European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.

23, 77-87 (1993)

Processing load and memory for

stereotype-based information

C. NEIL MACRAE
University of Wales College of Cardiff, U.K.

MILES HEWSTONE
Universitat Mannheim, Germany

and

RIANA J. GRlFFlTHS
University of Wales College of Cardiff, U.K.

Abstract

The present research considered the efects of stereotypes on judgmental and memorial
processes. In particular, we investigated the heuristic utility of stereotype application
in dificult or demanding information-processing contexts. Our results supported the
prediction that stereotypical effects on memory are contingent upon the characteristics
of the task environment. Whereasperceivers displayedpreferential recallfor stereotype-
inconsistent information under low processing loads, this switched to a preference for
consistent information as task demands increased. Likewise, target-based judgments
were most stereotypic under high processing loads. Judgment-recall correlations sup-
ported the contention that, under high-loads, these inferences are related to the relative
memorability of stereotypic information. We consider thesefindings in the wider context
of stereotype-based effects on social cognition

INTRODUCTION

Social psychologists have long been interested in how stereotype-based beliefs affect
people’s memory for information. In particular, the equation of stereotypes with
cognitive schemata, structures influencing the encoding, representation, and retrieval
of information, provided a major impetus for this research (Hamilton, Sherman
and Ruvolo, 1990; Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Sherman, Judd and Park, 1989; Stangor

Addressee for correspondence: Neil Macrae, School of Psychology, University of Wales, College of Cardiff,
Cardiff, U.K.

0046-2772/93/010077-11$10.50 Received 28 January I992

0 1993 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 15 May 1992
78 C. N. Macrae, M. Hewstone and R. J. Grifiths

and McMillan, 1992). Surprisingly, therefore, until relatively recently the empirical
picture in this domain remained rather muddled. The problem, it would appear,
stemmed from the existence of seemingly inconsistent and contradictory findings
in the available literature. Sometimes it was argued that perceivers preferentially
recall stereotype-consistent information, while on other occasions inconsistent infor-
mation was claimed to be more readily retrieved from long-term memory (e.g. Bargh
and Thein, 1985; Belmore and Hubbard, 1987; Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985;Cantor
and Mischel, 1977; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Macrae and Shepherd, 1989; Rothbart,
Evans and Fulero, 1979).
To account for these contradictory findings, a wide range of explanatory mecha-
nisms have been evoked. These include: (i) type of memory probe utilized (Srull,
1984); (ii) strength of the expectancy effects (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Higgins and
Bargh, 1987; Stangor and Ruble, 1989); (iii) nature of the targets involved (Srull,
Lichtenstein and Rothbart, 1985); and (iv) nature of the informational inconsistency
(Wyer and Martin, 1986). Given the multiple determinants of stereotypic effects
on social memory, attention shifted to a more constrained analysis of the phenome-
non. Specifically, researchers attempted to identify the factors or conditions which
reliably produce preferential recall for either stereotype-consistent or inconsistent
information (e.g. Stangor and Duan, 1991; Stangor and Ruble, 1989). Continuing
in this spirit, we investigate the effects of cognitive busyness (i.e. concurrent mental
tasks - see Gilbert and Hixon, 1991) on people’s memory for stereotype-based
information.
As cognitive misers or mental sluggards, perceivers are presumed to activate and
apply stereotypes to simplify complex judgmental tasks and to facilitate information
processing in sub-optimal environments (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Indeed, across
a number of domains, a rapidly expanding literature testifies to the utility of this
conceptualization of stereotypes and their functional role in social cognition (e.g.
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985; Gilbert and
Hixon, 1991). Recently, Stangor and Duan (1991) extended this cognitive miser
approach to social memory in their attempts to develop our understanding of how
and when stereotypes affect memorial accuracy for stereotypic information. Their
predictions were quite straightforward: under conditions of high processing load
perceivers should display preferential recall for stereotype-consistent information.
Under low-loads, in contrast, a memorial advantage for inconsistent information
should be apparent. These predictions were derived, in part, from Srull and Wyer’s
(1989) model of person memory. The model asserts that preferential recall of expec-
tancy-incongruent information is a consequence of the elaboration this information
receives during processing. In their attempts to reconcile incongruent information
with an existing expectancy, perceivers allegedly think about the information more
‘deeply’. This process of inconsistency-resolution, in turn, fosters the formation of
associative links between items of information in long-term memory which, ulti-
mately, enhances the memorability of the information. Consider, for example, a
situation where a perceiver witnesses a Scotsman behaving in an unambiguously
counterstereotypic manner. Let’s say, for instance, the target is seen in a bar refusing
a whisky. According to the previous model, as the perceiver attempts to reconcile
this discrepant behaviour with his or her conception of Scotsmen, associative links
will be forged in memory between this action and other target-related behaviours
(e.g. playing the bagpipes); thereby rendering the discrepant item highly memorable.
 Stereotypes and memory 79

