
period. referred to as lease contracts.
Example: The lease of an automobile is a lease subject to Article 2A of the

UCC.
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

In 1932, the American Law Institute completed the Restatement of the Law of Restatement of the Law of Contracts
Contracts. The Restatement is a compilation of contract law principles as agreed on A compilation of model contract law
by the drafters. The Restatement, which is currently in its second edition, is cited in principles drafted by legal scholars.
this book as Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Note that the Restatement is not The Restatement is not law.
law. However, lawyers and judges often refer to it for guidance in contract disputes
because of its stature.
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION

TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA)
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (a group of
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars) drafted the Uniform Computer Information Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA). The UCITA establishes uniform legal rules for the for- Transactions Act (UCITA)
mation and enforcement of electronic contracts and licenses. The UCITA addresses Model act that provides uniform
most of the legal issues that are encountered while conducting e-commerce over and comprehensive rules for
the Internet. contracts involving computer
information transactions and
The UCITA is a model act that does not become law until a state legislature
software and information licenses.
adopts it as a statute for the state. Although most states have not adopted the
UCITA, the UCITA has served as a model for states that have enacted their own
statutes that govern e-commerce. Because of the need for uniformity of e-commerce
rules, states are attempting to adopt uniform laws to govern the creation and
enforcement of cyberspace contracts and licenses.
Natalie H. Holman is a litigation my responsibility to review the information provided
paralegal with Risley Law Office, by the client, organize the case file, carefully outline
PLLC, in Lewiston, Idaho. She is the elements of the case that are in dispute, inform the
a graduate of Lewis-Clark State supervising attorney of my findings, and begin draft-
College with an associate’s degree ing the initial pleadings to commence a lawsuit.
in applied science (AAS) and a When bringing a real estate dispute before the
bachelor’s degree in applied sci- court, the contract is always the most important
ence (BAS) in paralegal studies. element of a plaintiff ’s case. It is my duty to under-
stand and prepare the attorney for the variety of dif-
As a litigation paralegal, the attorneys in my firm ferent ways the contract can be applied to the facts
depend on me to evaluate, prepare, and assist them of a particular case. Without understanding the dif-
with their complex case files. Many of these cases ferent elements of a contract, this interpretation
include disputes arising from real estate contracts, would be difficult to convey to the supervising
such as construction contracts, purchase and sale attorney.
agreements, and leases. My work as a litigation paralegal is demanding
After the attorney holds the initial conference but rewarding when the client and attorneys are
with the client to determine his/her/their dispute, it is pleased with my hard work and the outcome of a case.
10 Chapter 1
objective theory of contracts

A theory that says that the intent to
Objective Theory of Contracts
contract is judged by the reasonable The objective theory of contracts holds that the intent to enter into an express or
person standard and not by the implied-in-fact contract is judged by the reasonable person standard. Would a
subjective intent of the parties. hypothetical reasonable person conclude that the parties intended to create a con-
reasonable person standard tract after considering (1) the words and conduct of the parties and (2) the sur-
The standard by which the court rounding circumstances? For example, no valid contract results from offers that
decides if the parties intended to are made in jest, anger, or undue excitement.
create a contract. A “reasonable Under the objective theory of contracts, the subjective intent of a party to
person” is a fictitious person of enter into a contract is irrelevant. The following two cases illustrate the application
ordinary prudence. of the objective theory of contracts.
CASE 1.1 OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS

City of Everett v. Mitchell, 631 P.2d 366 (Wash. 1981).
“The objective manifestation theory of contracts lays stress on the
outward manifestation of assent made by each party to the other.
The subjective intention of the parties is irrelevant.”
Judge Dolliver,
Supreme Court of Washington
Facts
Al and Rosemary Mitchell owned a small secondhand store. The Mitchells
attended Alexander’s Auction, where they frequently shopped to obtain merchan-
dise for their business. While at the auction, they purchased a used safe for $50.
They were told by the auctioneer that the inside compartment of the safe was
locked and that no key could be found to unlock it. The safe was part of the Sum-
stad estate. Several days after the auction, the Mitchells took the safe to a locksmith
to have the locked compartment opened. When the locksmith opened the com-
partment, he found $32,207 in cash. The locksmith called the City of Everett
Police, who impounded the money. The City of Everett commenced an inter-
pleader action against the Sumstad estate and the Mitchells. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Sumstad estate. The court of appeals affirmed.
The Mitchells appealed.
Issue
Was a contract formed between the seller and the buyer of the safe?
Language of the Court

The objective manifestation theory of contracts stresses the outward manifestation
of assent made by each party to the other. The subjective intention of the parties is
irrelevant. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a
known intent. If, however, it were proved by 20 bishops that either party, when he
used the words, intended something other than the usual meaning that the law
imposes on them, he would still be held.
The Mitchells were aware of the rule of the auction that all sales were final.
Furthermore, the auctioneer made no statement reserving rights to any contents of
the safe to the estate. Under these circumstances, we hold reasonable persons would
conclude that the auctioneer manifested an objective intent to sell the safe and its
contents and that the parties mutually assented to enter into that sale of the safe and
the contents of the locked compartment.
Decision
The state supreme court held that under the objective theory of contracts, a con-
tract was formed between the seller and the buyer of the safe. The court reversed
the appellate court’s grant of summary judgment to the Sumstad estate and
remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the Mitchells.
Law & Ethics Questions

1. Law: Does the objective theory of contracts work? Is it easy to define a “reason-
able person”?
2. Ethics: Did the seller of the safe act ethically in alleging that no contract had
been made with the Mitchells?
3. Critical Thinking: What do you think would be the economic consequences
to business if the courts recognized a subjective theory of contracts?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of Washington at www.courts.wa.gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article about the objective theory of contracts.
CASE 1.2 OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS

Welles v. Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sci., No. CV 03-05314 DDP (JTLx),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5756, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2004).
“Courts presume that a contract, deliberately entered into, expresses the true intent
and meaning of the parties. A court will not set aside contractual obligations
because one party misunderstood, or failed to read, the contract.”
Judge Pregerson,
United States District Court for the Central District of California
Facts
Orson Welles won an Academy Award Oscar from the Academy of Motion Pic-
ture Arts and Sciences for the Best Original Screenplay for the 1941 film Citizen
Kane. After Orson Welles died, the right of ownership to the original Oscar passed
to his wife, and when she died it passed to her daughter, Beatrice Welles (Welles).
In 1988, Welles requested a duplicate Oscar from the Academy, stating that her
father had lost the original Oscar many years ago. The Academy provided her with
a duplicate Oscar, and she signed the following Receipt and Addendum.
12 Chapter 1
Receipt
I hereby acknowledge receipt from you of replica No. 2527 [duplicate Oscar]
of your copyrighted statuette, commonly known as the “Oscar”, as an award
for Orson Welles, Original Screenplay—“Citizen Kane”. I acknowledge that
my receipt of said replica does not entitle me to any right whatsoever in your
copyright, trademark and service mark of said statuette and that only the
physical replica itself shall belong to me. In consideration of your delivering
said replica to me, I agree to comply with your rules and regulations respect-
ing its use and not to sell or otherwise dispose of it, nor permit it to be sold or
disposed of by operation of law, without first offering to sell it to you for the
sum of $1.00. You shall have thirty days after any such offer is made to you
within which to accept it. This agreement shall be binding not only on me,
but also on my heirs, legatees, executors, administrators, estate, successors
and assigns. My legatees and heirs shall have the right to acquire said rep-
lica, if it becomes part of my estate, subject to this agreement.
Addendum
Any member of the Academy who has heretofore received any Academy
trophy shall be bound by the forgoing receipt and agreement with the
same force and effect as though he or she had executed and delivered the
same in consideration of receiving such trophy.
In 1994, Welles discovered and obtained possession of the original Oscar.
Welles decided that she wanted to sell the original Oscar through public auction at
Christie, Manson & Woods International (Christie’s). The Academy objected, and
Christie’s withdrew the original Oscar from auction pending the resolution of the
dispute between Welles and the Academy. Welles sued the Academy for a judicial
declaration that she was the rightful owner of the original Oscar and had the right
to sell it. The Academy defended that the Receipt and Addendum prevented her
from selling the original Oscar. Welles argued that the language of the Addendum
“Any member of the Academy . . .” did not apply to her because she was not a
member of the Academy. The Academy responded that it intended that the lan-
guage should apply to Welles and asked the court to reform the Receipt and
Addendum to apply to Welles and to order that the Academy had a right of first
refusal to purchase the original Oscar for $1.00.
Issue
Does the Receipt and Addendum prohibit Welles from selling the original Oscar?

A written contract, once executed, carries with it a legal presumption that it cor-
rectly expresses the intention of the parties. Where one party claims that a contract
was entered into pursuant to a unilateral mistake, in order to be granted reforma-
tion, that party must prove that the other party knew of or suspected the mistake at
the time the contract was executed. The Academy asserts that it committed a unilat-
eral mistake by using the form Receipt that contained the Addendum concerning
“members” in its agreement with Welles, a nonmember. The burden is on the Acad-
emy to show that Welles knew or suspected the Academy’s mistake—namely, that
the Academy intended that the Addendum apply to her.
In order for a court to reform a contract, there must be a mutual intention of

the parties for the reformed contract to express. Welles states in her declaration that
she “did not and would not under any circumstances agree to give the Academy a
right of first refusal for $1.00 on the original statuette awarded to my father.” The Acad-
emy asserts that it intended to preclude Welles from selling any Oscar. Thus, the court
finds that there was no meeting of the minds, and no mutual intention of the parties on
which a reformed contract would be based. The intention of the parties must be derived
from the language of the contract if possible. The Academy does not dispute that the
plain language of the Addendum does not apply to Welles. Instead, the Academy
argues that because Welles was unique—the replacement Oscar given to her was the
first one given to a nonmember who was not the original recipient of the award—the
Academy erred and sent Welles a form that did not apply to her. Courts presume that
a contract, deliberately entered into, expresses the true intent and meaning of the par-
ties. A court will not set aside contractual obligations because one party misunder-
stood, or failed to read, the contract. Here, the Academy failed to ensure that the
Addendum applied to Welles. The Academy drafted the document, and the court will
not set aside the contract because the Academy failed to review its own form. Per the
Receipt’s terms, the Addendum does not apply to Welles’s original Oscar which she
received from her father’s estate.
Decision
The U.S. district court applied the objective theory of contracts and decided that
the Academy’s subjective belief that the Addendum applied to Welles did not
change the express language of the contract. The district court granted Welles’s
motion for summary judgment, holding that the Academy did not have a right of
first refusal in Welles’s original Oscar. The district court held that Welles had
unrestricted property rights in the original Oscar, which she could dispose of as
she saw fit.

1. Law: What does the objective theory of contracts provide? Explain.
2. Critical Thinking: Do you think the Academy had the subjective intent to
provide in the contract that it had the right of first refusal if Welles tried to
sell the original Oscar? Does this matter in contract interpretation?
3. Ethics: Was it ethical for the Academy to try to get out from under the terms
of a contract that it drafted?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
at www.cacd.uscourts.gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find and read a short bibliography of Orson Welles.
3. Visit the website of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences at www.
oscars.org.
4. Use www.google.com to find a movie clip of Citizen Kane.
14 Chapter 1
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: BANKRUPTCY PARALEGAL
The bankruptcy paralegal may work for a debtor law firm, a creditor law firm, or a
bankruptcy trustee law firm. The bankruptcy paralegal can be involved with contracts
in bankruptcy in the following ways:
Responsibilities in a Debtor Law Firm

• Participate in first client interview with attorney.
• Prepare client representation agreement.
• Meet with client to obtain background information for filing petition, schedules,
and statement of financial affairs.
• Obtain debt information; draft list of debts and debtor contracts.
• Obtain asset information and prepare list of assets.
• Order asset appraisals.
• Draft petitions, schedules, and statement of financial affairs.
• Assist in preparing of disclosure statement and plan of reorganization in Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases.
• Draft debtor’s monthly operating reports in Chapter 11 cases.
• Assist in preference action litigation.
Responsibilities for Creditor Law Firm

• Review debtor schedules and statement of affairs. Obtain all necessary data from
client to draft proofs of claim.
• Draft notice of appearance and motion for admission pro hac vice for attorneys
not admitted to the bar in the state of the court proceeding.
• Draft motions for avoidance of liens and reaffirmation agreements; arrange for
execution of same.
• Draft complaints as the Bankruptcy Code allows.
Responsibilities for Trustee Law Firm

• Conduct Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) searches and real property searches
to determine status of liens on property and/or equipment.
• Arrange for appraisals of real and personal property, including those under land
contract.
• Draft complaints and motions for relief from stay with supporting affidavits in
adversary proceedings.
• Attend Section 341 meeting(s).
• Attend plan confirmation hearing.
• Maintain log to track discharge and status of bankruptcy.
• Draft request for information on real estate owned by debtor; analyze and sum-
marize contracts for sale of property; prepare lien priority exhibits for use in trial.
Classifications of Contracts
There are several types of contracts. Each differs somewhat in formation, enforce-
ment, performance, and discharge. The different types of contracts are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
BILATERAL AND UNILATERAL CONTRACTS

Contracts are either bilateral or unilateral, depending on what the offeree must
do to accept the offeror’s offer. A contract is bilateral if the offeror’s promise is bilateral contract
answered with the offeree’s promise of acceptance. In other words, a bilateral A contract entered into by way of
contract is a “promise for a promise.” This exchange of promises creates an exchange of promises of the parties;
enforceable contract. No act of performance is necessary to create a bilateral a “promise for a promise.”
contract.
A contract is unilateral if the offeror’s offer can be accepted only by the per- unilateral contract
formance of an act by the offeree. There is no contract until the offeree performs A contract in which the offeror’s
the requested act. An offer to create a unilateral contract cannot be accepted by a offer can be accepted only by the
promise to perform. It is a “promise for an act.” performance of an act by the
The language of the offeror’s promise must be carefully scrutinized to deter- offeree; a “promise for an act.”
mine whether it is an offer to create a bilateral or a unilateral contract. If there is
any ambiguity as to which it is, it is presumed to be a bilateral contract.
Example: Suppose Mary Douglas, the owner of the Chic Dress Shop, says to Peter
Jones, a painter, “If you promise to paint my store by July 1, I will pay you $3,000.”
Peter promises to do so. A bilateral contract was created at the moment Peter
promised to paint the dress shop (a promise for a promise). If Peter fails to paint
the store, he can be sued for whatever damages result from his breach of contract.
Similarly, Peter can sue Mary if she refuses to pay him after he has performed as
promised.
Example: However, if Mary had said, “If you paint my shop by July 1, I will pay you
$3,000,” the offer would have created a unilateral contract. The offer can be accepted
only by the painter’s performance of the requested act. If Peter does not paint the
shop by July 1, there has been no acceptance, and the painter cannot be sued for
damages.
INCOMPLETE OR PARTIAL PERFORMANCE

Problems can arise if the offeror in a unilateral contract attempts to revoke an offer
after the offeree has begun performance. Generally, an offer to create a unilateral
contract can be revoked by the offeror any time prior to the offeree’s performance
of the requested act. However, the offer cannot be revoked if the offeree has begun
or has substantially completed performance.
Example: Suppose Alan Matthews tells Sherry Levine that he will pay her $5,000 if
she finishes the Boston Marathon. Alan cannot revoke the offer once Sherry starts
running the marathon.
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS

An actual contract (as distinguished from a quasi-contract, discussed later in this express contract
chapter) may be either express or implied-in-fact. An agreement that is expressed in
Express contracts are stated in oral or written words. Examples of such con- written or oral words.
tracts include an oral agreement to purchase a neighbor’s bicycle and a written implied-in-fact contract
agreement to buy an automobile from a dealership. A contract where agreement
Implied-in-fact contracts are implied from the conduct of the parties. This between parties has been inferred
supports the important concept in contract law that not all contracts need to be in because of their conduct.
16 Chapter 1
writing. Implied-in-fact contracts leave more room for questions. The following
elements must be established to create an implied-in-fact contract:
1. The plaintiff provided property or services to the defendant.
2. The plaintiff expected to be paid by the defendant for the property or services
and did not provide the property or services gratuitously.
3. The defendant was given an opportunity to reject the property or services
provided by the plaintiff but failed to do so.
In the following case, the court had to decide whether the plaintiffs could sue
a defendant for breach of an implied-in-fact contract.
CASE 1.3 IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT

Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
“The district court found that appellants produced sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an
implied-in-fact contract existed between the parties.”
Judge Graham,
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Facts
Thomas Rinks and Joseph Shields created the “Psycho Chihuahua” cartoon character,
which they promote, market, and license through their company, Wrench LLC. The
Psycho Chihuahua is a clever, feisty cartoon character dog with an attitude—a self-
confident, edgy, cool dog who knows what he wants and will not back down. Rinks
and Shields attended a licensing trade show in New York City, where they were
approached by two Taco Bell employees, Rudy Pollak, a vice president, and Ed Alfaro,
a creative services manager. Taco Bell owns and operates a nationwide chain of fast-food
Mexican restaurants. Pollak and Alfaro expressed interest in the Psycho Chihuahua
character for Taco Bell advertisements because they thought his character would
appeal to Taco Bell’s core consumers, men ages 18 to 24. Pollak and Alfaro obtained
some Psycho Chihuahua materials to take back with them to Taco Bell’s headquarters.
Later, Alfaro contacted Rinks and asked him to create art boards combining
Psycho Chihuahua with the Taco Bell name and image. Rinks and Shields prepared
art boards and sent them to Alfaro, along with Psycho Chihuahua T-shirts, hats,
and stickers. Alfaro showed these materials to Taco Bell’s vice president of brand
management as well as to Taco Bell’s outside advertising agency. Alfaro tested the
Psycho Chihuahua marketing concept with focus groups. Rinks suggested to Alfaro
that instead of using the cartoon version of Psycho Chihuahua in its advertise-
ments, Taco Bell should use a live Chihuahua dog manipulated by computer
graphic imaging that had the personality of Psycho Chihuahua and a love for Taco
Bell food. Rinks and Shields gave a formal presentation of this concept to Taco
Bell’s marketing department. One idea presented by Rinks and Shields was a com-
mercial in which a male Chihuahua dog passed by a female Chihuahua dog in order
to get to Taco Bell food. Taco Bell did not enter into an express contract with
Wrench LLC, Rinks, or Shields.
Just after Rinks and Shields’s presentation, Taco Bell hired a new outside
advertising agency, Chiat/Day. Taco Bell gave Chiat/Day materials received from
Rinks and Shields regarding the Psycho Chihuahua. Three months later, Chiat/Day
proposed using a Chihuahua in Taco Bell commercials. One commercial had a male
Chihuahua passing up a female Chihuahua to get to a person seated on a bench eat-
ing Taco Bell food. Chiat/Day says that it conceived these ideas by itself. In July 1997,
Taco Bell aired its first Chihuahua commercial in the United States, and it became an
instant success and the basis of its advertising. Taco Bell paid nothing to Wrench
LLC or to Rinks and Shields. Plaintiffs Wrench LLC, Rinks, and Shields sued defend-
ant Taco Bell to recover damages for breach of an implied-in-fact contract. On this
issue, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs. The decision was appealed.
Issue
Do the plaintiffs, Wrench LLC, Rinks, and Shields, state a cause of action for the
breach of an implied-in-fact contract?

The district court found that appellants produced sufficient evidence to create a gen-
uine issue of material fact regarding whether an implied-in-fact contract existed
between the parties. On appeal, Taco Bell argues that this conclusion was erroneous,
and asserts that the record contains no evidence of an enforceable contract. We agree
with the district court’s finding that appellants presented sufficient evidence to sur-
vive summary judgment on the question of whether an implied-in-fact contract
existed under Michigan law.
Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had stated a proper cause of
action against defendant Taco Bell for breach of an implied-in-fact contract. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case for trial.

1. Law: What does the doctrine of implied-in-fact contract provide? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did Taco Bell act ethically in this case? Did Chiat/Day act ethically in
this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Do you think there was an implied-in-fact contract in
this case? If so, what damages should be awarded to the plaintiffs?
4. Law: Several terms were used in this case that the paralegal student needs to
know to fully understand this case. Look up the terms summary judgment,
material fact, and punitive damages in a legal dictionary or thesaurus.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at www.
ca6.uscourts.gov.
2. Visit the website of Taco Bell Corporation at www.tacobell.com. Can you find
any reference to the “Psycho Chihuahua” commercial?
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the “Psycho Chihuahua”
advertising campaign used by Taco Bell.
18 Chapter 1
QUASI-CONTRACTS (IMPLIED-IN-LAW CONTRACTS)

quasi-contract The equitable doctrine of quasi-contract, also called implied-in-law contract, allows
An obligation created by the law to a court to award monetary damages to a plaintiff for providing work or services to a
avoid unjust enrichment in the defendant even though no actual contract existed between the parties. Recovery is
absence of an agreement between generally based on the reasonable value of the services received by the defendant.5
the parties. The doctrine is intended to prevent unjust enrichment and unjust detriment.
implied-in-law contract It does not apply where there is an enforceable contract between the parties. A
A contract not created or evidenced quasi-contract is imposed where (1) one person confers a benefit on another who
by an explicit agreement of the retains the benefit and (2) it would be unjust not to require that person to pay for
parties but, rather, inferred from the the benefit received.
parties’ conduct and the surrounding
circumstances. Sometimes referred Example: Heather is driving her automobile when she is involved in a serious auto-
to as a “quasi-contract,” the courts mobile accident in which she is knocked unconscious. She is rushed to Metropolitan
will enforce as a contract to avoid Hospital, where the doctors and other staff perform the necessary medical procedures
unjust enrichment. to save her life. Heather comes out of her coma, and after recovering she is released
from the hospital. Subsequently, Metropolitan Hospital sends Heather a bill for its
services. The charges are reasonable. Under the doctrine of quasi-contract, Heather is
responsible for any charges that are not covered by her insurance coverage.
In the following case, the court found a quasi-contract.
CASE 1.4 QUASI-CONTRACT

Powell v. Thompson-Powell, No. 04-12-0027, 2006 Del. LEXIS 10, *1 (C.P. Kent
Jan. 18, 2006).
“A contract implied in law permits recovery of that amount by which the defendant
has benefited at the expense of the plaintiff in order to preclude unjust enrichment.”
Judge Trader,
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
Facts
Samuel E. Powell Jr. and Susan Thompson-Powell, husband and wife, borrowed
$37,700 from Delaware Farm Credit and gave a mortgage to Delaware Farm Credit
that pledged two pieces of real property as collateral for the loan. The first piece of
property was 2.7 acres of land owned as marital property, and the other piece of
property was owned by Susan, which she had inherited. Eight years later, Samuel
Jr. and Susan defaulted on the mortgage. Samuel Jr. went to his father, Samuel E.
Powell Sr., and orally agreed that if his father would pay the mortgage and the back
taxes, he would pay his father back. Samuel Sr. paid off the mortgage and the back
taxes owed on the properties. Susan was not a party to this agreement.
Two years later, Samuel Jr. and Susan were divorced. The divorce court
ordered that the 2.7 acres of marital real property be sold and the sale proceeds
divided 50 percent to each party. When the property was sold, Samuel Jr. paid
Samuel Sr. half of the monies he had previously borrowed from his father. Samuel
Sr. sued Susan to recover the other half of the money. Susan defended, alleging
5
Monetary awards can be recovered when seeking quasi-contractual remedies. These can be available when no
contract is found to exist but there has been unjust enrichment to one of the parties to the dispute. One type of
quasi-contractual remedy used is Quantum Meruit, where the value of the services are calculated.
that she was not a party to the contract between Samuel Jr. and Samuel Sr. and
therefore was not bound by it. Samuel Sr. argued that Susan was liable to him for
half of the money based on the doctrine of quasi-contract.
Issue
Is Susan liable for half the money borrowed by Samuel Jr. from Samuel Sr. under
the doctrine of quasi-contract?

The primary issue in this case is whether the plaintiff can recover from Susan
Thompson-Powell on the theory of contract implied in law. A contract implied in
law permits recovery of that amount by which the defendant has benefited at the
expense of the plaintiff in order to preclude unjust enrichment. To claim restitution,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant was unjustly enriched and secured a ben-
efit that it would be unconscionable to allow her to retain.
The essential elements of a quasi-contract are a benefit conferred upon the
defendant by the plaintiff, appreciation or realization of the benefit by the defend-
ant, and acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit under such cir-
cumstances that it would be inequitable to retain without paying the value thereof.
In the case before me the plaintiff paid the mortgage of the son and daughter-
in-law at a time when the bank was about to foreclose on the mortgage. If the prop-
erty had been sold at a foreclosure sale, neither Samuel E. Powell Jr. nor Susan
Thompson-Powell would have received any benefit from the sale of the marital prop-
erty. Additionally, payment of the mortgage protected Susan Thompson-Powell’s
inherited property. Thus, because of the plaintiff’s acts in preserving the real estate
from foreclosure Susan Thompson-Powell received a substantial benefit at the plain-
tiff’s expense. Since the retention of the benefit in this case is unjust, she must repay
her share of the money advanced by the plaintiff.
Decision
The court held that Samuel E. Powell Sr. was entitled to recover from Susan
Thompson-Powell half of the money advanced for her benefit.

1. Law: What does the doctrine of quasi-contract provide? Explain.
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for Susan Thompson-Powell not to pay back half of the
money borrowed from Samuel E. Powell Sr.?
3. Ethics: What is the doctrine of quasi-contract designed to prevent? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. For the complete opinion of this case, conduct a search at www.google.com.
2. Visit the website of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware at www.courts.
delaware.gov.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the doctrine of
quasi-contract.
20 Chapter 1
formal contract FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS

A contract that requires a special
form or method of creation. Contracts may be classified as either formal or informal. Formal contracts are con-
negotiable instrument
tracts that require a special form or method of creation. The Restatement (Second)
Commercial paper that must meet of Contracts identifies the following types of formal contracts:6
these requirements: (1) be in writ- • Negotiable instruments. Negotiable instruments, which include checks, drafts,
ing, (2) be signed by the maker or notes, and certificates of deposit, are special forms of contracts recognized by
drawer, (3) be an unconditional
the UCC. They require a special form and language for their creation and
promise or order to pay, (4) state a
must meet certain requirements for transfer.
fixed amount of money, (5) not
require any undertaking in addition
• Letters of credit. A letter of credit is an agreement by the issuer of the letter
to the payment of money, (6) be to pay a sum of money upon the receipt of an invoice and other documents.
payable on demand or at a definite Letters of credit are governed by the UCC.
time, and (7) be payable to order or • Recognizances. In a recognizance, a party acknowledges in court that he or
to bearer. A special form of contract she will pay a specified sum of money if a certain event occurs. A bail bond is
that satisfies the requirement estab- an example of a recognizance.
lished by Article 3 of the UCC. Also • Contracts under seal. This type of contract is one to which a seal (usually a
called commercial paper. wax seal) is attached. Although no state currently requires contracts to be
letter of credit under seal, a few states provide that no consideration is necessary if a con-
A written instrument addressed by tract is made under seal.
one person to another requesting All contracts that do not qualify as formal contracts are called informal con-
the latter to give credit to the person
tracts (or simple contracts). The term is a misnomer. Valid informal contracts (e.g.,
in whose favor it is drawn.
leases, sales contracts, service contracts) are fully enforceable and may be sued
bail bond upon if breached. They are called informal contracts only because no special form
A three-party contract that involves or method is required for their creation.
the state, the accused, and a surety
(such as a bonding company) VALID, VOID, VOIDABLE, AND
under which the surety guarantees
the state that the accused will UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
appear in court as the case proceeds.
Contract law places contracts in the following categories:
informal contract
1. Valid contract. A valid contract meets all the essential elements to establish
A contract that is not formal. Valid
a contract. In other words, it must (1) consist of an agreement between the
informal contracts are fully enforce-
able and may be sued upon if
parties, (2) be supported by legally sufficient consideration, (3) be between
breached. parties with contractual capacity, and (4) accomplish a lawful object. A valid
contract is enforceable by at least one of the parties.
valid contract 2. Void contract. A void contract has no legal effect. It is as if no contract had
A contract that meets all of the ever been created.
essential elements to establish a
contract; a contract that is enforce- Example: A contract to commit a crime is void. If a contract is void, neither
able by at least one of the parties. party is obligated to perform, and neither party can enforce the contract.
void contract 3. Voidable contract. A voidable contract is one where at least one party has
A contract that has no legal effect; a the option to avoid his or her contractual obligations. If the contract is
nullity. avoided, both parties are released from their obligations under the contract.
voidable contract If the party with the option chooses to ratify the contract, both parties must
A contract where one or both parties fully perform their obligations.
have the option to avoid their con-
Example: With certain exceptions, contracts may be voided by minors,
tractual obligations. If a contract is
avoided, both parties are released
insane persons, intoxicated persons, persons acting under duress or undue
from their contractual obligations. influence or fraud, and in cases involving a mutual mistake.
6
4. Unenforceable contract. With an unenforceable contract, there is some legal unenforceable contract
defense to the enforcement of the contract. A contract where the essential ele-
ments to create a valid contract are
Example: If a contract is required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds met, but there is some legal defense
but is not, the contract is unenforceable. The parties may voluntarily perform to the enforcement of the contract.
a contract that is unenforceable.
executed contract
EXECUTED AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS A contract that has been fully per-
A completed contract—that is, one that has been fully performed on both sides—is formed on both sides; a completed
contract.
called an executed contract. A contract that has not been performed by both sides
is called an executory contract. Contracts that have been fully performed by one executory contract
side but not by the other are classified as executory contracts. A contract that has not yet been
fully completed or performed.
Example: Suppose Elizabeth Andrews signs a contract to purchase a new Jaguar
automobile from Ace Motors. She has not yet paid for the car, and Ace Motors has
not yet delivered it. This is an executory contract. Assume the car was paid for, but
Ace Motors has not yet delivered the car. Here, the contract is executed by Elizabeth
but is executory as to Ace Motors. This is an executory contract. Assume that Ace
Motors now delivers the car to Elizabeth. The contract has been fully performed by
both parties. It is an executed contract.
Concept Summary
Classifications of Contracts
FORMATION
1. Bilateral contract. A promise for a promise.
2. Unilateral contract. A promise for an act.
3. Express contract. A contract expressed in oral or written words.
4. Implied-in-fact contract. A contract inferred from the conduct of the parties.
5. Quasi-contract. A contract implied by law to prevent unjust enrichment.
6. Formal contract. A contract that requires a special form or method of creation.
7. Informal contract. A contract that requires no special form or method of
creation.
ENFORCEABILITY
1. Valid contract. A contract that meets all the essential elements of establishing
a contract.
2. Void contract. No contract exists.
3. Voidable contract. A contract for which a party has the option of voiding or
enforcing the contract.
4. Unenforceable contract. A contract that cannot be enforced because of a legal
defense.
PERFORMANCE
1. Executed contract. A contract that is fully performed on both sides.
2. Executory contract. A contract that is not fully performed by one or both parties.
22 Chapter 1
International Law
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods
United Nations Convention on The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
Contracts for the International Sale tional Sale of Goods (CISG) came into effect on January 1, 1988,
of Goods (CISG) climaxing more than 50 years of negotiations. The CISG is the work of
Seventy countries and several inter- many countries and several international organizations. There are now
national organizations created this approximately 70 signature countries to the CISG. In adopting the CISG,
law, which governs contracts for the the UN stated the following in its preamble:
international sale of goods.
PREAMBLE
The State Parties to This Convention,
Considering that the development of international trade on the
basis of equality and mutual benefit is an important element in pro-
moting friendly relations among States,
Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform rules which
govern contracts for the international sale of goods and take into
account the different social, economic and legal systems would
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and
promote the development of international trade,
Have agreed as follows:
[The text of the CISG followed the Preamble]
The CISG provides legal rules that govern the formation, per-
formance, and enforcement of international contracts entered into
between international businesses. Many of its provisions are remark-
ably similar to those of the U.S. UCC, for example. It incorporates
rules from all the major legal systems. It has, accordingly, received
widespread support from developed, developing, and communist
countries.
The CISG applies to contracts for the international sale of goods.
That is, the buyer and seller must have their places of business in differ-
ent countries. In addition, either (1) both of the nations must be parties
to the convention or (2) the contract must specify that the CISG con-
trols. The contracting parties may agree to exclude (i.e., opt out of) or
modify its application.
Web Exercises
1. To view the CISG, go to www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/CISG.pdf.
2. Use www.google.com to find out whether the United States has
adopted the CISG.

Integrity
Fear of discipline (or losing one’s job) is an inadequate and, at best,
only partial motivation for paralegals to conduct themselves as legal
professionals with integrity. More likely is that the paralegal’s basic integ-
rity is what will influence that paralegal’s professional behavior.
However, because legal professionals are held to such high stand-
ards of moral and ethical conduct, all states have adopted rules to
encourage a legal professional’s ethical behavior where basic integrity
might be lacking. The majority of states have adopted their rules from
the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.7
ABA Model Rule 8.1 states that legal professionals should be persons of
integrity.
The paralegal should be aware that violations of ethics rules can lead
to serious sanctions. If an attorney violates an ethical rule, sanctions range
from disbarment for extremely unethical activities to a warning for minor
infractions. Paralegals must always be aware that under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, their actions are imputed to the supervising attor-
ney. In other words, if the paralegal does something unethical, the attor-
ney will receive the punishment for that paralegal’s unethical behavior.
Although most of ethics rules pertain exclusively to attorneys, the
paralegal can also personally face serious penalties for unethical con-
duct. These penalties range from criminal and civil penalties to contempt
of court charges, fines, and even a jail sentence. Ethics violations are nor-
mally investigated and prosecuted by the state bar association, the state
disciplinary council, or the local bar association’s grievance committees.
So ethical paralegals should always conduct themselves with
integrity—a broad concept that includes morality, ethics, etiquette,
and professional values and attitudes.
7
Copies of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are available from Service Center, American Bar Asso-
ciation, 321 North Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60610, 1-800-285-2221. The Model Rules can also be viewed online at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html.
CHAPTER 1 SUMMARY
CONTRACT OVERVIEW, p. 5 Elements of a Contract
Definition of Contract 1. Agreement
2. Consideration
A contract is “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 3. Contractual capacity
which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which 4. Lawful object
the law in some way recognizes a duty.”
Parties to a Contract Defenses to the Enforcement of a Contract

1. Offeror. The party who makes an offer to enter into a 1. Genuineness of assent
contract is the offeror. 2. Writing and form
2. Offeree. The party to whom the offer is made is the offeree.
24 Chapter 1
Forms Contracts 4. Implied-in-fact contract. This is a contract implied

from the conduct of the parties.
SOURCES OF CONTRACT LAW, p. 8 5. Quasi-contract. This is a contract implied by law to
prevent unjust enrichment and unjust detriment.
Sources of Contract Law 6. Formal contract. This is a contract that requires a spe-
1. Common law of contracts (law) cial form or method for creation.
2. Uniform Commercial Code (law) 7. Informal contract. This is a contract that requires no
3. Restatement (Second) of Contracts (advisory only, not law) special form or method for creation.
Theories of Contract Law Enforceability

1. Classical law of contracts. According to this theory, 1. Valid contract. A valid contract meets all the essential
parties were free to negotiate contract terms without elements to establish a contract.
government interference. 2. Void contract. No contract exists.
2. Modern law of contracts. According to this theory, 3. Voidable contract. A voidable contract is one where
parties may negotiate contract terms subject to govern- one or both parties have the option of avoiding or en-
ment regulations. forcing the contract.
4. Unenforceable contract. An unenforceable contract is a
contract that cannot be enforced because of a legal defense.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS,
p. 14 Performance
Formation 1. Executed contract. A contract that is fully performed
1. Bilateral contract. This is a promise for a promise. on both sides is called an executed contract.
2. Unilateral contract. This is a promise for an act. 2. Executory contract. A contract that is not fully per-
3. Express contract. This is a contract expressed in oral or formed by one or both parties is called an executory
written words. contract.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Agreement 7 Formal contract 20 Restatement of the Law of Contracts 9
Article 2 (Sales) 8 Genuineness of assent 8 Sales contract 8
Article 2A (Leases) 8 Informal contract (simple contract) 20 Standard Form Contracts 6
Bail bond 20 Implied-in-fact contract 15 The United Nations Convention on
Bilateral contract 15 Lawful object 7 Contracts for the International Sale
Classical law of contracts 5 Lease contract 8 of Goods (CISG) 22
Common law 5 Legally enforceable 4 Unenforceable contract 21
Common law of contracts 8 Letter of credit 20 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 8
Consideration 7 Negotiable instrument 20 Uniform Computer Information
Contract 6 Objective theory of contracts 10 Transactions Act (UCITA) 9
Contractual capacity 7 Offeree 7 Unilateral contract 15
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) 6 Offeror 7 Valid contract 20
Executed contract 21 Quasi-contract (implied-in-law Void contract 20
Executory contract 21 contract) 18 Voidable contract 20
Express contract 15 Reasonable person standard 10 Writing and form 8
CASE SCENARIO REVISITED

Let’s go back to the Case Scenario at the beginning of the implied-in-fact contract could result from the conduct of
chapter. What would be the focus of your law firm’s repre- unmarried persons who live together? To help you with your
sentation of Casey against Tom? Now that you understand answer, take a look at the case of Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
more about implied-in-fact contracts, do you think an 106 (Cal. 1976).
INTERNET EXERCISES AND CASE QUESTIONS

Working the Web Internet Exercises 3. For international sales contracts, compare the CISG
and the UCC by visiting the website www.cisg.law.
1. Go to www.findlaw.com and review the extensive
material on contracts. Determine the statute of limita- pace.edu, which contains the entire text of the CISG
and related information.
tions on written contracts in your jurisdiction.
4. What is the rule regarding contractual capacity of
2. Review www.perkinscoie.com as an example of
minors in your jurisdiction? Use www.findlaw.com
one law firm’s website. Examine the materials col-
again to locate the statute. Hint: Using FindLaw, nar-
lected there on contract law by using the search
row your search by selecting your state first. Then
feature for “contracts.” How many different kinds
enter your search terms.
can you find?
SKILL-BUILDING EXERCISE
All contracts begin with an “introductory paragraph” that Exercise:
sets out the date and the names of the parties contracting,
Using the above sample format along with the facts from the
using a format such as this:
Portfolio Exercise at the end of Chapter 4, draft this first
AGREEMENT dated the day of , 20 introductory sentence of a contract.
, between and .
HANDS-ON DRAFTING EXERCISE

Topic: Exercise/Assignment:
Nondisclosure Agreement Draft a short nondisclosure agreement to be signed by all
employees of All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc.
Facts:
Sources:
Emma, Grace, and Jack form a business and call it “All You Can
Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc.” All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Use paragraph 8 of the sample Contract for Sale of Equip-
Inc., sells ice cream to both grocery stores and individual con- ment in Appendix C as a guide for drafting the nondisclo-
sumers and has come to you for its contract drafting needs. sure agreement.
Emma, Grace, and Jack, as owners of All You Can Eat
Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., are concerned about keeping secret
the ingredients they use to make their ice cream.
CRITICAL LEGAL THINKING CASES

Critical Legal Thinking Case 1.1 Bilateral or Unilateral at 7½ percent interest. Adams then resigned from the bank.
Contract G. S. Adams Jr., vice president of the Washington The bank notified Bickham that general economic changes
Bank & Trust Co., met with Bruce Bickham. An agreement made it necessary to charge a higher rate of interest on both
was reached whereby Bickham agreed to do his personal and outstanding and new loans. Bickham sued the bank for
corporate banking business with the bank and the bank breach of contract. Was the contract a bilateral or a unilateral
agreed to loan Bickham money at 7½ percent interest per contract? Does Bickham win? Bickham v. Washington Bank
annum. Bickham would have 10 years to repay the loans. For & Trust Co., 515 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 1987).
the next two years the bank made several loans to Bickham
26 Chapter 1
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 1.1 The Lewiston Lodge of Elks sponsored a Ethics Case 1.2 Loren Vranich, a doctor practicing under
golf tournament at the Fairlawn Country Club in Poland, the corporate name Family Health Care, P.C., entered into a
Maine. For promotional purposes, Marcel Motors, an auto- written employment contract to hire Dennis Winkel. The con-
mobile dealership, agreed to give any golfer who shot a hole- tract provided for an annual salary, insurance benefits, and
in-one a new Dodge automobile. Fliers advertising the other employment benefits. Another doctor, Dr. Quan, also
tournament were posted in the Elks Club and sent to poten- practiced with Dr. Vranich. About nine months later, when
tial participants. On the day of the tournament, the new Dr. Quan left the practice, Vranich and Winkel entered into an
Dodge automobile was parked near the clubhouse with one oral modification of their written contract whereby Winkel
of the posters conspicuously displayed on the vehicle. Alphee was to receive a higher salary and a profit-sharing bonus.
Chenard Jr., who had seen the promotional literature regard- During the next year, Winkel received the increased salary.
ing the hole-in-one offer, registered for the tournament and However, a disagreement arose, and Winkel sued to recover
paid the requisite entrance fee. While playing the 13th hole the profit-sharing bonus. Under Montana law, a written con-
of the golf course, in the presence of the other members of tract can be altered only in writing or by an executed oral
his foursome, Chenard shot a hole-in-one. When Marcel agreement. Dr. Vranich argued that the contract could not be
Motors refused to tender the automobile, Chenard sued for enforced because it was not in writing. Does Winkel receive
breach of contract. Was the contract a bilateral or a unilateral the profit-sharing bonus? Did Dr. Vranich act ethically in rais-
contract? Does Chenard win? Was it ethical for Marcel ing the defense that the contract was not in writing? Winkel v.
Motors to refuse to give the automobile to Chenard? Chenard Family Health Care, P.C., 668 P.2d 208 (Mont. 1983).
v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978).
BRIEFING THE CASE WRITING ASSIGNMENT

Read Case B.1 in Appendix B (Mark Realty, Inc. v. Rogness). 3. Which party did the appellate court find in favor of?
This case is excerpted from the appellate court’s opinion. What evidence did the court cite in reaching its
Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) using the IRAC conclusion?
method. After briefing the case, you should be able to answer 4. How might owners of property protect themselves
the following questions: from paying a broker’s commission if the owners sold
the property themselves?
1. Who is the plaintiff? Who is the defendant?
2. Why did it make a difference if the court found the
contract to be unilateral or bilateral? Who would win
in each situation?
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
SCRABBLE OWNER HELD LIABLE ON
AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
“Finding that S & R had denied the existence of the contract in bad faith and without
probable cause, the district court impose[d] punitive damages on S & R. This factual find-
ing was not clearly erroneous. Indeed defendants have offered no evidence to suggest that
they acted in good faith. We therefore affirm the initial $100,000 punitive damage award.”
Judge Goodwin
Implied-in-fact contracts are implied from the conduct of the parties. Consider the
following case. Selchow & Richter Company (S&R) owns the trademark to the
famous board game Scrabble. Mark Landsberg wrote a book on strategy for winning
at Scrabble and contacted S&R to request permission to use the Scrabble trademark.
In response, S&R requested a copy of Landsberg’s manuscript, which he provided.
After prolonged negotiations between the parties regarding the possibility of S&R’s
publication of the manuscript broke off, S&R brought out its own Scrabble strategy
book. No express contract was ever entered into between Landsberg and S&R. Lands-
berg sued S&R for damages for breach of an implied contract.
Was there an implied-in-fact contract between the parties? The U.S. District Court
and the U.S. Court of Appeals held that an implied-in-fact contract had been formed
between the parties and that the contract was breached by the defendants. The U.S.
Court of Appeals noted, “California law allows for recovery for the breach of an implied-
in-fact contract when the recipient of a valuable idea accepts the information knowing
that compensation is expected, and subsequently uses the idea without paying for it.”
Here, the court found (1) that Landsberg’s disclosure of his manuscript was con-
fidential and for the limited purpose of obtaining approval for the use of the Scrabble
mark, and (2) given Landsberg’s express intention to exploit his manuscript commer-
cially, the defendant’s use of any portion of it was conditioned on payment. Landsberg
was awarded the profits that S&R made on the sale of the book plus $100,000 punitive
damages, bringing the total award to $440,300. The U.S. Court of Appeals stated,
“Finding that S & R had denied the existence of the contract in bad faith and without
probable cause, the district court impose[d] punitive damages on S & R. This factual
finding was not clearly erroneous. Indeed defendants have offered no evidence to sug-
gest that they acted in good faith. We therefore affirm the initial $100,000 punitive
damage award.” Landsberg v. Selchow & Richter Co., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).

1. Critical Thinking: Does the implied-in-fact doctrine provide any useful
protections? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did Selchow & Richter act ethically in this case?
3. Ethics: Will the doctrine of implied-in-fact contract encourage more
ethical behavior?
4. Ethics: Was the award of punitive damages justified in this case? Why or
why not?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov.
2. Go to the website www.scrabble.com. This is the official web page for
Scrabble.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses strategy for playing
Scrabble.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”
—Lewis Carroll
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865)
chapter 2
AGREEMENT
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Cheryl and Jim, CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
husband and wife. One Friday night after work, Cheryl and Jim were drink-
ing margaritas with their friend Nicholas.1 Jim made a written offer to sell should be able to:
Nicholas 600 acres of hunting property that the couple owns for $5,000. Nicholas 1. Define offer and acceptance.
appeared to take the offer seriously and offered $5 to bind the deal. The next 2. Identify the terms that can be implied in
day, Nicholas pressured Jim and Cheryl to close on the hunting property. a contract.
Because the property is actually worth $500,000, Jim and Cheryl refused to 3. Understand special offers like auctions
and advertisements.
perform the contract.
4. Define counteroffer, and describe the
effects of counteroffers.
5. Describe how offers are terminated.
6. Describe auctions.
7. Understand how an offer can be
accepted, including acceptance by
silence.
1
The specific issue of voluntary intoxication as it relates to capacity to contract is discussed in
Chapter 4. For now, focus on the broader issue of whether this was a serious offer.
29
30 Chapter 2
Contracts are voluntary agreements between the parties—that is, one party makes an
offer that is accepted by the other party. Without mutual assent, there is no contract.
Assent may be expressly evidenced by the oral or written words of the parties or
implied from the conduct of the parties. This chapter discusses offer and acceptance.
Allison Alger graduated in 2004 My responsibilities include drafting numer-
with her bachelor’s degree in parale- ous legal documents for the attorneys’ review, such
gal from Lewis-Clark State College as on business and property matters, preparing and
in Lewiston, Idaho. She works in witnessing wills and other documents for estate
Lewiston as a legal assistant for the planning, preparing agreements in divorce matters,
firm of Aherin, Rice & Anegon. and researching the breach of duty or contracts in
legal malpractice cases. A substantial portion of my
I work in a law firm with three work is done independently under the guidelines
attorneys who all do very differ- set forth to me by each attorney.
ent work, such as personal injury, medical malprac- It is vital for me to have a clear understanding
tice, workers’ compensation, family law, criminal of contract law to perform my work. I believe that
work, and probates. Primarily, I work with cases this understanding comes from applying the valuable
involving business matters (corporations, LLCs, knowledge that I gained in the classroom to each of
etc.), estate planning, probates, property matters, the cases that I am presented with in the workplace.
divorces, legal malpractice, and personal injury.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: COLLECTIONS PARALEGAL
A collections paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
Preliminary Investigation
• Obtain all documentation from the client concerning the account, including
information about the debtor, invoices, contracts, promissory notes, payments,
and related correspondence.
• Investigate public records for information about debtor’s financial status, includ-
ing real estate records and prior judgments.
• Draft demand letter to debtor.
Commencement of Formal Action

• Draft complaint and prepare exhibits (such as a copy of the contract) in support
of complaint.
• Monitor date for response to complaint and, if appropriate, draft motion for
default judgment for attorney review.
• Assist attorney at hearing for initial claim for plaintiff.
• Draft documents for examination of debtor for attorney review; assist attorney
with examination.
• Draft sworn denial if collection is sued on a sworn account.
• Draft journal entry, default or otherwise.
• Obtain certified copy of judgment transcript.
Agreement 31
Post-Judgment Activities
• Abstract the judgment, obtain a writ of execution, and request that the sheriff
attempt to collect what is owed on the writ of execution.
• Arrange for indemnity bond from sheriff.
• Draft notice of lien on real property.
• Prepare bid and attend sheriff ’s sale of real property.
• Track redemption period and, if appropriate, prepare documents to redeem real
property.
• Arrange for posting or publication of notice of sale.
• Maintain communication with sheriff about levy on personal property.
• Negotiate agreement for payment arrangements for attorney/client approval.
• Draft promissory note reflecting payment agreement.
• Correspond with client informing status of collection.
• Maintain judgment account worksheet to record payments, collection costs, and
court costs.
• When debt is collected, draft satisfaction of judgment to release judgment.
• Draft release of judgment or release of lien.
• If or when appropriate, file request for dismissal form.
Agreement
An agreement is the manifestation by two or more persons of the substance of a agreement
contract. It requires an offer and an acceptance. The process of reaching an agree- The manifestation by two or more
ment usually proceeds as follows. Prior to entering into a contract, the parties may persons of the substance of a con-
engage in preliminary negotiations about price, time of performance, and such. At tract.
some point during these negotiations, one party makes an offer. The person who offeror
makes the offer is called the offeror, and the person to whom the offer is made is The party who makes an offer to
called the offeree. The offer sets forth the terms under which the offeree is willing enter into a contract. The party who
to enter into the contract. The offeree has the power to create an agreement by makes an offer.
accepting the offer. offeree
The party to whom an offer to enter
into a contract is made. The party to
OFFER whom an offer has been made.
Section 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts2 defines an offer as “the mani- offer
festation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person The manifestation of willingness
in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” to enter into a bargain, so made
The following three elements are required for an offer to be effective: as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to
1. The offeror must objectively intend to be bound by the offer. that bargain is invited and will
2. The terms of the offer must be definite or reasonably certain. conclude it. (Section 24 of
3. The offer must be communicated to the offeree. Restatement [Second] of Contracts)
Exhibit 2.1 shows the making of an offer.
2
Again, remember that the Restatement is not “law.” The Restatement is a summary of judge-made doctrines and
input from law professors, practicing attorneys, and judges. However, even though the Restatement is not law, it is
held in very high regard as an authority on the topic of contract law and is followed by many courts.
32 Chapter 2
EXHIBIT 2.1 Offer
Offer
Offeror Offeree
Offeror makes an
offer to the offeree.
Objective Intent
objective theory of contracts The intent to enter into a contract is determined using the objective theory of
A theory that says that the intent to contracts—that is, whether a reasonable person viewing the circumstances would
contract is judged by the reasonable conclude that the parties intended to be legally bound. Subjective intent is irrele-
person standard and not by the sub- vant. Therefore, no valid contract results from preliminary negotiations, offers
jective intent of the parties. that are an expression of opinion, or offers made in jest, anger, or undue
excitement.
Preliminary negotiations: For example, a question such as “Are you inter-
ested in selling your building for $2 million?” is not an offer. It is an invitation to
make an offer or an invitation to negotiate. The statement, “I will buy your building
for $2 million” is a valid offer, however, because it indicates the offeror’s present
intent to contract.
Offers that are made in jest, anger, or undue excitement: For example,
suppose the owner of Company A has lunch with the owner of Company B. In the
course of their conversation, Company A’s owner exclaims in frustration, “For two
dollars I’d sell the whole computer division!” An offer such as that cannot result in
a valid contract.
Offers that are an expression of an opinion: A lawyer who tells her client
that she thinks the lawsuit will result in an award of $100,000 cannot be sued for
the difference if the trial jury awards only $50,000. The lawyer’s statement is not an
enforceable promise.
Definiteness of Terms
The terms of an offer must be clear enough for the offeree to be able to decide
whether to accept or reject the terms of the offer. If the terms are indefinite, the
courts cannot enforce the contract or determine an appropriate remedy for its
breach.
To be considered definite, an offer (and contract) generally must contain the
following terms: (1) identification of the parties, (2) identification of the subject
matter and quantity, (3) consideration to be paid, and (4) time of performance.
Complex contracts usually state additional terms.
The common law of contracts required an exact specification of contract
terms. If one essential term was omitted, the courts would hold that no contract
had been made. This rule was inflexible.
The modern law of contracts is more lenient. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts merely requires that the terms of the offer be “reasonably certain.” 3
3
Agreement 33
Accordingly, the court can supply a missing term if a reasonable term can be
implied.4 The definition of reasonable depends on the circumstances. Terms that
are supplied in this way are called implied terms. implied term
Generally, time of performance can be implied. Price can be implied if there A term in a contract that can
is a market or source from which to determine the price of the item or service—for reasonably be supplied by the
example, the “blue book” for an automobile price, the New York Stock Exchange courts.
for a stock price. The parties or subject matter of the contract usually cannot be
implied if an item or a service is unique or personal, such as the construction of a
house or the performance of a professional sports contract.
In the following case, the court applied the adage “A contract is a contract is a
contract.”
CASE 2.1 CONTRACT

Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2006).
“Though in hindsight the agreement appears to be unfair to Marder—she
only received $2,300 in exchange for a release of all claims relating
to a movie that grossed over $150 million.”
Judge Pregerson,
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Facts
The movie Flashdance tells a story of a woman construction worker who performs
at night as an exotic dancer. She performs an innovative form of dancing that
includes a chair dance. Her goal is to obtain formal dance training at a university.
The movie is based on the life of Maureen Marder, a nightclub dancer. Paramount
Pictures Corporation used information from Marder to create the screenplay for
the movie. Paramount paid Marder $2,300 and Marder signed a General Release
that provides that Marder “releases and discharges Paramount Pictures Corpora-
tion…of and from each and every claim, demand, debt, liability, cost and expense
of any kind or character which have risen or are based in whole or in part on any
matters occurring at any time prior to the date of this Release.” Marder also released
Paramount from claims “arising out of or in any way connected with either directly
or indirectly, any and all arrangements . . . in connection with the preparation of
screenplay material and the production, filming and exploitation of . . . Flashdance.”
Paramount released the movie Flashdance, which grossed over $150 million
in domestic box office and is still shown on television and distributed through DVD
rentals. Subsequently, Sony Music Entertainment paid Paramount for release of
copyright and produced a music video for the Jennifer Lopez song “I’m Glad.” The
video featured Lopez’s performance as a dancer and singer. Marder believed that
the video contains re-creations of many well-known scenes from Flashdance.
Marder brought a lawsuit in U.S. district court against Paramount, Sony, and
Lopez. Marder sought a declaration that she had rights as a co-author of Flashdance
and a co-owner with Paramount of the copyright to Flashdance. She sued Sony and
4
Section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that an offer that the offeror should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and that does
induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.
34 Chapter 2
Lopez for allegedly violating her copyright in Flashdance. The district court dis-
missed Marder’s claims against Paramount, Sony, and Lopez. Marder appealed.
Issue
Was the General Release signed by Marder an enforceable contract?

The Release’s language is exceptionally broad and we hold that it is fatal to each of
Marder’s claims against Paramount. Such a release of “each and every claim” covers
all claims within the scope of the language. Accordingly, the law imputes to Marder
an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of her words and acts. Here,
Marder released a broad array of claims relating to any assistance she provided dur-
ing the creation of a Hollywood movie. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of
the Release is that it encompasses the various copyright claims she asserts in the
instant suit.
Though in hindsight the agreement appears to be unfair to Marder—she only
received $2,300 in exchange for a release of all claims relating to a movie that grossed
over $150 million—there is simply no evidence that her consent was obtained by
fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence.
We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of claims against Sony and Lopez.
As we held above, under the terms of the Release, Marder cannot sue Paramount to
assert a co-ownership in Flashdance. It is therefore impossible for her to establish a
prima facie case of copyright infringement against Sony and Lopez.
Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the General Release signed by Marder was an
enforceable contract. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court that dismissed Marder’s complaint against Paramount, Sony, and Lopez.

1. Critical Thinking: What does the adage “A contract is a contract is a con-
tract” mean? Was it applied in this case?
2. Ethics: Why did Marder bring this lawsuit? Did she act ethically in bringing
this lawsuit? Why or why not?
3. Ethics: Do you think Paramount should have paid Marder more money after
the movie Flashdance became a success?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at www.
ca9.uscourts.gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find a video clip from the movie Flashdance.
3. Visit the website of Jennifer Lopez at www.jenniferlopez.com.
4. Use www.google.com to find a video clip of Jennifer Lopez’s music video in
which she dances and sings the song “I’m Glad.”
Agreement 35
Communication
An offer cannot be accepted if it is not communicated to the offeree by the offeror
or a representative or an agent of the offeror.
Example: Suppose Mr. Jones, the CEO of Ace Corporation, wants to sell a manu-
facturing division to Baker Corporation. He puts the offer in writing, but he does
not send it. Assume that Mr. Griswald, the CEO of Baker Corporation, visits
Mr. Jones and sees the written offer lying on Jones’s desk. Griswald tells his CEO
about the offer. Because Mr. Jones never communicated the offer to the CEO of
Baker Corporation, there is no offer to be accepted.
SPECIAL TYPES OF OFFERS

In several special situations there is a question of whether an offer has been made.
Advertisements, rewards, and auctions are examples of such situations. These spe-
cial situations have been complicated by the amount of contracting now done on
the Internet, which includes online auctions. Some of these special offers are dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs.
Advertisements
Advertisements for the sale of goods, even at specific prices, generally are treated advertisement
as invitations to make an offer. A general advertisement is an invita-
tion to make an offer. A specific
Example: Catalogs, price lists, quotation sheets, offering circulars, and other sales advertisement is an offer.
materials are viewed in the same way. This rule is intended to protect advertiser/
sellers from the unwarranted breach of contract suits for nonperformance that
would otherwise arise if the seller ran out of the advertised goods.
There is one exception to this rule: An advertisement is considered an offer if

it is so definite or specific that it is apparent that the advertiser has the present
intent to bind himself or herself to the terms of the advertisement.
Example: An automobile dealer’s advertisement to sell a “previously owned

maroon 2004 Lexus 330 SUV, serial no. 3210674, for $30,000” is an offer. Because
the advertisement identifies the exact automobile for sale, the first person to accept
the offer owns the automobile.
Consider the two examples just cited in light of the case Mesaros v. United
States. In that case, the court had to decide whether an advertisement was a solici-
tation of an offer or an offer.
CASE 2.2 INVITATION TO MAKE AN OFFER

Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
“It is well established that materials such as those mailed to prospective customers
by the Mint are no more than advertisements or invitations to deal.”
Judge Skelton,
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
36 Chapter 2
Facts
The U.S. Congress directed the secretary of the treasury to mint and sell a stated
number of specially minted commemorative coins to raise funds to restore and
renovate the Statue of Liberty. The U.S. Mint mailed advertising materials to
persons, including Mary and Anthony C. Mesaros, husband and wife, that described
the various types of coins that were to be issued. Payment could be made by check,
money order, or credit card. The materials included an order form. Directly above
the space provided on this form for the customer’s signature was the following:
“YES, Please accept my order for the U.S. Liberty Coins I have indicated.” Mary
Mesaros forwarded to the mint a credit-card order of $1,675 for certain coins,
including the $5 gold coin. All credit-card orders were forwarded by the Mint to
Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for verification, which took a period of
time. Meanwhile, cash orders were filled immediately, and orders by check were
filled as the checks cleared. The issuance of 500,000 gold coins was exhausted before
Mesaros’s credit-card order could be filled. The Mint sent a letter to the Mesaroses,
notifying them of this fact. The gold coin increased in value by 200 percent within
the first few months of 1986. Mary and Anthony C. Mesaros filed a class action
lawsuit against the United States, seeking in the alternative either damages for
breach of contract or a decree of mandamus ordering the Mint to deliver the gold
coins to the plaintiffs. The district court held for the Mint. The Mesaroses appealed.
Issue
Was the U.S. Mint’s advertisement a solicitation of an offer or an offer?

The plaintiffs contend that the materials sent to them by the Mint, including the
order form, constituted an offer that upon acceptance by the plaintiffs created a
binding contract between them and the government whereby the government was
bound and obligated to deliver the coins ordered by them. The great weight of
authority is against the plaintiffs. It is well established that materials such as those
mailed to prospective customers by the Mint are no more than advertisements or
invitations to deal. They are mere notices and solicitations for offers that create no
power of acceptance in the recipient.
A basic rule of contracts holds that whether an offer has been made depends on
the objective reasonableness of the alleged offeree’s belief that the advertisement or
solicitation was intended as an offer. Generally, it is considered unreasonable for a
person to believe that advertisements and solicitations are offers that bind the adver-
tiser. Otherwise, the advertiser could be bound by an excessive number of contracts
requiring delivery of goods far in excess of amounts available. That is particularly true
in the instant case where the gold coins were limited to 500,000 by the act of Congress.
We conclude that a thorough reading, construction, and interpretation of
the materials sent to the plaintiffs by the Mint makes clear that the contention of the
plaintiffs that they reasonably believed the materials were intended as an offer is
unreasonable as a matter of law. This is especially true in view of the words “YES,
Please accept my order . . .” that were printed on the credit-card form, which showed
that the credit-card order was an offer from the plaintiffs to the Mint to buy the
coins, which offer might or might not be accepted by the Mint. Accordingly, the Mint
materials were intended solely as solicitations of offers from customers that were
subject to acceptance by the Mint before the Mint would be bound by a contract.
Agreement 37
Decision
The court of appeals held that the advertising materials sent out by the U.S. Mint
were a solicitation to make an offer and not an offer. Therefore, the Mint wins.

1. Law: Should an advertisement be treated as an offer instead of as an invita-
tion to make an offer? Why or why not?
2. Ethics: Do you think the Mesaroses acted ethically by suing the Mint?
3. Critical Thinking: Would it cause any problems for businesses if advertise-
ments were considered offers? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit at www.
cafc.uscourts.gov.
2. Visit the website of the U.S. Mint at www.usmint.gov.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses U.S. Liberty Coins and
their value today.
Rewards
An offer to pay a reward (e.g., for the return of lost property or the capture of a reward
criminal) is an offer to form a unilateral contract. To be entitled to collect the To collect a reward, the offeree must
reward, the offeree must (1) have knowledge of the reward offer prior to complet- (1) have knowledge of the reward
ing the requested act and (2) perform the requested act. offer prior to completing the
requested act and (2) perform the
Example: John Anderson accidentally leaves a briefcase containing $500,000 in requested act.
negotiable bonds on a subway train. He places newspaper ads stating, “$5,000
reward for return of briefcase left on a train in Manhattan on January 10, 2010, at
approximately 10 a.m. Call 212-555-6789.” Helen Smith, who is unaware of the
offer, finds the briefcase. She reads the luggage tag containing Anderson’s name,
address, and telephone number, and she returns the briefcase to him. She is not
entitled to the reward money because she did not know about it when she per-
formed the requested act.
Auctions
At an auction, the seller offers goods for sale through an auctioneer. Unless other-
wise expressly stated, an auction is considered an auction with reserve—that is, it auction with reserve
is an invitation to make an offer. The seller retains the right to refuse the highest Unless expressly stated otherwise,
bid and withdraw the goods from sale. A contract is formed only when the auc- an auction is an auction with
tioneer strikes the gavel down or indicates acceptance by some other means. The reserve—that is, the seller retains
bidder may withdraw his or her bid prior to that time. the right to refuse the highest bid
and withdraw the goods from sale.
If an auction is expressly announced to be an auction without reserve, the
participants reverse the roles: The seller is the offeror, and the bidders are the offer- auction without reserve
ees. The seller must accept the highest bid and cannot withdraw the goods from An auction in which the seller
sale. A seller who sets a minimum bid has to sell the item only if the highest bid is expressly gives up his or her right to
equal to or greater than the minimum bid. withdraw the goods from sale and
In the following case, the court addressed the issue of an auction. must accept the highest bid.
38 Chapter 2
CASE 2.3 AUCTION

Lim v. The.TV Corp. Int’l, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 2002).
“Defendant put the name “Golf.tv” up for public auction, and plaintiff bid on that
name and no other. That was an offer and acceptance, and formed a contract.”
Judge Epstein,
Court of Appeals of California
Facts
The island nation of Tuvalu was awarded the top-level domain name “tv.” Thus,
Tuvalu controlled who could use domain names with the suffix “tv” on the Inter-
net. For example, if a person named Jones acquired the suffix tv, her domain name
on the Internet would be “jones.tv.” Tuvalu hired The.TV Corporation Interna-
tional, a California corporation doing business under the name dotTV, to sell
Internet names bearing the top-level domain name “tv.” In April 2000, dotTV
posted the name “golf.tv” for sale on its website, to be sold to the highest bidder.
Je Ho Lim, a resident of South Korea, submitted the highest bid of $1,010 and
authorized dotTV to charge his credit card for the amount of the bid. DotTV sent
the following e-mail to Lim confirming the sale:
DotTV—The New Frontier on the Internet
E-Mail Invoice for Domain Registration
NAME: Je Ho Lim
Congratulations!
You have won the auction for the following domain name:
DOMAIN NAME: --golf
SUBSCRIPTION LENGTH: 2 years, starts from activation date
Amount (US$): $1,010 (first year registration fee)
Please remember that the annual registration fee increases by 5% annually.
You have the guaranteed right to renew the registration indefinitely.
DotTV expects to charge your card and activate the registered domain name
by May 15, 2000.
See ya on the new frontier of the Internet!
Lou Kerner CEO, dotTV Corporation www.TV
Shortly thereafter, dotTV sent another e-mail to Lim that stated, “We have decided
to release you from your bid” and that Lim should disregard the prior e-mail because
of “an e-mail error that occurred.” Later, dotTV publicly offered the domain name
“golf.tv” with a beginning bid of $1 million. DotTV claimed that its original e-mail to
Lim concerned a different domain name, “--golf,” instead of “golf.” Lim countered
that characters such as two dashes (“--”) are not recognized on the Internet and
therefore the name “--golf” is an invalid domain name. When dotTV refused to
transfer the domain name “golf.tv” to Lim, Lim sued dotTV for breach of contract.
The trial court dismissed Lim’s case against dotTV. Lim appealed.
Issue
Did Lim properly state a cause of action for breach of contract against dotTV?
Agreement 39

Defendant put the name “Golf.tv” up for public auction, and plaintiff bid on that
name and no other. That was an offer and acceptance, and it formed a contract. The
distinction between “Golf.tv” and “--Golf.tv” comes from the acceptance e-mail sent
by defendant. Certainly the hyphens preceding the name “golf” could not defeat the
existence of an already formed contract. Defendant was accepting plaintiff’s bid; it
plainly was not making a counteroffer, particularly because, according to the plead-
ing, the name “--Golf” did not “compute”; it did not qualify as a domain name. The
e-mail must be read as an acknowledgment of plaintiff’s winning bid and acceptance
of the contract.
Decision
The court of appeals held that plaintiff Lim had properly pleaded a cause of action
against defendant dotTV for breach of contract and reinstated Lim’s case against
dotTV.

1. Law: Explain the difference between an auction with reserve and an auction
without reserve. Which is presumed if there is no other statement to the con-
trary?
2. Ethics: Did dotTV act ethically in this case? Why do you think that dotTV
reneged on its e-mail confirmation to Lim?
3. Critical Thinking: Are Internet domain names valuable? How do you regis-
ter an Internet domain name?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate Dis-
trict, at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/courtsofappeal.
2. Visit the website of dotTV at www.tv.
3. Think up an Internet domain name you would like to have. Go to the Network
Solutions website at www.networksolutions.com to see if that name is available.
Online Auctions
Auctions have been used traditionally to sell horses, antiques, paintings, and
other such one-of-a-kind items. A bidder usually had to be physically present
at the auction to bid, although some auctions allow telephone bids from pre-
qualified callers. Because of these restrictions, auctions used to occupy a small
portion of the U.S. economy. But no more, thanks to the advent of the
Internet.
Led by the giant online auction house eBay, online auctions have exploded
on the Internet. eBay started as a small online auction house that made a market
in such consumer collectibles as Pez dispensers, Beanie Babies, and rare books.
After seeing how successful this mode of business was for these items, eBay
expanded into a full-service online auctioneer. By the year 2000, eBay was
40 Chapter 2
offering several million items each day for sale over the Internet. The millions of
eBay’s cybershoppers are loyal, spending an average of 130 minutes per month at
the eBay auction site.
eBay does not own the items it sells. Instead, sellers list the items they want to
auction on the eBay site, and buyers bid for the items. The purchase contract is
between the cyberseller and the cyberbuyer. One of the problems with Internet auc-
tions is that many sellers do not take credit cards, so payment must be made by check
or cash. Thus, many transactions take days, if not weeks, to complete. eBay takes a 6
percent commission on items sold by its online auction house. In the beginning of
online auctions, most of the goods sold were goods that were customarily sold at flea
markets, antique stores, and classified advertisements. Today, many businesses have
started using eBay auctions to sell their excess inventory or to sell mainstream con-
sumer and business goods. Business sales through online auctions now exceed non-
business sales.
eBay is now receiving stiff competition from many other online auctioneers.
The giant e-commerce leader Amazon.com conducts online auctions, and many
small online auction houses specialize in selling jewelry, baseball cards, horses, and
other items. eBay itself began offering localized auctions in individual cities for
such large items as cars and furniture. Even traditional auction houses such as
Sotheby’s, which auctions pricey items like paintings, jewelry, and antiques, have
begun selling through online auctions. As proven by the success of eBay and other
online auctioneers, consumers and businesses have embraced the dynamic pricing
and fluid give-and-take of Internet auctions.
Concept Summary
Types of Auctions
Type Is It an Offer?
Auction with reserve No. It is an invitation to make an offer. Because the
bidder is the offeror, the seller (the offeree) may
refuse to sell the goods. An auction is with reserve
unless otherwise stated.
Auction without reserve Yes. The seller is the offeror and must sell the goods
to the highest bidder (the offeree). An auction is
without reserve only if it is stipulated as such.
TERMINATION OF OFFERS
An offer may be terminated by the actions of the parties or by operation of laws.
The termination of offers is discussed in the following paragraphs.
Revocation of an Offer by the Offeror

Under the common law, an offeror may revoke (i.e., withdraw) an offer any time prior
to its acceptance by the offeree. Generally, an offer can be so revoked even if the offe-
ror promised to keep the offer open for a longer time. The revocation may be com-
municated to the offeree by the offeror or by a third party and made by (1) the offeror’s
Agreement 41
express statement (e.g., “I hereby withdraw my offer”) or (2) an act of the offeror that
is inconsistent with the offer (e.g., selling the goods to another party). Most states pro-
vide that a revocation is not effective until it is actually received by the offeree or the
offeree’s agent.
Offers made to the public may be revoked by communicating the revocation
by the same means used to make the offer.
Example: If a reward offer for a lost watch was published in two local newspapers
each week for four weeks, notice of revocation must be published in the same
newspapers for the same length of time. The revocation is effective against all
offerees, even those who saw the reward offer but not the notice of revocation.
Rejection of an Offer by the Offeree

An offer is terminated if the offeree rejects it. Any subsequent attempt by the
offeree to accept the offer is ineffective and is construed as a new offer that the
original offeror (now the offeree) is free to accept or reject. A rejection may be evi- rejection
denced by the offeree’s express words (oral or written) or conduct. Generally, a Nonacceptance or withdrawal of the
rejection is not effective until it is actually received by the offeror. offer prior to its acceptance.
Example: Harriet Jackson, sales manager of IBM Corporation, offers to sell 1,000
computers to Ted Green, purchasing manager of General Motors Corporation, for
$250,000. The offer is made on August 1. Green telephones Jackson to say that he is
not interested. This rejection terminates the offer. If Green later decides that he
wants to purchase the computers, an entirely new contract must be formed.
Counteroffer by the Offeree

A counteroffer by the offeree simultaneously terminates the offeror’s offer and cre- counteroffer
ates a new offer. A response by an offeree that
contains terms and conditions
Example: Suppose that Fei Jia says to Harold Brown, “I will sell you my house for different from or in addition to those
$700,000.” Brown says, “I think $700,000 is too high; I will pay you $600,000.” of the offer. A counteroffer
Brown has made a counteroffer. The original offer is terminated, and the counter- terminates an offer.
offer is a new offer that Jia is free to accept or reject.
In the following case, the court found that a counteroffer had been made.
CASE 2.4 COUNTEROFFER

McLaughlin v. Heikkila, 697 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
“A written offer does not evidence a completed contract and a written
acceptance is required.”
Judge Dietzen,
Court of Appeals of Minnesota
Facts
Wilbert Heikkila listed eight parcels of real property for sale. David McLaugh-
lin submitted written offers to purchase three of the parcels. Three printed pur-
chase agreements were prepared and submitted to Heikkila with three
earnest-money checks from McLaughlin. Writing on the purchase agreements,
42 Chapter 2
Heikkila changed the price of one parcel from $145,000 to $150,000, the price
of another parcel from $32,000 to $45,000, and the price of the third parcel
from $175,000 to $179,000. Heikkila also changed the closing dates on all three
of the properties, added a reservation of mineral rights to all three, and signed
the purchase agreements.
McLaughlin did not sign the purchase agreements to accept the changes
before Heikkila withdrew his offer to sell. McLaughlin sued to compel specific per-
formance of the purchase agreements under the terms of the agreements before
Heikkila withdrew his offer. The district court granted Heikkila’s motion to dis-
miss McLaughlin’s claim. McLaughlin appealed.
Issue
Did a contract to convey real property exist between Heikkila and McLaughlin?

A written offer does not evidence a completed contract and a written acceptance is
required. Minnesota has followed the “mirror image rule” in analyzing acceptance
of offers. Under that rule, an acceptance must be coextensive with the offer and
may not introduce additional terms or conditions. The district court correctly con-
cluded that Heikkila’s alterations of the purchase agreements constituted a rejec-
tion and counteroffer. Heikkila withdrew the counteroffer before McLaughlin
provided a written acceptance, as he was entitled to do. Only a written acceptance
by McLaughlin of the written terms proposed by Heikkila on the purchase agree-
ments would have created a binding contract for the sale of land. Without a writ-
ten acceptance and delivery to the other party to the agreement, no contract was
formed.
Decision
The court of appeals held that because McLaughlin did not sign or otherwise
accept in writing Heikkila’s counteroffers, there was no contract for the sale of
land between the parties. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Heikkila.

1. Law: What is a counteroffer? When a counteroffer is made, what happens to
the prior offer?
2. Law: The term mirror image is used in this case. Look up that term in a legal
dictionary or thesaurus.
3. Ethics: Did McLaughlin have much of a chance to win this lawsuit?
4. Ethics: Did Heikkila act ethically in withdrawing his offers in this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Minnesota at www.courts.state.
mn.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses counteroffers.
Agreement 43
Concept Summary
Termination of an Offer by Action of the Parties
Action Description
Revocation The offeror revokes (withdraws) the offer any time prior to its
acceptance by the offeree.
Rejection The offeree rejects the offer by his or her words or conduct.
Counteroffer A counteroffer by the offeree creates a new offer and termi-
nates the offeror’s offer.
Destruction of the Subject Matter

An offer terminates if the subject matter of the offer is destroyed through no fault
of either party prior to the offer’s acceptance. For example, if a fire destroys an
office building that has been listed for sale, the offer automatically terminates.
Death or Incompetency of the Offeror or Offeree

The death or incompetency of either the offeror or the offeree terminates an offer.
Notice of the other party’s death or incompetence is not a requirement.
Example: Suppose that on June 1, Shari Hunter offers to sell her house to Damian
Coe for $100,000, provided he decides on or before June 15. Hunter dies on June 7,
before Coe has made up his mind. Because there is no contract prior to her death,
the offer automatically terminates on June 7.
Supervening Illegality
If the object of an offer is made illegal prior to the acceptance of the offer, the offer
terminates. This situation, which usually occurs when a statute is enacted or a
court case is announced that makes the object of the offer illegal, is called a super- supervening illegality
vening illegality. The enactment of a statute,
regulation, or court decision that
Example: Suppose City Bank offers to loan ABC Corporation $5 million at an makes the object of an offer illegal.
18 percent interest rate. Prior to ABC’s acceptance of the offer, the state legislature This action terminates the offer.
enacts a statute that sets a usury interest rate of 12 percent. City Bank’s offer to ABC
Corporation is automatically terminated when the usury statute becomes effective.
Lapse of Time
An offer expires at the lapse of time of an offer. An offer may state that it is effective lapse of time
only until a certain date. Unless otherwise stated, the time period begins to run An offer terminates when a stated
when the offer is actually received by the offeree and terminates when the stated time period expires. If no time is
time period expires. stated, an offer terminates after a
reasonable time.
Example: Statements such as “This offer is good for 10 days” or “This offer must be
accepted by January 1, 2002” are examples of such notices.
If no time is stated in the offer, the offer terminates after a “reasonable time”
dictated by the circumstances. A reasonable time to accept an offer to purchase
stock traded on a national stock exchange may be a few moments, but a reasonable
time to accept an offer to purchase a house may be a few days. Unless otherwise
stated, an offer made face-to-face or during a telephone call usually expires when
the conversation ends.
44 Chapter 2
Sara Hall Low is a graduate of the that were sent out prior to selecting a vendor for the
University of Tennessee at Chat- needed service. Next, I would review the response to
tanooga’s Legal Studies Program. the RFP to ensure that all legal obligations had been
She currently works in the health- met by the chosen vendor. Last, I would use those
care sales industry in Tennessee. documents to draft the contract to be reviewed by my
supervising attorney. It was very important for me to
Before entering into the health- complete all of those tasks in a timely and accurate
care sales industry, I worked as manner to best assist my attorney and the company.
an in-house paralegal for a local utility. As an in- Even though my career has transitioned into
house paralegal, contracts were a part of my daily health-care sales, contracts are still important in my
routine. Our clients were not clients in the tradi- daily routine. To close deals, I have to first review
tional sense of the word. The clients were the other the drafted contract and negotiate its terms to best
divisions in the utility. Those divisions relied on our meet the needs of the clients as well as the needs of
legal expertise to assist them in the closing of con- my company. Contracts are a part of nearly every
tracts and other agreements for services provided industry and are significant in nearly all aspects of
by outside vendors. daily life. My understanding of the legalities sur-
As an in-house paralegal, it was my job to first rounding contracts has greatly assisted me in my
review the request for purchase (RFP) documents success today.
Concept Summary
Termination of an Offer by Operation of Law
Action Description
Destruction of the The subject matter of the offer is destroyed prior to
subject matter acceptance through no fault of either party.
Death or incompetency Prior to acceptance of the offer, either the offeror or
the offeree dies or becomes incompetent.
Supervening illegality Prior to the acceptance of an offer, the object of the
offer is made illegal by statute, regulation, court deci-
sion, or other law.
Lapse of time An offer terminates upon the expiration of a stated
time in the offer. If no time is stated, the offer termi-
nates after a “reasonable time.”
EFFECT OF OPTION CONTRACT ON OFFER

option contract An offeree can use an option contract to prevent the offeror from revoking his or
A method used to prevent the her offer. This will involve the offeree paying the offeror compensation to keep the
offeror from revoking his or her offer. offer open for an agreed-upon period of time. With the option contract, the offeror
This involves the offeree paying the agrees not to sell the property to anyone but the offeree during the option period.
offeror compensation to keep the The death or incompetency of either party does not terminate an option contract
offer open for an agreed-upon
unless the contract is for the performance of a personal service.
period of time. With the option
contract, the offeror agrees not to Example: Anne Mason offers to sell a piece of real estate to Harold Greenberg for
sell the property to anyone but the $1 million. Greenberg wants time to make a decision, so he pays Mason $20,000 to
offeree during the option period.
keep her offer open to him for six months. At any time during the option period,
Agreement 45
Greenberg may exercise his option and pay Mason the $1 million purchase price. If
Greenberg lets the option expire, however, Mason may keep the $20,000 and sell
the property to someone else.
EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY ON OFFERS

Throughout history, contract law has struggled to keep pace with inventions that
change the way that we communicate and form contracts with each other. The lat-
est technological challenges to come down the pike are the fax machine and e-mail,
both of which have become indispensable means of business communication.
Although faxes and e-mails have revolutionized communications by enabling the
instantaneous exchange of written documents between people in distant corners of
the world, they have also caused a variety of problems. For example, amid the
flurry of faxes and e-mails that are sent back and forth during contractual negotia-
tions, it is sometimes difficult to tell exactly when the haggling ended and an agree-
ment was reached.
There are several problems that the courts must address concerning faxes and
e-mails as contracts. First, the courts must examine them to determine if an agree-
ment was reached and, if so, the terms of the agreement. Courts examine faxes and
e-mails the same way they examine other documents in determining whether a
meeting of the minds was reached. Therefore, it is important for businesses to
retain copies of faxes and e-mails so they can substantiate the contracts they have
entered into. Second, to reinforce a written contract against a party, the party’s sig-
nature must appear in writing. Most court decisions that have addressed the issue
have recognized the enforceability of signatures sent by fax. Otherwise, the rules
regarding oral contracts apply to faxes. The enforceability of “signatures” sent by
e-mail is not yet totally settled by the courts.
As faxes and e-mails are used increasingly to communicate everything from
orders for concert tickets to multimillion-dollar orders for equipment, judges and
juries will be called on to read through stacks of faxes and e-mails to decide if disput-
ing parties ever really reached an agreement and, if so, what they really agreed on.
Acceptance
Acceptance is “a manifestation of assent by the offeree to the terms of the offer in a acceptance
manner invited or required by the offer as measured by the objective theory of The assent by the person to whom
contracts.”5 Recall that generally (1) unilateral contracts can be accepted only by an offer has been made (offeree) to
the offeree’s performance of the required act and (2) a bilateral contract can be enter into a binding agreement with
accepted by an offeree who promises to perform (or, where permitted, by perform- the person making the offer (offeror)
according to the terms of the offer.
ance of) the requested act.
WHO CAN ACCEPT AN OFFER?

Only the offeree has the legal power to accept an offer and create a contract. Third
persons usually do not have the power to accept an offer. If an offer is made indi-
vidually to two or more persons, each has the power to accept the offer. Once one
of the offerees accepts the offer, it terminates as to the other offerees. An offer that
is made to two or more persons jointly must be accepted jointly.
Exhibit 2.2 illustrates the acceptance of an offer.
5
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 50(1).
46 Chapter 2
EXHIBIT 2.2 Acceptance
Offeror Offeree
Acceptance
Offeree accepts the

offeror’s offer and
creates a contract.
UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE
unequivocal acceptance The offeree’s acceptance must be unequivocal. For an acceptance to exist, the
Where acceptance of the contract is offeree must accept the terms as stated in the offer. This is called the mirror image
definite and absolute. rule. Generally, a “grumbling acceptance” is a legal acceptance.
mirror image rule Example: A response such as, “Okay, I’ll take the car, but I sure wish you would
States that for an acceptance to make me a better deal” creates an enforceable contract.
exist, the offeree must accept the
terms as stated in the offer. An acceptance is equivocal if certain conditions are added to the acceptance.
Example: If the offeree responds, “I accept, but only if you repaint the car red.”
There is no acceptance in this case.
In the following case, the court had to decide whether there had been an
acceptance of an offer.
CASE 2.5 ACCEPTANCE

Montgomery v. English, 902 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
“Florida employs the ‘mirror image rule’ with respect to contracts. Under this rule,
in order for a contract to be formed, an acceptance of an offer must be absolute,
unconditional, and identical with the terms of the offer.”
Judge Palmer,
Court of Appeal of Florida
Facts
Norma English made an offer to purchase a house from Michael and Lourie
Montgomery. English included in her offer a request to purchase several items
of the Montgomerys’ personal property. After the Montgomerys received Eng-
lish’s offer, they made several changes to the document, including (1) deleting
certain items from the personal property section of the offer, (2) deleting a pro-
vision regarding latent defects, (3) deleting a provision regarding building
inspections, and (4) adding a specific “AS IS” rider. The Montgomerys signed
the counteroffer and delivered it to English. English initialed some, but not all,
of the Montgomerys’ changes. When the Montgomerys refused to sell the house
to English, English sued for specific performance of the contract. The trial court
held in favor of English and ordered specific performance. The Montgomerys
appealed.
Agreement 47
Issue
Was an enforceable contract made between English and the Montgomerys?

The Montgomerys argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for sum-
mary judgment because the record demonstrated that there had been no meeting of
the minds between the parties as to the essential terms of the contract. We agree.
Florida employs the “mirror image rule” with respect to contracts. Under this rule, in
order for a contract to be formed, an acceptance of an offer must be absolute, uncon-
ditional, and identical with the terms of the offer. Applying the mirror image rule to
these undisputed facts we hold that, as a matter of law, the parties failed to reach an
agreement on the terms of the contract and, therefore, no enforceable contract was
created.
Decision
The court of appeal held that no contract had been created between the parties.
The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order of specific performance and
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment
in favor of the Montgomerys.

1. Law: What does the mirror image rule provide? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did the Montgomerys act ethically when they backed out of selling
the house?
3. Ethics: Did English act ethically by trying to force the sale of the house to her?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, at www.
5dca.org.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the mirror image rule.
EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY ON ACCEPTANCE

Sales of goods through the mail reached new heights with Internet sales of compu-
ter hardware and software. One only has to pick up the telephone or log onto the
computer to order thousands of dollars of computer hardware and software. Com-
puter hardware usually arrives via mail or overnight carrier (United Parcel Service)
within a few days, whereas software can arrive the same way or be instantly down-
loaded from the web onto your computer.
In that delivered box, or on the computer if software is downloaded, is a
contract, either a license agreement in the case of most software or a sales con-
tract in the case of most computer equipment. These licenses or contracts con-
tain the terms upon which the licensor or seller is willing to license or sell the
goods to the user. The user usually has some stated period of time, often 30 days,
to accept or reject the goods based on the license or contract terms. The courts
48 Chapter 2
have found the terms of the previously unseen license or sales contracts to be
valid and enforceable.
For example, in ProCD, Incorporated v. Ziedenberg, ProCD had spent over
$10 million to develop a database of names called SelectPhone. ProCD sells this
database to both commercial and consumer users who are licensed to use the
information in seeking customers. Matthew Ziedenberg purchased a version of
SelectPhone at their price but then offered it for sale over the Internet at a lower
price than ProCD charged. ProCD sued Ziedenberg for violating its license agree-
ment, which prohibited the resale of the data. Ziedenberg countered that the
license agreement did not apply because it was included in the software box and
that he had not had the opportunity to read it before buying the software. The trial
court sided with Ziedenberg and held that the “shrinkwrap license”—so called
because retail software packages are covered in plastic or cellophane—was not
enforceable; ProCD appealed.
The court of appeals had to address an issue of first impression: Are licenses
and contracts inside software boxes and computer equipment boxes enforceable
against the purchaser? The court answered yes. The court noted that modern com-
mercial transactions would be hindered if such contracts and licenses were not
recognized as enforceable. The court found that with the “accept-or-return” nature
of these agreements, the purchaser or licensee could read and accept the terms of
the offer or could return the goods. Therefore, potential licensees or purchasers
had adequate protection against contracts they did not want to accept; they could
return the goods and not accept them. The court of appeals held that Ziedenberg
was bound by the license received in the box from ProCD. ProCD, Inc. v. Zieden-
berg, 86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
SILENCE AS ACCEPTANCE
Silence usually is not considered acceptance, even if the offeror states that it is. This
rule is intended to protect offerees from being legally bound to offers because they
failed to respond. Nevertheless, silence does constitute acceptance in the following
situations:
1. The offeree has indicated that silence means assent.
Example: “If you do not hear from me by Friday, ship the order.”
2. The offeree signed an agreement indicating continuing acceptance of deliv-
ery until further notification.
Example: Book-of-the-month and CD-of-the-month club memberships are
examples of such acceptances.
3. Prior dealings between the parties indicate that silence means acceptance.
Example: A fish wholesaler who has delivered 30 pounds of fish to a restau-
rant each Friday for several years and is paid for the fish can continue the
deliveries with expectation of payment until notified otherwise by the
restaurant.
4. The offeree takes the benefit of goods or services provided by the offeror even
though he or she (a) has an opportunity to reject the goods or services but
fails to do so and (b) knows the offeror expects to be compensated.
Example: A homeowner who stands idly by and watches a painter she has not
hired mistakenly paint her house owes the painter for the work.
Agreement 49
TIME OF ACCEPTANCE
Under the common law of contracts, acceptance of a bilateral contract occurs when
the offeree dispatches the acceptance by an authorized means of communication.
This rule is called the acceptance-upon-dispatch rule or, more commonly, the
mailbox rule. mailbox rule
A rule that states that an accept-
MAILBOX RULE ance of an offer is effective when it
is dispatched, even if it is lost in
With a bilateral contract, it is important to know when a contract is accepted. Con- transmission.
temporary contract law has created numerous ways that acceptance might happen:
by telephone, fax, telegram, and e-mail, for instance. But before these contemporary
forms of methods of acceptance were used, acceptance of a contract was normally
done through the postal service. As a result, the mailbox rule came into being.
Under the mailbox rule, an acceptance is effective when it is dispatched—or
put into the mailbox—even if it is lost in transmission. If an offeree first dispatches
a rejection and then sends an acceptance, the mailbox rule does not apply to the
acceptance.6
The problem of lost acceptances can be minimized by expressly altering the
mailbox rule. The offeror can do this by stating in the offer that acceptance is effec-
tive only upon actual receipt of the acceptance. In the following case, the court
enforced the mailbox rule.
CASE 2.6 MAILBOX RULE

Soldau v. Organon, Inc., 860 F.2d 355 (1988).
Background and Facts

John Soldau was discharged by his employer, Organon, Inc. (Organon). He received
a letter from Organon offering to pay him double the normal severance pay in
exchange for a release by Soldau of all claims against Organon regarding the dis-
charge. Soldau signed and dated the release and deposited it in a mailbox outside of
a post office. When he returned home, he had received a check from Organon for
the increased severance pay. Soldau returned to the post office, persuaded a postal
employee to open the mailbox, and retrieved the release. He cashed the severance
paycheck and brought this action against Organon, alleging a violation of the fed-
eral Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted summary
judgment for Organon. Soldau appealed.
Issue
Did Soldau accept the release contract?
In the Language of the Court

Per Curiam The district court was clearly correct under California law. Under fed-
eral as well as California law, Soldau’s acceptance was effective when it was mailed.
6
50 Chapter 2
The so-called “mailbox” or “effective when mailed” rule was adopted and followed as
federal common law by the Supreme Court prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
We could not change the rule, and there is no reason to believe the Supreme
Court would be inclined to do so. It is almost universally accepted in the common
law world. It is enshrined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 63(a),
and endorsed by the major contract treatises. Commentators are also virtually
unanimous in approving the “effective when mailed” rule, pointing to the long his-
tory of the rule; its importance in creating certainty for contracting parties; and its
essential soundness, on balance, as a means of allocating the risk during the period
between the making of the offer and the communication of the acceptance or rejec-
tion to the offeror.
Decision and Remedy

The court of appeals applied the “mailbox rule” and found that the acceptance was
effective when Soldau first deposited it in the mailbox outside the post office. His
later retrieval of the release did not undo his acceptance.
Case Questions
1. Critical Thinking: Should the mailbox rule be changed to place the risk of
loss of lost letters on the sender? Or is the present rule the best rule?
2. Ethics: Did Soldau act ethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: How can businesses that make offers protect themselves
from the risk of loss associated with the mailbox rule?
MODE OR METHOD OF ACCEPTANCE

proper dispatch The acceptance must be properly dispatched—that is, properly addressed, pack-
The acceptance must be sent in a aged in an appropriate envelope or container, and have prepaid postage or delivery
way that is properly addressed, charges. Under common law, if an acceptance is not properly dispatched, it is not
packaged, and postage applied. effective until it is actually received by the offeror.
Generally, an offeree must accept an offer by an authorized means of com-
munication. The offer can stipulate that acceptance must be by a specified means
of communication (e.g., registered mail, telegram). Such stipulation is called
express authorization express authorization. If the offeree uses an unauthorized means of communica-
A stipulation in the offer that says tion to transmit the acceptance, the acceptance is not effective, even if it is received
the acceptance must be by a speci- by the offeror within the allowed time period, because the means of communica-
fied means of communication. tion was a condition of acceptance.
Most offers do not expressly specify the means of communication required
for acceptance. The common law recognizes certain implied means of communi-
implied authorization cation. Implied authorization may be inferred from what is customary in similar
Mode of acceptance that is implied transactions, usage of trade, or prior dealings between the parties. Section 30 of the
from what is customary in similar Restatement (Second) of Contracts permits implied authorization “by any medium
transactions, usage of trade, or prior reasonable in the circumstances.”
dealings between the parties. The following case brings up many of the elements of offer and acceptance.
Agreement 51
CASE 2.7 COUNTEROFFER

Ellefson v. Megadeth, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5395 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 545, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005).
“The issue presented by this motion is reminiscent of a first year law school
contracts exam. We begin with the fundamental tenet: to have a valid contract,
there must be both an offer and an acceptance.”
Judge Buchwald,
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Facts
David Mustaine and David Ellefson are original members of the heavy metal rock
band Megadeth. The band was initially formed in 1983, with Mustaine as the lead
guitarist, lead vocalist, and lead songwriter. Ellefson was the band’s bassist. In 1990,
the parties formed a corporation, Megadeth, Inc., with Mustaine owning 80 percent
of the corporation and Ellefson 20 percent. Approximately 13 years later, Ellefson
sued Mustaine and Megadeth, Inc., alleging that the defendants (collectively Mus-
taine) had defrauded Ellefson out of his share of the corporation’s profits.
In October 2003, Ellefson and Mustaine entered into negotiations to settle
the case. Both parties were represented by attorneys. Mustaine sent a proposed
Settlement and General Release to Ellefson whereby Mustaine would purchase
Ellefson’s interest in the corporation and various licensing and recording agree-
ments. The settlement offer was received by Ellefson on April 16, 2004.
Negotiations over the proposed settlement continued uneventfully for the
next four weeks. Mustaine imposed a 5 o’clock deadline on Friday, May 14, 2004,
for completion of the settlement. On May 13, Mustaine e-mailed Ellefson that the
offer to Ellefson terminated as of 5 p.m. PST on Friday, May 14. The following day,
Friday, May 14, the attorneys for both sides traded e-mails proposing changes to
the offer. At 4:45 p.m., minutes prior to the expiration of Mustaine’s offer, Mustaine
e-mailed Ellefson an execution (read-only) copy of the settlement agreement, reit-
erated the 5 o’clock deadline, and stated that he reserved the right to make further
changes to Exhibits A and B the following week. Ellefson signed a copy of the settle-
ment agreement and faxed the signature page to Mustaine. Mustaine alleges that
Ellefson’s faxed signature page was received before the 5 o’clock deadline. Ellefson
alleges that his fax was not sent by the 5 o’clock deadline.
On Thursday, May 20, 2004, Mustaine sent Ellefson fully executed copies of
the settlement agreement by regular mail. On May 24, Ellefson e-mailed Mustaine
that he was withdrawing from the negotiations and was withdrawing all proposals.
Mustaine responded that there was a signed settlement agreement in place, which
Ellefson had faxed on May 15, 2004.
On June 2, 2004, Ellefson received the finalized settlement agreement that
had been sent by Mustaine by regular mail on May 20, 2004.
Mustaine argues that there was an enforceable settlement agreement between
the parties. Ellefson argues that there was not an enforceable settlement agreement
between the parties.
Issue
Was an enforceable settlement agreement reached between the parties?
52 Chapter 2

The issue presented by this motion is reminiscent of a first year law school con-
tracts exam. We begin with the fundamental tenet: to have a valid contract, there
must be both an offer and an acceptance. These critical elements insure that there
has been mutual assent by the parties to be bound by the terms of the contract. One
party makes an offer to enter into a mutual obligation, and the other party can
either accept or reject this offer. However, once the offer has been accepted, the par-
ties have formed a contract and are bound by the terms of that agreement, even if
later events make them regret their decisions. In the case at hand, the issue is whether
the exchange between Ellefson and Mustaine fulfilled the requirements of offer and
acceptance.
Contracts are often formed after receipt of a defective acceptance. This is
because an acceptance that does not unequivocally comply with the terms of origi-
nal offer is considered a counteroffer. Any new terms or modified terms in the
defective acceptance are treated as new terms of the counteroffer, which the origi-
nal offeror may then choose to accept or reject. A late acceptance is a form of defec-
tive acceptance, and therefore is considered a counteroffer which the original
offeror can decide to either accept or reject. Therefore, in order for a contract to
exist after receipt of a late acceptance, the original offeror must accept the offeree’s
counteroffer.
It is undisputed that Mustaine conditioned his offer to Ellefson on the require-
ment that it be accepted by Ellefson by 5 p.m. PST on Friday, May 14. Further, there
is no evidence to support Mustaine’s claim that Ellefson’s fax was sent within that
deadline; accordingly, Ellefson did not comply with the terms of the offer and no
contract was formed upon its receipt. Because Ellefson’s acceptance did not fully
comply with the terms of the original offer, it was not a valid acceptance and thus is
viewed as a counteroffer.
Ellefson asserts that his faxed signature page cannot reasonably be construed
as a counteroffer since it was utterly silent as to the terms of the Agreement. We find
Ellefson’s arguments unpersuasive. Regardless of Ellefson’s subjective intent, it is the
objective significance of his actions that controls. By faxing a signed signature page
to an undisputed, execution version of the Agreement, Ellefson signaled his willing-
ness to be bound by its terms, rather than, as he now claims, a desire to continue
negotiations. Upon receipt of this fax, Mustaine could reasonably infer that Ellefson
offered to bind himself to the terms of the Agreement (sent to him just minutes ear-
lier) if Mustaine was willing to accept his counteroffer. The fact that the signature
page did not contain all of the terms is immaterial, as the terms of the contract are
not disputed and were contained in the underlying Agreement. Once Mustaine
received the fax, Mustaine was free either to accept or reject Ellefson’s counteroffer.
While Mustaine could accept or reject Ellefson’s counteroffer, Mustaine had to man-
ifest his consent to be bound by the counteroffer. Without such evidence of mutual
assent, no contract had been formed.
We do concur with Mustaine’s alternative contention that the mailing of
the completed contract on May 20, 2004, constituted an acceptance of Ellefson’s
counteroffer. This act established Mustaine’s unequivocal intention to accept
Ellefson’s counteroffer and be bound by the terms of the Agreement. Under the
mailbox rule, Mustaine’s acceptance is considered complete upon mailing.
Therefore, Mustaine accepted Ellefson’s counteroffer prior to Ellefson’s May 24
withdrawal of that offer, and an enforceable contract was formed on May 20,
2004.
Agreement 53
Ellefson argues that the Court should reject Mustaine’s acceptance because the
use of regular U.S. mail was an unreasonable method of acceptance in light of the
parties’ previous conduct. Prior communications between parties had been almost
exclusively by fax or e-mail. Therefore, “it was patently unreasonable for Mustaine
to mail a purported acceptance by ‘snail mail’ without even advising Ellefson that it
was mailed.” [Ellefson’s Memorandum]
Under California law, any reasonable and usual mode of communication
may be used to accept an offer unless a specific mode is prescribed. Therefore, in
the absence of any specific restriction, defendants’ acceptance by mail is reason-
able. Having examined all the surrounding circumstances, we find no impedi-
ment to Mustaine’s acceptance by regular mail. First, the original offer and
Ellefson’s counteroffer contained no restrictions on the mode of acceptance. Sec-
ond, the use of fax and e-mail to negotiate the Agreement does not preclude Mus-
taine from using mail to accept Ellefson’s counteroffer by sending a fully-executed
hard copy of the Agreement, and Ellefson offers no relevant authority to challenge
this proposition.
Mustaine’s last offer to Ellefson stated that Mustaine reserved the right to make
“further changes pending our finalizing Exhibits A and B and the full execution of
the agreement early next week.” Ellefson’s counteroffer signaled his willingness to
comply with these terms, including completion by Mustaine the following week.
Therefore Mustaine’s mailing of the fully-executed contract the following Thursday
was consistent with these terms, and reasonable under the circumstances. We there-
fore find that an enforceable contract was formed on May 20, 2004, prior to Ellef-
son’s attempted withdrawal.
Decision
The U.S. district court held that an enforceable settlement agreement had been
entered into by the parties. The U.S. district court granted Mustaine’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement against Ellefson.

1. Law: What is an offer? What is an acceptance?
2. Law: What does the mailbox rule provide? Explain.
3. Critical Thinking: Do you think the proper mode of acceptance was used in
this case?
4. Ethics: Was it ethical for Ellefson to try to revoke his acceptance of the set-
tlement agreement?
5. Ethics: Did Mustaine act ethically in this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York at www.nysd.uscourts.gov.
2. Visit the website of Megadeth at www.megadeth.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find a video clip of the band Megadeth.
54 Chapter 2
Concept Summary
Offer and Acceptance
Communication by Offeror Effective When
Offer Received by offeree
Revocation of offer Received by offeree
Rejection of offer Received by offeror
Counteroffer Received by offeror
Acceptance of offer Sent by offeree
Acceptance after previous rejection of offer Received by offeror
International Law
China Adopts New Contracts Law
After 15 years of negotiations, China officially joined the ranks of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001. In preparation for this, the
National People’s Congress of China took many steps to ensure suc-
cess, including modernizing the country’s legal system. Just two years
earlier, China dramatically overhauled its contract laws by enacting the
Unified Contract Law (UCL) Unified Contract Law (UCL). This new set of laws effectively wiped out
A new business and commercial or drastically changed many business and commercial contract laws
contract law enacted by China. that had been the standard for many years.
The UCL was designed to provide users with a consistent and easy-
to-understand set of statues that more closely resembled international
business contracting principles. This was a necessary step to ensure
that China was accepted into the WTO and to help the country move
closer to the global economic powerhouse it is now becoming.
According to the UCL, the new guidelines exist to “protect contract-
ing parties’ legal rights, maintain social economic order, and improve
the construction of socialist modernization.” The general provisions of
the UCL also require that a contract “not interrupt social-economic
order or harm public interests” and the contracting parties be “honest
and trustworthy, and respect societal ethics.”
The UCL covers all the parts of contract law that should be familiar to
Western businesses, including the definition of a contract, acceptance,
consideration, performance, breach of contract, and remedies. Even so,
many aspects of the UCL differ from U.S. contract law, and anyone doing
business in China or with a Chinese company should study it carefully.
Web Exercises
1. To learn more about Chinese law, visit the Library of Congress
guide to China at www.loc.gov/law/guide/china.html.
2. To learn more about doing business in China, visit the U.S.-China
Business Council’s website at www.uschina.org.
Agreement 55

Confidentiality
If an attorney is to be able to represent a client adequately, the attorney
must know all of the facts relating to the client’s case. However, without
the attorney’s guarantee of confidentiality, the client would never disclose
all of those facts to the attorney. As a result, ABA Model Rule 1.6 requires
the legal professional to owe the client a duty of confidentiality.7
One area in which the ethical paralegal should be on guard is
protecting the client’s confidentiality when technology is used in the
law office. If an e-mail or a fax on case strategy was inadvertently sent
by the paralegal to opposing counsel instead of co-counsel, a client’s
case would be seriously compromised. Although this example brings
up questions regarding opposing counsel’s duty regarding receipt of
privileged and confidential information, it still remains that the client’s
confidentiality would have been breached, and it would have been
the paralegal who did so.
7
ciation, 321 North Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60610, 1-800-285-2221. The Model Rules can also be viewed online
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html.
CHAPTER 2 SUMMARY
AGREEMENT, p. 31 Special Offer Situations

Offer 1. Advertisement.
a. General rule. Generally, an advertisement is an
1. Offer. An offer is a manifestation by one party of a will-
invitation to make an offer.
ingness to enter into a contract.
b. Exception. An advertisement is an offer if it is so
2. Offeror. The offeror is the party who makes an offer.
definite and specific as to show the advertiser’s intent
3. Offeree. The offeree is the party to whom an offer is
to be bound to the terms of the advertisement.
made. This party has the power to create an agreement
2. Reward. A reward is an offer to create a unilateral contract.
by accepting the terms of the offer.
3. Auction:
a. Action with reserve. An action with reserve is an
OFFER, p. 31 invitation to make an offer. The seller retains the
right to refuse the highest bid and withdraw the
Requirements of an Offer goods from sale.
1. Objective intent. The intent to enter into a contract is b. Auction without reserve. An auction without
determined by the objective theory of contract—that is, reserve is an offer. The seller must accept the highest
whether a reasonable person viewing the circumstances bid (above the minimum bid). This type of auction
would conclude that the parties intended to be legally must be stipulated.
bound.
2. Definite terms. The terms of an offer must be definite
so that the agreement between the parties can be deter- TERMINATIONS OF OFFERS, p. 40
mined. Reasonable terms (e.g., price, time for perform-
Termination of an Offer by Action of the Parties
ance) may be implied.
3. Communication. The offer must be communicated to 1. Revocation. The offeror may revoke (withdraw) an
the offeree by the offeror. offer any time prior to its acceptance by the offeree.
56 Chapter 2
2. Rejection. An offer is terminated if the offeree rejects ACCEPTANCE, p. 45

the offer by his or her words or conduct.
Acceptance
3. Counteroffer. A counteroffer by the offeree terminates
the offeror’s offer (and creates a new offer). Acceptance is manifestation of assent by the offeree to the
terms of the offer. Acceptance of the offer by the offeree cre-
Termination of an Offer by Operation of Law ates a contract.
1. Destruction of the subject matter. An offer terminates Rules for Acceptance
if the subject matter of the offer is destroyed prior to
1. Mirror image rule. Under the common law of con-
acceptance through no fault of either party.
tracts, an offeree must accept the terms offered by the
2. Death or incompetency. The death or incompetency of
offeror to create a contract. Any change in terms by
either the offeror or the offeree prior to acceptance ter-
the offeree constitutes a counteroffer, not an acceptance.
minates the offer.
2. Acceptance-upon-dispatch rule. Unless otherwise pro-
3. Supervening illegality. If prior to the acceptance of an
vided in the offer, acceptance is effective when it is dis-
offer the object of the offer is made illegal by statute, reg-
patched by the offeree. This rule is often called the
ulation, court decision, or other law, the offer terminates.
mailbox rule.
4. Lapse of time. An offer terminates upon the expiration
3. Proper dispatch rule. An acceptance must be properly
of a stated time in the offer. If no time is stated, the
addressed, packaged, and have prepaid postage or de-
offer terminates after a “reasonable time.”
livery charges to be effective when dispatched. Gener-
Option Contract ally, improperly dispatched acceptances are not
effective until actually received by the offeror.
If an offeree pays the offeror compensation to keep an offer
4. Mode of acceptance. Acceptance must be by the express
open for an agreed on period of time, an option contract is
means of communication stipulated in the offer or, if
created. The offeror cannot sell the property to anyone else
no means is stipulated, then by reasonable means in the
during the option period.
circumstances.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Acceptance 45 Express authorization 50 Offeror 31
Acceptance-upon-dispatch rule Implied authorization 50 Option contract 44
(mailbox rule) 49 Implied terms 33 Properly dispatched 50
Advertisements 35 Lapse of time 43 Rejection of an offer by the offeree 41
Agreement 31 Mirror image rule 46 Rewards 37
Auction with reserve 37 Objective theory of contracts 32 Supervening illegality 43
Auction without reserve 37 Offer 31 Unequivocal acceptance 46
Counteroffer 41 Offeree 31 Unified Contract Law (UCL) 54

Remember the case scenario at the beginning of the chapter difference between the amount Jim offered the property for
involving Jim and Cheryl’s hunting property? Because Jim and what the property was really worth? What you have
actually wrote out an agreement for sale of the property, can learned in this chapter will help you answer these questions.
he argue that his offer was made in jest? Could Nicholas have You can also review the case of Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516
really taken the offer seriously, because he certainly knew the (Va. 1954).

Working the Web Internet Exercises your ability by visiting the site and searching for
employment agreements that have noncompetition
1. Visit www.cori.missouri.edu. Use this site to aid in
clauses.
drafting specific types of contracts and/or clauses. Test
Agreement 57
Once the date and the parties to the contract are set out in The word WHEREAS is a formal term used in most
the first introductory sentence of a contract (see the Practice contracts. The purpose of using this term is to mark or
Tip at the end of Chapter 1), the next step in drafting a con- clearly set forth the fact that the recital or background infor-
tract is to follow with a “recital” that sets out an overview of mation is about to be given.
what or why the parties would like to contract. The form for You should note that many bar associations and legal
this recital is as follows: experts recommend using “plain English” language in the
contract.
WITNESSETH:
Exercise:
WHEREAS, _________ and _________ wish to ________,
all on the terms set forth;
Portfolio Exercise at the end of Chapter 4, draft a recital for
a contract.
Topic: Offer—Definite Terms Exercise/Assignment:
Facts: Draft an introductory clause, a recital clause, and a purchase

price section—all with definite terms—for purpose of inclu-
(To the student: Reread the basic facts from the Hands-On sion in a warehouse purchase contract.
Drafting Exercise from the previous chapter before working
on this exercise.) Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., desires to purchase Use the introductory clause, the recital clause, and the pur-
for $1 million a warehouse building located at 1234 Main chase price section of the sample Real Estate Purchase
Street Sylvania, Ohio, 43560 and owned by ABC Company. Agreement in Appendix C of the textbook as a guide to
drafting these three clauses.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 2.1 Terms of a Contract Ben more than two jewelry stores” located in the mall. Nine years
Hunt and others operated a farm under the name S.B.H. later, MacDonald sent Edmond’s notice that it intended to
Farms. Hunt went to McIlory Bank & Trust and requested a expand the mall and lease space to other jewelers. The lease
loan to build hog houses, buy livestock, and expand farming was silent as to the coverage of additional mall space.
operations. The bank agreed to loan S.B.H. Farms $175,000, Edmond’s sued MacDonald, arguing that the lease applied to
for which short-term promissory notes were signed by Hunt mall additions. Who wins? Edmond’s of Fresno v. MacDonald
and the other owners of S.B.H. Farms. At that time, oral dis- Group, Ltd., 217 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1985).
cussions were held with the bank officer regarding long-
Critical Legal Thinking Case 2.3 Counteroffer Glende
term financing of S.B.H.’s farming operations; no dollar
Motor Company (Glende), an automobile dealership that
amount, interest rate, or repayment terms were discussed.
sold new cars, leased premises from certain landlords. One
When the owners of S.B.H. Farms defaulted on the promis-
day, fire destroyed part of the leased premises, and Glende
sory notes, the bank filed for foreclosure on the farm and
restored the leasehold premises. The landlords received pay-
other collateral. S.B.H. Farms counterclaimed for $750,000
ment of insurance proceeds for the fire. Glende sued the
damages, alleging that the bank breached its oral contract to
landlords to recover the insurance proceeds. Ten days before
provide long-term financing. Was there an oral contract for
the trial was to begin, the defendants jointly served on
long-term financing? Hunt v. McIlory Bank & Trust, 616
Glende a document titled “Offer to Compromise Before
S.W.2d 759 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981).
Trial,” which was a settlement offer of $190,000. Glende
Critical Legal Thinking Case 2.2 Implied Terms agreed to the amount of the settlement but made it contin-
MacDonald Group, Ltd. (MacDonald), is the managing gen- gent on the execution of a new lease. The next day, the
eral partner of “Fresno Fashion Square,” a regional shopping defendants notified Glende that they were revoking the set-
mall in Fresno, California. The mall has several major tlement offer. Glende thereafter tried to accept the original
anchor tenants and numerous smaller stores and shops, settlement offer. Has there been a settlement of the lawsuit?
including Edmond’s of Fresno, a jeweler. Edmond’s signed a Glende Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Ct.
lease with MacDonald that provided that “there shall not be App. 1984).
58 Chapter 2
Critical Legal Thinking Case 2.4 Acceptance Peter Andrus five years. The lease provided that Tuneup Masters could
owned an apartment building that he had insured under a extend the lease for an additional five years if it gave written
fire insurance policy sold by J.C. Durick Insurance (Durick). notice of its intention to do so by certified or registered mail at
Two months prior to the expiration of the policy, Durick least six months prior to the expiration of the term of the lease.
notified Andrus that the building should be insured for
Three days before the expiration of the lease, Larry
$48,000 (or 80 percent of the building’s value), as required by
Selditz, vice president of Tuneup Masters, prepared a letter
the insurance company. Andrus replied that (1) he wanted
exercising the option, prepared and sealed an envelope with
insurance to match the amount of the outstanding mortgage
the letter in it, prepared U.S. Postal Service Form 3800,
on the building (i.e., $24,000) and (2) if Durick could not sell
affixed the certified mail sticker on the envelope, and had his
this insurance, he would go elsewhere. Durick sent a new
secretary deliver the envelope to the Postal Service annex
insurance policy in the face amount of $48,000 with the
located on the ground floor of the office building. Postal per-
notation that the policy was automatically accepted unless
sonnel occupied the annex only between the hours of 9 and
Andrus notified him to the contrary. Andrus did not reply.
10 a.m. At the end of each day, between 5 and 5:15 p.m., a
However, he did not pay the premiums on the policy.
postal employee picked up outgoing mail. The letter to the
Durick sued Andrus to recover these premiums. Who wins?
landlords was lost in the mail. The landlords thereafter
J.C. Durick Ins. v. Andrus, 424 A.2d 249 (Vt. 1980).
refused to renew the lease and brought an unlawful detainer
Critical Legal Thinking Case 2.5 Mailbox Rule William action against Tuneup Masters. Was the notice renewing the
Jenkins and Nathalie Monk owned a building in Sacramento, option effective? Jenkins v. Tuneup Masters, 235 Cal. Rptr.
California. They leased the building to Tuneup Masters for 214 (Ct. App. 1987).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 2.1 Howard R. Wright hired John W. Cerdes James in 1882 was an impostor and that Jesse James lived for
to construct a home for him at a price of $43,150. The con- many years thereafter under the alias J. Frank Dalton and
tract was silent regarding the time of completion. Construc- last lived with Turilli at his museum until the 1950s. Turilli
tion was not completed after nine months. At that time, appeared before a nationwide television audience and stated
Wright obtained an injunction ordering Cerdes to stop work. that he would pay $10,000 to anyone who could prove his
Wright hired other contractors to complete the building. statements were wrong. After hearing this offer, Stella James,
Cerdes sued Wright for breach of contract, claiming he was a relative of Jesse James, produced affidavits of persons
due the contract price. How long should Cerdes have had to related to and acquainted with the Jesse James family, consti-
complete the house? Was it ethical for Wright to hire other tuting evidence that Jesse James was killed, as alleged in song
contractors to complete the building? See Cerdes v. Wright, and legend, on April 3, 1882. When Turilli refused to pay the
408 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 1981) to help you with your answers. reward, James sued for breach of contract. Was it ethical for
Turilli to refuse to pay? In a breach of contract suit, who
Ethics Case 2.2 Rudy Turilli operated the “Jesse James
wins? See James v. Turilli, 473 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App.
Museum” in Stanton, Missouri. He contends the man who
1971) to help you with your answer.
was shot, killed, and buried as the notorious desperado Jesse

Read Case B.2 in Appendix B (Traco, Inc. v. Arrow Glass Co., 3. What does the doctrine of promissory estoppel pro-
Inc.). This case is excerpted from the appellate court’s opinion. vide? Explain.
Review and brief the case (see Appendix A for information on 4. Did the court apply the doctrine of promissory estop-
how to brief a case) using the IRAC method. After briefing the pel in this case?
case, you should be able to answer the following questions:
1. Who was the plaintiff? Who was the defendant?
2. Was there an express agreement between the parties?
Agreement 59
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
“A CONTRACT IS A CONTRACT IS A CONTRACT”
“The disputed agreement transferred plaintiff ’s copyright in the Mighty Morphin Power
Rangers’ logo with as much specificity as the law requires.”
Judge Kozinski
Mighty Morphin Power Rangers was a phenomenal success as a television series. The
Power Rangers battled to save the universe from all sorts of diabolical plots and bad
guys. They were also featured in a profitable line of toys and garments bearing the
Power Rangers’ logo. The Power Rangers’ name and logo are known to millions of
children and their parents worldwide. The claim of ownership of the logo for the
Power Rangers ended up in a battle in a courtroom.
David Dees is a designer who works as d.b.a. David Dees Illustration. Saban
Entertainment, Inc. (Saban), which owns the copyright and trademark to Power
Rangers figures and the name “Power Ranger,” hired Dees as an independent con-
tractor to design a logo for the Power Rangers. The contract signed by the parties was
titled “Work-for-Hire/Independent Contractor Agreement.” The contract was
drafted by Saban with the help of its attorneys; Dees signed the agreement without
the representation of legal counsel.
Dees designed the logo currently used for the Power Rangers and was paid $250
to transfer his copyright ownership in the logo. Subsequently, Dees sued Saban to
recover damages for copyright and trademark infringement. Saban defended, argu-
ing that Dees was bound by the agreement he had signed.
The trial court agreed with Saban, finding that the “Work-for-Hire/Inde-
pendent Contractor Agreement” was an enforceable contract between the parties
and that Dees had transferred his ownership interests in the logo to Saban. Dees
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Saban, stating, “The
disputed agreement transferred plaintiff ’s copyright in the Mighty Morphin
Power Rangers’ logo with as much specificity as the law requires.” The court
found that a contract is a contract is a contract, at least in this case. Dees’s appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied. Dees v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 131 F.3d 146
(9th Cir. 1997).

1. Critical Thinking: Should a contract be enforced as written, even if it is
later discovered that one party benefited substantially more than the
other party to the contract?
2. Ethics: Did Dees act ethically by suing for more money?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at www.ca9.uscourts.
gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find a video clip of the Mighty Morphin Power
Rangers.
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise
word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a
broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole
writing may be “instinct with an obligation,” imperfectly expressed.
—Justice Cardozo
Wood v. Duff Gordon, 222 N.Y.88, 91 (1917)
chapter 3
CONSIDERATION AND EQUITY
CASE SCENARIO
Jan and Dean were married 10 years ago.1 At the time of their marriage, Dean CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
was the president of a successful advertising agency, and Jan owned a gym.
Several months after their marriage, Jan became ill and was unable to work. should be able to:
She asked Dean to devote full time to the gym. If he would agree, they would 1. Define consideration.
operate the business together, share equally in the ownership of its assets, and 2. Identify when there is inadequacy of
divide any profits equally. Dean agreed and terminated his advertising agency consideration.
business. Ten years later, Jan divorced Dean and denied him any rights to the 3. Analyze whether contracts are lacking in
consideration.
gym. The law firm where you work as a paralegal represents Dean.
4. Explain the doctrines of preexisting duty
and past consideration.
5. Apply the doctrine of promissory
estoppels.
1
Remember that domestic relations law may override any contract law principles in such a real
scenario, at least in certain states. In Massachusetts, for example, this would be an alimony issue for
Dean, and his lawyer most likely wouldn’t pursue an action based on regular contract law. In fact,
if Dean’s attorney didn’t make it a central issue in the divorce, he would probably be guilty of
malpractice.
61
62 Chapter 3
To be enforceable, a contract must be supported by “consideration,” which is
broadly defined as something of legal value. It can consist of money, property, the
provision of services, the forbearance of a right, or anything else of value. Most
contracts that are not supported by consideration are not enforceable. The parties
may voluntarily perform a contract that is lacking in consideration. This chapter
discusses consideration, promises that lack consideration, and promises that are
enforceable without consideration.
The doctrine of equity is also discussed in this chapter. Equity is a branch of
law based on fairness, justice, and honesty. Equity is imposed when there is no
adequate remedy available at law. Equitable remedies are sometimes applied in
contract cases, especially specific performance, rescission, and injunction.
Rebecca Cain is a graduate of the sive to the litigation at hand. During the review
University of Toledo’s Paralegal process, contracts and other documents collected
Studies Program. She is the parale- for discovery are flagged as “responsive” or “nonre-
gal supervisor for the Discovery sponsive.” These documents are then reviewed by
Management Unit at Nationwide legal counsel to decide whether they will be pro-
Mutual Insurance Company, duced in court.
Office of the Chief Legal Govern- By working with electronic services, such as
ance Officer, at Nationwide’s world CaseVault, the process of reviewing documents
headquarters in Columbus, Ohio. online is now easier and faster. This enables legal
counsel to review the exact same documents I have
I work in a corporate litigation environment, where already reviewed, no matter where they are physi-
my job involves different aspects of the discovery cally located, to determine which documents must
process, such as gathering voluminous amounts of be produced for discovery purposes.
documents, electronic document searches, and Today I use all of my paralegal skills: written
dealing with e-discovery issues. and verbal communication skills, analytical deci-
Throughout the discovery process, I may be sion making, organizational skills, time manage-
required to gather hundreds of thousands of document, computer skills, and much more! I thoroughly
ments for a production request. After gathering enjoy my job in the Discovery Management Unit
these documents, I may be required to review them and find it very rewarding, knowing I am making
for determination as to whether they are respon- the jobs of the attorneys I work for much easier.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: BUSINESS FRANCHISE PARALEGAL
• Draft franchise agreement and related agreements/contracts.
• Draft Federal Trade Commission (FTC) disclosure statements and franchise
offering circulars.
• Compile information for inclusion in FTC disclosure statements and franchise
offering circulars.
• File offering circulars, annual reports, and amendments in registration states.
• File notices of intent to sell franchises/business opportunities or exemption
notices in registration states.
• Communicate with state regulators about registration/disclosure requirements.
Consideration and Equity 63
• Review and file advertising/promotional materials with registration states.

• Administer disclosure process of prospective franchisees.
• Draft franchise documents for execution.
• Communicate with client or franchisee about execution of documents.
• Communicate with client or franchisee about compliance with franchise agreement.
• Draft default notices to franchisees.
• Monitor franchisee compliance with terms of franchise and other agreements.
• Write policies for disclosure and franchising processes.
• Monitor activities of franchise salespeople.
• Prepare earnings claims information to give to franchisees.
• Review requests for transfer of franchise and prepare documents for execution.
• Draft documents for repurchasing franchise business.
• Draft documents for terminating franchise agreement.
• Maintain repository and/or database of franchise activity.
• Review and draft documents for franchisee financing.
Consideration
Consideration must be given before a contract can exist. Consideration is defined consideration
as something of legal value given in exchange for a promise. Consideration can Something of legal value given in
come in many forms. The most common types consist of either a tangible payment exchange for a promise.
(e.g., money, property) or the performance of an act (e.g., providing legal services).
Less usual forms of consideration include the forbearance of a legal right (e.g.,
accepting an out-of-court settlement in exchange for dropping a lawsuit) and non-
economic forms of consideration (e.g., refraining from “drinking, using tobacco,
swearing, or playing cards or billiards for money”2 for a specified time period).
Written contracts are presumed to be supported by consideration. This
rebuttable presumption, however, may be overcome by sufficient evidence. A few
states provide that contracts made under seal cannot be challenged for lack of
consideration.
REQUIREMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
Consideration consists of two elements: (1) Something of legal value must be given
(e.g., either a legal benefit must be received or legal detriment must be suffered),
and (2) there must be a bargained-for exchange. Each of these is discussed in the
paragraphs that follow.
1. Legal value. Under the modern law of contracts, a contract is considered
supported by legal value if (1) the promisee suffers a legal detriment or (2) the legal value
promisor receives a legal benefit. Where the promisee suffers a legal
detriment or the promisor receives a
Example: Suppose the Dallas Cowboys contract with a tailor to have him legal benefit.
make uniforms for the team. The tailor completes the uniforms, but the team
manager thinks the color is wrong and refuses to allow the team to wear
them. The tailor has suffered a legal detriment (time spent making the uni-
forms). Under the modern rule of contracts, there is sufficiency of considera-
tion and the contract is enforceable.
2
Hamer v. Sidwa, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
64 Chapter 3
2. Bargained-for exchange. To be enforceable, a contract must arise from a

bargained-for exchange bargained-for exchange. In most business contracts, the parties engage in
Exchange that parties engage in that such exchanges. The commercial setting in which business contracts are
leads to an enforceable contract. formed leads to this conclusion.
Concept Summary
Consideration
Type of Consideration Description of Element
Legal value Where:
(1) the promisee suffers a legal detriment or
(2) the promisor receives a legal benefit.
Bargained-for exchange Exchange that the parties actively engage in and
that leads to an enforceable contract.
GIFT PROMISES
gift promise Gift promises, also called gratuitous promises, are unenforceable because they lack
An unenforceable promise because consideration. To change a gift promise into an enforceable promise, the promisee
it lacks consideration. must offer to do something in exchange—that is, consideration—for the promise.
A completed gift promise cannot be rescinded for lack of consideration.
Example: Suppose Mrs. Colby promised to give her son $10,000 and then rescinded
the promise. The son would have no recourse because it was a gift promise that
lacked consideration. If, however, Mrs. Colby promised her son $10,000 for getting
an A in his business law course and the son performed as required, the contract
would be enforceable.
Example: On May 1, Mr. Smith promises to give his granddaughter $10,000 on
June 1. If on June 1 Mr. Smith actually gives $10,000 to his granddaughter, it is a
completed gift promise. Mr. Smith cannot thereafter recover the money from his
granddaughter, even if the original promise lacked consideration.
Case 3.1 involves an uncompleted gift promise. Case 3.2 involves completed gifts.
CASE 3.1 GIFT PROMISE

Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862 (Tenn. 1982).
“The court of appeals concurred in the finding that there was no gift
for failure to deliver.”
Judge Fones,
Supreme Court of Tennessee
Facts
Elvis Presley, a singer of great renown and a man of substantial wealth, became
engaged to Ginger Alden. He was generous with the Alden family, paying for
landscaping their lawn, installing a swimming pool, and making other gifts.
When his fiancée’s mother, Jo Laverne Alden, sought to divorce her husband, Pres-
ley promised to pay off the remaining mortgage indebtedness on the Alden home,
which Mrs. Alden was to receive in the divorce settlement. On August 16, 1977,
Presley died suddenly, leaving the mortgage unpaid. When the legal representative
of Presley’s estate refused to pay the $39,587 mortgage, Mrs. Alden brought an
action to enforce Presley’s promise. The trial court denied recovery. Mrs. Alden
appealed.
Issue
Was Presley’s promise to pay the mortgage enforceable?

In the instant case, the trial court held decedent did make a promise unsupported
by consideration to plaintiff, that no gift was consummated for failure of delivery,
that plaintiff suffered no detriment as she “wound up much better after her associa-
tion with Elvis A. Presley than if he had never made any promise to Jo Laverne
Alden.” The court of appeals concurred in the finding that there was no gift for fail-
ure to deliver, holding that delivery is not complete unless complete dominion and
control of the gift is surrendered by the donor and acquired by the donee.
Decision
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that Presley’s promise was a gratuitous
executory promise that was not supported by consideration. As such, it was unen-
forceable against Presley’s estate. The court dismissed the case and assessed costs
against the plaintiff.

1. Critical Thinking: Should gratuitous promises be enforced? Why or why
not?
2. Ethics: Was it unethical for the representative of Presley’s estate to refuse to
complete the gift? Did he have any other choice?
2. Critical Thinking: Does it make a difference if a gift promise is executed or
executory? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the Supreme Court of Tennessee at www.tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/bio/
supreme/biosc.htm.
2. Use www.google.com to find a brief biography of Elvis Presley.
3. Visit the website of Graceland, the home of Elvis Presley, at www.elvis.com/
graceland.
4. Go to www.elvis.com to see a video clip of Elvis Presley singing a song.
66 Chapter 3
CASE 3.2 GIFT

Cooper v. Smith, 800 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
“Many gifts are made for reasons that sour with the passage of time.
Unfortunately, gift law does not allow a donor to recover/revoke a gift simply
because his or her reasons for giving it have soured.”
Judge Harsha,
Court of Appeals of Ohio
Facts
In May 2001, Lester Cooper suffered serious injuries that caused him to be hospi-
talized for an extended period of time. While he was hospitalized, Julie Smith,
whom Cooper had met the year before, and Janet Smith, Julie’s mother, made
numerous trips to visit him. Although Julie was married to another man at the
time, a romantic relationship developed between Cooper and Julie. While in the
hospital, Cooper proposed marriage to Julie, and she accepted. Julie obtained a
divorce from her husband in October 2001. Cooper ultimately received a $180,000
settlement for his injuries.
After being released from the hospital, Cooper moved into Janet’s house and
lived with Janet and Julie. Over the next couple of months, Cooper purchased a
number of items for Julie, including a diamond engagement ring, a car, a compu-
ter, a tanning bed, and horses. On Julie’s request, Cooper paid off Janet’s car.
Cooper also paid for various improvements to Janet’s house, such as having a new
furnace installed and having wood flooring laid in the kitchen. By December 2001,
the settlement money had run out, and Julie had not yet married Cooper. In the
summer of 2002, Julie and Cooper had a disagreement, and Cooper moved out of
the house. Julie returned the engagement ring to Cooper. Cooper sued Julie and
Janet to recover the gifts or the value of the gifts he gave them. The magistrate who
heard the case dismissed Cooper’s case, and the trial court affirmed the dismissed
of the case. Cooper appealed.
Issue
Can Cooper recover the gifts or the value of the gifts he gave to Julie and Janet Smith?

Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the donor is entitled to recover the engagement
ring (or its value) if the marriage does not occur, regardless of who ended the engage-
ment. While we are willing to imply a condition concerning the engagement ring, we are
unwilling to do so for other gifts given during the engagement period. Unlike the engage-
ment ring, the other gifts have no symbolic meaning. Rather, they are merely “tokens of
love and affection” which the donor bore for the donee. Many gifts are made for reasons
that sour with the passage of time. Unfortunately, gift law does not allow a donor to
recover/revoke a gift simply because his or her reasons for giving it have soured.
Generally, a completed gift is absolute and irrevocable. If we were to imply a
condition on gifts given during the engagement period, then every gift the donor
gave, no matter how small or insignificant, would be recoverable. We believe the best
approach is to treat gifts exchanged during the engagement period (excluding the
engagement ring) as absolute and irrevocable gifts unless the donor has expressed
intent that the gift be conditioned on the subsequent marriage. Cooper offered no
evidence establishing that he gave the gifts on the express condition that they be
returned to him if the engagement ended. Thus, the gifts are irrevocable gifts and
Cooper is not entitled to their return.
Decision
The court of appeals held that the gifts made by Cooper to Julie (other than the
engagement ring) and to Janet were irrevocable gifts that he could not recover
simply because his engagement to Julie ended. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, allowing Julie and Janet Smith to keep these gifts.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the return of an engagement ring and other gifts
made during the engagement period be treated differently when the engage-
ment is broken off? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did Julie and Janet Smith act ethically in keeping the gifts Cooper
had given them? Did Cooper act ethically in trying to get the gifts back?
3. Critical Thinking: Does the no-fault rule regarding the return of engage-
ment rings on the termination of an engagement save court expenses?
Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Ohio and find the Fourth District
at www.sconet.state.oh.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article about gifts and contracts.
Contracts Lacking Consideration

Some contracts seem as though they are supported by consideration even though
they are not. The following types of contracts fall into this category.
ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION
A contract cannot be supported by a promise to refrain from doing an illegal act
because that is illegal consideration. Contracts based on illegal consideration are void. illegal consideration
A promise to refrain from doing an
Example: A statement such as “I will burn your house down unless you agree to illegal act. Such a promise will not
pay me $10,000” cannot become an enforceable contract. Even if the threatened support a contract.
party agrees to make the payment, the contract is unenforceable and void because
it is supported by illegal consideration (arson is unlawful).
INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION adequate consideration

A value of the bargain that is equal
The courts usually do not inquire into adequate consideration. Generally, parties to or reasonably proportioned to the
are free to agree on the consideration they are willing to pay or receive under a value of that for which it is given.
68 Chapter 3
contract. This rule is based on the court’s reluctance to inquire into the motives of
a party for entering into a contract or to save a party from a “bad deal.”
Some states recognize an exception to the general rule that the courts will not
examine the sufficiency of consideration. These states permit a party to escape
from a contract if the inadequacy of consideration “shocks the conscience of the
court.” This standard, which is applied on a case-by-case basis, considers the value
of the item or service contracted for, the amount of consideration paid, the rela-
tionship of the parties, and other facts and circumstances of the case.
Consider this situation: Mr. and Mrs. James Paul DeLaney were married in
January 1953. A few years later, they acquired a painting, allegedly the work of
Peter Paul Rubens, titled Hunting of the Calydonian Boar. In 1966, the DeLaneys
moved into an apartment building and became friends with Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas
T. O’Neill. Mr. DeLaney and Mr. O’Neill became close friends. On August 18,
1970, Mr. DeLaney purportedly sold the Rubens painting to Mr. O’Neill for $10
and “other good and valuable consideration.” A written contract embodying the
terms of the agreement was prepared and signed by Mr. DeLaney and Mr. O’Neill.
Mrs. DeLaney was not informed of the sale. At the time of the sale, Mr. DeLaney
told Mr. O’Neill that the painting was worth at least $100,000. The painting,
however, remained with DeLaney and was in storage at the time of this lawsuit.
In 1974, Mrs. DeLaney instituted a divorce action against Mr. DeLaney. At that
time she learned of the purported sale of the painting to O’Neill. In the divorce
action, Mrs. DeLaney claimed an interest in the painting as marital property.
Mr. O’Neill instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding title
to the painting.
The trial court held in favor of Mrs. DeLaney and voided the sales contract
between Mr. DeLaney and Mr. O’Neill. The appellate court affirmed. The courts
held that the consideration paid by Mr. O’Neill for the painting “shocked the
conscience of the court” and thereby rendered the transfer void. The appellate
court stated,
Plaintiff expressly testified that “other good and valuable consideration”
meant the love and affection plaintiff and James Paul DeLaney had for
one another. In Illinois, love and affection do not constitute legal consid-
eration. Thus, the only remaining valid consideration for the transaction
was the tender of $10. A purchase price of $10 for such a valuable work of
art is so grossly inadequate consideration as to shock the conscience of this
court, as it did the trial court’s. To find $10 valid consideration for this
painting would be to reduce the requirement of consideration to a mere
formality. This we will not do.
Critics of this case argue that the parties should be free to contract based on
what they feel is adequate consideration in the circumstances. Proponents of this
case argue that courts should be allowed to examine the adequacy of consideration
underlying a contract to prevent unfair contracts. O’Neill v. DeLaney, 415 N.E.2d
1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
illusory promise
A contract into which both parties ILLUSORY PROMISES
enter, but one or both of the parties
can choose not to perform their If parties enter into a contract but one or both of the parties can choose not to perform
contractual obligations. Thus the their contractual obligations, the contract lacks consideration. Such promises, which
contract lacks consideration. are known as illusory promises (or illusory contracts), are unenforceable.
Example: A contract that provides that one of the parties has to perform only if he
or she chooses to do so is an illusory contract.
MORAL OBLIGATION
Promises made out of a sense of moral obligation or honor are generally unen- moral obligation
forceable on the grounds that they lack consideration. In other words, moral con- A duty that rests on moral consider-
sideration is not treated as legal consideration. Contracts based on love and ations alone and is not imposed or
affection and deathbed promises are examples of such promises. A minority of enforced by positive law; a duty
states hold that moral obligations are enforceable. binding in conscience but not in law.
PREEXISTING DUTY
A promise lacks consideration if a person promises to perform an act or do some- preexisting duty
thing he or she is already under an obligation to do. This is called a preexisting A promise lacks consideration if a
duty. The promise is unenforceable because no new consideration has been given. person promises to perform an act
or do something he or she is
Example: Many states have adopted statutes that prohibit police officers from already under an obligation to do.
accepting rewards for apprehending criminals.
In the private sector, the preexisting duty rule often arises when one of the
parties to an existing contract seeks to change the terms of the contract during
the course of its performance. Such midstream changes are unenforceable: The
parties have a preexisting duty to perform according to the original terms of the
contract.
Unforeseen Difficulties
Sometimes, a party to a contract runs into substantial unforeseen difficulties while
performing his or her contractual duties. If the parties modify their contract to
accommodate these unforeseen difficulties, the modification will be enforced even
though it is not supported by new consideration.
Example: Suppose a landowner enters into a contract with a contractor who agrees
to excavate the hole for the foundation of a major office building. When the exca-
vation is partially completed, toxic wastes are unexpectedly found at the site.
Removal of toxic wastes is highly regulated by law and would substantially increase
the cost of the excavation. If the landowner agrees to pay the contractor increased
compensation to remove the toxic wastes, this modification of the contract is
enforceable even though it is unsupported by new consideration.
PAST CONSIDERATION
In a business setting, problems of past consideration often arise when a party to a past consideration
contract promises to pay additional compensation for work done in the past. A prior act or performance. Past con-
sideration (e.g., prior acts) will not
Example: Felipe Chavez, who has worked for the Acme Corporation for 30 years, support a new contract. New consid-
is retiring. The president of Acme says, “Because you were such a loyal employee, eration must be given.
Acme will pay you a bonus of $25,000.” The corporation then refuses to pay the
$25,000. Unfortunately for Mr. Chavez, the contract is unenforceable because it is
based on past consideration.
In the following case, the court had to decide whether there was consideration.
70 Chapter 3
CASE 3.3 CONSIDERATION

In re Wirth, 789 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 2005).
“The Pledge Agreement further stated: ‘I acknowledge that Drexel’s
promise to use the amount pledged by me shall constitute full
and adequate consideration for this pledge.’”
Judge Schmidt,
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division
Facts
Raymond P. Wirth signed a Pledge Agreement that stated that in consideration of
his interest in education, and “intending to be legally bound,” he irrevocably
pledged and promised to pay Drexel University the sum of $150,000. The Pledge
Agreement provided that an endowed scholarship would be created in Wirth’s
name. Wirth died two months after signing the pledge but before any money had
been paid to Drexel. When the estate of Wirth refused to honor the pledge, Drexel
sued the estate to collect the $150,000. The estate alleged that the pledge was unen-
forceable because of lack of consideration. The surrogate court denied Drexel’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Drexel’s claim against the estate.
Drexel appealed.
Issue
Was the Pledge Agreement supported by consideration and therefore enforceable
against the estate of Wirth?

Pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Uniform Written Obligations Act: “A written release or
promise, hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or promising, shall not
be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an
additional express statement, in any form or language, that the signer intends to be
legally bound.” Pursuant to this statute, the Pledge Agreement does not fail for lack
of consideration, as the decedent expressly stated his intent to be legally bound by
the pledge.
Moreover, even if we were to determine that the decedent, as promisor, antici-
pated consideration in return for his promise, there was no failure of consideration.
The Pledge Agreement, which also was executed by representatives of Drexel, pro-
vided that the pledged sum “shall be used by” Drexel to create an endowed scholar-
ship fund in the decedent’s name, per the terms of the attached Letter of
Understanding. The Pledge Agreement further stated: “I acknowledge that Drexel’s
promise to use the amount pledged by me shall constitute full and adequate consid-
eration for this pledge.”
In our view, pursuant to the terms of the Pledge Agreement, Drexel provided
sufficient consideration by expressly accepting the terms of the Pledge Agreement
and by promising to establish the scholarship fund in the decedent’s name. The
fact that the decedent died before the initial gift was transferred into a special
account set up by Drexel and therefore the scholarship fund was not yet imple-
mented, did not negate the sufficiency of the promise as consideration to set up
the fund.
Decision
The appellate court held that the Pledge Agreement was supported by considera-
tion and was therefore enforceable against the estate of Wirth. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the surrogate court and granted Drexel’s motion for sum-
mary judgment against the estate of Wirth.

1. Critical Thinking: What is consideration? What happens if there is lack of
consideration supporting a promise? Explain.
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for the estate of Wirth to try to back out of the pledge
agreement made by Wirth before he died?
3. Critical Thinking: What special statute did Pennsylvania enact that solves
the issue of lack of consideration in many contracts? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department, at www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2.
2. Visit the website of Drexel University at www.drexel.edu and Drexel Online
at www.drexel.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses a pledge or gift to your
college or university.
Concept Summary
Promises Lacking Consideration
Type of Consideration Description of Promise
Illegal consideration Promise to refrain from doing an illegal act.
Illusory promise Promise in which one or both parties can choose not to
perform their obligation.
Moral obligation Promise made out of a sense of moral obligation, honor,
love, or affection. Some states enforce these types of
contracts.
Preexisting duty Promise based on the preexisting duty of the promisee
to perform. The promise is enforceable if (1) the par-
ties rescind the contract and enter into a new contract
or (2) there are unforeseen difficulties.
Past consideration Promise based on the past performance of the promisee.
72 Chapter 3
Special Business Contracts

Generally, the courts tolerate a greater degree of uncertainty in business contracts
than in personal contracts, under the premise that sophisticated parties know how
to protect themselves when negotiating contracts. The law imposes an obligation
of good faith on the performance of the parties to requirements and output
contracts.
The following are special types of business contracts that specifically allow a
greater degree of uncertainty concerning consideration.
OUTPUT CONTRACT
output contract In an output contract, the seller agrees to sell all of its production to a single buyer.
A contract in which one party Output contracts serve the legitimate business purposes of (1) assuring the seller of
agrees to sell his or her entire out- a purchaser for all of its output and (2) assuring the buyer of a source of supply for
put and the other agrees to buy it. the goods it needs.
Example: Organic Foods, Inc. operates farms that produce organically grown
grains and vegetables. Whole Food Markets is a grocery store chain that sells
organically grown foods. Whole Food Markets contracts with Organic Foods, Inc.
to purchase all of the organic foods grown by Organic Foods, Inc. this year. This is
an example of an output contract: Organic Foods, Inc. must sell all of its output to
Whole Foods Market.
REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT
requirements contract A requirements contract is one in which a buyer contracts to purchase all of the
A contract in which the purchaser requirements for an item from one seller. Such contracts serve the legitimate busi-
agrees to buy all of its needs of ness purposes of (1) assuring the buyer of a uniform source of supply and (2) pro-
specified material from a particular viding the seller with reduced selling costs.
supplier, and the latter agrees to fill
all of the purchaser’s needs during Example: The Firestone Tire Company manufactures tires used on automobiles.
the period of the contract. Ford Motor Company manufactures automobiles on which it must place tires
before the automobiles can be sold. Ford Motor Company enters into a contract
with Firestone Tire Company to purchase all of the tires it will need this year from
Firestone Tire Company. This is an example of a requirements contract: Ford
Motor Company has agreed to purchase all of the tires it will need from Firestone
Tire Company.
BEST-EFFORTS CONTRACT
best-efforts contract A best-efforts contract contains a clause that requires one or both of the parties to
A contract clause that requires one use their best efforts to achieve the objective of the contract. The courts generally
or both of the parties to use their have held that the imposition of the best-efforts duty provides sufficient considera-
best efforts to achieve the objective tion to make a contract enforceable.
of the contract.
Example: Real estate listing contracts often require a real estate broker to use his or
her best efforts to find a buyer for the listed real estate. Contracts often require
underwriters to use their best efforts to sell securities on behalf of their corporate
clients.
Settlement of Claims
The law promotes the voluntary settlement of disputed claims. Settlement saves
judicial resources and serves the interests of the parties entering into the
settlement.
In some situations, one of the parties to a contract believes he or she did not
receive what he or she was due. This party may attempt to reach a compromise
with the other party (e.g., by paying less consideration than was provided for in
the contract). The compromise agreement is called an accord. If the accord is accord
performed, it is called a satisfaction. This type of settlement is called an accord An agreement whereby the parties
and satisfaction or a compromise. If the accord is not satisfied, the other party agree to accept something different
can sue to enforce either the accord or the original contract. in satisfaction of the original contract.
Example: Suppose that a contract stipulated the cost of a computer system to keep satisfaction
track of inventory, accounts receivable, and so on, is $100,000. After it is installed, The performance of an accord.
the computer system does not perform as promised. To settle the dispute, the par- accord and satisfaction
ties agree that $70,000 is to be paid as full and final payment for the computer. This The settlement of a contract dispute.
accord is enforceable even though no new consideration is given because reasona-
ble persons would disagree on the worth of the computer system that was actually
installed.
Equity
Reviewing common law, you may remember that two separate courts developed
in England: the courts of law and the Chancery Courts (or courts of equity). The
equity courts developed a set of maxims based on fairness, equality, moral rights,
and natural law that were applied in settling disputes. Equity was resorted to equity
when (1) an award of money damages “at law” would not be the proper remedy A doctrine that permits judges to
or (2) fairness required the application of equitable principles. Today, in most make decisions based on fairness,
U.S. states, the courts of law and equity have been merged into one court. In an equality, moral rights, and natural
action “in equity,” the judge decides the equitable issue; there is no right to a jury law.
trial in an equitable action. The doctrine of equity is sometimes applied in con-
tract cases.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The courts have developed the doctrine of promissory estoppel or (detrimental promissory estoppel
reliance) to avoid injustice. This doctrine is a broad policy-based doctrine. It is An equitable doctrine that prevents
used to provide a remedy to a person who has relied on another person’s promise, the withdrawal of a promise by a
but that person withdraws his or her promise and is not subject to a breach of con- promisor if it will adversely affect a
tract action because one of the two elements discussed in this chapter (i.e., agree- promisee who has adjusted his or
her position in justifiable reliance on
ment or consideration) is lacking. The doctrine of promissory estoppel estops
the promise. An equitable doctrine
(prevents) the promisor from revoking his or her promise. Therefore, the person
that permits enforcement of oral
who has detrimentally relied on the promise for performance may sue the promi- contracts that should have been in
sor for performance or other remedy the court feels is fair to award in the writing. It is applied to avoid injustice.
circumstances.
For the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be applied, the following elements
must be shown:
1. The promisor made a promise.
2. The promisor should have reasonably expected to induce the promisee to rely
on the promise.
74 Chapter 3
3. The promisee actually relied on the promise and engaged in an action or for-
bearance of a right of a definite and substantial nature.
4. Injustice would be caused if the promise were not enforced.
Example: XYZ Construction Company, a general contractor, requests

bids from subcontractors for work to be done on a hospital building that
XYZ plans to submit a bid to build. Bert Plumbing Company submits the
lowest bid for the plumbing work, and XYZ incorporates Bert’s low bid in
its own bid for the general contract. In this example, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel prevents Bert from withdrawing its bid. If XYZ is
awarded the contract to build the hospital, it could enforce Bert’s promise
to perform.
remedies at law EQUITABLE REMEDIES

Economic compensation in the form
of real property, personal property, Courts today can award both legal and equitable remedies, so plaintiffs may request
and money. both types of relief in the same case. Three types of economic compensation, or rem-
equitable remedies edies at law, can be awarded to a plaintiff. These forms of economic compensation
A remedy based upon settled rules are land (real property), items of value (personal property), and money. If a party
of fairness, justice, and honesty. wants a remedy other than economic compensation, or if the court concludes that a
remedy at law is not appropriate or adequate, the court may award an equitable
specific performance
A remedy that orders the breaching
remedy.
party to perform the acts promised in Remedies in equity are based on settled rules of fairness, justice, and honesty.
the contract; usually awarded in cases The main remedies in equity are specific performance, rescission, and injunction.
in which the subject matter is unique,
such as in contracts involving land, Specific Performance
heirlooms, and paintings. Judgment of The equitable remedy of specific performance may be used when the contract
the court ordering a licensor to spe- involves something unique and money damages are not appropriate. In this case,
cifically perform the license by making
the court would order the party or parties to perform exactly what was promised in
the contracted-for unique information
the contract.
available to the licensee. A decree of
the court that orders a seller or lessor Example: A contract for the sale of a painting might be appropriate for specific
to perform his or her obligations performance because the subject of the contract (the painting) is unique, so money
under the contract; usually occurs damages will not enable a buyer to obtain a substantially identical substitute in the
when the goods in question are marketplace.
unique, such as art or antiques.
rescission Rescission
An action to rescind (undo) the A court may find that the only equitable remedy is to undo a contract. The remedy
contract. Rescission is available if of rescission terminates the contract and returns the parties to the positions they
there has been a material breach of
occupied prior to the contract.
contract, fraud, duress, undue
influence, or mistake. Example: A customer might want to rescind, or cancel, an agreement to purchase
restitution
a high-definition television because the seller misrepresented its quality. The court
Returning of goods or property might order a rescission of the agreement if no money has yet changed hands. If
received from the other party to the customer has already paid for the television, the rescission would also involve
rescind a contract; if the actual restitution, returning to each party any money or other items of value (the televi-
goods or property is not available, a sion) that had been exchanged.
cash equivalent must be made.
injunction
Injunction
A court order that prohibits a person Although rare in a contractual dispute, an injunction may be ordered by the court
from doing a certain act. to direct the defendant to carry out—or refrain from carrying out—the contract.
Persons who violate an injunction are typically held in contempt of court and pun-
ished with a jail sentence or fine.
Susan M. Bartel is a 1997 gradu- All areas of law require comprehensively
ate of the Bachelor’s Degree Parale- drafted contracts. It is critically important that all of
gal Studies Program at David N. the necessary provisions are set forth in the contract
Myers University in Cleveland, in a concise and clear manner so that the parties are
Ohio. She also holds an associate aware of the terms and conditions of the contract.
degree in paralegal studies from The contract should set forth not only present con-
Cuyahoga Community College in ditions but also future considerations such as termi-
Parma, Ohio. Susan also received nation or dissolution of the contract. Under the
her master of science degree in urban studies from supervision of an attorney, the paralegal provides a
Cleveland State University in Cleveland. Susan is vital resource in reviewing the contract to see that
employed by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Cleveland the document contains the necessary information
in its Real Estate and Legal Services Department. for a particular matter and also includes all of the
elements of a legal and binding contract.
The paralegal profession has been a very positive The use of paralegals in drafting contracts for
career choice for me, giving me the opportunity to review by attorneys, or in reviewing contracts that
assist attorneys in many areas of law, including loan attorneys have previously drafted, is an effective
acquisition and refinancing, construction contracts, way for the law firm or legal department and the
real estate transactions, leases, tax matters, probate, client to save money and time.
and corporate law.

Competence
An attorney has a double duty to represent a client competently. One
duty arises through the common law of torts, which controls if an attor-
ney commits professional negligence. The attorney also has an ethical
duty to represent a client competently. ABA Model Rule 1.1 requires that
the attorney have legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
so as to be competent in representing a client.3
The ethical paralegal must share the attorney’s requirement of
competence by engaging in education and training. As a paralegal
student, you are engaging in that education and training right now.
However, to maintain your competence, you will need to attend con-
tinuing legal education seminars and keep up with the case law in
your area throughout your professional career.
3
76 Chapter 3
CHAPTER 3 SUMMARY
CONSIDERATION, p. 63 4. Preexisting duty. Promise to perform an act or do

something that a person is already under an obligation
Consideration
to do.
Consideration involves a thing of value being given in 5. Past consideration. Promise based on a party’s past
exchange for a promise. It may be tangible or intangible consideration.
property, performance of a service, forbearance of a legal
right, or another thing of value. EQUITY, p. 73
Requirements of Consideration 1. Remedy in equity. A remedy allowed by courts in situ-
ations where remedies at law are not appropriate.
1. Legal value. Something of legal value must be given as
2. Remedies. Remedies in equity are based on settled
consideration. Either (a) the promisee suffers a legal
rules of fairness, justice, and honesty.
detriment or (b) the promisor receives a legal benefit.
3. Equitable remedies.
2. Bargained-for exchange. A contract must arise from a
a. Specific performance. An equitable remedy requir-
bargained-for exchange. Gift promises (or gratuitous prom-
ing exactly the performance that was specified in a
ises) are unenforceable because they lack consideration.
contract.
Special Contracts b. Rescission. An equitable remedy where a contract is
terminated and the parties are returned to the posi-
1. Requirements contracts. Contracts in which the buyer
tions they occupied before the contract was made.
agrees to purchase all the requirements for an item
c. Injunction. A court decree ordering a person to do
from a single seller are enforceable if the parties act in
or refrain from doing a certain act or activity.
good faith.
2. Output contracts. Contracts in which the seller agrees
to sell all of its production to a single buyer are enforce-
able if the parties act in good faith.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, p. 73
3. Best-efforts contracts. Contracts that require a party to Promissory estoppel is a policy-based equitable doctrine
use its best efforts to accomplish the objective of the that prevents a promisor from revoking his or her promise
contract are enforceable. even though the promise lacks consideration. The require-
ments are:
CONTRACTS LACKING 1. The promisor made a promise.
CONSIDERATION, p. 67 2. The promisor should have reasonably expected to in-
duce the promisee to rely on the promise.
Contracts carried out under the following conditions are
3. The promisee actually relied on the promise and en-
unenforceable because they lack consideration:
gaged in an action or forbearance of a right of a definite
1. Illegal consideration. Promise to refrain from doing an and substantial nature.
illegal act. 4. Injustice would be caused if the promise were not
2. Illusory promise. If one or both parties to a contract enforced.
can choose not to perform their contractual duties.
3. Moral obligation. Promise made out of a sense of
moral obligation, honor, love, or affection.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Accord 73 Gift promises (gratuitous promises) 64 Promissory estoppel (detrimental
Accord and satisfaction (compromise) 73 Illegal consideration 67 reliance) 73
Adequate consideration 67 Illusory promises (illusory contracts) 68 Remedies at law 74
Bargained-for exchange 64 Injunction 74 Requirements contract 72
Best-efforts contract 72 Legal value 63 Rescission 74
Consideration 63 Moral obligation 69 Restitution 74
Equitable relief 81 Output contract 72 Satisfaction 73
Equitable remedies 74 Past consideration 69 Specific performance 74
Equity 73 Preexisting duty 69

What you have learned about enforceability will help you Take a look at Penley v. Penley, 332 S.E.2d 51 (N.C. 1985), to
understand Dean’s rights to the gym in this chapter’s case sce- aid you in your answer.
nario. Did consideration exist in Jan and Dean’s agreement?

