PELEGRINO VS.

PEOPLE
FACTS
Stripped of the non-essentials, the prosecution's evidence shows that about the last
week of July or early August of 1991, accused Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter of
authority dated July 4, 1991 (Exhibit K) to complainant Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano in the
latter's office at Valgozon Bldg., Pasong Tamo, Makati. Said Exhibit K is addressed to
Dr. Antonio [N.] Feliciano signed by one Eufracio D. Santos a [d]eputy [c]ommissioner
of the BIR stating inter alia that 'x x x the bearer(s) hereof Revenue Officer Eutiquio
Peligrino to be supervised by Buenaventura Buenafe is/are authorized to examine your
books of accounts and other accounting records for income and business for the
calendar/fiscal year(s) ending 1988 & 1989 x x x.' Atty. Buenafe was referred to the
accountant of the complaining witness.
"About two weeks later, the complainant received a telephone call from accused Atty.
Buenafe asking him if his accountant had not told him anything, and when he
(complainant) inquired from his accountant Ellen Quijano about the matter, he was
informed that the accused were demanding half a million pesos. Surprised about the
demand, since the books were not even examined, he instructed Ellen Quijano to
further clarify the matter. Thereafter about Sept. 1991, Atty. Buenafe called him up
requesting for a meeting in his (complainant's) office.
"On October 10, 1991 accused Eutiquio Peligrino and Atty. Buenaventura Buenafe
appeared in the complainant's office and told the latter that his tax deficiencies would
amount to [f]ive [h]undred [t]housand [p]esos (P500,000.00)[.]
"Flabbergasted, because his books were not even examined, complainant entertained
the idea that it was the beginning of an extortion, and he tried to negotiate for a smaller
amount, and finally the two (2) accused agreed to the amount of [t]wo [h]undred
[t]housand, of which [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos would be paid to the BIR, and the rest to
them. The pay-off would take place on that coming Monday. He immediately wrote a
letter to the NBI (Exhibit A) requesting for assistance, and an NBI Agent Atty. Rafael
Ragos, went to his office where they talked and arranged for an entrapment which was
set on October 14.
At around 4:30 p.m., accused Peligrino arrived, and so upon hearing the sound of the
buzzer, he [Ragos], together with his co-NBI agents immediately proceeded to the room
of Dr. Feliciano, and on seeing the accused in possession of the brown envelope which
contained the marked money, arrested him, and made a body search on him.
BUENAFE – ACQUITTED BY SANDIGANBAYAN
PELEGRINO – FOUND GUILTY
ISSUE
W/N Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner demanded and received the
envelope with the boodle money

RULING
The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the offense described in Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), 11 had been
proven. Being a public officer, specifically an examiner of the BIR, Peligrino had the
right to intervene in the subject transaction. He was a member of the Special Project
Committee tasked to verify the tax liabilities of professionals, particularly physicians,
within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila.

Demand and Receipt of

"Boodle Money"

Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended)
provides:

"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,

share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.

ELEMENTS
(1) the offender is a public officer
(2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or
a benefit
(3) on behalf of the offender or any other person
(4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government
(5) in which the public officer, in .an official capacity under the law, has the
right to intervene.

 Entrapment is resorted to in order to apprehend a public officer while in the act of

obtaining undue benefits.
 In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure
the accused into committing an offense, which the latter otherwise would not
commit and has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent
 or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused,
and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime.
 Petitioner PELEGRINO:
- denies that he received payoff money from complainant. According to
him, receive, as contemplated in the offense charged, connotes a
voluntary act coupled with knowledge. Hence, where the giving of the
money affords the accused no opportunity either to refuse or to return it to the
giver, no punishable offense ensues.20 Petitioner claims that the 40 seconds
or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely a momentary
possession that could not prove "receipt," which the law requires for the
offense charged to be consummated.
- He avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that
it was the latter who requested the reduction of the amount claimed.

CA:
- Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts –
(1) demanding or requesting;
(2) receiving; or
(3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the government and any other party,
wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law.

These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each
other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant
conviction.16 THE LACK OF DEMAND IS IMMATERIAL. 
MENDOZA-ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

The Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed Resolution No.

93-132,  authorizing the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the
Philippine Army’s 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the
improvement of Laoang’s Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132 likewise
mandated the municipal government to shoulder the expenses for fuel, oil,
and the subsistence allowances of the heavy equipment operators for the
duration of the project.

Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was diverted by the

petitioner, who was then the town mayor 6 of Laoang, to develop some of her
private properties in Rawis, Laoang, Northern Samar. A concerned citizen
and ex-member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G. Poso, Sr.,
filed a complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other municipal officers 7 with
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

Investigator Sarmiento recommended the filing of the appropriate criminal

action against petitioner for violation of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A. 3019, as
amended.9 Despite strenuous opposition and objections by the defense, on
August 1, 1997, two informations were filed against her at the
Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging in the
main that: (1) the informations especially in Criminal Case No. 23848, failed
to allege facts constituting an offense; (2) that the officer who filed the
information has no authority to do so; and (3) that the accused was deprived
of her right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases against her.

On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to

Quash.1awphi1.nét Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration but this was
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its order dated November 9, 2000.

ISSUE
whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred or gravely abused its discretion in
denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner, particularly on the ground that
the information in Criminal Case No. 23848 does not constitute an offense.

RULING

PETITIONER:
- Criminal prosecution for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019 as
amended, the law requires that the gift received should be "manifestly
excessive" as defined by Section 2(c) of the same Act. She adds that it
is imperative to specify the exact value of the five drums of diesel fuel
allegedly received by Mayor Ong as public officer to determine whether
such is "manifestly excessive" under the circumstances

Elements of the offense charged in the assailed information are as

follows:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a person any
government permit or license;

(3) he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and

(4) he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material

benefit in consideration for help given or to be given.

(1) accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the

Municipal Mayor of Laoang,
 (2) committed the crime charged in relation to, while in the performance
and taking advantage of her official functions,
(3) did request or receive directly or indirectly, a gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five drums of diesel fuel, for
herself or for another, from spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons
for whom accused Mendoza-Ong,
(4) has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, a Municipal
Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus company,
JB Lines, owned by said spouses, in consideration for help given or to
be given by the accused.

SC:

- Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the above provision, the
value of the alleged gift must be specified in the information. But note that
Section 2(c) abovecited mentions a situation where (1) the value of the gift is
manifestly excessive; (2) from a person who is not a member of the public
officer’s immediate family; and (3) even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity.

In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies

regardless of whether the gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and
regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in our view, is whether
the gift is received in consideration for help given or to be given by the public
officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an essential element of
the offense charged under Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to
require the prosecution to specify such value in order to comply with the
requirements of showing a prima facie case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions

of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23848 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

JUAN CORANDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner, Juan Coronado, for violation of

Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, from which the decision 1 this petition for review on
certiorari was filed.

Herein petitioner JUAN CONDRADO, then a newly hired Process Server in

the office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Antipolo,
Rizal, was charged, along with Cesar Villamor and Oscar Caing.

First — The Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Br. 71) issued an Order, dated 11
July 1984, denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the order of 23
January 1984, that dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 290-A, entitled
"Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro-Development Corporation, et al. v. Mariano Lim
et al.";

Second — On 31 August 1984, the complaining witness Mariano Lim, one of

the defendants in the above civil case, learned the rendition of the Order and
the fact that it had not yet then been served upon the plaintiffs. Lim left
"agitated about the loss of eleven days before the decision's period of finality
had commenced to run," and he, therefore, made representations with the
Executive Judge, the Hon. Antonio Benedicto, to have the Order served on
Atty. Patrocinio Palanog, the counsel for the plaintiffs;

Third — The accused, a process server, was directed to effect the service.
His first attempt was unsuccessful because he could not locate the address of
Atty. Palanog. The accused again tried on September 02, 1984, and although
this time he found the address, Atty. Palanog and his entire family had
apparently gone out for the weekend. The accused found only a woman, not
a member of the family of Atty. Palanog, who had only been asked to watch
over the house. Accused Coronado did not thus leave the Order;

Fourth — On 22 February 1985, Lim went back to the courthouse where he

was informed that the case had meanwhile been sent to the archives together
with 29 other cases (Exhibit "E"{ (Ibid.)