Inconsistency-resolutionis not, however, a particularly efficient process. The task

of reconciling discrepant behaviours with a pre-existing expectancy places heavy
demands on a limited pool of cognitive resources. Accordingly, when resources are
scarce the process should not occur and the relative memorial advantage for inconsis-
tent information should disappear (Hamilton, Driscoll and Worth, 1989; Srull et
al., 1985). Moreover, under conditions of high-load (i.e. diminished resources), one
might reasonably expect perceivers to preferentially recall stereotype-consistentinfor-
mation. Under these conditions the activated stereotype might function as a central,
simplifying theme facilitating the representation (and ultimately the recall) of stereo-
type-consistent information (Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987;Bodenhausen and
Wyer, 1985). In other words, when the information-processing going gets tough,
stereotypes (as heuristic structures) get going.
To investigate this possibility, Stangor and Duan (1991, Experiment 2) asked their
subjects to form impressions of two groups under either normal conditions (i.e.
low-load) or while distracted by a secondary task (i.e. high-load). In support of
their predictions, low-load resulted in the preferential recall of inconsistent infor-
mation and high-load the preferential recall of stereotype-consistent information
(see also Stangor and McMillan, 1992). As well as revealing the role of inconsistency-
resolution in the mediation of stereotype-based effects on memory, these findings
have a number of worrisome practical implications. Most notably, in effortful and
cognitively demanding social interactions, it would appear that stereotypical beliefs
are likely to be maintained or perpetuated through perceivers’ preferential recall
of confirming information. After all, if perceivers’ recollections of a Scotsman are
of an inebriated, bagpipe playing maniac, this information will do little to override
their pre-established stereotypic beliefs.
This latter assertion, of course, implicitly assumes some sort of relationship between
people’s judgments and recall. Specifically, that the utilization (hence maintenance)
of stereotypes might be related to the enhanced memorability of confirming infor-
mation in recall. While such a relationship is intuitively appealing, researchers have
consistently experienced difficulty in demonstrating its existence. In part, the appear-
ance of judgment-recall correlations seems to depend upon whether the judgment
is made on-line or is memory-based (Hastie and Park, 1986). When judgments are
computed on-line (i.e. as the stimulus information is processed), perceivers are
assumed to store them in memory quite separately from the information on which
they are based. Accordingly, when a judgment is requested, perceivers can indepen-
dently access it from memory without the necessity of considering the relevance
of other stored information (i.e. no judgment-recall correlation). For memory-based
tasks, in contrast, perceivers are typically required to furnish a judgment after the
stimulus information has been encountered and represented in memory. Unsurpris-
ingly, therefore, they tend to rely upon this information to compute the judgment
(i.e. judgment-recall correlation).
If stereotypes do indeed function as simplifying mental structures, then one might
reasonably expect to obtain judgment-recall correlations in situations where process-
ing demands are high. That is, through stereotype application, perceivers: (i) simplify
complex task domains; and (ii) base their subsequent judgments and evaluations
upon the products of this simplification process (i.e. the information stored in
memory). This, then, would reveal the heuristic utility of stereotypes in demanding
task environments. Not only do they simplify complex stimulus arrays, but they
80 C. N. Macrae, M. Hewstone and R. J. GrifJiths

