Water Infrastructure Case Neg - Michigan7 2021

***water neg – infrastructure – preseason
**case
1nc – recovery advantage
1. Their lead deaths study is bad
Belluz 18 (Julia, Vox's senior health correspondent. March 30. https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2018/3/15/171079lead24/lead-health-adults-heart-problems)
Still, this was an observational study, which can only tell us about relationships between phenomena,
and not whether one caused the other. And at least one important potential confounding factor was
overlooked, said Stephen Lim, director of science at the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation,
which measures health effects of lead exposure on blood pressure and cardiovascular disease globally.
Lead is correlated with other known risk factors for cardiovascular disease — most importantly, that
lead exposure tends to be higher in lower-income communities like Flint, Lim said. “[They] did not
control for community-level socioeconomic factors, and as a result, the magnitude of the effect found in
the study may be confounded by the relationship of higher lead exposure in lower socioeconomic
communities.” And it’s possible this might have exaggerated the magnitude of lead’s effects on heart
health.
“That lead increases the risk of cardiovascular disease is not surprising, [but] what is surprising is the
magnitude of the effect,” Lim said.
“Today, lead exposure is much lower because of regulations banning the use of lead in petrol, paints,
and other consumer products, so the number of deaths from lead exposure will be lower in younger
generations,” Lanphear said.
Landrigan suggested that blood lead testing should become the norm in adult medicine the way
pediatricians now often screen children for lead exposure.
Flint’s Hanna-Attisha said the study should be further fuel for policymakers working to eliminate lead
exposures from our environment. “We spend billions each year treating cardiovascular disease —
medications, hospitalizations, procedures — yet with lead elimination, we know how to prevent a
portion of this health burden, not even considering preventing all the other evils of lead exposure,” she
said.
There are many ways the EPA and federal regulators can continue to reduce people’s lead exposure,
Lanphear said, by enforcing stricter standards on allowable levels of lead in the air, water, dust, and soil.
EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt has declared a “war on lead” in drinking water in the wake of the Flint
water crisis, but the agency has dragged its feet on new regulations for lead in paint.
“Ongoing sources... need to be phased out, remediated, or banned,” Lanphear said, adding that
manufacturers should further reduce lead levels in foods, drinks, and cosmetics.
With limited treatments available for lead, he emphasized, “the ideal solution is prevention.”
2. Aff can’t solve polarization- takes too long and their ev isn’t reverse causal
3. Water not key to lead poisoning
Zarracina 16 (Javier, Graphics Editor, Vox. February 19. "How lead can get into the water supply,
explained in 5 charts" https://www.vox.com/2016/2/19/10972256/the-visual-guide-to-lead-poisoning)
5) Water is not the main cause of lead poisoning overall
Lead in the drinking water is one of the contributors to the total lead exposure, but the main cause of
chronic lead poisoning is lead-based paint in old homes. When the paint deteriorates, it breaks in little
chips that mix with household dust and can be inhaled or ingested.
There are other causes — like painted toys, some cosmetics, and pottery. The EPA has a list of lead
exposure causes here.
4. The aff can’t solve polarization globally- makes the WEF impact inevitable
5. Water not key to regional decline

Bash et al 20 (Rachel Bash, Walker Grimshaw, Kat Horan, Ruby Stanmyer, Simon Warren, (Master of
Environmental Management students at Duke University’s Nicholas School) and Lauren Patterson
(Senior Policy Associate in the Water Policy Program at the Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy
Solutions.) "Addressing Financial Sustainability of Drinking Water Systems with Declining Populations
Lessons from Pennsylvania" October. Duke Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions.
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Addressing-Financial-Sustainability-
of-Drinking-Water-Systems-with-Declining-Populations.pdf)
Despite attractive rates, large industrial customers have continued to leave each of the four Focus
Systems. This continued loss of industry likely indicates economic factors at play beyond water rates.
Raising rates for industrial and commercial customers would generate more revenue than similarly
raising rates for residential customers; however, shrinking cities may not want to risk contributing to
industry loss by increasing these rates substantially. Unfortunately, the decision to keep rates low for
larger water users effectively passes the costs of the water system to residential customers.
6. Econ about to boom- 17 reasons

Irwin 3/13 (Neil, senior economics correspondent for The Upshot.. 17 Reasons to Let the Economic
Optimism Begin. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/13/upshot/economy-optimism-boom.html)
But strange as it may seem in this time of pandemic, I’m starting to get optimistic . It’s an odd feeling, because so many people are
suffering — and because for so much of my career, a gloomy outlook has been the correct one.
Predictions are a hard business, of course, and much could go wrong that makes the decades ahead as bad as, or worse than, the recent past. But this
optimism is not just about the details of the new pandemic relief legislation or the politics of the
moment. Rather, it stems from a diagnosis of three problematic mega-trends, all related .
There has been a dearth of economy-altering innovation, the kind that fuels rapid growth in the
economy’s productive potential. There has been a global glut of labor because of a period of rapid
globalization and technological change that reduced workers’ bargaining power in rich countries. And
there has been persistently inadequate demand for goods and services that government policy has
unable to fix.
There is not one reason, however, to think that these negative trends have run their course . There are
17.
1. The ketchup might be ready to flow
In 1987, the economist Robert Solow said, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” Companies were making great use of rapid
improvements in computing power, but the overall economy wasn’t really becoming more productive.
This analysis was right until it was wrong. Starting around the mid-1990s, technological innovations in supply chain management and factory production enabled
companies to squeeze more economic output out of every hour of work and dollar of capital spending. This was an important reason for the economic boom of the
late 1990s.
The Solow paradox, as the idea underlying his quote would later be called, reflected an insight: An innovation, no matter how revolutionary, will often have little
effect on the larger economy immediately after it is invented. It often takes many years before businesses figure out exactly what they have and how it can be used,
and years more to work out kinks and bring costs down.
In the beginning, it may even lower productivity! In the 1980s, companies that tried out new computing technology often needed to employ new armies of
programmers as well as others to maintain old, redundant systems.
But once such hurdles are cleared, the innovation can spread with dizzying speed.
It’s like the old ditty: “Shake and shake the ketchup bottle. First none will come and then a lot’ll.”
Or, in a more formal sense, the economists Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock and Chad Syverson call this the
“productivity J-curve,” in which an
important new general-purpose technology — they use artificial intelligence as a contemporary example — initially depresses apparent
productivity, but over time unleashes much stronger growth in economic potential. It looks as if companies have
been putting in a lot of work for no return, but once those returns start to flow, they come faster than
once seemed imaginable.
There are several areas where innovation seems to be at just such a point, and not just artificial
intelligence.
2. 2020s battery technology looks kind of like 1990s microprocessors
Remember Moore’s Law? It was the idea that the number of transistors that could be put on an integrated circuit would double every two years as manufacturing
technology improved. That is the reason you may well be wearing a watch with more computer processing power than the devices that sent people into outer space
in the 1960s.
Battery technology isn’t improving at quite that pace, but it’s not far behind it. The price of lithium-ion battery packs has fallen 89 percent in inflation-adjusted
terms since 2010, according to BloombergNEF, and is poised for further declines. There have been similar advances in solar cells, raising the prospect of more
widespread inexpensive clean energy.
Another similarity: Microprocessors and batteries are not ends unto themselves, but rather technologies that enable lots of other innovation. Fast, cheap computer
chips led to software that revolutionized the modern economy; cheap batteries and solar cells could lead to a wave of innovation around how energy is generated
and used. We’re only at the early stages of that process.
Keep up with the new Washington — get live updates on politics.

3. Emerging innovations can combine in unexpected ways
In the early part of the 20th century, indoor plumbing was sweeping the nation. So was home electricity. But the people installing those pipes and those power lines
presumably had no idea that by the 1920s, the widespread availability of electricity and free-flowing water in homes would enable the adoption of the home
washing machine, a device that saved Americans vast amounts of time and backbreaking labor.
It required not just electricity and running water, but also revolutions in manufacturing techniques, production and distribution. All those innovations combined to
make domestic life much easier.
Could a combination of technologies now maturing create more improvement in living standards than any of them could in isolation?
Consider driverless cars and trucks. They will rely on long-building research in artificial intelligence software, sensors and batteries. After years of hype, billions of
dollars in investment, and millions of miles of test drives, the possibilities are starting to come into view.
Waymo, a sister company of Google, has opened a driverless taxi service to the public in the Phoenix suburbs. Major companies including General Motors, Tesla and
Apple are in the hunt as well, along with many smaller competitors.
Apply the same logic to health care, to warehousing and heavy industry, and countless other fields. Inventions maturing now could be combined in new ways we
can’t yet imagine.
4. The pandemic has taught us how to work remotely
Being cooped up at home may pay some surprising economic dividends . As companies and workers have learned how to
operate remotely, it could allow more people in places that are less expensive and that have fewer high-paying
jobs to be more productive. It could enable companies to operate with less office space per employee, which in economic terms means less capital
needed to generate the same output. And it could mean a reduction in commuting time.
Even after the pandemic recedes, if only 10 percent of office workers took advantage of more remote work, that would have big implications for the United States’
economic future — bad news if you are a landlord in an expensive downtown perhaps, but good news for overall growth prospects.
5. Even Robert Gordon is (a little) more optimistic!
Mr. Gordon wrote the book on America’s shortfall in innovation and productivity in recent decades — a 784-page book in 2016, to be precise. Now Mr. Gordon, a
Northwestern University economist, is kind of, sort of, moderately optimistic. “I would fully expect growth in the decade of the 2020s to be higher than it was in the
2010s, but not as fast as it was between 1995 and 2005,” he said recently.
6. Crises spur innovation
The mobilization to fight World War II was a remarkable feat. Business and government worked together to drastically increase the productive capacity of the
economy, put millions to work, and advance countless innovations like synthetic rubber and the mass production of aircraft.
Similarly, the Cold War generated a wave of public investment and innovation, such as satellites (a byproduct of the space race) and the internet (originally intended
to provide decentralized communication in the event of a nuclear attack).
Could our current crises spur similar ambition? Already the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the
usage of mRNA technology for creating new vaccines, which could have far-reaching consequences for
preventing disease.
And as the 2020s progress, the deepening sense of urgency to reduce carbon emissions and cope with
the fallout of climate change is the sort of all-encompassing challenge that could prove as galvanizing as
those experiences — with similar implications for investment and innovation .
7. Tight labor markets spur innovation, too
Why did the Industrial Revolution begin in Britain instead of somewhere else? One theory is that relatively high wages there (a result of international trade) created
an urgency for firms to substitute machinery for human labor. Over time, finding ways to do more with fewer workers generated higher incomes and living
standards.
But why might the labor market of the 2020s be a tight one? It boils down to two big ideas: shifts
in the global economy and
demographics that make workers scarcer in the coming decade than in recent ones; and a newfound
and bipartisan determination on the part of policymakers in Washington to achieve full employment.
8. There’s only one China
Imagine an isolated farm town with 100 people.
Five of the 100 own the farms. An additional 10 act as managers on behalf of the owners. And there are five intellectuals who sit around thinking big thoughts. The
other 80 people are laborers.
What would happen if suddenly another 80 laborers showed up, people who were used to lower living standards?
The intellectuals might tell a complex story about how the influx of labor would eventually make everyone better off, as more land was cultivated and workers could
specialize more. The owners and their managers would be happy because they would be instantly richer (they could pay people less to plow the fields).
But the existing 80 laborers — competing for their jobs with an influx of lower-paid people — would see only immediate pain. The long-term argument that
everybody gets richer in the end wouldn’t carry much weight.
That’s essentially what has happened in the last few decades as

China has gone from being isolated to being deeply integrated
in the world economy. When the country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, its population of 1.28 billion was bigger than that of the
combined 34 advanced countries that make up the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1.16 billion).
But that
was a one-time adjustment, and wages are rising rapidly in China as it moves beyond low-end
manufacturing and toward more sophisticated goods . India, the only other country with comparable population, is already well
integrated into the world economy. To the degree globalization continues, it should be a more gradual process.
9. There’s only one Mexico
For years, American workers were also coming into competition with lower-earning Mexicans after enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement in
1994. As with China, the new dynamic improved the long-term economic prospects for the United States, but in the short run it was bad for many American factory
workers.
But it too was a one-time adjustment . Even before President Trump, trade agreements under negotiation were for the most part no longer
focused on making it easier to import from low- labor-cost countries. The main aim was to improve trade rules for American companies doing business in other rich
countries.
10. The offshoring revolution is mostly played out
Once upon a time, if you were an American company that needed to operate a customer service call center or carry out some labor-intensive information
technology work, you had no real choice but to hire a bunch of Americans to do it. The emergence of inexpensive, instant global telecommunication changed that,
allowing you to put work wherever costs were the lowest.
In the first decade of the 2000s, American companies did just that on mass scale, locating work in countries like India and the Philippines. It’s a slightly different
version of the earlier analogy involving the farm; a customer service operator in Kansas was suddenly in competition with millions of lower-earning Indians for a job.
But it’s not as if the internet can be invented a second time.
Sensing a theme here? In the early years of the 21st century, a combination of globalization and technological advancements put American workers in competition
with billions of workers around the world.
It created a dynamic in which workers had less bargaining power, and companies could achieve cost savings not by creating more innovative ways of doing things
but exploiting a form of labor cost arbitrage. That may not be the case in the 2020s.
11. Baby boomers can’t work forever
The surge of births that took place in the two decades after World War II created a huge generation with long-reaching consequences for the economy. Now, their
ages ranging from 57 to 76, the baby boomers are retiring, and that means opportunity for the generations that came behind them.
Frequently Asked Questions About the New Stimulus Package
How big are the stimulus payments in the bill, and who is eligible?
The stimulus payments would be $1,400 for most recipients. Those who are eligible would also receive an identical payment for each of their children. To qualify for
the full $1,400, a single person would need an adjusted gross income of $75,000 or below. For heads of household, adjusted gross income would need to be
$112,500 or below, and for married couples filing jointly that number would need to be $150,000 or below. To be eligible for a payment, a person must have a
Social Security number. Read more.
What would the relief bill do about health insurance?
What would the bill change about the child and dependent care tax credit?
What student loan changes are included in the bill?
What would the bill do to help people with housing?
As the boomers seek to continue consuming — spending their amassed savings, pensions and Social Security benefits — there will be relatively stable demand for
goods and services and a relatively smaller pool of workers to produce them.
According to the Social Security Administration’s projections of the so-called “dependency ratio,” in 2030 for every 100 people in their prime working years of 20 to
64, there will be 81 people outside that age range. In 2020 that number was 73.
That is bad news for public finances and for the headline rate of G.D.P. growth, but good news for those in the work force. It should give workers more leverage to
demand raises and give employers incentives to invest in productivity-enhancing software or machinery.
12. The millennials are entering their prime
Spending has a life cycle. Young adults don’t make much money. As they age, they start to earn more. Many start families and begin spending a lot more, buying
houses and cars and everything else it takes to raise children. Then they tend to cut back on spending as the kids move out of the house.
That, anyway, is what the data says takes place on average. The rate of consumption spending soars for Americans in their 20s and 30s, and peaks sometime in their
late 40s. It’s probably not a coincidence that some of the best years for the American economy in recent generations were from 1983 to 2000, when the ultra-large
baby boom generation was in that crucial high-spending period.
Guess what generation is in that life phase in the 2020s? The millennials, an even larger generation than the boomers.
They’ve had a rough young adulthood, starting their careers in the shadow of the Great Recession. But all that adult-ing they’re starting to do could have big,
positive economic consequences for the decade ahead.
13. Everybody likes it hot
Twelve years ago, a Democratic president took office at a time of economic crisis. He succeeded at ending the crisis, but the expansion that followed was a
disappointment, with years of slow growth at a time millions were either unemployed or out of the work force entirely.
The overwhelming tone of the economic policy discussion during those years, however, was different.
President Obama spoke of his plans to reduce the budget deficit. Republicans in Congress demanded
even more fiscal restraint. Top Federal Reserve officials fretted about inflation risks, even when
unemployment was high and inflation persistently low .
The Trump presidency changed

that discussion. Even as tax cuts widened the budget deficit, interest rates
stayed low. Even as the jobless rate fell to levels not seen in nearly five decades, inflation stayed low . It
was evident, based on how the economy performed in 2018 and 2019, and up until the pandemic began, that the U.S. economy could run hotter than the Obama-
era consensus seemed to allow. That insight has powerful implications for the 2020s.
14. Joe Biden wants to let it rip
President Biden and congressional Democrats were determined to learn the lessons of the Obama era. Mr. Biden was deeply involved in that stimulus plan, which
proved inadequate to the task of creating and sustaining a robust recovery.
The lesson that Mr. Biden and the Democratic Party took from 2009 was straightforward: Do whatever it takes to get the economy humming, and the politics will
work in your favor.
That thinking helped lead to the $1.9 trillion relief bill signed on Thursday.
15. Jay Powell wants to let it rip
“To call something hot, you need to see heat,” Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said in 2019. That’s as good a summary of the Fed’s approach to the economy
as any.
In more formal terms, the

Fed has a new framework for policy called “Flexible Average Inflation Targeting.” It is
in effect a repudiation of past Fed strategies of pre-emptively slowing the economy to prevent an
outbreak of inflation predicted by economic models .
Now, the Fed says it will raise interest rates in response to actual inflation in the economy, not just forecasts, and will not act simply because the unemployment
rate is lower than models say it can sustainably get.
Nearly every time he speaks, Mr. Powell sounds like a true believer in the church of full employment.
16. Republicans are getting away from austerity politics
Consider an event that took place less than three months ago (that may feel like three years ago): Overwhelming bipartisan majorities in Congress passed a $900
billion pandemic relief bill. Then a Republican president threatened to veto it, not because it was too generous, but because it was too stingy.
President Trump didn’t get his way on increasing $600 payments to most Americans to $2,000 payments, and he signed the legislation anyway, grudgingly. But the
episode reflects a shift away from the focus on fiscal austerity that prevailed in the Obama era.
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With the current stimulus bill, opposition in conservative talk radio was relatively muted. Republicans voted against it, but there hasn’t been quite the fire-and-
brimstone sense of opposition evident toward the Obama stimulus a dozen years ago.
As the party becomes more focused on the kinds of culture-war battles that Mr. Trump made his signature, and its base shifts away from business elites, it wouldn’t
be surprising if we saw the end of an era in which cutting government spending was its animating idea. This would imply a U.S. government that aims to keep
flooding the economy with cash no matter who wins the next few elections.
17. The post-pandemic era could start with a bang
The last year has been terrible on nearly every level. But it’s easy to see the potential for the economy
to burst out of the starting gate like an Olympic sprinter .
That could have consequences beyond 2021. A rapid start to the post-pandemic economy could create a virtuous cycle in which consumers spend; companies hire
and invest to fulfill that demand; and workers wind up having more money in their pockets to consume even more.
Americans have saved an extra $1.8 trillion during the pandemic, reflecting government help and lower
spending. That is money that people can spend in the months ahead, or it could give them a comfort
level that they have adequate savings and can spend more of their earnin gs.
Things are also primed for a boom time in the executive suite. C.E.O.
confidence is at a 17-year high, and near-record stock
market valuations imply that companies have access to very cheap capital. There is no reason corporate
America can’t hire, invest and expand to take advantage of the post-pandemic surge in activity .
And on a psychological level, doesn’t everybody desperately want to return to feeling a sense of joy, of
exuberance? That is an emotion that could prove the most powerful economic force of them all .
Economics may be a dismal science, and those of us who write about it are consigned to see what is broken in the world. But sometimes, things
align in
surprising ways, and the result is a period in which things really do get better. This is starting to look like
one of those times.
1nc – waterworld advantage
1. Water scarcity good
Waslekar 17 (Sundeep, President of Strategic Foresight Group, a think-tank based in India that advises
governments and institutions around the world on managing future challenges. Philosophy, Politics and
Economics (PPE) at St. John's College of the Oxford University on the Oxford JCR Scholarship. He was
conferred D. Litt. (Honoris Causa) of Symbiosis International University, by the President of India in 2011.
He was elected as Senior Research Fellow of the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts at
Harris Manchester College of Oxford University in 2014. faculty at World Economic Forum annual
meetings at Davos and a senior executive at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, Stockholm. "Wars will not be fought over water – our thirst could pave the way to peace"
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jan/19/water-wars-
infrastructure-isis-peace)
The changing of the guard on the 38th floor of the United Nations has taken place at a time when
notions about peace and conflict undergo a subtle change. In particular, the role of resources –
especially water – is getting the recognition it deserves, as António Guterres takes over from Ban Ki-
moon as UN secretary general.
This recognition has been a long time coming. Both Ban and his predecessor, Kofi Annan, have argued
for decades that protecting and sharing natural resources, particularly water, is critical to peace and
security. But it was not until last November that the issue gained widespread acknowledgement, when
Senegal – that month’s UN security council president – held the UN’s first official debate on water,
peace and security.
Open to all UN member states, the debate brought together representatives from 69 governments.
Together they called for water to be transformed from a potential source of crisis into an instrument of
peace and cooperation. A few weeks later, Guterres appointed Amina Mohammed, Nigeria’s former
environment minister, as his deputy secretary general.
The growing recognition of water’s strategic relevance reflects global developments. In the last three
years, the Islamic State (Isis) captured the Tabqa, Tishrin, Mosul and Fallujah dams on the Tigris–
Euphrates river system. Isis subsequently lost control of all of the dams, but not before using them to
flood or starve downstream populations, to pressure them to surrender.
The importance of water in the 21st century – comparable to that of oil in the 20th – can hardly be
overstated
Many analysts hope Isis will finally be eliminated from Iraq and Syria in the next few months, but that
does not mean that the group will disband. On the contrary, it may well relocate to the border areas
between Libya and Chad, putting west African cities and water installations at risk.
This tactic is not exclusive to Isis. Extremist groups in South Asia have also threatened to attack water
infrastructure, and state actors, too, can use water resources to .
The importance of water in the 21st century – comparable to that of oil in the 20th – can hardly be
overstated, yet some strategic experts continue to underestimate it. The reality is that oil has
alternatives, such as natural gas, wind, solar and nuclear energy. But for industry and agriculture, and for
drinking and sanitation, there is no alternative to water.
The same is true for trade. Consider the Chagres river. It may not be widely known, but it is vitally
important as it feeds the Panama Canal, through which 50% of trade between Asia and the Americas
flows. There is no risk of the river naturally depleting for the next hundred years, but in the event of a
security crisis in central America, it could be taken over by rogue forces. The impact on the global
economy would be enormous.
The consensus on the need to protect water resources and installations in conflict zones is clear. What is
less clear is how to do it. Unlike medicines and food packets, water cannot be airdropped into conflict
zones, and UN peacekeeping forces are overstretched.
The International Committee of the Red Cross does negotiate safe passages for technicians to inspect
and repair damage to water pipes and storage systems in Iraq, Syria and the Ukraine. But each passage
must be negotiated with governments in conflict and rebel commanders – a long and cumbersome
process. A better approach would be for great powers, with their considerable influence, to negotiate
short-term ceasefires in areas experiencing protracted conflict, specifically to repair and restore water
systems.
To pave the way for such an approach, however, the UN security council will have to declare water a
“strategic resource of humanity” and adopt a resolution to protect water resources and installations,
similar to Resolution 2286 to protect medical facilities in armed conflicts.
In the longer term, countries that share riparian systems will need to establish regional security
arrangements to preserve and protect their resources. With collaborative management underpinning
collective protection, water – often a source of competition and conflict – could become a facilitator of
peace and cooperation.
The president of the Republic of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, is at the forefront of this movement.
He is leading a group of eight governments toward the establishment of the Blue Fund for the Congo
Basin. If successful, the fund will help to mitigate climate change, create new avenues of river-based
employment, and promote collective security in an unstable region. The Africa Action Summit in
Marrakech two months ago described the fund as one of four key ideas that can transform the
continent.
On World Water Day last year, Jordan’s Prince Hassan bin Talal and I called for the establishment of a .
The Blue Fund for the Congo Basin is a step in that direction. Now we need similar funds to protect all of
the world’s 263 shared river basins and lakes. It is a huge challenge, but given the power of water to sow
conflict and support peace, we must confront it head-on.
2. No modelling- their ev is aspirational, doesn’t say countries will spend on their

own infrastructure just because the US does
3. Infrastructure makes water conflict more likely

Risi 19 (Lauren, directs the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program, which is
housed in the Global Risk and Resilience Program. Risi has authored and edited a number of
publications, and is the managing editor of New Security Beat; co-producer of the "Backdraft" and
"Water Stories" podcast series; and managing producer of the animated short, "Water, Conflict, and
Cooperation." holds a master’s degree in environmental security and peace from the UN-mandated
University for Peace in Costa Rica. Summer. "Beyond Water Wars"
https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/water-in-a-world-of-conflict/beyond-water-wars/)
“It turns out that conflict increases when there’s more to fight over,” says Scott Moore, a political
scientist at the University of Pennsylvania and author of Subnational Hydropolitics: Conflict,
Cooperation, and Institution-Building in Shared River Basins. “In the case of the Colorado, interstate
conflict has tended to spike in response to competition for federal funding to build dams, irrigation
systems, and other water infrastructure.”
Variability in a basin, and not scarcity, turns out to be a more accurate indicator of potential conflict.
Sudden changes in the physical nature of a basin or its governance (the creation of a new country, for
example), and the institutional capacity to absorb those changes, is more likely to lead to increased
tensions and hostility between parties.
Often, these changes take the form of a large infrastructure project, like the development of a large dam
by one country without consideration of the impact on downstream neighbors. Ultimately, geography
takes a backseat to governance when it comes to determining the conflict or peace outcomes of a water
source.
4. No water wars
Risi 19 (Lauren, directs the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program, which is
housed in the Global Risk and Resilience Program. Risi has authored and edited a number of
publications, and is the managing editor of New Security Beat; co-producer of the "Backdraft" and
"Water Stories" podcast series; and managing producer of the animated short, "Water, Conflict, and
Cooperation." holds a master’s degree in environmental security and peace from the UN-mandated
University for Peace in Costa Rica. Summer. "Beyond Water Wars"
https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/water-in-a-world-of-conflict/beyond-water-wars/)
Concern over “water wars” writ large has gained renewed traction as climate change, continued
population growth, and increasingly polluted waterways pose growing risks to the world’s water. It
remains a go-to concept, no matter what the facts are.
“We’re seeing some of the same headlines we’ve been trying to knock down for going on 30 years,” says
Geoff Dabelko, former director and current senior advisor to the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change
& Security Program. “Despite the seemingly irresistible temptation for politicians and headline writers to
proclaim otherwise, countries have not fought wars over water.”
Researchers have put the notion of "water wars" to the test. An analysis in the 1990s of 263
international water basins conducted by Aaron Wolf, Shira Yoffe, and colleagues at Oregon State
University found conclusively that states are much more likely to cooperate over shared water than go
to war. In fact, while water may be one of many factors influencing skirmishes between states, wars
have rarely, if ever, been fought over water. To date, this finding continues to be backed up by empirical
studies.
Dabelko says that the implications of clinging to the broad concept of “water wars” between nations
comes at a cost. “When we focus so heavily on potential interstate wars over water,” he says, “we miss
the mark on how important water is to fostering cooperation, to achieving development goals, and to
managing the inevitable tensions over competing uses for water at local levels.”
This doesn’t mean that there aren’t large scale battles over water looming. Some of them are right in
our own backyard. Last year, research by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC)
inspired a new spate of headlines about coming “water wars.”
1nc – solvency
1. Federal funding is bad- cities say no, too much red-tape

PENNVEST’s DWSRF benefits systems by providing lower interest loans with more flexible terms
than municipal bonds, and at times grants. However, to receive DWSRF assistance, the water
system must demonstrate that it has the technical, managerial, and financial capability to ensure
SDWA compliance (U.S. EPA 2014), and the communities must participate in a formal Planning
Consultation meeting. This meeting must include the community project sponsors, the engineer,
PENNVEST and DEP staff, as well as local planning representatives (PENNVEST Information).
These terms can be challenging, particularly for smaller systems. These systems may lack the
resources to comply with SDWA or could be hampered by the inability to engage with all the necessary
staff. Additionally, the lack of trust between local and state governments can also manifest
drinking water systems being hesitant to partner with state programs.
Once a system decides to apply for funding, assistance from PENNVEST cannot total more than
$11 million per project, except for projects that serve more than one municipality, for which assistance
can reach up to $20 million. However, the board of directors can vote to authorize loans
in excess of $20 million for comprehensive projects providing or proposing consolidation services
to a region encompassing all or parts of four or more municipalities (Pennsylvania Infrastructure
Investment Authority). Pennsylvania systems can use PENNVEST to fund expensive consolidation or
regionalization projects with neighboring systems that serve multiple municipalities by
purchasing or interconnecting with systems. It is not clear whether systems are taking advantage
of this opportunity.
DWSRF “set-aside” funds can also be used to support planning and analysis needed for partnerships that
may not involve physical consolidation, such as evaluating and developing shared
billing or system managements (U.S. EPA 2020). The 1996 SDWA Amendments required states
to implement Capacity Development Programs. This program is known in Pennsylvania as the
Capability Enhancement Program (CEP) and is designed to address technical, managerial, and
financial burdens faced by the state’s public drinking water systems (Governor’s Report 2017).
DWSRF set-aside funds are used by Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection to
implement the CEP. The CEP maintains databases on priority drinking water systems and provides
additional funding for PENNVEST recipients.
Under applicable DWSRF regulations, states may take up to 31% of their capitalization grants
for set-aside funds including: technical assistance to small water systems (2%), administration of
DWSRF and technical assistance to water systems (~4% or 1/5 of a Percentage of Fund Valuation),
PWSS and related programs (10%), and assistance to public water systems for source water protection
and capacity development—including loan/grant writing (15%). (U.S. EPA 2020). It is
unclear the extent to which PENNVEST has been willing to take advantage of this flexibility to
use these set-asides to support rate restructuring and affordability programs.
In 2019, 35.3% of total assistance provided by Pennsylvania’s DWSRF went to disadvantaged

communities (U.S. EPA 2019). Disadvantaged communities are defined as having residential
water rates higher than similar communities, particularly if rates are higher than 2% of MHI
(State Revolving Fund Intended Use Plan). Additionally, if it is determined by PENNVEST that
the water system does not have the financial capability to repay a loan, PENNVEST can determine that
the applicant fits the definition of a disadvantaged system (Pennsylvania Infrastructure
Investment Authority). This may result in even lower interest rates, or the decision to present the
community with a grant in place of a loan.
Since 2014, any capital project funded by an SRF must use American Iron and Steel (AIS) for construction
(U.S. EPA 2020). This requirement increases the cost of capital projects and may offset
some of the cost savings from a low-interest PENNVEST loan. Compliance with the AIS provision must
also be documented throughout the construction process, a small but not insignificant
extra hurdle for low-interest financing. Though the EPA provides guidance on AIS compliance,
the responsibility is ultimately on the award recipient (U.S. EPA 2020). The other large cost
associated with an SRF financed project is paying the prevailing wage rate, often called DavisBacon
wages (Congressional Research Service 2008). Davis-Bacon wages are estimated to increase
labor costs by nearly 20%, but studies differ on the impact on the total contract cost. Some studies
even estimate that total contract cost does not increase and is offset by higher efficiency and more
skilled labor (Mahalia 2008). The perception of higher project costs and the reality of compliance
documentation hurdles may together contribute to the underutilization of PENNVEST funding
and should be addressed by PENNVEST.
The 16 Struggling Systems in this report have issued a total of $457 million in bonds for capital
projects that could have been funded by PENNVEST awards instead (Figure 5-6). If these bonds
had instead been low-interest PENNVEST awards, the difference in interest rates could have
saved the customers of these Struggling Systems up to $90 million dollars, depending on AIS
and prevailing wage compliance costs. Beyond the hurdles mentioned above, it is unclear why
PENNVEST financing is not fully utilized for capital projects. Due to the additional requirements
attached to PENNVEST funding and logistical difficulties in applying, some cities may find it
easier to simply issue familiar bonds, even if they are higher cost. There may also be a stigma
attached to approaching the state government for help.
2. We need way less money than the aff thinks and funding alone is insufficient
Knopman et al 17 (Debra Knopman, Principal Researcher; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in geography and
environmental engineering, Johns Hopkins University; M.S. in civil engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.A. in chemistry,
Wellesley College. Martin Wachs, American professor emeritus of Urban Planning at the University of California, Los Angeles and of City and
Regional Planning and of Civil and Environmental Engineering[2] at the University of California, Berkeley. He wrote 180 articles and four books
on subjects related to transportation and land use.[3] Wachs was awarded the Guggenheim Fellowship[4] for his exceptional scholarship and
the Carey Award for service to the Transportation Research Board. Benjamin M. Miller, Economist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School.
Ph.D. in economics, University of California, San Diego; B.S. in economics, Purdue University. Scott G. Davis, Senior Advisor at the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). While with the Department, his roles included serving as a Senior Advisor in the Office
of Community Planning and Development, the Office of the Secretary, and the President’s Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. He also
served as Director of the Disaster Recovery Division, responsible for the national portfolio of Community Development Block Grant Disaster
Recovery (CDBG-DR) funding. Before joining HUD, Scott served as Director of Policy and Research for the Office of the Federal Coordinator for
Gulf Coast Rebuilding housed within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Prior to beginning his federal service in 2005, he served
as Director of Programs for the Economic and Community Development Institute in Columbus, Ohio and as Director of the Office of Economic
Development at The University of Arizona. He is a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners and holds degrees in Regional
Development and Environmental Planning. Katherine Pfrommer, Quantitative Analyst, RAND. M.S. in public policy/admin/analysis, Carnegie
Mellon University; B.S. in economics, Allegheny College. "Not Everything Is Broken: The Future of U.S. Transportation and Water Infrastructure
Funding and Finance" The RAND Corporation)
In fact, the perception that U.S. infrastructure needs are not being met, which animates so much of the
debate over spending, requires reexamination . These “needs gaps” are calculated in different ways. For
water infrastructure, some needs are derived from estimates of repair frequency required to maintain a
regulatory standard, given factors such as population growth and age of the system. Other estimates use
survey data to collect information on selfreported costs of planned future projects. The adequacy of
pricing and cost-recovery methods across state and local governments can alter the view of needs as
well. The bottom line is that needs assessments offer an unreliable guide for policy and priority setting.
State and local O&M spending for both highways and water infrastructure has risen steadily since at
least 1956. The system of financing new and major rehabilitation projects through public borrowing and,
to a much lesser extent, some version of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is generally working for
projects that fall within single states and local jurisdictions and for which revenues are sufficient to cover
debt service and ongoing O&M costs. Infrastructure tends to be well maintained and modernized in
areas where local and regional economies are thriving, good governance is the rule, and revenue
streams for sustainable O&M cost recovery are in place.
Elsewhere, problems persist that defy easy solutions: The federal Highway Trust Fund and the state
funds for drinking water and wastewater treatment plants have not been operating on a sustainable
basis for some time now. • Congestion on some interstate highways and freight transportation systems
hurts regional economies. • Without operating subsidies, mass transit systems have a hard time paying
their way. • Critical infrastructure problems that cross jurisdictional lines, like the proposed Gateway rail
tunnel under the Hudson River between New Jersey and New York, are proving difficult to resolve
through existing governance arrangements. • Communities with declining tax bases struggle to maintain
their roads, bridges, and water systems and repay their debts to bond holders. • Some communities are
at risk of flooding from structurally compromised dams and levees, coastal communities are at risk from
rising seas and changing patterns of precipitation, and many communities are vulnerable to flooding
from undersized and aging storm water systems.
Each place has its own blend of issues with infrastructure maintenance or investment, economics or
governance. Dysfunction arises from many sources. An across-the-board rampup of federal spending is
unlikely to solve the infrastructure problems that need fixing — regardless of whether the money
comes through direct funding, tax credits to private developers, or a combination. Lasting changes will
require thoughtful consideration of targeted spending priorities, policy constraints, and regional
differences.
3. There’s no water funding gap- the aff relies on faulty, self-reported needs
assessments
A needs assessment is the first part of estimating the gap between the spending that is thought to be
needed and actual spending. The arithmetic is simple—GAP = NEEDS – SPENDING—but is often
complicated by a number of methodological issues (Copeland and Tiemann, 2010).
The bottom line of the ASCE report card on U.S. infrastructure and other infrastructure assessments is
the large gap between the infrastructure America has today and the infrastructure America “should”
have. In 2013, ASCE estimated a need for $1 trillion in capital spending for drinking water infrastructure
over the next 25 years and $298 billion spending for wastewater infrastructure over the next 20 years
(ASCE, 2013a). On an annual basis, these needs estimates translate to about $55 billion in capital
spending for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. Other recent needs assessments range from
$11.25 billion to $40 billion per year (in 2011 dollars) for drinking water infrastructure (EPA, 2013a;
American Water Works Association, 2012). Estimates of wastewater capital costs come in at around
$12.7 billion per year (2011 dollars) (Copeland, 2012). For comparison, in 2014, CBO estimated public
capital spending on drinking water and wastewater infrastructure to be $34 billion and O&M spending
to be $72 billion.
The size of the gap depends on assumptions about replacement rates of pipes and facilities. Some costs
in needs assessments are based on varying standards of repair frequency, including factors such as
population growth and age of the system. Assumptions about construction costs, including the price of
energy, also influence the numbers. Assessments also differ by the method used to generate the
estimates. For example, the EPA’s Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey and Assessment uses
survey data to collect information on self-reported costs of planned future projects (EPA, 2011). Systems
that do not appropriately price their services—and are consequently undermaintained—are implicitly
given greater weight in these assessments than systems that employ full-cost pricing to cover their
routine maintenance and system upgrades. Further, needs assessments do not account for whether
users are willing to pay for higher levels of maintenance or investment.
Because of these and other issues, national-level needs assessments can provide some indication of
order of magnitude needs, but they cannot reliably guide levels of investment or individual investment
decisions. A 2002 CBO study found the average annual gap between current spending (1999 at the time
of the study) and projected needs between 2000 and 2019 for its low-cost (and preferred) scenario to
be $0 for water supply and $3.2 billion for wastewater systems, an increase of 14 percent above 1999
spending levels; its high estimates came in at 90 percent above 1999 spending (CBO, 2002; Copeland
and Tiemann, 2010). CBO was more confident about the validity of its low-cost scenario. As CBO noted
at the time, the “result contradicts conventional wisdom that the nation’s water systems will soon be
straining to fund a large increase in investment.” A 2010 Congressional Research Service study reviewed
the 2002 CBO study, noting that a future investment gap was not inevitable as long as water and
wastewater utilities ramped up their revenues to cover maintenance and replacement costs.
Example: Drinking Water Infrastructure To drive home the limited use of needs assessments, we
examined the varying estimates of drinking water infrastructure needs. Figure 5.3 compares multiple
needs assessments covering roughly the same time period, illustrating the problem of using these widely
varying assessments as a guide for setting policy and priorities. In its latest report to Congress in 2013,
the EPA found that the “nation’s drinking water utilities need $384.2 billion in infrastructure
investments over the next 20 years” (EPA, 2013, p. i). The EPA only surveys projects eligible for DWSRF
funding. The report also compared this estimate to prior EPA estimates and estimates from other
organizations and found widely varying results.4 The EPA’s own estimates jumped from $227 billion over
20 years in 1999 to $376 billion over 20 years in 2003 by “better captur ing previously underreported
longer term needs for infrastructure rehabilitation and replacement” (EPA, 2013, p. 3).
There is considerable uncertainty behind these point estimates. A 2002 CBO study estimated $331.2 to
$571.7 billion in investment needed for drinking water systems over the same 20-year period as the
2003 EPA assessment, not including significantly larger O&M costs (CBO, 2002). In its own 2002 study,
EPA reported a wider range, estimating the cost of capital investments in drinking water systems for
2000–2019 would range from $231 billion to $670 billion (EPA, 2002). CBO found that critical
assumptions drove differences in estimates of water infrastructure costs over time: replacement rate for
drinking water pipes, the cost savings associated with improved efficiency, the costs of controlling
overflow caused by heavy rainfall events for systems that combine storm water with household and
industrial water, and the repayment period of any borrowed funds. In contrast, under different
assumptions about replacement rates and expansion needs driven by growth, the American Water
Works Association estimated $1.02 trillion would be needed to cover investments in water mains over
the 25 years from 2011 to 2035 (American Water Works Association, 2012), which for comparability to
other estimates is an average of $816 billion over 20 years.5 Similarly, a report by the Water
Infrastructure Network (WIN) (WIN, 2002) estimated the cost of drinking water infrastructure built in
2000–2019 at $700 billion.
One reason for the discrepancy between government and interest group estimates is that WIN’s $700
billion estimate includes principal and interest costs paid on debt after 2019 but does not include
principal and interest paid during 2000–2019 on pre-2000 capital investments. The CBO estimates follow
the opposite approach, including borrowing costs on earlier projects paid during 2000–2019, but not
considering principal and interest paid after 2019. This makes comparison difficult. CBO estimated that if
WIN had used the CBO approach to counting principal and interest payments, the WIN estimate would
be $570 billion. Further, the estimates in Figure 5.3 do not include O&M costs. Adding in O&M costs,
WIN estimates “the cost of building, operating, and maintaining needed drinking water and wastewater
facilities over [2000–2019] approaches $2 trillion” in 1999 real dollars.
In sum, the wide range of estimates produced from inconsistent assessment methods yields little
information or guidance to decisionmakers on how they should decide how much to spend on capital
versus O&M for drinking water infrastructure, and where to spend it. The assessments do, however,
suggest the order of magnitude of potential funding needed over some future time period. Needs
assessments directed toward policymakers also tend to miss the potential for market responses to real
needs. For example, water industry analysts projected in 2016 that spending in the water and
wastewater utility sector alone will exceed $532 billion over the next ten years, a 28 percent increase
over the previous decade (Nabers, 2016).
4. Federal spending can’t solve and is a net negative- it diverts effective use of
state resources, gets allocated poorly, and isn’t necessary
Our intent in this report is to present a more nuanced view of the infrastructure challenge than has been
portrayed by public officials and in the media. Not all transportation and water infrastructure in the
United States is falling apart. The extent of underinvestment differs markedly by type of infrastructure,
its ownership and maintenance arrangements, and the economic fortunes of the region. For this reason,
a rapid and substantial ramp-up of federal spending — whether through direct funding, tax credits to
private developers, or a combination— will not solve the real infrastructure problems that need fixing
unless accompanied by thoughtful consideration of priorities, policy constraints, and regional
variations. Further, a one-off spike in federal spending could divert local and state governments’
attention away from their longerterm imperative to adopt new technologies and secure sustainable
financing .
In this chapter, we synthesize our findings from the preceding chapters and offer several ideas for
policymakers to consider going forward. Each of these ideas merits more extensive analysis and field-
testing.
Findings The Spending Picture Is Not Dire Overall, the data do not support a picture of precipitous
national decline in total spending, per capita spending, or spending as a share of GDP. Total public
spending on transportation and water infrastructure in constant dollars as a share of U.S. GDP has been
remarkably stable since 1956. Private funding in these areas of infrastructure is less than 3 percent of
the total, nearly all of which is for rail. When federal spending has declined, state and local governments
often have picked up the slack. By the end of 2016, municipal bond issues were at their highest levels
ever, more than double levels in 1996, although bond issues fluctuate from year to year. Apart from
these broad trends, federal capital spending on highways has been in a period of a gradual decline since
around 2002. Capital spending by water and wastewater utilities declined after the 2008 financial crisis
but has been rising since.
State and local O&M spending for water infrastructure has been on a relatively steady rise since at least
1956. The system of financing new and major rehabilitation projects through public borrowing and, to a
much lesser extent, some version of PPPs is generally working for projects whose benefits fall within
single states and local jurisdictions and whose revenues are sufficient to cover debt service and ongoing
O&M costs.
***disadvantages
**spending disad
1nc – uniqueness counterplan
The United States federal government should not increase spending in 2021 or 2022
1nc – spending disad
New spending derails the economic recovery, guarantees GOP wins in 22 and 24- the
plan causes surprise action from the Fed and worker shortages, which causes market
freak-out about inflation- second Biden term is key to trade relations with Europe-
Pethokoukis 21 (James, DeWitt Wallace Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where he runs
the AEIdeas blog. May 7. "The economic threats that could derail the Democrats' election dreams"
https://theweek.com/articles/981286/economic-threats-that-could-derail-democrats-election-dreams)
Can Joe Biden "reimagine and rebuild" the American economy in just 550 days? Because that's how long
it is until the 2022 midterm elections. And history suggests a good chance Democrats will lose their
narrow control of Congress, most likely by losing the House. Then gridlock resumes. It's doubtful that
Republicans will have much interest in helping Biden further become a "transformational president" by
passing more wish-list items from the progressive agenda.
Democrats surely understand the clock is ticking. But they also have to be hoping that the extraordinary
power of the emerging economic boom might make the 2022 midterms an exception to the political
pattern. Moody's Analytics, for example, recently revised its 2021 real GDP growth outlook to nearly 7
percent and to over 5 percent next year. "If we are right," chief economist Mark Zandi told clients in a
report, "and there's good reason to believe we will be, this will be the strongest two years of growth
since 1950-1951 at the height of the post-World War II economic boom." And Moody's is hardly alone in
predicting warp-speed GDP and job growth this year and next.
So we're really off the map here. Who knows, not only might the Biden Boom keep the House and
Senate in Democratic hands, it might also make a second Biden term (or a first Harris term, perhaps) a
pretty good bet. And when you think about it, two presidential terms might be what Democrats need to
pass key legislation and then make sure those programs survive during an era of extreme partisanship .
Democrats are already trying to undo the Trump presidency wherever possible, such as attempting to
partially reverse the Trump tax cuts, restore environmental rules, and rebuild America's trade
relationship with Europe.
But the political impact of an unprecedented economic surge isn't the only unknown here. Putting aside
the possibility of a dangerous new COVID-19 variant, perhaps the greatest risk to the recovery — and
thus the Biden legacy — is how Washington is helping generate that recovery . The stimulus continues
to flow even as consumers boost spending and businesses fully reopen. And some Democrats still don't
think there's enough federal dough being spent, such as those who want recurring stimulus checks to be
sent out and the $2.3 trillion Biden infrastructure plan to be a $10 trillion plan. As is, the tsunami of
spending might yet boost inflation, resulting in surprise action from the Federal Reserve and an
unexpected slowdown. Imagining pre-election recessions during the first terms of Ronald Reagan,
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama creates a pretty interesting game of "what if" alternate history with
Presidents Mondale, Kerry, and Romney.
An inflation surprise is hardly the only risk. While the recovery is currently generating gobs of jobs, the
expansion will eventually slow. And it might slow faster than necessary thanks to generous jobless
benefits that could potentially discourage work and create shortages. The $1.9 trillion COVID relief
package last March extended supplemental benefits of $300 a month through early September. It’s an
argument sure to gain momentum after Friday's wildly disappointing April jobs report that showed
266,000 net new jobs were created last month vs. a Wall Street forecast of a million or so. Now fat
unemployment checks might not be the main reason for that undershoot. Home schooling, a lack of
child care, virus fears, and data issues all might have played a role. But the report does suggest why
some economists are worried about the labor-supply impact of impact of jobless benefits as the
economy continues to gain strength in the coming months. A worker shortage would also add to the
inflation threat. Again, many Democrats don't seem at all worried, at least so far. Late last month, nearly
40 Democrats on Capitol Hill sent the Biden White House a letter proposing "more generous and long-
lasting jobless benefits on a permanent basis," according to the Wall Street Journal.
EU-US trade relations key to the WTO

Alexandr Svetlicinii 20, PhD, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Macau, 3/29/20, "China
and the EU join forces in support of WTO dispute settlement", CGTN,
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-03-29/China-and-the-EU-join-forces-in-support-of-WTO-dispute-
settlement-PeAfe7dQic/index.html
On March 27, 2020, China, the E uropean U nion and 14 other members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) reached an agreement that would allow them to resolve trade disputes under WTO rules despite
the current paralysis (stasis) of the WTO Appellate Body , which was caused by the U nited S tates.
The trade ministers the WTO members confirmed at a meeting in Davos on January 24, 2020 that "a functioning dispute
settlement system of the WTO is of the utmost importance for a rules-based trading system, and that
an independent and impartial appeal stage must continue to be one of its essential features."
The WTO Appellate Body is the second level of the dispute resolution mechanism, which reviews the
panel reports adopted in first instance and delivers the final rulings in the trade disputes adjudicated
under the WTO rules. It consists of seven members who serve four-year terms and at least three are necessary to hear an appeal case.
The Trump administration has systematically blocked the appointment of the new members and by
December 2019 the Appellate Body became fully dysfunctional after two members Ujal Singh Bhatia (India) and Thomas
R. Graham (U.S.) had their terms expired. Currently, there is only a single member – Hong Zhao (China), whose term
will also expire on November 30 this year.
In order to overcome the deadlock , the "coalition of the willing" WTO members have agreed to set up
an arbitration appeal procedure. The appeals among the specified members will be heard by three appeal arbitrators selected from
the pool of 10 arbitrators appointed by the participating members. Former and current members of the Appellate Body can also serve as
arbitrators. It is expected that the composition of the arbitration pool will be completed within two months. Each
participating
member can nominate one arbitrator but the final decision on the inclusion in the pool should be
reached by consensus . As explained by the EU trade commissioner Phil Hogan, "This is a stop-gap measure to reflect the temporary
paralysis of the WTO's appeal function for trade disputes."
The arbitration procedure will apply to all pending and future disputes that may arise in between the
members. This arrangement is open for accession by any other WTO member and also allows the subsequent withdrawal by any member.
Thus, any member will have a possibility to ask for review of the first-instance panel report under the agreed appeal arbitration procedure. The
agreed procedure will allow other WTO members interested in the outcome of the dispute to participate as third parties and deliver their
written and oral submissions to the arbitrators. The arbitrators will be able to uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of
the first-instance panel.
The temporary arrangement for the WTO dispute settlement is especially timely during the time of
COVID -19 pandemic, which caused significant disruptions in international trade.
The leaders of G20 countries at the recent virtual summit have reiterated their unanimous support for
"a free, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment,
and to keep our markets open." In his address, Chinese President Xi Jinping called upon G20 countries to undertake collective
efforts by "cutting tariffs, removing barriers, and facilitating the unfettered flow of trade ." To achieve
these goals, it is crucial to have a stable and rules-based system for the settlement of the trade
disputes . By reaching the consensus on trade dispute settlement, China, the EU and 14 other WTO
members demonstrated their adherence to the above commitments.
While the WTO today remains the only multilateral platform for the global trade governance, its
functionality and credibility will be greatly enhanced by the availability of the temporary substitute
of the Appellate Body. The professionalism of the arbitrators and the participating members'
compliance with the appeal arbitration awards could serve as an impetus for other WTO members to
follow the suit and join this temporary arrangement.
Trade multilateralism solves global crises

Ian Bremmer 19, PhD, Professor, Applied Geopolitics, Columbia University's School of International
and Public Affairs, President, Eurasia Group, , editor-at-large at Time, 11/18/19, "The End of the
American International Order: What Comes Next?", Time, https://time.com/5730849/end-american-
order-what-next/
China has made its decision. Beijing is building a separate system of Chinese tech nology—its own standards,
infrastructure, and supply chains—to compete with the West.
Make no mistake: this is

the single most consequential geopolitical decision taken in the last three decades.
It’s also the greatest threat to globalization since the end of World War II.
It wasn’t supposed to be like this.
Globalization has lifted billions of people from poverty around the world. We now live longer,
healthier, and more productive lives than ever before . We are better educated and better informed than at any time in
history. There has never been a better place and a better time to be alive than right here, right now.
So why are so many people so angry, and why is globalization under unprecedented threat?
Why are citizens in country after country bitterly casting aside both governing and opposition parties in favor of political disruptors?
At this moment in history, why is there so much alarm?