Fifth — On 25 February 1985, Lim returned to the courthouse and, examining

the records, he observed additional unnumbered pages that include, among
other things, a) a return, dated 4 September 1984 (Exhibit "F"), signed by
accused Coronado stating the plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Palanog, could not be
contacted; b) an entry at the foot of the Order of 11 July 1984 (Exhibit "A-2")
to the effect that Atty. Palanog had received the Order on 25 February 1985;
and (c) a return, dated 25 February 1985 (Exhibit "B") that the Order had
indeed been served on plaintiffs (pp. 35-36, Rollo).
On the basis of the foregoing, particularly the 5-month delay in the service of
the court order, the Sandiganbayan convicted herein petitioner of having
violated Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 and imposed upon him the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to
nine (9) years and one (1) day.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to successfully serve the 11 July
1984 Order, given the above settings, warrants his conviction under Section
3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The pertinent provision of the law (Republic Act No. 3019) alleged to have
been violated provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers: The following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared unlawful:
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any
matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of
or discriminating against another interested party.

Admittedly, the elements of the offense are that:

a) The offender is a public officer;

b) The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient
justification after due demand or request has been made on him;

c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the
public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and

d) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly,

from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit
or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another.

The attendance of the first three elements in this case can hardly be disputed.
The controversy, however, lies on the fourth element.
RULING: We agree with Sandiganbayan that, indeed, there was failure on
the part of the petitioner, a public officer, to observe due diligence in his
assigned task; let us call it one of neglect, a broad term which is defined as a
failure to do what can be done and what is required to be done (West's legal
Thesaurus/Dictionary, 1986). In its generic sense, it would not matter whether
such refusal is intended or unintended. But here is not the real issue. To
warrant conviction for a violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the law itself additionally requires that the accused's dereliction,
besides being without justification, must be for the purpose of (a) obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary
or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party or (b)
discriminating against another interested party. The severity of the penalty
imposed by the law leaves no doubt that the legislative intent is to consider
this element to be indispensable.

The record is bereft of evidence, albeit alleged, to indicate that the petitioner's
failure to act was motivated by any gain or benefit for himself or knowingly for
the purpose of favoring an interested party or discriminating against another.
It is not enough that an advantage in favor of one party, as against another,
would result from one neglect or refusal. Had it been so, the law would have
perhaps instead said, "or as a consequence of such neglect or refusal undue
advantage is derived by an interested party or another is unduly discriminated
against."

Let it again be said: It has always been the avowed policy of the law that
before an accused is convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, and the burden of that proof rests upon the prosecution.
The stringency with which we have scrupulously observed this rule needs no
further explanation; suffice it to say that it behooves us to do no less
whenever at stake is the life or liberty of a person. And so it is, not only in the
appreciation of the evidence but likewise in the application and interpretation
of the law.

It is not that We are condoning the misconduct of the petitioner, nor that we
are unmindful of the prejudice that may have been sustained by the private
respondent, but the legal remedies lie elsewhere, not in the instant action.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from a REVERSED and the petitioner,

Juan Coronado, is hereby acquitted of the charge on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting petitioners Edgar and

Teresita Tevesof violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; and ordering
the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and
properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the
Government, as well as perpetualdisqualification from public office.The
conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed
pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that
(a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his
pecuniary interest in said cockpit;
(b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the owner/licensee of the
cockpit; and
(c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from
1983 until 1992, their property relations as husband and wife, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have
pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of
R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government Code(LGC)of 1991,
and thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law.

ISSUE:
1. WON PETIONERS ARE GUILTY? YES but only under the 2ndMode
1. WON the petitioners be convicted, considering that the information does
not charge Petitioners of the 2ndMode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law even though it was provedthrough evidence? YES
 RULING:
The petition is not totallydevoid of merit.Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the
crime of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction;
3. He either(2 MODES)
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with
such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by
any law.

There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction
may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in connection
with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction, the public
officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity.
The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such interest by
the Constitution or any law.
PETITIONERS ARE AQUITTED ON THE FIRST MODE

Regarding petitioners culpability anent the first mode:

- That portionof the Informationwhich seeks to indict the spouses Teves for his
causing the issuance of a business permit/license to operate the Valencia
cockpit on or about February 4, 1992is not well-founded. Mayor Edgar Teves
could not have issued a permit to operate the cockpit in the year 1992
because as of January 1, 1992the license could be issued only by the
Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the permit or license in 1991 or
 even before that when he legally could, but that is not the charge. The charge
is for acts committed in 1992.

Why did the Court held that Petioners are NOT guilty under First
Mode?
- The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing
the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center is not well-founded. This it based, and
rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan
could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992.
Indeed, under Section 447(3)of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a
license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike
in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was
the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,under the LGC of 1991, the
mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of theSangguniang
Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his
official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time,
as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan.(Remember on the Law on Public Corporation)
- A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator
in the absence of a finding that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the offense
charged. In short, the Sandiganbayancorrectly absolved the petitioners of the
charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to belabor this point.