also help to provide the raw materials for a range of subsequent social judgments.
Interestingly, Stangor and Duan (1991) failed to obtain significant judgment-recall
correlations in their study. As they admit, however, this was probably because their
subjects were forming judgments on-line. In their paradigm, at the outset, subjects
were requested to form an impression of the group. It seems likely that this instruction
would foster the on-line computation of socialjudgments. Of further concern, Stangor
and Duan noted that judgments and recall were differentially affected by their manipu-
lation of processing load. On the basis of these findings, then, an unequivocal specifi-
cation of the relationship between processing load, stereotype application, and
perceivers’ judgmental and memorial outcomes is rendered somewhat problematic.
In the present study, accordingly, we reinvestigate this potentially important issue.
Given the theoretical and practical significance of heuristic effects on social cogni-
tion, like Stangor and Duan (1991), we also investigate the effects of processing
load on the relative memorability of stereotype-based information. In the present
research, however, we make a number of methodological alterations to earlier work
in this domain. First, we utilize a dynamic stimulus presentation mode. That is,
subjects are shown a videotape of two women having a conversation (cf. Cohen,
1981) and their memory for the details of the conversation is assessed. This method
of stimulus presentation was selected for two main reasons: (i) within the constraints
of laboratory-based research, it captures everyday social interaction at its most realis-
tic; and (ii) it addresses Gilbert and Hixon’s (1991) criticism that social psychologists
are too eager to present subjects with written stimulus materials, describing meaning-
less targets, in their research. Second, unlike Stangor and Duan (1991), we utilize
naturalistic stereotypes in our study. Whereas they manipulated experimentally
created expectancies, we investigate the pre-existing stereotype-based beliefs that
subjects bring to the laboratory. One might reasonably question, after all, the equiva-
lence of transient, artificially induced beliefs and real world stereotypes which tend
to be characterized by their resistance to change or modification. Moreover, different
memorial and judgmental processes may be implicated in expectancy-formation and
expectancy-testing (see Higgins and Bargh, 1987). Third, and finally, we utilize a
different manipulation of processing load.
The reasoning behind these methodological changes was quite straightforward.
Given the undoubted significance of Stangor and Duan’s (1991) findings, we felt
it necessary to establish the generality of their effects utilizing real world stereotypes
and a different stimulus presentation mode. Successful replication would serve several
important functions: (i) it would testify to the robustness of the effect; and (ii) it
would reinforce the emerging conception of stereotypes as simplifying mental struc-
tures with all the resultant implications for social cognition that this implies. In
particular, it would reveal the role of memorial processes in the maintenance and
use of social stereotypes.
On the basis of previous research, we selected a digit rehearsal task as our resource
depleting manipulation (e.g. Gilbert and Hixon, 1991). This type of task has consis-
tently been shown to debilitate people’s processing capacity. Moreover, the experi-
mental introduction of a concurrent mental task usurping people’s mental resources
captures, in part, the complexity of everyday social behaviour. Inert and passive
social perceivers tend only to be found in psychology experiments. Everyday interac-
tion, in contrast, is typically characterized by perceivers’ involvement in a range
of concurrent (i.e. resource debilitating) tasks and activities. Thus, to understand
 Stereotypes and memory 81

how stereotypes influence social memory, we must investigate their effects under
conditions which attempt to simulate everyday interaction in all its complexity.
Accordingly, in our experiment, subjects viewed a conversation between two
women. Attention was focused on one of the women who, importantly, was described
as either a doctor or a hairdresser. With respect to the particular occupational prime
subjects were given, half of the target’s utterances and behaviours were stereotypic
and the others were counterstereotypic. In addition, half of the subjects viewed the
videotape while also engaging in a cognitively demanding digit rehearsal task (i.e.
high-load); the others simply viewed the videotape (i.e. low-load). On the basis of
previous research in this domain (see Stangor and Duan, 1991),we made the following
experimental predictions: (i) under low-load subjects will preferentially recall stereo-
type-inconsistent information; (ii) under high-load they will preferentially recall ster-
eotype-consistent information; and (iii) target-based judgments will be more
stereotypic under high than low processing loads.

METHOD

Subjects and design

Thirty-two undergraduate students of the University of Wales, College of Cardiff
participated in the study. The experiment had a 2 (prime: doctor/hairdresser) x
2 (load: highllow) x 2 (recall: consistenthnconsistent) mixed-design with repeated
measures on the last factor.

