Comprehensive Risk Management in Horizontal Directional Drilling Projects
Comprehensive Risk Management in Horizontal Directional Drilling Projects
Comprehensive Risk Management in Horizontal Directional Drilling Projects
Abstract: Nowadays, horizontal directional drilling (HDD) technology is one of the most popular trenchless construction methods for
installing pipelines under obstacles. Both risk analysis and risk management are key tools helping to meet today’s challenging trenchless
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construction project demands connected with quality, deadlines, costs, and legal issues. In this paper, a new model based on proactive and
holistic approaches is presented, which is an extension from traditional risk analysis toward complex risk management in HDD projects.
Fuzzy fault tree analysis, fuzzy weighted index, and a risk response matrix supported the risk management process. Overall, 147 risk remedia-
tion strategies for all the identified HDD risks were proposed. The following types of risk response strategies were applied: passive and active
risk retention, risk transfer, risk elimination, and risk cause or effect reduction. The practical application of the proposed risk management
model for HDD projects was shown in an example. The application of the proposed risk management model allows one to effectively reduce
the risk of basic events occurrence and provides a remarkable reduction of the risk of the top event’s occurrence. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)
CO.1943-7862.0001809. © 2020 American Society of Civil Engineers.
the machines X5: Drill tool failure due to the material’s fatigue technology was divided into five steps: risk assessment, risk treat-
X6: Drill rig breakdown ment, risk register, risk monitoring and review, and risk financ-
X7: Mud motor breakdowna ing (Fig. 1).
X8: Mud cleaning system breakdowna
X9: Roller blocks failurea
X10: Roller cradles failurea Risk Assessment
X11: Side cranes breakdowna
X12: Ballasting system breakdowna Risk Identification
Problems with X14: Unexpected natural or man-made subsurface The first substep of the risk assessment stage is risk identification.
the ground obstacles The methodology of identifying risks is shown in the first column
X15: Borehole collapse in Fig. 1. Gierczak (2014a) presented a risk identification process
X16: Blocking of the drilling pipe or product pipe and qualitative risk assessment in HDD projects. Feedback from
installation due to the swelling of clay and silt expert surveys from 5,940 HDD projects in five countries was
X17: Drilling fluid seepage shown. It allowed for assessment of the frequency of occurrence
Problems with X20: Legal problem and the influence on the project failure of 38 risks in HDD technol-
the environment X21: Severe weather conditions ogy. It was found that the following problems were the most frequent
a problems in the analyzed installations: downtime in installation
If used.
b (18%), unexpected natural subsurface obstacles (15%), drilling fluid
Only for midi and maxi HDD.
seepage (15%), unexpected human-made subsurface obstructions
(11%), not taking into consideration allowable bending radius of drill
management strategy based on proactive and holistic approaches. pipes or product pipe (10%), drill rig breakdown (10%), and bore-
Krechowicz (2017a, b) proved that effective proactive risk manage- hole collapse (10%).
ment in complex building construction projects resulted in effective The influence on HDD project failure was assessed using a scale
project realization in accordance with the planned schedule and of 1 to 5 (with 1 being the least important and 5 being the most
budget specified in the contract. When dealing with emergency important). The following problems had the highest influence on
situations, most HDD contractors use only the rules of thumb that HDD project failure in the analyzed installations: borehole collapse
they have developed over the years. Many owners, engineers, and (3.6), operator lacking required skills (3.6), blocking of the drilling
contractors are unable to start the risk management process early in pipe or product pipe installation due to swelling of clay and silt
the project planning phase because they do not have any compre- (3.4), unexpected natural subsurface obstacles (3.4), and drill pipe
hensive risk management model that could be a reasonable tool to failure due to material’s fatigue (3.3). It was a basis for carrying out
effectively model and reduce the risk level. It often results in creat- quantitative risk assessment and preparing risk management strat-
ing unrealistic project delivery and performance options. egy for HDD projects.