BUT PETIONERS ARE GUILTY WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND MODE

- The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the
evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary interest
in the Valencia Cockpit,which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of
1991.HERE the 2ndMode was PROVED but the information does not charge
Petitioners under this 2ndMode
The last part of the dispositive portion of the information states that said
accused
Edgar Y. Teveshaving a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein
considering the fact thatsaid cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by
him and accused eresita Teves. A careful reading of the information reveals
that the afore-quoted last part thereof is merely an allegation of the second
element of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction. Not by any stretch
of imagination can it be discerned or construed that the afore-quoted last part
of the information charges the petitioners with the second mode by which
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Lawmay be violated. Hence, we agree with the
petitioners that the charge was for unlawful intervention in the issuance of the
license to operate the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for possession
of pecuniary interest prohibited by law.

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,owned the cockpit in
question. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over
thecockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing
once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that
nature.His affidavit he turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.
Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that hecould no longer devote a full time as
managerof the said. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to
Teresita Teveseffective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his
interest over it was direct. Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves
over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct
interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan,
they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as suchtheir
property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the
husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is,
therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89.Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest.

(a)It shall be unlawful for any local government officialor employee,
directly or indirectly,to:
(2)Hold such interests in any cockpitor other games licensed by a
local government unit.

REMEMBER: 1stMode was charged and 2ndMode was not

charged but was proved during trial.

IMPORTANT:The offense proved, is the second mode of

violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession
of a prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be convicted thereof,
considering that it was not charged in the information? YES
LEGAL BASIS:
VARIANCE DOCTRINE embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4.Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof.When there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is includedin or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5.When an offense includes or is included in another. An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included inthe offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter. The elements of the offense charged
in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a
cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law(1stMODE)are

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law;
and
3. He intervenes or takespart in his official capacity in connection
with such interest.

The offense PROVED, the essential ingredients of the offense

proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are asfollows

(2ndMODE):
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or
any law.

CONCLUSION:
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved
constitute or form part of those constituting the offense charged.
Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense
proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the
offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the
 offense proved.Thevariance doctrinethus finds application to this
case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves
for the offense proved.

LUZ ALMEDA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

This Petition for Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the September 6, 2012 Order [2] of the
Office of the Ombudsman tor Mindanao (Ombudsman) in OMB-MIN-01-0183 denying
herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration [3] of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003
Resolution[4] indicting her for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA
3019);[5] and directing that the corresponding Information therefor be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

Factual Antecedents

In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd), Surigao del Norte, and several
other public officers and employees were charged administratively and criminally before
the Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged improper use and disbursement of the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to petitioner's co-respondent
Constantino H. Navarre, Jr. (Navarro), Surigao del Norte Congressman, and
implemented through the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
DepEd. The criminal charges were consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0183.
On March 19, 2003, a Resolution was issued in said case by Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit (dela Cruz-Likit), to the effect that
probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused for violation of Sections
3(e) and (g) of RA 3019.[6] This Resolution was disapproved in part by then
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Marcelo), who made minor modifications and
instructions thereto.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case, and it prepared the
corresponding Information against petitioner, which was approved by then Special
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio and Marcelo. On May 19, 2003, the Information was
forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, who in turn indorsed and
forwarded the same, together with the Ombudsman's Resolution, to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte on June 3, 2003, for appropriate filing in court. [7]

Petitioner received a copy of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003 Resolution on May 29,
2003. On July 3, 2003, she filed via a commercial courier service [8] her Motion for
Reconsideration, with a prayer for reversal of the Ombudsman's ruling and to hold in
abeyance the filing of an information against her until the motion is resolved. An
advance copy of the motion was transmitted to the Ombudsman by fax on June 16,
2003.[9]
On July 7, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of
Information[10] before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, which
in turn referred the said motion to the Ombudsman. [11]

On July 18, 2003, dela Cruz-Likit issued an Order [12] giving due course to petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and a similar motion filed by one of her co-respondents. The
Order states, among others:

In their Motions for Reconsiderations [sic], both respondents-movants are united in

pointing to co-respondent ex-Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., as the one who
entered into the transaction of purchasing the nine computers delivered to DepEd
Siargao, which transaction is made the basis of their indictment for Violation of Section
3(g) of RA 3019.