Stimulus materials and procedure

Subjects viewed, individually, a 7-minute videotape depicting a conversation between
two women. Importantly, only one of the women (i.e. experimental target) was in
the camera shot for the duration of the video and she answered a number of questions
which were posed by the other woman. Through her appearance, behaviour, and
answers to these questions the stereotypic information was conveyed to the subjects.
Essentially, the conversation revolved around the target’s lifestyle and interests. While
half of the information she conveyed was stereotype-consistent with regard to her
occupation (i.e. doctor or hairdresser); the other half was stereotype-inconsistent.
Importantly, subjects were given the occupational prime prior to watching the video.
To obtain the stimulus information, 10 independent subjects were asked to imagine
a typical young female doctor and hairdresser and to describe her appearance, life-
style, and background (see Cohen, 1981). On the basis of the items collected, a
questionnaire (containing 100 items) was constructed and given to a further 10 inde-
pendent subjects. These subjects had to rate (on 9-point scales anchored ‘not at
all likely’ to ‘very likely’) the extent to which the items were likely to be characteristic
of young female doctors and hairdressers. For example, how likely is it that doctors
(hairdressers) attend a disco every Friday night? From these ratings, 40 items were
selected for the experiment proper. Twenty items were stereotype-confirmingof doc-
tors but disconfirming of hairdressers; the other 20 items were stereotype-confirming
of hairdressers but disconfirming of doctors. For example, unlike hairdressers, young
female doctors: like cooking; are interested in politics; attend the opera and drive
around in fast cars. In contrast, hairdressers: enjoy discos; go to Spain on holiday;
82 C. N. Macrae, M.Hewstone and R. J. Grifiths

have chauvinistic boyfriends and like wearing short mini-skirts. All the selected items
were woven into a meaningful conversation between the two women. Thus, in the
video, the target conveyed information which was both stereotype-consistent and
-inconsistent with respect to the stereotypic beliefs associated with her occupation.
Before watching the video, half of the subjects (i.e. high-load) were given 25 seconds
to rehearse an 8-digit number. They were informed that upon completion of the
experiment they would be required to reproduce this number. Previous research
has consistently demonstrated that this task has a debilitating effect on people’s
processing resources. That is, throughout the experimental task they expend ‘on-line’
resources rehearsing the 8-digit number and this influences their allocation of attentio-
nal resources to the experiment proper.
After viewing the videotape, all subjects were given a 5-minute distractor task
where they were required to draw a floor-plan of their home (prior to the completion
of this task subjects in the high-load condition were required to reproduce the 8-digit
number). They were then given a sheet of paper and asked to recall, as best they
could, the conversation between the two women. Subjects were given as much time
as they required to complete this task. Upon its completion, they were requested
to estimate the extent to which 10 personality traits were characteristic of the target
(9-point scale, anchored 1 -‘not at all’ to 9 - ‘very well’). These traits were derived
from pilot testing: half of them being stereotypic of doctors but counterstereotypic
of hairdressers (i.e. intelligent, stable, cultured, responsible, caring); the others being
stereotypic of hairdressers but counterstereotypic of doctors (i.e. extroverted, con$-
dent, talkative, fashionable, attractive). Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.

RESULTS

Busyness manipulation
None of the subjects in the busyness condition made more than two errors when
reporting the 8-digit number (see Gilbert and Hixon, 1991). Consequently, the recall
data of all 16 subjects were included in the statistical analysis.

Each subject’s memory for the interaction was scored using a gist criterion. Standard
proportional scores were then calculated by dividing the number of consistent and
inconsistent items recalled by the total number of items in the stimulus set (i.e.
20 respectively). A 2 (prime) x 2 (load) X 2 (recall) mixed-model ANOVA was
performed on these data. The only significant effect to emerge from this analysis
was a load X recall interaction, F(1,28) = 13.63, p < 0.001. Subjects’ proportional
recall of the stereotype-based information is displayed in Figure 1 .
Simple effects analysis showed that, in the low-load condition, subjects recalled
significantly more inconsistent than consistent information, F( 1,28) = 7.3 1, p c 0.02
(respective means; 0.55 versus 0.46). In the high-load condition, in contrast, signifi-
 Stereotypes and memory 83

-
6
0
a

H inconsistent

Lord
Figure 1. Subjects’recall of stereotype-basedinformation

cantly more consistent than inconsistent information was recalled, F(1,28) = 6.34,
p < 0.02 (respectivemeans; 0.48 versus 0.39).