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. Check out the summary of consideration available at
www.law.cornell.edu.
1. For a simplified explanation of the concept of consid-
eration, see www.lectlaw.com. Type “consideration”
into the search box and read the articles that are listed.
Once the date and the parties to the contract are set out in an 2.
introductory clause (see the Practice Tip in Chapter 1), and the
recital as to what and why the parties would like to contract is
written (see the Practice Tip in Chapter 2), the next step in 3.
drafting the contract is to follow with a section that describes
the transaction. The basic form for this section is as follows: Exercise:
NOW THEREFORE, and ________ agree as Using the above sample format and the facts from the Port-
follows: folio Exercise at the end of Chapter 4, and after reviewing the
descriptive sections in some of the sample contracts in
1.
Appendix C, draft several sections that describe the transaction.

Topic: Rescission Clause Sources:
(To the student: Reread the basic facts from the Hands-On Use the sample rescission clause (for rescission and/or ter-
Drafting Exercises located at the end of Chapters 1 and 2 mination relating to inspection) from paragraph 4(b) of the
before working on the exercise below.) sample Real Estate Purchase Agreement in Appendix C as a
guide to drafting this rescission and/or termination clause
Facts:
related to financing. (Note that the final warehouse purchase
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., wants to make sure contract will follow the format of this sample Real Estate
that the warehouse purchase contract can be rescinded or Purchase Agreement.)
terminated in the event that it is unable to secure a loan in
the amount of $1 million.
Exercise/Assignment:
Draft a rescission and/or termination clause related to financ-
ing for purpose of inclusion in a warehouse purchase contract.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 3.1 Forbearance to Sue waiver by Lena of her interest in the community property,
When John W. Frasier died, he left a will that devised certain and if she failed to file the waiver, she would then receive
of his community and separate property to his wife, Lena, only her interest in the community property and nothing
and their three children. These devises were more valuable more. Lena hired her brother, D. L. Carter, an attorney, to
to Lena than just her interest in the community property represent her. Carter failed to file the waiver on Lena’s behalf,
that she would otherwise have received without the will. The thus preventing her from taking under the will. Instead, she
devises to her, however, were conditioned on the filing of a received her interest in the community property, which was
78 Chapter 3
$19,358 less than she would have received under the will. Critical Legal Thinking Case 3.4 Promissory Estoppel
Carter sent Lena the following letter: Nalley’s, Inc. (Nalley’s), was a major food distributor with its
home office in the state of Washington. Jacob Aronowicz
This is to advise and confirm our agreement—that in
and Samuel Duncan approached Nalley’s about the possibil-
the event the J. W. Frasier estate case now on appeal
ity of their company manufacturing a line of sliced meat
is not terminated so that you will receive settlement
products to be distributed by Nalley’s. When Nalley’s showed
equal to your share of the estate as you would have
considerable interest, Aronowicz and Duncan incorporated
done if your waiver had been filed in the estate in
as Major Food Products, Inc. (Major). Meetings to discuss
proper time, I will make up any balance to you in
the proposal continued at length with Charles Gardiner, a
payments as suits my convenience and will pay inter-
vice president and general manager of the Los Angeles divi-
est on your loss at 6 percent.
sion of Nalley’s. Gardiner delivered a letter to Major, agree-
The appeal was decided against Lena. When she tried to enforce ing to become the exclusive Los Angeles and Orange County
the contract against Carter, he alleged that the contract was not distributor for Major’s products, but he stated in the letter
enforceable because it was not supported by valid considera- “that should we determine your product line is not repre-
tion. Who wins? Frasier v. Carter, 432 P.2d 32 (Idaho 1968). sentative of, or is not compatible with, our operation we are
free to terminate our agreement within 30 days.” Based on
Critical Legal Thinking Case 3.2 Past Consideration A. J.
Gardiner’s assurances, Major leased a plant, modified the
Whitmire and R. Lee Whitmire were brothers. R. Lee Whit-
plant to its specifications, purchased and installed equip-
mire married Lillie Mae Whitmire. For four years, A. J. per-
ment, signed contracts to obtain meat to be processed, and
formed various services for his brother and sister-in-law.
hired personnel. Both Aronowicz and Duncan resigned
During this time, R. Lee and Lillie Mae purchased some land.
from their positions at other meat-processing companies to
Fifteen years later, in the presence of Lillie Mae, R. Lee told A.
devote full time to the project. Financing was completed
J., “When we’re gone, this land is yours.” At that time, A. J. had
when Aronowicz and Duncan used their personal fortunes
not done any work for R. Lee or Lillie Mae for 16 years, and
to purchase the stock of Major. Gardiner and other repre-
none was expected or provided in the future. Thirty years
sentatives of Nalley’s visited Major’s plant and expressed sat-
later, after both R. Lee and Lillie Mae had died, A. J. filed a
isfaction with the premises. Major obtained the necessary
claim with the estate of Lillie Mae seeking specific perform-
government approvals regarding health standards and
ance of the earlier promise to give him the land. Does A. J. get
immediately achieved full production. Because Nalley’s was
the property? Whitmire v. Watkins, 267 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1980).
to pick up the finished products at Major’s plant, drivers
Critical Legal Thinking Case 3.3 Preexisting Duty Robert employed by Nalley’s visited Major’s plant to acquaint them-
Chuckrow Construction Company (Chuckrow) was selves with its operations.
employed as the general contractor to build a Kinney shoe Gardiner sent the final proposal regarding the Nalley’s
store. Chuckrow employed Ralph Gough to perform the car- and Major relationship to the Nalley’s home office for final
pentry work on the store. The contract with Gough stipulated approval. One week later, the Nalley’s home office in Wash-
that he was to provide all labor, materials, tools, equipment, ington made a decision not to distribute Major’s products.
scaffolding, and other items necessary to complete the car- Nalley’s refused to give any reason to Major for its decision.
pentry work. Gough’s employees erected 38 trusses at the job No final agreement was ever executed between the parties.
site. The next day, 32 of the trusses fell off the building. The Immediate efforts by Major to secure other distribution for
reason for the trusses having fallen was unexplained, and evi- its products proved unsuccessful. Further, because Major
dence showed it was not due to Chuckrow’s fault or a defi- owned no trucks itself and had no sales organization, it could
ciency in the building plans. Chuckrow told Gough that he not distribute the products itself. In less than six months,
would pay him to re-erect the trusses and continue work. Major had failed, and Aronowicz’s and Duncan’s stock in
When the job was complete, Chuckrow paid Gough the orig- Major was worthless. Major, Aronowicz, and Duncan sued
inal contract price but refused to pay him for the additional Nalley’s for damages under the doctrine of promissory
cost of re-erecting the trusses. Gough sued Chuckrow for this estoppel. Do they win? Aronowicz v. Nalley’s, Inc., 106 Cal.
expense. Can Gough recover? Robert Chuckrow Constr. Co. v. Rptr. 424 (Ct. App. 1972).
Gough, 159 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 3.1 Kortney Dempsey took a cruise on a ship are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. However,
operated by Norwegian Cruise Line (Norwegian). In gen- Congress permits this period to be reduced to one year by
eral, suits for personal injuries arising out of maritime torts contract. The Norwegian passenger ticket limited the period
to one year. Evidence showed that the cruise line ticket con- remedy. Was the defendant’s duty under the contract illu-
tained the notation “Important Notice” in a bright red box in sory? Was it ethical for Ocean Dunes to place the provi-
the bottom-right corner of each of the first four pages of the sion at issue in the contract? Ocean Dunes of Hutchinson
ticket. The information in the box stated that certain pages Island Dev. Corp. v. Colangelo, 463 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
of the ticket contain information that “affect[s] important App. 1985).
legal rights.” In addition, at the top of page 6 of the ticket,
Ethics Case 3.4 Red Owl Stores, Inc., a Minnesota corpo-
where the terms and conditions begin, it is stated in bold let-
ration with its home office at Hopkins, Minnesota, owns
ters: “Passengers are advised to read the terms and condi-
and operates grocery supermarkets and grants franchises to
tions of the Passenger Ticket Contract set forth below.” The
franchisees to also operate such stores. Joseph Hoffman,
clause at issue, which appears on page 8, clearly provides that
who operated a bakery with his wife in Wautoma, Wisconsin,
suits must be brought within one year of injury. More than
was interested in obtaining a Red Owl franchise to operate a
one year after Dempsey had taken the cruise (but within
grocery store in Wisconsin. Hoffman contacted a represent-
three years), she filed suit against Norwegian, seeking dam-
ative of Red Owl and had numerous conversations regard-
ages for an alleged injury suffered while on the cruise.
ing this proposal. Ten months later, Mr. Lukowitz became
Dempsey asserted that the one-year limitations period had
Red Owl’s representative for the territory comprising upper
not been reasonably communicated to her. Did Dempsey act
Michigan and most of Wisconsin. Hoffman mentioned to
ethically in suing when she did? Did Norwegian act ethically
Lukowitz that he had the capital to invest, and Lukowitz
in reducing the limitations period to one year? Who wins the
assured him that would be sufficient to open a Red Owl
lawsuit? Dempsey v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 972 F.2d 998
franchise.
(9th Cir. 1992).
To gain experience in the grocery store business, and
Ethics Case 3.2 Genaro Munoz owned property that he on the advice of Lukowitz and other Red Owl representa-
leased to Goodwest Rubber Corporation (Goodwest) for five tives, Hoffman bought a small grocery store in Wautoma.
years. The lease granted Goodwest the option to buy the After three months of operating this store, a Red Owl repre-
property at a fair market value. Goodwest sought to exercise sentative came in and took inventory, checked operations,
the option to purchase the property and tendered $80,000 to and found the store was operating at a profit. Lukowitz
Munoz. When Munoz rejected this offer, Goodwest filed advised Hoffman to sell the store to his manager and assured
suit, seeking specific performance of the option agreement. Hoffman that Red Owl would find a larger store for him
The court was presented with a single issue for review: Was a elsewhere. Although Hoffman was reluctant to sell at that
price designation of “fair market value” definite enough to time because it meant losing the summer tourist business,
support an action for specific performance? Do you think he sold on the assurance he would be operating a Red Owl
Munoz acted ethically in refusing to honor the option? Who store at a new location by the fall. Again, Lukowitz assured
wins? Goodwest Rubber Corp. v. Munoz, 216 Cal. Rptr. 604 Hoffman that the capital he had was sufficient to open a
(Ct. App. 1985). Red Owl franchise.
Ethics Case 3.3 Ocean Dunes of Hutchinson Island Devel- Red Owl had selected a site in Chilton, Wisconsin, for
opment Corporation (Ocean Dunes) was a developer of con- the proposed store. On Red Owl’s insistence, Hoffman
dominium units. Prior to the construction, Albert and Helen obtained an option to purchase the site. Hoffman and his
Colangelo entered into a purchase agreement to buy one of wife rented a house in Chilton. Hoffman met with Lukowitz,
the units and paid a deposit to Ocean Dunes. A provision in who assured him, “Everything is ready to go. Get your
the purchase agreement provided the following: money together and we are set.” Lukowitz told Hoffman he
must sell his bakery business and building in Wautoma,
If Developer shall default in the performance of its
which was the only “hitch” in the entire plan. Hoffman sold
obligations pursuant to this agreement, Purchaser’s
his bakery building but retained the equipment to be used in
only remedy shall be to terminate this agreement,
the proposed Red Owl store. During the next two months,
whereupon the Deposit shall be refunded to Pur-
Red Owl prepared various financial projections for the pro-
chaser and all rights and obligations thereunder shall
posed site. Hoffman met with Lukowitz and the credit man-
thereupon become null and void.
ager for Red Owl, who demanded that Hoffman have more
The purchase agreement provided that if the buyer capital to invest in the store. Hoffman contacted his father-
defaulted, the developer could retain the buyer’s deposit or in-law, who agreed to provide the additional money. A week
sue the buyer for damages and any other legal or equitable later, Red Owl sent Hoffman a telegram demanding that he
remedy. When Ocean Dunes refused to sell the unit to the have more capital to invest. When Hoffman could not raise
Colangelos, they sued, seeking a decree of specific per- the additional money, the transaction fell through. Hoffman
formance to require Ocean Dunes to sell them the unit. did not purchase the store site in Chilton and forfeited the
Ocean Dunes alleged that the provision just quoted pre- option payment. The parties had never entered into a final
vented the plaintiffs from seeking any legal or equitable agreement regarding the franchise.
80 Chapter 3
Hoffman sued Red Owl under the doctrine of promis- Red Owl Stores, Inc., act ethically in this case? Should the
sory estoppel, seeking damages for the money lost on the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel apply in this
option payment on the Chilton property and the lease pay- case? Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267
ments on the house in Chilton. Did the representatives of (Wis. 1965).

Read Case B.3 in Appendix B (Congregation Kadimah Toras- 1. What was the plaintiff suing for? Explain.
Moshe v. DeLeo). This case is excerpted from the appellate 2. What was the defendant estate’s defense?
court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) 3. How did the court decide this case?
using the IRAC method. After briefing the case, you should
be able to answer the following questions:
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
EQUITY SAVES CONTRACTING PARTY
“[T]here is only minimal delay in giving notice, the harm to the lessor is slight, and the
hardship to the lessee is severe.”
Judge Abbe
The courts usually interpret a valid contract as a solemn promise to perform. This
view of the sanctity of a contract can cause an ethical conflict. Consider the following
case.
A landlord leased a motel he owned to lessees for a 10-year period. The lessees
had an option to extend the lease for an additional 10 years. To do so, they had to give
written notice to the landlord three months before the first 10-year lease expired. The
lease provided for forfeiture of all furniture, fixtures, and equipment installed by the
lessees, free of any liens, upon termination of the lease.
For almost 10 years the lessees devoted most of their assets and a great deal of
their energy building up the business. During this time, they transformed a
disheveled, unrated motel into a AAA three-star operation. With the landlord’s
knowledge, the lessees made extensive long-term improvements that greatly
increased the value of both the property and the business. The landlord knew that the
lessees had obtained long-term financing for the improvements that would extend
well beyond the first 10-year term of the lease. The landlord also knew that the only
source of income the lessees had to pay for these improvements was the income gen-
erated from the motel business. The lessees told the landlord orally in a conversation
that they intended to extend the lease.
The lessees had instructed their accountant to exercise the option on time.
Despite reminders from the lessees, the accountant failed to give the written notice
within three months of the expiration of the lease. As soon as they discovered the
mistake, the lessees personally delivered written notice of renewal of the option to
the landlord, 13 days too late. The landlord rejected it as late and instituted a lawsuit
for unlawful detainer to evict the lessees.
The trial and appellate courts held in favor of the lessees. They rejected the land-
lord’s argument for the strict adherence to the deadline for giving written notice of
renewal of the lease. Instead, the courts granted equitable relief and permitted the late equitable relief
renewal notice. The court reasoned that “there is only minimal delay in giving notice, The kind of relief sought in a court
the harm to the lessor is slight, and the hardship to the lessee is severe.” Romasanta with equity powers (e.g., injunction,
v. Mitton, 234 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1987). specific performance of a contract).

1. Ethics: Did the landlord act ethically in this case?
2. Ethics: Should the court have applied equity and saved the lessees from their
mistake? Or should they have been held to the terms of the lease?
Web Exercise
1. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the application of equity
to contract disputes.
An unconscionable contract is one which no man in his senses, not
under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair
and honest man would accept on the other.
—Hume v. United States
132 U.S. 406 (1889).
chapter 4
CAPACITY AND LEGALITY
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal represents Michael, an auto sales CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
dealer. James, a minor, entered into a contract to purchase a 2008 Hummer
from Michael. James paid $5,000 in cash and agreed to pay $1,000 per week should be able to:
until the full purchase price of $50,000 was paid. Five weeks later, a connecting 1. Define and describe the infancy doctrine.
rod on the vehicle’s engine broke. James took the car to a garage, where it was 2. Define legal insanity and intoxication and
repaired at a cost of $4,000. James refused to pay for the repairs and told explain how they affect contractual
capacity.
Michael he was “getting out” of the contract to purchase the Hummer.
3. Identify illegal contracts that are contrary
to statutes and those that violate public
policy.
4. Describe covenants not to compete and
exculpatory clauses and identify when
they are lawful.
5. Define unconscionable contracts and
determine when these contracts are
unlawful.
83
84 Chapter 4
contractual capacity Generally, the law presumes that the parties to a contract have the requisite contrac-
The legal qualification or competency tual capacity to enter into the contract. Certain persons do not have this capacity,
to understand the nature and effects however, including minors, insane persons, and intoxicated persons. The common
of one’s acts so as to enter into a law of contracts and many state statutes protect persons who lack contractual capacity
contract. from having contracts enforced against them. The party asserting incapacity or his or
her guardian, conservator, or other legal representative bears the burden of proof.
An essential element for the formation of a contract is that the object of the
illegal contract contract be lawful. A contract to perform an illegal act is called an illegal contract
A contract to perform an illegal act. and is void. That is, it cannot be enforced by either party to the contract. The term
“illegal contract” is a misnomer, however, because no contract exists if the object of
unconscionable contract the contract is illegal. In addition, courts hold that unconscionable contracts are
A contract so oppressive or unfair unenforceable. An unconscionable contract is one that is so oppressive or mani-
that it would be unjust for the court festly unfair that it would be unjust to enforce it.
to enforce it. Capacity to contract and the lawfulness of contracts are discussed in this
chapter.
Brandy Spurgin is a graduate of For example, in criminal law, the prosecution must
the University of Tennessee at make plea bargains with the defense. In personal
Chattanooga’s Legal Assistant injury law, the attorneys must examine insurance
Studies Program. She worked for policies, which are contracts. These may not be the
several years as a legal assistant first contracts that come to mind when the subject
for a civil rights attorney. Brandy of contracts is addressed. However, this sort of con-
has now graduated from law tract is just as important to the parties involved as
school and works in the areas of any others.
criminal defense, domestic law, In civil rights law, I deal with countless con-
and personal injury at the law firm of Speek and tract issues arising from our own contracts for rep-
Webb, PLLC, in Chattanooga, Tennessee. resentation, insurance policies, employment, and
criminal pleas. The subject of contracts is a require-
Contracts are invaluable tools in every business that ment in some form for every field of law and cannot
allow everyone the opportunity to take control of be avoided.
the conditions under which they do business and I draft and revise attorney-client contracts,
conduct transactions. As such, contracts are impor- draft and review settlement agreements, and review
tant in all businesses but are especially important in employment contracts regularly. This portion of my
every field of law. job is immensely important to my performance as
There are some contracts that at first glance well as the quality of service to our clients.
one might overlook but nevertheless are contracts.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
PARALEGAL
A contract administration paralegal works with contracts in numerous ways, such as
the following:
• Works with internal business groups representing outside vendor services to
determine need for and scope of potential contract.
• Negotiates contract terms with outside vendor.
Capacity and Legality 85
• If vendor does not provide contract, drafts contract for outside services.
• Reviews vendor contract for accuracy of scope, provisions, and cost. Revises and/or
amends vendor contract as necessary to obtain adequate protection for company.
• Maintains database and/or central repository of all existing contracts with out-
side vendors.
• Creates contract clause manual for boilerplate contract language.
• Develops standard services contracts for routine services.
Minors
Minors do not always have the maturity, experience, or sophistication needed to minor
enter into contracts with adults. Common law defines minors as females younger A person who has not reached the
than 18 years and males younger than 21 years. In addition, many states have age of majority.
enacted statutes that specify the age of majority. The most prevalent age of majority
is 18 for both males and females. Any age below the statutory age of majority is
called the period of minority.
THE INFANCY DOCTRINE

To protect minors, the law recognizes the infancy doctrine, which gives minors the infancy doctrine
right to disaffirm (or cancel) most contracts they have entered into with adults. A doctrine that allows minors to
This right is based on public policy that reasons minors should be protected from disaffirm (cancel) most contracts
the unscrupulous behavior of adults. In most states, the infancy doctrine is an they have entered into with adults.
objective standard. If a person’s age is below the age of majority, the court will not
inquire into his or her knowledge, experience, or sophistication. Generally, con-
tracts for the necessaries of life, which we discuss later in this chapter, are exempted
from the scope of this doctrine.
Under the infancy doctrine, a minor has the option of choosing whether to
enforce a contract (i.e., the contract is voidable by a minor). The adult party is
bound to the minor’s decision. If both parties to a contract are minors, both parties
have the right to disaffirm the contract.
If performance of the contract favors the minor, the minor will probably
enforce the contract. Otherwise, he or she will probably disaffirm the contract. A
minor may not affirm one part of a contract and disaffirm another part.
DISAFFIRMANCE
A minor can expressly disaffirm a contract orally, in writing, or through his or her disaffirmance
conduct. No special formalities are required. The contract may be disaffirmed at The act of a minor to rescind a
any time prior to the person’s reaching the age of majority plus a “reasonable time.” contract under the infancy doctrine.
The designation of a reasonable time is determined on a case-by-case basis. Disaffirmance may be done orally, in
writing, or by the minor’s conduct.
MINOR’S DUTY OF RESTORATION AND RESTITUTION

If a minor’s contract is executory and neither party has performed, the minor can
simply disaffirm the contract: There is nothing to recover because neither party has
given the other party anything of value. If the parties have exchanged consideration
and partially or fully performed the contract by the time the minor disaffirms the
86 Chapter 4
contract, however, the issue becomes one of what consideration or restitution must
be made. The following rules apply:
• Competent party’s duty of restitution —If the minor has transferred
consideration—money, property, or other valuables—to the competent party
before disaffirming the contract, that party must place the minor in status
quo. That is, the minor must be restored to the same position he or she was in
before the minor entered into the contract. This restoration is usually done by
returning the consideration to the minor. If the consideration has been sold
or has depreciated in value, the competent party must pay the minor the cash
duty of restitution equivalent. This action is called the competent party’s duty of restitution.
Where, upon disaffirmance, the • Minor’s duty of restoration—Generally, a minor is obligated only to return
competent party returns the consid- the goods or property he or she has received from the adult in the condition it
eration of the contract to the minor. is in at the time of disaffirmance (subject to several exceptions, discussed later
in this chapter), even if the item has been consumed, lost, or destroyed or has
depreciated in value by the time of disaffirmance. This rule is called the
duty of restoration minor’s duty of restoration. It is based on the rationale that if a minor had to
Where, upon disaffirmance, the place the adult in status quo upon disaffirmance of a contract, there would be
minor returns the goods or property an incentive for an adult to deal with a minor.
to the competent party.
Example: When Sherry is 17 years old (a minor), she enters into a contract to pur-
chase an automobile costing $10,000 from Bruce, a competent adult. Bruce, who
believes Sherry is an adult and does not ask for verification of her age, delivers own-
ership of the automobile to Sherry after he receives her payment of $10,000. Subse-
quently, before Sherry reaches the age of 18 (the age of majority), she is involved in
an automobile accident not caused by her own negligence. The automobile sustains
$7,000 worth of damage in the accident (and is now only worth $3,000). Sherry can
disaffirm the contract, return the damaged automobile to Bruce, and recover
$10,000 from Bruce. In this result, Sherry recovers her entire $10,000 purchase price
from Bruce, and Bruce only has a damaged automobile worth $3,000.
chase an automobile costing $10,000 from Bruce, a competent adult. Bruce, who
believes Sherry is an adult and does not ask for verification of her age, delivers own-
ership of the automobile to Sherry after he receives her payment of $10,000. Subse-
quently, before Sherry reaches the age of 18 (the age of majority), she is involved in an
automobile accident caused by her own recklessness. The accident happened because
Sherry was driving 70 miles per hour in a 45 mph traffic zone. The automobile sus-
tains $7,000 worth of damage in the accident (and is now only worth $3,000). Sherry
can disaffirm the contract and return the damaged automobile to Bruce, but she can
only recover $3,000 from Bruce. In this result, Bruce is made whole (he keeps $7,000
of Sherry’s money and has a damaged automobile worth $3,000). Sherry has $3,000.
On occasion, minors might misrepresent their age to adults when entering
into contracts. Most state laws provide that minors who misrepresent their age
must place the adult in status quo if they disaffirm the contract.
chase an automobile that costs $10,000 from Bruce, a competent adult. Bruce, who
has doubts that Sherry is an adult, asks Sherry for verification of her age. Sherry
produces a driver’s license that shows she is 19 years old. Bruce delivers ownership
of the automobile to Sherry after he receives her payment of $10,000. Subsequently,
before Sherry reaches the age of 18 (the age of majority), she is involved in an
automobile accident caused by another driver’s negligence. Sherry is not at fault.
The automobile sustains $7,000 worth of damage in the accident (and is now only
worth $3,000). Sherry can disaffirm the contract and return the damaged automobile
to Bruce, but she can only recover $3,000 from Bruce. This is because she lied about
her age. In this result, Bruce is made whole (he keeps $7,000 of Sherry’s money and
has a damaged automobile worth $3,000).
A few states have enacted statutes that require the minor to make restitution
of the reasonable value of the item when disaffirming any contract.
MISREPRESENTATION OF AGE
On occasion, minors might misrepresent their age to adults when entering into
contracts. Under the common law, such a minor would still have the right to disaf-
firm the contract. Most states, however, have changed this rule in recognition of its
unfairness to adults. The revised rule provides that minors who misrepresent their
age must place the adult in status quo if they disaffirm the contract. In other words,
a minor who has misrepresented his or her age when entering into a contract owes
the duties of restoration and restitution when disaffirming it.
RATIFICATION OF A MINOR’S CONTRACT

If a minor does not disaffirm a contract either during the period of minority or within
a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, the contract is considered ratified
(accepted). Hence, the minor (who is now an adult) is bound by the contract; the right
to disaffirm the contract is lost. Note that any attempt by a minor to ratify a contract
while still a minor can be disaffirmed just as the original contract can be disaffirmed.
The ratification, which relates back to the inception of the contract, can be ratification
by express oral or written words or implied from the minor’s conduct (e.g., after The act of a minor after the minor
reaching the age of majority, the minor remains silent regarding the contract). has reached the age of majority by
which he or she accepts a contract
Example: When June is 17 years old (a minor), she enters into a contract and pur- entered into when he or she was a
chases a used automobile from Ken, a sane adult, for $10,000. June pays Ken minor. When a principal accepts an
$10,000 and Ken signs over the ownership of the automobile to June. When June agent’s unauthorized contract. The
reaches the age of 18 (the age of majority), she has not yet disaffirmed the contract. acceptance by a corporation of an
If June waits one month after reaching the age of majority and has not yet disaf- unauthorized act of a corporate
firmed the contract, then she will be considered to have ratified the contract. She officer or agent.
cannot thereafter disaffirm the contract.
Case 4.1 presents the issue of whether a minor had ratified a contract when
he reached the age of majority.
CASE 4.1 MINOR’S CONTRACT

Jones v. Flight Sport Aviation, Inc., 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981).
“A minor may disaffirm a contract made during his minority within
a reasonable time after attaining his majority or he may, after becoming
of legal age, by acts recognizing the contract, ratify it.”
Judge Erickson,
Supreme Court of Colorado
Facts
William Michael Jones, a 17-year-old minor, signed a contract with Free Flight
Sport Aviation, Inc. (Free Flight), for the use of recreational skydiving facilities. A
covenant not to sue and an exculpatory clause exempting Free Flight from liability
88 Chapter 4
were included in the contract. One month later, Jones attained the age of majority
(18 years of age). Ten months later, while on a Free Flight skydiving operation, the
airplane crashed shortly after takeoff from Littleton Airport. Jones suffered severe
personal injuries. Jones filed suit against Free Flight, alleging negligence and will-
ful and wanton misconduct. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Free Flight. The Colorado court of appeals affirmed. Jones appealed.
Issue
Did Jones ratify the contract?

As a matter of public policy, the courts have protected minors from improvident and
imprudent contractual commitments by declaring that the contract of a minor is void-
able at the election of the minor after he attains his majority. A minor may disaffirm a
contract made during his minority within a reasonable time after attaining his major-
ity or he may, after becoming of legal age, by acts recognizing the contract, ratify it.
Affirmance is not merely a matter of intent. It may be determined by the
actions of a minor who accepts the benefits of a contract after reaching the age of
majority, or who is silent or acquiesces in the contract for a considerable length of
time. We conclude that the trial court properly determined that Jones ratified the
contract, as a matter of law, by accepting the benefits of the contract when he used
Free Flight’s facilities on October 19, 1974.
Decision
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that Jones had ratified his contract with Free
Flight by continuing, for 10 months after reaching the age of majority, to perform
under the contract. Therefore, the covenant not to sue and the exculpatory clause
exempting Free Flight from liability to Jones were enforceable. The court affirmed
the decision of the trial court and court of appeals in favor of Free Flight.

1. Critical Thinking: Should a person be allowed to disaffirm his or her
minor’s contract after reaching the age of majority? What is a reasonable
length of time after reaching the age of majority to permit disaffirmance?
2. Ethics: Did Jones act ethically by suing Free Flight Sport Aviation in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Should the covenant not to sue have been enforced here
even though Jones was an adult?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of Colorado at www.coloradosuprem-
ecourt.com.
2. Use www.google.com to find a video clip of someone skydiving.
PARENTS’ LIABILITY FOR THEIR CHILDREN’S CONTRACTS

Generally, parents owe a legal duty to provide food, clothing, shelter, and
other necessaries of life for their minor children. Parents are liable for their
children’s contracts for necessaries of life if they have not adequately provided
such items.
The parental duty of support terminates if a minor becomes emancipated.
Emancipation occurs when a minor voluntarily leaves home and lives apart from emancipation
his or her parents. The courts consider factors such as getting married, setting up a When a minor voluntarily leaves
separate household, or joining the military service in determining whether a minor home and lives apart from his or
is emancipated. Each situation is examined on its merits. her parents.
NECESSARIES OF LIFE
Minors are obligated to pay for the necessaries of life that they contract for. Other- necessaries of life
wise, many adults would refuse to sell these items to them. There is no standard A minor must pay the reasonable
definition of what is a necessary of life, but items such as food, clothing, shelter, and value of food, clothing, shelter, medi-
medical services are generally understood to fit this category. cal care, and other items considered
necessary to the maintenance of life.
Example: Goods and services such as automobiles, tools of trade, education, and
vocational training have also been found to be necessaries of life in some situations.
The minor’s age, lifestyle, and status in life influence what is considered necessary.
For example, necessaries for a married minor are greater than those for an unmar-
ried minor.
The seller’s recovery is based on the equitable doctrine of quasi-contract rather
than on the contract itself. Under this theory, the minor is obligated only to pay the
reasonable value of the goods or services received. Reasonable value is determined
on a case-by-case basis.
In Case 4.2, the court found a minor liable for necessaries of life.
CASE 4.2 NECESSARIES OF LIFE

Yale Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Fountain, 838 A.2d 179 (Conn. 2004).
“The rule that a minor’s contracts are voidable, however, is not absolute. An exception
to this rule, eponymously known as the doctrine of necessaries, is that a minor may not
avoid a contract for goods or services necessary for his health and sustenance.”
Judge Borden,
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Facts
Harun Fountain, a minor, was shot in the back of the head at point-blank range by
a playmate. Fountain required extensive lifesaving medical services from a variety
of medical service providers, including Yale Diagnostic Radiology. The expense of
the services rendered by Yale to Fountain totaled $17,694. Yale billed Vernetta
Turner-Tucker (Tucker), Fountain’s mother, for the services. Tucker, however,
declared bankruptcy and had Yale’s claim against her discharged in bankruptcy.
Tucker, on behalf of Fountain, sued the boy who shot Fountain and recovered
damages in a settlement agreement. These funds were placed in an estate on Foun-
tain’s behalf under the supervision of the probate court.
Yale filed a motion with the probate court for payment of the $17,694 from
the estate. The probate court denied the motion. Yale appealed to the trial court,
which held in favor of Yale. The trial court held that minors were liable for their
necessaries. Fountain’s estate appealed.
90 Chapter 4
Issue
Is Fountain’s estate liable to Yale under the doctrine of necessaries?

Connecticut has long recognized the common-law rule that a minor child’s contracts
are voidable. The rule that a minor’s contracts are voidable, however, is not abso-
lute. An exception to this rule, eponymously known as the doctrine of necessaries, is
that a minor may not avoid a contract for goods or services necessary for his health
and sustenance.
Thus, when a medical service provider renders necessary medical care to an
injured minor, two contracts arise: the primary contract between the provider and
the minor’s parents; and an implied in law contract between the provider and the
minor himself. The primary contract between the provider and the parents is based
on the parents’ duty to pay for their children’s necessary expenses, under both com-
mon law and statute. The primacy of this contract means that the provider of neces-
saries must make all reasonable efforts to collect from the parents before resorting to
the secondary implied in law contract with the minor.
The secondary implied in law contract between the medical services provider and
the minor arises from equitable considerations, including the law’s disfavor of unjust
enrichment. Therefore, where necessary medical services are rendered to a minor whose
parents do not pay for them, equity and justice demand that a secondary implied in law
contract arise between the medical services provider and the minor who has received the
benefits of those services. These principles compel the conclusion that, in the circum-
stances of the present case, the estate of Fountain is liable to plaintiff Yale under the
common-law doctrine of necessaries, for the services rendered by Yale to Fountain.
Decision
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that under the doctrine of necessaries,
Fountain’s estate is liable to Yale for the expense of the services rendered to Foun-
tain. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Yale.

1. Law: What is the doctrine of necessaries? Explain.
2. Law: What is a parent’s legal responsibility for medical services and other
necessaries provided to his or her child?
3. Ethics: Was it ethical for Fountain’s mother not to pay Yale for the medical
service rendered to her child? Was it ethical for her to avoid this bill by declar-
ing bankruptcy?
4. Ethics: Should Yale have just written off this debt and not pursued Fountain’s
estate for payment? Why or why not?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of Connecticut at www.jud.state.ct.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses minors’ contracts.
SPECIAL TYPES OF MINORS’ CONTRACTS

The infancy doctrine of the common law of contracts allows minors to disaffirm
many contracts they have entered into with adults. Based on public policy, many
states have enacted statutes that make certain specified contracts enforceable
against minors—that is, minors cannot assert the infancy doctrine against enforce-
ment for these contracts. These usually include contracts for the following:
• Medical, surgical, and pregnancy care
• Psychological counseling
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• The performance of duties relating to stock and bond transfers, bank accounts,
and the like
• Educational loan agreements
• Contracts to support children
• Contracts to enlist in the military
• Artistic, sports, and entertainment contracts that have been entered into with
the approval of the court (many of these statutes require that a certain portion
of the wages and fees earned by the minor be put in trust until the minor
reaches the age of majority)
Mentally Incompetent Persons

Mental incapacity may arise because of mental illness, brain damage, mental retarda-
tion, senility, and the like. The law protects people suffering from substantial mental
incapacity from enforcement of contracts against them because such persons may
not understand the consequences of their actions in entering into a contract.
To be relieved of his or her duties under a contract, the law requires a person
to have been legally insane at the time of entering into the contract. This state is
called legal insanity. Most states use the objective cognitive “understanding” test to legal insanity
determine legal insanity. Under this test, the person’s mental incapacity must A state of contractual incapacity as
render that person incapable of understanding or comprehending the nature of the determined by law.
transaction. Mere weakness of intellect, slight psychological or emotional prob-
lems, or delusions do not constitute legal insanity.
The law has developed two standards concerning contracts of mentally
incompetent persons: (1) adjudged insane and (2) insane but not adjudged insane.
ADJUDGED INSANE
In certain cases, a relative, a loved one, or another interested party may institute a legal
action to have someone declared legally (i.e., adjudged) insane. If after hearing the
evidence at a formal judicial or administrative hearing the person is adjudged insane, adjudged insane
the court makes that person a ward of the court and appoints a guardian to act on that A person who has been legally
person’s behalf. Any contract entered into by a person who has been adjudged insane adjudged insane by a proper court
is void. That is, no contract exists. The court-appointed guardian is the only one who or administrative agency. A contract
has the legal authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the person. entered into by such a person is void.
Example: Ted, Heather, and Jed are the three surviving relatives of their grand-
mother, Mabel. For years, Mabel has exhibited substantial mental impairment such
that she is incapable of understanding or comprehending the nature of her transac-
tions. The three grandchildren bring a proceeding in family court asking the court
92 Chapter 4
to adjudge Mabel insane. After a hearing in which evidence is introduced, the

judge decides that Mabel is permanently insane and issues a judgment saying so.
Mabel has now been adjudged insane. The court appoints Heather as guardian.
Subsequently, Mabel enters into a contract with Sidell’s Siding Company to put
new siding on her house. This is a void contract. Only Heather can enter into such
a contract on behalf of Mabel.
INSANE BUT NOT ADJUDGED INSANE

insane but not adjudged insane If no formal ruling has been made—that is, if a person is insane but not adjudged
A person who is insane but has not insane—any contracts entered into by a person who suffers from a mental impair-
been adjudged insane by a court or ment that makes him or her legally insane are voidable by the insane person. Unless
administrative agency. A contract the other party does not have contractual capacity, he or she does not have the
entered into by such person is gen- option to void the contract.
erally voidable. Some states hold
that such a contract is void. Example: Ted, Heather, and Jed are the three surviving relatives of their grandmother,
Mabel. For years, Mabel has exhibited substantial mental impairment such that she is
incapable of understanding or comprehending the nature of her transactions. The
three grandchildren have never brought a legal proceeding to have Mabel legally
declared insane. Mabel enters into a contract with Sidell’s Siding Company to put new
siding on her house. This is a voidable contract that is only voidable by Mabel. Sidell’s
Siding Company cannot avoid the contract; only Mabel can.
Some people have alternating periods of sanity and insanity. Any contracts
made by such persons during a lucid interval are enforceable. Contracts made
while the person was not legally sane can be disaffirmed.
A person who has dealt with an insane person must place that insane person
in status quo if the contract is either void or voided by the insane person. Most states
hold that a party who did not know he or she was dealing with an insane person must
be placed in status quo upon avoidance of the contract. Insane persons are liable in
quasi-contract to pay the reasonable value for the necessaries of life they receive.
In Case 4.3, the court had to decide whether mental incapacity relieved a
person from a contract.
CASE 4.3 MENTAL CAPACITY

Campbell v. Carr, 603 S.E.2d 625 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
“This inadequate consideration combined with Carr’s weakness of mind,
due to her schizophrenia and depression, makes it inequitable to order
specific performance.”
Judge Anderson,
Court of Appeals of South Carolina
Facts
Martha M. Carr suffered from schizophrenia and depression. Schizophrenia is a psy-
chotic disorder characterized by disturbances in perception, inferential thinking,
delusions, hallucinations, and grossly disorganized behavior. Depression is charac-
terized by altered moods and a diminished ability to think or concentrate. Carr was
taking two prescription drugs for her mental diseases: Haldol and Cogentin.
Carr, a resident of New York, inherited from her mother a 108-acre tract of
unimproved land in South Carolina. Carr contacted Raymond C. and Betty Campbell
(Campbell), who had leased the property for 30 years, about selling the property to
them. Carr asked Campbell how much the property was worth, and Campbell told
Carr that the tax assessor’s agricultural assessed value of the property was $54,000.
Carr and Campbell entered into a written contract for $54,000, which averaged
$500 an acre. Campbell paid Carr earnest money. Carr subsequently missed the
closing day for the sale of the property, returned the earnest money, and refused to
sell the property to Campbell. Campbell sued Carr to obtain a court judgment
ordering Carr to specifically perform the contract and sell the property to Campbell.
At trial, evidence and expert witness testimony placed the value of the property at
$162,000, or $1,500 an acre. Testimony showed that Campbell knew the value of
the property exceeded $54,000. The court agreed with Campbell and ordered Carr
to specifically perform the contract. Carr appealed.
Issue
Did Carr, because of her mental diseases of schizophrenia and depression, lack the
mental capacity to enter into the contract with Campbell?

An action for specific performance is one in equity. Specific performance should
be granted only if there is no adequate remedy at law and specific enforcement
of the contract is equitable between the parties. Equity will not decree specific
performance unless the contract is fair, just, and equitable.
The consideration stated in the contract between Carr and the Campbells was
inadequate. The $54,000 sales price in the contract was significantly below the
appraised value of $162,000, the Collateral I.D. report’s expected sell value of
$129,625 to $145,180, and the Richmond County Tax Assessor’s fair market value of
$103,700. This inadequate consideration combined with Carr’s weakness of mind,
due to her schizophrenia and depression, makes it inequitable to order specific per-
formance. The Campbells, as the prospective purchasers, had greater knowledge of
the real estate value of the land, having leased the land for 30 years for personal
hunting and farming purposes, compared with Carr, who lived in New York, had
not visited the property since she was a child, and had no knowledge of the fair mar-
ket value of the property. Additionally, Carr suffers from mental illness.
Decision
The court of appeals held that Carr’s mental diseases of schizophrenia and depression
affected her ability to make an informed decision regarding the sale of the property.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision ordering specific performance.

1. Law: What does the doctrine of incapacity to contract provide? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did the Campbells act ethically in this case?
3. Ethics: Was it ethical for Carr to withdraw from the contract? Did she have
sufficient reason to withdraw from the contract?
94 Chapter 4
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina at www.judicial.
state.sc.us/appeals.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses schizophrenia.
Concept Summary
Disaffirmance of Contracts Based on Legal Insanity
Type of Legal Insanity Disaffirmance Rule
Adjudged insane Contract is void. Neither party can enforce the contract.
Insane but not adjudged Contract is voidable by the insane person; the competent
insane party cannot void the contract.
Intoxicated Persons
intoxicated person Most states provide that contracts entered into by certain intoxicated persons are
A person who is under contractual voidable by those persons. The intoxication may occur because of alcohol or drugs.
incapacity because of ingestion of The contract is not voidable by the other party if that party had contractual capacity.
alcohol or drugs to the point of Under the majority rule, the contract is voidable only if the person was so
incompetence. intoxicated when the contract was entered into that he or she was incapable of
understanding or comprehending the nature of the transaction. In most states, this
rule holds even if the intoxication was self-induced. Some states allow the person
to disaffirm the contract only if the person was forced to become intoxicated or did
so unknowingly.
The amount of alcohol or drugs necessary to be consumed for a person to be
considered legally intoxicated to disaffirm contracts varies from case to case. The
factors that are considered include the user’s physical characteristics and his or her
ability to “hold” intoxicants.
A person who disaffirms a contract based on intoxication generally must be
returned to the status quo. In turn, the intoxicated person generally must return
the consideration received under the contract to the other party and make restitu-
tion that returns the other party to status quo. After becoming sober, an intoxi-
cated person can ratify the contracts he or she entered into while intoxicated.
Intoxicated persons are liable in quasi-contract to pay the reasonable value for nec-
essaries they receive.
In Case 4.4, the court found that a person was not bound to a contact she
entered while intoxicated.
CASE 4.4 INTOXICATION

Smith v. Williamson, 429 So. 2d 598 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982).
“The record further shows that Williamson had consumed a pint of 100-proof
vodka and that she remained in an agitated state over the sale of her home.”
Judge Bradley,
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Facts
Carolyn Ann Williamson entered into a contract to sell her house to Mr. and
Mrs. Matthews at a time when her house was threatened with foreclosure. Evidence
showed that Williamson was an alcoholic. Having read about the threatened fore-
closure in the newspaper, attorney Virgil M. Smith appeared at Williamson’s home
to discuss the matter with her. Williamson told Smith that she expected to receive
$17,000 from the sale but had actually received $1,700. On the following day, after
drinking a pint of 100-proof vodka, Williamson and her son went to Smith’s office,
where Smith prepared a lawsuit to have the sale of the house set aside based on
Williamson’s lack of capacity due to alcoholism. At that time, Smith loaned Williamson
$500 and took back a note and mortgage on her house to secure repayment of this
amount and his attorney fees. Evidence showed that Smith did not allow Williamson’s
son to read the mortgage. The sale to Mr. and Mrs. Matthews was set aside. Subse-
quently, Smith began foreclosure proceedings on Williamson’s house to recover
attorney’s fees and advances. Williamson filed this lawsuit to enjoin the foreclosure.
The trial court held that Smith’s mortgage was void and permanently enjoined him
from foreclosing on Williamson’s house. Smith appealed.
Issue
Was Williamson’s alcoholism a sufficient mental incapacity to void the mortgage?

In essence, Smith takes the position that while Williamson had been drinking on the
morning that she executed the mortgage to him, the transaction was still valid
because she had sufficient capacity to understand the nature of the act, and it was
free from fraud and undue influence. To accept Smith’s position would require us to
ignore certain subtle ironies arising from the facts of this appeal and the nature of
the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client.
The record indicates that Williamson executed the note and mortgage on her
home to Smith the following morning. The record further shows that Williamson
had consumed a pint of 100-proof vodka and that she remained in an agitated state
over the sale of her home. To hold that Williamson was incapable of understanding
the nature of the transaction with the Matthewses and then to hold that she was able
to comprehend the nature of her dealings with Smith would be to reach illogical
results, especially in light of the facts presented at trial.
Decision
The court of appeals held that Williamson was not bound to the contract and
mortgage with attorney Smith because she was mentally incompetent by reason of
intoxication at the time she signed the documents. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision that had held Smith’s mortgage void and permanently
enjoined him from foreclosing on Williamson’s property.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the law protect persons who voluntarily become
intoxicated from their contracts?
2. Ethics: Do you think that attorney Smith acted ethically in this case?
96 Chapter 4
3. Critical Thinking: Do you think many business deals are entered into after
the parties have been drinking? Should these deals be allowed to be voided?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama at www.judicial.state.al.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find a case in which someone has been let out of his
or her contract because of intoxication.
Legality
One requirement to have an enforceable contract is that the object of the contract
must be lawful. Most contracts that individuals and businesses enter into are
lawful contracts lawful contracts that are enforceable. These include contracts for the sale of goods,
To be an enforceable contract, the services, real property, and intangible rights; the lease of goods; property leases;
object of the contract must be lawful. licenses; and other contracts.
Some contracts have illegal objects. Contracts with an illegal object are void
and therefore unenforceable. They are called illegal contracts. The following para-
graphs discuss various illegal contracts.
CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO STATUTES

Both federal and state legislatures have enacted statutes that prohibit certain types
of conduct.
Example: Penal codes make certain activities crimes; antitrust statutes prohibit
certain types of agreements between competitors, and so on. Contracts to perform
activities prohibited by statute are illegal contracts.
USURY LAWS
usury law State usury laws set an upper limit on the annual interest rate that can be charged on
A law that sets an upper limit on the certain types of loans. The limits vary from state to state. Lenders who charge a higher
interest rate that can be charged on rate than the state limit are guilty of usury. These laws are intended to protect unsophis-
certain types of loans. ticated borrowers from loan sharks and others who charge exorbitant rates of interest.
Most states provide criminal and civil penalties for making usurious loans.
Some states require lenders to remit the difference between the interest rate charged
on the loan and the usury rate to the borrower. Other states prohibit lenders from
collecting any interest on the loan. Still other states provide that a usurious loan is
a void contract, permitting the borrower not to have to pay the interest or the prin-
cipal of the loan to the lender.
Most usury laws exempt certain types of lenders and loan transactions involv-
ing legitimate business transactions from the reach of the law. These exemptions
often include loans made by banks and other financial institutions, loans above a
certain dollar amount, and loans made to corporations and other businesses.
SABBATH LAWS
Sabbath law
A law that prohibits or limits the Certain states have enacted laws—called Sabbath laws, Sunday laws, or blue laws—
carrying on of certain secular that prohibit or limit the carrying on of certain secular activities on Sundays.
activities on Sundays. Except for contracts for the necessaries of life, charitable donations, and such, these
laws generally prohibit or invalidate executory contracts entered into on Sundays.

Many states do not actively enforce these laws. In some states, they have even been
found to be unconstitutional.
CONTRACTS TO COMMIT CRIMES

As mentioned previously, contracts to commit criminal acts are void. If the object
of a contract becomes illegal after the contract is entered into because the govern-
ment has enacted a statute that makes it unlawful, the parties are discharged from
the contract. The contract is not an illegal contract unless the parties agree to go
forward and complete it.
CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY

Certain contracts are illegal because they are contrary to public policy. Such con- contracts contrary to public policy
tracts are void. Although public policy eludes a precise definition, the courts have Contracts that have a negative
held contracts to be contrary to public policy if they have a negative impact on impact on society or that interfere
society or interfere with the public’s safety and welfare. with the public’s safety and welfare.
Immoral contracts—that is, contracts whose objective is the commission of immoral contract
an act considered immoral by society—may be found to be against public policy. A contract whose objective is the
commission of an act that is consid-
Example: A contract based on sexual favors has been held to be an immoral con-
ered immoral by society.
tract and void as against public policy. Judges are not free to define morality based
on their individual views. Instead, they must look to the practices and beliefs of
society when defining immoral conduct.
Case 4.5 raises the issue of whether a contract violated public policy and was
therefore illegal.
CASE 4.5 ILLEGAL CONTRACT

Flood v. Fiduciary & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 1981).
“Louisiana follows the majority rule that holds, as a matter of public policy,
that a beneficiary named in a life insurance policy is not entitled to the
proceeds of the insurance if the beneficiary feloniously kills the insured.”
Judge Lear,
Court of Appeals of Louisiana
Facts
Ellen and Richard Alvin Flood, a married couple, lived in a mobile home in
Louisiana. Richard worked as a maintenance man, and Ellen was employed at an
insurance agency. Evidence at trial showed that Ellen was unhappy with her marriage.
Ellen took out a life insurance policy on the life of her husband and named herself
as beneficiary. The policy was issued by Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company
(Fidelity). Seven years after the marriage, Richard became unexpectedly ill. He was
taken to the hospital, where his condition improved. After a visit at the hospital
from his wife, however, Richard died. Ellen was criminally charged with the murder
of her husband by poisoning. Evidence showed that six medicine bottles at the
couple’s home, including Tylenol and paregoric bottles, contained arsenic. The
court found that Ellen had fed Richard ice cubes laced with arsenic at the hospital.
98 Chapter 4
Ellen was tried and convicted of the murder of her husband. Ellen, as beneficiary
of Richard’s life insurance policy, requested Fidelity to pay her the benefits. Fidelity
refused to pay the benefits and returned all premiums paid on the policy. This suit
followed. The district court held in favor of Ellen Flood and awarded her the
benefits of the life insurance policy. Fidelity appealed.
Issue
Was the life insurance policy an illegal contract that is void?

Louisiana follows the majority rule that holds, as a matter of public policy, that a
beneficiary named in a life insurance policy is not entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance if the beneficiary feloniously kills the insured.
The genesis of this litigation is the escalating criminal action of Ellen Flood, bent
on taking the life of her lawful husband. Our courts have previously adjudicated (1) the
issue of the cause of death of Richard Flood, (2) the culprit in that death, and (3) the
motives for the death. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was unreasonable
of the trial court not to consider and to assign great weight to the mountain of evidence
tending to prove Mrs. Flood’s scheme to defraud both the insurer, Fidelity, and the
insured, Mr. Flood. It is clear to us that the entirety of the transaction here reviewed is
tainted with the intendment of Ellen Flood to contravene the prohibitory law.
Life insurance policies are procured because life is, indeed, precarious and
uncertain. Our law does not and cannot sanction any scheme that has as its purpose
the certain infliction of death for, inter alia, financial gain through receipt of the
proceeds of life insurance. To sanction this policy in any way would surely shackle
the spirit, letter, and life of our laws.
Decision
The court of appeals held that the life insurance policy Ellen had taken out on the
life of her husband was void based on public policy and that Ellen could not
recover the life insurance proceeds from the death of her husband, whom she had
killed. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court.

1. Critical Thinking: Should Ellen Flood have been allowed to retain the
insurance proceeds in this case?
2. Ethics: Did Ellen Flood act unethically in this case? Did she act illegally?
3. Critical Thinking: What would be the economic consequences if persons
could recover insurance proceeds for losses caused by their illegal activities
(e.g., murder, arson)?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit, at www.
la-fcca.org.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article or case that discusses murder to
recover life insurance proceeds.
GAMBLING STATUTES
All states either prohibit or regulate gambling, wagering, lotteries, and games of
chance via gambling statutes. States provide various criminal and civil penalties for gambling statutes
illegal gambling. There is a distinction between lawful risk-shifting contracts and Statutes that make certain forms of
gambling contracts. gambling illegal.
Example: If property insurance is purchased on one’s own car and the car is
destroyed in an accident, the insurance company must pay the claim. This agree-
ment is a lawful risk-shifting contract because the purchaser had an “insurable
interest” in the car. Insurance purchased on a neighbor’s car would be considered
to be gambling, however. The purchaser does not have an insurable interest in the
car and is betting only on its destruction.
There are many exceptions to wagering laws.
Example: Many states have enacted statutes that permit games of chance under a
certain dollar amount, bingo games, lotteries conducted by religious and charitable
organizations, and the like. Many states also permit and regulate horse racing, har-
ness racing, dog racing, and state-operated lotteries.
EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY
Because illegal contracts are void, the parties cannot sue for nonperformance. Fur-
ther, if an illegal contract is executed, the court generally leaves the parties where it
finds them.
Certain situations are exempt from the general rule of the effect of finding an
illegal contract. If an exception applies, the innocent party may use the court sys-
tem to sue for damages or to recover consideration paid under the illegal contract.
The following persons can assert an exception:
1. Innocent persons who were justifiably ignorant of the law or fact that made
the contract illegal.
Example: A person who purchases insurance from an unlicensed insurance
company may recover insurance benefits from the unlicensed company.
2. Persons who were induced to enter into an illegal contract by fraud, duress,
or undue influence.
Example: A shop owner who pays $5,000 “protection money” to a mobster so
his store will not be burned down by the mobster can recover the $5,000.
3. Persons who entered into an illegal contract and withdraw before the illegal
act is performed.
Example: If the president of New Toy Corporation pays $10,000 to an
employee of Old Toy Corporation to steal a trade secret from his employer
but reconsiders and tells the employee not to do it before he has done it, the
New Toy Corporation may recover the $10,000.
4. Persons who were less at fault than the other party for entering into the illegal
contract. At common law, parties to an illegal contract were considered
in pari delicto (in equal fault). Some states have changed this rule and permit in pari delicto
the less-at-fault party to recover restitution of the consideration they paid In equal fault; equally culpable or
under an illegal contract from the more-at-fault party. criminal.
In Case 4.6, the court had to decide the lawfulness of a contract.

100 Chapter 4
CASE 4.6 ILLEGAL CONTRACT

Ryno v. Tyra, 752 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App. 1988).
“The trial court could not have compelled Ryno to honor his wager
by delivering the BMW to Tyra. However, Ryno did deliver the BMW to
Tyra, and the facts incident to that delivery are sufficient to establish a
transfer by gift of the BMW from Ryno to Tyra.”
Judge Farris,
Court of Appeals of Texas
Facts
R. D. Ryno Jr. owned Bavarian Motors, an automobile dealership in Fort Worth,
Texas. One day, Lee Tyra discussed purchasing a BMW M-1 from Ryno for $125,000.
Ryno then suggested a double-or-nothing coin flip, to which Tyra agreed. If the
seller Ryno won the coin flip, Tyra would have to pay $250,000 for the car; if the
buyer Tyra won the coin flip, he would get the car for free. When Tyra won the coin
flip, Ryno said, “It’s yours,” and handed Tyra the keys and title to the car. Tyra drove
away in the car. This suit ensued as to the ownership of the car. The trial court held
in favor of Tyra. Ryno appealed.
Issue
Was there an illegal contract? Who owns the car?

Ryno complains that the trial court erred in granting Tyra judgment because the judg-
ment enforces a gambling contract. We find there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
jury finding that Ryno intended to transfer to Tyra his ownership interest in the BMW
at the time he delivered the documents, keys, and possession of the automobile to Tyra.
We agree with appellant Ryno that his wager with Tyra was unenforceable. The trial
court could not have compelled Ryno to honor his wager by delivering the BMW to
Tyra. However, Ryno did deliver the BMW to Tyra, and the facts incident to that
delivery are sufficient to establish a transfer by gift of the BMW from Ryno to Tyra.
Decision
Tyra, the patron at the car dealership who won the coin toss, owns the car. The
court of appeals found that because gambling was involved, this was an illegal con-
tract. However, the court decided to leave the parties where it found them—that is,
with Tyra in possession of the car. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
judgment in favor of Tyra.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the court have lent its resources to help Ryno
recover the car?
2. Ethics: Did Ryno act ethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: What is the moral of this story if you ever win anything
in an illegal gambling contract?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, at
www.2ndcoa.courts.state.tx.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article about illegal gambling contracts.
Special Business Contracts

The issue of the lawfulness of contracts applies to several special business con-
tracts. These include contracts that restrain trade, contracts to provide services
that require a government license, exculpatory clauses, and covenants not to com-
pete. These contracts are discussed in the following paragraphs.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

The general economic policy of the United States favors competition. At common
law, contracts in restraint of trade—that is, contracts that unreasonably restrain contracts in restraint of trade
trade—are held to be unlawful. An economic policy of competition
in the United States; contracts
Example: It would be an illegal restraint of trade if all the bakers in a neighborhood restraining trade are illegal.
agreed to fix the prices of the bread they sold. The bakers’ contract would be void.
LICENSING STATUTES
All states have licensing statutes that require members of certain professions and licensing statute
occupations to be licensed by the state in which they practice. Lawyers, doctors, Statute that requires a person or
real estate agents, insurance agents, certified public accountants, teachers, contrac- business to obtain a license from
tors, hairdressers, and such are among them. In most instances, a license is granted the government prior to engaging in
to a person who demonstrates that he or she has the proper schooling, experience, a specified occupation or activity.
and moral character required by the relevant statute. Sometimes, a written exami-
nation is also required.
Problems arise if an unlicensed person tries to collect payment for services
provided to another under a contract. Some statutes expressly provide that unli-
censed persons cannot enforce contracts to provide these services. If the statute is
silent on the point, enforcement depends on whether it is a regulatory statute or a
revenue-raising statute.
Regulatory Statutes
Licensing statutes enacted to protect the public are called regulatory statutes. Gen- regulatory statute
erally, unlicensed persons cannot recover payment for services that a regulatory A licensing statute enacted to
statute requires a licensed person to provide. protect the public.
Example: State law stipulates that legal services can be provided only by lawyers
who have graduated from law school and passed the appropriate bar exam. Never-
theless, suppose Marie Sweiger, a first-year law student, agrees to draft a will for
Randy McCabe for a $150 fee. Because Sweiger is not licensed to provide legal
services, she has violated a regulatory statute. She cannot enforce the contract and
recover payment from McCabe.
102 Chapter 4
Revenue-Raising Statutes
revenue-raising statute Licensing statutes enacted to raise money for the government are called revenue-
A licensing statute with the primary raising statutes. A person who provides services pursuant to a contract without the
purpose of raising revenue for the appropriate license required by such a statute can enforce the contract and recover
government. payment for services rendered.
Example: Suppose a state licensing statute requires licensed attorneys to pay an
annual $200 license fee without requiring continuing education or other new qual-
ifications. A licensed attorney who forgets to pay the fee can enforce contracts and
recover payment for the legal services he or she renders. The statute merely gathers
revenue; protection of the public is not a factor.
EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
exculpatory clause An exculpatory clause is a contractual provision that relieves one (or both) of the
A contractual provision that relieves parties of a contract from tort liability. An exculpatory clause can relieve a party of
one (or both) of the parties to the liability for ordinary negligence. It cannot be used in a situation involving willful
contract from tort liability for ordinary conduct, intentional torts, fraud, recklessness, or gross negligence.
negligence.
Example: Exculpatory clauses are often found in leases, sales contracts, ticket stubs
to sporting events, parking lot tickets, service contracts, and the like. Such clauses
do not have to be reciprocal (i.e., one party may be relieved of tort liability, whereas
the other party is not).
Generally, the courts do not favor exculpatory clauses unless both parties have
equal bargaining power. The courts are willing to permit competent parties of equal bar-
gaining power to establish which of them bears the risk. The court considers the precise
contract language in addition to other considerations when making its determination.
Example: Jim Jackson voluntarily enrolled in a parachute jump course and signed
a contract containing an exculpatory clause that relieved the parachute center of
liability. After receiving proper instruction, he jumped from an airplane. Unfortu-
nately, Jim was injured when he could not steer his parachute toward the target
area. He sued the parachute center for damages, but the court enforced the excul-
patory clause, reasoning that parachute jumping did not involve an essential serv-
ice and there was no decisive advantage in bargaining power between the parties.
Exculpatory clauses that either affect the public interest or result from supe-
rior bargaining power are usually found to be void as against public policy. Although
the outcome varies with the circumstances of the case, the greater the degree to
which the party serves the general public, the greater the chance the exculpatory
clause will be struck down as illegal. The courts consider such factors as the type
of activity involved; the relative bargaining power, knowledge, experience, and
sophistication of the parties; and other relevant factors.
In Case 4.7, the court had to decide the legality of an exculpatory clause.
CASE 4.7 EXCULPATORY CLAUSE

Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998).
“Yet the threat of liability strongly deters many individuals from
volunteering for nonprofit organizations.”
Judge Sweeney,
Supreme Court of Ohio
Facts
Pamela Zivich registered her 7-year-old son, Bryan, to play soccer with the Mentor
Soccer Club, Inc. (club). The club is a nonprofit organization composed primarily
of volunteers in the Mentor, Ohio, area who provide children the opportunity to
learn and play soccer. The club’s registration form, which Mrs. Zivich signed, con-
tained the following language:
Recognizing the possibility of physical injury associated with soccer and for
the Mentor Soccer Club, and the USYSA [United States Youth Soccer Asso-
ciation] accepting the registrant for its soccer programs and activities, I
hereby release, discharge and/or otherwise indemnify the Mentor Soccer
Club and the USYSA, its affiliated organizations and sponsors, their
employees, and associated personnel, including the owners of the fields and
facilities utilized by the Soccer Club, against any claim by or on behalf of
the registrant as a result of the registrant’s participation in the Soccer Club.
Bryan attended soccer practice with his father, Philip Zivich. During prac-
tice, the team participated in an intrasquad scrimmage. After the scrimmage,
Bryan jumped onto the soccer goal and was swinging back and forth on it, but the
goal was not anchored down. It tipped backward, and Bryan fell. The goal came
down on his chest, breaking three of his ribs and his collarbone and severely bruis-
ing his lungs. Bryan’s parents sued the club for negligence to recover damages for
injuries suffered by Bryan and the loss of consortium for themselves. The club
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the exculpatory agreement signed by
Bryan’s mother barred the claims. The trial court agreed and granted the club’s
summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Issue
Did the exculpatory agreement signed by Mrs. Zivich on behalf of her son release
the club from liability for the child’s claims and the parents’ claims?

It cannot be disputed that volunteers in community recreational activities serve an
important function. Organized recreational activities offer children the opportunity to
learn valuable life skills. It is here that many children learn how to work as a team and
how to operate within an organizational structure. Children also are given the chance
to exercise and develop coordination skills. Due in great part to the assistance of volun-
teers, nonprofit organizations are able to offer these activities at minimal cost. Clearly,
without the work of its volunteers, these nonprofit organizations could not exist, and
scores of children would be without the benefit and enjoyment of organized sports.
Yet the threat of liability strongly deters many individuals from volunteering for
nonprofit organizations. Therefore, faced with the very real threat of a lawsuit, and the
potential for substantial damage awards, nonprofit organizations and their volunteers
could very well decide that the risks are not worth the effort. Hence, invalidation of
exculpatory agreements would reduce the number of activities made possible through
the uncompensated services of volunteers and their sponsoring organizations.
Therefore, we conclude that although Bryan, like many children before him,
gave up his right to sue for the negligent acts of others, the public as a whole received
the benefit of these exculpatory agreements. Because of this agreement, the Club was
104 Chapter 4
able to offer affordable recreation and to continue to do so without the risks and
overwhelming costs of litigation. Bryan’s parents agreed to shoulder the risk. Public
policy does not forbid such an agreement. In fact, public policy supports it.
Decision
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a parent’s signature on an exculpatory agree-
ment on behalf of his or her child releases the other party from liability to the
child, the parent who signed the agreement, and the other parent. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and court of appeals in favor of
Mentor Soccer Club.

1. Critical Thinking: Do exculpatory agreements serve any valid purpose?
Should exculpatory agreements be enforceable?
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for Mrs. Zivich to sign the exculpatory agreement and
then bring this lawsuit?
3. Critical Thinking: What would have been the consequences if the court had
found the exculpatory agreement to be invalid in this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of Ohio at www.sconet.state.oh.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find an example of an exculpatory clause.
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE

Entrepreneurs and others often buy and sell businesses. The sale of a business
includes its “goodwill,” or reputation. To protect this goodwill after the sale, the
seller often enters into an agreement with the buyer not to engage in a similar busi-
ness or occupation within a specified geographic area for a specified period of time
covenant not to compete following the sale. This agreement is called a covenant not to compete, or a non-
An agreement in which a party compete clause.
agrees not to engage in a similar Covenants not to compete that are ancillary to a legitimate sale of a busi-
business or occupation within a ness or employment contract are lawful if they are reasonable in three aspects:
specified geographic area for a (1) the line of business protected, (2) the geographic area protected, and (3) the
specified period of time following
duration of the restriction. A covenant found to be unreasonable is not enforce-
a sale.
able as written. The reasonableness of covenants not to compete is examined on
a case-by-case basis. If a covenant not to compete is unreasonable, the courts may
either refuse to enforce it or change it so it is reasonable. Usually, the courts choose
the first option.
Example: Suppose Stacy Rogers is a certified public accountant (CPA) with a lucra-
tive practice in San Diego, California. Her business includes a substantial amount
of goodwill. When she sells her practice, she agrees not to open another accounting
practice in the state of California for a 20-year period. This covenant not to com-
pete is reasonable in the line of business protected but is unreasonable in geo-
graphic scope and duration. It will not be enforced by the courts as written. The
covenant not to compete would be reasonable and enforceable if it prohibited
Ms. Rogers only from practicing as a CPA in the city of San Diego for three years.
Employment contracts often contain noncompete clauses that prohibit an

employee from competing with his or her employer for a certain time period after
leaving the employment. These covenants not to compete are also judged using the
reasonableness standard.
Unconscionable Contracts
The general rule of freedom of contract holds that if (1) the object of a contract is
lawful and (2) the other elements for the formation of a contract are met, the courts
will enforce a contract according to its terms. Although it is generally presumed
that parties are capable of protecting their own interests when contracting, it is a
fact of life that dominant parties sometimes take advantage of weaker parties. As a
result, some otherwise lawful contracts are so oppressive or manifestly unfair that
they are unjust. To prevent the enforcement of such contracts, the courts developed
the equitable doctrine of unconscionability, which is based on public policy. A doctrine of unconscionability
contract found to be unconscionable under this doctrine is called an unconscion- Where an otherwise lawful contract
able contract, or a contract of adhesion. will not be enforced because it is so
The courts are given substantial discretion in determining whether a contract oppressive or manifestly unfair that
or contract clause is unconscionable. There is no single definition of unconsciona- it is unjust.
bility. The doctrine may not be used merely to save a contracting party from a bad contract of adhesion
bargain. A contract that is often a standard-
ized form contract covering con-
sumer goods and services where
ELEMENTS OF UNCONSCIONABILITY the seller is in a superior bargaining
The following elements must be shown to prove that a contract or clause in a con- position. The buyer has no realistic
tract is unconscionable: opportunity to bargain over the
terms because the contract is
1. The parties possessed severely unequal bargaining power. offered on a “take it or leave it” basis.
2. The dominant party unreasonably used its unequal bargaining power to
obtain oppressive or manifestly unfair contract terms.
3. The adhering party had no reasonable alternative.
Unconscionable contracts are sometimes found where there is a consumer
contract that takes advantage of uneducated, poor, or elderly people who have been
persuaded to enter into an unfair contract. This often involves door-to-door sales
and sales over the telephone.
Example: Suppose a door-to-door salesperson sells a poor family a freezer full of
meat and other foods for $3,000, with monthly payments for 60 months at 20 percent
interest. If the actual cost of the freezer and the food is $1,000, this contract could
be found to be unconscionable.
The unequal bargaining power of the elderly is a very contemporary, real-life
issue important to contract law. Model Rule 1.14 of Professional Conduct of
the American Bar Association give guidance when lawyers and paralegals have
clients—including the elderly—with diminished capacity. The area of elder law is a
fast-growing area of law for paralegals, and an understanding of the relationship of
contract law to elder law is important.
If the court finds that a contract or contract clause is unconscionable, it may
(1) refuse to enforce the contract, (2) refuse to enforce the unconscionable clause
but enforce the remainder of the contract, or (3) limit the applicability of any uncon-
scionable clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result. The appropriate remedy
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Note that because unconscion-
ability is a matter of law, the judge may opt to decide the case without a jury trial.
106 Chapter 4
IMBALANCE OF BARGAINING POWER

Sometimes contracts favor one party over another party. This imbalance often
occurs when the strongest party drafts the contract and presents it to the other party
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Mere unbalanced contracts are not necessarily illegal,
but those that overreach and are too lopsided can be found to be unenforceable
under the equitable doctrine of unconscionability. Consider the following case.
Supercuts, Inc., a Delaware corporation, conducts a national hair care franchise
business. David E. Lipson was the president of Supercuts. For just over one year, Super-
cuts employed William N. Stirlen as its vice president and chief financial officer. Stirlen
signed an employment agreement prepared by Supercuts. The contract provided for
Stirlen to receive an annual salary of $150,000, stock options, a bonus plan, a supple-
mental retirement plan, and a $10,000 signing bonus. The contract was an at-will
employment contract, meaning Stirlen could be terminated without cause at any time.
After beginning work, Stirlen informed Lipson and other corporate officers of
various problems and “accounting irregularities” he feared might be in violation of
state and federal statutes. Stirlen also expressed concern that the company’s decline
in profits “was being hidden in the books and from public shareholders.” Stirlen pro-
vided senior managers with accounting statements outlining the accounting irregu-
larities. After Stirlen brought these issues to Supercuts’s outside auditors, Lipson
allegedly reprimanded Stirlen and accused him of being a “troublemaker.” Lipson
also told him that if Stirlen did not reverse his position on these issues, he would no
longer be considered a “member of the team.” When Stirlen did not comply, Lipson
suspended Stirlen from his job; Stirlen was fired the following month.
Stirlen sued Supercuts and Lipson for breach of contract, wrongful termina-
tion in violation of public policy, and intentional misrepresentation. The defend-
ants made a motion to the court alleging that the arbitration clause in Stirlen’s
employment contract required the dispute to be arbitrated. Stirlen countered that
the arbitration clause, and other clauses in Supercuts’ contract, were unconsciona-
ble and therefore unenforceable. The challenged clauses provided that (1) Stirlen
would have to submit to final and binding arbitration all disputes concerning the
contract, but Supercuts could go to court on most matters if it sued Stirlen, (2) any
damages that could be awarded Stirlen could not exceed the actual damages for
breach of contract, and (3) any salary or benefits payable to Stirlen would cease
pending the outcome of any action between the parties.
Stirlen argued that the employment contract was so one-sided as to be “uncon-
scionable.” The court of appeals held that a contract is unconscionable if it “does not
fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker party” or if the contact is “unduly
oppressive.” Supercuts’s attorneys argued that Stirlen was a sophisticated business
executive who knew what he was doing when he signed Supercuts’s contract.
After weighing all the evidence, the court found that Supercuts’s contract was
an unconscionable contract—a contract of adhesion—that was unenforceable. The
court found Supercuts’s contract to be unconscionable in the following ways: Super-
cuts reserved the right to sue in court but denied this right to Stirlen; Supercuts
limited the damages that Stirlen could recover from them in violation of the law;
and state law provided that a party could not require another party to waive the abil-
ity to sue for fraud, which Supercuts required Stirlen to do. The court also held that
Stirlen could proceed with his lawsuit against Supercuts to recover damages. The
court concluded, “Considering the terms of the arbitration clause in the light of the
commercial context in which it operates and the legitimate needs of the parties at
the time it was entered into, we have little difficulty concluding that its terms are so
extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices
of the time and place.” Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997).
ARE “MANDATORY ARBITRATION” CLAUSES

UNCONSCIONABLE?
Are we fast losing our rights to sue on contracts that we’ve supposedly negotiated?
Susan Saladoff, producer of the HBO documentary Hot Coffee, believes so. Her
2011 documentary exposed how corporations have been inserting mandatory
arbitration clauses into most of the contracts we enter into today. These clauses
prevent consumers from taking breach of contract actions to court. Many say that
this trend is taking away consumers’ rights to due process.
Think this doesn’t apply to you? Do you have a cell phone, a health club mem-
bership, health insurance, or an employment agreement? Not only do these man-
datory arbitration clauses take away your right to sue in court, but they also allow
for corporations to select and pay for their own arbitrator in matters of disputes,
rather than permitting the consumer or employee to file a lawsuit.
Political figures such as Karl Rove and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce back
mandatory arbitration; however, in 2011, U.S. senators Al Franken and Richard
Blumenthal and Representative Hank Johnson reintroduced the Arbitration Fairness
Act, which would ban these mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts.
Interestingly, popular culture and reality TV have adopted and revised these man-
datory clauses to meet their needs. An example can be seen in the contracts presented to
American Idol contestants. Simon Fuller’s 19 Group and affiliated companies presents
contracts to potential contestants whereby they are given just a few hours to either sign
or decline the contract. But perhaps, unlike with our cell phone and health club con-
tracts, we would all give up our rights to bargain for a chance to be on television.
The proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses invites controversy regard-
ing whether our constitutional rights are being compromised by signing such
binding contracts, thereby compromising the right to a judicial process. Are these
mandatory arbitration clauses examples of unconscionable contracts? Stay tuned.
Toni D. Mers is a trusts and When reviewing contracts prepared by others,
estates paralegal at the law firm it is important to note the following: (1) proper exe-
of McCulloch, Felger, Fite & Gut- cution, (2) contract details, (3) contract duration, and
mann Co., L.P.A., in Piqua, Ohio. (4) applicable provisions. You must determine what
She received an associate of portion, if any, of the contract is effective after death.
applied business in legal assisting When preparing contracts, important issues
at Edison Community College in include fiduciary capacity, clarity, and conciseness.
Piqua. For example, a trustee or attorney in fact (under
durable power of attorney) may have very broad
As a trusts and estates paralegal, I manage files contracting authority; an executor or administrator
(under the supervision of an attorney) pertaining to may not. It is also critical to focus on stating only
trusts, estates, guardianships, and powers of attorney. the necessary terms, with clarity and precision.
How are contracts involved in my job? One of Being able to interpret and prepare contracts is
my responsibilities is to research and track assets. essential to nearly every paralegal specialty. There is
Almost all assets owned by an individual, an estate, no substitute for analytically reviewing existing or
or a trust are held subject to contract terms in docu- proposed contracts by applying the fundamentals of
ments such as deeds (contracts in form of warran- contract law learned through higher education. To
ties found in warranty deeds), leases, notes, trust avoid becoming lackadaisical when reviewing and
agreements, life insurance policies, certificates of preparing contracts, it is also beneficial to refresh
deposit, and brokerage accounts. your skills through seminars or additional education.
108 Chapter 4

Fees
An attorney cannot divide fees with nonattorneys. ABA Model Rule 5.4
specifically prohibits fee splitting with nonattorneys.1 So, for example, the
ethical paralegal cannot have a contract with the attorney that would
give the paralegal a percentage of the attorney’s fees for case referrals.2
This does not mean the paralegal can never receive a bonus or
salary increase. But it does mean that such a bonus or salary increase
cannot be based on the outcome of a case, the profits of the firm, or a
percentage of a particular legal fee.
1
2
Plumlee v. Paddock, S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1992).
CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY
MINORS, p. 85 such as for medical care, health and life insurance, edu-
cational loan agreements, and the like.
1. Infancy doctrine. Minors under the age of majority
8. Emancipation. Emancipation occurs when a minor
may disaffirm (cancel) most contracts they have entered
voluntarily leaves home and lives apart from his or her
into with adults. Such a contract is voidable by the
parents. The parents’ duty to support the minor termi-
minor but not by the adult.
nates upon emancipation.
2. Disaffirmance. Disaffirmance must occur before or
within a reasonable time after the minor reaches the
age of majority. MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
3. Competent party’s duty of restitution. If a minor disaf- PERSONS, p. 91
firms a contract, the adult must place the minor in sta- 1. Adjudged insane. Contracts by persons who have been
tus quo by returning the value of the consideration that adjudged insane are void. That is, such a contract can-
the minor paid. not be enforced by either the sane or insane party.
4. Minor’s duty upon disaffirmance: 2. Insane but not adjudged insane. Contracts by persons
a. Minor’s duty of restoration. Generally, upon disaf- who are insane but have not been adjudged insane are
firmance of a contract, a minor owes a duty to return voidable by the insane person but not by the competent
the consideration to the adult in whatever condition party to the contract.
it is in at the time of disaffirmance. 3. Duty of restitution. A person who has dealt with an in-
b. Minor’s duty of restitution. A minor’s duty is to place sane person must place the insane person in status quo
the adult in status quo by returning the value of the by returning the value of the consideration paid by the
consideration paid by the adult at the time of con- insane person at the time of contracting. Most states
tracting if the minor (1) misrepresented his or her place the same duty on insane persons when they void
age or (2) intentionally or with gross negligence a contract.
caused the loss to the adult’s property. 4. Necessaries of life. Insane persons are obligated to pay
5. Ratification. If a minor does not disaffirm a contract the reasonable value for the necessaries of life.
during the period of minority or within a reasonable
time after reaching the age of majority, the contract is
ratified (accepted). INTOXICATED PERSONS, p. 94
6. Necessaries of life. Minors are obligated to pay the rea- 1. Intoxicated persons. Contracts by intoxicated persons
sonable value for the necessaries of life (e.g., food, are voidable by the intoxicated person but not by the
clothing, shelter). competent party to the contract.
7. Special contracts. Many states have enacted statutes 2. Duty of restitution. Both parties owe a duty to place
that make minors liable on certain types of contracts, the other party in status quo by returning the value of
the consideration paid by the other party at the time of SPECIAL BUSINESS CONTRACTS, p. 101
contracting.
1. Contracts in restraint of trade. Contracts that unrea-
3. Necessaries of life. Intoxicated persons are obliged to
sonably restrain trade are illegal contracts.
pay the reasonable value for the necessaries of life.
2. Exculpatory clauses. Contract clauses that relieve one or
both of the parties to the contract from tort liability for
LEGALITY, p. 96 ordinary negligence are called exculpatory clauses. Excul-
Contracts Contrary to Statutes patory clauses that affect public interests, result from su-
perior bargaining power, or attempt to relieve one of
Contracts that violate statutes are illegal, void, and unen- liability for intentional torts, fraud, recklessness, or gross
forceable. negligence are illegal. Reasonable exculpatory clauses be-
1. Usury laws. These set the upper limit on the annual tween parties of equal bargaining power are legal.
interest rate that can be charged on certain types of 3. Covenants not to compete. These are contracts that
loans by certain lenders. provide that a seller of a business or an employee will
2. Gambling statutes. These make certain types of gam- not engage in a similar business or occupation within a
bling illegal. specified geographic area for a specified time following
3. Sabbath laws. These prohibit or limit the carrying on the sale of the business or termination of employment.
of certain secular activities on Sundays. They are also Also called noncompete clauses. They are illegal if they
called Sunday laws or blue laws. are unreasonable in the line of business, geographic
4. Criminal statutes. Contracts to commit crimes are illegal. area, or time. Reasonable noncompete clauses are legal
5. Licensing statutes: and enforceable.
a. Regulatory statutes. These are licensing statutes
enacted to protect the public. Unlicensed persons UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS,
cannot recover payment for providing services that p. 105
a licensed person is required to provide.
b. Revenue-raising statutes. These are licensing statutes Contracts that are oppressively unfair or unjust are called
enacted to raise money for the government. Unli- unconscionable contracts, or contracts of adhesion.
censed persons can enforce contracts and recover 1. Elements of unconscionable contracts:
for rendering services. a. The parties possessed severely unequal bargaining
Contracts Contrary to Public Policy power.
b. The dominant party unreasonably used its power to
Contracts that violate public policy are illegal, void, and obtain oppressive or manifestly unfair contract terms.
unenforceable. c. The adhering party had no reasonable alternative.
1. Immoral contracts. A contract whose objective is the com- 2. Remedies for unconscionability. Where a contract or
mission of an act considered immoral by society is illegal. contract clause is found to be unconscionable, the court
may do one of the following:
Effect of Illegality a. Refuse to enforce the contract.
b. Refuse to enforce the unconscionable clause but
1. General rule. An illegal contract is void. Therefore, the
enforce the remainder of the contract.
parties cannot sue for nonperformance. If the contract
c. Limit the applicability of any unconscionable clause
has been executed, the court will leave the parties where
so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
it finds them.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Adjudged insane 91 Emancipation 89 Licensing statute 101
Contract in restraint of trade 101 Exculpatory clause 102 Minor 85
Contract of adhesion 105 Gambling statutes 99 Necessaries of life 89
Contracts contrary to public policy 97 Illegal contract 84 Ratification 87
Contractual capacity 84 Immoral contract 97 Regulatory statute 101
Covenant not to compete (noncompete Infancy doctrine 85 Revenue-raising statute 102
clause) 104 In pari delicto 99 Sabbath laws (Sunday laws, blue
Disaffirmance 85 Insane but not adjudged insane 92 laws) 96
Doctrine of unconscionability 105 Intoxicated persons 94 Unconscionable contract (contract
Duty of restitution 86 Lawful contract 96 of adhesion) 84
Duty of restoration 86 Legal insanity 91 Usury law 96
110 Chapter 4

Let’s go back to the case scenario involving the minor, James, Can Michael refuse to pick up the car and make James fulfill
and his purchase of a Hummer. Knowing what you know the contract? The case of Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562
now, do you believe James can disaffirm the contract? How (Wis. 1980), should help you answer these questions.
much, if anything, would James have to reimburse Michael?

Working the Web Internet Exercises 4. Find the website for your state that explains the requi-
site level of intoxication for a driving-while-impaired
1. This chapter discussed capacity in relation to a minor.
traffic citation. Would that minimum amount be
Locate the statute for your state that deals with when a
sufficient to provide a lack-of-capacity defense to a
minor has reached “majority” for purposes of entering
contract claim?
into a contract.
5. Find your state statutes relating to usury. What is the
2. Review the laws of your jurisdiction regarding minors
maximum allowable interest rate?
and purchases of alcohol and tobacco, purchases of
6. An extensive overview of contract law can be found at
motor vehicles, and renting of an apartment.
the Contracts home page (by Craig Smith, Santa
3. In the 2011 season of American Idol, the winner, Scotty
Barbara College of Law), at www.west.net/~smith/
McCreery, and runner-up, Lauren Alaina, were both
contracts.htm. Review the “Policing the Bargain”
minors. As a result, Los Angeles Superior Court judge
page. Note that capacity is listed with other problem
Marjorie Steinberg had the task of approving their con-
areas.
tracts with the show. View the entire contract at: http://
images.eonline.com/static/news/pdf/AIContract2.pdf.
After the introductory section with the date and the parties Exercise:
to the contract are set out (see the Practice Tip in Chapter 1),
Using the above sample format along with the fact situation
the recital as to what and why the parties would like to con-
in the Portfolio Exercise at the end of this chapter, draft a
tract is written (see the Practice Tip in Chapter 2), and the
signature section for a contract.
description of the transaction (see the Practice Tip in Chap-
ter 3) is completed, the final step in drafting the contract is
to end with the signature section. The form for the signature
section is as follows:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF ____________ and __________
have executed this Agreement.
______________________
[name]
______________________
[name]

Topic: Effect of Illegality equipment is invalid, the rest of the document will remain
enforceable.
(To the student: Reread the basic facts from the Hands-On
Drafting Exercises you’ve completed so far before working Exercise/Assignment:
on the exercise below.)
Draft a divisibility clause for insertion into the sample Con-
tract for Sale of Equipment in Appendix C.
Facts:
Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., desires to purchase
equipment needed to make and sell ice cream and wants to Use paragraph 14(i) of the sample Real Estate Purchase Agreement
make sure that if one portion of the contract for sale of in Appendix C as a guide to drafting this divisibility clause.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.1 Ratification Charles Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.5 Covenant Not to Compete
Edwards Smith, a minor, purchased an automobile from Gerry Morris owned a silk screening and lettering shop in
Bobby Floars Toyota (Toyota). Smith executed a security Tucson, Arizona. Morris entered into a contract to sell the
agreement to finance part of the balance due on the purchase business to Alfred and Connie Gann. The contract contained
price, agreeing to pay off the balance in 30 monthly install- the following covenant not to compete: “Seller agrees not to
ments. Smith turned 18, which was the age of majority in his enter into silk screening or lettering shop business within
state. Smith made 10 monthly payments after turning 18. He Tucson and a 100-mile radius of Tucson, for a period of ten
then decided to disaffirm the contract and stopped making (10) years from the date of this agreement and will not com-
the payments. Smith claims that he may disaffirm the con- pete in any manner whatsoever with buyers, and seller fur-
tract entered into when he was a minor. Toyota argues that ther agrees that he will refer all business contracts to buyers.”
Smith has ratified the contract since attaining the age of Morris opened a silk screening and lettering business in
majority. Who is correct? Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, competition with the Ganns and in violation of the noncom-
269 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). petition clause. The Ganns brought this action against Mor-
ris for breach of contract and to enforce the covenant not to
Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.2 Adjudged Insane Manzelle compete. Is the covenant not to compete valid and enforcea-
Johnson, who had been adjudicated insane, executed a quit- ble in this case? Gann v. Morris, 596 P.2d 43 (Ariz. Ct. App.
claim and warranty deed conveying real estate she owned to 1979).
her guardian, Obbie Neal. Neal subsequently conveyed the
real estate to James R. Beavers by warranty deed. Charles L. Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.6 Exculpatory Clause
Weatherly, Johnson’s subsequent guardian, brought this Grady Perkins owned the Raleigh Institute of Cosmetol-
action, seeking a decree of the court that title to the real ogy (institute), and Ray Monk and Rovetta Allen were
estate be restored to Johnson because of her inability to con- employed as instructors there. The school trained students
tract. Should Johnson be allowed to void the contract? Beavers to do hair styling and coloring, cosmetology, and other
v. Weatherly, 299 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. 1983). beauty services. The students received practical training
Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.3 Intoxication Betty Gallo- by providing services to members of the public under the
way, an alcoholic, signed a settlement agreement upon her supervision of the instructors. Francis I. Alston went to
divorce from her husband, Henry Galloway. Henry, in Betty’s the institute to have her hair colored and styled by a stu-
absence in court, stated that she had lucid intervals from her dent who was under the supervision of Monk and Allen.
alcoholism, had been sober for two months, and was lucid Before receiving any services, Alston signed a written
when she signed the settlement agreement. Betty moved to release form that released the institute and its employees
vacate the settlement agreement after she had retained present from liability for their negligence. While coloring Alston’s
legal counsel. Four months later, Betty was declared incompe- hair, the student negligently used a chemical that caused
tent to handle her person and her affairs, and a guardian and Alston’s hair to fall out. Alston sued the institute, Perkins,
conservator was appointed. Betty, through her guardian, sued Monk, and Allen for damages. The defendants asserted
to have the settlement agreement voided. Who wins? Gallo- that the release form signed by Alston barred her suit. Is
way v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979). the exculpatory clause valid? Alston v. Monk, 373 S.E.2d
463 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.4 Licensing Statute The
state of Hawaii requires a person who wants to practice Critical Legal Thinking Case 4.7 Exculpatory Clause
architecture to meet certain educational requirements and Wilbur Spaulding owned and operated the Jacksonville race-
to pass a written examination before that person is granted track at the Morgan Country Fairgrounds, where automobile
a license to practice. After receiving the license, an archi- races were held. Lawrence P. Koch was a flagman at the race-
tect must pay an annual license fee of $15. Ben Lee Wilson way. One day when Koch arrived at the pit shack at the race-
satisfied the initial requirements and was granted an archi- way, he was handed a clipboard on which was a track release
tecture license. Four years later, Wilson failed to renew his and waiver of liability form that released the racetrack from
license by paying the required annual fee. Wilson con- liability for negligence. Koch signed the form and took up
tracted with Kealakekua Ranch, Ltd., and Gentry Hawaii his position as flagman. During the first race, the last car on
(defendants) to provide architectural services for the the track lost control and slid off the end of the track, strik-
Kealakekua Ranch Center project. Wilson provided ing Koch. Koch suffered a broken leg and other injuries and
$33,994 of architectural services to the defendants. The was unable to work for 14 months. Koch sued Spaulding for
defendants refused to pay this fee because Wilson did not damages for negligence. Spaulding asserted that the release
have an architectural license. Wilson sued to collect his form signed by Koch barred his suit. Is the exculpatory
fees. Who wins? Wilson v. Kealakekua Ranch, Ltd., 551 P.2d clause valid against Koch? Koch v. Spaulding, 529 N.E.2d 19
525 (Haw. 1976). (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
112 Chapter 4
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 4.1 Joe Plumlee owned and operated an Ethics Case 4.2 Richard Zientara was a friend of Chester
ambulance company. He alleged that the law firm of Pad- and Bernice Kaszuba. All three were residents of Indiana.
dock, Loveless & Roach agreed to pay him an up-front fee Bernice, who was employed in an Illinois tavern where Illi-
and a percentage of the law firm’s fees generated from per- nois state lottery tickets were sold, had previously obtained
sonal injury case referrals. When the law firm did not pay lottery tickets for Zientara because Indiana did not have a
Plumlee, he sued to recover damages for breach of con- state lottery. One day, Zientara requested that Kaszuba pur-
tract. Texas law prohibits lawyers from sharing fees with chase an Illinois lottery ticket for him. He gave Kaszuba the
laypersons (Tex. Penal Code Section 38.12; Supreme Court money for the ticket and the numbers 6–15–16–23–24–37.
of Texas). A disciplinary rule also forbids such activity Kaszuba purchased the ticket, but when it turned out to be
(State Bar Rules Art. X, Section 9). The law firm asserted the winning combination worth $1,696,800, she refused to
that the contract could not be enforced because it would give the ticket to Zientara and unsuccessfully tried to collect
be an illegal contract. Who wins? Did Plumlee act ethi- the money. Zientara filed suit against Kaszuba in Indiana,
cally in this case? If the contract existed, did the lawyers claiming the ticket and proceeds thereof. Was the contract
act ethically? Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. legal? Did the Kaszubas act ethically in this case? Kaszuba v.
App. 1992). Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1987).

Read Case B.4 in Appendix B (Carnival Leisure Industries, 3. What is the consequence of finding an illegal contract?
Ltd. v. Aubin). This case is excerpted from the appellate Apply this rule to the facts of this case.
court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) 4. Did Aubin act ethically in avoiding an obligation that
using the IRAC method. After briefing the case, you should he knowingly made? Do you think he would have
be able to answer the following questions: given back the money if he had won at gambling?
1. What were the plaintiff ’s contentions on appeal?
2. What law was applied by the court in this case:
Bahamian law or Texas law? Why was that law applied?
PARALEGAL PORTFOLIO EXERCISE

Now that you have learned the basic contract form (from the Henry. Sarah would like to sell to Kelly a one-carat square
Practice Tips located in Chapters 1 through 4), you should diamond ring that Sarah no longer wears. The diamond
be able to draft a simple contract. This will be especially does have a slight flaw in it, which Sarah has pointed out
important when you are employed as a paralegal and asked to Kelly. But Sarah wants to make sure the agreement
to draft a contract for your attorney’s review. reflects the flaw, so there is no chance Kelly will later ask
Using the fact situation that follows, draft a simple contract: for her money back. Sarah and Kelly have settled on a
price of $800 for the ring. They want to close the deal on
A client, Sarah Smith, at the law firm where you work as a
August 5, 2008.
paralegal would like to enter into an agreement with Kelly
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR GETS DUNKED
“The obvious statutory intent is to discourage persons who have failed to comply with
the licensing law from offering or providing their unlicensed services for pay.”
Justice Eagleson
Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. (Hydrotech), was a New York corporation that manufac-
tured and installed patented equipment to simulate ocean waves. Oasis Waterpark
(Oasis) was a California corporation that owned and operated a water-oriented
amusement park in Palm Springs, California. Wessman Construction Company, Inc.
(Wessman) was Oasis’s general contractor at the park.
Wessman contracted with Hydrotech to design and construct a 29,000-square-
foot “surfing pool” at the park, using Hydrotech’s wave equipment. The total contract
price was $850,000. Hydrotech was aware of a California law that requires a contrac-
tor to have a California contractor’s license to provide construction services in Cali-
fornia. The statute stipulates that an unlicensed contractor cannot sue in a California
court to recover compensation for work requiring a California contractor’s license
(California Business and Professional Code Section 7031).
Because it was concerned with the licensing problem, Hydrotech wished only to
sell and deliver the equipment and to avoid involvement in the design and construc-
tion of the pool. However, Oasis insisted that Hydrotech’s unique expertise in design
and construction was essential. Oasis induced Hydrotech to provide these services by
promising to pay Hydrotech even if the law provided otherwise.
Relying on these promises, Hydrotech furnished equipment and services in
full compliance with the contract. Hydrotech had been paid $740,000 during the
course of the contract. When it billed Oasis for the remaining $110,000, Oasis
refused to pay. Hydrotech sued Oasis and Wessman for damages in California
court for breach of contract and fraud. The defendants moved the court to dismiss
the action because Hydrotech did not possess a California contractor’s license, as
required by law.
The California Supreme Court agreed with the defendants and ordered
Hydrotech’s complaint dismissed. The court found that Hydrotech had violated
the licensing statute. The court stated, “The obvious statutory intent is to discour-
age persons who have failed to comply with the licensing law from offering
or providing their unlicensed services for pay. Because of the strength and clarity
of this policy, it is well settled that Section 7031 applies despite injustice to
the unlicensed contractor.” Hydrotech Sys. Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370
(Cal. 1991).

1. Ethics: Did Oasis act unethically by not paying Hydrotech? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did Hydrotech act unethically by providing services in California without
the proper license? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of California at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
courts/supreme.
Freedom of contract begins where equality of bargaining power
begins.
—Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
June 4, 1928
chapter 5
GENUINENESS OF ASSENT
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal represents the estate of Philip CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
Moore. Mr. Moore had six children, all of whom had frequent contact with him
and helped with his needs prior to 2006. In 2006, his eldest son, Gary, advised should be able to:
his siblings that he would begin managing their father’s business affairs. In 1. Explain genuineness of assent.
March 2007, after much urging by Gary, Mr. Moore deeded his 80-acre farm in 2. Explain how mutual mistake of fact
Nebraska to Gary for $23,500. Investigation has shown that at the time of the excuses performance.
sale, the reasonable fair market value of the farm was between $145,000 and 3. Describe intentional misrepresentation
(fraud).
$160,000. At the time Mr. Moore signed over the real estate, his health had
4. Describe duress.
deteriorated. He was, for the most part, an invalid, relying on Gary for all of his
5. Define undue influence.
personal needs, transportation, banking, and other business matters. In addi-
tion, Mr. Moore was born in France and could not read or write English.
115
116 Chapter 5
Voluntary assent by the parties is necessary to create an enforceable contract.
Assent is determined by the relevant facts surrounding the negotiation and forma-
genuine assent
tion of the contract. Assent may be manifested in any manner sufficient to show
Where agreement (or assent) to the agreement, including express words or conduct of the parties.
contract by both parties is genuine A contract may not be enforced if the assent of one or both of the parties to
and real. the contract was not genuine or real. Genuine assent may be missing because a
genuineness of assent party entered into a contract based on mistake, fraudulent misrepresentation,
The requirement that a party’s duress, or undue influence. Problems concerning genuineness of assent are dis-
assent to a contract be genuine. cussed in this chapter.
Teresa J. Turner is a transac- tered an area of law in which contracts are not
tional paralegal with the law involved, from a single-page letter of intent to buy
firm Spink Butler, LLP, in Boise, property to a complex business merger agreement
Idaho, specializing in real estate hundreds of pages long, and everything in between.
and land use law. She graduated Reviewing, analyzing, and drafting contracts
summa cum laude from Boise are a routine and almost daily task in my current
State University with a certificate position as a real estate paralegal. My attorneys rely
of paralegal studies and a bach- on me for drafts or thorough legal analyses of con-
elor of applied science in legal studies. tracts involving our clients, making the attorneys
much more productive and efficient in their prac-
Having worked in the legal field for over 20 years in tices. One of the more interesting contracts I drafted
Colorado and Idaho, I’ve been involved with con- recently was an agreement to release future inter-
tracts in every area of my career in real estate trans- ests in property on the occurrence of certain
actions (e.g., real estate purchase agreements), events, and the agreement was placed into escrow
business transactions (e.g., corporate merger agree- with specific written instructions to the escrowee
ments), land use (e.g., development agreements), (yet another contract) for disposition of this execu-
business entities (e.g., shareholder agreements), tory agreement.
securities (e.g., stock purchase agreements), probate Working with contracts in all areas of law is
(e.g., executory contracts involving the decedent), always interesting and challenging, and I’m fre-
estate planning (e.g., trusts and beneficiary agree- quently encountering new or unique contractual
ments), bankruptcy (e.g., secured loan agreements), provisions. Transactions of every nature are made
and torts (e.g., insurance policies). I’ve never encoun- or broken within the “four corners” of a contract.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: SECURITIES/MUNICIPAL BONDS
PARALEGAL
A securities/municipal bonds paralegal works with contracts in the following ways:
• Draft registration statement and prospectus.
• Coordinate filing of registration statement and exhibits.
• Draft questionnaires for officers, directors, and principal shareholders.
• Draft promissory notes.
• Draft underwriting agreements.
• Draft trust indentures.
• Draft bond purchase agreements.
Genuineness of Assent 117
• Draft NASDAQ and National Market System listing applications.

• Draft and file documents for renewing or withdrawing the registration of broker/
dealers with salespersons.
• Research and obtain information concerning filings with NASD and SEC.
• Draft lease agreement, loan agreement, agreement of sale, facilities financing
agreement, ordinance, or contracts.
• Draft letter of transmittal and other tender offer documents.
• Draft confidential offering memorandum.
• Draft security agreements, including deeds, guaranties, mortgages.
• Draft summaries of documents to use in preparing preliminary official state-
ments and official statements.
• Coordinate accuracy of statements with underwriter.
• Finalize basic documents and distribute for execution.
• Draft necessary resolutions authorizing the issuance of bonds.
• Send bond forms to printer.
• Obtain Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP)
number for offerings.
• Proof first gallery of bonds and check manufacturing schedule, coupon amounts,
and CUSIP numbers.
• Check bonds at time of closing and read bond numbered 1. Draft closing docu-
ments for issuer, including authorizing resolutions, authentication order to trus-
tee, incumbency certificate, nonarbitrage certificates, and CUSIP numbers.
• Draft resolutions and officers’ certificates for corporate approval and execution.
• Draft tax election and arrange for filing.
• Draft recording certificate.
• Draft financing statements.
• Obtain certificates from state agencies (e.g., good standing of company).
• Attend closing; check all certificates and opinions, security agreements, insur-
ance policies, and legal descriptions.
• Compile closing transcript, prepare index, and organize closing binders.
• Draft regulation of public companies.
• Prepare drafts of proxy material and statements.
• Draft annual report to shareholders.
Mistake
A mistake occurs when one or both of the parties have an erroneous belief about the mistake
subject matter, value, or some other aspect of a contract. Mistakes may be either uni- An unintentional act, omission, or
lateral or mutual. The law permits rescission of some contracts made in mistake. error arising from ignorance,
surprise, imposition, or misplaced
confidence (mutual mistake).
UNILATERAL MISTAKE rescission
Unilateral mistakes occur when only one party is mistaken about a material fact An action to rescind (undo) the con-
tract. Rescission is available if there
regarding the subject matter of the contract. In the three following types of situa-
has been a material breach of con-
tions, a contract may not be enforced because of such a mistake:
tract, fraud, duress, undue influence,
1. One party makes a unilateral mistake of fact and the other party knew (or or mistake.
should have known) a mistake was made.1 unilateral mistake
When only one party is mistaken
1 about a material fact regarding the
In instances where unilateral mistake can rescind a contract, some courts hold that the nonmistaken party has
not only to know the other party has made a mistake but that the nonmistaken party also has to have been under subject matter of the contract.
some duty to correct the other party.
118 Chapter 5
2. A unilateral mistake occurs because of a clerical or mathematical error that is

not the result of gross negligence.
3. The mistake is so serious that enforcing the contract would be unconscionable.2
In most cases, however, the mistaken party is not permitted to rescind the
contract. The contract is enforced on its terms.
Example: Suppose Trent Anderson wants to purchase a car from the showroom
floor. He looks at several models. Although he decides to purchase a car with a
sunroof, he does not tell the salesperson about this preference. The model named
in the contract he signs does not have this feature, although he believes it does.
Anderson’s unilateral mistake does not relieve him of his contractual obligation to
purchase the car.
In Case 5.1, the court had to decide whether to allow a party out of a contract
because of the party’s unilateral mistake.
CASE 5.1 UNILATERAL MISTAKE

Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin, 650 So. 2d 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
“We accept the trial court’s conclusion that the amount of the sale was grossly
inadequate. This inadequacy, however, occurred due to an avoidable, unilateral
mistake by an agent of Wells Fargo.”
Judge Altenbernd,
Court of Appeal of Florida
Facts
Wells Fargo Credit Corporation (Wells Fargo) obtained a judgment of foreclosure
on a house owned by Mr. and Mrs. Clevenger. The total indebtedness stated in the
judgment was $207,141. The foreclosure sale was scheduled for 11 a.m. on July 12,
1991, at the west front door of the Hillsborough County Courthouse.
Wells Fargo was represented by a paralegal, who had attended more than
1,000 similar sales. Wells Fargo’s handwritten instruction sheet informed the
paralegal to make one bid at $115,000, the tax-appraised value of the property.
Because the first “1” in the number was close to the “$,” the paralegal misread the
bid instruction as $15,000 and opened the bidding at that amount.
Harley Martin, who was attending his first judicial sale, bid $20,000. The
county clerk gave ample time for another bid and then announced, “$20,000 going
once, $20,000 going twice, sold to Harley Martin.” The paralegal shouted, “Stop!
I’m sorry, I made a mistake!” The certificate of sale was issued to Martin. Wells
Fargo filed suit to set aside the judicial sale based on its unilateral mistake. The
trial court held for Martin. Wells Fargo appealed.
Issue
Does Wells Fargo’s unilateral mistake constitute grounds for setting aside the judi-
cial sale?
2

We accept the trial court’s conclusion that the amount of the sale was grossly inade-
quate. This inadequacy, however, occurred due to an avoidable, unilateral mistake
by an agent of Wells Fargo. As between Wells Fargo and a good faith purchaser at
the judicial sale, the trial court had the discretion to place the risk of this mistake
upon Wells Fargo.
Thus, we affirm the trial court’s orders denying relief to Wells Fargo. We are
certain that this result seems harsh to Wells Fargo. Nevertheless, Mr. Martin’s bid
was accepted when the clerk announced “sold.” Without ruling that a unilateral
mistake by the complaining party could never justify relief, we hold that the trial
court had the discretion under these facts to make Wells Fargo suffer the loss.
Decision
The appellate court held that Wells Fargo’s unilateral mistake did not entitle it to
relief from the judicial sale.

1. Not all jurisdictions would have decided as harshly as the court did in this
case. Although the court’s opinion in Wells Fargo is indeed a trend, it is still
not the approach the majority of the courts would have taken. Do you think
the modern trend will ultimately win out over the majority opinion?
2. Critical Thinking: Should contracts be allowed to be rescinded because of
unilateral mistakes? Why or why not?
3. Ethics: Did Wells Fargo act ethically in trying to set aside the judicial sale?
4. Critical Thinking: Do you think mistakes such as that made by Wells Fargo
happen very often in business?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, at
www.2dca.org.
2. Visit the website of Wells Fargo Financial at www.wellsfargofinancial.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article or case that involves a unilateral mistake.
MUTUAL MISTAKE
Either party may rescind a contract if there has been a mutual mistake of a past or mutual mistake
existing material fact.3 A material fact is one that is important to the subject matter A mistake common to both contract-
of a contract. An ambiguity in a contract may constitute a mutual mistake of a ing parties, where each is laboring
material fact. An ambiguity occurs when a word or term in the contract is suscep- under the same misconception as
tible to more than one logical interpretation. If there has been a mutual mistake, to a past or existing material fact.
the contract may be rescinded on the ground that no contract has been formed
because there has been no “meeting of the minds” between the parties.
3
120 Chapter 5
In the celebrated case Raffles v. Wichelhaus,4 which has become better known
as the case of the good ship Peerless, the parties agreed on a sale of cotton that was
to be delivered from Bombay by the ship. There were two ships named Peerless,
however, and each party, in agreeing to the sale, was referring to a different ship.
Because the sailing time of the two ships was materially different, neither party was
willing to agree to shipment by the other Peerless. The court ruled there was no
binding contract because each party had a different ship in mind when the con-
tract was entered into.
The courts must distinguish between mutual mistakes of fact and mutual mis-
takes of value. A mutual mistake of value exists if both parties know the object of
the contract but are mistaken as to its value. Here, the contract remains enforceable
by either party because the identity of the subject matter of the contract is not at
issue. If the rule were different, almost all contracts could later be rescinded by the
party who got the “worst” of the deal.
Example: Suppose Helen Pitts cleans her attic and finds a painting of a tomato
soup can. She has no use for the painting, so she offers to sell it to Qian Huang for
$100. Qian, who likes the painting, accepts the offer and pays Helen $100. It is later
discovered that the painting is worth $1 million because it was painted by Andy
Warhol. Neither party knew this at the time of contracting. It is a mistake of value.
Helen cannot recover the painting.
Fraud
A misrepresentation occurs when an assertion is made that is not in accord with the
facts.5 An intentional misrepresentation occurs when one person consciously decides
to induce another person to rely and act on a misrepresentation. International mis-
fraudulent misrepresentation (fraud) representation is commonly referred to as fraudulent misrepresentation (or fraud).
Where one person to a contract When fraudulent misrepresentation is used to induce another to enter into a con-
intentionally induces (or causes) tract, the innocent party’s assent to the contract is not genuine, and the contract is
another person to rely and act on an voidable by the innocent party.6 The innocent party can either rescind the contract
assertion not in accord with the facts. and obtain restitution or enforce the contract and sue for contract damages.
fraud in the inception
Occurs if a person is deceived as to
the nature of his or her act and
FRAUD IN THE INCEPTION
does not know what he or she is Fraud in the inception (or fraud in the factum), occurs if a person is deceived as to
signing. A real defense against the
the nature of his or her act and does not know what he or she is signing. Contracts
enforcement of a negotiable instru-
involving fraud in the inception are void rather than just voidable.
ment; a person has been deceived
into signing a negotiable instrument Example: Suppose Heather brings her professor a grade card to sign. The professor
thinking that it is something else. signs the front of the grade card. On the back, however, are contract terms that
fraud in the inducement transfer all of the professor’s property to Heather. Here, there is fraud in the incep-
Occurs when the party knows what tion. The contract is void.
he or she is signing but has been
fraudulently induced to enter into
the contract. A personal defense FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
against the enforcement of a nego-
tiable instrument; a wrongdoer A great many fraud cases concern fraud in the inducement. Here, the innocent
makes a false statement to another party knows what he or she is signing but has been fraudulently induced to enter
person to lead that person to enter into the contract. Such contracts are voidable by the innocent party.
into a contract with the wrongdoer.
4
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
5
6
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sections 163 and 164.
Example: Suppose Lyle Green tells Candice Young that he is forming a partnership
to invest in drilling for oil and invites her to invest in this venture. In reality, though,
Green intends to use whatever money he receives for his personal expenses, and he
absconds with Young’s $30,000 investment. Here, there has been fraud in the
inducement. Young can rescind the contract and recover the money from Green, if
he can be found.
FRAUD BY CONCEALMENT
Fraud by concealment occurs when one party takes specific action to conceal a fraud by concealment
material fact from another party.7 Occurs when one party takes
specific action to conceal a
Example: Suppose ABC Blouses, Inc., contracted to buy a used sewing machine material fact from another party.
from Wear-Well Shirts, Inc. ABC asked to see any past repair invoices on the
machine. Wear-Well indicated no repairs were made to sewing machine. Relying on
the knowledge that the machine was in good condition and never had to be repaired,
ABC bought the machine. If ABC later should discover a significant repair record
has been concealed, it can sue Wear-Well for fraud in concealing the past repairs.
SILENCE AS MISREPRESENTATION
Generally, neither party to a contract owes a duty to disclose all the facts to the
other party. Ordinarily, such silence is not a misrepresentation unless (1) nondis-
closure would cause bodily injury or death, (2) there is a fiduciary relationship
(i.e., a relationship of trust and confidence) between the contracting parties, or
(3) federal and state statutes require disclosure. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts specifies a broader duty of disclosure: Nondisclosure is a misrepresentation if
it would constitute a failure to act in “good faith.”8
In Case 5.2, the court found fraud and awarded punitive damages.
CASE 5.2 FRAUD

Krysa v. Payne, 176 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
“Punitive damages differ from compensatory damages in that compensatory
damages are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has
suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, while the
well-established purpose of punitive damages is to inflict punishment
and to serve as an example and a deterrent to similar conduct.”
Judge Ellis,
Court of Appeals of Missouri
Facts
Frank and Shelly Krysa were shopping for a truck to pull their 18-foot trailer. Dur-
ing the course of their search they visited Payne’s Car Company, a used car dealer-
ship owned by Emmett Payne. Kemp Crane, a salesman, showed the Krysas around
the car lot. The Krysas saw an F-350 truck that they were interested in purchasing.
7
8
122 Chapter 5
Crane told the Krysas the truck would tow their trailer, the truck would make it to
400,000 miles, and it was “a one-owner trade-in.” The Krysas took the truck for a
test drive and decided to purchase the truck. The Krysas, who had to borrow some
of the money from Mrs. Krysa’s mother, paid for the truck and took possession.
Later that day, the Krysas noticed that the power locks did not work on the
truck. A few days later, the truck took three hours to start. The heater was not
working. Mr. Krysa tried to fix some problems and noticed the radiator was
smashed up, the radiator cap did not have a seal, and the thermostat was missing.
Mr. Krysa noticed broken glass on the floor underneath the front seats and real-
ized the driver’s side window had been replaced. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Krysa
attempted to tow his trailer, but within a few miles he had his foot to the floor try-
ing to get the truck to pull the trailer. A large amount of smoke was pouring out of
the back of the truck. Mr. Krysa also noticed the truck was consuming a lot of oil.
Mr. Krysa obtained a CARFAX report for the truck, which showed the truck had
13 prior owners. Evidence proved that the truck was actually two halves of differ-
ent trucks that had been welded together. An automobile expert told the Krysas
not to drive the truck because it was unsafe.
Mr. Krysa went back to the dealership to return the truck and get his money
back. Payne told Krysa he would credit the purchase price of the truck toward the
purchase of one of the other vehicles on the lot, but he would not give Krysa his
money back. Krysa could not find another vehicle on Payne’s used car lot that
would suit his needs. The Krysas sued Payne for fraudulent nondisclosure and
fraudulent misrepresentation, and they sought to recover compensatory and puni-
tive damages. The jury returned a verdict for the Krysas and awarded them $18,449
in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Payne appealed the
award of punitive damages.
Issue
Did Payne engage in fraudulent nondisclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
reckless disregard for the safety of the Krysas and the public to support the award
of $500,000 in punitive damages?

Punitive damages differ from compensatory damages in that compensatory damages
are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of
the defendant’s wrongful conduct, while the well-established purpose of punitive
damages is to inflict punishment and to serve as an example and a deterrent to sim-
ilar conduct. While the damage actually sustained by the Krysas was relatively small
and was economic in nature, the record clearly supports a finding that Payne acted
indifferently to or in reckless disregard of the safety of the Krysas in selling them a
vehicle that he knew or should have known was not safe to drive and that the poten-
tial harm to the Krysas was much greater than the harm that was actually incurred.
The evidence also supported a finding that the harm sustained by Krysas was
the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, and was not merely an accident.
Payne had a significant amount of work done to the vehicle to make it appear to be
in good shape. This included, among numerous other repairs, straightening both the
bed and cab of the truck. Payne’s salesman, Crane, lied to the Krysas on several
occasions about the condition of the truck, its origin, and its capabilities. This evi-
dence, in addition to other evidence previously described, sufficiently established
that Payne affirmatively misrepresented the condition of the F-350 to the Krysas in
an attempt to trick them into buying the vehicle.
In sum, while the harm actually sustained by the Krysas in this case was eco-
nomic as opposed to physical, Payne’s conduct did pose a significant risk to the phys-
ical welfare of Respondents and evinced an indifference to or reckless disregard of the
health or safety of the Krysas and the general public as well. Furthermore, the con-
duct was consistent with Payne’s regular business practices and was not an isolated
incident, involved acts of intentional trickery and deceit, and targeted victims that
were financially vulnerable. Thus, in society’s eyes, viewing the totality of the cir-
cumstances, Payne’s conduct can only be seen as exhibiting a very high degree of
reprehensibility.
Payne contends that the ratio between the actual damages awarded,
$18,449.53, and the punitive award, $500,000, is grossly excessive, in that the ratio
of punitive to actual damages is approximately 27:1. The initial problem with
Payne’s argument is that it fails to consider the evidence of the potential harm that
could have been sustained by the Krysas. In this case, given the relatively small
amount of actual damages awarded, the egregious nature of Payne’s acts, Payne’s
open refusal to alter his behavior, and the magnitude of the potential harm that
could have been sustained had the structural problems with the truck not been dis-
covered by the Krysas’s expert, the ratio of the punitive to actual damages does not,
in and of itself, offend due process.
Decision
The court of appeals found that Payne’s fraudulent concealment, fraudulent mis-
representation, and reckless disregard for the safety of the Krysas and the public
justified the award of $500,000 of punitive damages to the Krysas.

1. Law: What is fraudulent concealment? What is fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion?
2. Law: What are punitive damages? Why are they awarded?
3. Ethics: Did Payne, the used car dealer, act ethically in this case?
4. Ethics: Do you have any apprehension about purchasing a car from a used
car dealership? Why or why not?
Web Exercises
1. For the complete opinion of this case, search for it at www.google.com.
2. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, at
www.courts.mo.gov.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article or case about a fraudulent transaction.
MISREPRESENTATION OF LAW misrepresentation of law

When a party to a contract
Usually, a misrepresentation of law is not actionable as fraud. The innocent party misstates the law related to that
cannot generally rescind the contract because each party to a contract is assumed contract—whether innocently or
to know the law that applies to the transaction, either through his or her own intentionally.
124 Chapter 5
investigation or by hiring a lawyer. There is one major exception to this rule: The
misrepresentation will be allowed as grounds for rescission of the contract if one
party to the contract is a professional who should know what the law is and inten-
tionally misrepresents the law to a less sophisticated contracting party.9
INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION
innocent misrepresentation An innocent misrepresentation occurs when a person makes a statement of fact
Occurs when a person makes a that he or she honestly and reasonably believes to be true even though it is not.
statement of fact that he or she Innocent misrepresentation is not fraud. If an innocent misrepresentation has been
honestly and reasonably believes to made, the aggrieved party may rescind the contract but may not sue for damages.
be true, even though it is not. Occurs Innocent misrepresentation often is treated as a mutual mistake.
when an agent makes an untrue
In Case 5.3, the court allowed a contract to be rescinded because of fraud.
statement that he or she honestly
and reasonably believes to be true.
CASE 5.3 FRAUD

Wilson v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Ct. App. 1991).
“A material misrepresentation or concealment entitles the injured party to
rescission.”
Judge Stone,
Facts
Daniel and Doris Wilson were husband and wife. One day Daniel fainted from a
narcotics overdose and was rushed, unconscious, to the hospital. Doris accompa-
nied him. Daniel responded to medication used to counteract a narcotics overdose
and recovered. The emergency room physician noted that Daniel had probably
suffered from a heroin overdose and had multiple puncture sites on his arms. Two
months later an agent for Western National Life Insurance Company (Western)
met with the Wilsons in their home for the purpose of taking their application for
life insurance. The agent asked questions and recorded the Wilsons’ responses on
a written application form. Daniel answered the following questions:
13. In the past 10 years, have you been treated or Yes No
joined an organization for alcoholism or drug
addiction? If “Yes,” explain on the reverse side.
17. In the past 5 years, have you consulted or been Yes No
treated or examined by any physician or
practitioner?
Both of the Wilsons signed the application form and paid the agent the first
month’s premium. Under insurance law and the application form, the life insur-
ance policy took effect immediately. Daniel Wilson died from a drug overdose two
days later. Western rescinded the policy and rejected Doris Wilson’s claim to
recover the policy’s $50,000 death benefit for Daniel’s death, alleging failure to
9
disclose Daniel’s heroin overdose incident. Doris sued to recover the death bene-
fits. The trial court granted summary judgment for Western. Doris appealed.
Issue
Was there a concealment of a material fact that justified Western’s rescission of
the life insurance policy?

Plaintiff asserts the court erroneously granted summary judgment because Western
failed to prove she or decedent made a misrepresentation in the application. We
disagree. In her deposition, plaintiff testified neither she nor decedent told the agent
about decedent’s fainting spell or his hospital treatment two months earlier. Thus,
there is no question but that they omitted medical information. Knowledge of the
true facts by plaintiff and decedent is beyond dispute.
Plaintiff further argues the misrepresentation, if one occurred, was not mate-
rial. Plaintiff’s argument must fail. The trial court properly found the omissions to
be material and the evidence supporting its materiality uncontradicted. The trial
court had before it evidence from Western that the application would not have
been accepted, and decedent would not have been found to be insurable, had he
disclosed on the application the episode when he became unconscious from a nar-
cotics overdose.
A material misrepresentation or concealment entitles the injured party to
rescission. Concealment, whether intentional or unintentional, entitles the injured
party to rescind insurance. Western properly rescinded the insurance contract and
its obligation to provide coverage terminated as of the date of application.
Decision
The appellate court held there was concealment by the Wilsons that warranted
rescission of the life insurance policy by Western.

1. Critical Thinking: Should a contract be allowed to be rescinded because of
an innocent misrepresentation? Why or why not?
2. Ethics: Do you think the concealment in this case was intentional or
innocent?
3. Critical Thinking: Do you think there is very much insurance fraud in the
United States? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of California at www.courtinfo.
ca.gov/courts/courtsofappeal.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article or case about insurance fraud.
126 Chapter 5
Concept Summary
Types of Misrepresentation
Type of Misrepresentation Legal Consequences: Innocent Party May
Sue for Damages Rescind Contract
Fraud in the inception Yes Yes
Fraud in the inducement Yes Yes
Fraud by concealment Yes Yes
Silence as misrepresentation Yes Yes
Misrepresentation of law Usually no Usually no
Innocent misrepresentation No Yes
Undue Influence
The courts may permit the rescission of a contract based on the equitable doctrine
undue influence of undue influence. Undue influence occurs when one person (the dominant
Taking advantage of a person’s party) takes advantage of another person’s mental, emotional, or physical weakness
weakness, infirmity, age, or distress and unduly persuades that person (the servient party) to enter into a contract. The
in order to change that person’s persuasion by the wrongdoer must overcome the free will of the innocent party. A
actions or decisions. contract entered into because of undue influence is voidable by the innocent
party.10 Wills are often challenged as having been made under undue influence.
The following elements must be shown to prove undue influence:
1. A fiduciary or confidential relationship must have existed between the
parties.
2. The dominant party must have unduly used his or her influence to persuade
the servient party to enter into a contract.
If there is a confidential relationship between persons—such as a lawyer and
a client, a doctor and a patient, a psychiatrist and a patient—any contract made by
the servient party that benefits the dominant party is presumed to be entered into
under undue influence. This rebuttable presumption can be overcome through
proper evidence.
Example: Mr. Johnson, 70 years old, has a stroke and is partially paralyzed. He is
required to use a wheelchair, and he needs constant nursing care. Prior to his
stroke, Mr. Johnson had executed a will, leaving his property upon his death equally
to his four grandchildren. Edward, a licensed nurse, is hired to care daily for
Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Johnson relies on Edward’s care. Edward works for Mr. Johnson
for two years before Mr. Johnson passes away. It is discovered that Mr. Johnson had
executed a new will three months before he died, leaving all of his property to
Edward. If it is shown that Edward has used his dominant and fiduciary position to
influence Mr. Johnson unduly to change his will, then the will is invalid. If no undue
influence is shown, the second will is valid, and Edward will receive the property
left to him by Mr. Johnson in the will.
10
Duress
Duress occurs when one party threatens to do some wrongful act unless the other duress
party enters into a contract. If a party to a contract has been forced into making the Occurs where one party threatens to
contract, the assent is not voluntary. Such a contract is not enforceable against the do a wrongful act unless the other
innocent party. party enters into a contract.
Example: If someone threatens to harm another person unless that person signs a
contract, this is physical duress. This contract cannot be enforced against the
duressed party.
The threat to commit physical harm or extortion unless someone enters into a con-
tract constitutes duress. So does a threat to bring (or not drop) a criminal lawsuit.
Such threats are duress even if the criminal lawsuit is well founded.11 A threat to
bring (or not drop) a civil lawsuit, however, does not constitute duress unless such
a suit is frivolous or brought in bad faith.
ECONOMIC DURESS
The courts have recognized another type of duress called economic duress, which economic duress
usually occurs when one party to a contract refuses to perform his or her contrac- Occurs when one party to a contract
tual duties unless the other party pays an increased price, enters into a second con- refuses to perform his or her con-
tract with the threatening party, or the like. The duressed party must prove he or tractual duties unless the other
she had no alternative but to acquiesce to the other party’s threat. party pays an increased price,
enters into a second contract with
Economic duress is also called business compulsion, business duress, and
the threatening party, or undertakes
economic coercion. The appropriateness of these terms becomes apparent when
a similar action.
the facts of the following case are examined.
Ashton Development, Inc. (Ashton), hired Bob Britton, Inc. (Britton), a gen-
eral contractor, to build a development for it. Britton signed a contract with a sub-
contractor, Rich & Whillock, Inc. (R&W), to provide grading and excavation work
at the project. R&W proceeded with the excavation work and rock removal, which
included blasting. After completing all the required work and receiving $109,363
in payments to date, R&W submitted a final bill to Britton for $72,286.
Britton refused to pay this amount. R&W told Britton it would go “broke” if
payment was not received. One month later, Britton presented R&W with an agree-
ment whereby Britton would pay $25,000 upon the signing of the agreement and
another $25,000 one month later. When R&W complained of the financial bind it
was in, Britton stated, “I have a check for you, and you just take it or leave it: This is
all you get. If you don’t take this, you’ll have to sue me.” After claiming it was
“blackmail,” R&W accepted the $25,000 check. Britton did not pay the other
$25,000 until one month later.
After receiving payment, R&W sued Britton for breach of contract. The trial
and appellate courts held in favor of R&W, finding that Britton’s tactics amounted
to economic duress. In applying the doctrine of economic duress to the case, the
court stated, “The underlying concern of the economic duress doctrine is the
enforcement in the marketplace of certain minimal standards of business ethics.”
The court found that Britton had acted in bad faith when it refused to pay R&W’s
final billing and offered instead to pay a compromise amount of $50,000. At the
time of its bad faith breach and settlement offer, Britton knew that R&W was a new
11
128 Chapter 5
company, overextended to creditors and subcontractors, and faced with imminent

bankruptcy if not paid its final billing. Under these circumstances, the court found
that the settlement agreement was unenforceable. The court ordered Britton to pay
the balance due on the contract to R&W. Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc.,
204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1984).

1. Law: What is economic duress? What distinguishes it from just plain hard
business tactics?
2. Ethics: Did Britton act ethically in this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of California at www.courtinfo.
ca.gov/courts/courtsofappeal.
Proving Fraud
To prove fraud, there are certain elements that the plaintiff must show, including
the following:
1. The wrongdoer made a false representation of material fact.
2. The wrongdoer intended to deceive the innocent party.
3. The innocent party justifiably relied on the misrepresentation.
4. The innocent party was injured.
Each of these elements is explained and discussed in more detail in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
1. Material Misrepresentation of Fact

A misrepresentation may occur by words (oral or written) or by the conduct of a
party. To be actionable as fraud, the misrepresentation must be of a past or existing
material fact. This means the misrepresentation must have been a significant factor
in inducing the innocent party to enter into the contract. It does not have to have
been the sole factor. Statements of opinion or predictions about the future gener-
ally do not form the basis for fraud.
2. Intent to Deceive
To prove fraud, the person making the misrepresentation must have either had
knowledge that the representation was false or made it without sufficient knowl-
scienter edge of the truth. This is called scienter (“guilty mind”). The misrepresentation
Guilty knowledge; intent to deceive must have been made with the intent to deceive the innocent party. Intent can be
or manipulate. inferred from the circumstances.
3. Reliance on the Misrepresentation

A misrepresentation is not actionable unless the innocent party to whom the mis-
representation was directed acted on it. Further, an innocent party who acts in
reliance on the misrepresentation must justify his or her reliance. Justifiable reli-
ance is generally found unless the innocent party knew the misrepresentation was
false or was so extravagant as to be obviously false.
Example: Reliance on a statement such as “This diamond ring is worth $10,000,
but I’ll sell it to you for $100” would not be justified.
4. Injury to the Innocent Party

To recover damages, the innocent party must prove that the fraud caused economic
injury. The measure of damages is the difference between the value of the property
as represented and the actual value of the property. This measure of damages gives
the innocent party the “benefit of the bargain.” In the alternative, the buyer can
rescind the contract and recover the purchase price.
Individuals must be on guard in their commercial and personal dealings not
to be taken by fraud. Basically, if it sounds “too good to be true,” it is a signal that
the situation might be fraudulent. Although the law permits a victim of fraud to
rescind the contract and recover damages from the wrongdoer, often the wrong-
doer cannot be found or the money has been spent.
Denise Schmidt is employed as a I have also had case assignments in which the
litigation paralegal with the law incident at issue involves real estate contracts. For
firm of Bahret & Associates Co., example, I've worked on several cases involving a slip
L.P.A., in Holland, Ohio. The law and fall at a restaurant resulting from unnatural
firm primarily handles defense accumulations of ice and snow. In those cases, not
civil litigation. only do I review the insurance contracts, but I may
have to review the applicable lease contracts, land
My main duties are concentrated contracts, or purchase agreements. I'm looking to the
in discovery. Most of our cases revolve around insur- contracts and other documents to determine who
ance coverage, so I spend a lot of my time assisting owns the property, who owns the restaurant, and
the attorney in reviewing and interpreting different who is responsible for removal of the ice and snow.
insurance contracts or policies. Not only do I have to If a lawsuit settles, I assist in the drafting of, or
review the policy applicable to our own client (the reviewing of, the settlement agreement and/or
defendant), but I must also obtain and review any release. It is very important to make sure that any
other policies or contracts that may provide cover- claims being asserted against our client are fully
age on the alleged claims. I also review these con- discharged and that no future claims can be made
tracts for indemnification language and the that would stem from the incident in question.
possibility of potential claims or additional defenses.

Making Legal Services Available
Surveys show that a high percentage of Americans cannot afford a
lawyer. The ethical paralegal should be concerned that all people
have access to legal representation, regardless of their ability to pay.
ABA Model Rules 1.5 and 6.1 both deal with this important issue.12
To fill this need, many bar organizations have established pro bono pro bono
programs through which attorneys volunteer to represent clients at no For the good; work or services
charge. Paralegals can play an important role in pro bono activities. performed free of charge.
Even if the paralegal’s law firm doesn’t handle pro bono cases, the
paralegal might volunteer for pro bono projects sponsored by the local
bar association or paralegal association. However, the ethical parale-
gal should be cautious and take into consideration any possible con-
flicts of interest (as set out in the Ethical Paralegal feature in Chapter 8).
12
130 Chapter 5
CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY
MISTAKE, p. 117 2. Fraud in the inducement. With this type of fraud, the
wrongdoer fraudulently induces another party to enter
Unilateral Mistakes
into a contract.
Unilateral mistakes occur when only one party is mistaken 3. Fraud by concealment. With this type of fraud, the
about a material fact regarding the subject matter of a con- wrongdoer takes specific action to conceal a material
tract. The legal consequences are as follows: fact from the other party.
4. Silence as misrepresentation. With this type of fraud,
1. General rule. The mistaken party is not permitted to
the wrongdoer remains silent when he or she is under a
rescind the contract.
legal obligation to disclose a material fact.
2. Exceptions. The mistaken party can rescind the con-
5. Misrepresentation of law. A professional who should
tract if:
know what the law is may intentionally misrepresent
a. The other party knew or should have known of the
the law to a less sophisticated party.
mistake and took advantage of it.
b. The mistake occurred because of a clerical or Innocent Misrepresentation
mathematical error that was not the result of gross
negligence. When a person unintentionally makes an assertion that is
c. The mistake is so serious that enforcing the contract not in accord with the facts, the innocent party may rescind
would be unconscionable. the contract but cannot recover damages. Innocent misrep-
resentation is not fraud.
Mutual Mistakes
1. Mutual mistake of fact. If both parties are mistaken
about the essence or object of a contract, either party UNDUE INFLUENCE, p. 126
may rescind the contract. Undue influence occurs when one person takes advantage of
2. Mutual mistake of value. If both parties know the another person’s mental, emotional, or physical weakness
object of a contract but are mistaken as to its value, nei- and unduly persuades that person to enter into a contract. A
ther party may rescind the contract. contract entered into under undue influence cannot be
enforced.
1. Elements of undue influence:
FRAUD, p. 120 a. A fiduciary or confidential relationship existed
Elements of Fraud between the dominant and servient parties.
b. The dominant party unduly used his or her influ-
Fraudulent misrepresentation. Fraudulent misrepresentation ence to persuade the servient party to enter into a
occurs when a person intentionally makes an assertion that contract.
is not in accord with the facts. Also called fraud. 2. Presumption. If there is a confidential relationship
1. Elements of fraud: between persons, any contract by the servient party
a. The wrongdoer made a false representation of mate- that benefits the dominant party is presumed to have
rial fact. been entered into under undue influence. This position
b. The wrongdoer intended to deceive the innocent is a rebuttable presumption.
party.
c. The innocent party justifiably relied on the misrep-
resentation. DURESS, p. 127
d. The innocent party was injured.
2. Legal consequence if fraudulent misrepresentation is Duress occurs when one party threatens to do some wrong-
found. The innocent party may: ful act unless the other party enters into a contract. A con-
a. Rescind the contract and obtain restitution, or tract entered into under duress cannot be enforced.
b. Enforce the contract and sue for damages Common types of duress:
Types of Fraud 1. Physical duress
2. Extortion
Common types of fraud:
1. Fraud in the inception. With this type of fraud, an
innocent person is deceived as to the nature of his or
her act. Also called fraud in the factum.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Duress 127 Fraudulent misrepresentation (fraud) 120 Mutual mistake 119
Economic duress (business Genuine assent 116 Pro bono 129
compulsion, business duress) 127 Genuineness of assent 116 Rescission 117
Fraud by concealment 121 Innocent misrepresentation 124 Scienter 128
Fraud in the inception 120 Misrepresentation of law 123 Undue influence 126
Fraud in the inducement 120 Mistake 117 Unilateral mistake 117

Remember the case at the beginning of this chapter? If for that action? Review the case of Schaneman v. Schaneman,
Mr. Moore’s other children brought an action to cancel the 291 N.W.2d 412 (Neb. 1980), to help you with your answer.
deed transferring the farm to Gary, what would be the basis

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. For an interesting case involving genuineness of assent,
go to www.legalwa.org and search for Barnes v.
1. For a practical Q & A on contract basics, see http://
Treece, 549 P.2d 1152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-forms-con-
tracts/business-forms-contracts-overview/
After working with the Skill-Building Exercises in Chapters 2. ____________________________________________
1 through 4, and then completing the Portfolio Exercise in
____________________________________________
Chapter 4, you have mastered the basic structure of a simple
contract. However, contracts sometimes come in the form Sincerely yours,
of a “letter contract.” Being able to draft a simple letter con-
______________________
tract for your attorney’s review will be especially important
when you are employed as a paralegal. ______________________
Here is a basic structure for a letter contract:
Exercise:
Date: ___________, 20_______
________________________________________________ Portfolio Exercise at the end of Chapter 4, draft a letter con-
tract for Sarah and Kelly.
________________________________________________
(IMPORTANT NOTE TO THE STUDENT: Be sure to
________________________________________________ save the letter contract that you draft either on your hard drive
or on a flash drive. You will need that agreement for future use
Dear ______________:
in later exercises.)
This letter will confirm our agreement as follows:
1. ____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Topic: Genuineness of Assent—and Duress Facts:
(To the student: Reread the basic facts and the facts relating All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., has learned that ABC
to the purchase of the warehouse from the Hands-On Draft- Company has a track record of attempting to back out of
ing Exercises you’ve completed so far before you begin the contracts after they are executed by claiming it did not have
exercise below.
132 Chapter 5
an opportunity to speak with counsel or did not enter into Sources:

the agreement voluntarily.
Use paragraph 15 from the sample Contract for the Sale of
Exercise/Assignment: Equipment in Appendix C as a guide to drafting this provision.
(Note that the warehouse purchase contract will ultimately
Draft a voluntary execution provision for inclusion in a follow the form of the sample Real Estate Purchase Agreement
warehouse purchase contract. also in Appendix C.)

Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.1 Unilateral Mistake Beachcomber received an offer of $700 for the coin, subject
When she died, Mrs. Chaney left behind a house in Annapo- to certification of its genuineness by the American Numis-
lis, Maryland. The representative of her estate listed the matic Society. When this organization labeled the coin coun-
property for sale with a real estate broker, stating the prop- terfeit, Beachcomber sued Boskett to rescind the purchase of
erty was approximately 15,650 square feet. Drs. Steele and the coin. Can Beachcomber rescind the contract? Beach-
Faust made an offer of $300,000 for the property, which comber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 400 A.2d 78 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App.
was accepted by the estate. A contract for the sale of the Div. 1979).
property was signed by all the parties. When a subsequent
Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.4 Fraud Robert McClure
survey (done before the deed was transferred) showed the
owned a vehicle salvage and rebuilding business. He listed
property had an area of 22,047 square feet, the estate
the business for sale and had a brochure printed that
requested that the buyers pay more money for the property.
described the business and stated that the business grossed
When the estate refused to transfer the property to the buy-
$581,117 and netted $142,727 the prior year. Fred H. Camp-
ers, they sued for specific performance. Can the estate rescind
bell saw the brochure and inquired about buying the busi-
the contract? Steele v. Goettee, 542 A.2d 847 (Md. 1988).
ness. Campbell hired a CPA to review McClure’s business
Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.2 Unilateral Mistake The records and tax returns, but the CPA could not reconcile
County of Contra Costa, California, held a tax sale in which them with the income claimed for the business in the bro-
it offered for sale a vacant piece of property located in the chure. When Campbell asked McClure about the discrep-
city of El Cerrito. Richard J. Schultz, a carpenter, saw the ancy, McClure stated that the business records did—and tax
notice of the pending tax sale and was interested in purchas- returns did not—accurately reflect the cash flow or profits of
ing the lot to build a house. Prior to attending the tax sale, the business because it was such a high-cash operation with
Schultz visited and measured the parcel, examined the much of the cash not being reported to the Internal Revenue
neighborhood, and found the houses there to be “very nice.” Service on tax returns. McClure signed a warranty that
He had a title search done that turned up no liens or judg- stated the true income of the business was as represented in
ments against the property. Schultz did not, however, check the brochure.
with the city zoning department regarding the zoning of the Campbell bought the business based on these represen-
property. tations. However, the business, although operated in sub-
Schultz attended the tax sale and, after spirited bidding, stantially the same manner as when owned by McClure,
won with a bid of $9,100 and received a deed to the property. failed to yield a net income similar to that warranted by
Within one week of the purchase, Schultz discovered that the McClure. Evidence showed that McClure’s representations
city’s zoning laws prevented building a residence on the lot. were substantially overstated. Campbell sued McClure for
In essence, the lot was worthless. Schultz sued to rescind the damages for fraud. Who wins? Campbell v. McClure, 227 Cal.
contract. Can the contract be rescinded? Schultz v. County of Rptr. 450 (Ct. App. 1986).
Contra Costa, Cal., 203 Cal. Rptr. 760 (Ct. App. 1984).
Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.5 Fraud James L. “Skip”
Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.3 Mutual Mistake Ron Deupree, a developer, was building a development of town-
Boskett, a part-time coin dealer, purchased a dime purport- houses called Point South in Destin, Florida. All the town-
edly minted in 1916 at the Denver Mint; he paid nearly $450. houses in the development were to have individual boat
The fact that the “D” on the coin signified Denver mintage slips. Sam and Louise Butner, husband and wife, bought one
made the coin rare and valuable. Boskett sold the coin to of the townhouses. The sales contract between Deupree and
Beachcomber Coins, Inc. (Beachcomber), a retail coin the Butners provided that a boat slip would be built and was
dealer, for $500. A principal of Beachcomber examined the included in the price of the townhouse. The contract stated
coin for 15 to 45 minutes prior to its purchase. Soon thereafter, that permission from the Florida Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) had to be obtained to build the boat slips. Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.7 Duress Judith and
It is undisputed that a boat slip adds substantially to the Donald Eckstein were married and had two daughters. Years
value of a property and the Butners relied on the fact that the later, Judith left the marital abode in the parties’ jointly
townhouse would have a boat slip. owned Volkswagen van with only the clothes on her back.
Prior to the sale of the townhouse to the Butners, the She did not take the children, who were 6 and 8 years old at
DNR had informed Deupree it objected to the plan to build the time. She had no funds, and the husband promptly
the boat slips and that permission to build them would closed the couple’s bank account. The wife was unemployed.
probably not be forthcoming. Deupree did not tell the But- Shortly after she left, the husband discovered her wherea-
ners this information but instead stated there would be “no bouts and the location of the van and seized and secreted the
problem” in getting permission from the state to build the van. The husband refused the wife’s request to visit or com-
boat slips. The Butners purchased the townhouse. When municate with her children and refused to give her clothing.
the DNR would not approve the building of the boat slips He told her she could see the children and take her clothes
for the Butners’ townhouse, they sued for damages for only if she signed a separation agreement prepared by his
fraud. Who wins? Deupree v. Butner , 522 So. 2d 242 lawyer. The wife contacted Legal Aid but was advised she did
(Ala. 1988). not qualify for assistance.
The wife was directed to go to her husband’s lawyer’s
Critical Legal Thinking Case 5.6 Innocent Misrepresenta- office. A copy of a separation agreement was given to her to
tion W. F. Yost, who owned the Red Barn Barbecue Restau- read. The separation agreement provided that the wife
rant (Red Barn), listed it for sale. Richard and Evelyn (1) give custody of the children to her husband, (2) deed her
Ramano of Rieve Enterprises, Inc. (Rieve), were interested in interest in their jointly owned house to the husband,
buying the restaurant. After visiting and conducting a visual (3) assign her interest in a jointly owned new Chevrolet van
inspection of the premises, Rieve entered into a contract to to her husband, and (4) waive alimony, support, maintenance,
purchase the assets and equipment of Red Barn, as well as court costs, attorneys’ fees, and any right to inheritance in her
the five-year lease of, and option to buy, the land and the husband’s estate. By the agreement, she was to receive $1,100
building. Prior to the sale, the restaurant had been cited for cash, her clothes, the Volkswagen van, and any furniture she
certain health violations that Yost had corrected. In the con- desired. The wife testified that her husband told her over an
tract of sale, Yost warranted that “the premises will pass all interoffice phone in the lawyer’s office that if she did not sign
inspections” to conduct the business. the separation agreement, he would get her for desertion, she
Rieve took possession immediately after the sale and would never see her children again, and she would get noth-
operated the restaurant. After two weeks, when the Board of ing—neither her clothes nor the van. The wife signed the
Health conducted a routine inspection, it cited 52 health separation agreement. Immediately thereafter, her clothes
code violations and thereupon closed the restaurant. Rieve were surrendered to her, and she was given $1,100 cash and
sued to rescind the purchase agreement. Evidence estab- the keys to the Volkswagen van. The husband filed for
lished that Yost’s misrepresentations were innocently made. divorce. The wife filed an answer seeking to rescind the sepa-
Can Rieve rescind the contract? Yost v. Rieve Enter., Inc., 461 ration agreement. Can she rescind the separation agreement?
So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 5.1 The First Baptist Church of Moultrie, Contracting’s estimate worksheets. The church had not been
Georgia, invited bids for the construction of a music, educa- provided these worksheets. Barber Contracting sent a letter
tion, and recreation building. The bids were to be accompa- to the church, stating it was withdrawing its bid. The next
nied by a bid bond of 5 percent of the bid amount. Barber day, the church sent a construction contract to Barber Con-
Contracting Company (Barber Contracting) submitted a bid tracting, containing the original bid amount. When Barber
in the amount of $1,860,000. A bid bond in the amount of Contracting refused to sign the contract and refused to do
5 percent of the bid—$93,000—was issued by the American the work for the original contract price, the church signed a
Insurance Company. The bids were opened by the church, contract with the second-lowest bidder, H & H Construction
and Barber Contracting’s was the lowest bid. and Supply Company, Inc., to complete the work for
On the next day, Albert W. Barber, the president of Bar- $1,919,272. The church sued Barber Contracting and the
ber Contracting, informed the church that his company’s bid American Insurance Company, seeking to recover the
was in error and should have been $143,120 higher. The amount of the bid bond. Who wins? Did Barber act ethically
error was caused in totaling the material costs on Barber in trying to get out of the contract? Did the church act
134 Chapter 5
ethically in trying to enforce Barber’s bid? First Baptist Lockheed did not reveal its findings to Sulzer. In addi-
Church of Moultrie v. Barber Contracting Co., 377 S.E.2d 717 tion, it never notified Sulzer that its bid was significantly
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989). lower than the next lowest bid and lower than Lockheed’s
own estimate of the cost of the job as well. Finally, Sulzer was
Ethics Case 5.2 Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc.
never told that Lockheed suspected the contract could not
(Lockheed) sent out a request to potential subcontractors,
be completed at the bid price.
seeking bids for the manufacture of 124 ballast cans for the
Lockheed accepted Sulzer’s bid, and Sulzer started
Trident II nuclear submarines it was building for the U.S.
work. Nine months later, Sulzer revised its estimate of the
Navy. In February 1989, Lockheed received eight bids,
cost of the job and asked Lockheed for an additional
including one from Sulzer Bingham Pumps, Inc. (Sulzer).
$2,110,000 in compensation. When Lockheed rejected this
Sulzer was the lowest bidder, at $6,544,055. The next lowest
request, Sulzer sued Lockheed, asking the court to either
bid was $10,176,670, and the bids ranged up to $17,766,327.
increase the price of the contract to $8,645,000 or, alterna-
Lockheed itself estimated the job would cost at least
tively, to rescind its bid. Did Lockheed act ethically in this
$8.5 million. Lockheed’s employees were shocked by Sulzer’s
case by not notifying Sulzer of the suspected mistake? Did
bid and thought it was surprisingly low.
Sulzer act ethically by trying to get out of the contract
Lockheed then inspected Sulzer’s Portland facility to
because of its own economic misjudgments? Legally, who
evaluate Sulzer’s technical capabilities. The inspection
wins? Sulzer Bingham Pumps, Inc. v. Lockheed Missiles &
revealed that Sulzer would have to make many modifications
Space Co., 947 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1991).
to its existing facility to complete the contract.

Read Case B.5 in Appendix B (Continental Airlines, Inc. v. 3. Were the statements made by McDonnell Douglas
McDonnell Douglas Corp.). This case is excerpted from the material? What evidence supports your conclusion?
appellate court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see 4. Did Continental rely on the statements of McDonnell
Appendix A) using the IRAC method. After briefing the Douglas? What evidence supports your conclusion?
case, you should be able to answer the following questions: 5. Do false representations made recklessly and without
regard to the truth constitute fraud?
1. When did the action commence? When was the deci-
6. What damages were awarded to Continental?
sion of the appellate court rendered?
2. Were the statements made by McDonnell Douglas
opinions (i.e., puffing) or statements of fact?
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: UNDUE INFLUENCE
Religions obviously have an influence on their members. People who practice reli-
gions often donate money and property to their place of worship and religious causes.
Most religious giving (and church asking) is legitimate. Sometimes there are charges
of illegal and unethical conduct, however. Sometimes the charge is undue influence.
Consider the following case.
Elizabeth Dayton Dovydenas was born in 1952. As an heir to the Dayton-Hudson
department store chain fortune, she was worth approximately $19 million. She
married Jonas Dovydenas. When Elizabeth was interested in finding a church to
attend, the couple’s housekeeper suggested her church, The Bible Speaks (TBS).
Elizabeth and Jonas went to a TBS service, liked what they saw, and left a $500 check
in the collection plate.
After this, pastors from TBS contacted them and set up a tea with Carl Stevens,
the founder of TBS. Stevens had been a fundamentalist preacher for 26 years. At the
first meeting, Stevens asked Elizabeth for money for a counseling center, and she gave
him a check for $2,000. Elizabeth became a devout member of TBS. Eventually,
Elizabeth met with Stevens alone every day after Bible classes and attended other
functions with him. She abandoned her prior friends and saw little of her family.
One day in the fall of 1984, as she was driving with Stevens, Elizabeth heard a
voice telling her to give $1 million to TBS. Elizabeth gave $1 million of Dayton-
Hudson stock to TBS. Elizabeth was led to believe that large gifts by her to TBS could
affect events on earth. She was also told she had to obey Stevens because he was the
highest authority on earth.
In March 1985, Elizabeth told Stevens that she heard God tell her to give $5 million
to TBS in June. Elizabeth had planned a trip to Florida on April 18. Before she left,
she was told that a TBS pastor had been detained in Romania and that “they’re prob-
ably pulling his fingernails out right now.” Elizabeth went to Florida but called
Stevens on April 21 and told him she wanted to give the $5 million right away so the
pastor would be released. Stevens did not tell her the pastor had already been released.
Elizabeth was cautioned against telling anyone that she had worked a miracle. The
gift of $5 million of Dayton-Hudson stock was completed on May 13.
After her relatives tricked Elizabeth away from Stevens, Elizabeth was depro-
grammed from her “cult” experience. Elizabeth then sued to rescind her $1-million
and $5-million gifts to TBS, alleging that Stevens and TBS had engaged in undue
influence. The U.S. District Court agreed and ordered that both gifts be rescinded.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated,
Undue influence, while sometimes susceptible of proof by direct testimony,
may be exercised by indirect and secret ways, which are disclosed only in their
result. Because undue influence is often practiced in “veiled and secret ways,”
its existence may be inferred from such factors as disproportionate gifts made
under unusual circumstances, the age and health of the donor, and the exist-
ence of a confidential relationship.
Two other factors are also important. One, attempts by the recipient to isolate
the donor from her former friends and relatives can be considered in deter-
mining undue influence. Two, a court can also consider that the donor acted
without independent and disinterested advice. Any species of coercion, whether
physical, mental, or moral, which subverts the sound judgment and genuine
desire of the individual, is enough to constitute undue influence.
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed as to the $1-million gift, finding no undue influ-
ence at the time this gift was made. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed that the
$5-million gift had been made based on undue influence and must be rescinded.
Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1989).