In order to confirm the necessity of analyzing the risk in HDD
projects, the author carried out a survey of 14 enterprises dealing Risk Analysis
with trenchless construction of pipelines using HDD technology in The second substep of the risk assessment is risk analysis. In this
Europe and the US. The survey is based on rich HDD contractors’ substep, the author’s risk analysis model was applied, which is
experiences from 5,940 HDD installations. Approximately 31.5% based on fuzzy fault tree analysis. The model has been described
of the analyzed HDD installations were carried out in Poland, in detail by Gierczak (2014b). However, it has been modified to
28.6% in France, 23.6% in the Netherlands, 15.5% in the US, adapt to the needs of comprehensive risk management. The main
and 1.2% in Germany. Of these, 34.8% of the analyzed installations changes include the fact that it has been connected to the risk re-
were mini, 25.8% midi, and 39.4% maxi HDD. The surveyed com- sponse matrix (RRM), the fuzzy fault tree has been drawn in a hori-
panies were asked if a risk analysis model in HDD technology is zontal format, the consequences and fuzzy risks of unwanted basic
needed. A full 100% of respondents answered that it is needed. The events, as well as risk reduction coefficients, have been taken into
surveyed companies were also asked if there is a need to develop a account in the calculations, and it has been extended to include
risk management model in HDD technology; 93% of respondents sensitivity analysis. Fig. 2 shows the proposed hybrid fuzzy fault
confirmed that it is needed. Moreover, the surveyed companies tree (FFT) and RRM for HDD projects.
were asked to give suggested actions to be taken to prevent or over- The model was drawn in a horizontal format, so the top event,
come 22 problems in HDD projects. The problems were the same namely unsuccessful HDD project, was placed on the left of the
as the basic events specified in Table 1. The obtained results were page, and the four intermediate events to the right were further di-
analyzed, and the most valuable were used for preparation of the list vided into the basic events in the middle of the page. The top event
of risk treatment strategies. was fully defined as the HDD failure by not meeting the project
objectives, exceeding the cost stated in the budget or time assumed but dynamic and dependent on time, human factors, and variable
in the project schedule in the contract, or not meeting the quality conditions of the environment. A solution to this problem is the
standards. The four intermediate events and 22 identified basic application of a fuzzy sets theory, which allows one to decrease
events are presented in Table 1. the uncertainty and lack of precision in the problems with gaining
The basic events and their consequences of occurrence were de- crisp values of the basic events’ probability. Fuzzy sets permit the
scribed in detail by Gierczak (2014b). Safety risks involved with gradual assessment of the membership of elements in a set, which is
HDD projects are also assessed by the group of experts through the described by a membership function valued in the real unit interval
presented framework, e.g., safety risk connected with a utility strike [0, 1] (Zadeh, 1965), e.g., the statement “Element a is a member of
is assessed within the basic event X14 (unexpected natural or Set A” is not necessarily either true or false, but can be true to some
human-made subsurface obstacles); safety risk connected with se- degree (membership degree). In this way, a gradual transition be-
vere weather condition is assessed within basic event X21 (severe tween the linguistic terms is allowed. Fuzzy sets theory is often used
weather conditions); safety risk connected with accidents on the in risk assessment, monitoring, and control in the construction indus-
building site caused by improper employee training program, try. Its efficiency was proved by Abdelgawad and Fayek (2011),
improper operation and maintenance of machines, or improper (2012), Shoar et al. (2019), and Skorupka and Kuchta (2016).
supervision is assessed within the basic event X18 (contractor’s er- The proposed risk assessment model is an expert system, in
ror); safety issues connected with failure of the tools and machines which the groups of HDD experts familiar with the analyzed project
are assessed within the basic events X5–X12. and the risk management model assess the probability of basic events
The level of detail to which the FFT was developed is crucial occurrence applying the following linguistic terms: very low (VL),
because it determines how significant the final result will be. It was low (L), medium (M), high (H), and very high (VH). In order to
extended to the mechanisms needed to identify functional depend- show how the groups of experts understand certain linguistic terms,
encies between the events while ensuring the consistency and read- it was needed to create trapezoidal membership functions for them.