Trait judgments
The dependent measure we submitted to statistical analysis was an index of the
stereotypicality of subjects’target-based judgments. This was computed in the follow-
ing manner. First, we calculated subjects’ mean ratings on the five stereotypical
and counterstereotypical traits. Second, we subtracted their mean ratings on the
counterstereotypic traits from their ratings on the stereotypic traits. Thus, for each
subject, we derived a single measure of the stereotypicality of their judgments (i.e.
negative values refer to an overall counterstereotypic evaluation, positive values to
a stereotypic evaluation). A 2 (prime) X 2 (load) between-subjects ANOVA was
carried out on these data and revealed a main effect of load on subjects’ evaluations,
F(1,28) = 9.72, p < 0.005. Target-based evaluations were more stereotypic under high
than low processing loads (means;high = 2.04, low = 0.73).

Judgment-recall correlations
To assess the relationship between judgment and recall, the index of judgmental
stereotypicality was correlated with an index of stereotypical memory. This latter
index was similar to the former, except a correction was made for the total number
of items subjects’ recalled. The formula was as follows: recall(consistent - inconsis-
+
tent/recall(consistent inconsistent). Thus, a positive value signified greater recall
84 C. N. Macrae, M. Hewstone and R. J. GrifJiths

of consistent information, a negative value greater recall of inconsistent information.

Separate intercorrelations between the two indices were then computed for subjects
under each of the processing loads. This revealed a significantcorrelation for subjects
in the high-load condition, r = 0.463, p < 0.05 (low-load, r = 0.232, ns). That is, in
the high-load condition, the more stereotypic subjects’recall, the more category-based
their evaluations of the targets.

DISCUSSION

The present results provide further empirical evidence for the heuristic utility of
social stereotypes in difficult or demanding information-processing contexts (Boden-
hausen and Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985; Gilbert and Hixon,
1991; Stangor and Duan, 1991). When a need for simplification is created through
the introduction of mentally debilitating concurrent tasks, stereotypes facilitate the
representation and retrieval of confirming information (Stangor and Duan, 1991).
Moreover, this would appear to be a relatively robust finding. The present results
replicated those of Stangor and Duan despite the utilization of a completely different
experimental paradigm. Perceivers, it would appear, only preferentially recall stereo-
type-inconsistent information when available resources can drive a process of ‘incon-
sistency-resolution’. Remove this process (through the depletion of cognitive
resources) and they switch instead to the preferential recall of confirming information
(see Figure 1).
These findings are interesting for a number of reasons. First, several theorists
have suggested that preferential recall for incongruent information is only likely
to occur when initial group-based expectancies are being formed; when established
expectancies are implicated, preferential memory for congruent information should
be apparent (see Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Stangor and Ruble, 1989). The present
results, however, do not completely support this view. When established expectancies
were manipulated, and perceivers had sufficient resources available to drive the pro-
cess of inconsistency-resolution, a memorial advantage for incongruent information
accrued. Second, given the demands of everyday interaction, it would appear that
perceivers are naturally predisposed to recall information which is consistent with
the implications of the activated stereotype.
As predicted, subjects’judgments were more stereotypic under high than low pro-
cessing loads, replicating previous research in this area (Bodenhausen and Lichten-
stein, 1987; Gilbert and Hixon, 1991; Pratto and Bargh, 1991). Gilbert and Hixon
(1991), for instance, recently demonstrated that cognitive busyness increases the likeli-
hood that stereotypic beliefs will intrude upon people’s decision processes. Their
subjects (busy or non-busy) listened to a description of a woman’s (Asian or Cauca-
sian) rather trivial life events. Their task was then to rate her on a series of stereotypic
and non-stereotypic trait dimensions. As expected, busy subjects made more stereoty-
pic ratings of the Asian target. Comparable effects were obtained in the present
study. In addition, however, we identified a possible mechanism through which these
judgmental biases may operate. When processing demands are high, stereotypes oper-
ate as simplifying themes, facilitating the representation of consistent information
in memory (see Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985). The enhanced memorability of this
information, in turn, is reflected in perceiver’s target-based judgments. Judgment-
 Stereotypes andmemory 85