Because this IS a moment of transformation, and uncertainty. In much of the world, the lightning-fast,
cross-border flows of ideas, information, people, money, goods and services—the same forces that
have created so much opportunity and prosperity—also generate fear .
Fear that the world now becomes more complicated and more dangerous in real time. Fear that the world we
knew is gone for good, and fear that no one is willing and able to do anything about it.
I want to talk with you today about why all this is happening, and why it’s so vitally important that we’re having this conversation at this
moment—and in the heart of this great country.
Japan is both blessed and burdened by its unique place in this G-Zero world. Japan has the political stability, the foresight, and the technological
talent to help lead the world into a brighter future than the one we currently face. We all have reason to hope that Japan’s leaders, its
companies, its political will, and its people will help lead the transition toward a new order, one in which human ingenuity, moral imagination,
and courage can help all of us meet the challenges to come.
The Geopolitical Recession
When I started Eurasia Group in 1998, our clients were interested almost exclusively in the so-called emerging-markets countries, those that
presented both big growth opportunities and unfamiliar political challenges.
I defined an emerging market as “any country where politics matters at least as much as economic fundamentals for market outcomes.”
Countries like Japan, the United States, Canada, and the leading nations of Western Europe offered a much more stable and predictable
political landscape, but more modest opportunities for growth.
Those days are gone. The financial crisis of 2008 and the turmoil that followed have brought politics directly into the performance of economies
and markets in even the world’s richest countries.
We also face a growing number of transnational threats . The U.S.-led global order is finished. So many of the dark
clouds now hanging over us—from climate change to cyber -conflict, from terror ism to the post-industrial
revolution—move unchecked across borders, leaving national governments much less able to meet the
needs of their citizens.
Today, it
is not economics but geopolitics that has become the main driver of global economic uncertainty.
The world has entered a “geopolitical recession,” a bust cycle for the international system and
relations among governments. It’s a time when alliances , institutions, and the values that bind them together
are all coming apart.
From an historical perspective, geopolitical recessions are both rarer than economic recessions and longer-lasting. We’ll be living in this
geopolitical recession for at least a decade to come.
How did we get here?
Economists tell us that the process of “creative destruction” fuels the engine of growth that builds the future, and history says that’s true. But
lives and livelihoods are destroyed in the process, and growing numbers of people say their government is either powerless to help them
manage or doesn’t care what happens to them. Resentment of elites is on the rise in every region of the world. The system is rigged
against them, they believe; it’s increasingly hard to argue they’re wrong.
This creates opportunities for a new breed of populist who offers scapegoats and promises of protection.
These politicians did not invent this problem. They’re just profiting from it.
And the greatest worry is this: All this anger is building in good economic times. What happens when
economies start to slow?
History shows that governments that are unpopular at home are more likely to make trouble abroad ,
especially with their neighbors, to rally public support and divert attention from domestic troubles.
That breeds less trust among governments. The risk of misunderstanding rises. Accidents are more
likely —and more likely to escalate toward conflict.
There are three implications to consider…
The first centers on “tail risks,” the low-likelihood-but-high-impact events that have become commonplace in a world reshaped by China’s rise,
Middle East turmoil, populist Europe, revanchist Russia, divided America, a world-record 71 million displaced people, and the destabilizing
effects of technological and climate changes.
Imagine a military accident in the S outh C hina S ea, at a time when the U.S. and Chinese presidents are
locked in a war of wills over trade and technology , and determined to project strength at home, that spirals out of
control.
Turn to the Middle East —the U.S. has confronted Iran. Since President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal and then
re-imposed sanctions, Iran has taken bold military action—including a strike on the heart of Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. Washington
responded by sending troops to Saudi Arabia, a move which, you might recall, sharply increased the risk of terrorism in the U.S. a generation
ago.
What if President Trump is defeated for re-election next year, and North Korea ’s Kim Jong-un discovers the next U.S. president won’t
accept his phone calls? What provocative action might he take? What accidents might he risk?
What if a debt crisis hits Italy, created when a future Italian government defies EU budget rules and inadvertently creates a financial
crisis too large for lenders to manage? Or a miscalculation in Ukraine pulls Russia into a shooting war? Or a US-Russia cyber
confrontation hits critical infrastructure, creating a humanitarian crisis inside an American city?
The lack of coordinated leadership in today’s world, our G-zero world, makes all of these crises both
more likely to happen and more difficult to manage when they do. Individually, they are long-shots. Collectively,
they pose unprecedented danger.
The second implication of the geopolitical recession is the breakdown of international institutions.
The tens of millions of displaced people around the world today create one of the most urgent and expensive
problems that the United Nations has to cope with. Yet, even as national governments are less willing to welcome big numbers of refugees,
even fewer are willing to invest more to support the UN Refugee Agency.
We also see fragmentation of European institutions as voters send growing numbers of anti-EU politicians to serve in the European parliament.
There is no longer consensus among Europeans on the free movement of EU citizens across borders, on how to manage immigrants from
outside the EU, or on important questions like how best to manage relations with Russia.
The Trump administration has threatened the coherence of NATO, the most successful military alliance in history (French President Macron
certainly seems to agree), and has withdrawn the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
treaty with Russia, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Paris Climate Accord, to name only a few.
The inevitable consequence of all this is a world that has become more unpredictable and much less
safe.
There is little chance in this environment to establish new agreements and new institutions to help
manage tomorrow’s crises.
Instead, individual governments will adopt their own rules in an attempt to contain challenges that don’t
respect borders. They will threaten economic penalties and military retaliation in a world with fewer
institutions able to enforce generally accepted rules and practices .
The last implication of the geopolitical recession: The weakness of today’s international system not
only leaves the world more
vulnerable to crisis, but less resilient when crisis comes. In recent years, we’ve avoided a major
international crisis. We’ve seen Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, the growth of populism across Europe, Russia’s bid to undermine
Ukraine’s independence, Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power in China, a meltdown in Venezuela, and plenty of individual fires in the Middle East
and in democracies across the world. But we have not yet experienced anything during this period that poses a
challenge to the entire international system, and the global economy has remained relatively strong .
Our luck can’t last.

2nc – link wall
Trillion-dollar infrastructure deal causes inflation and monetary tightening- derails the
recovery, leads to Democratic in-fighting, and causes GOP Senate win in 2022
Morici 21 (Peter, economist and emeritus business professor at the University of Maryland, and a
national columnist. April 7. "How deficit spending could hand Congress to the
Republicanshttps://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-deficit-spending-could-hand-congress-to-the-
republicans-11617730940) *There’s a comma after “full employment”. It’s in the original, there’s
nothing omitted
President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Recovery Act scored 75% public approval, and it is full of
goodies for reliable Democratic constituencies—money for state budgets, union pensions, universities,
and the like—often having little to do with the pandemic.
Now his infrastructure package is full of spending having little to do with rebuilding America’s roads,
bridges and the like, but this time Democrats in Congress may prove more difficult to unite. And as the
pandemic recedes, the Federal Reserve is proving less cooperative to monetize record deficits as Biden
seeks even more spending to Build Back Better.
The price tag to repair America’s infrastructure and electrical grid, accelerate the build-out of windmills,
solar power and electric vehicles, lessen inequality by making permanent the stimulus package’s one-
year boost to the child, dependent care and earned-income tax credits and food stamps, harden supply
chains for medical equipment and semiconductors, and boost R&D to meet the China challenge would
require at least $1 trillion a year.
A trillion here, a trillion there
The federal deficit was $3.1 trillion in 2020 or about 15% of gross domestic product. Before the $900
billion stimulus package passed in the waning days of the Trump administration and the ARA, the deficit
for 2021 was on track to be a bit less than $1 trillion. Now it is projected to be $3.4 trillion this year and
$1.6 trillion next year.
Add to that another $1 trillion for the infrastructure bill and the rest of Build Back Better, and that’s a
lot of bonds to sell—even with proposed tax increases.
Each month, the Fed prints money to buy Treasury, mortgage-backed and other securities. During the
pandemic, it printed as much money as needed to finance the $3.1 trillion deficit and push the rate on
10-year Treasuries well below 1%.
We didn’t get much new inflation in goods and services markets, because households used much of
their stimulus checks to pay down debt, pad cash reserves and invest. The latter caused asset price
inflation. Last year, stocks SPX, +0.36% COMP, +0.10% DJIA, +0.48% jumped 16% and existing home
prices increased 14%.
With herd immunity in the United States within sight, many sectors of the economy are headed to max
capacity, and the Fed has a binary choice. It can tolerate households spending more of their cash stashes
to boost inflation or dial down its money-printing machine.
Chairman Jerome Powell tells us he expects a temporary surge in prices but not an inflationary spiral
and is determined to keep the money flowing to get to full employment,
Fed already tightening
The latter will be tough, because for many workers the old jobs won’t come back soon, and they may be
stuck in lower paying or part-time work. Employers in the hospitality, airline, amusement and other
industries are not soon returning to pre-pandemic levels, and the economy would need a lot of
accommodative monetary policy, excess demand in other sectors, and inflation to overcome that reality.
Powell’s actions belie his words . The 10-year Treasuries rate is up, because he’s not buying nearly so
many bonds this year.
That’s monetary tightening and will brake the recovery .
A higher 10-year Treasury rate BX:TMUBMUSD10Y and steeper yield curve are as important to rates
charged on mortgages, auto and student loans and credit cards as the overnight bank borrowing rate
FF00, -0.00% the Fed advertises as its policy rate and has kept near zero since March 2020.
As the months wear on, unemployment—especially U6, which includes folks working part time that
can’t find full-time positions and those not currently looking that don’t believe they could find a good
job—could remain stubbornly high.
Then you will see the sweat forming on Messrs. Biden’s and Schumer’s brows as they contemplate the
midterms in congressional districts and states where Democrats prevailed by only thin margins over the
unpopular Donald Trump.
Pressure will build for another big reconciliation bill . As much of the hard left’s agenda in Congress—for
example, the push to raise the corporate tax rate to 28%—does not enjoy 50-vote support in the Senate
or even majority support in the House, that ballet to reach a deal on the final infrastructure package will
be more like the rumble in “West Side Story” than “Swan Lake.”
High interest rates will slow the recovery but not enough to stave off inflation . Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell may not have to say much in 2022—the Democrats’ handiwork and infighting may do the
campaigning for him.
We’re on the verge of runaway inflation- current increases have been temporary but a
shift in expectations makes it permanent
Irwin 21 (Neil, senior economics correspondent for The New York Times, where he writes for The
Upshot, a Times site for analysis of politics, economics and more. "Inflation Is Here. What Now?" May
13. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/upshot/inflation-is-here-what-now.html)
The central fact of the American economy in mid-2021 is that demand for all sorts of goods and services
has surged. But supplies are coming back slowly, with the economy acting like a creaky machine that
was turned off for a year and has some rusty parts.
The result, as underlined in new government data this week, is shortages and price inflation across many
parts of the economy. That is putting the Biden administration and the Federal Reserve in a jam that is
only partly of their own making.
Higher prices and the other problems that result from an economy that reboots itself are frustrating, but
should be temporary. Still, the longer that the surges in prices continue and the more parts of the
economy that they encompass, the greater the chances that Americans’ psychology about prices and
inflation could shift in ways that become self-sustaining .
For the last few decades, companies have resisted raising prices or paying higher wages because they
felt that doing so would cost them too much business. That put a damper on inflation across the
economy. The question is whether current circumstances are evolving in a way that could change that.
“Now the genie’s out of the bottle,” said Kristin Forbes, an economist at M.I.T. and a former official at
the U.S. Treasury and the Bank of England. “If everybody else is raising prices, it becomes a lot easier for
you to do that, too.”
To understand the bewildering mix of forces at play, consider what’s going on at your nearest used-car
lot.
The price of used cars and trucks rose 10 percent in April, according to the latest federal data, one major
factor in pushing the Consumer Price Index to its steepest year-over-year jump in 13 years. People in the
car business say that this has not one cause, but several — each with different implications for the
economy and for policy.
Some involve the microeconomic decisions made by companies and consumers many months ago that
are still rippling through the automobile market.
Rental car companies reduced their fleets during the pandemic-induced collapse in travel, and are now
struggling to rebuild their inventories — and therefore are not selling the used cars that in a normal
market they would continually be unloading. New car sales fell last year during the pandemic, resulting
in fewer trade-ins finding their way into the used-car market, and now new car sales are being held back
by a shortage of microchips.
There isn’t much that government policy can do to fix those problems, unless it involves a time machine.
But government policies are part of the story.
The combined $2,000 per-person stimulus checks most Americans received in the early months of the
year amount to a healthy down payment for many families. Generous unemployment benefits are
helping contain the number of delinquent auto loans, and in turn the supplies of repossessed cars on
the market. Low interest rate policies from the Fed have made financing cheap.
But let’s imagine that, in response to the problem, the Fed raised interest rates or that Congress
increased taxes to claw back stimulus payments.
Those actions alone wouldn’t create more microchips or let rental car companies undo decisions from a
year ago. Higher interest rates or taxes might even make things worse, if the actions led suppliers to
hold back on investing in new capacity for fear demand would fall in the future.
The used-car market may start to stabilize late this year, but the problems are unlikely to be fully
worked out until 2022, said Jessica Caldwell, an auto industry analyst with Edmunds.
“The only winners here are people that have a vehicle they want to get rid of,” she said. “If you have a
car to sell that you don’t need, it is bonkers what you can get for it.”
At any given time, the prices for some things are rising and those for others are falling, for all kinds of
idiosyncratic reasons. Policymakers generally try not to react to those moves; they are essential to how
markets work. If there is a shortage of limes, their prices spike and people use more lemons.
What is unusual about this moment is that prices for so many things are rising at once, albeit for
different reasons. Some, like airfares, are simply returning to prepandemic levels, which shows up in
inflation data as a price increase. Others, like lumber prices, reflect high demand along with supply that
is fixed in the short run.
And still others, like the spike in East Coast gasoline prices after a cyberattack shut down a major
pipeline, are truly random events that tell us virtually nothing about underlying supply and demand or
future inflation.
Some other sectors seem poised to experience price rises. Restaurants, for example, are complaining of
severe labor shortages that are forcing them to curtail service or sharply raise pay for line cooks and
dishwashers. If they try to reflect those higher costs in their prices, it will cause the price of food away
from home to start rising faster than the (already fairly high) 3.8 percent figure over the last year.
Professional inflation-watchers are on close watch for signs that these forces might be unleashing a form
of thinking about price dynamics unseen since the early 1980s, when prices rose in part because
everyone expected them to.
The Fed is betting that won’t happen — that even if there are several months of surging prices, it will be
at worst a one-time adjustment, and potentially something that reverses as old spending patterns return
and workers return to their jobs.
“If past experience is any guide, production will rise to meet the level of goods demand before too
long,” the Fed governor Lael Brainard said in a speech this week. “A limited period of pandemic-related
price increases is unlikely to durably change inflation dynamics.”
For now, movements in key financial markets mostly align with the Fed view .
Futures contracts for major commodities like oil and copper, for example, suggest that traders expect
prices to fall slightly in the years ahead, not rise further.
And in the bond market, even after a surge in longer-term interest rates following the high inflation
reading Wednesday, most signs point to future inflation consistent with the 2 percent the Fed aims for.
Still, the level of future inflation implied by those bond prices has risen significantly in the last few
weeks, meaning further moves are likely to increase worries that the inflation issues will be not-so-
transitory after all. And the pattern could change abruptly if more evidence starts to arrive that the
outlook for inflation is becoming unmoored.
“We aren’t obviously on the way to a very high and persistent inflation outcome,” said Brian Sack,
director of global economics at the hedge fund D.E. Shaw and a former senior Federal Reserve official.
“But we’re at an inflection point, in that the rise in inflation expectations to date has been a policy
success, but a rise from here could become a policy problem .”
The Fed may believe that the evidence emerging in various corners of the economy is a one-time
occurrence that will fade into memory before too long. The Biden administration is betting its agenda on
the same idea.
Ultimately, what matters more than whatever the bond market does is how ordinary Americans who
make everyday economic decisions — demanding raises or not, paying more for a car or not — view
things. Can they wait for the complex machinery of the American economy to fully crank into gear?
Plan triggers the perception that the fed is undergoing a regime shift- guarantees
hyper-inflationary cycle
Smith 21 (Noah, Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was an assistant professor of finance at Stony
Brook University, and he blogs at Noahpinion. "Two Big Things You Need to Understand About Inflation"
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-11/debt-makes-the-fed-s-job-harder-if-inflation-
accelerates)
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen caused some consternation last week when she raised the possibility
that “interest rates will have to rise somewhat to make sure our economy doesn’t overheat.” Stock
markets fell, and Yellen clarified her remarks by saying that she was neither forecasting nor
recommending an interest rate hike.
But the issue isn’t going away . More voices are starting to publicly warn of rising inflation. Warren
Buffett recently called the economy “red hot” and said he’s seeing higher prices. Some wealth managers
are starting to tell clients inflation is on the way. Some economists, like Larry Summers and my colleague
Mohamed El-Erian, are giving the same warning.
Skeptics will note that past inflation scares have been false alarms. In 2010, a number of economists and
financiers sent an open letter to then-Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, warning that quantitative
easing policies would lead to higher inflation. The Fed ignored the letter and pressed ahead with QE, and
inflation never materialized. Why should this time be different?
One difference is that in 2010, there was little sign that so-called core inflation — which strips out
volatile food and energy prices — was rising. But in March of this year, core CPI and core PCE inflation
(two alternative measures of price changes) both showed increases of over 4%. These are well above
the levels we’ve become used to in recent years — and indeed, in recent decades.
An Unsettling Month
Three key measures of inflation were up sharply in March
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Note: Annual rate of change

One month, of course, is just one month. It remains to be seen if March’s levels were a temporary spike
or the start of a new long-term trend; in fact, it will be several months before we really know. It’s
perfectly OK for inflation to occasionally exceed the Fed’s target of 2% — that target is not supposed to
be a ceiling.
But in any case, given the number of people who are now talking about rapid price rises, it makes sense
to think about why and how that might become a problem. And even more importantly, it’s time to start
coming up with a contingency plan for what to do if the dreaded inflation monster does awaken from
the slumber it’s been in since the 1980s.
In fact, these are both very difficult things to ponder because of the uncertainties, complexities and
multitude of decision makers involved. There are two key concepts to understand here: regime shift,
and fiscal dominance.
Regime Shift
Economists often think about inflation as obeying some kind of Phillips Curve. A Phillips Curve is a
relationship between employment and inflation — when lots of people have jobs, they spend a lot, and
they charge higher wages, and then prices go up. There are a lot of fancy variations on this theme, but
that’s the basic idea. The Phillips Curve is where the idea of “running the economy hot” comes from — it
implies that if you raise demand with government stimulus or monetary policy, you’ll get a concomitant
increase in prices.
Goldman's Hatzius Sees Inflation Rising Temporarily
Inflation isn’t as much of a worry if prices rise smoothly with demand because as soon as policymakers
see that prices have begun to exceed their appointed bounds, the Fed can just bump up interest rates,
or Congress cuts deficits a bit, and balance will be restored.
Unfortunately, the economy probably doesn’t work that way. In a recent paper, macroeconomists
Jonathon Hazell, Juan Herreño, Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson look at the history of price increases
using detailed new data and conclude that the Phillips Curve is pretty flat — in other words, changes in
demand, including demand driven by government policy, typically don’t shift inflation that much.
But big changes in inflation still do happen, and policy can cause them ! The most important was when
Fed Chair Paul Volcker raised interest rates in the early 1980s, crushing inflation at the expense of two
deep recessions.
Volcker's Legacy
The Fed crushed inflation in the 1980s, and it could do it again
Hazell et al. explain this as a regime shift — not a change in policy, but a change in the way that policy
gets made. In other words, Volcker’s big interest rate hikes convinced the whole country that the Fed
would simply not accept continued high inflation. At first people didn’t quite believe things had
changed, but when Volcker stuck to his guns despite painful recessions, businesses all over the country
realized inflation was done for and stopped raising prices.
This change was long-lasting. In a well-known 2000 paper, economists Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and
Mark Gertler estimated how much the Fed changes interest rates in response to changes in inflation.
They found that there was a big shift in the Volcker years — after the late 1970s, the Fed reacted more
to price changes than it had before. The regime shift was real.
Paid Post
Infrastructure Investments Can Only Be a Partial Hedge to Inflation Risk
EDHECinfra
This probably works in the other direction as well. Looking at past episodes of hyperinflation — price
changes so astronomical that they wreck an economy utterly — economist Thomas Sargent
hypothesized that these catastrophes begin when people start to believe that the central bank will keep
printing money to finance ever-increasing amounts of government borrowing. Anticipating an exploding
money supply and an accompanying rise in prices, businesses start to raise prices in anticipation of the
shift, which thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
With interest rates low and deficits set to rise, this second sort of regime shift is certainly on the
minds of the people warning about inflation . Democrats seem to have finally tired of the one-sided
game where Republicans run up the debt but still get credited as the party of fiscal responsibility; now,
both parties seem more content to let deficits go up. That could be a real regime shift .
It could take only a modest bump in inflation to start the ball rolling . Right now, one reason prices are
rising is that the economy is having difficulty adjusting to the end of the pandemic. As consumption
patterns shift, there will be acute shortages in the things people suddenly want to buy more of. For
example, people are so interested in buying new houses that the price of lumber has shot up:
Lumber Rally
Soaring housing demand is driving up prices for materials
Source: Bloomberg
A global semiconductor shortage is pushing prices up in that industry, too. Other items like steel and
corn are seeing shortages as well .
This is what economists call “cost-push” inflation. It’s not going to get extreme, but the worry is that
when combined with exploding government deficits, it might be high enough to kick off an inflationary
spiral. The scary scenario here is that businesses see cost-push inflation, they see President Joe Biden
and Congress borrowing a ton of money, and they see the Fed keeping interest rates low, so they decide
that prices are going to have to go up, and they start raising their own prices immediately to beat the
rush. Of course, when everyone tries to beat the rush, that becomes the rush.
So that brings us to the Fed, and to the question of interest rate hikes. Why can’t the Fed just hike rates
if inflation gets bad? Well it can, but it’s a little more complicated than that.
Fiscal Dominance
In addition to a large and increasing deficit, the U.S. government has a large existing stock of debt —
about $21.7 trillion, or just over 100% of GDP. Because interest rates have been low for a while, the
federal government doesn’t have to make big interest payments on that debt:
Keeping the Lid On
Low interest rates have minimized U.S. debt payments
But if the Fed were to raise interest rates, that could change. The nation's current stock of debt is much
bigger than when Volcker did his thing in the 80s — now, even a relatively modest rate hike might send
interest payments soaring.
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The Making of the Tiffany True Diamond
Tiffany & Co.
That understandably might make the Fed nervous about raising rates. If government interest payments
go too high, the U.S. would have to either hike taxes, cut spending or borrow even more to cover the
greater interest costs. If the government, fearful of a recession, chooses the “even more deficits” option,
that could raise inflation even more and force the Fed to hike rates yet again.
Eventually this process would lead to some sort of bad end — either Congress would finally capitulate
and enact a punishing austerity program, or borrowing would continue and inflation would spiral out
of control, or the government would decide to default on its debts . The austerity option would be the
least bad, but any of these would be extremely painful for American workers and consumers.
This kind of macroeconomic trap is known as “ fiscal dominance ” — as in, fiscal policy is so important
that it dominates monetary policy. Sargent and co-author Neil Wallace warned about this sort of
situation in a famous paper in 1984.
Fiscal dominance is really bad news, so the government should work very hard to avoid it . One way to
do this is to borrow at longer maturities. The longer the average maturity of government debt, the less it
has to be rolled over, and the less Fed interest rate hikes will spur higher borrowing costs. Essentially,
borrowing long allows the government to lock in low rates, leaving the Fed more space to fight any
inflation that arises. Troublingly, the average maturity of U.S. debt has changed little since the 1980s.
Another way the government might be able to avert fiscal dominance is for the Fed to threaten to raise
rates. As long as Americans believe that their central bank isn’t constrained by the size of the debt, they
won’t believe that policy has entered a pro-inflationary regime shift; thus they will not start hiking
prices, and the Fed won’t have to raise rates.
This is undoubtedly what Yellen was doing when she talked about rate hikes. Though she’s no longer the
Fed chair, her words carried weight, as evidenced by the stock market’s reaction. That reaction suggests
that the country — or at least, the stock market — still believes the Fed can and will hike rates to head
off inflation. In other words, people don’t think we’re in fiscal dominance yet.
The danger is if this belief starts to crack. If asset managers and pundits keep talking about inflation,
and if federal borrowing keeps exploding upward while interest rates seem pinned near zero, people
might decide that inflation really is coming — and that could summon the beast into existence . That
won’t immediately send consumer prices to the moon — countries typically get at least a couple years
of lead time before things get really bad. But if inflation stays significantly above the 2% target for
several months, it will be time to worry.
At that point, the only really sensible move is austerity. The president and Congress will have to quickly
hammer out some combination of tax hikes and spending cuts to bring down deficits and make it clear
that inflation isn’t going to be tolerated. That will be economically painful, but waiting will result in even
greater pain down the road.
It’s still far from clear that the U.S. is facing an inflationary threat. But over the next year the picture
should clarify, and Biden and Congress will have to be prepared to beat inflation down if it rears its
head.
2nc – brink
Sustained inflation becomes sticky- the US economy is recovering now, demand is no
longer the concern
La Monica 21 (Paul, digital correspondent for CNN Business. He writes daily about the markets and
blue chip companies. May 20. "The Fed needs to get real about inflation"
https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/20/investing/inflation-stocks-economy-federal-reserve/index.html)
Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell loves to use the word "transitory" to describe the threat of
inflation. But with each passing day, it looks more and more like inflation pressures are mounting in a
much more significant manner than the Fed would like.
The use of the word "transitory" could very well turn out to be transitory. Powell may need a new
catchphrase to describe how inflation might be a bit stickier and thornier problem.
Wages are rising and so are bond yields. The housing market is still chugging along. The prices of many
retail goods are going up, partly because of supply shortages but also because of real demand.
It is true that the US economy (especially the job market) still hasn't fully recovered from the depths of
the coronavirus recession. But the Fed may be underestimating the recent rebound and the potential for
sky-high inflation like in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
"The Fed is putting out the message that inflation is transitory and that there are still 8 million
unemployed. The problem is that price expectations in various markets from wood to labor and
company pricing strategies are running ahead of economic reality," said Sebastien Galy, senior macro
strategist at Nordea Asset Management, in a report Wednesday.
"It will likely take two months for pricing strategies and wage expectations to gravitate back towards
something more realistic," Galy added.
Transition from transitory?
For now, despite the volatility in the stock and bond markets, many Fed watchers still believe Powell.
They think the Fed will remain cautious and not overreact to near-term inflation pressures.
According to futures contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, investors are only pricing in about
an 11% chance of a rate hike by the end of the year. That's actually down slightly from what the market
was expecting a month ago.
Prices are rising as the economy recovers
Still, there is no denying how quickly the stock market and parts of the economy have rebounded last
year.
Vaccines have helped restore confidence. And as consumers go back to work and start shopping again,
many of them also have government stimulus checks to spend. That may fuel temporary (we won't say
transitory) inflation fears.
"We're in the vortex of a massive supply chain and demand imbalance. It's as if someone turned on the
light switch and the US went back to normal," said Jennifer Foster, co-chief investment officer with
Chilton Trust.
The economy is on the brink of overheating

Smith et al 21 (Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, FT's US business editor. Colby Smith, US economics editor.
James Politi, Washington Bureau Chief. "Corporations grapple with signs of overheating US economy"
May 19. https://www.ft.com/content/5fc30d51-50d5-4109-98b6-5eebc9b5856c)
The speed of the US rebound from the Covid-19 crisis has left executives, investors and economists
scrambling to interpret whether labour shortages and rising prices point to a short-term economic
summer heatwave or a longer period of dangerous inflation.
Some of the country’s largest companies have hailed the strength of the recovery in recent earnings
announcements while declining to predict whether the swift vaccination rollout and massive fiscal
stimulus will cause problems for corporate America.
“The second half will likely have more uncertainty than a normal year,” Doug McMillon, chief executive
of Walmart, cautioned this week, even as he and his contemporaries noted the strength of consumer
spending and the prospect that elevated savings rates indicated continuing pent-up demand.
3M, the manufacturer, was among an array of companies highlighting “tremendous inflation” in the
costs of labour, freight and some raw materials last week, although it said it had raised prices for
customers in response.
Some recent economic data has raised red flags, such as a jump in consumer prices, although it was
driven by factors that might be transitory. These included a sharp rise in the price of airfares as
Americans started travelling again, and higher demand for used cars sparked by a chip shortage that has
dented production of new vehicles.
Unexpectedly weak job creation last month also masked a more muddled picture, and was driven by a
drop in employment in temporary jobs, transportation and warehousing, and manufacturing.
“The pandemic . . . sliced through the market and picked certain industries and demolished them like a
hurricane [but] skipped over other industries and left them intact,” said Nela Richardson, chief
economist of ADP.
Those disparities have been evident in companies’ earnings. A sharp increase in lumber prices has hurt
home builders and DIY retailers, while clothing chains such as TJX have warned that driver shortages
might keep freight costs “stubbornly high” all year.
Unhedged — Markets, finance and strong opinion
Gershon Distenfeld, co-head of fixed income at AllianceBernstein, said: “It has long been evident there
would be a spike in prices in spring and summer this year. The question is not whether prices are going
to rise in the short run — they are. It is whether this is going to be persistent.”
Despite widespread evidence of worker shortages, companies including Disney and Home Depot have
expressed confidence that they can staff up to meet a revival in consumer demand while also passing on
higher costs to customers.
A tighter labour market is concerning some employers, however, as a combination of factors make it
harder to find staff, including higher unemployment benefits, a childcare shortage, and the fact that
some workers remain worried about taking a job while the virus is still spreading.
One McDonald’s franchisee in Florida made headlines last month for offering $50 to anybody showing
up for a job interview, and the parent company announced plans to increase wages by an average of 10
per cent at the 650 US restaurants it directly manages. Under Armour, the athletic apparel group, on
Wednesday announced broad increases in its minimum hourly wages.
Cost increases and “simply lacking workers to fill plants” were challenges “that we are going to have to
navigate through this long, hot summer”, Robert Vitale, chief executive of cereal group Post Holdings,
warned earlier this month. But he said he hoped that more people would return to work when extended
unemployment benefits expire in September.
Analysts and policymakers are split on how long investors can expect cost and labour pressures to last
due to the unique circumstances of the Covid-19 pandemic and the resultant response from
policymakers
“We’ve never shut down for this long [and] we’ve never had fiscal support of this size during a recession.
The opening is going to be . . . bumpy,” said Louise Sheiner, policy director at the Hutchins Center on
Fiscal and Monetary Policy, an economic think-tank.
“There’s a whole bunch of demand in some areas, but . . . you don’t know how [long] it’s going to last,”
she said.
Ellen Zentner, chief US economist at Morgan Stanley, agreed that a short-term surge in prices was
always foreseen, but warned that inflation data was “running even higher than expected”.
“I see a multitude of risks here: the risk of higher inflation that is sustained, the risk that we can’t get
enough jobs back as quickly as we would like to, and the risk that some of these supply chain disruptions
go on for longer and depress production.”
Morgan Stanley still expects 8 per cent growth for the US economy this year, but if disappointing job
growth persists through the summer “that would raise a lot of concern”, Zentner said.
Recent market moves, however, suggest investors are not too fearful that today’s higher consumer
prices herald a more prolonged bout of inflation.
The summer of inflation: will central banks and investors hold their nerve?
A sell-off in US government debt has moderated following a tumultuous first quarter. After yielding
nearly 1.8 per cent in March, the benchmark 10-year bond now trades below 1.7 per cent. Inflation
hurts these bondholders because it erodes the value of their interest payments.
Short-term gauges of inflation still sit above their long-term counterparts, indicating that investors
largely subscribe to the Federal Reserve’s view that the current bout of inflation is “transitory”.
ADP’s Richardson said many of the current cost pressures were the product of temporary bottlenecks,
and expects September to be “a turning point for employment” as children return to schools and their
parents go back to work.
But part of the challenge for those trying to read the mixed messages from the US economy is that the
pandemic has resulted in swift structural changes, she says: “There’s nothing in history that can mimic
this and even if there was, the economy shifted in a different direction.”
2nc – uniqueness – output gap
Risk of overheating- status quo stimulus has filled three-times the output gap, means
risk of overheating is high
Summers 21 (Lawrence, professor at and past president of Harvard University. He was treasury
secretary from 1999 to 2001 and an economic adviser to President Barack Obama from 2009 through
2010. February 4. "The Biden stimulus is admirably ambitious. But it brings some big risks, too"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/04/larry-summers-biden-covid-stimulus/)
President Biden’s $1.9 trillion covid-19 relief plan, added to the stimulus measure Congress passed in
December with the incoming administration’s strong support, would represent the boldest act of
macroeconomic stabilization policy in U.S. history. Its ambition, its rejection of austerity orthodoxy and
its commitment to reducing economic inequality are all admirable. It is imperative that safety-net
measures for those suffering and investments in vaccination and testing be undertaken rapidly after the
indefensible delays of the last months of the Trump administration.
Yet bold measures need to be accompanied by careful consideration of risks and how they can be
mitigated. While the arguments for providing relief to those hurt by the economic fallout of the
pandemic, investing in controlling the virus and supporting consumer demand are compelling, much of
the policy discussion has not fully reckoned with the magnitude of what is being debated.
Stimulus FAQ: The latest Democratic plan for $1,400 checks
I agree with the general consensus of progressive economists that it would have been much better if the
Obama administration had been able to legislate a much larger fiscal stimulus in early 2009, in response
to the Great Recession. Yet a comparison of the 2009 stimulus and what is now being proposed is
instructive. In 2009, the gap between actual and estimated potential output was about $80 billion a
month and increasing. The 2009 stimulus measures provided an incremental $30 billion to $40 billion a
month during 2009 — an amount equal to about half the output shortfall.
In contrast, recent Congressional Budget Office estimates suggest that with the already enacted $900
billion package — but without any new stimulus — the gap between actual and potential output will
decline from about $50 billion a month at the beginning of the year to $20 billion a month at its end. The
proposed stimulus will total in the neighborhood of $150 billion a month, even before consideration of
any follow-on measures. That is at least three times the size of the output shortfall .
In other words, whereas the Obama stimulus was about half as large as the output shortfall, the
proposed Biden stimulus is three times as large as the projected shortfall. Relative to the size of the gap
being addressed, it is six times as large.
A calculation like this can only be very approximate for many reasons. Most important, estimates of
potential gross domestic product may be inaccurate, and it may be that the CBO is underestimating
potential GDP and the output gap. On the other hand, this crude calculation actually underestimates the
difference between what was done in 2009 and what is proposed now.
First, unemployment is falling, rather than skyrocketing as it was in 2009, and the economy is likely
before too long to receive a major boost as covid-19 comes under control. Second, monetary conditions
are far looser today than in 2009 given extraordinary Federal Reserve policies, the booming stock and
corporate bond markets, and the weakness of the dollar. Third, there is likely to be further
strengthening of demand as consumers spend down the approximately $1.5 trillion they accumulated
last year as the pandemic curtailed their ability to spend and as promised further fiscal measures are
undertaken.
Lawrence H. Summers: My column on the stimulus sparked a lot of questions. Here are my answers.
Looking at incremental deficits relative to GDP gaps is only one way of assessing the scale of a fiscal
program. Another is to look at family income losses and compare them to benefit increases and tax
credits. Wage and salary incomes are now running about $30 billion a month below pre-covid-19
forecasts, and this gap will likely decline during 2021. Yet increased benefit payments and tax credits in
2021 with proposed stimulus measures would total about $150 billion — a ratio of 5 to 1. The ratio is
likely even greater for low-income individuals and families, given the targeting of stimulus measures.
In normal times, a family of four with a pretax income of $1,000 a week would take home about $22,000
over the next six months. Under the Biden proposal, if the breadwinner were laid off, the family’s
income over the next six months would likely exceed $30,000 as a result of regular unemployment
insurance, the $400-a-week special unemployment insurance benefit and tax credits.
Judged relative to either the macroeconomic output gap or declines in family incomes, the proposed
covid-19 relief package appears very large. The Biden administration is right that it will never have a
progressive window of opportunity like the present one. And I share its judgment that the risks of
insufficient fiscal stimulus are greater than those of excessive fiscal stimulus. In many ways, an
overheated economy in which employers are desperate to find workers and push up wages and benefits
would be a very positive thing.
Yet as a massive program moves toward enactment and implementation, policymakers need to ensure
that they have plans in place to address two possible, and quite serious, problems.
First, while there are enormous uncertainties, there is a chance that macroeconomic stimulus on a scale
closer to World War II levels than normal recession levels will set off inflationary pressures of a kind we
have not seen in a generation, with consequences for the value of the dollar and financial stability. This
will be manageable if monetary and fiscal policy can be rapidly adjusted to address the problem. But
given the commitments the Fed has made, administration officials’ dismissal of even the possibility of
inflation, and the difficulties in mobilizing congressional support for tax increases or spending cuts, there
is the risk of inflation expectations rising sharply. Stimulus measures of the magnitude contemplated are
steps into the unknown. For credibility, they need to be accompanied by clear statements that the
consequences will be monitored closely and, if necessary, there will be the capacity and will to adjust
policy quickly.
2nc – uniqueness – fed brink
Fed has started tapering and is on the brink of taking action

Robb 21 (Greg, senior reporter for MarketWatch in Washington. May 19. "Fed takes baby step toward
scaling back its bond purchases" https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-minutes-include-some-
comments-about-potential-future-discussions-of-tapering-11621450612)
A number of Federal Reserve officials said at the central bank’s late April meeting that it could soon be
time to begin talking about talking about scaling back its massive asset purchases, according to minutes
of the discussion released Wednesday.
“A number of participants suggested that if the economy continued to make rapid progress toward the
committee’s goals, it might be appropriate at some point in upcoming meetings to begin discussing a
plan for adjusting the pace of asset purchases,” the minutes said.
While not a major step, economists said it suggests the Fed may start to talk about when to make a plan
in coming months.
“It was evidently a bit of a shot across the bow for the Treasury market. The passage came chock full of
qualifiers…but it serves as notice that the FOMC will not sit still forever,” said Stephen Stanley, chief
economist at Amherst Pierpont.
Since the Fed meeting, only one policy maker, Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan, has said publicly he
thought the economy would soon make enough progress to begin discussing pulling back its asset-
purchase program.
In addition to holding benchmark rates at a range between 0% and 0.25%, the Fed is buying $80 billion
of Treasurys and $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities each month to smooth financial market
conditions and support the economy. The central bank has said it wants to see “substantial forward
progress” before tapering these purchases. This is important because it would be the first step away
from an easy-policy stance that supported financial markets during the height of pandemic-inspired
instability back in March 2020.
Talk of a tapering has historically been a sensitive topic for investors since markets were roiled back in
2013, as then-Fed boss Ben Bernanke attempted to unwind the Fed’s accommodative asset purchases.
Back then, the suggestion of a reduction in bond purchases sent panic into global bond markets, and
sent the 10-year yield rising around 1.40 percentage points in the span of four months, and Powell & Co.
want to avoid a repeat of that episode.
Former New York Fed President William Dudley has said that the central bank can’t avoid upsetting the
market entirely when it first signals a pullback.
According to the minutes, “various” Fed officials said it would likely be “some time” before the economy
has met the “substantial further progress benchmark.”
“Many participants highlighted the importance of the committee clearly communicating its assessment
of progress toward its longer-run goals well in advance of the time when it could be judged substantial
enough to warrant a change in the pace of asset purchases,” the minutes said.
Last fall, the Fed adopted a new policy framework emphasizing that policy would be based on observed
progress — and not forecasts of economic outcomes.
During the April meeting, “a couple of participants commented on the risks of inflation pressures
building up to unwelcome levels before they become sufficiently evident to induce a policy reaction,”
according to the minutes.
But the 11 voting members of the Fed’s interest-rate committee weren’t as concerned, minutes showed.
While these officials recognized “the expected rebound in spending as the economy continued to
reopen was also likely to boost inflation temporarily, particularly if supply bottlenecks limited how
quickly production could respond to demand in the near term,” they also “viewed these increases in
prices as likely to have only transitory effects on inflation.”
Since the meeting, there has been unexpectedly strong inflation data in April and a weaker-than-
expected employment figures.
Michael Gapen, chief U.S. economist at Barclays, said because of the weak jobs data, “any discussion of
tapering is at least two meetings out, if not more.”
Many other economists think Fed Chairman Jerome Powell may signal talk of tapering in late August
during the Fed’s symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyo.
Economist and Fed adviser Diane Swonk tweeted that the minutes were the “beginning of the
beginning” of tapering talk.
Financial markets have become volatile, with stocks DJIA, 0.11% SPX, 0.16% sinking from recent record
highs, reflecting increasing sensitivity to pricing pressures and the Fed’s potential reaction to rising
inflation.
Market commentator Mohamed El-Erian has said investors are growing worried the Fed will be late to
react to higher inflation. And former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has forcefully argued the Fed
needs to adjust policy to account for the risk that the economy could overheat.
On Wednesday, two Fed officials said they were not ignoring risks of an overheated economy and would
be nimble about upcoming policy decisions.
The yield on the 10-year Treasury note TMUBMUSD10Y, 1.562% moved higher Wednesday after the
minutes were released.
2nc – uniqueness – perception
Companies increasingly concerned about inflation- future inflation locks in perception
that it’s here to stay
Kilgore 21 (Tomi, Marketwatch. May 17. "‘Inflation’ an earnings concern for the most companies in at
least 11 years" https://www.marketwatch.com/story/inflation-an-earnings-concern-for-the-most-
companies-in-at-least-11-years-11621276546)
The word “inflation” is being thrown around in post-earnings conference calls by the most companies in
at least 11 years, enough to set a fresh record, according to research provided by FactSet.
The companies are seeing from the ground up, what data from the top down have been showing. The
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics said that the rate of wholesale inflation jumped in April to the highest
level since the index was reformulated in 2009, and said consumer inflation rose to the highest level in
nearly 13 years.
From March 15 through May 14, FactSet said the 175 companies within the S&P 500 index SPX, 1.06%
that reported quarterly results mentioned “inflation” during their earnings calls, the highest overall
number going back to at least 2010, and on track to break the previous of 163 companies for the second
quarter of 2018.
Among things mentioned as drivers of inflation are increases in raw materials costs, as a result of rises in
commodities prices, and supply-and-demand dynamics, as demand has increased along with COVID-19-
related reopenings faster than supply chains have reopened, given labor and weather-related
disruptions.
The impact on consumers is likely to increase, as the passing of price increases to customers tends to lag
increases in wholesale prices.
FACTSET
Among sectors, those seeing the highest percentage of companies mentioning inflation were consumer
staples at 84% and materials at 75%. Meanwhile, industrials saw the total highest number of companies
mentioning inflation at 46, followed by consumer discretionary at 25 and financials at 22, FactSet Senior
Earnings analyst John Butters wrote in “FactSet Insight” blog post.
Read more: DuPont sees a big jump in inflation costs for the rest of the year.
It wasn’t just the most companies mentioning inflation in more than 10 years, the first quarter also
marked the largest year-over-year increase in companies using the I-word — up 116 companies — going
back to at least 2010, Butters wrote.
The record number of inflation mentions comes even with 42 of the S&P 500 companies, or 8.3%, still
having not reported results, so the actual number for the quarter will likely be higher, Butters said.
What could be of more interest to investors is what companies say about inflation in the second quarter,
as many, including the Federal Reserve, expect inflation pressures to be temporary.
“[T]he Fed seems convinced that the spike in inflation is transitory, and will subside as the year
progresses,” said William Lynch, director of investments at Hinsdale Associates Inc. “However, the trend
over the next few months bears watching as investors may have legitimate concerns that it may not be
temporary and interest rates could head higher as a result.”
2nc – recession internal link
Inflation tanks the economy- causes overheating and leads to recession

Miller 21 (Rich, Bloomberg Journalist. May 19. "Specter of 1960s Inflation Takeoff Haunts U.S.
Economy Today" https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-19/specter-of-1960s-inflation-
take-off-haunts-u-s-economy-today)
A newly-elected president promising to tackle racial injustice and build a better and fairer economy and
society. A Federal Reserve chairman who’d voiced satisfaction with the course of monetary policy the
previous year. A sharply accelerating economy with an inflation rate that’s been below 2% for years.
2021? No, 1965, a year that marked the start of a years-long climb in inflation to double-digit levels the
following decade. That’s an upward trend that some experts fear could be about to begin today, as a
super-charged federal budget combines with a lax monetary posture to once again overheat the
economy .
Consumer prices rise at fastest annual pace since 2008
“If we do not have a recession that exerts disinflation, the odds are better-than-even that inflation will
exceed 3% over the next five years,” former Treasury Secretary and paid Bloomberg contributor
Lawrence Summers said. “They’re one in four that we will have at least a year of inflation above 5%.”
A marked speed-up in inflation -- it’s averaged just 1.5% over the past 10 years based on the Fed’s
favorite measure -- would damage the U.S. economy , robbing consumers of the buying power needed
to keep growth going. It would also undercut buoyant financial markets by putting upward pressure on
interest rates.
Investors got a hint of what might be in store last week, with news that consumer prices jumped 0.8% in
April alone. While some increase had been expected, the size of the run-up surprised forecasters inside
and outside the Fed, raising fresh questions about consensus projections that inflation will ebb after a
temporary rise on the back of a re-opening of the economy.
Minutes of the Fed’s April 27-28 policy meeting will be released at 2 p.m. Washington time and could
shed more light on the internal debate over price pressures and potential overheating.
‘Fairly Relaxed’
“I’m fairly relaxed but not as relaxed as I was,” said former Fed Vice Chairman and Princeton University
professor Alan Blinder. “I’m moving a bit in the more alarmed direction, but not to the Summers camp.”
The argument of those who worry about a rerun of the 1960’s rests with the simple law of supply and
demand.
Just as then-President Lyndon Baines Johnson did in 1965 with his Great Society spending programs,
current commander in chief Joe Biden wants to use the federal budget to reshape America. He’s already
won congressional approval of a $1.9 trillion package and is seeking some $4 trillion more for an
economy that is already booming coming out of the pandemic.
Some economists also see disturbing parallels in Fed policy between now and then. They worry that the
Fed’s new strategic framework -- it’s openly seeking higher inflation -- risks letting price increases get
out of control, just as occurred more than a half century ago.
While then-Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin had a nasty confrontation with Johnson at the end
of 1965 after the central bank raised interest rates, economists generally fault him for not acting more
forcefully to restrain a rise in inflation to 4.9% at the start of 1970.
The risk is that a potent mix of super-loose fiscal and monetary policies will again end up straining the
economy’s capacity to produce enough supply to keep up with the elevated demand, leading to
widespread price increases.
“History doesn’t necessarily have to repeat, but the fact that it happened before does mean it can
happen again,” said Peter Hooper, global head of economic research for Deutsche Bank AG.
He sees at least a one-in-five possibility of inflation rising to 3% or more over the next few years,
markedly above the average 2% target that Fed Chairman Jerome Powell and his colleagues adopted last
year.
Powell Push Back
Powell has pushed back on concerns that the central bank will repeat its inflationary mistakes.
“We’re all very familiar, at the Fed, with the history of the 1960s and ‘70s,” he told reporters April 28
after the central bank reaffirmed its ultra-easy policy of near zero interest rates and massive bond
purchases. “We know that our job is to achieve 2% inflation over time.”
White House officials also have played down worries about overheating and have portrayed the
administration’s push for more spending as long-term investments rather than short-term fillips to
demand. But they’ve made clear that it’s the politically-independent Fed’s job to make sure price hikes
don’t run amuck.
Powell is betting that structural forces that became ingrained in the economy after the inflationary
1970’s will help limit price pressures as growth takes off.
“We think that the inflation dynamics that we’ve seen around the world for a quarter of a century are
essentially intact,” he told lawmakers in March. “The U.S. has had low inflation for some time, and we
think those dynamics haven’t gone away.”
Those dynamics include increased globalization -- and the cheaper-priced imports it brings -- waning
worker bargaining power, and well-anchored inflation expectations. If inflation is seen as staying
subdued, that can act as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy: Workers don’t feel compelled to press for
outsized wage increases while companies are more inclined to cut costs than raise prices.
Summers said he’s “very concerned” about the inflation outlook and suggested that the Fed’s faith in
well-moored expectations may end up misplaced.
“I can’t understand how they can say that this is the biggest policy revolution in 45 years since the Great
Society and the Fed is having the most radical change in its operating model in a generation, but we
know from experience that expectations are anchored,” he said.
While he doesn’t see anything like the economic overheating Summers fears, Blinder said he wouldn’t
be surprised if inflation rises too high for the Fed’s liking sometime in the next few years. That could
prompt a reaction from the central bank that inadvertently tips the economy into what is a “hopefully
mild” recession.
“The Summers view -- which you can summarize as saying there is a hell of a lot of aggregate demand
pushing on less aggregate supply -- is not completely wrong,” he said. “There is a point there.”
2nc – wage inflation link
Labor shortages are coming now- plan causes wage inflation and derails the recovery
Fickenscher 21 (Lisa, New York Post business reporter. May 12. "Worker shortage threatening to
derail US economic recovery: experts" https://nypost.com/2021/05/12/worker-shortage-threatening-to-
derail-us-economic-recovery-experts/)
Small and big businesses alike are struggling to hire workers nationwide — and experts say the problem
is putting a damper on the US economy’s recovery.
Starting next week, workers at more than 600 Sheetz convenience stores stretching from Pennsylvania
to North Carolina will be earning as much as $18.50 an hour — $4 an hour more than they had been
making at the start of the year.
Nevertheless, like thousands of other companies — from Chipotle and McDonald’s to small-time
contractors scrambling to meet booming construction demand — Sheetz is not entirely certain that its
$50 million in planned pay hikes will be enough to convince workers to apply for jobs.
“We are definitely behind this year in our hiring,” said Sheetz owner and president Travis Sheetz, who is
scrambling to hire 2,000 more workers for the summer travel season. “Business is good and it’s going to
get better in the summer. We see those two things colliding.”
The problem is threatening to put a lid on the nation’s nascent recovery from the pandemic-induced
recession, as workers continue to opt for generous COVID-19 unemployment benefits — including the
$300 weekly handout from the federal government — amid lingering concerns including health and
safety, adequate hours and access to childcare, experts warn.
“Small business owners are seeing a growth in sales but are stunted by not having enough workers,”
said Bill Dunkelberg, chief economist for the National Federation of Independent Business. “Finding
qualified employees remains the biggest challenge for small businesses and is slowing economic
growth.”
The US Labor Department said this week that job openings in March swelled to a record 8.1 million —
the highest number recorded since the feds began compiling the data more than 20 years ago — even as
the ranks of unemployed neared 10 million people. The NFIB, meanwhile, found that 44 percent of small
businesses say they have job openings that they can’t fill. That’s the highest level ever, and double the
historic average of 22 percent.
Most openings are at restaurants, retailers and travel related companies, according to government data.
The largest increases in job vacancies at the end of March were in accommodations and food services —
which grew by 185,000 new openings followed by 155,000 new openings in state and local public
education and 81,000 new openings in the arts, entertainment and recreation.
With such disparities, the US job market isn’t likely to return to full employment — meaning an
unemployment rate of 3.5 percent — until early 2023, according to Mark Zandi, chief economist at
Moody’s Analytics. In the meantime, businesses looking to attract employees in the coming months
could be forced to shell out even higher hourly pay rates, he predicts.
“You could see wages accelerate further because businesses are opening,” Zandi said. “The parents who
are at home with their kids may be at home until September.”
At 6.1 percent last month, the unemployment rate has shrunk dramatically since its 14.7 percent peak in
April 2020. Nevertheless, pushing it down further has become a stubborn obstacle for businesses like
restaurants and hotels which have struggled to hire enough people to keep up with rising demand as
COVID-19 restrictions ease.
In big cities like New York, the $15 minimum wage effectively has been nudged up to $18 per hour.
That’s the average in Brooklyn, where food-related businesses and childcare services are desperately
short-handed, according to Ruel Minott, recruitment and training manager of the Brooklyn Chamber of
Commerce.
One challenge Big Apple restaurants are facing is that a large segment of their labor pool — Broadway
actors — has temporarily left the city until Broadway reopens in the fall. Minott said one eatery in
Brooklyn just landed a baker only after offering a $30 hourly wage — $10 more than what it had been
paying previously.
“I was surprised that only two people replied to the ad,” Minott told The Post.
Despite increased pressure to hire workers, many employers have sought to avoid permanent wage
increases by instead offering one-time perks such as referral and signing bonuses. After the 2009
recession, it took nine years for wages to rise, notes Andrew Challenger of Challenger, Gray and
Christmas, a Chicago-based executive-placement firm.
“We have not seen a rise in wages yet, despite the fact that employers are finding it hard to get
employees,” Challenger said.
Some states are not waiting until September to see whether employees are ready to come back to work.
Republican governors of at least nine states including Arkansas, Montana and South Carolina recently
said they would prematurely end the additional benefits for their constituents to help struggling
employers in their states.
In the meantime the Sheetz chain, which says it is permanently boosting its hourly wages, also notes
that one dollar of the $4 increase will disappear by Sept. 23, when the $300 in federal unemployment
benefits ends.
“We need to get people in place now before the summer starts,” Sheetz said, referring to the extra buck
as a “summer stimulus” wage.
2nc – at: fed solves
Fed can’t solve investor concerns- new policy rubric means they can’t prevent
runaway inflation
Smith & Stubbington 21 (Colby, US economics editor. Tommy, Capital Markets Correspondent. "The
summer of inflation: will central banks and investors hold their nerve?" May 14.
https://www.ft.com/content/414e8e47-e904-42ac-80ea-5d6c38282cac)
After three decades as a bond investor, Jim Leaviss has witnessed plenty of false alarms over the return
of one of the biggest debt market nemeses: inflation. But as his screen flashed with Wednesday’s US
consumer price index figures — showing a 4.2 per cent annual rise — he felt the stirrings of a new era in
financial markets.
“It’s always been right to be sceptical when someone says ‘this is the year that inflation comes back’. But
for the first time you can say this time is different,” says Leaviss. “The pandemic might be the systemic
earthquake that changes the inflation outlook we have been used to for the past 30 years.”
A summer burst of inflation was always inevitable once lockdown measures began to ease: a year ago
the spread of Covid-19 had crushed economies around the world, sending commodity prices
plummeting and even pushing the cost of a barrel of oil in the US below zero.
Central bankers — particularly at the US Federal Reserve — have been at pains to insist the current bout
of price rises is temporary, and will not push them to an early unwind of the massive monetary stimulus
actions they launched last year to combat the fallout from the pandemic.
Those assurances, however, have not deterred a growing number of investors from becoming unnerved
that a groundswell of deeper inflationary forces may soon test these policymakers.
A prolonged bout of inflation could hamper the post-pandemic recovery, potentially forcing the Fed
and other central banks to quickly tighten its monetary screws . Also at stake is one of the most
remarkable rebounds in financial history, which has seen equities and other risk assets leap from one all-
time high to the next thanks to historically low borrowing costs.
Investors this week got an inkling of the potential pain to come, with the technology-heavy Nasdaq
Composite among the indices falling in response to this week’s inflation data, before recouping some of
those losses.
“It’s just one data point, but it’s the first blowout that shows inflation is really hitting consumers,” says
Leaviss, who is head of public fixed income at M&G Investments. “Yes, it’s a reflection of where we were
a year ago, and we know there are supply disruptions. But there comes a time when you can’t explain all
of this away as one-offs.”
Before Wednesday’s CPI report — which Rick Rieder, BlackRock’s chief investment officer of global fixed
income, called “jaw-dropping” — inflationary signals were already beginning to flash.
Sonal Desai of Franklin Templeton says that now, ‘inflation may have more legs’, while BlackRock’s Rick
Rieder called Wednesday’s CPI report ‘jaw-dropping’
The cost of commodities critical to the global economy, including copper and iron ore, has soared . A
semiconductor chip shortage has hampered new automobile production worldwide, driving buyers to
seek out alternatives in the pre-owned market. Prices for used vehicles rose 10 per cent on a month-by-
month basis in April, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Home prices have rocketed higher as
well, alongside swelling lumber prices. A startling shortage of workers has emerged in several countries,
too.
“It is not just oil. It is not just copper. It is lumber. It is the fact that people cannot find workers. All of
this together makes me think that inflation may have more legs,” says Sonal Desai, chief investment
officer at Franklin Templeton’s fixed income group.
“There is an entire generation of traders who have grown up investing in the post-global financial crisis
world of no inflation,” she adds. “People shouldn’t underestimate how uncertain things will look if we
are entering a new paradigm.”
Dropping the pre-emptive approach
Since Paul Volcker raised US interest rates to a record 20 per cent in the early 1980s, controlling inflation
has been woven deep into the DNA of the world’s central bankers.
With their inflation-targeting frameworks, these policymakers tended to act swiftly by raising interest
rates at the merest whiff of a return to the inflationary 1970s. That held true in the years following the
global financial crisis of 2008-09: Jean-Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank in 2011 and the
Fed’s Janet Yellen in 2015 both started raising rates to stave off ascendant consumer prices.
Jay Powell, the current Fed chair, has taken the Fed in a different direction — culminating in August’s
shift in the policy framework to explicitly tolerate periods of higher inflation in recognition that
premature tightening by the central bank in the past along with fiscal austerity had prolonged the
previous recovery.
Most other central banks have yet to mimic this so-called “average inflation targeting” but have
nevertheless broken new ground with their pandemic responses. The current bond-buying programmes
of the ECB and the Bank of England dwarf earlier ones in their scale.
“Central banks seem to have dropped their pre-emptive approach for dealing with inflation,” says Mark
Dowding, chief investment officer at BlueBay Asset Management. “Instead, policymakers seem to be
cheering it on from the sidelines.”
Fed governor Lael Brainard has urged patience in the face of a ‘transitory surge’ in inflation, while
policymakers at the ECB, including German economist Isabel Schnabel, have dismissed near-term upticks
Few would argue this monetary largesse on its own should fire up prices, especially with deflationary
impulses such as ageing demographics and technological innovation in play. Rather, it is how
governments have responded to this crisis that has been transformative. Borrowing levels have
exploded throughout the developed world, and the spending taps are still open.
The US has gone furthest with Joe Biden’s $1.9tn stimulus programme enacted in March and the
promise of $4tn more in infrastructure and social safety net investments over a decade, if he can get
sufficient congressional support. Even the more fiscally cautious eurozone has joined in with the bloc’s
€750bn recovery fund.
Little wonder then that market-based inflation expectations really began to climb following Democrats’
legislative victories in January, which handed power over government spending to Biden’s party. The
two-year break-even rate, which is a popular proxy for future inflation and is derived from prices of US
inflation-protected government securities, now sits above 2.8 per cent, while the 10-year measure has
risen to 2.5 per cent.
“People underestimate the role that austerity played in the deflationary pressures of the last decade,”
says Karen Ward, chief market strategist for Europe at JPMorgan Asset Management.
Testing the Fed
Fed officials have so far brushed aside any concerns that bottlenecks in supply chains tied to the
reopening of economies and enormous fiscal support will compound into something that compels the
central bank to waver on its pledge to keep policy ultra-accommodative until its newfound goal of a
more inclusive recovery is achieved.
Powell was adamant at the April meeting that the Fed has not yet seen “substantial further progress”
towards its inflation and employment targets to warrant an adjustment to its $120bn monthly asset
purchase programme.
Fed governor Lael Brainard on Tuesday echoed these remarks, urging patience in the face of a
“transitory surge” in inflation — a message also delivered by vice-chair Richard Clarida this week. Even
policymakers at the ECB, including German economist Isabel Schnabel, have dismissed near-term
upticks.
Market pricing for future interest rates reflect the Fed’s success so far in quelling concerns about its
ability to control consumer prices. One popular barometer, eurodollar futures, indicates that the central
bank will begin raising rates by early 2023. While that is roughly a year earlier than the Fed’s most
recent projections, it does not suggest widespread fears about runaway inflation.
“We are in a new era with the Fed,” says Anne Mathias, a senior strategist at Vanguard. “They have a
new reaction function . . . [and] this is their first trip around the track with it.”
Investors lament, however, that they have been left guessing not only how the Fed defines “transitory”,
but also the specific parameters that motivate a change in policy. That leaves the Fed susceptible to a
communications blunder as inflationary pressures build this year, according to Vincent Reinhart, a
former Fed economist who now serves as chief economist at Mellon.
“The committee is diverse and inflection points are tough,” he says. “Jay Powell is essentially saying, ‘we
are going to be driving at top speed into the turn, but trust me, we know when to start turning the
wheel’.”
“There will be some committee members who will have white knuckles at that point and will worry,”
Reinhart warned. “That then feeds into the inflation jitters.”
Investor angst
Wednesday’s US consumer price figures landed in a market that was already anxious about inflation. A
bond sell-off that had been on pause for two months briefly resumed this week, pushing yields in the
eurozone to their highest level in two years. US Treasuries also weakened, although yields remain below
their March highs and are still close to historic lows. After initially spiking to 1.7 per cent, the 10-year
note, a benchmark for financial assets across the globe, fell back towards 1.6 per cent by the end of the
week.
Some investors already sense an overreaction. “The market response is odd,” says Gurpreet Gill, a fixed-
income strategist at Goldman Sachs Asset Management. “Everyone’s been talking about inflation for
months. It’s been telegraphed.”
But the sellers are far more worried about a long-lasting pick-up in price growth than the current spike.
Inflation is poison for bonds, eroding the fixed interest payments they offer.
“There’s quite a lot of complacency in this idea that inflation is transitory, and I think that’s born from
the fact that a lot of people in financial markets haven’t ever seen any inflation at all,” says BlueBay’s
Dowding.
Jay Powell, the Fed chair, has shifted its policy framework to explicitly tolerate periods of higher inflation
© Jim Lo Scalzo/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
The Fed’s determination to stay the course could also see long-term inflation expectations rise even
further — leading to sharper rate rises down the line.
“If you are going to be intentionally late, it means you could have to be more aggressive on the back end
of this,” says BlackRock’s Rieder.
Recommended
FT News Briefing podcast9 min listen
Consumer price data stokes inflation fears, US labour shortage
That prospect is especially worrying for stock markets, which have surged to new heights led by gains
from high-growth companies such as US tech giants. Those companies are valued based on their earning
potential far into the future. Investors value those earnings relative to the “risk-free” rate they can earn
by buying bonds, so higher yields in effect make them worth less today.
“The last few years have been great for investors because everything went up — you gained on your
equities and your bonds,” says Mohamed El-Erian, chief economic adviser at Allianz and former co-
investment chief at bond group Pimco. “Now you risk losing money on both sides. It’s a horrible
environment, and I’m glad I’m not managing money.”
2nc – trade good
lessens the intensity and quantity of wars---best and most recent studies prove
Julian Adorney 13, economic historian, entrepreneur, and contributor for the Ludwig von Mises
Institute. He’s citing Professor McDonald who teaches courses on international relations theory,
international political economy, and international security at University of Texas at Austin. (, Foundation
for Economic Education, “Want Peace? Promote Free Trade”, 10/15,
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/want-peace-promote-free-trade
Frédéric Bastiat famously claimed that “ if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will." Bastiat argued that free trade between
countries could reduce international conflict because trade forges connections between nations and
gives each country an incentive to avoid war with its trading partners. If every nation were an economic
island, the lack of positive interaction created by trade could leave more room for conflict . Two hundred years
after Bastiat, libertarians take this idea as gospel. Unfortunately, not everyone does. But as recent research shows, the historical evidence
confirms Bastiat’s famous claim. To Trade or to Raid In “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” professor Patrick J. McDonald,
from the University of Texas at Austin, empirically tested whether greater levels of protectionism in a country (tariffs, quotas, etc.)
would increase the probability of international conflict in that nation. He used a tool called dyads to analyze every country’s
international relations from 1960 until 2000. A dyad is the interaction between one country and another country: German and French
relations would be one dyad, German and Russian relations would be a second, French and Australian relations would be a third. He further broke this down into
dyad-years; the relations between Germany and France in 1965 would be one dyad-year, the relations between France and Australia in 1973 would be a second,
and so on. Using these dyad-years, McDonald analyzed the behavior of every country in the world for the past 40
years. His analysis showed a negative correlation between free trade and conflict: The more freely a
country trades, the fewer wars it engages in. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to invade
and less likely to be invaded. The Causal Arrow Of course, this finding might be a matter of confusing correlation
for causation. Maybe countries engaging in free trade fight less often for some other reason, like the fact that they tend also to be more democratic.
Democratic countries make war less often than empires do. But McDonald controls for these variables. Controlling for a state’s political structure
is important, because democracies and republics tend to fight less than authoritarian regimes. McDonald also controlled for a country’s
economic growth, because countries in a recession are more likely to go to war than those in a boom, often in order to
distract their people from their economic woes. McDonald even controlled for factors like geographic proximity : It’s easier for
Germany and France to fight each other than it is for the United States and China, because troops in the former group only have to cross a shared border. The
takeaway from McDonald’s analysis is that protectionism can actually lead to conflict. McDonald found
that a country in the bottom 10 percent for protectionism (meaning it is less protectionist than 90
percent of other countries) is 70 percent less likely to engage in a new conflict (either as invader or as
target) than one in the top 10 percent for protectionism. Protectionism and War Why does protectionism lead to
conflict, and why does free trade help to prevent it? The answers, though well-known to classical liberals, are worth mentioning. First,
trade creates international goodwill . If Chinese and American businessmen trade on a regular basis,
both sides benefit. And mutual benefit disposes people to look for the good in each other. Exchange of
goods also promotes an exchange of cultures . For decades, Americans saw China as a mysterious country with strange, even hostile
values. But in the 21st century, trade between our nations has increased markedly, and both countries know each
other a little better now. iPod-wielding Chinese teenagers are like American teenagers, for example. They’re not terribly mysterious. Likewise, the
Chinese understand democracy and American consumerism more than they once did. The countries may not find overlap in all of each
other’s values, but trade has helped us to at least understand each other. Trade helps to humanize the
people that you trade with. And it’s tougher to want to go to war with your human trading partners than
with a country you see only as lines on a map. Second, trade gives nations an economic incentive to
avoid war. If Nation X sells its best steel to Nation Y, and its businessmen reap plenty of profits in exchange, then businessmen on both sides are going to
oppose war. This was actually the case with Germany and France right before World War I. Germany sold steel to France, and German businessmen were firmly
opposed to war. They only grudgingly came to support it when German ministers told them that the war would only last a few short months. German steel had a
strong incentive to oppose war, and if the situation had progressed a little differently—or if the German government had been a little more realistic about the
timeline of the war—that incentive might have kept Germany out of World War I. Third, protectionism promotes hostility . This is why
free trade, not just aggregate trade (which could be accompanied by high tariffs and quotas), leads to peace. If the United States
imposes a tariff on Japanese automobiles, that tariff hurts Japanese businesses. It creates hostility in
Japan toward the United States. Japan might even retaliate with a tariff on U.S. steel, hurting U.S. steel makers and angering our government,
which would retaliate with another tariff. Both countries now have an excuse to leverage nationalist feelings to gain
support at home ; that makes outright war with the other country an easier sell, should it come to that.
In socioeconomic academic circles, this is called the Richardson process of reciprocal and increasing
hostilities; the United States harms Japan, which retaliates, causing the United States to retaliate again. History shows that the Richardson
process can easily be applied to protectionism. For instance, in the 1930s, industrialized nations raised
tariffs and trade barriers; countries eschewed multilateralism and turned inward. These decisions led to
rising hostilities, which helped set World War II in motion . These factors help explain why free trade
leads to peace, and protectionism leads to more conflict. Free Trade and Peace One final note: McDonald’s analysis
shows that taking a country from the top 10 percent for protectionism to the bottom 10 percent will
reduce the probability of future conflict by 70 percent . He performed the same analysis for the democracy of a country and showed
that taking a country from the top 10 percent (very democratic) to the bottom 10 percent (not democratic) would only reduce conflict by 30 percent. Democracy is a
well-documented deterrent: The more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to resort to international conflict. But reducing
protectionism, according to McDonald, is more than twice as effective at reducing conflict than
becoming more democratic. Here in the United States, we talk a lot about spreading democracy. We invaded Iraq partly to “spread democracy.” A
New York Times op-ed by Professor Dov Ronen of Harvard University claimed that “the United States has been waging an ideological campaign to spread democracy
around the world” since 1989. One of the justifications for our international crusade is to make the world a safer place. Perhaps we
should spend a
little more time spreading free trade instead. That might really lead to a more peaceful world.
Communal linkages stop war