1. Law: What is undue influence? Is it hard to prove? Explain.
2. Ethics: Did Stevens and the other members of TBS act ethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Should the plaintiff have been saved from her folly? Why or
why not?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of California at www.ca1.uscourts.gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the history of the Dayton-
Hudson Corporation.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses what further happened in
this story after this case was decided.
A verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.
—Samuel Goldwyn
American Film Producer
chapter 6
WRITING, FORMALITY, AND
E-COMMERCE SIGNATURE LAW
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal represents Bell Enterprises, a com- CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
pany in the business of selling gold and silver. A long-time customer of the
company, Gary McGraw, placed an order for 300 ounces of silver for $10,000. should be able to:
The company immediately ordered and paid for the silver. Once the silver 1. List the contracts that must be in writing
arrived at Bell Enterprises, the company contacted McGraw about payment. under the Statute of Frauds.
He told the company to continue to hold it in its vault, and he would be in to 2. Explain the effect of noncompliance with
the Statute of Frauds.
pick it up soon. Meanwhile, the price of silver fell substantially. When McGraw
3. Describe how the Statute of Frauds is
refused to pick up and pay for the silver, the company sold it for $4,000, thereby applicable to the sale of goods.
incurring a loss of $6,000.
4. Apply the Parol Evidence Rule.
137
138 Chapter 6
Certain types of contracts must be in writing. In addition, other issues regarding
the form of a contract may arise, such as the form of signature that is required on a
written contract, whether a contract can be created by the integration of several
documents, whether any previous oral or written agreements between the parties
can be given effect, and how contract language should be interpreted. Issues regard-
ing the writing and formality of contracts are discussed in this chapter.
Kim A. Spitzmiller is a graduate implied. It is important to interpret what obliga-
of Caldwell College and has been tions are being conveyed within the contract and
a paralegal for over 25 years in how that may affect and/or restrict future market-
the field of intellectual property. ing of products covered under the trademarks of
In 1997, she formed her own both parties. Although it is difficult to predict the
consulting firm in Bridgewater, future, I work closely with the client's marketing
New Jersey, specializing in trade- department to ensure that I have a clear under-
mark. She supports a multitude standing of the possibilities of product and industry
of clients in the pharmaceutical, medical device, expansion, as well as a feel for the competition in
chemical, personal care, and food industries. the marketplace.
Another type of contract frequently used
Working in the field of trademark law requires a involves licensing. Although the same attention to
number of skills and points of reference. Often- the stated versus unstated terms is important, it is
times conflicts arise between parties that are seek- also imperative to ensure that the licensor exercises
ing to register similar trademarks. One type of quality control over a licensee’s goods and services.
resolution to this type of conflict is having the par- If this is not done, in some countries, the trademark
ties enter into a contract called a Consent or Co- may become vulnerable to attack by the licensee or
Existence Agreement. a third party. In addition, the drafting of terms cov-
Preparing or reviewing this type of contract ering length of time, royalties, exclusivity and
involves understanding and evaluating not only the proper trademark usage are specific clauses that I
written words but those terms that are unwritten or get involved with drafting.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: CONSTRUCTION LAW PARALEGAL
A construction law paralegal works with contracts in the following ways:
• Meet with client and obtain information about project history and current status.
• Review and obtain relevant documents located at city building department,
including city meeting minutes, building applications, inspection reports,
permits, and drawings.
• Obtain, organize, review, and summarize bid and contract documents and any
amendments thereto.
• Obtain, organize, review, and summarize all subcontractor and vendor
agreements and any amendments thereto.
• Obtain, review, and summarize all insurance policies and/or bonds issued for the
project.
• Obtain, review, organize, and summarize project logs, daily reports, change
orders, pay applications, and certified payroll records.
Writing, Formality, and E-Commerce Signature Law 139
• Obtain, review, and summarize documentation evidencing financial transactions

between all entities involved in the project.
• Obtain and review relevant union contracts to ensure compliance with prevailing
wage provisions.
• Prepare financial analysis and project summary.
• Interview construction manager.
• Interview representatives of subcontractors and vendors.
• Coordinate site visit/inspection; photograph site as necessary.
• Negotiate settlements with subcontractors and vendors.
• Work with experts to review and analyze project plans and specifications.
• Identify liens filed by contractor and/or subcontractors through review of county
records.
• Draft mechanic’s lien and obtain all documents supporting lien; coordinate
filing of lien and distribution of notice of filing lien with appropriate entities/
individuals.
• Obtain information about mechanic’s lien(s) from county records. Obtain all
necessary documents and information from lien holder to verify amount and
validity of lien. Negotiate settlement of lien(s). Coordinate payment of lien(s)
with client. Draft releases, including release of claims and release/satisfaction of
mechanic’s lien.
Statute of Frauds
In 1677, the English Parliament enacted a statute called “An Act for the Prevention
of Frauds and Perjuries.” This act required that certain types of contracts had to be
in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement was sought. Today,
every U.S. state has enacted a Statute of Frauds that requires certain types of con- statute of frauds
tracts to be in writing. This statute is intended to ensure that the terms of impor- State statute that requires certain
tant contracts are not forgotten, misunderstood, or fabricated. types of contracts to be in writing.
WRITING REQUIREMENT
Although the statutes vary slightly from state to state, most states require the fol-
lowing types of contracts to be in writing.1
• Contracts involving interests in land
• Contracts that by their own terms cannot possibly be performed within one
year
• Collateral contracts in which a person promises to answer for the debt or
duty of another
• Promises made in consideration of marriage
• Contracts for the sale of goods for more than $500
• Real estate agents’ contracts
• Agents’ contracts where the underlying contract must be in writing
• Promises to write a will
• Contracts to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in
bankruptcy
1
140 Chapter 6
• Contracts to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating the pur-

chase of a business
• Finder’s fee contracts
CONTRACTS THAT MUST BE IN WRITING

Generally, an executory contract that is not in writing even though the Statute of
Frauds requires it to be is unenforceable by either party. The Statute of Frauds is
usually raised by one party as a defense to the enforcement of the contract by the
other party.
If an oral contract that should have been in writing under the Statute of
Frauds is already executed, neither party can seek to rescind the contract on the
real property
The land itself as well as buildings,
ground of noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds. That is, the contract may be
trees, soil, minerals, timber, plants, voluntarily performed by the parties.
crops, and other things permanently Generally, contracts listed in the Statute of Frauds must be in writing to be
affixed to the land. enforceable. There are several equity exceptions to this rule. The contracts that
mortgage
must be in writing pursuant to the Statute of Frauds and the exceptions to this rule
An interest in real property given to are discussed in the following paragraphs.
a lender as security for the repay-
ment of a loan. Contracts Involving Interests in Land
deed of trust Under the Statute of Frauds, any contract that transfers an ownership interest in
An instrument that gives the creditor real property must be in writing to be enforceable. Real property includes the land
a security interest in the debtor’s itself, buildings, trees, soil, minerals, timber, plants, crops, fixtures, and things per-
property that is pledged as collateral. manently affixed to the land or buildings. Certain items of personal property that
lease are permanently affixed to the real property are fixtures that become part of the
Common Law Definition: A contract real property.
for the exclusive possession of lands
or tenements for a determinate Example: Built-in cabinets in a house are fixtures that become part of the real
period: a contract by which the lessor property.
grants the lessee the exclusive right Other contracts that transfer an ownership interest in land must be in writing
to possess and use personal property
under the Statute of Frauds. These interests include the following:
of the lessor for a specified period
of time. • Mortgages—Borrowers often give a lender an interest in real property as
UCC Article 2a Definition: A transfer security for the repayment of a loan. This action must be done through the
of the right to possession and use of use of a written mortgage or deed of trust.
goods for a term in return for
consideration, but a sale, including Example: Suppose ABC Corporation purchases a factory and borrows part
a sale on approval or a sale or return, of the purchase price from City Bank. City Bank requires that the factory be
or retention or creation of a security used as collateral for the loan and takes a mortgage on the factory. Here, the
interest is not a lease. Unless the mortgage must be in writing to be enforceable.
context clearly indicates otherwise,
the term includes a sublease. • Leases—A lease is the transfer of the right to use real property for a specified
period of time. Most Statutes of Frauds require leases for a term over one year
life estate
to be in writing.
An interest in the land for a person’s
lifetime; upon that person’s death,
• Life estates—On some occasions, a person is given a life estate in real prop-
the interest will be transferred to erty. In other words, the person has an interest in the land for the person’s life-
another party. time, and the interest will be transferred to another party on that person’s
death. A life estate is an ownership interest that must be in writing under the
easement
A right to use someone else’s land Statute of Frauds.
without owning or leasing it. A given • Easements—An easement is a given or required right to use another person’s
or required right to make limited use land without owning or leasing it. Easements may be either express or
of someone else’s land without implied. Express easements must be in writing to be enforceable; implied
owning or leasing it. easements need not be written.
Part Performance Exception

If an oral contract for the sale of land or transfer of another interest in real property
has been partially performed, it may not be possible to return the parties to their
status quo. To solve this problem, the courts have developed the equitable doctrine
of part performance. This doctrine allows the court to order such an oral contract part performance
to be specifically performed if performance is necessary to avoid injustice. For this An equitable doctrine that allows
performance exception to apply, most courts require that the purchaser either pay the court to order an oral contract
part of the purchase price and take possession of the property or make valuable for the sale of land or transfer of
improvements on the land. another interest in real property to
be specifically performed if it has
Case 6.1 involves the doctrine of part performance.
been partially performed and per-
formance is necessary to avoid
injustice.
CASE 6.1 PART PERFORMANCE

Sutton v. Warner, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Ct. App. 1993).
“The doctrine of part performance by the purchaser is a well-recognized excep-
tion to the Statute of Frauds as applied to contracts for the sale of real property.”
Judge Kline, P. J., Court of Appeal of California
Facts
Arlene and Donald Warner inherited a third interest in a home at 101 Molimo
Street in San Francisco. The Warners bought out the other heirs and obtained a
$170,000 loan on the property. Donald Warner and Kenneth Sutton were friends.
Donald Warner proposed that Sutton and his wife purchase the residence. His
proposal included a $15,000 down payment toward the purchase price of $185,000.
The Suttons were to pay all the mortgage payments and real estate taxes on the
property for five years, and at any time during the five-year period they could pur-
chase the house. All this was agreed to orally. The Suttons paid the down payment
and cash payments equal to the monthly mortgage to the Warners. The Suttons
paid the annual property taxes on the house. The Suttons also made improvements
to the property. Four and a half years later, the Warners reneged on the sales/
option agreement. At that time, the house had risen in value to between $250,000
and $320,000. The Suttons sued for specific performance of the sales agreement.
The Warners defended, alleging that the oral promise to sell real estate had to be in
writing under the Statute of Frauds and was therefore unenforceable. The trial
court applied the equitable doctrine of part performance and ordered specific per-
formance. The Warners appealed.
Issue
Does the equitable doctrine of part performance make this oral contract for the
sale of real property enforceable even though the Statute of Frauds may apply?

The doctrine of part performance by the purchaser is a well-recognized exception to
the Statute of Frauds as applied to contracts for the sale of real property. The ques-
tion here, then, is whether the continued possession of the property by the Suttons
142 Chapter 6
and their other actions are sufficiently related to the option contract to constitute
part performance. The trial court responded in the affirmative. After entering the
oral agreement, the Suttons made a $15,000 down payment and increased their
monthly payments to the Warners from the original monthly rental payment to pay-
ments in the precise amount of the variable mortgage payments due under the
$170,000 loan. They reimbursed the Warners for property taxes in the sum of $800
every six months.
Although it was disputed whether the dollar value of improvements made by
the Suttons in reliance upon the oral agreement constituted “substantial” improve-
ments, it is undisputed that many of the improvements—such as painting the inte-
rior of the house and the installation of a toilet and entry lamp—were done by the
Suttons’ own labor. The trial court found that these actions were unequivocally
related to the purchase agreement.
The actions taken by the Suttons in reliance upon the oral agreement, when
considered together with the Warners’ admission that there was an oral agreement
of some duration, satisfy both elements of the part performance doctrine.
Decision
The court of appeal held that the doctrine of part performance applied and that the
Statute of Frauds did not prevent the enforcement of the oral contract to sell real
estate. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court that ordered
specific performance to the Suttons.

1. Critical Thinking: What purposes are served by the Statute of Frauds?
Explain.
2. Ethics: Did the Warners act ethically in this case? Did the Statute of Frauds
give them a justifiable reason not to go through with the deal?
3. Critical Thinking: Should important business contracts be put in writing?
Why or why not?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of California at http://www.courts.
ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article about the Statute of Frauds.
3. Contemporary Issue The Internet and e-mail are increasingly affecting the
writing feature of the Statute of Frauds. Does an e-mail satisfy the writing and
signature requirements? For more on this important contemporary issue,
find and review the case Shattuck v. Klotzbach, 14 Mass. L. Rep. 360 (Super.
Ct. 2001).
One-Year Rule
According to the Statute of Frauds, an executory contract that cannot be per-
formed by its own terms within one year of its formation must be in writing.2
2
This one-year rule is intended to prevent disputes about contract terms that may one-year rule
otherwise occur toward the end of a long-term contract. If the performance of the An executory contract that cannot
contract is possible within the one-year period, the contract may be oral. The be performed by its own terms
extension of an oral contract might cause the contract to violate the Statute of within one year of its formation
must be in writing.
Frauds.
Example: Suppose the owner of a Burger King franchise hires Eugene Daly as a
manager for six months. This contract may be oral. Assume that after 3 months,
the owner and manager agree to extend the contract for an additional 11 months.
At the time of the extension, the contract would be for 14 months (the 3 left on the
contract plus 11 added by the extension). The modification would have to be in
writing because it exceeds the one-year rule.
Guaranty Contract
A guaranty contract occurs when one person agrees to answer for the debts or guaranty contract
duties of another person. Guaranty contracts are required to be in writing under The contract between the guarantor
the Statute of Frauds.3 and the original creditor.
In a guaranty situation, there are at least three parties and two contracts (see
Exhibit 6.1). The first contract, which is known as the original, or primary, con- original (primary) contract
tract, is between the debtor and the creditor. It does not have to be in writing In a guaranty situation, this is the
(unless another provision of the Statute of Frauds requires it to be). The second first contract between the debtor
contract, called the guaranty contract, is between the person who agrees to pay the and the creditor.
debt if the primary debtor does not (i.e., the guarantor) and the original creditor. guarantor
The guarantor’s liability is secondary because it does not arise unless the party pri- The person who agrees to pay the
marily liable fails to perform. debt if the primary debtor does not.
The third person who agrees to be
Example: Wei Wang, a recent college graduate, offers to purchase a new automo- liable in a guaranty arrangement.
bile on credit from a Mercedes-Benz automobile dealership. Because Wei, a stu-
dent, does not have a credit history, the dealer will agree to sell the car to her only
if there is a guarantor. Wei’s father signs the guaranty contract. He becomes respon-
sible for any payments his daughter fails to make.
EXHIBIT 6.1 Guaranty Contract
Contract No. 1
Debtor Creditor
Original contract
Guarantor agrees
to pay the debt
if the debtor
fails to pay
the creditor.
Contract No. 2
Guarantor
Guaranty contract
3
144 Chapter 6
The “Main Purpose” Exception If the main purpose of a transaction and an

oral collateral contract is to provide pecuniary (i.e., financial) benefit to the guar-
antor, the collateral contract is treated like an original contract and does not have
main purpose or leading object to be in writing to be enforced.4 This exception is called the main purpose, or lead-
exception ing object, exception to the Statute of Frauds. This exception is intended to ensure
If the main purpose of a transaction that the primary benefactor of the original contract (i.e., the guarantor) is answer-
and an oral collateral contract is to able for the debt or duty.
provide pecuniary benefit to the
guarantor, the collateral contract Example: Suppose Ethel Brand is president and sole shareholder of Brand Compu-
does not have to be in writing to be ter Corporation, Inc. Assume that (1) the corporation borrows $100,000 from City
enforced. Bank for working capital, and (2) Ethel orally guarantees to repay the loan if the
corporation fails to pay it. City Bank can enforce the oral guaranty contract against
Ethel if the corporation does not meet its obligation because the main purpose of
the loan was to benefit her as the sole shareholder of the corporation.
Section 201 of the Uniform Contracts for the Sale of Goods, Section 201 of the Uniform Commercial
Commercial Code (UCC) Code (UCC), is the basic Statute of Frauds provision for sales contracts. It requires
A rule sometimes referred to as the that contracts for the sale of goods costing $500 or more be in writing to be enforce-
“Statute of Frauds”; requires that able.5 If the contract price of an original sales contract is below $500, it does not
contracts for the sale of goods cost- have to be in writing under the UCC Statute of Frauds, but if a modification of the
ing $500 or more be in writing.
contract increases the sales price to $500 or more, the modification has to be in
UCC Statute of Frauds writing to be enforceable.6
A rule that requires all contracts for
Example: Echo enters into an oral contract to sell James her used car for $10,000,
the sale of goods costing $500 or
more and lease contracts involving
with the delivery date to be May 1. When May 1 comes and James tenders $10,000
payments of $1,000 or more to be to Echo, Echo refuses to sell her car to James. The contract will not be enforced
in writing. against Echo because it was an oral contract for the sale of goods costing $500 or
more, and it should have been in writing.
modification
An alteration that does not change
the general purpose and effect of FORM CONTRACTS
that which is modified (modification
of the agreement). Historically, sellers began using form contracts that offered their goods to buyers on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.7 The majority of contracts in the United States today are
form contracts.
Example: Automobile contracts, mortgage contracts, sales contracts for consumer
goods, and such are examples of form contracts.
Both federal and state governments have enacted statutes intended to protect
consumers, debtors, and others from unfair contracts. In addition, the courts have
developed certain common law legal theories that allow some oppressive or other-
wise unjust contracts to be avoided. Today, under this modern law of contracts,
there is substantial government regulation of the right to contract. This has been
further expanded by the use of the Internet and e-commerce.
equal dignity rule
Agents’ Contracts
A rule that says that agents’
contracts to sell property covered Many state Statutes of Frauds require that agents’ contracts to sell real property cov-
by the Statute of Frauds must be ered by the Statute of Frauds be in writing to be enforceable. The requirement is
in writing to be enforceable. often referred to as the equal dignity rule.
4
5
UCC Section 2-201(1).
6
UCC Section 2-209(3).
7
Sometimes a “form contract” is referred to as an “adhesion contract.” An adhesion contract is a contract that is
offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. In other words, the terms of an adhesion contract are not negotiable.
Example: Suppose Barney Berkowitz hires Cynthia Lamont, a licensed Century 21

real estate agent, to sell his house. Because a contract to sell real estate must be in
writing, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, the equal dignity rule requires the agent’s
contract to be in writing as well. Some state Statutes of Frauds expressly list the
agents’ contracts that must be in writing.
Promises Made in Consideration of Marriage

Under the Statute of Frauds, a unilateral promise to pay money or property in con-
sideration for a promise to marry must be in writing. For example, a prenuptial prenuptial agreement
agreement, which is a contract entered into by parties prior to marriage that A contract entered into by parties
defines their ownership rights in each other’s property, must be in writing. prior to their marriage that defines
their ownership rights in each oth-
er’s property; it must be in writing.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, or equitable estoppel, is another equitable promissory estoppel (equitable
exception to the strict application of the Statute of Frauds. The version of promis- estoppel)
sory estoppel in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that if parties enter An equitable doctrine that prevents
into an oral contract that should be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, the oral the withdrawal of a promise by a
promise is enforceable against the promisor if three conditions are met: (1) The promisor if it will adversely affect a
promisee who has adjusted his or
promise induces action or forbearance of action by another, (2) the reliance on the
her position in justifiable reliance on
oral promise was foreseeable, and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing
the promise. An equitable doctrine
the oral promise.8 Where this doctrine applies, the promisor is estopped (pre- that permits enforcement of oral
vented) from raising the Statute of Frauds as a defense to the enforcement of the contracts that should have been in
oral contract. Case 6.2 illustrates the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. writing. It is applied to avoid injustice.
CASE 6.2 PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct. App. 1988).
Facts
Bronco Wine Company (Bronco) crushed grapes and sold them for use in bulk
wines. It purchased the grapes it needed from various grape growers. Bronco
entered into an oral contract with Allied Grape Growers (Allied), a cooperative
corporation of many grape growers, to purchase 850 tons of Carnelian grapes from
Allied for delivery the next year.
The following year’s grape crop was very large, and there was a glut of for-
eign wines on the market. Thus, the price of grapes and wines decreased substan-
tially. Bronco accepted and paid for one shipment of Carnelian grapes from Allied
but refused to accept the rest. By the time Bronco rejected the highly perishable
grapes, it was too late for Allied to resell the grapes to another buyer.
Allied sued Bronco to recover damages for breach of contract. Bronco
defended, arguing that the Statute of Frauds applied to the Bronco-Allied contract,
and because the contract was oral Bronco did not have to perform the contract.
The trial court held that the parties’ oral contract did not violate the Statute
of Frauds because Allied detrimentally relied on Bronco’s promise to purchase the
grapes. The jury awarded $3.4 million to Allied. Bronco appealed.
8
146 Chapter 6
Issue
Did the equity doctrine of promissory estoppel apply and thus excuse the writing
requirement in this case?

The court of appeals applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel and prohibited
Bronco from raising the Statute of Frauds against enforcement of its oral promise to
buy the grapes from Allied. The court stated, “In California, the doctrine of estoppel
is proven where one party suffers an unconscionable injury if the Statute of Frauds
is asserted to prevent enforcement of oral contracts. There is substantial evidence
that Allied’s loss was unconscionable given these facts. The Statute of Frauds should
not be used in this instance to defeat the oral agreement reached by the parties in
this case.”
Decision
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, awarding $3.4 million of
damages to Allied.

1. Critical Thinking: Was a contract entered into in this case?
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for Bronco to assert the Statute of Frauds to save it
from performing the oral contract it had agreed to?
3. Critical Thinking: What does the equity doctrine of promissory estoppel
provide?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of California, Fifth Appellate District,
at http://www.courts.ca.gov/5dca.htm.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article or case that describes a recent applica-
tion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Formality of the Writing

Some written commercial contracts are long, detailed documents that have been
negotiated by the parties and drafted and reviewed by their lawyers. Others are
preprinted forms with blanks that can be filled in to fit the facts of a particular
situation.
A written contract does not, however, have to be either drafted by a lawyer or
formally typed to be legally binding. Generally, the law only requires a writing con-
taining the essential terms of the parties’ agreement.
Example: Any writing—including letters, faxes, e-mails, telegrams, invoices, sales
receipts, checks, and handwritten agreements written on scraps of paper—can be
an enforceable contract under this rule.
REQUIRED SIGNATURE
The Statute of Frauds and the UCC require a written contract, whatever its form, to
be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. The signature of the
person who is enforcing the contract is not necessary. Thus, a written contract may
be enforceable against one party but not the other party.
Generally, the signature may appear anywhere on the writing. In addition, it
does not have to be a person’s full legal name.
Example: The person’s last name, first name, nickname, initials, seal, stamp,
engraving, or other symbol or mark (e.g., an X) that indicates the person’s intent
can be binding. The signature may be affixed by an authorized agent.
In the past, courts have accepted nicknames, first names, initials, symbols,
and X’s as proper signatures of a promisor. But what happens if the promisor does
not actually sign the document? Can it be enforced? One court said yes. Consider
the following facts.
MRLS Construction Corporation (MRLS), which was the construction man-
ager on a building project, hired a subcontractor, Sime Construction Company
(Sime), to work on the project. When Parma Tile, Mosaic & Marble Company, Inc.
(Parma), refused to deliver tile to Sime unless MRLS guaranteed payment, MRLS sent
the following fax to Parma: “MRLS would guarantee payment for goods delivered to
the Nehemiah project in the event Sime Construction does not pay within terms.”
The name MRLS was printed across the top of the unsigned fax. Parma deliv-
ered the tile to Sime and, when Sime failed to pay, billed MRLS in reliance on the
purported guarantee. MRLS refused to pay. MRLS argued that there was no
enforceable contract because the fax was not signed. Parma sued MRLS.
The court rejected this argument and held that the fax constituted an enforce-
able guarantee because the printed name MRLS appeared across the top of the fax.
The court found that this satisfied the signature requirement of the Statute of
Frauds. The court stated, “The Statute of Frauds was not meant to be utilized to
evade an obligation intentionally incurred. MRLS should not be permitted to evade
its obligation because of the current and extensive use of electronic transmissions
in modern business transactions.” Parma Tile, Mosaic & Marble Company, Inc. v.
Estate of Short, New York Law Journal, December 10, 1992.
INTEGRATION OF SEVERAL WRITINGS

Both the common law of contracts and the UCC permit integration of several integration of several writings
writings to form a single written contract. That is, the entire writing does not have Where several different writings or
to appear in one document to be an enforceable contract. documents are considered to form
Integration may be by an express reference in one document that refers to and one enforceable contract.
incorporates another document within it. This procedure is called incorporation incorporation by reference
by reference. Thus, what may often look like a simple one-page contract may actu- When integration is made by
ally be hundreds of pages in length. express reference in one document
that refers to and incorporates
Example: Credit cards, documents to open bank accounts, contracts with colleges another document within it.
and universities, and other contracts often incorporate by express reference such
documents as the master agreement between the issuer and cardholders, subse-
quent amendments to the agreement, and such.
Several documents may be integrated to form a single written contract if they
are somehow physically attached to each other to indicate a party’s intent to show
integration.
148 Chapter 6
Example: Attaching several documents together with a staple, paper clip, or some
other means may indicate integration. Placing several documents in the same con-
tainer (e.g., an envelope) may also indicate integration. Such an action is called
implied integration.
INTERPRETING CONTRACT WORDS AND TERMS

When contracts are at issue in a lawsuit, courts are often called on to interpret the
meaning of certain contract words or terms. The parties to a contract may define
the words and terms used in their contract. Many written contracts contain a
glossary detailed definition section—usually called a glossary—that defines many of the
A detailed definition section in a words and terms used in the contract.
written contract. If the parties have not defined the words and terms of a contract, the courts
standards of interpretation apply the following standards of interpretation:
If the parties have not defined the
words and terms of a contract, the
• Ordinary words are given their usual meaning according to the dictionary.
courts apply those words and terms • Technical words are given their technical meaning, unless a different meaning
in the manner in which they nor- is clearly intended.
mally are defined. • Specific terms are presumed to qualify general terms. For example, if a provi-
sion in a contract refers to the subject matter as “corn,” but a later provision
refers to the subject matter as “feed corn” for cattle, this specific term qualifies
the general term.
• If both parties are members of the same trade or profession, words are given
their meaning as used in the trade (i.e., usage of trade). If the parties do not
want trade usage to apply, the contract must indicate that.
• Where a preprinted form contract is used, typed words in a contract prevail
over preprinted words. Handwritten words prevail over both preprinted and
typed words.
• If there is an ambiguity in a contract, the ambiguity will be resolved against
the party who drafted the contract.
merger clause
A merger clause contains within its MERGER, OR INTEGRATION, CLAUSE
four corners the entire agreement of
the parties and is the final expres- The parties to a written contract may include a clause stipulating that the contract
sion of their agreement. is a complete integration and the exclusive expression of their agreement and that
parol evidence parol evidence may not be introduced to explain, alter, contradict, or add to the
Any oral or written words outside the terms of the contract. This type of clause, called a merger, or integration, clause,
four corners of the written contract. expressly reiterates the parol evidence rule.
parol evidence rule
A rule that says if a written contract
is a complete and final statement of Parol Evidence Rule
the parties’ agreement, any prior or
By the time a contract is reduced to writing, the parties usually have engaged in
contemporaneous oral or written
prior or contemporaneous discussions and negotiations or exchanged prior writ-
statements that alter, contradict, or
are in addition to the terms of the
ings. Any oral or written words outside the four corners of the written contract are
written contract are inadmissible in called parol evidence. Parol means “word.”
court regarding a dispute over the The parol evidence rule was originally developed by courts as part of the com-
contract. There are several excep- mon law of contracts. The UCC has adopted the parol evidence rule as part of the law
tions to this rule. of sales contracts.9 The parol evidence rule states that if a written contract is a complete
9
UCC Section 2-202.
and final statement of the parties’ agreement (i.e., a complete integration), any prior or complete integration
contemporaneous oral or written statements that alter, contradict, or are in addition to Where the written contract is a com-
the terms of the written contract are inadmissible in any court proceeding concerning plete and final statement of the par-
the contract.10 In other words, a completely integrated contract is viewed as the best ties’ agreement.
evidence of the terms of the parties’ agreement.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

There are several major exceptions to the general rule excluding parol evidence.
Parol evidence may be admitted in court if it:
• Shows that a contract is void or voidable (e.g., evidence that the contract was
induced by fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or mistake).
• Explains ambiguous language.
• Concerns a prior course of dealing or course of performance between the par-
ties or a usage of trade.11
• Fills in the gaps in a contract (e.g., if a price term or time of performance term
is omitted from a written contract, the court can hear parol evidence to imply
the reasonable price or time of performance under the contract).
• Corrects an obvious clerical or typographical error. The court can reform the
contract to reflect the correction.
Karen Wasil was the former chief should review the contract to be sure that they are
compliance officer for a registered capable of complying with the representations and
investment advising company in not agreeing to something that they think is “boil-
Troy, Michigan. She received her erplate.” You should be aware that there are regula-
paralegal degree from the Univer- tory restrictions on some contracts (i.e., investment
sity of Toledo in Toledo, Ohio. advisory) that will not allow the assignment of a
contract or may require shareholder approval
Before retirement, I was the chief before an assignment can be completed. In addi-
compliance officer for a regis- tion, contracts are part of the mandatory books and
tered investment adviser. Contracts are an integral records that regulators want to see when they con-
part of that company. The company must have an duct an examination of a company.
investment contract and guidelines describing its I agree with the saying, “If it is not in writing,
agreement with the client to establish an account then it is not part of the contract.” So many times,
and invest the client’s money. salespeople will sell the product, but when it comes
Contracts are the backbone of every aspect of to the contract, they are unable to put the represen-
the investment business, including electronic trad- tations into the contract.
ing, custody of the money, e-mail retention, audi- Do not be afraid to ask for changes to the con-
tors, disaster recovery, software, and employee tract, even if someone tells you, “This is our stand-
benefit agreements. If you, as a paralegal, are draft- ard agreement.” You may be surprised at what you
ing a contract for a client, remember that the client are able to negotiate.
10
11
UCC Sections 1-205, 2-202, and 2-208.
150 Chapter 6
International Law
Signatures in Foreign Countries
Americans, Europeans, and many others in the world use their personal
hand-applied signatures on legal documents. In Japan, China, and
other countries of Asia, however, individuals often do not use their hand-
applied signatures to sign legal documents. Instead, they follow the
age-old tradition of using a stamp as their signature. The stamp is a
character or set of characters carved onto the end of a cylinder-shaped
piece held in a person’s hand. The owner places this end in ink and
then applies this end to the document to be signed, leaving an imprint
that serves as the owner’s signature. In Japan, this cylinder is called a
hanko; in China, it is called a chop. Hankos and chops are registered
with the government. They can be made of ivory, jade, agate, gold, ani-
mal’s horn, wood, or even plastic.
In societies that use personal signatures, if a signature is suspected
of being forged, the victim can hire handwriting experts and use mod-
ern technology to prove it is not his or her signature. In Japan, China,
and other countries where hankos and chops are used, it is much more
difficult to prove forgery because anyone in possession of another’s
hanko or chop can apply it. Some people predict the demise of the
hanko and chop because of the possible problem of fraud and the
increased use of hand-applied signatures by younger persons in coun-
tries used to using the hanko and chop. Others predict the rich tradition
of using a hanko or chop will continue.

Communication with Clients
ABA Model Rule 1.4 requires that the attorney communicate with clients
so as to keep them reasonably informed about the case and thus able to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.12 Although a
nonattorney is prohibited from giving legal advice (see this feature in
Chapter 7 for a discussion of the unauthorized practice of law), the ethical
paralegal can help keep clients advised of the status of their cases.
Many times the paralegal is the client’s main contact with the law
office. The paralegal can assist in returning clients’ phone calls
promptly and in sending the client regular written reports on how the
case is proceeding. Again, although the paralegal should be careful
never to give legal advice, the ethical paralegal can still serve as a
conduit between the attorney and the client.
12
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, p. 139 contract. The signature may be the person’s full legal
name, last name, first name, nickname, initials, or other
Writing Requirement
symbol or mark.
Statute of Frauds. This state statute requires that the follow- 3. Integration of several writings. Several writings may
ing contracts be in writing: be integrated to form a contract. Integration may be by:
a. Express reference. In this case, one document
1. Contracts involving the transfer of interests in real
expressly incorporates another document.
property. This includes contracts for the sale of land,
b. Implied reference. In this case, documents are physi-
buildings and items attached to land, mortgages, leases
cally attached by staple or by paper clip or are placed
for a term of more than one year, and express easements.
in the same envelope.
a. Part performance exception. To avoid injustice, this
exception permits the specific enforcement of oral
contracts for the sale of land when they have been PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, p. 148
partially performed. 1. Parol evidence. Parol evidence consists of any oral or
2. Contracts that cannot be performed within one year of written words that are outside the four corners of a
their formation. written contract.
3. Collateral contracts. These contracts occur where one 2. Parol evidence rule. This rule provides that if a written con-
person promises to answer for the debts or duties of an- tract is a complete integration, any prior or contemporane-
other person. Also called guaranty contracts. ous oral or written statements are inadmissible as evidence
Main purpose exception. This exception permits en- to alter or contradict the terms of the written contract.
forcement of oral collateral promises if the main or 3. Exceptions to the parol evidence rule. Parol evidence
leading purpose of the collateral promise is to benefit may be admitted in court to:
the guarantor. a. Prove mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, undue
4. Promises made in consideration of marriage, such as influence, or duress.
prenuptial agreements. b. Explain ambiguous language.
5. Agents’ contracts to sell real property. c. Explain a prior course of dealing or course of per-
6. Contracts for the sale of goods costing $500 or more. formance between the parties or a usage of trade.
[UCC §201] d. Fill in the gaps in a contract.
e. Correct obvious clerical or typographical errors.
Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents Interpretation of Contracts
the application of the Statute of Frauds. It permits the
The courts have developed the following rules for interpret-
enforcement of oral contracts that should otherwise be in
ing contracts:
writing under the Statute of Frauds to prevent injustice or
unjust enrichment. 1. Ordinary words are given their usual dictionary meaning.
2. Technical words are given their technical meaning, un-
FORMALITY OF THE WRITING, p. 146 less a different meaning is clearly intended.
3. Specific terms are presumed to qualify general terms.
Sufficiency of the Writing
4. Typed words prevail over preprinted words; handwritten
1. Formality of the writing. A written contract does not words prevail over both preprinted and typed words.
have to be formal or drafted by a lawyer to be enforce- 5. Ambiguities in a contract are resolved against the party
able. Informal contracts, such as handwritten notes, let- who drafted the contract.
ters, and invoices, are enforceable contracts. 6. Unless otherwise agreed, words are given their usual
2. Required signature. The party against whom enforce- meaning in the trade if both parties are members of
ment of the contract is sought must have signed the the same trade.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Complete integration 149 Guarantor 143 Life estate 140
Deed of trust 140 Guaranty contract 143 “Main purpose” (leading object)
Easement 140 Incorporation by reference 147 exception 144
Equal dignity rule 144 Integration of several writings 147 Merger clause 148
Glossary 148 Lease 140 Modification 144
152 Chapter 6
Mortgage 140 Prenuptial agreement 145 Standards of interpretation 148

One-year rule 143 Promissory estoppel (equitable Statute of Frauds 139
Original (primary) contract 143 estoppel) 145 UCC Statute of Frauds 144
Parol evidence 148 Real property 140
Parol evidence rule 148 Section 201 of the Uniform
Part performance 141 Commercial Code (UCC) 144

Now that you understand more about the Statute of Frauds and Gary McGraw’s oral promise to buy the silver? Does the doctrine
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, consider the case scenario of promissory estoppel prevent the application of the Statute of
from the beginning of the chapter. Do you think the Statute of Frauds in this case? See Atlantic Wholesale Co. v. Solondz, 320
Frauds will prevent Bell Enterprises from enforcing S.E.2d 720 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), to help you with your answer.

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. For an overview of the developing law of e-commerce
and digital signatures, see “Are Online Business Trans-
1. Earlier in this chapter, you were instructed to review
actions Executed by Electronic Signatures Legally
Stattuck v. Klotzbach, a case that is part of contempo-
Binding?” at www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/
rary contract law relating to e-mails and the Statute of
ARTICLES/2001dltr0005.html.
Frauds. Other contemporary case law indicates that a
3. Although common law contract principles have gen-
buyer’s e-mail of a firm offer on a seller’s house can be
eral application, many contracts are regulated on an
sufficient for Statute of Frauds purposes. For a con-
industrywide basis, by state statutes. See www.law.cor-
temporary case in which the court found no “meeting
nell.edu/topics/topic2.html#particular for examples.
of the minds” occurred as to the terms of the sale of
4. For an overview of defenses to contract claims, see
the house where “essential terms” were not included
www.west.net/~smith/contracts.htm.
in the e-mail, find and review the case Rosenfeld v.
Zerneck, 776 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 2004).
You now know how to put together a simple contract and a The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
letter contract. There are sometimes contracts that begin and day of , 20___.
end without the formality contained in either of those con-
tracts. For instance, an agreement called a promissory note is ______________________________
an unconditional written promise by one party to pay money
Notary Public
to another party. (The purpose and use of promissory notes
will be covered in detail in Chapter 15.) Being able to draft a State of
simple promissory note for your attorney’s review will be
especially important when you are employed as a paralegal. (Place Seal Here) My commission expires
Below is an example of a promissory note form. You
Exercise:
should also be aware that many legal documents, such as this
one, may also require the signature and seal of a notary public. Remember the facts from the Portfolio Exercise in Chapter 4
regarding Kelly’s purchase of a diamond ring from Sarah?
Dated: ____________________
Now assume that Sarah agrees to give Kelly one year to pay the
purchase price and, because Kelly is a friend, will only charge
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned,
her 2% interest for that year. With this information in mind,
____________________, promises to pay the order of
and using the form above as a guide, draft a promissory note
the sum of $ on , 20___,
for this transaction.
together with interest thereon at the rate of %
per annum from the date hereof.
__________________________
STATE OF , COUNTY, ss:

Topic: Integration agreement apply to the contract for sale of equipment needed
to make and sell ice cream.
(To the student: First reread the basic facts from the previous
Hands-On Drafting Exercises and the facts relating to the Exercise/Assignment:
sale of equipment in the Hands-On Drafting Exercise at the
Draft an integration clause for insertion into the sample
end of Chapter 4.)
Contract for Sale of Equipment in Appendix C.
Facts: Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., is concerned that Use paragraph 17 of the Business Purchase Agreement contained
ABC Company will try to argue that the terms of a prior in Appendix C as a guide to drafting this integration clause.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.1 Statute of Frauds Fritz Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.3 One-Year Contract Robert
Hoffman and Fritz Frey contracted the Sun Valley Company S. Ohanian was vice president of sales for the West Region of
(Company) about purchasing a 1.64-acre piece of property Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. (Avis). Officers of Avis testified
known as the “Ruud Mountain Property,” located in Sun Valley, that Ohanian’s performance in the West Region was excel-
Idaho, from the Company. Mr. Conger, a representative of the lent, and, in a depressed economic period, Ohanian’s West
Company, was authorized to sell the property, subject to the Region stood out as the one region that was growing and
approval of the executive committee of the Company. Conger profitable. In the fall of 1980, when Avis’s Northeast Region
reached an agreement on the telephone with Hoffman and Frey was doing badly, the president of Avis asked Ohanian to take
whereby they would purchase the property for $90,000, payable over that region. Ohanian was reluctant to do so because he
at 30 percent down, with the balance to be payable quarterly at and his family liked living in San Francisco, and he had
an annual interest rate of 9.25 percent. The next day, Hoffman developed a good team in the West Region, was secure in his
sent Conger a letter confirming the conversation. position, and feared the politics of the Northeast Region.
Ohanian agreed to the transfer only after the general man-
The executive committee of the Company approved the ager of Avis orally told him “unless you screw up badly, there
sale. Sun Valley Realty prepared the deed of trust, note, is no way you are going to get fired—you will never get hurt
seller’s closing statement, and other loan documents. How- here in this company.” Ohanian did a commendable job in
ever, before the documents were executed by either side, Sun the Northeast Region. Approximately one year later, at the
Valley Company sold all of its assets, including the Ruud age of 47, Ohanian was fired without cause by Avis. Ohanian
Mountain property, to another purchaser. When the new sued Avis for breach of the oral lifetime contract. Avis
owner refused to sell the Ruud Mountain lot to Hoffman and asserted the Statute of Frauds against this claim. Who wins?
Frey, they brought this action for specific performance of the Ohanian v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir.
oral contract. Who wins? Hoffman v. Sun Valley Co., 628 P.2d 1985).
218 (Idaho 1981).
Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.4 Guaranty Contract David
Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.2 Real Property Robert Brown met with Stan Steele, a loan officer with the Bank of
Briggs and his wife purchased a home located at 167 Lower Idaho (now First Interstate Bank) to discuss borrowing
Orchard Drive, Levittown, Pennsylvania. They made a down money from the bank to start a new business. After learning
payment and borrowed the balance on a 30-year mortgage. that he did not qualify for the loan on the basis of his own
Six years later, when the Briggs were behind on their mort- financial strength, Brown told Steele that his former employ-
gage payments, they entered into an oral contract to sell the ers, James and Donna West of California, might be willing to
house to Winfield and Emma Sackett if the Sacketts would guarantee the payment of the loan. Steele talked to Mr. West,
pay the three months’ arrearages on the loan and agree to who orally stated on the telephone that he would personally
make the future payments on the mortgage. Mrs. Briggs and guarantee the loan to Brown. Based on this guaranty, the
Mrs. Sackett were sisters. The Sacketts paid the arrearages, bank loaned Brown the money. The bank sent a written
moved into the house, and continued to live there. Fifteen guaranty to Mr. and Mrs. West for their signatures, but it was
years later, Robert Briggs filed an action to void the oral con- never returned to the bank. When Brown defaulted on the
tract as in violation of the Statute of Frauds and evict the loan, the bank filed suit against the Wests to recover on their
Sacketts from the house. Who wins? Briggs v. Sackett, 418 guaranty contract. Are the Wests liable? First Interstate Bank
A.2d 586 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). of Idaho, N.A. v. West, 693 P.2d 1053 (Idaho 1984).
154 Chapter 6
Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.5 Guaranty Contract Six station only if he also took a “dog” station on Garvey Ave-
persons, including Benjamin Rosenbloom and Alfred Feiler, nue. McGirr agreed to take this station only if he also was
were members of the board of directors of the Togs Corpora- assured he would get the Figueroa station. Marks assured
tion. A bank agreed to loan the corporation $250,000 if the him he would. When McGirr asked Marks for this assurance
members of the board would personally guarantee the pay- in writing, Marks stated that he did not have to put it in writ-
ment of the loan. Feiler objected to signing the guaranty to ing because he was the “kingpin in his territory.” So they
the bank because of other pending personal financial nego- shook hands on the deal.
tiations that the contingent liability of the guaranty might
McGirr terminated his arrangement with Enco and
adversely affect. Feiler agreed with Rosenbloom and the
moved to the Garvey Avenue station. He signed a written
other board members that if they were held personally liable
lease for the Garvey station, which was signed by Max Reed,
on the guaranty, he would pay his one-sixth share of that
Gulf ’s regional sales manager. Under the Statute of Frauds,
amount to them directly. Rosenbloom and the other mem-
the lease for a service station must be in writing. Nothing in
bers of the board signed the personal guaranty with the
writing was ever signed by the parties regarding the Figueroa
bank, and the bank made the loan to the corporation. When
station. A few months later, Marks was transferred to a dif-
the corporation defaulted on the loan, the five guarantors
ferent territory, and Gulf refused to lease the Figueroa sta-
had to pay the loan amount to the bank. When they
tion to McGirr. McGirr sued Marks and Gulf for breach of
attempted to collect a one-sixth share from Feiler, he refused
an oral contract. Is Marks or Gulf liable? McGirr v. Gulf Oil
to pay, alleging that his oral promise had to be in writing
Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1974).
under the Statute of Frauds. Does Feiler have to pay the one-
sixth share to the other board members? Feiler v. Rosenbloom, Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.7 Sufficiency of a Writing
416 A.2d 1345 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980). Irving Levin and Harold Lipton owned the San Diego Clip-
pers basketball club, a professional basketball franchise.
Critical Legal Thinking Case 6.6 Agent’s Contract Paul
Levin and Lipton met with Philip Knight to discuss the sale
L. McGirr operated an Enco service station in Los Angeles
of the Clippers to Knight. After the meeting, they all initialed
that sold approximately 25,000 to 35,000 gallons of gasoline
a three-page handwritten memorandum that Levin had
a month. McGirr telephoned Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf)
drafted during the meeting. The memorandum outlined the
regarding an advertisement for dealers. McGirr met with
major terms of their discussion, including subject matter,
Theodore Marks, an area representative of Gulf, to discuss
price, and the parties to the agreement. Levin and Lipton
the possibility of McGirr’s operating a Gulf service station.
forwarded to Knight a letter and proposed sale agreement.
McGirr asked Marks if Gulf had any good, high-producing
Two days later, Knight informed Levin that he had decided
units available. Marks replied that he had a station at the cor-
not to purchase the Clippers. Levin and Lipton sued Knight
ner of Figueroa and Avenue 26 that sold about 200,000 gal-
for breach of contract. Knight argued in defense that the
lons of gasoline a month. Marks told McGirr that this station
handwritten memorandum was not enforceable because it
would not be available for about 90 days because Gulf had to
did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Is he correct? Levin v.
terminate the arrangement with the current operator of the
Knight, 865 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1989).
station. Marks told McGirr that he could have the Figueroa
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 6.1 American Broadcasting Company Mer- no express written or oral contract among ABC and Blye and
chandising, Inc., a subsidiary of American Broadcasting Sklar, they alleged there was an implied-in-fact contract
Company, Inc. (collectively, ABC), entered into a written between the parties. Section 5-701 (a)(10) of the New York
contract with model Cheryl Tiegs whereby ABC would pay Statute of Frauds requires a finder’s fee contract of the type
Tiegs $400,000 per year for the right to be the exclusive agent in this case to be in writing. Who wins? Did ABC act ethically
to license the merchandising of goods under her name. in this case? Blye v. American Broad. Co. Merch., Inc., 476
When ABC was unsuccessful in attracting licensing arrange- N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1984).
ments for Tiegs, a representative of ABC contacted Paul
Sklar, who had previous experience in marketing apparel Ethics Case 6.2 Adolfo Mozzetti, who owned a construc-
and licensing labels. Sklar enlisted the help of Mark Blye, and tion company, orally promised his son, Remo, that if Remo
together they introduced ABC and Tiegs to Sears, Roebuck would manage the family business for their mutual benefit
and Company (Sears). This introduction led to an agree- and would take care of him for the rest of his life, he would
ment among Sears, ABC, and Tiegs whereby Sears marketed leave the family home to Remo. Section 2714 of the Dela-
a line of “Cheryl Tiegs” female apparel through Sears depart- ware Code requires contracts for the transfer of land to be in
ment stores and catalog sales. Blye and Sklar sued ABC for a writing. Section 2715 of the Delaware Code requires testa-
finder’s fee for introducing ABC to Sears. Because there was mentary transfers of real property to be in writing. Remo
performed as requested—he managed the family business daughter argued that the will should be upheld. Who wins?
and took care of his father until the father died. When the Did the daughter act ethically in trying to defeat the father’s
father died, his will devised the family home to his daughter, promise to leave the property to the son? Did the son act
Lucia M. Shepard. Remo brought an action to enforce his ethically in trying to defeat his father’s will? Shepard v.
father’s oral promise that the home belonged to him. The Mozzetti, 545 A.2d 621 (Del. 1988).

Read Case B.6 in Appendix B (Hampton v. Federal Express 1. Why was the plaintiff suing the defendant? What
Corporation). This case is excerpted from the appellate amount of damages was the plaintiff suing for?
court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) 2. What did the written contract stipulate regarding the
using the IRAC method. After briefing the case, you should recovery of damages? Explain.
be able to answer the following questions: 3. Was the written contract enforced by the court in this case?
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Bronco Wine Company (Bronco) crushed grapes and sold them for use in bulk
wines. It purchased the grapes it needed from various grape growers. In 1981, Bronco
entered into an oral contract with Allied Grape Growers (Allied), a cooperative cor-
poration of many grape growers, to purchase 850 tons of Carnelian grapes for deliv-
ery in 1982. Allied had originally contracted to sell these grapes to United Vintners
but received special permission to sell the grapes to Bronco instead.
The 1982 grape crop was the largest to date in California history, and there was a
glut of foreign wines on the market. Thus, the price of grapes and wines decreased sub-
stantially. Bronco accepted and paid for one shipment of Carnelian grapes from Allied
but refused to accept the rest. By the time Bronco started to reject the highly perishable
goods, it was too late for Allied to resell the grapes to United Vintners or others.
Allied sued for breach of contract, and Bronco alleged the Statute of Frauds as its
defense. In essence, Bronco argued that it did not have to perform because the con-
tract was not in writing.
The appellate court applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel and prohibited
Bronco from raising the Statute of Frauds against enforcement of its oral promise to
buy the grapes from Allied. The court stated, “In California, the doctrine of estoppel
is proven where one party suffers an unconscionable injury if the Statute of Frauds is
asserted to prevent enforcement of oral contracts. There is substantial evidence that
Allied’s loss was unconscionable given these facts. The Statute of Frauds should not
be used in this instance to defeat the oral agreement reached by the parties in this
case.” The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s verdict, awarding damages to
Allied. Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Company, 203 Cal. App.3d 432 (1988).
1. Is it ever ethical to raise the Statute of Frauds against the enforcement of an oral
contract?
2. Should courts apply the equitable doctrine of estoppel to save contracting parties
from the Statute of Frauds?
An honest man’s word is as good as his bond.
—Don Quixote
chapter 7
THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS
AND DISCHARGE
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Maco, Inc. (Maco), CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
a roofing contractor. In January 2006, Maco hired Brian Barrows as a salesper-
son. Barrows was assigned a geographic territory and was responsible for should be able to:
securing contracts for Maco within his territory. The employment contract 1. Describe assignment of contracts and
provided that Barrows was to receive a 26 percent commission on the net prof- what contract rights are assignable.
its from roofing contracts he obtained. The contract contained the following 2. Define intended beneficiary and describe
this person’s rights under a contract.
provision: “To qualify for payment of the commission, the salesperson must
3. Define covenant.
sell and supervise the job; the job must be completed and paid for; and the
4. Distinguish among conditions precedent,
salesperson must have been in the continuous employment of Maco, Inc., dur-
conditions subsequent, and concurrent
ing the aforementioned period.” In July 2007, Barrows obtained a $129,603 conditions.
contract with the Board of Education of Cook County for Maco to make repairs 5. Explain when the performance of a
to the roof of the Hoover School in Evanston, Illinois. During the course of the contract is excused because of
objective impossibility or
work, Barrows visited the site more than 60 times. In January 2008, before the commercial impracticability.
work was completed, Maco fired Barrows. Later, Maco refused to pay Barrows
the commission when the project was completed and paid for. Barrows sued
Maco to recover the commission.
157
158 Chapter 7
privity of contract The parties to a contract are said to be in privity of contract. Contracting parties
The state of two specified parties have a legal obligation to perform the duties specified in their contract. A party’s
being in a contract. duty of performance may be discharged by agreement of the parties, excuse of per-
formance, or operation of law. If one party fails to perform as promised, the other
party may enforce the contract and sue for breach.
With two exceptions, third parties do not acquire any rights under other peo-
ple’s contracts. The exceptions are (1) assignees to whom rights are subsequently
transferred and (2) intended third-party beneficiaries to whom the contracting par-
ties intended to give rights under the contract at the time of contracting.
This chapter discusses the rights of third parties under a contract, conditions
to performance, and ways of discharging the duty of performance.
Della Wallace is a graduate of the clause. Document searches are used in conjunction
Raritan Valley Community College’s with making the determination on how to assert
Paralegal Studies Program in New responsibility for the cost of the remediation. The
Jersey. She works as an environmen- indemnification clause will identify the extent of
tal litigation paralegal for the law liability for the parties of interest.
firm of DiFrancesco, Bateman,
Once the preliminary investigations are per-
Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis &
Lehrer in Warren, New Jersey.
formed, it is imperative to seek historical informa-
tion such as names and addresses of previous
As an environmental litigation paralegal, I am owners or tenants of the contaminated property,
responsible for locating any and all documents that the types of businesses that operated on the site
will help substantiate the client’s position. The use of and the dates of operation, current status informa-
contracts in the legal venue is essential to determine tion regarding the former owner or tenant, and
the course of action that best suits the client’s defense whether the property is listed on the superfund
strategy process. Many of our clients seek legal site.
advice due to one or more forms of nondisclosure, The optimal solution for a contaminated site
misrepresentation, or fraud. The use of contracts in would be the sale of the property to an entity that
environmental matters provides evidence of fact. specializes in the remediation process. Brownfield’s
A standard in the environmental litigation Land and Revitalization program is known for
practice is the investigation of the indemnification cleaning up and reinvesting in the properties.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: PERSONAL INJURY PARALEGAL
A personal injury paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Draft client agreement for attorney review and client signature.
• Maintain file including documents involving contact with insurance carrier(s),
client, health care provider(s), employer(s), and state/local agencies.
• Obtain, review, organize, and analyze medical records. If appropriate, compile
medical notebook for each individual involved in action.
• Conduct computerized medical, scientific, and technical literature research.
Analyze materials and prepare synopsis.
Third-Party Rights and Discharge 159
• Obtain and compile records relating to product history and information about sim-
ilar products, including research and development, manufacture, patent/copyright
filings, instructions for use, distribution, sales, and advertising documents.
• Attend site, product, accident, or vehicle inspection.
• As necessary and appropriate, interview doctors, nurses, and hospital personnel
involved in patient care.
• Obtain, review, and organize damage information; calculate damages (medical
expenses, lost wages, household expenses, insurance agreements, consortium
claims, property damages); and prepare, maintain, and update damage summaries.
• Prepare settlement proposals and agreements, including assembling information
on the history of plaintiff and the nature and effect of injuries and damages.
• Develop information and acquire records for wrongful death (e.g., supporting
evidence regarding sibling and/or child/parent economic claims).
• Obtain factual information about products, companies, and individuals from
various resources, including government agencies.
• As necessary and appropriate, arrange medical examinations for client or opposing
parties.
• Communicate with experts and provide copies of all relevant documentation
regarding accident, product information, and/or medical care, including all
summaries of same.
• Answer client questions; keep client updated on progress of case.
• Liaise with insurance adjusters; provide necessary information/documentation to
adjusters.
• Interview experts and develop questions to ask experts. (Many times government
experts will not volunteer information but will answer direct questions posed to
them, so the paralegal needs to know what questions to ask.)
• Write demand letters.
• Prepare settlement statements and agreements .
Assignment of Rights
In many cases, the parties to a contract can transfer their rights under the contract assignment of rights
to other parties. The transfer of contractual rights is called an assignment of rights The transfer by the parties of their
or just an assignment. contractual rights.
assignor
FORM OF ASSIGNMENT The party who transfers the rights.
The transferor in an assignment
A party who owes a duty of performance is called the obligor. A party who is owed situation. The obligee who transfers
a right under a contract is called the obligee. An obligee who transfers the right to the right.
receive performance is called an assignor. The party to whom the right has been
assignee
transferred is called the assignee. The assignee can assign the right to yet another
The party to whom the right has
person (called a subsequent assignee, or subassignee). Exhibit 7.1 illustrates these
been transferred. The transferee in
relationships. an assignment situation. The party to
Generally, no formalities are required for a valid assignment of rights. whom rights have been transferred.
Although the assignor often uses the word assign, other words or terms, such as
sell, transfer, convey, and give, are sufficient to indicate an intent to transfer a con- subsequent assignee
tract right. (subassignee)
When an assignee transfers the
Example: Suppose a retail clothing store purchases $5,000 worth of goods on credit rights under the contract to yet
from a manufacturer. Payment is due in 120 days. Assume the manufacturer needs another person.
160 Chapter 7
EXHIBIT 7.1 Assignment of a Right
Contract No. 1
Loan of money Contract No. 1:
Debtor Creditor
(Obligor) (Obligee)
Contract No. 2:
Note Assignor
(Promise to pay)
Contract No. 2
Right to Assignment
enforce of note
payment
of note
Assignee
cash before the 120-day period expires, so the manufacturer (assignor) sells its
right to collect the money to another party (assignee) for $4,000. If the retail store
is given proper notice of the assignment, it must pay $5,000 to the assignee.
RIGHTS THAT CAN AND CANNOT BE ASSIGNED

In the United States, public policy favors a free flow of commerce. Hence, most
contract rights are assignable, including sales contracts and contracts for the pay-
ment of money.
The following types of contracts present special problems for assignments:
personal service contracts 1. Personal service contracts. Contracts for the provision of personal services
Contracts for providing personal are generally not assignable.1 For example, if an artist contracts to paint
services, such as for an artist someone’s portrait, the artist cannot send a different artist to do the painting
painting someone’s portrait. without the prior approval of the person to be painted. The parties may agree
that a personal service contract may be assigned. For example, many profes-
sional athletes’ contracts contain a clause permitting assignability of the
contract.
assignment of future rights 2. Assignment of future rights. Usually, a person cannot assign a currently
A currently nonexistent right that a nonexistent right that he or she expects to have in the future. For example,
party expects to have sometime in suppose a multimillion-dollar heiress signs a will, leaving all her property to
the future. her grandson. The grandson cannot assign his expected right to receive his
inheritance.
3. Contracts where assignment would materially alter the risk. A contract
cannot be assigned if the assignment would materially alter the risk or duties
of the obligor. For example, suppose Laura Peters, who has a safe driving
record, purchases automobile insurance from an insurance company. Her
rights to be insured cannot be assigned to another driver because the assign-
ment would materially alter the risk and duties of the insurance company.
4. Assignment of legal action. Legal actions involving personal rights cannot
be assigned. For example, suppose Donald Matthews is severely injured by
Alice Hollyfield in an automobile accident caused by her negligence. Matthews
1
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sections 311 and 318.
can sue Hollyfield to recover damages for his injuries. He cannot assign his
right to sue her to another person.
A legal right that arises out of a breach of contract may be assigned.
Example: Suppose Andrea borrows $10,000 from the bank. If she defaults on the
loan, the bank may assign the legal rights to collect the money to a collection agency.
EFFECT OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS

Where there has been a valid assignment of rights, the assignee “stands in the shoes
of the assignor.” That is, the assignor is entitled to performance from the obligor.
The unconditional assignment of a contract right extinguishes all the assignor’s
rights, including the right to sue the obligor directly for nonperformance.2
An assignee takes no better rights under the contract than the assignor had.
For example, if the assignor has a right to receive $10,000 from a debtor, the right
to receive this $10,000 is all that the assignor can assign to the assignee. An obligor
can assert any defense he or she had against the assignor or the assignee. For exam-
ple, an obligor can raise the defenses of fraud, duress, undue influence, minority,
insanity, illegality of the contract, mutual mistake, or payment by worthless check
of the assignor against enforcement of the contract by the assignee. The obligor can
also raise any personal defenses (e.g., participation in the assignor’s fraudulent
scheme) he or she may have directly against the assignee.
In Case 7.1, the court held that an assignment was illegal.
CASE 7.1 ASSIGNING LEASES

Accrued Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2002).
Facts
Accrued Financial Services, Incorporated (AFS), is a corporation engaged in the
business of conducting lease audits on behalf of tenants in commercial buildings
and factory outlet malls. AFS is paid a percentage—usually 40 to 50 percent—of
the discrepancy overcharges that it discovers and collects as a result of its audits.
The tenant signs a letter of agreement with AFS and assigns all legal causes of
action it may have against the landlord to AFS. The assignment grants AFS the
authority to file lawsuits in its name against landlords at its discretion. After AFS
conducted an audit of Prime Retail, Incorporated (a landlord), on behalf of tenants
who had signed assignment agreements, AFS brought a lawsuit against Prime
Retail, asserting various claims of overcharges. The U.S. District Court dismissed
the case, finding that the assignment of the tenants’ claims to AFS violated public
policy and were therefore illegal. AFS appealed.
Issue
Does the assignment by a tenant of its legal claims against a landlord violate public
policy and is therefore illegal?
2
162 Chapter 7

These relationships between AFS and the tenants were essentially lawsuit-mining
arrangements under which AFS “mined for” and prosecuted lawsuits with no regard
for the informed wishes of the real parties in interest. AFS thus became a promoter of
litigation principally for the sake of the fees that it would earn for itself and not for
the benefit that it might produce for the tenant, the real party in interest. Under
these arrangements, even though the tenant might conclude, after reviewing the facts
uncovered, that a lawsuit would imprudently damage the landlord-tenant relationship—
or that pursuing aggressive allegations would do more harm than good—the tenant
lost the right to control its destiny. Because we see these broad assignments as
nothing more than arrangements through which to intermeddle and stir up litiga-
tion for the purpose of making a profit, we conclude that they violate Maryland’s
strong public policy against stirring up litigation and are therefore void and unen-
forceable in Maryland.
Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the tenants’ assignment of their legal causes of
action against Prime Retail to AFS violated public policy and was therefore illegal
and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court.

1. Critical Thinking: Why did the court of appeals find the tenants’ assign-
ments of their legal causes of action against Prime Retail to AFS illegal? How
can these assignments be distinguished from typical contingency fee arrange-
ments that plaintiffs’ lawyers often have with clients?
2. Ethics: Did AFS act ethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: What would be the consequences if a party’s legal cause
of action could be assigned to another party to pursue? Explain.
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT
When an assignor makes an assignment of a right under a contract, the assignee
is under a duty to notify the obligor that (1) the assignment has been made and
(2) performance must be rendered to the assignee. If the assignee fails to notify the
obligor of the assignment, the obligor may continue to render performance to the
assignor, who no longer has a right to it. The assignee cannot sue the obligor to
recover payment because the obligor has performed according to the original con-
tract. The assignee’s only course of action is to sue the assignor for damages.
The result changes if the obligor is notified of the assignment but continues to
render performance to the assignor. In such situations, the assignee can sue the
obligor and recover payment. The obligor will then have to pay twice: once wrong-
fully to the assignor and then rightfully to the assignee. The obligor’s only recourse
is to sue the assignor for damages.
ANTI-ASSIGNMENT AND APPROVAL CLAUSES

anti-assignment clause
A clause that prohibits the assign- Some contracts contain anti-assignment clauses that prohibit the assignment of
ment of rights under the contract. rights under the contracts. Such clauses may be used if the obligor does not want to
deal with or render performance to an unknown third party. Some contracts con- approval clause
tain an approval clause that requires the obligor to approve any assignment. Many A clause that permits the assign-
states prohibit the obligor from unreasonably withholding approval. ment of the contract only upon
receipt of an obligor’s approval.
SUCCESSIVE ASSIGNMENTS OF THE SAME RIGHT

An obligee (the party who is owed a performance, money, a right, or another thing
of value) has the right to assign a contract right or benefit to another party. If the
obligee fraudulently or mistakenly makes successive assignments of the same right
to a number of assignees, which assignee has the legal right to the assigned right?
To answer this question, the following rules are applied:
• The American rule (or New York rule) provides that the first assignment in
time prevails, regardless of notice. Most states follow this rule.
• The English rule provides that the first assignee to give notice to the obligor (the
person who owes the performance, money, duty, or other thing of value) prevails.
• The possession of tangible token rule provides that under either the American
or English rule, if the assignor makes successive assignments of a contract
right that is represented by a tangible token, such as a stock certificate or a
savings account passbook, the first assignee who receives delivery of the tan-
gible token prevails over subsequent assignees. However, if the first assignee
leaves the tangible token with the assignor, the subsequent assignee prevails.
This is because the first assignee could have prevented the problem by having
demanded delivery of the tangible token. In other words, physical possession
of the tangible token is the pivotal issue.
Delegation of Duties
Unless otherwise agreed, the parties to a contract can generally transfer the per- delegation of duties
formance of their duties under the contract to other parties. This transfer is called A transfer of contractual duties by
the delegation of duties, or just delegation. the obligor to another party for
performance.
An obligor who transfers his or her duty is called a delegator. The party to
whom the duty is transferred is the delegate. The party to whom the duty is owed delegator
is the obligee. Generally, no special words or formalities are required to create a The obligor who transferred his or
delegation of duties. Exhibit 7.2 illustrates the parties to a delegation of a duty. her duty.
delegate
EXHIBIT 7.2 Delegation of a Duty The party to whom the duty has
been transferred.
Contract No. 1:
Contract No. 1 Promisor
Promisee (Obligor)
(Obligee) Promise to perform Contract No. 2:
Delegator
Contract No. 2
Delegation
of duties
Duty of
performance
Delegate
164 Chapter 7
DUTIES THAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DELEGATED

Often, contracts are entered into with companies or firms rather than with indi-
viduals. In such cases, a firm may designate any of its qualified employees to per-
form the contract. For example, if a client retains a firm of lawyers to represent her,
the firm can delegate the duties under the contract to any qualified member of the
firm. If the obligee has a substantial interest in having the obligor perform the acts
required by the contract, however, duties may not be transferred.3 This restriction
includes obligations under the following types of contracts:
1. Personal service contracts calling for the exercise of personal skills, discre-
tion, or expertise. For example, if Dr. Dre is hired to give a concert on a
college campus, the Dixie Chicks cannot appear in his place.
2. Contracts whose performance would materially vary if the obligor’s duties
were delegated. For example, if a person hires an experienced surgeon to
perform a complex surgery, a recent medical school graduate cannot be sub-
stituted in the operating room.
EFFECT OF DELEGATION OF DUTIES

assumption of duties If a delegation is valid, the delegator remains legally liable for the performance of
When a delegation of duties the contract. If the delegate does not perform properly, the obligee can sue the
contains the term assumption, obligor-delegator for any resulting damages.
“I assume the duties,” or other The question of the delegate’s liability to the obligee depends on whether
similar language, the delegate is
there has been an assumption of duties or a declaration of duties. Where a delegation
legally liable to the obligee for
of duties contains the term assumption or other similar language, there is an
nonperformance.
assumption of duties by the delegate. The delegate is liable to the obligee for non-
declaration of duties performance. The obligee can sue either the delegator or the delegate.
If the delegate has not assumed If the delegate has not assumed the duties under a contract, the delegation of
the duties under a contract, the duties is called a declaration of duties. Here, the delegate is not legally liable to the
delegate is not legally liable to the obligee for nonperformance. The obligee’s only recourse is to sue the delegator. A
obligee for nonperformance.
delegate who fails to perform his or her duties is liable to the delegator for damages
arising from this failure to perform.
ANTI-DELEGATION CLAUSE
anti-delegation clause The parties to a contract can include an anti-delegation clause indicating that the
A clause that prohibits the delega- duties cannot be delegated. Anti-delegation clauses are usually enforced. Some
tion of duties under the contract. courts, however, have held that duties that are totally impersonal—such as the
payment of money—can be delegated despite such clauses.
ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION

assignment and delegation An assignment and delegation occurs when there is a transfer of both rights and
Transfer of both rights and duties duties under a contract. If the transfer of a contract to a third party contains only
under the contract. language of assignment, the modern view holds that there is corresponding delega-
tion of the duties of the contract.4
3
4
Third-Party Beneficiaries
Third parties sometimes claim rights under others’ contracts. Such third parties
are either intended or incidental beneficiaries. Each of these designations is dis-
cussed here.
INTENDED BENEFICIARIES
When parties enter into a contract, they can agree that the performance of one of
the parties should be rendered to or directly benefit a third party. Under such cir-
cumstances, the third party is called an intended third-party beneficiary. An third-party beneficiary
intended third-party beneficiary can enforce the contract against the party who A third person that the contracting
promised to render performance.5 parties intended should receive a
The beneficiary may be expressly named in the contract from which he or she benefit from the contract.
is to benefit or may be identified by another means. For example, there is sufficient
identification if a testator of a will leaves his estate to “all my children, equally.”
Intended third-party beneficiaries may be classified as either donee or credi-
tor beneficiaries. These terms are defined in the following sections. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts and many state statutes have dropped this distinction,
however, and now refer to both collectively as intended beneficiaries.6
Donee Beneficiaries
When a person enters into a contract with the intent to confer a benefit or gift on
an intended third party, the contract is called a donee beneficiary contract. A life donee beneficiary contract
insurance policy with a named beneficiary is an example of such a contract. These A contract entered into with the
three persons are involved in such a contract: intent to confer a benefit or gift on
an intended third party.
1. The promisee (the contracting party who directs that the benefit be conferred
on another) promisee
2. The promisor (the contracting party who agrees to confer performance for One to whom promise has been
made.
the benefit of the third person)
3. The donee beneficiary (the third person on whom the benefit is to be promisor
conferred) One who makes a promise.
If the promisor fails to perform the contract, the donee beneficiary can sue the donee beneficiary
promisor directly. The third party on whom the benefit
is to be conferred.
Example: Brian Peterson hires a lawyer to draft his will. He directs the lawyer to
leave all of his property to his best friend, Jeffrey Silverman. Assume that (1) Peterson
dies and (2) the lawyer’s negligence in drafting the will causes it to be invalid.
Consequently, Peterson’s distant relatives receive the property under the state’s
inheritance statute. Silverman can sue the lawyer for damages because he was the
intended donee beneficiary of the will.
Example: A mother, the insured, buys a life insurance policy from a life insurance
company and names her daughter as the beneficiary to be paid the life insurance
proceeds if the mother dies. The daughter is the intended beneficiary of the con-
tract between her mother and the life insurance company. Assume that the mother
dies. If the life insurance company refuses to pay the life insurance proceeds to the
daughter, the daughter can sue the life insurance company and recover the insur-
ance proceeds (see Exhibit 7.3).
5
6
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 302(1)(b).
166 Chapter 7
EXHIBIT 7.3 Donee Beneficiary Contract
Insured Original contract Life Insurance

(Promisee) Company
(Life insurance policy) (Promisor)
Right to
enforce
contract
Named
Beneficiary
(Donee
Beneficiary)
Creditor Beneficiaries
creditor beneficiary contract The second type of intended beneficiary is the creditor beneficiary. A creditor
A contract that arises in the follow- beneficiary contract usually arises in the following situation:
ing situation: (1) a debtor borrows
money, (2) the debtor signs an 1. A debtor borrows money from a creditor to purchase some item.
agreement to pay back the money 2. The debtor signs an agreement to pay the creditor the amount of the loan
plus interest, (3) the debtor sells the plus interest.
item to a third party before the loan 3. The debtor sells the item to another party before the loan is paid.
is paid off, and (4) the third party 4. The new buyer promises the debtor that he or she will pay the remainder of
promises the debtor that he or she the loan amount to the creditor.
will pay the remainder of the loan to
the creditor. The creditor is the new intended creditor beneficiary to this second creditor.7
The parties to the second contract are the original debtor (the promisee), the new
creditor beneficiary
party (the promisor), and the original creditor (the creditor beneficiary) (see
Original creditor who becomes a
Exhibit 7.4).
beneficiary under the debtor’s new
contract with another party.
EXHIBIT 7.4 Creditor Beneficiary Contract
Contract No. 1
First sale of goods Contract No. 1:
Creditor
First Buyer
Contract No. 2:
(Debtor)
Creditor
Note Beneficiary
(Promise to pay)
Contract No. 2
Second sale Promise to Right to

of goods pay debt to recover
creditor payments
Second Buyer
7
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 302(1)(a).
If the promisor fails to perform according to the contract, the creditor benefi-
ciary may either (1) enforce the original contract against the debtor-promisee or
(2) enforce the new contract against the promisor. However, the creditor can collect
only once.
Example: Suppose Big Hotels obtains a loan from City Bank to refurbish a hotel in
Atlanta, Georgia. The parties sign a promissory note requiring the loan to be paid
off in equal monthly installments over the next 10 years. Before the loan is paid,
Big Hotels sells the hotel to ABC Hotels, another chain of hotels. ABC Hotels agrees
with Big Hotels to complete the payments due on the City Bank loan. The bank has
two options if ABC Hotels fails to pay: It can sue Big Hotels on the promissory note
to recover the unpaid loan amount, or it can use its status as a creditor beneficiary
to sue ABC Hotels.
INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARIES
In many instances, the parties to a contract unintentionally benefit a third party
when the contract is performed. In such situations, the third party is referred to as
an incidental beneficiary. An incidental beneficiary has no rights to enforce or sue incidental beneficiary
under other people’s contracts. Generally, the public and taxpayers are only inci- A party who is unintentionally ben-
dental beneficiaries to contracts entered into by the government on their behalf. As efited by other people’s contracts.
such, they acquire no right to enforce government contracts or to sue parties who
breach these contracts.
Example: Suppose Heather owns a house on Residential Street. Her neighbor John
owns the house next door. Heather contracts with a painting contractor to paint
her house. The painting contractor breaches the contract and does not paint
Heather’s house. Although John may have benefited if Heather’s house was painted,
he is merely an incidental beneficiary and has no cause of action to sue the painting
contractor for not painting Heather’s house. Heather, of course, can sue the paint-
ing contractor for breach of contract.
Often the courts are asked to decide whether a third party is an intended or
an incidental beneficiary, as in Case 7.2.
CASE 7.2 INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARY

Ramos/Carson/DePaul, a Joint Venture v. The Phillies, L.P. Web 2006 Phila.
Ct. Com. Pl. Lexis 397 (2006) Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County,
Pennsylvania
Facts
The Phillies, L.P., the owner of the Philadelphia Phillies professional baseball team
(Phillies), decided to build a new baseball stadium called Citizens Bank Park (the
Project). The Phillies entered into a contract (Agreement) with Driscoll/Hunt
Joint Venture (DH), whereby DH would act as the construction manager of the
Project. In that capacity, DH entered into multiple contracts with subcontractors
to provide material and services in constructing the Project. One such subcontrac-
tor was Ramos/Carson/DePaul, Joint Venture (RCD), which was hired to install
concrete foundations for the Project. The Project was beset with numerous delays
and disruptions, for which RCD claimed it was owed additional compensation
168 Chapter 7
from DH and the Phillies. RCD sued the Phillies to recover the alleged compensa-
tion, alleging it was an intended beneficiary to the Phillies-DH Agreement, thus
giving it rights to recover compensation from the Phillies. The Phillies argued that
RCD was merely an incidental beneficiary to the Phillies-DH Agreement and
could not recover compensation from the Phillies.
Issue
Was RCD an intended or an incidental beneficiary of the Phillies-DH Agreement?

In order to determine if RCD is a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement between
the Phillies and DH, the court must apply the standards set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. Under the Restatement a promise in the Agreement between
the Phillies and DH creates a duty in the Phillies to any intended beneficiary to
perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.
RCD has not proffered any evidence to show that the Phillies and DH intended
to give RCD the right to demand payment directly from the Phillies. There is no
other evidence showing that either the Phillies or DH intended to benefit RCD of the
other subcontractors in drafting the Agreement's payment provisions.
In fact, the parties specifically disclaimed such an intention in the Agreement:
“Nothing in the Contract Documents shall be deemed to give any third party any
claim or right of action against the Phillies or DH.” Since RCD has failed to show
that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Agreement between the Phillies
and DH, RCD’s breach of contract claim against the Phillies must be dismissed.
Decision
The court held that RCD was not an intended beneficiary of the Phillies-DH
Agreement but instead was an incidental beneficiary to the Agreement and there-
fore had no right to sue the Phillies as a third-party beneficiary. The court granted
the Phillies summary judgment against RCD.

1. Critical Thinking: What is the difference between an intended beneficiary
and an incidental beneficiary? Explain.
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for RCD, the subcontractor, to try to recover its alleged
damages from the Phillies? Why or why not? Was it ethical for the Phillies to
deny liability for the alleged damages suffered by RCD? Explain.
3. Critical Thinking: Who is the correct party for RCD to try to recover its
alleged damages from? Explain.
Note: Some states have enacted a statute that permits subcontractors to recover
compensation from the owner of the property for their work and services if the
general contractor has not paid them. If homeowners or others who have hired a
general contractor obtain a release from the subcontractor whereby the subcon-
tractor agrees not to sue the owner if they are not paid by the general contractor,
then the owner is not liable to the subcontractor.
Covenants and Conditions

In contracts, parties make certain promises to each other. These promises may be
classified as covenants or conditions. The difference between the two is discussed in
the following paragraphs.
COVENANTS
A covenant is an unconditional promise to perform. Nonperformance of a cove- covenant
nant is a breach of contract that gives the other party the right to sue. For example, An unconditional promise to
if Medcliff Corporation borrows $100,000 from a bank and signs a promissory perform.
note to repay this amount plus 10 percent interest in one year, this promise is a
covenant. That is, it is an unconditional promise to perform.
CONDITIONS OF PERFORMANCE
A conditional promise (or qualified promise) is not as definite as a covenant. The
promisor’s duty to perform (or not perform) arises only if the condition does (or condition
does not) occur.8 It becomes a covenant if the condition is met, however. A qualification of a promise that
Generally, contractual language such as if, on condition that, provided that, becomes a covenant if it is met.
when, after, and as soon as indicates a condition. A single contract may contain There are three types of conditions:
numerous conditions that trigger or excuse performance. There are four types of conditions precedent, conditions
subsequent, and concurrent
conditions: (1) conditions precedent, (2) conditions subsequent, (3) concurrent con-
conditions.
ditions, and (4) implied conditions.
Condition Precedent
If a contract requires the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of an event before a party
is obligated to perform a contractual duty, there is a condition precedent. The condition precedent
happening (or nonhappening) of the event triggers the contract or duty of per- A condition that must happen or be
formance. If the event does not occur, no duty to perform arises because there is a performed before some right
failure of condition. dependent thereon accrues or some
act dependent thereon is performed.
Example: Suppose Company B offers Joan Andrews a job as an industrial engineer
upon her graduation from college. If Andrews graduates, the condition has been
met. If the employer refuses to hire Andrews at that time, she can sue the employer
for breach of contract. If Andrews does not graduate, however, Company B is not
obligated to hire her because there has been a failure of condition.
CASE 7.3 CONDITION PRECEDENT

Architectural Systems, Inc. v. Gilbane Building Co., 760 F. Supp. 79 (D. Md. 1991).
Facts
Carley Capital Group (Carley) was the owner of a project in the city of Baltimore
known as “Henderson’s Wharf.” The project was designed to convert warehouses
into residential condominiums. On September 4, 1987, Carley hired Gilbane
8
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 224, defines a condition as “an event, not certain to occur, which
must occur, unless its nonperformance is excused, before performance under a contract is due.”
170 Chapter 7
Building Company (Gilbane) to be the general contractor and construction

manager for the project. Gilbane hired Architectural Systems, Inc. (ASI), as the
subcontractor to perform drywall and acoustical tile work on the project. The
subcontract included the following clause: “It is specifically understood and
agreed that the payment to the trade contractor is dependent, as a condition prec-
edent, upon the construction manager receiving contract payments from the
owner.”
Gilbane received periodic payments from Carley and paid ASI as work
progressed. By late 1988, ASI had satisfactorily performed all of its obliga-
tions under the subcontract and submitted a final bill of $348,155 to Gilbane.
Gilbane did not pay this bill because it had not received payment from Carley.
On March 10, 1989, Carley filed for bankruptcy. ASI sued Gilbane seeking
payment.
Issue
Must Gilbane pay ASI?

ASI argues that it did not assume the credit risk simply by the inclusion of the
statement “as a condition precedent” in the subcontract. It may not be sound
business practice to accept such a business proposal but that is what occurred.
The provision unambiguously declares that Gilbane is not obligated to pay ASI
until it first received payment by the owner. The cause for the owner’s nonpay-
ment is not specifically addressed and could be due to a number of causes, includ-
ing insolvency.
A provision that makes receipt of payment by the general contractor a condi-
tion precedent to its obligation to pay the subcontractor transfers from the general
contractor to the subcontractor the credit risk of non-payment by the owner for any
reason (at least for any reason other than the general owner’s own fault), including
insolvency of the owner.
Decision
The district court held that Gilbane was not obligated to pay ASI because the con-
dition precedent to this payment—receipt of payment from Carley—had not
occurred. The court granted summary judgment to Gilbane.

1. Law: What is the difference between a covenant and a condition precedent?
Explain.
2. Ethics: Did Gilbane act unethically in not paying ASI? Did ASI act unethi-
cally in suing Gilbane?
3. Critical Thinking: If the condition precedent had not been expressly
provided in the subcontract, who would have borne the risk of Carley’s
default?
Condition Precedent Based on Satisfaction Some contracts reserve the condition precedent based on
right to a party to pay for services provided by the other only if the services meet the satisfaction
first party’s “satisfaction,” called condition precedent based on satisfaction. The courts Clause in a contract that reserves
the right to a party to pay for the
have developed two tests—the personal satisfaction test and the reasonable person
items or services contracted for only
test—to examine whether this special form of condition precedent has been met:
if they meet his or her satisfaction.
1. The personal satisfaction test is a subjective test that applies if the performance personal satisfaction test
involves personal taste and comfort (e.g., contracts for decorating, tailoring). Subjective test that applies to
The only requirement is that the person given the right to reject the contract contracts involving personal
acts in good faith. taste and comfort.
Example: Suppose Gretchen employs an artist to paint her daughter’s por-
trait. Assume the contract provides that the client does not have to pay for the
portrait unless she is satisfied with it. Accordingly, Gretchen may reject the
painting if she personally dislikes it, even though a reasonable person would
be satisfied with it.
2. The reasonable person test is an objective test used to judge contracts involv- reasonable person test
ing mechanical fitness and most commercial contracts. Most contracts that Objective test that applies to
require the work to meet a third person’s satisfaction (e.g., engineer, archi- commercial contracts and contracts
tect) are judged by this standard. involving mechanical fitness.
Example: Suppose a large mail-order catalog business hires someone to

install a state-of-the-art computer system that will handle its order entry and
record-keeping functions. The system is installed and operates to industry
standards. According to the reasonable person test, the company cannot
reject the contract as not meeting its satisfaction.
Time of Performance as a Condition Precedent Generally, there is a breach
of contract if the contract is not performed when due. Nevertheless, if the other
party is not jeopardized by the delay, most courts treat the delay as a minor breach
and give the nonperforming party additional time to perform. Conversely, if the
contract expressly provides that “time is of the essence” or similar language, per-
formance by the stated time is an express condition. There is a breach of contract if
the contracting party does not perform by the stated date.
Condition Subsequent
A condition subsequent exists when a contract provides that the occurrence or condition subsequent
nonoccurrence of a specific event automatically excuses the performance of an A condition, if it occurs or doesn’t
existing duty to perform. For example, many employment contracts include a occur, that automatically excuses
clause that permits the employer to terminate the contract if the employee fails a the performance of an existing
drug test. contractual duty to perform.
Note that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts eliminates the distinction
between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent. Both are referred to as
“conditions.”9
Concurrent Condition
Concurrent conditions arise when the parties to a contract must render perform- concurrent condition
ance simultaneously—that is, when each party’s absolute duty to perform is condi- A condition that exists when the
tioned on the other party’s absolute duty to perform. parties to a contract must render
performance simultaneously; each
party’s absolute duty to perform is
conditioned on the other party’s
9 absolute duty to perform.
172 Chapter 7
For example, suppose a contract to purchase goods provides that payment is

due upon delivery. In other words, the buyer’s duty to pay is conditioned on the
seller’s duty to deliver the goods, and vice versa. Recovery is available if one party
fails to respond to the other party’s performance.
Implied Condition
Any of the previous types of conditions may be further classified as either express
or implied conditions. An express condition exists if the parties expressly agree on
implied-in-fact condition it. An implied-in-fact condition is one that can be implied from the circumstances
A condition that can be implied surrounding a contract and the parties’ conduct. For example, a contract in which
from the circumstances surrounding a buyer agrees to purchase grain from a farmer implies proper street access to the
a contract and the parties’ conduct. delivery site, proper unloading facilities, and the like.
Discharge of Performance
A party’s duty to perform under a contract may be discharged by mutual agreement
of the parties, by impossibility of performance, or by operation of law. These meth-
ods of discharge are discussed next.
DISCHARGE BY AGREEMENT
In many situations, the parties to a contract mutually decide to discharge their con-
tractual duties. The different types of mutual agreement are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
• Mutual rescission—If a contract is wholly or partially executory on both
mutual rescission sides, the parties can agree to rescind (i.e., cancel) the contract. Mutual
Where the parties enter into a rescission requires the parties to enter into a second agreement that expressly
second agreement that expressly terminates the first one. Unilateral rescission of the contract by one of the
terminates the first one. parties without the other party’s consent is not effective. Unilateral rescission
of a contract constitutes a breach of that contract.
Concept Summary
Conditions
Type of Condition Description
Condition precedent A specified event must occur or not occur before a party is
obligated to perform contractual duties.
Condition subsequent The occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specified event
excuses the performance of an existing contractual duty to
perform.
Concurrent condition The parties to a contract are obligated to render perform-
ance simultaneously. Each party’s duty to perform is condi-
tioned on the other party’s duty to perform.
Implied condition An implied-in-fact condition is implied from the circum-
stances surrounding a contract and the parties’ conduct.
• Substituted contract—The parties to a contract may enter into a new con-

tract that revokes and discharges a prior contract. The new contract is called
a substituted contract. If one of the parties fails to perform his or her duties substituted contract
under a substituted contract, the nonbreaching party can sue to enforce its A new contract that revokes and
terms against the breaching party. The prior contract cannot be enforced discharges a prior contract.
against the breaching party because it has been discharged.
• Novation—A novation agreement (commonly called novation) substitutes a novation
third party for one of the original contracting parties. The new substituted An agreement that substitutes a new
party is obligated to perform the contract. All three parties must agree to the party for one of the original contract-
substitution. In a novation, the existing party is relieved of liability on the ing parties and relieves the exiting
contract. party of liability on the contract.
• Accord and satisfaction—The parties to a contract may agree to settle a con- accord and satisfaction
tract dispute by an accord and satisfaction. The agreement whereby the The settlement of a contract dispute.
parties agree to accept something different in satisfaction of the original accord
contract is called an accord.10 The performance of an accord is called a An agreement whereby the parties
satisfaction. agree to accept something different
in satisfaction of the original
An accord does not discharge the original contract. It only suspends the orig- contract.
inal contract until the accord is performed. Satisfaction of the accord discharges
both the original contract and the accord. If an accord is not satisfied when it is satisfaction
due, the aggrieved party may enforce either the accord or the original contract. The performance of an accord.
DISCHARGE BY IMPOSSIBILITY
Under certain circumstances, the nonperformance of contractual duties is
excused—that is, discharged—because of impossibility of performance.
Impossibility of performance (or objective impossibility) occurs if a contract impossibility of performance
becomes impossible to perform.11 The impossibility must be objective impossibil- (objective impossibility)
ity (“it cannot be done”) rather than subjective impossibility (“I cannot do it”). The Nonperformance that is excused if
following types of objective impossibility excuse nonperformance: the contract becomes impossible to
perform; must be objective impos-
1. The death or incapacity of the promisor prior to the performance of a per- sibility, not subjective.
sonal service contract.12 For example, if a professional athlete dies prior to or
during a contract period, his or her contract with the team is discharged.
2. The destruction of the subject matter of a contract prior to performance.13
For example, if a building is destroyed by fire, the lessees are discharged from
further performance unless otherwise provided in the lease.
3. A supervening illegality, which makes performance of the contract illegal.14
For example, suppose an art dealer contracts to purchase native art found in
a foreign country. The contract is discharged if the foreign country enacts a
law forbidding native art from being exported from the country before the
contract is performed.
10
11
12
13
14
174 Chapter 7
CASE 7.4 PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS

Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 295 N.E.2d 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
Facts
In November 1959, Ryland S. Parker, a 37-year-old college-educated bachelor,
went to the Arthur Murray Studios (Arthur Murray) in Oak Park, Illinois, to
redeem a certificate entitling him to three free dancing lessons. At that time he
lived alone in a one-room attic apartment. During the free lessons, the instructor
told Parker that he had “exceptional potential to be a fine and accomplished
dancer.” Parker thereupon signed a contract for more lessons. Parker attended
lessons regularly and was praised and encouraged by his instructors despite his lack
of progress. Contract extensions and new contracts for additional instructional
hours were executed, which Parker prepaid. Each written contract contained the
bold-type words, “NONCANCELLABLE CONTRACT.” On September 24, 1961,
Parker was severely injured in an automobile accident, rendering him incapable of
continuing his dancing lessons. At that time he had contracted for a total of 2,734
hours of dance lessons, for which he had prepaid $24,812. When Arthur Murray
refused to refund any of the money, Parker sued to rescind the outstanding con-
tracts. The trial courts held in favor of Parker and ordered Arthur Murray to return
the prepaid contract payments. Arthur Murray appealed.
Issue
Does the doctrine of impossibility excuse Parker’s performance of the personal
service contracts?

Plaintiff was granted rescission on the ground of impossibility of performance.
Defendants do not deny that the doctrine of impossibility of performance is gener-
ally applicable to the case at bar. Rather they assert that certain contract provisions
bring the case within the Restatement’s limitation that the doctrine is inapplicable
if “the contract indicates a contrary intention.” It is contended that such bold-
type phrases as “NON-CANCELLABLE CONTRACT,” “NON-CANCELLABLE
NEGOTIABLE CONTRACT,” and “I UNDERSTAND THAT NO REFUNDS
WILL BE MADE UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT” manifested the
parties’ mutual intent to waive their respective rights to invoke the doctrine of
impossibility.
This is a construction that we find unacceptable. Courts engage in the con-
struction and interpretation of contracts with the sole aim of determining the
intention of the parties. We need rely on no construction aids to conclude that
plaintiff never contemplated that by signing a contract with such terms as “NON-
CANCELLABLE” and “NO REFUNDS,” he was waiving a remedy expressly recog-
nized by Illinois courts. Although neither party to a contract should be relieved
from performance on the ground that good business judgment was lacking, a court
will not place upon language a ridiculous construction. We conclude that plaintiff
did not waive his right to assert the doctrine of impossibility.
Suffice it to say that overwhelming evidence supported plaintiff’s contention

that he was incapable of continuing his lessons.
Decision
The appellate court held that the doctrine of impossibility of performance excused
Parker’s performance of the personal service contracts. Affirmed.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the doctrine of impossibility excuse parties from
performance of their contracts? Why or why not?
2. Ethics: Did Arthur Murray act ethically in not returning Parker’s money?
3. Critical Thinking: Why do you think Arthur Murray fought this case?
FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSES

The parties may agree in a contract that certain events will excuse nonperformance
of the contract. These clauses are called force majeure clauses. force majeure clauses
Usually, force majeure clauses excuse nonperformance caused by natural Clauses in contracts involving
disasters such as floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, and such. Modern clauses certain events, such as floods,
often excuse performance due to labor strikes, shortages of raw materials, and earthquakes, or tornadoes, that will
the like. excuse nonperformance of a
contract.
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
Many states recognize the doctrine of commercial impracticability as an excuse commercial impracticability
for nonperformance of contracts. Commercial impracticability excuses perform- Nonperformance that is excused if
ance if an unforeseeable event makes it impractical for the promisor to perform. an extreme or unexpected develop-
This doctrine has not yet been fully developed by the courts. It is examined on a ment or expense makes it impracti-
case-by-case basis. cal for the promisor to perform.
Example: A utility company enters into a contract to purchase uranium for its
nuclear-powered generator from a uranium supplier at a fixed price of $1 million
per year for five years. Suppose a new uranium cartel is formed worldwide, and the
supplier must pay $3 million for uranium to supply the utility with each year’s sup-
ply. In this case, the court would likely allow the supplier to rescind its contract
with the utility, based on commercial impracticability. Note that it is not impossi-
ble for the supplier to supply the uranium.
DISCHARGE BY OPERATION OF LAW

Certain legal rules discharge parties from performing contractual duties. These statute of limitations
rules are discussed in the following paragraphs. Statute that establishes the time
period during which a lawsuit must
• Statutes of limitations—Every state has a statute of limitations that applies be brought; if the lawsuit is not
to contract actions. Although the time periods vary from state to state, the brought within this period, the
usual period for bringing a lawsuit based on breach of contract is one to five injured party loses the right to sue.
176 Chapter 7
years. The UCC provides that a cause of action based on a breach of sales or
lease contract must be brought within four years after the cause of action
accrues [UCC §2-725, UCC §2A-506].
• Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy, governed by federal law, is a means of allocating
the debtor’s nonexempt property to satisfy his or her debts. Debtors may also
reorganize in bankruptcy. In most cases, the debtor’s assets are insufficient to
discharge pay all the creditors’ claims. In this case, the debtor receives a discharge of the
Discharge of a contract can be unpaid debts. The debtor is then relieved of legal liability to pay the dis-
based upon actions or events that charged debts.
relieve certain parties from liability • Alteration of the contract—If a party to a contract intentionally alters the
on negotiable instruments. There contract materially, the innocent party may opt either to discharge the con-
are three methods of discharge:
tract or to enforce it. The contract may be enforced either on its original
(1) payment of the instrument,
terms or on the altered terms. A material alteration is a change in price, quantity,
(2) cancellation, and (3) impair-
ment of the right of recourse. The
or some other important term.
termination of the legal duty of a
debtor to pay debts that remain
unpaid upon the completion of a
bankruptcy proceeding. Creditors’ COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
claims that are not included in a
Chapter 11 reorganization are Sometimes, unforeseen circumstances make the performance of a contract highly
discharged. A discharge is granted impracticable or very expensive. Modern contract law, including the Uniform
to a debtor in a Chapter 13 consumer Commercial Code (UCC), recognizes the doctrine of commercial impracticabil-
debt adjustment bankruptcy only ity as excusing nonperformance in certain situations. Consider the following
after all the payments under the
case.
plan are completed by the debtor.
Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. (Alimenta), entered into a contract with Cargill, Inc.
(Cargill), under which Alimenta would purchase shelled edible peanuts from
Cargill. The peanut crop had been planted in the fields at the time the contract was
entered into. Cargill, which had contracts to purchase peanuts from peanut farm-
ers, expected to make $3 million in profit from peanut sales.
Unfortunately, there was a severe drought that year, and the crop yield was
substantially reduced. Thus, Cargill could deliver to Alimenta only about 65 percent
of the promised peanuts. Cargill delivered the same percentage to all of its custom-
ers. Alimenta filed suit against Cargill for breach of contract. Cargill asserted that
further performance under the contract was excused by the doctrine of commer-
cial impracticability. At trial the jury rendered a verdict for Cargill. Alimenta
appealed.
The trial court held that the drought in this case was unforeseen. The evi-
dence showed that the shortage of peanuts was unprecedented. In fact, there had
been a surplus of domestic peanuts for the preceding 20 years. The trial court
found that it was not impossible for Cargill to fully perform the contract. Cargill
could have gone into the market and purchased the peanuts, which were selling at
a much higher price than contracted for, and delivered the peanuts to Alimenta.
Cargill, however, had already suffered a $47-million loss on its peanut contract
even without taking this step.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of Cargill.
The court held that Cargill was excused from further performance by the
doctrine of commercial impracticability. The court stated that “the focus of
impracticability analysis is upon the nature of the agreement and the expecta-
tions of the parties” and not on whether it is physically possible for the defendant
to perform the contract. Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 861 F.2d 650
(11th Cir. 1988).
Heather Fauber Brinkman is a grad- drafts go back and forth between the parties to an
uate of Saint Mary-of-the-Woods agreement, I do preliminary reviews of the docu-
College’s Paralegal Studies Program. ments, noting errors and potential risks. My reviews
She works as a paralegal in the Legal save time for the attorney working on the matter.
Department of Caterpillar, Inc. As a member of the mergers and acquisitions
I am a paralegal in the commer- team, when assigned to a deal, I take on a leader-
cial section of the legal depart- ship role in coordinating the due diligence process
ment of Caterpillar, Inc. My job for the team. I also assist with preparation, review,
entails preparing contracts for specific business and execution of the necessary merger/acquisition
units within the corporation and working with the documents. When necessary, I also perform admin-
mergers and acquisitions team. The contracts I istrative duties, such as formation and registration
work with vary from general confidentiality agree- of subsidiary corporations and LLCs.
ments to highly negotiated purchase agreements. Paralegals are an invaluable part of corporate
Under the supervision of an attorney, I work legal departments. I am able to act as a liaison
with our internal business unit contacts through between the business units and the attorneys,
contract negotiation, drafting, and execution. As increasing productivity a great deal.

Unauthorized Practice of Law
The practice of law is limited to attorneys who are licensed and admit-
ted to the bar. It is just that simple. No matter how skilled a paralegal is
or how many years of experience he or she has, a paralegal cannot do
any of the things generally understood to be the “practice of law.” ABA
Model Rule 5.5 deals with the unauthorized practice of law, or “UPL.”15
The ethical paralegal knows there are four things the paralegal
cannot do because they are UPL. In other words, these four things are
considered the “practice of law”:
1. Accept a case (i.e., tell the client that the firm or lawyer will take
his or her case)
2. Set a fee (i.e., evaluate the case and tell the client how much the
fee will be for representation)
3. Give legal advice (this does not preclude the paralegal from
giving factual information)
4. Represent a client in court—except for some administrative agen-
cies (however, of course the paralegal can still assist the attorney
in court)16
15
16
For more on a paralegal representing a client before an administrative agency, see Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Comp-
Management, Inc., 818 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2004) and Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. CompManagement, Inc., 857 N.E.2d 95
(Ohio 2006).
178 Chapter 7
CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS, p. 159 2. Declaration of duties. The delegate is not liable to the
obligee for nonperformance. The obligee can sue only
Form of Assignment
the delegator. The delegate is liable to the delegator for
1. Assignment. Assignment is transfer of contractual any damages suffered by the delegator because of the
rights by a party to a contract to a third person. delegate’s nonperformance.
2. Assignor. An assignor is a contract party who assigns
the contractual rights. Anti-Delegation Clause
3. Assignee. An assignee is a third person to whom con-
tract rights are assigned. This clause prohibits the delegation of duties under a
contract.
Effect of Assignment
The assignee “stands in the shoes of the assignor” and is enti-
tled to performance of the contract by the obligor. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES, p. 165
Intended Beneficiaries
Notice of Assignment
An intended beneficiary is a third person who is owed per-
1. Duty to notify. The assignee must notify the obligor formance under other parties’ contract. There are two types:
that (1) the assignment has been made, and (2) per-
formance must be rendered to the assignee. 1. Donee beneficiary. This person is to be rendered per-
2. Failure to give notice. If the assignee fails to give proper formance gratuitously under a contract (e.g., a benefi-
notice to the obligor and the obligor renders perform- ciary of a life insurance policy). A donee beneficiary
ance to the assignor, the assignee’s only course of action may sue the promisor for nonperformance.
to recover is from the assignor. 2. Creditor beneficiary. A creditor becomes a beneficiary
to a contract between the debtor and a third party who
Anti-Assignment and Approval Clauses agrees to perform the debtor’s obligation. If the debt is
not paid, the creditor may sue either (1) the debtor
1. Anti-assignment clause. This clause prohibits the
under the original contract or (2) the third party as a
assignment of rights under a contract.
creditor beneficiary.
2. Approval clause. This clause permits assignment of the
contract only upon receipt of the obligor’s approval.
Incidental Beneficiaries
Successive Assignments An incidental beneficiary is a third person who incidentally
If the obligee makes successive assignments of the same right, receives some benefit under other parties’ contract but who
one of the following rules (depending on state law) applies: has no rights to enforce it or to sue for its nonperformance.
1. American rule. Under this rule, the first assignment in
time prevails, regardless of notice. Also called the New
York rule. COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS, p. 169
2. English rule. Under this rule, the first assignee to give Covenants
notice to the obligor prevails.
Covenants are unconditional promises to perform. Nonper-
formance of a covenant is a breach of contract that gives the
DELEGATION OF DUTIES, p. 163 other party the right to sue.
1. Delegation. Delegation is transfer of contractual duties
by a party to a contract to a third person. Conditions of Performance
2. Delegator. The delegator is the party who transfers his Condition. A promisor’s duty to perform or not perform
or her contractual duties. arises only if the condition does or does not occur. Also
3. Delegate. The delegate is the third person to whom called a qualified promise. There are several types:
contractual duties are delegated.
1. Condition precedent. This requires the occurrence or
Effect of Delegation nonoccurrence of an event before a party is obligated to
perform. Conditions precedent based on “satisfaction”
The effect of delegation depends on whether there has been:
are measured by one or two standards:
1. Assumption of duties. The delegate is liable to the obli- a. Personal satisfaction test. The subjective intent of the
gee for nonperformance. The obligee may sue either decision maker applies if the performance involves
the delegate or the delegator. personal taste or comfort.
b. Reasonable person test. The objective intent of a party is relieved of liability, and the entering party is
reasonable person in the circumstances applies to obligated to perform the contract.
contracts involving mechanical fitness or commer- 4. Accord and satisfaction. The parties agree to settle a
cial contracts. contract dispute. The satisfaction of the accord discharges
2. Condition subsequent. This provides that the occur- the original contract.
rence or nonoccurrence of a specific event automati-
cally excuses performance under a contract. Discharge by Impossibility
3. Concurrent condition. This arises when the parties to a 1. Impossibility of performance. The contract is objec-
contract must render performance simultaneously. tively impossible to perform because of an event.
4. Implied-in-fact condition. This condition is implied 2. Commercial impracticability. The contract is imprac-
from the circumstances surrounding a contract and the tical for the promisor to perform because of an event.
parties’ conduct. 3. Force majeure clause. The parties stipulate in the con-
tract what events will excuse performance.
Discharge by Operation of Law
DISCHARGE OF PERFORMANCE,
p. 172 1. Statute of limitations. A contract that is not brought
within the stipulated limitations period discharges con-
Discharge by Agreement
tractual duties.
1. Mutual rescission. The parties mutually agree to 2. Bankruptcy. Discharge in bankruptcy relieves the
rescind an executory contract. debtor of legal liability to pay the discharged debts.
2. Substituted contract. The parties enter into a new con- 3. Alteration of a contract. If a party to a contract inten-
tract that revokes a prior contract. tionally alters it materially, the innocent party may opt
3. Novation. The parties agree to the substitution of a either to discharge the contract or enforce it on its orig-
third party for one of the original parties. The exiting inal or altered terms.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Accord 173 Condition subsequent 171 Novation 173
Accord and satisfaction 173 Covenant 169 Personal satisfaction test 171
Anti-assignment clause 162 Creditor beneficiary 166 Personal service contracts 160
Anti-delegation clause 164 Creditor beneficiary contract 166 Privity of contract 158
Approval clause 163 Declaration of duties 164 Promisee 165
Assignment and delegation 164 Delegate 163 Promisor 165
Assignment of future rights 160 Delegator 163 Reasonable person test 171
Assignment of rights 159 Delegation of duties 163 Satisfaction 173
Assignee 159 Discharge 176 Statute of limitations 175
Assignor 159 Donee beneficiary 165 Subsequent assignee
Assumption of duties 164 Donee beneficiary contract 165 (subassignee) 159
Commercial impracticability 175 Force majeure clauses 175 Substituted contract 173
Concurrent condition 171 Implied-in-fact condition 172 Third-party beneficiary 165
Condition 169 Impossibility of performance
Condition precedent 169 (objective impossibility) 173
Condition precedent based on Incidental beneficiary 167
satisfaction 171 Mutual rescission 172

Remember the case scenario at the beginning of the chapter would bring about the excuse of a condition? Who do you
involving the employment contract between Maco, Inc., and think would win in this dispute? For more information on
Brian Barrows? How are employment contracts different this situation, see the case Barrows v. Maco, Inc., 419 N.E.2d
from other contracts? Is there anything in this contract that 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
180 Chapter 7

Working the Web Internet Exercises www.west.net/~smith/contracts.htm. Review the
“Third Party Rights” section.
1. Which provision of the UCC permits assignment
2. Why does bankruptcy have the effect of discharging
and delegation? An extensive overview of contract
contractual obligations? See www.nolo.com and search
law can be found at the Contracts home page
for bankruptcy.
(Craig Smith, Santa Barbara College of Law) at
The number of days in the contract is very often an important Exercise:
term—for repayment, delivery of goods, and the like. The
Remember the basic facts from the Skill-Building Exercise in
number of days set out in the contract could refer to the days
Chapter 4 regarding Kelly’s purchase of a diamond ring
before something is to be done or after something is to be done.
from Sarah and the additional facts regarding the purchase
Depending on the contract, the provision regarding the date
price and interest in Chapter 5? Do you think that Sarah
might read as set out in one of the following two examples:
would want her money before or after turning the ring over
_______ will pay half of the total amount due within the to Kelly? Depending upon your opinion, and using one of
thirty days prior to the delivery of the goods. the above examples as a guide, draft a sentence for inclusion
in a purchase agreement relating to payment for and deliv-
_______ will pay the remaining half of the total amount due ery of the ring.
within the thirty days following the delivery of the goods.

Topic: Third Party Rights and Discharge the sale of equipment needed to make and sell ice cream to
an unknown entity.
(To the student: First reread the basic facts from the previous
Hands-On Drafting Exercises, paying special attention to Exercise/Assignment:
the facts relating to the sale of equipment from the exercises
Draft a provision prohibiting such an assignment for inclu-
in Chapters 4 and 6.)
sion into the sample Contract for Sale of Equipment set out
in Appendix C.
Facts:
Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., is concerned that
ABC Company will attempt to assign its rights to receive Use paragraph 17 of the Event Contract in Appendix C as a
payment in the amount of $100,000 under the contract for guide to drafting this assignment prohibition provision.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.1 Third Party Eugene H. Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.2 Third-Party Beneficiary
Emmick hired L. S. Hamm, an attorney, to draft his will. The Angelo Boussiacos hired Demetrios Sofias, a general con-
will named Robert Lucas and others (Lucas) as beneficiaries. tractor, to build a restaurant for him. Boussiacos entered
When Emmick died, it was discovered that the will was into a loan agreement with Bank of America (B of A)
improperly drafted, violated state law, and was therefore whereby B of A would provide the construction financing to
ineffective. Emmick’s estate was transferred pursuant to the build the restaurant. As is normal with most construction
state’s intestate laws. Lucas did not receive the $75,000 he loans, the loan agreement provided that loan funds would be
would have otherwise received had the will been valid. Lucas periodically disbursed by B of A to Boussiacos at different
sued Hamm for breach of the Emmick-Hamm contract to stages of construction, as requested by Boussiacos. Problems
recover what he would have received under the will. Who arose in the progress of the construction. When Boussiacos
wins? Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). did not pay Sofias for certain work that had been done,
Sofias sued B of A for breach of contract to collect payment Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.5 Anti-Assignment
directly from B of A. Can Sofias maintain the lawsuit against Clause In 1976, the city of Vancouver, Washington, con-
B of A? Sofias v. Bank of America, 218 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Ct. tracted with B & B Contracting Corporation (B & B) to
App. 1985). construct a well pump at a city-owned water station. The
contract contained the following anti-assignment clause:
Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.3 Assignment William
“The contractor shall not assign this contract or any part
John Cunningham, a professional basketball player, entered
thereof, or any moneys due or to become due thereunder.”
into a contract with Southern Sports Corporation, which
The work was not completed on time, and the city withheld
owned the Carolina Cougars, a professional basketball team.
$6,510 as liquidated damages from the contract price. B & B
The contract provided that Cunningham was to play basket-
assigned the claim to this money to Portland Electric and
ball for the Cougars for a three-year period, commencing on
Plumbing Company (PEPCo). PEPCo, as the assignee, filed
October 2, 1971. The contract contained a provision that it
suit against the City of Vancouver, alleging that the city had
could not be assigned to any other professional basketball
breached its contract with B & B by wrongfully refusing to
franchise without Cunningham’s approval. Subsequently,
pay $6,510 to B & B. Can PEPCo maintain the lawsuit against
Southern Sports Corporation sold its assets, including its
the City of Vancouver? Portland Elec. and Plumbing Co. v.
franchise and Cunningham’s contract, to the Munchak Cor-
City of Vancouver, 627 P.2d 1350 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
poration (Munchak). There was no change in the location of
the Cougars after the purchase. When Cunningham refused Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.6 Delegation of Duties
to play for the new owners, Munchak sued to enforce Cun- C. W. Milford owned a registered quarter horse named Hired
ningham’s contract. Was Cunningham’s contract assignable Chico. In March 1969, Milford sold the horse to Norman
to the new owner? Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d Stewart. Recognizing that Hired Chico was a good stud, Mil-
721 (4th Cir. 1972). ford included the following provision in the written contract
that was signed by both parties: “I, C. W. Milford, reserve 2
Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.4 Assignment In 1974,
breedings each year on Hired Chico registration #403692 for
Berliner Foods Corporation (Berliner), pursuant to an oral
the life of this stud horse regardless of whom the horse may
contract, became a distributor for Häagen-Dazs ice cream.
be sold to.” The agreement was filed with the county court
Over the next decade, both parties flourished as the market-
clerk of Shelby County, Texas. Stewart later sold Hired Chico
ing of high-quality, high-priced ice cream took hold. Ber-
to Sam McKinnie. Prior to purchasing the horse, McKinnie
liner successfully promoted the sale of Häagen-Dazs to
read the Milford-Stewart contract and testified that he under-
supermarket chains and other retailers in the Baltimore–
stood the terms of the contract. When McKinnie refused to
Washington, DC, area. In 1983, the Pillsbury Company
grant Milford the stud services of Hired Chico, Milford sued
acquired Häagen-Dazs. Pillsbury adhered to the oral distri-
McKinnie for breach of contract. Who wins? McKinnie v.
bution agreement and retained Berliner as a distributor for
Milford, 597 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App. 1980).
Häagen-Dazs ice cream. In December 1985, Berliner entered
into a contract and sold its assets to Dreyer’s, a manufacturer Critical Legal Thinking Case 7.7 Condition Shumann
of premium ice cream that competed with Häagen-Dazs. Investments, Inc. (Shumann), hired Pace Construction Cor-
Dreyer’s ice cream had previously been sold primarily in the poration (Pace), a general contractor, to build “Outlet World
western part of the United States. Dreyer’s attempted to of Pasco County.” In turn, Pace hired OBS Company, Inc.
expand its market to the east by choosing to purchase Ber- (OBS), a subcontractor, to perform the framing, drywall, insu-
liner as a means to obtain distribution in the mid-Atlantic lation, and stucco work on the project. The contract between
region. When Pillsbury learned of the sale, it advised Ber- Pace and OBS stipulated: “Final payment shall not become
liner that its distributorship for Häagen-Dazs was termi- due unless and until the following conditions precedent to
nated. Berliner, which wanted to remain a distributor for final payment have been satisfied . . . (c) receipt of final pay-
Häagen-Dazs, sued Pillsbury for breach of contract, alleging ment for subcontractor’s work by contractor from owner.”
that the oral distribution agreement with Häagen-Dazs and When Shumann refused to pay Pace, Pace refused to pay OBS.
Pillsbury was properly assigned to Dreyer’s. Who wins? Ber- OBS sued Pace to recover payment. Who wins? Pace Constr.
liner Foods Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 633 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. Corp. v. OBS Co., 531 So. 2d 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
1986).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 7.1 Pabagold, Inc. (Pabagold), a manufacturer Pabagold authorized Mediasmith to enter into agreements
and distributor of suntan lotions, hired Mediasmith, an adver- with third parties to place Pabagold advertisements for the
tising agency, to develop an advertising campaign for Paba- campaign and to make payments to these third parties for the
gold’s Hawaiian Gold Pabatan suntan lotion. In the contract, Pabagold account. Pabagold agreed to pay Mediasmith for its
182 Chapter 7
services and to reimburse it for expenses incurred on behalf of Outdoor Services and Pabagold were not in privity of con-
Pabagold. The Pabagold-Mediasmith contract provided for tract? Who wins? Outdoor Serv., Inc. v. Pabagold, Inc., 230
arbitration of any dispute arising under the contract. Cal. Rptr. 73 (Ct. App. 1986).
In April 1981, Mediasmith entered into a contract with Ethics Case 7.2 Indiana Tri-City Plaza Bowl (Tri-City)
Outdoor Services, Inc. (Outdoor Services), an outdoor leased a building from Charles H. Glueck for use as a bowl-
advertising company, to place Pabagold ads on billboards ing alley. The lease provided that Glueck was to provide ade-
owned by Outdoor Services. Outdoor Services provided the quate paved parking for the building. The lease gave Tri-City
agreed-upon work and billed Mediasmith $8,545 for its serv- the right to approve the plans for the construction and pav-
ices. Mediasmith requested payment of this amount from ing of the parking lot. When Glueck submitted paving plans
Pabagold so it could pay Outdoor Services. When Pabagold to Tri-City, it rejected the plans and withheld its approval.
refused to pay, Outdoor Services filed a demand for arbitra- Tri-City argued that the plans were required to meet its per-
tion as provided in the Pabagold-Mediasmith contract. sonal satisfaction before it had to approve them. Evidence
Pabagold defended, asserting that Outdoor Services could showed that the plans were commercially reasonable in the
not try to recover the money because it was not in privity of circumstances. A lawsuit was filed between Tri-City and
contract with Pabagold. Glueck. Who wins? Was it ethical for Tri-City to reject the
Did Pabagold act ethically in refusing to pay Outdoor plans? Indiana Tri-City Plaza Bowl v. Estate of Glueck, 422
Services? From a moral perspective, does it matter that N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

Read Case B.7 in Appendix B (Chase Precast Corporation v. 2. Why did the defendant not complete the contract?
John J. Paonessa Company, Inc.). This case is excerpted from 3. What does the doctrine of frustration of purpose
the appellate court opinion. Review and brief the case. After provide?
briefing the case, you should be able to answer the following 4. Did the doctrine of frustration of purpose excuse the
questions: defendant’s nonperformance?
1. Who were the contracting parties, and what did their
contract provide?
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: SATISFACTION CLAUSE
Commercial contracts often include “satisfaction clauses” that are designed to ensure
that an appropriate quality of performance is received before the promisee is obli-
gated to pay. But how satisfied must the contracting party be before there is an obli-
gation to pay? Consider the following case.
General Motors Corporation hired Baystone Construction, Inc. (Baystone), to
build an addition to a Chevrolet plant in Muncie, Indiana. Baystone, in turn, hired
Morin Building Products Company (Morin) to supply and erect the aluminum walls
for the addition. The contract required that the exterior siding of the walls be of
“aluminum with a mill finish and stucco embossed surface texture to match finish
and texture of existing metal siding.” The contract also included a satisfaction clause.
Morin put up the walls. The exterior siding did not give the impression of having a
uniform finish when viewed in bright sunlight from an acute angle and General
Motors’ representatives rejected it. Baystone removed Morin’s siding and hired
another subcontractor to replace it. General Motors approved the replacement siding.
When Baystone refused to pay Morin the $23,000 balance owing on the contract,
Morin brought suit against Baystone to recover this amount.
The trial court held in favor of Morin and permitted it to recover the balance
from Baystone. The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the objective
reasonable person standard governed the satisfaction clauses in this commercial

dispute.
The reasonable person standard applies to most contracts involving commercial
quality, operative fitness, or mechanical utility that other knowledgeable persons can
judge. The court of appeals held that Baystone was not justified in rejecting Morin’s
work under the reasonable person standard. The court stated, “The building for
which the aluminum siding was intended was a factory. Aesthetic considerations
were decidedly secondary to considerations of function and cost. The parties proba-
bly did not intend to subject Morin’s rights to aesthetic whims.” Morin Building Prod-
ucts Co., Inc. v. Baystone Construction, Inc., 717 F. 2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983).
1. Do you think General Motors was justified in rejecting Morin’s work in this
case?
2. Should the law adopt the personal satisfaction test to judge compliance with
satisfaction clauses in all instances? Why or why not?
Contracts must not be sports of an idle hour, mere matters of
pleasantry and badinage, never intended by the parties to have any
serious effect whatsoever.
—Lord Stowell
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hag. Con. 54, at 105 (1811).
chapter 8
REMEDIES FOR BREACH
OF TRADITIONAL AND
E-CONTRACTS
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing L.C., Inc., a large CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
maker of sportswear in the United States. L.C. is a well-known name in fashion,
with sales of over $1 billion per year. The company distributes its products should be able to:
through 9,000 retail outlets in the United States. Another company, Fragrance, 1. Explain how complete performance
Inc., is a major producer of fragrances, toiletries, and cosmetics, with annual discharges contractual duties.
sales of more than $3 billion a year. L.C. wanted to promote its well-known 2. Identify inferior performance and the
material breach of a contract.
name on perfumes and cosmetics, so it entered into a joint venture with
3. Describe compensatory, consequential,
Fragrance, Inc. Under the contract, L.C. would make available its names, and nominal damages.
trademarks, and marketing experience, and Fragrance would engage in the
4. Define the equitable remedies of specific
procurement and manufacture of the fragrances, toiletries, and cosmetics. The performance, reformation, and injunction.
parties agreed to equally share the financial requirements of the joint venture. 5. Describe torts associated with contracts.
During its first year of operation, the joint venture had sales of more than
$16 million. In the second year, sales increased to $26 million, making it one of
the fastest growing fragrance and cosmetic lines in the country. It is now one year
later and Fragrance has refused to continue procuring and manufacturing the
line of fragrances and cosmetics for the joint venture. The Christmas season is
fast approaching, and L.C. has been unable to obtain the necessary fragrances
and cosmetics from any other source.
185
186 Chapter 8
The three levels of performance of a contract are complete, substantial, and inferior.
Complete (or strict) performance by a party discharges that party’s duties under
the contract. Substantial performance constitutes a minor breach of the contract.
Inferior performance constitutes a material breach that impairs or destroys the
essence of the contract. Various remedies may be obtained by a nonbreaching party
breach of contract if a breach of contract occurs—that is, if a contracting party fails to perform an
If a contracting party fails to perform absolute duty owed under a contract.1
an absolute duty owed under a The most common remedy for a breach of contract is an award of monetary
contract. damages, often called the “law remedy.” If a monetary award does not provide ade-
monetary damages quate relief, however, the court may order any one of several equitable remedies,
An award of money. including specific performance, reformation, and injunction. Equitable remedies
are based on the concept of fairness.
equitable remedies
Remedies based on the concept of
This chapter discusses breach of contract and the remedies available to the
fairness, such as specific perform- nonbreaching party.
ance, reformation, and injunction.
Karen Billieu is a graduate of wishes are carried out or, in the case of intestacy,
the Paralegal Studies Program that the estate is distributed according to statute.
at the University of Cincinnati. This may involve the sale of real estate, automo-
She has been a paralegal for biles, and other personal property; however, occa-
seven years. She currently works sionally, the sale, distribution, or liquidation of a
in the areas of probate and business interest is required. I review all real estate
estate planning for the law firm listing contracts and purchase contracts and pre-
of Katz, Greenberger & Norton pare fiduciary deeds for the attorney’s review.
LLP in Cincinnati, Ohio. Where a business interest is involved, I initially
review all partnership or incorporation documents
In the area of estate planning, I am responsible for and report any requirements for sale or transfer of
drafting wills, powers of attorney, and advance interest to the attorney and then draft or review the
directives for the attorney’s review. Many of our contracts or other documents required to affect the
clients wish to create revocable or irrevocable trust sale or transfer, for the attorney’s approval.
agreements or family limited liability companies for The attorney relies on me to identify areas of
asset protection and probate avoidance. Because concern or unusual requirements, to research all
these are contracts, I am required to ensure that statutory requirements, to be the main contact for
each document meets the statutory requirements clients, and to maintain the timely progression of
for all contracts and adequately accomplishes the the probate of a decedent’s estate or the completion
client’s testamentary wishes. of a client’s estate plan. In this way, we are able to
In the area of probate, I am responsible for provide a more efficient and cost-effective service
assisting the attorney in ensuring that the decedent’s to our clients.
1
Remedies for Breach of Traditional and E-Contracts 187
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: BUSINESS FORMATION PARALEGAL
A business formation paralegal can be involved with contracts relating to the formation
of corporate entities in the following ways:
• Check name availability and reserve or register corporate name.
• Draft and file articles or certificate of incorporation.
• Draft bylaws.
• Draft notices of organizational meetings and resolutions to be adopted.
• Draft minutes of organizational meeting of incorporator(s), stockholders or
board of directors, or written consents in lieu of meeting.
• Assemble and maintain corporate minute book.
• Order corporate seal.
• Draft documents necessary to issue stock certificates, including subscription
agreements, receipts, stock certificates, restrictive legends, investment letters,
stock and stockholder registers, and trust agreements.
• Assist with the establishment of a bank account.
• Prepare and file application for federal employer identification number.
• Prepare and file appropriate state tax registrations, including workers’ compensation
and unemployment insurance.
• Prepare and file election by a small-business corporation and draft stockholder
consents to such election.
• Prepare and file documents and forms necessary to secure appropriate local
business licenses.
• Prepare and file assumed name certificates.
• Prepare and file appropriate applications for professional or special purpose
corporations.
• Prepare and file appropriate Internal Revenue Service forms concerning the
formation of nonprofit corporations.
• Draft employment agreements and confidentiality agreements for corporate
officers and key employees.
• Draft stockholders agreement.
• Draft lease agreement.
• Draft buy-sell agreement.
Performance and Breach

If a contractual duty has not been discharged (i.e., terminated) or excused (i.e.,
relieved of legal liability), the contracting party owes an absolute duty (i.e., cove-
nant) to perform the duty. As mentioned in the chapter introduction, the three
types of performance of a contract are complete performance, substantial perform-
ance (or minor breach), and inferior performance (or material breach). These con-
cepts are discussed in the following paragraphs.
complete performance
Occurs when a party to a contract
COMPLETE PERFORMANCE renders performance exactly as
required by the contract; discharges
Most contracts are discharged by the complete performance (or strict perform- that party’s obligations under the
ance) of the contracting parties. Complete performance occurs when a party to a contract.
188 Chapter 8
executed contract contract renders performance exactly as required by the contract. A fully per-
A contract that has been fully formed contract is called an executed contract.
performed on both sides; a Note that tender of performance also discharges a party’s contractual obliga-
completed contract. tions. Tender is an unconditional and absolute offer by a contracting party to per-
tender of performance form his or her obligations under the contract.
Tender is an unconditional and
Example: Suppose Ashley’s Dress Shops, Inc., contracts to purchase dresses from a
absolute offer by a contracting party
to perform his or her obligations
manufacturer for $25,000. Ashley’s has performed its obligation under the contract
under the contract. Occurs when a once it tenders the $25,000 to the manufacturer. If the manufacturer fails to deliver
party who has the ability and the dresses, Ashley’s can sue it for breach of contract.
willingness to perform offers to
complete the performance of his or
her duties under the contract. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE: MINOR BREACH
substantial performance Substantial performance occurs when there has been a minor breach of contract.
Performance by a contracting party
In other words, it occurs when a party to a contract renders performance that devi-
that deviates only slightly from com-
ates slightly from complete performance. The nonbreaching party may try to con-
plete performance.
vince the breaching party to elevate his or her performance to complete
minor breach performance. If the breaching party does not correct the breach, the nonbreaching
A breach that occurs when a party party can sue to recover damages by (1) deducting the cost to repair the defect from
renders substantial performance of the contract price and remitting the balance to the breaching party or (2) suing the
his or her contractual duties.
breaching party to recover the cost to repair the defect if the breaching party has
already been paid (see Exhibit 8.1).
Example: Suppose Donald Trump contracts with Big Apple Construction Co. to
have Big Apple construct an office building for $50 million. The architectural plans
call for installation of three-ply windows in the building. Big Apple constructs the
building exactly to plan except that it installs two-ply windows. There has been
substantial performance. It would cost $300,000 to install the correct windows. If
Big Apple agrees to replace the windows, its performance is elevated to complete
performance, and Trump must remit the entire contract price. However, if Trump
has to hire someone else to replace the windows, he may deduct this cost of repair
from the contract price and remit the difference to Big Apple.
material breach INFERIOR PERFORMANCE: MATERIAL BREACH

A breach that occurs when a party
renders inferior performance of his A material breach of a contract occurs when a party renders inferior performance
or her contractual duties. of his or her contractual obligations that impairs or destroys the essence of the con-
inferior performance tract. There is no clear line between a minor breach and a material breach. A deter-
Occurs when a party fails to perform mination is made on a case-by-case basis.
express or implied contractual Where there has been a material breach of contract, the nonbreaching party
obligations that impair or destroy may rescind the contract and seek restitution of any compensation paid under the
the essence of the contract. contract to the breaching party. The nonbreaching party is discharged from any
EXHIBIT 8.1 Remedy Where There Has Been Substantial Performance (Minor Breach)
Contract
Contracting Contracting
Party A Party A breaches the contract Party B
(Breaching (Substantial performance) (Nonbreaching
Party) Party)
Party B may
1. Recover damages
EXHIBIT 8.2 Remedies Where There Has Been Inferior Performance (Material Breach)
Contract
Contracting Contracting
Party A Party A breaches the contract Party B
(Breaching (Inferior performance) (Nonbreaching
Party) Party)
Party B may
1. Recover damages
or
2. Rescind the contract
further performance under the contract.2 Alternatively, the nonbreaching party

may treat the contract as being in effect and sue the breaching party to recover
damages (see Exhibit 8.2).
Example: Suppose a university contracts with a general contractor to build a new
three-story building with classroom space for 1,000 students. However, the com-
pleted building can support the weight of only 500 students because the contractor
used inferior materials. The defect cannot be repaired without rebuilding the entire
structure. Because this is a material breach, the university may rescind the contract
and require the removal of the building. The university is discharged of any obliga-
tions under the contract and free to employ another contractor to rebuild the
building. Alternatively, the university could accept the building and deduct from
the contract price damages caused by the defect.
ANTICIPATORY BREACH
Anticipatory breach (or anticipatory repudiation) of a contract occurs when the anticipatory breach
contracting party informs the other party in advance that he or she will not per- A breach that occurs when one
form his or her contractual duties when due. This type of material breach can be contracting party informs the other
expressly stated or implied from the conduct of the repudiator. Where there is an that he or she will not perform his or
anticipatory repudiation, the nonbreaching party’s obligations under the contract her contractual duties when due.
are discharged immediately. The nonbreaching party also has the right to sue the
repudiating party when the anticipatory breach occurs; there is no need to wait
until performance is due.3
Concept Summary
Type of Performance Legal Consequence
Complete performance The contract is discharged.
Substantial performance (minor The nonbreaching party may recover damages
breach) caused by the breach.
Inferior performance (mate- The nonbreaching party may either (1) rescind
rial breach) the contract and recover restitution or (2) affirm
the contract and recover damages.
2
3
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 253; UCC Section 2-610.
190 Chapter 8
In Case 8.1, the court found a breach of contract.
CASE 8.1 BREACH OF CONTRACT

Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2002).
“Because West concedes that the manuscript was of high quality and that
it declined to publish it solely for commercial reasons rather than because of
any defect in its form and content, we hold as a matter of law that
West breached its agreement with Chodos.”
Judge Reinhardt,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Facts
Rafael Chodos is a California attorney who specializes in the law of fiduciary duty,
which includes a party’s obligation to act honestly and with loyalty when performing
his or her legal duties to another. Chodos sent a detailed proposal and table of con-
tents to Bancroft-Whitney, the leading publisher of legal texts, to write a treatise on
fiduciary duties. The editors at Bancroft-Whitney were enthusiastic about the pro-
posal and sent Chodos a standard-form “author agreement” that set forth the terms
of the publishing contract. Chodos was to be paid 15 percent of the gross revenues
from the sales of the treatise. Chodos and Bancroft-Whitney signed the agreement.
For three years, Chodos wrote the manuscript. He significantly limited the
time spent on his law practice and spent over 3,600 hours writing the manuscript.
During this time, Chodos worked with editors of Bancroft-Whitney in developing
and editing the manuscript. Midway through this period, West Publishing Group
purchased Bancroft-Whitney, and the two companies merged. The Bancroft-
Whitney editors, now employed by West, continued to work with Chodos on edit-
ing and developing the manuscript. Three years after beginning, Chodos submitted
the final manuscript to West. West editors suggested changes to the manuscript,
which Chodos completed. West sent Chodos a letter, apologizing for delays in
publication and assuring him publication would take place within three months.
However, one month after the promised publication date, Chodos received a
letter from West’s marketing department, stating that West had decided not to
publish Chodos’s manuscript because it did not “fit with [West’s] current product
mix” and because of concerns about its “market potential.” West admitted, how-
ever, that the manuscript was of “high quality” and that its decision was not due to
any literary shortcomings of Chodos’s work. Chodos filed a lawsuit against West,
alleging breach of contract. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of West. Chodos appealed.
Issue
Did West Publishing breach the author agreement it had with Chodos?

The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that Chodos worked diligently in coope-
ration with West—indeed with West’s encouragement—to produce a work that
met the highest professional standard, and that he was successful in that venture.
His performance was induced by an agreement that permitted rejection of the com-
pleted manuscript only for deficiencies in “form and content.” Chodos thus labored
to complete a work of high quality with the expectation that, if he did so, it would be
published. He devoted thousands of hours of labor to the venture, and passed up
substantial professional opportunities, only for West to decide that due to the vagar-
ies of its internal reorganizations and changes in its business strategies or in the
national economy or the market for legal treaties, his work, albeit admittedly of high
quality, was for naught. It would be inequitable, if not unconscionable, for an author
to be forced to bear this considerable burden solely because of his publisher’s change
of management, its poor planning, or its inadequate financial analyses at the time it
entered into the contract, or even because of an unexpected change in the market-
place. Moreover, to allow a publisher to escape its contractual obligations for these
reasons would be directly contrary to both the language and the spirit of the stand-
ard Author Agreement.
In sum, we reject the district court’s determination that West acted within its
discretion afforded it by the Author Agreement when it decided not to publish Chodos’s
manuscript. Because West concedes that the manuscript was of high quality and
that it declined to publish it solely for commercial reasons rather than because of any
defect in its form and content, we hold as a matter of law that West breached its
agreement with Chodos.
Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that West Publishing had
breached its contract with Chodos. The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of West, remanded the case to the U.S. District
Court to enter summary judgment as to liability in Chodos’s favor, and ordered
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the court of appeals.

1. Critical Thinking: Should a court enforce the terms of a contract literally?
Or should the court give contracts a broad interpretation, as requested by
West Publishing?
2. Ethics: Did West Publishing act ethically in this case? Should it have read
Chodos’s treatise on fiduciary duty before terminating its contract with
Chodos?
3. Critical Thinking: If West Publishing wanted to reserve the right to termi-
nate its contract with Chodos based on changes in its own marketing strat-
egy, company reorganization, or changes in the marketplace, how should
West have done so? What amount of money should West have paid Chodos?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department, at www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad1.
2. Visit the website of West Group at www.westgroup.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article or case about a breach of a contract.
192 Chapter 8
E-Commerce & Information

Technology
Breach of an Internet Contract
A contract is a contract is a contract, even if it is over the Internet. Con-
sider the following case. The Hotmail Corporation (Hotmail) is a Silicon
Valley company that provides free e-mail on the Internet. Hotmail’s
online services allow its millions of registered subscribers to exchange
e-mail messages on the Internet. The company registered the name
“Hotmail” as a federal trademark and obtained the Internet domain
name “hotmail.com.” Every e-mail sent by a Hotmail subscriber auto-
matically displays Hotmail’s domain name and mark. To become a
Hotmail subscriber, one must agree to abide by a Service Agreement by
clicking an “accept” prompt on the computer screen. This click-wrap
contract expressly prohibits subscribers from using Hotmail’s services to
send unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail, or “spam,” or to send obscene
or pornographic messages. The transmission of spam is a practice
widely condemned by the Internet community.
In the fall of 1997, Hotmail discovered that defendants Van$ Money
Pie Inc.; ALS Enterprises, Inc.; LCGM, Inc.; and the Genesis Network,
Inc., created Hotmail accounts that were facilitating their sending
spam e-mail to Hotmail subscribers. The spam messages advertised
pornography and “get-rich-quick” schemes, among other things. Hot-
mail was inundated with complaints from its subscribers who had
received the spam and faced the loss of customers as well as an over-
loading of its services from the spam e-mail.
Hotmail sued the defendants in district court for breach of contract
and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from
sending spam e-mail using Hotmail accounts, domain name, and
mark. This district court agreed with Hotmail on its breach of contract
claim, stating:
The evidence supports a finding that plaintiff Hotmail will
likely prevail on its breach of contract claim and that there
are at least serious questions going to the merits of this claim
in that plaintiff has presented evidence of the following: that
defendants obtained a number of Hotmail mail-boxes and
access to Hotmail’s services; that in so doing defendants
agreed to abide by Hotmail’s Terms of Service which prohibit
using a Hotmail account for purposes of sending spam and/
or pornography; that defendants breached their contract
with Hotmail by using Hotmail’s services to facilitate sending
spam and/or pornography; that Hotmail complied with the
conditions of the contract except those from which its per-
formance was excused; and that if defendants are not
enjoined they will continue to create such accounts in viola-
tion of the Terms of Service.
The district court enforced the click-wrap contract and held the
defendants in breach of Hotmail’s Internet contract. The court issued
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from using Hot-
mail accounts or Hotmail’s domain name or mark to send spam.
Hotmail Corporation v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc. , 47 U.S.P.Q. 1020
(N.D.Cal. 1998).
ARBITRATION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

The use of the court system to resolve business and other disputes—including
breach of contract—can take years and cost thousands, if not millions, of dollars in
legal fees and expenses. In commercial litigation, the normal business operations
of the parties are often disrupted. To avoid or lessen these problems, businesses are
increasingly turning to methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other
aids to resolve disputes. One of the most common forms of ADR is arbitration. arbitration
Other forms of ADR are mediation, conciliation, mini-trial, fact finding, and using The submission of a dispute to an
a judicial referee. Arbitration clauses are frequently found in contracts. These impartial third party as an alterna-
clauses essentially require disputes to be resolved in a private forum rather than a tive to traditional litigation in court.
court. Arbitration clauses can be found everywhere these days; from cell phone
contracts to video rental contracts.
In arbitration, the parties choose an impartial third party to hear and decide
the dispute. This neutral party is called the arbitrator. Arbitrators are usually mem-
bers of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or another arbitration asso-
ciation. Labor union agreements, franchise agreements, leases, and other
commercial contracts often contain arbitration clauses that require disputes arising
out of the contract to be submitted to arbitration. If there is no arbitration clause,
the parties can enter into a submission agreement whereby they agree to submit a
dispute to arbitration after the dispute arises.
Evidence and testimony are presented to the arbitrator at a hearing held for
this purpose. Less formal evidentiary rules are usually applied in arbitration hear-
ings than at court. After the hearing, the arbitrator reaches a decision and enters an
award. The parties often agree in advance to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision
and award. If the parties have not so agreed, the arbitrator’s award can be appealed
to the court. The court gives great deference to the arbitrator’s decision.
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act to promote the arbitration of
disputes. About half of the states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act. This
act promotes the arbitration of disputes at the state level. Many federal and state
courts have instituted programs to refer legal disputes—which include contract
disputes—to arbitration or another form of ADR.
Arbitration clauses might immediately seem as though they exist to favor
companies. However, for the individual, arbitration clauses can provide a resolu-
tion that is faster and cheaper than going to court.
Monetary Damages
A nonbreaching party may recover monetary damages from a breaching party.
Monetary damages are available whether the breach was minor or material. Several
compensatory damages
types of monetary damages may be awarded. These include compensatory, conse- An award of money intended to
quential, liquidated, and nominal damages. compensate a nonbreaching party
for the loss of the bargain; they
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES place the nonbreaching party in the
same position as if the contract had
Compensatory damages are intended to compensate a nonbreaching party for the been fully performed by restoring
loss of the bargain. In other words, they place the nonbreaching party in the same the “benefit of the bargain.” Dam-
position as if the contract had been fully performed by restoring the “benefit of ages that are generally equal to the
the bargain.” difference between the value of the
goods as warranted and the actual
Example: Suppose Lederle Laboratories enters into a written contract to employ a value of the goods accepted at the
manager for three years at a salary of $6,000 per month. Before work starts, the time and place of acceptance.
194 Chapter 8
manager is informed that he or she will not be needed. This is a material breach of
contract. Assume the manager finds another job, but it pays only $5,000 a month.
The manager may recover $1,000 per month for 36 months (a total of $36,000)
from Lederle Laboratories as compensatory damages. These damages place the
manager in the same situation as if the contract with Lederle had been performed.
The amount of compensatory damages that will be awarded for breach of
contract depends on the type of contract involved and which party breached
the contract. The award of compensatory damages in some special types of con-
tracts is discussed in the following paragraphs.
SALE OF GOODS
Compensatory damages for a breach of a sales contract involving goods are gov-
erned by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The usual measure of damages
for a breach of a sales contract is the difference between the contract price and the
market price of the goods at the time and place the goods were to be delivered.4
Example: Suppose Revlon, Inc., contracted to buy a piece of equipment from
Greenway Supply Co. for $20,000 and the equipment is not delivered. Revlon then
purchases the equipment from another vendor but has to pay $25,000 because the
current market price for the equipment has risen. Revlon can recover $5,000—the
difference between the market price paid ($25,000) and the contract price
($20,000)—in compensatory damages.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
A construction contract arises when the owner of real property contracts to have a
contractor build a structure or do other construction work. The compensatory
damages recoverable for a breach of a construction contract vary with the stage of
completion the project is in when the breach occurs.
The contractor may recover the profits he or she would have made on the con-
tract if the owner breaches the construction contract before construction begins.
Example: Suppose RXZ Corporation contracts to have Ace Construction Co. build
a factory for $1.2 million. It will cost Ace $800,000 in materials and labor to build
the factory for RXZ. If RXZ Corporation breaches the contract before construction
begins, Ace can recover $400,000 in “lost profit.”
Example: Assume in the prior example that Ace Construction Co. had spent
$300,000 on materials and labor before RXZ breached the contract. Here, Ace can
recover $700,000—$400,000 lost profit plus $300,000 expended on materials and labor.
If the builder breaches a construction contract, either before or during con-
struction, the owner can recover the increased cost above the contract price that he
or she has to pay to have the work completed by another contractor.
Example: Suppose that in the previous instance, Ace Construction Co. which had
contracted to build the factory for RXZ for $1.2 million, breached the contract by
refusing to build the factory. Assume that RXZ Corporation has to pay $1.5 million
to have the same factory built by another contractor. RXZ can recover the increased
cost of construction ($300,000) from Ace as compensatory damages.
4
UCC Sections 2-708 and 2-713.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
An employee whose employer breaches an employment contract can recover lost
wages or salary as compensatory damages. If the employee breaches the contract,
the employer can recover the costs to hire a new employee plus any increase in sal-
ary paid to the replacement.
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
If a contract has been breached, the law places a duty on the innocent nonbreaching
party to take reasonable efforts to mitigate (i.e., avoid and reduce) the resulting dam- mitigation of damages
ages. The extent of mitigation required depends on the type of contract involved. When a contract has been
If an employer breaches an employment contract, the employee owes a duty breached, the law places a duty on
to mitigate damages by trying to find substitute employment. The employee is only the innocent nonbreaching party to
required to accept comparable employment. The courts consider such factors as avoid and reduce the resulting
damages.
compensation, rank, status, job description, and geographic location in determin-
ing the comparability of jobs.
In Case 8.2, the court had to decide whether jobs were comparable.
CASE 8.2 MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970).
“The female lead as a dramatic actress in a Western-style motion picture can
by no stretch of imagination be considered the equivalent of or substantially
similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.”
Judge Burke,
Supreme Court of California
Facts
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (Fox), a major film production studio,
entered into an employment contract with Shirley MacLaine Parker (Parker), an
actress. Under the contract, Parker was to play the leading female role in a musical
production called Bloomer Girl, to be filmed in Los Angeles. In the movie, Parker
would be able to use her talents as a dancer and as an actress. The contract pro-
vided that Parker was to be paid guaranteed compensation of $53,571.42 per week
for 14 weeks, for a total of $750,000. One month before filming was to start, Fox
sent Parker a letter, notifying her it was not going to film Bloomer Girl. However,
the letter offered Parker the leading female role in a film tentatively titled Big
Country, which was a dramatic western to be filmed in Australia. The compensa-
tion Fox offered Parker was identical to that offered for Bloomer Girl. Fox gave
Parker one week to accept. She did not, and the offer expired. Parker sued Fox to
recover the guaranteed compensation provided in the Bloomer Girl contract. The
trial court granted summary judgment to Parker. Fox appealed.
Issue
Was the job that Fox offered Parker in Big Country comparable employment that
Parker was obligated to accept to mitigate damages?
196 Chapter 8

The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee
is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount that the
employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort
might have earned from other employment. However, before projected earnings from
other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee
can be applied, in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was
comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived,
the employee’s rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different
or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages.
Applying the foregoing rules to the record in the present case, with all intend-
ments in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment motion—here, defend-
ant Fox—it is clear that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff’s failure to accept
defendant’s tendered substitute employment could not be applied in mitigation of
damages because the offer of the Big Country lead was of employment both different
and inferior, and that no factual dispute was presented on that issue. The mere cir-
cumstances that Bloomer Girl was to be a musical review, calling upon plaintiff’s
talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be produced in the City of Los
Angeles, whereas Big Country was a straight dramatic role in a Western-type story
taking place in an opal mine in Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind
between the two employments. The female lead as a dramatic actress in a Western-
style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered the equivalent of
or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.
Decision
The supreme court held that the job that Fox offered to Parker in Big Country was
not comparable employment to the role Fox had contracted Parker to play in
Bloomer Girl. Therefore, Parker did not fail to mitigate damages by refusing to
accept such employment. The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s summary
judgment in favor of Parker.

1. Critical Thinking: Should nonbreaching parties be under a duty to mitigate
damages caused by the breaching party? Why or why not?
2. Ethics: Did Fox act ethically in this case? Did Parker?
3. Critical Thinking: Who is most likely to be able to mitigate damages when
there is a breach of an employment contract: (1) the president of a large cor-
poration, (2) a middle manager, or (3) a bank teller?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the Supreme Court of California at www.courtsinfo.ca.gov/courts/
supreme.
2. Visit the website of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation at www.
foxmovies.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the doctrine of mitiga-
tion of damages.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
In addition to compensatory damages, a nonbreaching party can sometimes
recover consequential damages (or special damages) from the breaching party. consequential (or special) damages
Consequential damages are foreseeable damages that arise from circumstances out- Foreseeable damages that arise
side a contract. To be liable for consequential damages, the breaching party must from circumstances outside the
know or have reason to know that the breach will cause special damages to the contract. To be liable for these
other party. damages, the breaching party must
know or have reason to know that
Example: Suppose Soan-Allen Co., a wholesaler, enters into a contract to purchase the breach will cause special
1,000 men’s suits for $150 each from Fabric Manufacturing Co., a manufacturer. damages to the other party.
Prior to contracting, the wholesaler tells the manufacturer that the suits will be
resold to retailers for $225. The manufacturer breaches the contract by failing to
manufacture the suits. The wholesaler cannot get the suits manufactured by any-
one else in time to meet his contracts. Soan-Allen Co. can recover $75,000 of lost
profits on the resale contracts (1,000 suits 3 $75 profit) as consequential damages
from the manufacturer because the manufacturer knew of this special damage to
Soan-Allen Co. if it breached the contract.
CASE 8.3 LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 506 So. 2d 317 (Ala. 1987).
Facts
Super Valu Stores, Inc. (Super Valu), a wholesale operator of supermarkets,
developed a new concept for a market called “County Market.” The basic concept
of the County Market was that it must be the lowest-priced store in the market-
place and operate on a high-volume, low-profit margin structure. In 1981, Super
Valu purchased a parcel of property in Oxford, Alabama, for the development of
a County Market.
It planned to lease the store to an independent retailer to operate. Thomas J.
Peterson, who was an executive of Super Valu, applied for the operator’s position
at the proposed store. In January 1984, Peterson was approved as the retail opera-
tor of the proposed Oxford County Market. On February 24, 1984, Peterson retired
from Super Valu so that he could operate the new store. When Super Valu failed to
construct and lease the store to Peterson, he sued Super Valu for breach of con-
tract. The trial court held in favor of Peterson and awarded him $5 million in lost
profits that would have been derived by him from the store. Super Valu appealed.
Issue
Are lost profits from an unestablished business recoverable as consequential
damages even though it can be argued that they are inherently too speculative
and conjectural?

We are of the opinion that the jury’s award of damages to Peterson is completely
consistent with the law of Alabama and with the evidence in this case. Current
Alabama law, like the law of other states, authorizes recovery of anticipated profits
198 Chapter 8
of an unestablished business, if proved with reasonable certainty. This general rule is

applied in most states and is referred to as the “rule of reasonable certainty.” This
Court’s explicit rationale for applying the reasonable certainty rule was its recogni-
tion that to disallow damages for loss of reasonably certain future profits would
encourage breach of contract with new business. The rule in Alabama is that jury
verdicts awarding lost profits will be affirmed if the plaintiff provides a basis upon
which the jury could, with reasonable certainty, calculate the amount of profits that
were lost as a result of defendant’s wrongful actions.
The fundamental basis for Peterson’s evidence as to damages was Super Valu’s
own projections of profits, produced in its normal course of business long before this
dispute arose. These projections were the product of an intense, exhaustive process
involving many different Super Valu personnel. Super Valu’s projections resulted
from the application of a scientific methodology that for many years had accurately
predicted the future performance of stores associated with Super Valu. These projec-
tions were also based upon the prior successful performances of the Super Valu busi-
ness system, of which the Oxford County Market would have become a standardized
part. The jury could have found that Super Valu and Peterson relied upon these
profit projections in making their initial decision to go forward with the Oxford
County Market store.
Decision
The state supreme court held that lost profits from an unestablished business can
be recovered as consequential damages if they can be determined with reasonable
certainty. The court held that such damages were determined with reasonable cer-
tainty in this case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

1. Critical Thinking: Are lost profits too speculative to be awarded in breach
of contract actions?
2. Ethics: Did Super Valu act ethically by denying liability in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: If unestablished businesses could not recover lost profits,
would there be more or fewer breaches of contract with such businesses?
Under certain circumstances, the parties to a contract may agree in advance

to the amount of damages payable upon a breach of contract. These damages are
liquidated damages called liquidated damages. To be lawful, the actual damages must be difficult or
Damages to which parties to a impracticable to determine, and the liquidated amount must be reasonable in the
contract agree in advance if the circumstances.5 An enforceable liquidated damages clause is an exclusive remedy,
contract is breached. Damages that even if actual damages are later determined to be different.
are specified in the contract rather A liquidated damages clause is considered a penalty if actual damages are
than determined by the court.
clearly determinable in advance or if the liquidated damages are excessive or
Damages that will be paid upon a
unconscionable. If a liquidated damages clause is found to be a penalty, it is unen-
breach of contract and that are
established in advance.
forceable. The nonbreaching party may then recover actual damages.
In Cases 8.4 and 8.5, the court had to decide whether a liquidated damages
penalty clause was enforceable.
Punishment imposed by law (the
penalty of imprisonment).
5

Uzan v. 845 UN Ltd. P’ship, 778 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2004).
“In his affidavit Donald Trump stated that he sought 25% down payments from
preconstruction purchasers at the Trump World Tower because of the substantial
length of time between contract signing and closing, during which period 845 UN
had to keep the units off the market, and because of the obvious associated risks.”
Judge Mazzarelli,
Facts
The Trump World Tower was a luxury condominium building to be constructed at
845 United Nations Plaza in Manhattan, New York. It would be New York City’s
highest residential building. 845 UN Limited Partnership (845 UN) began selling
condominiums at the building before the building was constructed. Donald Trump
is the managing general partner of 845 UN. The condominium offering plan required
a nonrefundable down payment of 25 percent of the purchase price. The pur-
chase contract provided that if a purchaser defaulted and did not complete the
purchase, 845 UN could keep the 25 percent down payment as liquidated damages.
Cem Uzan and Hakan Uzan, brothers and Turkish billionaires, each con-
tracted to purchase two condominium units on the top floors of the building. Cem
and Hakan were both represented by attorneys and took two months of negotia-
tions and many draft purchase agreements in which they obtained special conces-
sions from 845 UN regarding the purchase of their units for a total cost of
$32 million. Over the course of two years, while the building was being constructed,
the brothers paid the 25 percent nonrefundable down payment of $8 million.
On September 11, 2001, before the building was complete, terrorists attacked
New York City by flying two planes into the World Trade Center, the city’s two
tallest buildings, murdering thousands of people. Thereafter, the Uzans’ attorneys
delivered a letter to 845 UN stating,
We believe that our clients are entitled to rescind their Purchase Agree-
ments in view of the terrorist attack which occurred on September 11 and
has not abated. In particular, our clients are concerned that the top floors
in a “trophy” building, described as the tallest residential building in the
world, will be an attractive terrorist target. The situation is further aggra-
vated by the fact that the building bears the name of Donald Trump, per-
haps the most widely known symbol of American capitalism. Finally, the
United Nations complex brings even more attention to this location.
That day, 845 UN sent Cem and Hakan default letters notifying them that
they had 30 days to cure their default. Upon the expiration of the cure period, 845
UN terminated the four purchase agreements and kept the 25 percent down pay-
ments on the four condominiums as liquidated damages. Cem and Hakan sued
845 UN, alleging that the 25 percent nonrefundable down payment was an unen-
forceable and unconscionable penalty that should be returned to them. 845 UN
defended, arguing that the 25 percent nonrefundable down payment was an
enforceable liquidated damage clause. The trial court granted 845 UN partial sum-
mary judgment finding that Cem and Hakan had to forfeit a 10 percent down pay-
ment. 845 UN appealed.
200 Chapter 8
Issue
Is the 25 percent nonrefundable down payment enforceable liquidated damages,
or is it an unconscionable and unenforceable penalty?

In his affidavit Donald Trump stated that he sought 25% down payments from pre-
construction purchasers at the Trump World Tower because of the substantial length
of time between contract signing and closing, during which period 845 UN had to
keep the units off the market, and because of the obvious associated risks. Trump
also affirmed that down payments in the range of 20% to 25% are standard practice
in the new construction luxury condominium submarket in New York City.
It is clear that plaintiffs are not entitled to a return of any portion of their
down payment. Here the 25% down payment was a specifically negotiated element
of the contracts. There is no question that this was an arm’s length transaction. The
parties were sophisticated businesspeople, represented by counsel, who spent two
months at the bargaining table before executing the amended purchase agreements.
Further, the record evidences that it is customary in the preconstruction luxury
condominium industry for parties to price the risk of default at 25% of the purchase
price. The purchase agreements included a detailed nonrefundable down payment
clause to which plaintiffs’ counsel had negotiated a specific amendment. That amend-
ment allowed for the payment of 25% of the purchase price in three installments: 10%
at contract, an additional 7 1/2% 12 months later, and a final 7 1/2% 18 months
later. Clearly, plaintiffs were fully aware of and accepted the requirement of a nonre-
fundable 25% down payment for these luxury preconstruction condominiums.
The detailed provision concerning the nonrefundable deposit was integral to
the transaction. If plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the 25% nonrefundable down pay-
ment provision in the purchase agreements, the time to have voiced objection was at
the bargaining table. Because they chose to accept it, they are committed to its terms.
Thus, upon plaintiffs’ default and failure to cure, defendant was entitled to retain
the full 25% down payments.
Decision
The appellate court held that the 25 percent nonrefundable down payment was an
enforceable liquidated damage clause and not an unconscionable penalty. The
appellate court, as a matter of law, granted 845 UN’s motion for summary judg-
ment, allowing 845 UN to keep Cem and Hakan’s down payments, and dismissed
their complaint.

1. Law: What are liquidated damages? What purpose is served by liquidated
damages? Explain.
2. Law: What is an unconscionable penalty? What are the consequences of
finding that a liquidated damage clause is a penalty?
3. Ethics: Was it ethical for Cem and Hakan to try to back out of the purchase
agreements and get their money back? Do you think they had a good reason
to do so?
4. Ethics: Was it unethical for Donald Trump and 845 UN not to let Cem and
Hakan rescind their purchase agreements and receive back their down pay-
ments?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department,
at www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad1.
2. To view a photograph of the Trump World Tower in New York City, go to
www.trumpworldtower.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find a video of the terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001.

California & Hawaii Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
“Promising to pay damages of a fixed amount, the parties normally have
a much better sense of what damages can occur. Courts must be reluctant
to over-rule their judgment.”
Judge Noonan,
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Facts
The California and Hawaiian Sugar Company (C&H), a California corporation, is
an agricultural cooperative owned by 14 sugar plantations in Hawaii. It transports
raw sugar to its refinery in Crockett, California. Sugar is a seasonal crop, with about
70 percent of the harvest occurring between April and October. C&H requires reli-
able seasonal shipping of the raw sugar from Hawaii to California. Sugar stored on
the ground or left unharvested suffers a loss of sucrose and goes to waste.
After C&H was notified by its normal shipper that it would be withdrawing
its services at a specified date in the future, C&H commissioned the design of a
large hybrid vessel—a tug of a catamaran design consisting of a barge attached to
the tug. After substantial negotiation, C&H contracted with Sun Ship, Inc. (Sun
Ship), a Pennsylvania corporation, to build the vessel for $25,405,000. The con-
tract gave Sun Ship one and three-quarter years to build and deliver the ship to
C&H. The contract also contained a liquidated damages clause calling for a pay-
ment of $17,000 per day for each day that the vessel was not delivered to C&H
after the agreed-upon delivery date. Sun Ship did not complete the vessel until
eight and a half months after the agreed-upon delivery date. Upon delivery, the
vessel was commissioned and christened the Moku Pahu.
During the season the boat had not been delivered, C&H was able to find
other means of shipping the crop from Hawaii to its California refinery. Evidence
established that actual damages suffered by C&H because of the nonavailability of
the vessel from Sun Ship were $368,000. When Sun Ship refused to pay the liqui-
dated damages, C&H filed suit to require payment of $4,413,000 in liquidated
damages under the contract. The district court entered judgment in favor of C&H
and awarded the corporation $4,413,000 plus interest. Sun Ship appealed.
202 Chapter 8
Issue
Is the liquidated damages clause enforceable, or is it a penalty clause that is not
enforceable?

Contracts are contracts because they contain enforceable promises, and absent some
over-riding public policy, those promises are to be enforced. Where each of the parties is
content to take the risk of its turning out in a particular way, why should one be released
from the contract, if there were no misrepresentation or other want of fair dealing?
Promising to pay damages of a fixed amount, the parties normally have a much better
sense of what damages can occur. Courts must be reluctant to over-rule their judgment.
Where damages are real but difficult to prove, injustice will be done the injured party if
the court substitutes the requirements of judicial proof for the parties own informed
agreement as to what is a reasonable measure of damages. The liquidated damage
clause here functions in lieu of a court’s determination of the consequential damages
suffered by C&H.
Proof of this loss is difficult. Whatever the loss, the parties had promised each
other that $17,000 per day was a reasonable measure. The court must decline to
substitute the requirements of judicial proof for the parties’ own conclusion. The
court will uphold the parties’ bargain.
Decision
The court of appeals held that the liquidated damages clause was not a penalty and
was therefore enforceable. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court in favor of C&H.