recall correlations demonstrated that the more stereotypic subjects’ recollections,

the more category-based their subsequent evaluations of the target. Under low pro-
cessing loads, in contrast, judgments and recall were not significantly correlated.
This suggests that perceivers make greater use of the target-based information in
memory when it has been encountered in difficult processing contexts.’
The magnitude of stereotypic effects on judgmental processes, then, may ultimately
depend upon the characteristics of the task environment. When cognitive resources
are depleted, heuristic processes are instigated, resulting in the magnification of ster-
eotype-based judgmental biases. In the present study, even subjects in the low-load
condition tended to evaluate the targets stereotypically.Introducing a resource deplet-
ing concurrent task simply exacerbated this effect. Given the effortful nature of every-
day interactions, these findings raise some troubling issues for psychologists and
social legislators interested in stereotype change. In demanding social interactions,
cognitive processes seem to be facilitating the maintenance and perpetuation of social
stereotypes. That is, the enhanced recall of consistent information and the resultant
effects this has on target-based evaluations, provide yet another barrier to the attenua-
tion of stereotype-based beliefs. While seeminglypessimistic, these findings are largely
consistent with an emerging conception of the functional role of stereotypes in social
cognition (see Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). As simplifying mental struc-
tures, stereotypes guide information processing and response generation in difficult
or demanding task environments.
This, of course, raises a rather fundamental question: why do stereotypes function
in this manner? One possible solution, consistent with related theorizing in this
domain, implies that human inferential systems have simply evolved in this manner
(see Gilbert, 1989). A legacy of evolutionary processes, for example, would be a
cognitive system that: (i) comprises relatively rigid and inflexible mental structures
(i.e. schemata); and (ii) implements stereotypical thinking when processing resources
are scarce. It is rather fortuitous that pre-existing mental structures are highly resistant
to modification or change. Perceivers continually strive to impose order, stability,
and meaning on a social world characterized by flux and change (Heider, 1958).
The development and maintenance of relatively rigid, inflexible mental structures
(e.g. stereotypes) undoubtedly facilitates this process. Were schematic beliefs to be
overridden with consummate ease, then their utility as cognitive structures guiding
and shaping information-processing would disappear. In addition, the implemen-
tation of stereotypical thinking under conditions of resource depletion has some
obvious processing advantages. Most notably, ‘inferences can be made cheaply and
quickly’ (Gilbert, 1989, p. 208). Within this cognitive miser perspective, then, stereo-
types afford perceivers the luxury of constructing an abbreviated, though sometimes
erroneous, conception of social reality.
In sum, the present results replicate and extend earlier research in this domain
and provide further empirical evidence for the heuristic properties of social stereo-
types in difficult or demanding information-processing contexts. While serving a

’ It must be acknowledged that, although highly plausible, the present explanation is not the only one
that might underlie the present effect. It is possible that a third variable, namely the stereotype as a
‘cognitive simplifier’, may influence both judgments and recall, but only under adverse processing con-
ditions. This interpretation would be consistent with the theoretical claim that stereotypes not only simplify
judgmental inferences, but also guide recall of specific attributes (e.g. Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull,
1984).
86 C. N . Macrae, M . Hewstone and R. J. Grifiths

valuable cognitive function, stereotypes nonetheless seem to play a critical role in

the moderation and causation of judgmental and memorial biases. Notwithstanding
the often pernicious consequences of these effects, a complete understanding of stereo-
typing can only be obtained through a consideration of the origins and development
of an inferential system which sustains this mode of thought. In the years ahead
researchers will doubtless begin to address this issue.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Klaus Fiedler, Chuck Stangor, and several anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. This
research was supported, in part, by ESRC grant ROO0232423 (Cognitive processes
in stereotype formation) to Miles Hewstone.

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