ability of the analysis were not lost. In the proposed model, the The methodology of creating the membership function as well as the
occurrence of any of the basic events is sufficient to lead to the requirements for the experts and the factors that should be taken into
top event occurrence, which is represented in the proposed FFT account in the assessment of unwanted events probabilities were pre-
by OR gates. Fig. 2 shows the proposed hybrid fuzzy fault tree sented by Gierczak (2014b). It is important to remember that the
and risk response matrix for the risk assessment and management groups of experts assessed the probability assuming taking no risk
in HDD projects. To make it more useful and clear, it illustrates the remediation strategies.
example of the Australian project, which will be the subject of The risk connected with the basic event occurrence for the mem-
analysis in the next section of this paper. bership degree αjk can be calculated from the formula given in
Because of the fact that in the FFT structure there are only OR Eq. (1)
gates and identical events do not occur on separate fault tree (FT) Y
branches, the methodology of general tree studies was applied to Rg g
Xiαjk ¼ PXiα · CXi · wzXi ð1Þ
jk
the logical (qualitative) analysis of the hybrid FFT and risk z∈Z
ability distribution for basic events in HDD technology, and the two values of the risk of the basic event occurrence will be reached:
crisp failure rates of various problems in HDD cannot be obtained. Rg jk
g
Xiaα from the left side and RXidα from the right side; αjk ¼ jkth
jk
Moreover, the basic events in HDD technology are not stationary membership degree to the set of fuzzy probabilities defining each
Fig. 2. Proposed hybrid fuzzy fault tree and risk response matrix for the risk assessment and management in a HDD project in Australia.
linguistic value, j ¼ 0; 1; 2; : : : ; m − 1, where m is the number of for all the identified basic events. When assessing the basic events
the analyzed membership grades; k = step of changes of the mem- risks without considering introducing any risk treatment (or using
bership grades to the fuzzy set, k ¼ 1=ðm − 1Þ; CXi = factor rep- only passive risk acceptance
Q strategy), a total risk reduction factor
resenting consequences of the basic event occurrence Xi; wzXi = in Eq. (1) equals 1 ( z∈Z wzXi ¼ 1), so no risk reduction is reached.
total risk reduction factor for the chosen risk treatment strategies The top event fuzzy risk from the left and right side, Rg tαajk ,
of a given type for the basic event Xi, wzXi ≠ 0 (this will be ex- Rgtαdjk , can be calculated from Eq. (3) for various values of the
plained in detail in section “Risk Treatment”); and Z = set contain- membership grade α by substituting fuzzy risks values Rg Xiaαjk
ing all types of the risk treatment strategies, defined by Eq. (2) and Rg Xidα , which were calculated from Eq. (1)
jk
top event risk for jkth membership grade (%); and Rg tdα = extreme
jk
agement is not oriented in the belief in the inevitability of events but
(from the right side) values of the top event risk for jkth member- also considers risks in a more proactive manner, which is also based
ship grade (%). on holistic approaches. That is why the proposed approach is
mainly focused on effective action through the analysis of the po-
Risk Evaluation tential risks and measures to reduce their causes or consequences,
The third substep in risk assessment is risk evaluation, which aims to as well as risk elimination.
determine whether a considered HDD project entails an acceptable or Risk reduction assumes the removal of one or more causes of the
unacceptable risk level. It should be based on the following param- risk, one or more consequences of the risks, or both the risk causes
eters: the results of the risk assessment (percentage value of the top and consequences. It is vital to adjust the most appropriate method
event
Q risk calculated assuming taking no risk remediation strategies, of risk reduction to the nature of risk by checking whether the result
z∈Z wXi ¼ 1) and the results of the sensitivity analysis. It is impor-
z
or the cause is dominant in the considered risk.
tant to individually set the borderline of acceptable and unacceptable Risk elimination refers to undertaking such actions so that risk is
risk level of basic event and top event occurrence for each HDD no longer present (e.g., giving up the project or choosing a different
project, owner, and contractor considering the specificity of the design option). It is advised to apply it to risks with both a high
project as well as technical, economic, and legal conditions. probability of occurrence and very serious consequences, espe-
Sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine the critical factors cially in the cases when risk retention, reduction, and transfer are
of the HDD project, which in particular should be a subject of risk not appropriate at a reasonable costs.