Alan Dowd 14, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, heads the Center for America’s Purpose, also
holds senior fellow posts with the American Security Council Foundation and Fraser Institute,
“Capitalizing on the Capitalist Peace”, 7/9/14, The American, magazine of the American Enterprise
Institute, http://www.american.com/archive/2014/july/rehabbing-broken-nations
If Americans have learned anything from their well-intentioned, costly efforts in the unforgiving lands of Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s that
democratic elections do not ensure freedom. Nor do democratic elections necessarily promote stability, as the post-Arab Spring chaos reminds
us. But a new Fraser Institute study helps quantify how building
up free-market institutions and promoting economic
freedom can strengthen societies by increasing social trust and reducing the risk of war .¶ Starting from the
premise that “adequate finance is a key ingredient for organizing violence against a state,” Indra de Soysa and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati
argue that “economic repression and market distortions create conditions that make armed conflict
feasible.” These factors “supply the means, motive and opportunity for groups to challenge states because economic distortions spawn
underground economies that form the organizational bases of insurgency.” The expansion of free markets and free economic
exchange, on the other hand, “marginalizes violence because it binds people meaningfully in a way suited to
addressing the collective dilemmas stemming from violence.”¶ “With economic freedom, people gain
when they produce goods and services others desire in mutually beneficial exchange ,” the report concludes.
“People from other groups become customers, employees, employers, suppliers .” Together, they lay
the building blocks for social trust and become essential ingredients in economic expansion — rather
than enemies in a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources. In other words, economic freedom raises the
costs of violence — and helps remove the incentives and benefits of civil disorder.¶ Of course, others have pointed out the limitations of
democracy in promoting stability and prosperity — and even the dangers of prematurely opening up a society to democratic governance. For
instance, Robert Kaplan observed in his 2000 book The Coming Anarchy that “Democracies do not always make societies more civil — but they
do always mercilessly expose the health of the societies in which they operate … If a society is not in reasonable health, democracy can be not
only risky but disastrous.”¶ He wrote those words two years before America began its nation-building project in Afghanistan, four years before
Iraq’s postwar war, and more than a decade before Egypt descended into its spiral of re-revolution. ¶ “Democracy,” Kaplan noted, “emerges
only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements.” These include the rule of law, stable institutions, economic freedom, and a civil
society that protects minority rights as much as it respects majority rule.¶ There is also an application here for international relations. Just as
the spread of economic freedom creates incentives for cooperation within nation-states and disincentives for conflict between sub-state
groups, it lessens the likelihood of war between nation-states by raising the costs of war. As political scientist Erik
Gartzke noted in 2005, “For six decades, developed nations have not fought each other .” This “capitalist peace” is
historically unusual given that “powerful nations are the most war prone.” However, nations that embrace economic freedom
— even those with different approaches to governance, politics, and religion — are learning to “capitalize on the capitalist
peace … through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose .”¶ Thus,
the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China would seem to be lower than it was between the United States and the Soviet
Union. After all, China needs the U.S. market, and the United States needs China’s cash — and wants China’s
goods. Beijing owns $1.3 trillion in U.S. government debt. Annual U.S.-China trade is $562 billion. There was no such connective tissue
between the United States and the USSR
Best historical evidence

Erik Gartzke 14, is professor of political science at the University of Essex and associate professor of
political science at the University of California at San Diego. Yonatan Lupu is assistant professor of
political science at George Washington University, Washington Post, “What World War I can tell us
about international commerce and war today”, 4/1/14,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/01/what-world-war-i-can-tell-us-
about-international-commerce-and-war-today
The growth of international economic exchange in Europe before the war was uneven. Much of Western
Europe belonged to a highly interdependent subsystem of states in which crises arose but were resolved
peacefully. By contrast, economic interdependence was much shallower in most of Eastern Europe and
parts of Central Europe. The Ottoman Empire, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and several other newly
independent Balkan states traded relatively little with each other . Unlike in the interdependent West,
crises in this region tended to escalate to war. It is no coincidence that World War I was sparked among
the non-interdependent states in Eastern Europe. Economic ties played an important role in averting escalation
to major warfare in the crises that led up to the Great War , especially in the first and second Balkan wars. These crises, however,
produced the need for the more economically integrated countries, most importantly Germany and Russia, to demonstrate an increasing resolve to support their
weaker, less interdependent, allies, Austria-Hungary and Serbia .
Alliances tightened after Germany and Russia took turns
backing down under the pressure of war in previous crises. Tighter alliances increased the leverage of
Balkan allies, but only by in effect handing the foreign policies of the interdependent powers over to
countries that were less well integrated into the world economy, and thus had fewer reasons not to
engage in war. Economic integration could not forestall conflict where integration had yet to occur. And
a partial European network of economic interdependence could not prevent war , once started, from
spreading through the competing network of alliance commitments, making it more difficult for Western
powers to take advantage of available economic linkages to their greatest pacific effect. The world is
different today from 1914, but there are enough similarities that it is tempting to draw on historical
analogy. U.S. hegemony is on the wane, much as British hegemony was at the close of the 19th century. Rising powers were and are creating a more complex
set of political dynamics, even as strong trading relations among the most prominent nations led and lead to liberal optimism, and realist skepticism, about peace.
Tensions exist and existed between status quo nations and those nations that perceive that they have been denied their rightful status as they rise in power in world
affairs. A naval arms race enshrouded Europe for the first two decades of the 20th century, much as one appears to be developing in Asia today. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan recently compared Sino-Japanese tensions to relations between Great
Britain and Germany a century ago, citing strong trade relationships between both pairs of nations as well as the onset of world war. Will
economic interdependence in Asia today again fail to prevent a major war? The size and organization of
existing trade networks suggest that Asia, like western European powers in the decades before World
War I, is more likely to manage secondary crises without bloodshed. If interdependence works as theorized,
disputes such as those over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are more likely to be occasions of considerable
posturing and no actual force. While no one likes to be the loser, excessive brinksmanship is not a
practical strategy in the world that Japan, China and other developed nations inhabit today . Discretion is
likely to rule these relationships, even if there is occasional grumbling from those on the short end of
the stick. There is much to gain from tough talk, but more to lose by failing to pull back from the brink.
The larger risk to international stability today comes from nations cast in the role of the Eastern
European powers a century ago. Lacking economic inhibitions and with no other methods to advance
themselves, sovereigns in some countries will find it useful to heighten international tensions. North
Korea is a prime example. Russia is on the cusp. Reliance on energy exports rather than a more diversified trading base has allowed President Putin to
bluster more often and occasionally to engage in naked aggression, if only against minor powers so far. Fortunately, fewer of these countries
exist today and most are on the periphery of the international system, not near its center. Still, the risk with
North Korea, Russia and others is much the same as that of Eastern European powers in 1914. Alliance ties produce their own logic of (non-economic)
interdependence. Alliance ties can be forged in part because interdependent states find it difficult signal their resolve to fight. Nations with no wish for war can be
drawn into contests simply because abandonment is not a viable option, shifting discretion to client states. The effectiveness of economic ties in producing or failing
to produce peace is again, as it was a century ago, not so much about economics as it is about alliance commitments to nations with no such investment in stability.
The relative scarcity of such relationships offers promise today, and hope that interdependence will prove more successful in
fostering peace this time around.
**politics disad
2nc – Biden link
Any infrastructure bill will be close but Biden pushing gets it through- plan uses up
Biden’s infrastructure-specific political capital
Nobles 6/11 (Ryan, CNN Congressional Correspondent. "Here's what we know about the bipartisan
infrastructure deal" https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/10/politics/infrastructure-deal-announced-10-
senators/index.html)
A bipartisan group of 10 senators announced Thursday they have reached a deal on a $1.2 trillion
infrastructure package, the most significant development yet in negotiations over a key priority of the
Biden administration, but it still faces serious obstacles from skeptics in both parties.
"Our group -- comprised of 10 Senators, 5 from each party -- has worked in good faith and reached a
bipartisan agreement on a realistic, compromise framework to modernize our nation's infrastructure
and energy technologies. This investment would be fully paid for and not include tax increases," the
senators said in a joint statement.
Here's how far apart the White House and GOP are on infrastructure
The initial reception from the White House was positive.
Senior White House staff and President Joe Biden's jobs cabinet will work with the bipartisan Senate
group behind a new infrastructure proposal, according to White House spokesman Andrew Bates.
However, he cautioned that "questions need to be addressed, particularly around the details of both
policy and pay-fors, among other matters."
Here's what we know so far:
What's in the deal?
While the group didn't publicly reveal specifics of the agreement, several sources tell CNN they crafted a
package that includes:
$1.2 trillion of spending over eight years
$974 billion spent over the first five years
The plan calls for $579 billion dollars of new spending.
The spending will be focused on core, physical infrastructure.
The plan will be paid for without tax hikes.
Many of the specific details still need to be ironed out.
The obstacles
While this deal is an important first step, the negotiations still have a long way to go before becoming
reality. Liberal Democrats in the Senate in particular have spent recent days urging their more centrist
colleagues to move on from trying to win Republican support, and instead push for a partisan plan that
can pass through reconciliation.
Reconciliation only requires 50 senators to advance the plan, unlike most other legislation, which needs
60 votes. While the bipartisan group of negotiators contains five Republicans, that's still five GOP votes
short -- and that's if all 50 members of the Democratic caucus vote year. Liberal members of the Senate
complained about the bipartisan group's negotiations this week urging Democrats to go at it alone.
"Let's face it. It's time to move forward," Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a Massachusetts Democrat, told CNN
regarding the bipartisan group's negotiations. "The Republicans have held us up long enough."
And that's to say nothing of the House, where Democrats also hold a very narrow majority.
White House reaction
The new money in the agreement could represent slightly more than half of Biden's initial physical
infrastructure proposal and a senior administration official told CNN that makes it worth exploring. The
lack of tax increases doesn't make it a nonstarter, the official added, saying that potentially acceptable
pay-fors that the White House still considers in play are "user fees" on corporations, not individuals, and
tougher IRS enforcement.
The green energy revolution is coming -- with or without help from Washington
The green energy revolution is coming -- with or without help from Washington
The efforts of the group, made up of moderate members of both parties, took on new importance after
Biden broke off talks with Sen. Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia, a Republican who had been
empowered by GOP leadership to negotiate with the White House on behalf of the conference. The
senators had been negotiating behind closed doors for several weeks before announcing they had come
to an agreement.
Getting White House buy-in will be important. While many Democrats expressed concerns that their
party's negotiators were giving up too much in the talks, if the President endorses the plan it could
force many to fall in line. But navigating razor thin margins in both the Senate and House could prove
dicey. Progressives in both chambers are insistent tax hikes on wealthy corporations and spending on
climate change initiatives be included in the final package. If they walk away from the deal, it will require
more Republicans to vote for the package.
"Earlier today, White House staff were briefed by Democratic Senators working on the bipartisan
agreement on infrastructure," White House spokesman Bates said in his statement. "The President
appreciates the Senators' work to advance critical investments we need to create good jobs, prepare for
our clean energy future, and compete in the global economy."
Who's in the group?
Thursday's announcement came from a group of 10 senators who have become the primary negotiators
after talks between Capito and Biden fell through. That includes:
Democrats:
Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia
Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire

Sen. Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona
Sen. Jon Tester of Montana
Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia
Republicans:
Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana
Sen. Susan Collins of Maine
Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska
Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio
Sen. Mitt Romney of Utah
What's next?
Expect this group to continue to hammer out the details in the coming days, particularly while Biden is
on his overseas trip. White House contributions are primarily expected to be from aides who are not
traveling with Biden, such as White House Chief of Staff Ron Klain and director of Legislative Affairs
Louisa Terrell.
Exclusive: US businesses warn crumbling infrastructure is hurting the economy
Lawmakers have eyed the July 4 holiday as a key time period for making progress on a deal, but an exact
deadline has not been specified as Hill and White House negotiators wanted to allow enough time for a
deal to emerge. The bipartisan deal makers acknowledged they had work to do, but vowed to work to
convince their colleagues this proposal offers their best hope of getting something done.
"We are discussing our approach with our respective colleagues, and the White House, and remain
optimistic that this can lay the groundwork to garner broad support from both parties and meet
America's infrastructure needs," the group said.
2nc – water link
Plan forces horse-trading that hurts Bidens’ agenda
Ooska 21 (OOSKANews. Water News. Water Intelligence. Water Insight. April 26. We are specialist,
independent publishers of international water sector news and intelligence, informing senior executives
who make policy and investment strategy decisions where timely water-related knowledge and insight
are critical. “OOSKA”?? - the word "OOSKA" is a phonetic spelling of the Gaelic word for water - “uisge”
in Scotland and "uisce" in Ireland! "Biden's First 100 Days Of Water From Lead Piping To Climate Change,
New Water Diplomacy At Home And Abroad" https://www.ooskanews.com/story/2021/04/bidens-first-
100-days-water)
Hours after his inauguration, US president Joe Biden signed an executive order for the US to rejoin the
Paris climate agreement. Seven days later, he signed a further slew of orders under a shared banner of
“tackling climate change, creating jobs and restoring scientific integrity”, with water featuring high on
the agenda.
He said: “Today is ‘Climate Day’ at the White House - which means that today is ‘Jobs Day’ at the White
House. We’re talking about American innovation, American products, American labour. And we’re
talking about the health of our families and cleaner water, cleaner air, and cleaner communities.”
Biden went on to lay out his vision for putting “millions of Americans to work modernising our water
systems”, promising to “properly manage lands and waterways in ways that allow us to protect,
preserve them”.
Describing so-called “fenceline communities”, largely those home to people of colour and Whites living
in poverty, he said: “We’re going to work to make sure that they receive 40 percent of the benefits of
key federal investments in clean energy, clean water, and wastewater infrastructure.”
99 days after taking the oath of office, he addressed the joint chambers of congress and reiterated his
focus on tackling climate change and upgrading the nation's water infrastructure through a lens of
American job creation with his flagship American Jobs Plan.
A president’s first 100 days in office is traditionally a milestone for the administration’s agenda. It is
during the honeymoon period at the start of a presidency when it is likely to have more momentum and
to get bills passed by congress.
During his address to congress, Biden laid out his key policies and made multiple pleas for a constructive
approach in a bid to free the legislative part of the American government from partisan gridlock ,
arguing: "We can’t be so busy competing with each other that we forget the competition is with the rest
of the world to win the 21st Century".
The Domestic Water Agenda
By mid-March, the administration was starting to make firm financial commitments to water initiatives.
On 22 March, World Water Day, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced it had awarded $27.5
million to 16 projects working across 13 states to decarbonise US water infrastructure.
Singling out wastewater treatment, in particular, which accounts for up to two percent of domestic US
energy consumption, secretary of energy Jennifer M. Granholm said: “By modernising our water
infrastructure, we can reduce electricity demand and turn water utilities into clean energy producers.
The next-generation innovations DOE is investing in will also lower costs while increasing access to clean
water for Americans, and drive us toward a cleaner, healthier, more prosperous future.”
It was at the end of March that Biden unveiled his American Jobs Plan, which includes $111 billion of
investment in the nation’s crumbling water infrastructure as well as a range of other proposals to clean
up and restore polluted land and waterways, improve resilience to climate-related disasters such as
flooding, and protect and restore nature-based infrastructure such as wetlands and watersheds.
The drinking water plans incorporate a $45 Billion USD investment to replace 100 percent of the nation’s
lead pipes and service lines.
The plan proposes a further $56 Billion USD in grants and low-cost flexible loans to states, Tribes,
territories and disadvantaged communities to “Upgrade and modernize America’s drinking water,
wastewater, and stormwater systems, tackle new contaminants, and support clean water infrastructure
across rural America”.
An additional $10 Billion USD is earmarked for “monitoring and remediating PFAS (per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances) in drinking water and to invest in rural small water systems and household
well and wastewater systems, including drainage fields”.
Other aspects of the plan with wide-ranging implications for water include proposals to plug orphan oil
and gas wells and clean up abandoned mines. “Hundreds of thousands” such wells and mines, many
located in rural communities, “pose serious safety hazards, while also causing ongoing air, water and
other environmental damage”.
Citing 22 separate billion-dollar weather and climate disasters in the US in 2020 that cost $95 Billion USD
in damages, the plan calls for $50 Billion USD in dedicated investments to improve infrastructure
resilience in the face of increasingly severe floods and other risks caused by climate change.
It also seeks to protect and restore “major land and water resources like Florida’s Everglades and the
Great Lakes” and alleviate “the western drought crisis by investing in water efficiency and recycling
programs”.
The plan, which will have to be approved by Congress in a series of bills, has been described in the
financial media as “far-reaching” and “ambitious” and widely welcomed in the water community.
However, if and in what form they make it through congress will depend upon Washington small
print and trade-offs that have seen grand infrastructure plans founder in the past .
2nc – moderates link
Infrastructure negotiations are on the brink- plan derails both tracks- Biden says yes to
the plan as the product of bipartisan negotiations which means there’s no more room
for anything else
Megerian 6/9 (Chris, LA Times Staff Writer. "One set of infrastructure talks failed. What’s next as
Biden seeks a bipartisan plan?" https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-06-09/biden-
infrastructure-plan-where-do-things-stand)
President Biden could be facing a make-or-break moment at home in his push for an expensive
infrastructure proposal while he’s traveling in Europe this week on his first overseas diplomatic trip since
taking office.
One set of negotiations with Republicans broke down shortly before he left, and now the White House is
exploring other options for reaching a bipartisan deal.
“The fact is, this train is moving on several tracks,” White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters.
Keeping track of all the moving pieces can be overwhelming, so here’s a look at where things stand now
and how they got to this point.
The opening offer
Biden’s original blueprint, called the American Jobs Plan, was for $2.25 trillion for roads, bridges,
broadband internet access, water systems, electric car charging stations and more. He wanted to
finance the new spending by partially reversing corporate tax cuts enacted under former President
Trump, raising the rate to 28% after Republicans slashed it from 35% to 21%.
The White House sees political upside in seeking a bipartisan deal, especially after Democrats pushed
through a $1.9-trillion COVID-19 relief plan on a party-line vote earlier this year. Although agreements
between the parties have been rare, Biden has been engaged in protracted negotiations with
Republicans despite concern from progressives, who worry he’s wasting his time or risks compromising
too much.
Capito’s way
Until Tuesday, the White House’s primary focus had been on negotiations with Sen. Shelley Moore
Capito (R-W.Va.). However, Capito ultimately agreed to only $330 billion in new spending — the rest of
the money in her proposal had been repurposed from other areas of the budget. Biden said he was
willing to come down from his original proposal, but wanted at least $1 trillion in spending beyond
what is projected under existing programs .
There was also no agreement on how to pay for the plan, especially with Republicans refusing to revisit
corporate tax cuts.
Psaki said Biden told Capito “that the latest offer from her group did not, in his view, meet the essential
needs of our country.”
The senator said that “after negotiating in good faith and making significant progress to move closer to
what the president wanted, I am disappointed by his decision.”
G20
The White House still sees potential for a deal with Republicans , and Biden has shifted his attention
elsewhere. On the same day he broke off negotiations with Capito, he called a few other centrist
senators — Sens. Bill Cassidy (R-La.), Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) — and “urged
them to continue their work with other Democrats and Republicans to develop a bipartisan proposal.”
The senators are part of a bipartisan group known as the G20, including Republican Sens. Rob Portman
of Ohio and Mitt Romney of Utah, who have been trying to hammer out their own proposal.
“Any infrastructure package should and must be bipartisan,” Cassidy tweeted.
Right now the price tag on that proposal stands at roughly $900 billion, and Biden plans to be in touch
while he’s traveling in Europe this week and next. It is not yet clear whether an agreement among this
group would have the blessing of Senate leaders of either party , let alone enough rank-and-file
members.
The Problem Solvers Caucus
If a deal is reached in the Senate, it will still need to be passed in the House, and a bipartisan group in
the lower chamber is already working on its own proposal. That group, known as the Problem Solvers
Caucus, unveiled a proposal with nearly $762 billion in new spending.
It’s unclear whether this idea will gain traction, particularly with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San
Francisco), who has final say on what reaches the floor for a vote.
Reconciliation
Since negotiations with Republicans have been bogged down, some Democrats are urging Biden to push
forward with a party-line vote using the budget reconciliation process. That set of rules allows the
Senate to pass budget-related legislation with a simple majority, rather than the 60 votes needed to
avoid a potential filibuster.
“Every day that is wasted trying to get Republicans on board is another day that people can’t go back to
work because they don’t have child care; another day without investing in millions of good, union jobs,
another day that we lose further ground on the climate crisis,” said Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.),
chairperson of the Congressional Progressive Caucus. “Further delays jeopardize momentum and allow
Republicans to block progress for the American people with no end in sight.”
However, Biden doesn’t seem ready to give up yet. And there’s no guarantee that reconciliation would
work.
For starters, it would require total unanimity among Democrats in the Senate, who have the bare
minimum 50 votes needed for the maneuver, and key figures like Manchin don’t want to take that step.
And if Democrats placate him and other moderates, they risk losing support from progressives, who are
demanding stronger action on issues such as climate change.
2nc – piecemeal link
The plan tanks a broader infrastructure bill- either signals White House rejection of
bipartisan negotiations over a broader infrastructure bill and is passed as a standalone
water infrastructure bill through reconciliation- OR, the plan passes through bipartisan
negotiations and crowds out the rest of the bill
Pramuk & Mui 6/11 (Jacob, Staff Reporter. Ylan, CNBC Senior Congressional Correspondent.
"Bipartisan Senate infrastructure deal would cost about $1 trillion".
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/11/bipartisan-senate-infrastructure-deal-would-cost-about-1-
trillion.html)
An infrastructure plan crafted by a group of Senate Democrats and Republicans would cost roughly $1
trillion, a price tag that leaves the senators with work to do to win over members of both parties.
The proposal, which aims to upgrade physical infrastructure such as transportation and water systems,
would cost $974 billion over five years or $1.2 trillion over eight years, a source familiar with the plan
told CNBC. It would include $579 billion in new spending above the baseline already set by Congress.
Biden asked for about $600 billion in new money, according to Sen. Bill Cassidy, R-La.
Senators have not announced how they plan to pay for the investments. The proposal “would be fully
paid for and not include tax increases,” the 10 lawmakers who reached the deal said in a statement
Thursday.
The group framed their proposal as a compromise to upgrade U.S. infrastructure with bipartisan support
in Congress. The senators still need to win backing from President Joe Biden and congressional leaders
for their plan to gain traction.
CNBC Politics
Read more of CNBC’s politics coverage:
Bipartisan Senate group reaches infrastructure deal without tax hikes — but leaders need to sign off
Biden and G-7 leaders will endorse a global minimum corporate tax of at least 15%
Trump spokesman Jason Miller leaving his role to join tech start-up
In a statement responding to the plan Thursday night, White House spokesman Andrew Bates said
“questions need to be addressed, particularly around the details of both policy and pay fors, among
other matters.”
“Senior White House staff and the Jobs Cabinet will work with the Senate group in the days ahead to get
answers to those questions, as we also consult with other Members in both the House and the Senate
on the path forward,” he said.
The White House let senators know it would not agree to pay for a bill by either indexing the gas tax to
inflation or implementing an electric vehicle mileage tax, NBC News reported Thursday. The measures
would break Biden’s promise not to raise taxes on anyone making less than $400,000 per year.
It is also unclear if the spending will be broad enough to win over Senate Majority Leader Chuck
Schumer, D-N.Y., House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., or progressives who have grown impatient with
Biden’s efforts to reach a bipartisan deal. While Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., has said
he wants to pass a bipartisan infrastructure bill, he has also signaled he aims to block major pieces of
Biden’s economic agenda.
Schumer’s and Pelosi’s offices did not immediately respond to requests to comment. A spokesman for
McConnell did not immediately comment.
Democrats are working on more than one front to pass an infrastructure bill and implement the first
piece of Biden’s economic recovery agenda. While the White House considers the bipartisan proposal,
Democrats have started to set the groundwork to pass pieces of the president’s $2.3 trillion American
Jobs Plan by other means.Bipartisan group of senators reaches agreement on infrastructure
One tool is the five-year, $547 billion surface transportation funding bill advanced by the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee this week. Democrats could use the measure, which the
House could vote on as soon as the end of the month, to approve parts of Biden’s agenda.
Biden has also urged Schumer and Pelosi to move forward with a budget resolution to set up the
reconciliation process. By doing so, Democrats could pass an infrastructure bill without Republican
support.
The path appears blocked for now. Sen. Joe Manchin, the West Virginia Democrat whose vote the party
would need to approve legislation in a Senate split 50-50 by party, has stressed he wants to pass a
bipartisan bill.
Manchin is one of the 10 negotiators in the Senate group.
It is unclear whether Democratic leaders would accept the bipartisan plan’s lack of spending on so-called
human infrastructure, such as Biden’s plan to expand care for elderly and disabled Americans. The party
could potentially weave those proposals into a separate bill based around Biden’s American Families
Plan. The proposal focuses on child care, education and health care.
Democrats have argued the country needs to improve care programs alongside physical infrastructure
because both would help Americans get back to work.
Biden has also called to hike the corporate tax rate to at least 25% to pay for the first piece of his
recovery plan. However, Republicans said they would not alter their 2017 tax law, which cut the
corporate rate to 21% from 35%.
2nc – crowd-out link
Plan hurts the rest of the infrastructure bill
Mascaro & Freking 21 (Lisa, AP Chief Congressional Correspondent. Kevin, AP Congressional
Reporter. April 29. "Water bill may open spigot for Biden infrastructure plan"
https://apnews.com/article/business-bills-government-and-politics-
dc3d654f1502085300684435af03e90f)
With Congress essentially split, and Democrats holding only slim majorities in the House and Senate,
Biden and the congressional leaders will soon have to decide how they plan to muscle his priority
legislation into law.
The White House is reaching out to Republicans, as Biden courts GOP lawmakers for their input on the
package and to win over their votes.
Biden spoke by phone Thursday with Sen. Shelley Moore Capito, R-W.Va., a leader on the water bill who
is also working on a Republican alternative to Biden’s infrastructure plan.
They had a warm, friendly conversation, reiterating their willingness to negotiate, the White House said.
They also discussed having another potential in-person meeting in the near future.
“We both expressed our mutual desire to work together and find common ground,” said Capito, the top
Republican on the Environment and Public Works Committee, in a statement.
Capito called it “a constructive and substantive call” and said she stands ready to “be a partner in
advancing infrastructure legislation in a bipartisan way—just as we’ve done in the past.”
But most Republicans are opposing Biden’s overall agenda as big government overreach. Together the
American Jobs Plan and the American Families Plan, a robust investment in free pre-school, community
college and child tax breaks, sum an eye-popping $4 trillion.
The water bill is an example of what’s possible, but also the gaping divide .
The $35 billion effort falls far short of what the president has proposed, $111 billion over eight years, for
water projects in his big infrastructure plan. But it is in line with what Capito and the Republican
senators proposed last week as their counter offer to Biden’s package, and could serve as a piece of that
or starting point in talks.
“We know the next couple of weeks and months are going to be tough,” said Capito, in a speech before
the vote. But she said she was hopeful colleagues would “remember this moment.”
The water bill is the kind of routine legislation that has been a mainstay on Capitol Hill, but that
lawmakers have struggled to pass in recent years amid the partisanship and gridlock , and the power that
party leaders exert over the legislative process.
Part of the exuberance among senators this week was over the very act of legislating, carrying the bill
through the give-and-take of the committee process and onto the Senate floor for amendments and
debate.
“I say, the more of these we can do, the better,” said Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va.
“Maybe we can take the Biden infrastructure plan and do the pieces of it,” he said. “Where we can get
some agreement, do those together. And then the remaining things that we think need to be done, that
price tag shrinks a little bit, because we’ve done some other stuff.”
One reason the water bill easily passed was because it’s routine government spending. Another reason
is that the price tag was tiny compared to typical congressional budget spats. Few expect such
harmony to last when the stakes get bigger in the months ahead .
Biden’s infrastructure plan proposes a tax hike on corporations, reverting the rate from 21% to 28%, as it
was before the 2017 GOP tax cuts. That is a nonstarter for Republicans, who are unwilling to undo the
signature Trump-era achievement.
Sen. Roy Blunt of Missouri, a member of GOP leadership, said the water bill could certainly become part
of a bigger infrastructure package, “one of the building blocks going forward .”
But he cautioned, “It’s apples and oranges compared to the President’s infrastructure bill.”
The increased spending called for in the water bill goes to two longstanding programs that work like
infrastructure banks — one for drinking water and the other for wastewater. Each program is set to get
up to $14.65 billion over five years under the bill. It is expected to be paid for with routine government
funding.
Supported by a broad range of interest groups, the bill enables water and wastewater systems around
the to country use the money to fix leaky pipes, construct storage tanks and improve water treatment
plants, to name just a few uses.
The bill also includes an array of grant programs, including to reduce lead in drinking water, turn waste
to energy and make water systems more resilient to flooding and other extreme weather events. More
than 40% of the bill’s investments are targeted to low-income and rural communities.
The bill’s chief sponsor, Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill., said she remembers a House hearing a few years
ago, when a mother from Flint, Mich., held up a baby bottle filled with murky brown water from her tap.
“While Flint was a tragedy, it was not an anomaly,” she said. Lead-service water lines were banned
decades ago, but more than 6 million homes across the country get water from lead service lines,
including Illinois.
“We can’t only pour money into fixing our roads while failing to repair the pipes beneath them,”
Duckworth said.
The federal government plays a small role compared to states and local governments when it comes to
public spending on drinking water and wastewater facilities — less than 5%.
But, in hearings, local utility officials testified that the pandemic has exacerbated the financial strains
they face in replacing aging pipes and other infrastructure. They called for more federal investment to
prevent rate increases down the road for communities that can least afford such hikes.
Meanwhile, House Democrats are pursuing water infrastructure bills with price tags that go beyond
what the White House has proposed, making clear that a compromise just on a relatively narrow public
works upgrade focused on water is still a ways away.
***counterplans
**private investment counterplan
1nc – private investment counterplan
The United States federal government should substantially reduce its technical and
financial assistance programs to help communities build sewage treatment and
drinking water treatment works and reduce barriers to nonfederal investment for
sewage treatment and drinking water treatment works.
Counterplan solves- perm deters private investment and effective state management,
which are comparatively better
Edwards 17 (Chris, director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of
www.DownsizingGovernment.org. (lol) He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues.
Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a
manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. "Who Owns U.S.
Infrastructure?" https://www.cato.org/tax-budget-bulletin/who-owns-us-infrastructure)
This bulletin provides input to the discussion by examining infrastructure ownership and funding. Some people assume that the federal government plays the main role in infrastructure. But,
state and local governments and the private sector own 97 percent of the nation’s nondefense
by one measure,
infrastructure, and they fund 94 percent of it . That decentralized approach to ownership and funding is a
strength of the American economy — a strength that would be undermined by increased federal
spending and intervention.
WHAT IS INFRASTRUCTURE AND WHO OWNS IT?
Economists agree that robust infrastructure investment is important for economic growth . Infrastructure generally refers to long-lived
fixed assets, such as highways, that provide a backbone for production and consumption activities in the economy.
However, economists have no clear criteria to decide which assets should be considered “infrastructure.”2
Economic studies often use all government-owned fixed assets as a measure of infrastructure. But that definition includes assets that people may not think of as infrastructure, such as schools,
and it excludes private assets that people do think of as infrastructure, such as electric utilities. The widely cited “Infrastructure Report Card” from the American Society of Civil Engineers
examines 16 types of public and private infrastructure, but the report’s coverage is ad hoc.3
It includes public schools but not private schools or universities. It includes public parks but not private recreational facilities. It includes railways and electric utilities, which are network
industries, but leaves out the huge telecommunications industry.
To find hard and consistent data on infrastructure, we need to look at the national income accounts produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For the public and private sectors, the
BEA calculates the net stock of fixed assets, which is a very broad but uniform measure of infrastructure.4
Fixed assets accumulate over time from investments in structures, equipment, and intellectual property. Those investments less depreciation form the net stock of fixed assets. Fixed assets are
combined with labor and other inputs to produce the nation’s gross domestic product.
Figure 1 shows that the private sector owns most of the nation’s nondefense infrastructure. In 2015, private infrastructure assets of $40.7 trillion were four times larger than state and local
assets of $10.1 trillion, and 27 times larger than federal assets of $1.5 trillion, according to the BEA data.5
Private capital stock consists of $19 trillion in residential assets and $22 trillion in nonresidential assets. The latter includes a vast array of infrastructure, such as pipelines, power stations,
railways, factories, satellites, and telecommunications networks. State and local infrastructure includes assets such as highways, roads, bridges, schools, and prisons. Federal nondefense
infrastructure includes assets such as dams, postal buildings, and the air traffic control system.
While the federal government owns relatively little infrastructure, its policies have a large effect on the
infrastructure owned by the state, local, and private sectors. The federal government is the tail that
wags the dog on the nation’s infrastructure — and not in a good way.
Federal laws and regulations raise the costs and slow the construction of infrastructure such as highways and
pipelines. Federal subsidies for infrastructure distort the capital investment choices made by state, local,
and private owners. And federal taxes reduce the return to investment in private infrastructure across
every industry.
federal interventions may be beneficial, the accumulated mass of regulations, subsidies, and taxes has created
Although some
a growing hurdle to efficient investment. For example, the average time for states to complete reviews for highway projects under the National
Environmental Policy Act increased from 2.2 years in the 1970s to at least 6.6 years today.6
The number of environmental laws and executive orders affecting transportation projects has increased from 26 in 1970 to about 70 today.7
The upshot is that rather than increasing federal spending , the Trump administration and Congress could spur added infrastructure
investment by reducing barriers to state, local, and private projects. Consider taxation. By one estimate, cutting the
corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 15 percent, combined with other business tax reforms, would
increase the private capital stock by $10 trillion within a decade .8
That increase to the capital stock would be productive because the investment would be allocated in a
decentralized manner by market supply and demand.
Some analysts say that increased federal infrastructure spending would create a “multiplier” or
leveraged effect on GDP.9
But policymakers would exercise more leverage by reducing federal barriers to nonfederal infrastructure
investments because those investments are so large .
A CLOSER LOOK AT GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE
Table 1 shows the infrastructure assets owned by governments in the United States.10 The federal government owns 13 percent of the total, while state and local governments own 87
percent.
State and local governments dominate ownership in almost every area in the table . They own 98 percent of highways and
streets, including the entire interstate highway system.11 They own schools, water and sewer systems, police and fire stations, and transit systems.
The federal government dominates infrastructure ownership in just two main areas, intellectual property and conservation. The former mainly includes research and development assets,
whereas the latter includes items such as dams and park infrastructure.
Just 3 percent of U.S. infrastructure is

Figure 1 and Table 1 indicate that decentralized ownership is a central feature of infrastructure in the United States.
federally owned. Decentralization makes sense in a large country because dispersed decisionmakers can
balance the costs and benefits of local capital investments better than faraway officials in Washington
can.
a “national” plan to boost infrastructure, in the sense of a topdown strategy

Nonetheless, many commentators have called for
for the country.12 Yet, given that the federal government owns just 3 percent of infrastructure, such a plan would amount to federal intervention
in state, local, and private investment decisions in the belief that federal officials can make superior
choices.
President Trump’s spokesman, Sean Spicer, said, “Dams, bridges, roads and all ports around the country have fallen into disrepair... . In order to prevent the next disaster we will pursue the
president’s vision for an overhaul of our nation’s crumbling infrastructure.”13 Bridges, roads, and seaports are owned by the states, so Spicer is implying that federal officials are better able to
manage this infrastructure than the current owners.
federal management of its own infrastructure is widely regarded as inefficient: the air traffic control system is falling
However,
and federal dams have a long history of pork barrel politics and inefficient operation. Increased
behind on technology; the national park system has a huge repair backlog;
federal intervention offers little more than the imposition of federal politics and bad federal
management on state and local governments.
In addition, increased federal intervention blurs accountability for infrastructure across multiple levels of government. When the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
each level of government blamed the other levels. Similar political finger pointing occurred after Minnesota’s I-35W bridge collapsed in 2007 and during the recent Flint, Michigan, water crisis.
responsibility has become confused over time because ownership, funding, and regulatory
In each case,
control are shared between federal, state, and local governments. Increased federal intervention
encourages “learned helplessness” on the part of state and local governments. For example, we often
see states delaying projects when slow federal bureaucracies or the uncertain federal budget process
hold up part of the funding.14
The states are entirely capable of owning and funding infrastructure without federal aid and direction.
States can tax, borrow, collect user charges, and attract private investment to fund their highways,
bridges, airports, seaports, and other infrastructure. State decisionmakers are closer to infrastructure
users than are federal officials, and they are better suited to make those calls.
Reducing the federal role would free the states from costly rules and increase state incentives to fix their
own infrastructure in a proactive manner. Asset ownership conveys responsibility; federal intervention
diffuses it.
FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
The nation’s infrastructure stock is replenished by annual spending on capital investment. Aside from defense, total
U.S. capital investment was $3.5 trillion in 2016, of which 86 percent was by the private sector, 8 percent was by state and local
governments, and 6 percent was by the federal government.15 The federal share includes federal spending on its own infrastructure and
federal spending on aid for state and local infrastructure.
Table 2 summarizes estimated federal infrastructure investment in 2017.16 Spending on federally owned infrastructure — such as veterans hospitals and the air traffic control system — was
$44 billion, while spending on aid for state and local infrastructure — such as highways and urban transit — was $80 billion.
Each item has spawned supportive lobbies that push

In Washington, debate is ongoing about the proper funding levels for each item in Table 2.
for higher spending. These groups often complain that their favored infrastructure is crumbling,
congested, or underfunded, and in some cases they are right.
However, rather than haggling over annual spending levels, policymakers should consider fundamental
reforms to the federal role in infrastructure. They should think about what the best institutional
structure for each item in Table 2 might be to ensure efficient funding and management over the long term.
They should consider whether state, local, or private ownership and funding might produce the best
result for each item in the table.
For many items in the table, a good reform option is privatization, which means transferring the ownership of
organizations and their assets to the private sector .17 Governments abroad have privatized a vast array of assets in recent decades, including
railroads, airports, and energy utilities.18 Alternatively, partial privatization and public-private partnerships (P3s) are good
reform options for some infrastructure. When possible, such reforms should be combined with ending
subsidies and opening infrastructure businesses to competition. Policymakers should consider
privatizing the following activities:
• Air Traffic Control (ATC). The Federal Aviation Administration has struggled to modernize America’s ATC system.19 Meanwhile, Canada privatized its ATC in 1996 in the form of a self-funded
nonprofit corporation. Today, the Canadian system is on the leading edge of ATC efficiency and innovation.
• Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This electric utility has a bloated cost structure and poor environmental record, and it has wasted billions of dollars on its nuclear program.20 Electric
utilities have been privatized around the world, so privatizing TVA should be a no-brainer.
water infrastructure such as harbors, locks,