1. Critical Thinking: Should liquidated damages clauses be enforced, or
should nonbreaching parties be allowed to recover only actual damages
caused by the breaching party?
2. Ethics: Did either party act unethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Do you think many businesses use liquidated damages
clauses? Can you give some examples?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at www.
ca9.uscourts.gov.
2. Visit the website of C&H Sugar Company at www.chsugar.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find information about sugar plantations in Hawaii.
nominal damages
Damages awarded when the non-
breaching party sues the breaching
party even though no financial loss NOMINAL DAMAGES
has resulted from the breach; usually
consists of $1 or some other small A nonbreaching party can sue a breaching party to a contract for nominal damages
amount. even if no financial loss resulted from the breach. Nominal damages are usually
awarded in a small amount, such as $1. Cases involving nominal damages are usu-
ally brought on principle.
Example: Suppose Mary enters into an employment contract with Microhard Cor-
poration. It is a three-year contract, and Mary is to be paid $100,000 per year. After
Mary works for one year, Microhard Corporation fires Mary. The next day, Mary
finds a better position at Microsoft Corporation, in the same city, paying $125,000
per year on a two-year contract. Mary has suffered no monetary damages but could
bring a civil lawsuit against Microhard Corporation because of its breach and
recover nominal damages ($1). Most courts disfavor nominal damage lawsuits
because they use valuable court time and resources.
ENFORCEMENT OF REMEDIES
If a nonbreaching party brings a successful lawsuit against a breaching party to a
contract, the court will enter a judgment in his or her favor. This judgment must
then be collected. If the breaching party refuses to pay the judgment, the court may
do the following:
• Issue a writ of attachment—A writ of attachment orders the sheriff or other writ of attachment
government officer to seize property in the possession of the breaching party A document that orders a sheriff or
that he or she owns and to sell the property at auction to satisfy the other government officer to seize
judgment. the breaching party’s property and
to sell the property at auction to
satisfy a judgment.
Concept Summary
Types of Monetary Damages
Type of Damage Description
Compensatory Compensates a nonbreaching party for the loss of a bargain.
It places the nonbreaching party in the same position as if
the contract had been fully performed.
Consequential Compensates a nonbreaching party for foreseeable special
damages. The breaching party must have known or should
have known that these damages would result from the breach.
Liquidated Agreement by the parties in advance that sets the amount
of damages recoverable in case of breach. These damages
are lawful if they do not cause a penalty.
Nominal Damages awarded against the breaching party even though
the nonbreaching party has suffered no actual damages
because of the breach. A small amount (e.g., $1) is usually
awarded.
writ of garnishment
• Issue a writ of garnishment—A writ of garnishment orders that wages, bank A document that orders the breach-
accounts, or other property of the breaching party in the hands of third par- ing party’s wages, bank accounts, or
ties be paid over to the nonbreaching party to satisfy the judgment. Federal other property held by a third party
and state laws limit the amount of the breaching party’s wages or salary that be paid over to the nonbreaching
can be garnished. party to satisfy a judgment.
204 Chapter 8
Jurisdiction in Contemporary
Contract Law Cases
As a litigation paralegal knows, for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a
defendant who is a nonresident, the defendant must be subject to a “long-arm stat-
ute.” The extent of state long-arm statutes varies considerably among the states.
However, most states specifically indemnify those types of contacts with the forum
state that must be present for a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.
E-mail and cyberspace issues have added a new dimension in determining juris-
diction in contract law cases.
Some states have created a sliding scale to determine jurisdiction issues aris-
ing out of these new technology issues. At one end are “active” websites where busi-
ness is being done over the site and people in the forum state are encouraged or
even enticed to interact with the website. At the other end are the “inactive” or
“passive” websites where information is posted on a website. In those cases, the site
is accessible to forum jurisdiction users, but there is no effort to do business nor do
much more than make information available. The difficult cases are those in the
middle, where there is some interaction or the possibility of interaction. Those
cases require the courts to examine the level of interactivity and the commercial-
ism of the website.
In one case, CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,6 the 6th Circuit required more
than a passive website to establish minimum contacts for purposes of jurisdiction.
In that case, the court found that Patterson had purposely availed himself of the
laws of Ohio through his online activities. He entered into a contract with the
plaintiff (the computer network service) in Ohio, used the plaintiff ’s Ohio-based
service to market and sell his software, and maintained contacts with Ohio by
sending messages by e-mail to the plaintiff in Ohio.
Although issues relating to long-arm jurisdiction issues created by e-mail
and cyberspace may not yet be totally settled, the perceived outcome of the
CompuServe case is that an individual who uses a computer network service to
market a product should expect that disputes can be brought in the service’s
home state.
Rescission and Restitution

rescission Rescission is an action to undo a contract. It is available where there has been a mate-
An action to rescind (undo) the rial breach of contract, fraud, duress, undue influence, or mistake. Generally, to
contract. Rescission is available if rescind a contract, the parties must make restitution of the consideration they
there has been a material breach received under the contract.7 Restitution consists of returning the goods, property,
of contract, fraud, duress, undue money, or other consideration received from the other party. If possible, the actual
influence, or mistake.
goods or property must be returned. If the goods or property have been consumed or
restitution are otherwise unavailable, restitution must be made by conveying a cash equivalent.
Returning of goods or property The rescinding party must give adequate notice of the rescission to the breaching
received from the other party to party. Rescission and restitution restore the parties to the positions they occupied
rescind a contract; if the actual prior to the contract.
goods or property is not available, a
cash equivalent must be made.
6
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), rehearing en banc denied, No. 95-3452, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24796, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 1996).
7
Example: Suppose Filene’s Department Store contracts to purchase $100,000 of

goods from a sweater manufacturer. The store pays $10,000 as a down payment,
and the first $20,000 of goods are delivered. The goods are materially defective,
and the defect cannot be cured. This breach is a material breach. Filene’s can
rescind the contract. The store is entitled to receive its down payment back from
the manufacturer, and the manufacturer is entitled to receive the goods back
from the store. In Case 8.6, the court had to decide whether to order the rescis-
sion of a contract.
CASE 8.6 RESCISSION OF A CONTRACT

Hickman v. Bates, 889 So. 2d 1249 (La. App. 2004).
“The Court finds that Keith’s failure to inform his young, limited, first cousin
was intentional and was done to obtain an advantage over her. That is, of
divesting her interest in 45 acres in Bienville Parish and 236 acres in
Madison Parish for a pittance.”
Judge Caraway,
Court of Appeal of Louisiana
Facts
Patricia Dianne Hickman inherited half interests to two pieces of real property
when her mother died. One of the properties, in Bienville Parish, Louisiana,
contained 45 acres of woodland. The second property, in Madison Parish,
Louisiana, contained approximately 236 acres of land and a house. Patricia was
20 years old and had a mental condition that required medication. Patricia,
who lived separately from her parents, received a telephone call from her father,
Joe Hickman, to come and visit him. Joe was ill with cancer and lived with his
sister, Christine Bates, and her husband. They are parents of Keith Bates, Patricia’s
first cousin.
The day after Patricia arrived, Joe informed Patricia that an important con-
cern of his was for her to sell her interests in the two pieces of property to Keith
Bates and his wife, Sheila (the Bates). Joe expressed his doubts that Patricia
would be able to maintain the properties and expressed his interest in keeping
the property in the family. Patricia agreed to sell the properties to the Bates for
$500. Patricia signed legal documents that had been drawn by an attorney prior
to her arrival.
Subsequently, through a friend, Patricia sued the Bates to rescind the con-
tracts selling her interest in the two pieces of property to them, alleging fraud.
Expert testimony at trial valued the Madison Parish property at $259,000 and the
Bienville Parish property at $20,700. The trial court found fraud and rescinded the
contracts. The trial court did not, however, award Patricia attorneys fees. Both
sides appealed.
Issue
Should the sales contracts be rescinded because of fraud, and should Patricia be
awarded attorneys fees?
206 Chapter 8

A contract is formed by the consent of the parties. However, consent may be vitiated
by error, fraud, or duress. Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth
made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to
cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud need only be proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and may be established by circumstantial evidence.
In its very thorough and well-reasoned oral ruling, the trial court made the follow-
ing findings of fact concerning its determination of fraud: “The court finds that Patri-
cia’s intellectual abilities are limited, both from her lack of education and from her
mental condition that requires medicine. Considering her situation, her youth, she was
then 20 years old, and her limited abilities, as well as her lack of prior knowledge of the
purpose of the visit, and her father’s illness, and the fact that she trusted her father and
her cousin, the Court finds that Keith had a responsibility to make sure Patricia was
informed fully about the transactions and make sure that she understood everything she
was doing and the import of everything she was doing, including the fact that she would
own nothing, and including the price considerations involved before she signed those
documents. The Court finds that Keith’s failure to inform his young, limited, first cousin
was intentional and was done to obtain an advantage over her. That is, of divesting her
interest in 45 acres in Bienville Parish and 236 acres in Madison Parish for a pittance.”
We can discern no manifest error in these determinations. Accordingly, we find
that the trial court committed no error in rescinding the sales on the ground of fraud.
This portion of the judgment is affirmed. We reverse the trial court’s ruling denying
attorney fees and grant Patricia reasonable attorney fees through the time of this appeal
in the amount of $12,000. Costs of this appeal are assessed to defendants-appellants.
Decision
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding of fraud and its judgment
rescinding the sales contracts by which Patricia sold her interests in the two prop-
erties to the Bates. The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of an award
of attorney fees to Patricia and awarded $12,000 in attorney fees to Patricia.

1. Law: Describe the rescission of a contract.
2. Critical Thinking: Define fraud. Do you think fraud occurred in this case?
3. Ethics: Did Patricia’s father, Joe Hickman, and her first cousin, Keith Bates,
act ethically in this case?
4. Ethics: Did Patricia need the court’s help in this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, at www.
lacoa2.org.
2. Visit the websites of Bienville Parish, Louisiana, at www.lapage.com/
parishes/bienv.htm, and Madison Parish, Louisiana, at www.lapage.com/
parishes/madis.htm.
3. Use www.google.com to find a case where a contract was rescinded.
Special Cases: Wedding Rings

When a man and woman are in love, the man often asks the woman to marry him
and presents her with an engagement ring. But engagements do not always lead to
weddings and are sometimes broken off by one of the parties. Who gets the engage-
ment ring? Does the woman get to keep the ring, or can the man recover it? Con-
sider the following case.
Rodger Lindh (Rodger) proposed marriage to Janis Surman (Janis) and
presented her with a diamond ring he purchased for $17,400. She accepted his
proposal and ring. Discord developed in their relationship, however. Seven
months after the engagement, Rodger called off the engagement. He asked Janis
to return the engagement ring, but when she refused, Rodger sued her, seeking
recovery of the ring. The Pennsylvania trial court and appellate court applied a
no-fault rule and held that Janis must return the ring to Rodger. Janis appealed to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that Janis favored the “fault”
rule for deciding who gets the ring in a broken engagement case. Under this
rule, if she breaks off the engagement, he gets the ring back; if he breaks off the
engagement, she gets to keep the ring. Although noting that some states still
follow this rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that Pennsylvania
would not follow the fault rule. The court noted that the process of determin-
ing who is “wrong” and who is “right” is difficult in modern relationships and
that this would require parties to aim bitter and unpleasant accusations at
each other.
Instead, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to follow the modern,
objective no-fault rule, which holds that an engagement ring must be returned to
the donor, no matter who breaks off the engagement. The court stated,
Courts that have applied no-fault principles to engagement ring cases

have borrowed from the policies of their respective legislatures that have
moved away from the notion of fault in their divorce statutes. We agree
with those jurisdictions that have looked toward the development of
no-fault divorce law for a principle to decide engagement ring cases,
and the inherent weaknesses in any fault-based system lead us to adopt
a no-fault approach to resolution of engagement ring disputes. We
believe that the benefits from the certainty of our rule outweigh its neg-
atives, and that a strict no-fault approach is less flawed than a fault-
based theory.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower

courts, awarding the engagement ring to Rodger. Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643
(Pa. 1999).
Equitable Remedies
Equitable remedies are available if a breach of contract cannot be adequately com-
pensated through a legal remedy. They are also available to prevent unjust enrich-
ment. The most common equitable remedies are specific performance, reformation,
and injunction.
208 Chapter 8
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
specific performance An award of specific performance orders the breaching party to perform the acts
A remedy that orders the breaching promised in a contract. The courts have the discretion to award this remedy if the
party to perform the acts promised subject matter of the contract is unique.8
in the contract; usually awarded in
cases where the subject matter is Example: Specific performance is available to enforce land contracts because every
unique, such as in contracts involving piece of real property is considered unique. Works of art, antiques, items of senti-
land, heirlooms, and paintings. mental value, rare coins, stamps, heirlooms, all fit the requirement for uniqueness.
Judgment of the court ordering a Most other personal property does not.
licensor to specifically perform the
license by making the contracted-for
Specific performance of personal service contracts is not granted because the
unique information available to the courts would find it difficult or impracticable to supervise or monitor performance
licensee. A decree of the court that of such a contract.
orders a seller or lessor to perform Example: Brad contracts with Michael Angelo to paint a life-size portrait of Angie.
his or her obligations under the
Subsequently, Michael refuses to paint the painting. Brad cannot sue Michael to
contract; usually occurs when the
paint the painting because specific performance would not be ordered. Brad could
goods in question are unique, such
as art or antiques.
sue to recover any payments he has made to Michael.
Example: Brad contracts with Michael Angelo to paint a life-size portrait of Angie.
Michael paints the painting, but, because he wants to keep his masterpiece, Michael
refuses to deliver it to Brad. In this case, Brad can sue for specific performance and
recover possession of the unique painting.
In Case 8.7, the court had to decide whether to issue an order of specific
performance.
CASE 8.7 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Alba v. Kaufmann, 810 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 2006).
“[T]he case law reveals that the equitable remedy of specific performance is
routinely awarded in contract actions involving real property, on the premise
that each parcel of real property is unique.”
Judge Crew,
Facts
Jean-Claude Kaufmann owned approximately 37 acres of real property located in
Rensselaer County, New York. The property is located in a wooded area and
improved with a nineteenth-century farmhouse. Kaufmann and his spouse, Christine
Cacace, reside in New York City and use the property as a weekend or vacation
home. After Kaufmann and Cacace lost their jobs, their financial situation
prompted Kaufmann to list the property for sale for $350,000.
Richard Alba and his spouse (Albas) were shown the property and offered
the full asking price. The parties executed a contract for sale and the Albas paid a
deposit, obtained a mortgage commitment, and procured a satisfactory house
inspection and title insurance. A date for closing the transaction was set. Prior to
8
closing, Cacace sent the Albas an e-mail indicating that she and Kaufmann had “a
change of heart” and no longer wished to go forward with the sale. The Albas sent
a reply e-mail stating their intent to go forward with the scheduled closing. Cacace
responded with another e-mail informing the Albas that she had multiple sclerosis
and alleging that the “remorse and dread” over the impending sale was making her
ill. When Kaufmann refused to close, the Albas sued, seeking specific perform-
ance, and moved for summary judgment. The supreme court denied the motion.
The Albas appealed.
Issue
Was an order of specific performance of the real estate contract warranted in
this case?

There must be a reversal. In order to establish their entitlement to summary judg-
ment, the Albas were required to demonstrate that they substantially performed
their contractual obligations and were ready, willing and able to fulfill their remain-
ing obligations, that Kaufmann was able but unwilling to convey the property and
that there is no adequate remedy at law. The Albas plainly discharged that burden
here. After executing the underlying contract, the Albas paid a deposit, obtained a
mortgage commitment, demonstrated that they had the financial wherewithal to
purchase what was to be for them a vacation home, obtained a satisfactory home
inspection and procured title insurance. In short, the record demonstrates that the
Albas were ready, willing and able to close and, but for Kaufmann’s admitted refusal
to do so, would have consummated the transaction.
As to the remedy the Albas seek, the case law reveals that the equitable rem-
edy of specific performance is routinely awarded in contract actions involving real
property, on the premise that each parcel of real property is unique. Although cer-
tain defenses do exist including, insofar as is relevant here, unreasonable hard-
ship, the court’s discretion to grant or deny specific performance of a contract for
the sale of realty is not unlimited; unless the court finds that granting a decree of
specific performance would be a drastic or harsh remedy, or work injustice, the
court must direct specific performance. Moreover, volitional unwillingness, as dis-
tinguished from good faith inability, to meet contractual obligations furnishes nei-
ther a ground for cancellation of the contract nor a defense against its specific
performance.
Even accepting, for purposes of this discussion, that the alleged exacerbation
of Cacace’s symptoms is both genuine and causally related to the proposed sale of
property, as she is not a party to the contract, her connection to the transaction is
simply too attenuated for Kaufmann to claim undue hardship. In our view, permit-
ting a third party who is not a signatory to a real estate contract, such as a spouse
or, potentially, a child, sibling, or parent, to assert, via the titled owner, an undue
hardship claim by voicing objection to or otherwise contending that the proposed
sale is simply too much to bear would interject uncertainty and chaos into the oth-
erwise orderly world of contract law. Simply put, permitting a defendant to raise an
undue hardship defense under the circumstances present here would place a nearly
impossible burden upon potential purchasers of real property, namely, to ascertain
whether any of the signatories’ relatives had any potential objection to the sale in
question.
210 Chapter 8
Decision
The appellate court reversed the supreme court’s denial of the Albas’ motion for
summary judgment. The appellate court, as a matter of law, granted the Albas’
motion for summary judgment and ordered Kaufmann to specifically perform the
real estate contract.

1. Law: What does the doctrine of specific performance provide? Explain.
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for the seller, Kaufman, to try to back out of the contract?
3. Ethics: Should the Albas’ knowledge of Cacace’s health problems have led
them not to sue for specific performance?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
Third Department, at www.courts.state.ny.us/ad3.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article or case where the doctrine of specific
performance has been applied.
REFORMATION
reformation Reformation is an equitable doctrine that permits the court to rewrite a contract to
An equitable doctrine that permits express the parties’ true intentions.
the court to rewrite a contract to
express the parties’ true intentions. Example: Suppose a clerical error is made during the typing of a contract, and
both parties sign the contract without discovering the error. If a dispute later arises,
the court can reform the contract to correct the clerical error to read as the parties
originally intended.
QUASI-CONTRACT
quasi-contract A quasi-contract (also called quantum meruit or an implied-in-law contract) is an
An obligation created by the law to equitable doctrine that permits the recovery of compensation even though no
avoid unjust enrichment in the enforceable contract exists between the parties because of lack of consideration,
absence of an agreement between the Statute of Frauds has run out, or the like. Such contracts are imposed by law to
the parties. prevent unjust enrichment. Under quasi-contract, a party can recover the reason-
able value of the services or materials provided.
Example: Suppose a physician stops to render aid to an unconscious victim of an
automobile accident. That physician could recover the reasonable value of his or
her services from that person.
INJUNCTION
injunction An injunction is a court order that prohibits a person from doing a certain act. To
A court order that prohibits a person obtain an injunction, the requesting party must show that he or she will suffer
from doing a certain act. irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued.
Example: Suppose a professional football team enters into a five-year employ-
ment contract with a “superstar” quarterback. During this five-year period, the
quarterback breaches the contract and enters into a contract to play for a compet-
ing team. Here, the first team can seek an injunction to prevent the quarterback
from playing for the other team.
Concept Summary
Type of Equitable
Remedy Description
Specific performance Court orders the breaching party to perform the acts
promised in the contract. The subject matter of the
contract must be unique.
Reformation A court rewrites a contract to express the parties’ true
intentions. It is usually used to correct clerical errors.
Injunction A court prohibits a party from doing a certain act.
Injunctions are available in contract actions only in limited
circumstances.
Torts Associated with Contracts

The recovery for breach of contract is usually limited to contract damages. A party
who can prove a contract-related tort, however, may also recover tort damages. tort
Tort damages include compensation for personal injury, pain and suffering, emo- A wrong. There are three categories:
tional distress, and possibly punitive damages. (1) intentional torts, (2) unintentional
Generally, punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract. They torts (negligence), and (3) strict
are recoverable, however, for certain tortious conduct that may be associated with liability.
the nonperformance of a contract. These actions include fraud, intentional con- punitive damages
duct, and other egregious conduct. Punitive damages are in addition to actual Damages that are awarded to punish
damages and may be kept by the plaintiff. Punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant, to deter the defendant
the defendant, to deter the defendant from similar conduct in the future, and to set from similar conduct in the future,
an example for others. and to set an example for others.
The major torts associated with contracts are intentional interference with con-
tractual relations and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
A party to a contract may sue any third person who intentionally interferes with the
contract and causes that party injury. The third party does not have to have acted with
malice or bad faith. This tort, which is known as the tort of intentional interference intentional interference with
with contractual relations, usually arises when a third party induces a contracting contractual relations
party to breach a contract with another party. The following elements must be shown: A tort that arises when a third party
induces a contracting party to breach
1. A valid, enforceable contract between the contracting parties the contract with another party.
2. Third-party knowledge of this contract
3. Third-party inducement to breach the contract
A third party can contract with the breaching party without becoming liable
for this tort if a contracting party has already breached the contract, because the
third party cannot be held to have induced a preexisting breach.
212 Chapter 8
There is a substantial danger of being found liable for tortious conduct and being
assessed punitive damages if one intentionally interferes with another’s contract. An
example of this kind of interference occurred in a recent case involving a rapper.
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF

GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
covenant of good faith and fair Several states have held that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
dealing certain types of contracts. Under this covenant, the parties to a contract are not only
Under this implied covenant, the held to the express terms of the contract but are also required to act in “good faith”
parties to a contract not only are and deal fairly in all respects in obtaining the objective of the contract. A breach of
held to the express terms of the this implied covenant is a tort for which tort damages are recoverable. This tort,
contract but are also required to act
which is sometimes referred to as the tort of bad faith, is an evolving area of the law.
in “good faith” and deal fairly in all
In Case 8.8, the court found a bad faith tort and awarded punitive damages.
respects in obtaining the objective
of the contact.
tort of bad faith

A breach of the requirement that the
CASE 8.8 BAD FAITH TORT
parties act and deal fairly in all O’Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
respects in obtaining the objective
of the contract. “Where an insurer is pursued for its refusal to settle a claim, ‘bad faith’ lies in an
insurer’s failure to give at least equal consideration to the insured’s interests when
the insurer arrives at a decision on whether to settle the claim.”
Judge Kuehn,
Appellate Court of Illinois
Facts
On Halloween Day, Christine Narvaez drove her automobile onto the parking lot
of a busy supermarket. Narvaez had her 2-year-old grandchild with her. The
youngster was riding, unconstrained, in a booster seat. Narvaez saw a friend and
decided to stop for a brief chat. She parked the car and exited the car, leaving the
keys in the ignition and the motor running. The youngster crawled behind the
wheel, slipped the car into gear, and set it in motion. The car struck Marguerite
O’Neill, a woman in her 80s, pinned her between the Narvaez car and another car,
and slowly crushed the woman’s trapped body.
O’Neill was pried loose and airlifted to a hospital trauma center. She suffered a
crushed hip, a broken arm, and four cracked ribs, and she lost more than 40 percent
of her blood supply as a result of internal bleeding. She spent one month in the
hospital intensive care unit and had to be placed in a nursing home and was
deprived of the ability to live independently.
Narvaez carried the $20,000 minimum amount of liability insurance allowed
by law. She was insured by Gallant Insurance Company. O’Neill’s medical bills
totaled $105,000. O’Neill sued Narvaez and her insurance company, Gallant.
O’Neill’s attorney demanded the policy limit of $20,000 from Gallant in settlement
of O’Neill’s claim and offered a complete release from liability for Narvaez. Three
Gallant insurance adjusters, its claims manager, and the lawyer of the law firm
representing Gallant for the case all stated to John Moss, Gallant’s executive vice
president, that Gallant should accept the settlement offer. Moss rejected their
advice and refused to settle the case.
One year later, on the eve of trial, Moss offered to settle for the $20,000 policy
limit, but O’Neill then refused. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict
against Narvaez of $731,063. Gallant paid $20,000 of this amount, closed its file, and
left Narvaez liable for the $711,063 excess judgment. To settle her debt to O’Neill,
Narvaez assigned her claims against Gallant to O’Neill. O’Neill then sued Gallant for
a bad faith tort for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that Gallant
owed to Narvaez to settle the case. The jury found Gallant liable for a bad faith tort
and awarded O’Neill $710,063 ($1,000 short of the judgment in the first trial) in
actual damages and $2.3 million in punitive damages. Gallant appealed.
Issue
Was Gallant liable for a bad faith tort?

Where an insurer is pursued for its refusal to settle a claim, “bad faith” lies in an
insurer’s failure to give at least equal consideration to the insured’s interests when
the insurer arrives at a decision on whether to settle the claim. A significant part of
the evidence presented against Gallant consisted of the pattern of conduct engaged in
by Gallant over the five years leading up to this bad-faith action. O’Neill presented
44 known cases where Gallant’s Illinois customers suffered excess judgments after
Gallant passed up the opportunity to settle within the policy limits. Most of the excess
judgments occurred on John Moss’s watch. The dollar amount by which the excess
judgments exceeded policy limits totaled $10,849,313.
The jury’s finding of bad faith was not against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence. We must side with O’Neill and against Gallant on the extent to which the
evidence established the existence of reprehensible conduct on the part of Narvaez’s
insurance provider. If the term “reprehensible” means shameful, i.e., conduct deserv-
ing of severe reproach, Gallant’s treatment of Narvaez and others who bought insur-
ance from it, was truly reprehensible.
Decision
The appellate court held that Gallant was liable for a bad faith tort and upheld the trial
court’s judgment, awarding O’Neill $710,063 in actual damages and $2.3 million in
punitive damages.

1. Law: Define the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Why is it called the “bad faith” tort?
2. Ethics: Did Gallant act ethically in this case?
3. Ethics: Will the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing make insur-
ance companies act more ethically toward their customers? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Appellate Court of Illinois at www.state.il.us/court/
appellatecourt.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article or case that discusses a bad faith tort.
214 Chapter 8
Amy Gabbard graduated from the Because I have over a hundred projects open
University of Arkansas Fort Smith at any given time, I take on the role of assisting my
with an A.A.S. in paralegal/legal attorney in reviewing contracts as opposed to the
assistance. She is certified by the initial drafting of them. It is important that I am
National Association of Legal aware of the elements of a contract, what consti-
Assistants. She is currently tutes consideration, the difference between words
employed as a real estate paralegal such as “shall” and “may”, and the danger of ambigu-
for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ous words such as “prefer”. Overlooking something
during this process could either void a contract or
I work for a large corporation handling real estate cause liability for the company.
transactions from the initial purchase/lease of land Coming into the role of a real estate paralegal,
through construction and the grand opening of I was apprehensive because I had no experience with
stores. In my position, I deal with contracts daily. real estate work. I relied on my strong background
These contracts vary from purchase/lease agree- in contract law to succeed. Whether working in a
ments, development agreements, documents position focusing on contracts or one focusing on
regarding covenants, and restrictions to letter another area of law, I feel the knowledge of contracts
agreements and easements. will be beneficial and useful to me in whatever I do.

Conflict of Interest
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney or any person repre-
sented by the attorney (i.e., a client) has interests adverse in any way to
another client. Several ABA Model Rules—Rule 1.7 through Rule 1.13—
address this essential element of loyalty in the attorney’s relationship with
the client. Paralegals can be of important assistance to the attorney and
the law firm in making sure that conflict of interest checks are done.
However, a conflict of interest can be created in ways other than just the
representation of two clients whose interests are adverse to each other. The
acceptance of a gift can also be considered a conflict of interest in the attor-
ney’s dual role of adviser to a client and a recipient of a gift from a client.
Although the potential for conflict of interest is less when a client
gives a paralegal a gift, the ethical paralegal knows to be cautious in
these situations. A cautionary tale for this situation is set out in the case
of In Re Estate of Divine, 635 N.E.2d 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
CHAPTER 8 SUMMARY
PERFORMANCE AND BREACH, p. 187 2. Substantial performance. A party in substantial per-

formance renders performance that deviates only
Levels of Performance
slightly from complete performance. There is a minor
1. Complete performance. A party in complete perform- breach. The nonbreaching party may recover damages
ance renders performance exactly as required by the caused by the breach.
contract. That party’s contractual duties are discharged.
3. Inferior performance. A party in inferior performance RESCISSION AND RESTITUTION, p. 204

fails to perform express or implied contractual duties,
Rescission is an action by a nonbreaching party to undo a con-
which impairs or destroys the essence of the contract.
tract. It is available upon the material breach of a contract.
There is a material breach. The nonbreaching party
The parties must make restitution of the consideration they have
may either (1) rescind the contract and recover restitu-
received from the other party. Rescission and restitution restore
tion or (2) affirm the contract and recover damages.
the parties to the positions they occupied prior to the contract.
Anticipatory Breach
In an anticipatory breach, one contracting party informs the EQUITABLE REMEDIES, p. 207
other party—by express words or by conduct—that he or she will
Equitable remedies are available if a nonbreaching party can-
not perform his or her contractual duties when due. This gives
not be adequately compensated by a legal remedy or to pre-
an immediate cause of action to the nonbreaching party to sue
vent unjust enrichment.
for breach of contract. It is also called anticipatory repudiation.
1. Specific performance. This court order requires the
MONETARY DAMAGES, p. 193 breaching party to perform his or her contractual
duties. It is available only if the subject matter of the
1. Compensatory damages. These damages compensate a
contract is unique.
nonbreaching party for the loss of a contract. They re-
2. Reformation. Reformation permits the court to rewrite
store the “benefit of the bargain” to the nonbreaching
a contract to express the parties’ true intention. It is
party as if the contract had been fully performed.
available to correct clerical and mathematical errors.
2. Consequential damages. These are foreseeable dam-
3. Injunction. This court order prohibits a person from
ages that arise from circumstances outside the contract
doing a certain act. The requesting party must show
and of which the breaching party either knew or had
that he or she will suffer irreparable injury if the in-
reason to know. They are also called special damages.
junction is not granted.
3. Nominal damages. These are small damages awarded
to a nonbreaching party who has suffered no financial
loss because of the defendant’s breach of contract. They TORTS ASSOCIATED WITH
are usually awarded on principle. CONTRACTS, p. 211
4. Liquidated damages. These are damages payable upon
breach of contract that are agreed on in advance by the 1. Intentional interference with contractual relations.
contracting parties. Liquidated damages substitute for When this tort is committed, a third party intentionally
actual damages. For a liquidated damage clause to be interferes with another party’s contract and induces the
lawful, the following two conditions must be met: other party to that contract to breach it, causing the
a. The actual damages must be extremely difficult or nonbreaching party injury.
impracticable to determine. 2. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
b. The liquidated amount must be a reasonable esti- dealing. When this tort is committed, a party to a con-
mate of the harm that would result from the breach. tract does not act in good faith or fails to deal fairly in
achieving the object of the contract. This duty is im-
A liquidated damage clause is considered a penalty if actual plied in only certain contracts (e.g., insurance con-
damages are clearly determinable in advance or the liqui- tracts). It is also called the tort of bad faith.
dated damages are excessive or unconscionable. A penalty is
Tort Damages
unenforceable and the nonbreaching party may recover
actual damages. 1. Compensatory damages. These include compensation for
personal injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and
Mitigation of Damages
other injuries caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct.
The law places a duty on a nonbreaching party to take rea- 2. Punitive damages. These are recoverable against a de-
sonable efforts to avoid or reduce the resulting damages fendant for intentional or egregious conduct. They are
from a breach of contract. To mitigate a breach of an employ- awarded to punish the defendant, to deter the defend-
ment contract, the nonbreaching party must only accept ant from similar conduct in the future, and to set an
“comparable” employment. example for others.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Anticipatory breach (anticipatory Breach of contract 186 Consequential (special) damages 197
repudiation) 189 Compensatory damages 193 Covenant of good faith and fair dealing 212
Arbitration 193 Complete (strict) performance 187 Equitable remedies 186
216 Chapter 8
Executed contract 188 Mitigation of damages 195 Restitution 204

Inferior performance 188 Monetary damages 186 Specific performance 208
Injunction 210 Nominal damages 202 Substantial performance 188
Intentional interference with Penalty 198 Tender of performance 188
contractual relations 211 Punitive damages 211 Tort 211
Liquidated damages 198 Quasi-contract 210 Tort of bad faith 212
Material breach 188 Reformation 210 Writ of attachment 203
Minor breach 188 Rescission 204 Writ of garnishment 203

Remember the case scenario at the beginning of the chapter remedy in this situation? To help you with your answer, see
involving L.C., Inc.? Now that you know more about the con- the case Liz Claiborne, Inc. v. Avon Prod., Inc., 530 N.Y.S.2d
cept of specific performance, do you think it is an appropriate 425 (App. Div. 1988).

Working the Web Internet Exercises • Good faith and reasonableness requirement
• Right to stop goods in transit
1. Visit at the Cornell University Law School website at
• Right to cover
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode to review specific parts of
3. Use www.google.com to find what your state’s law is
the UCC on consumer credit, damages, debtors and
regarding the return of an engagement ring if the
creditors, injunctions, and remedies.
engagement is broken off.
2. Determine whether the following are provided in your
state’s UCC:
A process sometimes known as “redlining” helps track Exercise:
changes made to drafts of a contract during the negotiation
Redline an Existing “Letter Contract.”
process. The paralegal must assist the attorney by making sure
the other side does not make changes to the contract that go Use the “Letter Contract” you drafted for the Skill-Building
unnoticed. The redlining, or “track changes,” feature should Exercise in Chapter 5 for this exercise. Turn on the “track
be activated in the word processing software so changes are changes” or the redlining feature of your particular word
reviewed. In addition, the paralegal should be certain that processing software (e.g., Microsoft Word), and then make
every new draft of the contract is dated. Redlining and dating changes to the agreement between Kelly and Sarah so that
are critical to ensure that there is nothing in the contract that the redlining appears.
has not been thoroughly reviewed by the attorney.
HANDS-ON-DRAFTING EXERCISE
Topic: Nondisclosure Agreement appear for the conference and there aren’t enough attendees,
they will not get paid for speaking.
(To the student: Reread the facts from the various Hands-On
Drafting Exercises at the end of each chapter so as to famil-
Exercise/Assignment:
iarize yourself before beginning the exercise below.)
Draft a “Liquidated Damages Clause” that could be inserted
Facts: into an Event Contract, such as the one in Appendix C.
In light of their success as owners of All You Can Eat Ice Sources:
Cream Buffet, Inc., Emma, Grace, and Jack have been asked
to speak at an annual conference for young entrepreneurs at Use paragraph 17 of the sample contract for Sale of Equipment
the University of Toledo. They are concerned that if they in Appendix C as a guide to drafting this clause.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.1 Performance Louis character, a prostitute named Suzy. At 40 years old, Welch rel-
Haeuser, who owned several small warehouses, contracted ished the chance to direct her career toward more serious
with Wallace C. Drennen, Inc. (Drennen), to construct a roles. Welch was to receive $250,000 from MGM, with pay-
road to the warehouses. The contract price was $42,324. ment divided into weekly increments during filming. Filming
After Drennen completed the work, some cracks appeared in began, but three weeks later MGM fired Welch and replaced
the road, causing improper drainage. In addition, “bird- her with another actress, Debra Winger. Welch sued MGM to
baths” that accumulated water appeared in the road. When recover the balance of the $194,444 that remained unpaid
Haeuser refused to pay, Drennen sued to recover the full under the contract. Who wins? Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-
contract price. Haeuser filed a cross-complaint to recover Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1988).
the cost of repairing the road. Who wins? Wallace C. Drennen, Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.5 Damages Ptarmigan
Inc. v. Haeuser, 402 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 1981). Investment Company (Ptarmigan), a partnership, entered
Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.2 Anticipatory Repudiation into a contract with Gundersons, Inc. (Gundersons), a South
Muhammad Ali (Ali), a professional heavyweight boxer, suc- Dakota corporation in the business of golf course construction.
cessfully defended his heavyweight boxing championship of The contract provided that Gundersons would construct a golf
the world by defeating Ken Norton. Shortly after the fight, Ali course for Ptarmigan for a contract price of $1,294,129.
held a press conference and, as he had done on several occa- Gundersons immediately started work and completed about a
sions before, announced his retirement from boxing. At that third of the work by about three months later, when bad
time, Ali had beaten every challenger except Duane Bobick, weather forced cessation of most work. Ptarmigan paid
whom he had not yet fought. Subsequently, Madison Square Gundersons for the work to that date. In the following spring,
Garden Boxing, Inc. (MSGB), a fight promoter, offered Ali Ptarmigan ran out of funds and was unable to pay for the com-
$2.5 million if he would fight Bobick. Ali agreed, stating, “We pletion of the golf course. Gundersons sued Ptarmigan and its
are back in business again.” MSGB and Ali signed a fighters’ individual partners to recover the lost profits it would have
agreement, and MSGB paid Ali a $125,000 advance payment. made on the remaining two thirds of the contract. Can
The fight was to take place in Madison Square Garden. Three Gundersons recover these lost profits as damages? Gundersons,
months before the fight was to take place, Ali told MSGB that Inc. v. Ptarmigan Inv. Co., 678 P.2d 1061 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
he was retiring from boxing and would not fight Bobick in Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.6 Liquidated Damages
February. Must MSGB wait until the date performance is due H. S. Perlin Company, Inc. (Perlin), and Morse Signal Devices
to sue Ali for breach of contract? Madison Square Garden Box- of San Diego (Morse) entered into a contract whereby Morse
ing, Inc. v. Muhammad Ali, 430 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1977). agreed to provide burglar and fire alarm service to Perlin’s coin
Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.3 Damages Hawaiian Tel- and stamp store. Perlin paid $50 per month for this service.
ephone Company entered into a contract with Microform The contract contained a liquidated damages clause limiting
Data Systems, Inc. (Microform), for Microform to provide a Morse’s liability to $250 for any losses incurred by Perlin based
computerized assistance system that would handle 15,000 on Morse’s failure of service. Six years after the burglary system
calls per hour with a one-second response time and with a was installed, a burglary occurred at Perlin’s store. Before enter-
“nonstop” feature to allow automatic recovery from any ing the store, the burglars cut a telephone line that ran from the
component failure. The contract called for installation of the burglar system in Perlin’s store to Morse’s central location.
host computer no later than mid-February of the next year. When the line was cut, a signal indicated the interruption of
Microform was not able to meet the initial installation date, service at Morse’s central station. Inexplicably, Morse took no
and at that time, it was determined that Microform was at further steps to investigate the interruption of service at Perlin’s
least nine months away from providing a system that met store. The burglars stole stamps and coins with a wholesale
contract specifications. Hawaiian Telephone canceled the value of $958,000, and Perlin did not have insurance against
contract and sued Microform for damages. Did Microform this loss. Perlin sued Morse to recover damages. Is the liqui-
materially breach the contract to allow recovery of damages? dated damages clause enforceable? H.S. Perlin Co. v. Morse Sig-
Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Microform Data Sys. Inc., 829 F.2d 919 nal Devices of San Diego, 258 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1989).
(9th Cir. 1987). Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.7 Liquidated Damages
Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.4 Damages Raquel Welch United Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (UMC), an employer,
was a movie actress who appeared in about 30 films over a agreed to provide a pension plan for its unionized workers.
15-year period. She was considered a sex symbol, and her UMC was to make monthly payments into a pension fund
only serious dramatic role was as a roller derby queen in administered by the Idaho Plumbers and Pipefitters Health
Kansas City Bomber. During that time period, Michael Phillips and Welfare Fund (Fund). Payments were due by the 15th of
and David Ward developed a film package based on the John each month. The contract between UMC and the Fund con-
Steinbeck novella Cannery Row. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer tained a liquidated damages clause that provided if payments
Film Company (MGM) accepted to produce the project and due from UMC were received later than the 20th of the
entered into a contract with Welch to play the leading female month, liquidated damages of 20 percent of the required
218 Chapter 8
contribution would be assessed against UMC. In one month, Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.9 Intentional Interference
the fund received UMC’s payment on the 24th. The Fund with Contractual Relations Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
sued UMC to recover $9,245.23 in liquidated damages. Is the pany (PG & E) entered into a contract with Placer County
liquidated damages clause enforceable? Idaho Plumbers & Water Agency (Agency) to purchase hydroelectric power
Pipefitters Health & Welfare Fund v. United Mech. Contrac- generated by the Agency’s Middle Fork American River
tors, Inc., 875 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989). Project. The contract was not terminable until 2013. As energy
Critical Legal Thinking Case 8.8 Injunction Anita Baker, prices rose during the 1970s, the contract became extremely
a then-unknown singer, signed a multiyear recording contract valuable to PG & E. The price PG & E paid for energy under
with Beverly Glen Music, Inc. (Beverly Glen). Baker recorded the contract was much lower than the cost of energy from
for Beverly Glen a record album that was moderately success- other sources. Ten years later, Bear Stearns & Company (Bear
ful. After having some difficulties with Beverly Glen, Baker Stearns), an investment bank and securities underwriting
was offered a considerably more lucrative contract by Warner firm, learned of the Agency’s power contract with PG & E.
Communications, Inc. (Warner). Baker accepted the Warner Bear Stearns offered to assist the Agency in an effort to termi-
offer and informed Beverly Glen that she would not complete nate the power contract with PG & E in exchange for a share
their contract because she had entered into an agreement with of the Agency’s subsequent profits and the right to under-
Warner. Beverly Glen sued Baker and Warner, and it sought write any new securities issued by the Agency. Bear Stearns
an injunction to prevent Baker from performing as a singer also agreed to pay the legal fees incurred by the Agency in
for Warner. Is an injunction an appropriate remedy in this litigation concerning the attempt to get out of the PG & E
case? Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 224 contract. Who wins, and why? Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear
Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1986). Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1990).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 8.1 Walgreen Company began operating a DiMare was descending a wooden staircase on the outside of
pharmacy in the Southgate Mall in Milwaukee when the mall the apartment building, she fell through the staircase and
opened. It had a lease for a 30-year term that contained an was left hanging 15 feet above the ground until she was res-
exclusivity clause in which the landlord, Sara Creek Property cued. Crisci had a $10,000 liability insurance policy on the
Company (Sara Creek), promised not to lease space in the building from the Security Insurance Company (Security) of
mall to anyone else who wanted to operate a pharmacy or a New Haven, Connecticut. DiMare sued Crisci and Security
store containing a pharmacy. With 11 years left on the for $400,000 for physical injuries and psychosis suffered
Walgreen-Sara Creek lease, after its anchor tenant went from the fall. Prior to trial, DiMare agreed to take $10,000 in
broke, Sara Creek informed Walgreen that it intended to lease settlement of the case. Security refused this settlement offer.
the anchor tenant space to Phar-Mor Corporation. Phar-Mor, DiMare reduced her settlement offer to $9,000, of which
a “deep discount” chain, would occupy 100,000 square feet, of Crisci offered to pay $2,500. Security again refused to settle
which 12,000 square feet would be occupied by a pharmacy the case. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury awarded
the same size as Walgreen’s. The entrances to the two stores DiMare and her husband $110,000. Security paid $10,000,
would be within a few hundred feet of each other. Walgreen pursuant to the insurance contract, and Crisci had to pay the
sued Sara Creek for breach of contract and sought a perma- difference. Crisci, a widow of 70 years of age, had to sell her
nent injunction against Sara Creek’s leasing the anchor assets, became dependent on her relatives, declined in physi-
premises to Phar-Mor. Do the facts of this case justify the cal health, and suffered from hysteria and suicide attempts.
issuance of a permanent injunction? Did Sara Creek act ethi- Crisci sued Security for tort damages for breach of the
cally in not living up to the contract with Walgreen? Walgreen implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Did Security
Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). act in bad faith? Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven,
Conn., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
Ethics Case 8.2 Rosina Crisci owned an apartment build-
ing in which Mrs. DiMare was a tenant. One day while

Read Case B.8 in Appendix B (E. B. Harvey & Company, Inc. 2. What amount of damages was Protective Systems
v. Protective Systems, Inc.). This case is excerpted from liable for under the express terms of the contract?
the appellate court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see 3. Was Protective Systems negligent in this case?
Appendix A) using the IRAC method. After briefing the 4. What policy considerations did the court cite in
case, you should be able to answer the following questions: upholding the liquidated damage clause?
1. What were Protective Systems’ duties under the contract?
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: CONTRACT INTERFERENCE
Ricardo E. Brown Jr., known as “Kurupt,” was an unknown teenage rap singer who
lived with his father. In 1989, Lamont Brumfield, a promoter of young rappers,
“discovered” Kurupt. Lamont introduced his brother, Kenneth Brumfield, who
owned a music publishing business, to Kurupt. Beginning in 1990, Lamont pro-
duced demos for Kurupt, set up photo shoots, booked him to sing at many clubs,
and paid for Kurupt’s clothing and personal and living expenses. Kurupt lived with
Lamont after Kurupt’s father kicked him out of the house. In 1991, Lamont obtained
recording work for Kurupt with the rap group SOS. In November 1991, Kurupt
signed an exclusive recording agreement with Lamont’s company, an exclusive
publishing agreement with Kenneth’s company, and a management agreement with
Kenneth for an initial term of three years, with an additional option term. These
contracts gave Kurupt 7 percent royalties on sales. The Brumfields spent at least
$65,000 to support and promote Kurupt, often borrowing money from family and
friends to do so.
Andre Young, known as Dr. Dre, invited Lamont, Kenneth, and Kurupt to a
picnic, where he introduced them to Marion Knight, the owner of Death Row
Records, Inc. The Brumfields and Kurupt made it clear to Dr. Dre and Knight that
the Brumfields had exclusive contracts with Kurupt. After Kurupt performed at the
picnic, Dr. Dre invited Kurupt to his house to record songs for Dr. Dre’s album The
Chronic. In December 1992, The Chronic was released by Death Row Records, Inc.,
and sold millions of copies. The Brumfields continued to promote Kurupt and to
take care of his living expenses. When Dr. Dre invited Kurupt to go on tour to pro-
mote the The Chronic, Kurupt told the Brumfields he was going to visit family in
Philadelphia but instead went on tour for four weeks. In 1993, Kurupt worked on
another Death Row Records album. In May 1994, Kenneth exercised his option and
renewed his management agreement with Kurupt. Despite the multimillion-dollar
profit of The Chronic album, the Brumfields were paid nothing by Death Row
Records. At the end of 1994, Death Row moved Kurupt out of the condominium he
shared with Lamont and into a house. While cleaning out the condominium, Lam-
ont found papers showing that Death Row Records had paid Kurupt advances
beginning in April 1993.
The evidence showed that Kurupt had breached the contracts he had with the
Brumfields and had earned approximately $1.5 million in royalties from Death Row
records for his work on The Chronic and many other albums. The court held there
was evidence that Death Row Records had caused Kurupt to breach these contracts
and was therefore liable for the tort of intentional interference with a contract. The
court held that defendant Death Row Records, Inc., had committed the tort of inten-
tionally interfering with the contracts that the Brumfields had with rapper Kurupt.
The court awarded $5,519,000 to the Brumfields, including $1.5 million in punitive
damages to Lamont and $1 million in punitive damages to Kenneth. The judgment of
the superior court was upheld by the Court of Appeals of California. Brumfield v.
Death Row Records, Inc., No. B149561, 2003 LEXIS 7843, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Unpub.
Aug. 19, 2003).
This court holds that the sender’s act of typing his name at the
bottom of the e-mail manifested his intention to authenticate this
transmission for statute of frauds purposes and the copy of the
e-mail in question submitted as evidence by the defendant
constitutes a sufficient demonstration of same.
—Judge Herbert Kramer
Rosenfeld v. Zerneck, 4 MISC.3D 193, 776 N.Y.S.2D 458 (SUP. CT. KINGS CO., NY 2004).
chapter 9
E-CONTRACTS AND
INTERNET LAW
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing James Holmes. CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
James corresponded back and forth by e-mail with Gregory Lindblad regarding
the purchase of a real estate parcel owned by James. In one of the last e-mails, should be able to:
James indicated that the price of $530,000 was final. Based on what he believed 1. Describe Internet domain names and
was an agreed-upon contract, James then applied for and received a mortgage how domain names are protected by
the Anticybersquatting Consumer
loan for another parcel of real estate to which he planned to move. Protection Act.
2. Define an e-contract and a software
license.
3. Describe the provisions of the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions
Act (UCITA).
4. Describe the provisions of the Federal
Electronics Signatures Act and the
Electronic Signature in Global and
National Commerce Act.
5. Describe the federal laws that protect
against cyber crimes.
221
222 Chapter 9
The use of the Internet and the World Wide Web, and the sale of goods and serv-
e-commerce ices through e-commerce, has exploded. Large and small businesses all over the
The sale of goods and services by world sell goods and services through Internet websites and registered domain
computer over the Internet. names. Now, consumers and businesses can purchase almost any good or service
domain name they want over the Internet, using such sites as Amazon.com, eBay, and others. It
A unique name that identifies an is clear that the increased the use of technology and the Internet has made for
individual’s or company’s website. faster and innovative ways to engage in contracting. However, those same tech-
nological advancements that have made e-commerce flourish have created new
legal questions and legal obligations that governments and the courts are address-
ing every day.
Because technological changes—and their resulting applications to con-
tract law—are occurring so rapidly, any coverage of Internet law or e-contracts
makes a textbook out-of-date the minute it goes to press. But, because of the
growth of electronic commerce, any textbook author would be remiss in not
addressing this subject.
This chapter covers Internet law, domain names, e-contracts, licensing of
software, privacy laws, and criminal laws that regulate the Internet and online
commerce. The chapter also covers the operation of web businesses and explains
how the UETA and UCITA and other laws regulate the creation, transfer, and
enforcement of e-commerce and informational rights licensing contracts.
Although the case law in this area is slim and evolving, several instructive cases
are provided in this chapter. But because Internet law and e-contract law is still
relatively new and developing every day, paralegals must be diligent in keeping
themselves up-to-date on the changes affecting these evolving areas as they affect
contract law.
Raeann Bromark is a graduate of When I am needed in the Corporate Depart-
Norwalk Community College's ment, I draft the paperwork to form new compa-
Paralegal Studies Program in nies, such as limited liability companies and
Norwalk, CT. She works as a corporations. I also draft the necessary documents
project paralegal for the law firm needed for a merger and acquisition, such as pur-
of Edward Angell Palmer & chase agreements and lease assignments, both of
Dodge, L.L.P., in Stamford, CT. which are contracts.
In intellectual property, I do research needed
I work in a law firm that represents clients in the to prepare trademarks and patents. Then I draft the
areas of real estate, corporate, intellectual property, trademark and patent paperwork for attorney
and litigation. My job involves working on any review.
project that is needed throughout the office. In addition to drafting contracts for attorney
When I assist in the real estate area, I draft for review, the attorneys I work with want me to review all
attorney review all of the documents required to contracts to ensure that they are free from mistakes.
perform a closing. These documents include con- Based on my experience, regardless of the
tracts needed, such as the purchase agreement, the type of law paralegals work in, they will be dealing
deeds, and lease assignments. with some sort of contract.
E-Contracts and Internet Law 223
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: BUSINESS FRANCHISE PARALEGAL
A business franchise paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Draft franchise agreement and related agreements/contracts.
• Draft Federal Trade Commission (FTC) disclosure statements and franchise
offering circulars.
• Compile information for inclusion in FTC disclosure statements and franchise
offering circulars.
• File offering circulars, annual reports, and amendments in registration states.
• File notices of intent to sell franchises/business opportunities or exemption
notices in registration states.
• Communicate with state regulators about registration/disclosure requirements.
• Review and file advertising/promotional materials with registration states.
• Administer disclosure process of prospective franchisees.
• Draft franchise documents for execution.
• Communicate with client or franchisee about execution of documents.
• Communicate with client or franchisee about compliance with franchise agreement.
• Draft default notices to franchisees.
• Monitor franchisee compliance with terms of franchise and other agreements.
• Write policies for disclosure and franchising processes.
• Monitor activities of franchise salespeople.
• Prepare earnings claims information to give to franchisees.
• Review requests for transfer of franchise and prepare documents for execution.
• Draft documents for repurchasing franchise business.
• Draft documents for terminating franchise agreement.
• Maintain repository and/or database of franchise activity.
• Review and draft documents for franchisee financing.
The Internet and the World Wide Web

The Internet is a collection of millions of computers that provide a network of elec- Internet
tronic connections between the computers. Individuals and businesses use the A collection of millions of
Internet and the World Wide Web for communication of information and data, computers that provide a network
much of it related to commercial transactions and the resulting e-contracts. of electronic connections between
computers.
THE INTERNET
The Internet’s evolution helped usher in the Information Age of today. The idea for
the Internet first began in 1969 when the U.S. Department of Defense created elec-
tronic communications for military and national defense purposes. Building on
this start, in the 1980s the National Science Foundation, the federal government’s
main scientific and technical agency, established the Internet to facilitate high-
speed communications among research centers at academic and research institu-
tions around the world.
Eventually, individuals and businesses began using the Internet for commu-
nication of information and data. In 1980, fewer than 250 computers were hooked
to the Internet. Growth was rapid in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, and
today several hundred million computers are connected to the Internet.
224 Chapter 9
THE WORLD WIDE WEB

World Wide Web The World Wide Web consists of millions of computers that support a standard set of
An electronic connection of millions rules for the exchange of information called hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). Web-
of computers that support a stand- based documents are formatted using common coding languages. Businesses and indi-
ard set of rules for the exchange of viduals can hook up to the web by registering with various on-line service providers.
information. Individuals and businesses can have their own websites. A website is com-
posed of electronic documents known as web pages. Websites and pages are stored
Internet service provider (ISP) on servers throughout the world, which are operated by Internet service providers
An operator maintaining a server (ISPs). They are viewed by using web-browsing software such as Microsoft Inter-
upon which individuals and busi- net Explorer and Google Chrome. Each website has a unique online address.
nesses can have their own websites. The web has made it extremely attractive to conduct commercial activities
online. Companies such as Amazon.com and eBay are e-commerce powerhouses
that sell all sorts of goods and services. Existing brick-and-mortar companies, such
as Wal-Mart, Merrill Lynch, and Dell Computers, sell their goods and services online
as well. E-commerce over the web will continue to grow dramatically each year.
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, a major case involving free-speech rights over the Internet.
CASE 9.1 FREE SPEECH AND THE INTERNET
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”
Justice Stevens
Facts
A federal statute enacted by Congress, entitled the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), was designed to protect minors from “indecent transmissions” over the
Internet.
Issue
Does the CDA violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution?

The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. The Internet
has experienced extraordinary growth. Individuals can obtain access to the Internet
from many different sources, generally hosts themselves or entities with a host affili-
ation. Most colleges and universities provide access for their students and faculty;
many corporations provide their employees with access through an office network.
Several major national “online services” offer access to their own extensive proprie-
tary networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of the Internet.
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of
communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly
evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as presently constituted, those
most relevant to this case are electronic mail (“e-mail”), automatic mailing list serv-
ices (“mail exploders,” sometimes referred to as “listservs”), “newsgroups,” “chat
rooms,” and the “World Wide Web.” All of these methods can be used to transmit
text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken together,
these tools constitute a unique medium—known to its users as “cyberspace”—located
in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the
world, with access to the Internet.
Each medium of expression may present its own problems. Thus, some of our
cases have recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media
that are not applicable to other speakers. In these cases, the Court relied on the his-
tory of extensive government regulation of the broadcast medium, the scarcity of
available frequencies at its inception, and its “invasive” nature. Those factors are not
present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the
vast democratic fora of the Internet been subject to the type of government supervi-
sion and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry. Moreover, the Inter-
net is not as “invasive” as radio or television. The District Court specifically found
that “communications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s home or
appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content by acci-
dent.” It also found that “almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warn-
ings as to the content,” and cited testimony that “odds are slim that a user would
come across a sexually explicit site by accident.”
Unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regula-
tion of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a “scarce”
expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for com-
munication of all kinds. This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages,
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.
As the District Court found, “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.”
Systems have been developed to help parents control the material that may be
available on a home computer with Internet access. A system may either limit a
computer’s access to an approved list of sources that have been identified as contain-
ing no adult material, it may block designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt
to block messages containing identifiable objectionable features. Although parental
control software currently can screen for certain suggestive words or for known sexu-
ally explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually explicit images. Nevertheless, the
evidence indicates that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent
their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may
believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be available.
Decision
The Government may not reduce the adult population to only what is fit for chil-
dren. The CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a
large segment of the Internet community. Notwithstanding the legitimacy and
importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials,
we agree with the three-judge District Court that the statute abridges “the freedom of
speech” protected by the First Amendment.
226 Chapter 9

1. Law: What did the federal Communications Decency Act (CDA) enacted by
Congress try to do?
2. Ethics: Should parents be responsible for their children’s access to the Internet?
3. Critical Thinking: Do you agree with the following statement of the U.S.
Supreme Court? “The Government may not reduce the adult population to
only what is fit for children. The CDA…threatens to torch a large segment of
the Internet community.”
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Supreme Court at www.supremecourtus.gov.
Can you find any documents that relate to this case?
2. Visit the website of the attorney general of the United States at www.usdoj.
gov/ag. What is the function of the attorney general? Who is the current
attorney general?
3. Visit the website of the American Civil Liberties Union at www.aclu.org.
What is an issue with which the ACLU is currently involved?
E-MAIL
electronic mail (e-mail) Electronic mail, or e-mail, is one of the most widely used applications for commu-
Electronic written communication nication over the Internet. Using e-mail, individuals around the world can instan-
between individuals using comput- taneously communicate in electronic writing with one another. Each person can
ers connected to the Internet. have a unique e-mail address that identifies only him or her. E-mail will continue
to grow in use in the future as it replaces some telephone and paper correspond-
ence and increases new communication between persons.
In Case 9.2, the court addressed the liability of an ISP.
CASE 9.2 INTERNET LAW

John Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
“[A] web host cannot be classified as an aider and abettor of criminal activities
conducted through access to the Internet.”
Judge Easterbrook,
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Facts
Someone secretly took video cameras into the locker room and showers of the
Illinois State football team. Videotapes showing these undressed players were dis-
played at the website univ.youngstuds.com operated by Franco Productions. The
Internet name concealed the name of the person responsible. The GTE Corpora-
tion, an ISP, provided a high-speed connection and storage space on its server so
the content of the website could be accessed. The nude images passed over GTE’s
network between Franco Productions and its customers. The football players sued
Franco Productions and GTE for monetary damages. Franco Productions
defaulted when it could not be located. Franco Productions was ordered to pay
over $500 million in damages, though there is little hope of collection. The U.S.
District Court dismissed the case against GTE. The football players appealed.
Issue
Is GTE Corporation, as the ISP, liable for damages to the plaintiff football players?

The district court’s order dismissing the complaint rests on 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(1),
a part of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996. This subsection provides:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” Just as the telephone company is not liable as an aider and abettor for
tapes or narcotics sold by phone, and the Postal Service is not liable for tapes sold
(and delivered) by mail, so a web host cannot be classified as an aider and abettor of
criminal activities conducted through access to the Internet. GTE is not a “publisher
or speaker” as Section 230(c)(1) uses those terms. Therefore, GTE cannot be liable
under any state-law theory to the persons harmed by Franco’s material.
Decision
The court of appeals held that GTE Corporation, as an ISP, was not liable for the
nude videos of the football players transmitted over its system by Franco Produc-
tions. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order, dismissing the plain-
tiff football players’ lawsuit against GTE.

1. Critical Thinking: Why do you think Congress enacted Section 230(c)(1)?
2. Ethics: Did the owner of Franco Productions act ethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Will the taking and posting on the Internet of unconsented-
to photographs of others escalate? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at www.ca7.uscourts.gov.
2. Go to www.google.com to find an article that discusses free speech over the
Internet.
Domain Names
Most businesses conduct e-commerce by using websites that can be located on the
Internet under domain names, and each website is identified by a unique domain name.
Example: The domain name for the publisher of this book is www.prenhall.com.
Domain names can be registered. The first step in registering a domain name
is to determine whether any other party already owns the name. For this purpose,
228 Chapter 9
EXHIBIT 9.1 Commonly Used Top-Level Extensions for Domain Names
• .com This extension represents the word commercial and is the most widely used extension in the
world. Most businesses prefer a .com domain name because it is a highly recognized business symbol.
• .net This extension represents the word network, and it is most commonly used by ISPs, Web-hosting
companies, and other businesses that are directly involved in the infrastructure of the Internet. Some
businesses also choose domain names with a .net extension.
• .org This extension represents the word organization and is primarily used by nonprofit groups and
trade associations.
• .gov This extension is used by websites run by the United States government.
• .info This extension signifies a resource website. It is an unrestricted global name that may be used by
businesses, individuals, and organizations.
• .biz This extension is used for small-business websites.
• .us This extension is for U.S. websites. Many businesses choose this extension, which is relatively new.
• .cc This extension was originally the country code for Coco Keeling Islands, but it is now unrestricted
and may be registered by anyone from any country. It is often registered by businesses.
• .bz This extension was originally the country code for Belize, but it is now unrestricted and may be
registered by anyone from any country. It is commonly used by small businesses.
• .name This new extension is for individuals, who can use it to register personalized domain names.
• .museum This extension enables museums, museum associations, and museum professionals to
register websites.
• .coop This extension represents the word cooperative and may be used by cooperative associations
around the world.
• .aero This extension is exclusively reserved for the aviation community. It enables organizations and
individuals in that community to reserve websites.
• .pro This extension is available to professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, and other
professionals.
• .edu This extension is for educational institutions.
InterNIC maintains a “Whois” database that contains the domain names that have
been registered. The InterNIC website is located online at www.internic.net.
Domain names can also be registered at Network Solutions, Inc.’s, website,
which is located at www.networksolutions.com, as well as at other sites. An applicant
must complete a registration form, which can be done online. It costs less than $50 to
register a domain name for one year, and the fee may be paid by credit card online.
Exhibit 9.1 lists the most commonly used top-level extensions for domain names.
DOMAIN NAME ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT

Anticybersquatting Consumer In November 1999, the U.S. Congress enacted, and the president signed, the Anti-
Protection Act cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act [15 U.S.C. Section 1125(d)]. The act was
A law specifically aimed at specifically aimed at cybersquatters who register Internet domain names of famous
“cybersquatters”—persons who companies and people and hold them hostage by demanding ransom payments
register Internet domain names of from the famous company or person.
famous companies and people and
In the past, trademark law was of little help in this area, either because the
hold them hostage by demanding
famous person’s name was not trademarked or because, even if the name was
ransom payments from the famous
companies or people if they want to
trademarked, trademark law required distribution of goods or services to find
take possession of their namesake infringement, and most cybersquatters did not distribute goods or services but
web page names. merely sat on the Internet domain name.
The 1999 act has two fundamental requirements: (1) The name must be
famous and (2) the domain name must have been registered in bad faith. Thus, the
law prohibits the act of cybersquatting itself if it is done in bad faith.
The first issue in applying the statute is whether the domain name is someone
else’s famous name. Trademarked names qualify; nontrademarked names—such as
those of famous actors, actresses, singers, sports stars, politicians, and such—are
also protected. In determining bad faith, the law provides that courts may consider
the extent to which the domain name resembles the holder’s name or the famous
person’s name, whether goods or services are sold under the name, the holder’s
offer to sell or transfer the name, and whether the holder has acquired multiple
Internet domain names of famous companies and persons.
The act provides for the issuance of cease-and-desist orders and injunctions
by the court. In addition, the law adds monetary penalties: A plaintiff has the
option of seeking statutory damages of between $1,000 and $300,000 in lieu of
proving damages. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act gives owners
of trademarks and persons with famous names a new weapon to attack the kidnap-
ping of Internet domain names by cyberpirates.
Example: The Academy Award-winning actress Julia Roberts won back the
domain name juliaroberts.com because it had been registered in bad faith by
another party. The singer Sting was not so lucky, because the word sting is generic,
allowing someone else to register and keep the domain name sting.com.
Example: G. A. Modefine S. A. is the owner of the famous “Armani” trademark,
under which it produces and sells upscale and high-priced apparel. The Armani
label is recognized worldwide. But Modefine was surprised when it tried to register
for the domain name armani.com and found that it had already been taken. Mode-
fine brought an arbitration action in the World Intellectual Property Organiza- World Intellectual Property
tion (WIPO), an international arbitration and mediation center, against the Organization (WIPO)
domain name owner to recover the armani.com domain name. To win, Modefine An international arbitration and
had to prove the domain name was identical or confusingly similar to its trade- mediation center where domain
mark, the owner who registered the name did not have a legitimate interest in the owners can bring actions to recover
a domain name.
name, and the owner registered the name in bad faith.
The person who owned the domain name, Anand Ramnath Mani, appeared at
the proceeding and defended his ownership rights. The arbitrator found that Modefine’s
trademark and Mr. Mani’s domain name were identical but held that Mr. Mani had
a legitimate claim to the domain name. The arbitrator wrote that it is “common
practice for people to register domain names which are based upon initials and a
name, acronyms or otherwise variants of their full names.” The court rejected
Modefine’s claim that Mr. Mani’s offer to sell the name for $1,935 constituted bad
faith. The arbitrator ruled against Modefine and permitted Mr. Mani to own the
domain name armani.com. G. A. Modefine S.A. v. A. R. Mani, No. D2001-0537
WIPO (2001).
In Case 9.3, the court applied the federal anticybersquatting act.
CASE 9.3 DOMAIN NAME

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
“Spider Webs has no intellectual property rights or trademark in the name
‘ernestandjuliogallo,’ aside from its registered domain name.”
Judge Jolly,
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
230 Chapter 9
Facts
Ernest & Julio Gallo Winery (Gallo) is a famous maker of wines located in California.
The company registered the trademark “Ernest & Julio Gallo” in 1964 with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office. The company has spent over $500 million promot-
ing its brand name and has sold more than 4 billion bottles of wine. Its name has
taken on a secondary meaning as a famous trademark name. In 1999, Steve, Pierce,
and Fred Thumann created Spider Webs Ltd., a limited partnership, to register
Internet domain names. Spider Webs registered more than 2,000 Internet domain
names, including ernestandjuliogallo.com. Spider Webs is in the business of sell-
ing domain names. Gallo filed suit against Spider Webs Ltd. and the Thumanns,
alleging violation of the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA). The U.S. District Court held in favor of Gallo and ordered Spider Webs
to transfer the domain name ernestandjuliogallo.com to Gallo. Spider Webs Ltd.
appealed.
Issue
Did Spider Webs Ltd. and the Thumanns act in bad faith in registering the Inter-
net domain name ernestandjuliogallo.com?

Spider Webs does not appeal the holdings that Gallo had a valid registration in its mark,
that the mark is famous and distinctive, and that the domain name registered by Spider
Webs is identical or confusingly similar to Gallo’s mark. However, Spider Webs argues
that they did not act with a “bad faith intent to profit,” as required by the ACPA.
Spider Webs has no intellectual property rights or trademark in the name
“ernestandjuliogallo,” aside from its registered domain name. The domain name
does not contain the name of Spider Webs or any of the other defendants. Spider
Webs had no prior use or any current use of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of goods or services. Steve Thumann admitted that the domain
name was valuable and that they hoped Gallo would contact them so that they could
“assist” Gallo in some way. There is uncontradicted evidence that Spider Webs was
engaged in commerce in the selling of domain names and that they hoped to sell this
domain name someday.
There was evidence presented that Gallo’s mark is distinctive and famous.
Further, Gallo registered the mark, which is a family name, thirty-eight years ago,
and other courts have found that “‘Gallo’ has clearly become associated with wine in
the United States such that its evolution to ‘secondary meaning’ status may not be
seriously questioned.” The circumstances of this case all indicate that Spider Webs
knew Gallo had a famous mark in which Gallo had built up goodwill, and that they
hoped to profit from this by registering “ernestandjuliogallo.com” and waiting for
Gallo to contact them so they could “assist” Gallo. In sum, the factors strongly sup-
port a finding of bad faith.
Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the name Ernest and Julio Gallo was a famous
trademark name and that Spider Web Ltd. and the Thumanns acted in bad faith when
they registered the Internet domain name ernestandjuliogallo.com. The U.S. Court
of Appeals upheld the U.S. District Court’s decision, ordering the defendants to trans-
fer the domain name to plaintiff E. & J. Gallo Winery.

1. Law: What does the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)
provide?
2. Ethics: Did the defendants act ethically in registering so many Internet
domain names? What was the motive of the defendants?
3. Critical Thinking: How valuable is a company’s trademark name? Does the
ACPA protect that value? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at www.
ca5.uscourts.gov.
2. Visit the website of the E. & J. Gallo Winery at www.gallo.com.
WORTH OF A DOMAIN NAME

What is a domain name worth? In some cases, plenty. Take the case of the domain
name www.business.com. This name, which was originally registered as a domain
name for less than $50, was sold to another purchaser for $150,000 in 1996. Many
people at the time thought this was an outrageous sum to pay for a domain name—
that is, until the second purchaser turned around and resold the name to E-Companies
for $7,500,000.
Other domain names have been sold at high prices, too.
Example: The domain name www.altavista.com was purchased by Compaq Com-
puter for its Internet search engine. Other domain names sold for high prices
include www.wine.com for $3 million, www.bingo.com for $1.1 million, www.
wallstreet.com for $1 million, and www.drugs.com for $800,000.
The highest price paid for a domain name was paid for the domain name
www.sex.com. Gary Kremen had purchased the name in 1996 for next to nothing.
In 2006, Kremen sold the name to Escom for the record price of $14 million.
As commerce over the Internet increases, unregistered memorable domain
names become harder to find. The sale of the better domain names has increased,
with multimillion-dollar price tags being paid for the most desirable names—
which were originally registered for less than $100.
E-Contracts
In the very early days of the Internet’s use in the sale of goods and services, legal
scholars and lawyers argued that the traditional rules of contract law did not ade-
quately meet the needs of Internet transactions and software and information
licensing. Those concerns led to an effort to create new laws for electronic transac-
tions affecting contracts.
Assuming all the elements to establish a contract are present, an electronic con-
tract, or e-contract, is valid and enforceable. There are two broad categories of
232 Chapter 9
electronic contracts: One relates to contracts that trade with physical goods or serv-
ices, and the second relates to contracts that trade with electronic materials such as
software or images. Each contract within these two categories may be subject to a set
of specific regulatory policy—such as strict government regulations on tobacco prod-
ucts, liquor, and firearms. The laws set out below refer to the basic contractual rules
any electronic contract must follow to be binding on and enforceable by the parties.
E-CONTRACTS WRITING REQUIREMENT

Electronic Signature in Global and In 2000, the federal government enacted the Electronic Signature in Global and
National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act) National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act). This act is a federal statute enacted by Con-
A federal statute designed to recog- gress and therefore has national reach. The main purpose of this act was to bestow
nize electronic contracts as meeting on electronic contracts the same authority as its paper-based counterparts. The act
the writing requirement of the recognizes the validity of contracts entered electronically where an electronic sig-
Statute of Frauds for most contracts.
nature has been incorporated.
One of the main features of the act is that it recognizes electronic contracts as
meeting the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds for most contracts. Stat-
utes of Frauds are state laws that require certain types of contracts to be in writing.
The 2000 federal act provides that electronically signed contracts cannot be denied
effect because they are in electronic form or delivered electronically. The act also
provides that record retention requirements are satisfied if the records are stored
electronically.
The federal law was passed with several provisions to protect consumers.
First, consumers must consent to receiving electronic records and contracts. Sec-
ond, to receive electronic records, consumers must be able to demonstrate that
they have access to the electronic records. Third, businesses must tell consumers
that they have the right to receive hard-copy documents of their transaction.
As a practical matter, these e-contracts create a “paperless contract.” The main
problem with this is that in a lawsuit seeking to enforce an e-contract, evidence is
needed. However, this evidence problem can be overcome by printing out the e-mail
or web contract as well as its prior e-mail or web negotiations, if necessary.
E-SIGNATURES
In the past, signatures have been hand-applied to a contract by the person signing
the document. Today, as a result of the E-Sign Act, electronic signatures are suffi-
cient to form an enforceable contract.
One of the main features of this federal law is that it recognizes an electronic
signature, or e-signature. The act gives an e-signature the same force and effect as a
pen-inscribed signature on paper. The act is technology neutral, however, in that
the law does not define or decide which technologies should be used to create a
legally binding signature in cyberspace. Loosely defined, a digital signature is some
electronic method that identifies an individual. The challenge is to make sure that
someone who uses a digital signature is the person he or she claims to be. The act
provides that a digital signature can basically be verified in one of three ways:
1. By something the signatory knows, such as a secret password, pet’s name, and
so forth
2. By something a person has, such as a smart card, which looks like a credit
card and stores personal information
3. By biometrics, which uses a device that digitally recognizes fingerprints or
the retina or iris of the eye
It is important to note that the E-Sign Act is not considered a wide-sweeping

U.S. electronic signature law. The E-Sign Act expressly excludes its application to
transactions such as wills, testamentary trusts, family matters such as adoptions
and divorce, and other similar matters. However, because this area is changing so
rapidly, paralegals should ensure that no changes or updates to the E-Sign Act
affect the practice areas in which they work.
Software and E-Licensing

Today, software and information may be licensed either by physically purchasing
the software or information and installing it on a computer or by merely down-
loading the software or information directly into the computer. Courts have found
that simply clicking an “I agree” button at the end of an online agreement is enough
to form a contract.
THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION

TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA)
In 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (a
group of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars) drafted the Uniform Computer Infor- Uniform Computer Information
mation Transactions Act (UCITA). This model act was a set of proposed model Transactions Act (UCITA)
rules applicable to the formation of electronic contracts, especially to those e- A model act that provides uniform
contracts on electronic materials, or “computer information transactions.” A com- and comprehensive rules for con-
puter information transaction is an agreement to create, transfer, or license tracts involving computer informa-
tion transactions and software and
computer information or information rights [UCITA § 102(a)(11)].
information licenses.
As with all model rules, the UCITA does not become law until a state’s legis-
lature enacts it as a state statute. The UCITA has not been adopted by all states, and computer information transactions
several of the states that have adopted the UCITA have included multiple amend- Under UCITA Section 102(a)(II), a
ments to the original UCITA text. So, when dealing with licensing or transfer of computer information transaction “is
computer software within the United States, the paralegal should be sure to check an agreement to create, transfer, or
license computer information or
to see if the UCITA’s rules have been adopted by his or her particular state.
informational rights.”
Unless displaced by the UCITA, state law and equity principles, including
principal and agent law, fraud, duress, mistake, trade secret law, and other state laws,
supplement the UCITA [UCITA § 114]. Any provisions of the UCITA preempted
by federal law are unenforceable to the extent of the preemption [UCITA § 105(a)].
THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS

ACT (UETA)
Another important piece of U.S. legislation applicable to electronic contracts is the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). This model act, promulgated by the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was designed to (UETA)
create uniform laws for electronic records and electronic signatures. The goal of A model act that—along with the
the act is to place electronic records and signatures on the same level as paper con- UCITA—provides uniform and
tracts and written signatures. Thus, electronic contracts should be as enforceable, comprehensive rules for contracts
involving computer information
as well as avoidable, as paper contracts. Again, as with any model act, the UETA is
transactions and software and
not law in itself but must be adopted by a state to be considered law. Forty-six
information licenses.
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have incorporated
UETA rules within their state rules. So, when dealing with matters surrounding
e-contracts, the paralegal should be sure to check to see if the UETA has been
adopted by his or her particular state.
234 Chapter 9
The UETA applies only to transactions between parties who have agreed to
conduct their transactions by electronic means. Whether the parties agree to con-
duct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and sur-
rounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct, customer initiation of
Internet communications, and such [UETA § 5].
Once a transaction is determined to be covered by the UETA, the UETA rec-
ognizes two main concepts. First, the UETA states that an electronic record satisfies
the requirement for a contract and also the requirement for writing where the con-
tract is required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds. Second, the UETA recog-
nizes that an electronic signature is a signature that is enforceable equal to a written
signature on a paper contract [UETA § 2]. In addition, the UETA specifies that as
the law requires a record or signature to be notarized, acknowledged, or made
under oath, the requirement is satisfied by an electronic signature of the author-
ized person, provided all information required in the notarization, acknowledge-
ment, and so forth, is included [UETA § 11].
The UETA supports the increased use of electronic commerce by assuring
that electronic records receive legal recognition on a par with paper contracts and
that electronic signatures are treated equally to signatures written on paper. The
UETA does not displace existing contract law concerning offer and acceptance,
consideration, reliance, mistake, fraud, undue influence, duress, duties of care, and
other contract requirements or defenses. The UETA does not become law until a
state adopts the model act as its own statute. States are expected to adopt the UETA
to provide uniformity of law for enforcing electronic records and signatures as
contracts.
LICENSING OF INFORMATIONAL RIGHTS

Intellectual property and information rights are extremely important assets of
many individuals and companies. Patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets,
data, software programs, and such constitute valuable intellectual property and
information rights.
The owners of intellectual property and information rights often wish to
transfer limited rights in the property or information to parties for specified pur-
poses and limited duration. The agreement that is used to transfer such limited
license rights is called a license, defined as follows [UCITA § 102(a)(40)]:
A contract that transfers limited
rights in intellectual property and
License means a contract that authorizes access to, or use, distribution,
informational rights. Grants a person performance, modification, or reproduction of, information or infor-
the right to enter upon another's mation rights, but expressly limits the access or uses authorized or
property for a specified and usually expressly grants fewer than all rights in the information, whether or
short period of time. not the transferee has title to a licensed copy. The term includes an
access contract, a lease of a computer program, and a consignment of a
copy.
licensor
The owner of intellectual property or The parties to a license are the licensor and the licensee. The licensor is the
informational rights who transfers party who owns the intellectual property or information rights and obligates him-
rights in the property or information self or herself to transfer rights in the property or information to the licensee. The
to the licensee. licensee is the party who is granted limited rights in or access to the intellectual
licensee property of information rights [UCITA § 102(a)(41), (42)]. Exhibit 9.2 illustrates a
The party who is granted limited licensing arrangement.
rights in or access to intellectual A license grants the contractual rights expressly described in the license and
property or informational rights the right to use any information rights within the licensor’s control that are neces-
owned by the licensor. sary to exercise the expressly described rights [UCITA § 307(a)].
EXHIBIT 9.2 Licensing Arrangement
Licensor
License
(Transfer of rights in
intellectual property
or information)
Licensee
EXCLUSIVE LICENSE
A license can grant the licensee the exclusive rights to use the information. An
exclusive license means that for the specified duration of the license, the licensor exclusive license
will not grant to any other person rights in the same information [UCITA A license that grants the licensee
§ 307(f)(2)]. exclusive rights to use informational
rights for a specified duration.
CLICK-WRAP LICENSES
In the past, most business and consumer contracts consisted of written agreements
signed by both parties. With the advent of the Internet, many online contracts no
longer fit this traditional mode. Take click-wrap licenses, for example. A click-wrap click-wrap license
license is a contract used by many software companies to sell their software over the A contract used by many software
Internet or in physical packages where the software is later installed on a computer. companies to sell their software
The software company, called the licensor, typically displays a series of dia- over the Internet or in physical pack-
logue boxes on the computer screen that state the terms of the agreement before ages where the software is later
installed on a computer.
the software is downloaded or installed by the potential licensee. The terms of a
software click-wrap license are typically not negotiable, and the licensee (the per-
son who is granted the license) indicates his or her acceptance by clicking on a
prompt button on the screen labeled “I accept” or “I agree.” Click-wrap licenses
contain terms of the agreement, disclaimers of warranties, guarantees for the pro-
tection of trademarks and trade secrets, and other provisions that would normally
be contained in a paper license. Click-wrap agreements provide a fast, inexpensive,
and convenient way for licensors to mass-market their software to users without
requiring paper contracts or physical signatures.
A question recently presented to the courts is whether click-wrap licenses are
enforceable. The courts have held that a party is considered to have manifested his
or her consent to enter into a contract by the physical action of using a mouse to
click the “I agree” prompt button for the click-wrap license.
UCITA specifically provides that a licensee who has the opportunity to review
the terms of the license is bound by those terms if the licensee “manifests assent”
before or during the party’s initial use of or access to the licensor’s software [UCITA
§ 210(a)]. Thus, under the modern e-commerce interpretation of the law of con-
tracts, popular click-wrap licenses are enforceable contracts between software
licensors and user licensees.
236 Chapter 9
LICENSING AGREEMENT
licensing agreement A licensor and a licensee usually enter into a written licensing agreement that
Detailed and comprehensive written expressly states the terms of their agreement. Licensing agreements tend to be very
agreement between the licensor detailed and comprehensive contracts. This is primarily because of the nature of
and licensee that sets forth the the subject matter and the limited uses granted in the intellectual property or infor-
express terms of their agreement. mational rights.
SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION ACCESS CONTRACTS

Sometimes instead of transferring a copy of information to a licensee, a software
license grants the licensee the right to access information in the possession of the
access contract licensor. This type of license is called an access contract. Access contracts provide
Where a software licensor grants for access by the licensee to the information for an agreed-upon time or number of
the licensee the right to access uses. The licensee’s access to the information must be available at times and in a
information in the possession of the manner that complies with the express terms of the license. If such terms are not
licensor for an agreed-upon time or stated in the agreement, access by the licensee shall be at times and in a manner
for a number of uses.
that is reasonable for the particular type of contract in light of ordinary standards
of the business, trade, or industry.
The licensee’s right of access is to information as periodically modified and
updated by the licensor. A change in the content of the information is not a breach of
contract unless the change conflicts with express terms in the license. An occasional
failure to have access available is not a breach of contact if it is either (1) normal in
the business, trade, or industry or (2) is caused by scheduling downtime; reasona-
ble periods of failure of equipment, communications, or computer programs; or
reasonable needs for maintenance [UCITA § 611].
ELECTRONIC AGENTS
In today’s e-commerce, many sellers use electronic agents to sell goods and serv-
ices. An electronic agent is any telephonic or computer system established by a
seller to accept orders. Voice mail and web page order systems are examples of elec-
tronic agents.
In the past, when humans dealt with each other face-to-face, by telephone, or
in writing, their negotiations might have consisted of an exchange of several offers
and counteroffers until agreed-upon terms were reached and a contract was
formed. Each new counteroffer extinguished the previous offer and became a new
viable offer. Most electronic agents do not have the ability to evaluate and accept
counteroffers or to make counteroffers. The UCITA recognizes this limitation and
provides that a contract is formed if an individual takes action that causes the elec-
tronic agent to cause performance or promise benefits to the individual. Thus,
counteroffers are not effective against electronic agents [UCITA § 206(a)].
Example: “Birdie” is an electronic ordering system for placing orders for electronic
information sold by the Green Company, a producer of computer software and
electronic information. Freddie Calloway dials the Green Company’s toll-free
telephone number and orders new software for $1,000, using the Birdie voice mail
electronic ordering system. Freddie enters the product code and description, his
mailing address and credit card information, and other data needed to complete
the transaction, but at the end of the order states, “I will accept this software if,
after two weeks of use, I am satisfied with the software.” Because Freddie has placed
the order with an electronic agent, Freddie has ordered the software, and his coun-
teroffer is ineffectual.
LICENSING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RIGHTS

UCITA creates contract law for the licensing of information technology rights and
will be used for discussing the licensing of information rights in the following
paragraphs.
Formation of a Contract
A contract may be formed in any manner that shows agreement, including an offer
and acceptance, conduct of both parties, or operation of electronic agents [UCITA
§ 202(a)]. An offer to make a contract invites acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable under circumstances. If an offer is received, the offer may be
accepted by either promptly promising to ship. If an offer in an electronic message
evokes an electronic message accepting the offer, a contract is formed when an
electronic acceptance is received [UCITA § 203].
A transaction covered by the UCITA is not subject to the Statute of Frauds,
which requires contracts to be in writing, or by other state laws [UCITA § 201(f)].
Acceptance with Varying Terms A party can expressly make an offer condi-
tional on agreement by the other party to all the terms of the offer. Acceptance by
the other party of all the terms creates a contract, but varying the terms in the pur-
ported acceptance does not create a contract [UCITA § 205].
If an offer has not been made conditional on acceptance of all the terms, and
the party purporting to accept has varied the terms of the offer in his or her
acceptance, the following rules apply: If the transaction is between merchants, the
purposed additional nonmaterial terms offered by the offeree become part of the
contract unless the original offeror gives notice of objections to these terms
within a reasonable time after receiving them. If one of the parties is not a mer-
chant, varying the terms of an offer by the offeree is a rejection of the offer and
constitutes a counteroffer. Any material alteration of the terms of the offer by the
offeree, even between merchants, rejects the offer, and no contract is formed
[UCITA § 204].
Title to Copy Title to a copy of the software or electronic information is deter-
mined by the license. In many licenses, the licensor reserves title to a copy; in other
licenses, title to the copy transfers to the licensee. A licensee’s right under the license
to possess, control, and use a copy is governed by the license [UCITA § 502(a)].
Authenticating the Record

If a contract requires payment of a contract fee of $5,000 or more, the contract is
enforceable against a party only if that party authenticated the record [UCITA §
201(a)]. Authenticate means either signing the contract or executing an electronic authenticate
symbol, sound, or message attached to, included in, or linked with the record Signing the contract or executing
[UCITA § 102(a)(6)]. an electronic symbol, sound, or
An electronic authentication is attributed to a person if it was the act of that message attached to, included in,
person or his or her electronic agent [UCITA § 213]. Authentication may be proven or linked with the record.
in any manner, including a showing that a party made use of information or access
that could have been available only if he or she engaged in operations that authen- attribution procedure
ticated the record [UCITA § 108]. Authentication may be shown by using an A procedure using codes, algo-
attribution procedure to verify the electronic authentication and to detect errors rithms, identifying words or num-
or changes in electronic authentication. This procedure requires the use of codes, bers, encryption, callback, or other
algorithms, identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback, or other acknowl- acknowledgment to verify an
edgment [UCITA § 102(a)(5)]. authentication of a record.
238 Chapter 9
Example: Yuan uses the Internet and places an order to license software for her com-
puter from License.com, Inc., through its electronic website ordering system. The web
page order form asks Yuan to type her name, address, telephone number, credit card
information, computer information, and a personal identification number. The elec-
tronic agent requests that Yuan verify this information a second time before accepting
the order, which Yuan does. Only after doing so does License.com, Inc.’s, electronic
agent place the order and send an electronic copy of the software to Yuan’s computer,
where she installs the new software program. There has been authentication of Yuan’s
signature and a proper attribution procedure to verify the authentication.
Confirmation Letter If the parties to a contract are merchants and the con-
tract fee is $5,000 or more, the contract may be enforced even without authentica-
tion if one party to the contract sends a record confirming the contract and the
other party does not reject the confirmation within 10 days after receiving it
[UCITA § 201(d)].
Performance
A party to a licensing agreement owes a duty to perform in a manner that con-
forms to the contract. Each party owes a duty to tender performance when per-
tender of performance formance is due. Tender of performance occurs when a party who has the ability
Tender is an unconditional and and willingness to perform offers to complete the performance of his or her duties
absolute offer by a contracting under the contract [UCITA § 601].
party to perform his or her A software license requires the delivery of software, information, or data
obligations under the contract. from the licensor to the licensee. The parties may designate in their contract the
Occurs when a party who has the
place for the electronic or physical delivery of a copy of the information. If no place
ability and willingness to perform
is stated in the contract, the place of delivery is the licensor’s place of business
offers to complete the performance
of his or her duties under the
[UCITA § 606].
contract. Example: Maria enters into a licensing agreement to license electronic information
from DataBase, Inc. DataBase, Inc., notifies Maria that a copy of the electronic
information she has licensed is available for her to download from its website;
DataBase, Inc., has tendered performance. Maria offers to pay DataBase, Inc., the
licensing fee by credit card; Maria has tendered performance.
Risk of Loss of the Copy When the copy is delivered electronically or is not
delivered by a carrier, the risk of loss of the copy passes to the licensee upon its
receipt of the copy.
If a copy is delivered from the licensor to the licensee by a carrier, one of two
rules applies: (1) If the agreement requires the licensor to deliver the copy to a par-
ticular destination, the risk of loss remains with the licensor until the copy is ten-
dered at the designated destination, or (2) if the agreement does not require the
licensor to deliver the copy to a particular destination, the risk of loss transfers to
the licensee when the licensor delivers the copy to the carrier [UCITA § 614].
Acceptance of a Copy A licensee who has been tendered a copy by the
licensor is deemed to have accepted the copy if the licensee (1) signifies that the
tender was conforming, (2) acts with respect to the copy in a manner that signifies
the tender was conforming, (3) retains a copy despite its nonconformity, (4) com-
mingles the copy or information with other copies or information, (5) obtains a
substantial benefit for the copy that cannot be returned, or (6) acts in a manner
inconsistent with the licensor’s ownership of the copy [UCITA § 610].
Excuse of Performance The UCITA provides that a party’s delay in perform-
ance or nonperformance under a license agreement is excused if the performance
has been made impracticable. The UCITA stipulates that delay or nonperformance
is made impracticable by (1) the occurrence of a contingency whose nonoccur-
rence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or (2) compliance
with any domestic or foreign statute or governmental rule. Where there is a delay
or nonperformance excused by impracticability, there is no breach of contract.
A party claiming the excuse of impracticability must reasonably notify the
other party that there has been a delay in performance. If an excuse affects only
part of the party’s capacity to perform, the party claiming the excuse shall allocate
performance among its customers in any manner that is fair and reasonable and
notify the other party of the quota it is to receive. Whenever a party is notified that
there is a delay or nonperformance caused by impracticability, that party may ter-
minate the contract and thereby be discharged from the unperformed portion of
the contract [UCITA § 615].
Example: Zeke, a foreign national and businessperson, enters into a licensing
agreement to license certain informational rights from Zendex Corporation, a cor-
poration located in the United States. Zeke is to take possession of the information
when it is made available to him on Zendex’s website, and he will be able to down-
load it to his computer. Prior to the delivery of the informational rights, however,
the U.S. Congress enacts a statute restricting the exporting of the type of informa-
tion that Zeke has contracted to receive. In this instance, Zendex’s performance is
excused because its performance of the contract has been made illegal by govern-
ment statute.
Warranties
Certain warranties may attach to a license of informational rights because either
the licensor has made express warranties or the law has imposed one or more
implied warranties. The law, however, permits some of these warranties to be dis-
claimed if certain requirements are met.
Warranties of Noninterference and Noninfringement A licensor of infor-
mation warrants that no third person holds any claim or interest in the informa-
tion or claim of infringement or misappropriation that would interfere with the
license’s use or enjoyment of the information [UCITA § 401].
Example: Antoine licenses a certain database from Data.com, Inc., for three years
to use in his business. After using the database for a short time, Antoine receives
notice from a court to desist from using the database because the data infringes a
copyright held by Information.com, Inc. Here, there has been a breach of the war-
ranty of noninfringement by Data.com, Inc.; Antoine can recover damages from
Data.com, Inc., for the breach of this warranty.
Express Warranty Licensors are not required to do so, but they often make
express warranties concerning the quality of their software or information. An
express warranty is any affirmation of fact or promise by the licensor about the express warranty
quality of its software or information. An express warranty can result from a Any affirmation of fact or promise by
description of the information, advertising, samples or models, demonstrations of the licensor about the quality of its
the final product, and such. An express warranty is not created by the licensor’s software or information. A warranty
statements of opinion [UCITA § 402]. that is created when a seller or
lessor makes an affirmation that
Example: Info, Inc., has developed software for predicting the price of securities the goods he or she is selling or
sold on NASDAQ and warrants that its software is free from defects. Info, Inc., will leasing meet certain standards of
pay $10,000 liquidated damages and replace the software free of charge if it does quality, description, performance,
not perform correctly within the first year of use. Here, Info, Inc., has made an or condition.
240 Chapter 9
express warranty about the quality of its information. Financial Times, Inc., a
financial services company, licenses the software from Info, Inc., but after three
months of use the software fails. Info, Inc., owes Financial Times, Inc., $10,000 and
a free replacement copy of the software [UCITA § 406(a)].
Implied Warranty of Merchantability of the Computer Program The law
implies that a merchant licensor warrants the computer program is fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which the computer program is used. This warranty is called the
implied warranty of merchantability implied warranty of merchantability of the computer program. This implied war-
of the computer program ranty includes a warranty that the copies of the computer program have been ade-
An implied warranty that the copies quately packaged and labeled and that the program conforms to any promises or
of the computer program are within affirmations of fact made on the container or label [UCITA § 403].
the parameters permitted by the
licensing agreement, that the Example: Juan licenses a software program from Medi, Inc., to sort data and infor-
computer program has been mation from his extensive databases and to run with other software and database
adequately packaged and labeled, programs used in his medical supplies business. The licensing agreement and label
and that the program conforms to on the Medi software program state that the copy of the license program has been
any promises or affirmations of fact tested and will run without error. Juan installs the software, but every third or
on the container or label. fourth time he runs it, it fails to operate properly and shuts down his computer and
other programs. There has been a breach of the implied warranty of the merchant-
ability of the computer program because the Medi software does not fall within the
parameters of the licensing agreement or affirmation of fact on the label. Juan can
recover remedies from Medi, Inc.
Implied Warranty of Informational Content A merchant who collects, com-
piles, processes, provides, or transmits informational content warrants to the licen-
see that there is no inaccuracy in the informational content caused by the merchant’s
implied warranty of informational failure to perform with reasonable care. This warranty is called the implied
content warranty of informational content [UCITA § 404].
An implied warranty that there is no
inaccuracy in the informational Example: Christine licenses a database of historical and current interest-rate infor-
content caused by the merchant- mation from DataMarket, Inc.; the information is updated daily by DataMarket.
licensor’s failure to perform with Christine uses the information to make extensive bond investments for her clients.
reasonable care. She uses the information one day to make certain investments. It turns out, how-
ever, that DataMarket, Inc., made several accidental errors in inputting the inter-
est-rate data, thus causing an error in Christine’s calculations and decisions. Here
there has been a breach of implied warranty of informational content because the
licensor, DataMarket, Inc., failed to perform with reasonable care. Christine can
seek remedies against DataMarket, Inc.
Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose A licensor that has a
reason to know of any particular purpose for which the computer information is
required and knows that the licensee is relying on the licensor’s skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable information warrants that the information is fit for the
implied warranty of fitness for a licensee’s purpose. This warranty is called the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose particular purpose [UCITA § 405].
An implied warranty that information
is fit for the licensee’s purpose that Example: Ahmad, who operates a large Internet order-taking and delivery busi-
applies if the licensor (1) knows of ness, contacts IMB, Inc., a large software developer, about licensing software to
any particular purpose for which the operate his business. Ahmad tells the IMB representative about the volume of his
computer information is required business and his business needs and informs the IMB representative that he is rely-
and (2) knows that the licensee is ing on her to select the software for Ahmad, which she installs. The software, how-
relying on the licensor’s skill or ever, is inadequate to handle Ahmad’s business needs. Here, there has been a breach
judgment to select or furnish of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Ahmad may pursue reme-
suitable information. dies against IMB, Inc.
General Disclaimer of Warranties The UCITA permits a licensor to dis-

claim all implied warranties by expressions like “as is” or “with all faults” or other
language that in common understanding calls the licensee’s attention to the dis-
claimer and makes plain that there are no implied warranties [UCITA § 406(c)].
All of the implied warranties are also disclaimed by stating, “Except for express
warranties stated in this contract, if any, this ‘information’ [or ‘computer program’]
is provided with all faults, and the entire risk as to satisfactory quality, perform-
ance, accuracy, and effort is with the user,” or by using words of similar import
[UCITA § 406 (b)(3)]. General disclaimers must be conspicuous.
Breach of License Agreements

The parties to a contract for the licensing of information owe a duty to perform the
obligations stated in the contract. If a party fails to perform as required, there is a
breach of the contract. Breach of contract by one party to a licensing agreement
gives the nonbreaching party certain rights, including the right to recover damages
or other remedies [UCITA § 701].
ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF PERFORMANCE

Each party to a license agreement expects to receive due performance from the
other party. If any reasonable grounds arise prior to the performance date that
make one party think the other party might not deliver performance when due,
the aggrieved party may demand adequate assurance of due performance from
the other party. Until such assurance is received, the aggrieved party may, if com-
mercially reasonable, suspend performance until assurance is received. Failure to
provide assurance within 30 days permits the aggrieved party to repudiate the
contract [UCITA § 708].
LICENSEE’S REFUSAL OF DEFECTIVE TENDER

If the licensor tenders a copy that is a material breach of the contract, the non-
breaching party to whom tender is made may either (1) refuse the tender, (2) accept
the tender, or (3) accept any commercially reasonable units and refuse the rest
[UCITA § 704].
LICENSEE’S REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE

If a licensee has accepted tender of a copy where the nonconformity is a material
breach, the licensee may later revoke his or her acceptance if (1) acceptance was
made because discovery was difficult at the time of tender but was then later dis-
covered, or (2) the nonconformity was discovered at the time of tender but the
licensor agreed to cure the defect, and the defect has not been reasonably cured
[UCITA § 707].
UNILATERAL ELECTRONIC ERRORS

The UCITA provides that consumers are not bound by their unilateral electronic
errors if the consumer:
1. Promptly upon learning of the error notifies the licensor of the error
2. Does not use or receive any benefit from the information or make the infor-
mation or benefit available to a third party
242 Chapter 9
3. Delivers all copies of the information to the licensor or destroys all copies of
the information, pursuant to reasonable instructions from the licensor
4. Pays all shipping, reshipping, and processing costs of the licensor [UCITA
§ 217]
The UCITA does not relieve a consumer of his or her electronic error if the
other party provides a reasonable method to detect and correct or avoid the error.
Thus, many sellers establish methods whereby the buyer must verify the informa-
tion and purchase order a second time before an electronic order is processed. This
procedure strips the consumer of the defense of UCITA Section 217. Section 217 of
the UCITA applies only to consumers who make electronic errors in contracting.
Electronic errors by nonconsumers are handled under the common law of con-
tracts or the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), whichever applies.
Example: Kai, a consumer, intends to order 10 copies of a video game over the
Internet from Cybertendo, a video game producer. In fact, Kai makes an error
and orders 110 games. The electronic agent maintaining Cybertendo’s website’s
ordering process electronically disburses 110 games. The next morning, Kai dis-
covers his mistake and immediately e-mails Cybertendo, describing the mistake
and offering to return or destroy the copies at his expense. When Kai receives
the games, he returns the 110 copies unused. Under the UCITA, Kai has no con-
tract obligation for 110 copies but bears the cost of returning them to Cyber-
tendo or destroying them if Cybertendo instructs him to do so. However, if
Cybertendo’s website’s electronic ordering system had asked Kai to confirm his
order of 110 copies of the purchase order, and Kai had confirmed the original
order of 110 copies, Kai would have had to pay for the 110 copies, even if his con-
firmation had been in error.
Remedies for Breach

The UCITA provides certain remedies to an aggrieved party upon the breach of a
licensing agreement. A party may not recover more than once for the same loss,
and his or her remedy (other than liquidated damages) may not exceed the loss
caused by the breach [UCITA § 801]. The UCITA provides that a cause of action
must be commenced within one year after the breach was or should have been dis-
covered, but not more than five years after the breach actually occurred [UCITA §
805]. Remedies are discussed in the following paragraphs.
CANCELLATION
If there has been a material breach of a contract that has not been cured or waived,
cancellation the aggrieved party may cancel the contract. Cancellation is effective when the
The termination of a contract by a canceling party notifies the breaching party of the cancellation. Upon cancellation,
contracting party upon the material
the breaching party in possession or control of copies, information, documenta-
breach of the contract by the other
tion, or other materials that are the property of the other party must use commer-
party. A buyer or lessee may cancel
a sales or lease contract if the seller
cially reasonable efforts to return them or hold them for disposal on instructions
or lessor fails to deliver conforming from the other party. All obligations that are executory on both sides at the time of
goods or repudiates the contract or cancellation are discharged [UCITA § 802(a) and (b)].
if the buyer or lessee rightfully Upon cancellation of a license, the licensor has the right to have all copies of
rejects the goods or justifiably the licensed information returned by the licensee and to prevent the licensee from
revokes acceptance of the goods. continuing to use the licensed information.
LICENSOR’S DAMAGES
If a licensee breaches a contract, the licensor may recover licensor’s damages. The licensor’s damages
licensor may sue and recover from the licensee monetary damages caused by the If a licensee breaches a contract,
breach, plus any consequential and incidental damages [UCITA § 808]. A licensor the licensor may sue and recover
can recover lost profits caused by the licensee’s failure to accept or complete per- monetary damages from the licen-
formance of the contract. Lost profits is a proper measure of damages in this case see caused by the breach.
because the licensor has effectively unlimited capability to make access available to
others so there will be no license to substitute to reduce damages owed by the
breaching licensee.
Example: iSuperSoftware.com licenses a master disk of its software program to
Distributors, Inc., to make and distribute 10,000 copies of the software. This is a
nonexclusive license, and the license fee is $1 million. It costs iSuperSoftware.com
$15 to produce the disk. If Distributors, Inc., refuses the disk and breaches the con-
tract, iSuperSoftware.com can recover $1 million less $15 as damages for the prof-
its lost on the transaction.
LICENSOR’S RIGHT TO CURE

Unlike the common law of contracts, the UCITA provides that a licensor has the
right to cure a breach of a license in certain circumstances. A breach of contract right to cure
may be cured if (1) the time of performance of the contract has not expired and the A licensor has the right to restore a
licensor makes conforming performance within the time of performance; (2) the contract under certain conditions.
time of performance has expired but the licensor had reasonable grounds to believe
the performance would be acceptable, in which case the licensor has a reasonable
time to make conforming performance; or (3) the licensor makes conforming per-
formance before the licensee cancels the contract. In all three situations, the licen-
sor must reasonably notify the licensee of the intent to cure [UCITA § 703(a)].
ELECTRONIC SELF-HELP
Just like normal contracts, electronic licenses can be breached by licensees. If such
a breach occurs, the licensor can resort to remedies provided in the UCITA. Sec-
tions 815 and 816 of the UCITA provide that a licensor can resort to electronic
self-help if a breach occurs—for example, if the licensee fails to pay the license fee.
Such electronic self-help can consist of activating disabling bugs and time bombs
that have been embedded in the software or information that will prevent the
licensee from further using the software or information.
Section 816 provides that a licensor is entitled to use electronic self-help only
if the following requirements are met:
1. The licensee must specifically agree to the inclusion in the license of self-help
as a remedy. There must be a specific self-help option to which the licensee
assents.
2. The licensor must give the licensee at least 15 days’ notice prior to the disa-
bling action. The notice period allows the licensee to make lawful adjust-
ments to minimize the effects of the licensor’s self-help or to seek a judicial
remedy to combat the use of the self-help.
3. The licensor may not use self-help if it would cause a breach of the peace, risk
personal injury, cause significant damage or injury to information other than
the licensee’s information, result in injury to the public health or safety, or
cause grave harm to national security.
244 Chapter 9
A licensor who violates these provisions and uses self-help improperly is lia-
ble for damages. This liability cannot be disclaimed.
LICENSEE’S DAMAGES
When a licensor breaches a contract, the licensee may sue and recover monetary
damages from the licensor. The amount of the damages depends on the facts of the
licensee’s damages situation. This is called the licensee’s damages. Upon the licensor’s breach, the
The amount of monetary licensee may either (1) cover by purchasing other electronic information from
compensation the licensee another source and recover the difference between the value of the promised per-
can recover when the licensor formance from the licensor and the cost of cover or (2) not cover and recover the
breaches a contract. value of the performance from the licensor. Cover means engaging in a commer-
cover cially reasonable substitute transaction. The licensee may obtain an award of con-
Right of a buyer or lessee to sequential and incidental damages in either case. A licensee cannot obtain excessive
purchase or lease substitute goods or double recovery [UCITA § 809].
if a seller or lessor fails to make
delivery of the goods or repudiates
Example: Auction.com is an Internet company that operates an online auction
the contract or if the buyer or lessee service. Auction.com enters into a contract with MicroHard, Inc., a software pro-
rightfully rejects the goods or ducer, for a site license to use MicroHard, Inc.’s, software. Auction.com agrees to
justifiably revokes their acceptance. pay $500,000 as an initial license fee and $10,000 per month for the license dura-
The licensee’s right to engage in a tion of three years. Before Auction.com pays any money under the license, Micro-
commercially reasonable substitute Hard, Inc., breaches the contract and does not deliver the software. Auction.com
transaction after the licensor has covers by licensing commercially similar software from another software company
breached the contract. for the payment of a $600,000 initial licensing fee and $11,000 per month for the
license duration of three years. Under the facts of this case, Auction.com can
recover from MicroHard, Inc., $100,000 for the increased initial fee and $36,000
for the increased monthly costs for breach of contract.
specific performance LICENSEE CAN OBTAIN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

A remedy that orders the breaching
party to perform the acts promised The UCITA provides the remedy of specific performance if the parties have agreed
in the contract; usually awarded in to this remedy in their contract or if the agreed-upon performance is unique. The
cases where the subject matter is test of uniqueness requires the court to examine the total situation that character-
unique, such as in contracts izes the contract [UCITA § 811].
involving land, heirlooms, and
Example: Nedra enters into a licensing agreement to obtain access to certain infor-
paintings. Judgment of the court
ordering a licensor to specifically
mational rights from Info, Inc., for a specified monthly license fee. The data are
perform the license by making the proprietary to Info, Inc., and are not available from any other vendor. If Info, Inc.,
contracted-for unique information breaches the license and refuses to give Nedra access to the information, Nedra can
available to the licensee. A decree sue and obtain an order of specific performance whereby the court orders Info,
of the court that orders a seller or Inc., to make the contracted-for information available to Nedra for duration of the
lessor to perform his or her license.
obligations under the contract.
liquidated damages
Damages to which parties to a LIQUIDATION OF DAMAGES
contract agree in advance if the
contract is breached. Damages that
The parties to a license may provide that damages for breach of contract may be
are specified in the contract rather liquidated. Liquidated damages are damages specified in the contract rather than
than determined by the court. determined by the court. The amount of liquidated damages must be reasonable in
Damages that will be paid upon a light of the loss anticipated at the time of contracting or the anticipated difficulties
breach of contract and that are of proving loss in the event of breach. The fixing of unreasonably large liquidated
established in advance. damages is void [UCITA § 804].
Limitation of Remedies
The UCITA provides that the parties to an agreement may limit the remedies avail-
able for breach of the contract. This is done by including provisions in the contract.
Remedies may be restricted to the return of copies and repayment of the licensing
fee or limited to the repair or replacement of the nonconforming copies. Limita-
tions of remedies in licenses subject to the UCITA are enforceable unless they are
unconscionable [UCITA § 803].
In Case 9.4, the court upheld a limitation-of-remedies clause in a software
license.
CASE 9.4 REMEDIES

M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999).
“We find that Mortenson’s installation and use of the software
manifested its assent to the terms of the license.”
Judge Webster,
Court of Appeals of Washington
Facts
The Timberline Software Corporation (Timberline) produces software programs
that are used by contractors to prepare bids to do work on construction projects.
The M.A. Mortenson Company (Mortenson), a contractor, had been using
Timberline software for some time without any problem. Timberline introduced
an advanced version of its bidding software program called Precision. Mortenson,
as the licensee, entered into a license agreement with Timberline, the licensor, to
license the use of the Precision software. Timberline delivered the software to
Mortenson, and a Timberline representative installed the software on Mortenson’s
computer. The software license agreement contained the following terms, which
were printed on the outside of the envelope in which the software disks were pack-
aged and on the inside cover of the user’s manual, and they also appear on the
introductory computer screen each time the software program is executed:
Carefully read the following terms and conditions before using the pro-
grams. Use of the programs indicates your acknowledgement that you
have read this license, understand it, and agree to be bound by its terms
and conditions. If you do not agree to these terms and conditions, promptly
return the programs and user manuals to the place of purchase and your
purchase price will be refunded. You agree that your use of the program
acknowledges that you have read this license, understand it, and agree to
be bound by its terms and conditions.
Limitation of remedies and liability: neither Timberline nor anyone
else who has been involved in the creation, production, or delivery of the
programs or user manuals shall be liable to you for any damages of any
type, including but not limited to any lost profits, lost savings, loss of antic-
ipated benefits, or other incidental or consequential damages arising out
of the use or inability to use such programs, whether arising out of con-
tract, negligence, strict tort, or under any warranty, or otherwise, even if
246 Chapter 9
Timberline has been advised of the possibility of such damages or for any
other claim by any other party. Timberline’s liability for damages in no
event shall exceed the license fee paid for the right to use the programs.
Mortenson used the Precision software and prepared a bid to do contracting
work for the Harborview Hospital project. While preparing the bid, the program
aborted at least five times before Mortenson’s employees finished the bid. Subse-
quently, Mortenson claimed that its bid was $2 million under what it should have
been had the Precision software program worked correctly. Mortenson sued
Timberline to recover consequential damages, arguing that the Precision software
calculated an inaccurate bid. Timberline defended, alleging that the limitation-of-
remedies clause in the software license prevented Mortenson’s lawsuit. Mortenson
countered that the limitation-of-remedies clause was unconscionable and there-
fore unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment to Timberline and
dismissed the lawsuit. Mortenson appealed.
Issue
Was the limitation-of-remedies clause in the Timberline software license uncon-
scionable?

We hold that the terms of the present license agreement are part of the contract as
formed between the parties. We find that Mortenson’s installation and use of the
software manifested its assent to the terms of the license and that it is bound by all
terms of that license that are not found to be illegal or unconscionable.
Considering all the circumstances surrounding the transaction in the case, the
limitations clause is not unconscionable. The introductory screen warned that use of
the program was subject to a license. This warning placed Mortenson on notice that
use of the software was governed by a license. Mortenson had reasonable opportu-
nity to learn and understand the terms of the agreement. The limitations provision
was not hidden in a maze of fine print but appeared in all capital letters. Finally,
such limitations provisions are widely used in the computer software industry.
Decision
The court of appeals held that the limitation-of-remedies clause in the software
license was conspicuous and not unconscionable, and it therefore prohibited
Mortenson’s lawsuit to recover consequential damages from Timberline. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgments to Timber-
line that dismissed the case.

1. Law: What does the doctrine of unconscionability provide? Does the doc-
trine serve any useful purpose?
2. Ethics: Did Timberline act ethically when it included a limitation-of-
remedies clause in its software license?
3. Critical Thinking: What would be the business consequences if limitation-
of-remedies clauses in software licenses were all held to be per se illegal?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, at www.courts.
wa.gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find a software license and determine if it has a
limitation-of-remedies clause in it.
Online Privacy and Social Media

The widespread use of social media—such as Facebook and Twitter—can influence
a company’s sales. Companies begin with collecting information on what custom-
ers want to buy and then proceed to selling those goods through targeted online
sales. Millions of consumers buy these goods and services by clicking on links in
email messages, instant messaging or texts. Recognizing how the use of computer
and electronic communications raise special issues of privacy, the federal govern-
ment enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Electronic Communications Privacy
The ECPA makes it a crime to intercept an electronic communication at the Act (ECPA)
point of transmission, while in transit, when stored by a router or server, or after A federal law that, with some excep-
receipt by the intended recipient. An electronic communication includes any trans- tions, makes it a crime to intercept
fer of signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature. The an electronic communication.
ECPA makes it illegal to access stored e-mail as well as e-mail in transmission.
The ECPA provides that stored electronic communications may be accessed
without violating the law by the following:
1. The party or entity providing the electronic communication service. The pri-
mary example would be an employer who can access stored e-mail communi-
cations of employees using the employer’s service.
2. Government and law enforcement entities that are investigating suspected illegal
activity. Disclosure would be required only pursuant to a validly issued warrant.
The ECPA provides for criminal penalties. In addition, the ECPA provides
that an injured party may sue for civil damages for violations of the ECPA.

1. Law: What does the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) prohibit?
Explain.
2. Critical Thinking: Does the use of electronic communications make it easier
to violate privacy rights?
3. Ethics: Should one expect to have lessened privacy rights for electronic
communications?
Cyber Crimes
The advent of the computer and the Internet created an ability of persons to engage
in a new form of crimes called cyber crimes. This new technology allowed crimi-
nals to commit existing crimes using a new medium.
Fraud can now be perpetrated over the Internet. In addition, the Internet has
allowed criminals to engage in new crimes as well. The police, law enforcement agen-
cies, Congress, and the courts have had to address these new cyber crimes. In response,
Congress has enacted several new federal statutes that define criminal behavior using
computers and the Internet. The courts have had to interpret and apply these new
statutes and apply existing criminal statutes to this new medium of crime.
248 Chapter 9
COUNTERFEIT ACCESS DEVICE AND COMPUTER

FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
Counterfeit Access Device and The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, as
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act amended, makes it a federal crime to access a computer knowingly to obtain
of 1984 (1) restricted federal government information, (2) financial records of financial
A federal law that makes it a crime institutions, and (3) consumer reports of consumer reporting agencies. The act
to access restricted government and also makes it a crime to use counterfeit or unauthorized access devices, such as
other information by computer for
cards or code numbers, to obtain things of value or transfer funds or to traffic in
unauthorized purposes.
such devices [Public Law 98–473, Title II].
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT

Electronic Funds Transfer Act The Electronic Funds Transfer Act regulates the payment and deposit of funds
A law regulating the payment and using electronic funds transfers, such as direct deposit of payroll and Social Secu-
deposit of funds by electronic rity checks in financial institutions, transactions using automated teller machines
transfer. (ATMs), and such. The act makes it a federal crime to use, furnish, sell, or transport
a counterfeit, stolen, lost, or fraudulently obtained ATM card, code number, or
other device used to conduct electronic funds transfers. The act imposes criminal
penalties of imprisonment and the assessment of criminal fines [15 U.S.C. § 1693].
CYBER IDENTITY FRAUD

For centuries, some people—for various purposes, mostly financial—have attempted
to take the identities of other persons. Today, taking on the identity of another can be
extremely lucrative, earning the spoils of another’s credit cards, bank accounts, Social
Security benefits, and such. The use of new technology—computers and the Internet—
has made such identity fraud even easier. But a victim of such fraud is left with funds
stolen, a dismantled credit history, and thousands of dollars in costs trying to straighten
out the mess. Identity fraud is the fastest-growing financial fraud in America.
Identity Theft and Assumption To combat such fraud, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act of 1998 Deterrence Act of 1998. This act criminalizes identity fraud, making it a federal
A federal law making it a federal felony punishable with prison sentences ranging from 3 to 25 years. The act also
felony to commit identity fraud or appoints a federal administrative agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to
theft. help victims restore their credit and erase the impact of the imposter. Law enforce-
ment officials suggest the following steps to protect against identity fraud: Never
put your Social Security number on any document unless it is legally required,
obtain and review copies of your credit report at least twice each year, and use safe
passwords (e.g., other than family names and birthdays) on bank accounts and
other accounts that require personal identification numbers (PINs).
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT

(IIP ACT)
The Internet and Information Age ushered in a whole new world for education,
business, and consumer transactions. But what followed was a rash of cyber crimes.
Information Infrastructure
Prosecutors and courts wrestled over how to apply existing laws written in a non-
Protection Act (IIP Act) digital age to new Internet-related abuses.
A federal law making it a federal In 1996, Congress responded by enacting the Information Infrastructure
crime to access and acquire Protection Act (IIP Act). In this federal law, Congress addressed computer-related
information from a protected crimes as distinct offenses. The IIP Act provides protection for any computer
computer without authorization. attached to the Internet.
The IIP Act makes it a federal crime for anyone intentionally to access and
acquire information from a protected computer without authorization. The IIP Act
does not require that the defendant accessed a protected computer for commercial
benefit. Thus, persons who transmit a computer virus over the Internet or hackers
who trespass into Internet-connected computers may be criminally prosecuted under
the IIP Act. Even merely observing data on a protected computer without authoriza-
tion is sufficient to meet the requirement that the defendant has accessed a protected
computer. Criminal penalties for violating the IIP Act include imprisonment and fines.
The IIP Act gives the federal government a much-needed weapon for directly
prosecuting cyber crooks, hackers, and others who enter, steal, destroy, or look at
others’ computer data without authorization.
STATE CRIMINAL LAWS

Often, larceny statutes cover only the theft of tangible property. Because computer
software, programs, and data are intangible property, they are not covered by some
existing state criminal statutes. To compensate for this, many states have either
modernized existing laws to include computer crime or amended existing penal
codes to make certain abuses of computers a criminal offense. Computer trespass,
the unauthorized use of computers, tampering with computers, and the unauthor-
ized duplication of computer-related materials are usually forbidden by these acts
(see New York Session Laws, 1986, Chapter 514).
Our growing reliance on computers has made us more aware of the risks asso-
ciated with losing the data stored on them. As a result, it is likely that the safety of the
nation’s ever-expanding computer networks will be legislated even more in the future.
Cynthia A. Laquinta is a certi- indemnification is available from another party.
fied paralegal employed by the Indemnification from a third party will eliminate or
company Koppers, Inc., in Pitts- reduce the liability of our corporation, thus reduc-
burgh, Pennsylvania. She gradu- ing our expenses and exposure.
ated from the Paralegal Institute For example, each of our insurance policies is
at Duquesne in Pittsburgh. a contract and requires a review and analysis for
each claim; our contracts with our transportation
While working as a litigation and supply vendors often determine the extent of
paralegal in a corporate law potential liability we may have in a particular claim.
department, my knowledge of contract law is deep- When drafting contracts with our vendors,
ened with every claim and lawsuit. A contract is one of the cornerstones of the terms and conditions
nothing more than an agreement to exchange valu- is to ensure that our interests are protected and full
able items between two or more parties; however, it indemnification is provided by our vendors and
is vital to conducting business. I depend on con- third parties. This requires the corporate law
tracts when defending the corporation’s position in department to work closely with the corporation’s
claims and lawsuits. manufacturing and logistics departments in draft-
When I review a claim for any potential liabil- ing and negotiating contracts.
ity on the part of our corporation, I am also review- Our in-house and outside counsel depend on
ing the claim for a source of outside liability or me to consider all sources of the corporation’s
indemnification by a third party. Applicable con- extent of liability and potential methods of indem-
tracts with our vendors must be reviewed at the nification or remuneration; contracts are a major
onset of a claim or litigation to determine if any source during my search.
250 Chapter 9

Reporting Misconduct
ABA Rule 8.3 deals with reporting professional misconduct.1 This rule
descended from another ABA ethics rule referred to as “The Fink Rule.”
The idea is that an attorney has the duty to expose corrupt or dishonest
conduct in order to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.
Don’t forget that the ABA Model Rules themselves do not carry the
weight of law. What is important—at least in regard to what is enforce-
able by law—are the ethics rules that the paralegal’s state has adopted
on reporting misconduct. Therefore, ethical paralegals should know
what their particular state law says about reporting misconduct to the
appropriate authority.
Future Considerations
This chapter discusses some of the ways that technology and the Internet has
affected how we contract. Clearly, the federal government has enacted many fed-
eral statutes that regulate the Internet and e-commerce, protects personal rights,
and protect against cyber crimes. However, with every day’s newspaper and online
news comes new issues and topics that affect e-contracts and e-commerce. The
information consumers trust to online companies is particularly at risk. While,
perhaps, this issue might not seem directly related to e-contracts, those in the legal
profession must be vigilant in protecting client confidentiality.
Confidentiality of data becomes more complicated with the Internet and “the
cloud,” the system of shared computer storage that allows users to tap into the Web
on the go. A company’s presence on social media site such as Facebook and Twitter
can significantly boost sales. But the data that clients entrust to some company
websites may exist in cyber limbo, and users’ rights may be unclear. As companies
fold and merge at astonishing speed, consumers can’t always trust that those com-
panies’ websites will take long-term care of private information. Currently there is
no general legal requirement for companies to get rid of information.
The point here is that every single day technology is changing how we negoti-
ate and enter into contracts. True, technology does not change the basic elements
of a contract. But technology in general, and the Internet in particular, are chang-
ing the method of negotiating and finalizing a contract and the way that goods and
services are delivered.
As set out at the beginning of this chapter, because Internet law and e-con-
tract law is still relatively new and developing every day, paralegals must be diligent
in keeping themselves up-to-date on the changes affecting these evolving areas as
they affect contract law.
1
CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY
INTERNET, p. 223 2. Licensor. The owner of intellectual property or infor-

mational rights who transfers rights in the property or
The Internet and World Wide Web
information to the licensee is called a licensor.
1. Internet. The Internet is a collection of millions of 3. Licensee. The party who is granted limited rights or
computers that provide a network of electronic connec- access to intellectual property or informational rights
tions between computers. owned by the licensor is called a licensee.
2. World Wide Web. The web is an electronic collection of 4. Licensing agreement. A licensing agreement is a de-
computers that support a standard set of rules for the tailed and comprehensive written agreement between
exchange of information called hypertext transfer pro- the licensor and the licensee that sets forth the express
tocol (HTTP). terms of their agreement.
3. Electronic mail (e-mail). E-mail is electronic written 5. Access contract. An access contract is a type of license
communication between individuals using computers that grants the licensee access to the licensed informa-
connected to the Internet. tion for an agreed-upon time or number of uses.
DOMAINS, p. 227
ONLINE PRIVACY, p. 247
1. Domain name. A domain name is a unique name that
identifies an individual’s or a company’s website. Electronic Privacy
2. Domain name registration. Domain names are regis- Electronic Communications Privacy Act. This federal statute
tered by filing the appropriate form with a domain name makes it a crime to intercept an “electronic communication”
registration service and paying the appropriate fee. at the point of transmission, while in transit, when stored by
a router or server, or after receipt by the intended recipient.
Anticybersquatting Act
1. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. This CYBER CRIMES, p. 247
federal statute permits a court to issue cease-and-desist
orders and injunctions and to award monetary dam- Cyber crimes are those crimes committed by using compu-
ages against anyone who has registered a domain name ter technology and the Internet. These crimes could be
(1) of a famous name or (2) in bad faith. crimes that already exist and new cyber crimes enacted into
law.
E-CONTRACTS, p. 231 1. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
E-Mail and Web Contracts Abuse Act. This federal statute makes it a crime to
knowingly access a computer to obtain specified infor-
Contracts may be formed electronically over the Internet mation.
using e-mail and the World Wide Web. 2. Electronic Funds Transfer Act. This federal statute
Electronic Signatures makes it a crime to use, furnish, sell, or transport a
counterfeit, stolen, lost, or fraudulently obtained ATM
The Electronic Signature in Global and National Commerce card, code number, or device used to conduct elec-
Act (E-Sign Act). This federal statute (1) recognizes electronic funds transfers.
tronic contracts as meeting the writing requirement of the 3. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act. This
Statute of Frauds and (2) recognizes and gives electronic federal statute makes it a crime to engage in identity
signatures—e-signatures—the same force and effect as pen- theft.
inscribed signatures on paper. 4. Information Infrastructure Protection Act (IIP Act).
This federal statute makes it a crime to intentionally
SOFTWARE AND E-LICENSING, p. 233 access and obtain information from a protected com-
1. License. A license is a contract that transfers limited puter without authorization.
rights in intellectual property and informational rights.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Access contract 236 Attribution procedure 237 Click-wrap license 235
Anticybersquatting Consumer Authenticate 237 Computer information transactions
Protection Act 228 Cancellation 242 233
252 Chapter 9
Counterfeit Access Device and Identity Theft and Assumption Licensing agreement 236
Computer Fraud and Abuse Deterrence Act of 1998 248 Licensor 234
Act of 1984 248 Implied warranty of fitness for a Licensor’s damages 243
Cover 244 particular purpose 240 Liquidated damages 244
Domain name 222 Implied warranty of informational Right to cure 243
E-commerce 222 content 240 Specific performance 244
Electronic Communications Privacy Implied warranty of merchantability of Tender of performance 238
Act (ECPA) 247 the computer program 240 Uniform Computer Information
Electronic Funds Transfer Act 248 Information Infrastructure Protection Transactions Act (UCITA) 233
Electronic mail (e-mail) 226 Act (IIP Act) 248 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
Electronic Signature in Global and Internet 223 (UETA) 233
National Commerce Act Internet service provider (ISP) 224 World Intellectual Property
(E-SIGN Act) 232 License 234 Organization (WIPO) 229
Exclusive license 235 Licensee 234 World Wide Web 224
Express warranty 239 Licensee’s damages 244

Remember the case of James and Gregory at the beginning would prevail if Gregory refused to complete the contract for
of the chapter? Now that you understand more about the rel- the sale of James’s real estate? The case of Lindblad v. Holmes,
evance of e-mails to the law of contracts, as well as the issues No. BACV2004-00469, 2004 Mass. LEXIS 631, at*1 (Super.
of a “writing” and specific performance, who do you think Ct. Nov. 24, 2004), may help you with your analysis.

Working the Web Internet Exercises Legally Binding?” at www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/
Articles/2001dltr0005.html.
1. For a discussion of the Federal Dilution Act, featuring
3. Domain name dispute resolution procedures are pre-
Barbie, Elvis, and Coca-Cola, see cyber.law.harvard.
sented in great detail at www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/
edu/property/respect/antibarbie.html.
policy.htm. Check this site for everything from an
2. For an overview of the Federal Electronic Signatures
overview to sample pleading forms.
Act, explore the law review article “Are Online Busi-
ness Transactions Executed by Electronic Signatures
Many bar associations and legal experts recommend POWERS OF THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE:
using “plain English” language in the contract. The the-
To employ staff, agents and other people (either casually,
ory is that by using plain English, fewer disputes will
temporarily, permanently or on secondment) to carry out the
ensue over the terms of the contract. In other words, the
objects of the Association upon such terms and conditions as
language won’t be ambiguous or confusing. Rather, the
they may from time to time consider desirable, and to termi-
contract’s meaning will be totally clear to all of the par-
nate such employment or agency, and to pay their salaries,
ties involved.
fees, commissions, remuneration and other charges out of the
The “plain English” theory is discussed in more detail
Association’s Fund and to confer upon any staff or agents so
on several websites. A couple of those websites are:
appointed the right to exercise any discretion which may be
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/plainenglish/
vested in the Management Committee Members.
columns/147.html
http://www.languageandlaw.org/PLAINENGLISH.HTM Exercise:
http://www.ask.com/wiki/Legal_writing Revise the above 84-word paragraph to create a much
The following is an example of a paragraph from a home- smaller clause that eliminates legalese but retains enough
owner association contract that is full of legalese: wording to be totally clear to all of the parties involved.
Topic: E-Signatures Exercise/Assignment:

(To the student: Reread the facts from the various Hands-On Draft a provision allowing for electronic signatures for the
Drafting Exercises at the end of each chapter so as to famil- purpose of inclusion in the Event Contract in Appendix C.
Sources:
Facts:
Use paragraph 18 of the sample Contract for Sale of Equip-
Emma, Grace, and Jack are constantly traveling all over the ment in Appendix C as a guide to drafting this provision.
world in search of good ice cream. Consequently, it is not
always practical for them to sign documents by hand.
Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.1 Domain Name Frances steel parts for various metal machine shop clients. When
Net, a freshman in college and a computer expert, browses Little Steel Company receives an order from a client, it
websites for hours each day. One day, she thinks, “I can make must locate and purchase 10 tons of a certain grade of steel
money registering domain names and selling them for a for- to complete the order. The Little Steel Company sends an
tune.” She has recently seen an advertisement for Classic e-mail message to West Coast Steel Company, a large steel
Coke, a cola drink produced and marketed by Coca-Cola company, inquiring about the availability of 10 tons of the
Company. Coca-Cola Company has a famous trademark on described grade of steel. The West Coast Steel Company
the term Classic Coke and has spent millions of dollars replies by e-mail that it has the required 10 tons of steel
advertising this brand and making the term famous through- available and quotes $450 per ton. The Little Steel Compa-
out the United States and the world. Frances goes to the web- ny’s purchasing agent replies by e-mail that the Little Steel
site www.networksolutions.com, an Internet domain Company will purchase the 10 tons of described steel at
name registration service, to see if the Internet domain name the quoted price of $450 per ton. The e-mails are signed
classiccoke.com has been taken. She discovers that it is avail- electronically by the Little Steel Company’s purchasing
able, so she immediately registers the Internet domain name agent and the selling agent of the West Coast Steel Com-
classiccoke.com for herself and pays the $70 registration fee pany. When the steel arrives at the Little Steel Company’s
with her credit card. Coca-Cola Company decides to register plant, the Little Steel Company rejects the shipment, claim-
the Internet domain name classiccoke.com, but when it ing the defense of the Statute of Frauds. The West Coast
checks at the Network Solutions website, it discovers that Steel Company sues the Little Steel Company for damages.
Francis Net has already registered the Internet domain name. Who wins?
Coca-Cola Company contacts Frances, who demands
$500,000 for the name. Coca-Cola Company sues Frances to Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.3 Contract Einstein
prevent her from using the Internet domain name classic- Financial Analysts, Inc. (EFA), has developed an electronic
coke.com and to recover it from her under the federal ACPA. database that has recorded the number of plastic pails manu-
Who wins? factured and sold in the United States since plastic was first
invented. Using this data and a complicated patented soft-
This critical thinking case is a hypothetical. However, a
ware mathematical formula developed by EFA, a user can
somewhat similar issue regarding website names was dealt
predict with 100 percent accuracy (historically) how the
with in the case Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, No. 02-1782 ADM/
stock of each of the companies of the Dow Jones Industrial
JGL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1226, at *1 (D.Minn. Jan. 28,
Average will perform on any given day of the year. William
2005). In the Purdy case, the Coca-Cola-like website in ques-
Buffet, an astute billionaire investor, wants to increase his
tion was actually an anti-abortion site. The court ordered a
wealth, so he enters into an agreement with EFA whereby he
permanent injunction against the usage of this website name.
is granted the sole right to use the EFA data (updated daily)
As a critical thinking exercise, find and read the Purdy case.
and its financial model for the next five years. Buffet pays
Distinguish the facts, the laws applied, and the outcomes of
EFA $100 million for the right to the data and mathematical
these two cases.
formula. After using the data and software formula for one
Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.2 E-Mail Contract The week, Buffet discovers that EFA has also transferred the right
Little Steel Company is a small steel fabricator that makes to use the EFA plastic pail database and software formula to
254 Chapter 9
his competitor. Buffet sues EFA. What type of arrangement Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.6 License Tiffany Pan, a
have EFA and Buffet entered into? Who wins? consumer, intends to order three copies of a financial soft-
ware program from iSoftware, Inc. Tiffany, using her com-
Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.4 License An Internet puter, enters iSoftware’s website, isoftware.com, and places
firm called Info.com, Inc., licenses computer software and an order with the electronic agent taking orders for the web-
electronic information over the Internet. Info.com has a site. The license provides for a duration of three years at $300
website, info.com, where users can license Info.com software per month for each copy of the software program. Tiffany
and electronic information. The website is operated by an enters the necessary product code and description; her
electronic agent; a potential user enters Info.com’s website name, mailing address, and credit card information; and
and looks at software and electronic information that is other data necessary to place the order. When the electronic
available from Info.com. Mildred Hayward pulls up the Info. order form prompts Tiffany to enter the number of copies of
com website on her computer and decides to order a certain the software program she is ordering, Tiffany mistakenly
type of Info.com software. Hayward enters the appropriate types in “30.” Isoftware’s electronic agent places the order
product code and description; her name, mailing address, and ships 30 copies of the software program to Tiffany.
and credit card information; and other data needed to com- When Tiffany receives the 30 copies of the software pro-
plete the order for a three-year license at $300 per month; gram, she ships them back to iSoftware with a note stating,
the electronic agent has Hayward verify all the information a “Sorry, there has been a mistake. I only meant to order
second time. When Hayward has completed verifying the 3 copies of the software, not 30.” When iSoftware bills Tiffany
information, she types at the end of her order, “I accept this for the license fees for the 30 copies, Tiffany refuses to pay.
electronic software only if after I have used it for two months iSoftware sues Tiffany to recover the license fees for 30 copies.
I still personally like it.” Info.com’s electronic agent delivers a Who wins?
copy of the software to Hayward, who downloads the copy of
the software onto her computer. Two weeks later, Hayward This critical thinking case is a hypothetical. A similar,
sends the copy of the software back to Info.com, stating, but still different, software licensing issue was dealt with in
“Read our contract: I personally don’t like this software; can- the case 1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30
cel my license.” Info.com sues Hayward to recover the license (Dist. Ct. 2003). In the 1-A case, the court found that a forum
payments for three years. Who wins? selection clause (i.e., where a lawsuit had to be filed) located
in the license agreement was binding. As a critical thinking
This critical thinking case is a hypothetical. However, a exercise, find and read the 1-A case. Distinguish the facts,
somewhat similar issue was dealt with in the case ProCD, the laws applied, and the outcomes of these two cases.
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). In the ProCD Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.7 License Silvia Miofsky
case, the defendant chose to ignore the licensing agreement licenses a software program from Accura.com, Inc., to sort
restricting its use to noncommercial purposes. The court information from a database to be used in Silvia’s financial
found that the original licensing agreement was binding. As planning business. The license is for three years, and the
a critical thinking exercise, find and read the ProCD case. license fee is $500 per month. The new software program
Distinguish the facts, the laws applied, and the outcomes of from Accura.com will be run in conjunction with other
these two cases. software programs and databases used by Silvia in her busi-
ness. The licensing agreement between Accura.com and
Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.5 Electronic Signature David
Silvia and the label on the software package state that the
Abacus uses the Internet to order license software for his
copy of the licensed software program has been tested by
computer from Inet.License, Inc. (Inet), through Inet’s elec-
Accura.com and will run without error. Silvia installs the
tronic website ordering system. Inet’s web page order form
copy of Accura.com’s software, but every fifth or sixth time
asks David to type in his name, mailing address, telephone
the program is run, it fails to operate properly and shuts
number, e-mail address, credit card information, computer
down Silvia’s computer and other programs. Silvia sends the
location information, and personal identification number.
software, marked defective, back to Accura.com. When
Inet’s electronic agent requests that David verify the infor-
Accura.com bills Silvia for the unpaid license fees for the
mation a second time before it accepts the order, which
three years of the license, Silvia refuses to pay. Accura.com
David does. The license duration is two years, at a license
sues Silvia to recover the license fees under the three-year
fee of $300 per month. Only after receiving the verifica-
license. Who wins?
tion of information does Inet’s electronic agent place the
order and send an electronic copy of the software program This critical thinking case is a hypothetical. However, a
to David’s computer, where he installs the new software similar issue was dealt with in the case Performance Chevrolet,
program. David later refuses to pay the license fee due Inet Inc. v. Market Scan Info. Sys., Inc., No. CV-04-244-S-BLW,
because he claims his electronic signature and informa- 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23257, at *1 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2007).
tion were not authentic. Inet sues David to recover the In the Performance Chevrolet case, the purchased software
license fee. Is David’s electronic signature enforceable did not provide daily updates as promised. As a result, the
against him? court found that the software provider had breached the
contract. As a critical thinking exercise, find and read the sense unknown to the world before. The software license is
Performance Chevrolet case. Distinguish the facts, the laws nonexclusive, and Metatag licenses its Virtual 4-D Link to
applied, and the outcomes of these two cases. millions of users worldwide. Nolan Bates, who has lived
alone with his mother too long, licenses the Virtual 4-D
Critical Legal Thinking Case 9.8 License Metatag, Inc., Link program for five years for a license fee of $350 per
is a developer and distributor of software and electronic month. Bates uses the program for two months before his
information rights over the Internet. Metatag produces a mother discovers why he has had a smile on his face lately.
software program called Virtual 4-D Links; a user of the Bates, upon his mother’s urging, returns the Virtual 4-D
program merely types in the name of a city and address Link software program to Metatag, stating he is canceling
anywhere in the world, and the computer transports the the license. Metatag sues Bates to recover the unpaid license
user there and creates a four-dimensional space and a sixth fees. Who wins?
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 9.1 BluePeace.org is a new environmental *1 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2000). In that case, the defendant had
group that has decided that expounding its environmental rushed to reserve numerous domain names. The court in the
causes over the Internet is the best and most efficient way to Porsche case granted a preliminary injunction against the
spend its time and money to advance its environmental defendant’s use of the website name at issue. As a critical
causes. To draw attention to its websites, BluePeace.org thinking exercise, find and read the Porsche case. Distin-
comes up with catchy Internet domain names. One is guish the facts, the laws applied, and the outcomes of these
macyswearus.org, another is exxonvaldezesseals.org, and two cases.
another is generalmotorscrashesdummies.org. The
Ethics Case 9.2 Apricot.com is a major software devel-
macyswearus.org website first shows beautiful women
oper that licenses software to be used over the Internet. One
dressed in mink fur coats sold by Macy’s Department Stores
of its programs, called Match, is a search engine that
and then goes into graphic photos of minks being slaugh-
searches personal ads on the Internet and provides a match
tered and skinned and made into the coats. The exxonval-
for users for potential dates and possible marriage partners.
dezesseals.org website first shows a beautiful, pristine bay in
Nolan Bates subscribes to the Match software program from
Alaska, with the Exxon Valdez oil tanker quietly sailing
Apricot.com. The license duration is five years, with a
through the waters, and then it shows photos of the ship
license fee of $200 per month. For each subscriber, Apricot.
breaking open and spewing forth oil and then seals who are
com produces a separate web page that shows photos of the
gooey with oil, suffocating and dying on the shoreline. The
subscriber and personal data. Bates places a photo of him-
website generalmotorscrashesdummies.org shows a General
self with his mother, with the caption, “Male, 30 years old,
Motors automobile involved in normal crash tests with dum-
lives with mother, likes quiet nights at home.” Bates licenses
mies followed by photographs of automobile accident scenes
the Apricot.com Match software and uses it 12 hours each
where adults and children lie bleeding and dying after an
day, searching for his Internet match. Bates does not pay
accident involving General Motors automobiles. Macy’s
Apricot.com the required monthly licensing fee for any of
Department Stores, the ExxonMobil Corporation, and the
the three months he uses the software. After using the
General Motors Corporation sue BluePeace.org for violating
Match software but refusing to pay Apricot.com its licensing
the federal ACPA. Who wins? Has BluePeace.org acted
fee, Apricot.com activates the disabling bug in the software
unethically in this case?
and disables the Match software on Bates’s computer. Apricot.
This critical thinking case is a hypothetical case dealing com does this with no warning to Bates. It then sends a let-
with a “bait and switch” issue in a website name. A different ter to Bates stating, “Loser, the license is canceled!” Bates
sort of website name issue—regarding cybersquatting—was sues Apricot.com for disabling the Match software program.
dealt with in the case Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Spencer, Who wins? Did Bates act ethically? Did Apricot.com act
No. CIV. S-00-471 GEN PAN, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060, at ethically?
Read Case B.9 in Appendix B (Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Abir). This 1. Who was the plaintiff? Who was the defendant?
case is excerpted from the appellate court’s opinion. Review 2. How did the Internet domain names of both parties
and brief the case (see Appendix A) using the IRAC method. influence the court’s decision?
After briefing the case, you should be able to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
256 Chapter 9
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: CYBER CRIMES
In “techie” circles, Kevin D. Mitnick became the underground icon of computer
hackers. During a decade’s reign, Mitnick terrorized the federal government, univer-
sities, and such high-tech companies as Sun Microsystems, Novell Corporation, MCI
Communications, Digital Equipment Corporation, and others by breaking into their
computer systems. Mitnick used his computer skills to penetrate his victims’ compu-
ter systems to steal secret information and wreak havoc with their software and data.
Mitnick, a self-taught computer user, has a history of computer-related crime. As
a 17-year-old, he was placed on probation for stealing computer manuals from a
Pacific Bell Telephone switching center in Los Angeles. Mitnick was next accused of
breaking into federal government and military computers. He was also accused of
breaking into the nation’s telephone and cellular telephone networks, stealing thou-
sands of data files and trade secrets from corporate targets, obtaining at least 20,000
credit card numbers of some of the country’s richest persons, and sabotaging govern-
ment, university, and private computer systems around the nation. Mitnick was
arrested and convicted of computer crimes and served time in prison.
Upon release from prison, he was put on probation and placed in a medical pro-
gram to treat his compulsive addiction to computers, which included a court order
not to touch a computer or modem. Mitnick dropped out of sight and evaded federal
law enforcement officials for several years as he continued a life of computer crime.
Mitnick’s next undoing came when he broke into the computer of Tsutomu
Shimomura, a researcher at the San Diego Supercomputer Center. Shimomura, a
cybersleuth who advises the FBI and major companies on computer and Internet secu-
rity, made it his crusade to catch the hacker who broke into his computer. Shimomura
watched electronically as Mitnick invaded other computers across the country, but he
could not physically locate Mitnick because he disguised his whereabouts by breaking
into telephone company computers and rerouting all his computer calls. Eventually,
Shimomura’s patient watching paid off as he traced the electronic burglar to Raleigh,
North Carolina. Shimomura flew to Raleigh, where he used a cellular-frequency-
direction-finding antenna to locate Mitnick’s apartment. The FBI was notified and an
arrest warrant was obtained from a judge at his home. The FBI arrested Mitnick at his
apartment. Mitnick was placed in jail without bail pending the investigation of his case.
Mitnick’s computer crimes spree have been estimated to have cost his victims several
hundreds of millions of dollars in losses. Mitnick has not been accused of benefiting
financially from his deeds. Subsequently, Mitnick entered into a plea agreement with fed-
eral prosecutors. The U.S. District Court judge sentenced Kevin Mitnick to 46 months in
prison, including time served, and ordered him to pay $4,125 in restitution to the compa-
nies he victimized. The judge called this a token amount but did not order a larger restitu-
tion because she believed Mitnick would not be able to pay more. After serving his time
in jail, Mitnick was released from prison. As part of the sentencing, Mitnick cannot use
electronic devices, from PCs to cellular telephones, during an additional probationary
period following his release from prison. Mitnick is now acting as a consultant to busi-
nesses, advising them how to protect themselves from computer hackers.

1. Law: What is a computer hacker?
2. Law: Is it a crime to hack into other person’s or entity’s computers and either
steal important and confidential information or just cause damages to the com-
puter system and its contents?
3. Ethics: Why do many computer hackers do what they do?
4. Critical Thinking: Should Mitnick have been given a greater sentence in this
case? Why or why not?
part TWO
DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL SALES
AND LEASE CONTRACTS
CHAPTER 10 Formation of Sales and Lease Contracts
CHAPTER 11 Performance of Sales and Lease Contracts
CHAPTER 12 Remedies for Breach of Sales and Lease Contracts
CHAPTER 13 Sales and Lease Warranties
Commercial law lies within a narrow compass, and is far purer and
freer from defects than any other part of the system.
—Henry Peter Brougham
House of Commons, February 7, 1828
chapter 10
FORMATION OF SALES
AND LEASE CONTRACTS
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Jane Wilson, who CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
leased a pickup truck from World Leasing, Inc. Jane had experience in business After studying this chapter, you
and had signed contracts before. In the past, Wilson had read the contracts should be able to:
before signing them. When signing the contract for the lease of the truck, how- 1. Define sales contracts governed by Article
ever, Jane did not take the opportunity to read the lease. She signed a statement 2 of the UCC.
declaring she had read and understood the lease. The lease contained a provi- 2. Define lease contracts governed by
Article 2A of the UCC.
sion that made Jane responsible for payments on the truck even if the truck was
3. Apply the basic UCC principles of good
destroyed. Several months after leasing the truck, Jane was involved in a two- faith and reasonableness.
vehicle collision. The pickup truck was destroyed. World Leasing, Inc., has 4. Describe the formation of sales and lease
demanded to be paid for the balance of the lease. contracts.
5. Define the UCC’s firm offer rule, additional
terms rule, and written confirmation rule.
259
260 Chapter 10
Uniform Sales Act Most tangible items—such as books, clothing, and tools—are considered goods. In
A law governing sales of goods that medieval times, merchants gathered at fairs in Europe to exchange such goods.
was adopted by most states. It was Over time, certain customs and rules evolved for enforcing contracts and resolving
later subsumed within Article 2 of disputes. These customs and rules, which were referred to as the “Law Merchant,”
the Uniform Commercial Code.
were enforced by “fair courts” established by the merchants. Eventually, the customs
Uniform Commercial Code and rules of the Law Merchant were absorbed into the common law.
Comprehensive statutory scheme Toward the end of the 1800s, England enacted a statute (the Sales of Goods
that includes laws that cover Act) that codified the common law rules of commercial transactions. In the United
aspects of commercial transactions. States, laws governing the sale of goods also developed. In 1906, the Uniform Sales
Article 2 (Sales) Act was promulgated in the United States. This act was enacted in many states. It
A section of the Uniform Commercial was quickly outdated, however, as mass production and distribution of goods
Code that deals with the sale of developed in the 20th century.
goods. In 1949, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated a comprehensive statutory scheme called the Uniform Commercial
intangible property
Property that is a “right” rather than
Code (UCC). The UCC covers most aspects of commercial transactions. The most
a physical object even though the important section of the UCC—as it relates to contract law—is Article 2.
right may be evidenced by a Note that Article 2 (Sales) of the UCC deals with the sale of goods, not real
physical piece of paper (e.g., patent, property (real estate), services, or intangible property. Article 2A (Leases) of the
stock, trademark, copyright, or UCC governs personal property leases. These articles are intended to provide clear,
goodwill). easy-to-apply rules that place the risk of loss of the goods on the party most able to
Article 2A (Leases)
either bear the risk or insure against it. The rules of the UCC may vary depending
Article of the UCC that governs lease on whether the buyer or the seller is a merchant.
of goods. The UCC does not replace the common law of contracts. The common law of
contracts continues to govern if the UCC is silent on an issue.
This Chapter discusses sales and lease contracts. Other articles of the UCC
are discussed in subsequent Chapters.
Cathy D. Canny is a senior parale- From simple contracts to those that are com-
gal at the law firm of Benesch, plex, my attorneys depend on me to have substan-
Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, tive knowledge. I am able to review the contracts to
LLP, in Indianapolis, Indiana. She is identify the parts that are relevant and those that are
a graduate of Saint Mary-of-the- in contention. Then, I look at the applicable law and
Woods College in Saint Mary-of-
gather facts for preparation of the case. This enables
the-Woods, Indiana. She holds a
bachelor of arts degree in paralegal
my attorneys to have more reliance on me, which frees
studies, and she also obtained a up their time for other tasks they must accomplish.
minor in business administration. Knowledge of contract law has given me
invaluable expertise to better assist my attorneys in
Many of our cases involve contract disputes. From our litigation cases. There are so many areas of
the initial client conference, to drafting or respond- litigation, and it is imperative that I, as a paralegal,
ing to complaints, through the discovery stage, and have practice knowledge of substantive areas of law.
preparing for and assisting at trial, my knowledge It also enables me to assist attorneys in other prac-
of contract law is extremely important. My work tice areas, such as bankruptcy, real estate, and
often involves some sort of contract. Types of con- corporate law. This makes me a very well-rounded
tracts that I may see in cases include employment paralegal and an asset to my law firm.
agreements, severance and release agreements, Paralegals are an integral part of the legal
noncompete contracts, shareholder agreements, services team. With effective utilization by attorneys
contracts between customer and vendor, and pur- at my firm, our clients benefit and the law firm
chase contracts, to name just a few. improves its profitability.
Formation of Sales and Lease Contracts 261
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: CRIMINAL LAW PARALEGAL
A criminal law paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Prepare client agreement for attorney to undertake representation of client’s case.
• Prepare and file motion for bond reduction.
• Arrange for bail.
• Gather information for plea bargain agreement, and prepare changes or plea for
arraignment.
• Obtain discovery (police reports, search warrant, and affidavits) and interview
witnesses.
• Examine physical evidence and tangible objects.
• Examine and photograph scene of alleged crime.
• Analyze case based on documents and information obtained.
• Prepare for preliminary hearing or grand jury presentation.
• Draft demurrer.
• As necessary and appropriate, draft motions to change venue, to set aside indict-
ment, to suppress, for acquittal, for civil compromise, for diversion, in limine, for
return of property, to postpone trial, to disqualify judge, and to withdraw as
attorney of record.
• Arrange civil compromise.
• Prepare documents concerning work release.
• Draft trial memorandum.
• Attend conference with prosecutor.
• Draft motions in arrest of judgment, for new trial, for release pending new trial,
for appeal.
• Prepare sentencing information and work with probation officers.
• Draft petition for leniency for probation.
• Research law about appealable issues.
• Draft assignments of error and arguments.

One of the major frustrations of businesspersons conducting interstate business is
that they are subject to the laws of each state in which they operate. To address this
problem, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1949 promulgated the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
The UCC is a model act drafted by the American Law Institute and the model act
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law. This model act A statute proposed to legislatures
contains uniform rules that govern commercial transactions. For the UCC, or any for adoption (e.g., the Model Probate
part of the UCC, to become law in a state, that state needs to enact the UCC as its Code proposed by the National
commercial law statute. Every state (except Louisiana, which has adopted only Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform Laws).
parts of the UCC) has enacted the UCC or the majority of the UCC as a commer-
cial statute.
The UCC is divided into articles, with each article establishing uniform rules
for a particular facet of U.S. commerce. The articles of the UCC are listed below
and are discussed in Appendix D of this textbook.
The UCC is continually being revised to reflect changes in modern commer-
cial practices and technology. Article 2, which establishes rules that govern the sale
262 Chapter 10
of goods, was recently amended. Article 2A was added to govern leases of personal
property, and Article 4A was added to regulate the use of wire transfers in the
banking system. Articles 3 and 4, which cover the creation and transfer of negoti-
able instruments and the clearing of checks through the banking system, were sub-
stantially amended in 1990. Article 9, which covers secured transactions in personal
property, has also been revised.
The following are the topics covered by each of the articles in the UCC:
Article 1 General Provisions
Article 2 Sales
Article 2A Leases
Article 3 Negotiable Instruments
Article 4 Bank Deposits and Collections
Article 4A Funds Transfers
Article 5 Letters of Credit
Article 6 Bulk Transfers
Article 7 Documents of Title
Article 8 Investment Securities
Article 9 Secured Transactions
Revised Article 9 Secured Transactions
Each of the above UCC articles can be viewed online at www.law.cornell.

edu/ucc/.
Article 2 (Sales)
All states except Louisiana have adopted some version of Article 2 (Sales) of the
UCC. Article 2 is also applied by federal courts to sales contracts governed by fed-
Revised Article 2 eral law. Article 2 has recently been revised. This article, referred to as Revised
A recent revision of Article 2 to the Article 2, has been adopted by some states.
Uniform Commercial Code that
deals with the sale of goods. WHAT IS A SALE?
Article 2 of the UCC applies to transactions in goods [UCC 2-102]. All states have
sale held that Article 2 applies to the sale of goods. A sale consists of the passing of title
The passing of title from a seller to from a seller to a buyer for a price [UCC 2-106(1)].
a buyer for a price.
Example: The purchase of a computer is a sale subject to Article 2, whether the
computer was paid for by cash, credit card, or other form of consideration (see
Exhibit 10.1).
goods WHAT ARE GOODS?

Tangible things that are movable at
the time of their identification to the Goods are defined as tangible things that are movable at the time of their identifi-
contract. cation to a contract [UCC 2-105(1)]. Specially manufactured goods and the unborn
EXHIBIT 10.1 Sales Transaction
Sale of goods
Purchaser Seller
Payment
young of animals are examples of goods. Certain items are not considered goods
and not subject to Article 2:
1. Money and intangible items, such as stocks, bonds, and patents, are not tan-
gible goods.
2. Real estate is not a tangible good because it is not movable [UCC 2-105(1)].
Minerals, structures, growing crops, and other things that are severable from
real estate may be classified as goods subject to Article 2, however.
Example: The sale and removal of a chandelier in a house is a sale of goods subject
to Article 2 because its removal would not materially harm the realty. The sale
and removal of the furnace, however, would be a sale of real property because its
removal would cause material harm [UCC 2-107(2)].
GOODS VERSUS SERVICES

Contracts for the provision of services—including legal services, medical services,
and dental services—are not covered by Article 2. Sometimes, however, a sale
involves both the provision of a service and a good in the same transaction. This
sale is referred to as a mixed sale. Article 2 applies to mixed sales only if the goods mixed sale
are the predominant part of the transaction. The UCC provides no guidance for A sale that involves the provision of
deciding cases based on mixed sales; therefore, the courts decide these issues on a a service and a good in the same
case-by-case basis, using the common law of contracts. transaction.
In Case 10.1, the court had to decide whether a sale was of a good or a
service.
CASE 10.1 GOOD OR SERVICE

Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Ct. App. 1986).
“The essence of the relationship between a hospital and its patients
does not relate essentially to any product or piece of equipment it uses
but to the professional services it provides.”
Judge Spencer,
Court of Appeal of California
Facts
Frances Hector entered Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars-Sinai), Los Angeles,
California, for surgery on her heart. During the operation, a pacemaker was
installed. The pacemaker, manufactured by American Technology, Inc., was installed
at Cedars-Sinai by Hector’s physician, Dr. Eugene Kompaniez. The pacemaker
264 Chapter 10
was defective, causing injury to Hector. Hector sued Cedars-Sinai under Article 2
of the UCC for breach of warranty. The trial court held that the sale was primarily
a sale of a service and not of goods; therefore, the UCC did not apply. The trial
court granted Cedars-Sinai motion for summary judgment and dismissed Hec-
tor’s lawsuit. Hector appealed.
Issue
Is the installation of a pacemaker by a hospital a sale of a good subject to Article 2
of the UCC?