Before taking further action on the motions, thus filed, let copies thereof be served.to
respondent Constantino H. Navarro Jr. and to complainant, or them to file their
respective Comment or Opposition thereto.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES considered, this office resolves to give due course to the
motions under consideration. Accordingly, let copies of the Motions for Reconsideration
and Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of Information be served to then
Representative Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. and to COA Auditors Rosalinda G. Salvador
and Mila L. Lopez, who are hereby directed to file their Comment and or [sic] Opposition
thereto within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Failure to comply with this order will be
deemed a waiver and the herein motions will be resolved accordingly.

SO ORDERED.[13]
Navarro filed his Comment[14] to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

On August 25, 2003, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman her Supplemental motion
for reconsideration.[15]

Through a June 16, 2004 Indorsement of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and all other pleadings, orders, and communications relative
thereto were forwarded to Marcelo for appropriate action, pursuant to Office Order No.
31 entitled "Review and Consideration of Motions for Reconsideration Filed in Relation
to Orders and Resolutions Issued by the Tanodbayan," which pertains to cases where
the Ombudsman disapproves orders, resolutions, or decisions emanating from sectoral
offices, and considering that the OSP has taken over the case. [16]

In another Indorsement dated October 11, 2004, then Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Antonio E. Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11, 2004 Order which
ultimately closed and terminated OMB-MIN-01-0183 as far as the Ombudsman for
Mindanao is concerned, pursuant to an August 4, 2004 Order issued by Marcelo
ordering the OSP to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. [17]
On May 25, 2010, petitioner sent a letter of, even date to the Ombudsman, seeking the
early resolution of her motions.[18] However, the letter was not acted upon, as the
handling Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO), dela Cruz-Likit, was then
on official study leave and no GIPO was as yet assigned to the case. [19]

On September 1, 2011, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman a Manifestation,

[20]
 seeking resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration. On November 18, 2011, she
filed a second Manifestation[21] with the Ombudsman with a prayer for dismissal of OMB-
MIN-01-0183 as against her.

Meanwhile, petitioner received copies of Indorsements dated September 28, 2011 and
December 9, 2011 and signed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Humphrey T.
Monteroso, referring and forwarding to the OSP petitioner's September 1, 2011
Manifestation and other pleadings and documents filed in OMB-MIN-01-0183, and
noting and informing that the entire record of the case has been forwarded previously to
the OSP.[22]

On August 8, 2012, petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman, instead
of the OSP, entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to Speedy Trial
with Prayer for Dismissal of the Case." [23] This time petitioner bewailed the inaction and
procedure taken by the Ombudsman and OSP in not taking cognizance of OMB-MIN-
01-0183 and instead indorsing and repeatedly tossing the case back and forth to each
other. She cited a June 18, 2012 Memorandum [24] within the OSP recommending that
her Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations be resolved by the Ombudsman for
Mindanao instead and not the OSP, which had no jurisdiction over petitioner since she
is not a high-ranking public official charged before the Sandiganbayan; she also noted a
June 21, 2012 Indorsement[25] by the OSP to the Ombudsman for Mindanao, referring
back petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations for action by the latter.
She claimed that as a result, her Motion for Reconsideration remained unresolved to
date; that said flip-flopping attitude of these two offices resulted in unwarranted delay
and unending torment, which has unduly affected her work; and consequently, her
constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. Petitioner thus prayed for dismissal of
her case.

On September 6, 2012, the Ombudsman through dela Cruz-Likit issued the assailed
Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, stating as follows:

This resolves the Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondents Luz S. Almeda and
Miguela S. Ligutom, seeking reconsideration to [sic] the Resolution dated March 19,
2003, indicting them for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019.

x x x x

The motions should be denied.

As informed by respondent Almeda, she received a copy of the approved Resolution on

May 29, 2003. Her motion for reconsideration dated June 12, 2003, with request to hold
in abeyance the filing of the Information in court, was sent through the Courier on July 3,
2003. On the other hand, respondent Ligutom's Motion for Reconsideration, with
request to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information in court, was filed on June 9,
2003. While counsel of respondent Almeda sent by fax an advance copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration on June 16, 2003, both motions were still filed out of time.