• Army Corps of Engineers: Civil Works. The civilian portion of the Army Corps constructs and maintains
waterways, levees, and beaches.21 It fills roles that state and local governments and private companies
could perform. When states need to improve their water infrastructure, they should hire private
engineering and construction firms to do the work. The civilian part of the Army Corps should be
privatized and compete for such work.
• U.S. Postal Service (USPS). The USPS has more than 30,000 retail offices and 200,000 vehicles. With the rise of email, paper mail volume has plunged, and the giant bureaucracy is losing
billions of dollars a year.22 The USPS has a legal monopoly over first-class mail, which prevents entrepreneurs from competing to reduce costs and improve quality. Other countries, including
Germany and the United Kingdom, have privatized their systems and opened them to competition. America should follow suit.
• Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs). The federal government owns four PMAs, which transmit wholesale electricity in 33 states. The power is mainly generated by hydropower plants
owned by the Army Corps and Bureau of Reclamation. The PMAs receive numerous subsidies and sell most of their power at below-market rates.23 Congress should privatize the PMAs.
•Bureau of Reclamation. This agency builds and operates dams, canals, and hydropower plants in 17
Western states. It is the nation’s largest wholesaler of water, which it generally sells at below-market
prices, thus distorting the economy and causing harm to the environment.24 The agency’s facilities
should be privatized or transferred to the states .
• Amtrak. The government’s passenger rail company has a costly union workforce and a poor on-time record.25 Many of its routes have low ridership, and the system loses more than a billion
dollars a year. Congress should privatize Amtrak and allow entrepreneurs to reduce costs and improve service.
• Highways. Some states are using public-private partnerships to add capacity to their highway systems. These arrangements shift various elements of financing, management, operations, and
project risks from the public sector to the private sector. Federal policymakers should remove hurdles to the expanded use of P3s.26
• Airports. The nation’s major airports are owned by state and local governments, but they receive federal aid for capital improvements. Hundreds of airports around the world have been
privatized, including almost half of those in Europe.27 Airports should be moved to the private sector and self-funded from charges on aviation users, retail concessions, advertising, and other
private revenues.
federal aid for state and local infrastructure will be an estimated $80 billion in 2017. None of
Table 2 showed that
that aid is crucial because the states can fund infrastructure by themselves. Some state and local
infrastructure should be privatized and self-funded, while other infrastructure should be funded by state
and local taxes, not federal aid. Consider highways. Fast- and slow-growing states vary in their need to expand capacity. Thus, it makes more sense for each state to
adjust its own gas tax to fit its highway revenue needs than for the federal government to impose a single gas tax on the whole country. The states own the highways and are close to the
users; they can best balance the costs and benefits of revenues and investments.
Federal aid for infrastructure is inefficient for a variety of reasons.28 To begin with, aid allocations are
based on political and bureaucratic factors, not marketplace demands. Also, federal aid replicates bad
infrastructure ideas across the nation — for example, high-rise public housing in the past and costly light-rail projects today.
federal aid comes bundled with costly regulations. Davis-Bacon rules, for example, raise
Another problem is that
labor costs on highway projects. Also, the states have a disincentive to be frugal on projects when a
substantial share of the funding comes “free” from Washington .
federal aid for infrastructure is that it discourages state and local privatization. Aid typically
A final disadvantage of
goes only to government-owned projects, which makes it difficult for unsubsidized private projects to
compete. Put another way, federal aid “crowds out” private investment in facilities such as airports and transit systems.
CONCLUSIONS
Federal
The federal government owns just a small share of the nation’s infrastructure, but it exercises control over state, local, and private infrastructure through taxes and regulations.
policymakers should reduce these interventions to spur an increase in investment, and they should
reform federal policies that bias state and local governments against privatization.29
policymakers should cut federal spending on infrastructure, not increase it, by privatizing some
Furthermore,
federally owned assets and phasing out federal aid to the states. Those two reforms would cut federal
infrastructure spending by three-quarters — from about $124 billion a year to $31 billion .30
A reduced federal role would allow for increases in private investment and more efficient state and local
investment. Everyone agrees that improving America’s infrastructure would raise living standards and
improve our business competitiveness. The way to get there is through decentralization and market-
based reforms.
2nc – overview
Counterplan solves 100% of the case- it reduces subsidies, regulations, and taxes that
inhibit private investment in US water infrastructure- the counterplan unleashes over
a trillion in capital but perm can’t solve because federal investment crowds out
private investment- case is a net benefit to the counterplan, private investment is
comparatively better- decentralized decision-making produces better results- “learned
helplessness” means they result in more delays- no uniqueness for any of their
offense, private investment is already 86% of infrastructure spending- their ev is
lobbying propaganda and federal decisions are driven by political considerations
2nc – solvency – top level
Private funding is better for water infrastructure- they provide the same quality but
with lower costs- removing barriers is key to solving
Poole & Stuart 17 (Robert W., director of transportation policy and the Searle Freedom Trust
transportation fellow at Reason Foundation, a national public policy think tank based in Los Angeles.
Poole received his B.S. and M.S. in mechanical engineering at MIT and did graduate work in operations
research at NYU. Austill, policy analyst at Reason Foundation, a non-profit think tank advancing free
minds (lol) and free markets. Stuart earned his M.A. in economics at George Mason University and his
B.A. in economics at Auburn University. "Federal Barriers to Private Capital Investment in U.S.
Infrastructure" https://reason.org/wp-
content/uploads/files/federal_barriers_to_private_capital_investment.pdf)
3.1 Limitations of Government Enterprises There is a widespread belief that government infrastructure
is inherently less costly than investor-owned infrastructure, for three reasons: • Lower financing costs
thanks to tax-exempt bonds; • Lower operating costs due to exemption from taxes on property and net
income; • Lower total cost because of no requirement to earn a profit. But this perception is likely not
correct. For example, empirical comparisons of investor-owned and municipal electric utilities show
mixed results. One 1996 study found that investor-owned water companies provide comparable water
service to customers, at comparable prices, but are significantly more efficient .16 If government-
owned facilities were inherently lower-cost for the above reasons, would it not make sense for all
production to be carried out by government firms? Yet the global record of government airlines,
telecoms companies and other businesses is dismal. The institutional incentives within government
enterprises generally do not lead to superior performance or lower costs .
A number of factors can lead to investor-owned firms having lower costs: economies of scale (in which a
company serves multiple jurisdictions instead of just one), more- efficient use of labor, and more-
efficient use of capital. Municipal utilities often “pre-finance” modernization in large blocks, whereas
investor-owned utilities tend toward “just-in-time” finance of such projects. Municipal utilities often
have to purchase bond insurance and accumulate reserve funds that are not required of larger and
more-diversified investor-owned utilities. Moreover, although the interest rate paid on companies’
taxable revenue bonds is higher than that of municipal utilities’ tax-exempt bonds, the amount financed
by a company may be less, thanks to a more costeffective design of the new facility.
Value-for-money analysis of privately financed infrastructure projects under long-term public-private

partnerships takes into account the tax payments that will be made to local, state and federal
governments, which may include local property taxes, as well as state and federal corporate income
taxes. These tax revenues that benefit the respective governments are often overlooked.
Furthermore, government infrastructure enterprises generally do not charge market prices for their
services. A Congressional Budget Office study found that “while both public and private [water] utilities
usually set prices that are more than enough to cover operating costs, only private utilities routinely
charge enough to fully cover not only operating costs but also the depreciation of capital facilities .”
17 Below-market pricing misleads consumers about the true cost of the water, electricity or highway
services they use. Cities that implemented “pay as you throw” pricing for garbage collection have higher
rates of recycling and yard waste composting than those where garbage service is paid for via the
property tax bill or charged for via a flat monthly fee.18 Government-run U.S. airports charge landing
fees based solely on the gross weight of the plane, yet a small plane may use as much (or more) runway
service as a large, faster plane. Privatized London Heathrow and Gatwick charge demand-based runway
prices instead, to maximize the use of their scarce and costly runway capacity.
A variant of government ownership is the public authority, intended to operate with the efficiency of a
private-sector firm while serving the public interest as part of government. Legal scholar Clayton Gillette
compared the performance of public authorities with that of investor-owned firms operating under
some kind of regulatory scrutiny. He found that the differences, summarized in Table 1, are large
enough to prompt reconsideration of the public authority model.19
In their paper proposing a $1 trillion program to rebuild America’s aging infrastructure, Wilbur Ross and
Peter Navarro identified an important global phenomenon that has largely passed the U nited S tates by:
privately financed infrastructure modernization. According to a database maintained by the newsletter
Public Works Financing since 1985, private infrastructure investment (in roads, rail, water and public
buildings) worldwide totaled $774 billion between 1985 and 2011. Of that total, a mere $68 billion took
place in the United States.20
The basic model is a long-term concession, under which the winning private consortium will design,
finance, build (or rebuild and modernize), operate and maintain an infrastructure facility. The project is
overseen by a state or local agency under the terms of a detailed long-term concession agreement. The
project is financed based on a dedicated revenue stream, generally from user fees paid to the
consortium by those who use the facility’s services. Typical financing would be an equity investment of
20% to 30% of the project cost, with the rest financed in the capital markets, sometimes via bank loans
but more often via revenue bonds. This is the basic model assumed in the Ross/Navarro paper.21
This model offers many advantages compared with typical government provision. In grant-funded
projects (e.g., highways), projects are often selected more on political grounds than on economic
grounds. They are paid for out of annual appropriations, rather than being financed on a long-term
basis. And they are generally awarded to the contractor who submits the lowest-priced bid to build a
fixed design. In many cases that leads to a less-durable design that costs far more to maintain than a
more-durable design that would cost slightly more to construct. This is penny-wise and pound-foolish.
By contrast, projects procured as long-term, user-fee-financed concessions, have the following

advantages: • Near-Term Development: Thanks to financing that raises all the construction money up
front, needed projects get built years or decades sooner. • On-Time Delivery: Increasing evidence shows
that these types of projects are far more likely to be completed on time, so users receive their benefits
sooner. • Increased Investment: New or increased user fees make it possible to invest more in
infrastructure improvements than would be likely via status-quo tax funding. • Innovation: Companies
that will operate and maintain the infrastructure that they design and build are motivated to think
outside the box, including design features that reduce cost and/or increase use of the facility (and hence
revenues).
• Lower Life-Cycle Costs: Rather than focusing on lowest-cost to construct, a concession company’s long-
term interest is lower total costs (including operations and maintenance) over the facility’s useful life. •
Risk Transfer: Megaprojects procured conventionally are notorious for cost overruns and revenue
shortfalls.22 Those risks are transferred to the company in long-term concession agreements, shielding
taxpayers and customers from those risks. • New Tax Revenues: As noted previously, to the extent that
concession companies earn a return on their investments, they will pay federal and state corporate
income taxes; depending on local tax laws, their projects might also be on the property tax rolls. These
points are discussed at greater length, with respect to highways, in a recent book by Cornell University
economist Richard Geddes.23
3.3 Overview of Barriers and Constraints on Private Investment Although there has been an increase in
P3 infrastructure projects in the United States in recent years, our use of this method still lags far behind
that of our industrial competitors. In the transportation sector alone, a recap of major PPP concessions
financed over the years 2008–2013 tallied concessions and their values by location: 24
In other words, despite having the world’s largest gross domestic product, the United States attracted
only 12.5% of the total private-sector investment in transportation infrastructure in North America,
South America and Europe combined.
Pension funds, insurance companies and infrastructure investment funds express a strong desire to
finance more large infrastructure projects in the United States. They do not lack incentives to do this;
what they lament is the lack of a “pipeline of P3 projects” offered by state and local government
agencies. Part of this is due to institutional inertia; making use of long-term infrastructure concessions
is a new and different way of doing business, which relatively few state and municipal governments have
made the effort to learn, so far.
But another major factor is a wide array of long-established government policies that favor traditional
procurement and traditional government ownership, operation and maintenance of infrastructure
facilities. Among the most important are tax policies. Both federal and state law exempt from taxation
the interest on bonds issued by state and local governments. By contrast, in many cases P3 consortia
must finance their projects using taxable bonds, which artificially increases their financing costs
compared with traditional government projects. The United States is virtually alone in exempting
infrastructure bonds from taxation. In addition, a municipal utility that performs the very same functions
as an investor-owned utility is exempt from both local property taxes and federal corporate income
taxes, but the investor-owned utility must pay both.
Also, a number of sector-specific federal policies treat an infrastructure facility differently if it was
developed and operated as a P3 project. • Many infrastructure facilities are partially funded by federal
grants. Until 1992, an OMB rule required that if such a facility were privatized, all federal grant monies
must be repaid—in effect, a federal tax on infrastructure privatization. The George H.W. Bush
administration issued E.O. 12803 in 1992 to reduce such obstacles, but instead of eliminating grant
repayment, it only reduced the amount to be repaid (equal to the portion of the facility value paid for by
the grants that is currently un-depreciated). This still amounts to a federal tax penalty on the P3
transaction. • A 1996 law creating an Airport Privatization Pilot program eliminated the grant repayment
requirement for airports, but imposed a number of other constraints that have severely limited the
usefulness of this program. • In the wastewater facility area, the federal Resource Conservation &
Recovery Act applies different regulations to P3 wastewater facilities than it does to “publicly owned
treatment works.” • Investor-owned water and electric utilities are treated differently from
government-owned utilities by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. When investor-owned utilities receive
“contributions in aid of construction” from would-be customers, the Act requires such payments to be
counted as taxable income to the utility. But no such taxation applies to municipal utilities that receive
comparable contributions. These and other tax and regulatory disparities may not have been intended
to discourage private investment in renewing infrastructure facilities, but they end up having exactly
that effect.
CP solves the economy better- short-term focus on fiscal stimulus results in worse
projects that hurts long-term growth- lowers costs and raises sufficient funds
Bourne 17 (Ryan, Scharf Chair for the Public Understanding of Economics at Cato. efore joining Cato,
Bourne was Head of Public Policy at the Institute of Economic Affairs and Head of Economic Research at
the Centre for Policy Studies (both in the UK). Bourne has extensive broadcast and print media
experience, and has appeared on BBC News, CNN and Sky News, CNBC, and Fox Business Network. He
writes weekly columns for the Daily Telegraph and a fortnightly column for the UK website
ConservativeHome. Bourne holds a BA and an MPhil in economics from the University of Cambridge,
United Kingdom. "Would More Government Infrastructure Spending Boost the U.S. Economy?" June 6.
Policy Analysis No 812. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/would-more-government-infrastructure-
spending-boost-us-economy)
What Policy Framework Would Improve U.S. Infrastructure Development ?

The analysis of the underlying economics of infrastructure investment presented here has been highly skeptical of the desirability of significant government
infrastructure investment. But the economics presented do provide lessons for creating responsive institutions . After all, at a
time when new technological innovations such as driverless cars could revolutionize the way we travel, and with politicians talking of seeking to harness $1 trillion
of new funds, we need to avoid the very real risk of wasted funds. Although the case is often exaggerated, the U.S. economy clearly has substantial infrastructure
needs, as the figures on congestion alone illustrate.
The aim should be to allow innovation, cost‐effective provision, and investment where it is most
economically beneficial. A first step here is to set an infrastructure framework that seeks to expand
productivity growth and that ignores short‐term macroeconomic considerations. It has been argued that fiscal
stimulus is not needed anyway, but that objective in itself—a short‐run “demand boost”—is much more likely to lead to
bad decisionmaking on projects, hampering the long‐term growth potential of the economy.
Instead, a pro‐growth agenda for infrastructure should get the incentives and institutions right, which
means any dollar of spending (by the public or private sector) will go much further . Thankfully, the new
administration has more recently acknowledged this. The 2018 infrastructure initiative emphasized, for example, that federal funding alone was not the solution to
infrastructure, instead talking up the need for long‐term reform of how infrastructure is “regulated, funded, delivered, and maintained.”110 The pro‐
growth aim can be achieved through the application of the following broad principles.
Privatize areas where government is not needed. Many types of infrastructure assets need not be under government control, whether
at the federal, state, or local level. Other countries have perfectly decent privatized airports (London’s Heathrow), air traffic control systems (Canada) and railways
(Japan), for example. The
principle here should be of “subsidiarity”—the least centralized authorities providing
infrastructure where they can, with subsequently higher levels of government intervening only when a clear and overwhelming need exists. Chris
Edwards has previously outlined how, in the field of major infrastructure, the federal government should give up its provision of air traffic control, following the
Canadian example. The responsibilities of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Amtrak, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation could likewise all be
turned over to the private sector.111 In the UK, large‐scale privatization often produced significant improvements in labor productivity and lower prices for users,
without compromising safety.112
Localize decisionmaking as far as possible. In a similar vein, the federal government’s current role clearly goes
way beyond that necessary to deal with genuine cross‐state border coordination problems and so‐called
market failures. The administration acknowledges this, explaining how the federal government today “acts as a complicated,
costly middleman between the collection of revenue and the expenditure of those funds by States and
localities.”113 Federal aid, not least for highways, can distort local decisionmaking in a way that is not conducive to
economic growth, while creating significant grievances. The Highway Trust Fund currently distributes money in a way that benefits
large, relatively underpopulated areas, rather than investing in areas of rapid growth. Harvard economist Edward Glaeser has outlined how “Alaska received $484
million in the 2015 highway‐aid apportionment … about $657 for each Alaskan.… New York State received $1.62 billion, or $82 per person.”114 Clearly, this is not
reflective of the highway needs of the two states.
It would be far better to completely decentralize responsibility for transportation infrastructure back to the states, limiting any federal role to coordinating cross‐
state investments and financing and providing infrastructure with large social benefits where neither the private sector nor states were able to. We would not have
the problem of the federal government crowding out state activity as discussed earlier in relation to Obama’s 2009 stimulus package.115 States would instead be
able to experiment according to their own needs, and the funds for generating new infrastructure would be better matched toward growing regions of the country.
This approach could include states adjusting their own gas taxes, working with the private sector to develop suitable PPP arrangements, or allowing the private
sector to develop infrastructure independently.
Remove payment barriers for charging users. For both federal‐ and state‐provided infrastructure, the
aim should be to move toward user funding rather than tax revenues . That approach would have many benefits, not least
allowing those who use infrastructure to be charged for their actions and providing an incentive to reduce congestion. The existence of streams of income would
also make private investment into transportation infrastructure projects more attractive.
The CBO estimates that, historically, less than half of federal funding for highways was tied to the amount of travel on the roads. This lack of connection between
use and investment can have significant negative effects on funding efficiency, biasing against regions with significant congestion and maintenance needs.
User charging—whether through per mile charging, congestion charging, or straight tolling of roads or highways—would adjust to allow traffic to move more quickly
and reliably. At the moment though, barriers impede the application of user charging in the transportation sector. In particular, there are federal restrictions on the
use of user fees to convert interstate highways into toll roads. In airports, the Passenger Facility Charge, a local user fee, is capped by the federal government at
$4.50 per passenger.
Removing these restrictions would help attract private capital investments in highways and airports, making the provision of both less dependent on government
and allowing a more efficient matching of investment to demand.
The effects of widespread user charging of this kind could be profound. According to the Federal Highway Administration, a wide rollout of congestion pricing could
reduce the amount of capital investment required to meet the same goals for the highway system by about 30 percent. Heavily used roads such as Interstates
would have the most to gain from user pricing, but at the moment just 7 percent of the current Interstate Highway System is composed of highways with tolls.116
Employ rigorous cost–benefit and risk analyses for government projects. Where government investment
is needed and justified, both the federal and state governments should seek to use rigorous cost–benefit
and risk evaluation to assign funding to the most economically valuable projects. As far as possible,
other ambitions—such as creating jobs, helping manufacturing, and more—should be jettisoned in favor
of maximizing overall economic gains relative to costs .
To get an idea of the scale of savings that could result from greater focus on “bang for the buck,” the Federal Highway Administration has estimated that funding
highway projects purely on the basis of cost–benefit ratios could see the same overall level of benefits for about 25 percent less cost than currently delivered.
Analysts believe this approach would lead to much more spending on urban Interstates, and repairs of urban highways and rural bridges.
Of course, where the political process is involved in projects, the cost–benefit analysis itself can be corrupted by overoptimism on both costs and usage rates, as we
have seen. No doubt some states would attach much more weight to somewhat fuzzy social benefits than others. But with more localized funding, they would bear
the full cost of their actions. To ensure high‐quality, accurate output, the methodology and assumptions behind cost–benefit methodology should also be produced
and published transparently, with states ideally using a clear framework that also presents the opportunity cost of undertaking any new project.
Level the playing field for private‐sector funding. Cato Institute scholars have long argued that the tax system tilts the
deck in favor of states borrowing to finance infrastructure over private borrowing. Under the present
federal income tax, the interest income you receive from investing in municipal bonds is free from
federal income taxes, which is not the case for private debt. Ideally, this exemption would be phased
out, broadening the tax base, levelling the playing field and allowing for small cuts to overall taxes on
investment in a revenue‐neutral manner.
Reassess, revise, and review regulations that raise the costs of providing infrastructure . This paper is primarily
concerned with evaluating the economic case for major government infrastructure investment in the United States. However, clearly, existing policies in
many areas increase the cost of infrastructure provision more broadly. A paper by outside consultants for the Obama
administration acknowledged, for example, “Increased capital costs are also a product of enhanced design standards and
regulatory requirements related to performance, safety, environmental protection, reliability, and

resiliency.”117
Complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has “extended the schedule and generally increased the cost of implementing major infrastructure
projects.”118 The Federal Highway Administration estimates that “the average time to complete a NEPA study increased from 2.2 years in the 1970s, to 4.4 years in
the 1980s, to 5.1 years in the 1995 to 2001 period, to 6.6 years in 2011.”119 A lengthy NEPA study increases costs and adds significant uncertainty to a project,
deterring private investment. Useful suggestions have been made for how to relieve this burden, from time limits for agency decisions through to narrowing the act
to focus only on issues not covered by other environment regulations.120 Thankfully, it appears the administration intends to streamline this regulatory process.
Regulations of inputs to the construction process also raise costs. The Davis‐Bacon Act commits federal
construction projects to pay the “prevailing wages” of the surrounding area for construction workers. In
practice, this often means union rates, which means a significantly higher cost . The CBO estimates repealing the act
could have saved taxpayers $13 billion between 2015 and 2023.121 Buy America regulations likewise impose requirements on
federal construction projects to use American steel, iron, and other products in highway construction,
unless a special waiver is granted—another regulation likely to increase costs. Add to this compliance
with land‐use planning laws, and it becomes clear that before asserting that more federal funding is
needed for infrastructure, politicians should reassess existing regulations that make overall
infrastructure delivery more expensive. Of course, higher import tariffs or antidumping measures on imported inputs such as steel would
drive up costs further.
Conclusion
Clearly, President Trump wants to sign off on a major program of infrastructure investment. At times, the president and his team have used both short‐term
macroeconomic “stimulus” arguments and longer‐term structural arguments to justify such a program. But more recently, the administration appears to have
recognized that fixing “underlying incentives, procedures, and policies” is more important than funding alone.”122
This paper has dismissed the case for using infrastructure

investment on short‐term macroeconomic grounds today. In fact, a
rushed attempt to begin “shovel‐ready” projects or “create jobs” will likely harm the economy in the
longer term, as resources are misallocated and infrastructure is delivered in the wrong places .
Instead, the administration should focus on long‐term growth and on creating an institutional environment where
investment is responsive to the wants and needs of users. That approach requires not obsessive focus
on hitting arbitrary spending limits through big increases in federal funding, infrastructure tax credits,
and a wide role for PPPs, but a reassessment of the whole framework of infrastructure policy.
Certainly, scope for significantly more private‐sector investment exists. That could be achieved through
regulatory and tax reforms, rather than new, costly tax credits or complex contracts that impose long‐term burdens on taxpayers in a
nontransparent way. Harnessing private‐sector expertise should come as part of a broader attempt to remove
current barriers to investment and to devolve decisions on infrastructure to as low a level of government as possible.
Federal aid is poorly allocated- doesn’t solve equitable recovery or access to water
Edwards 19 (Chris, director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovern
ment.org. (lol) He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato,
Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. "Restoring Responsible
Government by Cutting Federal Aid to the States"
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa868_2.pdf)
5. Spending Allocations across the States Supporters of aid hope that federal experts can efficiently
allocate funds to highvalue activities across the nation. But there is little reason to think that federal
officials are better able than state officials to target resources for education, housing, transportation,
and other activities.
For one thing, the allocation formulas used in aid programs are blunt tools that do not measure need
very well. One study found, for example, that highway aid formulas are biased against states that have
larger highway systems and more highway use, and thus biased against states that have greater
needs.31 Some states with growing populations consistently get shortchanged. Texas, for example, has
accounted for an average of 10 percent of gas taxes paid into the federal highway account over the past
decade but has received only 8 percent of the spending from it.32 One study found that the deadweight
or inefficiency losses from federal highway aid misallocation amounted to 40 percent of the value of the
spending.33
Numerous studies find that politics explains aid allocations better than public-interest theories .34 In
theory, aid should be targeted to the neediest states or targeted to fix interstate externalities, such as
when one state’s transportation policies affect neighboring states. But according to an Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) study, “the record indicates that federal aid
programs have never consistently transferred income to the poorest jurisdictions or individuals. Neither
do most existing grants accord with the prescriptions of ‘externality’ theory.”35 And the ACIR noted,
“The logrolling style . . . through which most grant programs are adopted frequently precludes any
careful ‘targeting’ of fiscal resources.”36
Summarizing the academic literature, economists Rainald Borck and Stephanie Owings noted that the
public-interest view of aid “does not fare well in empirical studies . Most papers find more evidence for
politically motivated transfers.”37 Borck and Owings, for example, point to evidence that a
disproportionate amount of aid goes to rural and less-populated states.38
One can see this bias with federal aid for airports, which is tilted toward smaller rural airports and away
from the largest airports where it would generate the most benefit.39 There has been a similar bias in
homeland security aid, whereby rural areas with low terrorism risks have received an unduly large share
of the grants, which in the years after 9/11 resulted in much low-value spending.40 This bias is caused
by the power of smaller-population states in the U.S. Senate.41 This small-state spending distortion has
apparently grown in recent decades because of differences in population growth across the states.42
A large share of federal aid goes toward anti-poverty programs, including Medicaid, Section 8 housing,
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Program supporters want to target resources to
the lowestincome parts of the nation. But every member of Congress wants a share of the aid, so
antipoverty programs usually expand into broadbased handouts that subsidize rich and poor
congressional districts alike.43 What economist Richard Nathan calls the “spreading effect” of sloshing
aid money around for political reasons has always predominated over the desire to help the poorest
areas.44
A 1946 study of the aid system by a Senate committee found that the 10 highest-income states received
$70 per capita in federal aid, while the lowest-income states received $49 per capita.45 A 1975 study
found that “federal expenditures per capita were $1,059 in the nation’s poorest counties . . . while the
counties with above-average incomes received an above average allocation of $1,665.”46
In a major 1981 study, the ACIR concluded that the “Robin Hood principle of fiscal redistribution—‘take
from the rich, give to the poor’—has always received much more lip service than actual use in aid
distribution. . . . Federal grant-in-aid dollars are commonly dispersed broadly among states and
localities, including the relatively rich and poor alike.”47 And the ACIR reiterated, “The record indicates
that federal aid programs have never consistently transferred income to the poorest jurisdictions or
individuals.”48
ACIR’s conclusions still hold today. For 2019, the federal budget estimates stateby-state data for $666
billion of federal aid spending.49 By my calculations, the 10 highestincome states received $2,354 per
capita while the 10 lowest-income received $2,068. That pattern holds for many individual aid programs,
including Medicaid, Section 8 rental housing, public housing, TANF, and Community Development Block
Grants (CDBG).
The website for the CDBG program states that the purpose is to “provide services to the most vulnerable
in our communities.”50 But an Urban Institute study found that the program’s allocation of funding to
the neediest governments has diminished over time, and it is “uncertain” whether governments
“adequately direct funding to low and moderate-income people.”51 The 2020 federal budget said of the
CDBG program, “Studies have shown that the allocation formula poorly targets funds to the areas of
greatest need.”52
As for Medicaid, its allocation formula is based on state per capita income, so poorer states receive a
higher federal match rate. However, the match has encouraged wealthier states to expand Medicaid
more than poorer states, so wealthier states end up getting relatively more dollars.53 This sort of
adverse result for matching programs has been observed for decades. The 1946 Senate committee
found, “as the matching principle came into use, the poorer states often found it impossible to match
federal grants to the same extent as the wealthier states.”54
The main federal aid program for disadvantaged K–12 schools (Title 1) does provide more aid per capita
to the poorest states, but nonetheless much of the funding goes to well-off school districts. A U.S. News
and World Report investigation found that “billions of dollars end up in districts that are richer on
average, while many of the nation’s poorest districts receive little Title I funding.”55 For example,
schools in Shelby County, Tennessee, received $926 per poor child in 2016 in federal aid, but schools in
Philadelphia received $2,000 per poor child.
Even when aid programs appear to target need or demand, the outcome is not necessarily efficient.
Consider federal disaster aid. Some states—such as Florida and Texas—are hit by many hurricanes and
receive more federal disaster aid than other states.56 Disaster aid seems to follow need.
The problem is that federal disaster aid encourages people to live in dangerous places, such as on
hurricane-prone seacoasts. Federal subsidies for the seacoasts include funds for disaster rebuilding,
beach replenishment, flood control structures, and flood insurance—all of which have encouraged
development in risky areas. Partly as a result, the number of Americans living in official flood hazard
areas has increased 60 percent since 1970.57 So federal subsidies can have the negative effect of
undermining prudent state and local decisionmaking.
In sum, federal aid tends not to be allocated the way that public interest theories suggest it should be.
Aid is often allocated bluntly and has never followed the Robin Hood principle consistently, even if that
were a good idea.58 Finally, even in cases where aid distribution does seem to match state needs, it may
undermine prudent decisionmaking by state policymakers.
2nc – solvency – econ
Federal spending tanks the econ in the long-run

The longer-term effects. Finally, given that the primary aim of fiscal expansions is to put resources to
work for the short term, the stimulus theory says nothing about what the money should be spent on and
how that might affect economic activity in the medium to long term. Temporary borrowing may actually
worsen the long-term growth potential of the economy because of the costs associated with financing
the spending and misallocating resources.
Let’s assume that Keynesian theories work in practice and the federal government increased investment
spending for one year. Any temporary GDP boost associated with the increase in spending in Year 1 will
be offset by cuts to that spending of an equivalent amount at some later date. Governments will also
have to service the increase in the debt burden, with higher taxes paid to cover interest payments on
the debt in the long term. If the deleterious effect of the long-run tax hikes on productivity growth
exceeds any productivity benefit of the temporary spending, then the long-run effect of a fiscal
expansion will be contractionary for the economy .
Stimulus measures also have the potential to undermine long-term growth potential by misallocating
resources. Economist and political commentator Paul Krugman once articulated the logical conclusion of
the case for government discretionary borrowing during recessions when he argued that a fake alien
invasion could end the post-financial crisis slump if governments were to spend hugely on defense and
military equipment. Yet such spending would have been economically useless in the longer term,
retarding the growth potential of the economy by misallocating resources away from productive
activity.31
In a real-life example, President Obama’s “Cash for Clunkers” program saw the federal government pay
automobile dealers between $3,500 and $4,500 each time a customer traded in an older, less fuel-
efficient vehicle and purchased a newer, more fuel-efficient vehicle. That program incentivized people to
dispose of cars prematurely, with some cars ultimately destroyed, wasting resources. The result was at
best a short-run boost to output that was later reversed,32 but it may have actually reduced overall
spending, because many who traded in subsequently bought much cheaper fuel-efficient cars than they
would have done otherwise.33
The mere act of engaging in stimulus spending can be a further drag on the economy by creating
uncertainty about future policy or by providing incentives for companies and entrepreneurs to invest in
unproductive rent-seeking activities.
2nc – solvency – innovation
Counterplan solves innovation through competition
Incentivizing Innovation Competition has been used as an approach to achieve excellence and
innovation since the earliest days of the U.S. government. The designs for both the U.S. Capitol building
and the White House were the winners of competitions in 1792. In recent times, competitions and
challenges often receive bipartisan support to drive innovation, solve complex problems, and maximize
taxpayer return on investment. The America COMPETES Act (Pub L. 110-69), signed into law in 2007 by
President George W. Bush and reauthorized in 2011 by President Obama (Pub L. 114-322), encourages
federal departments and agencies to use competitions and challenges as a key tool in achieving their
mission.
In March 2010, OMB issued a memo to further stimulate federal departments and agencies to use prizes
and challenges (OMB, 2010a). It established a web-based hub for federal prizes and challenges to
advance open government and share lessons learned and best practices. Challenge.gov, maintained by
the U.S. General Services Administration, has since received Harvard University’s Innovations in
American Government Award and contains information on more than 740 federal prize and challenge
competitions.
One of the primary goals of competitions is to generate solutions that are highly replicable and/or
scalable beyond their initial application. While competitions are often seen used in the fields of science,
technology, and health, they are also being used to increase the performance and decrease the cost of
infrastructure investments. Recent examples can be seen is the Desal Prize, sponsored by the U.S.
Agency for International Development and the BOR, and the Smart City Challenge, sponsored by DOT.
The Desal Prize was an engineering competition to develop technologies that could desalinate salt water
to a drinkable quality. The top five teams produced technologies that were able to be deployed as pilot
projects, with a team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology being named the winner in 2015.
Competitions such as this are able to generate infrastructure solutions that benefit cities not only in the
United States, but around the world.
Competitions, in addition to generating innovative solutions that increase performance and/or decrease
costs, can also successfully leverage nonfederal investment from philanthropy and the private sector.
The Smart City Challenge solicited cities seeking to integrate innovative technologies into their
transportation networks. The winner, Columbus, Ohio, was awarded a $40 million grant from DOT to
help implement its strategy. The $40 million DOT award was joined by a $10 million pledge from private-
sector partners, and the seven finalist cities in the Smart City Challenge raised more than $500 million in
other funding from a wide variety of partners to help implement their strategies (DOT, 2016c). Because
they are new programs, it is still too early to assess their effectiveness.
2nc – solvency – water
Counterplan solves water access and services

4.4 Water and Wastewater Systems Unlike municipal entities that handle their systems “in-house,”
water and wastewater facilities operated under long-term P3 agreements cannot issue tax-exempt
bonds, which is often cited as a political argument against changing the status quo, despite the proven
benefits of private capital and modernization. In addition to permitting tax-exempt revenue bonds for
such P3 arrangements, removing state caps on tax-exempt revenue bond issuance would also help,
though this is generally a matter for state, not federal, policy. However, Section 146 of the federal tax
code guides the volume cap, so Congress could amend that provision.
Municipalities can lose tax-exempt status for their existing bonds when a private entity acquires a long-
term interest in their asset(s). While the IRS has provided a way to get around that issue, it has proven
unhelpful for the water and wastewater sectors. Congress could modify Section 141 in the tax code to
address this issue.
The EPA could make two changes without legislation. Once it receives funding from Congress, the EPA
can ensure that P3-managed facilities are allowed equal opportunity to receive funding through the
Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA). Also, the agency could revise its narrow
interpretation of the term “publicly owned treatment works” in the Resource Conservation & Recovery
Act of 1976 to ensure that wastewater facilities that are operated privately under long-term P3 lease
concessions receive the same regulatory treatment as government-operated facilities. A simple wording
change to “public-purpose treatment works” instead of “publicly owned treatment works” would
accomplish this. However, it would likely take congressional action to permit such equal treatment for
any wastewater facility that was privatized via a sale.
4.5 Solid Waste Disposal Municipalities and counties in many parts of the country have entered into
waste disposal and recycling P3 agreements over the past few decades, to the point where the private
sector now provides 78% of waste disposal activity in the U.S.25 Since 1992, the municipal sector’s share
has fallen from 35% to 22% after being 75% just over three decades ago. The same general problems of
lack of equal access to tax-exempt revenue bonds and the constraint of state volume caps apply to this
sector, as they do for water and wastewater.
Solves water specifically
Water utility systems represent a fragmented market, with over 56,000 municipal water systems serving
over 300 million customers.6 Private water companies serve about 75 million customers—about one-
quarter of the U.S. population. These figures include both water and wastewater assets, and the private-
sector figures include municipally owned infrastructure that the private sector manages.7 Water
facilities provide many opportunities for P3 arrangements, from long-term lease concession agreements
for new facilities, replacement and modernization of existing facilities, and more-targeted arrangements
dealing with specific services such as desalinization and sludge treatment.
Public Works Financing reviewed water and wastewater service contracts that came up for renewal in
their 2016 Annual Water Outsourcing Report. The report found that 71 of the 79 contracts they
reviewed (of 89 total, with one contractor declining to have his 10 contracts included) in the previous
year either got renewed (61 contracts, or 77%) or transferred to another private entity (10 contracts, or
13%). As noted in Reason Foundation’s Annual Privatization Report for 2016, data from Public Works
Financing show contract renewal rates of around 90% over the past decade for water-related
privatization and outsourcing agreements, responsible for $2.2 billion in business activity in 2015.8
Many larger cities in recent years have turned to P3 arrangements to address both shortfalls in funding
and in capacity. In 2011 the city of Indianapolis transferred its water and wastewater systems to the
nonprofit Citizens Energy Group in a $1.9 billion deal that allowed the city to offload its water system
debt while also receiving a $500 million payment (which it used for transportation and parks
infrastructure). A $3.4 billion deal was approved in October 2014 that will enable the city of San Antonio
to increase its water supply by 20% (16 billion additional gallons per year) via a new water pipeline
system that will be designed, built, financed and maintained by a consortium of Abengoa Water USA and
Bluewater Systems.
Wastewater Facilities While wastewater treatment facilities and infrastructure are plentiful in the
United States—approximately 15,000 treatment facilities and 20,000 wastewater pipe systems—aging
assets raise concerns to those in the industry. According to the American Water Works Association’s
(AWWA’s) 2015 and 2016 editions of its State of the Water Industry Report, the two biggest concerns
for its members who responded were (1) renewal and replacement of aging water and wastewater
infrastructure and (2) financing for capital improvements.9
Municipalities have entered into P3 agreements with private consortia to address these concerns, with
the private entities often designing and building new infrastructure, in addition to providing operations
and management of the facilities and infrastructure. Other P3s are focused on environmental concerns
of wastewater management. Prince George’s County, MD signed a deal in November 2016 that partners
the county with Corvias Solutions to make 2000 acres of land surface more porous, enabling greater
absorption of storm water and reducing runoff into the Chesapeake Bay. If successful, future projects
totaling another 15,000 acres could follow over the next decade.10
2nc – at: non-econ advantages
Fed can’t solve non-economic effects from infrastructure investment
A separate case says significant public infrastructure investment is necessary to enhance productivity.
According to this view, the United States has an “infrastructure deficit”—a need for maintenance or new
infrastructure—given current demands or projections of future economic activity. Absent this
investment, potential growth will be diminished.
The growth performance of the economy has been sluggish compared with past recoveries, and the
Federal Reserve believes the long-term sustainable annual growth rate of the economy is now a mere
1.8 percent. The sustained downturn in productivity even as unemployment has fallen suggests a
problem on the supply side of the economy, perhaps because the conditions for growth are getting
harder or bad policies are producing a strong headwind against robust productivity growth.
In such an environment and with interest rates still low, so the argument goes, this is an opportune time
for the government to invest in roads, rail, energy, housing, and ports that will facilitate robust
productivity growth in future.
Can Good Infrastructure Enhance Economic Growth?
Few economists would argue that better infrastructure would not, all else equal, enhance a country’s
economic potential.
Consider a new highway that reduces the connection time between two cities. A reduction in travel
times lowers costs for businesses requiring the movement of inputs and labor through production and
delivery. Lower costs boost a company’s profits and increase its use of roads between the routes,
because of the effective fall in the price of transportation. Provided markets are contestable and
competitive, in time profit opportunities induce companies and individuals to relocate to the area now
connected through improved transport links. The ultimate beneficiaries are customers who enjoy lower
prices on final goods.
Some of the new activity will simply be displacement from other regions. But overall economic activity
will have increased as a result of better connectivity. Productive infrastructure reduces costs and
expands markets, allowing better realization of factor specialization and agglomeration effects. The
inverse applies too. Worsening connections caused by disrepair or outmoded facilities raise input prices
and reduce the beneficial effects of specialization.
Of course, infrastructure investment uses scarce resources. To assess whether a particular investment
has truly raised productivity, it must be judged against alternative uses of the funds. The extent to which
improved infrastructure actually feeds through into productivity improvements also depends on how
much the lowered costs compare with the total cost of production. That is why all individual proposals
should be judged on their own merits. But what is clear is that a strong theoretical basis exists for
believing that good infrastructure improves productivity.
Is Government Investment the Best Means of Delivering Infrastructure?
What is the best means of achieving infrastructure investments to enhance productivity and long-run
growth? Do we need public investment and planning through government, or are free markets capable
of enhancing supply as demands change?
The justifications for government provision or oversight of infrastructure projects can be split into three
broad categories: (a) markets fail and require government correction; (b) the cost of government
borrowing is cheap, and it is economical for governments to invest; and (c) governments can put social
ambitions above narrow commercial interests. The following sections evaluate each of those
justifications.
Market failure. Transport and water infrastructure are said to share some of the features of “public
goods,” meaning they might be unprovided or underprovided in a free market. The Brookings Institution
gives the example of a levee. Once built, a levee provides flood protection for an entire town or village.
Because nobody can be effectively excluded from its benefits, voluntary payments would unlikely occur
for the levee before development. Individuals would have an incentive to free-ride on the generosity of
others.48 In the absence of government provision, the levee would not be built.
In other words, government involvement in infrastructure provision can theoretically help solve a
collective action problem to improve social welfare. Taking road construction as an example, the
government may be better placed than private actors to deal with the transaction costs associated with
construction spanning the property of different landowners.49 In other cases, socially beneficial
investment might take place only alongside government privileges, such as noncompete clauses or
agreements inserted into contracts for toll road development to allow investors relative certainty on
returns by restricting the development of competing roads nearby.
Many (particularly large) projects certainly have significant external effects too, whether environmental
spillovers, noise pollution, or displacement to surrounding areas. When assigning clear property rights
and compensation is not possible, it is believed that government can intervene to ensure that these
social costs and social benefits are considered.
Yet historical examples of private-sector delivery suggest that the “market failure” arguments for public
investment are weaker than often asserted. Virtually the entire rail network in the United Kingdom (UK)
was privately built and operated for more than 100 years before its nationalization following World War
II. In the United States, the pioneering Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Corporation began building
private turnpikes in the late 18th century, and for the first third of the 19th century, private companies
built thousands of miles of road.
The private sector can and does build roads and railways now. Road owners can and do charge tolls for
use when they can, whereas railway owners can buy up the land around their tracks and thus capitalize
on the appreciation in land values following the development of a rail line. In many other countries,
airports and associated infrastructure are privately owned and delivered, with the government’s role
often limited to applying a framework to deal with land-use planning, spillover issues, or complementary
infrastructure in the surrounding area. Investors in London’s Heathrow Airport, for example, recently
agreed to a plan to deliver £650 million ($810 billion) in additional investment in 2019.50 The biggest
barriers to private investment in major projects are often regulatory or related to uncertainty (discussed
later).
Correcting for “market failures” also tends to be a lot more difficult in practice than in theory. Most
activities have external effects that are highly uncertain. The mere presence of externalities is not a
sufficient condition to justify government action. It may be that private returns are still high enough that
a project would be undertaken anyway, even though it has additional social benefits. With scarce
resources, it is also necessary to review not just whether a project has some social benefits, but also
whether the social rate of return is high compared with other uses of funds.51 There is even some
evidence that some things traditionally thought to be public goods, such as lighthouses, actually get
produced in a market economy.52
We should be skeptical then of those who use “market failures” as a justification for widespread
government provision of infrastructure. That is not to say that some worthy projects would not be
produced in a market economy. Government should undertake certain infrastructure projects if they are
strongly socially desirable but not privately profitable. But that is likely to occur much less frequently
than commonly believed. What is more, most projects with significant spillover effects tend to require
highly localized knowledge, meaning state or local government would be better placed than the federal
government to undertake any investment.
2nc – at: states incompetent
Federal spending undermines state effectiveness
State policymakers are distracted by the need to lobby the federal government. State governments have
long had lobbying offices in Washington, and hundreds of local governments hire Washington lobbying
firms.140 The number of local governments hiring federal lobbyists “has been on an upward trend for
more than 30 years.”141 State and local leaders do regular “fly-ins” to Washington to twist arms on
Capitol Hill.
There are nationwide lobbying groups, such as the National League of Cities; there are regional groups,
such as the Northeast-Midwest Institute; and there are state-specific groups, such as the California
Institute for Federal Policy Research. All these groups track federal aid and try to increase their share of
funding. Some state governments have special state offices that track federal aid, and there is an
industry of consulting firms that train people on how to secure federal grants.142
There are also many lobbying organizations representing state and local government employees who
rely on federal aid. The National WIC Association, for example, lobbies the federal government on behalf
of the 2,000 state and local government agencies that administer the $6 billion Women, Infants, and
Children program. And a slew of governmentrelated groups lobbies the federal government to spend
more on “economic development” programs, including the National Association of Development
Organizations, the National Association for County, Community, and Economic Development, and a
dozen others. The federal Economic Development Administration helpfully lists these lobbying groups
on its website.143 Federal bureaucracies and these state groups have the same interest in higher
federal aid spending. But for state officials, such lobbying distracts from what they should be focused on,
which is efficiently managing state and local services.
Federal aid has also undermined efficient state management by creating new layers of government.
Thousands of water authorities, public housing authorities, conservation districts, air quality regions,
and other government entities have been created as a requirement of receiving federal aid.144 The
number of such “special district” governments in the nation increased from 12,000 in 1952 to 35,000 by
2002.145 Transportation aid provides an example of such “capacity building” in government: [Federal
transportation law] requires that a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) be designated for each
urbanized area with a population of more than 50,000 people in order to carry out the metropolitan
transportation planning process, as a condition of federal aid. As a result of the 2010 decennial Census,
36 new urbanized areas were identified. These areas will either have to establish and staff a new MPO,
or merge with an existing MPO.146
The proliferation of such structures has tied the hands of elected state and local policymakers. They are
blocked from reallocating funds and restructuring programs because of the rules tied to aid. Federal aid
has balkanized state and local governments. The GAO found, for example, that an array of 16 separate
federal aid programs for first responders has created fragmented disaster response planning.147 The
rise in federal aid has produced disjointed and uncoordinated state and local management.
2nc – at: delay deficit
Federal aid is bad- bureaucracy, bad management, and regulations all make it a worse
product for a higher price- causes massive delays
7. Bureaucracy Experts have been criticizing the large bureaucracy of the aid system for decades. As the
system has grown, new programs are overlaid haphazardly on old programs, and few are ever repealed.
A 1946 report by a Senate committee found: The present situation on federal grants to state and local
governments is extremely chaotic. . . . One federal-aid program has been piled on top of another—
without sufficient effort to appraise the general effect of federal aid upon state and local activities or to
achieve coordination among the innumerable federal-aid programs. . . . The net effect of our present
federal-aid program, which has simply grown like Topsy, is a wild morass of red tape and administrative
confusion.74
In 1980, an ACIR report on federalism concluded that the aid system is a “bewildering maze” in which
the federal government’s role has become “more pervasive, more intrusive, more unmanageable, more
ineffective, more costly, and above all, more unaccountable.”75 At the time, there were 434 aid
programs; today there are 1,386.
More recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said, “The federal grant system continues to
be highly fragmented, potentially resulting in a high degree of duplication and overlap among federal
programs.”76 The auditing agency, for example, identified 80 federal aid programs that provide funding
for local economic development.77
Aid programs need legions of federal and state administrators, accountants, consultants, and lawyers to
prepare and review applications, draft program plans and procedures, file reports, submit waivers, audit
recipients, litigate disagreements, and comply with regulations. The federal rules for each aid program
can run to thousands of pages. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a good example.
The statute is 94 pages long, while the regulations are more than 1,700 pages long.78 A recent annual
report to Congress from IDEA’s administrators is 328 pages of dense text.79 Federal aid programs are
not just simple, costless transfers of money to the states.
The federal administrative costs of aid programs range from a few percent of the value of the aid to
more than 10 percent. That includes the costs of federal salaries, benefits, travel, office rent, and
supplies. For example, federal administrative costs were about y 5 percent of the value of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s aid of $38 billion in 2018;80 y 7 percent of the value
of school lunch and breakfast programs aid of $24 billion in 2018;81 y 13 percent of the value of the
Economic Development Administration’s aid of $299 million in 2018;82 and y 18 percent of the value of
the federal disaster aid to the states in a typical year.83
On top of federal costs, there are state and local administrative costs. Bureaucracy expert Paul Light
estimated that federal grants directly support 1.6 million state and local employees such as
schoolteachers.84 In addition, he figured that roughly 4.6 million state and local government jobs exist
to carry out federal mandates—both the rules tied to federal aid programs and other regulations for
environmental, labor, and other social policies.85
Light’s estimate of 4.6 million may be too high, but there do appear to be millions of state and local
government employees tethered to the federal government. Consider that between 1960 and 1980 the
aid system and the number of federal social mandates were growing rapidly, and state-local government
employment correspondingly doubled from 5.6 million to 11.2 million.86 Then, during the 1980s, aid
spending and mandate production slowed and state-local employment in turn was flat.
Consider the large bureaucracy for Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs). The GAO found that
local governments spent an average of 17 percent of CDBG funds on administration.87 You can
appreciate where the money goes by looking at the State of California’s CDBG webpage.88 It has more
than 170 links to forms, documents, and spreadsheets that local governments within the state must deal
with for the program—applications, procedure guides, compliance instructions, reporting templates,
certifications, demographic analyses, verifications, checklists, training videos, and much more. Note
that, as a block grant, the CDBG program is supposed to be a simpler type of grant with fewer rules than
normal categorical grants.
Now consider federal aid for K–12 schools, which flows from the federal government to state
bureaucracies to local school agencies and then to schools. In a study for Wisconsin, the Badger Institute
found that state-level administration consumed about 7 percent of the federal aid flowing to local
school agencies.89 In a poll, two-thirds of K–12 school administrators and board members found that
the reporting requirements for federal aid programs were “very” or “extremely” “time-consuming.”90
The Badger Institute investigated the funding sources of employee salaries. In Wisconsin’s Department
of Public Instruction, for example, 49 percent of the employees are paid with federal funds, while in the
Department of Workforce Development, 73 percent are paid with federal funds. Across a number of
departments, Badger found that the function of a bit less than one-third of these employees was simply
to handle federal paperwork.91
Competitive grants generate a particularly large amount of bureaucratic waste. That is because state
and local agencies must prepare lengthy proposals to request grants, but then many of the requests are
denied. For example, in three rounds of TIGER grants the Department of Transportation (DOT) awarded
$2.6 billion for 172 projects, but more than 3,000 state and local agencies sent in applications.92 Thus,
the efforts of 2,800 or so agencies were wasted.
In 2018, the DOT handed out $1.5 billion in BUILD grants to 91 out of 851 applicants. The DOT said that
BUILD “applications were evaluated by a team of 222 career staff in the department.”93 One of the
winning projects was a $14 million grant to widen Highway 157 near Cullman, Alabama. A local
newspaper noted, “Mayor Woody Jacobs said a lot of time and expertise was used to prepare the grant
application.”94 Another city official said, “It is a critical need that’s been important to us a long time.”95
But if that is true, then Alabama should have funded the project itself.
The Obama administration handed out $4.3 billion in Race to the Top school grants. In the first round,
just 2 of the 40 states that applied received aid, and in the second round just 10 of 30 states received
aid.96 The state applications for Race to the Top were generally more than 600 pages long, which would
have required large teams of state employees to complete.97
Finally, consider the federal Assistance for Arts Education Development and Dissemination program. In
2018, it awarded $12 million to school boards in 22 grants out of 96 applications received.98 Each
application was more than 50 pages in length.99 That is a large paperwork effort for a small amount of
federal money.
In sum, funding state and local government programs from Washington adds a substantial bureaucratic
cost that would be avoided if state and local governments funded their own programs.
8. Waste Many federal aid programs suffer from high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse. State
administrators have little incentive to reduce such costs because the funds come “free” from
Washington. At the same time, members of Congress have little incentive to reduce waste in aid
programs because all federal spending in their districts is generally seen as a political positive.
The largest aid program, Medicaid, has huge amounts of fraudulent and erroneous spending, referred to
as “improper payments.” The GAO estimates that $37 billion in Medicaid spending in 2017 was
improper, which was 10 percent of the program’s total cost.100 As a matching program, the incentive
for state administrators to reduce Medicaid waste is low because they would need to find more than
two dollars of waste to save state taxpayers one dollar. Indeed, the states themselves abuse Medicaid
with dubious schemes to inflate the matching dollars they receive from Washington.101
The school lunch and breakfast programs are subject to widespread abuse, with families taking benefits
they are not eligible for. The improper payment rate for school lunches is 16 percent and for breakfasts
is 25 percent.102 Local governments do little verification of recipient eligibility because they have no
incentive to.103 Indeed, school administrators have been caught illegally inflating the number of
children receiving benefits.104 When federal auditors have examined applications in detail, they have
found that about half of them claim excessive benefits.105
Government infrastructure funded by federal aid is plagued by cost overruns. Boston’s Big Dig highway
project more than quadrupled in cost from $2.6 billion to $14.6 billion, of which $8.5 billion came from
the federal government.106 Cost overruns are common on small projects as well. In Arlington, Virginia,
the local government built a single bus shelter that cost $1 million, whereas a “typical bus shelter costs
between $10,000 and $20,000” noted the Washington Post. 107 Arlington chose to build a Taj Mahal
bus shelter—with heated floors— because the federal and state governments were paying 80 percent of
the costs.108
Urban transit has suffered from bloated costs since the 1960s when federal aid began and private
systems were taken over by city governments. Construction cost overruns have averaged 43 percent on
64 major rail projects tracked by the federal government since 1990.109 With respect to operating
costs, excessive union pay in transit systems has been sustained by large subsidies, while productivity
has plunged. Transit trips per operating employee across U.S. cities fell from about 60,000 in the 1960 to
fewer than 30,000 today.110
The unneeded imposition of federal bureaucracy on local infrastructure projects causes delays that push
up costs. The GAO points to the “fragmented approach as five DOT agencies with 6,000 employees
administer over 100 separate programs with separate funding streams for highways, transit, rail, and
safety functions. This fragmented approach impedes effective decision making.”111 New York’s World
Trade Center rail station, completed in 2015, doubled in cost from $2 billion to $4 billion. A Wall Street
Journal investigation pointed to bureaucratic delays and complexities: “In public and private clashes,”
federal, state, and local government agencies “each pushed to include their own ideas, making the site’s
design ever more complex, former project officials said. These disputes added significant delays and
costs to the transit station.”112
In their 600-page book on fiscal federalism, Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah describe the general
perception across countries of the wastefulness of aid from national to subnational governments:
Perceptions of intergovernmental finance are generally negative. Many federal officials believe that
giving money and power to subnational governments is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenagers.
They believe that grant moneys enable these governments to go on a spending binge and the national
government then is faced with the consequences of its reckless spending behaviors.113
The authors are not necessarily saying they agree with these perceptions, just that these are the sorts of
views on federal aid they have come across in their studies of numerous countries.
For the United States, such views are well founded. Government programs funded through federal aid
tend to be executed inefficiently. State administrators do not treat federal money in a frugal manner,
and the involvement of multiple levels of governments in programs adds costs, complexity, and delays.
9. Regulations The regulations that come part and parcel with federal aid create a great deal of
inefficiency. Since the first aid program in 1862 for land-grant colleges, the federal government has
imposed on states detailed rules for operating programs and for reporting to Washington. The aid
system includes rules that are tied to particular programs, as well as rules that apply to a broad range of
programs, which are called cross-cutting regulations. The latter type greatly increased in the 1960s and
1970s as the federal government imposed dozens of labor, environmental, safety, and other social
requirements on aid recipients.114
Federalism expert John Kincaid says that during the 1960s and 1970s, the “conditions of aid, mandates,
preemptions, and federal court orders experienced unprecedented increases. Consequently, state and
local governments took on the mantle of administrative arms of the federal government.”115
The rules tied to federal aid raise state and local costs. For example, Davis-Bacon labor rules require that
workers on federally funded construction projects be paid “prevailing wages,” generally meaning higher
union wages. These rules increase wage costs on highway projects by an average of 22 percent, while
also slowing projects and piling paperwork on contractors.116
Federal environmental rules tied to aid push up construction costs and cause delays. A report for the
Obama administration found that the average time to complete federal environmental studies for
infrastructure projects increased from 2.2 years in the 1970s to 6.6 years in recent years.117 The
number of federal environmental laws and executive orders that transportation projects must comply
with increased from 26 in 1970 to about 70 today.118
In education, the Bush administration’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law of 2002 imposed many costly
rules. To receive NCLB grants, for example, the states had to implement extensive testing structures,
create complex measurement systems, and adopt new rules for teacher qualifications. The National
Conference of State Legislatures found that the Act’s requirements cost the states about $10 billion
more per year than the federal government covered with aid funding.119
Perhaps some NCLB rules made sense for some schools in some states, but the law bluntly imposed a
large array of costly rules on schools nationwide. Many education experts argued that NCLB did not just
generate bureaucracy, but also caused active harm.120 Teachers and state policymakers revolted
against NCLB, and dozens of states passed resolutions and statutes to counter the federal law.
The Obama administration pursued its own micromanagement of the nation’s schools. The 2009
economic stimulus bill provided the administration funding for its Race to the Top grants, which
required recipient states to impose all kinds of changes, including—essentially—the adoption of the
Common Core national standards.
The administration also used “waivers” on aid programs in a uniquely aggressive manner to
micromanage the schools. The states were clamoring for waivers from the costly NCLB rules, so the
administration created 18 “sets of policy commitments” that states had to agree to before waivers were
granted.121 One of the commitments was, essentially, to adopt Common Core.
Waivers have long been used as a pressure valve to release the states from costly federal rules, but the
Obama administration used them for the opposite purpose—to impose new rules on America’s schools.
Education scholar Rick Hess said that the Obama administration’s “aggressive approach politicized
nearly all that it touched, leaving in its wake unnecessarily divisive national debates over issues like
Common Core.”122
A final example of the cost-increasing effect of federal aid concerns the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) grants for local firefighting agencies, which total more than $600 million a
year. The grants fund the employee compensation and capital costs of local fire departments. A few
years ago, San Diego was ready to break ground on two new fire stations funded by local revenues. Then
the city heard that it could apply for a federal grant to pay for the buildings. The city eventually received
the federal aid, but its new stations were far behind schedule and cost $2.2 million more than they
would have without the aid because of aid-related regulations.123
10. Management Federal aid programs tend to be poorly managed by both federal and state
governments. Federal policymakers are too distracted to investigate failures and pursue improvements,
while state policymakers cannot manage programs effectively because they are tied in federal
regulatory knots. The GAO has noted with respect to aid programs that the “sheer number of actors
creates immense coordination problems” and that “high costs appear inevitable” in the aid system.124
At the federal level, the huge size and scope of the government overwhelms the ability of lawmakers to
oversee programs. At more than $4 trillion, the federal budget is 100 times larger than the average state
government budget of about $40 billion. Economist Milton Friedman observed, “Because government is
doing so many things it ought not to be doing, it performs the functions it ought to be performing
badly.”125 Federal bureaucracy expert Paul Light has found that the number of major federal failures
has increased over the past three decades.126
Congress is supposed to oversee the 1,386 aid programs it has enacted, but members do not have the
time or the expertise to do so effectively. Committees hold occasional oversight hearings, but most
members attend only briefly and make a few perfunctory comments aimed at the home-state media.
Members often miss their committee hearings altogether.127
Economist Alice Rivlin observed that with the proliferation of programs, the federal government
resembles “a giant conglomerate that has acquired too many different kinds of businesses and cannot
coordinate its own activities or manage them all effectively from central headquarters.”128 In markets,
business conglomerates are forced to shed low-value activities, but in government there is no similar
mechanism.
When the aid system was initially expanding in the early 20th century, lawmakers naïvely thought that
federal programs would be superior to state programs. President Woodrow Wilson and other
Progressives favored centralization so that experts could plan activities for the nation. Wilson thought
that power was too “dispersed” in America and ought to be concentrated.129 Economist and later U.S.
senator Paul Douglas was also optimistic about the expansion of aid. In a 1920 essay about federal aid,
he said that it “insures relatively economical expenditure of federal funds and prevents their misuse”
while being “purely voluntary” for the states.130
In a 1928 book about the growing federal aid system, political scientist Austin Macdonald captured the
spirit of the times: “The old line of division between state and national powers is manifestly unsuited to
present-day conditions” and the “bewildering patchwork” of state policies is unsatisfactory.131 Diversity
is old-fashioned—the modern approach to government management is national standards imposed with
“infinite tact and skill” by federal officials, claimed Macdonald.132
Not everyone was convinced. Gov. Albert Ritchie of Maryland pushed back hard against aid, saying in
1925, “the system ought to be abolished, root and branch.”133 The same year, President Calvin
Coolidge warned in his State of the Union address that federal encroachment on local governments
created the danger of “encumbering the national government beyond its wisdom to comprehend, or its
ability to administer” sound policies.134 And in 1926, Coolidge opposed spending $109 million that was
budgeted for state aid, saying: I am convinced that the broadening of this field of activity is detrimental
both to the federal and state governments. Efficiency of federal operations is impaired as their scope is
unduly enlarged. Efficiency of state governments is impaired as they relinquish and turn over to the
federal government responsibilities which are rightfully theirs. I am opposed to any expansion of these
subsidies.135
Timing is key- we’re already climbing out of the recession and the aff’s spending gets
delayed- means it causes a boom-bust cycle
Timing and dose. A third conclusion about the efficacy of fiscal stimulus is that it relies on having
accurate information on the state of the economy. That factor is necessary to work out whether, when,
and how much to spend or reduce taxes to attempt to remedy an economy below its potential.
The first seeds of the Great Recession, for example, occurred in December 2007, but the Obama fiscal
stimulus package was not agreed on in the United States until 2009, with much of the spending
occurring later in 2010. Far from keeping the economy on an even keel, fiscal policy applied at the
wrong time has the potential to exacerbate the boom–bust cycle . This problem has been described as
the “long and variable” lag argument, put forward by Milton Friedman. Policy tends to take time to
operate, and governments often make faulty forecasts about the state of the economy. By the time
spending actually comes on board, the health of the economy might be much improved.
Similar concerns about the inaccuracies of assessments of economic health affect the “dose.” Assessing
an economy’s potential output to determine how much stimulus is necessary is particularly difficult. In
the debate about closing deficits across the world after 2010, many governments revised down the
sustainable growth rates of their economies, believing the financial crisis had adversely affected their
capacity to grow. A larger proportion of the budget deficits was thus considered “structural,”
necessitating further spending cuts to achieve fiscal objectives.24 But these judgments were highly
uncertain. More recent research suggests that revisions to the productive potential of the economy can
have self-fulfilling consequences if believed, as forward-looking consumers adjust their spending to
changed outlooks for lifetime incomes.25
The interaction between federal and state governments adds further complexity in the United States.
Even if the federal government could perfectly assess economic health and the stimulus required to
reach economic potential, a spending program might “crowd out” state spending activity, thus having no
net effect on government spending overall. A new report by economist William Dupor of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis gives a specific example of this outcome in relation to highway funding under
the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. He finds that “as states spent Recovery Act highway
grants, many simultaneously slashed their own contributions to highway infrastructure, freeing up state
dollars for other uses,” and that receiving grants appeared to have no causal relationship on total state
spending.26 His finding backs up other research suggesting that states used the increased federal
spending as an opportunity to accumulate financial assets during the earliest phases of the Recovery
Act,27a potential problem with stimulus schemes long noted by prominent economists.28 In a seminal
paper as far back as 1956, economist E. Cary Brown outlined how the economic effects of federal
expansions in the 1930s were undermined by the “contractive effects of state and local
governments.”29 Indeed, the recent 2018 budget infrastructure initiative acknowledged that the
“flexibility to use Federal dollars to pay for essentially local infrastructure projects has created an
unhealthy dynamic in which State and local governments delay projects in the hope of receiving Federal
funds.”30
Federal spending causes delays
12. Timeliness Dependence on federal aid causes delays in state and local projects such as
infrastructure. Governments may stall needed projects for years as they wait for federal grants to be
approved. And then after aid is received, aidrelated regulations can raise costs and delay completion.
Charleston, South Carolina, has long needed to dredge its seaport to accommodate larger ships.
Completion of the project is crucial to the state’s economy, but the project has moved slowly while the
state has been waiting for federal funding.156 The federal government finally kicked in money for the
dredging in 2017. A local news source reported: The Charleston Harbor deepening project has been
allocated $17.5 million in federal funding, enabling construction to begin. . . . The project will deepen
Charleston Harbor to 52 feet. It is estimated to cost $509 million; the state already set aside $300 million
for it. The federal dollars bring the full amount of allocated funds to $317.5 million—roughly $192
million short of the total cost. The federal dollars are crucial, though; construction could not begin this
year without them. “The significance of this funding for the timeline of our deepening project cannot be
overstated—it is tremendous news for Charleston,” S.C. State Ports Authority President and CEO Jim
Newsome said in a news release.157
If the federal government withdrew from seaport dredging entirely, state and local governments would
proceed with projects when needed with their own funding. Other nations, such as the United Kingdom,
have shown that seaports can be funded, operated, and dredged privately without subsidies.158 But
because much of U.S. infrastructure is dependent on federal subsidies, upgrades and modernization can
lag the privatized infrastructure elsewhere. As another example, the government-run U.S. air traffic
control system lags behind the privatized Canadian system on technology upgrades because of federal
funding shortfalls and bureaucratic mismanagement.159
Federal aid and related regulations can impede the response to and recovery from natural disasters.160
FEMA’s main role is to hand out money, but the rules it imposes can slow and even block state, local,
and private disaster response efforts. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, federal supply efforts failed,
communications broke down, and federal political appointees were plagued by indecision and confusion
about complex federal rules and procedures. FEMA obstructed the relief efforts of charitable groups,
businesses, doctors, and others who rushed to New Orleans to help.
A New York Times article during Katrina said there was “uncertainty over who was in charge” and
“incomprehensible red tape.”161 Today’s disaster-response system “fractionates responsibilities” across
multiple governments, one expert noted.162 Another noted that “during the past 50 years, Congress
has created a legal edifice of byzantine complexity to cope with natural disasters.”163 FEMA is an
unneeded extra layer of bureaucracy that impedes first responders, who mainly work for state and local
governments.
Rebuilding after disasters can also be slowed as communities wait for federal funding. It takes FEMA
time to review the thousands of projects submitted to it for approval after storms. Disaster expert James
Fossett noted that FEMA “requires local governments to obtain advance approval for each project and
pay for each project up front before getting federal reimbursement for their costs, which must be
exhaustively documented. These lengthy, complex processes inevitably delay recovery and make it
difficult to spend money in a timely fashion.”164
In 2019, $4 billion of federal aid for Texas to rebuild after a 2017 hurricane was delayed by the usual
bureaucratic slowness in Washington, which caused Texas politicians to be “up in arms,” according to
the Wall Street Journal. The Texas leaders were “increasingly worried that the delay is leaving Gulf Coast
communities still recovering from Hurricane Harvey vulnerable to more destruction just as another
hurricane season is set to begin.”165 But Texas has a massive $1.7 trillion economy, so the state could
have easily afforded to fund the $4 billion of improvements itself, rather than waiting for Washington to
act.
Tax cuts solve better in the short-term