The physician’s services depend upon his skill and judgment derived from his spe-
cialized training, knowledge, experience, and skill. A doctor diagnosing and treating
a patient normally is not selling either a product or insurance. A hospital is not ordi-
narily engaged in the business of selling any of the products or equipment it uses in
providing such services. The essence of the relationship between a hospital and its
patients does not relate essentially to any product or piece of equipment it uses but to
the professional services it provides.
Testimony indicates that Cedars-Sinai does not routinely stock pacemakers,
nor is it in the business of selling, distributing, or testing pacemakers. The treatment
provided by Cedars-Sinai in relation to implantation of pacemakers includes pre-
and post-operative care, nursing care, a surgical operating room, and technicians.
As a provider of services rather than a seller of a product, the hospital is not subject
to liability for a defective product provided to the patient during the course of his or
her treatment.
Decision
The court of appeal held that Cedars-Sinai was a provider of medical services and
not a seller of goods. Therefore, Cedars-Sinai was not liable for breach of warranty
under the UCC because the UCC did not apply. The court of appeal affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the UCC be extended to service providers?
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for the hospital to deny liability in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Could American Technology, Inc., be held liable to the
plaintiff in this case? Why do you think the plaintiff sued Cedars-Sinai in this
case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Courts of Appeal of California to find the Second
Appellate District at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts.
2. Visit the website of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center at www.csmc.edu.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the use of Article 2
(Sales) in your state.
WHO IS A MERCHANT?
Generally, Article 2 of the UCC applies to all sales contracts, whether they involve
merchants or not. However, Article 2 contains several provisions that either apply merchant
only to merchants or impose a greater duty on merchants. UCC 2-104(1) defines a A person who (1) deals in the goods
merchant as (1) a person who deals in the goods of the kind involved in the trans- of the kind involved in the transac-
action or (2) a person who by his or her occupation holds himself or herself out as tion or (2) by his or her occupation
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods involved in the transaction. For holds himself or herself out as
example, a sporting goods dealer is a merchant with respect to sporting goods but having knowledge or skill peculiar
is not if he sells his lawn mower to a neighbor. The courts disagree as to whether to the goods involved in the
farmers are merchants within this definition. transaction.
Uniform Commercial Code—
Leases
Article 2A of the UCC directly
Article 2A (Leases) addresses personal property
leases, including the formation,
Personal property leases are a billion-dollar industry. Consumer leases of automo-
performance, and default of leases
biles or equipment and commercial leases of such items as aircraft and industrial
in goods.
machinery fall into this category. In the past, these transactions were governed by a
combination of common law principles, real estate law, and reference to Article 2. lease
Common Law Definition: A contract
Some of these legal rules and concepts do not quite fit a lease transaction.
for the exclusive possession of lands
Article 2A of the UCC was promulgated in 1987. This article, which is cited
or tenements for a determinate
as the Uniform Commercial Code—Leases, directly addresses personal property period: a contract by which the lessor
leases [UCC 2A-101]. It establishes a comprehensive, uniform law covering the grants the lessee the exclusive right
formation, performance, and default of leases in goods [UCC 2A-102, 2A-103(h)]. to possess and use personal property
Article 2A is similar to Article 2. In fact, many Article 2 provisions of the lessor for a specified period
were changed to reflect leasing terminology and practices that carried over to of time.
Article 2A. UCC Article 2a Definition: A transfer
of the right to possession and use of
goods for a term in return for
DEFINITION OF A LEASE consideration, but a sale, including
a sale on approval or a sale or return,
A lease is a transfer of the right to the possession and use of the named goods for a
or retention or creation of a security
set term in return for certain consideration [UCC 2A-103(1)(i)(x)]. The leased interest is not a lease. Unless the
goods can be anything from a hand tool leased to an individual for a few hours to a context clearly indicates otherwise,
complex line of industrial equipment leased to a multinational corporation for a the term includes a sublease.
number of years.
lessor
In an ordinary lease, the lessor is the person who transfers the right of posses- The person who transfers the right
sion and use of goods under the lease [UCC 2A-103(1)(p)]. The lessee is the per- of possession and use of goods
son who acquires the right to possession and use of goods under a lease [UCC under the lease.
2A-103(1)(n)].
lessee
Example: Dow Chemical Company decides to lease robotic equipment to manu- The person who acquires the right
facture most of its products. Ingersoll-Rand Corporation, which manufactures to possession and use of goods
robotic equipment, enters into a lease contract to lease robotic equipment to under a lease.
Dow Chemical. Ingersoll-Rand is the lessor, and Dow Chemical is the lessee (see finance lease
Exhibit 10.2). A three-party transaction consisting
of the lessor, the lessee, and the
supplier.
FINANCE LEASE supplier
One engaged in the business of
A finance lease is a three-party transaction consisting of a lessor, a lessee, and a making products available to
supplier (or vendor). The lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods. consumers; all persons in the chain
Instead, the lessor acquires title to the goods or the right to their possession and of production and distribution of a
use in connection with the terms of the lease [UCC 2A-103(1)(g)]. consumer product.
266 Chapter 10
EXHIBIT 10.2 Lease
Lease
Lessee Lessor
Equipment
Example: JetBlue Airways, a commercial air carrier, decides to acquire a new air-
plane. Boeing Company manufactures the airplane JetBlue wants to acquire. To
finance the airplane acquisition, JetBlue goes to Citibank which purchases the air-
plane from Boeing, and Citibank then leases the airplane to JetBlue. Citibank is the
lessor, JetBlue is the lessee, and Boeing is the supplier. Citibank does not take phys-
ical delivery of the airplane; the airplane is delivered by Boeing directly to JetBlue
(see Exhibit 10.3).
Formation of Sales and Lease

Contracts: Offer
As with general contracts, the formation of sales and lease contracts requires an
offer and an acceptance. The UCC-established rules for each of these elements
often differ considerably from common law.
A contract for the sale or lease of goods may be made in any manner suffi-
cient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties that recognizes the
existence of a contract [UCC 2-204, (1), 2A-204(1)]. Under the UCC, an agreement
sufficient to constitute a contract for the sale or lease of goods may be found even
though the moment of its making is undetermined [UCC 2-204 (2), 2A-204 (2)].
EXHIBIT 10.3 Finance Lease
Sale of airplane
City Bank Boeing
(Purchaser) (Seller)
(Lessor)
Payment
Lease
Lease
payments
Delivery of
airplane
JetBlue
Airways
(Lessee)
OPEN TERMS
Sometimes, the parties to a sale or lease contract leave open a major term in the open term
contract. The UCC is tolerant of open terms. According to UCC 2-204(3) and A section of a sales or lease
2A-204(3), the contract does not fail because of indefiniteness if (1) the parties contract on which the parties are
allowed to “read into” the meaning
intended to make a contract and (2) there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
of that section.
an appropriate remedy. In effect, certain open terms are permitted to be “read
into” a sale or lease contract. This rule is commonly referred to as the gap-filling gap-filling rule
rule. A rule that says an open term can
Some examples of terms that are commonly left open are the following: be “read into” a contract.
• Open price term—If a sales contract does not contain a specific price (open open price term
price term), a “reasonable price” is implied at the time of delivery. The Where a sales contract does
not contain a specific price, a
contract may provide that a price is to be fixed by a market rate (e.g., com-
“reasonable price” is implied at
modities market), as set or recorded by a third person or agency (e.g., a
the time of delivery.
government agency), or by another standard, either upon delivery or on a
set date. If the agreed-upon standard is unavailable when the price is to be
set, a reasonable price is implied at the time of delivery of the goods [UCC
2-305(1)].
A seller or buyer who reserves the right to fix a price must do so in good
faith [UCC 2-305(2)]. When one of the parties fails to fix an open price term,
the other party may opt either (1) to treat the contract as canceled or (2) to fix
a reasonable price for the goods [UCC 2-305(3)].
• Open payment term—If the parties to a sales contract do not agree on pay-
ment terms, payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to
receive the goods. If delivery is authorized and made by way of document of
title, payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the
document of title, regardless of where the goods are to be received [UCC
2-310].
• Open delivery term—If the parties to a sales contract do not agree to the
time, place, and manner of delivery of the goods, the place for delivery is the
seller’s place of business. If the seller does not have a place of business, deliv-
ery is to be made at the seller’s residence. If identified goods are located at
some other place, and both parties know of this fact at the time of contract-
ing, that place is the place of delivery [UCC 2-308].
Where goods are to be shipped but the shipper is not named, the seller
is obligated to make the shipping arrangements. Such arrangements must be
made in good faith and within limits of commercial reasonableness [UCC
2-311(2)].
• Open time term—If the parties to a sales contract do not set a specific time
of performance for any obligation under the contract, the contract must be
performed within a reasonable time. If the sales contract provides for succes-
sive performance over an unspecified period of time, the contract is valid for
a reasonable time [UCC 2-309].
• Open assortment term—If the assortment of goods to a sales contract is left
open, the buyer is given the option of choosing those goods.
Example: Suppose Macy’s contracts to purchase 1,000 dresses from Liz

Claiborne, Inc. The contract is silent as to the assortment of colors of the
dresses. The buyer may pick the assortment of colors for the dresses from the
seller’s stock. The buyer must make the selection in good faith and within
limits set by commercial reasonableness [UCC 2-311(2)].
268 Chapter 10
UCC “FIRM OFFER” RULE

Recall that the common law of contracts allows the offeror to revoke an offer any
time prior to its acceptance. The only exception allowed by the common law is an
option contract (i.e., where the offeree pays the offeror consideration to keep the
offer open).
firm offer rule The UCC recognizes another exception, which is called the firm offer rule.
Under the UCC, a merchant who This rule states that a merchant who (1) offers to buy, sell, or lease goods and (2)
offers to buy, sell, or lease goods gives a written and signed assurance on a separate form that the offer will be held
and who gives a written and signed open cannot revoke the offer for the time stated or, if no time is stated, for a reason-
assurance that the offer will be held able time. The maximum amount of time permitted under this rule is three months
open cannot revoke the offer for the
[UCC 2-205, 2A-205].
time stated or a reasonable time.
Example: On June 1, a merchant-seller offers to sell a Mercedes-Benz to a buyer
for $50,000. The merchant-seller signs a written assurance to keep that offer open
until August 30. On July 1, the merchant-seller sells the car to another buyer. On
August 21, the original offeree tenders $50,000 for the car. The merchant-seller is
liable to the original offeree for breach of contract.
CONSIDERATION
The formation of sales and lease contracts requires consideration. However, the
UCC changes the common law rule that requires the modification of a contract to
be supported by new consideration. An agreement modifying a sales or lease con-
tract needs no consideration to be binding [UCC 2-209(1), 2A-208(1)].
Modification of a sales or lease contract must be made in good faith [UCC
1-203]. As in the common law of contracts, modifications are not binding if they
are obtained through fraud, duress, extortion, and such.
Formation of Sales and Lease

Contracts: Acceptance
Both common law and the UCC provide that a contract is created when the offeree
(i.e., the buyer or lessee) sends an acceptance to the offeror, not when the offeror
receives the acceptance. For example, a contract is made when the acceptance letter
is delivered to the post office. The contract remains valid even if the post office
loses the letter.
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by language or circumstance, an
offer to make a sales or lease contract may be accepted in any manner and by any
reasonable medium of acceptance [UCC 2-206(1)(a), 2A-206(1)]. Applications of
this rule are discussed in the following paragraphs.
METHODS OF ACCEPTANCE
The UCC permits acceptance by any reasonable manner or method of
communication.
Example: A seller sends a telegram to a proposed buyer, offering to sell the buyer
certain goods. The buyer responds by mailing a letter of acceptance to the seller. In
most circumstances, mailing the letter of acceptance would be considered reasonable.
If the goods were extremely perishable or if the market for the goods were very vola-
tile, however, a faster means of acceptance (such as a telegram) might be warranted.
If an order or other offer to buy goods requires prompt or current shipment,

the offer is accepted if the seller (1) promptly promises to ship the goods or (2)
promptly ships either conforming or nonconforming goods [UCC 2-206(1)(b)].
The shipment of conforming goods signals acceptance of the buyer’s offer.
Acceptance of goods occurs after the buyer or lessee has a reasonable oppor-
tunity to inspect them and signifies that (1) the goods are conforming, (2) he or she
will take or retain the goods in spite of their nonconformity, or (3) he or she fails to
reject the goods within a reasonable time after tender or delivery [UCC 2-513(1),
2A-515(1)].
ACCOMMODATION SHIPMENT
A shipment of nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller
reasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation accommodation
to the buyer [UCC 2-206(1)(b)]. For example, suppose a buyer offers to purchase A shipment that is offered to the
500 red candles from a seller. The seller’s red candles are temporarily out of stock. buyer as a replacement for the
The seller sends the buyer 500 green candles and notifies the buyer that these can- original shipment when the original
dles are being sent as an accommodation. The seller has not accepted (or breached) shipment cannot be filled.
the contract. The accommodation is a counteroffer from the seller to the buyer.
The buyer is free either to accept or to reject the counteroffer.
ADDITIONAL TERMS
Under common law’s mirror image rule, an offeree’s acceptance must be on the mirror image rule
same terms as the offer. The inclusion of additional terms in the acceptance is con- States that for an acceptance to
sidered a counteroffer rather than an acceptance. Thus, the offeror’s original offer exist, the offeree must accept the
is extinguished. terms as stated in the offer.
UCC 2-207(1) is more liberal than the mirror image rule. It permits definite
and timely expression of acceptance or written confirmation to operate as an
acceptance even though they contain terms that are additional to or different from
the offered terms, unless the acceptance is expressly conditional on assent to such
terms. This rule differs for merchants and nonmerchants.
If one or both parties to a sales contract are nonmerchants, any additional
terms are considered proposed additions to the contract. The proposed additions proposed additions
do not constitute a counteroffer or extinguish the original offer. If the offeree’s pro- If one or both parties to the contract
posed additions are accepted by the original offeror, they become part of the con- are nonmerchants, any additional
tract. If they are not accepted, the sales contract is formed on the basis of the terms terms do not constitute a counter-
of the original offer [UCC 2-207(2)]. offer or extinguish the original offer.
If the offeree’s proposed conditions
Example: A salesperson at a Lexus dealership offers to sell a top-of-the-line coupe are accepted by the original offeror,
to a buyer for $64,000. The buyer replies, “I accept your offer, but I would like to they become part of the contract. If
have a satellite radio in the car.” The satellite radio is a proposed addition to the they are not accepted, the sales
contract. If the salesperson agrees, the contract between the parties consists of the contract is formed on the basis of
terms of the original offer plus the additional term regarding the satellite radio. the original offer.
If the salesperson rejects the proposed addition, the sales contract consists of the
terms of the original offer because the buyer made a definite expression of
acceptance.
“BATTLE OF THE FORMS”

When merchants negotiate sales contracts, they often exchange preprinted forms.
These boilerplate forms usually contain terms that favor the drafter. Thus, an
270 Chapter 10
battle of the forms offeror who sends a standard form contract as an offer to the offeree may receive
Where the parties to a contract go an acceptance drafted on the offeree’s own form contract. This scenario—
back and forth with each other commonly called the battle of the forms—raises important questions: Is there a
trying to get the other to agree to contract? If so, what are its terms? The UCC provides guidance in answering these
their standard contract form.
questions.
Under UCC 2-207(2), if both parties are merchants, any additional terms
contained in an acceptance become part of the sales contract unless (1) the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, (2) the additional terms mate-
rially alter the terms of the original contract, or (3) the offeror notifies the offeree
that he or she objects to the additional terms within a reasonable time after receiv-
ing the offeree’s modified acceptance.
The most important point in the battle of the forms is that there is no con-
tract if the additional terms so materially alter the terms of the original offer that
the parties cannot agree on the contract. This fact-specific determination is made
by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
UCC Statute of Frauds

The UCC includes Statute of Frauds provisions that apply to all sales and lease con-
tracts. All contracts for the sale of goods costing $500 or more and lease contracts
involving payments of $1,000 or more must be in writing [UCC 2-201(1),
2A-201(1)]. The writing must be sufficient to indicate that a contract has been
made between the parties. Except as discussed in the paragraphs that follow, the
writing must be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his
or her authorized agent or broker. If a contract falling within these parameters is
not written, it is unenforceable.
Example: A seller orally agrees to sell her computer to a buyer for $550. When the
buyer tenders the purchase price, the seller asserts the Statute of Frauds and refuses
to sell the computer to him. The seller is correct. The contract must be in writing to
be enforceable because the contract price for the computer exceeds $499.99.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

In three situations, a sales or lease contract that would otherwise be required to be
in writing is enforceable even if it is not in writing [UCC 2-201(3), UCC 2A-201(4)]:
specially manufactured goods
Goods manufactured specifically for 1. Specially manufactured goods—Buyers and lessees often order specially
the buyer. manufactured goods. If a contract to purchase or lease such goods is oral, the
admissions in pleadings or court
buyer or lessee may not assert the Statute of Frauds against the enforcement
When a party admits in pleadings, of the contract if (1) the goods are not suitable for sale or lease to others in the
testimony, or otherwise in court that ordinary course of the seller’s or the lessor’s business and (2) the seller or les-
a contract for the sale or lease of sor has made either a substantial beginning of the manufacture of the goods
goods was made, the oral contract or commitments for their procurement.
is enforceable against that party. 2. Admissions in pleadings or court—If the party against whom enforcement of
an oral sales or lease contract is sought admits in pleadings, testimony, or
part acceptance
When a sales or lease contract is
otherwise in court that a contract for the sale or lease of goods was made, the
oral but should have been in writing, oral contract is enforceable against that party. However, the contract is only
the contract is enforceable only to enforceable as to the quantity of goods admitted.
the extent to which the goods have 3. Part acceptance—An oral sales or lease contract that should otherwise be in
been received and accepted by the writing is enforceable to the extent to which the goods have been received
buyer or lessee. and accepted by the buyer or lessee.
Example: A lessor orally contracts to lease 100 personal computers to a lessee. The
lessee accepts the first 20 computers tendered by the lessor. This action is part
acceptance. The lessee refuses to take delivery of the remaining 80 computers.
Here, the lessee must pay for the 20 computers she originally received and accepted.
The lessee does not have to accept or pay for the remaining 80 computers.
WRITTEN CONFIRMATION RULE

If both parties to an oral sales or lease contract are merchants, the Statute of Frauds
requirement can be satisfied if (1) one of the parties to an oral agreement sends a
written confirmation of the sale or lease within a reasonable time after contracting
and (2) the other merchant does not give written notice of an objection to the con-
tract within 10 days after receiving the confirmation. This situation is true even
though the party receiving the written confirmation has not signed it. The only
stipulations are that the confirmation be sufficient and that the party to whom it
was sent has reason to know its contents [UCC 2-201(2)].
Example: A merchant-seller in Chicago orally contracts by telephone to sell goods
to a merchant-buyer in Phoenix for $25,000. Within a reasonable time after con-
tracting, the merchant-seller sends a sufficient written confirmation to the buyer.
The buyer, who has reason to know the contents of the confirmation, fails to object
to the contents of the confirmation in writing within 10 days after receiving it. The
Statute of Frauds has been met, and the buyer cannot thereafter raise it against
enforcement of the contract.
WHEN WRITTEN MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED

Oral modification of a contract is not enforceable if the parties agree that any mod-
ification of the sales or lease contract must be signed in writing [UCC 2-209(2),
2A-208(2)]. In the absence of such an agreement, oral modifications to sales and
lease contracts are binding if they do not violate the Statute of Frauds.
If the oral modification brings the contract within the Statute of Frauds, it
must be in writing to be enforceable.
Example: A lessor and lessee enter into an oral lease contract for the lease of goods
at a rent of $450. Subsequently, the contract is modified by raising the rent to $550.
Because the modified contract rent is more than $499.99, the contract comes under
the UCC Statute of Frauds, and the modification must be in writing to be
enforceable.
PAROL EVIDENCE parol evidence rule

The parol evidence rule states that when a sales or lease contract is evidenced by a A rule that says if a written contract
is a complete and final statement of
writing that is intended to be a final expression of the parties’ agreement or a con-
the parties’ agreement, any prior or
firmatory memorandum, the terms of the writing may not be contradicted by evi-
contemporaneous oral or written
dence of (1) a prior oral or written agreement or (2) a contemporaneous oral statements that alter, contradict, or
agreement (i.e., parol evidence) [UCC 2-202, 2A-202]. This rule is intended to are in addition to the terms of the
ensure certainty in written sales and lease contracts. written contract are inadmissible in
Occasionally, the express terms of a written contract are not clear on their court regarding a dispute over the
face and must be interpreted. In such cases, reference may be made to certain contract. There are several
sources outside the contract. These sources are construed together when they are exceptions to this rule.
272 Chapter 10
course of performance consistent with each other. If that is unreasonable, they are considered in descend-
The history of previous conduct of ing order of priority [UCC 2-208(2), 2A-207(2)]:
the parties regarding the contract in
question. 1. Course of performance—The previous conduct of the parties regarding the
contract in question
course of dealing
2. Course of dealing—The conduct of the parties in prior transactions and
A sequence of previous acts and
contracts
conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction, which fairly
3. Usage of trade—Any practice or method of dealing that is regularly observed
establishes a common basis of or adhered to in a place, a vocation, a trade, or an industry
understanding for interpreting their
communications and other conduct. Example: A cattle rancher contracts to purchase corn from a farmer. The farmer
delivers feed corn to the rancher. The rancher rejects this corn and demands deliv-
usage of trade ery of corn that is fit for human consumption. Ordinarily, usage of trade would be
A regularly observed or adhered-to
the first source of interpretation of the word corn. If the parties had prior dealings,
practice or method of dealing in a
though, the use of the term in their prior dealings would become the primary
particular trade or industry.
source of interpretation.
Concept Summary
Comparison of Contract Law and the Law of Sales
Topic Common Law of Contracts UCC Law of Sales
Definiteness Contract must contain all the The UCC gap-filling rule per-
material terms of the parties’ mits terms to be implied if the
agreement. parties intended to make a con-
tract [UCC 2-204].
Irrevocable Option contracts. Option contracts. Firm offers by
offers merchants to keep an offer open
are binding up to three months
without any consideration
[UCC 2-205].
Counteroffers Acceptance must be a mirror Additional terms of an accept-
image of the offer. A counteroffer ance become part of the con-
rejects and terminates the offer. tract if (1) they do not materially
alter the terms of the offer and
(2) the offeror does not object
within a reasonable time after
reviewing the acceptance [UCC
2-207].
Statute of Writing must be signed by the Writing may be enforced against
Frauds party against whom enforcement a party who has not signed it if
is sought. (1) both parties are merchants,
(2) one party sends a written
confirmation of oral agreement
within a reasonable time after
contracting, and (3) the other
party does not give written
notice of objection within
10 days after receiving the
confirmation [UCC 2-201].
Modification Consideration is required. Consideration is not required
[UCC 2-209].
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS OVER THE INTERNET

Little did Congress know when it passed the Federal Trade Commission Act that
Section 5 of the act would be used to prosecute fraud over the Internet. Section 5
prohibits “unfair and deceptive” acts affecting commerce. The FTC has demon-
strated recently that old laws can learn new tricks. Consider the following case.
Powerful search engines have been developed to allow surfers to browse the
Internet and connect to websites in which they are interested. Certain scammers
came up with a scheme where they would entice unwitting surfers to connect to
their porn sites and not be able to get out. The scheme worked as follows. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
scammers made fake copies of over 25 million popular websites, such as the Har- Federal government agency
vard Business Review and Japanese Friendship Gardens. Search engines trolling the empowered to enforce federal
franchising rules. Federal
web for new pages found these websites and added them to their listings. The
administrative agency empowered
scammers added to the faked web pages an extra bit of coding so that as soon
to enforce the Federal Trade
as surfers found the bogus web page, it rerouted—“page-jacked”—them to the Commission Act and other federal
scammer’s porn website. Once there, the user was “mouse-trapped” at the porn site, consumer protection statutes.
and efforts to escape led only to new porn pages. The porn site operators made
money by selling advertisements, and ad prices were often based on the number of Section 5
hits on the site. Prohibits unfair and deceptive
practices.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a federal government agency, investi-
gated and sued porn site operators in federal court for violating Section 5 of the letter of credit
FTC Act. The court found that the porn site operators had engaged in unfair and A written instrument addressed by
deceptive practices in violation of Section 5, issued an injunction to shut down the one person to another requesting
porn sites, and ordered the operators not to engage in such conduct in the future. the latter to give credit to the person
in whose favor it is drawn.
account party
LETTERS OF CREDIT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE The buyer in regard to a letter of
The major risks in any business transaction involving the sale of goods are that (1) the credit.
seller will not be paid after delivering the goods and (2) the buyer will not receive issuing bank
the goods after paying for them. These risks are even more acute in international The institution that issues the letter
transactions, where the buyer and seller may not know each other, the parties are of credit.
dealing at long distance, and the judicial systems of the parties’ countries may not
beneficiary
have jurisdiction to decide a dispute if one should arise. The irrevocable letter of
A person or organization designated
credit has been developed to manage these risks in international sales. The func- in the will that receives all or a
tion of a letter of credit is to substitute the credit of a recognized international bank portion of the testator’s property at
for that of the buyer. the time of the testator’s death. The
An irrevocable letter of credit works this way. Suppose a buyer in one country person who is to receive the life
and a seller in another country enter into a contract for the sale of goods. The insurance proceeds when the
buyer goes to his or her bank and pays the bank a fee to issue a letter of credit in insured dies. Person for whose
which the bank agrees to pay the amount of the letter (which is the amount of the benefit a trust is created.
purchase price of the goods) to the seller’s bank if certain conditions are met. These correspondent
conditions are usually the delivery of documents indicating that the seller has A securities firm, bank, or other
placed the goods in the hands of a shipper. The buyer is called the account party, financial organization that regularly
the bank that issues the letter of credit is called the issuing bank, and the seller is performs services for another in a
called the beneficiary of the letter of credit. place or market to which the other
The issuing bank then forwards the letter of credit to a bank that the seller does not have direct access (a cor-
has designated in his or her country. This bank, which is called the correspondent, respondent on an exchange; corre-
or confirming bank, relays the letter of credit to the seller. Now that the seller sees spondent bank).
that he or she is guaranteed payment, he or she makes arrangements to ship the bill of lading
goods and receives a bill of lading from the carrier proving so. The seller then A document of title that is issued by
delivers these documents to the confirming bank. The confirming bank examines a carrier when goods are received
the documents and, if it finds them in order, pays the seller and forwards the for transportation.
274 Chapter 10
Article 5 (Letters of Credit) documents to the issuing bank. By this time, the buyer has usually paid the amount
A section of the UCC that governs of the purchase price to the issuing bank (unless an extension of credit has been
letters of credit unless otherwise arranged), and the issuing bank then charges the buyer’s account. The issuing bank
agreed to by the parties. forwards the bill of lading and other necessary documents to the buyer, who then
Uniform Customs and Practices for picks up the goods from the shipper when they arrive.
Documentary Credits (UCP) If the documents (e.g., bill of lading, proof of insurance) conform to the con-
Rules created by the International ditions specified in the letter of credit, the issuing bank must pay the letter of credit.
Chamber of Commerce that govern If the account party does not pay the issuing bank, the issuing bank’s only recourse
the formation and performance of is to sue the account party to recover damages.
letters of credit. Article 5 (Letters of Credit) of the UCC governs letters of credit unless other-
wise agreed by the parties. The International Chamber of Commerce has promul-
gated the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP), which
contains rules governing the formation and performance of letters of credit.
Although the UCP is neither a treaty nor a legislative enactment, most banks incor-
porate the terms of the UCP in letters of credit they issue.
Fern Burnett currently works as a Because the company sells advertisement,
paralegal at the corporate offices of customer contracts are fundamental to any lawsuit
Valley Yellow Pages in Fresno, Cali- or dispute that may arise. Essential to the function-
fornia. Among the degrees she has ing of the corporation are agreements for payment,
earned is an A.S. degree in parale- contracts for services with companies for graphics,
galism from Fresno City College in
publishing, distribution, and website creation and
Fresno, California, where she now
teaches legal research and writing.
management.
The corporation must also enter into con-
As the company’s corporate paralegal, I work daily tracts with companies for employee services
with the general counsel and other corporate offic- (i.e., medical insurance, retirement accounts, and
ers and managers to review, draft, revise, or advise disability benefits).
on contracts. Under the supervision of the general counsel, I
Housing our employees in sales offices handle contracts and agreements in a very practical
throughout the state involves securing leases and way to help word agreements without using archaic
insurance policies, and reviewing subordination, legalese, and I help to ensure that the best interests
nondisturbance, and attornment agreements. My of the corporation and its employees are met.
work also involves analyzing contracts with inde-
pendent contractors and utility corporations.

Avoid the Appearance of Impropriety
The ethical paralegal knows to avoid unethical and improper acts.
However, the ethical rules require legal professionals to do more. Legal
professionals must avoid even the appearance of having done some-
thing unethical and improper. This is called the avoidance of the
appearance of impropriety.
The appearance of impropriety is often raised in situations where attorneys

move between law firms (ABA Model Rule 1.10) and where there are issues of
improper influence on a tribunal (ABA Model Rule 3.5).1 Because even an inno-
cent act can take on the appearance of impropriety, ethical paralegals should always
be aware of how their actions—even if innocent—might be interpreted by an
observer.
1
CHAPTER 10 SUMMARY
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, p. 261 b. Lessee. The lessee is the person who acquires the
right to possession and use of the goods.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a model act that c. Supplier. The supplier is the third party who supplies
contains uniform rules that govern commercial transactions. the goods. The supplier usually sells the goods to the
State Adoption of the UCC lessor.
Most states have enacted all or part of the UCC as their com-
mercial law statute. FORMATION OF SALES AND LEASE
CONTRACTS: OFFER, p. 266
ARTICLE 2 (SALES), p. 262 Open terms. If the parties leave open a major term in a sales
Article 2 of the UCC applies to transactions in goods [UCC or lease contract, the UCC permits the following terms to be
2-102]. read into the contract:
1. Goods. Goods are tangible things that are movable at 1. Price term
the time of their identification in a sales contract [UCC 2. Payment term
2-105(1)]. 3. Delivery term
2. Scope of Article 2. Article 2 applies to all sales contracts, 4. Time term
whether they involve merchants or not. 5. Assortment term
This is commonly called the gap-filling rule [UCC 2-204(3),

ARTICLE 2A (LEASES), p. 265 2A-204(3)].
Article 2A of the UCC applies to personal property leases of Firm Offer Rule
goods [UCC 2A-101].
The firm offer rule is a UCC rule that says a merchant who
1. Lease. A lease is a transfer of the right to the possession
(1) makes an offer to buy, sell, or lease goods and (2) assures
and use of the named goods for a set term in return for
the other party in a separate writing that the offer will be
certain consideration.
held open cannot revoke the offer for the time stated or, if
2. Parties to a lease:
no time is stated, for a reasonable time [UCC 2-205,
a. Lessor. A person who transfers the right of possession
2A-205].
and use of goods is a lessor [UCC 2A-103(1)(p)].
b. Lessee. A person who acquires the right to possession
and use of goods is a lessee [UCC 2A-103(1)(n)]. FORMATION OF SALES AND LEASE
3. Finance lease. A finance lease is a three-party transac-
tion of the lessor, the lessee, and the supplier of the
CONTRACTS: ACCEPTANCE, p. 268
leased goods. The parties to a finance lease are: Accommodation shipment. This is a shipment offered to the
a. Lessor. The lessor acquires title to the goods from buyer by the seller as a replacement for the original shipment
the supplier and leases the goods to the lessee. The when the original shipment cannot be filled. The buyer may
lessor is often a bank or another creditor. either accept or reject this shipment [UCC 2-206(1)(b)].
276 Chapter 10
Additional Terms Permitted payments of $1,000 or more to be in writing [UCC 2-201(1),

2A-201(1)].
The UCC permits an acceptance of a sales contract to con-
Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds. The UCC recognizes the
tain additional terms and still to act as an acceptance rather
following exceptions to the Statute of Frauds where a sales or
than a counteroffer in certain circumstances. The following
lease contract that is required to be in writing is enforceable
UCC rules apply [UCC 2-207(2)]:
even though it is not in writing:
1. One or both parties are nonmerchants. The additional
1. Specially manufactured goods. In these contracts, the
terms are considered proposed additions to the con-
goods are not suitable for sale or lease to others in the
tract. If the offeree’s proposed terms are accepted by the
ordinary course of business and the seller or lessor has
offeror, they become part of the contract. If they are not
made either a substantial beginning of manufacture of
accepted, the sales contract is formed on the basis of
the goods or commitments for their procurement.
the terms of the original offer.
2. Admissions in pleadings or court. A party admits in
2. Both parties are merchant. The additional terms
pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court that he or
contained in the acceptance become part of the sales
she has entered into a contract.
contract unless (1) the offer expressly limits the accept-
3. Part acceptance. An oral sales or lease contract is
ance to the terms of the offer, (2) the additional terms
enforceable to the extent to which the goods have been
materially alter the original contract, or (3) the offerer
received and accepted by the buyer or lessee.
notifies the offeree that he or she objects to the addi-
tional terms within a reasonable time after receiving
Written Confirmation Rule
the offeree’s modified acceptance. There is no contract
if the additional terms so materially alter the terms of If both parties to an oral sales or lease contract are merchants,
the original offer that the parties cannot agree on the the Statute of Frauds requirements are satisfied if (1) one of
contract. the parties sends a written confirmation of the sale to the
other within a reasonable time after contracting and (2) the
other merchant does not give written notice of an objection
UCC STATUTE OF FRAUDS, p. 270 to the contract within 10 days after receiving the confirma-
The UCC Statute of Frauds requires contracts for the sale of tion [UCC 2-201(2)].
goods costing $500 or more and lease contracts involving
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Accommodation shipment 269 Gap-filling rule 267 Part acceptance 270
Account party 273 Goods 262 Proposed additions 269
Admissions in pleadings or court 270 Intangible property 260 Revised Article 2 262
Article 2 (Sales) 260 Issuing bank 273 Sale 262
Article 2A (Leases) 260 Lease 265 Section 5 273
Article 5 (Letters of Credit) 274 Lessee 265 Specially manufactured goods 270
Battle of the forms 270 Lessor 265 Supplier 265
Beneficiary 273 Letter of credit 273 Uniform Commercial
Bill of lading 273 Merchant 265 Code (UCC) 260
Correspondent (confirming bank) 273 Mirror image rule 269 Uniform Commercial
Course of dealing 272 Mixed sale 263 Code—Leases 265
Course of performance 272 Model act 261 Uniform Customs and Practices for
Federal Trade Commission Act 273 Open price term 267 Documentary Credits (UCP) 274
Finance lease 265 Open term 267 Uniform Sales Act 260
Firm offer rule 268 Parol evidence rule 271 Usage of trade 272
Recall the case scenario at the beginning of the Chapter the outcome of this case? To help you with your decision,
involving Jane Wilson and her lease of a pickup truck from read the case Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d
World Leasing, Inc. Do you think this lease was unconscion- 713 (Ala. 1989).
able? Does the fact that Jane did not read the contract affect

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. Do the rules change when the parties are both mer-
chants?
1. Find the major differences in the rules of contract for-
3. Although a contract can be created under UCC Article
mation under the common law and UCC Article 2.
2 even when several terms are omitted, generally one
Visit “Legal Information Institute (LII) Sales Law
term must be included for a contract to be deemed
Overview” at www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Sales.
valid by a court. Which term is it?
Sometimes, rather than reciting and reciting again contract Whenever using such a shortcut, the paralegal must care-
provisions, specific provisions that are consistent from one fully check the second document to make sure all of the
agreement to another can be incorporated by using a “short- terms from the first document are a proper fit into the sec-
cut.” Sometimes those provisions have to do with definitions, ond document by incorporation. If not, then the best solu-
and sometimes they may relate to the subject of the contract. tion may be to eliminate the shortcut and draft the entire
Here is an example of a simple “shortcut” incorporation: provision to suit the second document.
As used in this Agreement, the terms _______ and Exercise:
_______ as defined in the Purchase Agreement will have
Find a “shortcut” provision utilized in the sample Physician
the same meanings as in this Agreement.
Employment Agreement in Appendix C.

Topic: Written Modification However, Emma, Grace, and Jack are concerned that ABC
Company will want to change the terms of the driveway
easement after it is executed.
Drafting Exercises at the end of each Chapter so as to famil-
iarize yourself before beginning the exercise below.) Exercise/Assignment:
Facts: Draft a provision for insertion into a driveway easement that

sets out that oral modification of the easement will not be
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., has discovered that enforceable.
one of the driveways used to enter the warehouse purchased
from ABC Company is shared with another property owner Sources:
and desires to enter into an agreement for a common drive- Use paragraph 10 of the Sample Contract for Sale of Equip-
way easement similar to the one appearing in Appendix C. ment in Appendix C as a guide for drafting this provision.
Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.1 Merchant Mark Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.2 Good or Service Mr.
Hemphill was a football player at Southern Illinois State Uni- Gulash lived in Shelton, Connecticut. He wanted an above-
versity. As a member of the team, Hemphill was furnished ground swimming pool installed in his backyard. Gulash
with a uniform and helmet. He was injured while playing contacted Stylarama, Inc. (Stylarama), a company specializ-
football for the school. Hemphill claimed that his helmet was ing in the sale and construction of pools. The two parties
defective and contributed to his injuries. Hemphill’s attor- entered into a contract that called for Stylarama to “furnish
neys suggested that he sue the university’s athletic director, all labor and materials to construct a Wavecrest brand pool,
Gale Sayers, and the head football coach, Shultz. The attor- and furnish and install a pool with vinyl liners.” The total
neys told Hemphill that he might be able to recover for his cost for materials and labor was $3,690. There was no break-
injuries based on several provisions of the Uniform Com- down in the contract of costs between labor and materials.
mercial Code. The attorneys specifically suggested that he After the pool was installed, its sides began bowing out, the
use the UCC provisions that impose certain obligations on 2-by-4-inch wooden supports for the pool rotted and mis-
merchants. Hemphill brought suit against Sayers and Shultz. aligned, and the entire pool became tilted. Gulash brought
Does Article 2 apply to this case? Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. suit, alleging that Stylarama had violated several provisions
Supp. 685 (S.D. Ill. 1982). of Article 2 of the UCC. Is this transaction one involving
278 Chapter 10
goods, making it subject to Article 2? Gulash v. Stylarama, wanted to inspect the photographs and offered a certain sum
364 A.2d 1221 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975). of money for each photo Newsweek used. The photos were to
remain Miller’s property. Miller and Dwyer agreed to the
Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.3 Statute of Frauds St. price and the date for delivery. Newsweek sent a courier to
Charles Cable TV (St. Charles) was building a new cable tel- pick up the photographs. Along with the photos, Miller gave
evision system in Louisiana. It contacted Eagle Comtronics, the courier a delivery memo that set out various conditions
Inc. (Eagle), by phone and began negotiating to buy descram- for the use of the photographs. The memo included a clause
bler units for its cable system. These units would allow that required Newsweek to pay $1,500 each if any of the pho-
St. Charles’s customers to receive the programs they had paid tos were lost or destroyed. After Newsweek> received the
for. Although no written contract was ever signed, St. Charles package, it decided it no longer needed Miller’s work. When
ordered several thousand descramblers. The descramblers Miller called to have the photos returned, he was told they
were shipped to St. Charles, along with a sales acknowledg- had all been lost. Miller demanded that Newsweek pay him
ment form. St. Charles made partial payment for the $1,500 for each of the 72 lost photos. Assuming the court
descramblers before discovering that some of the units were finds Miller and Newsweek to be merchants, are the clauses
defective. Eagle accepted a return of the defective scram- in the delivery memo part of the sales contract? Miller v.
blers. St. Charles then attempted to return all the descram- Newsweek, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1987).
blers, asking that they be replaced by a newer model. When
Eagle refused to replace all the old descramblers, St. Charles Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.6 Open Terms Alvin
stopped paying Eagle. Eagle sued St. Charles, claiming that Cagle was a potato farmer in Alabama who had had several
no valid contract existed between the parties. Is there a valid business dealings with the H. C. Schmieding Produce Co.
sales contract? St. Charles Cable TV v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., (Schmieding). Several months before harvest, Cagle entered
687 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). into an oral sales contract with Schmieding. The contract
called for Schmieding to pay the market price at harvest time
Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.4 Firm Offer Gordon for all the red potatoes that Cagle grew on his 30-acre farm.
Construction Company (Gordon) was a general contractor Schmieding asked that the potatoes be delivered during the
in the New York City area. Gordon planned on bidding for normal harvest months. As Cagle began harvesting his red
the job of constructing two buildings for the Port Authority potatoes, he contacted Schmieding to arrange delivery.
of New York. In anticipation of its own bid, Gordon sought Schmieding told the farmer that no contract had been
bids from subcontractors. E. A. Coronis Associates formed because the terms of the agreement were too indefi-
(Coronis), a fabricator of structured steel, sent a signed letter nite. Cagle demanded that Schmieding buy his crop. When
to Gordon. The letter quoted a price for work on the Port Schmieding refused, Cagle sued to have the contract
Authority project and stated that the price could change, enforced. Has a valid sales contract been formed? H.C.
based on the amount of steel used. The letter contained no Schmieding Produce Co. v. Cagle, 529 So. 2d 243 (Ala. 1988).
information other than the price Coronis would charge for
the job. One month later, Gordon was awarded the Port Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.7 Statute of Frauds Collins
Authority project. Four days later, Coronis sent Gordon a was a sales representative of Donzi Marine Corp. (Donzi), a
telegram, withdrawing its offer. Gordon replied that it builder of light speedboats. Collins met Wallach, the owner
expected Coronis to honor the price it had previously quoted of a retail boat outlet, at a marine trade show. Collins offered
to Gordon. When Coronis refused, Gordon sued. Gordon him a Donzi dealership, which would include the right to
claimed that Coronis was attempting to withdraw a firm purchase and then market Donzi speedboats. Wallach ten-
offer. Who wins? E.A. Coronis Assoc. v. Gordon Constr. Co., dered a check for $50,000 to Collins. Collins accepted the
216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966). check, but neither party ever signed a written contract.
Wallach ordered several boats. Donzi terminated the dealer-
Critical Legal Thinking Case 10.5 Battle of the Forms Dan ship because it had found another boat dealer willing to pay
Miller was a commercial photographer who had taken a more for the franchise. Wallach sued Donzi for breach of
series of photographs that had appeared in the New York contract. Is the contract enforceable under the UCC?
Times. Newsweek magazine wanted to use the photographs. Wallach Marine Corp. v. Donzi Marine Corp., 675 F. Supp.
When a Newsweek employee named Dwyer phoned Miller, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
he was told that 72 images were available. Dwyer said he
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 10.1 Kurt Perschke was a grain dealer in Indi- $1.95 a bushel. Sebasty accepted the offer. Perschke said that
ana. Perschke phoned Ken Sebasty, the owner of a large he could send a truck for the wheat on a date stated six
wheat farm, and offered to buy 14,000 bushels of wheat for months later. On the day of the phone call, Perschke’s office
manager sent a memorandum to Sebasty, stating the price immediately began experiencing problems with the machine.
and quantity of wheat that had been contracted for. One It did not process the tomatoes quickly enough. Tomatoes
month before the scheduled delivery, Perschke called Sebasty began piling up in front of the belt that separated the toma-
to arrange for the loading of the wheat. Sebasty stated that toes for weight sizing. Overflow tomatoes had to be sent
no contract had been made. When Perschke brought suit, through the machine at least twice, causing damage to them.
Sebasty claimed the contract was unenforceable because of Fungus spread through the damaged crop. Because of these
the Statute of Frauds. Was it ethical for Sebasty to raise the problems, the machine had to be continually started and
Statute of Frauds as a defense? Assuming both parties are stopped, which significantly reduced processing speed.
merchants, who wins the suit? Sebasty v. Perschke, 404
A&M tried on several occasions to get additional equip-
N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
ment from FMC, but on each occasion its request was rejected.
Ethics Case 10.2 Alex Abatti was the sole owner of A&M Because of the problems with the machine, A&M closed its
Produce Company (A&M), a small farming company located tomato operation. A&M finally stated, “Let’s call the whole
in California’s Imperial Valley. Although Abatti had never thing off ” and offered to return the machine if FMC would
grown tomatoes, he decided to do so. He sought the advice refund A&M’s down payment. When FMC rejected this offer
of FMC Corporation (FMC), a large diversified manufac- and demanded full payment of the balance due, A&M sued to
turer of farming and other equipment, as to what kind of recover its down payment and damages. It alleged breach of
equipment he would need to process the tomatoes. An FMC warranty caused by defect in the machine. In defense, FMC
representative recommended a certain type of machine, pointed to the fine print of the sales contract, stating that the
which A&M purchased from FMC pursuant to a form sales buyer waived any rights to sue it for breach of warranty or to
contract provided by FMC. Within the fine print, the con- recover consequential damages from it.
tract contained one clause that disclaimed any warranty lia-
Was it ethical for FMC to include waiver of liability and
bility by FMC and a second clause that stated that FMC
waiver of consequential damage clauses in its form contract?
would not be liable for consequential damages if the machine
Did A&M act morally in signing the contract and then trying
malfunctioned.
to get out from under its provisions? Legally, are the waiver
A&M paid $10,680 down toward the $32,041 purchase clauses so unconscionable as to not be enforced? A&M Pro-
price, and FMC delivered and installed the machine. A&M duce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1982).
Read Case B.10 in Appendix B (Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. Health 1. What was the plaintiff suing for? Explain.
Serv., Inc.). This case is excerpted from the appellate court’s 2. What issue was presented to the court? Why was this
opinion. Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) using issue important? Explain.
the IRAC method. After briefing the case, you should be able 3. How did the court decide this case?
to answer the following questions:
A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere
working mason: if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may
venture to call himself an architect.
—Sir Walter Scott
Guy Mannering, Chapter 37 (1815)
chapter 11
PERFORMANCE OF SALES
AND LEASE CONTRACTS
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Cherry Creek CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
Dodge, Inc. (Cherry Creek). Cherry Creek sold a 1985 Dodge Ram Charger to After studying this chapter, you
Executive Leasing of Colorado (Executive Leasing). Executive Leasing, which should be able to:
was in the business of buying and selling cars, paid for the Dodge with a draft. 1. Identify when title to goods passes in
Cherry Creek maintained a security interest in the car until the draft cleared. shipment and destination contracts.
The same day that Executive Leasing bought the Dodge, it sold the car to Bruce 2. Define shipment and delivery terms.
and Peggy Carter. The Carters paid in full for the Dodge with a cashier’s check, 3. Describe who bears the risk of loss when
goods are lost or damaged in shipment.
and the vehicle was delivered to them. The Carters had no knowledge of the
4. Identify who bears the risk of loss when
financial arrangement between Executive Leasing and Cherry Creek. The draft goods are stolen and resold.
that Executive Leasing gave Cherry Creek was worthless.
5. Define good faith purchaser for value and
buyer in the ordinary course of business.
281
282 Chapter 11
Under common law, the rights and obligations of the buyer, the seller, and third
parties were determined based on who held technical title to the goods. Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) establishes precise rules for determining
the passage of title in sales contracts. Other provisions of Article 2 apply, irrespec-
tive of title, except as otherwise provided [UCC 2-401].
Common law placed the risk of loss to goods on the party who held title to the
goods. Article 2 of the UCC rejects this notion and adopts concise rules for risk of
loss that are not tied to title. It also gives the parties to the sales contract the right to
insure the goods against loss if they have an “insurable interest” in the goods. Title,
risk of loss, and insurable interest are discussed in this Chapter.
Lori Rickard is a graduate of Texas Understanding that contract helps me ensure the
State University’s Legal Assistant service is being marketed correctly.
Studies and Master of Arts, Legal Having a foundation in contract law also
Studies, Program. She works as an helps with my review of marketing and advertising
advertising and marketing parale- that includes third-party products. Dell enters into
gal for Dell, Inc., in Round Rock,
contracts with third-party manufacturers, and
Texas.
these contracts often stipulate how a third-party
I work in Dell, Inc.’s, legal product can be advertised. With my knowledge of
department reviewing advertising and marketing contract law, I can help make sure these products
material to ensure compliance with state and fed- are being advertised in accordance with the
eral laws and regulations. contract.
One may not think that knowledge in con- Applying my skills in both advertising law
tract law would play a part in this position, but it and contract law helps ensure that Dell is in com-
actually has an important role. Dell advertises pliance with all contracts as well as state and fed-
many types of products and services, both Dell and eral advertising/marketing laws and regulations.
third-party branded. For example, each customer My expertise in this area also helps inspire confi-
who purchases a Dell service enters into a contract dence from the attorneys in my department and
with Dell and/or a third-party service provider. the corporate clients we serve.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: LABOR/EMPLOYMENT
A labor/employment paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Draft position papers to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Obtain and assemble documents and labor contracts pursuant to EEOC’s request
for information.
• Conduct factual investigation; that is, obtain documents from various sources
within the company, obtain files from government agencies, trace witnesses,
pursue relevant facts.
• Prepare case outlines.
• Handle Freedom of Information Act requests and other requests for employee
information.
Performance of Sales and Lease Contracts 283
• Analyze information and assist in preparing affirmative action plans.

• Draft performance evaluation forms for the client.
• Conduct research and develop materials for employee policy manual.
• Monitor state and federal regulations, such as OSHA and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, to ensure compliance by client.
• Assist with factual and legal research concerning status of employees and appli-
cable payroll exemptions.
• Maintain repository of applicable union contracts for client and assist with activi-
ties ensuring compliance with contract provisions.
• Pursuant to local authority, gather factual information and attend unemployment
compensation hearings.
Identification and Passage of Title

The identification of goods is rather simple. It means distinguishing the goods
named in a contract from the seller’s or lessor’s other goods. The seller or lessor
retains the risk of loss of the goods until he or she identifies them to a sales or lease
contract. Further, UCC 2-401(1) and 2-501 prevent title to goods from passing
from the seller to the buyer unless the goods are identified to the sales contract. In
a lease transaction, title to the leased goods remains with the lessor or a third party.
It does not pass to the lessee.
The identification of goods and the passage of title are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS
Identification of goods can be made at any time and in any manner explicitly identification of goods
agreed to by the parties to a contract. In the absence of such an agreement, the Distinguishing the goods named in
UCC mandates when identification occurs [UCC 2-501(1), 2A-217]. the contract from the seller’s or
Already existing goods are identified when the contract is made and names lessor’s other goods.
the specific goods sold or leased.
Example: A piece of farm machinery, a car, or a boat is identified when its serial
number is listed on the sales or lease contract.
Goods that are part of a larger mass of goods are identified when the specific
merchandise is designated.
Example: If a food processor contracts to purchase 150 cases of oranges from a
farmer who has 1,000 cases of oranges, the buyer’s goods are identified when the
seller explicitly separates or tags the 150 cases.
Future goods are goods not yet in existence. For example, unborn animals future goods
(such as unborn cattle) are identified when the young are conceived. Crops to be Goods not yet in existence
harvested are identified when the crops are planted or otherwise become growing (ungrown crops, unborn stock
crops. Future goods other than crops and unborn young are identified when the goods animals).
are shipped, marked, or otherwise designated by the seller or lessor as the goods to
which the contract refers.
284 Chapter 11
PASSAGE OF TITLE
Once the goods that are the subject of a contract exist and have been identified,
title to the goods may be transferred from the seller to the buyer. Article 2 of the
UCC establishes precise rules for determining the passage of title in sales contracts.
(As mentioned earlier, lessees do not acquire title to the goods they lease.)
title Under UCC 2-401(1), title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any
Legal, tangible evidence of manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed upon by the parties. If the parties
ownership of goods. do not agree to a specific time, title passes to the buyer when and where the seller’s
performance with reference to the physical delivery is completed. This point in
time is determined by applying the rules discussed in the following paragraphs
[UCC 2-401(2)].
SHIPMENT AND DESTINATION CONTRACTS

shipment contract A shipment contract requires the seller to ship the goods to the buyer via a com-
A contract that requires the seller to mon carrier. The seller is required to (1) make proper shipping arrangements and
ship the goods to the buyer via a (2) deliver the goods into the carrier’s hands. Title passes to the buyer at the time
common carrier. The buyer bears and place of shipment [UCC 2-401(2)(a)].
the risk of loss during transportation. A destination contract requires the seller to deliver the goods either to the
A sales contract that requires the
buyer’s place of business or to another destination specified in the sales contract.
seller to send the goods to the
Title passes to the buyer when the seller tenders delivery of the goods at the speci-
buyer but not to a specifically
named destination.
fied destination [UCC 2-401(2)(b)].
destination contract
A sales contract that requires the DELIVERY OF GOODS WITHOUT MOVING THEM
seller to deliver conforming goods
Sometimes, a sales contract authorizes goods to be delivered without requiring the
to a specific destination. The seller
seller to move them. In other words, the buyer might be required to pick up goods
bears the risk of loss during
transportation. A contract that
from the seller. In such situations, the time and place of the passage of title depends
requires the seller to deliver the on whether the seller is to deliver a document of title (i.e., a warehouse receipt or
goods either to the buyer’s place of bill of lading) to the buyer. If a document of title is required, title passes when and
business or to another destination where the seller delivers the document to the buyer [UCC 2-401(3)(a)].
specified in the sales contract.
Example: If the goods named in the sales contract are located at a warehouse, title
document of title passes when the seller delivers to the buyer a warehouse receipt representing the
An actual piece of paper, such as goods.
warehouse receipt or bill of lading,
that is required in some transactions If (1) no document of title is needed and (2) the goods are identified at the time
of pickup and delivery. A negotiable of contracting, title passes at the time and place of contracting [UCC 2-401(3)(b)].
instrument developed to represent For example, if the buyer signs a sales contract to purchase bricks from the seller,
the interests of the different parties and the contract stipulates that the buyer will pick up the bricks at the seller’s place
in a transaction that uses storage or of business, title passes when the contract is signed by both parties. This situation
transportation between the parties. is true even if the bricks are not picked up until a later date.
Risk of Loss: No Breach of Sales Contract

In the case of sales contracts, common law placed the risk of loss of goods on the
party who had title to the goods. Article 2 of the UCC rejects this notion and allows
the parties to a sales contract to agree among them who will bear the risk of loss if
the goods subject to the contract are lost or destroyed. If the parties do not have a
specific agreement concerning the assessment of the risk of loss, the UCC man-
dates who will bear the risk.
CARRIER CASES: MOVEMENT OF GOODS

Unless otherwise agreed, goods that are shipped via carrier (e.g., railroad, ship,
truck) are considered to be sent pursuant to a shipment contract or a destination
contract. Absent any indication to the contrary, sales contracts are presumed to be
shipment contracts rather than destination contracts.
Shipment Contracts
A shipment contract requires the seller to ship goods conforming to the contract to
a buyer via a carrier. The risk of loss passes to the buyer when the seller delivers the
conforming goods to the carrier. The buyer bears the risk of loss of the goods dur-
ing transportation [UCC 2-509(1)(a)].
Shipment contracts are created in two ways. The first requires the use of the
term shipment contract. The second requires the use of one of the following deliv-
ery terms: FOB, FAS, CIF, or C & F.
SHIPPING TERMS
The following are commonly used shipping terms:
• FOB (free on board) point of shipment (e.g., FOB Anchorage, Alaska) FOB
requires the seller to arrange to ship goods and put the goods in the carrier’s Free on board. The seller must bear
possession. The seller bears the expense and risk of loss until this is done the expense and risk of loss until
[UCC 2-319(1)(a)]. the goods are put in the carrier’s
• FAS (free alongside) or FAS (vessel) port of shipment (e.g., Gargoyle, New possession.
Orleans) requires the seller to deliver and tender the goods alongside the FAS
named vessel or on the dock designated and provided by the buyer. The seller Free alongside. The seller bears the
bears the expense and risk of loss until this is done [UCC 2-319(2)(a)]. expense and risk of loss until the
• CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) and C & F (cost and freight) are pricing goods are alongside a named
terms that indicate the cost for which the seller is responsible. These terms vessel or the dock designated.
require the seller to bear the expense and the risk of loss of loading the goods CIF
on the carrier [UCC 2-320(1)(3)]. Cost, insurance, and freight. Pricing
• FOB place of destination (e.g., FOB Miami, Florida) requires the seller to terms indicating the cost for which
bear the expense and risk of loss until the goods are tendered to the buyer at the seller is responsible.
the place of destination [UCC 2-319(1)(b)].
C&F
• Ex-ship (from the carrying vessel) requires the seller to bear the expense and Cost and freight. Pricing terms
risk of loss until the goods are unloaded from the ship at its port of destina- indicating the cost for which the
tion [UCC 2-322(1)(b)]. seller is responsible.
• No-arrival, no-sale contract requires the seller to bear the expense and risk
of loss of the goods during transportation. However, the seller is under no FOB place of destination
The seller bears the expense and
duty to deliver replacement goods to the buyer because there is no contrac-
risk of loss until the goods are
tual stipulation that the goods will arrive at the appointed destination [UCC
tendered to the buyer.
2-324(a)(b)].
ex-ship (from the carrying vessel)
The seller bears the expense and
Destination Contracts risk of loss until the goods are
A sales contract that requires the seller to deliver conforming goods to a specific unloaded.
destination is a destination contract. Such a contract requires the seller to bear the no-arrival, no-sale contract
risk of loss of the goods during their transportation. Thus, with the exception of a The seller bears the expense and
no-arrival, no-sale contract, the seller is required to replace any goods lost in tran- risk of loss during transportation
sit. The buyer does not have to pay for destroyed goods. The risk of loss does not only.
pass until the goods are tendered to the buyer at the specified destination [UCC
2-509(1)(b)].
286 Chapter 11
Unless otherwise agreed, destination contracts are created in two ways. The
first method requires the use of the term destination contract. The alternative
method requires the use of the following delivery terms: FOB place of destination;
ex-ship; or no-arrival, no-sale contract.
NONCARRIER CASES: NO MOVEMENT OF GOODS

Sometimes a sales contract stipulates that the buyer is to pick up the goods, at
either the seller’s place of business or another specified location. This type of
arrangement raises a question: Who bears the risk of loss if the goods are destroyed
or stolen after the contract date and before the buyer picks up the goods from the
seller? The UCC provides two different rules for this situation. One applies to
merchant-sellers and the other to nonmerchant-sellers [UCC 2-509(3)].
Merchant-Seller
If the seller is a merchant, the risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until the goods
are received. In other words, a merchant-seller bears the risk of loss between the
time of contracting and the time the buyer picks up the goods.
Example: On June 1, Tyus Motors, a merchant, contracts to sell a new automobile
to a consumer. Tyus Motors keeps the car for a few days after contracting to prep it.
During this period, the car is destroyed by fire. Under the UCC, Tyus Motors bears
the risk of loss because of its merchant status.
Nonmerchant-Seller
Nonmerchant-sellers pass the risk of loss to the buyer upon “tender of delivery” of
the goods. Tender of delivery occurs when the seller (1) places or holds the goods
available for the buyer to take delivery and (2) notifies the buyer of this fact.
Example: On June 1, a nonmerchant contracts to sell his automobile to his next-
door neighbor. Delivery of the car is tendered on June 3, and the buyer is notified
of this. The buyer tells the seller he will pick up the car “in a few days.” The car is
destroyed by fire before the buyer picks it up. In this situation, the buyer bears the
risk of loss because (1) the seller is a nonmerchant and (2) delivery was tendered
on June 3. If the car were destroyed on June 2—that is, before delivery was
tendered—the seller would bear the risk of loss.
GOODS IN THE POSSESSION OF A BAILEE

bailee Goods sold by a seller to a buyer are sometimes in the possession of a bailee (e.g., a
A holder of goods who is not a seller warehouse). If such goods are to be delivered to the buyer without the seller mov-
or a buyer (e.g., a warehouse or ing them, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when (1) the buyer receives a negoti-
common carrier). able document of title (such as a warehouse receipt or bill of lading) covering the
goods, (2) the bailee acknowledges the buyer’s right to possession of the goods, or
(3) the buyer receives a nonnegotiable document of title or other written direction
to deliver and has a reasonable time to present the document or direction to the
bailee and demand the goods. If the bailee refuses to honor the document or direc-
tion, the risk of loss remains on the seller [UCC 2-509(2)].
executory contract EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY ON EXECUTORY

A contract that has not yet been CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED LEASES
fully performed. With court approval,
executory contracts may be rejected In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor is given the opportunity to accept or reject
by a debtor in bankruptcy. certain executory contracts and unexpired leases. An executory contract, or
unexpired lease, is a contract or lease that has not been fully performed. For exam-
ple, a contract to purchase or supply goods at a later date is an executory contract;
a 20-year office lease that has 8 years left until it is completed is an unexpired lease.
Other executory contracts and unexpired leases may include consulting contracts,
contracts to purchase or provide services, equipment leases, warehouse leases, and
such.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor-in-possession (or trustee) in a
Chapter 11 proceeding is given authority to assume or reject executory contracts.
In general, the debtor rejects unfavorable executory contracts and assumes favorable
executory contracts. Court approval is necessary to reject an executory contract.
The debtor is not liable for damages caused by the rejection of executory contracts
and unexpired leases in bankruptcy. Note that executory contracts and unexpired
leases may also be rejected in Bankruptcy Chapter 07, Chapter 12, and Chapter 13
proceedings.
Example: Suppose Import Corporation files for Chapter 11 reorganization bank-
ruptcy. After a review of its executory contracts and unexpired leases, the corpora-
tion identifies the following unfavorable executory contracts and unexpired leases:
a contract to purchase goods from a supplier that has 2 years left, a contract to
deliver services to a customer that has 1 year left, a lease for office space that has
10 years left, and an equipment lease for trucks that has 3 years left. Import Corpo-
ration can reject all these contracts and leases, with the court’s approval. Import
Corporation is not liable for any damages caused by its rejection of these executory
contracts and unexpired leases.
Risk of Loss: Conditional Sales

Sellers often entrust possession of goods to buyers on a trial basis. These transactions
are classified as sales on approval, sales or returns, and consignment transactions [UCC
2-326].
SALE ON APPROVAL
In a sale on approval, there is no sale unless and until the buyer accepts the goods. sale on approval
A sale on approval occurs when a merchant (e.g., a computer store) allows a cus- A type of sale in which there is no
tomer to take the goods (e.g., an Apple computer) home for a specified period of actual sale unless and until the
time (e.g., three days) to see if they fit the customer’s needs. The prospective buyer buyer accepts the goods.
may use the goods to try them out during this time.
Acceptance of the goods occurs if the buyer (1) expressly indicates accept-
ance, (2) fails to notify the seller of rejection of the goods within the agreed-upon
trial period (or, if no time is agreed upon, a reasonable time), or (3) uses the goods
inconsistently with the purpose of the trial (e.g., the customer resells the computer
to another person).
The goods are not subject to the claims of the buyer’s creditors until the buyer
accepts them. In a sale on approval, the risk of loss and title to the goods remain
with the seller. They do not pass to the buyer until acceptance [UCC 2-327(1)]. sale or return contract
A contract that says that the seller
SALE OR RETURN delivers goods to a buyer with the
understanding that the buyer may
In a sale or return contract, the seller delivers goods to a buyer with the under- return them if they are not used or
standing that the buyer may return them if they are not used or resold within a resold within a stated or reasonable
stated period of time (or within a reasonable time, if no specific time is stated). The period of time.
288 Chapter 11
sale is considered final if the buyer fails to return the goods within the specified
time or reasonable time if no time is specified. The buyer has the option of return-
ing all the goods or any commercial unit of the goods.
Example: Suppose a fashion designer delivers 10 dresses to a fashion boutique on
a sale or return basis. The boutique pays $10,000 ($1,000 per dress). If the boutique
does not resell the dresses within three months, it may return the unsold garments
to the designer. At the end of three months, the boutique has sold four of the
dresses. The remaining six dresses may be returned to the designer. The boutique
can recover the compensation paid for the returned dresses.
In a sale or return contract, the risk of loss and title to the goods pass to the
buyer when the buyer takes possession of the goods. In the previous example, if the
dresses were destroyed while they were at the boutique, the boutique owner would
be responsible for paying the designer for them [UCC 2-327(2)]. Goods sold pur-
suant to a sale or return contract are subject to the claims of the buyer’s creditors
while the goods are in the buyer’s possession.
CONSIGNMENT
consignment In a consignment, a seller (the consignor) delivers goods to a buyer (the consignee)
An arrangement where a seller (the to sell. The consignee is paid a fee if he or she sells the goods on behalf of the con-
consignor) delivers goods to a buyer signor. A consignment is treated as a sale or return under the UCC. Whether the
(the consignee) for sale. goods are subject to the claims of the buyer’s creditors usually depends on whether
consignor the seller files a financing statement as required by Article 9 of the UCC. If the
The person shipping the goods. The seller filed a financing statement, the goods are subject to the claims of the seller’s
bailor. creditors. If the seller failed to file such statement, the goods are subject to the
claims of the buyer’s creditors [UCC 2-326(3)].
consignee
The person to whom the bailed
In Case 11.1, the court had to assess risk of loss in a conditioned sale
goods are to be delivered. situation.
CASE 11.1 CONDITIONAL SALE

Prewitt v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 745 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1984).
“Under the provisions of the UCC relating to risk of loss, as adopted in
Missouri, the risk of loss remains with the seller.”
Judge Bright,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Facts
Numismatic Funding Corporation (Numismatic), with its principal place of busi-
ness in New York, sells rare and collector coins by mail throughout the United
States. Frederick R. Prewitt, a resident of St. Louis, Missouri, responded to Numis-
matic’s advertisement in the Wall Street Journal. Prewitt received several ship-
ments of coins from Numismatic via the mail. These shipments were “on approval”
for 14 days. Numismatic gave no instructions as to the method for returning
unwanted coins. Prewitt kept and paid for several coins and returned the others to
Numismatic, fully insured, via FedEx. Numismatic mailed Prewitt 28 gold and
silver coins worth over $60,000 on a 14-day approval. Thirteen days later, Prewitt
returned all the coins via certified mail and insured them for the maximum
allowed, $400. Numismatic never received the coins. Prewitt brought this action
seeking a declaratory judgment as to his nonliability. Numismatic filed a counter-
claim. The district court awarded Prewitt a declaratory judgment of nonliability.
Numismatic appealed.
Issue
Who bears the risk of loss, Prewitt or Numismatic?

The trial court determined, and the parties do not dispute, that the delivery of coins
between seller Numismatic and buyer Prewitt constituted a sale “on approval.”
Under the provisions of the UCC relating to risk of loss, as adopted in Missouri, the
risk of loss remains with the seller.
Appellant Numismatic contends that the parties impliedly agreed to shift the
risk of loss to Prewitt. It argues that an agreement by Prewitt to assume the risk of
loss arose by implication from the prior course of dealing between the parties in
which Prewitt had returned coins fully insured via Federal Express. The trial court
found that Numismatic shipped the coins to Prewitt through the U.S. Postal Service
and that no instructions on the method of return were ever given by Numismatic. In
light of this finding, and the absence of any specific evidence in the record indicating
that the parties had agreed upon a method of return, we reject Numismatic’s conten-
tion that there was an understanding between the parties that Prewitt would return the
coins fully insured via Federal Express.
Decision
The court of appeals held that the transaction in question was a sale on approval
and that under UCC 2-327(1), Numismatic, the owner of the coins, bore the risk
of their loss during the return shipment from Prewitt. The court of appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court.

1. Critical Thinking: Do you agree with how the UCC assesses risk of loss in
sale on approval transactions?
2. Ethics: Should Prewitt have fully insured the coins before sending them
back to Numismatic?
3. Critical Thinking: How could Numismatic have protected its interests in
this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at www.ca8.uscourts.gov.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses conditional sales.
290 Chapter 11
Risk of Loss: Breach of Sales Contract

The risk of loss rules just discussed applies where there is no breach of contract.
Separate risk of loss rules apply to situations involving breach of a sales contract
[UCC 2-510].
SELLER IN BREACH
A seller breaches a sales contract if he or she tenders or delivers nonconforming
goods to the buyer. If the goods are so nonconforming that the buyer has the right
to reject them, the risk of loss remains on the seller until (1) the defect or noncon-
formity is cured or (2) the buyer accepts the nonconforming goods.
Example: A buyer orders 1,000 talking dolls from a seller. The contract is a ship-
ment contract, which normally places the risk of loss during transportation on the
buyer. The seller ships nonconforming dolls that cannot talk. The goods are
destroyed in transit. The seller bears the risk of loss because he breached the con-
tract by shipping nonconforming goods.
BUYER IN BREACH
A buyer breaches a sales contract if he or she (1) refuses to take delivery of con-
forming goods, (2) repudiates the contract, or (3) otherwise breaches the contract.
A buyer who breaches a sales contract before the risk of loss would normally pass
to him or her bears the risk of loss of any goods identified to the contract. The risk
of loss rests on the buyer for only a commercially reasonable time. The buyer is
only liable for any loss in excess of insurance recovered by the seller.
Risk of Loss: Lease Contracts

The parties to a lease contract may agree as to who will bear the risk of loss of the
goods if they are lost or destroyed. If the parties do not so agree, the UCC supplies
the following risk of loss rules:
1. In the case of an ordinary lease, the risk of loss is retained by the lessor. If the
lease is a finance lease, the risk of loss passes to the lessee [UCC 2A-219].
2. If a tender of delivery of goods fails to conform to the lease contract, the risk
of loss remains with the lessor or supplier until cure or acceptance [UCC 2A-
220(1)(a)].
INSURING AGAINST LOSS OF GOODS

To protect against financial loss that would occur if goods were damaged, destroyed,
lost, or stolen, the parties to sales and lease contracts should purchase insurance
against such loss. If the goods are then lost or damaged, the insured party receives
reimbursement from the insurance company for the loss.
To purchase insurance, a party must have an insurable interest in the goods. A
seller has an insurable interest in goods as long as he or she retains title or has a
security interest in the goods. A lessor retains an insurable interest in the goods
during the term of the lease. A buyer or lessee obtains an insurable interest in the
goods when they are identified in the sales or lease contract. Both the buyer and
seller, or the lessee and lessor, can have an insurable interest in the goods at the
same time [UCC 2-501 and 2A-218].
To obtain and maintain proper insurance coverage on goods, a contracting

party should:
• Determine the value of goods subject to the sales or lease contract.
• Purchase insurance from a reputable insurance company to cover the goods
subject to the contract.
• Maintain the insurance by paying the premiums when they are due.
• Immediately file the proper claim and supporting documentation with an
insurance company if the goods are damaged, destroyed, lost, or stolen.
Sales by Nonowners
Sometimes people sell goods even though they do not hold valid title to them. The
UCC anticipated many of the problems that this situation could cause and estab-
lished rules concerning the title, if any, that could be transferred to the purchasers.
VOID TITLE AND LEASE: STOLEN GOODS

In a case where a buyer purchases goods or a lessee leases goods from a thief who
has stolen them, the purchaser does not acquire title to the goods and the lessee
does not acquire any leasehold interest in the goods. The real owner can reclaim
the goods from the purchaser or lessee [UCC 2-403(1)]. This is called void title. void title
A thief acquires no title to the goods
Example: Suppose someone steals a truckload of Sony television sets that are he or she steals.
owned by Sears. The thief resells the televisions to City-Mart, which does not know
the goods were stolen. If Sears finds out where the televisions are, it can reclaim
them. Because the thief had no title in the goods, title was not transferred to City-
Mart. City-Mart’s only recourse is against the thief, if he or she can be found.
voidable title
VOIDABLE TITLE: SALES OR LEASE OF GOODS TO Title that a purchase has if the
goods were obtained by (1) fraud,
GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS FOR VALUE (2) a check that is later dishonored,
A seller or lessor has voidable title to goods if the goods were obtained by fraud, if or (3) impersonating another
person. In the case of theft, a thief
a check is later dishonored, or if he or she impersonates another person. A person
acquires no title to the goods he or
with voidable title to goods can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for
she steals.
value or a good faith subsequent lessee. A good faith purchaser or lessee for value
is someone who pays sufficient consideration or rent for the goods to the person he good faith purchaser for value
or she honestly believes has good title to those goods [UCC 2-201(1), 1-201(44) A person to whom good title can be
(d)]. The real owner cannot reclaim goods from such a purchaser [UCC 2-403(1)]. transferred from a person with
voidable title. The real owner cannot
Example: Suppose a person buys a Rolex watch from his neighbor for nearly fair reclaim goods from a good faith
market value. It is later discovered that the seller obtained the watch from a jewelry purchaser for value.
store with a “bounced check.” The jewelry store cannot reclaim the watch because
good faith subsequent lessee
the second purchaser purchased the watch in good faith and for value. A person to whom a lease interest
Assume instead that the purchaser bought the watch from a stranger for far can be transferred from a person
less than fair market value. It is later discovered the seller obtained the watch from with voidable title. The real owner
a jewelry store by fraud. The jewelry store can reclaim the watch because the sec- cannot reclaim the goods from the
subsequent lessee until the lease
ond purchaser was not a good faith purchaser for value.
expires.
ENTRUSTMENT RULE entrustment rule

A UCC section allowing certain
The entrustment rule found in UCC 2-403(2) holds that if an owner entrusts the merchants to transfer all rights in
possession of his or her goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind, the goods, including title.
292 Chapter 11
buyer in the ordinary course of merchant has the power to transfer all rights (including title) in the goods to a
business buyer in the ordinary course of business. The real owner cannot reclaim the goods
A person who in good faith and from this buyer.
without knowledge of another’s
ownership or security interest in Example: Kim Jones brings her computer into the Computer Store to be repaired.
goods buys the goods in the The Computer Store both sells and services computers. Jones leaves (entrusts) her
ordinary course of business from computer at the store until it is repaired. The Computer Store sells her computer to
a person in the business of selling Harold Green. Green, a buyer in the ordinary course of business, acquires title to
goods of that kind [UCC 1-201(9)]. the computer. Jones cannot reclaim the computer from Green. Her only recourse is
against the Computer Store.
The entrustment rule also applies to leases. If a lessor entrusts the possession
of his or her goods to a lessee who is a merchant who deals in goods of that kind,
the merchant-lessee has the power to transfer all the lessor’s and lessee’s rights in
the goods to a buyer or sublessee in the ordinary course of business [UCC
2A-305(2)].
In Case 11.2, the court had to decide whether a purchaser was a buyer in the
ordinary course of business.
CASE 11.2 BUYER IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS

Lindholm v. Brant, No. X05CV020189393, 2005 Conn. LEXIS 2366, at *1
(Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2005), aff’d, 925 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2007).
“Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods
of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business.”
Judge Rogers,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Facts
In 1962, Andy Warhol, a famous artist, created a silkscreen on canvas entitled Red
Elvis. Red Elvis consisted of 36 identical faces of Elvis Presley with a red back-
ground and is approximately 5.75 feet in height and 4.35 feet in width. Kerstin
Lindholm was an art collector who, for 30 years, had been represented by Anders
Malmberg, an art dealer. In 1987, with the assistance and advice of Malmberg,
Lindholm purchased Red Elvis for $300,000.
In 1996, the Guggenheim Museum in New York City decided to sponsor an
Andy Warhol exhibition. The staff of the Guggenheim contacted Malmberg to see
if Lindholm was willing to lend Red Elvis to the exhibition. Lindholm agreed, and
Red Elvis was placed in the Guggenheim exhibition. Once the Guggenheim exhibi-
tion was completed in 2000, Malmberg told Lindholm he could place Red Elvis on
loan to the Louisiana Museum in Denmark if Lindholm agreed. By letter dated
March 20, 2000, Lindholm agreed and gave permission to Malmberg to obtain
possession of Red Elvis from the Guggenheim Museum and place it on loan to the
Louisiana Museum. Instead of placing Red Elvis on loan to the Louisiana Museum,
Malmberg, claiming ownership to Red Elvis, immediately contracted to sell Red
Elvis to Peter M. Brant, an art collector, for $2.9 million. Brant had his lawyer do a
UCC lien search and search of the Art Loss Registry related to Red Elvis. These
searches revealed no claims or liens against Red Elvis.
Brant paid $2.9 million to Malmberg and received an invoice of sale and pos-
session of Red Elvis. Subsequently, Lindholm discovered the fraud. Lindholm
brought a civil lawsuit in the state of Connecticut against Brant to recover Red Elvis.
Brant argued that he was a buyer in the ordinary course of business because he pur-
chased Red Elvis from an art dealer to whom Lindholm had entrusted Red Elvis,
and therefore he had a claim that was superior to Lindholm’s claim of ownership.
Issue
Was Brant a buyer in the ordinary course of business who had a claim of owner-
ship to Red Elvis that was superior to that of the owner Lindholm?

The Brant defendants have pleaded a special defense to all counts that Brant is a
buyer in the ordinary course pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 42a-2-403(2)
and (3). A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchase for value. Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business. “Entrusting” includes any delivery and any acquies-
cence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the
parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of
the entrusting or the possessor’s disposition of the goods have been such as to be lar-
cenous under the criminal law.
That statutory provision sets forth the circumstances in which an innocent,
good faith purchaser of goods who acquires them from a dealer in goods of that kind
has a right to the goods superior to the rights of the owner/entrustor of the goods.
This special defense requires the Brant defendants to show that Brant was a buyer in
the ordinary course.
K. Lindholm’s March 20, 2000 letter constituted an entrustment of Red Elvis
to a merchant, Malmberg. Once K. Lindholm entrusted Red Elvis to Malmberg she
gave him the power to transfer all of her rights as the entruster to a buyer in the ordi-
nary course. Plaintiff’s expert, Hoffeld, admitted that the Art Loss Registry is the best
recognized mechanism for determining whether a piece of art is stolen. Accordingly,
it was reasonable in investigating title for Brant to search the Art Loss Registry and
the UCC liens to determine if there were any claims on Red Elvis.
Neither Brant nor his attorneys were focused on the possibility that Malmberg
was simply stealing the painting from K. Lindholm. Based on Brant’s lawyer’s failure
to identify to Brant that this might be an outright theft by Malmberg and based on
Malmberg’s excellent reputation in the art world as well as the fact that the Guggen-
heim released the painting to Malmberg, it was reasonable for Brant to believe that
Malmberg had title to the painting when Malmberg physically delivered the painting
to the agreed-upon bonded warehouse.
After considering all of the evidence, the court finds that pursuant to Conn.
Gen. Stat. Section 42a-2-403 Brant took good title to Red Elvis. Specifically, Brant
purchased Red Elvis from Malmberg in good faith and in the ordinary course of
business. Brant honestly believed Malmberg owned Red Elvis when he purchased the
painting from him. Brant also observed reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the art industry when he purchased Red Elvis from Malmberg. Accord-
ingly, because Brant has proven his special defense of being a buyer in the ordinary
course, judgment will enter in favor of the defendants on all counts.
294 Chapter 11
Decision
The court held that Brant was a buyer in the ordinary course of business who
obtained ownership to Red Elvis when he purchased the stolen Red Elvis from
Malmberg. The court held that Brant’s claim of ownership as a buyer in the ordinary
course of business was superior to Lindholm’s claim of ownership because Lind-
holm had entrusted Red Elvis to an art dealer who sold the stolen Red Elvis to Brant.

1. Critical Thinking: What does the rule of buyer in the ordinary course of
business provide regarding the purchase of stolen property? Explain.
2. Critical Thinking: Did Lindholm entrust Red Elvis to Malmberg, an art
dealer? What could be the consequence of entrusting property to a merchant
who sells the type of property that is entrusted to him?
3. Ethics: Did Malmberg act ethically in this case? Did he act criminally?
4. Ethics: Did Linholm have a good case to try to recover Red Elvis from Brant?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Superior Court of Connecticut at www.jud.state.ct.us.
2. Use www.google.com to find a short biography of Andy Warhol.
3. Visit the website of the Guggenheim Museum in New York City at www.
guggenheim.org.
4. Use www.google.com to find a picture of Red Elvis.
Concept Summary
Passage of Title by Nonowner Third Parties
Type of Title Possessed Innocent Purchaser Acquires
Transaction by Seller Purchaser Title to Goods
Goods acquired by Void title Good faith pur- No. Original owner may
theft are resold chaser for value reclaim the goods.
Goods acquired by Voidable title Good faith pur- Yes. Purchaser takes
fraud or dishonored chaser for value free of claim of original
check are resold owner.
Goods entrusted by No title Buyer in the Yes. Purchaser takes
owner to merchant ordinary course free of claim of original
who deals in that of business owner.
type of good are
resold
Creditor possesses Good title Buyer in the Yes. Purchaser takes
security interest in ordinary course free of creditor’s security
goods that are sold of business interest.
International Trade Terms

Trade abbreviations such as FOB and CIF are widely used in international con-
tracts. The most widely used trade terms are those published by the International
Chamber of Commerce. Called Incoterms, they are well known throughout the
world. Their use in international sales is encouraged by trade councils, courts,
and international lawyers. The UN Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG) allows parties to incorporate trade terms of their
choosing.
Parties who adopt the Incoterms or any other trade terms in their interna-
tional contracts should make sure they express their desire clearly. For example, a
contract might refer to FOB (Incoterms 1990) or CIF (U.S. UCC).
BULK SALES LAW

Article 6 (Bulk Sales) of the UCC establishes rules that were designed to prevent Article 6 (Bulk Sales)
fraud when there is a bulk transfer of goods. A bulk transfer occurs when an owner The section of the UCC that governs
transfers a major part of a business’s material, merchandise, inventory, or equip- when an owner transfers a major
ment not in the ordinary course of business. This usually occurs upon the sale of part of a business’s material,
the assets of a business. merchandise, inventory, or
If there is a bulk transfer of assets, Article 6 requires that (1) the seller furnish equipment not in the ordinary
course of business.
the buyer with a list of all of the creditors of the business and (2) the buyer notify
all of the listed creditors at least 10 days before taking possession of or paying for bulk transfer
the goods, whichever occurs first. The buyer is not responsible for or liable to When an owner transfers a major
unlisted creditors [UCC 6-105]. part of a business’s material,
If all of the requirements of Article 6 are met, the buyer receives title to merchandise, inventory, or
the goods free of all claims of the seller’s creditors. If the requirements of equipment not in the ordinary
course of business.
Article 6 are not met, the goods in the buyer’s possession are subject to the
claims of the seller’s creditors for six months after the date of the possession
[UCC 6-111].
In 1988, after much review, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) reported
that the regulation of bulk sales was no longer necessary. Consequently, they with-
drew their support for Article 6 and encouraged states that had enacted the Article
to repeal it.
The report criticized the bulk transfer law for adding costs—without corre-
sponding benefits—to business transactions. The report claimed that it was unfair
to impose liability on an innocent buyer because a dishonest seller failed to pay its
creditors. The committee then stated that changing laws and economics, as well as
improved communications, made it more difficult for merchants to sell their mer-
chandise and abscond with the proceeds. Further, the report noted that modern
jurisdiction laws make it easier to obtain and enforce judgments against debtors
who have left the state.
Recognizing that some state legislatures may wish to continue to regulate
bulk transfers, the committee also promulgated a revised version of Article 6.
296 Chapter 11
Angel Dietzel is a graduate of Ath- compliance initiatives, performing audits and eval-
ens Technical College’s Paralegal uations, performing legal research, updating poli-
Studies Program, Athens, Georgia. cies and procedures, and performing specific
She works as a privacy and data contractual audit reviews. The everyday realm of
security specialist for McKesson responsibilities associated with organizing and
Technology Solutions in Atlanta,
maintaining files and databases is ever present.
Georgia.
The variety of programs and responsibilities
As a privacy and data security assigned to me makes my job interesting and chal-
specialist, my focus is on various components of lenging. I’m an integral part of the team. As such,
privacy and security compliance programs. These there is always opportunity to learn more and
programs are supervised by the chief privacy and grow. The only limitation I have is self-imposed.
data security officer. I find this to be an exciting yet complex
The responsibilities associated with my job industry in which flexibility and adaptability are
are varied. They include assessing and evaluating valued traits.

Working to Improve the Legal System
The “Public Serve” ethics rules (ABA Model Rules 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4)
deal with the responsibility of legal professionals to improve the legal
system.1 For attorneys, fulfilling this responsibility can take place by pro-
viding pro bono service, accepting court appointments, becoming a
member of a legal services organization, and/or engaging in law
reform activities.
Paralegals can also help improve the legal system for the public—
and improve the paralegal profession in the process. Ethical parale-
gals engage in pro bono work, participate in continuing legal
education, seek involvement in professional paralegal organizations,
conduct themselves ethically, and act with integrity.
1
CHAPTER 11 SUMMARY
IDENTIFICATION AND PASSAGE OF ner and on any conditions explicitly agreed upon by the
parties.
TITLE, p. 283
2. Passage of title where there is no agreement. If the par-
Identification ties have no agreement as to the passage of title, title
passes according to the following UCC rules [UCC
Identification distinguishes the goods named in the contract
2-401(2)]:
from the seller’s or lessor’s other goods [UCC 2-501(1)].
a. Shipment contract. Requires the seller to ship the
Passage of Title goods to the buyer via a common carrier. Title
passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment.
1. Passage of title by agreement. Title to goods of a sales
contract passes from the seller to the buyer in any man-
b. Destination contract. Requires the seller to deliver RISK OF LOSS: CONDITIONAL SALES,
the goods to the buyer’s place of business or other
p. 287
designated destination. Title passes to the buyer
when the seller tenders delivery of the goods at the Conditional Sales
specified destination.
Sellers often entrust goods to a buyer on a trial basis. The
c. Goods that do not move. If a sales contract author-
following UCC rules for risk of loss apply [UCC 2-327]:
izes the goods to be delivered without requiring the
seller to move them, title passes at the time and 1. Sale on approval. Occurs when a merchant allows a
place of contracting, unless a document of title is customer to take the goods for a specified period of
required, in which case title passes when the seller time to try the goods. There is no sale unless and until
delivers the document of title to the buyer. the buyer accepts the goods. The risk of loss remains
3. Passage of title in lease contracts. Title to the leased with the seller and does not transfer to the buyer until
goods remains with the lessor or a third party. Title acceptance.
does not pass to the lessee. 2. Sale or return. Occurs when a seller delivers goods to a
buyer with the understanding that the buyer may re-
RISK OF LOSS: NO BREACH OF SALES turn them if they are not used or resold during a stated
CONTRACT, p. 284 period of time. The risk of loss passes to the buyer
when the buyer takes possession of the goods.
1. Agreement. The parties to a sales contract may agree
3. Consignment. Occurs when a seller (consignor) deliv-
among themselves as to who will bear the risk of loss of
ers goods to a buyer (consignee) to sell. The risk of loss
goods if they are lost or destroyed.
passes to the consignee when the consignee takes pos-
2. No agreement. If the parties to a sales contract do not
session of the goods.
have a specific agreement concerning the assessment of
risk of loss, the UCC mandates who will bear the risk
[UCC 2-509]. RISK OF LOSS: BREACH OF SALES
Carrier Cases: Movement of Goods CONTRACT, p. 290
1. Shipment contract. With a shipment contract, the risk If there has been a breach of a sales contract, the UCC rules
of loss passes to the buyer when the seller delivers con- concerning risk of loss apply [UCC 2-510].
forming goods to a carrier. The buyer bears the risk of
loss during transportation. Seller in Breach
2. Destination contract. With a destination contract, the If a seller breaches a sales contract by tendering or delivering
risk of loss does not pass to the buyer until the goods nonconforming goods, the risk of loss to the goods remains
are tendered to the buyer at the designated destination. with the seller until (1) the defect or nonconformity is cured
The seller bears the risk of loss during transportation. or (2) the buyer accepts the nonconforming goods.
Shipping Terms
Buyer in Breach
Sales contracts often contain the following shipping terms:
If a buyer breaches a sales contract by refusing to take delivery
1. FOB (free on board) point of shipment of conforming goods or repudiating the contract before the
2. FAS (free alongside) or FAS (vessel) port of shipment risk of loss would normally transfer to him or her, the buyer
3. CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) and C & F (cost and bears the risk of loss of any goods identified in the contract
freight) for a reasonable commercial time.
4. FOB place of destination
5. Ex-ship (from the carrying vessel)
6. No-arrival, no-sale contract
RISK OF LOSS: LEASE CONTRACTS, p. 290
1. Agreement. The parties to a lease contract may agree as
Noncarrier Cases: No Movement of Goods
to who will bear the risk of loss of the goods if they are
If the buyer is to pick up the goods from the seller’s place of busi- lost or destroyed.
ness or other specified location, the following UCC rules apply: 2. No agreement. If the parties do not have an agreement
1. Merchant-seller. If the seller is a merchant, the risk of concerning the assessment of risk of loss, the following
loss does not pass to the buyer until the goods are UCC rules for risk of loss apply [UCC 2A-219, 2A-220]:
received by the buyer. The merchant-seller bears the risk a. Ordinary lease. The risk of loss is retained by the
of loss between the time of contracting and the time the lessor.
buyer picks up the goods. b. Finance lease. The risk of loss passes to the lessee.
2. Nonmerchant-seller. If the seller is a nonmerchant, c. Breach of contract. If a tender of delivery of goods
risk of loss passes to the buyer upon tender of delivery fails to conform to the lease contract, the risk of loss
of the goods by the seller (i.e., the seller holds the goods remains with the lessor or supplier until acceptance
available for the buyer to take delivery). or cure.
298 Chapter 11
SALES BY NONOWNERS, p. 291 perpetrator acquires voidable title to the goods. If the perpe-
trator sells or leases the goods to a good faith purchaser or
If a person sells goods that he or she does not hold valid title lessee for value—a person who pays sufficient consideration
to, the buyer acquires rights in the goods under the UCC or rent for the goods and honestly believes the seller or lessor
[UCC 2-403]. has good title to the goods—the buyer or lessee acquires
Void Title and Lease: Stolen Goods good title to the goods. The real owner’s recourse is against
the perpetrator who acquired the goods from him or her.
A thief acquires no title to goods he or she steals. A person
who purchases stolen goods does not acquire title to the Entrustment Rule
goods. Any such title is call void title. The real owner can If an owner entrusts possession of his or her goods to a mer-
reclaim the goods from the purchaser. The purchaser’s chant who deals in goods of that kind (e.g., for repair) and
recourse is to recover from the thief. the merchant sells those goods to a buyer in the ordinary
Voidable Title: Sale or Lease of Goods to Good Faith course of business (e.g., a customer of the merchant), the
Purchasers for Value buyer acquires title to the goods. The real owner’s recourse is
against the merchant who sold his or her goods. This rule is
If goods are obtained by fraud, with a check that is later dis- called the entrustment rule.
honored, or through impersonation of another person, the
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Article 6 (Bulk Sales) 295 Document of title 284 Good faith purchaser for value 291
Bailee 286 Entrustment rule 291 Good faith subsequent lessee 291
Bulk transfer 295 Executory contract (unexpired lease) Identification of goods 283
Buyer in the ordinary course of 286 No-arrival, no-sale contract 285
business 292 Ex-ship (from the carrying vessel) 285 Sale on approval 287
C & F (cost and freight) 285 FAS (free alongside) or FAS (vessel) Sale or return contract 287
CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) 285 port of shipment 285 Shipment contract 284
Consignee 288 FOB place of destination 285 Title 284
Consignor 288 FOB (free on board) point of Void title 291
Consignment 288 shipment 285 Voidable title 291
Destination contract 284 Future goods 283

Remember the case scenario at the beginning of the Chapter recover the vehicle from the Carters? Who wins? To help you
involving Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc., and Executive Leasing with your answer, see Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter, 733
of Colorado? Is there any way this dispute might have been P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1987).
prevented? What will happen if Cherry Creek attempts to

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. When may the buyer revoke acceptance? See UCC
2-608(1).
1. Find UCC Article 2 as adopted in your jurisdiction.
3. Review UCC 2-712. What is the connection between
Review the seller’s remedies under UCC 2-703. See
cover and mitigation of damages?
www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2.
As you have already learned, sometimes contracts don’t go Exercise:
smoothly. Sometimes there is a breach of the contract, which
Draft a clause on future e-discovery related to e-mails for
may lead to litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
insertion into both the Buyer’s and the Seller’s portions of
and almost all state rules have been revised to include rules
the “Default and Remedies” sections of the Real Estate Pur-
on e-discovery in litigation matters. In such breach of con-
chase Agreement in Appendix C.
tract cases, a party can seek production of all electronically
stored e-mails relating to the contract along with their cor-
responding attachments.

Topic: Movement of Goods Exercise/Assignment:
(To the student: Reread the facts from the various Hands- Draft a revised paragraph 6 for the sample Contract for Sale
On Drafting Exercises at the end of each Chapter so as of Equipment in Appendix C—to change the contract from a
to familiarize yourself before beginning the exercise shipment contract (providing that the buyer bears the risk of
below.) loss of the goods during transportation) to a destination con-
tract (providing that the seller bears the risk of loss of the
Facts:
goods during transportation).
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., is concerned that
Sources:
ABC Company will try to save money and engage a
cheap and untrustworthy common carrier to transport the Use the Chapter material and Chapter examples for purposes
equipment. of drafting this demand promissory note.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.1 Identification of G&W had no knowledge of how Torniero obtained the jewels.
Goods The Big Knob Volunteer Fire Company (Fire Co.) Torniero was arrested when Michaels discovered the thefts.
agreed to purchase a fire truck from Hamerly Custom Pro- After Torniero admitted that he had sold the stolen jewelry to
ductions (Hamerly), which was in the business of assembling G&W, Michaels attempted to recover it from G&W. G&W
various component parts into fire trucks. Fire Co. paid claimed title to the jewelry as a good faith purchaser for value.
Hamerly $10,000 toward the price two days after signing the Michaels challenged G&W’s claim to title in court. Who wins?
contract. Two weeks later, it gave Hamerly $38,000 more United States v. Michaels Jewelers, Inc., No. N 85-242 (JAC),
toward the total purchase price of $53,000. Hamerly bought 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 8, 1985).
an engine chassis for the new fire truck on credit from Lowe
and Meyer Garage (Lowe and Meyer). After installing the Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.4 Passage of Title J. A.
chassis, Hamerly painted the Big Knob Fire Department’s Coghill owned a Rolls-Royce Corniche automobile, which he
name on the side of the cab. Hamerly never paid for the engine sold to a man claiming to be Daniel Bellman. Bellman gave
chassis, and the truck was repossessed by Lowe and Meyer. Coghill a cashier’s check for $94,500. When Coghill tried to
Fire Co. sought to recover the fire truck from Lowe and Meyer. cash the check, his bank informed him that the check had
Although Fire Co. was the buyer of a fire truck, Lowe and been forged. Coghill reported the vehicle as stolen. Subse-
Meyer questioned whether any goods had ever been identi- quently, Barry Hyken responded to a newspaper ad listing a
fied in the contract. Were they? Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Rolls-Royce Corniche for sale. Hyken went to meet the seller
Lowe & Meyer Garage, 487 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). of the car, the man who claimed to be Bellman, in a parking
lot. When Hyken asked why the car was advertised as a 1980
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.2 Passage of Title New model when it was in fact a 1979, Bellman replied that it was
England Yacht Sales (Yacht Sales) sold a yacht to Robert a newspaper mistake. Hyken agreed to pay $62,000 for the
Pease. Pease paid for the yacht in full, and Yacht Sales deliv- car. When Hyken asked to see Bellman’s identification,
ered to him a marine bill of sale. The marine bill of sale Bellman provided documents with two different addresses.
stated that Yacht Sales was transferring “all of its right, title, Bellman explained that he was in the process of moving.
and interest” in the yacht to Pease. The yacht never left Although there seemed to be some irregularities in the title
the Connecticut shipyard that Yacht Sales rented. During the documents to the car, Hyken took possession anyway. Three
winter, Yacht Sales did repair work on the yacht. In weeks later, the Rolls-Royce Corniche was seized by
the spring, Yacht Sales delivered the yacht to Pease in Rhode the police. Hyken sued to get it back. Who wins? Landshire
Island. At issue in this case was when the sales tax was due to Food Serv., Inc. v. Coghill, 709 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
the state of Connecticut—October 18, 1980, or May 8, 1981.
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.5 Entrustment Rule Fuqua
When did the title actually pass? New England Yacht Sales v.
Homes, Inc. (Fuqua), is a manufacturer of prefabricated
Commissioner of Revenue Serv., 504 A.2d 506 (Conn. 1986).
houses. MMM was a partnership created by two men named
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.3 Stolen Goods John Kirk and Underhill. MMM operated as a dealer of prefabri-
Torniero was employed by Michaels Jewelers, Inc. (Michaels). cated homes. On seven occasions before the disputed trans-
During the course of his employment, Torniero stole pieces of actions occurred, MMM had ordered homes from Fuqua.
jewelry, including several diamond rings, a sapphire ring, a MMM was contacted by Kenneth Ryan, who wanted to pur-
gold pendant, and several loose diamonds. Over a period of chase a 55-foot modular home. MMM called Fuqua and
several months, Torniero sold individual pieces of the stolen ordered a prefabricated home that met Ryan’s specifications.
jewelry to G&W Watch and Jewelry Corporation (G&W). Fuqua delivered the home to MMM and retained a security
300 Chapter 11
interest in it until MMM paid the purchase price. MMM in Atlanta, it was discovered that the railroad had been neg-
installed the house on Ryan’s property and collected full ligent in loading the train. The negligent loading had caused
payment from Ryan. Kirk and Underhill then disappeared, the cargo to shift during the trip, and the shifting had caused
taking Ryan’s money with them. Fuqua was never paid for the extensive damage to the wood. Who bore the risk of loss?
prefabricated home it had manufactured. Ryan had no Georgia Port Auth. v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 274 S.E.2d 699
knowledge of the dealings between MMM and Fuqua. Fuqua (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
claimed title to the house based on its security interest. Who
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.8 Risk of Loss Martin
has title to the home? Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Bldg. &
Silver ordered two rooms of furniture from Wycombe,
Loan Co., 370 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
Meyer & Co., Inc. (Wycombe), a manufacturer and seller of
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.6 Risk of Loss All America custom-made furniture. On February 23, 1982, Wycombe
Export-Import Corp. (All America) placed an order for sev- sent invoices to Silver, advising him the furniture was ready
eral thousand pounds of yarn with A.M. Knitwear (Knit- for shipment. Silver tendered payment in full for the goods
wear). On June 4, All America sent Knitwear a purchase and asked that one room of furniture be shipped immedi-
order. The purchase order stated the terms of the sale, includ- ately and the other be held for shipment on a later date.
ing language that stated the price was FOB the seller’s plant. Before any instructions were received as to the second room
A truck hired by All America arrived at Knitwear’s plant. of furniture, it was destroyed in a fire. Silver and his insur-
Knitwear turned the yarn over to the carrier and notified All ance company attempted to recover the money he had paid
America that the goods were now on the truck. The truck left for the destroyed furniture. Wycombe refused to return the
Knitwear’s plant and proceeded to a local warehouse. Some- payment, claiming the risk of loss was on Silver. Who wins?
time during the night, the truck was hijacked and all the yarn Silver v. Wycombe, Meyer & Co., 477 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. Civ.
was stolen. All America had paid for the yarn by check but Ct. 1984).
stopped payment on it when it learned the goods had been
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.7 Insurable Inter-
stolen. Knitwear sued All America, claiming it must pay for
est Donald Hayward signed a sales contract with Dry Land
the stolen goods because it bore the risk of loss. Who wins?
Marina, Inc. (Dry Land). The contract was for the purchase
A.M. Knitwear v. All Am., Etc., 359 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1976).
of a 30-foot Revel Craft Playmate Yacht for $100,000. The
Critical Legal Thinking Case 11.7 Risk of Loss Mitsubishi contract called for Dry Land to install a number of options
International Corporation (Mitsubishi) entered into a con- on Hayward’s yacht and then deliver it to him. Before taking
tract with Crown Door Company (Crown) that called for delivery of the yacht, Hayward signed a security agreement
Mitsubishi to sell 12 boxcar loads of plywood to Crown. in favor of Dry Land and a promissory note. Several weeks
According to the terms of the contract, Mitsubishi would later, a fire swept through Dry Land’s showroom. Hayward’s
import the wood from Taiwan and deliver it to Crown’s plant yacht was among the goods destroyed in the fire. Who had
in Atlanta. Mitsubishi had the wood shipped from Taiwan to an insurable interest in the yacht? Hayward v. Potsma, 188
Savannah, Georgia. At Savannah, the plywood was loaded N.W.2d 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
onto trains and hauled to Atlanta. When the plywood arrived
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 11.1 Raceway Auto Auction (Raceway), New Charles to recover. Did Triangle Auto Sales act ethically in
York, sold an Oldsmobile automobile to Triangle Auto Sales this case? Did Charles Motor Co. obtain valid title to the
(Triangle). Triangle paid for the car with a check. Raceway automobile? Lee Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Labonte, D.C.A.
delivered possession of the car to Triangle. Thereafter, Trian- No. 77-260, C.A. No. 76-2663, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 190, at *1
gle’s check bounced because of insufficient funds. In the (Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1980).
meantime, Triangle sold the car to Campus Auto Sales (Cam-
pus), Rhode Island, which sold it to Charles Motor Co., Inc. Ethics Case 11.2 Executive Financial Services, Inc. (EFS),
(Charles), Rhode Island, which sold it to Lee Oldsmobile- purchased three tractors from Tri-County Farm Company
Cadillac, Inc. (Lee Oldsmobile), Maine, which sold it to (Tri-County), a John Deere dealership owned by Gene Mohr
Stephanie K. LeBlanc of Augusta, Maine. When Triangle’s and James Loyd. The tractors cost $48,000, $19,000, and
check bounced, Raceway reported the car as stolen. Four $38,000. EFS did not take possession of the tractors but
months after she purchased the car, Stephanie was stopped by instead left the tractors on Tri-County’s lot. EFS leased the
the Maine police, who seized the car. To maintain good rela- tractors to Mohr-Loyd Leasing (Mohr-Loyd), a partnership
tions with its customer, Lee Oldsmobile paid Raceway to between Mohr and Loyd, with the understanding and repre-
obtain the certificate of title to the automobile and then sued sentation by Mohr-Loyd that the tractors would be leased out
to farmers. Instead of leasing the tractors, Tri-County sold who bought the tractors to recover the tractors from them.
them to three different farmers. EFS sued and obtained judg- Did Mohr and Loyd act ethically in this case? Who owns the
ment against Tri-County, Mohr-Loyd, and Mohr and Loyd tractors, EFS or the farmers? Executive Fin. Serv., Inc. v.
personally for breach of contract. Because that Pagel, 715 P.2d 381 (Kan. 1986).
judgment remained unsatisfied, EFS sued the three farmers
Read Case B.11 in Appendix B (Burnett v. Purtell). This case 2. Describe the sales transaction.
is excerpted from the appellate court’s opinion. Review and 3. Was there tender of delivery of the goods? Why is this
brief the case (see Appendix A) using the IRAC method. issue important to the outcome of the case?
After briefing the case, you should be able to answer the fol- 4. Who bore the risk of loss when the goods were
lowing questions: destroyed?
1. Who were the plaintiff and defendant? Were they
merchants?
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: ENTRUSTMENT RULE
The entrustment rule is raised in the following case. Robert, David, and Hazel
Schluter (Schluters) are grain farmers in Starbuck, Minnesota. They often hired a
specific trucker to haul their grain to the public grain elevator, United Farmers Ele-
vator, to whom they would sell their grain. On some occasions, the Schluters would
sell their grain to the trucker, who would then resell the grain to the elevator or oth-
ers. In the case at hand, the Schluters hired the trucker to haul their corn to the eleva-
tor. When the trucker got to the elevator, he represented that he owned the corn and
sold it to the elevator for $288,000. The trucker absconded with the money.
The Schluters sued the elevator to recover payment for their corn. Who owns the
corn, the Schluters or the elevator? The trail court applied the entrustment rule and
held that the elevator had title to the corn as a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. The appellate court state:
It is undisputed the trucker had for several years bought and sold grain
in the farmers’ area, and the elevator had done business with the
trucker not only as a hauler of grain belonging to others but also as a
seller of grain belonging to himself. Thus, he was known in the area as
a buyer and seller. This combination of the trucker’s own conduct over
time and his reputation in the area are sufficient to qualify him as a
merchant of grain under the UCC, since he dealt in goods of the kind or
otherwise held himself out as having knowledge or skill as a grain buyer
and seller.
Under these facts, the trucker was a “merchant” and the farmers entrusted their
grain to him. The undisputed facts show that the farmers entrusted their grain to an
independent trucker who was also a merchant, thereby empowering him to transfer
ownership to the elevator as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Under the
UCC entrustment rule, the elevator owned the corn. Schluter v. United Farmers Ele-
vator, 479 N.W.2d 82 (Minn.App.1992)
1. Did the trucker act ethically in this case?
2. Do you think the UCC entrustment rule places loss on the right party? Explain.
Trade and commerce, if they were not made of india-rubber, would
never manage to bounce over obstacles which legislators are
continually putting in their way.
—Henry D. Thoreau
Resistance to Civil Government (1849)
chapter 12
REMEDIES FOR BREACH
OF SALES AND
LEASE CONTRACTS
CASE SCENARIO CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Dr. and Mrs. Sedmak should be able to:
(Sedmaks). The Sedmaks are collectors of Chevrolet Corvettes. The couple saw 1. Describe the performance of sales and
an article in Vette Vues magazine concerning a new limited-edition Corvette. lease contracts.
The limited edition was designed to commemorate the selection of the 2. List and describe the seller’s remedies for
the buyer’s breach of a sales contract.
Corvette as the official pace car of the Indianapolis 500. Chevrolet was manu-
facturing only 6,000 of these pace cars. The Sedmaks visited Charlie’s Chevrolet, 3. List and describe the buyer’s remedies for
the seller’s breach of a sales contract.
Inc. (Charlie’s), a local Chevrolet dealer. Charlie’s was to receive only one
4. List and describe the lessor’s remedies
limited-edition car, which the sales manager agreed to sell to the Sedmaks for for the lessee’s breach of a lease
the sticker price of $35,000. When the Sedmaks went to pick up and pay for the contract.
car, they were told that because of the great demand for the limited edition, it 5. List and describe the lessee’s remedies
for the lessor’s breach of a lease contract.
was going to be auctioned to the highest bidder.
303
304 Chapter 12
obligation Usually, the parties to a sales or lease contract owe a duty to perform the obligations
An action a party to a sales or lease specified in their agreement [UCC 2-301, 2A-301]. The seller’s or lessor’s general
contract is required by law to carry obligation is to transfer and deliver the goods to the buyer or lessee. The buyer’s or
out. lessee’s general obligation is to accept and pay for the goods.
When one party breaches a sales or lease contract, the UCC provides the
injured party with a variety of prelitigation and litigation remedies. These remedies
are designed to place the injured party in as good a position as if the breaching
party’s contractual obligations were fully performed [UCC 1-106(1), 2A-401(1)].
The best remedy depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
The performance of obligations and remedies available for breach of sales
and lease contracts are discussed in this Chapter.
Cathy Lynn Davis is a certified a variety of tasks for our clients, including contract
paralegal with a specialty in civil review. In that regard, I interact with clients to
litigation. She currently works for ensure that all parties are kept apprised of the sta-
Wilkerson & Bryan, P.C., in Mont- tus of the negotiations, research various provisions,
gomery, Alabama, where she han- and track multiple drafts and revisions of complex
dles a variety of matters, including
agreements exchanged by the parties. Upon occa-
both telecommunications and
administrative law and civil litiga-
sion, I assist our attorneys in arbitration of disputes
tion matters. Cathy holds an associ- related to these matters.
ate’s degree in legal studies, a bachelor’s degree in Although my legal background is primarily
management of human resources, and a master’s degree in litigation, I have found contract work to be just
in criminal justice, all from Faulkner University in Mont- as challenging, particularly when assisting in the
gomery, Alabama. drafting process to avoid future litigation or other
disputes. It is my greatest challenge to obtain com-
Throughout my career, I have worked for a plain- plete disclosures from our clients and assist in cre-
tiff ’s firm and an insurance defense firm, and I am ating a contract that reduces the risk of a dispute
currently working in a firm that specializes in, for the agreement’s duration.
among other things, utility law. Presently, I perform
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: TRUST PARALEGAL
A trust paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Draft inter vivos trust agreements for attorney review.
• Review wills for creation and direction of testamentary trusts; review court
orders for creation and direction of statutory trusts.
• Maintain financial records of trusts.
• Obtain tax identification numbers for trusts.
• Coordinate periodic income and principal distributions from trusts.
• Correspond and communicate with trusts’ grantors and beneficiaries.
• Coordinate the transfer of assets into trusts, including bank accounts, stock
transfers, and real estate deeds.
Remedies for Breach of Sales and Lease Contracts 305
Seller’s and Lessor’s Performance

Tender of delivery, or the transfer and delivery of goods to the buyer or lessee in tender of delivery
accordance with a sales or lease contract, is the seller’s or lessor’s basic obligation The obligation of the seller to trans-
[UCC 2-301]. Tender of delivery requires the seller or lessor to (1) put and hold fer and deliver goods to the buyer in
conforming goods at the buyer’s or lessee’s disposition and (2) give the buyer or accordance with the sales contract.
lessee any notification reasonably necessary to enable delivery of goods. The par-
ties may agree as to the time, place, and manner of delivery. If there is no special
agreement, tender must be made at a reasonable hour, and the goods must be kept
available for a reasonable period of time.
Example: The seller cannot telephone the buyer at 12:01 a.m. and say the buyer has
15 minutes to accept delivery [UCC 2-503(1), 2A-508(1)].
Unless otherwise agreed or unless the circumstances permit either party to
request delivery in lots, the goods named in the contract must be tendered in a
single delivery. Payment of a sales contract is due upon tender of delivery unless an
extension of credit between the parties has been arranged. If the goods are right-
fully delivered in lots, the payment is apportioned for each lot [UCC 2-307]. Lease
payments are due in accordance with the terms of the lease contract.
PLACE OF DELIVERY
Many sales and lease contracts state where the goods are to be delivered. Often,
the contract will say that the buyer or lessee must pick up the goods from the
seller or lessor. If the contract does not expressly state where the delivery will take
place, the UCC stipulates place of delivery on the basis of whether a carrier is
involved.
Noncarrier Cases
Unless otherwise agreed, the place of delivery is the seller’s or lessor’s place of busi-
ness. If the seller or lessor has no place of business, the place of delivery is the sell-
er’s or lessor’s residence. If the parties have knowledge at the time of contracting
that identified goods are located in some other place, that place is the place of
delivery.
Example: If the parties contract regarding the sale of wheat that is located in a silo,
the silo is the place of delivery [UCC 2-308].
Sometimes, the goods are in the possession of a bailee (e.g., a warehouse) and
are to be delivered without being moved. In such cases, tender of delivery occurs
when the seller either (1) tenders to the buyer a negotiable document of title cover-
ing the goods, (2) produces acknowledgment from the bailee of the buyer’s right to
possession of the goods, or (3) tenders a nonnegotiable document of title or a writ-
ten direction to the bailee to deliver the goods to a buyer. The seller must deliver all
such documents in correct form [UCC 2-503(4) and (5)].
Carrier Cases
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, if delivery of goods to a buyer is to be
made by carrier, the UCC establishes different rules for shipment contracts and des-
tination contracts. These rules are described in the paragraphs that follow.
306 Chapter 12
Shipment Contracts
Sales contracts that require the seller to send the goods to the buyer, but not to a
shipment contract specifically named destination, are called shipment contracts. Under such con-
A contract that requires the seller to tracts, the seller must do all of the following [UCC 2-504]:
ship the goods to the buyer via a
common carrier. The buyer bears 1. Put the goods in the carrier’s possession and contract for the proper and safe
the risk of loss during transportation. transportation of the goods.
A sales contract that requires the 2. Obtain and promptly deliver or tender in correct form any documents (a)
seller to send the goods to the necessary to enable the buyer to obtain possession of the goods, (b) required
buyer but not to a specifically by the sales contract, or (c) required by usage of trade.
named destination. 3. Promptly notify the buyer of the shipment.
The buyer may reject the goods if a material delay or loss is caused by the
seller’s failure to make a proper contract for the shipment of goods or properly
notify the buyer of the shipment.
Example: If a shipment contract involves perishable goods and the seller fails to
ship the goods via a refrigerated carrier, the buyer may rightfully reject the goods if
they spoil during transit.
Destination Contracts
A sales contract that requires the seller to deliver goods to the buyer’s place of busi-
destination contract ness or another specified destination is a destination contract. Unless otherwise
A sales contract that requires the agreed, destination contracts require delivery to be tendered at the buyer’s place of
seller to deliver conforming goods business or other location specified in the sales contract. Delivery must be at a rea-
to a specific destination. The seller sonable time and in a reasonable manner and with proper notice to the buyer.
bears the risk of loss during trans- Appropriate documents of title must be provided by the seller to enable the buyer
portation. A contract that requires
to obtain the goods from the carrier [UCC 2-503].
the seller to deliver the goods either
to the buyer’s place of business or
Perfect Tender Rule
to another destination specified in
the sales contract. A seller or lessor is under a duty to deliver conforming goods. If the goods or ten-
der of delivery fails in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer or lessee
may opt either (1) to reject the whole shipment, (2) to accept the whole shipment,
or (3) to reject part and accept part of the shipment. This option is referred to as
perfect tender rule the perfect tender rule [UCC 2-601, 2A-509].
A rule that says if the goods or ten-
Example: A sales contract requires the seller to deliver 100 shirts to a buyer. When
der of a delivery fail in any respect
to conform to the contract, the buyer
the buyer inspects the delivered goods, it is discovered that 99 shirts conform to
may opt either (1) to reject the the contract and 1 shirt does not conform. Pursuant to the perfect tender rule, the
whole shipment, (2) to accept the buyer may reject the entire shipment. If a buyer accepts nonconforming goods, the
whole shipment, or (3) to reject part buyer may seek remedies against the seller.
and accept part of the shipment.
Exceptions to the Perfect Tender Rule
The UCC alters the perfect tender rule in the following situations:
1. Agreement of the parties—The parties to the sales or lease contract may
agree to limit the effect of the perfect tender rule. For example, they may
decide that (1) only the defective or nonconforming goods may be rejected,
(2) the seller or lessor may replace nonconforming goods or repair defects, or
(3) the buyer or lessee will accept nonconforming goods with appropriate
compensation from the seller or lessor.
2. Substitution of carriers—The UCC requires the seller to use a commercially
reasonable substitute if (1) the agreed-upon manner of delivery fails or
(2) the agreed-upon type of carrier becomes unavailable [UCC 2-614(1)].
Example: A sales contract specifies delivery of goods by Mac Trucks, Inc., a com-
mon carrier, but a labor strike prevents delivery by this carrier. The seller must use
any commercially reasonable substitute (such as another truck line or the rails).
The buyer cannot reject the delivery because there is a substitute carrier. Unless
otherwise agreed, the seller bears any increased cost of the substitute
performance.
Cure
The UCC gives a seller or lessor who delivers nonconforming goods an opportu-
nity to cure the nonconformity. Although the term cure is not defined by the UCC, cure
it generally means an opportunity to repair or replace defective or nonconforming An opportunity to repair or replace
goods [UCC 2-508, 2A-513]. defective or nonconforming goods.
A cure may be attempted if the time for performance has not expired and the
seller or lessor notifies the buyer or lessee of his or her intention to make a con-
forming delivery within the contract time.
Example: A lessee contracts to lease a BMW 850i automobile from a lessor for
delivery July 1. On June 15, the lessor delivers a BMW 740i to the lessee, and the
lessee rejects it as nonconforming. The lessor has until July 1 to cure the noncon-
formity by delivering the BMW 850i specified in the contract.
A cure may also be attempted if the seller or lessor had reasonable grounds to
believe the delivery would be accepted. The seller or lessor may have a further rea-
sonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
Example: A buyer contracts to purchase 100 red dresses from a seller for delivery
July 1. On July 1, the seller delivers 100 blue dresses to the buyer. In the past, the
buyer has accepted different-colored dresses than those ordered. This time, though,
the buyer rejects the blue dresses as nonconforming. The seller has a reasonable
time after July 1 to deliver conforming red dresses to the buyer.
In Case 12.1, a seller attempted to cure a defective delivery.
CASE 12.1 CURE

Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 443 N.E.2d 932 (N.Y. 1982).
“Prior to delivery and at the time Joc Oil made its offer to cure by
tendering a new conforming shipment, it had cause to believe that the
original shipment would have been accepted by the buyer ‘with or
without money allowance.’”
Judge Fuchsberg,
Court of Appeals of New York
Facts
Joc Oil USA, Inc. (Joc Oil), contracted to purchase low-sulfur fuel oil from an Ital-
ian oil refinery. The Italian refinery issued a certificate to Joc Oil, indicating that
the sulfur content of the oil was 0.50 percent. Joc Oil entered into a sales contract
to sell the oil to Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Ed). Con
Ed agreed to pay an agreed-upon price per barrel for oil not to exceed 0.50 percent
sulfur. When the ship delivering the oil arrived, it discharged the oil into three
308 Chapter 12
Con Ed storage tanks. A report issued by Con Ed stated that the sulfur content of
the oil was 0.92 percent. Joc Oil then made an offer to cure the defect by substitut-
ing a conforming shipment of oil already on a ship that was to arrive within two
weeks. Con Ed rejected Joc Oil’s offer to cure. Joc Oil sued Con Ed for breach of
contract. The trial court held that under the circumstances of this case, Joc Oil had
the right to cure the defect in delivery and that Con Ed breached the contract by
refusing to permit this cure. The court entered judgment against Con Ed and
awarded Joc Oil $1,385,512 in damages plus interest and the costs of this action.
The appellate division court affirmed the judgment. Con Ed appealed.
Issue
Did Joc Oil have a right to cure the defect in the delivery?

Joc Oil had “reasonable grounds to believe” that the original shipment would be
“acceptable” to Con Ed. Moreover, although Joc Oil had no predelivery knowledge of
the 0.92% sulfur content disclosed after delivery, it would still have believed that
such a shipment would have been acceptable to Con Ed based upon its prior knowl-
edge of Con Ed purchase and use practices during this period of oil scarcity and vola-
tile pricing. Prior to delivery and at the time Joc Oil made its offer to cure by
tendering a new conforming shipment, it had cause to believe that the original ship-
ment would have been accepted by the buyer “with or without money allowance”
[UCC 2-508(2)].
Decision
The court of appeals held that Joc Oil had made a reasonable and timely offer to
cure that was improperly rejected by Con Ed. The court of appeals affirmed the
prior court’s judgment, awarding Joc Oil $1,385,512 in damages plus interest and
costs.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the law recognize the right to cure a defective
tender of goods? Why or why not?
2. Ethics: Did Con Ed act ethically in this case? Did Joc Oil?
3. Critical Thinking: Why do you think Con Ed rejected Joc Oil’s offer to cure
the defect in delivery? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of New York at www.nycourts.gov.
2. Visit the website of Consolidated Edison Company of New York at www.
coned.com.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the UCC’s rule con-
cerning curing a defective delivery of a good.
Installment Contracts
An installment contract requires or authorizes goods to be delivered and accepted installment contract
in separate lots. Such a contract must contain a clause that states “each delivery in a A contract that requires or
separate lot” or equivalent language. authorizes the goods to be
delivered and accepted in
Example: A contract in which the buyer orders 100 shirts, to be delivered in four separate lots.
equal installments of 25 items, is an installment contract.
The UCC alters the perfect tender rule with regard to installment contracts.
The buyer or lessee may reject the entire contract only if the nonconformity or
default with respect to any installment or installments substantially impairs the
value of the entire contract. The buyer or lessee may reject any nonconforming
installment if the value of the installment is impaired and the defect cannot be
cured. Thus, in each case, the court must determine whether the nonconforming
installment impairs the value of the entire contract or only that installment [UCC
2-612, 2A-510].
DESTRUCTION OF GOODS
The UCC provides that if goods identified in a sales or lease contract are totally
destroyed without the fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer
or the lessee, the contract is void. Both parties are then excused from performing
the contract.
If the goods are only partially destroyed, the buyer or lessee may inspect the
goods and then choose either to treat the contract as void or to accept the goods. If
the buyer or lessee opts to accept the goods, the purchase price or rent will be
reduced to compensate for damages [UCC 2-613, 2A-221].
Example: A buyer contracts to purchase a sofa from a seller. The seller agrees to
deliver the sofa to the buyer’s home. The truck delivering the sofa is hit by an auto-
mobile, and the sofa is totally destroyed. Because the risk of loss has not passed to
the buyer, the contract is voided, and the buyer does not have to pay for the sofa.
Buyer’s and Lessee’s Performance

Once the seller or lessor has properly tendered delivery, the buyer or lessee is obli-
gated to accept and pay for the goods in accordance with the sales or lease contract.
If there is no agreement, the provisions of the UCC control the transaction.
RIGHT OF INSPECTION
Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer or lessee has the right to inspect goods that are
tendered, delivered, or identified in the sales contract prior to accepting or paying
for them. If the goods are shipped, the inspection may take place after their arrival.
If the inspected goods do not conform to the contract, the buyer or lessee may
reject them without paying for them [UCC 2-513(1), 2A-515(1)].
The parties may agree as to the time, place, and manner of inspection. If there
is no such agreement, the inspection must occur at a reasonable time and place and
in a reasonable manner. Reasonableness depends on the circumstances of the case,
common usage of trade, prior course of dealing between the parties, and such. If
the goods conform to the contract, the buyer pays for the inspection. If the goods
are rejected for nonconformance, the cost of inspection can be recovered from the
seller [UCC 2-513(2)].
310 Chapter 12
COD (cash on delivery) Buyers who agree to COD (cash on delivery) deliveries are not entitled to
Buyers must pay for the goods upon inspect the goods before paying for them. In certain sales contracts (e.g., cost,
delivery without the right to inspect insurance, and freight [CIF] contracts), payment is due from the buyer upon
them first. receipt of documents of title, even if the goods have not yet been received. In such
a case, the buyer is not entitled to inspect the goods before paying for them [UCC
2-513(3)].
PAYMENT
Goods that are accepted must be paid for [UCC 2-607(1)]. Unless the parties to a
contract agree otherwise, payment is due from a buyer when and where the goods
are delivered, even if the place of delivery is the same as the place of shipment. Buy-
ers often purchase goods on credit extended by the seller. Unless the parties agree
to other terms, the credit period begins to run from the time the goods are shipped
[UCC 2-310]. A lessee must pay lease payments in accordance with the lease con-
tract [UCC 2A-516(1)].
The goods can be paid for in any manner currently acceptable in the ordinary
course of business (check, credit card, or the like) unless the seller demands pay-
ment in cash or unless the contract names a specific form of payment. If the seller
requires cash payment, the buyer must be given an extension of time necessary to
procure the cash. If the buyer pays by check, payment is conditional on the check
being honored (paid) when it is presented to the bank for payment [UCC 2-511].
ACCEPTANCE
Acceptance occurs when the buyer or lessee takes any of the following actions after
a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods: (1) signifies to the seller or lessor in
words or by conduct that the goods are conforming or that the buyer or lessee will
take or retain the goods despite their nonconformity or (2) fails effectively to reject
the goods within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender by the seller or
lessor. Acceptance also occurs if a buyer acts inconsistently with the seller’s owner-
ship rights in the goods.
Example: Acceptance occurs if the buyer resells the goods delivered by the seller
[UCC 2-606(1), 2A-515(1)].
Buyers and lessees may only accept delivery of a “commercial unit,” a unit of
goods that commercial usage deems is a single whole for purpose of sale. Thus, it
may be a single article (such as a machine), a set of articles (such as a suite of furni-
ture or an assortment of sizes), a quantity (such as a bale, a gross, or a carload), or
any other unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a single whole. Accept-
ance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of the entire unit [UCC
2-606(2), 2A-515(2)].
REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
A buyer or lessee who has accepted goods may subsequently revoke his or her
acceptance if (1) the goods are nonconforming, (2) the nonconformity substan-
tially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer or lessee, and (3) one of the fol-
lowing factors is shown: (a) the seller’s or lessor’s promise to a timely cure of the
nonconformity is not met, (b) the goods were accepted before the nonconformity
was discovered and the nonconformity was difficult to discover, or (c) the goods
were accepted before the nonconformity was discovered and the seller or lessor
assured the buyer or lessee that the goods were conforming.
Revocation of acceptance is not effective until the seller or lessor is so noti- revocation of acceptance
fied. In addition, the revocation must occur within a reasonable time after the Where the buyer or lessee who has
buyer or lessee discovers or should have discovered the grounds for the revocation. accepted goods subsequently
The revocation, which must be of a lot or commercial unit, must occur before there withdraws that acceptance.
is any substantial change in the condition of the goods (e.g., before perishable
goods spoil) [UCC 2-608(1), 2A-517(1)].
Seller’s and Lessor’s Remedies

Various remedies are available to sellers and lessors if a buyer or lessee breaches a
contract. These remedies are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
RIGHT TO WITHHOLD DELIVERY

Delivery of goods may be withheld if the seller or lessor is in possession of them
when the buyer or lessee breaches the contract. This remedy is available if the buyer
or lessee wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of the goods, fails to make a pay-
ment when due, or repudiates the contract. If part of the goods under the contract
has been delivered when the buyer or lessee materially breaches the contract, the
seller or lessor may withhold delivery of the remainder of the affected goods [UCC
2-703(a), 2A-523(1)(c)].
A seller or lessor who discovers the buyer or lessee is insolvent before the
goods are delivered may refuse to deliver as promised unless the buyer or lessee
pays cash for the goods [UCC 2-702(1), 2A-525(1)]. Under the UCC, a person is
insolvent when he or she (1) ceases to pay his or her debts in the ordinary course of
business, (2) cannot pay his or her debts as they become due, or (3) is insolvent
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law [UCC 1-201(23)].
RIGHT TO STOP DELIVERY OF GOODS IN TRANSIT

Often, sellers and lessors employ common carriers and other bailees (e.g., ware-
houses) to hold and deliver goods to buyers and lessees. The goods are considered
to be in transit while they are in the possession of these carriers or bailees. A seller
or lessor that learns of the buyer’s or lessee’s insolvency while the goods are in tran-
sit may stop delivery of the goods, irrespective of the size of the shipment. stop delivery of the goods
Essentially, the same remedy is available if the buyer or lessee repudiates When a seller or lessor, upon
the contract, fails to make payment when due, or otherwise gives the seller or learning of a buyer’s or lessee’s
lessor some other right to withhold or reclaim the goods. In these circum- insolvency, stops goods from being
stances, however, the delivery can be stopped only if it constitutes a carload, a delivered while they are in transit.
truckload, a planeload, or a larger express or freight shipment [UCC 2-705(1),
2A-526(1)].
The seller or lessor must give sufficient notice to allow the bailee, by reason-
able diligence, to prevent delivery of the goods. After receipt of notice, the bailee
must hold and deliver the goods according to the directions of the seller or lessor.
The seller is responsible for all expenses borne by the bailee in stopping the goods
[UCC 2-705(3), 2A-526(3)].
Goods may be stopped in transit until the buyer or lessee obtains possession
of the goods or the carrier or other bailee acknowledges that it is holding the goods
for the buyer or lessee [UCC 2-705(2), 2A-526(2)].
312 Chapter 12
RIGHT TO RECLAIM GOODS

In certain situations, a seller or lessor may demand the return of the goods it sold
or leased that are already in the possession of the buyer or lessee. In a sale transac-
reclamation tion, reclamation is permitted in two situations. If the goods are delivered in a
The right of a seller or lessor to credit sale and the seller then discovers the buyer was insolvent, the seller has 10
demand the return of goods from days within which to demand that the goods be returned [UCC 2-507(2)]. If the
the buyer or lessee under specified buyer misrepresented his or her solvency in writing within three months before
situations. delivery [UCC 2-702(2)] or paid for goods in a cash sale with a check that bounces
[UCC 2-507(2)], the seller may reclaim the goods at any time.
A lessor may reclaim goods in the possession of the lessee if the lessee is in
default of the contract [UCC 2A-525(2)].
To exercise a right of reclamation, the seller or lessor must send the buyer or
lessee a written notice demanding return of the goods. The seller or lessor may not
use self-help to reclaim the goods if the buyer or lessee refuses to honor his or her
demand. Instead, appropriate legal proceedings must be instituted.
RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF GOODS

If a buyer or lessee breaches or repudiates a sales or lease contract before the seller
or lessor has delivered the goods, the seller or lessor may resell or re-lease the goods
and recover damages from the buyer or lessee [UCC 2-703(d), 2-706(1), 2A-523(1)
(e), 2A-527(1)]. This right also arises if the seller or lessor has reacquired the goods
after stopping them in transit.
disposition of goods The disposition of the goods by the seller or lessor must be made in good
A seller or lessor who is in posses- faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. The goods may be disposed of as a
sion of goods at the time the buyer unit or in parcels in a public or private transaction. The seller or lessor must give
or lessee breaches or repudiates the the buyer or lessee reasonable notification of his or her intention to dispose of
contract may in good faith resell, goods unless the goods threaten to quickly decline in value or are perishable. The
release, or otherwise dispose of the party who buys or leases the goods in good faith for value takes the goods free of
goods in a commercially reasonable
any rights of the original buyer or lessee [UCC 2-706(5), 2A-527(4)].
manner and recover damages,
The seller or lessor may recover any damages incurred on the disposition of
including incidental damages, from
the buyer or lessee.
the goods. In the case of a sales contract, damages are defined as the difference
between the disposition price and the original contract price. In the case of a lease
contract, damages are the difference between the disposition price and the rent the
original lessee would have paid.
The profit does not revert to the original buyer or lessee if the seller or lessor
disposes of the goods at a higher price than the buyer or lessee contracted to pay.
incidental damages The seller or lessor may also recover any incidental damages (reasonable expenses
When goods are resold or released, incurred in stopping delivery, transportation charges, storage charges, sales com-
incidental damages are reasonable mission, and the like [UCC 2-710, 2A-530]) incurred on the disposition of the
expenses incurred in stopping goods [UCC 2-706(1), 2A-527(2)].
delivery, transportation charges,
storage charges, sales commissions, Example: A buyer contracts to purchase a racehorse for $20,000. When the seller
and so on. tenders delivery, the buyer refuses to accept the horse or pay for it. The seller, in
good faith, and in a commercially reasonable manner, resells the horse to a third
party for $17,000. Incidental expenses of $500 are incurred on the resale. The seller
can recover $3,500 from the original buyer: the $3,000 difference between the
resale price and the contract price and $500 for the incidental expenses.
Unfinished Goods
Sometimes a sales or lease contract is breached or repudiated before the goods are fin-
ished. In such a case, the seller or lessor may choose either (1) to cease manufacturing
the goods and resell them for scrap or salvage value or (2) to complete the manu-
facture of the goods and resell, re-lease, or otherwise dispose of them to another
party [UCC 2-704(2), 2A-524(2)]. The seller or lessor may recover damages from
the breaching buyer or lessee.
RIGHT TO RECOVER THE PURCHASE PRICE OR RENT

In certain circumstances, the UCC provides that a seller or lessor may sue the
buyer or lessee to recover the purchase price or rent stipulated in the sales or lease recovery of the purchase price
contract. This remedy is available in the following situations: or rent
A seller or lessor may recover the
1. The buyer or lessee accepts the goods but fails to pay for them when the price contracted-for purchase price or
or rent is due. rent from the buyer or lessee if the
2. The buyer or lessee breaches the contract after the goods have been identified buyer or lessee (1) fails to pay for
in the contract and the seller or lessor cannot resell or dispose of them. accepted goods, (2) breaches the
3. The goods are damaged or lost after the risk of loss passes to the buyer or contract and the seller or lessor
lessee [UCC 2-709(1), 2A-529(1)]. cannot dispose of the goods, or if
(3) the goods are damaged or lost
To recover the purchase price or rent, the seller or lessor must hold the goods after the risk of loss passes to the
for the buyer or lessee. If resale or other disposition of the goods becomes possible buyer or lessee.
prior to the collection of the judgment, however, the seller or lessor may resell or
dispose of them. In such situations, the net proceeds of any disposition must be
credited against the judgment [UCC 2-709(2), 2A-529(2), and 2A-529(3)]. The
seller or lessor may also recover incidental damages from the buyer or lessee.
recovery of damages
RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BREACH A seller or lessor may recover
OF CONTRACT damages measured as the
difference between the contract
If a buyer or lessee repudiates a sales or lease contract or wrongfully rejects ten- price (or rent) and the market price
dered goods, the seller or lessor may sue to recover the damages caused by the (or rent) at the time and place the
buyer’s or lessee’s breach. Generally, the amount of damages is calculated as the dif- goods were to be delivered, plus
ference between the contract price (or rent) and the market price (or rent) of the incidental damages, from a buyer
goods at the time and place the goods were to be delivered to the buyer or lessee or lessee who repudiates the
plus incidental damages [UCC 2-708(1), 2A-528(1)]. contract or wrongfully rejects
If the preceding measure of damage will not put the seller or lessor in as good tendered goods.
a position as performance of the contract would have, the seller or lessor can seek recovery of lost profits
recovery of lost profits that would have resulted from the full performance of the When the buyer breaches
contract plus an allowance for reasonable overhead and incidental damages [UCC performance of the contract and the
2-708(2), 2A-528(2)]. seller seeks damages for profits they
would have received from the full
performance of the contract.
RIGHT TO CANCEL A CONTRACT cancellation
A seller or lessor may cancel a sales or lease contract if the buyer or lessee breaches The termination of a contract by a
contracting party upon the material
that contract by rejecting or revoking acceptance of the goods, failing to pay for the
breach of the contract by the other
goods, or repudiating all or any part of the contract. The cancellation may refer
party. A buyer or lessee may cancel
only to the affected goods or to the entire contract if the breach is material [UCC a sales or lease contract if the seller
2-703(f), 2A-523(1)(a)]. or lessor fails to deliver conforming
A seller or lessor who rightfully cancels a sales or lease contract by notifying goods or repudiates the contract or
the buyer or lessee is discharged of any further obligations under that contract. The if the buyer or lessee rightfully
buyer’s or lessee’s duties are not discharged, however. The seller or lessor retains the rejects the goods or justifiably
right to seek damages for the breach [UCC 2-106(4), 2A-523(3)]. revokes acceptance of the goods.
314 Chapter 12
LOST VOLUME SELLER

Should a seller be permitted to recover the profits it lost on a sale to a defaulting
buyer if the seller sold the goods to another buyer? It depends. If the seller had only
one item or a limited number of items and could produce no more, the seller can-
not recover lost profits from the defaulting buyer. This is because the seller made
those profits on the sale of the item to the new buyer. If, however, the seller could
have produced more of the item, the seller is a “lost volume seller.” In this situation,
the seller can make the profit from the sale of the item to the new buyer and sue the
defaulting buyer to recover the profit it would have made from this sale. This is
because the seller would have realized profits from two sales—the sale to the first
buyer who defaulted and the second sale to the new buyer.
Concept Summary
Seller’s and Lessor’s Remedies
Location of
Possession of Goods Remedies at Time of Buyer’s Breach
Goods in the possession of 1. Withhold delivery of the goods [UCC 2-703(a),
the seller 2A-523(1)(c)].
2. Demand payment in cash if the buyer is insolvent
[UCC 2-702(1), 2A-525(1)].
3. Resell or re-lease the goods and recover the differ-
ence between the contract or lease price and the
resale or re-lease price [UCC 2-706, 2A-527].
4. Sue for breach of contract and recover as damages
either:
a. The difference between the market price and the
contract price [UCC 2-708(1), 2A-528(1)] or
b. Lost profits [UCC 2-708(2), 2A-528(2)]
5. Cancel the contract [UCC 2-703(f), 2A-523(1)(a)].
Goods in the possession of 1. Stop goods in transit [UCC 2-705(1), 2A-526(1)].
a carrier or bailee a. Carload, truckload, planeload, or larger shipment
if the buyer is solvent.
b. Any size shipment if the buyer is insolvent.
Goods in the possession of 1. Sue to recover the purchase price or rent [UCC
the buyer 2-709(1), 2A-525(1)].
2. Reclaim the goods [UCC 2-507(2), 2A-525(2)].
a. The seller delivers goods in cash sale, and the
buyer’s check is dishonored.
b. The seller delivers goods in a credit sale, and the
goods are received by an insolvent buyer.
Buyer’s and Lessee’s Remedies

The UCC provides a variety of remedies to a buyer or lessee upon the seller’s or
lessor’s breach of a sales or lease contract. These remedies are discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
RIGHT TO REJECT NONCONFORMING GOODS

OR IMPROPERLY TENDERED GOODS
If the goods or the seller’s or lessor’s tender of delivery fails to conform to a sales or
lease contract in any way, the buyer or lessee may (1) reject the whole, (2) accept
the whole, or (3) accept any commercial unit and reject the rest. If the buyer or les-
see chooses to reject the goods, he or she must identify defects that are ascertaina-
ble by reasonable inspection. Failure to do so prevents the buyer or lessee from
relying on those defects to justify the rejection if the defect could have been cured
by a seller or lessor who was notified in a timely manner [UCC 2-601, 2A-509].
Nonconforming or improperly tendered goods must be rejected within a reasona-
ble time after their delivery or tender. The seller or lessor must be notified of the
rejection. The buyer or lessee must hold any rightfully rejected goods with reason-
able care for a reasonable time [UCC 2-602(2), 2A-512(1)].
If the buyer or lessee is a merchant and the seller or lessor has no agent or
place of business at the market where the goods are rejected, the merchant-buyer
or merchant-lessee must follow any reasonable instructions received from the
seller or lessor with respect to the rejected goods [UCC 2-603, 2A-511]. If the seller
or lessor gives no instructions and the rejected goods are perishable or will quickly
decline in value, the buyer or lessee may make reasonable efforts to sell them on
the seller’s or lessor’s behalf [UCC 2-604, 2A-512].
Any buyer or lessee who rightfully rejects goods is entitled to reimbursement
from the seller or lessor for reasonable expenses incurred in holding, storing, resel-
ling, shipping, and otherwise caring for the rejected goods.
RIGHT TO RECOVER GOODS FROM AN INSOLVENT

SELLER OR LESSOR
If a buyer or lessee makes partial or full payment for goods before they are received
and the seller or lessor becomes insolvent within 10 days after receiving the first
payment, the buyer or lessee may recover the goods from the seller or lessor. To do
so, the buyer or lessee must tender the unpaid portion of the purchase price or rent
due under the sales or lease contract. Only conforming goods that are identified in
the contract may be recovered [UCC 2-502, 2A-522]. This remedy is often referred capture
to as capture. The process by which a buyer or
lessee can recover goods when the
seller or lessor becomes insolvent
within 10 days of receiving the
buyer’s or lessee’s first payment.
RIGHT TO OBTAIN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
specific performance
If goods are unique or the remedy at law is inadequate, a buyer or lessee may obtain A remedy that orders the breaching
specific performance of a sales or lease contract. A decree of specific performance party to perform the acts promised
orders the seller or lessor to perform the contract. Specific performance is usually in the contract; usually awarded in
used to obtain possession of works of art, antiques, rare coins, and other unique cases where the subject matter is
items [UCC 2-716(1), 2A-521(1)]. unique, such as in contracts
involving land, heirlooms, and
Example: A buyer enters into a sales contract to purchase a specific Rembrandt paintings. Judgment of the court
painting from a seller for $10 million. When the buyer tenders payment, the seller ordering a licensor to specifically
refuses to sell the painting to the buyer. The buyer may bring an equity action to perform the license by making the
obtain a decree of specific performance from the court, ordering the seller to sell contracted-for unique information
the painting to the buyer. available to the licensee.
316 Chapter 12
RIGHT TO COVER
right to cover A buyer or lessee may exercise the right to cover by purchasing or renting substi-
When a buyer or lessee purchases tute goods if the seller or lessor fails to make delivery of the goods or repudiates the
or rents substitute goods. contract or if the buyer or lessee rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably revokes
their acceptance. The buyer’s or lessee’s cover must be made in good faith and with-
out unreasonable delay. If the exact commodity is not available, the buyer or lessee
may purchase or lease any commercially reasonable substitute.
A buyer or lessee who rightfully covers may sue the seller or lessor to recover
as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price or rent.
The buyer or lessee may also recover incidental and consequential damages, less
expenses saved (such as delivery costs) [UCC 2-712, 2A-518]. The UCC does not
require a buyer or lessee to cover when a seller or lessor breaches a sales or lease
contract. Failure of the buyer or lessee to cover does not bar the buyer from other
remedies against the seller.
RIGHT TO REPLEVY GOODS

A buyer or lessee may replevy (recover) goods from a seller or lessor who is wrong-
fully withholding them. The buyer or lessee must show that he or she was unable to
cover or that attempts at cover will be unavailing. Thus, the goods must be scarce,
replevin but not unique. Replevin actions are available only as to goods identified in a sales
An action by a buyer or lessor to or lease contract [UCC 2-716(3), 2A-521(3)].
recover scarce goods wrongfully
withheld by a seller or lessor. Example: On January 1, Dell contracts to purchase monitors for computers from a
seller for delivery on June 1. Dell intends to attach the monitors to a new computer
that will be introduced on June 30. On June 1, the seller refuses to sell the monitors
to Dell because it can get a higher price from another buyer. Dell tries to cover but
cannot. Dell may successfully replevy the monitors from the seller.
RIGHT TO CANCEL A CONTRACT

If a seller or lessor fails to deliver conforming goods or repudiates the contract, or if
the buyer or lessee rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably revokes acceptance of the
goods, the buyer or lessee may cancel the sales or lease contract. The contract may be
canceled with respect to the affected goods or, if there is a material breach, the whole
contract may be canceled. A buyer or lessee who rightfully cancels a contract is dis-
charged from any further obligations on the contract and retains his or her rights to
other remedies against the seller or lessor [UCC 2-711(1), 2A-508(1)(a)].
RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR NONDELIVERY

OR REPUDIATION
If a seller or lessor fails to deliver the goods or repudiates the sales or lease contract,
the buyer or lessee may recover damages. The measure of damages is the difference
between the contract price (or original rent) and the market price (or rent) at the
time the buyer or lessee learned of the breach. Incidental and consequential dam-
ages, less expenses saved, can also be recovered [UCC 2-713, 2A-519].
Example: Fresh Foods Company contracts to purchase 10,000 bushels of soybeans
from Sunshine Farms for $5 per bushel. Delivery is to occur on August 1. On
August 1 the market price of soybeans is $7 per bushel. Sunshine Farms does not
deliver the soybeans. Fresh Foods decides not to cover and to do without the
soybeans. Fresh Foods sues Sunshine for market value minus the contract price
damages. It can recover $20,000 ($7 market price minus $5 contract price multi-
plied by 10,000 bushels) plus incidental damages less expenses saved because of
Sunshine’s breach. Fresh Foods cannot recover consequential damages because it
did not attempt to cover.
RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR ACCEPTED

NONCONFORMING GOODS
A buyer or lessee may accept nonconforming goods from a seller or lessor. The
acceptance does not prevent the buyer or lessee from suing the seller or lessor to
recover the damages for accepted nonconforming goods and any loss resulting damages for accepted
from the seller’s or lessor’s breach. Incidental and consequential damages may also nonconforming goods
be recovered. The buyer or lessee must notify the seller or lessor of the noncon- A buyer or lessee may accept
formity within a reasonable time after the breach was or should have been discov- nonconforming goods and recover
ered. Failure to do so bars the buyer or lessee from any recovery. If the buyer or the damages caused by the breach
from the seller or lessor or deduct
lessee accepts nonconforming goods, he or she may deduct all or any part of dam-
the damages from any part of the
ages resulting from the breach from any part of the purchase price or rent still due
purchase price or rent still due
under the contract [UCC 2-714(1), 2A-516(1)]. under the contract.
Example: A retail clothing store contracts to purchase 100 designer dresses for
$100 per dress from a seller. The buyer pays for the dresses prior to delivery. After
the dresses are delivered, the buyer discovers that 10 of the dresses have flaws in
them. The buyer may accept these nonconforming dresses and sue the seller for
reasonable damages resulting from the nonconformity.
Concept Summary
Buyer’s and Lessee’s Remedies
Situation Remedy
Seller or lessor refuses to 1. Reject nonconforming goods [UCC 2-601,
deliver the goods or delivers 2A-509].
nonconforming goods that
2. Revoke acceptance of nonconforming goods [UCC
the buyer or lessee does not
2-608, 2A 517(1)].
want.
3. Cover [UCC 2-712, 2A-518].
4. Sue for breach of contract and recover damages
[UCC 2-713, 2A-519].
5. Cancel the contract [UCC 2-711(1), 2A-508(1)(a)].
Seller or lessor tenders non- 1. Sue for ordinary damages [UCC 2-714(1),
conforming goods and the 2A-516(1)].
buyer or lessee accepts them.
2. Deduct damages from the unpaid purchase or rent
price [UCC 2-714(1), 2A-516(1)].
Seller or lessor refuses to 1. Sue for specific performance [UCC 2-716(1),
deliver the goods and the 2A-521(1)].
buyer or lessee wants them.
2. Replevy the goods [UCC 2-716(3), 2A-521(3)].
3. Recover the goods from an insolvent seller or lessor
[UCC 2-502, 2A-522].
318 Chapter 12
Additional Performance Issues

UCC Articles 2 (Sales) and 2A (Leases) contain several other provisions that affect
the parties’ performance of a sales or lease contract. These provisions are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
ASSURANCE OF PERFORMANCE
Each party to a sales or lease contract expects that the other party will perform his
or her contractual obligations. If one party to a contract has reasonable grounds to
believe the other party either will not or cannot perform his or her contractual
adequate assurance obligations, an adequate assurance of due performance may be demanded in writ-
When a party has reasonable ing. If it is commercially reasonable, the party making the demand may suspend
grounds to believe that the other his or her performance until adequate assurance of due performance is received
party will not perform his or her from the other party [UCC 2-609, 2A-401].
contractual obligations, they may
demand a writing assuring them Example: A buyer contracts to purchase 1,000 bushels of wheat from a farmer. The
that performance will occur. contract requires delivery on September 1. In July, the buyer learns that floods have
caused substantial crop loss in the area of the seller’s farm. The farmer receives
the buyer’s written demand for adequate assurance on July 15. The farmer fails to
give adequate assurance of performance. The buyer may suspend performance and
treat the sales contract as having been repudiated.
ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
Occasionally, a party to a sales or lease contract repudiates the contract before his
or her performance is due under the contract. If the repudiation impairs the value
anticipatory repudiation of the contract to the aggrieved party, it is called anticipatory repudiation. Mere
The repudiation of a sales or lease wavering on performance does not meet the test for anticipatory repudiation.
contract by one of the parties prior If an anticipatory repudiation occurs, the aggrieved party can (1) await per-
to the date set for performance. formance by the repudiating party for a commercially reasonable time (e.g., until
the delivery date or shortly thereafter) or (2) treat the contract as having been
breached at the time of the anticipatory repudiation, which gives the aggrieved
party an immediate cause of action. In either case, the aggrieved party may sus-
pend performance of his or her obligations under the contract [UCC 2-610,
2A-402].
An anticipatory repudiation may be retracted before the repudiating party’s
next performance is due if the aggrieved party has not (1) canceled the contract,
(2) materially changed his or her position (e.g., purchased goods from another
party), or (3) otherwise indicated the repudiation is considered final. The retrac-
tion may be made by any method that clearly indicates the repudiating party’s
intent to perform the contract [UCC 2-611, 2A-403].
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
statute of limitations The UCC statute of limitations provides that an action for breach of any written or
Statute that establishes the time oral sales or lease contract must commence within four years after the cause of the
period during which a lawsuit must action accrues. The parties may agree to reduce the limitations period to one year,
be brought; if the lawsuit is not but they cannot extend it beyond four years.
brought within this period, the
injured party loses the right to sue.
AGREEMENTS AFFECTING REMEDIES
The parties to a sales or lease contract may agree on remedies in addition to or in
substitution for the remedies provided by the UCC.
Example: The parties may limit the buyer’s or lessee’s remedies to repair and
replacement of defective goods or parts or to the return of the goods and repay-
ment (refund) of the purchase price or rent. The remedies agreed on by the parties
are in addition to the remedies provided by the UCC unless the parties expressly
provide that they are exclusive. If an exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose
(e.g., there is an exclusive remedy of repair but there are no repair parts available),
any remedy may be had, as provided in the UCC.
The UCC permits parties to a sales or lease contract to establish in advance the
damages that will be paid upon a breach of the contract. Such preestablished damages,
called liquidated damages, substitute for actual damages. In a sales or lease contract, liquidated damages
liquidated damages are valid if they are reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual Damages to which parties to a
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or contract agree in advance if the
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy [UCC 2-718(1), 2A-504]. contract is breached. Damages that
are specified in the contract rather
than determined by the court.
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS
UCC Article 2 (Sales) and Article 2A (Leases) have adopted the equity doctrine of
unconscionability. Under this doctrine, a court may determine as a matter of law unconscionability
that a contract is unconscionable. To prove unconscionability, there must be proof Where there is unequal bargaining
that the parties had substantial unequal bargaining power, that the dominant party power between the parties such that
misused its power in contracting, and that it would be manifestly unfair or oppres- it would be manifestly unfair to
sive to enforce the contract. This sometimes happens where a dominant party uses enforce the contract.
a preprinted form contract and the terms of the contract are unfair or oppressive.
If a court finds a contract or any clause in a contract is unconscionable, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result [UCC 2-302,
2A-108]. Unconscionability is sometimes found in a consumer lease if the con-
sumer has been induced by unconscionable conduct to enter into the lease. The
doctrine of unconscionability also applies to Web contracts.

1. Ethics: Does the doctrine of unconscionability encourage ethical behavior?
Explain.
2. Critical Thinking: Is the doctrine of unconscionability necessary? Explain.
ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Labor union agreements, franchise agreements, leases, and other commercial con-
tracts often contain arbitration clauses that require disputes arising out of the con-
tract be submitted to arbitration. In arbitration, the parties choose an impartial
third party to hear and decide the dispute. This neutral party is called the arbitra-
tor. Arbitrators are usually members of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) or another arbitration association. You can learn more about the AAA by
going to its website at www.adr.org.
Some details should be clarified before drafting an arbitration clause:
• Will this be binding arbitration? Or, do the parties retain the right to chal-
lenge the result in court?
• How is the arbitrator to be chosen?
• How is the arbitrator paid?
• What is the timeline for arbitration?
320 Chapter 12
• Should the amount of an award for damages be specified in the contract?

• Will damages be limited to foreseeable damages? Or, will indirect damages
be agreed to as well?
A sample arbitration agreement might be as simple as the following:
“The parties agree to submit any disputes arising from this agreement to final
and binding arbitration under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association.”
Patty Kechter is a graduate of the The corporate law practice involves contracts
paralegal program at Lewis-Clark regarding purchase and sale of businesses and also
State College in Lewiston, Idaho. She stock sales and transfers. Again, it is very impor-
is employed as a paralegal at the law tant that every detail is completely understood and
firm of Cox & Wagner, PLLC in in writing.
Lewiston for an attorney who spe-
We use contracts at times in estates for agree-
cializes in real estate law, corporate
law, probate law, and estate planning.
ments between heirs and devisees. These agree-
ments help make the estate process proceed
I work for an attorney who specializes in real estate smoothly.
law, corporate law, probate law, and estate planning. My attorney depends on me to draft these
Each of these areas involves contracts of some sort. documents for his review. It is really important that
In the real estate area, I draft contracts for real a paralegal understands the client’s wants and
estate purchases and sales that involve not only real needs because, most times, the paralegal is the cli-
estate but equipment purchases and accounts ent’s first contact. Clients rely on the paralegal to
receivables. It is very important that these contracts draft documents that meet their needs and include
spell out completely what both sides of the transac- all aspects of the transaction.
tion want to accomplish.