treatment. After implementing risk response strategies for a particu- Thanks to the application of a hybrid FFT and risk response ma-
lar event, risk analysis can be carried out once again to assess the trix, it is possible for each analyzed basic event to check what types
impact of the solutions applied to the entire system. The sensitivity of risk treatment strategies are available and how many actions (s)
analysis of the system was carried out using a fuzzy weighted index from each group are possible to apply for a particular basic event
(FWI). With this indicator, the share of each of the basic events Xi. Some of the risk treatment strategies are dedicated for, e.g., plas-
leading to the occurrence of the unwanted top event is measured. tic pipes, steel pipes, or steering systems sensitive to interferences,
The fuzzy weighted indicator for the basic event Xi is defined by for example. That is why it is recommended to consider the ana-
the following formula: lyzed HDD project specificity and take into consideration only
those actions that may concern it.
FWIXi ðRCOA
t ; RCOA
ti Þ ¼ RCOA
t − RCOA
ti ð5Þ The hybrid FFT and RRM also one allows to assign to a given
where RCOA = risk of the top event occurrence taking into account unwanted event Xi the number of chosen risk treatment strategies
t
the basic event Xi, (%); and RCOA = risk of the top event occurrence (t) of a given type (passive and active risk retention, risk transfer,
ti
without taking into account the basic event Xi (%). The basic event risk elimination, and risk cause or effect reduction). In the last col-
for which the greatest value of the fuzzy weighted indicator is ob- umn of the RMM, there is a calculated comprehensive indicator
tained is considered as the most important. After calculating FWI illustrating the
Q possibility of lowering the risk level for a given
values, it is also recommended to mark in bold any relevant critical basic event z∈Z wzXi . Such a combination of methods enables a
events in the hybrid FFT and RMM in order to focus particular holistic view of all unwanted events by presenting dependencies
attention to choose proper risk management strategies for them. occurring among them and the possibilities of reacting to the risk
for each event. On a separate sheets of a hybrid FFT and RMM, it is
recommended to analyze several alternatives of risk management
Risk Treatment strategies and choose the most relevant one.
The process of selecting and implementing of various measures to Tables 2–5 present all identified risk treatment possibilities for
lower or modify risk is called risk treatment. Its proper preparation individual basic and undeveloped events. Some of the risk response
and execution is vital for the success of the risk management pro- options assigned to the individual basic events can be used alter-
cess. In the proposed risk management methodology, four types of natively, whereas for the others, it would be favorable to use them
risk treatment were analyzed: risk retention (absorption), risk trans- in combination. Risk response options are grouped according to
fer, risk elimination (avoidance), and risk reduction. holistic (risk elimination, risk cause reduction, and risk effect re-
Risk retention is connected with accepting the risk’s consequen- duction) or fatalistic (active and passive risk retention and risk
ces and is generally divided into passive and active acceptance. Pas- transfer) risk management approach. For each suggested action, it
sive risk retention concerns documenting of the risk existence. In is needed to state in which phase of the investment realization it
such a case, the contractors take responsibility for all consequences should be introduced and the party responsible for its implemen-
connected with unwanted events’ occurrence. Active risk retention tation. Some of the risk response options listed in Tables 2–5 have
is also about documenting the risk’s existence, but in this case, already been selectively used in good HDD projects in highly
CR(X18)d Use of drilling rigs with full automation of the process to avoid operator’s mistakes 0.70
CR(X18)e Use of contact grouting to block potential seepage paths of the drilling fluide 0.65
CR(X18)f Filling the annular space (after the installation of electric cables) with the thermal cement 0.80
mortar to avoid overheating of the cable during power transmission at high voltage
CR(X18)g Applying augmented reality in horizontal directional drilling project to increase the drill 0.90
rig operator’s awareness of underground utilitiesf
ER(X18)a Use of breakaway swivels in order to avoid deformation of the pulled pipe caused by 0.60
applying too high pulling force
ER(X18)b Application of strain gauge to measure the stress that the pipe is subjected to during the 0.80
installation
ER(X18)c Warranty deposit that is gradually deducted from each part of the contractor’s 0.80
remuneration as a means of securing the owner
ER(X18)d Applying poroscope to check the condition of the pipe’s insulation during the pullback 0.60
CR(X19)a Selection of certified suppliers and materials 0.70
ER(X19)a Applying poroscope to check the condition of the pipe’s insulation during the pullback 0.70
CR(X22)a Choosing the right type of contractf 0.80
CR(X22)b Risk sharing between the contractor and ownerg 0.70
CR(X22)c Collaborative partneringh 0.60
RT-P (X1, X3, X13, X18, X19, X22)a Documenting of the risk existence 1.00
CR(X1)c, CR(X2)b, CR(X3)d, CR(X18)h, Applying alternative project delivery methods (APDM) such as construction manager at 0.70
CR(X19)b, CR(X22)d risk (CMAR)i
Note: CR = reduction of the risk cause; ER = reduction of the risk effect; TR = risk transfer; EL = risk elimination; RT-A = active risk retention; and RT-P =
passive risk retention.