Even if we accept that fiscal policy works as expected, a key question is whether infrastructure
investment is the best mechanism for delivering a stimulus.
Keynesian economists frequently cite multiplier estimates suggesting government investment spending
has significantly bigger effects than either tax cuts or government consumption spending.35 Yet much
counterevidence is available. International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysis, for example, has found that
government investment has largely indistinguishable multipliers from government consumption
spending for open, flexible exchange rate countries or for highly indebted governments. In fact, a
growing literature (primarily based on so-called narrative studies) suggests that tax-based stimulus
programs may be more effective for short-term growth.36 More recent analysis also suggests that tax
rate increases have far worse effects on output than public spending cuts in fiscal consolidation
programs.37
One reason government investment spending might be an ineffective form of fiscal stimulus is that
infrastructure projects have long lead times. Even if we accurately assess the “demand deficiency” of the
economy, undertaking investment to coincide with a recession or slowdown is difficult. In the words of
the IMF, infrastructure investments “require coordination among federal, state, and local governments
and have to go through a long process of planning, bidding, contracting, construction, and
evaluation.”38
Government-imposed constraints, such as land-use planning laws and environmental audits, often delay
projects. President Obama realized that fact in relation to his stimulus program, acknowledging as far
back as 2010 that “there’s no such thing as shovel-ready projects.”39 By the end of 2009, actual
infrastructure spending was just 10 percent of that authorized for the year.40
Such delays can severely limit any positive effect of the spending and may even exacerbate the
downturn. The expectation of productive government spending and hence higher living standards
reduces work effort today, but if the project is delayed then that outweighs any positive effect on labor
and output from the actual spending. In fact, the IMF attributes delays as a potential explanation to why
President Obama’s stimulus package made much less of a dent on unemployment than expected. By the
second quarter of 2010, President Obama’s economics team had expected the unemployment rate to
have fallen to 7.5 percent. In fact, it was 9.6 percent.41 (Other factors might explain the difference
between forecasts and outcomes, not least fiscal stimulus working less well than expected or the legacy
effects of the financial crisis being more severe than believed.)
In contrast to investment spending, changes to tax rates can be implemented and reversed more quickly
(subject to political and legislative restraints). They can also provide positive supply-side effects by
improving incentives to work, save, and invest. To the extent that we expect fiscal stimulus to work as
Keynesian theory would predict, delays associated with infrastructure expenditure might mean tax cuts
are more effective.
In addition to short-run concerns, political considerations mean government investment spending might
worsen longer-term economic performance if used for short-term demand management. In deciding to
use infrastructure spending to directly support jobs, boost the economies of certain localities, or find
“shovel-ready” projects, programs may be selected that undermine the economy in the longer term.
If short-term jobs are a primary concern, more labor may be used for projects than is economically
efficient, meaning higher costs for taxpayers. “Jobs” are a cost, not a benefit, of investments, and those
“created” come only through the diversion of resources and opportunities from other parts of the
economy. To highlight that fact, Milton Friedman is frequently quoted as reacting to the absence of
heavy machinery in a canal built in Asia in the 1960s by asking why the project was being undertaken by
men with shovels. Upon being told it was a “jobs program,” he said: “I thought you were trying to build a
canal. If you really want to create jobs, then by all means give these men spoons, not shovels.”
Attempts to allocate funds to certain localities may likewise pour resources into regions with poor
economic fundamentals when the same investment could have been better used to improve
connectivity for regions with more growth potential. Funneling money quickly into “shovel-ready”
projects may lead to bad decisionmaking and encourage rent seeking. As noted, guidance sent to
governors by President Trump’s transition team suggested that projects considered for federal support
should include those that were “shovel ready” and direct job creators, and that would support
manufacturing employment. Given the leaked priority list of projects, moreover, resources might also be
allocated according to the political party landscape in different states.
Attempts to boost demand in the short term can therefore lead to investment in projects producing
unproductive capital in the longer term. If so, as IMF analysis has found, the need to adjust for the
temporary fiscal expansion through cuts to transfer programs, increased government consumption, and
especially tax increases in the future can actually contract the economy in the longer term.
2nc – at: not enough money
1. you should be broadly skeptical of deficits based on insufficient funding for two
reasons-
a. the 1AC is mostly industry propaganda, and;
b. federal regulations and political decisionmaking both artificially inflate the
cost of federally-funded projects
Reducing federal obstacles is key to spurring private investment to repair US water

infrastructure- private funding gets deployed more quickly independently generates
service exports that boosts the economy long-term
The incoming Trump administration has proposed a $1 trillion program to foster private investment in
aging public-sector infrastructure. Eligible projects would involve infrastructure that has, or could have,
robust user-fee revenue streams. Large-scale public-private partnerships ( P3s) would finance, redesign,
rebuild and modernize, operate and maintain aging and/or under-sized airport, highway, seaport, water-
supply and waste-treatment facilities. These projects would be financed via equity investment (20% to
30%) and longterm revenue bond financing (70% to 80%).
Global infrastructure investment funds , U.S investment banks and large pension funds are eager to
invest in such P3 projects in the United States . But to date, the opportunities to do such projects have
been far greater in Asia, Australia, Canada, Europe and Latin America than here in the land of free
enterprise. Part of this is due to the institutional inertia of many state and local governments that are
slow to adopt new ways of doing business. But another major factor is federal obstacles to this kind of
private capital investment in state and local infrastructure.
There is no lack of candidate projects. Those considered in this report include: • 130 large, medium and
small-hub airports; • 44,000 miles of non-tolled Interstate highways nearing or exceeding their 50-year
design lives; • Over 2,000 municipal electric and gas utilities; • 99 seaports; • 56,000 municipal water
systems; and • 15,000 wastewater treatment facilities
All of these already have bondable user-fee revenue streams or (in the case of Interstates) could
implement such fees (state-of-the-art all-electronic tolling).
Infrastructure that is already owned by investors—most electric and gas utilities and the occasional P3
airport (San Juan) or toll road (Indiana Toll Road)—already has access to private capital and is being
rebuilt and modernized. It is public-sector infrastructure that suffers from large-scale investment
shortfalls.
Worldwide and in a few dozen U.S. revenue-financed P3 projects , an impressive track record has been
assembled. Benefits include: • Major investments much sooner , thanks to ready access to capital; • A
demonstrated track record of largely on-time completion; • Innovation that reduces costs and/or
improves performance; • Lower life-cycle cost, since projects are designed to be efficiently maintained;
• Transfer of major risks (cost overruns, traffic shortfalls, etc.) from taxpayers to investors; and • New
tax revenues to government (as with investor-owned utilities).
The United States is missing out on these benefits, while much of our infrastructure continues to
deteriorate. In transportation alone, the last five years have seen $160 billion of P3 projects in Canada,
Europe, Latin America and the United States. But only 12.5% of that has been in this country. This lack of
projects is due in part to federal barriers that make it difficult , financially disadvantageous, or impossible
to do such projects here, compared with other countries.
This report identifies the principal federal barriers . Among them are the following: • A very restricted
airport privatization program that erects barriers not found in other countries; • A federal ban on using
toll revenues to finance the reconstruction of aging Interstate highways (except for a tiny pilot program);
and • An OMB rule requiring that if a facility that has received federal aid is privatized, the grant money
must be repaid (a de-facto tax on reinventing government). But by far the greatest federal obstacle is
the inability in most cases to use tax-exempt revenue bonds for P3 projects . The United States is
virtually alone in allowing state and local governments to issue tax-free revenue bonds . This creates a
non-level financial playing field since, except for surface transportation projects, P3 projects are limited
to using taxable debt. Once interest rates return to normal levels, the difference between taxable and
tax-exempt interest rates will be significant. Even for projects that still pencil out with taxable bonds, the
user fees will reflect the higher cost of taxable debt financing.
Two policy changes would create a level financial playing field: 1. Generalize the existing surface
transportation Private Activity Bond (PAB) program to apply to P3 projects for all categories of public-
purpose infrastructure; and 2. Allow the new PABs to be used to acquire and reconstruct existing
infrastructure, not just to build new projects. The second point is critically important, since the primary
need is not new infrastructure but the reconstruction and modernization of existing infrastructure.
This program would likely be revenue-positive for the U.S. Treasury for two reasons. First, hardly any
public-purpose infrastructure today is being financed by taxable bonds (or in cases where it has been,
large fractions of those bonds have been purchased by non-taxable entities such as pension funds). So, a
largescale expansion of infrastructure investment with tax-exempt PABs would not be substituting for
nonexistent taxable bonds. Second, there would be net new federal tax revenue from (a) corporate tax
payments by the P3 companies building and operating the rebuilt facilities, and (b) additional personal
income tax payments by a larger pool of construction and maintenance workers, getting premium wages
and overtime thanks to the expanded program.
Finally, there would be additional economic benefits over and above the value of the modernized
infrastructure. A trillion-dollar P3 infrastructure program would attract global equity investment from
the scores of global infrastructure investment funds that are mostly investing in other regions of the
world. Also, over time the United States would develop world-class P3 infrastructure
developer/operators that would compete in global markets, generating service-export revenues .
We need way less money than the aff says

2.2 Estimates of Unfunded Modernization Needs In 2013, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
released its most recent Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, which provides a broad assessment of
the nation’s infrastructure across 16 different categories.13 The Report Card also provides estimates of
expenditures that need to be made to upgrade and replace aging infrastructure.
Among the sectors where the ASCE sees a need for additional investment over the next two decades
include: • Bridges: $8 billion more per year • Dams: $2.3 billion more per year (Corps of Engineers dams
only) • Drinking Water: $50 billion more per year • Wastewater: $15 billion more per year (for projects
mostly needing completion in the next five years, according to a recent EPA survey of states and D.C.14)
• Roads: $80 billion more per year.
Notably, these estimates are derived in a way likely to produce overstated amounts . For example, the
drinking water figure, which originates from the AWWA, includes every inch of water delivery piping
in the U.S. being replaced, which is unlikely to be needed or to be cost-effective . Many of the inputs
driving these estimates originate from industry trade associations that generally do not include
return-on-investment or cost-benefit analysis .
2nc – reducing taxes good
The feds tax policy deters private investment-
5.1 The Problem: Tax Discrimination Against Private Investment For more than a century, state and local
infrastructure provided by the public sector has been financed primarily by tax-exempt bonds—meaning
that the interest paid to bond-holders is exempt from federal income taxes. Identical facilities built,
owned and operated by investor-owned companies in most cases may only use taxable debt, carrying a
higher interest rate and thereby incurring significantly higher financing costs.
This tax discrimination is unknown elsewhere in the world. Besides increasing the cost—other things
equal—of privatized infrastructure, this also gives opponents of P3s an argument that P3s are a poor
choice since their financing costs are higher. Even when that is not true (e.g., if the P3 project has a
lower-cost design or lower life-cycle costs), the rhetorical argument can have political salience.
One major exception to this tax discrimination took place when Congress enacted the SAFETEA-LU
surface transportation law in 2005. It authorized up to $15 billion of tax-exempt Private Activity Bonds
(PABs) for P3 highway and transit projects. PABs have subsequently been used for a growing number of
large-scale highway and transit P3 projects, including the East End Crossing over the Ohio River near
Louisville, the Eagle P3 transit line between downtown Denver and its international airport, and the
Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement Project under which Pennsylvania is having the private sector
refurbish or replace and maintain 558 deficient bridges.
The relatively new PABs program offers a preview of an expanded role for P3 infrastructure projects, if
tax discrimination in project finance were to be eliminated. There are two ways in which this might be
brought about. One would be to expand the availability of PABs to all the sectors of P3 infrastructure
discussed in this report. A more radical approach would be for the United States to cease offering
federal tax exemption on infrastructure bonds, regardless of public or private ownership.
The latter approach was analyzed in a 1995 policy study that estimated the impact of requiring all new
issues of infrastructure bonds to be taxable, regardless of ownership of the facility.26 For the five-year
period of 1990–1994 it tallied all municipal tax-exempt infrastructure revenue bonds, which totaled
$50.85 billion over that five-year period, with an average maturity of 18 years. It then assumed that as
each bond matured, it would be replaced by a taxable revenue bond. It then estimated net new federal
tax revenue as the new bonds were phased in over 18 years; by the end of that period, new annual
revenue was estimated to be $24.5 billion.
Since that approach is not likely to be feasible, this paper does not re-do those calculations using current
data on bond issuance and interest rates, but this remains an interesting longer-term possibility.
5.2 Creating a Level Infrastructure Finance Playing Field Generalize PABs to All Public-Purpose
Infrastructure Realistically, the best way forward in the near term is to, in effect, expand PABs to cover
P3 projects for all types of public-purpose infrastructure. Currently, only surface transportation projects
have something resembling a level financial playing field. Other infrastructure—airports, ports, schools
and other public buildings, parking structures, water and wastewater facilities—may use tax-exempt
bonds under certain conditions but must comply with various IRS regulations and government controls.
Airport terminal projects such as LaGuardia’s new Central Terminal can use tax-exempt debt (issued by
the Port Authority) only by restricting the term of their concession agreement to less than the estimated
useful life of the facility. Public buildings such as schools and courthouses must comply with IRS rules
that limit management agreements with private parties to ones interpreted as not impairing the
“public” character of the facility. Water and wastewater projects can use tax-exempt debt only if they
can obtain an allocation of “volume cap” from the state in question.
Changing this may garner bipartisan support, since the Obama administration proposed a reform along
these lines. In 2015 it proposed that Congress authorize a new kind of tax-exempt infrastructure bond
called Qualified Public Infrastructure Bonds (QPIBs), intended to “extend the benefits of municipal
bonds to public-private partnerships.” The White House Fact Sheet27 added the following: A similar
existing program, Private Activity Bonds (PABs) has already been used to support financing of over $10
billion of roads, tunnels, and bridges. QPIBs will expand the scope of PABs to include financing for
airports, ports, mass transit, solid waste disposal, sewer and water, as well as for more surface
transportation projects. Unlike PABs, the QPIB bond program will have no expiration date, no issuance
caps, and interest on these bonds will not be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax.
So the first and most urgent policy change is for Congress to generalize the current PABs along the lines
proposed for QPIB, specifically: • Inclusion of P3s for all sectors of public-purpose infrastructure; • No
cap on the volume that can be issued; • No expiration date; • Not subject to the Alternative Minimum
Tax (AMT).
Expand Generalized PABs to Existing Assets, for Asset Recycling Current U.S. law, including PABs,
encourages their use for projects that create new infrastructure facilities (referred to as “greenfield”
projects) but not for the operation and ongoing maintenance of existing facilities (referred to as
“brownfield” projects). In cases such as the long-term lease of the Indiana Toll Road or San Juan
International Airport—both of which will involve significant reconstruction over their lengthy terms (75
and 40 years, respectively), not only did existing tax-exempt bonds have to be paid off but they had to
be replaced by more expensive taxable bonds.
Other governments are taking a diametrically opposite view. The current governments of both Australia
and Canada are implementing a policy called “asset recycling.” Under this policy, the national
government is encouraging their states or provinces to privatize revenue-producing brownfield
infrastructure facilities and use any net proceeds to the government (from the sale or lease) to invest in
other needed infrastructure that does not have a stream of user-fee revenue (such as public buildings).
Australia’s national government has committed to provide a bonus equal to 15% of the transaction
proceeds to any state that thus “recycles” the net proceeds of an infrastructure sale or lease into other
infrastructure projects. Canada’s national government is still developing its asset recycling program.
A positive U.S. step in this direction would be to authorize the use of expanded PABs to finance the
longterm lease of brownfield infrastructure facilities, rather than restricting their use only to greenfield
projects. For assets requiring major near-term reconstruction and expansion, there might not be any net
proceeds to the government, but since long-term P3 concessions have a track record of better
management and more cost-effective construction and modernization efforts, there are sound public
policy reasons to shift their management to the private sector in advance of the need for major
reconstruction.
Most importantly, this would facilitate long-term leases that can often generate large net proceeds for
reinvestment in a whole range of other needed projects. The 2006 Indiana Toll Road lease generated
$3.3 billion of net proceeds that Gov. Daniels prudently reinvested in other transportation infrastructure
—a very large statewide infrastructure program funded entirely without a tax increase. Australia expects
to generate over $100 billion from its asset recycling program, and the potential in the United States is
much larger.
For state projects that yield net proceeds to the government, it is important to note that investing those
proceeds is not encumbered by federal restrictions such as Davis-Bacon regulations or NEPA.
5.3 Impact on Federal Tax Revenues Some will assert that the changes proposed here would cost the
U.S. Treasury a significant amount of tax revenue if they were widely used. This would only be the case if
most or all of the projects to build and rebuild U.S. infrastructure would otherwise have been carried
out with taxable bond financing. The fact that we have a large-scale investment shortfall in
infrastructure modernization suggests that very little infrastructure investment is taking place via
taxable bond financing. Except for surface transportation P3 projects financed in part via PABs, U.S.
infrastructure projects are overwhelmingly being financed via taxexempt municipal bonds.
Only a handful of transactions have involved leases of brownfield infrastructure, such as the previously
mentioned Indiana Toll Road and San Juan Airport. Those projects have required that previous tax-
exempt bonds be replaced by taxable bonds. However, industry sources believe that a significant
portion of such bonds has been purchased by pension funds that are themselves tax-exempt. The same
thing occurred when taxable Build America Bonds were available for several years.
Any marginal loss of tax revenues that might result from allowing tax-exempt bonds to be used for both
greenfield and brownfield infrastructure projects would be offset by increased federal tax revenues
generated by the profits earned by P3 companies (to the extent that their projects are profitable, of
course). To the extent that the volume of construction activity increased, there would also be gains in
income taxes paid by construction workers, as more of them were employed and often worked overtime
on a larger number of infrastructure projects.
Additional Implications for U.S Competitiveness Besides the obvious benefits from increased and better-
targeted investment to rebuild and modernize U.S. infrastructure, the United States will benefit in two
other ways from the program outlined in this paper. First, by creating a much larger market for private
capital in infrastructure, the program would attract significant inward investment from the growing
number of global infrastructure investment funds. Secondly, as U.S. companies hone their expertise in
developing, operating and maintaining first-class airports, toll roads, seaports, water and wastewater
systems, etc., they will be in a position to compete with the current market leaders in these fields from
Australia, France, Spain and other countries where P3 infrastructure has a longer and more-robust
history.
2nc – investment solves repairs
Investors will target water infrastructure repairs
6.1 Inward Investment by Global Infrastructure Investment Funds The past 15 years have seen a
proliferation of global funds seeking to invest equity in infrastructure projects that can generate a return
on that investment. Since it is not possible to invest equity in government-owned airports, highways,
utilities or seaports, these funds seek to invest in infrastructure that is already investorowned, is being
privatized via sale, or is or will be the responsibility of a long-term P3 concession.
Over the decade ending in 2015, infrastructure equity funds raised approximately $350 billion, according
to Infrastructure Investor, an industry periodical.28 Since equity is about 25% of a typical revenue-risk
P3 financing (with the other 75% being debt, such as revenue bonds), that $350 billion could support
projects worth $1.4 trillion. During 2015 alone, the total raised was $48.1 billion.
Most of these funds are global in nature, partly to diversify their investment portfolios. Some are
focused on particular geographic regions, such as Europe, North America or Latin America. Most would
very much like to invest more in the United States, with our rule of law, and relative absence of red tape
and bureaucracy. But their frustration is that there is simply not the kind of “pipeline of P3 projects” that
exists in Australia, Canada, Chile and other early-movers on P3 infrastructure.
By nationality, Infrastructure Investor found that the top 30 funds in 2015 broke down as follows, in
terms of percentage of capital raised (shown in the Table below).29 Thus, infrastructure investment
funds are largely a phenomenon of highly developed countries.
Of the 30 largest infrastructure funds based on 2015 fund-raising, two are owned by public pension
funds: IFM (Australia) and Borealis Infrastructure (Canada). U.S. pension funds are relative late-comers
to investing in privatized and P3 infrastructure, but in the last several years major funds such as CalPERS,
CalSTRS, the New York City Employees’ Retirement Fund, the State Board of Administration of Florida,
the Arizona State Retirement System, and the Illinois State Board of Investments have all made
commitments to invest in this kind of infrastructure to diversify their portfolios. Their initial investments
have been mostly overseas (e.g., Heathrow and Gatwick Airports), but more recently U.S. pension funds
joined with those of Canada to acquire the P3 concession for the Chicago Skyway, and other U.S.
pension funds joined with Australian pension funds to acquire the Indiana Toll Road concession.
The characteristics of long-lived, revenue-producing infrastructure with projected increased usage in

coming decades is a good match for the investment needs of pension funds. However, greenfield
projects are generally considered too risky for inherently conservative pension funds. They generally
prefer brownfield projects, with long-established customer bases and a long revenue history. A hybrid
type of project is the reconstruction of existing infrastructure, such as an aging water system or
Interstate highway. It has the customer base and history, and if its future usage looks likely to be
upward, that amounts to moderate risk compared with either pure brownfield or pure greenfield
projects.
In short, there is no question that the equity capital is there, should federal policy encourage a large-
scale expansion of P3 infrastructure in the United States.
2nc – service exports nb
Counterplan boosts service exports
6.2 Services Exports: Creating World-Class U.S. P3 Companies One of the early concerns raised by some
skeptics about P3 infrastructure was the leading role played by non-U.S. companies in transportation
infrastructure projects, both greenfield and brownfield. A table compiled each year by Public Works
Financing listing the world’s top 35 P3 transportation companies includes exactly one (Fluor) domiciled
in the United States, in position 34 as of 2015.30
There is a simple reason for this: companies from countries such as Australia, France, and Spain in
particular have 30 to 50 years of experience designing, financing, building, operating and maintaining
airports, toll roads, seaports, water systems, etc. No U.S. companies have that expertise, since this
country is a comparative late-comer to P3 infrastructure.
But that situation is starting to change. The few U.S. projects carried out in the 1990s and early 2000s
were implemented almost entirely by firms or teams of firms from the above countries. But the trend in
the last decade has seen winning teams that combine, say, a U.S. construction company, U.S. legal
expertise, a global infrastructure fund, and numerous U.S. subcontractors. The best way for U.S. firms
to become major players in this emerging field is for a much larger pipeline of P3 infrastructure
projects to be offered by state and local governments . And once U.S. firms have mastered the art of
being in the airports business, the water system business , or the toll roads business, they will be ready
to test their mettle against the world-class P3 firms of Europe and Australia .
It may take a decade or more until several U.S. P3 companies appear in the middle ranks of the world’s
leading P3 firms, but the most likely way for that industry to develop is for U.S. policy to encourage this
model of infrastructure provision to be used far more widely.
2nc – at: perm
Biden’s regulation causes a wave of municipal water system privatization-

infrastructure spending allows utilities to stave that off
Doerr 20 (Heike, S&P Global Market Intelligence Contributor. U.S. Water Utilities, Regulatory and
Financial. Ms. Doerr joined Regulatory Research Associates in January 2016 and spearheads the firm's
coverage of the water sector from both an industry and regulatory perspective. Previously, Ms. Doerr
had been Principal of Doerr Utility Strategies, a strategic consulting firm, which provided advisory
services for companies and investors in the water sector. "Biden's infrastructure plan may generate
water utility acquisition opportunities" https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/research/biden-s-infrastructure-plan-may-generate-water-utility-acquisition-opportunities)
In recent weeks, former vice president and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has
rolled out a variety of clean energy and infrastructure plans. Most recently, on July 14 he unveiled a
four-year, $2 trillion plan to reinvigorate the U.S. economy by investing in infrastructure. This and other
plans focused on the "clean energy economy" have been wide ranging.
As it relates to water utilities, Biden’s plans focus on investing in water infrastructure and addressing
drinking water contaminants. Monitoring additional contaminants and making the necessary
investments to keep below new drinking water standards can be a strain on municipal budgets .
Increased regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA, could drive further expansion of
water utility capital spending programs . Municipal systems overwhelmed by increased water testing
and treatment requirements may look to sell their water and wastewater systems, providing an
acquisition opportunity for investor-owned utilities, or IOUs.
Defining the water utility sector
For those less familiar with this niche group, the U.S. water utility industry comprises a mix of very
different entities within both the municipal and private/investor-owned sectors. The EPA estimates that
municipal systems represent 84% of the 52,000 community water systems and 98% of the 16,000
wastewater systems, while IOUs and privately-held utilities represent the remaining 16% of the water
and 2% of the wastewater market.
There are just nine publicly-traded U.S. water utilities, down from about 25 stocks traded 30 years ago.
They range in market capitalization from American Water Works Co. Inc. at approximately $26 billion to
Global Water Resources Inc. at approximately $242 million. There are also a handful of medium-sized
water utilities owned by larger electric and gas utilities, private equity and international owners.
Addressing water contaminants
In the "Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Opportunity in a Clean Energy
Future," Biden discusses improving drinking water quality, specifically highlighting lead and PFAS, or per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances.
Lead can enter drinking water when plumbing materials that contain lead corrode. In the case of Flint,
Mich., the lead contamination stemmed from the city’s water supply. Lead can cause damage to the
brain and kidneys, and is particularly dangerous to infants and young children, resulting in a loss of
developmental skills.
PFAS are water- and stain-resistant synthetic compounds that are difficult to break down in the
environment and in the human body and are commonly referred to as "forever chemicals." PFAS have
been widely used to make carpets, clothing, fabrics for furniture, paper packaging for food and other
materials that are resistant to water, grease or stains. It is estimated that up to 110 million American’s
drinking water could be contaminated with PFAS contaminants, which cause certain types of cancer, and
a host of other health issues. Cleaning up and protecting U.S. drinking water from PFAS contamination
could cost tens of billions of dollars nationally.
Biden intends to accelerate the process to test for and address the presence of lead in drinking water.
His plan would also designate PFAS as a hazardous substance, set limits for PFAS in the Safe Drinking
Water Act, and accelerate research on PFAS. The EPA has in recent years been criticized for moving too
slowly to regulate PFAS and expand the amount of chemicals it regulates.
Lack of regulation at the federal level has left state legislators with the difficult task of setting water
contaminant levels and state regulators with the responsibility to encourage water utilities to treat
drinking water for additional public health hazards. At last week’s annual National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners Summer Policy Summit, the Water Committee approved a resolution
calling for federal guidance on PFAS chemicals.
Addressing aging infrastructure
The water sector is extremely capital intensive , given its extensive pipe and main infrastructure system,
as well as treatment facilities, storage facilities, dams, wells, and pumps. The EPA's, most recent drinking
water "Needs Survey," published in 2013, estimated that about $384 billion, in 2011 dollars, will be
needed through 2030 to upgrade U.S. water systems, both public and private, to meet environmental
standards. Widely cited estimates of the investment required to upgrade, replace, and expand water
and wastewater infrastructure over the next 20 years ranges from $385 billion to $1.3 trillion.
Biden intends to double federal investment in clean drinking water and provide new funding for low-
income areas that are struggling to replace distribution pipes and treatment facilities.
While municipal entities have been investing at sub-optimal rates , the investor-owned water utility
industry has been increasing capital investment across the board . The IOUs already invest two to three
times their depreciation on capital expenditures . In 2020, the group is expected to spend $3.4 billion on
infrastructure investment.
Opportunity for water IOUs
Operationally, smaller systems lack the expertise to keep up with increasingly stringent water quality
standards. The larger privately held and investor-owned water utilities have the technological expertise
to test and treat drinking water as additional federal and/or state contaminant levels are adopted.
Municipal systems will likely consider divesting assets when the expense of testing and treating is overly
burdensome.
Financially, municipal systems have been challenged by limited government funding, competing financial
needs for other municipal services, such as fire and rescue and the general unwillingness of elected
officials to raise taxes. While an infusing of federal money will provide some support, funding will not be
available to all the municipalities in need.
Perm doesn’t solve- public spending crowds out private

17. Crowding Out In many policy areas, the federal government’s role appears to be crucial because
state and local governments and the private sector are not currently addressing public needs. But that is
often the case only because the federal government has partly or fully displaced (crowded out) state,
local, and private efforts.
For better or worse, the states have usually led the way on expansions in government services over the
past century.199 Modern limited-access highways, for example, were pioneered by the states before
the federal government passed the Interstate Highway Act of 1956. The Pennsylvania Turnpike opened
in 1940, and its success prompted more than a dozen states to launch their own superhighway
programs.200 The idea of weaving together state highways into a larger national system also predated
the 1956 federal highway law. State efforts to build interstate highways included the Dixie Highway from
the Midwest to Florida, the Lincoln Highway from New York to San Francisco, and the Bankhead
Highway from Washington, DC, to San Diego.201
Section 3 discussed the extent to which federal spending either displaces or adds to the amounts that
states spend on targeted activities. Federal spending on interstate highways likely did increase overall
highway spending initially and only partly crowded out state efforts. But, either way, federal aid for
highways has come with negative effects, such as raising construction costs, misallocating investments,
and creating bureaucracy.
As a separate matter, a less examined phenomenon is how federal aid induces state and local
governments to crowd out or displace the private provision of services. This negative effect of federal
aid is clear in the provision of transportation infrastructure.
Federal aid has crowded out private highway bridges. A 1932 survey found that nearly two-thirds of 322
toll bridges in the United States were privately owned.202 But then federal and state governments
began handing out subsidies to government-owned bridges during the 1930s, and that put private
bridges at a competitive disadvantage, as Robert Poole discusses in Rethinking America’s Highways.
Because private bridge owners did not receive subsidies and were already suffering from revenue
declines during the Great Depression, many succumbed to government takeovers.
Urban transit systems in most American cities were privately owned and operated until the 1960s, but
then the private share started falling rapidly. Of the systems in the 100 largest U.S. cities, the private
share fell from 90 percent in 1960 to just 20 percent by the late 1970s.203 The rise of automobiles
undermined transit; transit firms had difficulty cutting costs because they were unionized; and local
governments resisted allowing transit firms to end unprofitable routes. The nail in the coffin for private
transit was the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, which provided federal aid to government-
owned bus and rail systems. That encouraged state and local governments to take over private systems,
and a century of private transit investment came to an end.204
2nc – not key to the economy
Doesn’t solve the economy
Historical evidence showing significant positive effects of government infrastructure investments on

productivity provides little guidance on the worthiness of new projects today. Congestion and changing
demand patterns do necessitate new infrastructure investments, and government spending in certain
areas can enhance growth. But U.S. infrastructure is not in the dire physical condition asserted by
politicians, scope for more private funding is ample, and resources allocated through the political
process are often badly managed and prioritize ambitions that undermine economic performance.
The focus on the supposed stimulus and productivity‐enhancing effects of infrastructure spending
means policy debates center heavily on government funding. Yet proposals for more federal spending,
costly tax credits, or public‐private partnerships ignore that the primary barriers to responsive
infrastructure relate to structures and incentives. Rather than imposing further costs on taxpayers, the
new administration should prioritize localizing decisionmaking, removing regulatory barriers to private
investment, encouraging the use of user fees, and removing tax exemptions for public investment.
2nc – at: p3s unregulated
P3s regulation plank
Congress should support state and local governments in their development of common standards for
structuring public-private partnerships. The U.S. experience with PPPs in the realm of transportation and
water infrastructure has been mixed, with success largely hinging on the skill of state and local
negotiators in balancing the benefits and financial risks to the public. From the perspective of private
investors, the market for such investments is fragmented and fraught with political risks and
uncertainties in project timing. Navigating different rules across the states is a burden on investors and
adds to political uncertainties. The federal government could provide technical assistance and help with
tax issues and permitting processes.
2nc – at: gdp
No effect on GDP
Country characteristics. First, countries with certain characteristics—such as floating exchange rates and
high levels of public debt—tend to have low fiscal multipliers in general.18 Government borrowing puts
upward pressure on the exchange rate. London School of Economics lecturer Ethan Ilzetzki’s work shows
that in a country targeting a fixed exchange rate, the central bank will try to restore the value of the
exchange rate by lowering interest rates, accommodating the fiscal expansion with monetary
expansion.19 Such action leads to high multipliers. Conversely, in countries with flexible exchange rates
and an inflation-targeting regime, central banks will tend to raise interest rates and hence offset the
fiscal expansion. Countries with flexible exchange rates therefore see multipliers around 0.
Similarly, he finds highly indebted countries have low government spending multipliers. That is
consistent with the idea that highly indebted countries are more likely to experience what economists
dub Ricardian equivalence (consumers rein in spending now if government spending increases, realizing
taxes will likely rise in the future to finance the borrowing). That reaction offsets any positive effect of
the government spending on GDP.
Empirical research and stylized facts about consumption behavior suggest that full Ricardian equivalence
is highly unlikely. Although some consumers seem to be forward looking, many consumers behave
according to a “rule of thumb,” adjusting their consumption to changes in incomes, even if temporary.20
That fact has been backed up by recent empirical work analyzing individuals on unemployment
insurance.21 If correct, a fiscal expansion would lift GDP and would not be fully offset. That Ilzetzki’s
results imply full offset in countries with high debts suggests that consumers are more likely to be aware
of the government’s budget constraint when debt levels are high (and perhaps the need for near-term
consolidation features in public discourse).
In other words , in countries with floating exchange rates and high public debts, higher public
borrowing will at best crowd out significant amounts of private-sector activity, with government
spending having a minimal effect on GDP.
2nc – at: low-interest rates
Interest rates being low doesn’t justify the borrowing- alternative uses of that
investment capital are more economically productive
Cheap government borrowing. A less convincing argument says government should undertake large-
scale investment because government borrowing is cheap. With real interest rates very low in 2015,
Nobel laureate Robert Shiller argued, “The government should be borrowing, it would seem, heavily and
investing in anything that yields a positive return.”53
The Brookings Institution recently employed similar logic, suggesting low rates should also be inducing
private-sector investment.54 Many are puzzled by the private sector’s not taking advantage of this
“near-free” money to invest in anything with a positive return. Surely, in this environment, they say, it
makes sense for government to “step up.”
The mistake here is to conflate a less costly time to invest with a “good time” to invest. Take the
example of a toll road. If the long-term outlook indicates the growth or the population of an area will
slow, then expected use of the toll road would fall, as would demand for investment. That result would
lower equilibrium interest rates. Even if the interest rates are lower, it would not be a good time to
invest because demand for the toll road would be falling, lowering revenue expectations.
Similar logic applies to government investment in transport infrastructure without user fees. If demand
for transportation use is falling for structural reasons, then any investment will have far fewer economic
benefits, even if costs have fallen. The overall attractiveness of the project might be unchanged or may
have deteriorated. Examining what has happened to interest rates alone tells us little about whether
undertaking a project is worthwhile.
The fact that private-sector companies are not investing massively at low rates in infrastructure projects
suggests that it may simply not be a good time to invest generally. The explanation might be because
expected returns are poor. But it also might be because uncertainty is high.
Infrastructure investment comes with significant political risk. In France, the government declared it
would limit increases in tolls on roads, despite contractual agreements with operating companies
allowing increases via inflation-linked formulas.55 In Spain, a British investment fund took legal action
against the government after it attempted to lower airport tariffs, despite a guarantee that they would
be fixed for 10 years after privatization. The Norwegian government likewise stands accused of changing
the regulatory framework surrounding oil pipelines after investments were made.56 Political risks of this
kind are amplified when projects have exceptionally long lead times, with environmental and other
policy decisions potentially being altered midproject.
Political risk comes on top of risks associated with construction costs and usage, some of which might be
correlated with general economic health. There will be uncertainties unrelated to GDP too. The success
or otherwise of high-speed rail and much mass transit, for example, is strongly linked to the potential for
technological change, not least driverless cars. Private investors may fear the whole venture will become
obsolete.
That the private sector fails to invest in such projects does not show “market failures” in many
instances. It merely shows that private investors consider the project too risky or uneconomic. This is
something politicians should bear in mind when committing taxpayer funds.
Low interest rates do reduce the fiscal cost of borrowing, but one must also consider the
revenue/growth component and its effect on returns. All infrastructure investments should still go
through rigorous cost–benefit analyses and be judged against alternative uses of the funds, including the
option of leaving the money in the hands of taxpayers.
Social, rather than commercial, AIMS. Private companies will invest in projects in which they can make a
profit. Governments can invest to achieve other social objectives. That argument is often heard for
government-led investment. Of course, in many cases, that is at odds with the claim that government
will invest prudently to raise productivity, although in some cases—such as those in which
environmental projects help correct externalities—the two need not be incompatible. Nevertheless,
resources for infrastructure allocated through the political process clearly seek other objectives, often
with economic costs.
Short-term job creation is often one declared objective. Trump’s team has promised to prioritize
schemes that directly create jobs. Yet, as noted previously, jobs are a cost to projects. If “job creation” is
a target of government investment, then projects may be chosen and delivered in a less efficient
manner than they could be, raising the burden on taxpayers through making infrastructure delivery
more expensive.
Regional favoritism and pork-barrel spending often occur too. Infamously, in July 2005, Congress passed
a bill that included earmarked funds for the Gravina Bridge in Alaska, the so-called Bridge to Nowhere. It
was not funded with a view toward maximizing returns or allocating funds according to market
demands. It is well known that Amtrak has historically allocated resources for investment to rural areas
with low population densities at the behest of politicians.57 The Highway Trust Fund also allocates funds
seemingly divorced from needs. A 2013 paper found that states with greater highway use or a larger
highway system did relatively badly with regard to federal aid.58 The CBO echoes this criticism, noting
that “spending on highways does not correspond very well with how the roads are used and valued.”59
For political gain, politicians also grant funds to prestige or so-called ribbon-cutting projects, rather than
to projects with the highest economic returns, such as maintenance, repair, and bottlenecks. Consider
that federal funds have been granted to the California High-Speed Rail scheme, which originally had a
purported benefit–cost ratio of about 2.60 The estimated costs for this project have since expanded
rapidly and are still rising, taking the estimated benefit–cost ratio closer to 1 already.61 Meanwhile,
other schemes with much higher benefit–cost ratios have not received funds. The outgoing Obama
administration highlighted the $8 billion Hampton Roads highway project, for example, that had a
benefit–cost ratio of about 4.62
Choosing to prioritize investments that do not have the highest returns is a phenomenon not unique to
the United States. In the United Kingdom, the coalition government’s 2010 Comprehensive Spending
Review (which aimed to reduce government expenditure in light of a huge budget deficit) led to
deferral, cancellation, or review of a host of road schemes with average benefit–cost ratios of 6.8, 3.2,
and 4.2, respectively. Yet the government pushed on with plans for a high-speed rail project between
London and Birmingham despite the high-speed line’s purported benefit–cost ratio of just 1.2.63 New
historical evidence suggests a potential rationale: grand infrastructure projects can help boost electoral
performance.64
Quirks in funding allocation also mean that on occasion politicians threaten the withdrawal of resources
for infrastructure to achieve political objectives. Recent news reports suggest President Trump may cut
transportation funding as a means of punishing so-called sanctuary cities.65 Allocating funds according
to a city’s application of immigration laws—disregarding the congestion or other needs of the locality—
is clearly not economically optimal.
That government investments are not bound by market discipline and often become politicized with
other objectives is the reason projects are often not delivered efficiently.
The book Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition—written by Oxford University economic
geographer Bent Flyvbjerg and others—goes into detail about some of the accountability problems
associated with political management.66 The conflicted role of both promoting a project and being
responsible for examining its failures and risks leads politicians to make overoptimistic claims about a
scheme’s benefits relative to costs. Politicians’ desire to leave an infrastructure legacy (with costs
realized long after they have left office) means most large projects are mis-sold to electors. That factor
manifests itself in a lack of realism about initial costs, underestimating the time a project will take,
setting contingencies too low, not taking into account changes in specification, overestimating usage,
and not accounting for some of the nonmonetary spillover effects of the project itself (congestion
brought about by construction activity, for example).
2nc – at: models
Their models are wrong- no growth from gov infra spending

Unsurprisingly, given all these caveats and conditions, the evidence on the relationship between
government infrastructure investment and growth is extremely mixed. It stems from three types of
analysis: (a) cross-country regressions, (b) individual country case studies, and (c) time series work on
the United States.
Using large panel data sets across countries, the most up-to-date evidence for advanced economies
suggests small but significant positive effects of government investment on productivity growth, with a
10 percent increase in infrastructure assets raising GDP by 0.7 percent.69 These approaches, which
regress growth on public investment, are believed by many to be the best means of measuring the true
effect of investment, because they capture all potential spillovers to the broader economy.
Even here, estimates have considerable differences, depending on the countries, time periods, or types
of investments examined. As an example, a 2014 study by Andrew Warner for the IMF focusing on 126
low- to middle-income economies (where one might have thought infrastructure investment more
essential) found, for example, “no robust evidence that the investment booms exerted a long-term
positive impact on the level of GDP.”70 Although a case for eliminating transport bottlenecks exists, the
study found in its examination of case studies “no evidence that rational selection of public investments
according to sound economic criteria was ever seriously followed.”71
There is also a range of methodological difficulties associated with cross-sectional regressions, not least
because of the potential two-way relationship between growth and investment and important omitted
variables (such as the tax increases needed to finance the investment in some cases).
Individual country-specific case studies show more clearly that substantial infrastructure investment is
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for robust growth. Japan’s huge outlays (according to an
article in the New York Times, the country spent $6.3 trillion on “construction-related public
investment” between 1991 and 2008)72 produced, among other things, the world’s best-rated rail
system.73 Yet productivity increased three and a half times more between 1970 and 1990 than between
1991 and 2011.74
Spain, likewise, was left with empty airports following its infrastructure drive. A recent assessment of a
host of major projects in China also showed that a great deal of infrastructure investment was plagued
by cost overruns and overestimated benefits, with 55 percent of the projects having a benefit-to-cost
ratio below 1. That is, they led to a net loss in economic value.75
Given that the United States has different institutions and policy frameworks than other countries, one
has to be careful in generalizing conclusions from elsewhere. Instead, policymakers point to America’s
own historical record.
Three decades ago, the scholarly consensus was that U.S. spending on infrastructure yields great public
benefits. The work of Bates College economist David Aschauer in the late 1980s purported to show huge
returns on public capital using time series data and hence attributed a large portion of the productivity
growth slowdown following the postwar boom to a decline in public investment spending.76 Similarly
positive results were found by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (and later Boston College) economist
Alicia Munnell.77 This quarter-century-old work still dominates publications seeking increases in
infrastructure spending today.
But these studies are believed to have a range of important methodological problems. Edward Gramlich
showed convincingly that Aschauer’s estimates were too high to be plausible.78 More recent analysis
suggests much more modest effects of public investment on postwar growth rates.79
Historic work, as with evidence from other countries, can get us only so far with regard to lessons for
future policy. That public capital investment historically increased growth tells us nothing of the
desirability or growth effects of new projects, which should be judged on their own merits. That should
be obvious on a conceptual level. The fact that some bridges in the past have enhanced growth tells us
nothing of the desirability of a new bridge today.
Take the interstate highway system as a specific example. John Fernald’s work found that its
construction substantially boosted productivity in industries closely associated with road use, bringing
with it a one-time boost to U.S. economic growth.80 Yet more recent assessments have found that too
many new highways were built between 1983 and 2003 and that marginal extensions to the highway
system tend not to increase social welfare. The reason is the cost savings of reducing travel times are
small relative to incomes and prices.81 That is one reason that meta-analysis suggests that the
productivity gains from public capital investment have fallen over time.82
That is not to say that in areas with genuine bottlenecks, where heavy congestion has deleterious effects
on labor markets, new investments do not make sense. The key lesson is that we cannot make
generalized claims about the benefits of “infrastructure investment” without judging the worthiness of
individual projects. Evidence from cross-country regressions and historical data may be interesting in
their own right, but they do little to inform us about whether new projects will be beneficial.
2nc – at: jobs
Doesn’t boost jobs and hurts in the long-run
Some economists, such as Larry Summers and Brad DeLong, counter that temporary government
spending in downturns can in fact raise the long-term productive potential of the economy. In their
view, if the economy operates below potential over long periods, workers’ skills waste away and a
dearth of investment reduces the capital stock, generating a phenomenon known as “hysteresis.”
Preventing this erosion of skills and underinvestment can therefore raise potential output if the
temporary spending can prevent resources from falling idle.
For this analysis to hold, however, we have to presume that temporary spending by government will
permanently maintain the skills of workers and that, absent the spending, workers would not have
retrained . In essence, government must have the knowledge to bridge the gap in the short term and to
generate the private-sector skills or investment to replace the subsequently withdrawn government
spending. In her comment on the Summers-DeLong paper, economist Valerie Ramey showed that little
evidence exists for the idea that temporary increases in government spending raise output in the long
run.34
2nc – colorado river basin solvency
Western water infrastructure decisions specifically are bad
Edwards & Hill 12 (Chris director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of
manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Peter J. Hill is
Professor Emeritus of Economics at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois, and a senior fellow at the
Property and Environment Research Center in Bozeman, Montana. "Cutting the Bureau of Reclamation
and Reforming Water Markets" https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/interior/cutting-bureau-
reclamation)
The 1902 Reclamation Act required the full repayment of irrigation project costs by the beneficiaries.
Initial funding for reclamation projects was to come from the sale of federal land in the western states.
As projects were completed and revenues were raised from water users, the government could then
fund new projects.
Reclamation projects were supposed to involve no direct costs to federal taxpayers, but Congress soon
reneged on that promise and began to increase subsidies in various ways. One reason was that "early
on, it was discovered that the costs of establishing irrigated farming . . . were much higher than
expected, and the costs of building water projects were much higher than originally estimated," noted
the Government Accountability Office.26
Despite the high costs, Reclamation was eager to build dam after dam. One strategy it employed for
many decades was to fudge its analyses of proposed projects to make the costs look lower, and the
benefits higher, than they really were. The agency would paint a rosy economic picture to gain project
approval, and then it would allow the full information to trickle out later. For example, Reclamation
began constructing the Grand Coulee Dam with $63 million in funding from Congress, but it later
became clear that the agency had a $270 million project in mind.27
This strategy has long been employed on government infrastructure projects.28 The Army Corps of
Engineers, for example, has a history of distorting its analyses of water projects in order to secure
project approval.29 Or consider that in pushing for approval of the huge State Water Project in
California in 1959, Gov. Pat Brown kept throwing out a bogus cost estimate of $1.75 billion, even though
he knew it would cost far more, as he later admitted.30
From the beginning, political factors undermined the possibility that Bureau of Reclamation investment
decisions would be made in a rational economic manner. As Marc Reisner noted in his history of the
agency, Cadillac Desert, "Every Senator still wanted a project in his state; every Congressman wanted
one in his district; they didn't care whether they made economic sense or not."31
To secure support from the western states, the 1902 legislation required that 51 percent of the revenue
from federal land sales in each state be spent on Reclamation projects within that state.32 However,
there wasn't necessarily a relationship between land-sale revenues and the locations of the best
projects. This requirement "seriously compromised the ability of government engineers to select
projects objectively."33
After the Reclamation Act passed, the Republican Party saw political advantage in quickly proposing a
large number of projects in as many states as possible.34 This rush to launch projects for political
reasons reduced efficiency. By 1907 Reclamation had requested and received congressional approval for
24 projects, with every western state receiving at least one.35 "Most of the projects were begun in great
haste with little attention paid to 'economics, climate, soil, production, transportation, and markets.'"36
Reisner noted that "by building so many projects in a rush, the Reclamation Service was repeating its
mistakes before it had a chance to learn from them."37 Indeed, many early Bureau of Reclamation
projects were failures.38 The bureau gained experience, and went on to build some tremendous dams
in subsequent decades. Still, there were boondoggles and disasters, such as Reclamation's Teton Dam in
Idaho, constructed in 1975. The dam was built on the basis of a flawed economic analysis, and the dam's
engineering was so poor that it collapsed catastrophically in 1976.39
Private companies often make mistakes, but they systematically aim to make the investments that have
the highest net returns. By contrast, government projects are often chosen on the basis of factors such
as political pull, which often results in projects with low or negative returns. The history of Reclamation
reveals that it systematically followed poor policies regarding its infrastructure investments, decade
after decade.
**states
1nc – states cp
The 50 states and all relevant sub-national actors should incentivize consolidation,
allow alternative rate structures, increase funding, leverage existing federal funding to
raise investment, and invest in water innovation
State funding solves communities that lack resources