Candor and Honesty
The ethical paralegal knows that complete honesty is required in every
aspect of his or her professional career. Of particular note to the parale-
gal is the honesty and candor required before a tribunal (i.e., the court)
as set out in ABA Model Rule 3.3.1
At first blush, it might not seem that this rule is so important to the
paralegal because it is almost always the attorney who is appearing
before the court. However, there are several circumstances where the
paralegal is responsible for work that ultimately is presented to the court.
Many paralegals have the responsibility of legal research and writing.
The ethical paralegal knows that all of the law must be presented to the
court. In other words, if the paralegal finds a case in his or her legal research
that conflicts with a client’s position, that case must still be disclosed to the
court. Working with the attorney, the paralegal should be able to find a
way to distinguish that case in a way that might still favor the client.
1
CHAPTER 12 SUMMARY
SELLER’S AND LESSOR’S installment is impaired and the defect cannot be cured.
The buyer or lessee may reject the entire contract upon
PERFORMANCE, p. 305
the tender of a nonconforming installment only if the
Tender of Delivery nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the
entire contract [UCC 2-612, 2A-510].
Tender of delivery requires the seller or lessor to (1) put and
5. Destruction of goods. If goods identified in the con-
hold conforming goods at the buyer’s or lessee’s disposition
tract are totally destroyed without fault of either party
and (2) give the buyer or lessee any notification reasonably
before the risk of loss passes to the buyer or lessee, the
necessary to enable the buyer or lessee to take delivery of the
seller or lessor is excused from performance [UCC
goods [UCC 2-503(1), 2A-508(1)].
2-613].
Place of Delivery
General Obligations
1. Agreement. The parties may agree in the sales or lease
contract as to the place of delivery. The UCC has adopted the following broad principles that
2. No agreement. If there is no agreement in the contract govern the performance of sales and lease contracts:
as to place of delivery, the following UCC rules apply: 1. Good faith. Parties to a sales or lease contract must
a. Noncarrier cases. The place of delivery is the seller’s perform their contract obligations in good faith [UCC
or lessor’s place of business, unless the seller or les- 1-203].
sor has no place of business, in which case the place 2. Reasonableness. Many UCC provisions require parties
of delivery is the seller’s or lessor’s residence. to take reasonable steps or to act reasonably in perform-
b. Carrier cases: ing contract obligations.
i. Shipment contracts. The sales contract requires 3. Commercial reasonableness. Some provisions of the
the seller to send goods to the buyer by carrier. UCC require merchants to use commercial reasonable-
Delivery occurs when the seller puts the goods ness in the performance of their contract obligations.
in the carrier’s possession [UCC 2-504].
ii. Destination contracts. The sales contract requires BUYER’S AND LESSEE’S OBLIGATIONS
the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer’s place
of business or other destination. Delivery occurs AND PERFORMANCE, p. 309
when the goods reach this destination [UCC Right of Inspection
2-503].
Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer or lessee has the right to
Perfect Tender Rule inspect goods that are tendered, delivered, or identified in
the sales or lease contract prior to accepting or paying for
The seller or lessor is under a duty to deliver conforming
them [UCC 2-513(1), 2A-515(1)].
goods to the buyer or lessee. If the goods or tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer or Payment
lessee may opt to (1) reject the whole shipment, (2) accept
the whole shipment, or (3) reject part and accept part of the Duty to pay. Goods accepted by the buyer or lessee must be
shipment [UCC 2-601, 2A-509]. paid for in accordance with the terms of the sales or lease
contract. Unless otherwise agreed, payment or rent is due
Exceptions to the perfect tender rule:
when and where the goods are delivered [UCC 2-310,
1. Agreement of the parties. The parties may agree to 2A-516(1)].
limit the effect of the perfect tender rule.
Acceptance
2. Substitution of carriers. A seller must use a commer-
cially reasonable substitute if the agreed upon manner of Acceptance occurs when the buyer or lessee takes one of the
delivery fails or the agreed upon type of carrier becomes following actions [UCC 2-606, 2A-515]:
unavailable [UCC 2-614(1)].
3. Cure. A seller or lessor who delivers nonconforming 1. Signifies in words or by conduct that the goods are con-
goods has the opportunity to cure the nonconformity forming or that the goods will be taken or retained
by repairing or replacing defective or nonconforming despite their nonconformity.
goods if the time for performance has not expired and 2. Fails to reject the goods within a reasonable time after
the seller or lessor notifies the buyer or lessee of his or their delivery by the seller or lessor.
her intention to make a conforming delivery within the 3. Acts inconsistently with the seller’s ownership rights in
contract time [UCC 2-508, 2A-513]. the goods.
4. Installment contracts. The buyer or lessee may reject Buyers and lessees may only accept delivery of a commercial
any nonconforming installment if the value of the unit.
322 Chapter 12
SELLER’S AND LESSOR’S REMEDIES, Right to Cancel the Contract

p. 311 The seller or lessor may cancel the sales or lease contract if
Right to Withhold Delivery the buyer or lessee breaches the contract. The seller or lessor
is discharged of any further obligations under the canceled
Delivery of goods may be withheld if the seller or lessor dis- contract [UCC 2-106(4), 2A-523(3)].
covers the buyer or lessee is insolvent before the goods are
delivered [UCC 2-703(a), 2A-523(1)(c)].
BUYER’S AND LESSEE’S REMEDIES,
Demand payment in cash. If the seller or lessor discovers the
buyer or lessee is insolvent, he or she may refuse to deliver
p. 314
the goods unless payment is rendered in cash [UCC 2-702(1), Seller or Lessor Refuses to Deliver the Goods or Delivers
2A-525(1)]. Nonconforming Goods Lessee Does Not Want
Right to Stop Delivery of Goods in Transit 1. Reject nonconforming goods. If the goods or the seller’s
or lessor’s tender of delivery fails to conform to a sales or
If the goods are in transit or in the bailee’s possession, the lease contract in any way, the buyer or lessee may (1)
seller or lessor may stop delivery (1) of a carload, a truck- reject the whole, (2) accept the whole, or (3) accept any
load, or a planeload of goods if the buyer or lessee repudiates commercial unit and reject the rest [UCC 2-601, 2A-509].
the contract, fails to make a payment when due, or otherwise 2. Revoke acceptance of nonconforming goods. A buyer
breaches the contract or (2) of any size shipment if the buyer or lessee who has accepted goods may subsequently
or lessee becomes insolvent [UCC 2-705(1), 2A-526(1)]. revoke his or her acceptance if (1) the goods are non-
conforming, (2) the nonconformity substantially
Right to Reclaim Goods impairs the value of the goods to the buyer or lessee,
A seller or lessor may reclaim goods in the possession of the and (3) one of the following factors is shown:
buyer or lessee if: a. The seller’s or lessor’s promise to reasonably cure the
nonconformity is not met,
1. The goods are delivered in a credit sale and the seller b. The goods were accepted before the nonconformity
then discovers that the buyer was insolvent [UCC was discovered and the nonconformity was difficult
2-000]. to discover, or
2. The buyer misrepresented his or her solvency in writ- c. The goods were accepted before the nonconformity
ing within three months before delivery or paid for was discovered and the seller or lessor assured the
goods in a cash sale with a check that bounces [UCC buyer or lessee that the goods were conforming
2-702(2) and 507(2)]. [UCC 2-608(1), 2A-517(1)].
3. Cover. If the seller or lessor fails to make delivery of
Right to Dispose of Goods goods or repudiates a sales or lease contract or if the
If a buyer or lessee breaches or repudiates the sales or lease buyer or lessee rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably
contract before the seller or lessor has delivered the goods, revokes their acceptance, the buyer or lessee may cover
the seller or lessor may resell or release the goods and recover by purchasing or renting substitute goods from another
damages from the buyer or lessee. Damages are calculated as party. The buyer or lessee may recover from the seller
the difference between the disposition price or rent and the or lessor damages calculated as the difference between
original contract price or rent [UCC 2-706(1), 2A-527(1)]. the cost of cover and the original contract price or rent
[UCC 2-712, 2A-518].
Right to Recover the Purchase Price or Rent 4. Sue for breach of contract and recover damages. If a
seller or lessor fails to deliver the goods or repudiates a
If the buyer or lessee accepts the goods but fails to pay for sales or lease contract, the buyer or lessee may recover
them when the contract price or rent is due, the seller or les- damages from the seller or lessor. Damages are calcu-
sor may sue to recover the contracted-for purchase price or lated as the difference between the contract price (or
rent from the buyer or lessee [UCC 2-709(1), 2A-529(1)]. original rent) and the market price (or rent) at the time
Right to Recover Damages for Breach of Contract the buyer or lessee learned of the breach [UCC 2-713,
2A-519].
If a buyer or lessee repudiates a sales or lease contract, the 5. Cancel the contract. A buyer or lessee may cancel a
seller or lessor may sue to recover the damages caused by the sales or lease contract if the seller or lessor fails to
breach. Damages are calculated as the difference between deliver conforming goods or repudiates the contract or
the original contract price (or rent) and the market price (or if the buyer or lessee rightfully rejects the goods or jus-
rent) of the goods at the time and place the goods were to be tifiably revokes acceptance of the goods. The buyer or
delivered, or lost profits [UCC 2-708(1), 2-708(2), 2A-528(1), lessee is discharged from any further obligations under
2A-528(2)]. the canceled contract [UCC 2-711(1), 2A-508(1)(a)].
Seller or Lessor Tenders Nonconforming Goods and perform his or her contractual obligations, he or she may
Buyer or Lessee Accepts Them demand in writing an adequate assurance of performance
from the other party. The party making the demand may
1. Sue for damages. If a buyer or lessee accepts noncon-
suspend his or her performance until adequate assurance of
forming goods from a seller or lessor, the buyer or les-
performance is received [UCC 2-609, 2A-401].
see may recover as damages any loss resulting from the
seller’s or lessor’s breach [UCC 2-714(1), 2A-516(1)]. Anticipatory Repudiation
2. Deduct damages from unpaid purchase price or rent.
If a seller or lessor breaches the sales or lease contract Anticipatory repudiation occurs when a party to a sales or
and the buyer or lessee accepts nonconforming goods, lease contract repudiates the contract before his or her per-
the buyer or lessee may deduct all or any part of the formance is due. The aggrieved party can (1) await perform-
damages resulting from the breach from any part of the ance when due or (2) treat the contract as having been
price or rent still due under the sales or lease contract breached at the time of the anticipatory repudiation [UCC
[UCC 2-714(1), 2A-516(1)]. 2-610, 2A-402].
Seller or Lessor Refuses to Deliver the Goods and Buyer Statute of Limitations
or Lessee Wants Them
The UCC provides that an action for breach of any written
1. Specific performance. If the goods are unique or the or oral sales or lease contract must commence within four
remedy at law in inadequate, a buyer or lessee may years after the cause of action accrues. The parties may agree
obtain a decree of specific performance that orders the to reduce the limitations period to one year, but they cannot
seller or lessor to perform the sales or lease contract extend it beyond four years [UCC 2-725, 2A-506].
[UCC 2-716(1), 2A-521(1)].
Agreements Affecting Remedies
2. Replevy the goods. A buyer or lessee may replevy (re-
cover) scarce goods from a seller or lessor who is wrong- 1. Limitations on remedies. The parties to a sales or lease
fully withholding them [UCC 2-716(3), 2A-521(3)]. contract may agree on remedies in addition to or in
3. Recover the goods from an insolvent seller or lessor. If substitution for the remedies provided by Article 2 or
the buyer or lessee makes partial or full payment for the 2A of the UCC [UCC 2-719(1), 2A-503(1)].
goods before they are received and the seller or lessor 2. Unconscionable limitations. Any agreement concern-
becomes insolvent within 10 days after receiving the ing the limitation or exclusion of damages that is found
first payment, the buyer or lessee may recover the to be unconscionable is unenforceable. With respect to
goods from the seller or lessor [UCC 2-502, 2A522]. consumer goods, a limitation of consequential dam-
ages for personal injuries is prima facie unconscionable
Unconscionable Sales and Lease Contracts
[UCC 2-719(3), 2A-503(3)].
If a sales or lease contract or any clause in it is unconsciona- 3. Liquidated damages. The parties to a sales or lease
ble, the court may either refuse to enforce the contract or contract may establish in advance the damages that will
limit the application of the unconscionable clause [UCC be paid upon a breach of the contract [UCC 2-718(1),
2-302, 2A-108]. 2A-504].
ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE ISSUES,

p. 318
Assurance of Performance
If one party to a sales or lease contract has reasonable

grounds to believe the other party either will not or cannot
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Acceptance 310 COD (cash on delivery) 310 Disposition of goods 312
Adequate assurance 318 Cure 307 Incidental damages 312
Anticipatory repudiation 318 Damages for accepted nonconforming Installment contract 309
Cancellation 313 goods 317 Liquidated damages 319
Capture 315 Destination contract 306 Obligations 304
324 Chapter 12
Perfect tender rule 306 Replevin 316 Statute of limitations 318

Reclamation 312 Revocation of acceptance 311 Stop delivery of the goods 311
Recovery of damages 313 Right to cover 316 Tender of delivery 305
Recovery of lost profits 313 Shipment contract 306 Unconscionability 319
Recovery of purchase price or rent 313 Specific performance 315
Remember the case at the beginning of the Chapter where now know about specific performance, do you think this
Dr. and Mrs. Sedmak had agreed to purchase a limited- would be a good case under that theory? If so, who would
edition Corvette from a dealership but the dealership win? To help you with your answer, see the case of Sedmak v.
decided to auction off the car instead? Knowing what you Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. Determine whether the following are provided in your
state’s UCC:
1. Visit “LII: Law About. . .Remedies” at http://topics.law.
• Good faith and reasonableness requirement
cornell.edu/wex/remedy and “LII: Law About. . .Com-
• Right to stop goods in transit
mercial Law” at www.law.cornell.edu/topics/commercial.
• Right to cover
html, which includes information on consumer credit,
damages, debtors and creditors, injunctions, and
remedies.
Using the information about arbitration from the Chapter, 3. A more complicated arbitration clause that includes ref-
the American Arbitration Association’s website, and other erences to:
information on arbitration clauses you find on the Internet, a. How the arbitrator is chosen and paid
draft the following: b. The timeline for the arbitration
c. How damages are to be calculated
1. A basic arbitration clause
2. A binding arbitration clause
HANDS-ON DRAFTING EXERCISES
Topic: Destruction of Goods Exercise/Assignment:

(To the student: Reread the facts from the various Hands-On Draft a provision for insertion into the sample Contract for
Drafting Exercises at the end of each Chapter so as to famil- Sale of Equipment (in Appendix C) that allows All You Can
iarize yourself before beginning the exercise below.) Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., to terminate the contract if the
equipment is destroyed.
Facts:
Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., is concerned that the
equipment it is purchasing from ABC Company will be Use paragraph 15 from the Business Purchase Agreement in
destroyed by fire or other catastrophe while in transit and Appendix C as a guide in drafting this provision.
would like to terminate the contract if that should happen.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.1 Nonconforming Goods Farrar had accepted the packages and must pay for them.
The Jacob Hartz Seed Company, Inc. (Hartz), bought soy- Who wins? International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 700 P.2d 642
beans for use as seed from E. R. Coleman. Coleman certified (N.M. 1985).
that the seed had an 80 percent germination rate. Hartz paid
for the beans and picked them up from a warehouse in Card, Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.4 Commercial Impracti-
Arkansas. After the seed was transported to Georgia, a sam- cality Charles C. Campbell was a farmer who farmed some
ple was submitted for testing to the Georgia Department of 600 acres in the vicinity of Hanover, Pennsylvania. In the
Agriculture. When the department reported a germination spring, Campbell entered into a contract with Hostetter
level of only 67 percent, Coleman requested that the seed be Farms, Inc. (Hostetter), a grain dealer with facilities in
retested. The second set of tests reported a germination rate Hanover. The sales agreement called for Campbell to sell
of 65 percent. Hartz canceled the contract after the second Hostetter 20,000 bushels of No. 2 yellow corn at $1.70 per
test, and Coleman reclaimed the seed. Hartz sought a refund bushel. Delivery was made five months later in the fall.
of the money it had paid for the seed, claiming the soybeans Unfortunately, the summer was an unusually rainy one, and
were nonconforming goods. Who wins? Jacob Hartz Seed Campbell could not plant part of his crop because of the wet
Co. v. Coleman, 612 S.W.2d 91 (Ark. 1981). ground. After the corn was planted, part of the crop failed
due to the excessive rain. As a result, Campbell delivered
Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.2 Right to Cure Connie only 10,417 bushels. Hostetter sued Campbell for breach of
R. Grady purchased a new Chevrolet Chevette from Al contract. Campbell asserted the defense of commercial
Thompson Chevrolet (Thompson). Grady gave Thompson a impracticability. Who wins? Campbell v. Hostetter Farms,
down payment on the car and financed the remainder of the Inc., 380 A.2d 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
purchase price through General Motors Acceptance Corpo-
ration (GMAC). Grady picked up the Chevette. The next Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.5 Right to Reclaim Goods
day, the car broke down and had to be towed back to Thomp- Archer Daniels Midland Company (Archer) sold ethanol for
son. Grady picked up the repaired car one day later. The car’s use in gasoline. Archer sold 80,000 gallons of ethanol on
performance was still unsatisfactory in that the engine was credit to Charter International Oil Company (Charter). The
hard to start, the transmission slipped, and the brakes had to ethanol was shipped to Charter’s facility in Houston. Charter
be pushed to the floor to function. Two weeks later, Grady became insolvent sometime during that period. Archer sent
again returned the Chevette for servicing. When she picked a written notice to Charter, demanding the return of the eth-
up the car that evening, the engine started, but the engine anol. At the time Charter received the reclamation demand,
and brake warning lights came on. This pattern of malfunc- it had only 12,000 gallons of ethanol remaining at its Hou-
tion and repair continued for another two months. Grady ston facility. When Charter refused to return the unused
wrote a letter to Thompson, revoking the sale. Thompson ethanol, Archer sued to recover the ethanol. Who wins?
repossessed the Chevette. GMAC sued Grady to recover its Archer Daniels Midland v. Charter Int’l Oil Co., 60 B.R. 854
money. Grady sued Thompson to recover her down pay- (M.D. Fla. 1986).
ment. Thompson claimed that Grady’s suit was barred
Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.6 Right to Resell Goods
because the company was not given adequate opportunity to
Meuser Material & Equipment Company (Meuser) was a
cure. Who wins? General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grady,
dealer in construction equipment. Meuser entered into an
501 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
agreement with Joe McMillan for the sale of a bulldozer to
Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.3 Revocation of Accept- McMillan. The agreement called for Meuser to deliver the
ance Roy E. Farrar Produce Company (Farrar) was a bulldozer to McMillan’s residence in Greeley, Colorado.
packer and shipper of tomatoes in Rio Arriba County, New McMillan paid Meuser with a check. Before taking delivery,
Mexico. Farrar contacted Wilson, an agent and salesman McMillan stopped payment on the check. Meuser entered
for International Paper Company (International), and into negotiations with McMillan in an attempt to get McMillan
ordered 21,500 tomato boxes for $.64 per box. The boxes to abide by the sales agreement. During this period, Meuser
were to each hold between 20 and 30 pounds of tomatoes paid for the upkeep of the bulldozer. When it became apparent
for shipping. When the boxes arrived at Farrar’s plant, 3,624 that further negotiations would be fruitless, Meuser began
of them were immediately used to pack tomatoes. When looking for a new buyer. Fourteen months after the original
the boxes were stacked, they began to collapse and crush sale was supposed to have taken place, the bulldozer was
the tomatoes contained within them. The produce com- resold for less than the original contract price. Meuser sued
pany was forced to repackage the tomatoes and store the McMillan to recover the difference between the contract
unused tomato boxes. Farrar contacted International and price and the resale price as well as for the cost of upkeep on
informed it that it no longer wanted the boxes because they the bulldozer for 14 months. Who wins? McMillan v. Meuser
could not perform as promised. International claimed that Material & Equip. Co., 541 S.W.2d 911 (Ark. 1976).
326 Chapter 12
Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.7 Right to Recover Pur- on time. On August 1, Saber was informed that Tri-State
chase Price C. R. Daniels, Inc. (Daniels), entered into a was canceling the contract. Saber sued Tri-State for breach
contract for the design and sale of grass catcher bags for of contract and sought to recover its lost profits as dam-
lawn mowers to Yazoo Manufacturing Company, Inc. ages. Tri-State admitted its breach but claimed that lost
(Yazoo). Daniels contracted to design grass catcher bags profits is an inappropriate measure of damages. Who wins?
that would fit the “S” series mower made by Yazoo. Yazoo Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575
provided Daniels with a lawn mower to design the bag. (5th Cir. 1988).
After Yazoo approved the design of the bags, it issued a pur-
Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.9 Right to Cover Kent
chase order for 20,000 bags. Daniels began to ship the bags.
Nowlin Construction, Inc. (Nowlin), was awarded a contract
After accepting 8,000 bags, Yazoo requested that the ship-
by the state of New Mexico to pave a number of roads. After
ments stop. Officials of Yazoo told Daniels it would resume
Nowlin was awarded the contract, it entered into an agree-
accepting shipments in a few months. Despite several
ment with Concrete Sales & Equipment Rental Company,
attempts, Daniels could not get Yazoo to accept delivery of
Inc. (C&E). C&E was to supply 20,000 tons of paving mate-
the remaining 12,000 bags. Daniels sued Yazoo to recover
rial to Nowlin. Nowlin began paving the roads, anticipating
the purchase price of the grass bags still in its inventory.
C&E’s delivery of materials. On the delivery date, however,
Who wins? C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 641 F. Supp.
C&E shipped only 2,099 tons of paving materials. Because
205 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
Nowlin had a deadline to meet, the company contracted
Critical Legal Thinking Case 12.8 Right to Recover Lost with Gallup Sand and Gravel Company (Gallup) for substi-
Profits Saber Energy, Inc. (Saber), entered into a sales tute material. Nowlin sued C&E to recover the difference
contract with Tri-State Petroleum Corporation (Tri-State). between the higher price it had to pay Gallup for materials
The contract called for Saber to sell Tri-State 110,000 bar- and the contract price C&E had agreed to. C&E claims it is
rels of gasoline per month for six months. Saber was to not responsible for Nowlin’s increased costs. Who wins?
deliver the gasoline through the Colonial pipeline in Concrete Sales & Equip. Rental Co. v. Kent Nowlin Constr.,
Pasadena, Texas. The first 110,000 barrels were delivered Inc., 746 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1987).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 12.1 Ruby and Carmen Ybarra purchased a 1986, Lincoln’s sand dredge became inoperable. To continue
new double-wide mobile home from Modern Trailer Sales, in business, Lincoln negotiated a contract with Allsopp to
Inc. (Modern). Modern delivered the mobile home to the purchase sand over the course of a year. The contract called
Ybarras. A few days after delivery, portions of the floor for the sand to be loaded on Lincoln’s trucks during Allsopp’s
began to rise and bubble, creating an unsightly and trouble- regular operating season (March through November). Load-
some situation for the Ybarras. The Ybarras complained to ing at other times was to be done by “special arrangement.”
Modern about the floor as soon as they discovered the By November 1986, Lincoln had taken delivery of a quarter
defects. Modern sent repairmen to cure the defective floor of the sand it had contracted for. At that point, Lincoln
on at least three occasions, but each time they were unsuc- requested that several trucks of sand be loaded in December.
cessful. The Ybarras continued to complain about the Allsopp informed Lincoln it would have to pay extra for this
defects. The Ybarras continued to rely on Modern’s assur- special arrangement. Lincoln refused to pay extra, pointing
ances that it was able and willing to repair the floor. After out the sand was already stockpiled at Allsopp’s facilities.
four years of complaints, the Ybarras sued to revoke their Allsopp also offered to supply an employee to supervise the
acceptance of the sales contract. Did the Ybarras properly loading. Negotiations between the parties broke down, and
revoke their acceptance of the sales contract? Did Modern Lincoln informed Allsopp it did not intend to honor the
act ethically in this case? Did the Ybarras? Ybarras v. Modern remainder of the contract. Allsopp sued Lincoln. Was it
Trailer Sales, Inc., 609 P.2d 331 (N.M. 1980). commercially reasonable for Lincoln to demand delivery of
sand during December? Did Lincoln act ethically in this
Ethics Case 12.2 Allsopp Sand and Gravel (Allsopp) and
case? Allsopp Sand & Gravel v. Lincoln Sand & Gravel, 525
Lincoln Sand and Gravel (Lincoln) were both in the business
N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
of supplying sand to construction companies. In March
Read Case B.12 in Appendix B (LNS Investment Co., Inc. v. 1. What did the sales contract provide?
Phillips 66 Co.). This case is excerpted from the district court 2. Was the contract performed?
opinion. Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) using 3. What is the issue in this case?
the IRAC method. After briefing the case, you should be able 4. In whose favor did the court rule?
to answer the following questions:
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: GOOD FAITH AND REASONABLENESS
Generally, the common law of contracts only obligates the parties to perform accord-
ing to the express terms of their contract. There is no breach of contract unless the
parties fail to meet these terms.
Recognizing that certain situations may develop that are not expressly provided
for in a contract or that strict adherence to the terms of a contract without doing
more may not be sufficient to accomplish the contract’s objective, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) adopts two broad principles that govern the performance of
sales and lease contracts: good faith and reasonableness.
UCC 1-203 states, “Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” Although both parties owe a duty
of good faith in the performance of a sales or lease contract, merchants are held to a
higher standard of good faith than nonmerchants. Nonmerchants are held to the sub-
jective standard of honesty in fact, whereas merchants are held to the objective stand-
ard of fair dealing in the trade [UCC 2-103(1)(b)].
The words reasonable and reasonably are used throughout the UCC to establish
the duties of performance by the parties to sales and lease contracts. For example,
unless otherwise specified, the parties must act within a “reasonable” time [UCC
1-204(1)(2)]. As another example, if the seller does not deliver the goods as con-
tracted, the buyer may make “reasonable” purchases to cover (i.e., obtain substitute
performance) [UCC 2-712(1)]. The term commercial reasonableness is used to estab-
lish certain duties of merchants under the UCC. Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC do not
specifically define the terms reasonable and commercial reasonableness. Instead, these
terms are defined by reference to the course of performance or the course of dealing
between the parties, usage of trade, and such.
Note that the concepts of good faith and reasonableness extend to the “spirit” of
the contract as well as the contract terms. The underlying theory is that the parties
are more apt to perform properly if their conduct is to be judged against these princi-
ples. This is a major advance in the law of contracts.

1. Ethics: Do the UCC concepts of good faith and reasonableness enhance ethical
conduct?
2. Critical Thinking: Should the concept of good faith be implied in every contract?
Why or why not?
When a manufacturer engages in advertising in order to bring his goods and their quality to the
attention of the public and thus to create consumer demand, the representations made constitute
an express warranty running directly to a buyer who purchases in reliance thereon. The fact that
the sale is consummated with an independent dealer does not obviate the warranty.
—Justice Francis
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
chapter 13
SALES AND LEASE
WARRANTIES
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Jack Crothers. Jack CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
went to Norm’s Auto Sales (Norm’s) to buy a used car. Maurice Boyd, a sales-
man at Norm’s, showed Jack a Dodge automobile. While running the car’s should be able to:
engine, Boyd told Jack that the Dodge “had a rebuilt carburetor” and “runs 1. Identify and describe express warranties.
good.” After listening to the sales pitch, Jack bought the car. As Jack was driving 2. Describe the implied warranty of
the Dodge the next day, the car suddenly went out of control and crashed into merchantability.
a tree. Jack was seriously injured. The cause of the crash was an obvious defect 3. Describe the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.
in the Dodge’s accelerator linkage.
4. Identify warranty disclaimers and
determine when they are unlawful.
5. Describe the warranties of good title and
no infringements.
329
330 Chapter 13
The doctrine of caveat emptor—let the buyer beware—governed the law of sales and
leases for centuries. Finally, the law recognized that consumers and other purchasers
and lessees of goods needed greater protection. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), which has been adopted in whole or in part by all 50 states, establishes
warranty certain warranties that apply to the sale of goods. Article 2A of the UCC, which has
A buyer’s or lessee’s assurance that been adopted in many states, establish warranties that apply to lease transactions.
the goods meet certain standards. A Warranties are the buyer’s or lessee’s assurance that the goods meet certain
representation of the insured that is standards. Warranties, which are based on contract law, may be either expressly stated
expressly incorporated in the insur- or implied by law. If the seller or lessor fails to meet a warranty, the buyer or lessee can
ance contract.
sue for breach of warranty. Sales and lease warranties are discussed in this chapter.
Stephannie M. Gambill is a grad- The city purchases land or easements for
uate of Saint Mary-of-the Woods the construction of sanitary lift stations, sewer
College and has a bachelor of laterals, and public walking trails. I am responsi-
arts degree in paralegal studies. ble for working with appraisers; contacting prop-
She is the paralegal for the City of erty owners; drafting notification letters,
Terre Haute Legal Department purchase agreements, and deeds; and completing
in Terre Haute, Indiana. the transfers.
My supervisor is the mayor- The city maintains collective bargaining
appointed city attorney. The legal department is agreements with six unions that are renegotiated
responsible for representing all of the municipal and amended annually. In addition, the individual
departments, which include transit and sewage departments consistently purchase new equipment
treatment utilities, human resources, information or contract for specialized services. Those con-
technology, engineering, finance, police, fire, street, tracts are all reviewed by the legal department. I
and park departments. This office also represents work closely with the attorney and the individual
the mayor and the city council. Statutory law gov- departments to ensure that the contracts are pre-
erns almost all functions of municipal government. pared accurately to reflect the specific needs of the
Therefore, I must be aware of the constantly chang- department.
ing statutory requirements to ensure that the city Providing legal services for such a diversity of
remains compliant. organizations, needs, and interests, I get to see it all!
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS PARALEGAL
An employee benefits paralegal works with contracts in numerous ways, such as the
following:
• Draft and design qualified plan documents and trust agreements, including amend-
ments and restatements, to comply with law and regulations or client requests.
• Develop and review summary plan descriptions.
• Draft deferred compensation plans, including nonqualified executive compensation
and stock option plans.
• Draft welfare benefit plans, including cafeteria plans, medical reimbursement
plans, dependent care assistance plans, and health-care plans.
Sales and Lease Warranties 331
• Draft affiliate adoption statement.

• Draft administrative documents and agreements, including notification of
participation, election to participate, beneficiary designation, qualified joint and
survivor annuity and qualified preretirement survivor annuity waivers and
application for benefits, and election to contribute.
• Draft summary annual report.
• Draft benefit and/or compensation statement.
• Draft loan request forms, including loan agreements and consents, if appropriate,
and purpose of loan verification for participant loans.
• Draft board of directors resolutions for plan adoption, adoption of amendments,
contribution amounts, and other actions required to be taken by the board.
• Draft and file application for IRS determination letter.
• Assist client in preparing and filing annual report (5500 series and related schedules).
• Monitor progress of new plans and amendments to verify that required actions
occur on schedule.
• Review and interpret regulations issued by government agencies to determine
their application and relevance to client plans.
• Assist in preparing and coordinating general notice mailings to clients about
potential impact of new legal developments on plans.
• Research interpretive questions on prohibited transactions for qualified and
nonqualified plans.
• Calculate employer contributions and forfeitures and allocate to participant
accounts.
• Determine earnings adjustments and allocate to participant accounts.
• Calculate participants’ years of service for eligibility and vesting.
• Calculate benefit for terminated participants.
Warranties
A warranty is a party’s express or implied representation about the quality or other
characteristic of the goods or services being provided. Accompanying that war-
ranty is usually a promise that a payment or other remedy will be given if the goods
or services do not conform to the terms of the contract.
Express Warranty
Express warranties, which are the oldest form of warranty, are created when a express warranty
seller or lessor affirms that the goods he or she is selling or leasing meet certain Any affirmation of fact or promise by
standards of quality, description, performance, or condition.1 Express warranties the licensor about the quality of its
can be either written, oral, or inferred from the seller’s conduct. software or information. A warranty
It is not necessary to use formal words such as warrant or guarantee to create that is created when a seller or
lessor makes an affirmation that the
an express warranty. Express warranties can be made by mistake because the seller
goods he or she is selling or leasing
or lessor does not have to intend specifically to make the warranty.2
meet certain standards of quality,
Sellers and lessors are not required to make such warranties. Generally, description, performance, or condition.
express warranties are made to entice consumers and others to buy or lease their
1
UCC 2-313(1), 2A-210(1).
2
UCC 2-313(2), 2A-210(2).
332 Chapter 13
products. That is why these warranties are often in the form of advertisements,
brochures, catalogs, pictures, illustrations, diagrams, blueprints, and so on.
An express warranty is created when the seller or lessor indicates the goods
will conform to:
1. All affirmations of fact or promise made about them.
Example: Statements such as “This car will go 100 miles per hour” or “This
house paint will last at least five years.”
2. Any description of them.
Example: Terms such as Idaho potatoes and Michigan cherries.
3. Any model or sample of them.
Example: A model oil drilling rig or a sample of wheat taken from a silo.
BASIS OF THE BARGAIN

Buyers and lessees can recover for breach of an express warranty if the warranty
was a contributing factor—not necessarily the sole factor—that induced the buyer
to purchase the product or the lessee to lease the product. This is known as the
basis of the bargain basis of the bargain3. The UCC does not define the phrase basis of the bargain, so
All statements by the seller or lessor this test is broadly applied by the courts. Generally, all statements by the seller or
prior to or at the time of contracting. lessor prior to or at the time of contracting are presumed to be part of the basis of
the bargain unless good reason is shown to the contrary. Postsale statements that
modify the contract are part of the basis of the bargain.
Generally, a retailer is liable for the express warranties made by manufacturers
of goods it sells. Manufacturers are not liable for express warranties made by whole-
salers and retailers unless the manufacturer authorizes or ratifies the warranty.
STATEMENTS OF OPINION
Many express warranties arise during the course of negotiations between a buyer and
a seller (or lessor and lessee). The seller’s or lessor’s statements of opinion (i.e.,
puffing puffing) or commendation of the goods do not create an express warranty.4 It is often
A seller’s opinion on the quality of difficult to determine whether the seller’s statement is an affirmation of fact (which
goods; usually overpraise, creates an express warranty) or a statement of opinion (which does not create a war-
exaggeration, or hype. ranty). An affirmation of the value of goods does not create an express warranty.5
Example: A used car salesperson’s statement that “This is the best used car availa-
ble in town” does not create an express warranty because it is an opinion and mere
puffing. However, a statement such as “This car has been driven only 20,000 miles”
is an express warranty because it is a statement of fact. Statements such as “This
painting is worth a fortune” or “Others would gladly pay $20,000 for this car” do
not create an express warranty because these are a statement of value and not a
statement of fact.
In Case 13.1, the court had to decide whether an express warranty had been
created.
3
UCC 2-313(1), 2A-210(1).
4
UCC 2-313(2).
5
UCC 2-313(2).
CASE 13.1 EXPRESS WARRANTY

Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992).
“The trial judge found that the diamonds were of a grade substantially
less than v.v.s.”
Judge Whiting,
Supreme Court of Virginia
Facts
W. Hayes Daughtrey consulted Sidney Ashe, a jeweler, about the purchase of a
diamond bracelet as a Christmas present for his wife. Ashe showed Daughtrey
a diamond bracelet that he had for sale for $15,000. When Daughtrey decided to
purchase the bracelet, Ashe completed and signed an appraisal form that stated
that the diamonds were “H color and v.v.s. quality.” (V.v.s. is one of the highest
ratings in a quality classification employed by jewelers.) After Daughtrey paid
for the bracelet, Ashe put the bracelet and the appraisal form in a box. Daughtrey
gave the bracelet to his wife as a Christmas present. One year later, when another
jeweler looked at the bracelet, Daughtrey discovered that the diamonds were of
substantially lower grade than v.v.s. Daughtrey filed a specific performance suit
against Ashe to compel him to replace the bracelet with one mounted with v.v.s.
diamonds or pay appropriate damages. The trial court denied relief for breach of
warranty. Daughtrey appealed.
Issue
Was an express warranty made by Ashe regarding the quality of the diamonds in
the bracelet?

We consider whether Ashe’s statement of the grade of the diamonds was an express
warranty. The Court contends that Ashe’s statement of the grade of the diamonds is
a mere opinion and, thus, cannot qualify as an express warranty.
It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he have a specific inten-
tion to make a warranty. Here, Ashe did more than give a mere opinion of the
value of the goods; he specifically described them as diamonds of “H color and
v.v.s. quality.” Ashe did not qualify his statement as a mere opinion. And, if one
who has superior knowledge makes a statement about the goods sold and does not
qualify the statement as his opinion, the statement will be treated as a statement
of fact. The trial judge found that the diamonds were of a grade substantially less
than v.v.s.
Given these considerations, we conclude that Ashe’s description of the
goods was more than his opinion; rather, he intended it to be a statement of a
fact. Therefore, the court erred in holding that the description was not an express
warranty.
334 Chapter 13
Decision
The appellate court held that an express warranty had been created. The trial
court’s decision was reversed, and the case was remanded for a determination of
appropriate damages to be awarded to Daughtrey.

1. Critical Thinking: What is the remedy when an express warranty has been
breached? Is the remedy sufficient?
2. Ethics: Did Ashe act ethically in denying that his statement created an
express warranty?
3. Critical Thinking: Do businesses have to make express warranties? Why do
businesses make warranties about the quality of their products?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of De Beers International at www.debeers.com. Find the
rating system for the quality of diamonds.
2. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of Virginia at www.courts.state.va.us.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about the De Beers monopoly and the
mining of diamonds.
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR

BREACH OF WARRANTY
Where there has been a breach of warranty, the buyer or lessee may sue the seller or
compensatory damages lessor to recover compensatory damages. The amount of recoverable compensa-
An award of money intended to tory damages is generally equal to the difference between (1) the value of the goods
compensate a nonbreaching party as warranted and (2) the actual value of the goods accepted at the time and place of
for the loss of the bargain; they acceptance.6 A purchaser or lessee can recover for personal injuries that are caused
place the nonbreaching party in the by a breach of warranty.
same position as if the contract had
been fully performed by restoring the Example: Suppose a used car salesperson warrants that a used car has been driven
“benefit of the bargain.” Damages only 20,000 miles. If true, that would make the car worth $10,000. The salesperson
that are generally equal to the gives the buyer a “good deal” and sells the car for $8,000. Unfortunately, the car was
difference between the value of the worth only $4,000 because it was actually driven 100,000 miles. The buyer discov-
goods as warranted and the actual ers the breach of warranty and sues the salesperson for damages. The buyer can
value of the goods accepted at the recover $6,000 ($10,000 warranted value minus $4,000 actual value). The contract
time and place of acceptance.
price ($8,000) is irrelevant to this computation.
Example: Suppose Frances Gordon purchases new tires for her car, and the manu-
facturer expressly warrants the tires against blowout for 50,000 miles. Suppose one
of the tires blows out after being used only 20,000 miles, causing severe injury to
Gordon. She can recover personal injury damages from the manufacturer because
of the breach of warranty.
6
UCC 2-714(2), 2A-508(4).
Implied Warranty
In addition to express warranties made by a manufacturer or seller, the law some-
times implies warranties to the sale or lease of goods. Implied warranties are not
expressly stated in the sales or lease contract but instead are implied by law. The
most common forms of implied warranties are the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility, the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption, and the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Each one of these warranties is covered
in the following discussion.
IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY
If the seller or lessor of a good is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, the
sales contract contains an implied warranty of merchantability unless it is prop- implied warranty of merchantability
erly disclaimed.7 This requires the following standards to be met: Unless properly disclosed, a
warranty that is implied that sold or
• The goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used. leased goods are fit for the ordinary
purpose for which they are sold or
Example: A chair must be able to safely perform the function of a chair. If a
leased, and other assurances.
normal-size person sits in a chair that has not been tampered with, and the
chair collapses, there has been a breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability. If, however, the same person is injured because he or she uses the chair
as a ladder and it tips over, there is no breach of implied warranty because
serving as a ladder is not the ordinary purpose of a chair.
• The goods must be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled.

Example: The implied warranty of merchantability applies to the milk bottle
as well as to the milk inside the bottle.
• The goods must be of an even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit—
All the goods in a carton, package, or box must be consistent.
• The goods must conform to any promise or affirmation of fact made on the
container or label—The goods must be capable of being used safely in
accordance with the instructions on the package or label.
• The quality of the goods must pass without objection in the trade—Other
users of the goods should not object to their quality.
• Fungible goods must meet a fair average or middle range of quality—To be fungible
classified as a certain grade, grain or ore must meet the average range of qual- Goods consisting of identical and
ity of that grade. interchangeable particles or
components.
Note that the implied warranty of merchantability does not apply to sales or
leases by nonmerchants or casual sales.
Example: The implied warranty of merchantability applies to the sale of a lawn
mower sold by a merchant who is in the business of selling lawn mowers. It does
not apply when one neighbor sells a lawn mower to another neighbor.
Case 13.2 raised the issue of implied warranty of merchantability.
7
UCC 2-314(1), 2A-212(1).
336 Chapter 13
CASE 13.2 IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY

Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1995).
“The law implies a warranty by a manufacturer that places its product on
the market that the product is reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for
which it was intended.”
Judge Titone,
Court of Appeals of New York
Facts
Nancy Denny purchased a Bronco II, a small utility vehicle manufactured by Ford
Motor Company. Denny testified that she purchased the Bronco II for use on paved
city and suburban streets, not for off-road use. On June 9, 1986, when Denny was
driving the vehicle on a paved road, she slammed on the brakes in an effort to avoid
a deer that had walked directly into her motor vehicle’s path. The Bronco II rolled
over, and Denny was severely injured. Denny sued Ford Motor Company to recover
damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
Denny alleged that the Bronco II presented a significantly higher risk of
occurrence of rollover accidents than did ordinary passenger vehicles. Denny
introduced evidence at trial that showed that the Bronco II had a low stability
index because of its high center of gravity, narrow tracks, and shorter wheel base,
as well as the design of its suspension system. Ford countered that the Bronco II
was intended as an off-road vehicle and not designed to be used as a conventional
passenger automobile on paved streets. The trial court found Ford liable and
awarded Denny $1.2 million in damages. Ford appealed.
Issue
Did Ford Motor Company breach the implied warranty of merchantability?

Plaintiff introduced a Ford marketing manual that predicted many buyers would be
attracted to the Bronco II because utility vehicles were suitable to “contemporary
lifestyles” and were “considered fashionable” in some suburban areas. According to
this manual, the sales presentation of the Bronco II should take into account the
vehicle’s “suitability for commuting and for suburban and city driving.” Addition-
ally, the vehicle’s ability to switch between two-wheel and four-wheel drive would
“be particularly appealing to women who may be concerned about driving in snow
and ice with their children.” Plaintiff testified that the perceived safety benefits of its
four-wheel drive capacity was what attracted her to the Bronco II. She was not at all
interested in its off-road use.
The law implies a warranty by a manufacturer that places its product on the
market that the product is reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was
intended. If it is, in fact, defective and not reasonably fit to be used for its intended
purpose, the warranty is breached. Plaintiff’s proof focused on the sale of the Bronco II
for suburban driving and everyday road travel. Plaintiff also adduced proof that the
Bronco II’s design characteristics made it unusually susceptible to rollover accidents
when used on paved roads. All of this evidence was useful in showing that routine
highway and street driving was the “ordinary purpose” for which the Bronco II was
sold and that it was not “fit”—or safe—for that purpose. Thus, under the evidence in
this case, a rational fact finder could have concluded that the vehicle was not safe for
the “ordinary purpose” of daily driving for which it was marketed and sold.
Decision
The court of appeals held that Ford had breached the implied warranty of mer-
chantability and upheld the jury award for the plaintiff.

1. Law: What is an implied warranty of merchantability?
2. Critical Thinking: What is the public policy underlying an implied warranty?
3. Ethics: Did Ford act ethically in defending that the Bronco II was sold only
as an off-road vehicle? Was this argument persuasive?
4. Critical Thinking: What are the business implications of this decision? Do
you think that utility vehicles such as the Bronco II have a higher rollover
danger than normal passenger automobiles?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Ford Motor Company at www.ford.com. Does Ford still
make a Bronco class of vehicle?
2. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of New York at www.courts.state.
ny.us.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about the rollover problem of Ford
Bronco vehicles.
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS

FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION
The common law implied a special warranty—the implied warranty of fitness for implied warranty of fitness for
human consumption—to food products. The UCC incorporates this warranty, human consumption
which applies to food and drink consumed on or off the premises, within the A warranty that applies to food or
implied warranty of merchantability. Restaurants, grocery stores, fast-food outlets, drink consumed on or off the
and vending-machine operators are all subject to this warranty. States use one of premises of restaurants, grocery
stores, fast-food outlets, and vending
the following two tests in determining whether there has been a breach of the
machines.
implied warranty of fitness for human consumption:
• Foreign substance test. Under the foreign substance test, a food product is foreign substance test
unmerchantable if a foreign object in that product causes injury to a person. A test to determine merchantability
based on foreign objects that are
Example: The warranty would be breached if an injury were caused by a nail found in food.
in a cherry pie. If the same injury were caused by a cherry pit in the pie, the
pie would not be unmerchantable. consumer expectation test
A test to determine merchantability
• Consumer expectation test. The majority of states have adopted the mod- based on what the average con-
ern consumer expectation test to determine the merchantability of food sumer would expect to find in food
products. products.
338 Chapter 13
Example: Under this implied warranty, if a person is injured by a chicken

bone while eating fried chicken, the injury is not actionable.
Example: The implied warranty would be breached if a person was injured
by a chicken bone while eating a chicken salad sandwich. This is because a
consumer would expect that the food preparer would have removed all bones
from the chicken.
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS

FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
The UCC contains an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This
implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose
implied warranty is breached if the goods do not meet the buyer’s or lessee’s
An implied warranty that information expressed needs. The warranty applies to both merchant and nonmerchant sellers
is fit for the licensee’s purpose that and lessors.
applies if the licensor (1) knows of The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is implied at the time of con-
any particular purpose for which the tracting if:
computer information is required
1. The seller or lessor has reason to know the particular purpose for which the
and (2) knows that the licensee is
relying on the licensor’s skill or
buyer is purchasing the goods or the lessee is leasing the goods.
judgment to select or furnish suitable 2. The seller or lessor makes a statement that the goods will serve this purpose.
information. 3. The buyer or lessee relies on the seller’s or lessor’s skill and judgment and
purchases or leases the goods.8
Example: Susan Logan wants to buy lumber to build a house, so she goes to Win-
ter’s lumberyard. Logan describes to Winter the house she intends to build. She
also tells Winter that she is relying on him to select the right lumber. Winter selects
the lumber, and Logan buys it and builds the house. Unfortunately, the house col-
lapses because the lumber was not strong enough to support it. Logan can sue
Winter for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Case 13.3 raises the issue of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
CASE 13.3 IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR

A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
Mack Massey Motors, Inc. v. Garnica, 814 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
“A claim of warranty of fitness requires that goods serve their particular purpose.”
Judge Fuller,
Court of Appeals of Texas
Facts
Felicitas Garnica sought to purchase a vehicle capable of towing a 23-foot Air-
stream trailer she had on order. She went to Mack Massey Motors, Inc. (Massey
Motors), to inquire about purchasing a Jeep Cherokee that was manufactured by
8
UCC 2-315, 2A-213.
Jeep Eagle. After Garnica explained her requirements to the sales manager, he
called the Airstream dealer concerning the specifications of the trailer Garnica
was purchasing. The sales manager advised Garnica that the Jeep Cherokee
could do the job of pulling the trailer. After purchasing the vehicle, Garnica
claimed it did not have sufficient power to pull the trailer. She brought the Jeep
Cherokee back to Massey Motors several times for repairs for a slipping trans-
mission. Eventually, she was told to go to another dealer. The drive shaft on the
Jeep Cherokee twisted apart at 7,229 miles. Garnica sued Massey Motors and
Jeep Eagle for damages, alleging breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Garnica. Massey
Motors and Jeep Eagle appealed.
Issue
Did the defendants make and breach an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose?

In the instant case, the service provided by Massey Motors’ sales staff included
undertaking the responsibility of checking with the Airstream dealer and thereaf-
ter representing that the Jeep Cherokee, with an automatic transmission, was
suitable for pulling the Airstream. Massey Motors’ sales manager testified he
knew the intended purpose for Mrs. Garnica’s use of the proposed vehicle and that
he undertook to investigate the specifications of the Airstream. After having
undertaken the inquiry, he recommended the Jeep Cherokee as being suitable for
the purposes Mrs. Garnica was seeking—that of towing the Airstream trailer she
had on order.
A claim of warranty of fitness requires that goods serve their particular
purpose. The evidence supported the jury determination that the Jeep Cherokee
simply was exceeding its towing capacity and that Massey Motors had misrepre-
sented the fact that this was the proper vehicle suitable for towing the Airstream
trailer. In light of Massey Motors’ superior knowledge and expertise concerning
Mrs. Garnica’s inquiry and reliance, the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding.
Decision
The appellate court held that Massey Motors had made and breached an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose but Jeep Eagle had not.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the law recognize the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose? Or, should buyers be held to know their own requirements?
2. Ethics: Did Massey Motors act unethically in this case?
3. Critical Thinking: Do you think damages should have been awarded in this
case?
340 Chapter 13
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Chrysler LLC at www.chryslerllc.com. Does the company
still sell Jeep vehicles?
2. Visit the website of Airstream, Inc., at www.airstream.com. Look for an Air-
stream that is 23 feet long, the size of the Airstream in this case.
3. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth Circuit, at
www.8thcoa.courts.state.tx.us.
4. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the safety of Jeep
vehicles.
Concept Summary
Express and Implied Warranties of Quality
Type of
Warranty How Created Description
Express Made by the seller or Affirms that the goods meet certain
warranty lessor. standards of quality, description, per-
formance, or condition [UCC 2-313(1),
2A-210(1)].
Implied Implied by law if the Implies that the goods:
warranty of seller or lessor is a
1. Are fit for the ordinary purposes for
merchantability merchant.
which they are used
2. Are adequately contained, packaged,
and labeled
3. Are of an even kind, quality, and quan-
tity within each unit
4. Conform to any promise or affirma-
tion of fact made on the container or
label
5. Pass without objection in the trade
6. Meet a fair, average, or middle range
of quality for fungible goods [UCC
2-314(1), 2A-212(1)]
Implied Implied by law. Implies that the goods are fit for the pur-
warranty of pose for which the buyer or lessee
fitness for a acquires the goods if:
particular
1. The seller or lessor has reason to know
purpose
the particular purpose for which the
goods will be used
2. The seller or lessor makes a statement
that the goods will serve that purpose,
and
3. The buyer or lessee relies on the state-
ment and buys or leases the goods
[UCC 2-315, UCC 2A-213]
Warranty Disclaimer
Warranties can be disclaimed or limited. If an express warranty is made, it can be
limited only if the warranty disclaimer and the warranty can be reasonably con- warranty disclaimer
strued with each other. Statements that negate express and
All implied warranties of quality may be disclaimed by expressions such as as implied warranties.
is, with all faults, or other language that makes it clear to the buyer that there are no
implied warranties. This type of disclaimer is often included in sales contracts for
used products. If the preceding language is not used, disclaimers of the implied
warranty of merchantability must specifically mention the term merchantability.
These disclaimers may be oral or written.
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be disclaimed in
general language, without specific use of the term fitness.
Example: Language such as “There are no warranties that extend beyond the
description on the fact hereof ” is sufficient to disclaim the fitness warranty. The
disclaimer must be in writing.
CONSPICUOUS DISPLAY OF DISCLAIMER

Written disclaimers must be conspicuously displayed to be valid. The courts con-
strue conspicuous as noticeable to a reasonable person.9 conspicuous
A requirement that warranty
Example: A heading printed in capital letters or typeface that is larger or in a dif- disclaimers be noticeable to the
ferent style than the rest of the body of a sales or lease contract is considered con- average person.
spicuous. Different-color type is also considered conspicuous.
WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS IN SOFTWARE LICENSES

Most software companies license their software to users. A software license is a
complex contract that contains the terms of the license. Most software licenses
contain a warranty disclaimer and limitation on liability clauses that limit the licen-
sor’s liability if the software malfunctions. Disclaimer of warranty and limitation
on liability clauses that are included in a typical software license appear below.
SOFTWARE.COM, INC., LIMITATION AND WAIVERS OF WARRANTIES,

REMEDIES, AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
Limited Warranty. Software.com, Inc., warrants that (a) the software will
perform substantially in accordance with the accompanying written materi-
als for a period of 90 days from the date of receipt, and (b) any hardware
accompanying the software will be free from defects in materials and work-
manship under normal use and service for a period of one year from the
date of the receipt. Any implied warranties on the software and hardware are
limited to 90 days and one (1) year, respectively. Some states do not allow
limitations on duration of an implied warranty, so the above limitation may
not apply to you.
(continued)
9
UCC 2-316, 2A-214.
342 Chapter 13
Customer Remedies. Software.com, Inc.’s, entire liability and your exclu-

sive remedy shall be, at Software.com, Inc.’s, option, either (a) return of the
price paid or (b) repair or replacement of the software or hardware that does
not meet Software.com, Inc.’s, Limited Warranty and that is returned to
Software.com, Inc., with a copy of your receipt. This Limited Warranty is
void if failure of the software or hardware has resulted from accident, abuse,
or misapplication. Any replacement software will be warranted for the
remainder of the original warranty or 30 days, whichever is longer. These
remedies are not available outside the United States of America.
No Other Warranties. Software.com, Inc., disclaims all other warranties,
either express or implied, including but not limited to implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, with respect to the soft-
ware, the accompanying written materials, and any accompanying hard-
ware. This Limited Warranty gives you specific legal rights. You may have
others, which vary from state to state.
No Liability for Consequential Damages. In no event shall Software.com,
Inc., or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever (including, with-
out limitation, damages for loss of business profits, business interruption,
loss of business information, or other pecuniary loss) arising out of the use
of or inability to use this Software.com, Inc., product, even if Software.com,
Inc., has been advised of the possibility of such damages. Because some
states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or
incidental damages, the above limitation may not apply to you.
MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which covers writ-
A United States federal law (15 ten warranties relating to consumer products.10 This federal act is administered by
U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.). Enacted in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Commercial and industrial transactions are
1975, it is the federal statute that not governed by the act.
governs warranties on consumer The act does not require a seller or lessor to make express written warranties.
products.
However, persons who do make such warranties are subject to the provisions of the
act. If the warrantor chooses to make an express warranty, the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act requires that the warranty be labeled as either “full” or “limited.”
To qualify as a full warranty, the warrantor must guarantee free repair or
replacement of the defective product. The warrantor must indicate whether there
limited warranty is a time limit on the full warranty (e.g., “full 36-month warranty”). In a limited
A product guarantee that is limited warranty, the warrantor limits the scope of a full warranty in some way (e.g., a
or restricted in some way. return of the purchase price or replacement or such). The fact that the warranty is
full or limited must be conspicuously displayed. The disclosures must be in “under-
standable language.”
A consumer may bring a civil action against a defendant for violating the
provisions of the act. A successful plaintiff can recover damages, attorneys’ fees,
and other costs incurred in bringing the action. The act authorizes warrantors to estab-
lish an informal dispute resolution procedure. The procedure must be conspicuously
10
15 U.S.C Sections 2301-2312.
described in the written warranty. Aggrieved consumers must assert their claims
through this procedure before they can take legal action.
The act does not create any implied warranties. It does, however, modify
the state law of implied warranties in one crucial respect: Sellers or lessors who
make express written warranties relating to consumer products are forbidden
from disclaiming or modifying the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose. A seller or lessor may set a time limit on implied
warranties, but this time limit must correspond to the duration of any express
warranty.
Special Warranties of Title

and Possession
The UCC imposes special warranties on sellers and lessors of goods.
These include a warranty of good title, a warranty of no security interests, a
warranty of no infringements, and a warranty of no interference. These warranties warranty of no infringement
are discussed in the following paragraphs. An implied promise that there are
no interferences or interventions
that will affect the contract.
WARRANTY OF GOOD TITLE
Unless properly disclaimed, sellers of goods warrant they have valid title to the
goods they are selling and the transfer of title is rightful [UCC 2-312(1)(a)]. This is
called the warranty of good title. Persons who transfer goods without proper title warranty of good title
breach this warranty. Sellers warrant that they have valid
title to the goods they are selling
Example: Ingersoll-Rand owns a heavy-duty crane. A thief steals the crane and and that the transfer of title is
sells it to Turner Corp. Turner does not know the crane is stolen. If Ingersoll-Rand rightful.
discovers Turner has the equipment, it can reclaim it. Turner, in turn, can recover
against the thief for breach of the warranty of title. This is because the thief
impliedly warranted that he or she had good title to the equipment and the transfer
of title to Turner was rightful.
WARRANTY OF NO SECURITY INTERESTS

Under the UCC, sellers of goods automatically warrant that the goods they sell are
delivered free from any third-party security interests, liens, or encumbrances that
are unknown to the buyer [UCC 2-312(1)(b)]. This is called the warranty of no warranty of no security interests
security interests. Sellers of goods warrant that the
goods they sell are delivered free
Example: Albert Connors purchases a refrigerator on credit from Trader Horn’s, from any third-party security inter-
an appliance store. The store takes back a security interest in the refrigerator. Before ests, liens, or encumbrances that
completely paying off the refrigerator, Connors sells it to a friend for cash. The are unknown to the buyer.
friend has no knowledge of the store’s security interest. After Connors misses sev-
eral payments, the appliance store repossesses the refrigerator. Connors’s friend
may recover against him based on his breach of warranty of no security interests in
the goods [UCC 2-312(1)(b)].
The warranties of good title and no security interests may be excluded or
modified by specific language [UCC 2-312(2)]. For example, specific language
such as “seller hereby transfers only those rights, title, and interest as he or she has in
the goods” is sufficient to disclaim these warranties. General language such as “as
is” or “with all faults” is not specific enough to be a disclaimer to the warranties of
344 Chapter 13
good title and no security interests. The special nature of certain sales (e.g., sher-
iffs’ sales) tells the buyer that the seller is not giving title warranties with the sale of
the goods.
WARRANTY OF NO INFRINGEMENTS
Unless otherwise agreed, a seller or lessor who is a merchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind sold or leased automatically warrants that the goods are deliv-
ered free of any third-party patent, trademark, or copyright claim [UCC 2-312(3),
warranty against infringements 2A-211(2)]. This is called the warranty against infringement.
A seller or lessor who is a merchant
who regularly deals in goods of the
Example: Adams & Co., a manufacturer of machines that make shoes, sells a
kind sold or leased automatically machine to Smith & Franklin, a shoe manufacturer. Subsequently, Alice Jones
warrants that the goods are deliv- claims she has a patent on the machine. Jones proves her patent claim in court.
ered free of any third-party patent, Jones notifies Smith & Franklin that the machine can no longer be used without
trademark, or copyright claim. permission (and, perhaps, the payment of a fee). Smith & Franklin may rescind
the contract with Adams & Co. based on the breach of the no infringement
warranty.
WARRANTY OF NO INTERFERENCE
When goods are leased, the lessor warrants that no person holds a claim or an
interest in the goods that arose from an act or omission of the lessor that will inter-
fere with the lessee’s enjoyment of his or her leasehold interest [UCC 2A-211(1)].
warranty of no interference This is referred to as the warranty of no interference, or the warranty of quiet
An implied promise that there are possession.
no conflicts that will encroach upon
a contract.
Example: Suppose Occidental Petroleum leases a piece of heavy equipment from
Aztec Drilling Co. Aztec later gives a security interest in the equipment to Citibank
as collateral for a loan. If Aztec defaults on the loan and Citibank repossesses the
equipment, Occidental can recover damages from Aztec for breach of the warranty
of no interference.
Andrea Powell is a contract special- standard contract requirements for dealers, ven-
ist in the Center for Clinical dors, subcontractors, and suppliers. I review busi-
Research at the University of Toledo. ness contract agreements to ensure appropriate
She received an associate’s degree in risk transfer, insurance, and indemnification
legal assisting technology from the provisions.
University of Toledo, Ohio, and a
I’m also responsible for all contract manage-
bachelor’s degree in business admin-
istration from Lourdes College in
ment, including reviewing, analysis, drafting, and
Sylvania, Ohio. negotiating changes. In this role, I work with all
departments throughout the organization. I am
As a contracts specialist, I lead the review and often called upon to communicate with senior
negotiation of contract provisions of supplier, sales, management regarding terms and obligations that
and business contracts to ensure adherence with will affect the organization.
prudent risk-management practices. I establish

Advertising and Solicitation
An attorney being allowed to advertise his or her legal services to the
public is a relatively recent event. Before the case of Bates v. Arizona,
attorneys could not advertise on television or on billboards.11 Although
there are still cases dealing with misleading or otherwise unethical adver-
tising, for the most part, advertising is now fully permitted by attorneys.
However, solicitation by attorneys is another matter. Where adver-
tising is directed to the public at large, solicitation is directed to a spe-
cific individual by letter, telephone, or in person. ABA Rule 7.3 prohibits
attorneys and their employees from soliciting clients in most circum-
stances.12 The ethical paralegal should read the case of Idaho State
Bar v. Jenkins, 816 P.2d 335 (1991), to understand more fully the intrica-
cies of the prohibition against solicitation.
11
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
12
CHAPTER 13 SUMMARY
EXPRESS WARRANTY, p. 331 to be there caused the plaintiff ’s injury. The UCC
incorporates this warranty within the implied warranty
An express warranty is an affirmation by a seller or lessor of merchantability.
that the goods he or she is selling or leasing meet certain
standards of quality, description, performance, or condition.
Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
IMPLIED WARRANTY, p. 335 Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is a war-
Implied Warranty of Merchantability ranty by a seller or lessor that the goods will meet the buyer’s
or lessee’s expressed needs.
Implied warranty of merchantability is implied by law in
sales and lease transactions. It requires that the goods:
1. Be fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used
WARRANTY DISCLAIMER, p. 341
2. Be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled 1. Express warranties. Express warranties can be limited
3. Be of an even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit if the warranty and disclaimer can be reasonably con-
4. Conform to any promise or affirmation of fact made on strued with each other.
the container or label 2. Implied warranties:
5. Pass without objection in the trade a. Disclaimer. An implied warranty can be disclaimed
6. Meet a fair or middle range of quality if the goods are by expressions like as is, with all faults, or such lan-
fungible guage. If such language is not used, implied warran-
ties are disclaimed as follows:
Implied Warranty of Fitness for Human Consumption i. Implied warranty of merchantability. This is an
Implied warranty of fitness for human consumption is a oral or written disclaimer that mentions the
warranty implied by law that food products are fit for human word merchantability.
consumption. States apply one of the two following tests: ii. Implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. This is a written disclaimer of general
1. Foreign substance test. A food is unmerchantable if a language.
foreign object in the food caused the plaintiff ’s injury. 3. Conspicuousness. Written disclaimers must be con-
2. Consumer expectation test. A food is unmerchantable if spicuously displayed to be enforceable.
an object in the food that a consumer would not expect
346 Chapter 13
MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT, SPECIAL WARRANTIES OF TITLE AND

p. 342 POSSESSION, p. 343
This act is a federal statute that covers written warranties 1. Warranty of good title. A warranty in which the seller
that apply to consumer products. warrants that he or she has valid title to the goods being
sold and the transfer of title is rightful.
1. Full and limited warranties. If a good costs more than
2. Warranty of no security interests. A warranty in which
$10 and the warrantor makes an express warranty, the
sellers of goods warrant that the goods they sell are de-
warranty must be labeled full or limited.
livered free from any third-party security interests,
a. Full warranty. A full warranty guarantees free repair
liens, or encumbrances unknown to the buyer.
or replacement of a defective product. A time limit
3. Warranty of no infringements. An automatic warranty
may be placed on the warranty.
of a seller or lessor who is a merchant who regularly
b. Limited warranty. A limited warranty limits the
deals in goods of the kind sold or leased warrants that
scope of a full warranty in some way (e.g., return of
the goods are delivered free of any third-party patent,
the purchase price).
trademark, or copyright claim.
2. Limitation on disclaiming implied warranties. If a
4. Warranty of no interference. A warranty in which the
seller or lessor makes an express warranty, he or she can-
lessor warrants that no person holds a claim or interest
not disclaim or modify the implied warranties of mer-
in the goods that arose from an act or omission of the
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose. A time
lessor that will interfere with the lessee’s enjoyment of
limit may be placed on implied warranties but must
his or her leasehold interest.
correspond to the duration of the express warranty.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Basis of the bargain 332 Implied warranty of fitness for human Warranty 330
Compensatory damages 334 consumption 337 Warranty against infringement 344
Conspicuous 341 Implied warranty of fitness for a Warranty disclaimer 341
Consumer expectation particular purpose 338 Warranty of good title 343
test 337 Implied warranty of merchantability 335 Warranty of no security interests 343
Express warranty 331 Limited warranty 342 Warranty of no infringements
Foreign substance test 337 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 342 (warranty of quiet possession) 343
Fungible 335 Statements of opinion (puffing) 332 Warranty of no interference 344
Remember the situation at the beginning of the chapter lawsuit were brought? For help with your answer, see
regarding Jack Crothers and his purchase of a Dodge from Crothers v. Norm’s Auto Sales, 384 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct.
Norm’s Auto Sales? Now that you understand more about App. 1986).
sales and lease warranties, who do you think would win if a
Working the Web Internet Exercises Act and review the various disclaimers. Do you think
disclaimers are a good idea? Go to the Cornell Univer-
1. Review an example of Colorado’s UCC provisions at
sity Law School website at www.law.cornell.edu/
www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html and study the
warranty provisions and how they work. uscode and locate a summary of the warranties under
2. UCC Article 2 provides for disclaimers of warranties. UCC Article 2.
Find the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
It is especially important for a paralegal to have a general to simply omit any unwanted warranties from the written
understanding of the warranty provisions of the UCC when contract. The UCC provides for implied warranties. So
working with a contract subject to the UCC. It is not sufficient simply not mentioning warranties does not eliminate them.
In addition, the UCC is specific in its requirements for Sarah and Kelly (see the facts in the Chapter 4 Portfolio
disclaiming warranties. So the paralegal must be aware that Exercise).
there are times that a warranty disclaimer is a necessary part Use the “Disclaimer of Warranty” provision from the
of the contract. Sale of Equipment Contract in Appendix C as a guide in
Exercise: drafting this warranty clause.
Draft a warranty disclaimer clause related to the dia-

mond ring that is the subject of the contract between

Topic: Implied Warranty of Merchantability Exercise/Assignment:
(To the student: Reread the facts from the various Hands-On Modify paragraph 3 of the sample Contract for Sale of
Drafting Exercises at the end of each chapter so as to famil- Equipment in Appendix C such that it contains an express
iarize yourself before beginning the exercise below.) warranty of merchantability.
Facts: Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., is concerned that the Use the chapter material and chapter examples for purposes
equipment will not meet a fair average or middle range of quality. of drafting this demand promissory note.

Critical Legal Thinking Case 13.1 Warranty of Title When Critical Legal Thinking Case 13.3 Implied Warranty of
James Redmond wanted to purchase an automobile, he Merchantability Geraldine Maybank took a trip to New
spoke to a salesman at Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc. (Bill York City to visit her son and her two-year-old grandson.
Branch). The salesman offered to sell Redmond a blue She borrowed her daughter’s camera for the trip. Two days
Chevrolet Caprice for $6,200. The car was to be delivered to before leaving for New York, Maybank purchased a package
Redmond’s residence. Redmond gave the salesman $1,000 cash of GTE Sylvania Blue Dot flash cubes at a Kmart store,
and received a receipt in return. The next day, the salesman owned by the S. S. Kresge Company. On the carton of the
delivered the car to Redmond, and Redmond paid the package were words to the effect that each bulb was safety
remaining amount due. The salesman gave Redmond a coated. Upon arriving in New York, Maybank decided to
printed sales contract that reflected the payments made, take a picture of her grandson. She opened the carton of
with no balance due. One month later, Redmond called Bill flash cubes and put one on the camera. When Maybank
Branch and asked for the title papers to the car. Redmond pushed down the lever to take a picture, the flash cube
was told the car had been reported stolen prior to the sale exploded. The explosion knocked her glasses off and caused
and he could not receive title until he contacted Bill Branch’s cuts to her left eye. Maybank was hospitalized for eight days.
insurance company. Redmond sued Bill Branch Chevrolet, Maybank sued S. S. Kresge Company. Who wins? Maybank
Inc. Is Bill Branch liable? Bill Branch Chevrolet v. Redmond, v. S.S. Kresge Co., 266 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
378 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Critical Legal Thinking Case 13.4 Implied Warranty of
Critical Legal Thinking Case 13.2 Express Warranty Gloria Fitness for Human Consumption Tina Keperwes went to a
Crandell purchased a used Coronado clothes dryer from Publix Supermarket (Publix) in Florida and bought a can of
Larkin and Jones Appliance Company (Larkin and Jones). Doxsee brand clam chowder. Keperwes opened the can of soup
The dryer, displayed on the sales floor, had a tag affixed to it and prepared it at home. While eating the chowder, she bit
that described the machine as a “quality reconditioned unit” down on a clam shell and injured one of her molars. Keperwes
that was “tag tested” and “guaranteed.” In addition to these filed suit against Publix and Doxsee for breach of an implied
written statements, a salesman assured Crandell that the dryer warranty. In the lawsuit, Keperwes alleged that the clam chow-
carried a 90-day guarantee for “workmanship, parts, and der “was not fit for use as food, but was defective, unwholesome,
labor.” Crandell bought the dryer because of the guarantee and and unfit for human consumption” and “was in such condition
the low price. Two weeks after the machine was delivered, as to be dangerous to life and health.” At the trial, Doxsee’s gen-
Crandell asked her son to put a blanket in the dryer to dry. eral manager testified as to the state-of-the-art methods Doxsee
Twenty minutes later, she noticed smoke pouring into her uses in preparing its chowder. Are Publix and Doxsee liable for
bedroom. By the time Crandell reached the laundry room, the the injury to Keperwes’s tooth? Keperwes v. Publix Supermar-
machine was engulfed in flames. A defect in the clothes dryer kets, Inc., 534 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
had caused the fire. Crandell sued Larkin and Jones for breach
of an express warranty. Is there an express warranty? Crandell Critical Legal Thinking Case 13.5 Disclaimer of Warranty
v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31 (S.D. 1983). Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America (Automatic
348 Chapter 13
Sprinkler) wished to purchase a dry chemical fire protection Critical Legal Thinking Case 13.6 Disclaimer of Warranty
system from Ansul Company (Ansul). An Ansul representative Cole Energy Development Company (Cole Energy) wanted
gave Automatic Sprinkler a proposal on the company’s behalf. to lease a gas compressor for use in its business of pumping and
The proposal was a document five pages long. Each page selling natural gas and began negotiating with the Ingersoll-
included printed information describing the fire extinguisher Rand Company (Ingersoll-Rand). On December 5, 1983, the
system. Only the fifth and last page had printing on the back. two parties entered into a lease agreement for a KOA gas
The information on the back of page 5 contained a limited five- compressor. The lease agreement contained a section labeled
year warranty that covered only the replacement of defective “WARRANTIES.” Part of the section read:
parts. The limited warranty concluded with this statement:
“This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties express or There are no implied warranties of merchantability or
implied.” Automatic Sprinkler purchased the system and fitness for a particular purpose contained herein.
installed it in a client’s building. Several years later, a fire broke
The gas compressor that was installed failed to function
out in the building, and the Ansul fire extinguisher system
properly. As a result, Cole Energy lost business. Cole Energy
failed to discharge. Automatic Sprinkler sued Ansul for a breach
sued Ingersoll-Rand for the breach of an implied warranty of
of an implied warranty of merchantability. Ansul claimed that
merchantability. Is Ingersoll-Rand liable? Cole Energy Dev.
all warranties except the limited five-year warranty were dis-
Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 678 F. Supp. 208 (C.D. Ill. 1988).
claimed. Is Ansul’s disclaimer enforceable? Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Automatic Sprinkler, 423 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1981).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 13.1 Brian Keith, an actor, attended a boat to recover to a rolling boil, and boiling the crab for 10 min-
show in Long Beach, California. At the boat show, Keith utes. If the recovery time exceeds 10 minutes, or if the cooker
obtained sales literature on a sailboat called the “Island cannot sustain a rolling boil, the crab is immersed too long in
Trader 41” from a sales representative of James Buchanan, a hot water and the finished product is unpalatable. Troy and
seller of sailboats. One sales brochure described the vessel as Bader were equally unknowledgeable about gas-burner cook-
“a picture of sure-footed seaworthiness.” Another brochure ers, but Bader assured Troy that he would hire an expert to
called the sailboat “a carefully well-equipped and very sea- assist in manufacturing a crab cooker to meet Troy’s needs.
worthy live-aboard vessel.” One month later, Keith purchased
Bader sent Troy a brochure illustrating the type of
an Island Trader 41 sailboat from Buchanan for a total pur-
burner the expert had selected to meet Troy’s needs. Troy
chase price of $75,610. After delivery of the sailboat, a dispute
ordered the cooker, which was delivered to Troy’s Beaverton,
arose in regard to the seaworthiness of the vessel. Keith sued
Oregon, store. Within a week or two after delivery, Troy com-
Buchanan for breach of warranty. Buchanan defended, argu-
plained to Swan Island concerning the cooker’s performance.
ing that no warranty had been made. Is it ethical for Bucha-
The cooker cooked too slowly, and the pilot light and burner
nan to try to avoid being held accountable for statements of
were difficult to light and keep lit. Swan Island attempted but
quality about the product that were made in the sales bro-
could not correct the defects. For four months, Troy’s cooked
chures given Keith? Should sales puffing be considered to
crab in the Swan Island cooker. Because of the poor perform-
create an express warranty? Why or why not? Who wins this
ance of the cooker, Troy’s ruined a substantial amount of crab
case? Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1985).
and had to obtain cooked crab from another outlet to serve
Ethics Case 13.2 Peter Troy, president and owner of Troy’s its customers. Troy’s notified Swan Island to pick up the crab
Custom Smoking Co., Inc. (Troy’s), contacted Peter Bader, cooker. Swan Island sued Troy’s to recover the purchase price
president of Swan Island Sheet Metal Works, Inc. (Swan of the cooker. Troy’s filed a counterclaim against Swan Island
Island), and asked Bader if Swan Island could manufacture to rescind the contract and recover damages. Did Swan
two stainless-steel gas-burner crab cookers for Troy’s. Troy Island breach an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
explained to Bader the planned use of the cooker and some of purpose? Did Swan Island act ethically in denying liability in
the special needs a crab cooker must satisfy. That is, the crab this case? Swan Island Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Troy’s Custom
is cooked by dropping it into boiling water, allowing the water Smoking Co., 619 P.2d 1326 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).

Read Case B.13 in Appendix B (Cate v. Dover Corporation). 1. What did the warranty section of the contract provide?
This case is excerpted from the appellate court’s opinion. 2. What type of warranty was involved in this case?
Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) using the IRAC 3. What is the issue in the case?
method. After briefing the case, you should be able to answer 4. In whose favor did the court rule?
the following questions:
part THREE
CONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS
AND SPECIAL FORMS
CHAPTER 14 Relationship of Tort Law to Contract Law
CHAPTER 15 Special Forms of Contracts
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
—Justice Traynor
Greenman v. Yuba Power Product, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
chapter 14
RELATIONSHIP OF
TORT LAW TO
CONTRACT LAW
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Virginia Burke. CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
Burke purchased a bottle of Le Domaine champagne manufactured by
Almaden Vineyards, Inc. At home, she removed the wine seal from the top of should be able to:
the bottle but did not remove the plastic cork. She set the bottle on the counter, 1. Understand the relationship of tort law to
intending to serve it in a few minutes. Shortly thereafter, the plastic cork spon- contract law.
taneously ejected from the bottle, ricocheted off the wall, and struck Burke in 2. Define the doctrine of strict liability.
the left lens of her eyeglasses, shattering the lens and driving pieces of glass into 3. Identify and describe defects in
manufacture and design.
her eye. The champagne bottle did not contain any warning of this danger.
4. Identify and describe defects of failure to
Evidence showed that Almaden had previously been notified of the spontane-
warn and failure to provide adequate
ous ejection of the cork from its champagne bottles. packaging.
5. Describe the damages recoverable in a
product liability lawsuit.
351
352 Chapter 14
If a product defect causes injury to purchasers, lessees, users, or bystanders, the
injured party may recover damages under certain contract law theories. The
injured party may also be able to recover for his or her injuries under certain tort
law doctrines. These tort doctrines include negligence, misrepresentation, and the
modern theory of strict liability.
products liability The liability of manufacturers, sellers, lessors, and others for injuries caused
The liability of manufacturers, by defective products is commonly referred to as products liability. The various
sellers, and others for the injuries tort principles that permit injured parties to a contract to recover damages caused
caused by defective products. by defective products are discussed in this chapter.
Jennifer Wallace is a certified parale- a second set of “ears” or “eyes” in listening and
gal and a certified Florida legal interpreting what clients want in their contracts
assistant. She earned an AS degree and how they want it expressed.
in legal studies from Hillsborough Paralegals should understand their state’s
Community College and is pursuing legal requirements and any statutory requirements.
her BS degree in legal studies from
Only attorneys may interpret the law, but parale-
Florida Gulf Coast University. She
works at the law firm of Rory B.
gals should understand these basic requirements
Weiner, P.A., in Brandon, Florida, in and make sure to spot them when reviewing the
the areas of commercial litigation, wills and trusts, small- contract.
business law, and real estate. Some contracts contain the necessary ele-
ments to be enforceable, and others are poorly
Here’s a reality check: Without written contracts, written and vulnerable to attack. Paralegals must
most paralegals wouldn’t have a job. Think about educate themselves about the elements of a clear
it—contracts are everywhere: real estate, insur- and enforceable contract and use that knowledge
ance, settlements, business, and don’t forget the as a resource in assisting the attorney. In this case,
retainer agreement! knowledge is power.
Paralegals are invaluable when assisting in
the writing and reviewing of contracts. They offer
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: CORPORATE CONTRACTS PARALEGAL
A corporate contracts paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Process day-to-day builder contracts and other contractual agreements.
• Build and maintain relationships with internal and external customers.
• Manage lease process.
• Facilitate communications between builders, company, and parent company.
• Manage/facilitate daily contract process:
a. Review and modify contract .
b. Record to contract log.
c. Track metric on contracts .
d. Scan contract for electronic filing.
e. Send contract to the customer.
f. Follow up on executed copies of contract .
Relationship of Tort Law to Contract Law 353
• Assist in contract negotiation, writing contract addendums and protecting the

company’s legal rights under contract .
• Manage/facilitate daily lease process.
• Assist in monitoring and managing general liability claims and legal matters.
• Assist in monitoring construction defect and other litigation.
• Communicate effectively with parent company.
• Understand customers’ requirements, resolve issues, and build good relationships
internally and externally.
• Be an active part of the team working to reduce/limit risk exposure.
• Participate in continuous improvement activities.
Product Liability
The law provides that persons injured by products, and heirs of persons killed by
products, may bring tort actions to recover for damages. The plaintiff may rely on
several traditional tort theories, including negligence and material misrepresenta-
tion of the defendant. In addition, in certain circumstances a plaintiff can assert
the relatively modern tort doctrine of strict liability. If a violation of strict liability
has been found, the plaintiff not only may recover compensatory damages but also
may be able to recover punitive damages if the defendant’s conduct has been reck-
less or intentional.
Negligence And Fault

Depending on the circumstances of the case, persons who are injured by defective
products may be able to recover damages under the tort theories of negligence and
misrepresentation. Both theories require the defendant to be at fault for causing the
plaintiff ’s injuries. These theories are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
NEGLIGENCE
A person injured by a defective product may bring an action for negligence against negligence
the negligent party. To be successful, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant A tort related to defective products
breached a duty of due care to the plaintiff and thereby caused the plaintiff ’s inju- where the defendant has breached
ries. Failure to exercise due care includes failing to assemble the product carefully, a duty of due care and caused harm
negligent product design, negligent inspection or testing of the product, negligent to the plaintiff. Failure of a corporate
director or officer to exercise the
packaging, failure to warn of the dangerous propensities of the product, and such.
duty of care while conducting the
Note that in a negligence lawsuit, only a party who was actually negligent is liable
corporation’s business.
to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff and the defendant do not have to be in privity of contract.1 For
example, in the landmark case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 the court held that
an injured consumer could recover damages from the manufacturer of a product
even though the consumer was not in a contract with the manufacturer from which
1
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 395.
2
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
354 Chapter 14
he had purchased the product. The plaintiff generally bears the difficult burden of
proving that the defendant was negligent.
Example: Assume the purchaser of a motorcycle is injured in an accident. The
accident occurred because a screw was missing from the motorcycle. How does the
buyer prove who was negligent? Was it the manufacturer, which left the screw out
during the assembly of the motorcycle? Was it the retailer, who negligently failed to
discover the missing screw while preparing the motorcycle for sale? Was it the
mechanic, who failed to replace the screw after repairing the motorcycle? Negli-
gence remains a viable, yet difficult, theory on which to base a product liability
action.
In Case 14.1, the court held a defendant manufacturer liable for negligence in
a product liability lawsuit.
CASE 14.1 FAILURE TO WARN

Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995).
Facts
Antonio Benedi consumed three to four glasses of wine a night during the week
and sometimes more on the weekend. On February 5, 1993, Benedi began taking
Extra-Strength Tylenol in normal doses for flulike aches. On February 10, 1993,
Benedi was admitted to the hospital in a coma and near death due to liver and kid-
ney failure. On the night of February 12, 1993, Benedi underwent an emergency
liver transplant. Because of the transplant, Benedi would have to undergo kidney
dialysis in the future. Blood tests performed shortly after Benedi’s admission to the
hospital revealed that he suffered from acetaminophen (Tylenol) toxicity, which is
caused by the combination of Tylenol and too much alcohol. The bottle from
which Benedi took the Tylenol did not contain a warning of the dangers of the
combination of Tylenol and excessive alcohol consumption. Benedi sued McNeil-
P.P.C., Incorporated (McNeil), the manufacturer of Tylenol, for negligent failure
to warn. The jury found McNeil negligent and awarded Benedi $7,850,000 in com-
pensatory damages. McNeil appealed.
Issue
Is McNeil liable for negligent failure to warn?

At trial, Benedi called two liver disease specialists who both testified that a warning
of the possible danger to heavy drinkers from combining alcohol and acetaminophen
should have been placed on the Tylenol label since the mid-1980s. These experts
described exactly how the alcohol-acetaminophen mixture can become a toxin in the
liver. They cited numerous treatises and articles published in medical journals prior
to 1993 that described the increased risk of liver injury when acetaminophen is com-
bined with alcohol. One of plaintiff’s experts referred to sixty reports that McNeil
had received by the end of 1992 documenting cases of liver injury associated with
combining therapeutic doses of Tylenol with alcohol. Because Benedi’s experts
presented sufficient evidence on the issue of causation, the district judge properly
submitted that issue to the jury. It was the jury’s role to assess the weight and credi-
bility of the evidence, and the jury found that Benedi proved causation. We find that
ample evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could find for Benedi.
Decision
The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict awarding plaintiff Benedi
$7,850,000 against McNeil for negligent failure to warn.
Note: In the summer of 1993 (after Benedi’s injury), McNeil included a warning on
Tylenol that persons who regularly consume three or more alcoholic drinks a day
should consult a physician before using Tylenol.

1. Critical Thinking: What elements are necessary to prove negligence? Do
you think McNeil was negligent in this case? Do you think jurors are sophis-
ticated enough to evaluate and judge scientific evidence?
2. Ethics: Did McNeil act ethically in failing to put a warning on Tylenol? Do
you think a warning was warranted?
3. Critical Thinking: What will be the implication of this case to manufactur-
ers of painkilling drugs? Will consumers continue to be better off because of
this decision? Explain.
intentional misrepresentation
Intentionally defrauding another
MISREPRESENTATION person out of money, property, or
something else of value. When a
A buyer or lessee who is injured because a seller or lessor fraudulently misrepre- seller or lessor fraudulently misrep-
sented the quality of a product can sue the seller for the tort of intentional misrepresents the quality of a product and
resentation, or fraud. Recovery is limited to persons who were injured because a buyer is injured thereby. Occurs
they relied on the misrepresentation. when one person consciously
Intentional misrepresentation occurs when a seller or lessor either (1) affirm- decides to induce another person to
atively misrepresents the quality of a product or (2) conceals a defect in it. Because rely and act on a misrepresentation.
Also called fraud. Occurs when an
most reputable manufacturers, sellers, and lessors do not intentionally misrepre-
agent makes an untrue statement
sent the quality of their products, fraud is not often used as the basis for product
that he or she knows is not true.
liability actions.
misrepresentation
An assertion that is made that is not
Strict Liability in accord with the facts.
doctrine of strict liability in tort

In the landmark case Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 the California A tort doctrine that makes manufac-
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort as a basis for product turers, distributors, wholesalers,
liability actions. Most states have now adopted this doctrine as a basis for product lia- retailers, and others in the chain of
bility actions. The doctrine of strict liability removes many of the difficulties for the distribution of a defective product
plaintiff associated with other theories of product liability. This section examines liable for the damages caused by
the scope of the strict liability doctrine. the defect irrespective of fault.
3
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
356 Chapter 14
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT

Unlike negligence, strict liability does not require the injured person to prove that
strict liability the defendant breached a duty of care. Strict liability is liability without fault. A
Liability without fault. seller can be found strictly liable even though he or she has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his or her product.
The doctrine of strict liability applies to sellers and lessors of products who
are engaged in the business of selling and leasing products. Casual sales and trans-
actions by nonmerchants are not covered. Thus, a person who sells a defective
product to a neighbor in a casual sale is not strictly liable if the product causes
injury.
Strict liability applies only to products, not services. In hybrid transactions
involving both services and products, the dominant element of the transaction dic-
tates whether strict liability applies.
Example: In a medical operation that requires a blood transfusion, the operation
would be the dominant element, and strict liability would not apply. Strict liability
may not be disclaimed.
ALL IN THE CHAIN OF DISTRIBUTION ARE LIABLE

chain of distribution All parties in the chain of distribution of a defective product are strictly liable for
All manufacturers, distributors, the injuries caused by that product. Thus all manufacturers, distributors, wholesal-
wholesalers, retailers, lessors, and ers, retailers, lessors, and subcomponent manufacturers may be sued under the
subcomponent manufacturers doctrine of strict liability in tort. This view is based on public policy. Lawmakers
involved in a transaction. presume that sellers and lessors will insure against the risk of a strict liability law-
suit and spread the cost to their consumers by raising the price of products.
Example: Suppose a subcomponent manufacturer produces a defective tire and
sells it to a truck manufacturer. The truck manufacturer places the defective tire on
one of its new-model trucks. The truck is distributed by a distributor to a retail
dealer. Ultimately, the retail dealer sells the truck to a buyer. The defective tire
causes an accident in which the buyer is injured. All the parties in the tire’s chain of
distribution can be sued by the injured party; in this case, the liable parties are the
subcomponent manufacturer, the truck manufacturer, the distributor, and the
retailer.
A defendant who has not been negligent but who is made to pay a strict liabil-
ity judgment can bring a separate action against the negligent party in the chain of
distribution to recover its losses. In the preceding example, for instance, the retailer
could sue the manufacturer to recover the strict liability judgment assessed against it.
Exhibit 14.1 compares the doctrines of negligence and strict liability.
PARTIES WHO CAN RECOVER FOR STRICT LIABILITY

Because strict liability is a tort doctrine, privity of contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant is not required. In other words, the doctrine applies even if the
injured party had no contractual relations with the defendant. Under strict liability,
sellers and lessors are liable to the ultimate user or consumer. Users include the
purchaser or lessee, family members, guests, employees, customers, and persons
who passively enjoy the benefits of the product (e.g., passengers in automobiles).
Most jurisdictions have judicially or statutorily extended the protection of
strict liability to bystanders. The courts have stated that bystanders should be
EXHIBIT 14.1 Negligence and Strict Liability Compared
Negligence Strict Liability

Lawsuit Lawsuit
Defendant Defendant
Manufacturer
(Negligent)
Defective
product
Defendant
Distributor
Negligent party All in the chain

is liable of distribution
are liable
Defendant
Retailer
Negligence Strict liability

Consumer
lawsuit lawsuit
Defective product
causes injury
entitled to even greater protection than a consumer or user. This is because con-
sumers and users have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their
purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputa-
ble retailers, whereas bystanders do not have the same opportunity.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS DEFINITION OF

STRICT LIABILITY
The most widely recognized articulation of the doctrine of strict liability in tort is
found in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
a. the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b. it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
358 Chapter 14
2. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

a. the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
b. the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
In 1997, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Product Liability. This new Restatement includes the following definition of
defect:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings.
A product:
a. contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product;
b. is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omis-
sion of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe;
c. is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instruc-
tions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR STRICT LIABILITY

The damages recoverable in a strict liability action vary by jurisdiction. Damages
for personal injuries are recoverable in all jurisdictions that have adopted the doc-
trine of strict liability, although some jurisdictions limit the dollar amount of the
award. Property damage is recoverable in most jurisdictions, but economic loss
punitive damages (e.g., lost income) is recoverable in only a few jurisdictions. Punitive damages,
Damages that are awarded to monetary damages awarded to punish the defendant, are generally allowed if the
punish the defendant, to deter the plaintiff can prove the defendant either intentionally injured him or her or acted
defendant from similar conduct in with reckless disregard for his or her safety.
the future, and to set an example for
others.
Defective Product
To recover for strict liability, the injured party must first show that the product that
caused the injury was somehow defective. (Remember that the injured party does
not have to prove who caused the product to become defective.) Plaintiffs can
product defects allege multiple product defects in one lawsuit. A product can be found to be defec-
In a strict liability lawsuit, the injured tive in many ways. The most common types of defects are defects in manufacture,
party must show that the product design, and packaging and failure to warn. These defects are discussed in the
that caused the injury was defective. following paragraphs.
DEFECT IN MANUFACTURE
A defect in manufacture occurs when the manufacturer fails to (1) properly assem- defect in manufacture
ble a product, (2) properly test a product, or (3) adequately check the quality of a A defect that occurs when the
product. manufacturer fails to (1) properly
assemble a product, (2) properly
Example: American Ladder Company designs, manufactures, and sells ladders. test a product, or (3) adequately
American Ladder Company manufactures a ladder, but a worker at the company check the quality of the product.
fails to put one of the screws in the ladder that would support one of the steps of
the ladder. The ladder is sold to Weingard Distributor, a wholesaler, which sells it
to Reynolds Hardware Store, which sells the ladder to Heather, a consumer. When
Heather is on the ladder, painting her house, the step of the ladder breaks because
of the missing screw, and Heather falls and is injured. The missing screw is an
example of a defect in manufacture. Under the doctrine of strict liability, American
Ladder Company, Weingard Distributor, and Reynolds Hardware Store are liable
to Heather.
The Case 14.2 is a classic example involving a defect in manufacture.
CASE 14.2 DEFECT IN MANUFACTURE

Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966).
“In the case at hand, Shoshone contends that insufficient proof
was offered to establish that the mouse was in the bottle of ‘Squirt’
when it left Shoshone’s possession.”
Judge Thompson,
Supreme Court of Nevada
Facts
Leo Dolinski purchased a bottle of Squirt, a soft drink, from a vending machine at
a Sea and Ski plant, his place of employment. Dolinski opened the bottle and con-
sumed part of its contents. He immediately became ill. Upon examination, it was
found that the bottle contained the decomposed body of a mouse, mouse hair,
and mouse feces. Dolinski visited a doctor and was given medicine to counteract
nausea. Dolinski suffered physical and mental distress from consuming the
decomposed mouse and thereafter possessed an aversion to soft drinks. The
Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Shoshone) had manufactured and dis-
tributed the Squirt bottle. Dolinski sued Shoshone, basing his lawsuit on the doc-
trine of strict liability. The state of Nevada had not previously recognized the
doctrine of strict liability. However, the trial court adopted the doctrine of strict
liability, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Shoshone
appealed.
Issue
Should the state of Nevada judicially adopt the doctrine of strict liability? If so, was
there a defect in the manufacture of the Squirt bottle that caused the plaintiff’s
injuries?
360 Chapter 14

In our view, public policy demands that one who places upon the market a bottled
beverage in a condition dangerous for use must be held strictly liable to the ultimate
user for injuries resulting from such use, although the seller has exercised all reason-
able care.
Our acceptance of strict tort liability against the manufacturer and distributor
of a bottled beverage does not mean that the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of prov-
ing a case. He must still establish that his injury was caused by a defect in the product
and that such defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant.
In the case at hand, Shoshone contends that insufficient proof was offered to
establish that the mouse was in the bottle of “Squirt” when it left Shoshone’s posses-
sion. The plaintiff offered the expert testimony of a toxicologist who examined the
bottle and contents on the day the plaintiff drank from it. It was his opinion that the
mouse “had been dead for a long time” and that the dark stains (mouse feces) that he
found on the bottom of the bottle must have been there before the liquid was added.
The jury apparently preferred the latter evidence that traced cause to the defendant.
Decision
The Supreme Court of Nevada adopted the doctrine of strict liability and held that
the evidence supported the trial court’s finding of a defect in manufacture. The
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of plaintiff Dolinski.

1. Critical Thinking: Should the courts adopt the theory of strict liability?
Why or why not?
2. Ethics: Was it ethical for Shoshone to argue that it was not liable to Dolinski?
3. Ethics: Should all parties in the chain of distribution of a defective product—
even parties that are not responsible for the defect—be held liable under the
doctrine of strict liability? Or, should liability be based only on fault?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of PepsiCo at www.pepsico.com. Can you find any informa-
tion on the manufacture of Squirt soda?
2. Visit the website of the Supreme Court of Nevada at www.nvsupremecourt.
us.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about strict liability as it applies to
product defects.
DEFECT IN DESIGN
defect in design A defect in design can support a strict liability action.
A defect that occurs when a product
is improperly designed.
Example: Design defects include toys that are designed with removable parts that
could be swallowed by children, machines and appliances designed without proper
safeguards, and trucks and other vehicles designed without warning devices to let
people know the vehicle is backing up.
In evaluating the adequacy of a product’s design, the courts apply a risk-

utility analysis and consider the gravity of the danger posed by the design, the like-
lihood that injury will occur, the availability and cost of producing a safer alternative
design, the social utility of the product, and other factors.
In Cases 14.3 and 14.4, the courts had to decide whether there was a design
defect.
CASE 14.3 DEFECT IN DESIGN

Lakin v. Senco Prod., Inc., 925 P.2d 107 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
“Thus, it was foreseeable—indeed, highly likely given the SN325’s
recoil and ‘bump fire’ potential—that serious injury could occur to
someone when the nail gun double fired.”
Judge Haselton,
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Facts
Senco Products, Inc. (Senco), manufactures and markets a variety of pneumatic
nail guns, including the SN325 nail gun, which discharges 3.25-inch nails. The
SN325 uses special nails designed and sold by Senco. The SN325 discharges a nail
only if two trigger mechanisms are activated; that is, the user must both squeeze
the nail gun’s finger trigger and press the nail gun’s muzzle against a surface, acti-
vating the bottom trigger, or safety. The SN325 can fire up to nine nails per second
if the trigger is continuously depressed and the gun is bounced along the work
surface, constantly reactivating the muzzle safety/trigger.
John Lakin was using a Senco SN325 nail gun to help build a new home.
When attempting to nail two-by-fours under the eaves of the garage, Lakin stood
on tiptoe and raised a two-by-four over his head. As he held the board in position
with his left hand and the nail gun in his right hand, he pressed the nose of the
SN325 up against the board, depressed the safety, and pulled the finger trigger to
fire the nail into the board. The gun fired the first nail and then, in a phenomenon
known as “double firing,” immediately discharged an unintended second nail that
struck the first nail. The gun recoiled violently backward toward Lakin and, with
Lakin’s finger still on the trigger, came into contact with his cheek. That contact
activated the safety/trigger, causing the nail gun to fire a third nail. This third nail
went through Lakin’s cheekbone and into his brain.
The nail penetrated the frontal lobe of the right hemisphere of Lakin’s brain,
blocked a major artery, and caused extensive tissue damage. Lakin was uncon-
scious for several days and ultimately underwent multiple surgeries. He suffers
permanent brain damage and is unable to perceive information from the left hem-
isphere of the brain. He also suffers partial paralysis of the left side of his body.
Lakin has undergone a radical personality change and is prone to violent out-
bursts. He is unable to obtain employment. Lakin’s previously warm and loving
relationship with his wife and four children has been permanently altered. He can
no longer live with his family and instead resides in a supervised group home for
brain-injured persons. Lakin and his wife sued Senco for strict liability based on
design defect. The trial court found Senco liable and awarded $5,323,413 to Lakin,
$876,000 to his wife, and $4 million in punitive damages against Senco. Senco
appealed.
362 Chapter 14
Issue
Is Senco liable to Lakin for strict liability based on a design defect in the SN325
that allowed it to double-fire?

The evidence disclosed that the SN325 double-fired once in every 15 firings. Defend-
ant rushed the SN325’s production in order to maintain its position in the market,
modifying an existing nail gun model so that it could shoot longer nails, without
engaging in additional testing to determine whether the use of longer nails in that
model would increase the prevalence of double fire. A reasonable juror could plausi-
bly infer that conscious profit/market share motives underlay the failure to engage in
adequate product research, development, and testing.
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the amount of damages
awarded was within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award.
Before John Lakin’s injury, defendant knew from numerous complaints that it was
highly probable that the SN325 would “double fire.” Thus, it was foreseeable—
indeed, highly likely given the SN325’s recoil and “bump fire” potential—that serious
injury could occur to someone when the nail gun double fired.
Decision
The court of appeals applied a risk-utility analysis and held that the SN325 was
defectively designed. The court affirmed the award of damages to Lakin and his wife.
Legal & Ethics Questions

1. Critical Thinking: Do you think the utility served by the nine-nail-per-
second SN325 outweighed its risk of personal injury?
2. Ethics: Did Senco act in conscious disregard of safety factors when it
designed, manufactured, and sold the SN325 nail gun?
3. Ethics: Do you think the award of punitive damages was warranted in this case?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Senco Products, Inc., at www.senco.com. Can you find
descriptions of the nail guns it now sells?
2. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Oregon at www.ojd.state.or.us/
courts.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about the dangers of using nail guns.
CASE 14.4 DESIGN DEFECT

Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 99 P.3d 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
“Now, the ride down a snow-covered hill backward at 30 miles per hour may be a
thrill. But it has very little social value when compared to the risk of severe injury.”
Judge Sweeney,
Court of Appeals of Washington
Facts
The Intex Recreation Corporation designed and sold the Extreme Sno-Tube II.
This snow tube is ridden by a user down snow-covered hills and can reach a speed
of 30 miles per hour. The snow tube has no steering device, and therefore a rider
may end up spinning and going down a hill backward.
Dan Falkner bought an Extreme Sno-Tube II and used it sledding the same
day. During Falkner’s second run, the tube rotated him backward about a quarter
to a third of the way down the hill. A group of parents, including Tom Higgins,
stood near the bottom of the hill. Higgins saw 7-year-old Kyle Potter walking in
the path of Falkner’s speeding Sno-Tube. Higgins ran and grabbed Potter to save
him from harm, but while doing so the Sno-Tube hit Higgins and threw him into
the air. Higgins landed on his forehead, which snapped his head back. The impact
severed Higgins’s spinal cord and left him quadriplegic.
Higgins sued Intex for damages based on strict liability. Evidence was intro-
duced at trial that showed the Sno-Tube could rotate while going down hill and it
had no guiding mechanism and no steering device. Evidence also showed that
Intex made a Sno-Boggan that went just as fast but did not rotate because of ridges
on the bottom of the device. The jury found a design defect in the Sno-Tube and
held Intex liable for 35 percent of Higgins’s damages.
Issue
Was the Extreme Sno-Tube II defectively designed, thus supporting the judgment
against Intex?

There are two tests for determining whether a product is defective. The risk-utility
test requires a showing that the likelihood and seriousness of harm outweigh the
burden on the manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented that
harm and would not have impaired the product’s usefulness. The consumer-
expectation test requires a showing that the product is more dangerous than the
ordinary consumer would expect. This test focuses on the reasonable expectation of
the consumer.
A plaintiff can satisfy its burden of proving an alternative design by showing
that another product more safely serves the same function as the challenged product.
There is evidence in this record from which a jury could conclude that the place-
ment of ribs or ridges on the bottom of the Sno-Tube, like those used on Intex’s
Sno-Boggan, would keep the rider from facing downhill. The rider could then see
obstacles and direct the tube. All this could be done without sacrificing speed. This is
enough to prove an alternative safer design. Now, the ride down a snow-covered hill
backward at 30 miles per hour may be a thrill. But it has very little social value when
compared to the risk of severe injury. We do not think the Sno-Tube is a product that
is necessary regardless of the risks involved to the user. We find ample evidence to
support this verdict, applying the risk-utility test.
We next take up Intex’s assertion that the tube was not unsafe to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer. Again, we find
ample evidence in this record to support the Higgins’s assertion to the contrary. And
a reasonable jury could easily infer that the average consumer may expect the Sno-
Tube to rotate. But he or she might not expect that it would continue in a backward
364 Chapter 14
position. Here, the Sno-Tube is inexpensive. But so is Intex’s Sno-Boggan. And the
Sno-Boggan provides a fast ride but not a blind high-speed ride. A jury could then
find that a reasonable consumer would expect that a snow sliding product would not
put him or her in a backward, high-speed slide. We find ample evidence in favor of
the plaintiffs applying the consumer-expectation test.
Decision
The court of appeals held that the Sno-Tube was defectively designed and affirmed
the judgment in favor of Higgins against Intex.

1. Law: What is a design defect? Explain.
2. Law: What does the risk-utility test require? What does the consumer-
expectation test require?
3. Ethics: Should Intex have placed a ridge on the bottom of the Sno-Tube or
equipped it with a steering device to make it safer?
4. Critical Thinking: Would you have found for or against Intex in this case?
Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Intex Recreation Corporation at www.intexcorp.com.
Does the company still sell any type of snow-tube devices?
2. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Washington at www.courts.
wa.gov.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about the dangers of snow tubing.
CRASHWORTHINESS DOCTRINE
When an automobile is involved in an accident, the driver or passengers often are
not injured by the blow itself. Instead, they are injured when their bodies strike
something inside their own automobile (e.g., the dashboard or the steering wheel).
This is commonly referred to as the “second collision.” The courts have held that
automobile manufacturers are under a duty to design automobiles to take into
crashworthiness doctrine account the possibility of this second collision. This is called the crashworthiness
A doctrine that says automobile doctrine. Failure to design an automobile to protect occupants from foreseeable
manufacturers are under a duty to dangers caused by a second collision subjects the manufacturer and dealer to strict
design automobiles so they take liability.
into account the possibility of harm
from a person’s body striking
something inside the automobile
FAILURE TO WARN
in the case of a car accident. Certain products are inherently dangerous and cannot be made any safer and still
accomplish the task for which they are designed. For example, certain useful drugs
cause side effects, allergies, and other injuries to some users. Many machines and
appliances include dangerous moving parts that, if removed, would defeat the pur-
pose of the machine or appliance. Manufacturers and sellers of such products are
under a duty to warn users about such a product’s dangerous propensities. A proper
and conspicuous warning placed on the product insulates the manufacturer and failure to warn
others in the chain of distribution from strict liability. Failure to warn of these A defect that occurs when a
dangerous propensities is a defect that will support a strict liability action. manufacturer does not place a
warning on the packaging of
Example: The Universal Drug Corporation develops a new drug that has tremen- products that could cause injury
dous success in preventing and treating a certain type of cancer. The drug, how- if the danger is unknown.
ever, has a 3 percent probability of causing an increased risk of heart disease in
patients who take the drug. The drug cannot be made any safer and still have its
cancer treatment effects. The Universal Drug Corporation owes a duty to warn
potential users of its drug of these heart-related risks. If it fails to do so and a user
suffers a heart attack because of use of the drug, the Universal Drug Corporation
would be held strictly liable for failure to warn.
In Cases 14.4, 14.5, and 14.6, the court had to decide whether there was a
failure to warn.
CASE 14.5 DESIGN DEFECT

Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265 (Ct. App. 2006).
“This is a chance for you to say, ‘Hey Ford, if you know about a problem
that is taking place, than do something about it.’”
Plaintiff’s Lawyer,
Facts
Five-year-old Johan Karlsson was riding in a Ford Windstar minivan with his
mother, uncle, and four siblings. The Windstar minivan was designed and manufac-
tured by Ford Motor Company. The Windstar had three rows of seating and pro-
vided combination lap belt and shoulder harnesses for all of the seats but one, the
center seat of the rear third row bench, where Johan was seated. Instead of the so-
called three-point harness worn by the others, Johan was provided only a lap belt.
The Karlssons were driving on Interstate 5 when the driver of the tractor-
trailer in front of them dozed off and rear-ended a truck in front of him. A 15-ton
steel coil fell off the tractor-trailer and struck the Karlssons’ minivan. The six
Karlssons who were wearing the shoulder harnesses were injured but made full
recoveries. Johan suffered severe spinal injuries and was left a paraplegic.
The tractor-trailer was owned by TransContinental Transport (TCT). Johan
sued TCT and Ford Motor Company. Johan settled with TCT for $10 million.
Johan sued Ford to recover damages for strict liability, alleging design defect and
failure to warn. The jury awarded Johan over $30 million in economic damages,
pain and suffering, and punitive damages. Ford appealed.
Issue
Was there a design defect in the Windstar minivan, and did Ford fail to warn of
the defect?

Johan’s injuries were consistent with something physicians call seat belt syndrome,
when a passenger restrained by only a lap belt jackknives over at the waist due to the
366 Chapter 14
force of the collision. Had Johan been wearing a three-point restraint, his injuries
would have been no more severe than the other occupants of the Windstar. Johan’s
mother testified that she adjusted Johan’s lap belt for him before starting the trip,
making sure it fit snugly and rested on his hips.
The jury in this case was instructed on the theories of: (1) design defect under
the risk-benefit approach; and (2) failure to warn. Under the design defect theory,
Johan argued to the jury that Ford could have and should have installed a seat belt
in the rear bench center seat that included some type of shoulder harness. Under the
failure to warn theory, Johan argued to the jury that Ford did not adequately warn
of the need to wear the lap belt properly, or of the magnitude of the harm that might
follow as a result. Ford’s primary defense was that the collision was a severe one and
that Johan’s seat belt was not properly adjusted.
The one comment to which Ford raised an objection came at the very end of
Johan’s rebuttal argument. After Johan’s lawyer said, “This is your chance that
maybe companies won’t try to destroy . . .,” Ford counsel cut him off with an objec-
tion. That objection was overruled, and Johan’s lawyer then said, “This is a chance
for you to say, ‘Hey Ford, if you know about a problem that is taking place, than do
something about it.” Johan’s lawyer concluded his argument soon after.
Decision
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff Johan
Karlsson against Ford Motor Company.

1. Law: What is a design defect? Explain.
2. Law: What constitutes failure to warn? Explain.
3. Ethics: Did Ford Motor Company act ethically in this lawsuit?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Ford Motor Company at www.ford.com. To learn about
Ford vehicles, including minivans, go to www.fordvehicles.com
2. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses strict liability.

Crosswhite v. Jumpking, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D. Or. 2006).
“Plaintiff must present evidence that the trampoline was defectively designed.
The burden of proof that the product was defective at the time it left the hands
of the particular seller is upon the inured plaintiff.”
Judge Aiken,
United States District Court for the District of Oregon
Facts
One day, Gary Crosswhite was jumping on a trampoline with another boy. The
trampoline was owned by Jack and Misty Urbach. The 14-foot, round “backyard”
trampoline was manufactured by Jumpking, Inc. While on the trampoline, Cross-

white attempted a backflip and accidentally landed on his head and neck. The
force of the fall caused a fracture in Crosswhite’s spine, resulting in paraplegia.
Crosswhite was 16 years old at the time of the injury.
Crosswhite filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court against Jumpking to recover
damages for strict liability based on design defect and failure to warn of the danger of
using the trampoline. Defendant Jumpking filed a motion for summary judgment.
Issue
Is defendant Jumpking liable for strict liability to Crosswhite based on either defect
in design or failure to warn?

Plaintiff must present evidence that the trampoline was defectively designed. The
burden of proof that the product was defective at the time it left the hands of the
particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced
which will support the conclusion that it was then defective the burden will not be
sustained. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to meet this burden. There can
be no dispute that an ordinary consumer buys and uses a trampoline to jump on it,
and a design that allows for such activity is exactly that which is contemplated by an
ordinary consumer or user of a trampoline. Plaintiff’s complaint against the defend-
ant seems to be that all trampolines are defectively designed and should be banned
from the marketplace. Given Oregon’s objective standard and the facts that plaintiff
was a 16-year-old, with a 3.6 grade point average in high school, with over six years
experience with trampolines, I find that plaintiff was capable of appreciating the
risks associated with jumping and performing flips on a trampoline.
Defendant’s trampoline is manufactured with nine warning labels that are
affixed to various trampoline components. In addition to these nine warning labels,
defendant also provides a large laminated warning placard that is designed to be
attached by the consumer to the metal frame near the ladder upon which jumpers
mount the trampoline. Defendant further provides consumers with a detailed User
Manual and a videotape that instructs both users and supervisors about safe and
responsible trampoline use. However, defendant did affix those warnings to the tram-
poline as well as on a large warning placard attached to the trampoline at the point of
entry or mounting. Specifically, warnings attached to the trampoline frame leg stated:
WARNING!
DO NOT LAND ON HEAD OR NECK. PARALYSIS OR DEATH
CAN RESULT, EVEN IF YOU LAND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
TRAMPOLINE MAT (BED). TO REDUCE THE CHANCE OF
LANDING ON YOUR HEAD OR NECK, DO NOT DO FLIPS.
WARNING!
ONLY ONE PERSON AT A TIME ON THE TRAMPOLINE.
MULTIPLE JUMPERS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF LOSS OF
CONTROL, COLLISION, AND FALLING OFF. THIS CAN
RESULT IN BROKEN HEAD, NECK, BACK OR LEG.
I find that defendant’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law.
368 Chapter 14
Decision
The U.S. District Court held there was no design defect or failure to warn by
defendant Jumpking. The district court granted summary judgment to Jumpking
and dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit.

1. Critical Thinking: Do you think there was a design defect in the design of
the trampoline? Why or why not?
2. Critical Thinking: Do you think there was a failure to warn about the dan-
gers of using the trampoline? Why or why not?
3. Ethics: With the inherent dangers of using a trampoline, should all trampo-
lines be barred from the marketplace? Why or why not?
Web Exercises
1. Go to the website of Jumpking, Inc., at www.jumpking.com to view what a
trampoline looks like.
2. Visit the website of the U.S. District Court for Oregon at www.ord.uscourts.
gov.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about someone else being injured
using a trampoline.

Glenn v. Overhead Door Corp., 935 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
“Jolie could have easily avoided exposing Brittany to dangerous levels
of carbon monoxide by not leaving her in a car unattended for an extended
period of time with the engine running and the garage door down.”
Judge Chandler,
Court of Appeals of Mississippi
Facts
Jolie Glenn placed her 3-year old daughter, Brittany, in a car with the engine run-
ning while it was parked in her garage with the garage door closed. Glenn went
back into the house, sat down, and fell asleep. When she awoke, she realized
Brittany was not with her. Jolie went into the garage and saw that the garage door
was closed. Brittany was in the car and had died as a result of carbon monoxide
poisoning. Overhead Door Corporation had manufactured the garage door and
the garage door opener used by Jolie to open and close the garage door.
Malcolm Glenn, Jolie’s ex-husband and Brittany’s father, sued Overhead
Door for strict liability, alleging design defect and failure to warn. Glenn argued
that Overhead Door should have designed its garage door opener with a sensor
that would determine when carbon monoxide had gotten too high in a garage and
then alert the car owner. Glenn also alleged that Overhead Door had failed to warn
a user of its overhead garage door opener that if the car was left running and the
garage door was closed, carbon monoxide could build up to dangerous levels in
the garage. The trial court granted summary judgment to Overhead Door.
Issue
Was Overhead Door liable for strict liability for either design defect or failure to
warn?

Jolie could have easily avoided exposing Brittany to dangerous levels of carbon mon-
oxide by not leaving her in a car unattended for an extended period of time with the
engine running and the garage door down. Proving that a manufacturer did not
warn of some potential danger does not, by itself, create an issue of fact. In order to
create a triable issue regarding failure to warn, the plaintiff must show that the user
was ignorant of the danger warned against. Manufacturers and distributors have no
duty to warn of dangers that are open and obvious or if the hazard associated with
the product is common knowledge to the ordinary observer or consumer.
Malcolm argues that there is a genuine issue as to whether Overhead Door
should have warned of the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning because Jolie Glenn
testified that it never crossed her mind that her daughter could die from carbon mon-
oxide poisoning. However, she did testify that she knew a person should never leave a
child unattended in a car with the engine running. She also testified that she knew
and appreciated the danger of carbon monoxide poisoning and that she knew the
garage door would not open automatically. She needed no other warning.
Decision
The court of appeals held that Overhead Door was not strictly liable for design
defect or failure to warn. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Overhead Door.

1. Critical Thinking: Do you think there was a design defect in this case?
Explain.
2. Critical Thinking: Do you think there was a failure to warn in this case?
Explain.
3. Ethics: Was it ethical for the plaintiff in this case to sue Overhead Door
based on the facts of this case?
4. Ethics: Did Overhead Door owe a duty to design its garage door opener with
a sensor to alert of high levels of carbon monoxide? Why or why not?
5. Ethics: Did Overhead Door owe a duty to warn the owners of its garage
doors and garage door openers of the danger of carbon monoxide poisoning?
Why or why not?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Mississippi at www.mssc.state.
ms.us.
370 Chapter 14
2. Visit the website of Overhead Door Corporation at www.overheaddoor.com.

Does the company sell any garage door openers with sensors on them to
detect levels of carbon monoxide poisoning?
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about the safety of garage doors and
garage door openers.
DEFECT IN PACKAGING
Manufacturers owe a duty to design and provide safe packages for their products.
This duty requires manufacturers to provide packages and containers that are
tamperproof or clearly indicate if they have been tampered with. Certain manufac-
turers, such as drug manufacturers, owe a duty to place their products in contain-
ers that cannot be opened by children. A manufacturer’s failure to meet this duty—a
defect in packaging defect in packaging—subjects the manufacturer and others in the chain of distri-
A defect that occurs when a product bution of the product to strict liability.
has been placed in packaging that In Case 14.8, the court had to decide whether there was defective packaging.
is insufficiently tamperproof.
CASE 14.8 DEFECT IN PACKAGING

Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
“We return, however, to the fundamental premise: no packaging
can boast of being tamperproof.”
Judge Goettel,
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Facts
Harriet Notarnicola purchased a box of Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules from a
Bronxville, New York, grocery store owned by the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
(A&P). The Tylenol was manufactured by McNeil Consumer Products Co., a divi-
sion of McNeilab, Inc. (McNeil), under the name Johnson & Johnson. Diane
Elsroth was visiting her boyfriend, Michael Notarnicola, for a week at the home of
Michael’s parents. Late one night, Diane complained of a headache. Michael went
to the kitchen, opened the box and plastic container of Extra-Strength Tylenol
purchased by his mother at the A&P store, and returned with two capsules and a
glass of water for Diane. A short time after ingesting the capsules, Diane retired.
Her dead body was found the next day. The medical examiner concluded that the
Tylenol capsules ingested by Diane had been contaminated by a lethal dose of
potassium cyanide. The murder remains unsolved, but evidence shows that the
Tylenol bottle had been tampered with after the product left the manufacturer’s
control. An unknown third party purchased the Tylenol, breached the packaging,
substituted cyanide for some of the medicine contained in several of the gelatin
capsules, somehow resealed the container and box in such a way that the tamper-
ing was not readily detectable, and placed the contaminated box on the shelf of the
A&P store. John Elsroth, administrator of Diane’s estate, brought this strict liabil-
ity action against McNeil and A&P, seeking $1 million in compensatory damages
and $92 million in punitive damages.
Issue
Was there a defect in packaging that would support an action for strict liability?

Following issuance of the rule, the makers of Tylenol have marketed the product in
tamper-resistant packaging with the following features: (1) a foil seal glued to the
mouth of the container or bottle, (2) a “shrink seal” around the neck and cap of the
container, and (3) a sealed box (the end flaps of which are glued shut) in which the
product and container are placed. As one McNeil official put it, tampering by “the
Rembrandt kind of criminals” could not be prevented by this type of packaging.
McNeil was also operating under the constraint, as recognized by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), that no packaging could prevent this kind of “exotic”
tampering—tamperproof packaging is not possible.
The packaging alternative designed by McNeil employed not one, not two, but
three of the tamper-resistant features. When all of these factors are thrown into the
mix, we find, as a matter of law, that under a utility/risk analysis this packaging was
in a condition reasonably contemplated by the ultimate consumer and was not
unreasonably dangerous for its intended use. If there are better tamper-resistant fea-
tures available that would be feasible for use here, plaintiff has not described them.
We return, however, to the fundamental premise: no packaging can boast of being
tamperproof.
Decision
The court held there was not a defect in packaging. The defendants are not there-
fore strictly liable for Elsroth’s death.

1. Critical Thinking: Should manufacturers be forced to make tamperproof
packaging for their products? Is this possible? What would be the expense?
2. Ethics: Did any of the parties in the case act unethically? Explain.
3. Ethics: Do you think the plaintiff ’s seeking $92 million in punitive damages
was warranted?
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Johnson & Johnson at www.jnj.com.
2. Visit the website of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York at www.nysd.uscourts.gov.
3. Use www.google.com to find an article about the liability of manufacturers
for failing to provide safe packaging.
FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS

Sellers are responsible to provide adequate instructions for the safe assembly and
use of the products they sell.
372 Chapter 14
failure to provide adequate Failure to provide adequate instructions for the safe assembly and use of a
instructions product is a defect that subjects the manufacturer and others in the chain of distri-
A defect that occurs when a manu- bution to strict liability.
facturer does not provide detailed Other defects include inadequate testing of products, inadequate selection of
directions for safe assembly and
component parts or materials, and improper certification of the safety of a prod-
use of a product.
uct. The concept of “defect” is an expanding area of the law.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In product liability cases, a court can award punitive damages if it finds the defend-
ant’s conduct was committed with intent or reckless disregard for human life. Puni-
tive damages are meant to punish the defendants and to send a message to the
defendant (and other companies) that such behavior will not be tolerated. How-
ever, with large punitive damage awards making the headlines, companies began
asking themselves when are punitive damages too much. The U.S. Supreme Court
has addressed this issue.
In Case 14.9, the Supreme Court was asked to overturn a large award of puni-
tive damages.
CASE 14.9 PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
“In our view, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use
a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts
upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it
inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.”
Justice Breyer,
Supreme Court of the United States
Facts
Jesse Williams was a heavy cigarette smoker. He favored Marlboro brand ciga-
rettes, which are produced by Philip Morris USA. Williams died because of his
cigarette smoking. William’s personal representative sued Philip Morris, alleging
the company had engaged in deceit and had knowingly led Williams to believe
cigarette smoking was safe.
At trial, the jury held that Philip Morris had engaged in deceit. The jury
awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive dam-
ages. In reaching its decision on punitive damages, the jury was permitted to con-
sider harm caused to others who were not parties to the lawsuit. The trial court
judge held that the $79.5 million in punitive damages was excessive and reduced it
to $32 million. Both sides appealed.
The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Philip Morris’s arguments and
restored the $79.5 million jury award. The Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue
Did the Oregon court unconstitutionally punish the defendant Philip Morris USA
by allowing the jury to consider harm to nonparty victims when awarding punitive
damages to the plaintiff?
Language of the U.S. Supreme Court

In our view, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or
those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are,
essentially, strangers to the litigation. For one thing, the Due Process Clause prohib-
its a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual with
an opportunity to present every available defense. A defendant threatened with pun-
ishment for injuring a nonparty victim has no opportunity to defend against the
charge, by showing, for example in a case such as this, that the other victim was not
entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was dangerous or did not
rely upon the defendant’s statements to the contrary.
To permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near stand-
ardless dimension to the punitive damages equation. How many such victims are
there? How seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur?
The trial will not likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will
be left to speculate. And the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive
damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of notice—will be
magnified. We can find no authority supporting the use of punitive damages awards
for the purpose of punishing a defendant for harming others.
Respondent argues that she is free to show harm to other victims because it is
relevant to a different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, namely,
reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.
Philip Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in
order to demonstrate reprehensibility. Nor do we. Evidence of actual harm to non-
parties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a
substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible.
A jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Oregon court had applied the wrong stand-
ard in permitting the jury to award $79.5 million of punitive damages against
Philip Morris. The Supreme Court remanded the case so the Oregon court could
apply the correct standard stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in determining an
award of punitive damages against Philip Morris.

1. Law: What does the constitutional doctrine of due process provide? Explain.
2. Ethics: Does Philip Morris act ethically in selling cigarettes that knowingly
cause cancer and other diseases and early death to many smokers?
3. Ethics: What are the purposes of allowing the award of punitive damages?
Do you think punitive damages have a deterrent effect?
4. Ethics: In your opinion, do you think the award of $79.5 million of punitive
damages was warranted in this case? How much, if any, would you have
awarded?
5. Critical Thinking: Does Philip Morris USA act responsibly enough by try-
ing to dissuade people from smoking? Should it have this burden at all?
Explain.
374 Chapter 14
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of Philip Morris USA at www.philipmorrisusa.com. Does
the company still sell the Marlboro brand of cigarette?
2. Visit the website of the U.S. Supreme Court at www.supremecourtus.gov.
Can you find any documents related to this case?
3. Use www.google.com to find an article that discusses the dangers of smoking.
4. Use www.google.com to find an advertisement for the Marlboro brand
cigarette.
Defenses to Product Liability

Defendants in strict liability or negligence actions may raise several defenses to the
imposition of liability. These defenses are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
GENERALLY KNOWN DANGERS

Certain products are inherently dangerous and known to the general population to
generally known dangers be so. Sellers are not strictly liable for failing to warn of generally known dangers.
A defense that acknowledges that
certain products are inherently
Example: It is a known fact that guns shoot bullets. Manufacturers of guns do not
dangerous and are known to the have to place a warning on the barrel of a gun warning of this generally known
general population to be so. danger.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE

Many defense and other contractors manufacture products (e.g., rockets, airplanes)
government contractor defense to government specification. Most jurisdictions recognize a government contrac-
A defense that says a contractor tor defense to product liability actions. To establish this defense, a government
who was provided specifications by contractor must prove that (1) the precise specifications for the product were pro-
the government is not liable for any vided by the government, (2) the product conformed to those specifications, and
defect in the product that occurs as (3) the contractor warned the government of any known defects or dangers of the
a result of those specifications.
product.
Example: Assume that an airplane manufacturer becomes a government contrac-
tor when it is hired to manufacture a fighter airplane to specifications provided by
the U.S. Air Force. If the airplane proves defective because of its design, crashes,
and causes injury, the manufacturer can escape liability by asserting the govern-
ment contractor defense if the manufacturer either did not know of the defect or
knew of the defect and warned the government of the defect.
assumption of the risk
A defense a defendant can use
against a plaintiff who knowingly
and voluntarily enters into or partici- ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
pates in a risky activity that results
in injury. A defense in which the Theoretically, the traditional doctrine of assumption of the risk is a defense to a
defendant must prove that (1) the product liability action. For this defense to apply, the defendant must prove that
plaintiff knew and appreciated the (1) the plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk and (2) the plaintiff voluntarily
risk and (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. In practice, the defense assumption of the risk is narrowly
assumed the risk. applied by the courts.
MISUSE OF THE PRODUCT

Sometimes users are injured when they misuse a product. If a user brings a product misuse of the product
liability action, the defendant-seller may be able to assert misuse of the product as A defense that relieves a seller of
a defense. Whether the defense is effective depends on whether the misuse was product liability if the user abnor-
foreseeable. The seller is relieved of product liability if the plaintiff has engaged in mally misused the product. Products
must be designed to protect against
abnormal misused of the product—that is, if there has been an unforeseeable mis-
foreseeable misuse.
use of the product. However, the seller is liable if there has been a foreseeable misuse
of the product. This reasoning is intended to provide an incentive for manufactur- abnormal misuse
ers to design and manufacture safer products. Considerably irregular or an atypical
level of usage.
CORRECTION OF A PRODUCT DEFECT

A manufacturer that produces a defective product and later discovers said defect
must (1) notify purchasers and users of the defect and (2) correct the defect. Most
manufacturers faced with this situation recall the defective product and either
repair the defect or replace the product.
The seller must make reasonable efforts to notify purchasers and users of the
defect and the procedure to correct it. Reasonable efforts normally consist of send-
ing letters to known purchasers and users and placing notices in newspapers and
magazines of general circulation. If a user ignores the notice and fails to have the
defect corrected, the seller may raise this as a defense against further liability with
respect to the defect. Many courts have held that reasonable notice is effective even
against users who did not see the notice.
SUPERVENING EVENT
For a seller to be held strictly liable, the product it sells must reach the consumer or
user “without substantial change” in its condition. Under the doctrine of supervening supervening event
event, or intervening event, the original seller is not liable if the product is materi- An alteration or modification of a
ally altered or modified after it leaves the seller’s possession and the alteration or product by a party in the chain of
modification causes an injury. A supervening event absolves all prior sellers in the distribution that absolves all prior
chain of distribution from strict liability. sellers from strict liability.
Example: A manufacturer produces a safe piece of equipment. It sells the equip-

ment to a distributor, which removes a safety guard from the equipment. The dis-
tributor sells it to a retailer, who sells it to a buyer. The buyer is injured because of
the removal of the safety guard. The manufacturer can raise the defense of super-
vening event against the imposition of liability. However, the distributor and
retailer are strictly liable for the buyer’s injuries.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND STATUTE OF REPOSE

Most states have statutes of limitations that require an injured person to bring an statute of limitations
action within a certain number of years from the time that he or she was injured by Statute that establishes the time
a defective product. This limitation period varies from state to state. Failure to period during which a lawsuit must
bring an action within the appropriate time relieves the defendant of liability. be brought; if the lawsuit is not
In most jurisdictions, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the brought within this period, the
injured party loses the right to sue.
plaintiff suffers an injury. This subjects sellers and lessors to exposure for an
unspecified period of time because a defective product may not cause an injury for
years, or even decades, after it was sold.
376 Chapter 14
statute of repose Some states have enacted statutes of repose. Statues of repose limit the seller’s
A statute that limits the seller’s liability to a certain number of years from the date when the product was first sold.
liability to a certain number of years The period of repose varies from state to state.
from the date when the product was
first sold.
Concept Summary
Statute of Limitation and Statute of Repose
Statute Begins to Run
Statute of limitations When the plaintiff suffers injury
Statute of repose When the product is first sold
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND

COMPARATIVE FAULT
contributory negligence Sometimes a person who is injured by a defective product is negligent and contrib-
An unreasonable act or omission by utes to his or her own injuries. The defense of contributory negligence bars an
the victim (plaintiff) that, along with injured plaintiff from recovering from the defendant in a negligence action. How-
the defendant’s negligence, is the ever, this doctrine generally does not bar recovery in strict liability actions.
proximate cause of the injury.
Many states have held that the doctrine of comparative fault applies to strict
comparative fault liability actions. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff who is contributory negligent for
The measurement of damages by his or her injuries is responsible for a proportional share of the damages. In other
percentage. The victim’s damages words, the damages are apportioned between the plaintiff and the defendant.
are reduced proportionate to the
amount of negligence attributable Example: Suppose an automobile manufacturer produces a car with a hidden
to the victim. defect and a consumer purchases the car from an automobile dealer. Assume the
consumer is injured in an automobile accident in which the defect is found to be
75 percent responsible for the accident and the consumer’s own reckless driving is
found to be 25 percent responsible. The plaintiff suffers $1 million worth of inju-
ries. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, the plaintiff would recover
nothing from the defendants. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, the
plaintiff would recover $750,000 from the defendants.
Concept Summary
Contributory Negligence and Comparative Fault
Doctrine Description
Contributory negligence A person partially responsible for causing his or her own
injuries may not recover anything from the manufacturer
or seller of a defective product that caused the remainder
of the person’s injuries.
Comparative fault A person partially responsible for causing his or her own
injuries is responsible for a proportional share of the
damages. The manufacturer or seller of the defective
product is responsible for the remainder of the plaintiff ’s
damages.
“LEMON LAWS”
Nearly all American jurisdictions have passed lemon laws. (Only Alabama, Arkansas,
Idaho, South Carolina, and South Dakota do not have statutory lemon laws.) These
are laws that provide protection in new-car disputes in which the automobile was
flawed from the beginning. The lemon laws recognize the “disparity of bargaining
power” in the parties in vehicle purchase. The lemon laws are generally in addition
to common law contract rights and UCC remedies.4 The acts also supplement the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, federal legislation that protects consumers.
A “lemon” problem is severe, substantial, and resistant to repair. The lemon
laws are not to remedy wear and tear or minor flaws. The following are the ele-
ments of most lemon law statutes:
1. A warranty breach exists.
2. The breach is substantial and material.
3. Repair efforts were permitted a particular number of times.
4. The automobile has been out of service more than a particular number of
days or months.
5. The manufacturer or dealer has been put on notice.
6. Attempts have been made to arbitrate.
Paralegals should locate and be familiar with the lemon law statute in their
jurisdiction. Remember that proving a lemon law case calls for substantial record
collection and documentation.
Ron J. Taylor works as a corporate details of the case and collect client documents. At
paralegal in the legal department this point in our process, I likely will have most of
for the Williams Companies, Inc., in the required information to draft or review many
Tulsa, Oklahoma. He is a graduate of the agreements that follow.
of the University of Tulsa’s Paralegal Some of the many agreements that I’ve
Studies Program. Ron is also a
drafted and reviewed for supervising attorneys are
member of both TALA and NALA.
engagement letters, purchase and sale agreements,
I’m a member of the legal department of a large destruction notices, letters of conveyances, lease
energy company that represents its own internal agreements, assessment agreements, EEOC notices,
clients. Under the supervision of attorneys, I per- HSR filings, due diligence loan agreements, and
form tasks for many clients involving multiple FERC filings.
areas of law (i.e., litigation, acquisition and divesti- Supervising attorneys appreciate my talents
tures, employment, corporate, finance and treas- and expect the very best of my expertise on every
ury, regulatory, and research on records information project. Because nearly every document that I draft
management). is an agreement of some sort, the supervising attor-
At the onset of any matter, regardless of the ney expects me to identify, correct, or suggest any
area of law, I’m responsible for matter setup. Matter changes for clarity that I come across in an agree-
setup includes planning a budget, drafting a case ment. I have a lot of pride in being a noteworthy
assessment, engaging outside counsel, and more. member of the legal department where goals and
As the matter setup process progresses, I schedule processes are set to streamline costs.
client interviews and meetings to discuss the
4
For example, UCC section 2-601, in which a buyer may refuse to accept, or section 2-608, in which a buyer may
revoke acceptance.
378 Chapter 14

Billing Practices
In many law firms, the paralegals working there have what are called “bill-
able hours.” In other words, the time the paralegal spends on a client’s
case is billable to that client. Unfortunately, because of the pressure on
them to meet billable hour requirements, there have been a number of
cases involving overbilling and billing abuse practices by paralegals.5
Excessive legal fees and billing abuses contribute to the low esteem
in which the legal profession is sometimes held. However, the ethical
paralegal knows that dishonest billing practices are not only unethical
but also illegal. The ethical paralegal should never engage in this sort
of practice and should not continue to work for a law firm that engages
in such conduct.
5
Brown v. Hammond, 810 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
CHAPTER 14 SUMMARY
PRODUCT LIABILITY, p. 353 1. Supervening event. The product was materially altered
or modified after it left the seller’s possession and the
Misrepresentation
alteration or modification caused an injury. Also called
A seller or lessor fraudulently misrepresents the quality of a intervening event.
product, and the plaintiff relies on the misrepresentation 2. Generally known dangers. A seller is not liable for fail-
and is injured thereby. ing to warn about inherent dangers in products that are
known to the general population.
Negligence
3. Government contractor defense. A manufacturer pro-
A seller or lessor breaches his or her duty of due care by produces a product to government specifications and
ducing a defective product that causes injury to the plaintiff. warns the government of any known defects in the spe-
Privity of contract between the seller or lessor and the plain- cific design.
tiff is not required. 4. Correction of a defect. A manufacturer or seller who
learns about a defect in a product it has sold notifies
STRICT LIABILITY, p. 355 purchasers and users of the defect and corrects the defect.
Strict Liability in Tort 5. Assumption of the risk. The plaintiff knew and appre-
ciated the risk and voluntarily assumed the risk.
A manufacturer or seller who sells a defective product is lia- 6. Misuse of the product:
ble to the ultimate user who is injured thereby. All in the a. Abnormal misuse. The seller is not liable for inju-
chain of distribution are liable, irrespective of fault; some- ries caused by the abnormal misuse of the product
times called vertical liability. by the plaintiff. Also called unforeseeable misuse.
b. Foreseeable misuse. The seller is liable for injuries
DEFECTIVE PRODUCT, p. 358 caused by the foreseeable misuse of a product. The
The Concept of Defect manufacturer must design products to be safe for
1. Defect in manufacture foreseeable misuses.
2. Defect in design Statutes of Limitations and Repose
3. Failure to warn
1. Statute of limitations. An injured person must bring a
4. Defect in packaging
product liability lawsuit within a specified period of
5. Failure to provide adequate instructions for assembly
time after being injured by a defective product.
of a product
2. Statute of repose. A person must bring a product liabil-
6. Other defects
ity lawsuit within a specified period of time after a
DEFENSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY, p. 374 defective product was first purchased or leased.
A manufacturer or seller is not liable for damages caused by Contributory and Comparative Negligence
a product it manufactures or sells if one of the following 1. Contributory negligence. A person who is partially
defenses applies: responsible for causing his or her own injuries may not
recover anything from the manufacturer or seller of a responsible for a proportional share of the damages.
defective product that caused the remainder of the per- The manufacturer or seller of the defective product is
son’s injuries. responsible for the remainder of the plaintiff ’s dam-
2. Comparative negligence. A person who is partially ages. Also called comparative fault.
responsible for causing his or her own injuries is
TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Abnormal misuse (unforeseeable Doctrine of strict liability Misuse of the product 375
misuse) 375 in tort 355 Negligence 353
Assumption of the risk 374 Failure to provide adequate Product defects 358
Chain of distribution 356 instructions 372 Products liability 352
Comparative fault 376 Failure to warn 365 Punitive damages 358
Contributory negligence 376 Generally known dangers 374 Statute of limitations 375
Crashworthiness doctrine 364 Government contractor defense 374 Statute of repose 376
Defect in design 360 Intentional misrepresentation Strict liability 356
Defect in manufacture 359 (fraud) 355 Supervening event 375
Defect in packaging 370 Misrepresentation 355
Remember the case at the beginning of the chapter in which damages for strict liability, is Almaden liable? To help you
Virginia Burke was injured by the champagne bottle cork? with your answer, see the case Burke v. Almaden Vineyards,
Now that you know more about the relationship of strict lia- Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 419 (Ct. App. 1978).
bility to contract law, if Burke sued Almaden to recover

Working the Web Internet Exercises Restatement of Torts Section 402A, at http://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/Products_liability, which contains an
1. Find statistics on the most frequent type of product
overview of product liability law, with links to key
liability cases filed in your jurisdiction. Start with the
primary and secondary sources.
consumer product safety data at www.cpsc.gov/
3. Does your state have a statute of repose for product
library/data.html.
liability cases?
2. What is the statute of limitations on product liability
in your jurisdiction for strict liability? See the
Locate the so-called lemon law for your state (or if in a Exercise:
state without a lemon law, locate the law in another
In a memo titled “Lemon Law,” describe (1) legislative intent
state).
of the law, (2) what constitutes a “significant defect” under
the law, and (3) the time frame for corrective action.

Topic: Assumption of the Risk Exercise/Assignment:
(To the student: Reread the facts from the various Modify paragraph 9 of the sample Contract for Sale of Equip-
Hands-On Drafting Exercises at the end of each chapter ment in Appendix C so as to provide that All You Can Eat Ice
so as to familiarize yourself before beginning the exercise Cream Buffet, Inc., does not assume the risk that the equip-
below.) ment could cause injury and so the agreement does contain a
release from liability associated with the use of the equipment.
Facts:
Sources:
All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc., is concerned about
voluntarily assuming the risks associated with the purchase Use the chapter material and chapter examples for purposes
and use of the equipment. of drafting this demand promissory note.
380 Chapter 14
Critical Legal Thinking Case 14.1 Strict Liability Jeppesen Critical Legal Thinking Case 14.3 Crashworthiness
and Company produces charts that graphically display Doctrine One night Verne Prior, while driving on U.S. 101
approach procedures for airplanes landing at airports. These under the influence of alcohol and drugs at a speed of 65 to 85
charts are drafted from tabular data supplied by the Federal mph, crashed his automobile into the left rear of a Chevrolet
Aviation Administration (FAA), an agency of the U.S. govern- station wagon stopped on the shoulder of the freeway because
ment. By law, Jeppesen cannot construct charts that include of a flat tire. Christine Smith was sitting in the passenger seat
information different from that supplied by the FAA. One day, of the parked car when the accident occurred. In the crash,
the pilot of an airplane owned by World Airways was on the Chevrolet station wagon was knocked into a gully, where
descent to land at the Cold Bay, Alaska, airport. The pilot was its fuel tank ruptured. The vehicle caught fire, and Smith suf-
using an instrument approach procedure chart published by fered severe burn injuries. The Chevrolet station wagon was
Jeppesen. The airplane crashed into a mountain near Cold manufactured by General Motors Corporation. Evidence
Bay, killing all six crew members and destroying the aircraft. showed that the fuel tank was located in a vulnerable position
Evidence showed that the FAA data did not include the moun- in the back of the station wagon, outside the crossbars of the
tain. The heirs of the deceased crew members and World Air- frame. Evidence further showed that if the fuel tank had been
ways brought a strict liability action against Jeppesen. Does the located underneath the body of the station wagon, between
doctrine of strict liability apply to this case? Is Jeppesen liable? the crossbars of the frame, it would have been well protected
Brocklesby v. Jeppesen & Co., 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985). in the collision. Smith sued General Motors for strict liability.
Was the Chevrolet station wagon a defective product? Smith
Critical Legal Thinking Case 14.2 Failure to Warn The
v. General Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Ct. App. 1974).
Emerson Electric Co. manufactures and sells a product called
the Weed Eater XR-90. The Weed Eater is a multipurpose weed- Critical Legal Thinking Case 14.4 Misuse The Wilcox-
trimming and brush-cutting device. It consists of a handheld Crittendon Company manufactured harnesses, saddles, bri-
gasoline-powered engine connected to a long drive shaft, at the dles, leads, and other items commonly used for horses, cattle,
end of which can be attached various tools for cutting weeds and other ranch and farm animals. One such item was a stal-
and brush. One such attachment is a 10-inch circular saw blade lion or cattle tie, a five-inch-long iron hook with a one-inch
capable of cutting through growth up to 2 inches in diameter. ring at one end. The tongue on the ring opened outward to
When this saw blade is attached to the Weed Eater, approxi- allow the hook to be attached to a rope or another object. In
mately 270 degrees of blade edge are exposed when in use. The 1964, a purchasing agent for United Airlines, who was famil-
owner’s manual contained the following warning: “Keep chil- iar with this type of hook because of earlier experiences on a
dren away. All people and pets should be kept at a safe distance farm, purchased one of them from Keystone Brothers, a har-
from the work area, at least 30 feet, especially when using the ness and saddlery wares outlet located in San Francisco,
blade.” Donald Pearce, a 13-year-old boy, was helping his uncle California. Four years later, on March 28, 1968, Edward
clear an overgrown yard. The uncle was operating a Weed Eater Dosier, an employee of United Airlines, was working to
XR-90 with the circular saw blade attachment. When Pearce install a new grinding machine at a United Airlines mainte-
stooped to pick up something off the ground about 6 to 10 feet nance plant. As part of the installation process, Dosier
behind and slightly to the left of where his uncle was operating attached the hook to a 1,700-pound counterweight and
the Weed Eater, the saw blade on the Weed Eater struck some- raised the counterweight into the air. While the counter-
thing near the ground. The Weed Eater kicked back to the left weight was suspended in the air, Dosier reached under the
and cut off Pearce’s right arm to the elbow. Pearce, through his counterweight to retrieve a missing bolt. The hook broke,
mother, Charlotte Karns, sued Emerson to recover damages and the counterweight fell and crushed Dosier’s arm. Dosier
under strict liability. Is Emerson liable? Karns v. Emerson Elec. sued Wilcox-Crittendon for strict liability. Who wins? Dosier
Co., 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987). v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1975).
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 14.1 Celestino Luque lived with his cousins around the side of the lawn mower to remove the carton. As
Harry and Laura Dunn in Millbrae, California. The Dunns he did so, he slipped on the wet grass and fell backward.
purchased a rotary lawn mower from Rhoads Hardware. Luque’s left hand entered the unguarded hole of the lawn
The lawn mower was manufactured by Air Capital Manu- mower and was caught in its revolving blade, which turns at
facturing Company and distributed by Garehime Corpora- 175 miles per hour and 100 revolutions per second. Luque’s
tion. Neighbors asked Luque to mow their lawn. While hand was severely mangled and lacerated. The word Cau-
Luque was cutting the lawn, he noticed a small carton in tion was printed above the unguarded hole on the lawn
the path of the lawn mower. Luque left the lawn mower in a mower. Luque sued Rhoads Hardware, Air Capital, and
stationary position with its motor running and walked Garehime Corporation for strict liability. The defendants
argued that strict liability does not apply to patent (obvi- ever be corrected if the defendants’ contention was accepted
ous) defects. Was it ethical for the defendants to argue they by the court? Who wins? Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163
were not liable for patent defects? Would patent defects (Cal. 1972).

Read Case B.14 in Appendix B (Horn v. General Motors 1. What were the plaintiff ’s contentions upon appeal?
Corporation). This case is excerpted from the appellate 2. What theory of tort law was applied in this case?
court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see Appendix A) 3. What was the decision of the court?
using the IRAC method. After briefing the case, you should 4. Were damages awarded to the plaintiff?
be able to answer the following questions:
ETHICS SPOTLIGHT
TOPIC: DESIGN DEFECT
Lorenzo Peterson was swimming in a swimming pool with a friend at an apartment
complex. Lorenzo watched as his friend swam to the bottom of the pool, slid an
unattached drain cover away, and then slid it back. Lorenzo thought his friend had
hidden something inside the drain, so he swam to the bottom of the pool. Lorenzo
slid the drain cover aside and stuck his arm inside the drain. The 300 to 400 pounds
of pull of the drain pump held Lorenzo trapped underwater. At least seven people
tried to free Lorenzo to no avail. When the police arrived, they broke down the door
to the pool equipment room and turned off the drain pump.
Lorenzo was trapped underwater for 12 minutes, which left him irreversibly
brain damaged. Lorenzo, through his relatives, sued Sta-Rite Industries, Inc., the
manufacturer of the drain, under the doctrine of strict liability to recover damages
for Lorenzo’s injuries. The plaintiff alleged that the underwater pool drain was defec-
tively designed because it did not contain a shutoff mechanism. Evidence at trial
showed that Sta-Rite’s drain covers are designed to screw down, but often a drain
cover becomes loose. Further evidence showed there had been more than 20 prior
suction-entrapment accidents involving Sta-Rite’s drain covers and pumps.
Previously, experts had designed a pool drain pump with a mechanism that
would automatically shut off a pool drain pump when it detected it was pulling more
than it should. Sta-Rite did not install such safety features on its drain pumps, how-
ever. After hearing the evidence, including seeing a video of a typical day in the life of
Lorenzo after the accident, the jury took less than two hours to return a verdict
against Sta-Rite. The jury found that a design defect existed in Sta-Rite’s pool drain
equipment and awarded Lorenzo $32 million for past and future medical expenses
and $72 million for pain and suffering. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Peterson, 837 So. 2d 988
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).