Section 7(a), Rule II, of Administrative Order No. 07, which provides for the
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure in criminal cases, states:

"Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or

resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof
with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been
filed in court."
Accordingly, the motions, on procedural grounds, should be denied.

On the other hand, the matters raised by respondents Almeda and Ligutom in their
motions for reconsideration were already passed upon by this Office, and need not be
discussed all over again. Moreover, these are evidentiary in nature, and are best
threshed out in court.

x x x x

We also took note of respondents Almeda's [sic] and Ligutom's manifestation for the
dismissal of the case for alleged violation of their right to speedy trial, on the ground that
until now, no information was filed in court, and that their Motions for Reconsideration
were not resolved despite the lapse of a considerable period of time.

OMB-MIN could not be faulted for the non-filing of the Information in court because as
the records would show, both respondents Almeda and Ligutom were the ones who
moved to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information. The motions to hold in
abeyance the filing of the Information were not only filed with this Office, but also with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, and as shown by the
records, the Information was already indorsed to the OPP but was indorsed back to
OMB-MIN, in view of the motions to hold in abeyance the filing of such Information in
court. Significantly, OMB-MIN has nothing to do with the delay in the resolution of the
motions for reconsideration because as the records would show, all motions and
pleadings filed by respondents were appropriately and timely acted upon.

WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are hereby

DENIED. Let the corresponding Information for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019
approved by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.[26]
Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

In a February 5, 2014 Resolution, [27] this Court resolved to give due course to the instant
Petition, which contains the following assignment of errors:

V.a

DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CASES WHEN IT FAILED TO
RESOLVE THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE THE FILING OF INFORMATION FOR A PERIOD OF NINE (9) YEARS
FROM THE DATE OF ITS FILING?

V.b

GIVEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE, DID THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN ACT
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF
CASES?[28]
Petitioner's Arguments

In seeking reversal of the assailed Order and dismissal of OMB-MIN-01 -0183 as

against her, with additional prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner contends in her Petition
and Opposition[29] to the Ombudsman's Comment, which the Court treats as her Reply,
[30]
 that the Ombudsman's failure to promptly act on her case for nine years from the
filing of her motion for reconsideration, or from July 2003 to September 2012, is a
violation of her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case; that despite her
repeated manifestations and follow-ups, no action was taken on her case; that the
Ombudsman and OSP's actions constitute gross neglect and indifference; that the
Ombudsman's erroneous action of endorsing her case to the OSP despite the fact that
the latter had no jurisdiction over her is the sole cause of the long period of inaction and
delay which prejudiced her; and that contrary to the Ombudsman's argument, she
should not be deemed estopped, for filing a motion to suspend the filing of the
information against her, from claiming her right to a speedy disposition of her case.

Respondents' Arguments

In their joint Comment,[31] respondents contend that there is no grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the Ombudsman in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; that
her constitutional right to speedy disposition of her case was not violated, as the delay
in the proceedings was not attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive acts on
the Ombudsman's part; that in determining whether the right is violated, each case must
be approached on an ad hoc basis, and the length of and reasons for the delay,
assertion or failure to assert the right, prejudice caused by the delay, and the conduct of
the parties, must be carefully considered and balanced; [32] that the delay in the
resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration and filing of the information in court
was justified in that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and she
herself sought to hold in abeyance the filing of the information; that for being equally
responsible for the delay, petitioner is not entitled to dismissal of her case; and that no
injunctive relief should issue as petitioner has no right in esse that needs to be
protected since, as a public officer who serves on public trust, she has no vested right to
her position.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." This right applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies;[33] it is "not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature,
as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action to [sic] all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice." [34] It "includes within its contemplation the periods before,
during and after trial," [35] such as preliminary investigations and fact-finding
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. [36]

[T]he right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of
spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.
Akin to the right to speedy trial, its 'salutary objective' is to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having
his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming
unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be
weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. x x x [37]

[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. [38]
"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." [39] For this reason, "[a] balancing test of
applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."[40]

Regarding delays, it may be said that "[i]t is almost a universal experience that the
accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears
the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed
inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire." [41] These principles
should apply to respondents in other administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as
well. It must also be remembered that generally, respondents in preliminary
investigation proceedings are not required to follow up on their cases; it is the State's
duty to expedite the same "within the bounds of reasonable timeliness." [42]

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. [43]
"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object to the delay or that
the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him."[44] Failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended, yet
unjustified delay nonetheless causes just as much vexation and oppression. [45] Indeed,
delay prejudices the accused or respondent -and the State just the same.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. x x x[46]
Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that
is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly
decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition
of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and
by various legislations inutile."[47]

Finally, the Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal
complaint is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process
and to the speedy disposition of cases, which warrants the dismissal of the
criminal case.[48]

Using the foregoing as guides and applying them to the instant case, the
Court finds that petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of OMB-MIN-01-0183
was violated, which must result in the dismissal thereof.