Fedinick et al 19 (Kristi Pullen, Natural Resources Defense Council. Steve Taylor, Coming Clean.
Michele Roberts, EJHA. Contributing Reviewers: Richard Moore, EJHA. Erik Olson, NRDC. "Watered
Down Justice" September.https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/watered-down-justice-report.pdf)
FUND WATER INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES

The EPA has already noted that “some communities may be more challenged than others in their efforts
to achieve the goals of safe and clean water” and that vulnerable and overburdened communities often
lack the financial resources needed to ensure safe water.113 n Congress and state legislatures should
substantially increase funding for water infrastructure , including specific additional set-aside grants for
disadvantaged communities. n The EPA and states should direct funds to improve water infrastructure
in highly affected, underserved communities, including leveraging state revolving funds or prioritizing
and funding underserved, inadequately protected communities under the Drinking Water State
Revolving Fund. n The EPA and states should ensure that underserved communities have adequate
knowledge and capacity to identify funding opportunities and apply for grants or loans to address
inequities and gaps in the ability of different communities to seek and obtain funding. n The EPA and
states should substantially increase water infrastructure grants (not loans) to disproportionately
affected communities that prioritize spending in areas least able to afford solutions. n The EPA and
states should provide grants to economically challenged and Environmental Justice communities
(including Indigenous communities) to support water system technical and management capacity. n The
EPA and states should ensure that local costs of improving infrastructure do not make water bills
unaffordable for low-income customers, including new and expanded low-income affordability programs
and more equitable rate structures.
1nc – democratic control net benefit
Federal infrastructure spending is bad- it encourages too much spending, results in
ineffective projects, undermines democratic control, hurts effective water governance,
and inflates the deficit
The federal government has a large presence in state and local policy activities such as education,
housing, and transportation. That presence is facilitated by “grants-in-aid” programs, which are
subsidies to state and local governments accompanied by top-down regulations.
Federal aid spending was $697 billion in 2018, which was distributed through an estimated 1,386
separate programs. The number of programs has tripled since the 1980s, indicating that the scope of
federal activities has expanded as spending has grown.
Rather than being a positive feature of American federalism, the aid system produces irresponsible
policymaking. It encourages excessive and misallocated spending. It reduces accountability for failures
while generating costly bureaucracy and regulations. And it stifles policy diversity and undermines
democratic control.
Cutting federal aid would reduce federal budget deficits, but more importantly it would improve the
performance of federal, state, and local governments. The idea that federal experts can efficiently solve
local problems with rule-laden subsidy programs is misguided. Decades of experience in many policy
areas show that federal aid often produces harmful results and displaces state, local, and private policy
solutions.
This study describes the advantages of cutting federal aid. It discusses 18 reasons why it is better to fund
state activities with state revenues rather than with aid from Washington. Shrinking the aid system
would improve American governance along many dimensions.
Local democratic regulatory control is key to prevent tyranny

Siegel 6 (Neil, Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University School of Law. B.A.
(Economics, Political Science) Duke University, 1994; M.A. (Economics) Duke University, 1995; J.D./Ph.D.
(Jurisprudence & Social Policy) University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), 2001.
"Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective" Vanderbilt Law Review)
When pcond spend and pno fed reg are small, commandeering (absent anticommandeering doctrine)
and preemption are left as the only options, creating a potential tradeoff between lines of accountability
and the exercise of state regulatory power.87 The threat that federal preemption—and thus the
preemption-encouraging ban on commandeering—poses to state retention of regulatory control is
significant not because state regulatory control is important for its own sake. Rather, the key point is
that state regulatory autonomy is needed to realize the values that federalism is typically thought to
advance, including accountability. That is, state regulatory autonomy remains critical no matter which of
the commonly proffered virtues of federalism are under consideration.
Specifically, tyranny prevention is said to be advanced when multiple levels of government compete
for political power .88 Democratic self-government is supposed to be facilitated when there exists a
robust space for participatory politics at levels closer to the people who are governed.89 Political
responsiveness and accountability are believed to be encouraged when states compete for mobile
citizens who can vote with not just their hands but also their feet.90 Value pluralism is promoted when
state policies are allowed to differ along various dimensions of cultural difference.91 Social problem
solving can be encouraged when states are allowed to act as policy “laboratories.” 92 Finally, the
efficient delivery of local public goods by states saves various costs when they make more cost-effective
choices than the federal government would make for the nation as a whole.93 When federal
preemption reduces state regulatory control—and thus the ability of states to make choices, including
resource choices94—all of these federalism values can be compromised.95
This is well-trodden intellectual ground, and this inquiry does not take sides in the normative debate
regarding the kinds of values that a federal system should secure. Rather, this inquiry maintains that
state retention of regulatory control is needed to realize the commonly understood values advanced by
federalism,96 and then argues that anticommandeering doctrine undermines federalism values by
reducing state regulatory control insofar as a greater quantity of preemption results from the Court’s
ban on commandeering. If direct federal regulation removes states from the regulatory scene, there is
no meaningful sense in which they can prevent federal tyranny, advance political participation,
encourage political responsiveness and accountability through interjurisdictional and
intrajurisdictional competition, express the distinctive value commitments of the majority of their
populations, serve as laboratories of experimentation, or efficiently deliver public goods . Accordingly,
regardless of whether anticommandeering doctrine advances political accountability on balance, the
extent to which states lose regulatory control is strongly associated with the extent to which the U.S.
federal system can vindicate the other values typically thought to be advanced by federalism.97
Democracy checks global conflicts

Kasparov ’17 -- Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation (Garry, “Democracy and Human Rights:
The Case for U.S. Leadership” , 2/16/2017
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf)
There existential threat today is not found on a map,

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people.
but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order .
Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North
Korea threatening nuclear blackmail , and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia . They all want to turn the
world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world,
epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated . The global freedom index has declined for ten
consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home ,
right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and
importance of these things . Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now,
Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making
America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values
that were shared by both parties and nearly every American . Institutions that were created by a
Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency
created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies . Strong institutions
that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning . In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not
strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers , but cannot afford to think
beyond their own survival . This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos , the ability to move quickly. This can only
be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be
setbacks, but the United States cannot quit . The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that
plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism –all are generated and exacerbated by
authoritarian regimes . A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no
one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America
being envied, imitated, and admired around the world . Admired not for being perfect, but for having
the exceptional courage to always try to be better . Thank you
2nc – tyranny impacts
Tyranny outweighs extinction
Farquhar et al. 17 — Project Manager at FHI responsible for external relations, lead author of several
reports on the policy implications of emerging technologies (Sebastian Farquhar, “Existential Risk
Diplomacy and Governance”, GLOBAL PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017, 1/23/17, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf) Valiaveedu
During the twentieth century, citizens of several nations lived for a time under extremely brutal and
oppressive regimes .47 Between them, these states killed more than one hundred million people, and
sought total control over their citizens . Previous totalitarian states have not been particularly durable
chiefly due to the problem of ensuring orderly transition between leaders, and to external competition
from other more liberal and successful states. However, there is a non-negligible chance that the world
will come to be dominated by one or a handful of totalitarian states . If this were to happen, external
competition would no longer threaten the durability of such states to the same extent. Moreover,
improvements in certain forms of technology may make it easier for totalitarian states to maintain
control, for example by making surveillance much easier. Global totalitarianism could exacerbate other
existential risks by reducing the quality of governance . In addition, a long future under a particularly
brutal global totalitarian state could arguably be worse than complete extinction .
2nc – leveraging solves
Leveraging solves finances

One of the primary ways that other states increase the financial resources available to water systems is
through “leveraging”—using federal SRF capitalization grants as security for bonds. The proceeds of
these bonds are then redeposited in the SRF (Environmental Financial Advisory Board [EFAB] 2008).
State SRF programs lend the bond proceeds to communities to continue their development of
wastewater and drinking water infrastructure. The use of bond proceeds permits the amount of loans or
grants to exceed the amount of SRF equity. If a state leverages their SRFs, this creates additional funds
available for drinking and wastewater infrastructure improvements.
The Environmental Financial Advisory Board (EFAB) reports that state programs that leverage their state
revolving funds have provided greater assistance as a percentage of their capitalization grants than
those that use the direct loan approach (EFAB 2008). Currently, Pennsylvania’s CWSRF and DWSRF are
not being leveraged. This is a potentially large amount of funds not being utilized by
Pennsylvania, though PENNVEST is currently funding every drinking water project that applies with
available funds (R. Boos, personal communication, February 6, 2020). PENNVEST may not view the need
to leverage their SRFs, despite many Struggling Systems using high-interest bonds for capital projects.
Since 1994, rating agencies have consistently granted top ratings to SRF bond issues. This indicates a low
risk of missed payments or defaults (EFAB 2014). Furthermore, Fitch Ratings has assessed historical
default rate on water and sewer loans to be only 0.04% (Arndt 2016). The absence of defaults points to
the safe nature of SRF investments. Under PENNVEST itself, only one system has ever defaulted since its
inception at a modest amount of roughly $35,000 (Boos 2020). Therefore, leveraging of funds remains a
safe and viable options for Pennsylvania.
States, such as Pennsylvania, that do not leverage their federal capitalization grants, have effectively
turned every $1 of federal money into $1.26 of DWSRF loans, while those states implementing “High
Leverage” have turned every $1 into $2.91 of DWSRF loans (EFAB 2008). This is a large amount of
unused money that Pennsylvania could be accessing. For a leverage loan approach, the capacity of the
SRF to make loans for qualifying projects will exceed the amount of the SRF’s equity (EFAB 2008).
According to both the National Resources Defense Council and Bond Buyer, states are missing out on
the opportunity to generate new funding for water systems by not using more innovative financing
practices such as SRF leveraging (Moore 2018 and Tumulty 2018). Pennsylvania can look to its
neighboring state of New York, which runs the nation’s most active SRF program by implementing “High
Leverage” of DWSRF funds (Vedachalam and Geddes 2016). However, Pennsylvania could also be more
conservative while still leveraging its DWSRF, like Illinois, Maine, or New Jersey (EFAB 2008).
Addressing Capacity Barriers: Many systems simply cannot afford to devote an employee full time to go
through the intricacies of filing an application for a low-interest loan or grant from PENNVEST, even if
they qualify, and so may issue bonds because they can simply repeat the process from the last time.
Systems may also simply not know about the CEP or set-aside funds. Many states have the same
challenge, and several have experimented with different solutions. The Texas Water Development Board
has created the “CFO to Go” program, where the state agency contracts with accounting firms to
provide certified public accountants to small systems facing budgetary or financial challenges (Texas
Water Development Board 2019). The accounting services and financial guidance are free to the systems
that apply, and systems are under no obligation to use them. The program is in its pilot stage but may
help mitigate the risks of limited human capital, scarce financial resources, or reporting issues. A similar
program in Pennsylvania might increase small systems’ ability to apply for PENNVEST funds while
strengthening their long-term financial know-how, beyond the current CEP.
States also have partnered with third-party associations to help build capacity. Illinois and Florida have
contracted with their state-level Rural Water Associations to create tools and checklists for systems
looking to begin operator sharing, making the contracting process easier and fairer for all parties, and
Texas contracts with the Texas Rural Water Association to provide consolidation assessments for
systems (U.S. EPA 2017). Several states, including Pennsylvania, participate in state-level WARNs
(Water/Wastewater Agency Response Networks), which are facilitated by the American Water Works
Association at the national level, and allows systems to build up their emergency management capacity
(U.S. EPA 2017). Many small systems in Pennsylvania are part of the PaWARN network, demonstrating
their trust in the organization and their fellow utilities (“WARN Regions.”) PENNVEST might be able to
leverage partnerships with these intermediary organizations to build trust and closer ties with smaller
systems.
Policy: State-Level Intervention The technical and financial capacity challenges above may also be
addressed more structurally at the water system level through regionalization or consolidation with
other drinking water systems. As previously mentioned, consolidation and regionalization can result in
physical interconnection, but they also can facilitate sharing resources, developing regional
partnerships, and pooling technical expertise (ASWA and EFC 2019). Consolidating water systems often
results in greater economies of scale, and with improved resource sharing potential (ASWA and EFC
2019).
Our findings suggest that the three most effective policy types for increasing the rates of consolidation
are takeover rules, regional planning, and funding mechanisms, with takeover rules having the greatest
effect. This is not particularly surprising. Funding mechanisms beyond State Revolving Funds are the
traditional “carrots” and can be used to incentivize consolidation activity or support communities facing
affordability or quality challenges. Takeover rules are the “sticks” and add a level of threat and
accountability that may force public systems that have been on the fence to finally deactivate and
consolidate. Takeover rules also provide failing systems with an option of last resort, so that they have a
backstop that keeps them from simply continuing to deliver undrinkable or unaffordable water.
However, states may be reluctant to implement a takeover rule, as the process transfers power from
local governments to the state. Regional planning allows struggling systems to have a natural partner for
consolidation.
2nc – solves innovation
States can also solve innovation
Ajami et al 16 ("The Path to Water Innovation" October. The Hamilton Project. Launched in 2006 as an economic policy initiative at the
Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project is guided by an Advisory Council of academics, business leaders, and former public policy makers.
The Project provides a platform for a broad range of leading economic thinkers to inject innovative and pragmatic policy options into the
national debate. The Project offers proposals rooted in evidence and experience, not doctrine and ideology, and brings those ideas to bear on
policy debates in relevant and effective ways. This policy brief is based on The Hamilton Project discussion paper, “The Path to Water
Innovation,” which was authored by: NEWSHA K. AJAMI Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. BARTON H. THOMPSON JR. Stanford
Woods Institute for the Environment Stanford Law School. DAVID G. VICTOR University of California, San Diego.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/path_to_water_innovation_policy_brief.pdf)
Innovation in the U.S. water industry is incremental and fragmented. Ajami, Thompson, and Victor
propose increasing innovation in the water sector by addressing the challenges presented by inadequate
water pricing, obstructive regulations, and the lack of public-sector financing to raise capital for new
projects. Addressing these challenges would unlock new funding sources and opportunities for the
water industry, while also establishing a regulatory environment more conducive to innovation,
prerequisites for addressing the nation’s water needs.
Water Pricing To strengthen innovation in the water sector, the authors call for three targeted reforms.
First, they advocate pricing schemes that capture the full price of delivering water to better support the
financial health of water suppliers. In particular, they argue that rates should recover all the costs of
utilities’ services, including the costs of replacing infrastructure over time as well as needed research
and development. Full-cost water pricing would help utilities recover the fixed costs of their
infrastructures, granting them greater stability in funding innovative projects.
Second, they call for consumers to face the full marginal cost of each unit of water consumed, including
costs to society in the form of environmental damages. For example, water utilities that charge flat fees
for water, under which all users pay the same price no matter how much water they use, would move to
a metered pricing structure; utilities that charge a uniform unit rate to all consumers would move to a
pricing structure that charges more per unit as consumption rises. These pricing reforms would
encourage greater conservation by end users and incentivize them to adopt water-conserving
technologies.
Third, the authors propose decoupling utility revenue from the quantity of water sold by setting fixed
revenue targets that do not vary with sales. Decoupling can be achieved by allowing utilities to issue a
surcharge or a refund if the quantity of water sold lands below or above the target quantity,
respectively. For example, the California Public Utility Commission ordered investor-owned utilities to
decouple prices in 2006, using a water rate adjustment mechanism—the ability to issue a surcharge or
refund—to lower utilities’ risk of falling revenue resulting from increased conservation, unexpected
weather conditions, or an economic recession. Decoupling would remove the incentive from water
utilities to maximize the amount of water sold, instead giving them a stake in the development of more-
efficient technologies.
Regulations Regulation in the water sector can both promote and inhibit innovation. To ease the
negative impact of regulations, Ajami, Thompson, and Victor propose a two-pronged approach to
regulatory reform. First, they propose that state legislators and regulators undertake a review of
regulatory practices along several key criteria, such as minimizing variation across geographic
jurisdictions and across related sectors (e.g., water and wastewater, water and energy) and providing
sufficient flexibility to avoid blocking the timely adoption of new technologies. Second, they propose
that certain states create water innovation offices to better coordinate and support innovation efforts
across the industry and to recommend regulatory reforms to the respective state’s water sector.
The regulatory review would seek to: • Reconcile regulations that are inconsistent between state and
local government and among local governments, with state regulations always taking precedence. •
Coordinate regulations across sectors (e.g., water and wastewater, water and energy) to ensure
consistent treatment of new technologies and to reduce obstacles to the development and adoption of
new technologies. • Shape regulations to encourage utilities to meet performance standards, rather
than force them to adopt fixed technology mandates. • Enact regulations that drive, rather than inhibit,
the development of new technologies.
The authors propose that select states establish offices of water resources innovation and development
(called innovation offices) to develop a vision of water sector innovation. In some cases the legislature or
governor would first create a commission or task force comprising policymakers, academic experts, and
stakeholders to examine specific water challenges and opportunities in the state. The legislature or
governor would then decide if an independent innovation office is necessary to carry out the vision, or if
an existing office within the principal water agency can implement the plan.
Statewide water innovation offices would be well-positioned to support regulatory, as well as pricing
and financial, reforms. Potential first adopters of water innovation offices include California, Florida, and
Texas, which have the existing administrative capacity and most-pressing water supply challenges. These
states may wish to employ their innovation offices to carry out or assist in the systematic review of
water regulations. The innovation offices would also be positioned to support water pricing and utility
financing reform and to promote research and development to a level seen in the energy industry.
The authors also suggest that the federal government play a supportive role to the first innovation
offices, especially for states that lack the expertise or funding to promote innovation on their own.
Utilizing the resources of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the federal government would
supply expertise and enable information sharing of best practices among the states. It could reward best
practices with race-tothe-top funds and a periodic innovation report card. It would also engage
organizations such as the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners to promote adoption
of innovation-driving regulations.
Public-Sector Financing Finally, Ajami, Thompson, and Victor propose that authorities— either local
water utilities or a statewide entity such as a water innovation office—institute a surcharge on water
usage, called a public benefit charge (PBC), to create a stable and sustainable source of funding to
finance innovative projects. The surcharge would create a pool of monies that could be used to invest in
research and development, to pay for adoption of new technologies, and to attract private capital. The
authors also suggest that the federal government act as a catalyst to investment by continuing to
provide low-interest loans and grants to pilot and implement innovative projects.
Experience already shows how the administration of the PBC can be tailored effectively to state and
local circumstances. One example is the water stewardship rate levied by the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California, which added a fixed charge to water bills to fund conservation programs
and support research. Another successful illustration of how PBCs can promote innovation includes the
California Solar Initiative, which used the funds levied from California’s PBC on electricity usage to
promote renewable clean energy, successfully bringing down the prohibitive cost of rooftop solar power
through the use of subsidies. Implemented in stages, the subsidies started at a high level and then
declined—broadly in line with improvements in technology.
The primary benefit of instituting a PBC is that it would confront the water sector’s fundamental public-
sector challenge to raise sufficient capital to support innovation. For the 80 percent of the water market
that is supplied through state-owned enterprises, a public surcharge on water users is perhaps the most
economically efficient mechanism for raising new capital while tying the costs to users. The PBC would
help reverse the long-standing trend of exceptionally low public investment in water innovation.
Conclusion In order to prepare for the future and the nation’s anticipated increased vulnerability to
water scarcity, the water sector must confront its historic lack of support for innovation. The authors
stipulate that three factors in particular present barriers to greater innovation, and that these could be
addressed with smart policy reforms. First, water is typically underpriced, meaning that consumers do
not face the full cost of their consumption, and water systems struggle to fund infrastructure renewal
projects, let alone research and development of new technologies. Water systems are also subject to
regulations that vary by jurisdiction and often emphasize implementation and use of status quo— rather
than next-generation—water technologies. Furthermore, water systems lack access to the capital
needed for innovation due to a dearth of public funding and difficulty obtaining lowyield bonds. Taken
together, these factors limit the innovation in an industry predisposed to utilizing existing technologies
over pioneering, but possibly riskier, alternatives.
The policy reforms called for by Ajami, Thompson, and Victor can help to break down some of these
barriers to innovation. Price reforms would incentivize both utilities and consumers to conserve water
and increase funding for innovation. Conducting systematic reviews of water regulations at the state and
local levels would make regulations consistent and help drive the water industry to reach new
performance standards through innovation and adoption of new technologies. Finally, instituting a PBC
would provide utilities with a dedicated revenue stream and increase their access to capital to fund
research for new technologies.
Doesn’t require funding

Ajami et al 16 ("The Path to Water Innovation" October. The Hamilton Project. Launched in 2006 as an economic policy initiative at the
Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project is guided by an Advisory Council of academics, business leaders, and former public policy makers.
The Project provides a platform for a broad range of leading economic thinkers to inject innovative and pragmatic policy options into the
national debate. The Project offers proposals rooted in evidence and experience, not doctrine and ideology, and brings those ideas to bear on
policy debates in relevant and effective ways. This policy brief is based on The Hamilton Project discussion paper, “The Path to Water
Innovation,” which was authored by: NEWSHA K. AJAMI Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. BARTON H. THOMPSON JR. Stanford
Woods Institute for the Environment Stanford Law School. DAVID G. VICTOR University of California, San Diego.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/path_to_water_innovation_policy_brief.pdf)
1. Would states need to build additional capacity or provide additional funding for these reforms? Most
of the reforms presented in this paper, including reforms to pricing, regulations, and public financing, do
not require significant new capacity or funding from state governments. The only reform that could
require additional capacity or funding is the establishment of an innovation office. A task force or
commission in each state would initially evaluate the steps needed to promote innovation, including the
potential value of an innovation office. As part of this evaluation, the task force would examine the
capacity needs of such an office and how the office might be financed. The exact needs of an office
would depend on its mandate and activities. In some cases, a state might be able to create the office
without a significant investment of new resources by reallocating resources within an existing state
agency.
If the innovation office would need new resources, the state may be able to fund the office and its
activities either by allocating a portion of the funds collected from the public benefit charge or through
contributions from the local water agencies who would benefit from the office. States could require
local agencies to fund the office, or they could institute a membership model in which local agencies
could voluntarily decide whether to provide funding. In the energy sector, the Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) successfully relies on voluntary subscriptions to support its activities. Like the Institute, a
state innovation office could open its membership not only to local water agencies, but also to
businesses and other governmental agencies interested in promoting innovative water technologies.
EPRI estimates that, by pooling the resources of its members, it provides them with ten dollars in
research and development for every one dollar received in contributions. Under this model, members
would presumably receive benefits, such as the ability to formulate research goals and access research
results, that are not available to nonmembers. However, other activities, such as regulatory reform,
would benefit all water agencies.
2nc – consolidation solvency
Consolidation good- solves the case- states key
USWA 19 (US Water Alliance. "Utility Strengthening through Consolidation: A Briefing Paper"
www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Consolidation%20Briefing
%20Paper_Final_021819.pdf)
At the US Water Alliance’s leadership dialogue on Utility Strengthening Through Consolidation, the
discussion explored many complex factors utilities and local leaders need to consider. The conversation
examined the role consolidation can play in helping water sector utilities, and the communities they
serve, address existing and anticipated challenges; the benefits consolidation can provide; and the
barriers hindering the rate and scope of consolidation in the US water sector. Dialogue participants—
acting in their individual capacities as informed experts—agreed that further consolidation in the water
sector is desirable and feasible.
Participants in the US Water Alliance’s leadership dialogue, Utility Strengthening Through Consolidation,
call on all water sector partners to reduce barriers to consolidation and promote the use of this
important tool. Towards that end, together, we offer the following principles to guide future efforts:
1. Focus on proactive, community-driven, and locally-determined approaches to consolidation.

Consolidation is best undertaken proactively. Community leaders and stakeholders should tailor the
process for evaluating options and determine appropriate institutional arrangements at the local level.
Consolidation will work best when utilities voluntarily explore consolidation options before a substantial
deterioration in operations and assets takes place. An optimal time is when a fundamentally sound
system undertakes an opportunity assessment and identifies infrastructure replacement needs, new
regulatory requirements, or other significant cost drivers, and decides merging with another utility is the
best option for customer service and affordability. Consolidation is also a complex undertaking. It
intersects with the local history of how communities have governed drinking water and wastewater, and
will depend on watershed and socio-political conditions. Consolidation efforts must be sensitive to local
control of land use and water services and the community benefits they provide, whether they are
economic, social, cultural, public health, or environmental health related.
2. Build in backstops to address significant public health or environmental risks and threats. While
voluntary consolidation is the best approach, some communities and their water systems face
challenges that place public health or the environment at significant risk. State governments play an
important role in these cases. Communities facing economic, demographic, or other challenges can
experience an erosion of their rate base, which places substantial pressure on the technical, financial,
and managerial capacity of their water systems. These conditions can place public and environmental
health at risk and require coordinated intervention. Consolidation, technical assistance, funding, and
other support—individually or combined—all need to be on the table to ensure communities are
provided with reliable access to clean and safe water services. If communities are in this challenged
context but encounter resistance or reluctance to solve the challenge, state authority to require
consolidation becomes a critical option, and may ensure sustainable local water services, protection of
public health, and environmental well-being.
3. Define, and be guided by, the community value proposition. Present consolidation in the context of
the value it can provide the community. Clearly articulate the potential costs and the potential benefits
a community can anticipate from consolidating utilities. Consolidation must balance up-front
requirements, costs, and any true loss of community decision-making with the mid-to-longer-term
benefits consolidation can provide. Consolidation transactions are complex, and the benefits from
consolidation must be sufficiently compelling to justify and drive the transaction forward. A continuum
exists relative to current system operating contexts and the incentives and enabling environment that
support consolidation. This continuum runs from high technical/financial/managerial (TFM) capacity
systems operating in economically stable communities to low TFM capacity systems operating in
economically vulnerable communities. Each end of this continuum represents unique cases where either
the benefits of consolidation will be insufficient or the barriers to consolidation will be too high to
support consolidation taking place. The local value proposition for consolidation will vary along this
continuum, and communities should evaluate their value proposition and make a locally-driven business
decision on whether they will pursue consolidation. To help communities make informed, well-balanced
decisions, water sector partners need to better characterize and communicate the costs and benefits of
consolidation and promote rigorous, but streamlined, opportunity assessments.
4. A range of consolidation models can work; communities must have balanced, factual information to
make informed choices. Communities need balanced information on the full range of governance
models under which consolidation can take place. A range of governance models and institutional
arrangements exist to support consolidation. These include: general purpose government (e.g.,
municipal water departments); special purpose government utility (e.g., authority service district);
privately owned utilities; and cooperative, nonprofit organizations (e.g., membership cooperatives).
Each of these models offers communities a different combination of governance structures, access to
capital, and jurisdictional and geographic considerations. Any of the available institutional governance
models can be an effective approach to utility consolidation, with advantages in some community
contexts and disadvantages in others. The historical backdrop and the unique design elements of a
governance model determine effectiveness, not the structure of the model itself. Models can also be
customized through interlocal agreements in which different aspects of governance, decision making,
and operational responsibility are delegated or shared regionally. The water sector best serves
communities by providing clear, balanced information on the range of models, key considerations, and
design elements to make them effective.
5. Develop a cohesive authorizing environment at the state level. Given that consolidation is an
important tool to accelerate movement towards a One Water future in the United States, state
governments should adopt a complete and cohesive authorizing environment to streamline
consolidation transactions, lower up-front transaction costs, and provide balanced, factual information
on consolidation options. No state has a comprehensive and cohesive package of legislation and
regulation that enables a clear, lowtransaction cost path to consolidation. This complicates consolidation
transactions, and at times, actually prohibits certain forms of transactions. Some state governments
have policy or regulation that unfairly favors certain institutional approaches to consolidation. Others
have implemented policy to better motivate and enable water systems consolidation. State
governments should outline the assistance options and the technical assistance programs available to
support for systems interested in exploring consolidation. The water sector can support state
governments in adopting the needed statutes and regulations, as well as lower the significant barrier to
consolidation activity by cataloging and characterizing these options.
Consolidation advocate
In some ways, Pennsylvania’s various policies wind up cancelling out paths to consolidation. Emergency
planning and operator sharing are crucial in times of crisis, but they are not meant to address a utility’s
long-term financial strength. While the CEP can give a system the resources needed to begin
consolidation, it can also improve a utility’s ability to continue operating on its own, and avoid merging
with other systems. PENNVEST’s efforts to incentivize consolidation are hampered by the fact that the
fund itself is underutilized. Similarly, Act 47 is limited in its ability to support struggling municipalities
because the state cannot step in preemptively, and Pennsylvania municipal-county structures prevent
municipalities from dissolving when necessary. Laws like Act 12 increase the attractiveness of
privatization and diminish the appeal of consolidation, thereby limiting the options available to cities.
Cities face the choice to maintain the status quo, sell their systems to private water companies, or
consolidate or regionalize with other systems. Of these, consolidation may have the most promise to
address affordability, infrastructure, and financial strength at the same time. Each option brings with it
unique benefits and challenges, and the state government and outside funders can play a crucial role in
supporting cities as they attempt to move forward. Pennsylvania’s state government is not using
effective policies for consolidation and can improve outcomes for municipal systems by developing
stronger ones or following the examples of other states.
Approaches Adopted by Other States

Finance: Leveraging of State Revolving Fund
One of the primary ways that other states increase the financial resources available to water
systems is through “leveraging”—using federal SRF capitalization grants as security for bonds.
The proceeds of these bonds are then redeposited in the SRF (Environmental Financial Advisory
Board [EFAB] 2008). State SRF programs lend the bond proceeds to communities to continue
their development of wastewater and drinking water infrastructure. The use of bond proceeds
permits the amount of loans or grants to exceed the amount of SRF equity. If a state leverages
their SRFs, this creates additional funds available for drinking and wastewater infrastructure
improvements.
2nc – at: perm – consolidation good
--AT: perm- can’t solve consolidation
The technical and financial capacity challenges above may also be addressed more structurally at
the water system level through regionalization or consolidation with other drinking water systems. As
previously mentioned, consolidation and regionalization can result in physical interconnection, but they
also can facilitate sharing resources, developing regional partnerships, and
pooling technical expertise (ASWA and EFC 2019). Consolidating water systems often results in
greater economies of scale, and with improved resource sharing potential (ASWA and EFC 2019).
Our findings suggest that the three most effective policy types for increasing the rates of consolidation
are takeover rules, regional planning, and funding mechanisms, with takeover rules
having the greatest effect. This is not particularly surprising. Funding mechanisms beyond State
Revolving Funds are the traditional “carrots” and can be used to incentivize consolidation activity or
support communities facing affordability or quality challenges. Takeover rules are the
“sticks” and add a level of threat and accountability that may force public systems that have been
on the fence to finally deactivate and consolidate. Takeover rules also provide failing systems with
an option of last resort, so that they have a backstop that keeps them from simply continuing to
deliver undrinkable or unaffordable water. However, states may be reluctant to implement a takeover
rule, as the process transfers power from local governments to the state. Regional planning
allows struggling systems to have a natural partner for consolidation.
Regional planning and consolidation in Pennsylvania can pose some challenges. For example,
larger utilities that may have the capacity to support smaller systems often have no interest in
consolidation due to the risk of taking on the financial liabilities and deferred capital costs of adjacent
system. The state could consider incentives to consolidation by allowing greater accounting
flexibility and liability relief for larger systems. In addition, flexibility in permitting and monitoring
regimes for consolidated systems can reduce fixed costs and allow for greater scale and cost
efficiency.
In our analysis, state legislation or statutes led to practically no change in consolidation rates,
likely because they create incentives within existing SRF structures, and if the SRF is underutilized to
begin with, additional consolidation incentives may have no effect. Enforcement programs that
encompass takeover rules and forced interconnections create a small decrease in
consolidation rates—likely because state-ordered interconnections prop up struggling systems
that would otherwise consolidate.
These results make a strong case for policies that promote accountability and supportive networks,
rather than incentives. Pennsylvania relies on relatively weak incentives, while other states
have more aggressive interventionist polices, including both comprehensive regional planning
and aggressive takeover rules. Furthermore, other cities across the country are currently experimenting
with new infrastructure planning approaches, which may have applications for
Pennsylvania.
Takeover Rules: North Carolina’s Local Government Commission has been successful in
preventing municipal financial crises. The Commission was created in response to the Great
Depression and keeps a consistent and close watch on the finances of municipalities. When a
municipality shows warning signs or is not able to address its own financial distress, the
Commission can and does step in immediately and take over the financial operation of the city
(Pew 2013). No North Carolina municipality has defaulted on an obligation bond in the nearly
80 years since the Commission was established, resulting in the highest possible bond rating for
all state municipalities, despite shrinking populations in most counties (Pew 2013). Recently, the
state was able to intervene quickly in the town of Eureka, preventing the town from defaulting on
its sewage bills, and creating financial crises in the two nearby cities which supply its water and
treat its sewage (Long 2019).
Regional Planning: Kentucky was one of the earliest states to adopt a consolidation strategy and
has successfully exhibited some of the most innovative solutions, using regional planning as its
main tool. In 1999, Kentucky developed a strategic water resource development plan, creating
Area Water Management Councils within each of its Area Development Districts. Each Area
Development District encompass multiple counties. Since the creation of the plan and the specific
water regions, the number of public water systems in the state has gone from approximately 700
to 400, as smaller systems consolidate with larger ones (US EPA 2017). Regional planning like
Kentucky’s can also facilitate the strengthening of other tools. For instance, if a system is forced
to consolidate or dissolve, having a preexisting Regional Plan greatly reduces the work needed to
complete the process.
Municipal Planning: In addition to regional planning, comprehensive and innovative municipal

planning is happening in struggling cities across the country. “Rightsizing” is a planning approach being
undertaken specifically within shrinking cities. Rightsizing is still more of a theory
and refers to a yet-proven process of bringing cities down to some “correct” size. This refers to a
size that is proportionate to the city government’s ability to pay for itself (Hummel 2015). There
exists potential for rightsizing to occur in shrinking cities, but it has not yet been documented
in Pennsylvania. The five main cities experimenting with rightsizing within the United States
are in Ohio (Youngstown and Cleveland), Michigan (Detroit and Flint), and New York (Buffalo).
These five cities all have declining populations, postindustrial sites with expensive infrastructure
systems, and a lack of municipal financial resources to pay for social services. These cities have
all experimented with elements of rightsizing in different ways and to different extents. The main
aspects of rightsizing include building demolitions, service consolidation, urban green initiatives,
and the provision of incentives for residents to move out of abandoned or degraded areas. This
last aspect primarily involves the reduction or removal of public services, which functions to
force residents out of such neighborhoods.
Many cities, particularly in our focus state of Pennsylvania, were built for populations that were
double or triple what they are now. These cities now have an unmanageable and expensive system
of streets, public building, parks, housing, and most importantly to this discussion, sewer and
drinking water infrastructure (Hummel 2015). Erie, Pennsylvania is one of the few Pennsylvania
cities to have begun embarking on a process of rightsizing. Although the population of Erie
was too large to be included in this analysis (>100,000 residents), the city’s population has also
declined by almost 30% since its peak. In order to combat its declining populations, increase in
crime, and decrease in tax revenue, Erie created its own Comprehensive Plan to address their
issues (McDevitt 2015). Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, state counties are
required to come up with comprehensive plans, but city planners highly recommend them for
municipalities as well (McDevitt 2015). In the case of shrinking cities, municipalities and utilities
would benefit from a set of plans that could include options for public private partnerships, organized
demolitions, downtown reinvestments, and redistribution of public services (Rink 2016).
Rightsizing can disproportionately affect disadvantaged communities, many of which have protested
rightsizing efforts, particularly in Detroit (Kiertzner 2016). If rightsizing is to be attempted
in shrinking cities going forward, there is a need for community engagement and inclusion for it
to be successful and equitable (Hummel 2015).
2nc – consolidation solves utilities
States solve consolidation

USWA 19 (US Water Alliance. "Utility Strengthening through Consolidation: A Briefing Paper"
www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Consolidation%20Briefing
%20Paper_Final_021819.pdf)
Create a Supportive Regulatory and Policy Environment All levels of government have a role to play in
creating an enabling policy environment for utility consolidation. State governments are especially
important. State legislation and policy can unlock governance options, remove obstacles, and lower high
transaction costs. Comprehensive state frameworks should facilitate and encourage communities to
customize consolidation agreements. States may require systems to consider consolidation, and others
require it in certain cases. Some recommendations include: 1. Provide rules of the road. Develop clear
procedures for how to initiate and complete consolidations relative to each major institutional
governance model in state statute and regulation. 2. Define water utility asset valuation methods and
determine what entity has authority to vet and approve valuations. Valuation methods are used to
calculate the fair market value of system assets, and they establish the financial basis for acquiring water
systems. 3. Remove obstacles. There are a number of obstacles such as service area restrictions (e.g.,
two-mile limit rules), right to serve restrictions, and rights of first refusal. 4. Clarify and limit liability
exposure. Include an absorbing entity’s compliance and tort liability. 5. Establish the ability to order
consolidation as a backstop to address systems in significant non-compliance with health and safety
requirements.
Consolidation solves the case- resolves rural and increases access to capital which
solves funding- solves all their warrants for sq problems
Hughes et al 10 (Jeff, Director, UNC Environmental Finance Center. Dadhika Fox, CEO, US Water
Alliance. This report was informed by an experienced set of water sector leaders. Thank you to all those
who took the time to be interviewed and provide feedback on this report, including: • C. Tad Bohannon,
Chief Executive Officer, Central Arkansas Water • Jesse Cain, City Manager, City of Colusa • Maureen
Duffy, Vice President, Communications and Federal Affairs, American Water • Jim LaPlant, Chief
Executive Office, Iowa Regional Utilities Association • Shelli Lovell, General Manager, Marshalltown
Water Works • Kenny Waldroup, Assistant Public Utilities Director, City of Raleigh • John Walton,
Director of Marketing, Logan Todd Regional Water Commission. "Strengthening Utilities Through
Consolidation: The Financial Impact"
www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Final_Utility%20Consolidation
%20Financial%20Impact%20Report_022019.pdf)
Financial Benefits Communities contemplating whether to consolidate utilities need to consider a

multitude of information. The most critical pieces are knowing what the value to the community would
be and how long it could take to realize. Assessing, estimating, and quantifying benefits may be
daunting, but doing so is essential to know whether benefits outweigh the costs and challenges. Benefits
can be spread among customers, systems involved, and the broader economy. Potential financial
benefits from water utility consolidation include: • Economies of scale and operating efficiencies; •
Increased access to capital at a lower cost; • Lower or equal customer rates for a specified level of
service; • Revenue stability; • Reduced exposure to regulatory penalties; • Improved planning and risk
management; and • Increased opportunities for economic development.
Economies of Scale and Operating Efficiencies In rural and urban settings, consolidation often results in
greater economies of scale. In other words, water, wastewater, and stormwater services involve dozens
of separate business functions that can benefit from being spread over larger groups of customers.
Consider operating expenses. Reading 50 meters per month usually costs significantly more per meter
than reading 50,000 meters. Maintaining a large network of assets rather than a smaller network of
isolated assets can also be cost-effective. Similarly, the prices smaller systems pay for chemicals and
services are often much higher than the price paid by their larger counterparts. Essential chemicals, such
as chorine, are available in much lower unit costs when bought in bulk.
Staffing costs also benefit from economies of scale. Salaries for highly-trained managers have increased
in tandem with the regulations and environmental challenges those managers are entrusted to handle.
A skilled utility professional serving 500 customers may be equally able to serve a community with 5,000
customers. In this case, spreading the cost of a professional manager over more customers can reduce
costs.
Increased Access to Capital at a Lower Cost Water is a capital-intensive enterprise. There are high costs
associated with investing in and maintaining the vast infrastructure that water utilities operate. Costs
are climbing with the need to upgrade, retrofit, and make systems more resilient. Several case studies in
this report show that consolidated utilities can access capital from investors at a lower cost. When
utilities consolidate, they pool resources to serve larger customer bases. As a result, consolidated
systems may receive better terms and interest rates on bonds and commercial loans from private capital
markets to fund capital improvements.8
Regional consolidation may also qualify systems for subsidized public funding options not available for
nonregional efforts. These sources of funding vary by state but may include subsidized State Revolving
Fund loans or state planning grants that can save communities money on principal costs and interest
payments.
Lower or Equal Customer Rates for a Specified Level of Service Once a water utility reduces or minimizes
capital and operating costs, the level of funds needed from customers may change. In many situations,
financial benefits from consolidating are tempered by rates needing to rise to address overdue issues
and pay the near-term costs of consolidating. However, in less common situations, customers may see
immediate or short-term rate reductions.
Rate parity across customer bases is typically a more common goal than rate reductions. Customers
within a single geographic region served by multiple water service providers might pay different prices
for the services they receive. Carefully structured consolidation can equalize rates among customers
within a service area and slow future rate increases for all involved.
Revenue Stability The water sector is experiencing major changes in its revenue business model.9 Utility
consolidation can make systems less vulnerable to revenue shortfalls. Consolidated systems that tie
together more diverse water users may be able to mitigate revenue fluctuations and spread the cost of
filling shortfalls over a larger customer base when they do occur. Several case studies in this report
demonstrate how systems can maintain revenue and fully optimize capacity through consolidation. This
model works particularly well if systems consolidate when considering new investments. While
consolidation may alleviate some revenue challenges, utilities should not view consolidation as a fail-
safe way to protect communities from inherent risks like overoptimistic projections, large customer
losses, or the cost of retrofitting and building systems resilient enough for future circumstances.
Reduced Exposure to Regulatory Penalties Communities often consider consolidation because of

regulatory pressure, placing more weight on avoiding unwanted penalties than on saving revenue. From
treatment facilities to ailing collection systems, consolidation is increasingly becoming one of the main
solutions for achieving cost effective regulatory compliance. Consolidating utilities can shift regulatory
responsibility, streamline and reduce the cost of regulatory approvals, and, in some cases, provide
immediate regulatory financial relief.
Improved Planning and Risk Management Water service keeps local economies running, communities
healthy, and the environment safe; that means the risks utilities plan for and manage carry significant
costs. Consolidation has allowed many utilities to mitigate risk and benefit from integrated planning. A
particular risk, like diminishing water supply, may even be the driver for why communities consider
consolidation. The organizational and water resources planning processes under a consolidated utility
can also lead to a more comprehensive, less piecemeal strategy than when spread across multiple
systems or localities.
Increased Opportunities for Economic Development Some financial savings are apparent on water utility
budgets, rate sheets, and other financial documents. Other benefits may occur off the books in the
broader community, despite being direct and visible outcomes from consolidating water utilities. For
example, communities facing water shortages or lacking wastewater services can struggle to grow or
develop their local economies. Businesses hesitate to locate in places where access to water supply or
quality of water services are in question. Consolidation may give these communities the opportunity to
address water supply or water infrastructure challenges that deter growth or lead to decline.
2nc – alternative rate structure solvency
Alternative rate structure- go back and cut the main advocate from the 1ac- also has
some bonds stuff in that article
PENNVEST and other financing institutions should provide incentives for alternative rate structures or
implementation of a Customer Assistance Program (CAP) in exchange for low-interest capital where
affordability is an issue. The financial burden of replacing and maintaining aging infrastructure, or
improving infrastructure to meet new regulations or environmental changes, is passed on to the utility’s
customers. The ability for a utility to raise their rates may be prohibited if their customer base is small or
a large portion of their customers are low-income. The utility must navigate generating sufficient
revenue for utility operations while keeping those rates affordable for their customers. Funders
providing low-interest capital to a system may condition the loan on a utility implementing a customer
assistance program. Water systems should also look to the examples set in Philadelphia and Baltimore
to determine whether setting alternative rate structures to provide affordable water services is viable,
as alternative rate structures can address affordability more directly than CAPs. California also has
several utilities that undertake a water budgeting process to determine rates for indoor domestic usage,
efficient outdoor usage, and inefficient usage. The difference between the PENNVEST interest rates and
the higher market interest rates could then allow a water system to consider forgoing the extra revenue
from increased rates for their lowest income customers.
**other counterplans
1nc – advantage cp – colorado river basin
Adv cp for colorado river basin

Edwards & Hill 12 (Chris director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of
manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Peter J. Hill is
Professor Emeritus of Economics at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois, and a senior fellow at the
Property and Environment Research Center in Bozeman, Montana. "Cutting the Bureau of Reclamation
and Reforming Water Markets" https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/interior/cutting-bureau-
reclamation)
For more than a century, the Bureau of Reclamation has built and operated dams, canals, and
hydroelectric plants in the 17 western states. The bureau is the largest wholesaler of water in the
nation, and it is the second largest producer of hydroelectric power, with 58 plants. It owns about 250
dams and 350 reservoirs, which are used for power, irrigation, flood control, and recreation.1
In 2011 the Bureau of Reclamation's net budget outlays were $1.9 billion. Its gross outlays were larger at
about $2.9 billion, but about $1 billion of the bureau's annual spending is offset by receipts from various
sources.2
Many cities and farm businesses in the West have become dependent on water from Bureau of
Reclamation projects. However, the agency's policies have created economic distortions and
environmental damage. Numerous Reclamation dams have not made any economic sense because the
costs of the dams have outweighed the benefits gained from irrigation farming and other marginal uses
of water. Farmers have been the largest beneficiaries of federal water infrastructure in the West, and
they generally receive water at a small fraction of its market value.
The era of major federal dam building is over, but Reclamation continues to provide water to the
western states at artificially low prices. Without reforms, that policy will exacerbate the major water
challenges facing the western states. About four-fifths of water supplied by Reclamation goes to farm
businesses, and the agency provides the largest subsidies to those users.3 As a consequence, agriculture
must be at the center of efforts to reform federal water policies.
Constructing dams for irrigation and hydropower makes sense in some locations. But in the 20th
century, the Bureau of Reclamation was an agency run amok with grand engineering plans that ignored
economic and environmental logic. The bureau aggressively sought to dam nearly every major river in
the West at multiple locations. Dams have harmed wetlands and salmon fisheries, and federal irrigation
has generated ongoing problems such as heightened salinity levels in rivers.
Looking ahead, Congress should consider transferring Reclamation dams and other facilities to state and
local governments and the private sector. The bureau's mission to reclaim arid lands in the West by
constructing irrigation projects has long been complete. Today, water policy issues—which are
increasingly contentious—would be better handled within states that control their own infrastructure
and solve their own unique demand and supply problems.
Reforms are also needed with regard to water rights, water transfers, and water pricing in the West.
Reducing restrictions on water transfers and allowing water prices to better reflect market supply and
demand would promote efficiency and benefit the environment. In the West, new supplies of water
have been generally exhausted, so avoiding shortages in the future will depend on greater efficiency in
water allocation and consumption.
This essay examines the history of the Bureau of Reclamation, describes the poor economics of federal
water projects, and discusses some of the environmental problems caused by federal irrigation. It then
discusses reforms to water markets, particularly allowing greater water transfers. The final section
discusses transferring Reclamation assets to state and local governments and the private sector, which
would reduce federal taxpayer costs and allow for more diversity and innovation in water policy
solutions.
1nc – resiliency conditions cp
Resiliency conditions CP
Congress should condition capital funding on state and local governments’ efforts to incorporate
resilience to natural disasters and adaptation to rising seas and other climate trends. The dollar value of
damage from extreme weather events has quadrupled in real terms over the past four decades. New
spending creates an opportunity to make design changes in old infrastructure or rethink infrastructure
concepts entirely to meet new conditions. Following the lead of many states and cities, Congress
should embed resilience guidelines in federal infrastructure investment through statutory means. Well-
executed resilience measures have the potential to constrain or reduce spending on the growing federal
cost of disaster assistance, which the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated to have
been at least $277 billion between fiscal years 2005 and 2014, and is likely to rise in the future (GAO,
2016).
1nc – advantage cp – grey water/desal
Counterplan solves, aff doesn’t- generating new water resources is the necessary short
term fix, aff takes forever- solves Colorado River Basin
Friesen 21 (Cody, CEO and founder of SOURCE Global, PBC, the Fulton professor of innovation in the
Ira A Fulton Schools of Engineering at Arizona State University, a senior sustainability scientist at the ASU
Global Institute of Sustainability, and winner of the 2019 Lemelson-MIT Prize for invention. April 1.
"America’s Water Infrastructure Is Broken. Why the Biden Plan Won’t Fix It."
https://www.barrons.com/articles/americas-water-infrastructure-is-broken-why-the-biden-plan-wont-
fix-it-51617285044)
In their 2021 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, the American Society of Civil Engineers gave our
country’s drinking-water infrastructure a C- grade. For decades, while pipes crack and rust and
treatment facilities falter, underfunded water utilities have been forced to cut back on routine
maintenance and defer upgrades. According to the ACSE, “there is a water main break every two
minutes and an estimated 6 billion gallons of treated water lost each day in the U.S.” In recent years,
fire, floods, and freezing weather have demonstrated the fragility of our drinking water systems.
Tragedies like Flint, Mich. and Jackson, Miss. and are not isolated events. They are our future.
I applaud the administration for tackling this monumental challenge. But the core elements of their plan,
which prioritizes the replacement of all the nation’s lead pipes and service lines, could take more than
20 years to complete. The American people cannot wait that long.
Population growth and climate change are directly impacting our water resources. Increasingly frequent
and intense storms have made saltwater intrusion and contamination more common in America’s
coastal communities, adding to the region’s long list of drinking water challenges. Water levels in dams
along the Colorado River, which supplies drinking water to about 10% of the nation’s population, have
been falling since 2000.
While these families and communities are the first to feel the country’s water crisis, it is a matter of time
until we’re all on the frontlines. We can’t turn back the clock on climate change and, even with the
measures in the Biden plan to protect Americans from the impacts of storms and drought, we are facing
the very real prospect of not having enough clean drinking water to meet our nation’s needs. As water
becomes scarcer, it will also be increasingly expensive.
We aren’t going to solve these problems just with new pipes or better treatment plants. We have to face
the fact that our old, extractive methods will fail us sooner than we might expect.
We have to get smart about water.
Water is already being traded as a commodity. But even as municipalities and hedge funds bet against
the future, Americans are literally pouring billions of gallons of potable water down the drain.
Consumers have yet to adopt technologies that use salt water, air pressure, and even electrical currents
to clear toilets, which are among the biggest water gluttons in American homes. We’re using our
dwindling drinkable water supply to take showers, wash dishes and keep our lawns green. But with
relatively simple and readily available technology, we can recycle up to 70% of this “graywater” to
irrigate grass, plants, shrubs, and trees.
Just as solar and wind have given us clean, renewable energy alternatives to fossil fuels, renewable
technology can replace the centuries-old model of overdrawing water from the ground, treating it
unsustainably, and conveying it in leaky, crumbling pipes. We can add new sources of drinkable water to
the mix and do so sustainably without extracting from existing freshwater resources.
As an alternative to expensive and energy-intensive desalination, scientists are using graphene

membranes and solar energy to turn seawater into freshwater. The system uses the sun to warm ocean
water as it passes through a graphene array, which removes salt and contaminants and leaves clean,
drinkable water behind. Researchers estimated this new technology to be 3.5 times more efficient than
current, state-of-the-art solar vapor systems. Another research team developed a technique to quickly
transform brackish water and seawater into safe, clean drinking water.
The only real limitation on these emerging technologies is the nature of water itself.
Water is an entirely local resource, and often located far from where people need it. It’s unwieldy, heavy
and expensive to transport. Water is the stuff of life, and among its many micro-organisms are
pathogens that can and very often do harm human beings. It’s also the universal solvent, so it’s not
uncommon to find dangerous but naturally occurring levels of lead or arsenic in our freshwater
resources.
Our current infrastructure system was designed to deal with these inherent challenges, but as pipes,
wells and treatment plants age and fail to keep pace with population growth, Americans are and will
continue to suffer.
There is a better way. Using the principles of renewables, scientists have been able to develop entirely
new resources of drinking water, independent of geography or infrastructure and produced and
delivered where people live .
New hydropanel technology we developed in our team at SOURCE Global is currently deployed in 48
countries. It uses the power of the sun to pull clean water out of the air, even in dry climates, and
convert it to high-quality drinking water that’s delivered directly to taps and faucets. The system works
off the grid with no electricity, and no need to build or fix miles of pipes, truck in water, or package it in
single-use plastics.
By developing resilient solutions like these, we can free our water supply from scarcity, contamination,
and climate change. Using American ingenuity and innovation, we can replace aging, broken
infrastructure with new technologies that create safe, reliable drinking water at a far lower cost.
So as this nation works to address the infrastructure challenges that threaten our health and prosperity,
I challenge our new administration to look beyond simply fixing what’s broken. Backed by federal
policies, we need to start treating our drinking water as a precious and finite resource. We need to
conserve water, recycle it, and most importantly, embrace and invest in innovation.
1nc – equity assessment cp
The United States federal government should not substantially increase its technical
and financial assistance programs to help communities build sewage treatment and
drinking water treatment works unless the increases are approved by an equity
assessment
CP solves the aff and is competitive- revisability, ongoing review, and genuine input
are all key to avoiding outcomes of the plan that exacerbates corruption and crime
and inhibits equitable economic growth necessary to solve the aff- prior analysis is key
to establishing a good model that spills over to the states
Berry et al 21 ( Scott Berry, the US Water Alliance’s director of policy and government affairs, who led the writing and outreach for this report, and Mae Stevens, the Signal Group’s executive vice president
and water practice chair, for writing contributions and insights. The water experts who served as advisors and reviewers on this report are also greatly appreciated. They served in their individual capacity, and their assistance does
not necessarily reflect the endorsement from their organizations of the policy recommendations presented here. For giving time and insight, thank you: Margaret Bowman, Spring Point Partners Elizabeth Cisar, Joyce Foundation
Peter Colohan, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University Martin Doyle, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University Maureen Duffy, American Water Steve Fleischli, Natural
Resources Defense Council Yvonne Forrest, Houston Water Nathan Gardner-Andrews, National Association of Clean Water Agencies Dan Hartnett, Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies Larry Levine, Natural Resources
Defense Council Tim Male, Environmental Policy Innovation Center Natalie Mamerow, American Society of Civil Engineers Oluwole “OJ” McFoy, Buffalo Sewer Authority Jonathan Nelson, Community Water Center Nathan Ohle,
Rural Community Assistance Partnership Erik Olson, Natural Resources Defense Council Jim Proctor, McWane, Inc. Patrick Sabol, United for Infrastructure Eric Sapirstein, ENS Resources, Inc. Zachary Schafer, United for
Infrastructure Jennifer Sokolove, Water Foundation Ted Stiger, Rural Community Assistance Partnership Mae Wu, Natural Resources Defense Council. US Water Alliance. "Recovering Strong: A Federal Policy Blueprint. Transforming
Water Management Post COVID-19" www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Recovering%20Stronger%20Federal%20Policy%20Blueprint.pdf)
Improve the Gathering of, and Centralize, Federal Water Access Data The US Census Bureau’s American
Community Survey (ACS) is the only national data set on water access, and it has significant limitations—
for example, it does not ask whether water service is affordable or reliable or whether households have
wastewater services. Improving the health and well-being of the millions of people without safe drinking
water, modern plumbing, and wastewater service cannot begin if the extent of the problem is
unknown .
Legislative Action Congress should expand federal data collection by: • Adding the following questions
to the American Community Survey: ― What kind of wastewater disposal system is a household
connected to (central sewer, decentralized wastewater treatment system, or other/not connected to a
system)? ― What kind of drinking water source is a household connected to (municipal, private well, or
other/not connected to a system)? ― Does a household have a tap, toilet, and shower inside the home?
• Expanding the American Housing Survey (AHS) to include more extensive sampling in rural areas. •
Directing EPA to collect data on affordability and shutoffs from water and wastewater systems.
Executive Action The USDA and EPA should jointly analyze all currently available data and submit a
report to Congress with recommendations on how to address the water and wastewater access gap with
proposed legislative actions. As new questions are adopted and data collected , the USDA and EPA
should update their analysis and recommendations .
Conduct Equity Assessment and Mapping Communities that do not receive clean, safe, and affordable
water and wastewater services can exacerbate inequities by putting stress on both physical and mental
health, child development, and economic mobility. These effects are cumulative and compounded by
underlying poverty and community-wide resource constraints. Gathering, mapping, and reporting data
on water quality and affordability, overlaying the data from vulnerable populations, as well as
comparing best practices with other similar utilities across the nation can help utilities to fully evaluate
the level of water equity in their service areas. The intersecting impacts of climate change must be
considered and mapped, as projected changes in precipitation and temperatures will further
exacerbate water-related inequities in many areas, increasing the number of people at risk . To
recover stronger, communities must address today’s challenges and adequately prepare for future
shocks.
To help federal agencies understand and define the equity problem, executive branch agencies should
develop and implement an economic and racial equity screening tool and require all federal agencies
to systematically examine how different racial and income groups will likely be affected by a
proposed action or decision . This tool will also serve as a repository of standardized neighborhoodlevel
data on public health metrics, income and wealth, exposure to environmental hazards, climate risks and
vulnerabilities, access to jobs, education, recreational space, and other critical outcomes. This should
further include an evaluation function to be able to assess changes in actual equity outcomes after a
project or action has been implemented . In addition, the screening tool will enable agencies to
identify communities and neighborhoods most impacted by past actions and unjust practices, and
those where agencies should prioritize investments in affordable, accessible infrastructure .
This tool should be used to enhance other existing agency processes. An example of this would be the
environmental analysis required for all major federal actions under the National Environmental Policy
Act.40 The tool could assist with an assessment of a proposed project’s equity impacts from the
earliest stages of project planning and development, through implementation . The tool could also
help to inform agency cost-benefit analysis models that are used as part of the rulemaking process or
to support decisions for the distribution of federal grants and loans after considering equity benefits
and the costs of inequity. This builds on the economic theory and research into how inequity can
exacerbate political corruption and crime, as well as impede economic growth . This should include
requirements to evaluate equity as part of the selection criteria for all federal discretionary grant, loan,
and loan guarantee programs.
Executive Action The EPA should lead the federal family by conducting an analysis and developing an
equity assessment and mapping tool to better support decision-making . This tool should help inform
where federal investments are going and help states do the same for the funding they control. The
EPA should also develop training for states on how to adopt and use this tool .
1nc – climate assessment cp
The United States federal government should not substantially increase its technical
and financial assistance programs to help communities build sewage treatment and
drinking water treatment works unless the projects are approved by a climate
assessment
Climate impact assessment CP