1. Ethics: Do you think Sta-Rite acted unethically in its conduct? Why or why
not?
2. Ethics: Was the award of $104 million warranted? Explain.
Web Exercises
1. Visit the website of the Court of Appeals of Florida at www.flcourts.org.
2. Use www.google.com to find an article about someone being injured in a pool
accident.
The great object of the law is to encourage commerce.
—Judge Chambre
Beale v. Thompson, 12 U.S. 70 (1814).
chapter 15
SPECIAL FORMS
OF CONTRACTS
CASE SCENARIO
The law firm where you work as a paralegal is representing Leroy Behlman. CHAPTER OBJECTIVES
Leroy and 18 other football fans from Connecticut and New York decided to
attend Super Bowl XII in New Orleans. They entered into contracts with should be able to:
Octagon Travel Center, Inc. (Octagon), a tour operator, and paid $399 each for 1. Distinguish between negotiable and
transportation, lodging, and a ticket to Super Bowl XII. They purchased the nonnegotiable instruments.
tour package through Universal Travel Agency, Inc. (Universal), a travel agency 2. Describe an agency contract and the
liability it creates on a third party.
that acts as a broker for a number of airline companies and tour operators. The
3. Understand the term collective
individual contracts, however, were between the football fans and Octagon. bargaining agreement.
When they arrived in New Orleans, no tickets to Super Bowl XII were
4. Identify the effect of bankruptcy on labor
forthcoming. contracts.
383
384 Chapter 15
There are special forms of contracts of which the paralegal should be aware. An
in-depth discussion of these special forms of contracts—such as negotiable instru-
ments, agency contracts, and labor contracts—is outside the scope of this textbook.
However, because it is important that you have a general understanding of these
contracts, an overview of these special forms of contracts is contained in this
chapter.
Tracey A. Williams graduated from Through the process of finding assets I must
Roane State Community College review different types of contracts. On a daily basis
with an associate of applied science I review security agreements, deeds of trust, prom-
degree in paralegal studies and issory notes, land contracts, UCCs, and MDAs to
received her bachelor’s degree in determine the validity of the document. I must be
organizational management from
able to locate defects and inconsistencies in the
Tusculum College. She is a parale-
gal and trustee assistant with the
documents.
law firm of Mostoller, Stulberg & Whitfield in Oak Ridge, In liquidating assets, I draft, for approval by
Tennessee. She was certified as a bankruptcy assistant in my attorney, different types of contracts, such as
2004 by the Association of Bankruptcy Judicial Assist- promissory notes and deeds of trust. I also review
ants (ABJA). listing agreements with real estate agents, contracts
for sale on real estate, and settlement agreements
During my seven years as a paralegal, I have with creditors. I need to understand warranty
worked in different areas of law, and all of them deeds, quit claim deeds, divorce documents, wills,
have dealt with contracts. In my current position and trust agreements in an effort to determine the
as a trustee assistant, I oversee the administration type and validity of the transfer.
of bankruptcy estates in which my attorney is By knowing and understanding different
appointed trustee. This involves reviewing the case types of contracts, I am able to save my attorney
for potential assets and liquidating them for a time and make a successful and meaningful contri-
monetary distribution to creditors. bution to my attorney and firm.
CAREER FRONT
JOB DESCRIPTION: MUNICIPAL PARALEGAL
A municipal paralegal can be involved with contracts in the following ways:
• Track cases.
• Keep records and log case information.
• Respond to inquiries and complaints.
• Ensure deadlines are met.
• Prepare correspondence and subpoenas.
• Perform pretrial preparation.
• Research the law on various municipal issues for municipal attorney’s review.
• Prepare for trial and municipal attorney’s argument of cases before courts or
quasi-judicial bodies.
• Assist municipal attorney with appearances in courts to argue motions, writs,
and other proceedings.
Special Forms of Contracts 385
• Gather evidence.
• Conduct general research into legal matters.
• Draft briefs, motions, legal opinions, affidavits, memoranda, city contracts, and
other legal papers for municipal attorney’s review.
• Assist with witness preparation.
• Review city contracts for compliance with statute and policy.
Negotiable Instruments
One special form of contract is a negotiable instrument (sometimes called com- negotiable instrument
mercial paper). This type of contract is important for conducting business and Commercial paper that must meet
personal affairs. In fact, in the United States, modern commerce could not con- these requirements: (1) be in
tinue without them. Examples of negotiable instruments include checks (such as writing, (2) be signed by the maker
the one that may have been used to pay for this book) and promissory notes (such or drawer, (3) be an unconditional
promise or order to pay, (4) state a
as the one executed by a borrower of money to pay for tuition). An overview of the
fixed amount of money, (5) not
functions and types of negotiable instruments is covered in the following
require any undertaking in addition
discussion. to the payment of money, (6) be
payable on demand or at a definite
FUNCTIONS OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS time, and (7) be payable to order or
to bearer. A special form of contract
To qualify as a negotiable instrument, a document must meet certain requirements that satisfies the requirement
established by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). If these require- established by Article 3 of the UCC.
ments are met, a transferee who qualifies as a holder in due course (HDC) takes the Also called commercial paper.
instrument free of many defenses that can be asserted against the original payee. In
addition, the document is considered an ordinary contract that is subject to
draft
contract law.
A three-party instrument that is an
The concept of negotiation is important to the law of negotiable instruments. unconditional written order by one
The primary benefit of a negotiable instrument is that it can be used as a substitute party that orders.
for money. As such, it must be freely transferable to subsequent parties. Techni-
cally, a negotiable instrument is negotiated when it is originally issued. The term drawer
negotiation, however, is usually used to describe the transfer of negotiable instru- The checking account holder and
writer of the check. The bank where
ments to subsequent transferees.
the drawer has his or her account.
The party who writes the order for a
TYPES OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS draft.
Revised Article 3 recognizes four kinds of instruments: drafts, checks, promissory drawee
The bank where the drawer has his
notes, and certificates of deposit. Each of these is discussed in the following
or her account. The party who must
paragraphs.
pay the money stated in the draft.
Also called the acceptor of a draft.
Drafts
payee
A draft, which is a three-party instrument, is an unconditional written order by The party who receives the money
one party (the drawer of the draft) that orders a second party (the drawee of the from a draft. The party to whom the
draft) to pay money to a third party (the payee) [UCC 3-104(e)]. The drawee must check is written. The party to whom
be obligated to pay the drawer money before the drawer can order the drawee to the promise to pay is made (lender).
pay this money to a third party (the payee). The depositor (lender).
386 Chapter 15
EXHIBIT 15.1 Time Draft
Payee
Sun Valley, Idaho 1414
One hundred and twenty (120) days after date January 3, 20 08
DRAFT
PAY TO THE
ORDER OF Kneadery Restaurant, Inc. $ 10,000.00
Ten Thousand and no/100 Dollars
VALUE RECEIVED AND CHARGE THE SAME TO ACCOUNT OF
Hank’s Bank
100 Elkhorn Road
MEMO Michael Martin
Michael Martin
000000000 00000000001414
Drawee Drawer
For the drawee to be liable on a draft, the drawee must accept the drawer’s
written order to pay it. Acceptance is usually shown by the written word accepted
on the face of the draft, along with the drawee’s signature and the date. The drawee
acceptor is called the acceptor of the draft because his or her obligation changes from that
Someone who becomes liable on a of having to pay the drawer to that of having to pay the payee. After the drawee
draft by his or her acceptance of it. accepts the draft, it is returned to the drawer or the payee. The drawer or the
payee, in turn, can freely transfer it as a negotiable instrument to another party.
Example: Mary Owens owes Hector Martinez $1,000. Martinez writes out a draft
time draft that orders Owens to pay this $1,000 to Cindy Choy. Owens agrees to this change
A draft payable at a designated of obligation and accepts the draft. Martinez is the drawer, Owens is the drawee,
future date. and Choy is the payee.
sight draft A draft can be either a time draft or a sight draft. A time draft is payable at a
A draft payable on sight. Also called designated future date. For example, language such as “pay on January 1, 2008” or
a demand draft. “pay 120 days after date” creates a time draft (see Exhibit 15.1). A sight draft is pay-
demand draft able on sight. A sight draft is also called a demand draft. For example, language
An order to pay a certain sum of such as “on demand pay” or “at sight pay” creates a sight draft. A draft can be both
money that expressly states it is a time and a sight draft. Such a draft would provide that it is payable at a stated
payable on demand, on time after sight. For example, this type of draft is created by language such as “pay-
presentation, or on sight. able 90 days after sight.”
Checks
A check is a distinct form of draft. It is unique in that it is drawn on a financial
check institution (the drawee) and is payable on demand [UCC 3-104(f)]. In other words,
An order by the drawer to the a check is an order to pay (see Exhibit 15.2). Most businesses and many individuals
drawee bank to pay a specified sum have checking accounts at financial institutions.
of money from the drawer’s Like other drafts, a check is a three-party instrument. A customer who has a
checking account to the named checking account and writes (draws) a check is the drawer of a check. The financial
payee (or holder). A distinct form of
institution on which the check is written is the drawee of a check. And the party to
draft drawn on a financial institution
whom the check is written is the payee.
and payable on demand.
EXHIBIT 15.2 Check
Payee
Florence Cheeseman 16-4/1220 1483

123 Main Street
Westminster, NV 76543 January 3, 20 07
PAY TO THE
ORDER OF Gregory Cheeseman $ 100.00
One hundred and no/100 DOLLARS
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK

Wilshire-Highland Office
4929 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90010
MEMO college textbooks Florence Cheeseman

000000000 00000000001483 1483
Drawee Drawer
Promissory Notes
A promissory note (or note) is an unconditional written promise by one party to promissory note
pay money to another party [UCC 3-104(e)]. It is a two-party instrument (see A two-party negotiable instrument
Exhibit 15.3), not an order to pay. Promissory notes usually arise when one party that is an unconditional written
borrows money from another. The note is evidence of (1) the extension of credit promise by one party to pay money
and (2) the borrower’s promise to repay the debt. to another party.
A party who makes a promise to pay is the maker of a note (i.e., the bor- maker of a note
rower). The party to whom the promise to pay is made is the payee (i.e., the lender). The party who makes the promise to
A promissory note is a negotiable instrument that the payee can freely transfer to pay (borrower).
other parties.
EXHIBIT 15.3 Promissory Note
Missoula, Montana PROMISSORY NOTE
January 3, 20 07
1. PARTIES
“Borrower” means each person signing at the end of this Note, and the person’s
successors and assigns. “Lender” means THE BIG SKY CORPORATION and its
successors and assigns.
2. BORROWER’S PROMISE TO PAY; INTEREST

On or before 90 days after date, without grace, the undersigned promises to pay to Payee
the order of Lender at its office in Missoula, Montana, the sum of (Ten Thousand
Dollars ) or value received, with interest from date at the rate of 10% per annum
until paid. Principal and interest in lawful money of the United States.
Paul Bunyan (Seal) (Seal)

-Borrower -Borrower
Witness
Maker
388 Chapter 15
time note The parties are free to design the terms of a note to fit their needs. For
A note payable at a specific time. example, notes can be payable at a specific time (time notes) or on demand
demand note (demand notes). Notes can be made payable to a named payee or to “bearer.”
A note payable on demand. They can be payable in a single payment or in installments. The latter are called
installment notes. Most notes require the borrower to pay interest on the
installment note
An agreement to pay a portion of
principal.
a debt at successive periods until Lenders sometimes require the maker of a note to post security for the repay-
paid in full. ment of the note. This security, which is called collateral, may be in the form of
automobiles, houses, securities, or other property. If the maker fails to repay the
collateral
note when it is due, the lender can foreclose and take the collateral as payment for
Security against repayment of the
the note. Notes are often named after the security that underlies the note. For
note that lenders sometimes
require; can be a car, a house, or
example, notes secured by real estate are called mortgage notes, and notes secured
other property. The property that is by personal property are called collateral notes.
subject to the security interest.
mortgage note Certificates of Deposit

A promise to pay that secures the
A certificate of deposit (CD) is a special form of note created when a depositor
debt obligation.
deposits money at a financial institution in exchange for the institution’s promise
collateral note to pay back the amount of deposit plus an agreed-on rate of interest upon the expi-
A note secured by personal property. ration of a set time period agreed on by the parties [UCC 3-104(j)].
certificate of deposit (CD) The financial institution is the borrower (the maker), and the depositor is the
A two-party negotiable instrument lender (the payee). A CD is a two-party instrument (see Exhibit 15.4). Note that a
that is a special form of note created CD is a promise to pay, not an order to pay.
when a depositor deposits money at Unlike a regular passbook savings account, a CD is a negotiable instrument.
a financial institution in exchange CDs under $100,000 are commonly referred to as small CDs. CDs of $100,000 or
for the institution’s promise to pay more are usually called jumbo CDs.
back the amount of the deposit plus
an agreed-upon rate of interest
upon the expiration of a set time
period agreed upon by the parties.
small CD
A certificate of deposit under
$100,000.
jumbo CD
A certificate of deposit in a very
large denomination, usually at a
EXHIBIT 15.4 Certificate of Deposit
minimum of $100,000. Also called
negotiable certificates of deposit, Payee
these large investments are usually
considered low-risk, stable NEGOTIABLE CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT 1414
investments for large investors. HANK'S BANK
Manchester, New Hampshire
January 3, 20 07
maker of a CD
THIS CERTIFIES THAT THERE HAS BEEN DEPOSITED IN THE UNDERSIGNED
The bank (borrower).
THE SUM OF Ten Thousand and no/100 DOLLARS
PAY TO THE
ORDER OF Caesar Ramiroz $ 10,000.00
ON THE3rd DAY OFJanuary, 2010
WITH INTEREST TO MATURITY AT THE
RATE OF 10 % PER ANNUM UPON PRESENTATION AND SURRENDER OF
THIS CERTIFICATE PROPERLY INDORSED.
HANK'S BANK BY Henry Hildabrand 2

HENRY HILDABRAND II
PRESIDENT
000000000 00000000001414
Maker
Concept Summary
Types of Orders to Pay
Order to Pay Parties Description
1. Draft Drawer Person who issues a draft
Drawee Person who owes money to a drawer; person who is
ordered to pay a draft and accepts the draft
Payee Person to whom a draft is made payable
2. Check Drawer Owner of a checking account at a financial institution;
person who issues a check
Drawee Financial institution where drawer’s checking account
is located; party who is ordered to pay a check
Payee Person to whom a check is made payable
3. Promissory Maker Party who issues a promissory note; usually the
note borrower
Payee Party to whom a promissory note is made payable;
usually the lender
4. Certificate of Maker Financial institution that issues a CD
deposit (CD)
Payee Party to whom a CD is made payable; usually the depositor
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
While individual negotiable instruments may vary in specific requirements to be
included, there are definitely some requirements that must be included in all for-
mal negotiable instruments. These include the following:
1. Writing. A writing must be permanent and portable. Oral or implied instru-
ments are nonnegotiable.
2. Signed by drawer or maker. The maker or the drawer’s signature must appear
on the fact of the instrument. That signature may be any mark intended by
the signer to be his or her signature. The signature may also be by an author-
ized representative [UCC 3-104(a)].
3. Unconditional promise or order to pay. The instrument must be an uncondi-
tional promise or order to pay [UCC 3-104(a)]. Permissible notations listed
in UCC 3-106(a) do not affect the instrument’s negotiability. If the payment is
conditional on the performance of another agreement, the instrument is
nonnegotiable.
4. Fixed amount of money. The amount required to discharge an instrument
must be on the face of the instrument [UCC 3-104(a)]. The amount may
include payment of interest and costs of collection. Revised Article 3 provides
that variable-interest-rate notes are negotiable instruments. Note that an
amount must be payable in U.S. or a foreign country’s currency. If payment is
to be made in goods, services, or nonmonetary items, the instrument is non-
negotiable [UCC 3-104(a)].
390 Chapter 15
5. No undertaking in addition to the payment of money. A promise or an order

to pay cannot state any other undertaking to do an act in addition to the pay-
ment of money [UCC 3-104(a)(3)]. A promise or an order may include
authorization or power to protect collateral, dispose of collateral, waive any
law intended to protect the obligee, and the like.
6. Payable on demand or at a definite time. To be “payable on demand,” the
negotiable instrument must be payable at sight, upon presentation, or when
no time for payment is stated [UCC 3-108(a)]. For “payable at a definite
time,” the negotiable instrument must be payable at a definite date or before a
stated date, a fixed period after a stated date, or at a fixed period after sight
[UCC 3-108(b) and (c)]. An instrument payable only upon the occurrence of
an uncertain act or event is nonnegotiable.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE

IN FOREIGN CURRENCY
The UCC expressly provides that an instrument may state that it is payable in for-
eign money [UCC 3-107]. For example, an instrument “payable in 10,000 yen in
Japanese currency” is a negotiable instrument governed by Article 3 of the UCC.
Unless the instrument states otherwise, an instrument payable in foreign cur-
rency can be satisfied by the equivalent in U.S. dollars, as determined on the due date.
The conversion rate is the current bank-offered spot rate at the place of payment on
the due date. The instrument can expressly provide that it is payable only in the stated
agency law foreign currency. In that case, the instrument cannot be paid in U.S. dollars.
The large body of common law that
governs agency; a mixture of
contract law and tort law. Agency Contracts
principal If businesspeople had to conduct all their business personally, the scope of their
A person who authorizes an agent activities would be severely curtailed. Partnerships would not be able to operate,
to sign a negotiable instrument on corporations could not act through managers and employees, and sole proprietor-
his or her behalf. The party who ships would not be able to hire employees. The use of agents (or agency), which
employs another person to act on allows one person to act on behalf of another, solves this problem.
his or her behalf. The many examples of agency relationships include a salesperson who sells
agent goods for a store, an executive who works for a corporation, a partner who acts on
A person who has been authorized behalf of a partnership, an attorney who is hired to represent a client, a real estate
to sign a negotiable instrument on broker who is employed to sell a house, and so on. Agency is governed by a large
behalf of another person. The party body of common law known as agency law. The ability of the agent to contract for
who agrees to act on behalf of the principal is discussed in this section.
another.
agency AGENCY FORMATION

The principal-agent relationship: the
fiduciary relationship “which results Agency relationships are formed by the mutual consent of a principal and an agent.
from the manifestation of consent A party who employs another person to act on his or her behalf is called a principal.
by one person to another that the A party who agrees to act on behalf of another is called an agent. The principal-
other shall act in his behalf and agent relationship is commonly referred to as an agency. This relationship is
subject to his control, and consent depicted in Exhibit 15.5.
by the other so to act.”
contractual capacity PERSONS WHO CAN INITIATE

The legal qualification or competency AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
to understand the nature and effects
of one’s acts so as to enter into a Any person who has the capacity to contract can appoint an agent to act on his or
contract. her behalf. Generally, persons who lack contractual capacity, such as insane
EXHIBIT 15.5 Principal-Agent Relationship
Principal
Principal's
obligation
Agency to perform
contract the contract
Contract with
third party
Agent Third Party
on behalf
of principal
persons and minors, cannot appoint agents. However, the court can appoint a
legal guardian or another representative to handle the affairs of insane persons,
minors, and others who lack capacity to contract. With court approval, these rep-
resentatives can enter into enforceable contracts on behalf of the persons they
represent.
An agency can be created only to accomplish a lawful purpose. Agency con-
tracts created for illegal purposes or against public policy are void and unenforce-
able. For example, a principal cannot hire an agent to kill another person. Some
agency relationships are prohibited by law. For example, unlicensed agents cannot
be hired to perform the duties of certain licensed professionals (e.g., doctors,
lawyers).
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
A principal-agent relationship is formed when an employer hires an employee principal-agent relationship
and gives that employee authority to act and enter into contracts on his or her An employer hires an employee and
behalf. The extent of this authority is governed by any express agreement between gives that employee authority to act
the parties and implied from the circumstances of the agency. For example, the and enter into contracts on his or
president of a corporation usually has the authority to enter into major contracts her behalf.
on the corporation’s behalf, and a supervisor on the corporation’s assembly line
may have the authority only to purchase the supplies necessary to keep the line
running.
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
An employer-employee relationship exists when an employer hires an employee to employer-employee relationship
perform some form of physical service. For example, a welder on General Motors A relationship that results when an
Corporation’s assembly line is employed in an employer-employee relationship employer hires an employee to
because he performs a physical task. perform some form of physical
An employee is not an agent unless he or she is specifically empowered to service.
enter into contracts on the principal employer’s behalf. Employees may only enter
into contracts that are within the scope of their employment. The welder in the
previous example is not an agent because he cannot enter into contracts on behalf
of General Motors Corporation. If the company empowered him to enter into con-
tracts, he would become an agent.
392 Chapter 15
CONTRACT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES

A principal who authorizes an agent to enter into a contract with a third party is
liable on the contract. Thus, the third party can enforce the contract against the
principal and recover damages from the principal if the principal fails to per-
form it.
Concept Summary
Kinds of Agency Relationships
Type of Relationship Description
Principal-agent The agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal
as authorized by the principal and implied from the
agency. An employee is often the agent of his employer.
Employer-employee The employer has the right to control the physical con-
duct of the employee.
The agent can also be held liable on the contract in certain circumstances.
Imposition of such liability depends on whether the agency is classified as (1) fully
disclosed, (2) partially disclosed, or (3) undisclosed.
Fully Disclosed Agency

fully disclosed agency A fully disclosed agency results if a third party entering into a contract knows (1)
Where the fact that the agent is that the agent is acting as an agent for a principal and (2) the actual identity of the
acting on behalf of an agency is principal. The third party has the requisite knowledge if the principal’s identity is
fully revealed and free from secrecy. disclosed to the third party by either the agent or some other source.
In a fully disclosed agency, the contract is between the principal and the third
party. Thus, the principal, who is called a fully disclosed principal, is liable on the
contract. The agent, however, is not liable on the contract because the third party
relied on the principal’s credit and reputation when the contract was made. An
agent is liable on the contract if he or she guarantees that the principal will perform
the contract.
The agent’s signature on a contract entered into on the principal’s behalf is
important. It can establish the agent’s status and therefore his or her liability. For
instance, in a fully disclosed agency, the agent’s signature must clearly indicate that
he or she is acting as an agent for a specifically identified principal. Examples of
proper signatures include “Allison Adams, agent for Peter Perceival,” “Peter Per-
ceival, by Allison Adams, agent,” and “Peter Perceival, by Allison Adams.”
Example: Poran Kawamara decides to sell her house and hires Mark Robbins, a
real estate broker, to list and sell the house for a price of $1 million. They agree that
Mark will disclose the existence of the agency and the identity of the principal to
interested third parties. This is a fully disclosed agency. Mark shows the house to
Heather, a prospective buyer, and discloses to Heather that he is acting as an agent
for Poran. Heather makes an offer for the house at the $1 million asking price.
Mark signs the contract with Heather on behalf of Poran by signing “Mark Robbins,
agent for Poran Kawamara.” Poran is liable on the contract with Heather, but Mark
is not liable on the contract with Heather.
PARTIALLY DISCLOSED AGENCY

A partially disclosed agency occurs if the agent discloses his or her agency status partially disclosed agency
but does not reveal the principal’s identity and the third party does not know the Where the agency is partially
principal’s identity from another source. The nondisclosure may be because (1) the disclosed, both the agent and the
principal instructs the agent not to disclose his or her identity to the third party or principal are bound.
(2) the agent forgets to tell the third party the principal’s identity. In this kind of
agency, the principal is called a partially disclosed principal.
In a partially disclosed agency, both the principal and the agent are liable on
third-party contracts. This is because the third party must rely on the agent’s repu-
tation, integrity, and credit because the principal is unidentified. If the agent is
made to pay the contract, the agent can sue the principal for indemnification. The
third party and the agent can agree to relieve the agent’s liability. A partially dis-
closed agency can be created either expressly or by mistake.
Example: Assume a principal employs an agent to purchase a business on its behalf.
The principal and agent expressly agree that the agent will disclose the existence of
the agency to third parties but will not disclose the identity of the principal. The
agent finds a business for sale, and he discloses to the seller that he is acting as an
agent but does not disclose the identity of the principal. The seller agrees to sell the
business, and the agent signs “Allison Adams, agent.” Here, there is a partially dis-
closed agency. The principal is liable on the contract with the third-party seller; the
agent is also liable on the contract with the third-party seller.
If instead a principal and an agent agree that the agent will represent the prin-
cipal to purchase a business and that the agent will disclose the existence of the
agency and the identity of the principal to third parties, this is a fully disclosed
agency. Suppose the agent finds a suitable business for the principal and contracts
to purchase the business on behalf of the principal, but the agent mistakenly signs
the contract with the third party “Allison Adams, agent.” This is a partially dis-
closed agency. The principal is liable on the contract with the third party, and the
agent is also liable.
Undisclosed Agency
An undisclosed agency occurs when the third party is unaware of either the exist- undisclosed agency
ence of an agency or the principal’s identity. The principal is called an undisclosed Where the agency is undisclosed,
principal. Undisclosed agencies are lawful. They are often used when the principal both the agent and the principal
feels the terms of the contract would be changed if his or her identity were known. are bound.
For example, a wealthy person may use an undisclosed agency to purchase prop-
erty if he thinks the seller would raise the price of the property if his identity were
revealed.
In an undisclosed agency, both the principal and the agent are liable on the
contract with the third party. This is because the agent, by not divulging that he or
she is acting as an agent, becomes a principal to the contract. The third party relies
on the reputation and credit of the agent in entering into the contract. If the princi-
pal fails to perform the contract, the third party can recover against the principal of
the agent. If the agent is made to pay the contract, he or she can recover indemnifi-
cation from the principal. An undisclosed agency can be created either expressly or
by mistake.
Example: Assume the Walt Disney Company wants to open a new theme park in
Chicago but needs to first acquire land for the park. Disney employs an agent to
work on its behalf to acquire the needed property, with an express agreement that
394 Chapter 15
the agent will not disclose the existence of the agency to a third-party seller. If a
seller agrees to sell the needed land and the agent signs her name “Allison Adams,”
without disclosing the existence of the agency, it is an undisclosed agency. Disney
is liable on the contract with the third-party seller, and so is the agent.
Suppose instead that Disney hires an agent to purchase land on its behalf and
they agree that the agent will represent Disney in a fully disclosed agency—that is,
the agent is to disclose the existence of the agency and the identity of the principal
to the third-party seller. If the agent locates a third-party seller who is willing to
enter into a contract to sell the land but the agent mistakenly signs the contract
“Allison Adams,” without disclosing the agency to the third party, it is an undis-
closed agency. Disney is liable on the contract with the third-party seller, and the
agent is also liable.
Agent Exceeding the Scope of Authority

An agent who enters into a contract on behalf of another party impliedly warrants
implied warranty of authority that he or she has the authority to do so. This is called the agent’s implied warranty
An agent who enters into a contract of authority. If the agent exceeds the scope of his or her authority, the principal is
on behalf of another party impliedly not liable on the contract unless the principal ratifies it. The agent, however, is lia-
warrants that he or she has the ble to the third party for breaching the implied warranty of authority. To recover,
authority to do so. the third party must show (1) reliance on the agent’s representation and (2) igno-
rance of the agent’s lack of status.
Example: Suppose Sam, Sara, Samantha, and Simone form a rock band called
SSSS. SSSS is just a voluntary association without any legal status. Sam enters into a
contract with Rocky’s Musical Instruments to purchase instruments and equip-
ment for the band on credit and signs the contract, “Sam, for SSSS.” When SSSS
fails to pay the debt, Rocky’s can sue Sam and recover. Sam must pay the debt
because he breached his implied warranty of authority when he acted as an agent
for a nonexistent principal—that is, the purported principal was not a legal entity
on which liability could be imposed.
Concept Summary
Contract Liability of Principals and Agents to Third Parties
Type of
Agency Principal Liable Agent Liable
Fully disclosed Yes No, unless the agent (1) acts as a princi-
pal or (2) guarantees the performance of
the contract
Partially Yes Yes, unless the third party relieves the
disclosed agent’s liability
Undisclosed Yes Yes
Nonexistent No, unless the Yes, the agent is liable for breaching the
principal ratifies implied warranty of authority
the contract
AGENT’S MISREPRESENTATION
Intentional misrepresentations are also known as fraud or deceit. They occur intentional misrepresentation
when an agent makes statements that he or she knows are not true. An innocent Intentionally defrauding another
misrepresentation occurs when an agent negligently makes a misrepresentation to a person out of money, property, or
third party. something else of value. When a
A principal is liable for the intentional and innocent misrepresentations seller or lessor fraudulently misrep-
resents the quality of a product and
made by an agent acting within the scope of employment. The third party can
a buyer is injured thereby. Occurs
either (1) rescind the contract with the principal and recover any consideration
when one person consciously
paid or (2) affirm the contract and recover damages. decides to induce another person to
Example: Assume that (1) a car salesperson is employed to sell the principal’s car rely and act on a misrepresentation.
and (2) the principal tells the agent the car was repaired after it was involved in a Also called fraud. Occurs when an
major accident. If the agent intentionally tells the buyer the car was never involved agent makes an untrue statement
that he or she knows is not true.
in an accident, the agent has made an intentional misrepresentation. Both the prin-
cipal and the agent are liable for this misrepresentation.
Agent Distinguished from an Independent Contractor

Principals often employ outsiders—that is, persons and businesses who are not
employees—to perform certain tasks on their behalf. These persons and businesses
are called independent contractors. For example, lawyers, doctors, dentists, con- independent contractor
sultants, stockbrokers, architects, certified public accountants, real estate brokers, A person who contracts with
and plumbers are examples of people who commonly act as independent contrac- another to do something for him
tors. The party that employs an independent contractor is called a principal. who is not controlled by the other
nor subject to the other's right to
Example: Jin is a lawyer who has her own law firm and specializes in real estate control with respect to his physical
law. Raymond, a real estate developer, hires Jin to represent him in the purchase of conduct in the performance of the
land. Raymond is the principal, and Jin is the independent contractor. undertaking. [Restatement (Second)
of Agency].
Liability for an Independent Contractor’s Contracts

A principal can authorize an independent contractor to enter into contracts. Prin-
cipals are bound by the authorized contracts of their independent contractors. For
example, suppose a client hires a lawyer as an independent contractor to represent
her in a civil lawsuit against a defendant to recover monetary damages. If the client
authorizes the lawyer to settle a case within a certain dollar amount and the lawyer
does so, the settlement agreement is binding.
If an independent contractor enters into a contract with a third party on
behalf of the principal without express or implied authority from the principal to
do so, the principal is not liable on the contract.
AGENCY TERMINATION
An agency contract is similar to other contracts in that it can be terminated either
by an act of the parties or by operation of law. These different methods of termina-
tion are discussed next. Note that once an agency relationship is terminated, the
agent can no longer represent the principal or bind the principal to contracts.
Termination of an Agency Contract by Acts of the Parties

The parties to an agency contract can terminate the agency contract by agreement
or by their actions. These are the four methods of termination of an agency con-
tract by acts of the parties:
396 Chapter 15
1. Mutual agreement—As with any contract, the parties to an agency contract

can mutually agree to terminate their agreement. By doing so, the parties
relieve each other of any further rights, duties, obligations, or powers pro-
vided for in the agency contract. Either party can propose the termination of
an agency contract.
2. Lapse of time—Agency contracts are often written for a specific period of
time. The agency terminates when the specified time period elapses. Sup-
pose, for example, that the principal and agent enter into an agency contract
“beginning January 1, 2008, and ending December 31, 2010.” The agency
automatically terminates on December 31, 2010. If the agency contract does
not set forth a specific termination date, the agency terminates after a reason-
able time has elapsed. The courts often look to the custom of an industry in
determining the reasonable time for the termination of the agency.
3. Purpose achieved—A principal can employ an agent for the time it takes to
accomplish a certain task, purpose, or result. Such agencies automatically ter-
minate when they are completed. For example, suppose a principal employs a
licensed real estate broker to sell his house. The agency terminates when the
house is sold and the principal pays the broker the agreed-upon compensation.
4. Occurrence of a specified event—An agency contract can specify that the
agency exists until a specified event occurs. The agency terminates when
the specified event happens. For example, if a principal employs an agent to
take care of her dog until she returns from a trip, the agency terminates when the
principal returns from the trip.
Termination of an Agency Contract by Operation of Law

Agency contracts can be terminated by operation of law as well as by agreement of
the parties. The six methods of terminating an agency relationship by operation of
law are as follows:
1. Death—The death of either the principal or the agent terminates an agency
relationship. This rule is based on the old legal principle that because a dead
person cannot act, no one can act for him or her. Note that the agency termi-
nates even if one party is unaware of the other party’s death. An agent’s
actions that take place after the principal’s death do not bind the principal’s
estate.
2. Insanity—The insanity of either the principal or the agent generally termi-
nates an agency relationship. A few states have modified this rule to provide
that a contract entered into by an agent on behalf of an insane principal is
enforceable if (a) the insane person has not been adjudged insane, (b) the
third party does not have knowledge of the principal’s insanity at the time of
contracting, and (c) the enforcement of the contract will prevent injustice.
3. Bankruptcy—An agency relationship is terminated if the principal is declared
bankrupt. Bankruptcy requires the filing of a petition for bankruptcy under
federal bankruptcy law.1 With a few exceptions, neither the appointment of a
state court receiver nor the principal’s financial difficulties or insolvency ter-
minates the agency relationship. The agent’s bankruptcy usually does not
terminate an agency unless the agent’s credit standing is important to the
agency relationship.
1
See the discussion on bankruptcy later in this chapter.
4. Impossibility—An agency relationship terminates if a situation arises that

makes its fulfillment impossible. The following circumstances can lead to ter-
mination on this ground:
a. The loss or destruction of the subject matter of the agency. For example,
assume a principal employs an agent to sell his horse, but the horse dies
before it is sold. The agency relationship terminates at the moment the
horse dies.
b. The loss of a required qualification. For example, suppose a principal
employs a licensed real estate agent to sell her house, and the real estate
agent’s license is revoked. The agency terminates at the moment the license
is revoked.
c. A change in the law. For example, suppose a principal employs an agent to
trap alligators. If a law is passed that makes trapping alligators illegal, the
agency contract terminates when the law becomes effective.
5. Changed circumstances—An agency terminates when there is an unusual
change in circumstances that would lead the agent to believe the principal’s
original instructions should no longer be valid. For example, a principal
employs a licensed real estate agent to sell a farm for $100,000. The agent there-
after learns that oil has been discovered on the property and makes it worth $1
million. The agency terminates because of this change in circumstances.
6. War—The outbreak of war between the principal’s country and the agent’s
country terminates an agency relationship between the parties. Such an occur-
rence usually makes the performance of the agency contract impossible.
Labor Contracts
Before the Industrial Revolution, the doctrine of laissez-faire governed the employ-
ment relationship in the United States. Generally, this meant that employment was
subject to the common law of contracts and agency law. In most instances, employ-
ees and employers had somewhat equal bargaining power.
This changed dramatically when the country became industrialized in the
late 1800s. For one thing, large corporate employers had much more bargaining
power than their employees. For another, the issues of child labor, unsafe working
conditions, long hours, and low pay caused concern. Both federal and state legisla-
tion sought to protect workers’ rights, and labor unions were made lawful. Today,
labor law is a mixture of contract law, agency law, and government regulation.
This section discusses labor law and collective bargaining agreements as they
relate to contract law.
LABOR LAW
In the 1880s, few laws protected workers against employment abuses. The workers
reacted by organizing unions in an attempt to gain bargaining strength. Unlike
unions in many European countries, unions in the United States did not form their
own political party. By the early 1900s, employers used violent tactics against work-
ers who were trying to organize into unions. The courts generally sided with
employers in such disputes.
LABOR UNIONS
American Federation of Labor (AFL)
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was formed in 1886, under the leader- One of the first federations of labor
ship of Samuel Gompers. Only skilled craft workers such as silversmiths and unions in the United States.
398 Chapter 15
Congress of Industrial Organiza- artisans were allowed to belong. In 1935, John L. Lewis formed the Congress of
tions (CIO) Industrial Organizations (CIO). The CIO permitted semiskilled and unskilled
A federation of unions that workers to become members. In 1955, the AFL and CIO combined to form the
organized workers in industrial AFL-CIO. Individual unions (such as the United Auto Workers and United Steel
unions in the United States and
Workers) may choose to belong to the AFL-CIO, but not all unions opt to join.
Canada from 1935 to 1955. The
Today, approximately 15 percent of private-sector wage and salary workers
CIO was more aggressive and
militant than the American
belong to labor unions. Many government employees also belong to unions.
Federation of Labor (AFL). The CIO
merged with the AFL in 1955.
FEDERAL LABOR UNION STATUTES
AFL-CIO
The 1955 combination of the AFL In the early 1900s, members of the labor movement lobbied Congress to pass laws
and the CIO. to protect their rights to organize and bargain with management. During the Great
Depression of the 1930s, several statutes were enacted to give workers certain rights
and protections. Other statutes have been added since then. These are the major
federal statutes in this area:
• Norris-LaGuardia Act. Enacted in 1932, this act stipulates that it is legal for
employees to organize.2
• National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). This act, also known as the Wagner
Act, was enacted in 1935.3 The NLRA establishes the right of employees to
form, join, and assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively with employ-
ers; and to engage in concerted activity to promote these rights.
• Labor-Management Relations Act. In 1947, Congress enacted the Labor-
Management Relations Act (the Taft-Hartley Act).4 This act (1) expands the
activities that labor unions can engage in, (2) gives employers the right to
engage in free-speech efforts against unions prior to a union election, and
(3) gives the president of the United States the right to seek an injunction (for
up to 80 days) against a strike that would create a national emergency.
• Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Congress enacted the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act in 1959 (the Landrum-Griffin Act).5
This act regulates internal union affairs and establishes the rights of union
members.
• Railway Labor Act. The Railway Labor Act of 1926, as amended in 1934, covers
employees of railroad and airline carriers.6
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB)

The National Labor Relations Act created the National Labor Relations Board
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB is an administrative body comprising five members appointed
(NLRB) by the president and approved by the Senate. The NLRB oversees union elections,
A federal administrative agency that prevents employers and unions from engaging in illegal and unfair labor practices,
oversees union elections, prevents and enforces and interprets certain federal labor laws. The decisions of the NLRB
employers and unions from are enforceable in court.
engaging in illegal and unfair
In Case 15.1, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an
labor practices, and enforces and
employer had to allow nonemployee union organizers on its property.
interprets certain federal labor laws.
2
29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110 and 113–115.
3
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
4
29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq.
5
29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.
6
45 U.S.C. §§ 151–162 and 181–188.
CASE 15.1 ORGANIZING A UNION

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 918 (1991).
Facts
Lechmere, Inc. (Lechmere), owned and operated a retail store in the Lechmere
Shopping Plaza in Newington, Connecticut. Thirteen smaller stores were located
between Lechmere’s store and the parking lot, which was owned by Lechmere. In
June 1987, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO (Union),
attempted to organize Lechmere’s 200 employees, none of whom belonged to a
union. After a full-page advertisement in a local newspaper drew little response,
nonemployee union organizers entered Lechmere’s parking lot and began placing
handbills on windshields of cars parked in the employee section of the parking lot.
Lechmere’s manager informed the organizers that Lechmere prohibited solicita-
tion or handbill distribution of any kind on the property and asked them to leave.
They did so, and Lechmere personnel removed the handbills. Union organizers
renewed their handbill effort in the parking lot on several subsequent occasions,
but each time they were asked to leave and the handbills were removed. Union
filed a grievance with the NLRB. The NLRB ruled in favor of Union and ordered
Lechmere to allow handbill distribution in the parking lot. The court of appeals
affirmed. Lechmere appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue
May a store owner prohibit nonemployee union organizers from distributing leaf-
lets in a shopping mall parking lot owned by the store?

The U.S. Supreme Court cited the general rule that an employer cannot be com-
pelled to allow distribution of union literature by nonemployee union organizers
on its property. The Supreme Court noted, however, that an exception applies if
the employees would otherwise live and work beyond the reach of reasonable
union efforts to communicate with them. The Court held that this exception did
not apply in this case. The Court cited the fact that the employees lived in a metro-
politan area and that the union could advertise in the media and could stand on
the public area adjoining Lechmere’s parking lot to inform the employees of the
union’s organizational effort. The Supreme Court concluded, “Access to employ-
ees, not success in winning them over, is the critical issue.”
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, Lechmere could
prohibit nonemployee union organizers from distributing leaflets to employees in
the store’s parking lot, reversing the decision of the court of appeals.

1. Critical Thinking: Should property rights take precedence over a union’s
right to organize employees?
400 Chapter 15
2. Ethics: Is it ethical for an employer to deny union organizers access to com-

pany property to conduct their organization efforts? Is it ethical for union
organizers to demand this as a right?
3. Critical Thinking: What implications does this case have for business? Is
this a pro- or antibusiness decision?
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Once a union has been elected, the employer and the union discuss the terms of
employment of union members and try to negotiate a labor contract that embodies
collective bargaining these terms. The act of negotiating this labor contract is called collective bargaining.
The act of negotiating contract The resulting labor contract is called a collective bargaining agreement. The
terms between an employer and employer and the union must negotiate with each other in good faith. Among
the members of a union. other things, this prohibits making take-it-or-leave-it proposals.
collective bargaining agreement The subjects of collective bargaining are classified as follows:
The resulting contract from a • Compulsory subjects—Wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
collective bargaining procedure.
employment are compulsory subjects of collective bargaining. Fringe bene-
fits, health benefits, retirement plans, work assignments, safety rules, and the
like are included in this category.
• Illegal subjects—Subjects such as closed shops and discrimination are illegal
subjects and may not be negotiated.
• Permissive subjects—Subjects that are not compulsory or illegal are permis-
sive subjects of collective bargaining. These include such issues as the size
and composition of the supervisory force, location of plants, corporate reor-
ganizations, and the like. These subjects may be bargained for if the company
and union agree to do so.
EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY ON LABOR CONTRACTS

Similar to the earlier discussion regarding the effect of a bankruptcy on agency
labor contract contracts, labor contracts can be profoundly affected by bankruptcy law. For
Also called a collective bargaining instance, even after the company and the union have bargained in good faith to
agreement that applies to the establish a labor contract, a company filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy can peti-
employees a union represents. The tion the bankruptcy court to reject and/or modify that collective bargaining agree-
collective bargaining agreement ment. The effect of a bankruptcy on the labor contract is discussed in this
defines the terms and conditions of
section.
employment for represented
Debtors, normally companies, filing for Chapter 11 reorganization some-
employees.
times have collective bargaining agreements with labor unions that require the
payment of agreed-upon wages and other benefits to union member-employees for
some agreed-upon period in the future. Debtors also often have contracts to pay
union and nonunion retired employees and their dependents medical, surgical,
hospitalization, dental, and death benefits (retiree benefits). What happens to those
labor contracts when a company files bankruptcy is an important issue in the
paralegal’s study of contract law.
Debtors using bankruptcy reorganization as a tool to avoid collective bar-
gaining agreements was a serious issue when the U.S. Supreme Court held, in
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, that collective bargaining agreements are “executory
contracts” and thus subject to rejection. After that Supreme Court decision, Con-
gress amended the Bankruptcy Code to prevent debtors from misusing Chapter 11
to reject collective bargaining agreements.7 Although this is a very complicated

issue, you should remember that if certain circumstances are met—including that
the debtor’s financial situation under Chapter 11 is clearly benefited by rejecting
the collective bargaining agreement—the labor contract can be modified or even
rejected. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
Another important point to remember is that the burden of proof in these
collective bargaining matters is on the bankruptcy trustee. Until the collective bar-
gaining agreement is ruled on by the court, it remains in force. An important case
on collective bargaining agreements and bankruptcy is In Re Unimet Corp., 842
F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1988), Cert. Denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1989).
CHAPTER 11 REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING AGREEMENT
If the Chapter 11 debtor wishes to reject the collective bargaining agreement, the
Bankruptcy Code requires the following multistep process:
1. The debtor makes a proposal to the union or representative that sets forth its
proposed modifications.
2. The debtor meets with the union or representative to discuss the proposal
and confers in good faith in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory
modification.
3. The union or representative refuses to accept the proposal without good
cause.
If these steps have been taken, the court holds a hearing. The court may order
the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement or modification of retiree ben-
efits if it finds that the “balance of equities” favors rejection or modification of the
labor contract and that rejection or modification is necessary to the reorganization
of the company in the bankruptcy.
ADDITIONAL BANKRUPTCY IMPLICATIONS

ON CONTRACTS
As you saw in the section on labor law, the filing of a bankruptcy can have serious
implications on a collective bargaining agreement. Although that is an important
effect, the paralegal should be aware that a bankruptcy can lead to the automatic
termination of other relationships and other contracts as well.
In October 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) took effect. This revision led to some of the most com-
prehensive changes to bankruptcy law in over 25 years. Because of the BAPCPA’s
effect on contracts, you should have some familiarity with this law, no matter the
area of law in which you work.
First of all, remember that the discharge of a contract as a result of a bank-
ruptcy happens not by anything the parties do but, rather, by operation of law. As
you learned in previous chapters, contracts that have obligations due on both sides
7
The collective bargaining agreement section only applies in Chapter 11 cases under Section 1113 of the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
402 Chapter 15
are “executory contracts.” In bankruptcy Chapters 7, 11, and 13 cases,8 BAPCPA

sets out time limits for accepting or rejecting executory contracts. So, again, it is
not the filing of the bankruptcy that terminates a contract; it is either the explicit
rejection of the contract or the passage of a deadline that terminates the contract, if
the debtor or the other party(s) both have some obligation remaining under the
agreement.
For an example, think about a cell phone contract. If a debtor with a cell
phone contract files a bankruptcy case (usually a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13), the
debtor either has to assume the cell phone contract explicitly (in other words, agree
to continue to pay on the contract after the bankruptcy case is over), or the cell
phone contract is rejected automatically at the conclusion of the bankruptcy case.
But if the bankruptcy court finds that the cell phone contract is executory, the
contract remains in force. BAPCPA sets deadlines for assumption or rejection of
executory contracts.
Some executory contracts can’t be assumed where the services are “personal”
to the debtor. For example, a recording contract for a major recording artist who
filed bankruptcy could not be enforced, even though it was executory. The bank-
ruptcy court could not force the singer to continue to perform under his or her
contract with the recording studio.
Kristen A. Leeb is employed as a I find the contract aspect of the paralegal role
corporate paralegal for Hand Held to be most interesting and challenging. My first
Products, Inc., in Skaneateles Falls, paralegal position involved complex contract liti-
New York. She received her parale- gation; thus my interest was enhanced and my
gal education in the Certified Legal skills perfected in this area. Today I report directly
Assistant Program at Syracuse
to the general counsel of a worldwide corporation.
University in Syracuse, New York.
This corporate paralegal position requires knowl-
A contract is an agreement between competent edge and skills in contract drafting and review in
parties, based on the genuine consent of the par- the following areas: corporate work, subsidiary
ties, supported by consideration made for a lawful matters, mergers and acquisitions, litigation, sale
objective in a form required by law, if any. When I of products and services, environmental, intellec-
learned these elements of a contract, I didn't real- tual property, real property, research, and opera-
ize that contracts would be prevalent in so many tional policies and procedures.
areas of law.
8
A bankruptcy Chapter 7 case is the most familiar form of bankruptcy. This is where the debtor’s nonexempt
property is sold for cash, the cash is distributed to the creditors, and any unpaid debts are discharged. In a Chapter
11 bankruptcy case, there is a reorganization of the debtor’s financial affairs under the supervision of the Bank-
ruptcy Court. Most times, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case is filed by a company or a corporation. The Chapter 13 is
a rehabilitation form of bankruptcy that permits the courts to supervise the debtor’s plan for the payment of
unpaid debts in installments.

Disruptive Courtroom Tactics
ABA Model Rule 3.5 deals with impartiality and decorum in the court-
room.9 Although because of their role in representing the client in
court, it is normally an attorney who might be involved with disruptive
courtroom tactics or dirty tricks, paralegals must be aware of what con-
stitutes courtroom decorum.
Paralegals working in civil litigation and criminal law frequently
attend court proceedings with their attorneys. Because the paralegal
has such a level of involvement and interest in the case, it is sometimes
difficult to listen to the other side or hear a witness state something the
paralegal knows not to be true. However, ethical paralegals know they
must not react to these untrue statements by rolling their eyes or mak-
ing faces. Although the court might first warn the paralegal that his or
her conduct was offensive, the judge could immediately charge the
paralegal with contempt if he or she so chooses. Depending on the
severity of the paralegal's behavior, such a contempt charge could
result in a fine or even a jail term.
9
CHAPTER 15 SUMMARY
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, p. 385 Promissory note. A two-party negotiable instrument that is

an unconditional written promise by one party to pay
Negotiable instrument. A special form of contract that sat-
money to another party.
isfies the requirement established by Article 3 of the
Maker of a note. The party who makes a promise to pay
UCC. Also called commercial paper.
(borrower).
Instrument. Term that means negotiable instrument.
Payee of a note. The party to whom a promise to pay is
Article 3 of the UCC. A model code that establishes rules
made (lender).
for the creation of, transfer of, enforcement of, and lia-
Collateral. Security against repayment of a note that lend-
bility on negotiable instruments.
ers sometimes require; can be a car, a house, or other
Draft. A three-party instrument that is an unconditional
property.
written order by one party that orders the second party
Certificate of deposit (CD). A two-party negotiable instru-
to pay money to a third party.
ment that is a special form of note created when a deposi-
Drawer of a draft. The party who writes an order for a draft.
tor deposits money at a financial institution in exchange
Drawee of a draft. The party who must pay the money
for the institution’s promise to pay back the amount of the
stated in a draft. Also called the acceptor of a draft.
deposit plus an agreed-upon rate of interest upon the
Payee of a draft. The party who receives the money from a
expiration of a set time period agreed upon by the parties.
draft.
Maker of a CD. The financial institution that issues a CD
Check. A distinct form of draft drawn on a financial institu-
(borrower).
tion and payable on demand.
Payee of a CD. The party to whom a CD is made payable;
Drawer of a check. The checking account holder and writer
usually the depositor (lender).
of a check.
Permanency requirement. A requirement of negotiable
Drawee of a check. The financial institution where a drawer
instruments that says they must be in a permanent
has his or her account.
state, such as written on ordinary paper.
Payee of a check. The party to whom a check is written.
404 Chapter 15
Portability requirement. A requirement of negotiable 3. Labor-Management Relations Act. This act expanded
instruments that says they must be able to be easily the activities labor unions could engage in, gave em-
transported between areas. ployers free-speech rights to oppose unionization, and
gave the president the right to seek injunctions against
AGENCY CONTRACTS, p. 390 strikes that would create a national emergency. Also
Agency law. The large body of common law that governs called the Taft-Hartley Act.
agency; a mixture of contract law and tort law. 4. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
Principal. A party who employs another person to act on Called labor’s “bill of rights,” this act gives union mem-
his or her behalf. bers the right to nominate candidates for union offices
Agent. A party who agrees to act on behalf of another. and vote in union elections. Also called the Landrum-
Agency. The principal-agent relationship; the fiduciary rela- Griffin Act.
tionship that results from the manifestation of consent 5. Railway Labor Act. This act governs union rights of
by one person to another that the other shall act on his railroad and airline employees.
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
Principal-agent relationship. A relationship formed when This federal administrative agency is empowered to admin-
an employer hires an employee and gives that employee ister federal labor law, oversee union elections, and decide
authority to act and enter into contracts on his or her labor disputes.
behalf.
Employer-employee relationship. A relationship that results Collective Bargaining
when an employer hires an employee to perform some Collective bargaining is a process whereby the union and
form of physical service. employer negotiate the terms and conditions of employment
Independent contractor. A person or business that is not an for the covered employee union members.
employee but is employed by a principal to perform a
certain task on his behalf. 1. Collective bargaining agreement. This is a contract
resulting from collective bargaining.
LABOR CONTRACTS, p. 397 Subjects of Collective Bargaining
Federal Labor Statutes 1. Compulsory subjects. Compulsory subjects are wages,
Federal labor statutes include the following: hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
(e.g., vacations, medical benefits).
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act. This act made it legal for 2. Illegal subjects. Illegal subjects are subjects that may
employees to organize. not be negotiated (e.g., discrimination).
2. National Labor Relations Act. This act established the 3. Permissive subjects. Permissive subjects are not com-
right of employees to form, join, and assist labor un- pulsory or illegal (e.g., closing of plants).
ions. Also called the Wagner Act or NLRA.
TERMS AND CONCEPTS
Acceptor 386 Demand draft 386 Mortgage note 388

AFL-CIO 398 Demand note 388 National Labor Relations Board
Agency law 390 Draft 385 (NLRB) 398
Agent 390 Drawee 385 Negotiable instrument (commercial
Agency 390 Drawer 385 paper) 385
American Federation of Labor Employer-employee relationship 391 Partially disclosed agency 393
(AFL) 397 Fully disclosed agency 392 Payee 385
Certificate of deposit (CD) 388 Implied warranty of authority 394 Principal 390
Check 386 Independent contractor 395 Principal-agent relationship
Collateral 388 Installment note 388 391
Collateral note 388 Intentional misrepresentations (fraud Promissory note (note) 387
Collective bargaining 400 or deceit) 395 Sight draft 386
Collective bargaining agreement 400 Jumbo CD 388 Small CD 388
Congress of Industrial Organizations Labor contract 400 Time draft 386
(CIO) 398 Maker of a note 387 Time note 388
Contractual capacity 390 Maker of a CD 388 Undisclosed agency 393
Remember the case scenario at the beginning of the chapter and the agent’s ability to contract, do you believe Universal is
involving Leroy Behlman and the other football fans who liable? For assistance in answering this question, look at the
contracted with Octagon Travel Center, Inc., for tickets to case Behlman v. Universal Travel Agency, Inc., 496 A.2d 962
the Super Bowl? Now that you know more about agency law (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).

Working the Web Internet Exercises 2. For an overview of labor law, see “Labor and Employ-
ment Law,” at jurist.law.pitt.edu/sg_lab.htm.
1. Visit Nolo Press at www.nolo.com to find general
information regarding the classification of independ-
ent contractors versus employees.
A number of airlines—Delta, Northwest, United, and Exercise:

American—have filed for bankruptcy protection in recent
Do a Google search to find several other large companies
years. All of those airlines had pension plan agreements with
which have filed for bankruptcy protection during the cur-
their employment contracts with employees that were
rent economic crisis. Give examples of how each of those
affected by bankruptcy proceedings. For instance, under
companies were able to alter and/or breach contracts they
United’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan, the airline was
had previously negotiated.
permitted to drop its four pension plans that covered
120,000 current and retired United Airlines workers.

Topic: Promissory Notes what is owed by Charlie’s Supermarket to All You Can Eat Ice
Cream Buffet, Inc.
Drafting Exercises at the end of each chapter so as to famil- Exercise/Assignment:
Draft a “Demand Promissory Note” obligating Smith to pay
Facts: the above sum.
One of All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc.’s, customers, a Sources:
grocery store called Charlie’s Supermarket, is unable to pay
Use the chapter material and chapter examples for purposes
$10,000 it owes for ice cream it ordered. The owner of Charlie’s
of drafting this demand promissory note.
Supermarket, Charlie Smith, has agreed to personally pay

Critical Legal Thinking Case 15.1 Negotiable Instrument: Critical Legal Thinking Case 15.2 Student Loan Agree-
Note On August 17, 1979, Sandra McGuire and her hus- ments and Bankruptcy Raymond Woodcock graduated
band entered into a contract to purchase the inventory, from law school and finished his MBA in 1983. His student
equipment, accounts receivable, and name of “Becca’s loans came due nine months later. Because he was a part-
Boutique” from Pascal and Rebecca Tursi. Becca’s Boutique time student until 1990, he requested that payment be
was a clothing store owned as a sole proprietorship by the deferred, which the lender incorrectly approved. He was not
Tursis. The McGuires agreed to purchase the store for in a degree program, so payment should not have been
$75,000, with a down payment of $10,000 and the balance to deferred under the terms of the loan. Woodcock filed for
be paid by October 5, 1979. The promissory note signed by bankruptcy in 1992, more than seven years after the loans
the McGuires read: “For value received, Thomas J. McGuire first became due. So that debt would be discharged unless
and Sandra A. McGuire, husband and wife, do promise to there was an “applicable suspension of the repayment
pay to the order of Pascal and Rebecca Tursi the sum of period.” Should Woodcock’s student loan contract be dis-
$65,000.” Is the note an order to pay or a promise to pay? charged through filing for bankruptcy? Woodcock v. Chemi-
P.P. Inc. v. McGuire, 509 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1981). cal Bank, 144 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 1998).
406 Chapter 15
ETHICS CASES
Ethics Case 15.1 Mullins Enterprises, Inc. (Mullins), was a The note stipulated that the parties were jointly and severally
business operating in the state of Kentucky. To raise capital, obligated to State First. After Arkansas Parts defaulted on
Mullins obtained loans from Corbin Deposit Bank & Trust the note, State First sued Arkansas Parts and Rogers and
Company (Corbin). Between 1971 and 1975, Corbin made Mollenhour, individually. Mollenhour claimed he was not
eight loans to Mullins. Mullins executed a promissory note liable because his signature indicated his representative
setting out the amount of the debt, the dates and times of capacity. Who wins? Did Mollenhour act ethically in this
installment payments, and the date of final payment and case? Mollenhour v. State First Nat’l Bank of Texarkana, 769
delivered it to the bank each time a loan was made. The S.W.2d 28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989).
notes were signed by an officer of Mullins. In 1980, a dispute
Ethics Case 15.3 The Hagues, husband and wife, owned a
arose between Mullins and Corbin as to the proper interpreta-
160-acre tract they decided to sell. On March 19, 1976, they
tion of the language contained in the notes. The bank con-
entered into a listing agreement with Harvey C. Hilgendorf,
tended that the notes were demand notes. Mullins claimed the
a licensed real estate broker, which gave Hilgendorf the
notes were time instruments. Did Corbin or Mullins act
exclusive right to sell the property for a period of 12 months.
unethically in this case? Or was this just a legal dispute? Who
The Hagues agreed to pay Hilgendorf a commission of 6 per-
wins? Corbin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Mullins Enter., Inc.,
cent of the accepted sale price if a bona fide buyer were
641 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
found during the listing period.
Ethics Case 15.2 Mike J. Rogers, owner of Arkansas Parts By letter on August 13, 1976, the Hagues terminated the
and Equipment Company (Arkansas Parts), invited Paul listing agreement with Hilgendorf. Hilgendorf did not acqui-
Mollenhour to be an officer of the business. Rogers wanted esce to the Hagues’ termination, however. On September 30,
Mollenhour to join the business because his strong financial 1976, Hilgendorf presented an offer to the Hagues from a buyer
position would allow Rogers to secure operating financing willing to purchase the property at the full listing price. The
more easily. With Mollenhour’s assistance, Arkansas Parts Hagues ignored the offer and sold the property to another
secured financing in 1986. On February 19, 1986, Arkansas buyer. Hilgendorf sued the Hagues for breach of the agency
Parts executed a revolving credit note with State First agreement. Did the Hagues act ethically in this case? Who wins
National Bank of Texarkana (State First) in the amount of the lawsuit? Hilgendorf v. Hague, 293 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1980).
$150,000. The note was signed as follows:
/s/Mike Rogers
Mike Rogers, Individually
/s/Dave Mollenhour, V. Pres.

Dave Mollenhour, Individually
EQUIPMENT CO., INC.
by: /s/Mike Rogers
Mike Rogers, President
by: /s/Dave Mollenhour, V. Pres.
Dave Mollenhour, Vice President and Secretary
Read Case B.15 in Appendix B (Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 1. Who was the plaintiff? Who was the defendant?
583 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1978)). This case is excerpted from 2. What did the defendant do that caused the plaintiff to
the appellate court’s opinion. Review and brief the case (see file this action?
Appendix A) using the IRAC method. After briefing the 3. What is an unfair labor practice?
case, you should be able to answer the following questions: 4. Did the court find an unfair labor practice in this case?
LIST OF CASES REPORTED
1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30 (Dist. Ct. 2003). 254
A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1982). 279
A.M. Knitwear v. All Am., Etc., 359 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1976). 300
Accrued Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2002). 161
Alba v. Kaufmann, 810 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 2006). 208
Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862 (Tenn. 1982). 64
Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 861 F.2d 650 (11th Cir. 1988). 176
Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432 (1988). 145, 155
Allsopp Sand & Gravel v. Lincoln Sand & Gravel, 525 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988). 326
Alston v. Monk, 373 S.E.2d 463 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 111
Archer Daniels Midland v. Charter Int’l Oil Co., 60 B.R. 854 (M.D. Fla. 1986). 325
Architectural Systems, Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 760 F. Supp. 79 (D.Md. 1991). 169
Aronowicz v. Nalley’s, Inc., 106 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Ct. App. 1972). 78
Atlantic Wholesale Co. v. Solondz, 320 S.E.2d 720 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984). 152
Barnes v. Treece, 549 P.2d 1152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). 131
Barrows v. Maco, Inc., 419 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 179
Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 345
Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 400 A.2d 78 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1979). 132
Beale v. Thompson, 12 U.S. 70 (1814). 382
Beavers v. Weatherly, 299 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. 1983). 111
Behlman v. Universal Travel Agency, Inc., 496 A.2d 962 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). 405
Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995). 354
Berliner Foods Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 633 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1986). 181
Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 224 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App.
1986). 218
Bickham v. Washington Bank & Trust Co., 515 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 1987). 25
Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Meyer Garage, 487 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). 299
Bill Branch Chevrolet v. Redmond, 378 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 347
Blye v. American Broad. Co. Merch., Inc., 476 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1984). 154
Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, 269 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). 111
Briggs v. Sackett, 418 A.2d 586 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). 153
Brocklesby v. Jeppesen & Co., 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985). 380
Brown v. Hammond, 810 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 378
Brumfield v. Death Row Records, Inc., No. B149561, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 7843, at *1
(Ct. App. Unpub. Aug. 19, 2003). 219
Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 419 (Ct. App. 1978). 379
407
408 List of Cases Reported
Burnett v. Purtell, No. 91-L-094, 1992 Ohio LEXIS 3467, at *1 (Ct. App. June 30,
1992). 435
Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. Health Serv., Inc., 668 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1995). 434
California & Haw. Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986). 201
Campbell v. Carr, 603 S.E.2d 625 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). 92
Campbell v. Hostetter Farms, Inc., 380 A.2d 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). 325
Campbell v. McClure, 227 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Ct. App. 1986). 132
Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 53 F.3d
716 (5th Cir. 1995). 426–427
Cate v. Dover Corp., 776 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App. 1989), rev’d, 790 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.
1990). 437
Cerdes v. Wright, 408 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 1981). 58
Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1991). 430–431
Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596 (Me. 1978). 26
Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc. v. Carter, 733 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1987). 298
Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2002). 190
City of Everett v. Mitchell, 631 P.2d 366 (Wash. 1981). 10
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 818 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2004). 177
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 857 N.E.2d 95 (Ohio 2006). 177
Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, No. 02-1782 ADM/JGL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1226, at *1
(D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2005). 253
Cole Energy Dev. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 678 F. Supp. 208 (C.D. Ill. 1988). 348
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), rehearing en banc
denied, No. 95-3452, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24796, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 19,
1996). 204
Concrete Sales & Equip. Rental Co. v. Kent Nowlin Constr., Inc., 746 P.2d 645 (N.M.
1987). 326
Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989). 425–426
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App.
1989). 427–428
Cooper v. Smith, 800 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 66
Corbin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Mullins Enter., Inc., 641 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1982). 406
Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31 (S.D. 1983). 347
C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 641 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Miss. 1986). 326
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). 218
Crosswhite v. Jumpking, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D. Or. 2006). 366
Crothers v. Norm’s Auto Sales, 384 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 346
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hag. Con. 54, at 105 (1811). 184
Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992). 333
Dees v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 131 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1997). 59
Dempsey v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 972 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1992). 79
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1995). 336
Deupree v. Butner, 522 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1988). 133
In re Estate of Divine, 635 N.E.2d 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 214
Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1975). 380
Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1989). 135
E.A. Coronis Assoc. v. Gordon Constr. Co., 216 A.2d 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966). 278
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002). 229
E.B. Harvey & Co. v. Protective Sys., Inc., No. CA No. 840, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 105,
at *1 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1989). 431–433
Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978). 133
Edmond’s of Fresno v. MacDonald Group, Ltd., 217 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App.
1985). 57
Ellefson v. Megadeth, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5395 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 545, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005). 51
Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 370
Executive Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Pagel, 715 P.2d 381 (Kan. 1986). 301
Feiler v. Rosenbloom, 416 A.2d 1345 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980). 154
First Baptist Church of Moultrie v. Barber Contracting Co., 377 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989). 134
First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. West, 693 P.2d 1053 (Idaho 1984). 153
Flood v. Fiduciary & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 1981). 97
Frasier v. Carter, 432 P.2d 32 (Idaho 1968). 78
Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Bldg. & Loan Co., 370 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio Ct. App.
1977). 300
Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979). 111
G.A. Modefine S.A. v. A.R. Mani, No. D2001-0537 WIPO (2001). 229
Gann v. Morris, 596 P.2d 43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). 111
Georgia Port Auth. v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 274 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980). 300
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grady, 501 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985). 325
Glende Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Ct. App. 1984). 57
Glenn v. Overhead Door Corp., 935 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). 368
Goodwest Rubber Corp. v. Munoz, 170 Cal. App. 3d 919 (1985). 79
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 350, 355
Gulash v. Stylarama, 364 A.2d 1221 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975). 278
Gundersons, Inc. v. Ptarmigan Inv. Co., 678 P.2d 1061 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983). 217
Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1980). 110
Hamer v. Sidwa, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 63
Hampton v. Federal Express Corp., 917 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1990). 429
Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Microform Data Sys. Inc., 829 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1987). 217
Hayward v. Potsma, 188 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). 300
H.C. Schmieding Produce Co. v. Cagle, 529 So. 2d 243 (Ala.1988). 278
Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Ct. App. 1986). 263
Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ill. 1982). 277

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 328
Hickman v. Bates, 889 So. 2d 1249 (La. App. 2004). 205
Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 99 P.3d 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 362
Hilgendorf v. Hague, 293 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1980). 414
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683 (1965). 80
Hoffman v. Sun Valley Co., 628 P.2d 218 (Idaho 1981). 153
Horn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 551 P.2d 398 (Cal. 1976). 438–439
Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 1998). 192
H.S. Perlin Co. v. Morse Signal Devices of San Diego, 258 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App.
1989). 217
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889). 82
Hunt v. McIlory Bank & Trust, 616 S.W.2d 759 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981). 57
Hydrotech Sys. Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1991). 113
Idaho Plumbers & Pipefitters Health & Welfare Fund v. United Mech. Contractors,
Inc., 875 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989). 218
Idaho State Bar v. Jenkins, 816 P.2d 335 (1991). 345
Indiana Tri-City Plaza Bowl v. Estate of Glueck, 422 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981). 182
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Automatic Sprinkler, 423 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1981). 348
International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 700 P.2d 642 (N.M. 1985). 325
Jacob Hartz Seed Co. v. Coleman, 612 S.W.2d 91 (Ark. 1981). 325
James v. Turilli, 473 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). 58
J.C. Durick Ins. v. Andrus, 424 A.2d 249 (Vt. 1980). 58
Jenkins v. Tuneup Masters, 235 Cal. Rptr. 214 (Ct. App. 1987). 58
Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 443 N.E.2d 932 (N.Y.
1982). 307
John Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 226
Jones v. Flight Sport Aviation, Inc., 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981). 87
Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265 (Ct. App. 2006). 365
Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987). 380
Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1987). 112
Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1985). 348
Keperwes v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 534 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988). 347
Koch v. Spaulding, 529 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 111
Krysa v. Payne, 176 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 121
Lakin v. Senco Prod., Inc., 925 P.2d 107 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). 361
Landsberg v. Selchow & Richter Co., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986). 27
Landshire Food Serv., Inc. v. Coghill, 709 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 299
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 918 (1991). 399
Lee Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Labonte, D.C.A. No. 77-260, C.A. No. 76-2663,
1980 R.I. LEXIS 190, at *1 (Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1980). 300
Levin v. Knight, 865 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1989). 154
Lim v. The .TV Corp. Int’l, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 2002). 38
Lindblad v. Holmes, No. BACV2004-00469, 2004 Mass. LEXIS 631, at*1 (Super. Ct.
Nov. 24, 2004). 252
Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999). 207
Lindholm v. Brant, No. X05CV020189393, 2005 Conn. LEXIS 2366, at *1 (Super
Ct. Aug. 29, 2005), aff ’d, 925 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2007). 292
Liz Claiborne, Inc. v. Avon Prod., Inc., 530 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1988). 216
LNS Inv. Co. v. Phillips 66 Co., 731 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Kan. 1990). 435–437
Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). 180
Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). 56
Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1972). 381
Mack Massey Motors, Inc. v. Garnica, 814 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991). 338
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 353
Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Muhammad Ali, 430 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill.
1977). 217
M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999). 245
Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2006). 33
Mark Realty, Inc. v. Rogness, 418 So. 2d 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 422–423
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 24
Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 266 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). 347
McGirr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1974). 154
McKinnie v. Milford, 597 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App. 1980). 181
McLaughlin v. Heikkila, 697 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 41
McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 541 S.W.2d 911 (Ark. 1976). 325
Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 35
Miller v. Newsweek, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1987). 278
Mollenhour v. State First Nat’l Bank of Texarkana, 769 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. Ct. App.
1989). 406
Montgomery v. English, 902 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 46
Morin Bldg. Products Co., Inc. v. Baystone Construction, Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir.
1983). 183
Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972). 181
New England Yacht Sales v. Commissioner of Revenue Serv., 504 A.2d 506 (Conn.
1986). 299
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). 401
Ocean Dunes of Hutchinson Island Dev. Corp. v. Colangelo, 463 So. 2d 437 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 79
Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985). 153
O’Neill v. DeLaney, 415 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 68
O’Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 212
Outdoor Serv., Inc. v. Pabagold, Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Ct. App. 1986). 182
Pace Constr. Corp. v. OBS Co., 531 So. 2d 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 181
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1990). 218
Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 295 N.E.2d 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 174
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970). 195
Parma Tile, Mosaic & Marble Co. Inc. v. Estate of Short, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992) 147
Penley v. Penley, 332 S.E.2d 51 (N.C. 1985). 77
Performance Chevrolet, Inc. v. Mkt. Scan Info. Sys., Inc., No. CV-04-244-S-BLW,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23257, at *1 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 2007). 254
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 408–413
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 372
Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App. 1992). 112
Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Spencer, No. CIV. S-00-471 GEB PAN, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7060, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2000). 255
Portland Elec. and Plumbing Co. v. City of Vancouver, 627 P.2d 1350 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1981). 181
Powell v. Thompson-Powell, No. 04-12-0027, 2006 Del. LEXIS 10, *1 (C.P. Kent
Jan.18, 2006). 18
P.P. Inc. v. McGuire, 509 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1981). 405
Prewitt v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 745 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1984). 288
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 254
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). 120
Ramos et al., v. The Phillies, L.P., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS. 167
Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 1981). 4
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 224
Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App.
1984). 128
Robert Chuckrow Constr. Co. v. Gough, 159 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct. App.
1968). 78
Romasanta v. Mitton, 234 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1987). 81
Rosenfeld v. Zerneck, 776 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 2004). 152
Ryno v. Tyra, 752 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App. 1988). 100
Schaneman v. Schaneman, 291 N.W.2d 412 (Neb. 1980). 131
Schluter v. United Farmers Elevator, 479 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. App. 1992). 301
Schultz v. County of Contra Costa, Cal., 203 Cal. Rptr. 760 (Ct. App. 1984). 132
Sebasty v. Perschke, 404 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 279
Sedmak v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 324
Shattuck v. Klotzbach, 14 Mass. L. Rep. 360 (Super. Ct. 2001). 142
Shepard v. Mozzetti, 545 A.2d 621 (Del. 1988). 155
Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966). 359
Silver v. Wycombe, Meyer & Co., 477 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984). 300
Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 583 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1978). 438–439
Smith v. General Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Ct. App. 1974). 380
Smith v. Williamson, 429 So. 2d 598 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). 94
Sofias v. Bank of America, 218 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Ct. App. 1985). 181
Soldau v. Organon, Inc., 860 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1988). 49
Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Peterson, 837 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 381
St. Charles Cable TV v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). 278
Steele v. Goettee, 542 A.2d 847 (Md. 1988). 132
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997). 106
Sulzer Bingham Pumps, Inc. v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 947 F.2d 1362 (9th
Cir. 1991). 134
Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 506 So. 2d 317 (Ala. 1987). 197
Sutton v. Warner, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Ct. App. 1993). 141
Swan Island Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Troy’s Custom Smoking Co., 619 P.2d 1326
(Or. Ct. App. 1980). 348
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Abir, No. 97 Civ. 8673 (JGK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1275, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1999). 433
Traco, Inc. v. Arrow Glass Co., 814 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App. 1991). 423–425
Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1988). 326
In re Unimet Corp., 842 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828
(1989). 401
United States v. Michaels Jewelers, Inc., No. N 85-242 (JAC), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15142, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 8, 1985). 299
Uzan v. 845 UN Ltd. P’ship, 778 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2004). 199
Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). 218
Wallace C. Drennen, Inc. v. Haeuser, 402 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 1981). 217
Wallach Marine Corp. v. Donzi Marine Corp., 675 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1987). 278
Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App.
1988). 217
Welles v. Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sci., No. CV 03-05314 DDP (JTLx),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5756, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2004). 11
Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin, 650 So. 2d 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992). 118
Whitmire v. Watkins, 267 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1980). 78
Wilson v. Kealakekua Ranch, Ltd., 551 P.2d 525 (Haw. 1976). 111
Wilson v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Ct. App. 1991). 124
Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989). 276
Winkel v. Family Health Care, P.C., 668 P.2d 208 (Mont. 1983). 26
In re Wirth, 789 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 2005). 70
Woodcock v. Chemical Bank, 144 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 1998). 405
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). 16
Yale Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Fountain, 838 A.2d 179 (Conn.
2004). 89
Ybarras v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 609 P.2d 331 (N.M. 1980). 326
Yost v. Rieve Enter., Inc., 461 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 133
Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998). 102
appendix A
IRAC INSTRUCTIONS
FOR BRIEFING A
CASE AND WRITING
ASSIGNMENT CASES
BRIEFING A CASE
Judges apply legal reasoning in reaching a decision in a case. That is, a judge must
specify the issue presented by the case, identify the key facts in the case and the
applicable law, and then apply the law to the facts to come to a conclusion that
answers the issue presented. This process is called critical legal thinking. Skills of
analysis and interpretation are important in deciding legal cases.
Key Legal Terms

Before you embark on the study of law, you should know the following key legal
terms:
• Plaintiff. The plaintiff is the party who originally brought the lawsuit.
• Defendant. The defendant is the party against whom the lawsuit has been
brought.
• Petitioner, or appellant. The petitioner (or appellant) is the party who has
appealed the decision of the trial court or lower court. The petitioner may be
either the plaintiff or the defendant, depending on who lost the case at the
trial court or lower court level.
• Respondent, or appellee. The respondent (or appellee) is the party who
must answer the petitioner’s appeal. The respondent may be either the plain-
tiff or the defendant, depending on which party is the petitioner. In some
cases, both the plaintiff and the defendant may disagree with the trial court’s
or lower court’s decision, and both parties may appeal the decision.
Briefing a Case Using the IRAC Method

It is often helpful for a student to “brief ” a case to clarify the legal issues involved
and to gain a better understanding of the case. One procedure for briefing a case is
415
416 Appendix A
EXHIBIT A.1 Word Count for Briefing a Case Using the IRAC Method
PART MAXIMUM WORDS

1. The case name, citation, and court 50
2. A summary of the key facts in the case 150
3. I 5 The issue presented by the case, stated as a
one-sentence question answerable only by yes or no 50
4. R 5 The rule of law of the case, stated in one sentence 50
5. A 5 A summary of the court’s analysis and reason-
ing justifying the holding 250
6. C 5 The court’s conclusion of the issue (the “holding”) 50
Total words 600
to use the IRAC method. After reading the facts of a case, the student then uses the
following approach in analyzing the case:
I 5 What is the legal issue in the case?
R 5 What is the rule (law) of the case?
A 5 What is the court’s analysis and rationale?
C 5 What was the conclusion or outcome of the case?
The procedure for briefing a case using the IRAC method is as follows: The
student must summarize, or brief, the court’s decision in no more than 600 words
(some professors may shorten or lengthen this limit). The brief ’s format is highly
structured, consisting of six parts, each of which is numbered and labeled (see
Exhibit A.1).
Elements of a Case Brief

Briefing a case consists of making a summary of each of the following items of the
case:
1. Case name, citation, and court. The name of the case should be placed at the
beginning of each briefed case. The case name usually contains the names of
the parties to the lawsuit (for example, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin). Where there
are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, however, some of the names of the par-
ties may be omitted from the case name. Abbreviations are often used in case
names as well.
The case citation, which consists of a number plus the year in which the
case was decided, such as “532 U.S. 661, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904, Web
2001 U.S. Lexis 4115,” is set forth below the case name. The case citation
identifies the book in the law library or the Internet site where the case may
be found. For example, the case in the above citation may be found on page
661 in volume 532 of the United States Reports, on page 1879 in volume 121 of
the Supreme Court Reporter, on page 904 in volume 149 of the Lawyer’s
Edition second edition, and on the Lexis Nexis website, at 2001 U.S. Lexis
4115. The name of the court that decided the case should be set forth below
the case name for the case.
IRAC Instructions for Briefing a Case and Writing Assignment Cases 417
2. Key facts. The important facts of a case should be stated briefly. Extraneous
facts and facts of minor importance should be omitted from the brief. The
facts of the case can usually be found at the beginning of the case, but not
necessarily. Important facts may be found throughout the case.
3. I 5 Issue. In the briefing of a case, it is crucial to identify the issue presented
to the court to decide. The issue on appeal is most often a legal question,
although questions of fact are sometimes the subject of an appeal. The issue
presented in each case is usually quite specific and should be asked in a one-
sentence question that is answerable only by yes or no. For example, the issue
statement, “Is the PGA Tour, Inc., liable?” is too broad. A proper statement of
the issue would be, “Does the Americans with Disabilities Act require the
PGA to accommodate Martin by permitting him to use a golf cart while play-
ing in PGA tournaments?”
4. R 5 Rule of law. In setting forth the brief of the case, you should state the
rule of law at issue in the case. This could be a provision in the federal or
state constitutions, a federal or state statute, or other law that is presented in
the case.
5. A 5 Analysis. When an appellate court or a supreme court issues a decision,
which is often called an opinion, the court will normally state the reasoning it
used in reaching its decision. The rationale for the decision may be based on
the specific facts of the case, public policy, prior law, or other matters. In stat-
ing the reasoning of the court, the student should reword the court’s language
into his or her own language. This summary of the court’s reasoning should
pick out the meat of the opinions and weed out the nonessentials.
6. C 5 Conclusion. The conclusion is the decision reached by the present court.
It should be yes or no. The holding should also state which party won. The
conclusion is sometimes called the holding.
The following is an excerpted decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The case is presented in the language of the Supreme Court. Following the
Supreme Court’s opinion is the IRAC brief of the case.
CASE A.1
PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN,

532 U.S. 661, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.3d 904, Web 2001 U.S. Lexis 4115 (2001).
OPINION, STEVEN, JUSTICE This case raises two questions concerning the appli-
cation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.] to a
gifted athlete: first, whether the Act protects access to professional golf tournaments
by a qualified entrant with a disability, and second, whether a disabled contestant
may be denied the use of a golf cart because it would “fundamentally alter the
nature” of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk.
Petitioner PGA TOUR, Inc., a nonprofit entity formed in 1968, sponsors and cospon-
sors professional golf tournaments conducted on three annual tours. About 200 golf-
ers participate in the PGA TOUR; about 170 in the NIKE TOUR; and about 100 in the
SENIOR PGA TOUR. PGA TOUR and NIKE TOUR tournaments typically are four-day
418 Appendix A
events, played on courses leased and operated by petitioner. The revenues gener-
ated by television, admissions, concessions, and contributions from cosponsors
amount to about $300 million a year, much of which is distributed in prize money. The
“Conditions of Competition and Local Rules,” often described as the “hard card,”
apply specifically to petitioner’s professional tours. The hard cards for the PGA TOUR
and NIKE TOUR required players to walk the golf course during tournaments, but not
during open qualifying rounds. On the SENIOR PGA TOUR, which is limited to golfers
age 50 and older, the contestants may use golf carts. Most seniors, however, prefer to
walk.
Casey Martin is a talented golfer. As an amateur, be won 17 Oregon Golf Associa-
tion junior events before he was 15, and he won the state championship as a high
school senior. He played on the Stanford University golf team that won the 1994
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) championship. As a professional,
Martin qualified for the NIKE TOUR in 1998 and 1999, and based on his 1999 perform-
ance, qualified for the PGA TOUR in 2000. In the 1999 season, be entered 24 events,
made the cut 13 times, and had six top-10 finishes, coming in second twice and third
once.
Martin is also an individual with a disability, as defined in the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act). Since birth he has been afflicted with Klippel-Trenau-
nay-Weber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the flow of
blood from his right leg back to his heart. The disease is progressive; it causes severe
pain and has atrophied his right leg. During the latter part of his college career,
because of the progress of the disease, Martin could no longer walk an 18-hole golf
course. Walking not only caused him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also created a
significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so
badly that an amputation might be required.
When Martin turned pro and entered petitioner’s Qualifying-School, the hard card
permitted him to use a cart during his successful progress through the first two stages.
He made a request, supported by detailed medical records, for permission to use a
golf cart during the third stage. Petitioner refused to review those records or to waive
its walking rule for the third stage. Martin therefore filed this action.
At trial, petitioner PGA TOUR did not contest the conclusion that Martin has a dis-
ability covered by the ADA, or the fact that his disability prevents him from walking the
course during a round of golf. Rather, petitioner asserted that the condition of walking
is a substantive rule of competition and that waiving it as to any individual for any
reason would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. Petitioner’s evidence
included the testimony of a number of experts, among them some of the greatest
golfers in history. Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and Ken Venturi explained that fatigue
can be a critical factor in a tournament, particularly on the last day, when psycho-
logical pressure is at a maximum. Their testimony makes it clear that, in their view,
permission to use a cart might well give some players a competitive advantage over
other players who must walk.
The judge found that the purpose of the rule was to inject fatigue into the skill of
shot-making, but that the fatigue injected “by walking the course cannot be deemed
significant under normal circumstances.” Furthermore, Martin presented evidence,
and the judge found, that even with the use of a cart, Martin must walk over a mile
during an 18-hole round, and that the fatigue he suffers from coping with his disability
is “undeniably greater” than the fatigue his able-bodied competitors endure from
walking the course. As a result, the judge concluded that it would “not fundamentally
alter the nature of the PGA Tour’s game to accommodate him with a cart.” The judge
accordingly entered a permanent injunction requiring petitioner to permit Martin to
use a cart in tour and qualifying events.
The Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses remain places of public
accommodation during PGA tournaments. On the merits, because there was no
serious dispute about the fact that permitting Martin to use a golf cart was both a
reasonable and a necessary solution to the problem of providing him access to the
tournaments, the Court of Appeals regarded the central dispute as whether such per-
mission would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the PGA TOUR or NIKE TOUR. Like the
District Court, the Court of Appeals viewed the issue not as “whether use of carts gen-
erally would fundamentally alter the competition, but whether the use of a cart by
Martin would do so.” That issue turned on “an intensively fact-based inquiry,” and, the
court concluded, had been correctly resolved by the trial judge. In its words, “all that
the cart does is permit Martin access to a type of competition in which he otherwise
could not engage because of his disability.”
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against
disabled individuals. To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employ-
ment (Title I of the Act), public services (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III).
At issue now is the applicability of Title III to petitioner’s golf tours and qualifying rounds,
in particular to petitioner’s treatment of a qualified disabled golfer wishing to com-
pete in those events.
It seems apparent, from both the general rule and the comprehensive definition
of “public accommodation,” that petitioner’s golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit
comfortably within the coverage of Title III, and Martin within its protection. The events
occur on “golf courses,” a type of place specifically identified by the Act as a public
accommodation [Section 12181(7)(L)]. In this case, the narrow dispute is whether
allowing Martin to use a golf cart, despite the walking requirement that applies to the
PGA TOUR, the NIKE TOUR, and the third stage of the Qualifying-School, is a modifica-
tion that would “fundamentally alter the nature” of those events.
As an initial matter, we observe that the use of carts is not itself inconsistent with
the fundamental character of the game of golf. From early on, the essence of the
game has been shot-making—using clubs to cause a ball to progress from the teeing
ground to a hole some distance away with as few strokes as possible. Golf carts
started appearing with increasing regularity on American golf courses in the 1950s.
Today they are everywhere. And they are encouraged. For one thing, they often
speed up play, and for another, they are great revenue producers. There is nothing in
the rules of golf that either forbids the use of carts or penalizes a player for using a
cart.
Petitioner, however, distinguishes the game of golf as it is generally played from
the game that it sponsors in the PGA TOUR, NIKE TOUR, and the last stage of the
Qualifying-School—golf at the “highest level.” According to petitioner, “the goal of the
highest-level competitive athletics is to assess and compare the performance of differ-
ent competitors, a task that is meaningful only if the competitors are subject to identi-
cal substantive rules.” The waiver of any possibly “outcome-affecting” rule for a
contestant would violate this principle and therefore, in petitioner’s view, fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the highest-level athletic event. The walking rule is one such
rule, petitioner submits, because its purpose is “to inject the element of fatigue into
the skill of shot-making,” and thus its effect may be the critical loss of a stroke. As a
consequence, the reasonable modification Martin seeks would fundamentally alter
the nature of petitioner’s highest-level tournaments.
The force of petitioner’s argument is, first of all, mitigated by the fact that golf is a
game in which it is impossible to guarantee that all competitors will play under exactly
the same conditions or that an individual’s ability will be the sole determinant of the
outcome. For example, changes in the weather may produce harder greens and
more head winds for the tournament leader than for his closest pursuers. A lucky
bounce may save a shot or two. Whether such happenstance events are more or less
probable than the likelihood that a golfer afflicted with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber
Syndrome would one day qualify for the NIKE TOUR and PGA TOUR, they at least
420 Appendix A
demonstrate that pure chance may have a greater impact on the outcome of elite
golf tournaments than the fatigue resulting from the enforcement of the walking rule.
Further, the factual basis of petitioner’s argument is undermined by the District
Court’s finding that the fatigue from walking during one of petitioner’s 4-day tourna-
ments cannot be deemed significant. The District Court credited the testimony of a
professor in physiology and expert on fatigue, who calculated the calories expended
in walking a golf course (about five miles) to be approximately 500 calories—
“nutritionally less than a Big Mac.” What is more, that energy is expended over a
5-hour period, during which golfers have numerous intervals for rest and refreshment.
In fact, the expert concluded, because golf is a low-intensity activity, fatigue from the
game is primarily a psychological phenomenon in which stress and motivation are
the key ingredients. And even under conditions of severe heat and humidity, the criti-
cal factor in fatigue is fluid loss rather than exercise from walking. Moreover, when
given the option of using a cart, the majority of golfers in petitioner’s tournaments
have chosen to walk, often to relieve stress or for other strategic reasons. As NIKE TOUR
member Eric Johnson testified, walking allows him to keep in rhythm, stay warmer
when it is chilly, and develop a better sense of the elements and the course than rid-
ing a cart. As we have demonstrated, the walking rule is at best peripheral to the
nature of petitioner’s athletic events, and thus it might be waived in individual cases
without working a fundamental alteration.
Under the ADA’s basic requirement that the need of a disabled person be evalu-
ated on an individual basis, we have no doubt that allowing Martin to use a golf cart
would not fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner’s tournaments. As we have dis-
cussed, the purpose of the walking rule is to subject players to fatigue, which in turn
may influence the outcome of tournaments. Even if the rule does serve that purpose,
it is an uncontested finding of the District Court that Martin “easily endures greater
fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking.” The pur-
pose of the walking rule is therefore not compromised in the slightest by allowing
Martin to use a cart. A modification that provides an exception to a peripheral
tournament rule without impairing its purpose cannot be said to “fundamentally
alter” the tournament. What it can be said to do, on the other band, is to allow
Martin the chance to qualify for and compete in the athletic events petitioner offers
to those members of the public who have the skill and desire to enter. That is exactly
what the ADA requires. As a result, Martin’s request for a waiver of the walking rule
should have been granted.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.
DISSENTING OPINION, SCALIA, JUSTICE In my view today’s opinion exercises a

benevolent compassion that the law does not place it within our power to impose.
The judgment distorts the text of Title III, the structure of the ADA, and common sense.
I respectfully dissent.
Agility, strength, speed, balance, quickness of mind, steadiness of nerves, inten-
sity of concentration—these talents are not evenly distributed. No wild-eyed dreamer
has ever suggested that the managing bodies of the competitive sports that test pre-
cisely these qualities should try to take account of the uneven distribution of God-
given gifts when writing and enforcing the rules of competition. And I have no doubt
Congress did not authorize misty-eyed judicial supervision of such a revolution.
IRAC Brief of the Case
1. Case Name, Citation, and Court

PGA TOUR, Inc. v Martin
532 U.S. 661, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.3d 904, Web 2001 Lexis 4115 (2001)
2. Key Facts
a. PGA TOUR, Inc., is a nonprofit organization that sponsors professional
golf tournaments.
b. The PGA establishes rules for its golf tournaments. A PGA rule requires
golfers to walk the golf course and not use golf carts.
c. Casey Martin is a professional golfer who suffers from Klippel-
Trenaunay-Weber syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that
atrophied Martin’s right leg and causes him pain, fatigue, and anxiety
when walking.
d. When Martin petitioned the PGA to use a golf cart during golf tourna-
ments, the PGA refused.
e. Martin sued the PGA, alleging discrimination against a disabled
individual in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a
federal statute.
3. I 5 Issue
Does the Americans with Disabilities Act require the PGA to accommodate
Martin by permitting him to use a golf cart while playing in PGA tournaments?
4. R 5 Rule
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to make reason-
able accommodations to persons with disabilities where such rule does
not cause an undue burden on the employer.
5. A 5 Analysis
The Supreme Court held that:
a. Martin was disabled and covered by the act.
b. Golf courses are “public accommodations” covered by the act.
c. The use of golf carts is not a fundamental character of the game of
golf.
d. Other than the PGA rule, there is no rule of golf that forbids the use of
golf carts.
e. It is impossible to guarantee that all players in golf will play under
exactly the same conditions, so allowing Martin to use a golf cart gives
him no advantage over other golfers.
f. Martin, because of his disease, will probably suffer more fatigue play-
ing golf using a golf cart than other golfers will suffer without using a
cart.
g. The PGA’s “walking rule” is only peripheral to the game of golf and not
a fundamental part of golf.
h. Allowing Martin to use a golf cart will not fundamentally alter the PGA’s
highest-level professional golf tournaments.
6. C 5 Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the PGA must allow Martin to use a golf cart
when competing in PGA golf tournaments. Affirmed. U.S. supreme court
appendix B
CASES FOR “BRIEFING THE CASE

WRITING ASSIGNMENTS” CASE B.1
MARK REALTY, INC. v. ROGNESS, 418 SO. 2D 373
(FLA. DIST. CT. APP. 1982).
Tilman Rogness, owner, entered into four separate agreements with Mark Realty, Inc.,
a real estate broker. They were entitled “exclusive right of sale” and gave the broker,
for a stated period of time, the exclusive right to sell the property for a certain stated
price and on certain terms. The broker sued on the four agreements for brokerage
commissions, alleging that during the time provided in the agreements the owner
had conveyed the four properties. The owner’s answer alleged affirmative defenses
to the effect that the owner had “canceled, revoked and terminated” the brokerage
agreements before the properties were sold and that the broker had never performed
under the agreements.
The trial judge construed the brokerage agreements to constitute mere offers to
enter into unilateral contracts under which the broker would be entitled to a commis-
sion only if he performed by “finding a purchaser of the above property.” If the docu-
ments in question are merely offers limited to acceptance by performance only, the
trial judge’s analysis and conclusion would be correct.
We cannot agree that the documents were only offers for a unilateral contract.
The documents illustrate what has been termed “the usual practice” in the making of
bargains. One party indicates what he will do and what he requires in exchange and
the other then agrees. These documents, when first executed by the owner and ten-
dered to the broker, constituted offers which, when accepted by the broker by his
execution, constituted contracts. The contract is bilateral because it contains mutual
promises made in exchange for each other by each of the two contracting parties.
The most common recurring brokerage transaction is one in which the owner
employs a broker to find a purchaser able and willing to buy, on terms stated in
advance by the owner, and in which the owner promises to pay a specific commis-
sion for the service. Such a transaction as this is an offer by the owner of a unilateral
contract, an offered promise to pay by the owner, creating in the broker a power of
accepting the offer by actual rendition of the requested services. The only contem-
plated contract between the owner and broker is a unilateral contract—a promise to
pay a commission for services rendered. Such an offer of a promise to pay a commis-
sion for services rendered is revocable by the owner by notice before the broker has
rendered any part of the requested service. On the other hand, the transaction
between the owner and the broker can be a bilateral contract. An owner who puts his
land in the hands of a broker for sale usually clearly promises to pay a commission but
the broker rarely promises in return that he will produce a purchaser, although he
often promises, expressly or impliedly, that he will make certain efforts to do so. If the
parties have thus made mutual promises, the transaction no longer has the status of
an unaccepted offer—there is an existing bilateral contract and neither party has a
power of revocation. During the term of such a contract the owner may withdraw any
422
Cases for “Briefing the Case Writing Assignments” 423
power the owner has given the broker to contract with a third party in the owner’s
name, but this is not a revocation of the contract between the owner and the broker
and normally such action constitutes a breach of the brokerage contract.
In this case, the broker promised to inspect the property, to list the property with a
multiple listing service, to advertise the property in the local newspaper or other
media, to furnish information to inquiring cooperating brokers and prospective pur-
chasers, to show the property, to make efforts to find a purchaser, to “make an ear-
nest and continued effort to sell,” and to direct the concentrated efforts of his
organization in bringing about a sale.
In the instant case, the contract clearly provided that the brokerage commissions
would be paid “whether the purchaser be secured by you or me, or by any other per-
son.” Thus the contract granted the broker an exclusive right of sale and the trial court
erred in constructing the agreement as an offer of a unilateral contract revocable at
will at any time prior to performance.
The final judgment is REVERSED.
CASE B.2
TRACO, INC. v. ARROW GLASS CO., 814 S.W.2D 186
(TEX. APP. 1991).
This is a construction dispute stemming from a quotation given by Traco, Inc., a Three
Rivers Aluminum Company, a material supplier of preengineered aluminum and
glass sliding doors and windows, to Arrow Glass Company, Inc., a subcontractor, in
connection with the USAA Towers project in San Antonio, Texas. Arrow initially brought
suit against Traco on the theories of promissory estoppel and negligence for Traco’s
failure to supply aluminum and glass sliding doors at the quoted price. After a bench
trial, the trial court held for Arrow solely under the theory of promissory estoppel and
awarded Arrow judgment against Traco for damages in the amount of $75,843.38,
plus attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.
The facts of this case reflect that on or about October 9, 1986, construction bids
were due for the USAA Towers, a $49,000,000 retirement housing project located near
Fort Sam Houston, Texas. There were numerous suppliers, subcontractors, and gen-
eral contractors bidding to obtain work on this project including the appellant, Traco,
and the appellee, Arrow.
On bid day, a representative for Arrow received a telephone call from Dale Ferrar
of Traco. Mr. Ferrar told Bill Morris, the general manager of Arrow Glass, that Traco was
a very large window and sliding glass and aluminum door manufacturer in Pennsylvania.
Mr. Ferrar offered its A-2 aluminum and glass sliding doors, as an alternate product
substitution, to Arrow, which was bidding that portion of the project. However, after
some discussion of the required specifications, the parties realized that Traco’s doors
would have to be modified in order to comply with the project specifications. Arrow
declined to use Traco’s bid and, instead, submitted its original bid, using a different
supplier of doors. At approximately noon on bid day, Mr. Ferrar phoned Mr. Morris, quot-
ing a new price for the doors which included a modification of the frame depth which,
supposedly, enabled the doors to comply with the specifications. At this time, Mr. Morris
informed Mr. Ferrar that his bid was low and asked him to recheck his figures.
424 Appendix B
Mr. Ferrar explained that because of Traco’s size and the fact that it could manufac-
ture its products under one roof, Traco could sell the project for that amount. Mr. Ferrar
also indicated that Traco was seeking a high profile project to represent Traco in the
San Antonia area.
After receiving these assurances, Mr. Morris told Mr. Ferrar that he was going to
use Traco’s bid. Mr. Morris then phoned the contractors to whom he had originally
submitted his bid, and deducted $100,000 in reliance upon Traco’s bid. Mr. Morris
later told Mr. Ferrar that he had received favorable responses from three or four gen-
eral contractors, and that it appeared Arrow would get the project. Mr. Morris advised
Mr. Ferrar that if Arrow obtained the project, then Traco would be awarded the con-
tract on the doors.
The oral quote by Traco was followed with a written bid confirmation on the next
day, which reflected the product that would be supplied and the price agreed upon
by the parties. The confirmation also included the 1-¼” frame extended at a cost of
$27,860, which, allegedly, brought the doors into compliance with the project specifi-
cations.
Sometime in November, long after Mr. Morris had relied upon Mr. Ferrar’s repre-
sentations in submitting his bid, Mr. Morris began hearing rumors that there was a
problem with the doors. Mr. Morris contacted Mr. Ferrar, who admitted that there was
a problem with the doors meeting the architect’s wind load deflection requirements in
the specifications. Shortly after learning of this problem, Mr. Morris received a second
quote from Traco, wherein Traco offered its A-3 doors, which were a more expensive,
heavy grade commercial door that met the deflection requirement, for a price of
$304,300. After receiving this bid, Morris objected to the price and demanded that
Traco deliver doors meeting the project specifications at the original price quoted.
Traco refused and when it became obvious that Arrow would not be able to use Traco’s
product, Mr. Morris contracted with another supplier who had bid on the project.
The record clearly reflects the following: that it was Traco that initially contracted
Arrow and offered to do a certain specific act, i.e., supply the sliding doors required;
that Mr. Ferrar phoned Mr. Morris on several occasions and discussed, among other
things, the fact that the doors which Traco wished to bid would not comply with the
specifications without some modification; and, that Mr. Ferrar assured Mr. Morris that
the doors could be modified to comply with the specifications. Thus, under the present
facts, Traco’s bid gave Arrow “a right to expect or claim the performance of some
particular thing”; specifically, Traco’s bid constituted a promise to supply sliding doors
meeting the project specifications at a specified price.
Appellant initially argues that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for Arrow
because Traco’s bid was revocable and properly withdrawn 30 days after it was
made. Appellant primarily relies upon the argument that its sliding doors are goods as
defined by the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Nevertheless, appellant’s argu-
ments ignore the appellee’s basic contention and legal theory under which this suit
was brought. Appellee sought relief under the equitable doctrine of promissory estop-
pel, on the premise that the appellant’s promises, by way of its oral bid, caused appel-
lee to substantially rely to its detriment. The appellee relied to its detriment when it
reduced its bid based on a telephone conversation with the appellant, prior to the
time appellant’s confirmation letter was sent or received. We must now resolve
whether the equitable theory of promissory estoppel applied to bid construction cases
and, if so, whether this doctrine applies under the specific facts of this case. While no
Texas case has previously applied the theory of promissory estoppel in a bid construc-
tion case, other jurisdictions have consistently applied this doctrine under similar
facts, recognizing the necessity for equity in view of the lack of other remedies.
The Texas Supreme Court, in emphasizing that the underlying function of the the-
ory of promissory estoppel is to promote equity, has stated that: “The Vital principal is
that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not
otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing
the expectations, upon which he acted. This remedy is always so applied as to pro-
mote the ends of justice.” Clearly promissory estoppel is “a rule of equity” applied to
prevent injustice. As is true in most, if not all, bid construction cases, the present situa-
tion does not involve a contract. Therefore, were we to hold that promissory estoppel
does not exist in bid construction cases, this would necessarily mean that, notwith-
standing any language or conduct by the subcontractor which leads the general
contractor to do that which he would not otherwise have done and, thereby, incur
loss or injury, the general contractor would be denied all relief. This proposition is
untenable and conflicts with the underlying premise of promissory estoppel.
Section 90 of the STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) states the princi-
ple of promissory estoppel as follows: “A promise which the promisor should reasona-
bly expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Accordingly, the requirements of
promissory estoppel are: “(1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the
promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.” In order to
invoke the doctrine of estoppel, all the necessary elements of estoppel must be
present and the failure to establish even one of these elements is fatal to the claim-
ant’s cause of action.
Appellant insists, however, that because Traco was not an approved manufac-
turer and bid its doors as an alternate, that by its nature, Traco’s bid was conditional
and, therefore, promissory estoppel cannot lie. We fail to see how a bid for a specific
door at a specific price, which was submitted in response to solicitations that detailed
project specifications, is contingent, or somehow not final, merely because the wrong
door was bid upon. The appellant’s failure to receive the architect’s approval was not
due to new specifications but was caused by the appellant’s failure to regard those
specifications originally required when the appellant offered its doors. Appellant’s
point is rejected.
Notwithstanding the existence of this promise, the appellant argues that the
appellee could not have justifiably and reasonably relied upon appellant’s bid
because: Traco was not an approved manufacturer and bid its A-2 doors as an alter-
nate and, further, Traco’s bid was lower than the other suppliers who bid upon the
contract.
Because of the withdrawal of Traco’s bid, Arrow was compelled to seek another
supplier of doors at a much greater cost; clearly, this constituted an injustice to the
appellee. Additionally, appellee’s reliance upon appellant’s bid was reasonable in
view of the appellant’s attempts to modify its doors, and Mr. Ferrar’s assurances that
the doors, as modified, would meet the project specifications.
We hold that the controlling findings of fact support the promissory estoppel theory.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
CASE B.3
CONGREGATION KADIMAH TORAS-MOSHE v. DELEO,

540 N.E.2D 691 (MASS. 1989).
Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe (Congregation), an Orthodox Jewish syna-
gogue, commenced this action in the Superior Court to compel the administrator of
an estate (estate) to fulfill the oral promise of the decedent to give the Congregation
426 Appendix B
$25,000. The Superior Court transferred the case to the Boston Municipal Court, which
rendered summary judgment for the estate. The case was then transferred back to the
Superior Court, which also rendered summary judgment for the estate and dismissed
the Congregation’s complaint. We granted the Congregation’s application for direct
appellate review. We now affirm. The facts are not contested. The decedent suffered
a prolonged illness, throughout which he was visited by the Congregation’s spiritual
leader, Rabbi Abraham Halbfinger. During four or five of these visits, and in the pres-
ence of witnesses, the decedent made an oral promise to give the Congregation
$25,000. The Congregation planned to use the $25,000 to transform a storage room in
the synagogue into a library named after the decedent. The decedent died intestate
in September 1985. He had no children, but was survived by his wife. The Congrega-
tion asserts that the decedent’s oral promise is an enforceable contract under our
case law, because the promise is allegedly supported either by consideration and
bargain, or by reliance. The Superior Court judge determined that “this was an oral
gratuitous pledge, with no indication as to how the money should be used, or what
[the Congregation] was required to do if anything in return for this promise.” There was
no legal benefit to the promisor nor detriment to the promisee, and thus no considera-
tion. Moral obligation is not legal obligation. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the
record that the Congregation’s plans to name a library after the decedent induced
him to make or renew his promise. As to the lack of reliance, the judge stated that the
Congregation’s “allocation of $25,000 in its budget, for the purpose of renovating a
storage room, is insufficient to find reliance or an enforceable obligation.” We agree.
The inclusion of the promised $25,000 in the budget, by itself, merely reduced to writ-
ing the Congregation’s expectation that it would have additional funds. A hope or
expectation, even though well founded, is not equivalent to either legal detriment or
reliance.
We are of the opinion that in this case there is no injustice in declining decedent’s
promise. The promise to the Congregation is entirely unsupported by consideration or
reliance. To enforce such a promise would be against public policy.
Judgment AFFIRMED.
CASE B.4
CARNIVAL LEISURE INDUS., LTD. v. AUBIN, 938 F.2D 624
(5TH CIR. 1991).
During a January 1987 visit to the Bahamas, George J. Aubin, a Texas resident, visited
Cable Beach Hotel and Casino (the Casino), which was owned and operated by Car-
nival Leisure Industries, Ltd. (Carnival Leisure). While gambling at the Casino, Aubin
received markers or chips from the Casino and the Casino received drafts drawn on
Aubin’s bank accounts in Texas. Aubin spent all of the markers provided on gambling,
although he could also have spent them on food, beverages, souvenirs, or lodging at
the Casino. Aubin ultimately gambled and lost $25,000, having given the Casino the
same amount in bank drafts.
Carnival Leisure was unable to cash the bank drafts because Aubin had subse-
quently directed his bank to stop payment. Carnival Leisure sued Aubin in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to enforce the debt. The district
court granted Carnival Leisure’s motion for summary judgment against Aubin in the
amount of $25,000 and attorney’s fees and costs. Carnival Leisure claimed that the
debt was enforceable under Texas law because public policy had changed and now
favored enforcement of gambling debts. The district court agreed. Aubin raises on
appeal only the issue of whether public policy in Texas continues to prevent the
enforcement of gambling debts.
Carnival Leisure claims, however, that since 1973 the public policy of Texas toward
gambling and the legality of gambling debts has changed. Although gambling is
generally proscribed in Texas, there has been an exception for the “social” gambler
since 1973. The Texas legislature enacted the Bingo Enabling Act in 1981, the Texas
Racing Act in 1986, and the Charitable Raffle Enabling Act in 1989. Provisions were
added to the Texas Penal Code excepting these three activities from its general pro-
scription against gambling.
The enactment of statutes legalizing some forms of gambling admittedly evi-
dences some dissipation or narrowing of public disapproval of gambling. However,
such statutes hardly introduce a judicially cognizable change in public policy with
respect to gambling generally. The social gambling permitted is confined to private
places where no one receives any benefit other than his personal winnings and all
participants are subject to the same risks, a categorically vastly different kind of activ-
ity from the sort involved here. The racing, bingo, and raffling exceptions are narrow,
strictly regulated exceptions to a broad public policy in Texas against most forms of
gambling. Further, the kind of gambling engaged in here is not of the sort permitted
by any of these exceptions.
Even if gambling legislation in Texas were evidence sufficient to warrant judicial
notice of a shift in public policy with respect to legalized gambling, such a shift would
not be inconsistent with a continued public policy disfavoring gambling on credit.
Although Aubin could have used the loaned markers for nongambling purposes at
the Casino, it is undisputed that they were in fact used exclusively for gambling.
Aubin’s gambling debt therefore fits squarely within the terms of the public policy of
Texas prohibiting enforcement of gambling debts owed to gambling participants
incurred for the purpose of gambling.
We hold that the public policy in Texas against gambling on credit prevents
enforcement of a debt incurred for the purpose of gambling and provided by a par-
ticipant in the gambling activity. The district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Carnival Leisure is accordingly REVERSED and this case is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CASE B.5
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS

CORP., 264 CAL. RPTR. 779 (CT. APP. 1989).
This action was commenced by plaintiff and respondent Continental Airlines (Conti-
nental) in Los Angeles Superior Court on December 3, 1979, and alleged, against de-
fendant and appellant McDonnell Douglas Corporation (Douglas), causes of action
for deceit. In January 30, 1986, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Continental for
$17 million on its claim for fraud by misrepresentation and fraud by nondisclosure of
known facts. The judgment was granted. This appeal is from that judgment. We affirm
the judgment as modified.
On March 1, 1978, a Continental DC-10 aircraft, which had been delivered to
Continental by Douglas in 1972, was in its take-off roll at Los Angeles International
428 Appendix B
Airport when two tires burst on the left landing gear. The captain elected to try to stop
the plane, but it ran off the end of the runway at 8 miles per hour. The landing gear
broke through the tarmac, burrowed into the ground, and was ripped from the wing,
making a 3.7 hole which allowed fuel to pour from the wing fuel tanks. The plane was
severely damaged by the resulting fire and rendered unrepairable.
Douglas had approached Continental in 1968 to sell Continental DC-10 aircraft.
Douglas used a series of briefings and sales brochures in its sales campaign. The
sales brochure given to Continental consisted of hundreds of pages of technical infor-
mation drafted by Douglas’s engineers, and reviewed by its top management, for the
express purpose of explaining the DC-10 design and a “Detail Type Specification” to
potential aircraft purchasers. That Specification, as its name implies, described the
technical details of the DC-10. The Douglas briefings covered the landing gear and
wing design, as did many of its brochures. Continental personnel used the brochures
to write portions of Continental’s “Tri-Jet Evaluation,” a comparison between the DC-10
and Lockheed’s L-1011, which became a basis for Continental’s decision to purchase
the DC-10. When Continental decided to purchase the DC-10 instead of the L-1011
aircraft, it finalized a Purchase Agreement with Douglas which incorporated by refer-
ence the Detail Specifications for the DC-10.
The brochures contained statements that “the fuel tank will not rupture under
crash load conditions”; that the landing gear “are designed for wipe-off without rup-
turing the wing fuel tank”; that “the support structure is designed to a higher strength
than the gear to prevent fuel tank rupture due to an accidental landing gear over-
load”; that the DC-10 “is designed and tested for crash-worthiness”; that the “landing
gear will be tested” to demonstrate the fail safe integrity and wipe-off characteristics
of the gear design; and that “good reliability” for the DC-10 landing gear could be
predicted with an “unusually high degree of confidence” because of its close similar-
ity to the successful design on the DC-8 and DC-9 aircraft.
Douglas argues that “the Uniform Commercial Code and cases interpreting it
have recognized that general promotional observations of this type are merely expres-
sions of opinion that are not actionable as fraudulent statements. The alleged false
representations in the subject brochures were not statements of “opinion or mere puff-
ing.” They were, in essence, representations that the DC-10 was a safe aircraft. Prom-
ises of safety are not statements of opinion—they are representations of fact.
Douglas contends in its opening brief that there was no substantial evidence that
its precontract representations were material or that Continental reasonably relied on
them in deciding to purchase the DC-10. The materiality of the representations can
hardly be questioned. Any airline shopping for aircraft to service its customers natu-
rally searches for planes that are safe. Where representations have been made in
regard to material matter and action has been taken in the absence of evidence
showing the contrary, reliance on the representations will be presumed. Here, both
materiality and reliance are demonstrated by the fact that Continental evaluated the
DC-10 breakaway design in its “Tri-Jet Evaluation,” which compared the DC-10 with
the L-1011 for the purpose of deciding which aircraft to purchase. Douglas was the
only possible source for the information; there was no way Continental could inde-
pendently investigate or analyze the adequacy of that design. The foregoing provides
more than substantial evidence that Continental relied on Douglas’s representations
regarding landing gear breakaway in choosing to purchase the DC-10 and that those
representations were material.
False representations made recklessly and without regard for their truth in order to
induce action by another are equivalent of misrepresentations uttered. Therefore,
there is substantial evidence of the requisite intent for intentional fraud. For the forego-
ing reasons we conclude the evidence supports the jury’s findings of liability for fraud.
The judgment is modified to reflect an award of pre-judgment interest in the amount
of $9,549,750. As so modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
CASE B.6
HAMPTON v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., 917 F.2D 1119

(8TH CIR. 1990).
In March 1988, Carl Gerome Hampton, a 13-year-old cancer patient at Children’s
Memorial Hospital in Omaha, Nebraska, was awaiting a bone marrow transplant. A
transplant operation was scheduled at the University of Iowa Hospital in Iowa City,
Iowa, where five potential bone marrow donors had been found. On March 21, 1988,
in order to match Carl with the most suitable donor, five samples of Carl’s blood were
sent by the shipper, the Children’s Memorial Hospital in Omaha, to Dr. Nancy Goeken,
at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Iowa City. The shipper, the Children’s
Memorial Hospital, entered into a contract with the carrier, Federal Express, for the
transport of the blood samples.
In a paragraph entitled “Damages or Loss,” the contract of carriage, set forth in
the airbill, stated: “We are liable for no more than $100 per package in the event of
physical loss or damage, unless you fill in a higher Declared Value to the left and
document higher actual loss in the event of a claim. We charge 30 cents for each
additional $100 of declared value up to the maximum shown in our Service Guide.”
The reverse side of the airbill contains several paragraphs, entitled “Limitations On Our
Liability,” which state that: “Our liability for loss or damage to your package is limited
to your actual damages or $100, whichever is less, unless you pay for and declare a
higher authorized value.” It is not disputed that the blood samples were never received
by Dr. Goeken; that Carl Hampton, the infant cancer patient, never obtained a bone
marrow transplant; and that he died on May 19, 1988. Alleging causes of action for
personal injury, wrongful death, and loss of services, Carl Jerry Hampton, individually
and on behalf of his deceased son, Carl Gerome Hampton, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, seeking $3,081,000 in dam-
ages. The district court granted Federal Express’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment, and entered judgment in favor of Hampton for $100. Hampton appeals from
judgment of the district court.
We have held that, under federal common law, “a common carrier may not
exempt itself from liability for its negligence; however, a carrier may limit its liability”
[Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp, 749 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1984)].
In this case, that contract entered into by the shipper, the Children’s Memorial
Hospital, with the carrier of $100, and provided the shipper with an opportunity to
declare a higher value. Furthermore, it is not disputed that the shipper never declared
a higher value for the blood samples. Hence, the liability of the carrier would be lim-
ited to $100. Clearly, Federal Express had no knowledge of Hampton, and did not
know that the package contained blood samples. It is equally clear that the shipper,
Children’s Memorial Hospital, did not declare a value higher than $100 for the pack-
age. Under the circumstances, Federal Express could not reasonably foresee any
injury to Hampton, or the nature and extent of the injury.
Since, on the facts presented, the nature and extent of damages suffered by
plaintiff Hampton was not reasonably foreseeable to the carrier, Federal Express, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court granting Federal Express’s motion for partial
summary judgment.
430 Appendix B
CASE B.7
CHASE PRECAST CORP. v. JOHN J. PAONESSA,
566 N.E.2D 603 (MASS. 1991).
This appeal raises the question whether the doctrine of frustration of purpose may be a
defense in a breach of contract action in Massachusetts, and, if so, whether it excuses
the defendant J. J. Paonessa Company, Inc. (Paonessa), from performance.
The claim of the plaintiff, Chase Precast Corporation (Chase), arises from the can-
cellation of its contracts with Paonessa to supply median barriers in a highway con-
struction project of the Commonwealth. Chase brought an action to recover its
anticipated profit on the amount of the media barriers called for by its supply con-
tracts with Paonessa but was not produced. Paonessa brought a cross action against
the Commonwealth for indemnification in the event it should be held liable to Chase.
After a jury waived trail, a Superior Court judge ruled for Paonessa on the basis of
impossibility of performance. Chase and Paonessa cross-appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, noting that the doctrine of frustration of purpose more accurately
described the basis of the trial judge’s decision than the doctrine of impossibility. We
agree. We allowed Chase’s application for further appellate review and we now
affirm.
The pertinent facts are as follows. In 1982, the Commonwealth, through the
Department of Public Works (department), entered into two contracts with Paonessa
for resurfacing and improvements to two stretches of Route 128. Part of each contract
called for replacing a grass median strip between the north- and southbound lanes
with concrete resurfacing and precast concrete median barriers. Paonessa entered
into two contracts with Chase under which Chase was to supply, in the aggregate,
25,800 linear feet of concrete median barriers according to the specifications of the
department for highway construction. The quantity and type of barriers to be supplied
were specified in two purchase orders prepared by Chase.
The highway reconstruction began in the spring of 1983. By late May, the depart-
ment was receiving protests from the angry residents who objected to use of concrete
barriers and removal of the grass median strip. Paonessa and Chase became aware
of the protest around June 1. On June 6, a group of about 100 citizens filed an action
in the Superior Court to stop installation of the concrete barriers and other aspects of
the work. On June 7, anticipating modification by the department, Paonessa notified
Chase by letter to stop producing concrete barriers for the project. Chase did so
upon receipt of letter the following day. On June 17, the department and the citizens
group entered into a settlement which provided, in part, that no additional concrete
median barriers would be installed. On June 23, the department deleted the perma-
nent concrete median barriers item from its contract with Paonessa.
Before stopping production on June 8, Chase had produced approximately one-
half of the concrete median barriers called for by its contracts with Paonessa, and
had delivered most of them to the construction sites. Paonessa paid Chase for all that
it had produced, at the contract price. Chase suffered no out-of-pocket expense as a
result of cancellation of the remaining portion of barriers.
This court has long recognized and applied the doctrine of impossibility as a
defense to an action of breach of contract. Under that doctrine, “where from the
nature of the contract it appears that the parties must from the beginning have con-
templated the continued existence of some particular specified thing as the founda-
tion of what was to be done, then, in the absence of any warranty that the thing shall
exist…the parties shall be excused…when performance becomes impossible from the
accidental perishing of the thing without the fault of either party.”
On the other hand, although we have referred to the doctrine of frustration of

purpose in a few decisions, we have never clearly defined it. Other jurisdictions have
explained the doctrine as follows: when an event neither anticipated nor caused by
either party, the risk of which was not allocated by the contract, destroys the object or
purpose of the contract, thus destroying the value of performance, the parties are
excused from further performance.
In Mishara Construction Co., we called frustration of purpose a “companion rule”
to the doctrine of impossibility. Both doctrines concern the effect of supervening cir-
cumstances upon the rights and duties of the parties. The difference lies in the effect
of the supervening event. Another definition of frustration of purpose is found in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §265 (1981). “Where, after a contract is made, a
party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence
of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless
the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”
Paonessa bore no responsibility for the department’s elimination of the median
barriers from the projects. Therefore, whether it can rely on the defense of frustration
turns on whether elimination of the barriers was a risk allocated by the contracts to
Paonessa. The question is, given the commercial circumstances in which the parties
dealt: “Was the contingency which developed one which the parties could reasona-
bly be thought to have foreseen as a real possibility which could affect performance?
Was it one of that variety of risks which the parties were tacitly assigning to the promi-
sor by their failure to provide for it explicitly? If it was, performance will be required. If it
could not be considered, performance is excused.”
The record supports the conclusion that Chase was aware of the department’s
power to decrease quantities of contract items. The judge found that Chase had
been the supplier of median barriers to the department in the past. The provisions giv-
ing the department the power to eliminate items or portions thereof was standard in
its contracts. The judge’s finding that all parties were well aware that lost profits were
not an element of damage in either of the public works projects in issue further sup-
ports the conclusion that Chase was aware of the department’s power to decrease
quantities, since the term prohibiting claims for anticipated profit is part of the same
sentence in the standard provision as that allowing the engineer to eliminate items or
portions of work. In this case, even if the parties were aware generally of the depart-
ment’s power to eliminate contract items, the judge could reasonably have con-
cluded that they did not contemplate the cancellation for a major portion of the
project of such a widely used item as concrete median barriers, and did not allocate
the risk of such cancellations.
Judgment AFFIRMED.
CASE B.8
E.B. HARVEY & CO. v. PROTECTIVE SYS., INC., CA NO. 840,

1989 TENN. LEXIS 105, AT *1 (CT. APP. FEB. 19, 1989).
The plaintiff-appellant, E.B. Harvey Company, Inc. (Harvey), is engaged in the manu-
facture and wholesale of fine jewelry in Chattanooga. It has been engaged in this busi-
ness for about 10 years. It maintains an inventory in excess of $1 million of gold, silver,
precious stones, pearls, and other such materials related to the manufacture of jewelry.
432 Appendix B
A considerable amount of its jewelry is on consignment and, by the very nature of its
business, it requires a great deal of insurance. However, the insurance companies will
not write the insurance unless it maintains an Underwriters Laboratories (U.L.)-approved
AA burglary protection alarm system. The defendant-appellee, Protective Systems, Inc.
(Protective), is one of two companies in Hamilton County which furnishes and maintains
a U.L.-approved AA burglary protection system. In June 1981, Harvey entered into a three-
year contract with Protective to install and maintain a burglary protection system. The
contract provided:
It is agreed that Protective is not an insurer and that the payments
hereinbefore named are based solely upon the value of the services
herein described and it is not the intention of the parties that Protec-
tive assume responsibility for any losses occasioned by malfeasance
or misfeasance in the performance of the services under this con-
tract or for any loss or damage sustained through burglary, theft, rob-
bery, fire, or other cause or any liability on the part of Protective by
virtue of this Agreement or because of the relation hereby established.
If there shall at any time be or arise any liability on the part of Pro-
tective, by virtue of this Agreement or because of the relation hereby
established, whether due to the negligence of Protective or other-
wise, such liability is and shall be limited to a sum total in amount to
the rental service charge hereunder for a period of service not to
exceed six months, which sum shall be paid and received as liqui-
dated damages.
The burglary and hold-up system provided to Harvey operated by means of Grade
AA telephone lines between the central monitoring station of Protective and Harvey’s
premises. Said telephone lines were at all times owned and maintained by the South Cen-
tral Bell Telephone Company. On July 22, 1984, at 11:14 P.M., an outage condition was
indicated on the E.B. Harvey & Company account. For a period of two weeks prior to this
date, Protective’s computer had been registering an inordinate number of outage signals
which had all been traced back to problems in telephone company equipment. For this
reason, on July 22, 1984, Protective’s president, Pendell Meyers, notified the telephone
company of this condition and reported a potential problem to the police department
but did not contact a representative of Harvey to notify them of the outage condition.
The phone company was unable to locate the exact nature of the problem
despite several telephone conversations with Meyers. The Chattanooga Police Depart-
ment patrolled the premises surrounding Harvey’s place of business twice that evening
but did not note any unusual activity. The following morning, when an employee of
Harvey reported to work, it was discovered that a burglary had in fact taken place.
Some $200,000 worth of jewelry and inventory was stolen. Harvey sued Protective for
damages resulting from the burglary. It alleged that Protective was guilty of negli-
gence for its failure to notify Harvey or its employees of the outage which appeared
on the burglary monitoring equipment.
Protective, for answer, denied the allegations of Harvey’s complaint, and as an affirm-
ative defense, alleged the contract between the parties with its exculpatory and limitation
of liability provisions was enforceable and binding upon Harvey. After hearing testimony,
the trial court held the extent of Harvey’s recovery against Protective would be 650 per-
cent as liquidated damages. A final judgment was entered and Harvey has appealed.
There is nothing in public policy to render inoperative or nugatory the contractual
limitations contained in the agreement. Limitations against liability for negligence or
breach of contract have generally been upheld in this state in the absence of fraud
or overreaching. Limitations such as those contained in the present contract have
generally been deemed reasonable and have been sustained in actions against the
providers of burglary and fire alarm systems. Such clauses do not ordinarily protect
against liability for fraud or intentional misrepresentation.
We concur with the trial court. The issues are found in favor of the appellees. The
judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. The cost of this appeal is taxed to the appel-
lant and the case is remanded to the trial court for collection of cost.
CASE B.9
TOYS “R” US, INC. v. ABIR, NO. 97 CIV. 8673 (JGK), 1999 U.S.
DIST. LEXIS 1275, AT *1 (S.D.N.Y. FEB. 10, 1999).
In 1997, plaintiff Toys “R” Us, Inc., filed an action alleging violations of federal law
related to trademark dilution against the defendants, Eli Abir and Website Manage-
ment, who had registered the name Toysareus.com as their Internet domain name.
The plaintiffs alleged that this domain name diluted the plaintiff’s mark TOYS “R” US. In
November 1997, this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defend-
ants from “using or inducing others to use the names or marks or any colorable imita-
tion of Plaintiff’s TOYS ‘R’ US, BABIES ‘R’ US and/or the family of ‘R’ US marks” pending a
decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
In December 1997, this court heard argument on the motion for preliminary
injunction. At that time the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had also registered
the domain name Kidsareus.com. This court then issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining the defendants from, among other things, using or inducing others to use
any colorable imitation of the family of “R” US marks pending final judgment. On
August 27, 1998, this court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the
trademark dilution claims. The following day, the court issued a separate Judgment
and Order permanently enjoining the defendants from further infringement of the
family of “R” US marks and ordering the transfer of the Toysareus.com and Kidsareus.
com Internet domain names to the plaintiff.
In addition, this court held that because the defendants’ conduct in this case was
willful, intentional, deliberate, and in bad faith, the plaintiff is entitled to recover attor-
neys’ fees and costs. In order to determine what constitutes “reasonable” attorneys’
fees, the starting point is the “lodestar amount,” which is the number of hours reason-
ably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys
and paralegals.
In determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider, inter alia, the size and
experience of the firm. In this case, Darby & Darby is a well-known New York firm which
specializes in intellectual property; the rates charged for its attorneys are comparable to
other specialized intellectual property firms in the New York City legal market. The plain-
tiff’s counsel swore in her declaration in support of this application that care was taken to
enhance efficiency by assigning, at any one time, only one partner, one mid- to senior-
level associate, one to two junior associates and one to two legal assistants to the pros-
ecution of this case. Having carefully reviewed the itemized request for disbursements,
the court finds them neither unnecessary nor excessive for a case of this duration and
complexity. The plaintiff is also entitled to costs, as well as those reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred by the attorneys and which are normally charged fee-paying clients.
Defendant Eli Abir, who is the owner of defendant Website Management, does not
argue that the award requested by the plaintiffs is excessive. Instead, he argues that
due to his business and personal circumstances he has limited financial resources
and would be unable to pay more than a “symbolic” amount in attorneys’ fees. How-
ever, nothing in the record in this case justifies a financially based reduction in the
award of attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons stated above the plaintiff’s motion
for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the amount of $55,162.76. SO ORDERED.
434 Appendix B
CASE B.10
CAFAZZO v. CENT. MED. HEALTH SERV., INC., 668 A.2D 521

(PA. 1995).
In 1986, appellant Albert Cafazzo underwent surgery for implantation of a mandibular
prosthesis. In 1992, some time after it was discovered that this device was defective,
a complaint was filed against Dr. Normal Stern, the physician who performed the sur-
gery, and the hospital where the operation took place, claiming that “all defendants
sell, provide, or use certain prosthetic devices,” and that they should be held strictly
liable as having “provided, sold, or otherwise placed in the stream of commerce
products manufactured by Vitek, Inc., known as Proplast TMJ Implants.” The complaint
alleged that the prosthesis was defectively designed, unsafe for its intended use, and
lacked any warning necessary in order to ensure safety.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides in relevant part as
follows:
1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if:
a. the seller is engaged in the business of selling a product, and
b. it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
The thrust of the inquiry is not on whether a separate consideration is charged for
the physical material used in the exercise of medical skill, but what service is per-
formed to restore or maintain the patient’s health. The determinative question
becomes not what is being charged, but what is being done. The provision of medi-
cal services is regarded as qualitatively different from the sale of products.
This distinction is made clearer by the fact that case law also supports the appli-
cation of 402A where what has been provided is not medical service or products con-
nected with diagnosis and treatment, but rather materials related to mechanical or
administrative functions. See Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital, 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981) (hospital held strictly liable where hospital gown ignited when lighted
match fell on it).
It must be noted that the “seller” need not be engaged solely in the business of
selling products such as the defective one to be held strictly liable. An example sup-
porting this proposition appears in comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§402A and concerns the owner of a motion picture theater who offers edibles such as
popcorn and candy for sale to movie patrons. The analogue to the instant case is
valid in one respect only: both the candy and the TMJ implant are ancillary to the
primary activity, viewing a film or undergoing surgery respectively. However, beyond
that any comparison is specious. A movie audience is free to purchase or not any
food items on offer, and regardless of which option is exercised the primary activity is
unaffected. On the other hand, while the implant was incidental to the surgical pro-
cedure here, it was a necessary adjunct to the treatment administered, as were the
scalpel used to make the incision, and any other material objects involved in perform-
ing the operation, all of which fulfill a particular role in provision of medical service, the
primary activity.
When one enters the hospital as a patient, he goes there, not to buy medicines or
pills, not to purchase bandages or iodine or serum or blood, but to obtain a course of
treatment in the hope of being cured of what ails him. We find, consistent with the
decisions cited above which distinguish medical services from merchandising, that
appellees are not sellers, providers, suppliers or distributors of products such as to
activate 402A.
CASE B.11
BURNETT v. PURTELL, NO. 91-L-094, 1992 OHIO LEXIS 3467,

AT *1 (CT. APP. JUNE 30, 1992).
Appellees agreed to purchase a mobile home with shed from appellant. On Saturday,
March 3, 1990, appellees paid appellant $6,500 and in return were given the certifi-
cate of title to the mobile home as well as a key to the mobile home, but no keys to
the shed. At the same time the certificate of title was transferred, the following items
remained in the mobile home: the washer and dryer, mattress and box springs, two
chairs, items in the refrigerator, and the entire contents of the shed. These items were
to be retained by the appellant and removed by appellant. To facilitate removal, the
estate retained one key to the mobile home and the only keys to the shed.
On Sunday, March 4, 1990, the mobile home was destroyed by fire through the fault
of neither party. At the time of the fire, appellant still had a key to the mobile home, as
well as the keys to the shed, and she had not removed the contents of the mobile
home nor the shed. The contents of the shed were not destroyed and have now been
removed by appellant. The referee determined that the risk of loss remained with
appellant because there was no tender of delivery. Appellant objected to the conclu-
sion of law, but the trial court overruled the objection and entered judgment in favor
of appellee. First, the appellant argues that because the certificate of title was trans-
ferred, appellees were given a key to the mobile home and the full purchase price
was paid by appellees, that the risk of loss had shifted from appellant to appellees.
The risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a mer-
chant: otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
Analyzing the foregoing elements it is clear that, as the trial court stated, appellant
did not tender delivery. The parties agreed that appellees would purchase the mobile
home and shed from appellant. The contents of both the shed and the mobile home
were to be retained by appellant and removed by appellant. At the time of the fire,
appellant had not removed the items that she was required to remove from either the
mobile home or the shed. Additionally, all keys to the mobile home were not surren-
dered and none of the keys to the shed were relinquished. Under this scenario, appel-
lant did not tender conforming goods free of items belonging to her which remained
in the trailer, nor did she put the mobile home at the appellee’s disposition without
being fettered with the items previously enumerated. Accordingly, the trial court was
correct in determining that appellant did not tender delivery within the meaning of the
statute, and consequently the risk of loss remained with her. The trial court was correct
in determining that appellant did not tender delivery in a manner sufficient to shift the
risk of loss to appellees. Therefore, when it ordered appellant to rerun appellee’s pur-
chase money, it effectually mandated that the contract was “avoided.”
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
CASE B.12
LNS INV. CO. v. PHILLIPS 66 CO., 731 F. SUPP. 1484

(D. KAN. 1990).
Plaintiff is the successor to a company known as CompuBlend Corporation (“CBC”),
which blended, labeled, and packaged quart plastic bottles of motor oil for,
among others, defendant Phillips 66 Company. On July 29, 1986, W. Peter Buhlinger,
436 Appendix B
defendant’s manager of lubricants (“Buhlinger”), wrote a letter to Dan Tutcher, plain-

tiff’s vice-president of operations (“Tutcher”), which read as follows:
This will confirm our verbal agreement wherein Phillips will purchase
additional quantities of plastic bottles from CBC during 1986. CBC,
in an effort to increase their packaging capacity, has committed to
purchase several additional molds to blow the Phillips plastic one-
quart container. In order to amortize the cost of the additional
equipment, Phillips has agreed to take delivery of a maximum of
4,000,000 bottles to be made available by December 31, 1986. This
agreement includes the production available now and to be sup-
plemented by the additional equipment. Should CBC not be able
to produce the full 4,000,000 quarts by December 31, 1986, this
agreement shall be considered satisfied. Phillip’s desire is to receive
as many bottles packaged with Phillips motor oil in 1986 from CBC
as possible.
Plaintiff experienced numerous problems in maintaining even its precontract
capacity. Moreover, the quality of goods plaintiff was able to deliver was frequently
unacceptable to defendant. Laughlin reiterated defendant’s dissatisfaction with plain-
tiff’s products by letter dated October 15, 1986. Discussing bottles tendered by plaintiff,
Laughlin stated that “we definitely do not want bottles on the shelf of the quality sub-
mitted.” On December 16, 1986, Buhlinger wrote that defendant would not renew any
commitments to purchase goods from the plaintiff after March 31, 1987, due to plain-
tiff’s poor performance under the July 29 agreement. Plaintiff filed this suit on March
12, 1987, alleging, inter alia, that defendant breached the July 29 agreement by fail-
ing to purchase plaintiff’s full output of plastic bottles through December 31, 1986.
Plaintiff’s failure to provide either the quantity or quality of goods contemplated
by the July 29 agreement entitled defendant to suspend its performance. Section
84-2-609 of the Code states as follows:
Right to adequate assurance of performance. (1) A contract for sale
imposes an obligation on each party that the other’s expectation of
receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either
party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due
performance and until he receives such assurance may if commer-
cially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not
already received the agreed return.
It was incumbent upon plaintiff to provide adequate assurance of its future per-
formance to defendant. Plaintiff failed to provide defendant with adequate assur-
ance of its future performance. Official UCC Comment 4 states that what constitutes
“adequate” assurance of due performance is subject to the same test of factual con-
ditions as what constitutes “reasonable grounds for insecurity.” For example, where
the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a mere promise by a seller of good
repute that he is giving the matter his attention and that the defect will not be
repeated, is normally sufficient. Under the same circumstances, however, a similar
statement by a known corner-cutter might well be considered insufficient without the
posting of a guaranty or, if so demanded by the buyer, a speedy replacement of the
delivery involved. By the same token where a delivery has defects, even though easily
curable, which interfere with easy use by the buyer, no verbal assurance can be
deemed adequate which is not accomplished by replacement, repair, money-allow-
ance, or other commercially reasonable cure.
Plaintiff’s continual excuses for failure to perform, unaccompanied by correspond-
ing remedial action, cannot be deemed adequate assurance under the Code.
Accordingly, defendant was entitled to suspend its own performance of the contract
by refusing to place orders with plaintiff and/or canceling unfilled orders already
placed, thirty days after either or both the September 18, 1986, and October 15, 1986,
letters. In view of this conclusion, defendant did not breach the contract by suspend-
ing performance in December, 1986, and judgment will be entered in its favor.
Judgment for defendant.
CASE B.13
CATE v. DOVER CORP., 776 S.W.2D 680 (TEX. APP. 1989).

In September 1984, Edward Cate bought three Rotary brand vehicle lifts from Beech Tire
Mart. Dover Corporation manufactured the lifts, which were designed to elevate vehi-
cles for repair work underneath the vehicle. In his deposition, Cate stated that he re-
ceived a five-year written warranty from Dover when he purchased the lifts. On at least
three occasions, vehicles fell from the lifts. Although Beech and Dover made numerous
inspections, Cate said that the lifts never functioned properly. The warranty expressly
provided that Dover would replace all parts returned to the factory which proved to be
defective. Cate did not return the lifts, but rather sued Dover for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability about two and one-half years after he bought the lifts.
The issue is whether a material issue of fact exists regarding the conspicuous
nature of the disclaimer contained in the warranty. If the disclaimer is conspicuous,
then Cate is limited to a cause of action based upon the express warranty that was
created, and precluded from suing on the implied warranty of merchantability, since
the express warranty disclaimed the implied warranty. An express warranty that spe-
cifically disclaims an implied warranty controls.
A warranty of merchantability is implied in a contract for the sale of goods by a
merchant unless the warranty is excluded or modified in accordance with statutory
requirements. An implied warranty of merchantability…may be disclaimed by the
seller…so long as the disclaimer is conspicuous.
“Conspicuous” is defined as follows: A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicu-
ous. Language in the body of a form is conspicuous if it is larger or of other contrasting
type or color. But in a telegram, any stated term is conspicuous. Whether a term or
clause is conspicuous or not is for decision by the court.
The trial court found that the disclaimer contained in Dover’s warranty complied
with Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. Section 2.316, and accordingly granted Dover’s
motion for summary judgment. The warranty page itself is headed by the sentence,
written in solid blue one-half inch block type, “YOU CAN TAKE ROTARY’S NEW 5-YEAR
WARRANTY AND TEAR IT APART.” Then the warranty itself is set out below that, framed
by double blue lines entitled “WARRANTY” in solid blue letters three-eighths inch high.
The text of the warranty is in black type. The disclaimer portion, contained in a sepa-
rate paragraph within the warranty, provides the following: “This warranty is exclusive
and is in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied including any implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
which implied warranties are hereby expressly excluded.”
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
438 Appendix B
CASE B.14
HORN v. GEN. MOTORS CORP., 551 P.2D 398 (CAL. 1976).

In this action for damages for personal injuries, defendants General Motors Corpora-
tion and Fletcher Chevrolet, Inc., appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict
in favor of plaintiff.
About 9 P.M. on the evening of September 23, 1966, plaintiff Lillian Y. Horn was driv-
ing her 1965 Chevrolet station wagon down Laurel Canyon Boulevard, a curving Los
Angeles street. She was accompanied by her two sons; her six-year-old son was in the
front seat and her nine-year-old son in the rear. As she wound downhill, at approxi-
mately 25 miles per hour, a car rounding a curve suddenly swung into her lane, its
headlights temporarily blinding her. She swerved to her right to avoid the car, bounced
off the right curb across the street to the left and into a concrete reinforced abutment.
As she steered to the right, plaintiff brought her left hand across the horn cap in
the center of the steering wheel; at the same time, with her right hand, she tried to
hold her son on the front seat. She felt and saw something fly between herself and her
son; it was later established that this was the horn cap. When the car hit the abut-
ment, plaintiff felt a burning sensation as her face hit the “center part” of the steering
wheel. The “center part,” following removal of the horn cap, contained three sharp
prongs that held the horn cap in place. Plaintiff sustained a laceration of the chin, a
displaced fracture of her jaw, a fracture of her left ear canal, and the loss of two teeth.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant General Motors Corporation, the
manufacturer of the station wagon, and defendant Fletcher Chevrolet, Inc., the
dealer from whom she purchased it. The case was tried on the single theory of strict
liability in tort based on a defective product. In detail plaintiff’s theory was that the
automobile was defective in that the horn cap was easily removable in normal use of
the vehicle thereby exposing three sharp prongs, and that, as a result, when plaintiff
was involved in a collision not caused by defendants, she sustained injuries which
were measurably aggravated because of this defect in design or manufacture. In
short: the defective horn cap caused plaintiff injuries which were greater than the
injuries she otherwise would have received as a result of the collision. The jury returned
a verdict against both defendants for damages in the sum of $ 45,000.
Defendants contend that they are not liable as a matter of law because a colli-
sion is not a normal, proper or intended use of an automobile and therefore the man-
ufacturer is under no duty to design an automobile so as to prevent any aggravation
of injuries resulting from a collision which occurs for reasons wholly unconnected with
the design and manufacture of the automobile. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972)
8 Cal.3d 121, 126 [104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153], this court acknowledged the
existence of this line of authority but specifically rejected it: “Although a collision may
not be the ‘normal’ or intended use of a motor vehicle, vehicle manufacturers must
take accidents into consideration as reasonably foreseeable occurrences involving
their products. The design and manufacture of products should not be carried out in
an industrial vacuum but with recognition of the realities of their everyday use.” In
Cronin the driver of a bakery truck was injured when another vehicle forced the truck
off the road and into a ditch. The impact broke an aluminum hasp holding the bread
trays in place and the trays were driven forward against the driver, propelling him
through the windshield. We upheld a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the
manufacturer of the truck declaring that liability rested not on the basis that the hasp
caused the collision “but only that its defectiveness was a substantial factor contribut-
ing to [the plaintiff’s] injuries.” (Id., at p. 127.)
In the instant case the jury was properly instructed to the effect that if the station
wagon was defectively designed or manufactured in such a manner that the horn
assembly caused plaintiff to sustain greater injuries in the collision than she would
have otherwise sustained absent the defect, then the manufacturer and distributor of
the vehicle would be liable to the extent of such aggravation of her injuries. This
instruction contained a principle of liability consistent with our ruling in Cronin.
The judgment is affirmed.
CASE B.15
SIMPSON v. NORWESCO, INC., 583 F.2D 1007

(8TH CIR. 1978).
When Simpson went to work for Nowesco, the parties signed an employment contract
that provided he would be paid specified percentages on sales of certain items, as a
commission. The contract was “terminable at the will of either party upon six months’
written notice.”
When difficulties arose in its business and it decided there was a need to reduce
operating costs, Norwesco informed Simpson by letter that it was reducing his com-
mission rate. Simpson sent a letter back which clearly stated that he planned “to con-
tinue with the same efforts in accordance with the terms of the original agreement.”
When Norwesco began sending monthly commission checks reflecting the change in
commission rates, Simpson went ahead and cashed them. Later, a second similar cut
in commission rate was made by Norwesco. Simpson maintained that he again
refused to acquiesce.
Eventually, Norwesco sold the business to another corporation and Simpson
received a letter giving him six months’ notice that his employment was terminated.
When he sued to recover the money he should have received had he been paid at
the commission rates stipulated in his original contract, the jury awarded him
$90,381.68.
A party to a contract cannot alter his obligation thereunder without the consent
of the other party, and this principle extends to any labor or employment contract.
Such a unilateral change is precisely what Norwesco attempted—twice. Simpson
never acquiesced to a change in his commission rates. Indeed, he actively expressed
his disapproval of such an attempt and declared his intention to continue work under
the old contract terms. Whether or not his action of cashing the commission checks,
which bore no written declaration that acceptance of them constitutes settlement in
full, estopped him from making any further claims to commissions was a jury question
and was properly decided by the jury.
The final judgment is AFFIRMED.
appendix C
SAMPLE CONTRACTS
As you go through the sample contracts provided in this appendix, remember that
these are sample contracts. They are provided to give you a sense of the many dif-
ferent forms a contract may take and the various ways a contract might look. These
samples are from many different sources and states. So a particular type of contract
might look different—and might not be valid—in your state.
Some of the sample contracts that follow are simple and short (such as the Cor-
poration Formation Agreement); some are detailed and lengthy (such as the Real
Estate Property Sales Agreement). Some have blanks where you would insert infor-
mation if you were drafting a contract; some have information within them so you
can see how the specifics might be set forth. Note that the sample Contract for Sale of
Equipment is used at the end of every chapter in the Hands-On Drafting Exercises.
Paralegals are often asked to draft contracts. But remember that ethically, a
paralegal cannot draft the contract directly for the client. This would amount to the
unauthorized practice of law. Terminology is important here; the paralegal is
always drafting the contract for the attorney’s review.
When drafting the contract for the attorney’s review, always view the contract as a
living, breathing document. One size doesn’t fit all. In other words, just because a form is
titled “Real Estate Purchase Agreement” doesn’t necessarily mean that contract will
specifically fit the real estate transaction at hand. For instance, maybe the form is for
commercial real estate, but what if the actual contract needed is for residential real estate?
Once the contract is drafted—whether by you as the paralegal or by the other
party to the real estate transaction—you may be asked to review the contract to
make sure it serves the client’s needs properly. What follows are some practice tips
on how you should approach this contract review, whether or not you have the title
“contract review paralegal.”
HOW THE CONTRACT “ARRIVES”

For a contracts review paralegal, unless he or she specifically drafted the contract,
many times a contract drafted by someone else lands on the paralegal’s desk myste-
riously. Sometimes someone leaves it in the paralegal’s mailbox like a present. Or
maybe someone e-mails the contract to the paralegal. Many times the contract is in
a pdf format, which can be more difficult to revise. Maybe they are hoping the
paralegal won’t make changes. But the job of a contract review paralegal is to make
changes where appropriate—or at least to suggest changes to the attorney—in an
effort to serve the best interests of the client.
CONTRACT REVIEW IS NECESSARY

If you are drafting a contract, you must remember that ethically the contract should
be reviewed by an attorney. Just as important, the client should review the contract
440
Sample Contracts 441
to be sure he or she is capable of complying with the representations in the

contract—in other words, not agreeing to something that he or she cannot do.
TIMING FOR CONTRACT COMPLETION

It is always interesting to see how many vendor contracts need to be done “right
away” when it is getting toward the end of the month or quarter. Usually this occurs
because the rate listed in the contract is good only through that particular time.
But many times it really has to do with commissions and sales quotas. This doesn’t
mean a time deadline isn’t important. It does mean you should ask the reason for
the rush put on finalizing the contract in question.
CHECKLISTS FOR CONTRACT REVIEWS

A contract review paralegal finds it helpful to use a contract review sheet. Usually
this is a form the person submitting the contract for review attaches to the contract
he or she wants reviewed. The contract review sheet should always include the date
you received the contract and the date by which the review must be completed. The
contract review sheet should contain a checklist to make sure the contract is prop-
erly reviewed. That checklist should contain items such as the following:
1. Name and Address of the Parties
Surprisingly, many times this information is missing from the contract given
to the contract review paralegal. You need to obtain this information. Once
you get the correct name, do a quick Google search on the party. This back-
ground check can be especially important relating to the value of the contract
(see later) and the time given to review the contract. If the party is a company,
find out how long the company has been in business and who owns the
company.
2. Value of the Contract
This is another important topic for review. If a party is a large company, you
may need to have various personnel (e.g., the manager or the president) sign
off on the contract depending on the dollar amount.
Determine if the stated value is the actual value of the contract. For
instance, you may be told the value of the contract is $10,000 per year. But
perhaps someone failed to mention that this is a five-year contract. So, in this
case, the actual value of the contract would be $50,000. Be aware that there is
sometimes a licensing fee for servicing the product. If so, that amount would
need to be added into the contract as well. Be sure to ask questions regarding
the value of the contract.
3. What Is the Contract For?
Be diligent in questioning the staff on what the contract is for. They need to
be able to describe what the product will do and how they plan to use it. You
should not be left trying to figure out what the product or service is by a
vague or abbreviated purchase order.
4. Loopholes
Is there a way out of the contract? How can the contract be terminated? What
if a better product comes out next year? Do you want a three- to five-year
contract you cannot terminate? Some contracts provide for an automatic
442 Appendix C
renewal unless the parties provide 30 to 60 days written notice. Consider

marking the calendar for renewal of the contract, typically before the advance
written notice is required. This calendar system also serves to make you look
very organized and on top of matters!
5. Assignment Clauses
Always look at the assignment clauses contained in a contract. There should
always be a way to assign a contract if necessary. If one of the parties is a
company—and if the company is sold or merged with another company—
one very time-consuming part of due diligence will be the review of each
contract for assignability. Determine if the parties can add an assignment
clause, if permission is needed to assign the contract, or if there only needs to
be providing of a notice to assign the contract. If key contracts cannot be
assigned, the client may not have a deal. Also, there may be regulatory restrictions
on assignment of a contract, and a shareholder’s vote may be needed before
assignment can be completed. Some regulations consider a “change of
control” to be an assignment even if it is to an affiliated company.
6. Outside Agreements
Always remember this key point: If it isn’t in the writing, then it isn’t part of the
contract.
7. Changing the Contract
Do not be afraid to ask for changes to the contract, even when the other party
tells you that “this is our standard agreement.” Always keep the best interests
of the client in mind. You might be surprised at what changes to that so-
called standard agreement might be negotiated!
Sample Contracts
Agreement Among Devisees
Agreement for Common Driveway Easement
Attorney/Client Fee Agreement
Business Purchase Agreement
Contract for Sale of Equipment
Corporate Formation Agreement
Credit Card Agreement (Selected Section)
Employment Agreement
Event Contract
Physician Employment Agreement
Real Estate Purchase Agreement
Stock Purchase Agreement

444 Appendix C
AGREEMENT AMONG DEVISEES

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of this ___________ day of
______________, 20___, by and between ______________, a (married/single
man/woman), dealing with his/her sole and separate property, (hereinafter
“_____________ ”), ____________________, a (married/single man/woman),
dealing with his/her sole and separate property, (hereinafter “ ______________ ”),
___________________ , a (married/single man/woman), dealing with his/her sole
and separate property, (hereinafter “ _____________ ”), _____________, a (mar-
ried/single man/woman), dealing with his/her sole and separate property, (hereinafter
“_____________”), and ______________, a (married/single man/woman), deal-
ing with his/her sole and separate property (hereafter “ _____________”).
Article I.
All the parties to this Agreement acknowledge and agree that they are all de-
visees named in the Last Will and Testament of _____________________, de-
ceased, which said Last Will and Testament was filed in an informal probate
proceeding in the District Court of the ____________ Judicial District of the State
of _________________ in and for the County of ________________, as Case No.
__________________.
Article II.
Each of the parties hereto acknowledges and agrees that the Last Will and Tes-
tament of ________________________, deceased, generally provides in Para-
graph Seventh thereof for the creation of a Trust in which one of the parties hereto
is a Beneficiary. Said Trust is identified in the Will as the_____________________
Trust (hereinafter “ _________’s Trust”). A copy of the Last Will and Testament of
_________________ is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.
______________’s Trust generally provides that _____________ will receive
the net income from the Trust during his/her life and is also entitled to have the
principal invaded for his/her care and support upon terms as specifically set forth
in the Trust .____________’s Trust further provides that on ____________’s death
___________________ will receive the income from the Trust for his/her life.
______________ ’s Trust also makes provisions for_____________to receive
principal from the Trust upon the conditions set forth therein. Upon the death of
both _____________ and _____________ , _____________’s Trust provides that
the Trust assets will be distributed equally to ____________, _______________
and ______________.
Article III.
Each of the parties to this agreement hereby acknowledges that they are
entering into this agreement as a private agreement among devisees of the
decedent which shall be binding on the personal representative of the Estate
of _______________, deceased, pursuant to _________________ Code Section.
Article IV.
Each of the parties to the Agreement acknowledges and agrees that
______________created ______________’s Trust by the terms of his/her Last
Will and Testament at _____________’s request and as part of ___________ and
________________’s estate planning to keep the Trust assets from being taxable in
___________ and __________________’s estate. Since the time of execution of
___________________________’s Last Will and Testament, the exemption
amount for estate taxes has substantially increased and the estate planning need
for holding assets in _________________’s Trust no longer exists.
Article V.
Each of the parties hereto acknowledge and agree that the assets which are to pass
to __________________’s Trust under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of
________________, deceased, shall not be placed in Trust, and shall be distributed
to ________________ outright and free of trust. Thus the parties hereto, being all
the Beneficiaries of ________________’s Trust agree that ________________’s
Trust shall not be created or funded and all the assets which otherwise would have
passed to ______________’s Trust under the terms of the Last Will and Testament
of __________________, deceased, will be distributed to _________________.
Article VI.
The parties to this agreement hereby acknowledge and agree that the residual
assets of the estate are more than sufficient to pay all debts, expenses of last illness,
medical and funeral expenses, and administration expenses of the estate. The
terms and provisions of this agreement to the extent that it alters the provisions of
the decedent __________________’s Last Will and Testament shall not be a detri-
ment to any federal or state taxing authorities or to any creditors of the estate.
Article VII.
Each of the parties hereto acknowledge that good, valuable and adequate
consideration exists for each of the parties entering into this agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto have executed this
agreement as of the day and year hereinabove first written.
______________________________
******
______________________________
******
______________________________
******
______________________________
******
______________________________
******
NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS NEEDED
446 Appendix C
AGREEMENT FOR COMMON DRIVEWAY EASEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made this _____________ day of ____________, 2008,
by and between JOHN SMITH and JANE SMITH, husband and wife, hereinafter
referred to as “first parties”, and SCOUT JONES and SARA JONES, husband and
wife, hereinafter as “second parties”.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the first parties are the owners of that certain real property situ-
ated in the City of Lewiston, County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, and more par-
ticularly described as follows, to-wit:
SEE EXHIBIT A
WHEREAS, the second parties are the owners of that certain real property sit-
uated in the City of Lewiston, County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, and more par-
ticularly described as follows:
SEE EXHIBIT B
WHEREAS, there is currently in existence a paved driveway shared in
common by said premises and the parties desire to create an easement, half of
which is on each parcel, to assure that the parties and their successors, heirs,
assigns, and devisees shall continue to have the use of said roadway.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto do agree as follows:
1. An easement for a common driveway in favor of Parcel 2 is created over
six (6) feet of the twelve (12) feet of Parcel 1.
2. An easement for a common driveway in favor of Parcel 1 is hereby created
over six (6) feet of the twelve (12) feet of Parcel 2.
3. The purpose of the easements described in parts 1 and 2 above is to pre-
serve a common driveway one hundred forty-four (144) feet in width for the ben-
efit of both lots.
4. These easements so created are superior and paramount to the rights of
any of the parties hereto in the respective servient estates so created and that they
are covenants running with the land.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands on the
day and year first above indicated.
________________________________
JOHN SMITH, First Party
________________________________
JANE SMITH, First Party
________________________________
SCOUT JONES, Second Party
________________________________
SARA JONES, Second Party
ATTORNEY/CLIENT FEE AGREEMENT

___________________, 2008
____________
____________
Toledo, Ohio
Re:
Dear _______:
It was a pleasure meeting with you and ____________ on _____________ in
our offices. You have advised me that you would like our office to represent you in
the ________________________. We are very pleased to be retained by you as
counsel for this purpose. Unless a separate contract for legal services is negotiated,
it is understood that the fees for services do not include representation concern-
ing a different subject matter. This letter describes the basis on which our firm will
provide legal services to you and how our services shall be billed.
Please be assured that we (sometimes referred to as “Attorney”) will give our
best efforts to serve you (sometimes referred to as “Client”) effectively. Although
we cannot guarantee or give assurances of the success of any given matter, we will
strive to represent your interests professionally in a diligent and efficient manner.
The Client further understands and agrees that the Attorney does not make, and
will not make, any guarantee about the outcome of any proceedings, or negotia-
tion in which the Client might be a party. The Attorney is not obligated to
take any action that is repugnant to the Attorney’s sense of honor and propriety.
The Attorney’s representation of the Client does not constitute an endorsement of
the Client’s political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.
With respect to conflict matters, we are performing or have performed a formal
conflicts check within our office. As you understand, we represent many clients on a
broad range of matters. Based upon our initial conversations, we have found no appar-
ent conflicts relative to our representation of your interests. However, if we become
aware of a conflict, we will discuss it with you. We specifically reserve the right to with-
draw from representation if we feel that we cannot properly represent your interests.
Some aspects of legal representation will certainly require a higher expertise
than other aspects. It is our policy to assign and delegate responsibilities based
upon the degree of experience and expertise required. All legal work performed
will, however, be monitored and approved by one of the partners of the firm, which
under most circumstances will be me.
I will have primary responsibility for your representation. If, at any time, you
have any questions, concerns, or criticisms, please contact me at once.
In addition to our responsibility, it shall be your responsibility to cooperate
fully with us and to provide all information known by or available to you which
may aid us in representing you. Further, it shall be your responsibility to promptly
pay us for the performance of all legal services upon rendering of a statement and
for all expenses incurred in connection therewith.
For our services, you shall pay us a sum for services rendered based on the
hourly fees specified below for each hour devoted by each attorney, paralegal, or
448 Appendix C
legal assistant to your case, as shown by our Attorney’s records for this purpose.
Hourly fees may change during the period that you retain us. If such a change
occurs, we will notify you at least 30 days before the changes take effect.
Our schedule of hourly rates for attorneys and other members of the profes-
sional staff is based upon years of experience, specialization in training and prac-
tice, and level of professional attainment. My present hourly rate is $______________
per hour. You will be charged at the above hourly rate for consultations, correspond-
ence, phone calls, office and research work, court time, filing, and hearings.
You agree that a retainer of $______________ shall serve as the minimum fee
retainer for the express purpose of engaging our expertise and professional services for
the above-referenced matters and that said retainer may be used from time to time for
payment of fees incurred in representation pertaining to the above-referenced mat-
ters. You further agree that the retainer shall be paid on or before ____________
______. You consent to the deposit of trust funds into a common Attorney’s Clients’
Trust Account and to the payment of any interest on those deposits as provided by law
into an Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA). You agree that because of the
commitment hereby made of the attorney’s expertise, time, staff, resources, and cal-
endar, to the exclusion of other employment, the full retainer is not refundable after
the attorney accepts this employment. Any retainer fee will, at the end of each month,
be credited first to your obligation for costs and expenses and then to any fees you owe
to the Attorney under this agreement. As the retainer fee is reduced in this way, we
may, from time to time, require you to pay an additional sum to return the amount of
the retainer fee to the original amount specified in this paragraph.
In addition, we will bill and expect payment for out-of-pocket expenses, such
as photocopies, long distance tolls, certified mail, filing fees with the Ohio Secre-
tary of State, facsimile transmission, etc. Any extraordinary expenses, such as
printing costs, will generally be billed directly to you. Regardless of any other pro-
vision of this agreement that permits deferred payment, expenses under this para-
graph will be billed and shall be paid by you as they are actually incurred.
We take into account many factors in billing for services rendered, and I will
review all statements before they are issued to ensure that the amount charged is ap-
propriate. Although it is difficult to estimate the time that will be required to satisfac-
torily complete most legal matters, the principal factor employed in billing is our
schedule of hourly rates. While the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility allows
for setting fees based upon other factors such as the result obtained, most statements
for services rendered are simply the product of the hours worked including phone time
multiplied by the hourly rates for the attorneys and legal assistants who performed the
work. I will review all billings in order to make certain that they fairly reflect the value
of our services to you. If we feel that too much time was expended for the nature of
the matter, or the result obtained, we will reduce the fees accordingly.
Our statements generally will be prepared and mailed at least quarterly, but, de-
pending upon the extent of services rendered, may be as frequent as monthly during the
month following the billing period in which services are rendered and costs advanced.
Our statements generally summarize the nature and extent of services performed for the
period, for which detailed time charges will be available at your request. Payment is ex-
pected promptly, in accordance with customary vouchering and payment procedures.
We agree to notify you promptly of any significant developments and to con-

sult with you on significant decisions involving your case. We agree to send you a
copy of all pertinent written materials sent or received by the Attorney and per-
taining to the case. You agree to reimburse our costs for reproducing those materi-
als. You agree to keep us advised of changes in phone number and address and of
any significant changes in your situation. You will share with us information that
affects the case. You will answer requests for information promptly.
The work product produced in the course of our representation generally will
remain as our property, although you shall always be given reasonable access to it.
Files will be retained and maintained by us for a sufficient period of time follow-
ing the conclusion of such matter and following termination of representation, so
as to afford you continued reasonable access to files.
In the event of disputes, whether over fees or any other matter, we will
promptly attend to effecting a reasonable resolution of same as soon as such is
brought to our attention. Should any dispute not be satisfactorily resolved, the
same shall be submitted to arbitration for prompt resolution, and both counsel and
client agree to be bound by the results of such arbitration.
You will have the right to terminate our representation at any time. Notification
of termination shall be made in writing to us and no further fees or expenses shall ac-
crue after that point in time. You shall promptly pay us for all fees, charges, and ex-
penses incurred on your behalf prior to notification of termination, and we shall
refund any unearned portion of fees otherwise previously paid or advanced by you. We
likewise reserve the right to discontinue legal services and to withdraw from represen-
tation if you fail to honor this Letter of Engagement, or for any just reason as permit-
ted or required under the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, or as permitted by
the rules of the courts of the State of Ohio. Notification of withdrawal shall be made
in writing to you and, in the event of such withdrawal, you agree to promptly pay us
for all fees, charges, and expenses incurred prior to the date of withdrawal, and we shall
refund any unearned portion of fees otherwise previously paid or advanced by you.
You may terminate this agreement, with or without cause, on written notice
to us. If you terminate this agreement, we shall return your file immediately after
duplicating it. You agree to pay the cost incurred to duplicate the file. Termination
shall not affect your responsibility to pay for the legal services rendered and the
costs incurred up to the date of termination.
Please review the foregoing and, if it meets with your approval, sign a copy of the
letter and return it to my attention in the enclosed, self addressed, stamped envelope.
If you have any questions, please feel free to call upon me at your convenience.
In the meantime, we look forward to being of service to you and to both reflect and
project on your behalf a high degree of professionalism and quality of service.
Very truly yours,
_________________________________
Enclosures
AGREED AND ACCEPTED this ______ day of ___________, 2008
By: __________________________
450 Appendix C
BUSINESS PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into at ___________, _____________
County, Ohio this ____________ day of _______________, 2008 by and between
_____________, an Ohio corporation (“Seller”) and ____________, (“Buyer”).
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Seller owns the business, fixtures, furnishings and equipment
(collectively, “the Business”) known as ____________ located at _______________,
_____________, _____________ County, Ohio and in connection therewith has a
D _______ permit issued by the Ohio Department of Liquor Control being num-
ber _________, expiring _________.
WHEREAS, Seller is desirous of selling same and Buyer is desirous of purchas-
ing said Business:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Purchase and Sale
1. Seller agrees to sell and deliver to Buyer who agrees to purchase the Busi-
ness, including all its stock of goods, equipment, fixtures, and other assets
described in the inventory attached to this Contract as Exhibit A.
Purchase Price
2. Seller agrees to accept and buyer agrees to pay for the Business (not
including stock of goods provided for in Paragraph 4 of this contract) the
total sum of _____________ ($_____________) dollars as follows:
a. Furniture, fixtures and equipment ....................$ _____________
b. Liquor permit ......................................................$ _____________
c. Goodwill ...............................................................$ _____________
Payment Terms
3. The parties agree that payment of the total sum stated in Paragraph 2
shall be made in the following manner:
(a) Buyer shall pay to Seller at the signing of this Contract the sum of
____________ ($____________) dollars, to be held in the trust ac-
count of Jake M. Vogelsong as trustee, for Seller, for payment to
Seller at Settlement. This amount is non-refundable.
(b) Buyer shall execute a promissory note to Seller at Settlement in the
amount of ____________ ($____________) dollars to be amortized
over ______________ (______________) years at ______________
(____________ %) percent per annum, with a balloon payment
after ____________ (____________) years.
(c) Buyer and Seller agree that in the event Buyer pays the purchase
price in full at Settlement, the purchase price shall be discounted to
____________ ($____________) dollars. Buyer and Seller agree
that in the event Buyer pays the purchase price in full within
(______________) year of Settlement, then the note shall be dis-
counted by ____________ ($____________) dollars.
Sale of Stock of Goods

4. In addition to the total sale price of $___________, the consideration
shall be increased by the current wholesale value of food inventory, alco-
holic beverages and merchandise in sealed containers at Settlement. This
additional consideration shall be paid at Settlement.
Bill of Sale
5. Seller agrees to provide a Bill of Sale warranting that all of the goods and
equipment are free and clear of any and all encumbrances, said original
documents to be held in escrow pending the transfer of the permit and
delivered to Buyer at the time of Settlement.
Settlement
6. Settlement shall take place within ___________ (___________) days of
the receipt of the approval of the transfer of the liquor permit to Buyer. At
the time of Settlement, possession of the Business shall be given to Buyer.
It is understood that time is of the essence and that this transaction shall
be closed as soon as possible.
Payment of Taxes and Obligations

7. Seller warrants that all taxes, assessments, and unemployment compen-
sation contributions due in connection with the operation of the Busi-
ness to any city, county, state, or federal governmental agencies, shall be
paid in full up to the date of Settlement and that all due returns, forms,
and taxes required to be filed with those agencies will be properly filed
and paid as of the Settlement date, or will be filed and paid in due course
after that date.
Transfer of Liquor Permit

8. At the time of the signing of this Contract, Buyer and Seller shall execute
all papers necessary for transfer of Liquor Permit number ___________
to Buyer, and the papers shall be filed with the Department of Liquor
Control within ___________ (___________) days. Seller agrees to
render any and all assistance reasonably required by Buyer in connection
with the transfer. The liquor license renewal cost shall be prorated as of
the date of Settlement.
Contract Contingent on Transfer of Liquor Permit

9. This Contract is contingent on and subject to obtaining a written approval
of transfer of Liquor Permit number ___________ from Seller to the
Buyer by the Department of Liquor Control not later than ninety (90)
days from the date of this Contract, unless the time is extended by mutual
agreement of the parties in writing or if delay is due to processing delays
by Department of Liquor Control. In the event that the Department of
Liquor Control refuses to approve the transfer to Buyer on proper applica-
tion, all monies held in escrow, except the portion which is non-refundable,
shall be returned to Buyer without any deductions whatsoever. On return
452 Appendix C
of the monies, this Contract shall be null and void, and the parties shall
have no liability one to the other.
Seller’s Title to Property

10. Seller represents that Seller is the owner of and has good and marketable
title to all equipment, fixtures, and other assets being sold under this
Contract as set forth in the inventory attached hereto as Exhibit A; and
that at the time of Settlement those assets shall be free and clear of all
debts, encumbrances, liens, mortgages, or claims and demands
whatsoever.
Seller has purchase agreements for an ATM machine at the business

premises and for security cameras and monitor at the business premises.
Buyer agrees to assume Seller’s liability, rights and responsibilities on
each of these contracts. Buyer and Seller agree that each shall cooperate
in executing any and all documents necessary to effectuate said assump-
tion or assignment of these contracts.
Competition
11. Seller agrees that Seller shall not, either as an individual or a corporation, or
in any other business form, directly or indirectly, enter into competition with
Buyer or engage in the same or similar type of business, whether as principal,
agent, employee, or straw party within a radius of 2 miles from the address of
the business for a period of one (1) year from the date of this Contract.
Actions and Other Proceedings