a
Example computer programs were presented by Wiśniowski et al. (2004), Deltares (2019), and Plastic Pipe Institute (2008).
b
Some practical guidelines have been given by Pedrazza (2011) and Willoughby (2005).
c
In the case of applying plastic pipes.
d
Some practical guidelines have been given by Ertelt (2011).
e
Some guidelines have been given by Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008).
f
Some guidelines have been given by Fenais et al. (2018).
g
Some practical guidelines have been given by Willoughby (2005).
h
Some practical guidelines have been given by Hallager and Hald (2009).
i
Some practical guidelines have been given by Francom et al. (2016).
developed countries. Still, their selective application without being basic events. It is particularly important in the case of critical events
based on a complete risk management strategy tailored to the HDD for which risk treatment should be carried out especially carefully.
project is not adequate and can lead to omitting other important Fig. 3 presents the integration of FFT with the extended RMM on the
actions having a significant impact on the project risk level. example of MIDI HDD installation in Australia for one of the critical
The RMM can be developed to a higher level of detail for indi- events (X17).
vidual basic events. It is recommended to extend it in particular for In order to develop the extended RMM, it is needed to use
critical events. In the extended RMM, in the place of the number of Eqs. (6)–(11). The vector of risk reduction factors for the basic
available and chosen risk treatment strategies (s and t), the risk re- event Xi from the set of all types of risk treatment strategies Z
duction factors uzXi and wzXi are introduced. They are obtained for a is defined by
given number of available and chosen risk treatment strategies for
!
each type of risk response strategy from the set Z. It allows one rzXi ¼ ½rz1Xi ; rz2Xi ; : : : ; rzhði;zÞXi ð6Þ
to clearly show how each type of risk treatment from the set Z in-
fluences the basic event risk level, which was previously calculated where z ∈ Z hði; zÞ = function that returns the number of all risk
using FFT. Further development of the matrix allows one to see how response strategies for a given basic event Xi.
the integration of different types of risk treatment strategies from the The vector of the chosen risk reduction factors for the basic event
set Z [e.g., active risk retention (RT-A) and risk elimination (EL)] Xi for a given type of risk treatment strategies (z) is defined by
affects the value of the risk reduction factor for the analyzed un-
wanted event. This is helpful when assessing the desirability of !
czXi ¼ ½cz1Xi ; cz2Xi ; : : : ; czhði;zÞXi ð7Þ
undertaking various types of risk response strategies for the analyzed
EL(X4)a Use of a gyroscopic system, especially in the areas with strong magnetic disturbances and limited access to the area 0.60
above the crossing, also if the terrain prevents the distribution of surface grids of the loop system
CR(X5-12)a Conducting regular inspection of the drilling tools and equipment as well as drilling tools and equipment prestart checks 0.75
CR(X5-12)b Proper maintenance of drilling tools and equipment 0.75
ER(X6)d Use of new generation drilling rigs with displayed error messages and a possible remote machine diagnostics on site 0.80
CR(X7)c Use of mud motor components that have elastomeric elements for only one downhole trip due to the content of oils, 0.80
diesel, and other organic fluid additives making the predictable run life of the elastomeric elements difficult to determine
RT-A(X5-12)a Having basic spare parts/additional rented mud motor/drill rig/support rollers on the construction site, the presence of a 0.75
competent mechanic on the construction site
RT-A(X5)b, RT-A(X7)b Performing a trench or withdrawing tools from the borehole 0.90
RT-P(X4-12)a Documenting of the risk existence 1.00
Note: CR = reduction of the risk cause; ER = reduction of the risk effect; TR = risk transfer; EL = risk elimination; RT-A = active risk retention; and RT-P =
passive risk retention.