Berry et al 21 ( Scott Berry, the US Water Alliance’s director of policy and government affairs, who led the writing and outreach for this report, and Mae Stevens, the Signal Group’s executive vice president
and water practice chair, for writing contributions and insights. The water experts who served as advisors and reviewers on this report are also greatly appreciated. They served in their individual capacity, and their assistance does
not necessarily reflect the endorsement from their organizations of the policy recommendations presented here. For giving time and insight, thank you: Margaret Bowman, Spring Point Partners Elizabeth Cisar, Joyce Foundation
Peter Colohan, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University Martin Doyle, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke University Maureen Duffy, American Water Steve Fleischli, Natural
Resources Defense Council Yvonne Forrest, Houston Water Nathan Gardner-Andrews, National Association of Clean Water Agencies Dan Hartnett, Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies Larry Levine, Natural Resources
Defense Council Tim Male, Environmental Policy Innovation Center Natalie Mamerow, American Society of Civil Engineers Oluwole “OJ” McFoy, Buffalo Sewer Authority Jonathan Nelson, Community Water Center Nathan Ohle,
Rural Community Assistance Partnership Erik Olson, Natural Resources Defense Council Jim Proctor, McWane, Inc. Patrick Sabol, United for Infrastructure Eric Sapirstein, ENS Resources, Inc. Zachary Schafer, United for
Infrastructure Jennifer Sokolove, Water Foundation Ted Stiger, Rural Community Assistance Partnership Mae Wu, Natural Resources Defense Council. US Water Alliance. "Recovering Strong: A Federal Policy Blueprint. Transforming
Water Management Post COVID-19" www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Recovering%20Stronger%20Federal%20Policy%20Blueprint.pdf)
From enlarging capital needs and responding to disasters to keeping water affordable and treating
legacy and emerging contaminants, every aspect of running a water system has become more
challenging because of climate change. Additionally, climate stress is often felt as water stress, including
too much water (flooding from more frequent and stronger storms and sea-level rise), not enough water
(drought, decreased snowpack, low river flows) and more polluted water (point and nonpoint source
runoff, agricultural runoff, toxic algal outbreaks, fish kills). By addressing climate change, the water
sector will be more resilient, and in turn, minimize and mitigate some of the impacts of climate change
on communities. To make water more resilient, the federal government should: • Enact an equitable
climate and water disaster resilience package. • Incentivize natural infrastructure solutions and resilient
water resources management.
Enact an Equitable Climate and Water Disaster Resilience Package The Fourth National Climate
Assessment (2018) asserts that global warming “is transforming where and how we live and presents
growing challenges to human health and quality of life, the economy, and the natural systems that
support us.”46 It further declares that adaptation and mitigation are imperative “to avoid substantial
damages to the U.S. economy, environment, and human health and well-being over the coming
decades.”47 Much of this transformation and need have to do with water—too much in the case of
catastrophic flooding, hurricanes and sea-level rise; too little in the case of severe drought and forest
fires; and many times, both of those situations in close temporal or geographic proximity.
Too often the discussion of inequitable climate impacts is lacking, despite the reality that climate-related
water disasters hit low-income and communities of color first and worst. Further lacking are
corresponding equitable resilience planning and adaptation strategies. Low-income communities and
communities of color are more likely to live in low-quality housing, lack insurance to cushion the
devastation from fires and floods, and generally have fewer resources to manage the life-upending
challenges that come with preparing for, surviving, and recovering from extreme events.48 The urgency
is clear: we must address climate impacts while working to mitigate the worst of what is to come. In the
wake of COVID-19, there is a tremendous opportunity to address historic environmental inequities while
kick-starting the economy. Green jobs and policy incentives with positive climate feedback loops can
minimize water-related impacts on a warming world. At the same time, federal investment in water
sector resilience will help communities thrive and increase national security. Climate change will affect
every US citizen or business in some way. Mainstreaming climate considerations into infrastructure
decision-making so they are grounded in community and stakeholder input can only improve the
nation’s infrastructure . Incorporating equity into the conversation will lead to stronger and more
effective infrastructure decisions, and the United States is better off as a more just and equitable
country.
Legislative Action Congress should pass a comprehensive and integrated climate and water disaster
resilience package. This package should: • Focus on rural communities, low-income communities, and
communities of color who are disproportionately affected by the climate crisis. It must include equity as
a primary goal. The standards should include locally tailored climate adaptation responses that are
inclusive, informed by and designed in partnership with local stakeholders, and intersectional in
approach. • Include a significant increase in pre-disaster resilience funding specifically for low-income
and communities of color with reduced or waived cost shares. Pre-disaster funding should also become
available for communities facing anticipated future events, not just unlocked for communities after
disaster strikes. • Create and capitalize on a Water-Resilient Public Health Fund that allocates federal
disaster funding for communities with repeated flooding and failing infrastructure. • Significantly
increase funding, and expand eligibility, for grants to retrofit physical infrastructure owned by utilities,
using the latest climate data. Congress should build on programs like the Drinking Water System
Resilience and Sustainability program by expanding eligibility to drinking water systems of all sizes (while
still reserving a dedicated portion of the funds for small and underserved communities) and establishing
a mirror program for wastewater systems of all sizes. • Provide for climate impact considerations into
infrastructure planning and integration of that planning across all types of infrastructure (roads, bridges,
dams, ports, electricity sectors). This will mean that the nation is investing for the climate of the future,
not the climate of the past. • Direct the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to fund
resilience improvements rather than just repairs, with repeat flooding or infrastructure failures when
funding is granted after a disaster. • Provide technical assistance to ensure that communities can access
and implement all these new programs.
2nc – process cp block helpers
Sequencing matters
Fedinick et al 19 (Kristi Pullen, Natural Resources Defense Council. Steve Taylor, Coming Clean.
Michele Roberts, EJHA. Contributing Reviewers: Richard Moore, EJHA. Erik Olson, NRDC. "Watered
Down Justice" September.https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/watered-down-justice-report.pdf)
IDENTIFY, ENGAGE, AND SUPPORT DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED COMMUNITIES Identification of

underserved, overburdened communities is an important first step in developing plans and timelines to
engage and support them. Environmental Justice policies and recommendations must be quickly
adopted and implemented at all levels of decision-making. The sovereignty of Indigenous tribes must be
respected, and community members must be engaged as active participants in setting agendas and
priorities that affect their lives and communities. Congress, the EPA, the states, utilities, and other
relevant decision-makers must: n Fully implement the EPA Environmental Justice policies—beginning
with the Guidance on Considering Environmental Justice During the Development of Regulatory
Actions111 and the Environmental Justice 2020 Action Agendalxvi— throughout the agency’s SDWA
programs and all related programs. At the same time, implement specific goals and timetables to
measurably increase Environmental Justice communities’ access to safe drinking water, beyond the
basic actions already identified in the Action Agenda. n Identify underserved, overburdened
communities and develop specific plans and timelines to engage and support them. n Quickly and fully
implement recommendations from the EPA National Environmental Justice Advisory Council work group
on Environmental Justice and Water Infrastructure Finance and Capacity. n Meaningfully engage lxvii
community members in decision-making processes, including setting priorities for drinking water
protection, infrastructure spending, and identification of and response to threats to drinking water. All
communities, especially those with vulnerable populations, should be: n Fully informed about the state
of their drinking water, potential contamination hazards, (for example, large chemical storage tanks,
outdated infrastructure such as lead pipes), how to register a concern about drinking water, how
residents will be notified in case of contamination, and response plans in case of a major contamination
incident (for example, chemical spill), to honor their right to know about threats to their health and
welfare. n Provided regular opportunities to engage directly with drinking water providers; local, state,
and federal regulators; and the industries that create the highest risk to drinking water (for example,
chemical storage facilities, large agricultural operations) to understand and address threats to drinking
water. n Provided with grants or other financial support for community-based drinking water needs
assessments and planning and for technical expertise to allow them to engage fully in decision-making
processes. n Respect the sovereignty of Indigenous tribes and engage with them on a government-to-
government basis to develop solutions that reflect their unique needs.lxviii
Process card
USWA 20 (US Water Alliance. "Water Rising: Equitable Approaches to Urban Flooding" July. The US
Water Alliance is dedicated to building a sustainable water future for all. We accelerate the adoption of
One Water strategies—innovative, inclusive, and integrated approaches to water stewardship. As a
member-supported, national nonprofit organization, the Alliance educates the nation about the true
value of water and accelerates policies and programs that effectively manage water resources to build
stronger communities and a stronger America.
www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Final_USWA_Water
%20Rising_0.pdf)
Community engagement is often talked about in resilience work. Too often, approaches to community
engagement involve deciding on a strategy and then informing or garnering input from those most
affected. To effectively communicate risk and design flooding solutions that work for communities, cities
must go beyond this kind of engagement. They must identify problems and develop solutions in tandem
with communities, involving residents from the outset and throughout the implementation of projects.
This inclusive approach supports better prioritization of community needs and safety. It further allows
cities to examine potential unintended consequences, such as how new inequities may emerge, and
build toward long-term stewardship of flooding infrastructure as a public asset.
Information exchange creates a collective understanding of risk. Resilience planning should incorporate
all types of knowledge. Utilities, other city agencies, and communities all have useful knowledge that
informs flood risk and recovery, and they need channels to share this information with each other. This
may involve qualitative research, such as talking to residents or surveying vulnerable communities.
People living in high-risk areas have extensive knowledge of the realities of chronic flooding. They know
their neighborhood’s specific challenges with floodwaters and have a better understanding of external
factors, such as affordability concerns, that affect their ability to prepare, cope with, and recover from
disasters. This lived experience can help evaluate appropriate flood mitigation. Citizen science
techniques may be useful to fill data gaps. Some organizations use cell phone cameras and apps to
document flooding impacts and provide localized information in a visual format.
Similarly, residents need a better understanding of climate uncertainty and potential infrastructure
solutions. Utilities can provide educational resources to help communities understand what complex
scientific information means in terms of localized flooding impacts, as well as emergency preparedness
and what people can do to protect themselves. Information may need to be broken down or provided in
multiple languages. Information exchange better positions communities to assess their risks and weigh
in on decisions. This leads to local strategies that address residents’ needs while contributing to broader
urban flood management. It also leaves communities more prepared to activate emergency response
during extreme events that can result in major flooding such as hurricanes and nor’easters.
Sharing multiple options with communities leads to comprehensive decision-making processes. Since
climate change means a range of possible futures that impact flooding, it is helpful to present
communities with multiple mitigation solutions, allowing them to compare and contrast options.
Understanding different scenarios and working with communities to evaluate various options helps
vulnerable residents take control of their futures and build trust with cities and utilities. When
considering multiple scenarios, several alternatives emerge. Cities, utilities, and communities must work
together to explore these alternatives. Together, they can arrive at a decision that meets the utility’s
regulatory mandate and reduces vulnerability in each neighborhood. This ensures that infrastructure
investments, mitigation solutions, and supporting policies benefit everyone. For example, in the low-
lying, low-income Proctor Creek neighborhood of Atlanta, GA, the Department of Watershed
Management partnered with community-based organizations to gain intensive input from the
community on what kinds of green infrastructure solutions would and would not be effective. They are
also working to engage residents in the long-term maintenance of the planned green infrastructure
facilities.27
Communities need support to participate authentically. Sometimes community representatives have the
knowledge and willingness to work with water professionals but lack the time or ability to engage as
deeply as they would like. Cities or utilities can support widespread participation by providing a stipend
to compensate community members for their time, providing transportation to meetings and events,
offering childcare, ensuring translation services are available, and providing healthy meals. Community
partners can offer advice on how best to engage their communities, and they can also recommend local
vendors and services. Utilities or cities can hire community leaders as paid consultants to help develop
these strategies, vet scenarios, or gather input on potential flooding solutions.
Building relationships with community leaders enhances trust in vulnerable neighborhoods. Community-
based organizations can make good partners for water professionals since they often have trust among
residents. Utilities and city agencies can build relationships with these organizations to help gain trust in
neighborhoods. They can invite leaders from these organizations to serve on advisory committees to
help define the issues and co-develop goals, visions, and principles to guide planning processes.28
Advisors may include people like neighborhood nonprofit staff, healthcare professionals, or block club
leaders. Working through community organizations can help with course-corrections and finding
alternative solutions for a neighborhood when unforeseen challenges arise. Such ongoing local feedback
helps ensure that vulnerability information is not just collected but also used throughout the process. In
turn, this helps build trust and ensure that investments are cost effective, meet multiple objectives, and
enable community resilience.
Process card
USWA 20 (US Water Alliance. "Water Rising: Equitable Approaches to Urban Flooding" July. The US
Water Alliance is dedicated to building a sustainable water future for all. We accelerate the adoption of
One Water strategies—innovative, inclusive, and integrated approaches to water stewardship. As a
member-supported, national nonprofit organization, the Alliance educates the nation about the true
value of water and accelerates policies and programs that effectively manage water resources to build
stronger communities and a stronger America.
www.uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/publications/Final_USWA_Water
%20Rising_0.pdf)
Every step of the climate resilience planning process is an opportunity to consider equity. By
incorporating social vulnerabilities, flood resilience strategies can be more reflective of all communities.
When utilities and cities help the most vulnerable, they create more durable outcomes. In turn, it can
boost efficiency, reduce costs, and improve project outcomes. This is even more important in the face of
a changing climate.
Consideration of social vulnerability in planning activities across all operations provides a clear path for
equitable flood management strategies. The climate resilience field itself is still fairly new and rapidly
evolving. It may not follow a linear path through agencies. Cities and states generally develop climate
adaptation plans across several agencies, including water utilities. Large utilities may create their own
plans. Efforts to integrate stormwater and flood management within this broader context are still
emerging. Because responsibilities for stormwater, flood mitigation, and climate adaptation cross
multiple local government agencies and utilities, all agencies and efforts should consider equity. The
steps that each agency takes will vary. Successful processes generally move from risk identification and
data gathering, through assessments and planning, to funding and implementation, building in
monitoring and adjustment.
One way the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission— a water, sewer, and electric power utility
serving 2.6 million people in Northern California—works to consider equity in all operations is through a
community benefits assessment. Such assessments are guiding the utility’s Sewer System Improvement
Program (SSIP), a 20-year citywide investment to upgrade San Francisco’s aging sewer infrastructure to
ensure a reliable, sustainable, and seismically safe sewer system now and for generations to come. The
SSIP calls for building new facilities using a climate change design criterion so that the sewer system will
respond better to rising sea levels and other impacts. Community benefits and inclusion are an
important level of service goal for these facilities, with strategies to ensure economic and job benefits to
the communities they serve and maintain ratepayer affordability. The utility also established a level of
service goal tied to flooding— which is driving the use of innovative green stormwater projects together
with upgrades to sewer pipelines to minimize how stormwater affects neighborhoods and the sewer
system. By linking climate resilience, flooding, and equity goals, the SFPUC can maximize the benefits of
the sewer system rebuild.
Scenario planning helps consider future climate possibilities and impacts on vulnerable communities.
Although climate data and models have improved significantly, there is still some uncertainty in how
much the climate will change and what localized impacts will be. This is particularly true when looking at
the compounding impacts of climate change on different vulnerable populations.
The Water Utility Climate Alliance (WUCA), for instance, is a collaboration of 12 utilities building
leadership to better understand and address how the climate affects water resources and infrastructure
systems. WUCA works with uncertainties through scenario planning to inform decision-making
processes. WUCA conducts trainings for other utilities and water managers on how to incorporate
climate science and manage uncertainty for no-regrets solutions.
Scenario planning can scale up equitable flood resilience efforts. Looking at a range of future scenarios
can lend insight into what flooding challenges may arise and how flood risk might change in a given
community. Incorporating equity considerations into the scenario planning process can provide an
important opportunity for advancing water equity amidst uncertainty. Water professionals can work
with community representatives to help determine which scenarios to consider, as they have a sense of
how different circumstances may affect their neighborhoods. The assessment stage of risks and future
uncertainties can include data collected on social vulnerabilities. Findings from this work can then
inform planning processes to develop equitable adaptation strategies.
Strategies grounded in community solutions and shared decision-making improve outcomes.

Communities are increasingly taking it upon themselves to identify their own climate challenges,
including flooding, and develop solutions from the ground up. Fully incorporating social vulnerability
into resilience planning may involve integrating community efforts with utility or citywide initiatives and
plans. The National Association of Climate Resilience Planners notes that “processes grounded in
community assets can amplify resilience strategies already in play and embody desired outcomes at
every stage.”38 This provides multiple touchpoints along the planning process for different
“stakeholders to vision, experiment, reflect, and refine solutions [as they] reflect on habits and patterns
that perpetuate inequities and limit resiliency.”22
For example, in Philadelphia, an interagency Flood Risk Management Task Force (FRMTF) has been
operating since 2015. Eight city departments—including water, emergency management, parks
sustainability, and others—came together to coordinate resources and address flooding as it affects
different neighborhoods. More than 15 other local and federal agencies advise on projects and provide
technical assistance to the group. The FRMTF builds resilience through four key components: public
information, mapping and regulations, flood preparedness, and flood damage reduction. The group has
engaged communities throughout the process, tailoring flood management to the various challenges in
different neighborhoods. To improve the involvement of vulnerable communities, the FRMTF began
piloting a community-led sub-task force in 2020. The goals are to give voice to community leaders,
empower stakeholders to guide decisions on flood resilience projects, and improve risk communication
and information flow between the agencies and residents.
Equitable resilience is a new approach; utilities and communities learn as they go. Embedding equity is a
continuous, adaptive process with routine monitoring and adjustments. While the intersections of
water, climate, and equity run deep, it is only in recent years that they have begun to challenge our
existing ways of approaching flood solutions. Building a shared understanding of risks and finding cost-
effective solutions that meet community needs and regulatory requirements can be challenging.
Stakeholders are learning as they go about what works and what does not.
On the east side of Detroit, MI, torrential downpours combined with riverine flooding have caused
property damage and flooded basements in the Jefferson Chalmers neighborhood. The neighborhood is
predominantly African American and has a low median household income compared to other parts of
the city. Most of the neighborhood’s houses built in the early 1900s also lack air conditioning systems.
This poses a dual threat, as the community grapples with hotter summers and more frequent, heavy
rains. The Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) is working with the Housing and
Revitalization Department; Buildings, Safety, Engineering, and Environmental Division (BSEED); and the
communitybased Southeast Michigan Long Term Recovery Organization to reevaluate disaster risks and
a range of solutions to improve emergency response, while building out long-term mitigation strategies.
Across the nation, the stakes are high and both communities and utilities must remember that working
together is an ongoing process and may change over time. As community needs change, or new flooding
challenges arise, strategies may also need to evolve. Opportunities for continuous learning and course
correction of strategies along the way allow water professionals to check in with communities regularly,
re-evaluate risks and needs, and update management actions accordingly.
**kritiks
**settler-colonialism
1nc – settler-colonialism
The aff is ontological violence- vote neg to decenter the state and reject their framing
of water as a resource
Meehan et al 20 (Katie Meehan Wendy Jepson Leila M. Harris Amber Wutich Melissa Beresford
Amanda Fencl Jonathan London Gregory Pierce Lucero Radonic Christian Wells Nicole J. Wilson Ellis
Adjei Adams Rachel Arsenault Alexandra Brewis Victoria Harrington Yanna Lambrinidou Deborah
McGregor Robert Patrick Benjamin Pauli Amber L. Pearson Sameer Shah Dacotah Splichalova
Cassandra Workman Sera Young. "Exposing the myths of household water insecurity in the global north:
A critical review" WIREs Water, Volume 7, Issue 6. November/December 2020.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wat2.1486)
3.6 Myth 6: Modern water is the best water
Over the 20th century, the rise of the hydrologic sciences has made water increasingly legible—through
the quantification of stocks and flows of water—and amenable to control and management by state
agencies (Linton, 2010). Infrastructure expansion and development enabled the hydraulic state, a set
of public institutions and agencies that marshaled resources and consolidated power to construct the
necessary infrastructure to manage water —and by extension, people, and territory (Akhter, 2015;
Banister & Widdifield, 2014; Davis & Ryan, 2017; Dunlap, 1999; Harris & Alatout, 2010; Jackson & Head,
2020; Meehan, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2015; Worster, 1986). In colonized regions, in particular, the
expansion of settler‐colonial states was tied to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples through
mechanisms that include policy and law, property and water rights, ideology, and discourse about
identity, and the subversion of Indigenous knowledge and modes of water governance (Arsenault et
al., 2018; Curley, 2019; Daigle, 2018; McGregor, 2014; Montoya, 2017; Todd, 2018; Yazzie & Baldy,
2018). Dam construction has led to dispossession and resettlement of people with important
consequences for livelihoods, health, and cultural connections to territory (Lawson, 1994; Martin &
Hoffman, 2008; McCully, 2001).
As the literature on Indigenous water governance makes clear, a focus on the ontological politics of
water illustrates the implications of modern water as a hegemonic practice (McGregor, 2014; Wilson
& Inkster, 2018; Yates et al., 2017). Ontological politics are the “conflicts that ensue as different worlds
or ontologies strive to sustain their own existence as they interact and mingle with each other” (Blaser,
2009, p. 877). The consequences of such politics are best illustrated by the clash between colonial and
Indigenous relationships to water . Indigenous relationships to water most often center on
understandings of water as a living entity that has agency or “spirit” and exists in networks of reciprocal
responsibilities between humans and non‐humans (Chiblow (Ogamauh annag qwe), 2019; Craft, 2014;
LaBoucane‐Benson, Gibson, Benson, & Miller, 2012; McGregor, 2014; Wilson & Inkster, 2018; Zoanni,
2017).
Wilson et al. (2019) illustrate the implications of imposing western scientific assessments of water
safety, based on a modernist “treatment ontology,” onto Indigenous peoples such as the Tr'ondëk
Hwëch'in peoples in Northern Canada. Elders consider the use of traditional drinking water sources (e.g.,
untreated mountain creeks) essential for cultural and spiritual wellbeing because, among other reasons,
this use maintains reciprocal relationships to water as a living entity, however, western scientific
assessments ignore these relational qualities by assuming that it is possible to break water down into
merely H2O. In this way, the settler‐colonial imposition of modern water entails significant
“ontological violence ” because, in imagining water as a mere resource, it disregards the possibility of
water as a living entity (Hunt, 2014; McGregor, 2014; Sundberg, 2014; Wilson & Inkster, 2018; Yates et
al., 2017).
In reconceptualizing water beyond a strictly modernist paradigm, critical scholarship argues for
approaches that decenter human agency and reposition water as fundamentally relational and
political (Linton, 2010; Linton & Budds, 2014; Todd, 2018; Wilson & Inkster, 2018). The
acknowledgment of multiple worldviews and ontologies of water is fundamental to making this shift
(Yates et al., 2017). This ontological pluralism would necessitate “a fundamental rethinking of
governance including the values, decision‐making processes, and institutions that are involved in such
a system” (Wilson & Inkster, 2018, p. 531).
Engaging multiple ontologies also requires decolonial processes that place Indigenous self‐
determination, legal orders, rights, and responsibilities at the center of governance practice (Todd,
2018). In the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) (Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River
Claims Settlement) Act, 2017) in Aotearoa (New Zealand) the Whanganui Māori iwi (kin group) won a
140‐year legal battle to recognize their ancestral river as having personhood (legal standing) and thus
legal rights equal to that of humans (Salmond, 2014). Similar legal rights have been extended to Lake
Erie, an effort spearheaded by Toledo, Ohio (USA) activists, and citizen organizations. In this way,
building on Indigenous understandings of water to restructure legal and institutional arrangements is
one example of how to govern beyond modern water. Nonetheless, the intertwined history of modern
water and settler‐colonial states provide cause to question the ability of the state to “see” beyond
modern water (Wilson, 2019). Indeed, scholarship on Indigenous water governance and politics also
reveals the inherent tensions and contradictions of thinking about the state, and interconnections
with modernist assumptions of water, as the dispenser of justice and best available mechanism to
achieve or advance environmental justice (Pulido et al., 2016).
2nc – set-col – framework
The 1AC sustains the myth of modern water- vote neg to disrupt their narratives and
create a new agenda for water research to challenge institutionalized structures and
power that sustain water insecurity
Safe and secure water is a cornerstone of modern life in the global North. This article critically examines
a set of prevalent myths about household water in high‐income countries, with a focus on Canada and
the United States. Taking a relational approach, we argue that household water insecurity is a product of
institutionalized structures and power, manifests unevenly through space and time, and is reproduced in
places we tend to assume are the most water‐secure in the world. We first briefly introduce “modern
water” and the modern infrastructural ideal, a highly influential set of ideas that have shaped household
water provision and infrastructure development over the past two centuries. Against this backdrop, we
consolidate evidence to disrupt a set of narratives about water in high‐income countries: the notion
that water access is universal, clean, affordable, trustworthy, and uniformly or equitably governed. We
identify five thematic areas of future research to delineate an agenda for advancing scholarship and
action—including challenges of legal and regulatory regimes, the housing‐water nexus, water
affordability, and water quality and contamination. Data gaps underpin the experiences of household
water insecurity. Taken together, our review of water security for households in high‐income countries
provides a conceptual map to direct critical research in this area for the coming years.
2nc – set col – link wall
2NC cards- links- water infrastructure, resource,

Who gets to “thrive” and who suffers from household water insecurity in the global North? Why do such
conditions arise and persist? What are the impacts and diverse consequences of household water
insecurity? What are the gaps in knowledge and practice? In this article, we present the first major
review of research about household water insecurity in high‐income countries. Most scholarship on
water poverty and insecurity has a geographic focus and theoretical origins in the global South, where
notions of sufficient and secure domestic water are tied to indices of human development (Jepson et al.,
2017; Mehta, 2014). Our goal in this article is to set an intellectual agenda for water insecurity research
in the global North, drawing on a relational approach that places systemic processes that reproduce
water inequalities at the center of inquiry and analysis (Jepson et al., 2017; Loftus, 2015).
We review the field with an initial focus on Canada and the United States, where much of the emerging
scholarship is located and where activist struggles around water—such as in Flint and Standing Rock—
have focused attention on the historical and contemporary relations that produce conditions of water
insecurity. Our intention is not to equate Canada and the United States with all high‐income nations or
settings. Just as the global South cannot be mapped as a stable location or ontology (Roy, 2015), what
we call the “global North” reflects much diversity and difference—not a singular history or experience.
Rather, we use the experience of water insecurity in Canada and the United States as a starting point for
a broader research agenda and as a tactic to provincialize theory within and across North–South lines
(Lawhon, Nilsson, Silver, Ernstson, & Lwasa, 2018; Lawhon & Truelove, 2020; Ranganathan & Balazs,
2015). In this way, we seek to theorize water insecurity as a global condition that exists across
development gradients, and we begin to explore its manifestation in high‐income countries and the
particular relations, drivers, or policies that might be relevant.
What do we mean by a relational approach to water insecurity? Our approach is grounded in efforts to
excavate the social and spatial relations that produce poverty—including conditions of water insecurity
(Deitz & Meehan, 2019; Jepson et al., 2017; Loftus, 2015; Sultana, 2012, 2018; Wutich, 2020). This
approach insists that household water insecurity is a product of structural and institutionalized power;
manifests unevenly through space and time; and is reproduced in places we tend to assume are the
most affluent and water‐secure in the world. In the sections that follow, our review challenges six
common narratives (or “myths”) about household water in Canada and the United States. We first turn
to “modern water” and the modern infrastructural ideal: a highly influential set of ideas that have
informed water governance and infrastructure development over the past two centuries.
2 MODERN WATER
The notion that household water is universal and secure in high‐income countries is a product of what
Linton (2010) calls “modern water”: a set of ideas, discourses, and practices associated with scientific
and Western models of water management. When water is abstracted and modern, it is imagined as
uniform. The modern water ideal has dominated how many societies conceptualize infrastructure
networks and water services, with these essential services viewed as uniformly delivered to everyone
with similar quality and cost, across cities, and regions (Graham & Marvin, 2001). Modern water also
exemplifies political ideals of liberal models of governance and citizenship that underpin designs and
universal prescriptions of infrastructure development (Furlong, 2014; Lawhon et al., 2018). Indeed, the
ideas of liberal democracy emerged in tandem with the development of infrastructure networks
(Agostoni, 2003), and democracy was, in many places, viscerally symbolized by the water and sewer grid
(Banister & Widdifield, 2014).
Scholars have criticized modern water and its logic of universality . The abstraction of water as the
substance H2O, circulating in the hydrologic cycle, masks the socio‐cultural and political relations to
water forged through interactions among water users infused with power differences and cultural
politics (Boelens, 2013; Linton, 2010; Linton & Budds, 2014). Stripped of its social meaning and
contextual specificity, water in the modern form is rendered as a resource available for human
consumption and use that can be known and managed or manipulated by humans (Linton, 2010;
Strang, 2004). In following an anthropocentric assumption that “nature” exists solely for human use,
the separation of water from its social context is considered at the root of contemporary water crises
(Schmidt & Shrubsole, 2013).
Modern water continues to underpin the design and policy prescriptions of water and infrastructure
across the global North and South (Furlong, 2014; Lawhon et al., 2018). We suggest, in the following
sections, that modern water has also given rise to a set of collective beliefs—what we call myths—
about “secure” household water in sites such as Canada and the United States. While the following set
of myths may not fully describe people's beliefs or realities, our collected evidence from the literature
reveals they are deeply hegemonic in nature . In other words, water myths in the global North are
rooted in the experiences of people in power—the most well‐off and watered households in society.
And these water myths rarely hold as universal experiences or empirical truths among Indigenous
peoples, racialized groups, the poor, and other historically marginalized groups.
3 EXPOSING SIX MYTHS OF HOUSEHOLD WATER INSECURITY
Governance link
3.5 Myth 5: Water is uniformly governed

In contrast to the modern ideal of “uniform” water infrastructure, delivery, and service, emerging
research in the North points to institutional fragmentation in the water sector, leading to regulatory and
coverage gaps, sectoral failures, and institutional erasures that perpetuate inequality and household
water insecurity. Fragmentation occurs when “responsibility for water governance is allocated amongst
multiple actors and/or agencies with relatively little or no coordination and no clarity about how final
decisions are made” (Bakker & Cook, 2011, p. 280). While water governance for domestic use operates
differently across high‐income countries, with varying levels of centralized or decentralized authority,
decision‐making, and regulatory power, the experience in the United States and Canada reveals
fragmentation in the current political and physical organization of water, with the result of
(dis)advantaging different social groups (Arsenault, Diver, McGregor, Witham, & Bourassa, 2018; Bakker
& Cook, 2011; Bereskie, Delpla, Rodriguez, & Sadiq, 2018; Boyd, 2012; Hughes & Mullin, 2016; Kim,
Keane, & Bernard, 2015; McGregor, 2014; Mullin, 2009; Pannu, 2012; Pierce & Gonzalez, 2017).
In Canada and the United States, fragmentation may occur in terms of (a) laws and regulations, (b)
sectoral responsibilities, and (c) infrastructure provision. For example, laws differently govern
groundwater and surface water, source water quality, drinking water quality, and between point and
non‐point source pollution. Both water and regulatory enforcement are further fragmented across these
different water types and across jurisdictional hierarchies of international, federal, state, and local
governments. Most residents in the United States (87%) receive water from a water system owned and
operated by their city, investor‐owned utility, or a mutual water company, for example (Dieter and
Maupin, 2017). Water systems have differential capacities to comply with the variety of regulations.,
and there is no clear consensus around whether public or private system ownership yields fewer health‐
based water quality violations (Allaire et al., 2018; Beecher, 2013; Kirchhoff, Flagg, Zhuang, &
Utemuratov, 2019; Konisky & Teodoro, 2016).
Many of these studies caveat system performance by size. Structural disadvantage has created
situations where smaller systems are not well supported in terms of financial, managerial, or technical
capacity , thus impairing their ability to deliver sufficient and safe water and undermining trust of their
customers (McFarlane & Harris, 2018; Scott, Moldogaziev, & Greer, 2018; Switzer & Teodoro, 2017;
Switzer, Teodoro, & Karasik, 2016). For people without access to centralized water provision (13% of the
U.S. population), households self‐supply from a domestic well or from an unregulated small system. This
landscape of local water governance fragmentation may allow for local self‐determination and
autonomy; yet it may also (re)produce uneven power relations among users (Arsenault, Bourassa, Diver,
McGregor, & Witham, 2019; Harris, 2004). As such, positions of power can be exploited precisely
because of the ways that fragmentation privilege certain groups and makes invisible others.
Fragmentation in water governance provides opportunities for elites to take advantage of how water
decisions are made. Urban and rural communities were mapped out water system services through
restrictive racial covenants and redlining policies (Anderson, 2007; MacKillop & Boudreau, 2008; Pierce,
Lai, & DeShazo, 2019). Cities and local water districts in California's Central Valley, governed by land‐
owning political elites, have for decades avoided extending water services to low‐income and
unincorporated communities (Pannu, 2012) and continue to fail to include them in newly formed
groundwater agencies (Dobbin & Lubell, 2019). Local political elites continue to make development
decisions to facilitate a certain kind of segregated, landscape and thus deprived other residents’ access
to resources and services otherwise available. Furthermore, the fragmentation of water supply
systems renders invisible these unequal power relationships .
Universal access link

3.1 Myth 1: Water access is universal
Many global development reports concerning goals of “water and sanitation for all” present a rosy view
of water access in high‐income countries. For example, the Joint Monitoring Program (JMP), which
oversees global progress toward the Sustainable Development Goal targets, reports that 99% of the U.S.
population has “safely managed” access to drinking water that is “free from contamination.” Some high‐
income countries, such as England and Poland, report 100% universal water access (UN‐WHO Joint
Monitoring Programme, 2020).
Recent research suggests that household water access is far from universal in high‐income countries. In
the United States, for example, a total of 471,000 households (±5,600) or 1.1 million people lacked
piped water access between 2013 and 2017, with the majority (73%) of households located in
metropolitan areas and nearly half (47%) in the 50 largest urban areas (Meehan et al., 2020). Rural areas
also face risks associated with water access: the JMP (2020) reports that roughly 10% of the U.S.
population reliant on domestic wells have safely managed water, studies from across the country—
including Virginia, Wisconsin, and California—show that households reliant on wells are prone to chronic
shortage risks (Pauloo et al., 2020) and multi‐faceted contamination concerns (Knobeloch, Gorski,
Christenson, & Anderson, 2013; MacDonald Gibson & Pieper, 2017; Pieper, Krometis, Gallagher,
Benham, & Edwards, 2015). Comparatively, the literature on insecure access is more limited in Europe,
but similar access trends are found in Nordic countries (Gunnarsdottir, Persson, Andradottir, &
Gardarsson, 2017), Lithuania and Estonia (Orru & Rothstein, 2015), and France (WWAP, 2019).
What creates gaps in universal water access in high‐income countries? To date, research in Canada and
the United States identifies at least four factors. First, the ability to access piped water is linked to the
geography and scale of drinking water systems. Mismatched utility districts, municipal boundaries, and
water service inclusion decisions can result in exclusion from the network (Pierce, Gonzalez,
Roquemore, & Ferdman, 2019). Across North America and Europe, smaller systems tend to fail in
providing universal water access more often than larger systems (McFarlane & Harris, 2018; Orru &
Rothstein, 2015). In North Carolina, for example, the process of “underbounding” community water
service districts is a legacy of racial segregationist policies that excluded African American communities
from secure piped water and sewerage (Leker & MacDonald Gibson, 2018; MacDonald Gibson, DeFelice,
Sebastian, & Leker, 2014).
Second, the literature indicates that insecure water access is produced by racialized wealth gaps that
are expressed through the unequal geographies of housing —what Meehan et al (2020) call the
housing‐water nexus. Precarious housing is a significant driver. In the United States, residents of mobile
homes and trailer parks have consistently worse water service in terms of connection, reliability, and
quality (Deitz & Meehan, 2019; Pierce & Jimenez, 2015). Gaps in access can be the result of parks' spatial
and administrative marginalization through zoning decisions, which leaves them served by small, self‐
managed water systems (Pierce, Gabbe, & Gonzalez, 2018). Owners and managers of mobile home
parks also play a mediating role by neglecting infrastructure maintenance or bill payment (Pierce &
Gonzalez, 2017). Water access is even more insecure for people living without stable or conventional
housing—a population estimated at over 1 million people in Europe and the United States combined
(Fazel, Geddes, & Kushel, 2014). Such groups include people experiencing a spectrum of homelessness
(DeMyers, Warpinski, & Wutich, 2017; Hale, 2019; Speer, 2016) as well as migrant, Irish Traveler, and
Roma communities living in informal settlements (Davis & Ryan, 2017; Filčák, Szilvasi, & Škobla, 2018;
Hout & Staniewicz, 2012). Across these cases, water access disparities are produced at the fragmented
juncture of housing policy, water management, and entrenched social inequality (Meehan et al., 2020).
Third, differential access is linked to the status of citizenship and belonging. Hydraulic citizenship,
defined by Anand (2017, 18) as the ability of residents to be recognized by water agencies through
legitimate water service. For example, in the South Texas region, limited access to (safe) water
infrastructure has been traced to specific political dynamics in the 1970s that denied residents living in
disadvantaged Hispanic unincorporated communities (called colonias) the right to vote in elections for
their own regional water governance institutions, a legacy of the Jim Crow era and agro‐industrial
interests (Jepson, 2012). Such early instances of network exclusion—both political and geographic—
established a path of water insecurity in which communities and households found themselves in
subsequent decades (Vandewalle & Jepson, 2015). In some areas, foreign‐born U.S. residents continue
to depend on water trucks, stores, and vending machines, despite recent local improvements in water
and sanitation services (Jepson & Brown, 2014; Pierce, Gonzalez, et al., 2019). A recent study revealed
the odds of being water insecure were 4.2 times more likely for “mixed status” households as compared
to households with members who were all documented (Jepson & Vandewalle, 2016). Taken together,
flows of water to and through households follow patterns that reflect political marginality, despite the
promise of universal access and water security.
Fourth, disparities in water access reflect institutionalized structures of marginalization that are
unevenly expressed through space and place. Indigenous communities have disproportionately higher
levels of water insecurity as compared to non‐Indigenous populations (Deitz & Meehan, 2019;
Hanrahan, 2017; McGregor, 2014; Mitchell, 2019; Patrick, Grant, & Bharadwaj, 2019; Sarkar, Hanrahan,
& Hudson, 2015; Walters, Spence, Kuikman, & Singh, 2012; Winnipeg, 2016). In Canada, the
displacement and forced relocation of Indigenous peoples to reserves were accompanied by a lack of
planning for infrastructure development or policy frameworks to ensure universal water and sanitation
(Hanrahan, 2017; White, Murphy, & Spence, 2012). Today, provincial and territorial regulations that
govern safe drinking water do not extend to First Nations reserves. In its place, a segregated system of
governance—often involving unclear and fragmented responsibilities among the federal government
and provincial/territorial governments with First Nations—perpetuates the divide between Indigenous
and non‐Indigenous peoples (Daigle, 2018; Hanrahan, 2017; Phare, 2009; Wilson, Harris, Joseph‐Rear,
Beaumont, & Satterfield, 2019). Gaps in water provision and access are not simply a case of
“technical” issues or network failures, but the product of a system of racialized dispossession,
colonialism, and property rights, often through and at the hands of the state (Curley, 2019).
Clean water link- they’ll say they solve but the decisions to determine what is and isn’t
clean water are anti-Indigenous
3.2 Myth 2: Water is clean
In high‐income countries, there is a pervasive view that water is clean enough to drink straight from the
tap. Such beliefs reflect nearly two centuries of engineering expertise, treatment technologies, public
policies, and regulatory oversight to improve and protect water quality (Melosi, 2011). Evidence
suggests that many people in high‐income countries believe their tap water is generally clean (Ragusa &
Crampton, 2016; Watson, 2006), even when it comes from recycled sources and reclaimed effluent
(Garcia‐Cuerva, Berglund, & Binder, 2016; Ishii, Boyer, Cornwell, & Via, 2015; Marks, Martin, &
Zadoroznyj, 2008; Ormerod & Scott, 2013).
Despite high levels of public confidence in water quality, there are at least three emerging areas of
concern with respect to “clean” water. First, aging water infrastructure increasingly fails to provide the
kind of clean water people have come to expect (Allaire, Wu, & Lall, 2018; Grigg, 2019; Kenney et al.,
2019). For example, the 1993 outbreak of Cryptosporidium in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin public water
supply (the largest waterborne disease outbreak in U.S. history that sickened over 400,000 people and
killed over 100) was caused by contamination of a 1962‐era water purification plant that was unable to
provide adequate disinfection (MacKenzie et al., 1994). Moreover, contaminants of emerging concern
present novel challenges to clean drinking water. New classes of toxicants, including pharmaceuticals
and endocrine‐disrupting chemicals, are not federally monitored or regulated in the United States.
Examples include atrazine (a pesticide), perchlorate (a component of rocket fuel and explosives), and
per‐and polyfluorinated substances (Domingo & Nadal, 2019).
Second, a growing body of research documents on how water contamination has less to do with
identifiable technological failures and more to do with the social and institutional dynamics of
marginalization . In these cases, communities may suffer from direct exposure to unclean drinking water
(MacDonald Gibson et al., 2014; Stillo & MacDonald Gibson, 2017) or are forced into reliance on unsafe
and hazardous sources, as a result of longstanding systems of institutionalized inequality (Balazs & Ray,
2014; DeMyers et al., 2017). For example, among First Nations communities in Canada, the widespread
problem of tainted water is embedded in ongoing colonial practices of the state that most often do not
take into account Indigenous knowledge, cultural identity, or governance practices (Baijius & Patrick,
2019; Mascarenhas, 2007; Patrick, 2011; Smith, Guest, Svrcek, & Farahbakhsh, 2006; Wilson, 2014).
The Flint, Michigan water crisis deserves special mention here. Starting in 2014, lead leached from pipes
in the Flint drinking water systems, exposing an estimated 98,000 residents to elevated levels of lead,
Escherichia coli, and Legionella bacteria (Butler, Scammell, & Benson, 2016; Pauli, 2020). In brief, failure
to treat the water properly, given the piping system and age of infrastructure, led to a variety of
problems with water quality and public health (Pauli, 2020). As Pulido, Kohl, and Cotton (2016) argues,
the decisions leading to contaminated drinking water were set in motion by austerity measures cast by
an underfinanced and debt‐leveraged municipal government, in which water provision to low‐income
and racialized communities of Flint was explicitly devalued and subordinated to the goals of fiscal
solvency. In this way, the Flint water quality crisis is understood as an extension of a history of
deindustrialization, racialized dispossession, and racial segregation between the city and its suburbs
(Clark, 2018). Ranganathan (2016, p. 19) describes this process as racial liberalism's “illiberal legacies”
with consequences that continue to shape how clean water is understood and provisioned.
A third area of concern has to do with differential understandings of clean water and risk . Water
utilities, for instance, apply a techno‐scientific approach to meeting regulatory standards and risk; risk is
understood and regulated as a phenomenon that can be identified and measured empirically. In this
view, water experts assess, measure, and calculate risk as a probability that can then be used to inform
decision making for mitigating adverse impacts (Checker, 2007). In contrast, the understanding of risk by
the general population is less related to probabilistic scenarios, which is devalued because it is not based
on “objective” science. For example, First Nations in Canada and Indigenous peoples elsewhere
continued use of untreated traditional water sources is often assessed as “unsafe” by Western colonial
standards but more holistic assessments of risk or safety explain the role of relationships to water as a
“living entity” and settler‐colonial histories as they inform needs for spiritual and cultural well‐being and
broader distrust in water treatment (e.g., chlorination and its effects on physical health and the spirit of
water itself (Eichelberger, 2016; Goldhar, Bell, & Wolf, 2013; Wilson et al., 2019). In some cases, water
may be perceived as “unclean” but not necessarily unsafe per existing regulations, leading to mistrust in
tap water (Parag & Roberts, 2009; Pierce, Gonzalez, et al., 2019). In this way, different notions of risk
further exacerbate tensions between how regulatory science and communities begin to define clean
and safe water .
2nc – set-col – alt solvency
Alt solves
5 CONCLUSION
For well over a century, the modernist legacies of engineering expertise, infrastructure coverage,
advanced treatment technologies, public policies, and regulatory oversight have produced particular
logics and landscapes of household water provision in high‐income countries. Universal water access,
quality, and affordability—or the ideal that everyone in society has access to the same quality and
quantity of water—were predicated on uniform water delivery governed by trusted scientific and
regulatory regimes. Or so was the promise.
Returning to our initial question: who gets to thrive and who suffers from household water insecurity in
the global North? This article has consolidated evidence that brings modernist narratives into question.
Myths are more than a collection of misleading statistics or gaps in understanding: as shared beliefs,
myths create and sustain norms and perceptions of secure water, including whose water experiences
are deemed hegemonic or universal, and whose experiences are made invisible. As we document here,
people who do not have secure water rarely get the necessary attention or support. In the example of
Detroit, the longstanding problem of water affordability and shutoffs did not gain international media
attention until the Covid‐19 pandemic struck. In Canada and the United States, household water
insecurity is a product of structural and institutionalized power that favors elites at the expense of
largely poor and racialized communities—a systemic and relational problem that demands more than
simple technical responses . In busting these myths, we bring overdue attention to the fissures and
silences in these dominant narratives.
More work remains. In moving forward, the five thematic areas of future research all pivot on challenges
embedded in legal and regulatory regimes, the housing‐water nexus, water affordability, and new and
emerging contaminants. We need to fill data gaps and develop metrics that can more precisely
document affordability, as it likely plays an outsized role in perpetuating water shutoffs and insecurity,
especially in the United States. A range of research methods are needed take stock of water access,
insecurity, and disconnection at the household scale (Wutich et al., 2017).
Our review demonstrates the ideal of modern water is central to development myths that may hide
long‐standing social and spatial inequities. We have consolidated a wide body of research that identifies
trends in household water insecurity across high‐income countries, starting with Canada and the United
States. Uniform water systems have never been universal and accessible to all households, due to long
histories of racial segregation cut through by experiences of poverty, housing precarity, and systematic
exclusion. Fragmented and technocratic water governance further contributes to patterns of
disconnection and distrust. Taken together, emerging scholarship on water security for households in
high‐income countries demonstrates that water may have never been modern.
**securitization
1nc – securitization
“Water wars” rhetoric securitizes water and hurts cooperation