12. Seller represents that:
(a) Seller presently has, and at the time of Settlement will have, no judg-
ments, liens, actions, or proceedings against it and no claims of any nature
whatsoever for which Buyer or the assets being sold under this Contract
might be subject to liability with the exception of a lawsuit pending
against Seller in the Lucas County Common Pleas Court entitled
__________ under case number __________ of which Buyer is aware.
(b) There are no violations or actions pending or arising from noncom-
pliance or wrongful compliance with any regulations or require-
ments of any governmental agencies, whether federal, state, or local.
Seller will indemnify, defend and hold harmless Buyer from any
undisclosed violations, or violations that may arise in the future that
accrued prior to Settlement.
(c) There are no actions presently pending before the Department of
Liquor Control for citations against Seller; and that in the event that
any actions or citations may arise, the obligation for payment of any
fines or penalties imposed shall be that of Seller.
(d) Seller has no knowledge of any notices of an governmental authority
requiring alterations, corrections, additions, or improvements to the
Business premises in order to continue the conduct of a
______________ business in the premises.
Sale of Real Estate

13. Buyer shall have the right of first refusal to purchase the real estate located
at ______________, ______________, ______________ County, Ohio,
in the event Seller decides to sell said real estate in the future.
Business Name
14. Seller grants to Buyer the right to the use in any manner the name
______________. Seller also grants to Buyer exclusive use of any tele-
phone numbers used in connection with the Business either at the time
of signing of this Contract or at the time of the Settlement.
Destruction of Business
15. In the event that the Business, or any part of it, is destroyed by fire or
other catastrophe prior to Settlement, this Contract, at the option of
Seller, shall become null and void, all deposit monies shall be returned to
Buyer without deduction, and there shall be no further liability under
this Contract on the part of either party.
Service Contracts
16. Seller represents that Seller has no contracts in existence for any vending
machines or other service contracts, but in the event that there are any
such contracts in existence at the time of Settlement, it will be Seller’s sole
obligation to cancel or have the contracts transferred to Buyer at Buyer’s
option.
Entire Agreement
17. This Contract constitutes the sole and only agreement between Buyer
and Seller respecting the Business or the sale and purchase of the Busi-
ness. This Contract correctly sets forth the obligations of Buyer and Seller
to each other as of its date. Any agreements or representations respecting
the Business or its sale to Buyer not expressly set forth in this Contract
are null and void.
Binding on Heirs
18. This Contract shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of the
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the parties.
Executed at Toledo, Ohio, on the day and year first above written.
SELLER: BUYER:
__________, an Ohio corporation __________, an Ohio corporation
By: __________ By: __________
__________, (Title) __________, (Title)
454 Appendix C
EQUIPMENT LIST
BILL OF SALE
__________ date, 2008
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that __________, an Ohio

corporation, the Grantor, for full consideration paid by ______________, an
Ohio corporation, the Grantee, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does
hereby grant, bargain, sell, transfer, and deliver unto the Grantee, the following as
sets of the Grantor as of the above-noted date, all equipment and furniture, and
fixtures presently used by the Grantor at the business known as ______________
located at ______________, ______________, Ohio as described in Exhibit A,
attached hereto and incorporated herein for all purposes.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto Grantee and his successors and
assigns forever.
Grantor hereby covenants to and with the Grantee that the Grantor is the
lawful owner of the above-described goods and chattels; that the same are free and
clear from all encumbrances whatsoever; that the Grantor has good right to sell the
same as aforesaid; and that the Grantor will warrant and defend the same against
all lawful claims and demands whatsoever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, __________ has hereunto set its hand, by and
through its __________ (President), __________, the day and year first herein-
above written.
Signed and delivered in the presence of:
______________, an Ohio corporation
_________________
By: __________________
___________, __________ (President)
Grantor
_________________
456 Appendix C
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF EQUIPMENT

AGREEMENT made by and between All You Can Eat Ice Cream Buffet, Inc.
(Seller), and ABC Corporation (Buyer).
In consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained in this con-
tract, the parties agree as follows:
1. Seller agrees to sell, and Buyer agrees to buy the following described
equipment for use in making and selling ice cream:
(3) Dipping/Display Merchandisers, (6) Soft Serve and Shake Machines,
(11) Dipping Cabinets, (5) Beverage Freezers, (2) Batch Freezers,
(1) Fountainettes, (16) Cone Dispensers, (2) Upright Storage Freezers,
(7) Dishers, Scoops, and Ladles, (1) Mixers & (1) Blender. (hereinafter
“Assets”).
2. Sale Price. Buyer agrees to pay Seller the total price of $100,000.00 paya-
ble as follows:
$15,000.00 cash deposit herewith
$85,000.00 balance by cash or certified check at time of transfer
3. Disclaimer of Warranty. Said property is sold in “as is” condition. ALL
EQUIPMENT SOLD IS USED. SELLER HEREBY EXCLUDES THE
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PAR-
TICULAR PURPOSE. Seller disclaims all warranties in connection with
the assets, express or implied, as to any matter whatsoever, including with-
out limitation description, quality, design, performance, specifications,
condition, merchantability, and fitness for any particular purpose, except
as expressly set forth in this Agreement. SELLER HAS MADE NO AFFIR-
MATION OF FACT AND HAS MADE NO PROMISE RELATING TO
THE ASSETS WHICH HAS BEEN PART OF THE BASIS OF THE BAR-
GAIN MADE OR HAS CREATED OR AMOUNTED TO AN EXPRESS
WARRANTY THAT THE ASSETS WOULD CONFORM TO ANY
SUCH AFFIRMATION OR PROMISE.
4. Warranty of Title. Seller warrants that it has full legal title to said prop-
erty, authority to sell said property, and that said property shall be sold
free and clear of all claims by other parties.
5. Transfer of Title. Parties agree to transfer title on June 28, 2011, at 2801
W. Bancroft St. Toledo, Ohio, the address of the Seller.
6. Risk of Loss. Purchaser assumes responsibility and costs for all packing,
crating, removal, and transportation of the equipment and costs of trans-
portation. If Seller assists Purchaser in this regard, it is agreed that such
assistance is gratuitous, and Seller will have no obligation or liability aris-
ing out of such assistance.
7. Binding on Heirs. This agreement shall be binding on the parties, their
successors, assigns, and personal representatives.
8. Non-Disclosure. As part of the inducement of this Agreement, the Parties
agree that all of the information produced by them, including but not lim-
ited to the existence and/or content of this Agreement, is confidential and
shall not be disclosed by them to any other individual, entity, or party,
except that the Parties may disclose any and all evidence in their posses-
sion as they are commanded to do so by court order.
9. Assumption of Risk, Waiver, Release for Liability and Indemnification.
Buyer understands the risks associated with the operation of the equipment
to be purchased which include the possibility of causing property dam-

age, incurring bodily injury and further acknowledges that not all hazards
and dangers can be foreseen such as failure to wear protective gear,
mechanical malfunction and equipment failure. Buyer accepts and
assumes all risks that may arise out of or result from use of the equipment
and waives specific notice of the existence of the risks. Buyer releases,
waives, discharges and holds harmless ABC Corporation, its owners,
officers, employees, agents, and representatives, successors, heirs, and
assigns from any and all claims, law suits or causes of action of any kind
which might arise from their inactions, actions or omissions, which are in
any way associated or connected with the equipment.
10. Amendments. No change or modification of any of the terms, provisions,
or conditions of this Agreement shall be effective unless made in writing
and signed or initialed by all parties to this Agreement.
11. Arbitration. Any controversy or dispute arising among the parties or
under this agreement shall be resolved by arbitration conducted at The
University of Toledo in Toledo, Ohio, in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment on the award rendered
by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
12. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed and construed in
accordance with the statutory and decisional law of the State of Ohio.
13. Headings and Captions. The titles or captions of paragraphs and sub-
paragraphs contained in this Agreement are provided for convenience of
reference. They shall not be intended to limit the scope or extent of this
Agreement or any of its terms or provisions.
14. Gender and Number. All pronouns and variations thereof shall be
deemed to refer to the masculine, feminine, or neuter, to the singular or
plural, as the identity of the person or entity or persons or entities may
require.
15. Voluntary Execution. The parties have ascertained and weighed all of
the facts, conditions, and circumstances likely to influence their judg-
ment regarding this agreement and clearly understand and freely and
voluntarily consent to all of the provisions of this agreement. The parties
have entered into this agreement freely and voluntarily after taking into
account the advice of their or her own legal counsel. The parties further
acknowledge that they have not been nor are they under any duress
exerted by the other party or otherwise; that they have not relied upon
any representation by the other as an inducement to enter into this
Agreement other than those representations contained herein; that they
believe that this Agreement is fair and reasonable, given the circum-
stances of each party; that they have given due consideration to all pro-
visions of this Agreement and clearly understand and accept all of the
provisions hereof.
16. Construction. This Agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with
the plain meaning of its words and no rule of construction shall apply to
the benefit or detriment of either party based on which party drafted this
Agreement.
17. Limitation of Damages. Because of the difficulties and inconvenience in
attempting to establish the loss, if Seller breaches this agreement with
respect to the condition of the equipment, it shall pay to Purchaser as liq-
uidated damages, and not as a penalty, the sum of $1,000,000.00, which is
458 Appendix C
the parties’ reasonable estimate of fair compensation for the foreseeable

losses that might result from the breach.
18. Electronic Signature. The parties agree that signatures on this Agree-
ment, as well as any other documents to be executed under this agreement,
may be delivered electronically or digitally in lieu of an original hand-
applied signature, and the parties agree to treat electronic or digital
signatures as original hand-applied signatures and agree to be bound by
this provision.
Signed under seal this ____ day of __________.
____________________________ ________________________
Buyer Seller
CORPORATE FORMATION AGREEMENT

• First: The name of the limited liability company is Joe Smith LLC
____________________________________________________________
• Second: The address of its registered office in the State of Delaware is
2711 Centerville Road Suite 400 _________________ in the City of
Wilmington, DE 19808. The name of its Registered agent at such address
is ____________ Corporation Service Company
____________________________________________________________
• Third: (Use this paragraph only if the company is to have a specific effective
date of dissolution.) “The latest date on which the limited liability company
is to dissolve is ________________________
• Fourth: (Insert any other matters the members determine to include herein.)
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
In Witness Whereof, the undersigned have executed this Certificate of Forma-
January ____
tion this 21st ______________ day of ________ 20 08
Is/ Joe C. Smith
By:
Authorized Person(s)
Name: Joe C. Smith
Typed or Printed
460 Appendix C
CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT1
(Selected Section)
Bank customers are given this Agreement when approved for an Account, or
on request. By opening an Account and making Transactions (as defined below),
you agree to use this Account only for personal, family or household purposes and
to comply with, and be bound by, this entire Agreement.
Unless otherwise specified, “you,” “your” and “yours” mean each person or
persons who applied (by Internet, orally, or in writing) to the Bank for an Account,
which application has been approved by the Bank, and each person(s) who uses the
Account with your permission; the terms “we,” “our,” and “us” mean the Bank and
its successors and assigns; and the term “Card” means each Gold, Platinum, Select,
Secured/Good Neighbor and Secured MasterCard and VISA that we issue on your
Account, unless the context indicates otherwise.
You should retain and carefully review this entire Agreement. You and we
agree as follows:
1. Accepting this Agreement. This Agreement will be effective on the ear-
lier of the date (a) you sign or otherwise submit an application for the
Account that we approve; or (b) you use, or someone authorized by you
uses, the Card or the Account. You acknowledge and agree that any use,
signing of an Account application or other document, or other acceptance
of the Account or the Card constitutes your acceptance of the terms and
conditions of this Agreement.
2. Promise to Pay. By using your Card or your Account, you agree to pay us
an amount equal to the sum of all Transactions made in connection
with, and posted to, your Account plus any Finance Charges (as defined
below), fees and other charges provided for in this Agreement, regard-
less of the medium by which the Transaction occurs. If your Account is
established by two or more persons, each of you, together and individu-
ally, is responsible for all amounts owed, even if the Account is used by
only one of you.
3. Your Responsibility. You are responsible for all Transactions and other
transactions arising from the authorized use of your Account or Card by
you by any means. If you have authorized another person to use your Ac-
count or Card in any manner, that authorization will be deemed to include
the authorization to make Transactions of any kind using your Account or
Card and to incur related fees and charges, and such authorization will be
deemed to continue until you have taken all steps necessary to revoke it by
preventing such use by that person. We are not responsible for controlling
any person who you have asked us to add to your Account or someone
1
Remember that some agreements—such as software agreements and credit card agreements—don’t actually
have to have signatures to be effective. Software agreements can take effect immediately upon installing the soft-
ware. Credit card agreements can take effect upon application and/or issuance of the credit card.
you let use your Account or Card. If you let someone use your Account or
Card, you are responsible for all Transactions made in connection with,
and posted to, your Account plus all Finance Charges, fees and other
charges. If you wish to remove such person’s ability to use your Account or
Card, you must notify us in writing. No such notice will be effective until
we receive and have had a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
462 Appendix C
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this __________ day of __________, 20 ___,
between _____________, an Ohio corporation, of Toledo, Ohio, hereinafter
referred to as “Employer,” and _____________, of Toledo, Ohio, hereinafter
referred to as “Employee.”
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Employee has recently been hired as _____________ of
Employer in consideration of his agreeing to enter into this Employment Agree-
ment with Employer, and
WHEREAS, Employee will of necessity during his employment, become well
acquainted with Employer’s customers, sources of supply, other employees, and all
other facets of Employer’s business.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter
set forth, and particularly in consideration of Employer’s employing Employee,
and continuing to employ him in the same capacity, it is mutually covenanted and
agreed between the parties as follows:
1. Employer employs Employee as __________ for a period of __________ years,
commencing _____________, and ending _____________, unless his
employment is sooner terminated pursuant to provisions hereof. Employee
shall be elected an officer of Employer, and Employer shall use its best efforts
to have him elected. If elected, Employee agrees to accept the office of
_____________ and any other office to which he may be elected, and without
additional compensation to perform the duties thereof.
2. Employee shall devote his entire business time, attention and skill, reasonable
vacations and unforeseen illnesses excepted, to developing and increasing the
business of Employer in the sale and leasing of its products and shall perform his
duties to the best of his ability, and in a reasonably efficient and satisfactory man-
ner. During the period of his employment, Employee will not make any other
corporate affiliations without the approval of Employer’s Board of Directors.
3. Employee for all services to be rendered to Employer, shall be paid so long as
he shall be employed:
a. A fixed salary of __________ per year, payable in equal consecutive sem-
imonthly installments. On the first anniversary date Employee’s salary
shall be increased to __________ per year, and on the second anniver-
sary date to __________ per year, providing sufficient profits are being
generated from which to pay the aforesaid increases. It is the intention of
the parties that Employee’s base salary will not be increased unless the
Employer is financially capable of doing so without incurring a deficit;
provided, however, that Employee’s base salary shall never be reduced
below __________ per year.
b. Additional compensation payable on the first anniversary date hereof,
equal to __________% of the net income before provision for federal
income taxes and bonuses, but after all officers’ salaries are paid;
__________% on the second anniversary date and __________% on the
third anniversary date. The payment of a bonus hereunder shall be
restricted exclusively to the total net income available to pay bonuses to

all other employees of the Company with whom it has entered into a
similar Employment Agreement. In the event that sufficient net earnings
are not available on any one or more of the anniversary dates hereof with
which to pay said bonuses to all employees in their entirety, then in such
event, the bonuses to all employees with whom the Employer has an
employment contract shall be pro rated. If pro-rata bonus payments are
made on any anniversary date they shall be non-cumulative.
c. Employer’s net income before provision for Federal Income Taxes and
bonuses, but after the payment of all officers’ salaries, shall be deter-
mined in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices and
shall be based upon the Profit and Loss Statement prepared by Employ-
er’s independent accounting firm within _____________ days after each
anniversary date. The computation by such firm of net income and of
Employee’s additional compensation made in the manner herein pro-
vided shall be final and binding upon Employer and Employee, and
Employer shall pay such additional compensation to Employee within
_____________ days after each anniversary date.
4. Upon Employee’s death, resignation, or discharge for cause, Employee’s fixed
compensation shall be paid to the last day of the calendar month in which
such event occurs, and his additional compensation shall be computed pro
rata and be paid in the manner provided in paragraphs 3 (b and c) above.
5. In the event of Employee’s illness or other disability which prevents him from
performing his duties for a period in excess of _____________ days, this
agreement may be terminated by serving written notice on employee fixing a
date not less than _____________ days after the occurrence of said event and
this agreement shall terminate.
6. In the event of Employee’s protracted illness or disability, resignation, dis-
charge by Employer, or upon the expiration of this Agreement, it is expressly
agreed that all of the provisions below shall remain in full force and effect for
a period of _____________ years.
7. Employee agrees that he will not during his employment or for a period of
_____________ years thereafter by Employer, for himself or in conjunction
with any other person, persons, firm, company, partnership, association or
corporation, engage either directly or indirectly in any business competitive
with the Employer in the following geographic areas:
a. in the City of _____________
b. in the County of _____________
c. in the State of _____________
d. within a radius of _____________ (_____________) miles from the
center of the above City, County, and State.
8. Employee agrees that he will not, during his employment and for a period of
_____________ years immediately following the termination thereof with
Employer, whether such termination is voluntary or involuntary, either serv-
ice or solicit, or both, customers of Employer which are located in the geo-
graphical area specified above.
464 Appendix C
9. Employee agrees that he will not during his employment and for
_____________ years immediately following the termination of his employ-
ment with Employer, for himself or in conjunction with any other person,
persons, firm, company, partnership, association, or corporation, cause to be
employed any person either now or hereafter employed by Employer.
10. Employee agrees that he will not, during the term of his employment, and for
_____________ years immediately following the termination thereof, com-
municate or divulge to any person or entity any of Employer’s trade secrets,
advertising techniques, practices, policies or customers’ lists, or any other
information which he might acquire from time to time pertaining to the
business of Employer.
11. Employee agrees upon termination of employment by Employer to forthwith
surrender all records and data of every nature, kind, and description in his
possession, or under his control, prepared by Employer or him during the
course of his employment.
12. The validity, construction and enforceability of this agreement shall be deter-
mined exclusively by the laws of the State of _____________.
13. This agreement supersedes all prior oral and/or written agreements and
understandings between the parties and constitutes the entire contract
between them and may not be altered, amended, or revoked except by written
instrument signed by both parties and executed in accordance herewith.
14. If any of the covenants or conditions of this agreement should be found to be
unenforceable in a Court of law, then this agreement is severable and all
remaining covenants and conditions shall be enforceable by said Court.
15. This Agreement shall inure to and be binding upon the parties hereto, their
respective executors, administrators, heirs, successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto executed this Agree-
ment in duplicate, each of which shall be deemed to be an original on the day and
year first above written.
Witnesses:
As to Employer:
____________________________ By ______________________
Employer
As to Employee:
____________________________ ________________________
Employee
____________________________
EVENT CONTRACT
This contract is between The University of Ohio, located at 2801 West Smith
Street, Toledo, Ohio 43606 on behalf of the University’s Undergraduate Legal Spe-
cialties Program (“the University”), and Judge Roy Bean (“the Speaker”), whose
main office is located at 1234 Lady Justice Boulevard, Washington, DC 00386.
1. The parties wish to provide faculty, students, or guests of the University the
following event:
A 2-hour presentation titled “A Day in the Life of An Old West Justice Man”
at the annual Paralegal Christmas Party on December 11, 2008, 7:30 p.m. until
9:30 p.m. This event will be held in the Student Union Auditorium of the Main
Campus of the University.
2. Tickets will be available for sale in the amounts and for the prices as follows:
Total number of tickets available: Not applicable
University Student Price: Not applicable
Non-Student Ticket Price: Not applicable
3. The University will pay $5,000 to Speaker for a 2-hour presentation of his
topic beginning at 7:30 p.m. And, in addition, the University will pay for the
specific travel and lodging expenses not to exceed $500, which specifically
include reasonable air travel, accommodations, and ground transportation
expenses that are approved in advance and meals.
4. Checks should be made payable to: Judge Roy Bean, who will provide the
University with either his Social Security Number or Federal Tax ID Number.
5. Technical Requirements (insert N/A if none): Microphone, podium, compu-
ter with PowerPoint capabilities and a large screen.
6. Other requirements or special payment conditions: None known.
7. The University reserves the right to refuse and forbid the requested service or
arrangements as being impermissible on the grounds of safety, security, or
caution in the operation of the University.
8. If appropriate, University will obtain all necessary licenses and permits for
the event. Speaker will pay all applicable taxes.
9. Speaker guarantees that the Event will start at the time listed above. The Uni-
versity will not pay Speaker until after the performance is complete, unless
otherwise specified above.
10. In the event the University premises are rendered unsuitable for the Event by
reason of Force Majeure, the University may terminate this Agreement and
the University will not be responsible for any damages sustained by Speaker.
“Force Majeure” will mean fire, earthquake, flood, act of God, adverse
weather conditions, shortage of energy to the University, strikes, epidemic,
work stoppages, or other labor disturbances, riots or civil commotions, litiga-
tion, war or other act of any foreign nation, power of government, or govern-
mental agency or authority, or any other cause that is beyond the control or
authority of the University.
466 Appendix C
11. Failure of the Speaker to appear, present, or perform does not relieve Speaker
of the responsibility of paying the costs and expenses incurred by the Univer-
sity in preparation for the Event, unless such failure is caused by or due to the
physical disability of the Speaker, or acts or regulations of public authorities,
labor difficulties, civil tumult, strike, epidemic, acts of God, or other cause
beyond the control of the Speaker or the University.
12. Speaker must obtain written approval from the University for any advertising
in any medium before it is to appear.
13. Speaker will obtain and maintain public liability insurance against personal
bodily injury in the overall amount of $1,000,000 and against property dam-
age in the amount of $1,000,000 with bodily injury and property damage lia-
bility insurance in the amount of $1,000,000 for each person for bodily liability
and $1,000,000 for each occurrence for property damage liability to cover such
liability caused by, or arising out of, activities of Speaker, and their members,
agents, or employees while engaged in preparing for, or presenting the Event
hereunder, or such other insurance that is required by the University. Speaker
agrees to furnish the University with a certificate of insurance evidencing this
coverage at least 5 days prior to the Event and to have the University, its gov-
erning board, officers, and employees named as additional insureds.
14. Speaker will indemnify the University, its governing board, officers, employ-
ees, and agents, from all liability and claims arising in connection with such
liability caused by, or arising out of death or injury to any person or damage
to property, caused by or arising out of activities of Speaker, and their mem-
bers, agents, or employees while engaged in preparing for or presenting the
Event hereunder, except that the University retains the right to retain and
select counsel to represent the University in any such claim. Speaker will
indemnify the University for all liability and claims arising in connection
with the actual presentation of the material contained in the Event, whether
occurring due to defamation, copyright infringement or otherwise and the
University reserves the right to retain and select counsel.
15. The failure or delay of either party to exercise its rights under this Agreement
for a breach will not be deemed to be a waiver of such rights. And no waiver
by either party, whether written or oral, express or implied, of any rights
under or arising from this Agreement will be binding on any subsequent
occasion; and no concession by either party will be treated as an implied
modification of the Agreement unless specifically agreed in writing.
16. Any notice to either party hereunder must be in writing signed by the party
giving it, and will be served either personally or by registered or certified mail
to the party at the addresses listed above.
17. This Agreement (and its attachments, if any) contains all the terms between
the parties and may be amended only in writing signed by an authorized rep-
resentative of both parties. The parties may not assign this Agreement with-
out the written consent of the other party, and it is legally binding upon the
heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns of both parties.
18. The laws of the State of Ohio govern this Agreement and any conflict arising
out of this Agreement.
Agreed to this ______________ day of ______________________________,

20 ______________, by each party’s duly authorized representative.
THE UNIVERSITY OF OHIO SPEAKER
By: ________________________ By: ________________________

Par T. President Judge Roy Bean
Executive Vice President SSN or Tax ID:
________________________
468 Appendix C
PHYSICIAN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT (“Agreement”) is between John Q. Public, M.D. (“Physi-
cian”) and USA Hospital North, Inc. (“Employer”), a not-for-profit corporation.
This Agreement shall continue for the initial term and any renewal terms, unless
earlier terminated as provided herein.
RECITALS:
WHEREAS, in furtherance of its charitable, scientific, and educational purposes,
Employer provides various healthcare and medical services, including emergency
medical services, to residents of Any County, USA (the “Community”), initially at
USA Hospital North.
WHEREAS, Employer provides the emergency medical services to residents
of the Community specifically within the Emergency Department.
WHEREAS, there is presently an insufficient number of physicians to pro-
vide Emergency Department coverage and needed administrative direction of the
Emergency Department, and Employer has determined that employment of Physi-
cian will enable it to better serve the residents of the Community and thereby fur-
ther its charitable mission and purposes; and
WHEREAS, Employer desires to obtain the services of Physician as an
employee, to render health care services to residents of the Community, in order to
further its charitable mission and purposes.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of this premises and the mutual cove-
nants and agreements herein contained and for other good and valuable considera-
tion, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties
hereby agree as follows:
1. Definitions. Whenever used in this Agreement, the terms listed in Exhibit 1

have the meanings stated in such Exhibit unless the context should clearly require
otherwise.
2. Employment. Employer hereby employs Physician, and Physician accepts

employment with Employer, effective as of January 1, 2008, upon all of the terms
and conditions set forth below.
3. Duties and Extent of Services. Physician shall render professional emergency
medical services for patients of Employer, and Emergency Department adminis-
trative services for the hospital, as mutually determined from time to time by and
between Employer and Physician, in the manner and extent permitted by the laws
of the State of Anywhere and the canons of professional ethics. Physician agrees to
devote his best abilities and full working time to the practice of medicine at the
hospital for the Term of this Agreement. Physician shall use best efforts to provide
Emergency Department coverage and Emergency Department Administrative
services during at least, but not limited to, two (2) 24-hour shifts per week, a total
of forty-eight (48) hours per week for forty-eight (48) weeks, or two thousand three
hundred four hours (2,304) per year, the exact schedule for which to be determined
by Hospital Administrator, or his or her designee. Physician also shall perform such
other reasonable tasks and services, as mutually agreed upon by and between Phy-
sician and Employer, including other administrative tasks and duties as are consist-
ent with the relationship described herein. Commencing with his employment by
Employer, Physician also agrees as follows:
3.01 Practice Compliance. Physician will use Physician’s best efforts to comply
with any Employer practice protocols and productivity standards as may be
adopted by Employer from time to time and in a manner consistent with commu-
nity norms for the same type of practice.
3.02 Program Participation. Physician will participate in Employer’s programs
of professional education, quality and utilization management, marketing and
practice administration.
3.03 License and Medical Staff Requirements. Physician will maintain an unre-
stricted license to practice medicine in the State of Anywhere, as well as an unre-
stricted narcotics number. Physician shall be a medical staff member in good
standing with appropriate clinical privileges at USA Hospital North, and such
other facilities as designated and/or approved by Employer in writing.
3.04 Policies and Procedures. Physician shall observe and comply with all writ-
ten policies and procedures of Employer as adopted and amended from time to
time with respect to Physician’s obligations.
3.05 Competitive Activities. Physician agrees not to engage directly or indi-
rectly in any activity which is competitive with any business of Employer or its
Affiliates as such businesses are being conducted during the Term of this Agree-
ment, without the prior written consent of Employer.
3.06 Professional Liability Insurance. Physician agrees to practice medicine in
such a manner that professional liability insurance can be obtained and maintained
at reasonable rates which are comparable to rates commonly available to physicians
of comparable specialty to that of Physician in the Community.
3.07 Community Benefit. Physician recognizes that Employer is a tax-exempt
organization with charitable goals, interests and responsibilities, and agrees to sup-
port and to participate in the community benefit, charitable, and indigent care ini-
tiatives and programs of Employer. In connection with such participation,
Physician agrees to provide services to patients whose healthcare services are reim-
bursed by the Medicare/Medicaid programs, and other programs as may be desig-
nated by Employer from time to time.
4. Covenants and Agreements of Employer. Commencing with the employ-
ment of Physician, Employer agrees as follows:
4.01 Facilities. Employer will make available to Physician reasonable facilities,
equipment, services, and supplies necessary to engage in Physician’s professional
practice of medicine in the Community. Employer shall maintain such equipment
in good order and repair, reasonable wear and tear excepted. Physician shall use
such facilities, services, and supplies for purposes of providing the professional
services described in Section 3, but shall not use the facilities, services, and sup-
plies for other purposes. If Employer and Physician determine that the continuation
470 Appendix C
of Physician’s practice at the initial location is unsatisfactory from a practice devel-

opment standpoint, Employer, in consultation with Physician, shall reassign Physi-
cian to facilities of comparable quality to the initial location. Employer will be
responsible for all non-physician personnel decisions at the Practice (including but
not limited to hiring, termination, and compensation of such personnel). Hiring
decisions shall be made in consultation with Physician.
4.02 Practice Compensation. Physician shall be compensated by Employer in
the amount and manner set forth on Exhibit 4.02, attached hereto and incorpo-
rated herein by reference. All payments to Physician for which provisions are made
in this Agreement shall be subject to appropriate state or federal tax and other
withholding, as required by law.
4.03 Benefits. Physician shall be eligible for those benefits listed in Exhibit 4.03
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference; provided, however, that
Employer may unilaterally alter, from time to time, those benefits set forth in Exhibit
4.03 which are applicable to all employees of Employer, and Physician shall only be
entitled to such benefits as are otherwise available to all such employees of Employer.
5. Billing and Fees. Employer shall bill and collect for all services provided by
Physician under this Agreement on a monthly or more frequent basis, as Employer
shall deem appropriate, and Employer shall retain all revenues received from such
billings. Physician’s charges for professional services rendered shall be established
from time to time by Employer. Physician acknowledges that his employment does
not confer upon him any ownership interest in or personal claim upon any fees
charged or revenue received for his services, whether said fees are collected during
the Term of this Agreement or after termination thereof. Further, Physician shall
execute in a timely fashion such forms, including without limitation, assignments,
as may be reasonable or necessary to facilitate billing and collection by Employer.
Physician shall not directly or indirectly bill any party for any services provided
pursuant to this Agreement including, without limitation, Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the parties agree
that any fees for publications, honoraria for speeches, fees for directorship(s) with
civic organizations, compensation from insurance board(s) or any payment received
for a service contract that is not in conflict with this Agreement and has been agreed
to by the parties hereto in writing, shall be the sole property of Physician.
6. Term of this Agreement. The term of this Agreement shall commence on
January 1, 2008, and shall remain in effect through December 31, 2008, (“Initial
Term”), subject to the termination provisions set forth below. Unless Employer
gives to Physician, or Physician gives to Employer, written notice of nonrenewal at
least ninety (90) days prior to the end of the Initial Term or of any renewal
term, this Agreement shall be automatically renewed for additional periods of
one (1) year each. The Initial Term and any renewal terms of this Agreement are
referred to herein as Term of this Agreement.
6.01 Termination Without Cause. This Agreement may be terminated by either
party, without cause, by providing the other party at least ninety (90) days prior
written notice that such party wishes to terminate this Agreement. In the event
Physician gives notice of termination in compliance with this Section, Employer

shall have the right to terminate the continued provision by Physician of the serv-
ices set forth in Section 3 prior to the termination date specified in the notice. If
the Employer takes such action, Physician shall be entitled to continue to receive
the compensation set forth in Section 3 up to the date of termination provided in
the notice.
SIGNATURE PAGE
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement effective as of

the dates set forth below.
EMPLOYER:
USA Hospital North, Inc.
By: _____________________________
Title: ___________________________
Date: ___________________________
PHYSICIAN:
John Q. Public, M.D.
By: ____________________________
Social Security #: _________________
Date: ___________________________
472 Appendix C
EXHIBIT 1
DEFINITIONS
Affiliate. “Affiliate” means a person, corporation, partnership, or other form of
entity that directly or indirectly controls, or is controlled by, or is under common
control with another designated person, corporation, partnership, or other form
of entity. For purposes of this definition, “control” (including, with correlative
meanings, the terms “controlling,” “controlled by” and “under common control
with,” as applied to any person or entity, means the power, directly or indirectly,
to vote 50% or more if the securities having ordinary voting power for the elec-
tion of directors or managers of such person, or to directly or cause the direction
of the management and policies of that person, whether by voting power, con-
tract or otherwise.
Disability. “Disability” shall mean Physician’s inability to perform the essen-
tial functions of his job as required in this Employment Agreement, with a reason-
able accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities act, because of
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of Physician.
Hospital Administrator. “Hospital Administrator” shall mean the Adminis-
trator of USA Hospital North, Inc., Anytown, Anywhere USA or his/her designee.
Managed Care Plans. “Managed Care Plans” shall mean plans through which
health care services are reimbursed in a manner other than traditional indemnity
reimbursement on a fee for service basis, and shall include but not be limited to
health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, competitive
medical plans, managed care products offered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield or related
entities and similar plans.
Practice. “Practice” means the medical practice established by Employer to
which this Agreement relates and shall also include any other location to which the
medical practice to which this Agreement relates is subsequently relocated.
EXHIBIT 4.02
PHYSICIAN’S COMPENSATION
Physician shall be compensated for all of his services as an employee of Employer
during the Term of this Agreement as provided in this Exhibit 4.02. Fees attribut-
able to Physician’s professional services during the term of this Agreement shall
belong to Employer.
As used in this Exhibit, the following words shall have the meaning specified
in this section.
a. “Base Salary” shall mean the compensation set forth below, as adjusted by
Employer annually in accordance with its compensation adjustment procedures.
b. “Period” shall mean January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008, and each twelve
(12) month period thereafter unless modified by Employer.
1. Physician shall receive Base salary in the amount of fifty Thousand and
no/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) per month, payable with the regular pay periods of
Employer, for Emergency Department medical services to patients of Employer.
2. Physician may receive a Bonus based upon improvement of certain

“Benchmarks” of Emergency Room quality of service. The Benchmarks and the
plan for measuring this quality of service will be mutually developed and approved
by Physician and Employer.
3. Physician shall also receive Administrative Salary in the amount of Fifteen
Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) annually for the provision of Emer-
gency Department administrative services provided on behalf of Employer at the
Practice. In the event Physician’s employment commences or terminates during a
month, Administrative Salary shall be prorated to reflect the portion of the month
during which Physician was employed by Employer and shall be payable with the
regular pay periods of Employer, unless earlier payment is required by law in the
case of termination of employment.
EXHIBIT 4.03
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Physician will be entitled to participate in any benefit plans that Employer may
offer to its employees, subject to eligibility requirements and waiting periods, if
any. Presently, Employer offers its employees group health insurance, group dental
insurance, and life insurance. Employer currently pays 100% of the monthly pre-
mium for an individual employee’s health, dental, and life insurance coverage.
Employer also offers employees the opportunity to participate in a 401(k)
retirement savings plan. The Company does not have an obligation to match an
employee’s contributions or contribute to an employee’s account. In addition,
Employer offers participation in sponsored flexible spending accounts for both
health care and dependent care to all employees.
Physician will earn 24 days of Paid Time Off (“PTO”) per year. PTO includes
vacation time, sick days and personal time. PTO accrues at the rate of 7.38 hours
per pay period.
Physician will receive more information about Employer’s benefits upon exe-
cution of this Agreement.
474 Appendix C
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is
made this 20th day of January, 2008, by and between Land Company, an Idaho
corporation (“Seller”) and Real Estate Developers, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company (“Buyer”).
RECITALS
A. Seller owns that certain property located in the City of Star, County of
Ada, State of Idaho, more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
made a part hereof.
B. Seller desires to sell, transfer and convey such property and Buyer desires
to purchase such property all according to the provisions hereinafter set forth.
AGREEMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged and agreed, and in consideration of
the recitals above, which are incorporated herein, and the premises and the mutual
representations, covenants, undertakings and agreements hereinafter contained,
Seller and Buyer represent, covenant, undertake, and agree as follows:
1. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.
Seller agrees to sell, transfer, and convey and Buyer agrees to purchase and
have transferred and conveyed, all for a purchase price and subject to and upon
each of the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, the following:
(a) Property. The land legally described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
made a part hereof, together with all right, title, and interest of Seller in and to all
easements, tenements, hereditaments, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto
belonging (the “Land”), and improvements and structures located on the Land
(collectively the “Improvements”). The Improvements and the Land are hereinaf-
ter collectively referred to as the “Real Property.”
(b) Personalty. All personal property and other tangible property, if any,
whether enumerated herein or not, in which Seller has an interest and which is not
owned by any tenant, now or hereafter located on or in the Land or the Improve-
ments, used in connection with the operation or maintenance thereof (the
“Personalty”).
(c) Intangible Property. All intangible property, whether enumerated herein
or not, in which Seller has an interest, now or hereafter used in connection with the
operation or maintenance of the Improvements, the Land, or the Personalty,
including, without limitation, all leases, licenses, and other agreements to occupy
all or any part of the Real Property (all hereinafter collectively referred to as the
“Intangible Property”).
(d) Appurtenant Rights. All right, title, and interest of Seller to land, if any,
lying in the bed of any street, road, or avenue, open or proposed, at the foot of or
adjoining the Land to the center line of such street, road, or avenue, and to the use
of all easements, if any, whether of record or not, appurtenant to the Land and the
use of all strips and rights-of-way, if any, abutting, adjacent, contiguous, or adjoin-
ing such Land, and to all water and water rights, ditch and ditch rights, water stor-
age and water storage rights (all hereinafter collectively referred to as the
“Appurtenant Rights”).
The Real Property, Personalty, Intangible Property, and Appurtenant Rights
are hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the “Property.”
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND PAYMENT TERMS.

The purchase price to be paid by Buyer to Seller for the Property (the “Pur-
chase Price”) shall be Five Million and No/100 Dollars ($5,000,000.00). The Pur-
chase Price shall be payable in the following manner:
(a) Earnest Money. Within two (2) business days of the execution of this
Agreement, Buyer shall deposit with First American Title Company, located at 123
Any Street, Boise, Idaho, as escrowee (the “Escrowee”), an amount equal to One
Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($100,000.00) (the “Earnest Money ”).
The Earnest Money shall be held under the standard escrow instructions currently
in use by the Escrowee. All Earnest Money and interest earned thereon, if any, shall
be applied toward the Purchase Price at Closing, provided the transaction contem-
plated herein proceeds through Closing.
(b) Disbursement of Earnest Money. The Earnest Money shall be returned
to Buyer or delivered to Seller in accordance with the terms hereof. The parties
hereto agree to promptly direct the Escrowee to deliver the Earnest Money in
accordance with the terms hereof.
(c) Cash. The balance of the Purchase Price, plus or minus prorations set
forth herein, shall be paid by wire transfer or official bank check on the Closing
Date, defined below.
3. TITLE MATTERS.
(a) Documents Evidencing Title. Seller shall deliver or cause to be delivered
to Buyer, not more than ten (10) days after the date hereof, a commitment for an
owner’s title insurance policy, dated after the date hereof issued by First American
Title Insurance Company (the “Title Insurer”) in the amount of the Purchase
Price, with standard form coverage (the “Title Commitment”) showing marketa-
ble and insurable title to the Property to be in the Seller subject only to: (i) title
exceptions pertaining to liens or encumbrances of a definite or ascertainable
amount which may be removed by the payment of money or otherwise on the
Closing Date and which Seller shall so remove at that time; (ii) standard exceptions
printed by the Title Insurer; and (iii) permitted exceptions as set forth in Exhibit B,
attached hereto and made a part hereof (the “Permitted Exceptions”).
(b) Title Defects. Buyer shall have fifteen (15) business days after receipt of
the Title Commitment within which to object in writing to any material exception
shown thereon and if said exception cannot be removed by Seller on or before the
Closing Date, Buyer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement, in which
event the Earnest Money shall be returned to Buyer and all parties thereafter
released and discharged from any further obligation under this Agreement. The
failure of the Buyer to deliver written notice of an objection to a material exception
476 Appendix C
shown on the Title Commitment within the time provided shall conclusively con-
stitute the approval by Buyer of the exceptions shown in the Title Commitment.
4. INSPECTION.
(a) Right to Inspect. For a period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof
(sometimes hereinafter referred to as the “Review Period”), Buyer and its agents
shall have the right, during reasonable hours, to inspect the Property, and to under-
take, at Buyer’s expense, such tests and surveys and other activities as it shall deter-
mine in connection therewith, including, without limitation, the right to make:
(i) a complete physical inspection of the Property; (ii) investigations regarding
zoning, subdivision, and code requirements; (iii) real estate tax analysis and inves-
tigation of available financing; (iv) investigation of all records and all other docu-
ments and matters, public or private, pertaining to Seller’s ownership of the
Property; and (v) to make application for and receive any and all permits, approv-
als, and written agreements satisfactory to Buyer (including, without limitation,
site plan approvals, subdivision plat(s), building and use permits) required by the
appropriate public or governmental authorities to permit the development of the
Property in accordance with Buyer’s intended use. The foregoing shall hereinafter
sometimes be collectively referred to as the “Inspection.” Seller shall give Buyer
access to the Property for its Inspection. The Inspection to be conducted by Buyer
shall not disturb the quiet enjoyment of Seller or be without prior notice to Seller.
Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold Seller harmless from any and all costs
and expenses incurred or sustained by Seller as a result of such acts of Buyer, or
Buyer’s agents or independent contractors, pursuant to the right granted by this
paragraph; provided Buyer’s liability and indemnity shall not extend to any condi-
tion currently existing or discovered on the Property.
(b) Approval Notice. In the event that Buyer, in its sole and exclusive dis-
cretion, is not satisfied for any reason with the results of the Inspection, Buyer may,
by written notice (the “Termination Notice”) delivered to Seller on or before the
expiration of the Review Period (the “Approval Date”), terminate this Agreement,
which thereafter shall be of no force and effect without further action by the parties
hereto. Upon a termination as herein provided, the Earnest Money shall be
returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that the failure of Buyer to deliver a
Termination Notice for any reason, as a result of its Inspection, on or before the
Approval Date shall constitute a waiver of Buyer’s right to terminate this Agree-
ment pursuant to the terms of this paragraph.
(c) Continuing Right to Inspect. Notwithstanding the limitations of this
paragraph, Buyer shall have the continuing right to continue the Inspection after
the Review Period expires.
5. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING.

(a) Conditions Precedent. This Agreement, and Buyer’s obligation to close
the transaction contemplated herein, are subject to the following express condi-
tions precedent. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary which may be con-
tained herein, each of the conditions precedent may be waived in writing by Buyer,
such conditions being for the exclusive protection and benefit of Buyer. Seller
agrees to cooperate with Buyer and to execute any documents which may be neces-
sary or convenient to the performance or satisfaction of these conditions by Buyer
on or before closing:
(i) That at closing, the Property and the Buyer’s intended use is (or will
be) zoned and/or subdivided and all studies, reports, permits,
approvals, and written agreements satisfactory to Buyer (including,
without limitation, site plan approvals, subdivision plat(s), building
and use permits, and environmental reports and permits) required
by the appropriate public or governmental authorities to permit the
development of the Property in accordance with Buyer’s intended
use have been finally adopted, all without conditions that, in Buyer’s
reasonable opinion, would cause construction of facilities and/or site
work on the Property to be economically unfeasible.
(ii) Buyer has obtained, in Buyer’s sole discretion and at Buyer’s expense, a
current certified boundary survey of the Property prepared by a licensed
surveyor in accordance with Buyer’s requirements (the “Survey”) which
shall show (1) the legal description of the Property (it is agreed that the
legal description contained in the Survey shall be the legal description
used in the Warranty Deed conveying the Property to Buyer); (2) that the
Property extends to all adjacent streets, alleys and rights-of-way, which
streets, alleys and rights-of-way have been dedicated to, and accepted for
public use by, the appropriate governmental authority; (3) that utilities
are available to the boundaries of the Property adequate to serve Buyer’s
proposed use; and (4) if the Property contains more than one parcel,
then all of the parcels together form one parcel, and each parcel forming
the larger parcel shares its interior boundary lines with the other parcel
or parcels. The Survey shall be sufficient to cause the Title Insurer to
delete the standard printed survey exception and to issue a title policy
free from any survey-related objections or exceptions, whatsoever.
(iii) Title to the Property shall be good and marketable and shall be free
and clear of all liens, encumbrances, easements, assessments, restric-
tions, tenancies (whether recorded or unrecorded), and other excep-
tions to title, except the lien of taxes not yet due and payable, and the
Permitted Exceptions.
(b) Failure of a Condition Precedent. In the event of a failure of any other
condition precedent set forth herein, then Buyer may declare this Agreement null
and void, in which event the refundable Earnest Money shall be returned to Buyer,
and the parties shall have no further obligations or liabilities hereunder.
6. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND COVENANTS

OF SELLER.
Seller hereby represents, warrants, and covenants to Buyer that as of the date
hereof and as of the Closing Date:
(a) That Seller is and shall be the owner of marketable and insurable fee sim-
ple title to the Property, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, covenants, conditions,
478 Appendix C
restrictions, rights-of-way, easements, leases, tenancies, licenses, claims, options,

options to purchase, and any other matters affecting title, except, as of the date
hereof, for the exceptions shown on the Title Commitment, and those liens of a
definite and ascertainable amount which shall be removed at closing. There shall
be no change in the ownership, operation, or control of the Property from the date
hereof to the Closing Date.
(b) To the actual knowledge of Seller that there are no condemnation or judi-
cial proceedings, administrative actions or examinations, claims, or demands of
any type which have been instituted or which are pending or threatened against
Seller, the Property, or any part thereof. In the event Seller receives notice of any
such proceeding, action, examination, or demand, Seller shall promptly deliver a
copy of such notice to Buyer.
(c) That there is legal access to the Property from adjoining private or public
streets, highways, roads, and ways and adequate access to all electric, telephone,
drainage, and other utility equipment and services required by law or necessary for
the operation of the Property. No fact or condition exists which would result in the
termination or impairment of the furnishing of service to the Property of electric,
telephone, drainage, or other such utility service.
(d) To the actual knowledge of Seller that Seller and the Property, and the use
and operation thereof, are in compliance with all applicable municipal and govern-
mental laws, ordinances, regulations, licenses, permits, and authorizations, and
there are presently in effect all licenses, permits, and other authorizations neces-
sary for the use, occupancy, and operation of the Property as it is presently being
operated. That there exists no condition with respect to the operation, use, or occu-
pancy of the Property which violates any environmental, zoning, building, health,
fire, or similar law, ordinance, or regulation. There has been no notice of any viola-
tion of any environmental, zoning, building, health, fire, or similar law, ordinance,
or regulation relative to the maintenance, operation, use, or occupancy of any
building or other improvements constituting part of the Property which has not
been fully complied with, nor has Seller received any notice, written or otherwise,
from a government agency requiring the correction of any condition with respect
to the Property which has not been fully complied with. Seller shall promptly com-
ply with any notices received after the date hereof and shall promptly deliver to
Buyer a copy of any such notice together with evidence of compliance therewith.
(e) That from and after the date hereof and until the Closing Date, Seller shall
maintain, or cause to be maintained, the Property in good condition and repair,
and shall continue to make or cause to be made ordinary repairs, replacements,
and maintenance between the date hereof and the Closing Date with respect to the
Property.
(f) To the actual knowledge of Seller that there are no material latent or pat-
ent defects in the Property.
(g) That there are and will be no unrecorded mechanic’s or materialmen’s
liens or any claims for such liens affecting the Property, and as of the Closing Date,
there will be no work or material performed or furnished for which payment will
not have previously been made.
7. CLOSING AND RELATED MATTERS.

(a) Closing Date. The closing shall take place on or before April 1, 2008,
at the office of Escrowee at a time mutually agreed upon by the parties (the
“Closing Date”). Provided, however, Buyer shall be obligated to close only if the
conditions provided for in Section 5 have been satisfied and/or waived by Buyer.
(b) Seller’s Deposits. On the Closing Date, Seller shall deliver the following
documents to Escrowee:
(i) Warranty Deed executed by Seller conveying the Property to Buyer
subject only to the Permitted Exceptions.
(ii) Bill of Sale executed by Seller conveying the Personalty, if any, to
Buyer.
(iii) A Closing Statement.
(iv) Such other documents as the Title Insurer, Buyer, or its attorneys may
reasonably require in order to effectuate or further evidence the
intent of any provision in this Agreement.
All of the documents and instruments to be delivered by Seller hereunder
shall be in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to counsel for Buyer.
(c) Buyer’s Deposits. On the Closing Date, Buyer shall deliver the following
documents to Escrowee:
(i) A Closing Statement.
(ii) Cash or certified funds in an amount sufficient to meet Buyer’s obli-
gations hereunder.
(iii) Such other documents as the Title Insurer, Seller, or Seller’s attorneys
may reasonably require in order to effectuate or further evidence the
intent of any provision in this Agreement.
All of the documents and instruments to be delivered by Buyer hereunder
shall be in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to counsel for Seller.
(d) Conditions to Closing. In all events, the obligations of Buyer to make
payments and to close this transaction are contingent upon: (i) title to the Property
being shown to be good and the Title Insurer committing to issue a title policy in
the form as required by this Agreement; (ii) the Conditions Precedent to closing
provided for in this Agreement being satisfied or waived by Buyer in writing;
(iii) the representations, warranties, and covenants of Seller being true and accu-
rate; and (iv) Seller otherwise having performed all of Seller’s obligations hereun-
der. In the event that Seller fails to perform any of Seller’s obligations hereunder, as
set forth in the preceding sentence.
(e) Escrow Closing. The closing of the transaction contemplated herein
shall take place at the office of the Escrowee, using form escrow instructions then
in use by the Escrowee, modified to reflect the terms and conditions of the transac-
tion contemplated herein. The parties shall use their best efforts to have the Title
Insurer commit to insure the title of Buyer upon receipt of all of Buyer’s and Seller’s
deposits. The cost of the escrow relating to the transaction contemplated herein
shall be equally divided between Seller and Buyer. This Agreement shall not be
merged into any escrow agreement, and the escrow agreement shall always be
480 Appendix C
deemed auxiliary to this Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall always
be deemed controlling as between Seller and Buyer. The respective attorneys for
Seller and Buyer are hereby authorized to enter into and execute such escrow agree-
ment and any amendments thereto.
(f) Possession. Possession of the Property shall be delivered to Buyer on the
Closing Date.
(g) Tax-deferred Exchange. Notwithstanding any other provisions con-
tained herein, Buyer may use the transaction contemplated herein to facilitate a
tax-deferred exchange of property under such terms and conditions that qualify
as a tax-deferred exchange under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, and Seller may use the transaction contemplated herein to
facilitate such a tax-deferred exchange of property. The parties hereby agree to
cooperate with each other fully in completing such tax-deferred exchange(s),
provided, however, that such tax-deferred exchange(s) creates no additional lia-
bility to the party not effecting such tax deferred exchange, and that all costs of
facilitating such tax-deferred exchange are paid by the party effecting the 1031
Exchange.
8. PRORATIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS.

The following items shall be prorated and adjusted as of the Closing Date:
(a) General real estate taxes and all other levies and charges against the
Property for the year of closing that are accrued but not yet due and payable. Such
taxes shall be prorated on the basis of the most recent ascertainable tax bills.
(b) If, on the Closing Date, the Property or any part thereof shall be or shall
have been affected by an assessment or assessments which are or may become pay-
able in annual installments, of which the first installment is then a charge or lien,
or has been paid, then for the purposes of this Agreement all the unpaid install-
ments of any such assessment, including those which are to become due and pay-
able after the Closing Date, shall be deemed to be due and payable and to be liens
upon the premises affected thereby and shall be paid and discharged by Seller on
the Closing Date.
(c) All charges for utilities, including water charges, shall be paid by Seller to
the Closing Date. Bills received after closing which relate to expenses incurred or
services performed allocable to the period prior to the date of closing shall be paid
by Seller post-closing as and when due.
(d) Title insurance and any other impositions on the conveyance shall be paid
by Seller. Buyer shall not be liable for any state, county, federal income, excise, or
sales tax liabilities of Seller. All recording fees in connection with the conveyance
shall be paid by Buyer.
(e) All accounts payable and other obligations incurred by Seller in connection
with the Property prior to the Closing Date shall be caused to be paid or performed
by Seller on or before the Closing Date or as soon as practical thereafter, and Buyer
assumes no obligation or responsibility for the payment or performance thereof.
(f) Such other items as are customarily prorated in transactions of the type
contemplated in this Agreement.
9. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES.

(a) Default by Buyer. If Buyer should fail to consummate the transaction
contemplated herein for any reason other than default by Seller, Seller may elect,
without limitation, any one or more of the following remedies: (i) to enforce spe-
cific performance of this Agreement; (ii) to bring a suit for damages for breach of
this Agreement; (iii) to terminate this Agreement whereupon Buyer will reim-
burse Seller for Seller’s out-of-pocket expenses incurred with respect to this trans-
action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and inspection costs; or (iv) pursue
any and all remedies at law or equity. No delay or omission in the exercise of any
right or remedy accruing to Seller upon the breach by Buyer under this Agree-
ment shall impair such right or remedy or be construed as a waiver of any such
breach theretofore or thereafter occurring. The waiver by Seller of any condition
or the breach of any term, covenant, or condition herein contained shall not be
deemed to be a waiver of any other term, covenant, condition, or any subsequent
breach of the same or any other term, covenant, or condition contained herein.
(b) Default by Seller. If Seller should fail to consummate the transaction
contemplated herein for any reason other than default by Buyer, Buyer may elect,
without limitation, any one or more of the following remedies: (i) to enforce spe-
cific performance of this Agreement; (ii) to bring a suit for damages for breach of
this Agreement; (iii) to terminate this Agreement whereupon Seller will reim-
burse Buyer for Buyer’s out-of-pocket expenses incurred with respect to this
transaction, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and inspection costs; or (iv) pur-
sue any and all remedies at law or equity. No delay or omission in the exercise of
any right or remedy accruing to Buyer upon the breach by Seller under this Agree-
ment shall impair such right or remedy or be construed as a waiver of any such
breach theretofore or thereafter occurring. The waiver by Buyer of any condition
or the breach of any term, covenant, or condition herein contained shall not be
deemed to be a waiver of any other term, covenant, condition, or any subsequent
breach of the same or any other term, covenant, or condition contained herein.
10. INDEMNIFICATIONS AND DEFENSE OF CLAIMS.

(a) Seller’s Indemnity. Seller will indemnify, defend, and hold Buyer harm-
less against and in respect of: (i) any damage or deficiency resulting from any breach
of warranty or any non-fulfillment of any agreement on the part of Seller under this
Agreement or from any misrepresentation in or omissions from any document or
other instrument executed and delivered by Seller under this Agreement, unless
waived in writing by Buyer; and/or (ii) all actions, suits, proceedings, demands,
assessments, judgments, reasonable court costs and attorneys’ fees, and expenses
incident to or incurred by Buyer in connection with any of the foregoing.
(b) Buyer’s Indemnity. Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold Seller harm-
less against and in respect of: (i) any damage or deficiency resulting from any
breach of warranty or any non-fulfillment of any agreement on the part of Buyer
under this Agreement or from any misrepresentation in any document or other
instrument executed and delivered by Buyer under this Agreement, unless waived
in writing by Seller; and/or (ii) all actions, suits, proceedings, demands, assessments,
482 Appendix C
judgments, reasonable court costs and attorneys’ fees, and expenses incident to or
incurred by Seller in connection with any of the foregoing.
11. BROKERAGE.
Each of the parties represents and warrants to the other that it has not
incurred and will not incur any liability for finder’s or brokerage fees or commis-
sions in connection with this Agreement, other than John Smith of Real Estate
Brokers, Inc., representing Buyer, and whose fees or commissions shall be paid by
Buyer. It is agreed that if any claims for finder’s or brokerage fees or commissions
are ever made against Seller or Buyer in connection with this transaction, all such
claims shall be handled and paid by the party (the “Committing Party”) whose
actions or alleged commitments form the basis of such claim. The Committing
Party further agrees to indemnify and hold the other harmless from and against
any and all claims or demands with respect to any finder’s or brokerage fees or
commissions or other compensation asserted by any person, firm, or corporation
in connection with this Agreement or the transaction contemplated hereby. This
representation shall survive closing indefinitely.
12. INTERVENING DAMAGE OR LOSS.

Seller shall deliver the Property to Buyer in substantially the same condition
on the Closing Date as on the date hereof, excepting therefrom ordinary wear and
tear. If, prior to the Closing Date, all or a substantial portion of the Property having
a replacement value in excess of Ten Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) is
destroyed by fire or other casualty or is taken or made subject to eminent domain
proceedings, then Seller shall immediately notify Buyer. Thereupon Buyer shall, at
its option, have the right to: (i) terminate this Agreement; or (ii) complete this
transaction, in which event Seller shall: (x) deliver to Buyer a duly executed assign-
ment of all insurance proceeds or condemnation awards payable as a result of such
fire, casualty, or condemnation, in form and substance satisfactory to Buyer; and
(y) pay the amount of any deductible thereunder (Seller represents and warrants
that Seller shall maintain until the Closing Date full replacement cost insurance
and the present amount of rent loss insurance for the Property).
13. NOTICES.
All notices, demands, requests, and other communications under this Agree-
ment shall be in writing and shall be deemed properly served or delivered if delivered
by hand to the party to whose attention it is directed, or when sent, three (3) days after
deposit in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, certified mail, return receipt requested, or
one (1) day after deposit with a nationally recognized air carrier providing next day
delivery, or if sent via facsimile transmission, when received, addressed as follows:
(a) If to Seller:
Land Company, Inc.
Attention: Joe Smith, President
987 Real Estate Lane
Boise, Idaho 83702
208/123-4567 (facsimile)
(b) If to Buyer:
Real Estate Developers, LLC
Attention: Jane Doe, Manager
1010 Big Money Lane
208/987-6543 (facsimile)
14. MISCELLANEOUS.
(a) As used herein, the term “the date hereof” shall mean the date first writ-
ten above.
(b) This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the par-
ties hereto, and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns.
(c) Wherever under the terms and provisions of this Agreement the time for
performance falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or Legal Holiday, such time for per-
formance shall be extended to the next business day.
(d) This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall con-
stitute an original, but all together shall constitute one and the same Agreement.
(e) The terms, provisions, and covenants (to the extent applicable) and
indemnities shall survive the closing and delivery of the deed, and this Agreement
shall not be merged therein, but shall remain binding upon and for the parties
hereto until fully observed, kept or performed.
(f) This Agreement embodies the entire contract between the parties hereto
with respect to the subject matter hereof. No extension, change, modification, or
amendment to or of this Agreement of any kind whatsoever shall be made or
claimed by Seller or Buyer, and no notice of any extension, change, modification,
or amendment made or claimed by Seller or Buyer shall have any force or effect
whatsoever unless the same shall be endorsed in writing and be signed by the
party against which the enforcement of such extension, change, modification, or
amendment is sought, and then only to the extent set forth in such instrument.
(g) All parties hereto have either: (i) been represented by separate legal coun-
sel; or (ii) have had the opportunity to be so represented. Thus, in all cases, the
language herein shall be construed simply and in accordance with its fair meaning
and not strictly for or against a party, regardless of which party prepared or caused
the preparation of this Agreement.
(h) The captions at the beginning of the several paragraphs, respectively, are
for convenience in locating the context, but are not part of the text.
(i) In the event any term or provisions of this Agreement shall be held illegal,
invalid, or unenforceable or inoperative as a matter of law, the remaining terms and
provisions of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby, but each such term and
provision shall be valid and shall remain in full force and effect.
(j) This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Idaho.
(k) If either party shall default in the full and timely performance of this
Agreement and said default is cured with the assistance of an attorney for the other
party and before the commencement of a suit thereon, as a part of curing said
484 Appendix C
default, the reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the other party shall be reim-
bursed to the other party upon demand.
In the event that either party to this Agreement shall file suit or action at law
or equity to interpret or enforce this Agreement hereof, the unsuccessful party to
such litigation agrees to pay to the prevailing party all costs and expenses, includ-
ing reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by the prevailing party, including the same
with respect to an appeal.
(l) All times provided for in this Agreement or in any other instrument or
document referred to herein or contemplated hereby for the performance of any
act will be strictly construed, it being agreed that time is of the essence of this
Agreement.
(m) The parties may at any time hereafter modify or amend this Agreement
by a subsequent written agreement executed by all parties. This Agreement shall
not, however, be changed orally, nor shall it be deemed modified in any way by the
act of any of the parties hereto. Nothing herein is intended, nor shall it be con-
strued, as obligating either party to agree to any modification to this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have
executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.
SELLER:
LAND COMPANY, INC.,
an Idaho corporation
By: _______________________
Joe Smith, President
BUYER:
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company
By: _______________________
Jane Doe, Manager
EXHIBIT A
LEGAL DESCRIPTION
This parcel is all that of the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter and a
portion of the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 1, Township
4 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian and is more particularly described as
follows:
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of said Northwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter; thence North 89°30'55" East along the North boundary of said Southwest
quarter a distance of 2668.47 feet to the Northeast corner of said Southwest quar-
ter; thence
South 0°28'38" West along the East boundary of said Northeast quarter of the
Southwest quarter a distance of 1323.66 feet to the Southeast corner of said North-
east quarter of the Southwest quarter; thence
South 89°31'36" West along the South boundary of said Northeast quarter of
the Southwest quarter a distance of 1337.39 feet to the Southwest corner of said
Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter; thence
South 89°35'18" West along the South boundary of said Northeast quarter of
the Southwest quarter a distance of 1337.51 feet to the Southwest corner of said
Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter; thence
North 0°45'27" East along the West boundary of said Northwest quarter of
the Southwest quarter a distance of 60.00 feet; thence
North 89°35'18" East parallel with the South boundary of said Northwest
quarter of the Southwest quarter a distance of 1248.03 feet; thence
North 0°19'12" West a distance of 534.10 feet to a point on the centerline of a
canal as it now exists; thence traversing said centerline as follows:
South 89°47'21" West a distance of 451.20 feet;

South 88°36'48" West a distance of 165.45 feet;
North 88°48'06" West a distance of 103.44 feet;
North 45°52'21" West a distance of 102.64 feet to a point on the West bound-
ary of said Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter; thence leaving said center-
line and bearing North 0°45'27" East along said West boundary a distance of 588.71
feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
Also shown as Parcels 3 and 5 on Record of Survey recorded December 13, 2001 as
Instrument No. 20011234567.
486 Appendix C
EXHIBIT B
PERMITTED EXCEPTIONS
1. Taxes, including any assessments collected therewith, for the year 2008 which
are a lien not yet due and payable.
2. Levies and assessments of the Star Irrigation District and the rights, powers,
and easements of said district as provided by law.
3. Levies and assessments of the Hilltop Ditch Company and the rights, powers,
and easements of said district as provided by law.
4. Levies and assessments of the Drainage District No. 25 and the rights, pow-
ers, and easements of said district as provided by law.
5. Ditch, road, and public utility easements as the same may exist over said
premises.
6. An easement for the purpose shown below and rights incidental thereto as set
forth in a document.
Granted to: Idaho Power Company
Purpose: Public Utilities
Recorded: October 14, 1970
Instrument No.: 255889701
7. All matters, and any rights, easements, interests, or claims as disclosed by
Record of Survey recorded December 13, 2001 as Instrument No.
20011234567.
Recorded: July 18, 2003
Recorded: July 18, 2003
10. Terms, provisions, conditions, and restrictions contained in Crossing
Agreement by and between Star Ditch Company; Star Irrigation
Association, Inc., an Idaho corporation; Water Lateral and XYZ Lateral and
Intermountain Gas Company.
Recorded: January 10, 2005
Instrument No: 200509080706
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this ___________ day of
___________, 20 ___________, by and between ___________, (hereinafter
referred to as “Seller”) and ___________, (hereinafter referred to as “Purchaser”);
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the Seller is the record owner and holder of the issued and out-
standing shares of the capital stock of ___________, (hereinafter referred to as
the “Corporation”), a ___________ corporation, which Corporation has issued
capital stock of ___________ shares of $ ___________ par value common stock,
and
WHEREAS, the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and the Seller
desires to sell said stock, upon the terms and subject to the conditions hereinafter
set forth;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agree-
ments contained in this Agreement, and in order to consummate the purchase and
the sale of the Corporation’s Stock aforementioned, it is hereby agreed as follows:
1. PURCHASE AND SALE:

Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, at the closing of the
transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell, convey, transfer, and deliver
to the Purchaser certificates representing such stock, and the Purchaser shall pur-
chase from the Seller the Corporation’s Stock in consideration of the purchase price
set forth in this Agreement. The certificates representing the Corporation’s Stock
shall be duly endorsed for transfer or accompanied by appropriate stock transfer
powers duly executed in blank, in either case with signatures guaranteed in the
customary fashion, and shall have all the necessary documentary transfer tax
stamps affixed thereto at the expense of the Seller.
The closing of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement (the “Clos-
ing”) shall be held at ___________, on ___________ , at ___________ , or
such other place, date, and time as the parties hereto may otherwise agree.
2. AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE.

The total consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in
Exhibit “A” attached hereto and made a part hereof.
3. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER.

Seller hereby warrants and represents:
(a) Organization and Standing.
Corporation is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good
standing under the laws of the State of ______________ and has the corporate
power and authority to carry on its business as it is now being conducted.
488 Appendix C
(b) Restrictions on Stock.

i. The Seller is not a party to any agreement, written or oral, creating rights in
respect to the Corporation’s Stock in any third person or relating to the voting of
the Corporation’s Stock.
ii. Seller is the lawful owner of the Stock, free and clear of all security inter-
ests, liens, encumbrances, equities, and other charges.
iii. There are no existing warrants, options, stock purchase agreements, redemp-
tion agreements, restrictions of any nature, calls, or rights to subscribe of any charac-
ter relating to the stock, nor are there any securities convertible into such stock.
4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER AND

PURCHASER.
Seller and Purchaser hereby represent and warrant that there has been no act
or omission by Seller, Purchaser, or the Corporation which would give rise to any
valid claim against any of the parties hereto for a brokerage commission, finder’s
fee, or other like payment in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby.
5. GENERAL PROVISIONS
(a) Entire Agreement.
This Agreement (including the exhibits hereto and any written amend-
ments hereof executed by the parties) constitutes the entire Agreement and super-
sedes all prior agreements and understandings, oral and written, between the
parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof.
(b) Sections and Other Headings.
The section and other headings contained in this Agreement are for reference
purposes only and shall not affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
(c) Governing Law.
This agreement, and all transactions contemplated hereby, shall be gov-
erned by, construed, and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of
______________. The parties herein waive trial by jury and agree to submit to
the personal jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject matter jurisdiction
located in ______________ County, State of ______________. In the event that
litigation results from or arises out of this Agreement or the performance thereof,
the parties agree to reimburse the prevailing party’s reasonable attorney’s fees,
court costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the court as costs, in
addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of the
individual parties hereto on the date first above written.
___________________________
___________________________
Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of:
__________________________
__________________________
EXHIBIT “A”
AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE
(a) Consideration.
As total consideration for the purchase and sale of the Corporation’s Stock,
pursuant to this Agreement, the Purchaser shall pay to the Seller the sum of
_______(20)_______ Dollars ($_______), such total consideration to be referred
to in this Agreement as the “Purchase Price”.
(b) Payment.
The Purchase Price shall be paid as follows:
i. The sum of _______(21)_______ Dollars ($_______) to be delivered to
Seller upon the execution of this Agreement.
ii. The sum of _______(22)_______ Dollars ($_______) to be delivered to
Seller at Closing.
appendix D
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (UCC)
Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)

• Article 1: General Provisions
• Article 2: Sales✳
• Article 2A: Leases✳
• Article 3: Commercial Paper
• Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
• Article 4A: Funds Transfers
• Article 5: Letters of Credit
• Article 6: Bulk Transfers
• Article 7: Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title
• Article 8: Investment Securities
• Article 9: Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC)

LOCATOR
Go to: www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html.
This locator links to state statutes that correspond to articles of the UCC.
✳
The articles of the UCC that most relate to contract law are Article 2: Sales and Article 2A: Leases.
490
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 491
Sales
UCC Article 2
Uniform Law Commissioners drafts bearing on past and future revisions:
• Alabama • Kentucky (PDF) • North Carolina: §§ 25-2-

• Alaska • Louisiana: did not adopt 101 to 25-2-725
• Arizona: §§ 47-2101 this article • North Dakota
to 47-2725 • Maine • Ohio: Title 1302
• Arkansas • Maryland: article 5 • Oklahoma: 12A §§ 2-101
• California: §§ 2101 “Commercial Law” §§ • Oregon
to 2801 2-101 to 2-725 • Pennsylvania
• Colorado: §§ 4-2-101 to • Massachusetts • Rhode Island
4-2-725 • Michigan • South Carolina
• Connecticut: §§ • Minnesota: §§ 336.2-101 • South Dakota
42a-2-101 to 42a-2-725 to 336.2-725 • Tennessee
• Delaware • Mississippi: § 75-2-101 • Texas
• District of Columbia • Missouri • Utah
• Florida • Montana • Vermont
• Georgia: § 11-2-101 • Nebraska: § U2-101 • Virgin Islands
• Hawaii • Nevada • Virginia
• Idaho • New Hampshire: §§ 382- • Washington
• Illinois A:1-101 to 382-A:1-208 • West Virginia: Chapter
• Indiana • New Jersey: §§ 12A: 46-2-101 to 46-1-725
• Iowa 2-101 to 12A: 2-725 • Wisconsin
• Kansas: § 84-2-101 • New Mexico: §§ • Wyoming
(Chapt. 84): Fee based 55-2-101 to 55-2-725
service • New York
Leases
UCC Article 2A
Uniform Law Commissioners drafts bearing on past and future revisions:
• Alabama • Kentucky (PDF) • New York

• Alaska • Louisiana: did not adopt • North Carolina: §§
• Arizona: §§ 47-2A101 to this article 25-2A-101 to 25-2A-532
47-2A532 • Maine • North Dakota
• Arkansas • Maryland: article 5 • Ohio: Title 1310
• California: §§ 10101 to “Commercial Law” §§ • Oklahoma: 12A §§
10600 2A-101 to 2A-532 2A-101
• Colorado: §§ 4-2.5-101 • Massachusetts • Oregon
to 4-2.5-533 • Michigan • Pennsylvania
• Connecticut: not • Minnesota: §§ 336.2A- • Rhode Island
adopted 101 to 336.2A-531 • South Carolina
• Delaware • Mississippi: § 75-2a-101 • South Dakota
• District of Columbia • Missouri • Tennessee
• Florida • Montana • Texas
• Georgia • Nebraska: § U2A-101 • Utah
• Hawaii • Nevada • Vermont
• Idaho • New Hampshire: §§ 382- • Virgin Islands
• Illinois A: 2A-101 to 382-A: • Virginia
• Indiana 2A-532 • Washington
• Iowa • New Jersey: §§ 12A: • West Virginia: Chapter
• Kansas: § 84-2a-101 2A-101 to 12A: 2A-532 46-2A-101 to 46-2A-532
(Chapt. 84): Fee based • New Mexico: §§ 55-2A- • Wisconsin
service 101 to 55-2A-532 • Wyoming
GLOSSARY
abnormal misuse Considerably irregular or an atypical agency The principal-agent relationship: the fidu-
level of usage. ciary relationship “which results from the manifesta-
acceptance The assent by the person to whom an tion of consent by one person to another that the other
offer has been made (offeree) to enter into a binding shall act in his behalf and subject to his control, and
agreement with the person making the offer (offeror) consent by the other so to act.”
according to the terms of the offer. agency law The large body of common law that gov-
acceptance-upon-dispatch rule A rule that states erns agency; a mixture of contract law and tort law.
that an acceptance is effective when it is dispatched, agent A person who has been authorized to sign a
even if it is lost in transmission. negotiable instrument on behalf of another person.
acceptor Someone who becomes liable on a draft by The party who agrees to act on behalf of another.
his or her acceptance of it. agreement The manifestation by two or more per-
access contract Where a software licensor grants the sons of the substance of a contract.
licensee the right to access information in the posses- alternative dispute resolution (ADR) Methods of
sion of the licensor for an agreed-upon time or for a resolving disputes other than litigation.
number of uses. American Federation of Labor (AFL) One of the
accommodation A shipment that is offered to the first federations of labor unions in the United States.
buyer as a replacement for the original shipment when anti-assignment clause A clause that prohibits the
the original shipment cannot be filled. assignment of rights under the contract.
accord An agreement whereby the parties agree to anti-delegation clause A clause that prohibits the
accept something different in satisfaction of the origi- delegation of duties under the contract.
nal contract.
anticipatory breach A breach that occurs when one
accord and satisfaction The settlement of a contract contracting party informs the other that he or she will
dispute. not perform his or her contractual duties when due.
account party The buyer in regard to a letter of anticipatory repudiation The repudiation of a sales
credit. or lease contract by one of the parties prior to the date
adequate assurance When a party has reasonable set for performance.
grounds to believe the other party will not perform his Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act A
or her contractual obligations the party may demand a law specifically aimed at “cybersquatters”—persons
writing assuring that performance will occur. who register Internet domain names of famous com-
adequate consideration A value of the bargain that panies and people and hold them hostage by demand-
is equal to or reasonably proportioned to the value of ing ransom payments from the famous companies or
that for which it is given. people if they want to take possession of their name-
adjudged insane A person who has been adjudged sake web page names.
insane by a proper court or administrative agency. A approval clause A clause that permits the assign-
contract entered into by such a person is void. ment of the contract only upon receipt of an obligor’s
admissions in pleadings or court When a party approval.
admits in pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court arbitration A form of ADR in which the parties
that a contract for the sale or lease of goods was made, choose an impartial third party to hear and decide the
the oral contract is enforceable against that party. dispute. A nonjudicial method of dispute resolution
advertisement A general advertisement is an whereby a neutral third party decides the case.
invitation to make an offer. A specific advertisement Article 2 (Sales) The second article of the Uniform
is an offer. Commercial Code, which prescribes the rules for the
AFL-CIO The 1955 combination of the AFL and the creation and enforcement of contracts for the sale of
CIO. goods.
492
Glossary 493
Article 2A (Leases) Article of the UCC that governs bail bond A three-party contract that involves the
lease of goods. state, the accused, and a surety under which the surety
Article 5 (Letters of Credit) A section of the UCC guarantees the state that the accused will appear in
that governs letters of credit unless otherwise agreed to court as the case proceeds.
by the parties. bailee A holder of goods who is not a seller or a
Article 6 (Bulk Sales) The section of the UCC that buyer (e.g., a warehouse or common carrier).
governs when an owner transfers a major part of a bargained-for exchange Exchange that parties
business’s material, merchandise, inventory, or equip- engage in that leads to an enforceable contract.
ment not in the ordinary course of business. basis of the bargain All statements by the seller or
assignee The party to whom the right has been lessor prior to or at the time of contracting.
transferred. The transferee in an assignment situation. battle of the forms Where the parties to a contract
The party to whom rights have been transferred. go back and forth with each other trying to get the
assignment and delegation Transfer of both rights other to agree to their standard contract form.
and duties under the contract. beneficiary A person or organization designated in
assignment of future rights A currently nonexistent the will that receives all or a portion of the testator’s
right that a party expects to have sometime in the future. property at the time of the testator’s death. The person
who is to receive the life insurance proceeds when the
assignment of rights The transfer by the parties of insured dies. Person for whose benefit a trust is created.
their contractual rights.
best-efforts contract A contract clause that requires
assignor The party who transfers the rights. The one or both of the parties to use their best efforts to
transferor in an assignment situation. The obligee who achieve the objective of the contract.
transfers the right.
bilateral contract A contract entered into by way of
assumption of duties When a delegation of duties exchange of promises of the parties; a “promise for a
contains the term assumption, I assume the duties, or promise.”
other similar language, the delegate is legally liable to
bill of lading A document of title that is issued by a
the obligee for nonperformance.
carrier when goods are received for transportation.
assumption of the risk A defense a defendant can breach of contract If a contracting party fails to per-
use against a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily form an absolute duty owed under a contract.
enters into or participates in a risky activity that results
in injury. A defense in which the defendant must prove bulk transfer When an owner transfers a major part
that (1) the plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk and of a business’s material, merchandise, inventory, or
(2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. equipment not in the ordinary course of business.
buyer in the ordinary course of business A person
assurance of performance Where each party expects
who in good faith and without knowledge of another’s
that the other party will perform his or her contractual
ownership or security interest in goods buys the goods
obligations.
in the ordinary course of business from a person in the
attribution procedure A procedure using codes, business of selling goods of that kind [UCC 1-201(9)].
algorithms, identifying words or numbers, encryption,
C & F Cost and freight. Pricing terms indicating the
callback, or other acknowledgment to verify an
cost for which the seller is responsible.
authentication of a record.
cancellation The termination of a contract by a con-
auction with reserve Unless expressly stated other- tracting party upon the material breach of the contract
wise, an auction is an auction with reserve; that is, the by the other party. A buyer or lessee may cancel a sales
seller retains the right to refuse the highest bid and or lease contract if the seller or lessor fails to deliver
withdraw the goods from sale. conforming goods or repudiates the contract or if the
auction without reserve An auction in which the buyer or lessee rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably
seller expressly gives up his or her right to withdraw revokes acceptance of the goods.
the goods from sale and must accept the highest bid. capture The process by which a buyer or lessee can
authenticate Signing the contract or executing an recover goods when seller or lessor becomes insolvent
electronic symbol, sound, or message attached to, within 10 days of receiving the buyer’s or lessee’s first
included in, or linked with the record. payment.
494 Glossary
certificate of deposit (CD) A two-party negotiable compensatory damages An award of money

instrument that is a special form of note created when intended to compensate a nonbreaching party for the
a depositor deposits money at a financial institution in loss of the bargain; they place the nonbreaching party
exchange for the institution’s promise to pay back the in the same position as if the contract had been fully
amount of the deposit plus an agreed-upon rate of performed by restoring the “benefit of the bargain.”
interest upon the expiration of a set time period agreed Damages that are generally equal to the difference
upon by the parties. between the value of the goods as warranted and the
chain of distribution All manufacturers, distribu- actual value of the goods accepted at the time and
tors, wholesalers, retailers, lessors, and subcomponent place of acceptance.
manufacturers involved in a transaction. complete integration Where the written contract is a
check An order by the drawer to the drawee bank to complete and final statement of the parties’ agreement.
pay a specified sum of money from the drawer’s check- complete performance Occurs when a party to a
ing account to the named payee (or holder). A distinct contract renders performance exactly as required by
form of draft drawn on a financial institution and pay- the contract; discharges that party’s obligations under
able on demand. the contract.
CIF Cost, insurance, and freight. Pricing terms indi- computer information transactions Under UCITA
cating the cost for which the seller is responsible. Section 102(a)(II), a computer information transaction
classical law of contracts Objective rules of forming “is an agreement to create, transfer, or license com-
contracts which give certainty and predictability in puter information or informational rights.”
their enforcement. concurrent condition A condition that exists when
click-wrap license A contract used by many software the parties to a contract must render performance
companies to sell their software over the Internet or in simultaneously; each party’s absolute duty to perform
physical packages where the software is later installed is conditioned on the other party’s absolute duty to
on a computer. perform.
COD (cash on delivery) Buyers must pay for the condition A qualification of a promise that becomes
goods upon delivery without the right to inspect a covenant if it is met. There are three types of condi-
them first. tions: conditions precedent, conditions subsequent,
and concurrent conditions.
collateral Security against repayment of the note that
lenders sometimes require; can be a car, a house, or condition precedent A condition that must happen
other property. The property that is subject to the or be performed before some right dependent thereon
security interest. accrues or some act dependent thereon is performed.
collateral note Notes secured by personal property. condition precedent based on satisfaction Clause in
a contract that reserves the right to a party to pay for
collective bargaining The act of negotiating contract
the items or services contracted for only if they meet
terms between an employer and the members of a union.
his or her satisfaction.
collective bargaining agreement The resulting con-
condition subsequent A condition, if it occurs or
tract from a collective bargaining procedure.
doesn’t occur, that automatically excuses the perfor-
commercial impracticability Nonperformance that mance of an existing contractual duty to perform.
is excused if an extreme or unexpected development or
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) A fed-
expense makes it impractical for the promisor to perform.
eration of unions that organized workers in industrial
common law Developed by judges who issued their unions in the United States and Canada from 1935 to
opinions when deciding a case. The principles 1955. The CIO was more aggressive and militant than
announced in these cases became precedent for later the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The CIO
judges deciding similar cases. merged with the AFL in 1955.
common law of contracts Contract law developed consequential (special) damages Foreseeable dam-
primarily by state courts. ages that arise from circumstances outside the con-
comparative fault The measurement of damages by tract. To be liable for these damages, the breaching
percentage. The victim’s damages are reduced proportion- party must know or have reason to know that the
ate to the amount of negligence attributable to the victim. breach will cause special damages to the other party.
Glossary 495
consideration Something of legal value given in for interpreting their communications and other
exchange for a promise. conduct.
consignee The person to whom the bailed goods are course of performance The history of previous con-
to be delivered. duct of the parties regarding the contract in question.
consignment An arrangement where a seller (the covenant An unconditional promise to perform.
consignor) delivers goods to a buyer (the consignee) covenant not to compete An agreement in which a
for sale. party agrees not to engage in a similar business or
consignor The person shipping the goods. The bailor. occupation within a specified geographic area for a
conspicuous A requirement that warranty disclaim- specified period of time following a sale.
ers be noticeable to the average person. covenant of good faith and fair dealing Under this
consumer expectation test A test to determine mer- implied covenant, the parties to a contract not only are
chantability based on what the average consumer held to the express terms of the contract but are also
would expect to find in food products. required to act in “good faith” and deal fairly in all
contract An agreement between two or more parties respects in obtaining the objective of the contact.
that is enforceable by a court of law or equity. cover Right of a buyer or lessee to purchase or lease
contract of adhesion A contract that is often a stan- substitute goods if a seller or lessor fails to make deliv-
dardized, form contract covering consumer goods and ery of the goods or repudiates the contract or if the
services where the seller is in a superior bargaining buyer or lessee rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably
position. The buyer has no realistic opportunity to bar- revokes their acceptance. The licensee’s right to engage
gain over the terms because the contract is offered on a in a commercially reasonable substitute transaction
“take it or leave it” basis. after the licensor has breached the contract.
contracts contrary to public policy Contracts that crashworthiness doctrine A doctrine that says auto-
have a negative impact on society or that interfere with mobile manufacturers are under a duty to design auto-
the public’s safety and welfare. mobiles so they take into account the possibility of
contracts in restraint of trade An economic policy harm from a person’s body striking something inside
of competition in the United States; contracts restrain- the automobile in the case of a car accident.
ing trade are illegal. creditor beneficiary Original creditor who becomes
contractual capacity The legal qualification or com- a beneficiary under the debtor’s new contract with
petency to understand the nature and effects of one’s another party.
acts so as to enter into a contract. creditor beneficiary contract A contract that arises
contributory negligence An unreasonable act or in the following situation: (1) a debtor borrows money,
omission by the victim (plaintiff) that, along with the (2) the debtor signs an agreement to pay back the
defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the money plus interest, (3) the debtor sells the item to a
injury. third party before the loan is paid off, and (4) the third
party promises the debtor that he or she will pay the
correspondent A securities firm, bank, or other
remainder of the loan to the creditor.
financial organization that regularly performs services
for another in a place or market to which the other cure An opportunity to repair or replace defective or
does not have direct access (a correspondent on an nonconforming goods.
exchange; correspondent bank). damages for accepted nonconforming goods A
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and buyer or lessee may accept nonconforming goods and
Abuse Act of 1984 A federal law that makes it a recover the damages caused by the breach from the
crime to access restricted government and other infor- seller or lessor or deduct the damages from any part of
mation by computer for unauthorized purposes. the purchase price or rent still due under the contract.
counteroffer A response by an offeree that contains declaration of duties If the delegate has not assumed
terms and conditions different from or in addition to the duties under a contract, the delegate is not legally
those of the offer. A counteroffer terminates an offer. liable to the obligee for nonperformance.
course of dealing A sequence of previous acts and deed of trust An instrument that gives the creditor a
conduct between the parties to a particular transaction, security interest in the debtor’s property that is
which fairly establishes a common basis of understanding pledged as collateral.
496 Glossary
defect in design A defect that occurs when a product defective product liable for the damages caused by the
is improperly designed. defect, irrespective of fault.
defect in manufacture A defect that occurs when the doctrine of unconscionability Where an otherwise
manufacturer fails to (1) properly assemble a product, lawful contract will not be enforced because it is so
(2) properly test a product, or (3) adequately check the oppressive or manifestly unfair that it is unjust.
quality of the product. document of title An actual piece of paper, such as
defect in packaging A defect that occurs when a warehouse receipt or bill of lading, that is required in
product has been placed in packaging that is insuffi- some transactions of pickup and delivery. A negotiable
ciently tamperproof. instrument developed to represent the interests of the
delegate The party to whom the duty has been different parties in a transaction that uses storage or
transferred. transportation between the parties.
delegation of duties A transfer of contractual duties domain name A unique name that identifies an indi-
by the obligor to another party for performance. vidual’s or company’s website.
donee beneficiary The third party on whom the
delegator The obligor who transferred his or her duty.
benefit is to be conferred.
demand draft An order to pay a certain sum of
donee beneficiary contract A contract entered into
money that expressly states it is payable on demand,
with the intent to confer a benefit or gift on an
on presentation, or on sight.
intended third party.
demand note A note payable on demand.
draft A three-party instrument that is an uncondi-
destination contract A sales contract that requires tional written order by one party that orders the sec-
the seller to deliver conforming goods to a specific des- ond party to pay money to a third party.
tination. The seller bears the risk of loss during trans-
drawee The bank where the drawer has his or her
portation. A contract that requires the seller to deliver
account. The party who must pay the money stated in
the goods either to the buyer’s place of business or to
the draft. Also called the acceptor of a draft.
another destination specified in the sales contract.
drawer The checking account holder and writer of
disaffirm The act of a minor to rescind a contract the check. The bank where the drawer has his or her
under the infancy doctrine. Disaffirmance may be account. The party who writes the order for a draft.
done orally, in writing, or by the minor’s conduct.
duress Occurs where one party threatens to do a
discharge Actions or events that relieve certain wrongful act unless the other party enters into a contract.
parties from liability on negotiable instruments. There
duty of restitution Where, upon disaffirmance, the
are three methods of discharge: (1) payment of the
competent party returns the consideration of the con-
instrument, (2) cancellation, and (3) impairment of the
tract to the minor.
right of recourse. The termination of the legal duty of a
debtor to pay debts that remain unpaid upon the com- duty of restoration Where, upon disaffirmance, the
pletion of a bankruptcy proceeding. Creditors’ claims minor returns the goods or property to the competent
that are not included in a Chapter 11 reorganization party.
are discharged. A discharge is granted to a debtor in a e-commerce The sale of goods and services by com-
Chapter 13 consumer debt adjustment bankruptcy puter over the Internet.
only after all the payments under the plan are com- easement A right to use someone else’s land without
pleted by the debtor. owning or leasing it. A given or required right to make
disposition of goods A seller or lessor who is in limited use of someone else’s land without owning or
possession of goods at the time the buyer or lessee leasing it.
breaches or repudiates the contract may in good faith economic duress Occurs when one party to a con-
resell, release, or otherwise dispose of the goods in a tract refuses to perform his or her contractual duties
commercially reasonable manner and recover dam- unless the other party pays an increased price, enters
ages, including incidental damages, from the buyer or into a second contract with the threatening party, or
lessee. undertakes a similar action.
doctrine of strict liability in tort A tort doctrine Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) A
that makes manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, federal law that, with some exceptions, makes it a
retailers, and others in the chain of distribution of a crime to intercept an electronic communication.
Glossary 497
Electronic Funds Transfer Act A law regulating the express warranty Any affirmation of fact or promise
payment and deposit of funds by electronic transfer. by the licensor about the quality of its software or
electronic mail (e-mail) Electronic written commu- information. A warranty that is created when a seller
nication between individuals using computers con- or lessor makes an affirmation that the goods he or she
nected to the Internet. is selling or leasing meet certain standards of quality,
description, performance, or condition.
Electronic Signature in Global and National Com-
merce Act (SIGN Act) A federal statute designed to failure to provide adequate instructions A defect
recognize electronic contracts as meeting the writing that occurs when a manufacturer does not provide
requirement of the Statute of Frauds for most contracts. detailed directions for safe assembly and use of a product.
emancipation When a minor voluntarily leaves failure to warn A defect that occurs when a manu-
home and lives apart from his or her parents. facturer does not place a warning on the packaging of
products that could cause injury if the danger is
employer-employee relationship A relationship that
unknown.
results when an employer hires an employee to per-
form some form of physical service. FAS Free alongside. The seller bears the expense and
risk of loss until the goods are alongside a named ves-
entrustment rule A UCC section allowing certain
sel or the dock designated.
merchants to transfer all rights in goods, including title.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Federal govern-
equal dignity rule A rule that says that agents’ con-
ment agency empowered to enforce federal franchising
tracts to sell property covered by the Statute of Frauds
rules. Federal administrative agency empowered to
must be in writing to be enforceable.
enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act and other
equitable relief The kind of relief sought in a court federal consumer protection statutes.
with equity powers (e.g., injunction, specific perfor-
finance lease A three-party transaction consisting of
mance of a contract).
the lessor, the lessee, and the supplier.
equitable remedies Remedies based on settled rules firm offer rule Under the UCC, a merchant who
of fairness, justice, and honesty, such as specific per- offers to buy, sell, or lease goods and who gives a writ-
formance, reformation, and injunction. ten and signed assurance that the offer will be held
equity A doctrine that permits judges to make deci- open cannot revoke the offer for the time stated or a
sions based on fairness, equality, moral rights, and nat- reasonable time.
ural law. FOB Free on board. The seller must bear the expense
ex-ship (from the carrying vessel) The seller bears and risk of loss until the goods are put in the carrier’s
the expense and risk of loss until the goods are possession.
unloaded. FOB place of destination The seller bears the
exclusive license A license that grants the licensee expense and risk of loss until the goods are tendered to
exclusive rights to use informational rights for a speci- the buyer.
fied duration. force majeure clauses Certain events, such as floods,
exculpatory clause A contractual provision that earthquakes, or tornadoes, that will excuse nonperfor-
relieves one (or both) of the parties to the contract mance of a contract.
from tort liability for ordinary negligence. foreign substance test A test to determine mer-
executed contract A contract that has been fully per- chantability based on foreign objects that are found in
formed on both sides; a completed contract. food.
executory contract A contract that has not yet been formal contract A contract that requires a special
fully completed or performed. With court approval, form or method of creation.
executory contracts may be rejected by a debtor in fraud by concealment Occurs when one party takes
bankruptcy. specific action to conceal a material fact from another
express authorization A stipulation in the offer that party.
says the acceptance must be by a specified means of fraud in the inception Occurs if a person is deceived
communication. as to the nature of his or her act and does not know
express contract An agreement that is expressed in what he or she is signing. A real defense against the
written or oral words. enforcement of a negotiable instrument; a person has
498 Glossary
been deceived into signing a negotiable instrument guarantor The person who agrees to pay the debt if
thinking that it is something else. the primary debtor does not. The third person who
fraud in the inducement Occurs when the party agrees to be liable in a guaranty arrangement.
knows what he or she is signing but has been fraudu- guaranty contract The contract between the guaran-
lently induced to enter into the contract. A personal tor and the original creditor.
defense against the enforcement of a negotiable instru- identification of goods Distinguishing the goods
ment; a wrongdoer makes a false statement to another named in the contract from the seller’s or lessor’s other
person to lead that person to enter into a contract with goods.
the wrongdoer.
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of
fraudulent misrepresentation (fraud) Where one 1998 A federal law making it a federal felony to com-
person to a contract intentionally induces (or causes) mit identity fraud or theft.
another person to rely and act on an assertion not in
accord with the facts. illegal consideration A promise to refrain from
doing an illegal act. Such a promise will not support a
fully disclosed agency Where the fact that the agent contract.
is acting on behalf of an agency is fully revealed and
free from secrecy. illegal contract A contract to perform an illegal act.
fungible Goods consisting of identical and inter- illusory promise A contract into which both parties
changeable particles or components. enter, but one or both of the parties can choose not to
perform their contractual obligations. Thus the con-
future goods Goods not yet in existence (ungrown tract lacks consideration.
crops, unborn stock animals).
immoral contract A contract whose objective is the
gambling statutes Statutes that make certain forms
commission of an act that is considered immoral by
of gambling illegal.
society.
gap-filling rule A rule that says an open term can be
implied authorization Mode of acceptance that is
“read into” a contract.
implied from what is customary in similar transactions,
generally known dangers A defense that acknowl- usage of trade, or prior dealings between the parties.
edges that certain products are inherently dangerous
implied-in-fact condition A condition that can be
and are known to the general population to be so.
implied from the circumstances surrounding a con-
genuine assent Where agreement (or assent) to the tract and the parties’ conduct.
contract by both parties is genuine and real.
implied-in-fact contract A contract where agree-
genuineness of assent The requirement that a ment between parties has been inferred because of
party’s assent to a contract be genuine. their conduct.
gift promise An unenforceable promise because it implied-in-law contract A contract not created or
lacks consideration. evidenced by an explicit agreement of the parties but,
glossary A detailed definition section in a written rather, inferred from the parties’ conduct and the sur-
contract. rounding circumstances. Sometimes referred to as a
good faith purchaser for value A person to whom “quasi contract,” the courts will enforce as a contract
good title can be transferred from a person with void- to avoid unjust enrichment.
able title. The real owner cannot reclaim goods from a implied term A term in a contract that can reason-
good faith purchaser for value. ably be supplied by the courts.
good faith subsequent lessee A person to whom a implied warranty of authority An agent who enters
lease interest can be transferred from a person with into a contract on behalf of another party impliedly
voidable title. The real owner cannot reclaim the goods warrants that he or she has the authority to do so.
from the subsequent lessee until the lease expires.
implied warranty of fitness for a particular
goods Tangible things that are movable at the time purpose An implied warranty that information is fit
of their identification to the contract. for the licensee’s purpose that applies if the licensor
government contractor defense A defense that says (1) knows of any particular purpose for which the
a contractor who was provided specifications by the computer information is required and (2) knows that
government is not liable for any defect in the product the licensee is relying on the licensor’s skill or judg-
that occurs as a result of those specifications. ment to select or furnish suitable information.
Glossary 499
implied warranty of fitness for human consump- Information Infrastructure Protection Act (IIP
tion A warranty that applies to food or drink con- Act) A federal law making it a federal crime to access
sumed on or off the premises of restaurants, grocery and acquire information from a protected computer
stores, fast-food outlets, and vending machines. without authorization.
implied warranty of informational content An injunction A court order that prohibits a person
implied warranty that there is no inaccuracy in the from doing a certain act.
informational content caused by the merchant-licensor’s innocent misrepresentation Occurs when a person
failure to perform with reasonable care. makes a statement of fact that he or she honestly and
implied warranty of merchantability Unless prop- reasonably believes to be true, even though it is not.
erly disclosed, a warranty that is implied that sold or Occurs when an agent makes an untrue statement that
leased goods are fit for the ordinary purpose for which he or she honestly and reasonably believes to be true.
they are sold or leased, and other assurances. insane but not adjudged insane A person who is
implied warranty of merchantability of the com- insane but has not been adjudged insane by a court or
puter program An implied warranty that the copies administrative agency. A contract entered into by such
of the computer program are within the parameters person is generally voidable. Some states hold that
permitted by the licensing agreement, that the com- such a contract is void.
puter program has been adequately packaged and installment contract A contract that requires or
labeled, and that the program conforms to any prom- authorizes the goods to be delivered and accepted in
ises or affirmations of fact on the container or label. separate lots.
impossibility of performance (objective impossibil- installment note An agreement to pay a portion of a
ity) Nonperformance that is excused if the contract debt at successive periods until paid in full.
becomes impossible to perform; must be objective intangible property Property that is a “right” rather
impossibility, not subjective. than a physical object even though the right may be
in pari delicto In equal fault; equally culpable or evidenced by a physical piece of paper (e.g., patent,
criminal. stock, trademark, copyright, or goodwill).
incidental beneficiary A party who is unintention- integration of several writings Where several differ-
ally benefited by other people’s contracts. ent writings or documents are considered to form one
enforceable contract.
incidental damages When goods are resold or
released, incidental damages are reasonable expenses intentional interference with contractual rela-
incurred in stopping delivery, transportation charges, tions A tort that arises when a third party induces a
storage charges, sales commissions, and so on. contracting party to breach the contract with another
party.
incorporation by reference When integration is
intentional misrepresentation Intentionally
made by express reference in one document that refers
defrauding another person out of money, property, or
to and incorporates another document within it.
something else of value. When a seller or lessor fraud-
independent contractor A person who contracts ulently misrepresents the quality of a product and a
with another to do something for him who is not con- buyer is injured thereby. Occurs when one person con-
trolled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to sciously decides to induce another person to rely and
control with respect to his physical conduct in the per- act on a misrepresentation. Also called fraud. Occurs
formance of the undertaking. [Restatement (Second) of when an agent makes an untrue statement that he or
Agency.] she knows is not true.
infancy doctrine A doctrine that allows minors to Internet A collection of millions of computers that
disaffirm (cancel) most contracts they have entered provide a network of electronic connections between
into with adults. computers.
inferior performance Occurs when a party fails to Internet service provider (ISP) An operator main-
perform express or implied contractual obligations taining a server upon which individuals and businesses
that impair or destroy the essence of the contract. can have their own websites.
informal contract A contract that is not formal. intoxicated person A person who is under contrac-
Valid informal contracts are fully enforceable and may tual incapacity because of ingestion of alcohol or drugs
be sued upon if breached. to the point of incompetence.
500 Glossary
issuing bank The institution that issues the letter of person the right to enter upon another’s property for a
credit. specified and usually short period of time.
jumbo CD A certificate of deposit in a very large licensee The party who is granted limited rights in or
denomination, usually at a minimum of $100,000. Also access to intellectual property or informational rights
called negotiable certificates of deposit, these large owned by the licensor.
investments are usually considered low-risk, stable licensee’s damages The amount of monetary com-
investments for large investors. pensation the licensee can recover when the licensor
labor contract Also called a collective bargaining breaches a contract.
agreement that applies to the employees a union repre- licensing agreement Detailed and comprehensive
sents. The collective bargaining agreement defines the written agreement between the licensor and licensee
terms and conditions of employment for represented that sets forth the express terms of their agreement.
employees.
licensing statute Statute that requires a person or
lapse of time An offer terminates when a stated time business to obtain a license from the government prior
period expires. If no time is stated, an offer terminates to engaging in a specified occupation or activity.
after a reasonable time.
licensor The owner of intellectual property or infor-
lawful contracts To be an enforceable contract, the mational rights who transfers rights in the property or
object of the contract must be lawful. information to the licensee.
lawful object Where the focus or purpose of the con- licensor’s damages If a licensee breaches a contract,
tract is legal. the licensor may sue and recover monetary damages
lease Common Law Definition: A contract for the from the licensee caused by the breach.
exclusive possession of lands or tenements for a deter- life estate An interest in the land for a person’s life-
minate period: a contract by which the lessor grants the time; upon that person’s death, the interest will be
lessee the exclusive right to possess and use personal transferred to another party.
property of the lessor for a specified period of time.
limited warranty A product guarantee that is limited
UCC Article 2a Definition: A transfer of the right to or restricted in some way.
possession and use of goods for a term in return for
liquidated damages Damages to which parties to a
consideration, but a sale, including a sale on approval
contract agree in advance if the contract is breached.
or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security
Damages that are specified in the contract rather than
interest is not a lease. Unless the context clearly indi-
determined by the court. Damages that will be paid
cates otherwise, the term includes a sublease.
upon a breach of contract and that are established in
lease contracts Contracts for the exclusive posses- advance.
sion of real or personal property for a specified period.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act A United States fed-
legal insanity A state of contractual incapacity as eral law (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.). Enacted in 1975, it is
determined by law. the federal statute that governs warranties on con-
legal value Where the promisee suffers a legal detri- sumer products.
ment or the promisor receives a legal benefit. mailbox rule A rule that states that an acceptance of
legally enforceable contract If one party fails to per- an offer is effective when it is dispatched, even if it is
form as promised, the other party can use the court lost in transmission.
system to enforce the contract and recover damages or main purpose or leading object exception If the
other remedy. main purpose of a transaction and an oral collateral
lessee The person who acquires the right to posses- contract is to provide pecuniary benefit to the guaran-
sion and use of goods under a lease. tor, the collateral contract does not have to be in writ-
lessor The person who transfers the right of posses- ing to be enforced.
sion and use of goods under the lease. maker of a CD The bank (borrower).
letter of credit A written instrument addressed by maker of a note The party who makes the promise
one person to another requesting the latter to give to pay (borrower).
credit to the person in whose favor it is drawn. material breach A breach that occurs when a party
license A contract that transfers limited rights in renders inferior performance of his or her contractual
intellectual property and informational rights. Grants a duties.
Glossary 501
merchant A person who (1) deals in the goods of the mutual rescission Where the parties enter into a
kind involved in the transaction or (2) by his or her occu- second agreement that expressly terminates the first one.
pation holds himself or herself out as having knowledge National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) A federal
or skill peculiar to the goods involved in the transaction. administrative agency that oversees union elections,
merger clause A merger clause contains within its prevents employers and unions from engaging in ille-
four corners the entire agreement of the parties and is gal and unfair labor practices, and enforces and inter-
the final expression of their agreement. prets certain federal labor laws.
minor A person who has not reached the age of majority. necessaries of life A minor must pay the reasonable
minor breach A breach that occurs when a party value of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and other
renders substantial performance of his or her contrac- items considered necessary to the maintenance of life.
tual duties. negligence A tort related to defective products where
mirror image rule States that for an acceptance to exist, the defendant has breached a duty of due care and
the offeree must accept the terms as stated in the offer. caused harm to the plaintiff. Failure of a corporate
director or officer to exercise the duty of care while
misrepresentation An assertion that is made that is
conducting the corporation’s business.
not in accord with the facts.
misrepresentation of law When a party to a contract negotiable instrument Commercial paper that must
misstates the law related to that contract—whether meet these requirements: (1) be in writing, (2) be
innocently or intentionally. signed by the maker or drawer, (3) be an uncondi-
tional promise or order to pay, (4) state a fixed amount
mistake An unintentional act, omission, or error of money, (5) not require any undertaking in addition
arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition, or mis- to the payment of money, (6) be payable on demand or
placed confidence (mutual mistake). at a definite time, and (7) be payable to order or to
misuse of product A defense that relieves a seller of bearer. A special form of contract that satisfies the
product liability if the user abnormally misused the requirement established by Article 3 of the UCC. Also
product. Products must be designed to protect against called commercial paper.
foreseeable misuse. no-arrival, no-sale contract The seller bears the
mitigation of damages When a contract has been expense and risk of loss during transportation only.
breached, the law places a duty on the innocent nonb- nominal damages Damages awarded when the non-
reaching party to avoid and reduce the resulting damages. breaching party sues the breaching party even though
mixed sale A sale that involves the provision of a no financial loss has resulted from the breach; usually
service and a good in the same transaction. consists of $1 or some other small amount.
model act A statute proposed to legislatures for nondisclosure agreement A contract not to reveal
adoption (e.g., the Model Probate Code proposed by any facts or information on a particular matter.
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uni- novation An agreement that substitutes a new party
form Laws). for one of the original contracting parties and relieves
modification An alteration that does not change the the exiting party of liability on the contract.
general purpose and effect of that which is modified
objective theory of contracts A theory that says that
(modification of the agreement).
the intent to contract is judged by the reasonable per-
monetary damages An award of money. son standard and not by the subjective intent of the
moral obligation A duty that rests on moral consid- parties.
erations alone and is not imposed or enforced by posi- obligation An action a party to a sales or lease con-
tive law; a duty binding in conscience but not in law. tract is required by law to carry out.
mortgage An interest in real property given to a offer The manifestation of willingness to enter into a
lender as security for the repayment of a loan. bargain, so made as to justify another person in under-
mortgage note A promise to pay that secures the standing that his assent to that bargain is invited and
debt obligation. will conclude it [Section 24 of Restatement (Second) of
mutual mistake A mistake common to both con- Contracts].
tracting parties, where each is laboring under the same offeree The party to whom an offer to enter into a con-
misconception as to a past or existing material fact. tract is made. The party to whom an offer has been made.
502 Glossary
offeror The party who makes an offer to enter into a penalty Punishment imposed by law (the penalty of
contract. The party who makes an offer. imprisonment).
one-year rule An executory contract that cannot be perfect tender rule A rule that says if the goods or
performed by its own terms within one year of its for- tender of a delivery fail in any respect to conform to
mation must be in writing. the contract, the buyer may opt either (1) to reject the
open price term Where a sales contract does not whole shipment, (2) to accept the whole shipment, or
contain a specific price: a “reasonable price” is implied (3) to reject part and accept part of the shipment.
at the time of delivery. personal satisfaction test Subjective test that applies
open term A section of a sales or lease contract on to contracts involving personal taste and comfort.
which the parties are allowed to “read into” the mean- personal service contracts Contracts for providing
ing of that section. personal services such as for an artist painting some-
option contract A method used to prevent the offeror one’s portrait.
from revoking his or her offer. This involves the offeree preexisting duty A promise lacks consideration if a
paying the offeror compensation to keep the offer open person promises to perform an act or do something he
for an agreed-upon period of time. With the option or she is already under an obligation to do.
contract, the offeror agrees not to sell the property to prenuptial agreement A contract entered into by
anyone but the offeree during the option period. parties prior to their marriage that defines their own-
original (primary) contract In a guaranty situation, this ership rights in each other’s property; it must be in
is the first contract between the debtor and the creditor. writing.
output contract A contract in which one party principal A person who authorizes an agent to sign a
agrees to sell his or her entire output and the other negotiable instrument on his or her behalf. The party
agrees to buy it. who employs another person to act on his or her
parol evidence Any oral or written words outside behalf.
the four corners of the written contract. principal-agent relationship An employer hires an
parol evidence rule A rule that says if a written con- employee and gives that employee authority to act and
tract is a complete and final statement of the parties’ enter into contracts on his or her behalf.
agreement, any prior or contemporaneous oral or writ- privity of contract The state of two specified parties
ten statements that alter, contradict, or are in addition being in a contract.
to the terms of the written contract are inadmissible in
pro bono For the good; work or services performed
court regarding a dispute over the contract. There are
free of charge.
several exceptions to this rule.
part acceptance When a sales or lease contract is product defects In a strict liability lawsuit, the
oral but should have been in writing, the contract is injured party must show that the product that caused
enforceable only to the extent to which the goods have the injury was defective.
been received and accepted by the buyer or lessee. products liability The liability of manufacturers,
part performance An equitable doctrine that allows sellers, and others for the injuries caused by defective
the court to order an oral contract for the sale of land products.
or transfer of another interest in real property to be promisee One to whom a promise has been made.
specifically performed if it has been partially performed promisor One who makes a promise.
and performance is necessary to avoid injustice. promissory estoppel (equitable estoppel) An equi-
partially disclosed agency Where the agency is partially table doctrine that prevents the withdrawal of a prom-
disclosed, both the agent and the principal are bound. ise by a promisor if it will adversely affect a promisee
past consideration A prior act or performance. Past who has adjusted his or her position in justifiable reli-
consideration (e.g., prior acts) will not support a new ance on the promise. An equitable doctrine that per-
contract. New consideration must be given. mits enforcement of oral contracts that should have
payee The party who receives the money from a been in writing. It is applied to avoid injustice.
draft. The party to whom the check is written. The promissory note A two-party negotiable instrument
party to whom the promise to pay is made (lender). that is an unconditional written promise by one party
The depositor (lender). to pay money to another party.
Glossary 503
proper dispatch The acceptance must be sent in a recovery of the purchase price or rent A seller or
way that is properly addressed, packaged, and postage lessor may recover the contracted-for purchase price
applied. or rent from the buyer or lessee if the buyer or lessee
proposed additions If one or both parties to the (1) fails to pay for accepted goods, (2) breaches the
contract are nonmerchants, any additional terms do contract and the seller or lessor cannot dispose of the
not constitute a counteroffer or extinguish the original goods, or if (3) the goods are damaged or lost after the
offer. If the offeree’s proposed conditions are accepted risk of loss passes to the buyer or lessee.
by the original offeror, they become part of the con- reformation An equitable doctrine that permits the
tract. If they are not accepted, the sales contract is court to rewrite a contract to express the parties’ true
formed on the basis of the original offer. intentions.
puffing A seller’s opinion on the quality of goods; regulatory statute A licensing statute enacted to
usually overpraise, exaggeration, or hype. protect the public.
punitive damages Damages that are awarded to rejection Nonacceptance or withdrawal of the offer
punish the defendant, to deter the defendant from prior to its acceptance.
similar conduct in the future, and to set an example for remedies at law Economic compensation in the
others. form of real property, personal property, and money.
quasi-contract An obligation created by the law to replevin An action by a buyer or lessor to recover
avoid unjust enrichment in the absence of an agree- scarce goods wrongfully withheld by a seller or lessor.
ment between the parties.
requirement contract A contract in which the pur-
ratification The act of a minor after the minor has chaser agrees to buy all of its needs of specified mate-
reached the age of majority by which he or she accepts rial from a particular supplier, and the latter agrees to
a contract entered into when he or she was a minor. fill all of the purchaser’s needs during the period of the
When a principal accepts an agent’s unauthorized con- contract.
tract. The acceptance by a corporation of an unauthor-
rescission An action to rescind (undo) the contract.
ized act of a corporate officer or agent.
Rescission is available if there has been a material breach
real property The land itself as well as buildings, of contract, fraud, duress, undue influence, or mistake.
trees, soil, minerals, timber, plants, crops, and other
Restatement of the Law of Contracts A compilation
things permanently affixed to the land.
of model contract law principles drafted by legal schol-
reasonable person standard The standard by which ars. The Restatement is not law.
the court decides if the parties intended to create a
restitution Returning of goods or property received
contract. A “reasonable person” is a fictitious person of
from the other party to rescind a contract; if the actual
ordinary prudence.
goods or property is not available, a cash equivalent
reasonable person test Objective test that applies to must be made.
commercial contracts and contracts involving mechan-
revenue-raising statute A licensing statute with the
ical fitness.
primary purpose of raising revenue for the government.
reclamation The right of a seller or lessor to demand
Revised Article 2 A recent revision of Article 2 to
the return of goods from the buyer or lessee under
the Uniform Commercial Code that deals with the sale
specified situations.
of goods.
recovery of damages A seller or lessor may recover
revocation of acceptance Where the buyer or lessee
damages measured as the difference between the con-
who has accepted goods subsequently withdraws that
tract price (or rent) and the market price (or rent) at
acceptance.
the time and place the goods were to be delivered, plus
incidental damages, from a buyer or lessee who repu- reward To collect a reward, the offeree must (1) have
diates the contract or wrongfully rejects tendered knowledge of the reward offer prior to completing the
goods. requested act and (2) perform the requested act.
recovery of lost profits When the buyer breaches right to cover When a buyer or lessee purchases or
performance of the contract and the seller seeks dam- rents substitute goods.
ages for profits he or she would have received from the right to cure A licensor has the right to cure a con-
full performance of the contract. tract under certain conditions.
504 Glossary
Sabbath law A law that prohibits or limits the carry- Statute of Frauds State statute that requires certain
ing on of certain secular activities on Sundays. types of contracts to be in writing.
sale The passing of title from a seller to a buyer for a statute of limitations Statute that establishes the
price. Also called a conveyance. time period during which a lawsuit must be brought; if
sale on approval A type of sale in which there is no the lawsuit is not brought within this period, the
actual sale unless and until the buyer accepts the goods. injured party loses the right to sue.
sale or return contract A contract that says that the statute of repose A statute that limits the seller’s lia-
seller delivers goods to a buyer with the understanding bility to a certain number of years from the date when
that the buyer may return them if they are not used or the product was first sold.
resold within a stated or reasonable period of time. stop delivery of the goods When a seller or lessor,
sales contracts Refers to the sale of goods under upon learning of a buyer’s or lessee’s insolvency, stops
Article 2 of the UCC. goods from being delivered while they are in transit.
satisfaction The performance of an accord. strict liability Liability without fault.
scienter Guilty knowledge; intent to deceive or subsequent assignee (subassignee) When an
manipulate. assignee transfers the rights under the contract to yet
another person.
Section 5 Prohibits unfair and deceptive practices.
substantial performance Performance by a con-
Section 201 of the Uniform Commercial Code tracting party that deviates only slightly from complete
(UCC) A rule sometimes referred to as the “Statute performance.
of Frauds”; requires that contracts for the sale of goods
costing $500 or more be in writing. substituted contract A new contract that revokes
and discharges a prior contract.
shipment contract A contract that requires the seller
to ship the goods to the buyer via a common carrier. supervening event An alteration or modification of
The buyer bears the risk of loss during transportation. A a product by a party in the chain of distribution that
sales contract that requires the seller to send the goods absolves all prior sellers from strict liability.
to the buyer but not a specifically named destination. supervening illegality The enactment of a statute,
sight draft A draft payable on sight. Also called a regulation, or court decision that makes the object of
demand draft. an offer illegal. This action terminates the offer.
signature requirement A negotiable instrument supplier One engaged in the business of making
must be signed by the drawer or maker. Any symbol products available to consumers; all persons in the chain
executed or adopted by a party with a present intent to of production and distribution of a consumer product.
authenticate a writing qualifies as his or her signature. tender of delivery The obligation of the seller to
transfer and deliver goods to the buyer in accordance
small CD A certificate of deposit under $100,000.
with the sales contract.
specially manufactured goods Goods manufactured
tender of performance Tender is an unconditional
specifically for the buyer.
and absolute offer by a contracting party to perform
specific performance A remedy that orders the his or her obligations under the contract. Occurs when
breaching party to perform the acts promised in the a party who has the ability and willingness to perform
contract; usually awarded in cases where the subject offers to complete the performance of his or her duties
matter is unique, such as in contracts involving land, under the contract.
heirlooms, and paintings. Judgment of the court that
third-party beneficiary A third person that the con-
orders a seller or lessor to perform his or her obliga-
tracting parties intended should receive a benefit from
tions under the contract.
the contract.
standard form contract A document, usually pre-
time draft A draft payable at a designated future date.
printed, to be filled in and adopted to a particular
client’s needs. time note A note payable at a specific time.
standards of interpretation If the parties have not title Legal, tangible evidence of ownership of goods.
defined the words and terms of a contract, the courts tort A wrong. There are three categories: (1) inten-
apply those words and terms in the manner in which tional torts, (2) unintentional torts (negligence), and
they normally are defined. (3) strict liability.
Glossary 505
tort of bad faith A breach of the requirement that unilateral contract A contract in which the offeror’s
the parties act and deal fairly in all respects in obtain- offer can be accepted only by the performance of an
ing the objective of the contract. act by the offeree; a “promise for an act.”
UCC Statute of Frauds A rule that requires all con- unilateral mistake When only one party is mistaken
tracts for the sale of goods costing $500 or more and about a material fact regarding the subject matter of
lease contracts involving payments of $1,000 or more the contract.
to be in writing. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
unconscionability Where there is unequal bargain- International Sale of Goods (CISG) Seventy coun-
ing power between the parties such that it would be tries and several international organizations created
manifestly unfair to enforce the contract. this law, which governs contracts for the international
unconscionable contracts A contract so oppressive or sale of goods.
unfair that it would be unjust for the court to enforce it. usage of trade A regularly observed or adhered-to
undisclosed agency Where the agency is undis- practice or method of dealing in a particular trade or
closed, both the agent and the principal are bound. industry.
undue influence Taking advantage of a person’s usury law A law that sets an upper limit on the inter-
weakness, infirmity, age, or distress in order to change est rate that can be charged on certain types of loans.
that person’s actions or decisions. valid contract A contract that meets all of the essen-
unenforceable contract A contract where the essential elements to establish a contract; a contract that is
tial elements to create a valid contract are met, but enforceable by at least one of the parties.
there is some legal defense to the enforcement of the void contract A contract that has no legal effect; a
contract. nullity.
unequivocal acceptance Where acceptance of the
voidable contract A contract where one or both par-
contract is definite and absolute.
ties have the option to avoid their contractual obliga-
Unified Contract Law (UCL) A new business and tions. If a contract is avoided, both parties are released
commercial contract law enacted by China. from their contractual obligations.
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Comprehensive void title A thief acquires no title to the goods he or
statutory scheme that includes laws that cover aspects she steals.
of commercial transactions.
voidable title Title that a purchaser has if the goods
Uniform Commercial Code—Leases Article 2A of were obtained by (1) fraud, (2) a check that is later dis-
the UCC directly addresses personal property leases, honored, or (3) impersonating another person. In the
including the formation, performance, and default of case of theft, a thief acquires no title to the goods he or
leases in goods. she steals.
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
warranty A buyer’s or lessee’s assurance that the goods
(UCITA) A model act that provides uniform and
meet certain standards. A representation of the insured
comprehensive rules for contracts involving computer
that is expressly incorporated in the insurance contract.
information transactions and software and informa-
tion licenses. warranty against infringements A seller or lessor
who is a merchant who regularly deals in goods of the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
kind sold or leased automatically warrants that the
Credits (UCP) Rules created by the International
goods are delivered free of any third-party patent,
Chamber of Commerce that govern the formation and
trademark, or copyright claim.
performance of letters of credit.
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) A warranty disclaimer Statements that negate express
model act that—along with the UCITA—provides uni- and implied warranties.
form and comprehensive rules for contracts involving warranty of good title Sellers warrant that they have
computer information transactions and software and valid title to the goods they are selling and that the
information licenses. transfer of title is rightful.
Uniform Sales Act A law governing sales of goods warranty of no infringement An implied promise
that was adopted by most states. It was later subsumed that there are no interferences or interventions that
within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. will affect the contract.
506 Glossary
warranty of no interference An implied promise that writ of attachment A document that orders a sheriff
there are no conflicts that will encroach upon a contract. or other government officer to seize the breaching
warranty of no security interests Sellers of goods party’s property and to sell the property at auction to
warrant that the goods they sell are delivered free from satisfy a judgment.
any third-party security interests, liens, or encum- writ of garnishment A document that orders the
brances that are unknown to the buyer. breaching party’s wages, bank accounts, or other prop-
World Intellectual Property Organization erty held by a third party be paid over to the non-
(WIPO) An international arbitration and mediation breaching party to satisfy a judgment.
center where domain owners can bring actions to writing and form Certain contracts must be in
recover a domain name. writing or in a particular form in order to be
World Wide Web An electronic connection of mil- enforceable.
lions of computers that support a standard set of rules
for the exchange of information.
INDEX
A American Arbitration Association, 193
American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23
Abnormal misuse, 375 American Federation of Labor (AFL), 397–398
Acceptance American Law Institute, 9, 261, 295, 358
case examples, 46–47, 49–50, 51–53 American rule, 163
defined, 45 Anti-assignment clauses, 162–163
of goods, 310 Anticipatory breach, 189
mailbox rule, 49–50 Anticipatory repudiation, 318
methods of, 268–269 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 228–229
mirror image rule, 46 Anti-delegation clause, 164
mode or method of, 50–53 Approval clauses, 163
offers and, 45–54 Arbitration
part, 270 breach of contracts and, 193
revocation of, 310–311 clauses, 319–320
sales and leases and, 268–270 defined, 193
silence as, 48 mandatory, 107
technology and effects on, 47–48 Arbitration Fairness Act, 107
unequivocal, 46 Article 2 (Sales), 8, 260, 262–265, 488
-upon-dispatch rule, 49–50 Article 2A (Leases), 8–9, 260, 265–266, 488
who can make an, 45–46 Article 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 385
Acceptor, 386 Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 274
Access contracts, 236 Article 6 (Bulk Sales), 295
Accommodation, 269 Assent
Accord, 73, 173 See also Genuineness of assent
Accord and satisfaction, 73, 173 mutual, 30
Account party, 273 Assignee, 159
Adequate assurance, 318 Assignment and delegation, 164
Adequate consideration, 67–68 Assignment of rights
Adjudged insane, 91–92 anti-assignment and approval clauses, 162–163
Admissions in pleadings or court, 270 case example, 161–162
Advertisements, 35–37, 345 contracts that cannot be assigned, 160–161
AFL-CIO, 398 defined, 159
Age misrepresentation by minors, 87 effect of, 161
Agency form of, 159–160
defined, 390 future, 160
fully disclosed, 392, 394 notice of, 162
law, 390 successive, 163
partially disclosed, 393, 394 Assignor, 159
termination, 395–397 Assumption of duties, 164
undisclosed, 393–394 Assumption of the risk, 374
Agency relationships Assurance of performance, 318
employer-employee, 391, 392 Attribution procedure, 237
persons who can initiate, 390–391 Auctions
principal-agent, 391, 392 case example, 38–39
Agent online, 39–40
defined, 390 without reserve, 37, 40
independent contractors versus, 395 with reserve, 37, 40
misrepresentation, 395 Authenticate, 237
Agents’ contracts, 144–145 Authorization
Age of majority, 85 express, 50
Agreements implied, 50
See also Offers
accepting, on remedies, 318–319
defined, 7, 31
B
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) paralegals, Bad faith torts, 212–213
job description of, 5 Bail bond, 20
507
508 Index
Bailee, 286 mentally incompetent persons and, 91–94

Bankruptcy, 176 minors and, 85–91
executory contracts/unexpired leases and, 286–287 Capture, 315
labor contracts and, 400–402 Case briefing
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act cases for, 422–439
(BPACPA), 401–402 how to write, 415–421
Bankruptcy paralegals, job description of, 14 Caveat emptor, 330
Bargained-for exchange, 64 Certificates of deposit (CDs), 388, 389
Basis of the bargain, 332 Chain of distribution, 356
Battle of the forms, 269–270 Chapter 11, 400–403
Beneficiaries Checks, 386–387, 389
creditor, 166–167 China, 54
defined, 273 CIF (cost, insurance, and freight), 285
donee, 165–166 Claims, settlement of, 73
incidental, 167–168 Classical law of contracts, 5
intended, 165–167 Click-wrap licenses, 235
third-party, 165–168 COD (cash on delivery), 310
Best-efforts contracts, 72 Collateral, defined, 388
Bilateral contracts, 15, 21 Collateral contracts (guaranty contracts), 143
Billing practices, 378 Collateral notes, 388
Bill of lading, 273–274 Collections paralegals, job description of, 30–31
Blumenthal, R., 107 Collective bargaining, 400
Breach of contract Collective bargaining agreement, 400, 401
See also Monetary damages; Remedies; Torts Commercial impracticability, 175, 176
anticipatory, 189 Commercial paper. See Negotiable instruments
arbitration for, 193 Common law, defined, 5
case examples, 190–192 Common law of contracts, 8
defined, 186 Communicating offers, 35
engagement rings, 207 Communication with clients, 150
Internet, 192 Comparable employment, 195
material, 188 Comparative fault, 376
minor, 188 Compensatory damages, 193–195, 203, 334
monetary damages, 193–203 Competence, 75
performance and, 187–191 Complete integration, 149
risk of loss and breach of sales contract, 290 Complete performance, 186, 187–188, 189
risk of loss and no breach of sales contract, 284–287 Computer information transactions, 233
Breach of license agreements, 241–242 Concurrent conditions, 171–172
Breach of warranties, 334 Conditional sales, 287–289
Briefing a case Condition precedent based on satisfaction, 171
cases for, 422–439 Conditions
how to write, 415–421 concurrent, 171–172
Bulk Sales (Article 6), 295 defined, 169
Bulk transfer, 295 implied/express, 172
Business contracts of performance, 169–172
consideration and, 72 precedent, 169–171
covenant not to compete, 104–105 subsequent, 171
exculpatory clauses, 102–104 Confidentiality, 55
licensing statutes, 101–102 Conflicts of interest, 214
in restraint of trade, 101 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 398
Business formation paralegals, job description of, 187 Consequential damages, 197, 203
Business franchise paralegals, job descriptions of, 62–63, 233 Consideration
Buyer breaches, 290 adequate, 67–68
Buyer in the ordinary course of business, 292–294 business contracts and, 72
case examples, 64–67, 70–71
defined, 7, 62, 63
C gift promises, 64–67
Cancellation, 242, 313, 316 illegal, 67, 71
C & F (cost and freight), 285 illusory promises, 68–69, 71
Capacity moral obligations, 69, 71
defined, 7, 84, 390 past, 69–71
intoxicated persons and, 94–96 preexisting duty, 69, 71
Index 509
requirements of, 63–64 Criminal acts, 97

sales and leases and, 268 Criminal law paralegals, job description of, 261
Consignee, 288 Cure, 307–308
Consignment, 288 Cyber crimes, 247–249
Consignor, 288
Conspicuous, 341
Construction contracts, compensatory damages for breach of, 194
Construction law paralegals, job description of, 138–139
D
Consumer expectation test, 337 Damages
Contract administration paralegals, job description of, 84–85 See also Monetary damages
Contract law for accepted nonconforming goods, 317
compared to sales law, 272 compensatory, 193–195, 203, 334
sources of, 8–9 incidental, 312
Contract of adhesion, 105 licensee, 244
Contracts licensor, 243
See also E-contracts; Lease contracts/leases; Sales liquidated, 197–202, 203, 244, 319
contracts/sales; see also type of punitive, 211, 358, 372–374
alteration, 176 recovery of, 313, 316–317
bilateral, 15, 21 strict liability and recoverable, 358
defenses to the enforcement of, 8 Death of offeror or offeree, 43
defined, 6 Deceive, intent to, 128
elements of, 7 Declaration of duties, 164
evolution of, 5–6 Deed of trust, 140
executed, 21 Defects. See Product defects
executory, 21 Delegate, 163
express, 15, 21 Delegation of duties, 163–164
formal, 20, 21 Delegator, 163
implied-in-fact, 15–17, 21 Delivery
implied-in-law, 18–19, 21 place of, 305–309
incomplete, 15 right to withhold, 311
informal, 20, 21 tender of, 305
legally enforceable, 4 Demand draft, 386
objective theory of, 9, 10–13, 32 Demand notes, 388
parties to, 7 Design defects, 360–364, 365–366
purpose of, 4 Destination contracts, 284, 285–286, 306
quasi-, 18–19, 21 Destruction of goods, 309
sample, 440–486 Disaffirmance, 85
standard form, 6 Discharge, defined, 176
under seal, 20 Discharge of performance, 172–176
unenforceable, 21 Disclaimers, warranties, 341–342
unilateral, 15, 21 Disposition of goods, 312–313
valid, 20, 21 Doctrine of strict liability in tort, 355–358
void, 20, 21 Doctrine of unconscionability, 105
voidable, 20, 21 Document of title, 284
Contractual capacity Domain names
See also Capacity Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 228–229
defined, 390 case examples, 229–231
Contributory negligence, 376 defined, 222, 227
Corporate contracts paralegals, job description of, 352–353 extensions for, 228
Correspondent, 273 registering, 228
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 248 worth of, 231
Counteroffers, 41–42, 51–53 Donee beneficiaries, 165–166
Course of dealing, 272 Drafts, 385–386, 389
Course of performance, 272 Drawee, 385
Covenant(s) Drawer, 385
defined, 169 Duress, 127–128
of good faith and fair dealing, 212 Duties
not to compete, 104–105 assumption of, 164
Cover, 244 declaration of, 164
Crashworthiness doctrine, 364 delegation of, 163–164
Creditor beneficiaries, 166–167 Duty of restitution/restoration, 85–87
510 Index
E Exclusive license, 235

Exculpatory clauses, 102–104
Easements, 140 Executed contracts, 21, 188
e-Bay, 39–40 Executory contracts (unexpired leases), 21, 140
E-commerce bankruptcy and, 286–287
See also Internet Express authorization, 50
breach of contract, 192 Express conditions, 172
defined, 6, 222 Express contracts, 15, 21
Economic duress, 127–128 Express reference, 147
Economic injury, proving, 129 Express warranties, 239–240, 331–332, 333–334, 340
E-contracts Ex-ship (from carrying vessel), 285
breach of contract, 192 Extortion, 127
defined, 231–232
development of, 6
signatures, 232–233 F
writing requirements, 232 Failure to provide adequate instructions, 371–372
Electronic agents, 236 Failure to warn, 354–355, 364–365, 366–370
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 247 FAS (free alongside) shipment, 285
Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 248 Faxes, offers and, 45
Electronic self-help, 243–244 Federal Arbitration Act, 193
Electronic Signature in Global and National Commerce Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 273, 342
(E-Sign) Act, 232 Fees, 108, 129, 378
E-licensing, 233–247 Finance lease, 265–266
E-mail Firm offer rule, 268
defined, 226 FOB (free on board)
offers and, 45 place of destination, 285
Emancipation, 89 point of shipment, 285
Employee benefits paralegals, job description of, 330–331 Force majeure clauses, 175
Employer-employee relationship, 391, 392 Foreign substance test, 337
Employment contracts, compensatory damages Formal contracts, 20, 21
for breach of, 195 Formality of writing, 8, 146–148
Engagement rings, 207 Form contracts, 144–145
English rule, 163 Franken, A., 107
Entrustment rule, 291–292 Fraud
Equal dignity rule, 144–145 See also Statute of frauds
Equitable estoppels (promissory estoppels), 145–146 by concealment, 121
Equitable remedies case examples, 121–123, 124–125
defined, 186 defined, 120
injunction, 210–211 in the inception, 120
reformation, 210, 211 in the inducement, 120–121
specific performance, 74, 208–210, 211 misrepresentation of law, 123–125
Equity proving, 128–129
defined, 62, 73 silence, 121
promissory estoppels, 73–74 Freedom of/to contract, 5, 6
remedies, 74–75 Free speech, Internet, 224–226
E-signatures, 232–233 Fully disclosed agency, 392, 394
Ethics Fungible, 335
advertising and solicitation, 345 Future goods, 283
billing practices, 378
code of, and integrity, 23
communication with clients, 150
G
competence, 75 Gambling statutes, 99
confidentiality, 55 Gap-filling rule, 267
conflicts of interest, 214 Generally known dangers, 374
disruptive courtroom tactics, 403 Genuine assent, defined, 116
fees, 108, 129, 378 Genuineness of assent, 8
honesty and candor, 320 defined, 116
impropriety, appearance of, 274–275 duress, 127–128
legal system improvements, responsibility for, 296 fraud, 120–123, 124–125, 128–129
misconduct, reporting, 250 misrepresentation of law, 123–125
pro bono, 129 mistakes, 117–120
unauthorized practice of law, 177 undue influence, 126
Index 511
Gift promises, 64–67 of fitness for human consumption, 337–338

Glossary, 148 of informational content, 240
Gompers, S., 397 of merchantability, 240, 335–337, 340
Good faith purchaser for value, 291 Implied warranty of authority, 394
Good faith subsequent lessee, 291 Impossibility of performance, 173
Goods Impropriety, appearance of, 274–275
See also Sales contracts/sales Incidental beneficiaries, 167–168
acceptance of, 310–311 Incidental damages, 312
bailee, 286 Incorporation by reference, 147
defined, 262–263 Incoterms, 295
delivery of, without moving them, 286 Independent contractors, 395
destruction of, 309 Infancy doctrine, 85
disposing, 312–313 Inferior performance, 186, 188–189
future, 283 Informal contracts, 20, 21
identification of, 283 Informational rights, licensing of, 234, 237–241
payment for, 310 Information Infrastructure Protection Act (IIP Act), 248–249
reclaiming, 312 Injunction, 74–75, 210–211
recovery of, 316–317 Innocent misrepresentation, 124, 395
recovery of, from insolvent seller/lessor, 315 In pari delicto, 99
rejecting nonconforming, 315 Insane buy not adjudged insane, 92
shipment and destination, 284, 285–286 Insanity
sold by nonowners, 291–294 adjudged insane, 91–92
stop delivery of, 311 insane buy not adjudged insane, 92
title, passage of, 284 legal, 91
versus services, 263–264 Inspection, right of, 309–310
withholding, 311 Installment contracts, 309
Government contractor defense, 374 Installment notes, 388
Guarantor, 143 Insurance, against loss of goods, 290–291
Guaranty contracts, 143 Intangible property, 260
Integration clauses, 148
H Integration of several writings, 147–148
Integrity, 23
Holder in due course (HDC), 385
Intellectual property, 234
Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), 224
Intended beneficiaries, 165–167
Intentional misrepresentation, 355, 395
I Intentional torts (interference with contractual
Identification of goods, 283 relations), 211–212
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 248 International Chamber of Commerce, 274, 295
Illegal consideration, 67, 71 International contracts, 22, 54
Illegal contracts laws covering, 22, 54
case examples, 97–98, 100–101 signatures, 150
to commit crimes, 97 International trade
contrary to public policy, 97 letters of credit, 273–274
defined, 84 terms, 295
effect of, 99 Internet
gambling statutes, 99 See also E-commerce; E-contracts
immoral contracts, 97 breach of contract, 192
Sabbath (Sunday or blue) laws, 96–97 case examples, 226–227
usury laws, 96 cyber crimes, 247–249
Illusory promises/contracts, 68–69, 71 defined, 223
Immoral contracts, 97 development of, 223–224
Implied authorization, 50 domain names, 227–231
Implied-in-fact conditions, 172 e-mail, 236
Implied-in-fact contracts free speech and, 224–226
case example, 16–17 future issues, 250
defined, 15, 21 privacy issues, 247
Implied-in-law contracts, 18–19, 21, 210 software and E-licensing, 233–247
Implied integration, 148 unfair and deceptive acts over the, 273
Implied term, 33 Internet service providers (ISPs), 224
Implied warranties InterNIC, 228
of fitness for a particular purpose, 240, 338–340 Interpreting contract words/terms, 148
512 Index
Intoxicated persons, capacity and, 94–96 risk of loss, 290–291

IRAC, briefing a case, 415–421 shipment and destination, 284, 285–286, 306
Issuing bank, 273 Statute of Frauds, 270–272
title, passage of, 284, 294
J unexpired leases, 21, 140, 286–287
warranties, 329–345
Job descriptions Legal actions, assignment of, 160–161
alternative dispute resolution paralegals, 5 Legal insanity, 91
bankruptcy paralegals, 14 Legally enforceable contract, 4
business formation paralegals, 187 Legal value, 63, 64
business franchise paralegals, 62–63, 233 Lemon laws, 377
collections paralegals, 30–31 Lessee
construction law paralegals, 138–139 defined, 265
contract administration paralegals, 84–85 good faith subsequent, 291
corporate contracts paralegals, 352–353 Lessor, 265
criminal law paralegals, 261 Letters of credit (Article 5), 20, 273–274
employee benefits paralegals, 330–331 Lewis, J. L., 398
labor/employment paralegals, 282–283 Liability
municipal paralegals, 384–385 See also Products liability
personal injury paralegals, 158–159 agent, 392
securities/municipal bonds paralegals, 116–117 for independent contractors, 395
trust paralegals, 304 License, defined, 234
Johnson, H., 107 Licensee
Jumbo certificates of deposit (CDs), 388 damages, 244
Jurisdictional issues, 204 defined, 234
specific performance, 244
L Licensing
access contracts, 236
Labor
agreements, 236
collective bargaining, 400
breach of agreements, 241–242
laws, 397, 398
click-wrap, 235
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 398–400
electronic agents, 236
unions, 397–398
exclusive, 235
Labor contracts
of informational rights/intellectual property, 234, 237–241
bankruptcy and, 400–402
remedies for breach, 242–247
defined, 400
software and E-licensing, 233–247
Labor/employment paralegals, job description of, 282–283
statutes, 101–102
Labor-Management Relations Act, 398
Licensor
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 398
damages, 243
Land. See Real property
defined, 234
Landrum-Griffin Act, 398
right to cure, 243
Lapse of time, 43, 44
Life estates, 140
Lawful contracts, defined, 96
Limitations, statute of, 175–176, 318
Lawful object, 7
Limited warranties, 342
Law Merchant, 260
Liquidated damages, 197–202, 203, 244, 319
Leading object exception, 144
Loss, risk of loss
Lease, defined, 265
breach of sales contract, 290
Lease contracts/leases
conditional sales, 287–289
acceptance, 268–270
lease contracts and, 290–291
Article 2A, 8–9, 260, 265–266, 488
no breach of sales contract, 284–287
assigning, 161–162
Lost volume seller, 314
consideration, 268
defined, 8, 140, 265
document of title, 284
M
finance, 265–266 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 342–343, 377
firm offer rule, 268 Mailbox rule, 49–50
formation of, 259–275 Main purpose (leading object) exception, 144
goods, identification of, 283 Maker of a CD, 403
offers, 266–268 Maker of a note, 387
open terms, 267 Manufacture defects, 359–360
performance of, 281–298 Marriage, prenuptial agreements, 145
remedies for breach of, 303–320 Material breach, 188
Index 513
Material fact, 119, 128 National Labor Relations Board

Mentally incompetent persons, capacity and, 91–94 (NLRB), 398–400
Merchant Necessaries of life, 89–90
defined, 265, 268 Negligence, 353–355
risk of loss, 286 contributory, 376
Merchantability, implied warranty of, 240, 335–337, 340 Negotiable instruments
Merger clauses, 148 certificates of deposit (CDs), 388, 389
Minor breach, 188 checks, 386–387, 389
Minors defined, 20, 385
age misrepresentation by, 87 drafts, 385–386, 389
capacity and, 85–91 formal requirements for, 389–390
case examples, 87–88, 89–90 functions of, 385
contracts, types of, 91 payable in foreign currency, 390
defined, 85 promissory notes, 152, 387–388, 389
infancy doctrine, 85 Network Solutions, Inc., 228
parental liability, 88–89 New York rule, 163
ratification of contracts by, 87–88 No-arrival/sale contract, 285
restoration/restitution and duty of, 85–87 Nominal damages, 202–203
Mirror image rule, 46, 269 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 398
Misconduct, reporting, 250 Novation, 173
Misrepresentation
agent, 395 O
defined, 355
Objective impossibility, 173
of fact, material, 128
Objective theory of contracts
innocent, 124, 395
case examples, 10–13
intentional, 355, 395
defined, 9, 10
reliance on, 128
offers and, 32
silence as, 121
Obligations, 304
Misrepresentation of law, 123–125
Obligee, 159
See also Fraud
Obligor, 159
Mistakes
Offeree
case examples, 118–119, 120
death of, 43
defined, 117
defined, 7, 31
mutual, 119–120
Offeror
unilateral, 117–119
death of, 43
Misuse of product, 375
defined, 7, 31
Mitigation of damages, 195–196
Offers
Mixed sales, 263
acceptance, 45–54
Model act, 261
advertisements, 35–37
Modification, 144
auctions, 37–40
Monetary damages
case examples, 33–34, 35–37
case examples, 195–196, 197–198, 199–202
communicating, 35
compensatory, 193–195, 203
counter-, 41–42, 51–53
consequential, 197, 203
defined, 31
defined, 186
elements of, 31
enforcement of, 203
intent, 32
jurisdictional issues, 204
option contracts and effects on, 44–45
liquidated, 197–202, 203
rewards, 37
mitigation of, 195–196
sales and leases, 266–268
nominal, 202–203
technology and effects on, 45
Moral obligations, 69, 71
termination of, 40–44
Mortgage notes, 388
terms of, defined, 32–33
Mortgages, 140
One-year rule, 142–143
Municipal paralegals, job description of, 384–385
Online auctions, 39–40
Mutual mistakes, 119–120
See also Internet
Mutual rescission, 172
Open assortment, 267
Open delivery, 267
N Open payment, 267
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Open price, 267
Laws, 8, 9, 233, 260, 261, 295 Open terms, 267
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 398 Open time, 267
514 Index
Opinion statements (puffing), 332 Period of minority, 85

Option contracts, 44–45, 268 Personal injury paralegals, job description
Oral contracts, 140, 141 of, 158–159
Original contracts, 143 Personal satisfaction test, 171
Output contracts, 72 Personal service contracts, 160
Physical duress, 127
P Possession of tangible token rule, 163
Packaging defects, 370–371 Preexisting duty, 69, 71
Paralegals, perspectives of Prenuptial agreements, 145
Alger, A., 30 Primary contracts, 143
Bartel, S. M., 75 Principal, defined, 390
Billieu, K., 186 Principal-agent relationship, 391, 392
Brinkman, H. F., 177 Privacy issues, Internet, 247
Bromark, R., 222 Private law, 4
Burnett, F., 274 Privity of contract, 158
Cain, R., 62 Pro bono, 129
Canny, C. D., 260 Product defects
Davis, C. L., 304 correction of, 375
Dietzel, A., 296 defined, 358
Evard, A. L., 4 in design, 360–364, 365–366
Gabbard, A., 214 in manufacture, 359–360
Gambill, S. M., 330 packaging, 370–371
Holman, N. H., 9 Product liability defenses
Kechter, P., 320 assumption of the risk, 374
Laquinta, C. A., 249 comparative fault, 376
Leeb, K. A., 402 contributory negligence, 376
Low, S. H., 44 generally known dangers, 374
Mers, T. D., 107 government contractor defense, 374
Powell, A., 344 lemon laws, 377
Rickard, L., 282 misuse of product, 375
Schmidt, D., 129 statute of limitations, 375–376
Spitzmiller, K. A., 138 statute of repose, 376
Spurgin, B., 84 supervening event, 375
Taylor, R. J., 377 Products liability
Turner, T. J., 116 crashworthiness doctrine, 364
Wallace, D., 158 defined, 352
Wallace, J., 352 failure to provide adequate instructions,
Wasil, K., 149 371–372
Williams, T. A., 384 failure to warn, 354–355, 364–365, 366–370
Parental liability for minor contracts, 88–89 misrepresentation, 355
Parol evidence, 148 negligence, 353–355
Parol evidence rule, 148–149, 271–272 punitive damages, 372–374
Part acceptance, 270 strict liability, 355–358
Partially disclosed agency, 393, 394 Professional misconduct, reporting, 250
Part performance, 141–142 Promisee, 165
Past consideration, 69–71 Promisor, 165
Payee, 385 Promissory estoppels, 73–74, 145–146
Payment, 310 Promissory notes, 152, 387–388, 389
Penalty, 198 Proper dispatch, 50
Perfect tender rule, 306–307 Property. See Real property
Performance Proposed additions, 269
assurance of, 318 Public policy, contracts contrary to, 97
breach of contract and, 187–191 Puffing (opinion statements), 332
complete, 186, 187–188, 189 Punitive damages, 211, 358, 372–374
conditions of, 169–172
course of, 272
discharge of, 172–176
Q
inferior, 186, 188–189 Quantum meruit, 210
specific, 74, 208–210, 211, 244, 315 Quasi-contracts
substantial, 186, 188, 189 case example, 18–19
tender of, 188, 238–239 defined, 18, 21, 210
Index 515
R to reclaim, 312
to recover damages, 313, 316–317
Railway Labor Act, 398 to recover goods from insolvent seller/lessor, 315
Ratification of contracts by minors, 87–88 to recover purchase price or rent, 313
Real property to reject nonconforming goods, 315
case example, 141–142 to replevy goods, 316
contracts involving, 140–141, 144–145 to stop delivery of goods, 311
defined, 140 to withhold delivery, 311
Reasonable person standard, 10 Right to cure, 243
Reasonable person test, 171 Risk
Reclamation, 312 See also Loss, risk of
Recognizances, 20 assumption of, and product liability, 374
Recovery Rove, K., 107
of damages, 313
of goods from insolvent seller/lessor, 315 S
of lost profits, 313
of purchase price or rent, 313 Sabbath (Sunday or blue) laws, 96–97
Reformation, 210, 211 Saladoff, S., 107
Regulatory statutes, 101 Sale, defined, 262
Rejection of nonconforming goods, 315 Sales contracts/sales
Rejection of offers, 41 acceptance, 268–270
Remedies Article 2, 8, 260, 262–265, 488
See also Monetary damages; Torts Article 6 (Bulk Sales), 295
agreements to, 319–320 compensatory damages for breach of, 194
for breach of licensing agreements, 242–247 conditional, 287–289
for breach of sales and lease contracts, 303–320 consideration, 268
enforcement of, 203 consignment, 288
engagement rings, 207 defined, 8
equitable, 74–75, 207–211 document of title, 284
rescission and restitution, 204–206 firm offer rule, 268
Remedies at law, 74 goods, defined, 262–263
Replevin, 316 goods, identification of, 283
Repudiation, anticipatory, 318 goods versus services, 263–264
Requirements contracts, 72 formation of, 259–275
Rescission international, 273–274
case example, 205–206 Internet, 273
defined, 74, 117, 204 merchant, defined, 265, 268
mutual, 172 mixed, 263
Respondeat superior, 23 by nonowners, 291–294
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 9, 145 offers, 266–268
Restatement of Torts, 357–358 on approval, 287
Restitution open terms, 267
defined, 74, 204 performance of, 281–298
minors and duty of, 85–87 remedies for breach of, 303–320
Restoration, minors and duty of, 85–87 returns, 287–288
Restraint of trade, contracts in, 101 risk of loss, breach of sales contract, 290
Revenue-raising statutes, 102 risk of loss, conditional sales, 287–289
Revised Article 2, 262 risk of loss, no breach of sales contract, 284–287
Revocation of acceptance, 310–311 sales, defined
Revocation of offers, 40–41 Section 201 of the UCC, 144
Rewards, 37 shipment and destination, 284, 285–286, 306
Rights Statute of Frauds, 270–272
assignment of, 159–163 title, passage of, 284, 294
beneficiaries, 165–168 warranties, 329–345
to cancel contracts, 313, 316 Sales law, contract law compared to, 272
covenants and conditions, 169–172 Sales of Goods Act, 260
to cover, 316 Satisfaction, 73, 173
delegation of duties, 163–164 Scienter, 128
discharge of performance, 172–176 Section 5, 273
to dispose goods, 312–313 Section 201 of the UCC, 144
of inspection, 309–310 Securities/municipal bonds paralegals, job description
to obtain specific performance, 315 of, 116–117
516 Index
Seller Third-party beneficiaries, 165–168

breaches, 290 Third-party rights. See Assignment of rights; Rights
lost volume, 314 Time notes, 388
Services, goods versus, 263–264 Title
Settlement of claims, 73 document of, 284
Shipment contracts, 284, 285, 306 passage of, 284, 294
Sight draft, 386 voidable, 291
Signatures warranties, 343–344
E-signatures, 232–233 Torts
in foreign countries, 150 bad faith, 212–213
Statute of Frauds and required, 147 defined, 211
Silence as acceptance, 48 intentional, 211–212
Silence as misrepresentation, 121 misrepresentation, 355
Small certificates of deposit (CDs), 388 negligence, 353–355
Software and E-licensing, 233–247 strict liability, 355–358
Software licenses, warranty disclaimers, 341–342 types of, 211
Solicitations, 345 Trust paralegals, job description of, 304
Special damages, 197
Specially manufactured goods, 270 U
Specific performance, 74, 208–210, 211, 244, 315
UCC. See Uniform Commercial Code
Standard form contracts (STCs), 6
Unconscionability, 105, 319
Standards of interpretation, 148
Unconscionable contracts
Statute of Frauds
defined, 84, 319
defined, 139
doctrine of unconscionability, 105, 319
exception to, 270–271
elements of, 105
form contracts, 144–145
imbalance of bargaining power, 106
guaranty contracts, 143
mandatory arbitration clauses and, 107
main purpose (leading object) exception, 144
Undisclosed agency, 393–394
one-year rule, 142–143
Undue influence, 126
parol evidence rule, 148–149, 271–272
Unenforceable contracts, 21
part performance, 141–142
Unequivocal acceptance, 46
promissory estoppels, 145–146
Unexpired leases (executory contracts), 21, 140
sales and leases and, 144, 270–272
bankruptcy and, 286–287
signature, required, 147
Unforeseen difficulties, 69
writing, formality of, 146–148
Unified Contract Law (UCL), 54
written confirmation rule, 271
Uniform Arbitration Act, 193
written contracts, requirements, 139–144
written modifications, 271
Article 2 (Sales), 8, 144, 260, 262–265, 488
Statute of limitations, 175–176, 318
Article 2A (Leases), 8–9, 260, 265–266, 488
product liability defense and, 375–376
Article 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 385
Statute of repose, 376
Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 20, 273–274
Stop delivery of goods, 311
Article 6 (Bulk Sales), 295
Strict liability, 355–358
defined, 8–9, 260
Subassignee, 159
description of, 261–266
Subsequent assignee, 159
firm offer rule, 268
Substantial performance, 186, 188, 189
locator links, 487
Substituted contract, 173
provisions of, 262, 487
Supervening event, 375
revisions, 488
Supervening illegality, 43, 44
Section 201 of, 144
Suppliers/vendors, 265
Statute of Frauds, 144, 270–272
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
T (UCITA), 9, 233
Taft-Hartley Act, 398 Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Technology Credits (UCP), 274
See also Internet Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), 233–234
acceptance and, 47–48 Uniform Sales Act, 260
offers and, 45 Unilateral contracts, 15, 21
Tender of delivery, 305 Unilateral mistakes, 117–119
Tender of performance, 188, 238–239 Unions, 397–398
Tender rule, perfect, 306–307 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Time draft, 386 Sale of Goods (CISG), 22, 295
Index 517
Usage of trade, 272 implied, of fitness for human consumption, 337–338

Usury laws, 96 implied, of informational content, 240
implied, of merchantability, 240, 335–337, 340
V limited, 342
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 342–343, 377
Valid contracts, 20, 21
of no infringements, 343
Voidable contracts, 20, 21
of no interference, 344
Voidable title, 291
of noninterference and noninfringement, 239
Void contracts, 20, 21
of no security interests, 343–344
Void title, 291
opinion statements (puffing), 332
sales and lease, 329–345
W title, 343–344
Wagner Act, 398 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 229
Warn, failure to, 354–355, 364–365, 366–370 World Wide Web (WWW), 224
Warranties Writing
against infringements, 344 a case briefing, 415–421
basis of the bargain, 332 clauses in, 148
damages for breach of, 334 formality of, 8, 146–148
defined, 330 integration of several writings, 147–148
disclaimers, 341–342 words/terms, interpreting, 148
express, 239–240, 331–332, 333–334, 340 Writ of attachment, 203
general disclaimers, 241 Writ of garnishment, 203
of good title, 343 Written confirmation rule, 271
implied, of fitness for a particular purpose, 240, 338–340 Written contracts, requirements, 139–144

Contract Law For Paralegals 2e 2013

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Contract Law For Paralegals 2e 2013

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Contract Law For Paralegals 2e 2013

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Contract Law for

Kathleen Mercer Reed

Photo Credits: Lucky Business/Shutterstock, p. 2; Scott Rothstein/fotolia, p. 28; George Doyle/Thinkstock,

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Reed, Kathleen Mercer.

ISBN 10: 0-13-510945-0

ABOUT THE BOOK

high-level critical thinking skills through a textbook containing paralegal practice

NEW TO THE SECOND EDITION

Hands-On Drafting Exercises

The Ethical Paralegal

Paralegal Portfolio Exercise

The Briefing the Case Writing Assignment presents another reinforce-

ADDITIONAL TEXTBOOK FEATURES

Resources for Instructors

Pearson MyTest Electronic Testing Program

HENRY R. CHEESEMAN is clinical professor of business law, director of the Legal

JOHN J. SCHLAGETER, III, is an associate lecturer at the University of Toledo in

To the Reviewers Who Provided Feedback for the

To the Reviewers of the First Edition of This Text

To Those Providing Invaluable Assistance

To Students in the University of Toledo Paralegal

Personal Acknowledgments from the Authors

CHAPTER 3 Consideration and Equity 61

CHAPTER 4 Capacity and Legality 83

CHAPTER 5 Genuineness of Assent 115

CHAPTER 6 Writing, Formality, and E-Commerce Signature Law 137

CHAPTER 7 Third-Party Rights and Discharge 157

CHAPTER 8 Remedies for Breach of Traditional and E-Contracts 185

CHAPTER 9 E-Contracts and Internet Law 221

Part II Domestic and International Sales and Lease Contracts 257

CHAPTER 11 Performance of Sales and Lease Contracts 281

CHAPTER 12 Remedies for Breach of Sales and Lease Contracts 303

CHAPTER 13 Sales and Lease Warranties 329

Part III Contract Relationships and Special Forms 349

CHAPTER 15 Special Forms of Contracts 383

List of Cases Reported 407

CHAPTER 3 Consideration and Equity 61

CHAPTER 4 Capacity and Legality 83

Are “Mandatory Arbitration” Clauses Unconscionable? 107

CHAPTER 5 Genuineness of Assent 115

CHAPTER 6 Writing, Formality, and E-Commerce Signature Law 137

Statute of Frauds 139

CHAPTER 7 Third-Party Rights and Discharge 157

Discharge by Impossibility 173

CHAPTER 8 Remedies for Breach of Traditional and E-Contracts 185

Chapter 8 Summary 214

CHAPTER 9 E-Contracts and Internet Law 221

Liquidation of Damages 244

Part II Domestic and International Sales and Lease Contracts 257

Written Confirmation Rule 271

CHAPTER 11 Performance of Sales and Lease Contracts 281

Internet Exercises and Case Questions 298

CHAPTER 12 Remedies for Breach of Sales and Lease Contracts 303

Case Scenario Revisited 324

CHAPTER 13 Sales and Lease Warranties 329

Part III Contract Relationships and Special Forms 349

Chapter Introduction 352

CHAPTER 15 Special Forms of Contracts 383