a
In the case of using steering systems sensitive to interferences.
b
In the case when the measurement vertically above the transmitter is very difficult or impossible to perform.
c
Some guidelines have been given by Willoughby (2005).
d
In the case of wireline systems.
e
Some guidelines have been given by Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008).
The auxiliary vector used for calculating the total risk reduction Risk Register
factor for the basic event Xi for a given type of risk treatment strat-
During the third stage of risk management, it is necessary to prepare
egies (z) is defined by
a dynamic document used for recording risk management process for
!
0z 0z 0z 0z
all the identified risks, which will facilitate ownership and manage-
rXi ¼ ½r1Xi ; r2Xi ; : : : ; rhði;zÞXi ð8Þ ment of each unwanted basic event. Such a risk register can be stored
as a document held on a computer or on a database. A risk register
rzgXi ; czgXi ¼ 1 should include risk event symbol, its description, probability of oc-
0z
hði;zÞ
∧g¼1 rgXi ¼ ð9Þ currence, consequences, party responsible for risk treatment, and
1; czgXi ¼ 0 chosen risk treatment strategies’ symbols and descriptions. In addi-
tion to this, it is important to document the occurrence of individual
The total risk reduction factor for the available risk treatment emergency events that happened during the analyzed HDD installa-
strategies of a given type for the basic event Xi is defined by tion and describe in detail developed contingency plans (even if they
8Q are additional and do not seem to be needed at the moment) and the
< hði;zÞ rz !
g¼1 gXi j rzXi j ≠ 0 plan for the maintenance of drilling machines and tools. A risk regis-
uzXi ¼ ð10Þ
: ! ter needs to be updated regularly and should be an indispensable item
1; j rzXi j ¼ 0 in any HDD project management meeting.
The total risk reduction factor for the chosen risk treatment strat-
egies of a given type for the basic event Xi is defined by Risk Monitoring and Review
8Q The fourth stage of risk management in HDD technology is risk
< hði;zÞ r 0z j ! rzXi j ≠ 0 monitoring and review. During this stage, corrections should be
g¼1 gXi
wXi ¼
z
ð11Þ made and the risk analysis method used should be updated. The
: !
1; j rzXi j ¼ 0 risk analysis model should take into account technological advan-
ces in HDD technology and new drilling devices and machines
Several combinations of introducing risk response strategies launched on the market. Additional newly discovered risk factors
should be considered, especially for critical events and events with should also be taken into account.
relatively high FWI. The calculations of the top event occurrence
RCOA
t should be repeated taking into consideration the values of risk
Risk Financing
reduction coefficients (rgXi ) for the chosen risk treatment actions,
and the most favorable alternative should be chosen. It is also ad- In the fifth stage of risk management in HDD technology, the sour-
vised to compare the risk level of the basic events before and after ces of risk financing should be defined. A financial reserve should
risk treatment. be provided in the company’s budget to cover the costs related to
carrying out the risk management process in the organization (fees the losses of an organization after unwanted events occurrence: in-
for a group of experts assessing risk levels or risk manager, among surance, captive insurance, contingency reserves, internal or exter-
others). Moreover, one or a combination of the following measures nal funds, cash borrowings from external borrowings, and financial
could be applied to ensure the economic provision of funds to cover reinsurance.
Fig. 3. Integration of the FFT with the extended RMM for the example of midi HDD installation in Australia for one of the critical events.
0.00 0.00 6.00 2.00 16.00 11.00 35.00 30.00 72.00 52.00 100.00
0.50 0.00 4.00 4.00 13.50 13.50 32.50 32.50 62.00 62.00 100.00
1.00 0.00 2.00 6.00 11.00 16.00 30.00 35.00 52.00 72.00 100.00