Harrington 14 (Cameron, 2014 NRF Global Change Postdoctoral Fellow in the Global Risk Governance
Program at the University of Cape Town, where he researches conflict and cooperation along vulnerable
river catchments. He received his PhD in Political Science from Western University in London, Canada.
April 15. "Water Wars? Think Again: Conflict Over Freshwater Structural Rather Than Strategic"
https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2014/04/water-wars/)
The global water wars are almost upon us!
At least that’s how it seems to many. The signs are troubling: Egypt and Ethiopia have recently increased
their aggressive posture and rhetoric over the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in
the headwaters of the Blue Nile, Egypt’s major artery since antiquity. India continues to build new dams
that are seen by its rival Pakistan as a threat to its “water interests” and thus its national security.
Turkey, from its dominant position upstream, has been diverting the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and
increasing water stress in the already-volatile states of Iraq and Syria.
States rarely, if ever, fight over water; in fact, the opposite is true.
It has been claimed for decades that a confluence of factors, including water scarcity, societal unrest,
and strategic maneuvering, will inevitably push states and other actors to act aggressively, perhaps even
violently, to secure precious water resources. So are we finally witnessing the first flashes of the coming
age of water wars?
To put it simply: no.
These visions of future water wars miss one very important point: States rarely, if ever, fight over water;
in fact, the opposite is true. Cooperation over transboundary water resources is much more common,
even in the most sensitive geopolitical hotspots. In other words, the way many understand water
conflict is fundamentally misguided and risks being a largely diversionary exercise that obscures other,
non-military types of water problems occurring every day around the world.
Focusing on War a Distraction
While traditional organized warfare over water is essentially non-existent in the historical record, water
insecurity is pervasive. From time to time this insecurity manifests itself in violent ways, but far more
common is the day-to-day injustice endured by hundreds of millions from fundamentally inadequate
water supplies and sanitation, a result of political, economic, and social failings . Water is the lifeblood of
human societies. It sustains and nurtures our ability to lead full lives. When water supplies are diverted,
polluted, blocked, or overdrawn, it directly impacts the possibilities of human life. That is the real story
of water insecurity.
Aaron Wolf on updating ‘Basins at Risk,’ transboundary water conflict and cooperation
This does not mean military- or strategically-minded interpretations of water security are unimportant.
It should make news when Egypt threatens “escalatory steps” if Ethiopia continues to build the
Renaissance Dam. But we should still question the fascination with so-called “water wars.” It may be a
tempting story to tell because it plays upon our deepest, most human insecurities, and despite its
tenuous links to reality, it feels all-too-real in the face of the harrowing climate predictions we hear
today. Maybe the alliteration just sounds good.
The effects, though, can be dangerous. Our fear of, and obsession with, water wars diverts our attention
and decreases our awareness of the very daunting and very immediate problems of freshwater
resources. According to the latest measurements, 768 million people do not use an improved source of
drinking water, and 2.5 billion lack access to improved sanitation. It is safe to say that these problems
will not be solved in the war rooms of generals or on the computers of security analysts.
It should make news when Egypt threatens “escalatory steps” if Ethiopia continues to build the
Renaissance Dam
One telling example of the complexity of water problems comes from the theme of this year’s World
Water Day, celebrated on March 22: water and energy. Thousands of individuals, organizations, and
governments used the opportunity to raise awareness and advocate for better policy that takes stock of
the interconnections between water and energy consumption. According to the OECD’s International
Energy Association, global energy needs are set to increase by 33 percent by 2035, with China requiring
65 percent more water in order to meet the demands of its industrial and energy sectors. All told, 15
percent of the world’s total freshwater withdrawal is used for energy production. Given the increasing
energy needs of developing countries, the impact this growing demand will have on already-strained
water resources is likely to be significant. Rather than war, however, the main problems are much more
likely to be significant ecological degradation and adverse impacts on human health and well-being.
Build Resilience Through Collaboration
Rather than finding new “hotspots” where water wars will break out, it better serves us to focus on ways
to build resilience and adaptation. The water-energy nexus is but one aspect of the multi-faceted global
challenges to securing sustainable water resources, yet it can tell us much more about water security
than the water wars thesis ever could.
One of the principal ways to build resilience and adaption is to forge partnerships among various groups
and interested actors. Not only does it promote responsible water management, it also leads to
interactions that highlight the shared risks communities face from degraded water quality and
diminishing water quantity.
Far more prevalent is daily structural violence and injustice
An innovative strategy being pursued in countries as diverse as Canada, India, and South Africa is to
include “ecological infrastructure” in larger national investments in a country’s built infrastructure.
Ecological infrastructure is a concept that views healthy ecosystems as drivers of economic and social
well-being, in ways no less important than roads, railways, and ports. Viable ecosystems provide crucial
services like fresh water, soil formation, disaster risk reduction, climate regulation, as well as cultural
and recreational outlets. When properly managed they can provide high levels of economic and social
development.
Promoting ecological infrastructure will require a collaborative effort from a variety of stakeholders –
farmers, banks, municipalities, etc. – to promote the shared value of sustainably managing water
resources and the shared risk of inaction. It is this type of thinking that is needed to build resilient
societies that can promote human and environmental security, not the incessant doomsday
prophesizing that is characteristic of so much of the water wars literature.
While the world faces multiple water crises of varying levels of severity, the prospects for all-out war are
slim. Far more prevalent is the daily structural violence and injustice related to underdevelopment,
poverty, and environmental degradation, which is itself a symptom of water insecurity. We should focus
less on the specter of armed conflict and instead channel our efforts towards building environmentally
and socially resilient societies.
**capitalism
1nc – capitalism
Cap k
Ahlers & Merme 16 (Rhodante, specialises in interdisciplinary research into social, ecological and technological interactions that
produce uneven and contested landscapes, and that reveal potential pressure points for achieving social and environmental justice. Her current
work at SOMO focuses on energy and infrastructure development, and how these are financed. Before joining SOMO, Rhodante served as a
senior lecturer in Water Governance and Politics at UNESCO-IHE in the Netherlands. She has also worked as researcher at the International
Water Management Institute in Sri Lanka and Mexico, and in Cambodia for a consortium of NGOs. Her latest publications concern the political
ecology of large-scale hydropower development and the financialisation of water infrastructure. Rhodante has also published widely on the
subject of water governance and gender. Rhodante holds a PhD in International Planning from Cornell University and an MSc in Irrigation
Engineering from Wageningen University. Vincent, International Research Consultant, Global Water Operators' Partnerships Alliance/UN-
Habitat (GWOPA). Degree in Engineering, Energy and Environmental Industry, EIGSI La Rochelle, ecole d'ingenieurs generalistes. Masters of
Science, Environment Resource Management, VU University Amsterdam. "Financialization, water governance, and uneven development"
WIREs Water)
In the 1990s, neoliberal reforms of the water sector translated into water policy focused on the
integrated planning of water resource management at basin level with emphasis on institutional
solutions. Along with the call for stakeholder participation and decentralization of decision-making, the
reform introduced a policy agenda that was replicated globally based on the economic value of water
and the primacy of individual water rights, divorced from land and given private property characteristics,
in order to enable commercialization and privatization. More recently, the discourse has moved to focus
on water security to include dealing with uncertainties and risks regarding climate change, competing
demands for water, urbanization, food production, flood protection, and energy generation, amongst
others. The flexibility of the term renders it somewhat useless: ‘there are as many interpretation of
“water security” as interests in the global water community.’ 46 Simultaneously, the emphasis on risk
and scarcity attracts the financial sector. The focus has shifted back to large infrastructural
interventions as necessary solutions, which subsequently require huge financial investments to be
realized . The water security discourse is accompanied by a ‘ financial gap’ discourse that Bayliss aptly
points out has effectively reframed access to water from a development issue to a financial issue .7
Even though the emphasis is not on institutional reform concerning rights, laws, or decision-making fora,
for these objects to be ‘fit’ for finance by private capital, substantial institutional reform is needed.
Much reform has already taken place to deregulate the energy sector and national markets. Recently,
the notion of water financing facility is being developed and strongly advocated for by the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attract venture capital, private equity, and institutional investors by
creating bankable projects implemented by water utilities. This involves developing appropriate permits,
grants, and bonds that are then backed by donor guarantees.
That large infrastructure will deliver the promise of water security is far from evident given the mixed
results of such projects in the past and the uncertainties of the future. Controlling the planning and
outcome of such projects is challenged by the resistance of complex social-ecological landscapes to
predictability. This clearly merits more attention but is not the focus of this paper. Our concern here is
that such large infrastructure is financed by intermediaries without connection to, or expertise in, the
inherent complexity that is characteristic of the water sector and the landscapes it intends to reorder;
this includes competing demands for water (multiple uses and users), basic needs for livelihood
securities, and public health; ecosystem integrity; and transboundary challenges. Moreover, the huge
investment for such infrastructure provided by private equity carries implication not only for the
increase in public debt but also for the shift in decision-making processes toward shareholder interest.
The difficulty to harness processes of financialization, due to its specific characteristics of fragmentation,
speed and opacity, into a regulatory regime implies its deeply undemocratic tendencies.47 We develop
this argument by the implications of lack of transparency, regulatory deficit, and uneven development
on public accountability and social and environmental justice.
Public Accountability Agile financial flows that involve different kinds of investors and diverse and
complex instruments obstruct a clear and comprehensive picture of the full process for decision makers
within the water sector, for civil society, or politicians,9,35 making corrective policy and regulation
difficult. Furthermore, private sector investments have no legal obligation to disclose the content of
contracts. Although the effects of financing large infrastructure strongly reorder public space, the public
has little recourse to demand full disclosure of such operations (e.g., rights allocation, financial schemes,
operational decisions, ecosystem impacts, compensation mechanisms, etc.).f Public-Private Partnership
constructions are still popular with multilateral and bilateral funding agencies as well as policymakers,
but while they may give the impression of public interest, it remains unclear to what extent the
protection of the public is sufficiently safeguarded by private companies and financial agencies that are
not hindered by concerns of public legitimacy, and by public agencies that facilitate rather than
normatively regulate this process.
Attracting investors to fill ‘financial gaps’ implies not only an increase in public debt but also a particular
production of space, especially with large infrastructural projects that have huge spatial and long
temporal scales of impact. The limited transparency and accountability hinder democratic processes of
decision-making and make it arduous to effectively steer this process in a direction that is not primarily
profit-oriented. Investments in projects come from different sources seeking different returns.
Hildyard48 provides a clear general overview of how, for example; pension funds may seek a long-term
investment with a stable return, while venture capital seeks a shorter-term investment with high risk
and high return. Banks and private equity funds provide loans that can be repackaged and subsequently
traded. The project itself can be sold when it is up and running. Merme et al.23 provide insight on how
this works for a dam project in the Mekong, while Loftus and March24 do the same for a desalination
plant in London. Because the timeline of the returns of the various financial products are not
necessarily, and in the majority of cases not at all, congruent with the returns of the infrastructure when
completed, it is of less concern to investors what the eventual productivity or purpose is of the
infrastructure. Or as Loftus and March show, ‘A desalination plant has been constructed, the primary
objective of which seems to be to capture inflation protected returns for a range of institutional
investors. Whether or not the desalination plant produces any water for London’s residents seems far
less relevant to the plant’s existence; indeed Thames Water have guaranteed that it will only be used in
drought conditions. A more profound motivation seems to be the need for new infrastructural forms
within which to ensure speculative gains.’ 49
In the words of Lapavitsas,14 the result of investment is then ‘profiting without producing,’ and the
result of the intervention (e.g., investment in hydropower dam, water utility, or desalination plant) is
what Hildyard50 argues is ‘the development of finance, rather than financing development.’ Efforts that
introduce environmental and social safeguards (e.g., Equator Principles) or sustainable finance
frameworks (as promoted by the International Hydropower Association or International Financial
Corporation) are voluntary and have proven to be easily bypassed as the capacity or willingness for
technical and legal enforcement is not necessarily available.21,51,52
Social and Environmental Justice Remarkably, development paths are still presented as linear and
predictable. Resources are framed as idle (e.g., water flowing to the sea) and subsequently alienated
from their users (fishery, agriculture, flora, fauna, and other ecosystem demands) for the purpose of a
singular definition of development focused primarily on economic growth. Such a discourse
opportunistically negates lessons learned from the past where infrastructure development to control
resources has produced mixed results and consistent contestation. As the benefits of these projects are
openly celebrated (drinking water provision, irrigation schemes, flood protection, and energy
production), the costs can no longer be ignored. Overspending appears to be an integral part of these
projects due to budget overruns resulting from overly optimistic benefit projections,53,54 while the
environmental, social, and immaterial costs have been grossly underestimated.55 The impressive
underperformance and unaccounted for negative externalities of mega-projects is also due to the
unpredictability of the landscape and the resistance of ecosystems to being programmed and made to
behave in consistent patterns (e.g., river basin closure, flash floods, or landslides resulting from large
dam building).
Financialization of space (whether urbanized or less accessible or populated landscapes) is geared to the
undermining of the commons, whether this concerns public space, utilities, or collectively held and
managed resources.21,23,49 The financial interests, in tandem with the scale of the infrastructural
intervention in the landscape, result in a centralization and concentration of property rights and
decision-making power over ecosystem interventions and resources such as water. In the case of dam
development, but easily extrapolated to other large infrastructural works in the water sector, Ahlers et
al. (2016) identify three reasons for concern. First, financial interests do not necessarily or easily align
with the priorities of food security, access to water, or ecosystem integrity. Second, decision-making
institutions that govern the building of the dam and their subsequent impacts are disconnected both in
time and space. Third, when private investment is supplemented with public finance, so-called blending,
the public budget is hitched onto private sector concerns of profit maximization, thus ‘shifting public
agency interest from public concerns to private gains.’ 56 High risks can translate into high returns, but
just as easily into disaster, especially with large infrastructure such as dams, basic services infrastructure
such as drinking water networks, or safety structures for flood control or waste water treatment. The
public carries this risk and ends up paying for it.
In sum, seeking water security with large infrastructural interventions financed by finance companies
carries the danger that risk and return criteria increasingly determine development trajectories. The
investors, and in particular their intermediaries, have little interest in, are not spatially divorced from,
nor have any mandate to safeguard social and environmental sustainability. The short-term reality of
returns is highly discordant with the huge temporal and spatial scale of the impacts the investment
projects produce.
CONCLUSION Contemporary calls for investment in large-scale infrastructure in the water sector have
ushered in a new era of seducing private sector investment. Distinct from the previous round of
privatization, today’s policies revolve around private finance disconnected from the water sector and
well versed in financialization. The process of financialization in the water sector involves a variety of
actors and a wide range of regional and global financial sources trading in tranches of investments
reshaped into diverse financial products. As these webs of nimble financial flows and creative financial
products produce spatial transformations with temporal impacts that outlive their financial interest, the
opaque and fragmented nature of the process obfuscates the very material dispossession of resources
from many for the single purpose of producing outrageous profits for few.
We do not want to give the impression that nonfinancialized development is necessarily more just. We
do argue, however, that financialization render development trajectories even less democratic. In
particular with regard to the water sector, we question the ability of the sector to fully understand
processes of financialization and subsequently oversee the consequences.
Given the nature and scale of financialization, and its insidious permeation in everyday life Lohman
argues that ‘no regulation or “reprogramming” of the usual institutions will have any practical effect—
even one of so-called “damage control”—if it does not form part of a broader decommodification
campaign.’ 57 This demands a counter representation of the landscape as a collective and shared
responsibility and where the focus of financial gain is replaced with social and environmental justice.
Such a strategy may well lie in what Lefebvre20 argues is the return of the use value in everyday practice
and reclaiming the commons (autogestion). This would also demand, as Castree58 argues, embracing
and developing a production of knowledge that is truly interdisciplinary so as to fully grasp the
complexity and unpredictability of socio techno nature. In this sense, we question the effectiveness of
the creation and provision of global funds that were discussed at 2015s two main international events
(the United Nations General Assembly in New York on the SDGs and the COP 21 in Paris), unless there is
a structural effort to (1) expose financial flows and its sources so as to reveal the underlying relations
and interests that drive them; (2)demand long-term stable and accountable investments in the
collective management of our landscapes; and (3) democratize decision-making over development
priorities.
To conclude, we identify a set of questions to better capture current financialization processes and their
implications in the water sector. These are not exhaustive by any means but meant to generate more
interest and discussion. We suggest three focal points: (1) financial flows, (2) infrastructure, and (3)
development trajectories.
First, what is precisely the size, origins, and destinations of contemporary financial flows channeled to
water-related infrastructures? To what extent are these flows disjoint and spatially disconnected from
material investments? What are the social and policy patterns underpinning these flows? For example,
are particular financial actors interested in particular elements of the water? Or does a particular
element in the water sector draw more interest from investors? What are the returns and what are the
time frames? What is needed to be able to trace, reveal, and make financial investments accountable to
water users?
Second, what are the underlying drivers for the current development paradigm in motivating the current
need for infrastructure? To what extent are (infrastructural) alternatives available, acceptable, and
affordable? What prevents carbon-free, socially, and environmentally just infrastructures?
Third, how can we translate lessons learned from 20th century infrastructural development to current
endeavors? What are the current geopolitical hotspots for the water sector related to infrastructural
development, and to what extent do these align with private investment interests? How do financial
flows (or shareholder value) determine allocation and distribution of water, and what are its
implications for operation and maintenance of infrastructure? Where are the high-risk investments in
the water sector located; who carries the risk, and who bags the returns?
The increasing awareness of the impact of financialization to food security,59 such as the rise in cereals
prices and the consequent hunger riots in 2007-2008, has not prevented the water sector from
embracing similar processes to address water security. Far from enabling the development of healthy
and water-secure social-ecological landscapes, the nature of financialization is in essence a deeply
undemocratic process. As such, we urge the water sector to get up to speed on contemporary financial
dynamics, not by accommodating them but by confronting their highly uneven impact on social-
ecological landscapes and their inherent antidevelopment objective.
More cap cards

Loftus et al 18 (Alex, Dep't of Geography, King's College. Hug March, Estudis d'Economia i Empresa &
Internet Interdisciplinary Institute. Thomas Purcell, School of Social Sciences, Politics and International
Relations, Leeds Beckett University. October. "The political economy of water infrastructure: An
introduction to financialization" WIREs Water)
In a growing number of instances around the world, infrastructure is being reconfigured in ways that
maximize wealth extraction (Hildyard, 2016). In the case of London, for example, the city's water and
sanitation provider has been transformed from a public utility into a private company and now, in its
most recent form, into an investment vehicle for sovereign wealth funds in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and
China. Simultaneously London's water infrastructure now provides a reliable revenue stream for
pensioners in Canada and the UK. Providing infrastructure for actual needs is becoming less relevant
than extracting “value from illiquid assets by turning them into liquid forms” (Pryke & Allen, 2017, p. 2).
Of course, the two need not be incompatible—it could be quite possible for wealth to be extracted from
a project that the city desperately needs (for a more optimistic take on such a process see Castree &
Christophers, 2015)—however, the growing importance of infrastructure's function as a wealth
extraction mechanism emphasizes the significance of a process often referred to as financialization.
Reflecting this significance, the literature on the financialization of water has grown rapidly in recent
years (Ahlers & Merme, 2016; Allen & Pryke, 2013; Bayliss, 2014, 2017; Bresnihan, 2016; Loftus &
March, 2016, 2017; Merme, Ahlers, & Gupta, 2014; Schmidt & Matthews, 2018). Such research builds on
a much larger interest in the changing dynamics of capitalist societies (Harvey, 2010), the role of
infrastructure within those changing dynamics (Graham & Marvin, 2002), and the spiraling profits within
a financial sector that now appear to outstrip the wealth amassed in manufacturing, construction, and
the service economy (Lapavitsas, 2014). Generally associated with the growing power of new financial
actors (Epstein, 2005), financialization is also understood by some to refer to a process in which the
locus of profit making has shifted from the “real” economy to the financial economy (Stockhammer,
2010). In what follows, we will explore what is meant by financialization as well as the ways in which this
process appears to influence the construction, form, and ownership of water infrastructure.
**anti-blackness
1nc – anti-blackness
Water management policies are anti-black- funding decisions are controlled by white
people to fix problems that are a consequence of the historical and material
conditions brought about by segregation
Jackson 18 (Cody, Cody A. Jackson Texas Woman's University Department of English Master's Thesis
Summer 2018. "Water privatization, Environmental racism, and Flint, Michigan: The Body in Pain as
Performative-Material Archive" www.codyjacksonthesis.com/bendtwo.html)
Not only does segregation persist in many forms today, but the
historical and material conditions brought about by
segregation continues to have detrimental effects on communities of color. Tactics such as redlining,
which the U.S. federal government officially states are now “illegal,” not only continues to manifest in
many urban spaces but have made property ownership, economic mobility, and spatial mobility a nearly
impossible task for persons of color living in poverty. Urban design has historically been a mechanism
through which proximity between whites and communities of color is reduced as much as possible; in
other words, whites have historically – either directly or indirectly – participated in and benefited from
the marginalization and reiterative distancing of persons of color from whites. Proximity is less a matter of immediate
exposure in the present and more a historical process whereby populations of racialized “others” are held out “within a distance,” within the gaze of white violence,
just outside the horizon of exposure and contact that is oftentimes necessary for processes of identification and cross-cultural communication to take place. For
example, Flint is a city that provided incentives for corporations such as General Motors (GM) to continue operating within their city limits;
however, after World War II, with the help of federal programs initiated by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA), many
whites were able to physically move from the city of Flint to suburban areas (this is commonly referred to as “white
flight” and persists throughout the U.S. today). This massive white flight movement out of Flint destabilized the city’s tax
revenue, leading to fewer opportunities to improve Flint’s infrastructure. Therefore, the lack of
proximity between many whites and communities of color was not only devastating for Flint’s
infrastructure and continuing survival, but this distancing was the result of government legislation and
entities as well as a lack of corporate oversight .
Universal Objectivity and Neoliberal Hyper-Individualism
As DiAngelo importantly recognizes in her article, “ Individualism erases history and hides the ways in which wealth has been distributed and
accumulated over generations to benefit whites today” (59). According to DiAngelo, individualism enables whites to withdraw
themselves from whiteness as a racialized methodology and categorization ; this withdrawal, this foreclosure of proximity
as briefly elaborated above, is embodied in “…a white person [who] recognizes Whiteness as real, but as the individual problem of other ‘bad’ white people” (59).
An important example of this paradoxical performance of whiteness, wherein whites are simultaneously members of a group and rigid individuals depending upon
particular events in question, can be seen in what Bryan McCann refers to as the “mark of criminality” that systemically marks and stylizes black bodies as
inherently, or intrinsically, capable of or possessing the “will” to commit a crime (TEDx, McCann, 2014). In other words, many whites assign criminality to black
bodies based upon violently and reiteratively constructed stereotypes of blackness that have largely stemmed from interpretations of scientific practice such as
social Darwinismsee Grosz and Haraway.
Michelle Alexander writes in The New Jim Crow, “Race has always influenced the administration of justice in the [U.S.]. […] Biased police practices are also nothing
new, a recurring theme of African American experience since blacks were targeted by the police as suspected runaway slaves” (2010, 187). When confronted with
the violence of whiteness, many whites attribute these historical processes as merely individual acts and events as opposed to critiquing the ways in which
whiteness is a historical process and embodiment. In The New Jim Crow, Alexander emphasizes that racial
segregation continues today in the
form of spatial discrimination; specifically, as Alexander reminds us, during the era of Jim Crow, “Roads literally stopped at the
border of many black neighborhoods, shifting from pavement to dirt. Water, sewer systems, and other
public services that supported the white areas of town frequently did not extend to the black areas” (189-
90). Thus, not only have black people been excluded from electoral and juridical processes (voting and jury
duty), but the material conditions and spatial arrangements of capital and bodies affect the quotidian
survival and livelihoods of persons of color . We must, as rhetorical scholars, question and actively
critique such a contradictory performance of race: whiteness is neither a universal objectivity nor a
radically individualized performance. As DiAngelo notes, “Whites have deep investments in race, for the abstract depends on the
particular…; they need raced others as the backdrop against which they may rise…. Exposing this dichotomy destabilizes white identity” (60). Therefore , in
order for us to recognize whiteness itself as a stabilizing force that guarantees the continuation of
neoliberal violence and racialized capitalistic social models, we must view and expose whiteness from
the inside out as a performative that is malleable across a multitude of various times and spaces.
This “malleability” can be thought and felt through the frameworks provided by new feminist materialisms, which are
largely founded on the malleability and fluidity of both bodies and subjectivities. As such, water can be
thought and felt as a “communicative" materiality (Neimanis 2013, 34), which highlights the importance of going
beyond a simple rhetorical classification of water .
This chapter continues by exploring the paradoxical tension between whiteness as an identity and the
materiality of bodies themselves (as matter). Neoliberal forms of power, especially urban management
policies, which are dominated primarily by whites, work toward rejecting the flow of subjectivities,
clogging the pipes of a free-flowing materiality . A new feminist materialist approach that I will describe here will
hopefully uncover the corporeal resistance that works toward interrogating and disrupting the divisions
between materiality/sociality, nature/culture, and objectivity/subjectivity .

Although it is important to recognize that whiteness is an active mode of individualization with regard to violence and criminality, as I have attempted to do above,
it is also vital to point out the ways in which whiteness and individualism foreclose the possibility of
effective urban management policies that may combat forms of environmental racism and racialized
violence that are still being exerted through Flint’s water pipes, crumbling infrastructure, and the
bodyminds who live in Flint . Neoliberalism is not a colorblind enterprise; to the contrary, it is reiteratively employed through racialized parameters
and racialized bodies. As Terressa A. Benz asserts in “Toxic Cities,”
Race and neoliberalism are mutually constitutive and neoliberal discourse permits the circumvention of any consideration of
institutionalized racism in favor of…individual choice…. This relocation of racial disadvantage to the
private sphere absolves the state of its responsibility to…intervene when racial disparity is apparent …
(2017, 3)
Benz continues by stating that “If neoliberalism is in fact designed to concentrate wealth and power among the economic elite, who are predominantly white, then
the poor and people of color face the brunt of negative fallout from those policies in particular” (4). Therefore,
not only are the conditions in Flint the direct result of neoliberal policies that have funneled huge amounts of
wealth into the pockets of wealthy white men who control companies like GM, but those whose material existence is
threatened on a quotidian basis by these policies are sold forms of “bootstrappism” and to “persist” in
the face of absolute loss and slow death . Perhaps, this is what Lauren Berlant would refer to as a form of
“ cruel optimism .” Not only is the state “absolved” from its responsibility to care for its citizens, but
corporations are absolved from engaging in long-term solutions as well. It must be remembered that both the state, as well as
the vast majority of corporate entities in the U.S., are overwhelmingly owned and operated by white, wealthy men .
Causes ontological death
DiAngelo recognizes that “Because we don’t think complexly about racism , we don’t ask ourselves what safety means from a
position of societal dominance, or the impact on people of color, given our history, for whites to complain about safety when we are merely
talking about racism” (emphasis DiAngelo’s, 61). While I could point to a myriad of examples of white comfort
purported as safety (e.g., gated communities, private schools, charter schools, school “choice,” suggestions of so-called “reverse
racism,” and so on), the example of GM and their switching of water sources in Flint is of particular importance to
our work here .

In 2014, after realizing that the water from the City of Flint’s water source (the Flint River) was corroding the parts on the vehicles in its factory,
GM requested that its water source be moved back to the Detroit River. As Laura Pulido asks, “This should have been a major red flag: If the
water was corrosive to car parts, might it not present a problem to humans and other living beings?” (2017, 4). While
GM was
permitted to move their source of water back to the Detroit River, the residents of Flint were not given
such an opportunity. Furthermore, not only did the residents of Flint not have access (and still do not) to clean, healthy water, but the
City of Flint continued to charge them for the water they could not consume. According to Jacey Fortin with the New York Times,
The city mailed 8,002 letters to residents in an effort to collect about $5.8 million in unpaid bills for water and sewer services. If homeowners
do not pay by May 19, property liens are transferred to tax bills, which begins a process that can end with residents losing their homes unless
they pay their outstanding bills before March 2018. (2017)
Dispossession and water are inextricably linked here . Not only were residents kept in the dark about
the status of their drinking water, but they were at-risk of losing their homes for their inability to pay for
skyrocketing utility bills. This was, and continues to be, a matter of immediate and intergenerational risk
and many reports have suggested that the high amounts of lead in the Flint water supply can cause a host of health-related problemsSee
Laidlaw et al. and Hanna-Attisha et al.. Although this chapter is not an attempt to fully summarize the entirety of this conscious and deliberate
act of violence on the part of state actors (e.g., the State of Michigan), what emerges here is the distinction between
capitalist comfort and material, biopolitical risk .
GM’s relocation of its water supply rests solely on its attempts to maximize profits, for GM has made no systematic effort to approach a
solution to the systemic water mismanagement in Flint. In this instance, the
condition of rusting car parts was valued over
the material condition and lives of the residents of Flint – talk about a prioritization of objects as such !
Not only was the poisoning of Flint’s water supply caused, in part, by industrial contamination, but it was also caused by the
slow deterioration of the city’s infrastructure – which is heavily used by corporations such as GM (founded in Flint in 1908) to
transport materials, build their factories, and expand their enterprises. Seeing how the vast majority of corporations are led by wealthy, white
men, this is not only an issue of class-based violence (as a Marxist analysis would contend) but of racialized
violence that is exerted
at the bodily level of a population (Foucault). Comfort and safety have not only been “confused,” but
consciously entangled by corporate-influenced state actors, overwhelmingly run by wealthy whites
whose material existence rests outside the zone of risk, outside the (conscious) destruction of urban
space and design. As Chelsea Grimmer writes in “Racial Microbiopolitics,”
Residents [of Flint] become signified as the collateral of postindustrial waste to make room for gentrification and business expansion…
racialization in the era of finance happens in part through the privatization of water and its ability to value different populations in capital
precisely because they can be made valueless. (2017, 23)
Here, it is important to read Grimmer’s words carefully through the lens of Astrida Neimanis’s hydro-logics. The word “signified” above
connotes a semiotic process whereby bodies are inscribed with little to no value (I would venture to say little to no ontological value) and
water is the vehicle through which such an ontological death is ensured. Water is quite literally a
material-semiotic mode of power relations. Urban design, and water infrastructure, become
mechanisms through which the bodies of Flint residents become not only “valueless” but as existents
in a perpetual state of near-death. I would suggest it is what Eric Stanley refers to as overkill: in Stanley’s words, “the spectacular
material-semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which
they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing” (2011, 10).
The alternative is to vote neg for black care

With regard to such a “retreat” from “uncomfortable” conversations on race and white privilege, it is
important to recognize three things. First, white students and scholars must recognize that, while they
will not experience these forms of discrimination, they still have an ethical and moral obligation to
implicate themselves as beneficiaries of such a violent and material networked system of power.
Second, for white scholars attempting to work alongside issues of race and racial violence, we must be
willing to recognize the limits of our own fluid subjectivities. As a white male, for instance, I must
recognize that I always-already exist within a privilege positionality and that, by interrogating this
position and subjectivity, I may come to recognize the ways through which my Self is inextricably bound
to the lives and deaths of others. Third, by positioning the body and water as both material and semiotic
material entanglements of power and violence, we may come-to-terms with the forms of violence that
take the body as a vehicle for the continuation of neoliberal policies and (lack of) state government.
Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the ways in which the body, particularly the
bodies in Flint, Michigan, are not only mechanisms for the neoliberal assertion of toxic violence and
intergenerational anti-black discrimination, but are fluid and networked assemblages of resistance . In
other words, the toxic body is not only a site of condemnation but of resistance as well. Our bodies,
as both discursive texts for inscription, and material (trans-corporeal) flows, are deeply enmeshed
within the politics of water management and mismanagement. As bodies of water ourselves, we are
implicated with/in one another in the pursuit of a justice-to-come .
Bodies as Fluid Assemblages of Resistance
In thinking of bodies as both material and semiotic entanglements of and with water bodies, it is
important to focus on the ways in which we cultivate and care for bodies as such. In “Black Care,” Calvin
Warren discusses the ways through which blackness and black existence tests the limits of subjectivity
and being. Warren writes, “Black existence confronts metaphysical violence continually, without the
possibility of political or legal reprieve” (2016, 37). In other words, blackness exists (or, rather, does
not exist at all) outside the realm of political regulation and legal parameters. For Warren, “Black
Care” is an affective and non-discursive mode of communicative expression – a similar articulation as
Neimanis’s discussion on water bodies , meaning that blackness, as an affective exchange of being and
non-being, “is just as expansive as it is deep…” (38). According to Warren, “Affect is an invaluable
resource for those enduring a metaphysical holocaust” and “As a ‘primary narrative,’ the flesh is the
metaphysical target of violence. The flesh, then, is the structure of black existence, an ontological
grounding of sorts, which anti-blackness incessantly targets” (38-39). Therefore, while this project is
loosely grounded in an ethics of care, this chapter takes Warren’s “Black Care” as its shaky foundation.
In other words, as Warren writes, “Black care is an essential practice of attentiveness…. [It is a] non-
sense communication [that] does not have to manifest itself in language…but it must be
communicated…This sharing, this sending forth, is a strategy of endurance; and enduring anti-blackness
requires, above all, the operations of black care” (46-47).
Warren’s work reminds us of the paradox at the heart of this project: fluid subjectivity. It is difficult to
communicate the limits of one’s own subjective-becoming, but we must, as water itself, endure the flux
and oft-untraceable movements of power and violence. This, as Warren suggests, as I hope to have
made clear by now, is an essential tenet of care ethics.
2nc – alt solvency
Aff is anti-black- it’s a form of biopolitical control that renders resistance to whiteness
impossible- the alt interrogates whiteness and generates resistance necessary for
survival
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways through which watery hydro-logics, as theorized by
Astrida Neimanis, may be used as a methodology for thinking and feeling our way through the
toxification and poisoning of water supplies in Flint, Michigan. Neimanis writes that water is a “material
medium of communication (emphasis hers, 31). Through water’s circulatory and rhythmic dance (e.g.,
jet streams, the Great Ocean Conveyor Belt), “This circulation inaugurates us into complex relations of
gift, theft, and debt with all other life” (31). Thinking and feeling alongside water as a communicative
materiality forces us to reconsider the rhetorical capacity of water : water is a communicator and is the
space-time through which such communication is made articulable. First, I will suggest that a critique of
whiteness itself, as both a mode of political subjectivity and racial categorization, is necessary in order to
perform an analysis of environmental racism and watery violence. I will make this suggestion by
elaborating on how a critique of whiteness can be , at least provisionally, ‘ applied’ to the Flint water
poisoning as a historically enacted mode of procedural whiteness . Second, I will outline the ways in
which the archival body-in-motion, a fluid and relational body as a site of resistance, is more than a
metaphorization of the event, and could be a potential avenue for exploring the ways in which the
body is a material and biopolitical form of protest . In other words, the body itself, as a relational and
fluid agent of distributive becoming, is a fluid site of protest and resistance . Throughout this chapter, I
attempt to enmesh theories of social constructivism alongside ‘new’ feminist materialisms. The body is
not merely a site of cultural inscription; the body, in its distributive and relational becoming, is not
merely “formed by the forces of language, culture and politics” but is itself “formative ” (Frost, 69). In
other words, as Samantha Frost notes, ‘new’ feminist materialisms “explore how the forces of matter
and the processes of organic life contribute to the play of power and provide elements of modes of
resistance to it” (70).
An application of new feminist materialisms allows us to interrogate whiteness from the inside out .
Whiteness must be understood as a process whereby communities of color are marked as an
oppositional relationality, an other whose (non) being in the world is repressed under the mark of
ontological death. Not only does the Flint water poisoning embody the historical violence exerted
through black and brown bodies, it is evidence of the tyrannical role that whiteness has played in
diminishing the possibilities of black and brown lives and futures. Without water , the substance that
ensures the emergence and continuation of life itself, our bodies would cease to exist . Water both
marks and exceeds the material boundary between life and death , between the present and the future,
between here and there. Water is the material-semiotic space between our bodies and it is the
spacetime within and through which resistance becomes thinkable. But, it is also a space in which
power becomes exerted through bodies . As water flows through human (and non-human bodies),
power flows with/in it. As Neimanis reminds us, water is power and through water “The flows of global
power meet the flows of biomatter” (2012, 95).
Recognizing the violence of Flint’s water poisoning subverts tropes and generates
coalitions necessary to challenge white violence
Muñoz outlines at least (though this is not exhaustive) three ways in which the
Specifically, as I come-to-terms with his work,
disidentifying minoritarian subject may subvert dominant tropes of identity and experience: First, the
relinquishment of privacy in favor of the performance of an active counter-public (s) (150); second, this
“relinquishment” of privacy is a transformative practice which publicizes an ethics of the self (151); and
third, the reiterative critical examination of the self in relation to its intersectional subject positions (156).
On October 29, 2017, Carolyn Doshie ceased to breathe . In a previous draft of this chapter, I was unaware of Carolyn’s death; I feel her death and
her death haunts this chapter as a specter of all that remains unsaid and all remains that continue to go unclaimed and mysteriously caused by whiteness and the Flint water poisoning.
Carolyn’s obituary states, “She was a fighter going through life knowing that anything can happen she made it possible. Some of her favorite things to do included cooking, being around family,
helping to raise her grandson…, working at Medilodge…, and attending the Cross Missionary Baptist Church she grew up in…” (Banks Funeral Chapel, 2017).
“I never had no skin issues. It hurts. It’s cracked open and everything.” Carolyn Doshie, 2016
Carolyn’s body (see Fig. 7) is itself a disidentificatory practice of minoritarian un/becoming and care. As Chelsea
Grimmer writes in “Racial Microbiopolitics,” “ The image [of Carolyn’s lesioned hand] does not assuage an audience of complicity, nor does
it reinstate a desire for white, propertied, patriarchal norms so much as for less pain…” (28). Carolyn’s hand,
and, indeed Carolyn’s words themselves (indeed, she speaks!) lesioned after she used Flint’s water to
simply wash her hands, is a material form of protest that not only foregrounds flesh as a site of protest,
but as Grimmer notes, as a “counter-site of illegibility ” (30). Carolyn relinquishes her privacy and, in a confessional
in/capacity, uses her body itself to embody the structural and historical violence faced by many
residents in Flint.
Jack May, an editorial photographer living in Flint, Michigan, hosts a web archive of images that works to expose the ways in which the bodies of residents in Flint have been affected by the
city’s toxic water supply. One of the images of Gerry Woodberry, whose legs are covered with welts as a result of a chronic illness being inflamed by exposure to the toxic water, performs a
confessional role; the body is a site of testimony, of bearing witness, to the material conditions faced by those
who have been, and continue to be, impacted by the Flint water poisoning . Gerry Woodberry, in an interview with MLive
News, says that “Basically, my body attacks itself…It’s not about me wanting attention. It’s about me getting help…
This is not good…” (Acosta, 2016).
Sincere Smith, who was two years old in 2016, is featured on the cover of a TIME Magazine in February 2016. Sincere’s
mother, like so many other parents, as can be seen in May’s archive, seek s to expose the ways in
which her child’s health has been violently impacted as a result of the Flint water poisoning . In the photograph,
as part of the cover, we can see that Sincere’s face is covered in rashes : on his forehead, on his cheeks, almost as if the rashes exceed the limits of space allocated
by the photograph. As Muñoz points out with regard to disidentification and the liberation of minoritarian becomings ,
“[D]isidentification is about cultural, material, and psychic survival. It is a response to state and
global power apparatuses that employ systems of racial, sexual, and national subjugation ” (161). These
images of Carolyn, of Gerry, and of Sincere, are not accidental or merely provisional responses to crises. Nor are they
mere objects for my, or our, analyses. Rather, “they are suggested, rehearsed, and articulated” and
are “strategies that are called on by minoritarian subjects throughout their everyday life” (179).
It’s about me getting help.” By (re)presenting the body in pain as a performance of the
As Gerry said in his interview, “
self, residents of Flint, Michigan, such as Carolyn, Gerry, and Sincere, remind us that the body itself is an archive . For Astrida Neimanis,
water-as-archive is a hydro-logic of water’s communicative materiality . She reminds us that water’s “…material
communication can grind to an almost-halt, creating the conditions for repositories of memory, or
archives ” (2013, 31). While Neimanis is specifically writing on plastics in the ocean, could we not suggest that water-as-archive and body-as-archive
are not mutually-exclusive entanglements and are, in fact, mutually constitutive of one another ? For Muñoz,
this material-semiotic entanglement, this “transcendence of oneself” is an ethical act which regards
minoritarian subjectivity as an “impersonal self,” an intersectional agent whose belonging and becoming
weaves in and out of consciousness, public space, and private space (178). By keeping in mind water’s inextricable material-semiotic
connection with/in bodies, I would like to briefly turn to what Muñoz refers to as ephemera as evidence.
“Queer evidencing,” to borrow Muñoz’s usage of the term, the body in pain is an ephemeral gesture; it elides dominant
forms of evidence in the form of papers or documentation. Here, queer does not necessarily signify the
deployment of sexuality or sexualities as much as it connotes what Muñoz refers to as a “minoritarian position” that
exists outside of dominant temporalities and spaces . As Muñoz writes in Cruising Utopia,
Ephemeral evidence is rarely obvious because it is needed to stand against

Jacques Derrida’s idea of the trace is relevant here.
the harsh lights of mainstream visibility and the potential tyranny of the fact…Ephemera are the remains
that are often embedded in queer acts, in both stories we tell one another and communicative physical
gestures… […] For queers, the gesture and its aftermath, the ephemeral trace, matter more than many
traditional modes of evidencing lives and politics …We must also understand that after the gesture expires, its materiality has transformed into
ephemera that are utterly necessary. (2009, 65; 81)
What would have otherwise been seen as a mundane, everyday act or movement, raising one’s scarred and lesioned hand, as Carolyn does in Figure 7 for example, becomes the way through
which the minoritarian subject performs pain and gestures toward the evidencing of such pain . Furthermore, the
The body in pain is
photograph, placing emphasis on Carolyn and Carolyn’s hand while blurring the background, foregrounds the performativity of Carolyn’s material flesh.
not merely an identificatory practice; it is, as Muñoz writes, “a performative mode of tactical recognition that
various minoritarian subjects employ in an effort to resist the interpellating call of ideology that fixes a
subject within the state power apparatus” (1999, 97). But, the body in pain, as a performative or enactment of performativity, does not exist in a bubble of
individualism. Rather, the body in pain, or bodies in pain, are collective and residual evidences of lively beings whose
movement in and of the world is restricted within and through dominant (white) power networks .
**topicality/theory
1nc – t-water resources
The aff isn’t water resources
Figure S.2 Public Spending on Transportation and Water Infrastructure as a Share of Gross Domestic
Product, by Type of Infrastructure, 1956–2014 Highways Mass transit and rail Water resources a [a
Includes water containment systems (dams, reservoirs, and watersheds)] Water utilities b [b Includes
water supply and wastewater treatment facilities .] SOURCE: CBO, 2015, Exhibit 15, p. 25, based on
data from OMB, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. and freshwater
(lakes and rivers).
2nc – water resources
Wastewater and drinking water isn’t topical
Distinct from wastewater and drinking water systems, water resource infrastructure includes dams,
levees, harbors, canals, and the locks and dredged channels of navigable waterways . Capital spending
for federal water resource programs has been in decline for decades. Most of the nation’s desirable sites
for hydropower have been developed or otherwise been foreclosed from development and the need for
“reclaiming” arid lands in the West has diminished. In the South, Northeast, and Pacific Northwest, the
USACE was the primary builder of dams and levees, but the USACE now spends most of its budget on
dredging and ecosystem maintenance/restoration (National Research Council, Committee on U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Water Resources Science, Engineering, and Planning, National Academies Press,
2011). The share of the USACE’s budget dedicated to O&M has been increasing every year and now
exceeds spending on capital improvements. One of the most concerning issues on the USACE’s agenda is
dam safety, with so many of the dams built in the mid-20th century nearing or surpassing their planned
lifetimes.
Federal support for navigation, coastal protection, flood control, and ecosystem restoration is highly
variable in terms of cost-sharing arrangements with state and local governments (Rubin, 1983). The
variability in cost-sharing across the different business lines reflects changing perspectives in Congress
about the national and regional priorities over the 20th century. Table 5.1 summarizes these cost-
sharing arrangements as of 2016. In FY 2010, about 32 percent of the USACE’s budget was allocated to
navigation improvements, 34 percent to flood risk management, nearly 17 percent to environmental
restoration, and the remaining 17 percent to hydropower, recreation, water supply, emergency
management, and administration (National Research Council, Committee on U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Water Resources Science, Engineering, and Planning, National Academies Press, 2011).
1nc – t-protection
Protection of water means to prevent use
Cody et al 9 (Betsy A & Nicole Carter, Coordinators. Pervaze Sheikh. Specialists in Natural Resources
Policy. John Frittelli, Specialist in Transporation Policy. Linda Luther, Analyst in Environmental Policy.
Harold Upton, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy. Cynthia Brougher, Legislative Attorney. Roger Walke,
Specialist in American Indian Policy. Congressional Research Service. "Thirty-Five Years of Water Policy:
The 1973 National Water Commission and Present Challenges" May 11.
https://aquadoc.typepad.com/files/crs_report_35_years_water_policy_1973nwc_challenges_11may200
9.pdf)
Although the Commission’s recommendations were directed at state governments, Congress has
enacted legislation over the
last several decades that recognizes social values in decisions pertaining to waters regulated by federal water
projects or otherwise under federal jurisdiction . The legislation has been both of general application and
specifically targeted to certain federal water projects . The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-542, 82
Stat. 906) allowed the federal government to ensure protection of certain waters from development .122
Although the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was enacted prior to the Commission’s recommendations, Congress has continued to
designate rivers for protection over the past four decades, in addition to those originally protected by the act. Designation
under the act allows the federal government to recognize aesthetic and recreational values of the
rivers and prevent uses that would diminish those values, principles reflected in the Commission’s recommendations. In 1992,
Congress enacted the CVPIA, which amended the original authorization for the Central Valley Project—a major federal water supply project in
California—to include consideration of fish and wildlife preservation. The CVPIA also specifically allocated 800,000 acre-feet of project water for
fish and wildlife purposes,123 giving additional support to some of the goals highlighted by the Commission’s recommendations.
Water resources are river basins, surface water storage, or groundwater reserves-
topical affs must prohibit use by one of five categories of users
Evenson et al 18 (y Eric J. Evenson, Sonya A. Jones, Nancy L. Barber, Paul M. Barlow, David L.
Blodgett, Breton W. Bruce, Kyle Douglas-Mankin, William H. Farmer, Jeffrey M. Fischer, William B.
Hughes, Jonathan G. Kennen, Julie E. Kiang, Molly A. Maupin, Howard W. Reeves, Gabriel B. Senay,
Jennifer S. Stanton, Chad R. Wagner, and Jennifer T. Wilson. US Geological Survey. "Report to Congress
— Continuing Progress Toward a National Assessment of Water Availability and Use"
Section 9508 of the SECURE Water Act calls for the establishment of a “national water availability and
use assessment program” within the USGS to: • provide a more accurate assessment of the status of the
water resources of the United States; • assist in the determination of the quantity of water that is
available for beneficial uses; • assist in the determination of the quality of the water resources of the
United States; • identify long-term trends in water availability; • use each long-term trend to provide a
more accurate assessment of the change in the availability of water in the United States; and • develop
the basis for an improved ability to forecast the availability of water for future economic,
energyproduction, and environmental uses.
The national water availability and use assessment program called for by the SECURE Water Act also is
referred to as the Water Census. It is one of six major science directions identified by the USGS in 2007
in its Science Plan for the next decade (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007). Additionally, in 2016, the USGS
initiated the Water Availability and Use Science Program (WAUSP) and combined all of its activities that
are directly related to water availability and use in that one programmatic line item. This action was
taken for the most part to accomplish the task set for the USGS by the U.S. Congress under Section 9508
of the SECURE Water Act.
Included in the SECURE Water Act is a requirement to report to Congress every five years on progress
made in implementing the national water availability and use assessment program (see Box A). This
report summarizes progress for the second 5-year period.
Not later than December 31, 2012, and every 5 years thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that provides a detailed assessment of— 1. the current
availability of water resources in the United States, including — A. historic trends and annual updates
of river basin inflows and outflows; B. surface water storage; C. groundwater reserves ; and D.
estimates of undeveloped potential resources (including saline and brackish water and wastewater );
2. significant trends affecting water availability, including each documented or projected impact to the
availability of water as a result of global climate change;
3. the withdrawal and use of surface water and groundwater by various sectors, including— A. the
agricultural sector; B. municipalities; C. the industrial sector; D. thermoelectric power generators; and E.
hydroelectric power generators;
4. significant trends relating to each water use sector, including significant changes in water use due to
the development of new energy supplies;
5. significant water use conflicts or shortages that have occurred or are occurring; and
6. each factor that has caused, or is causing, a conflict or shortage described in paragraph (5).
1nc – funding spec
The aff must specify beyond funding, it’s key to neg ground- otherwise, normal means
is the money is a loan which decks solvency
Walton 21 (Brett, writes about agriculture, energy, infrastructure, and the politics and economics of
water in the United States. He also writes the Federal Water Tap, Circle of Blue’s weekly digest of U.S.
government water news. He is the winner of two Society of Environmental Journalists reporting awards,
one of the top honors in American environmental journalism: first place for explanatory reporting for a
series on septic system pollution in the United States(2016) and third place for beat reporting in a small
market (2014). He received the Sierra Club's Distinguished Service Award in 2018. "In Broad Strokes,
Biden Infrastructure Plan Sketches a Future for Federal Water Spending"
https://www.circleofblue.org/2021/world/in-broad-strokes-biden-infrastructure-plan-sketches-a-future-
for-federal-water-spending/)
President Joe Biden

unveiled a wide-ranging jobs and infrastructure plan on Wednesday, asking Congress to support a
$2 trillion investment in the built and natural systems that sustain American life, from trips to the grocery store to a glass of water from the faucet.
The administration is calling the proposal the American Jobs Plan, and among its many parts it includes $111 billion for water
systems. A month after winter storms crippled water and electric providers in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, the plan also calls for $50 billion to prepare the
country’s infrastructure for an era of severe floods, droughts, wildfires, and hurricanes.
Like much of the plan, the $111 billion in water systems funding is described in broad strokes and headline numbers
that sidestep, for now, details on how the money would be allocated . As part of that total, the plan offers $10 billion for
monitoring and cleaning up toxic PFAS chemicals and investing in rural water systems, household wells, and septic units. The plan includes $56 billion for
modernizing drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater conveyance and treatment.
Nathan Ohle, chief executive officer of Rural Community Assistance Partnership, said that his organization, which assists small communities with infrastructure
needs, applauds the plan.
“Specifically, we deeply appreciate the plan’s comprehensive approach to investing much needed federal resources towards our nation’s aging water infrastructure,
protecting vulnerable populations, and supporting our rural and regional economies,” Ohle wrote to Circle of Blue in an email.
Notably for water and public health, the administration proposes substantial funding to eliminate lead service
lines that are a source of the brain-damaging chemical .
“The American Jobs Plan will put plumbers and pipefitters to work, replacing 100 percent of the nation’s lead pipes and service lines so every American, every child
can turn on a faucet or a fountain and drink clean water,” Biden said during a speech in Pittsburgh to announce the plan.
In a discussion with reporters, a senior White House official emphasized the lead pipe replacement initiative, calling it “a bold but a very practical goal” for clean
water, mentioning also the need to target lead in schools and childcare centers.
The $45 billion that the administration wishes to allocate to the task is in the ballpark for what it would cost to remove all of the country’s estimated 6 million to 10
million lead drinking water lines, according to Elin Betanzo, founder of the consulting firm Safe Water Engineering.
“This is a plan we have been waiting for since the 1986 ban on the installation of new lead service lines, which included no requirements to remove the lead service
lines already installed,” Betanzo wrote to Circle of Blue in an email.
The proposal to remove all lead service lines runs counter to a recent U.S. Environmental Protection Agency rulemaking, though. In December, the Trump
administration completed long-awaited revisions to federal rules on lead in drinking water. To the chagrin of public health advocates, the revisions did not order
removal of all lead service lines.
In light of those concerns, the Biden administration said on March 12 that it was delaying the rule’s implementation. The EPA said it would also open additional
rounds of public consultation. The moves give the agency’s new leadership more time to review rules that were finalized at the end of the Trump administration.
The agency’s review is expected to be completed in December.
Sri Vedachalam, water program director at the Environmental Policy Innovation Center, said that the administration will be looking at how to reconcile these two
positions: on the one hand, stating publicly that it has a goal of total lead service line replacement, while on the other reviewing a rule that does not mandate such
action.
Vedachalam told Circle of Blue that the tension between offering financial carrots for lead pipe removal but not requiring that utilities do so could be maintained,
but “from a messaging perspective, it’s not at all compatible.”
Other administration objectives will also be put to the test .

Biden stated in an executive order on the climate crisis that 40 percent of the benefits of federal climate spending will go toward low-income areas and
communities of color. The $50 billion he proposes for infrastructure resilience should be similarly targeted, argues Sara Hughes of the University of Michigan.
“Climate resilience is a public good, and we should be taking steps to make sure that those who need protection and investment are both prioritized and involved,”
Hughes, who researches urban water and climate policy, wrote in an email to Circle of Blue.
Unanswered Questions
Water sector observers now await more details on the nuts and bolts of the Biden infrastructure plan as
administration officials work with Congress to turn the proposal into reality.
Tommy Holmes, legislativedirector at the American Water Works Association , an industry group, listed a number of
questions: How much funding will be in the form of grants versus loans? Will new programs be created? Will funding be
constrained to a certain time period or will it be open-ended? How much funding for infrastructure renewal will go through
the state revolving funds versus WIFIA ?
Thes tate r evolving f und s , a pair of federally funded, low-interest loan programs for drinking water and
sewer/stormwater, are administered by the states. WIFIA is a low-interest loan program overseen by
the EPA that is geared toward large water projects. Both are favored by Congress. Just last week, the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee advanced a bill that authorizes $14.7 billion over five years for both the Drinking Water and Clean Water state revolving
funds.
The fundingdetails will be especially important for lead service line replacement. State revolving funds are
loans that must be repaid, which puts pressure on communities that are already financially struggling.
The revolving funds also require that states provide 20 percent in matching funds . Vedachalam speculated that
some states might be reluctant to provide the required match if there is a large increase in the revolving
funds.

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***water neg – infrastructure – preseason

5) Water is not the main cause of lead poisoning overall

5. Water not key to regional decline

6. Econ about to boom- 17 reasons

2. 2020s battery technology looks kind of like 1990s microprocessors

Keep up with the new Washington — get live updates on politics.

4. The pandemic has taught us how to work remotely

5. Even Robert Gordon is (a little) more optimistic!

6. Crises spur innovation

7. Tight labor markets spur innovation, too

8. There’s only one China

Imagine an isolated farm town with 100 people.

That’s essentially what has happened in the last few decades as

9. There’s only one Mexico

10. The offshoring revolution is mostly played out

But it’s not as if the internet can be invented a second time.

11. Baby boomers can’t work forever

Frequently Asked Questions About the New Stimulus Package

What student loan changes are included in the bill?

What would the bill do to help people with housing?

12. The millennials are entering their prime

13. Everybody likes it hot

The Trump presidency changed

14. Joe Biden wants to let it rip

15. Jay Powell wants to let it rip

In more formal terms, the

16. Republicans are getting away from austerity politics

17. The post-pandemic era could start with a bang

2. No modelling- their ev is aspirational, doesn’t say countries will spend on their

3. Infrastructure makes water conflict more likely

1. Federal funding is bad- cities say no, too much red-tape

In 2019, 35.3% of total assistance provided by Pennsylvania’s DWSRF went to disadvantaged

EU-US trade relations key to the WTO

Trade multilateralism solves global crises

Make no mistake: this is

At this moment in history, why is there so much alarm?

The Geopolitical Recession

How did we get here?

Our luck can’t last.

A trillion here, a trillion there

Fed already tightening

That’s monetary tightening and will brake the recovery .

Three key measures of inflation were up sharply in March

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Note: Annual rate of change

Goldman's Hatzius Sees Inflation Rising Temporarily

The Fed crushed inflation in the 1980s, and it could do it again

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Infrastructure Investments Can Only Be a Partial Hedge to Inflation Risk

Soaring housing demand is driving up prices for materials

Keeping the Lid On

Low interest rates have minimized U.S. debt payments

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The Making of the Tiffany True Diamond

Tiffany & Co.

Transition from transitory?

Prices are rising as the economy recovers

The economy is on the brink of overheating

Unhedged — Markets, finance and strong opinion