First of all, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took more
than 11 long years to resolve, or from March 23, 2001 when the proceedings
were initiated and docketed,[49] to September 6, 2012 when petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.

Secondly, the delay in the proceedings was caused solely by the repeated
indorsement of the Ombudsman and the OSP, which may be attributed to the
Ombudsman's failure to realize that petitioner was not under the jurisdiction of
the OSP or the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, when dela Cruz-Likit, the handling
GIPO, went on official study leave, no GIPO was assigned to OMB-MIN-01-
0183; as a result, the case was neglected. Even if, as respondents argue,
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was tardy and that she filed a motion
to defer the filing of the information, these have no bearing as in fact they are
irrelevant to the issue; the fact remains that the Ombudsman's resolution of
the case took too long; the fact that the ground for denying the Motion for
Reconsideration involved a simple procedural issue highlights the
Ombudsman's failure to timely resolve the same.

Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay. As a matter of fact, she sent a
letter and filed written manifestations seeking the immediate resolution of her
case. While they were filed only in 2010 and 2011, petitioner's letter and
manifestations cannot be considered late, and no waiver or acquiescence
may be attached to the same, as she was not required as a rule to follow up
on her case; instead, it is the State's duty to expedite the same.

Fourth, the pendency of OMB-MIN-01-0183 undoubtedly prejudiced

petitioner. The case hung like a hangman's cord above her all these years,
causing distress, anxiety, and embarrassment. As was held in the
Corpuz[50] case, the passage of time affects the parties' and their witnesses'
ability to prepare a cogent case or defense; secure witnesses; and preserve
honor and reputation, financial resources, memory, and evidence.
Finally, the Ombudsman's explanation for the delay is not at all acceptable.
Instead, it can be seen that it failed to apply a basic rule that in the
investigation and prosecution of public officers and employees accused of
graft, specific rules on jurisdiction based on rank apply. What ensued was an
administrative "ping-pong," as petitioner puts it.

In Coscolluela,[51] the fact that it took the Ombudsman eight years to resolve a

case under preliminary investigation was considered violative of the right to
speedy disposition of cases. In Cervantes, [52] it took the OSP six years from
the filing of the initiatory complaint before deciding to file an information; this
was struck down as well. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[53] a three-year delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was
considered violative of the right. In Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,
[54]
 the preliminary investigation was resolved close to four years from the time
all the counter- and reply-affidavits were submitted to the Ombudsman, and
this was similarly struck down. In People v. Sandiganbayan,[55] the fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman lasted nearly
five years and five months, which the Court considered an inordinate delay.
The same is true in Angchangco, Jr.,[56] and Roque v. Office of the
Ombudsman,[57] where the delay involved a period of six years, more or less.
In Licaros,[58] the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the case even after
the lapse of more than 10 years after it was submitted for decision was
declared to involve "more than just a mere procrastination in the
proceedings."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2012 Order of

the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in OMB-MIN-01-0183
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. OMB-MIN-01-0183 and all proceedings or
actions arising therefrom are ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

SUMMARY:

o Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress'

prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a

complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

FACTS

On October 17, 1988, petitioner, then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration

and Deportation, allegedly, with evident bad faith, approve the application for
legalization of the stay of 32 aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984
in violation of EO 324 which prohibits legalization of said disqualified aliens, thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully
legalized by petitioner.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner fixing bail at P15,000. The
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until her physical condition improves as
she was recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. On May 24, 1991,
petitioner filed concurrently a Petition for Certiorari seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to defer her arraignment. The SC dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed
a motion for bill of particulars with Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the
aliens were conspicuously admitted in the complaint. The SC, in its resolution of
November 12, 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner’s arraignment not
later than 5 days from receipt of notice thereof.
 On December 7, 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to admit 32 amended informations. On December 2, 1993, the SC directed the
OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Said informations
were consolidated under Criminal Case No. 16698.

On July 31, 1995, the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an
order preventively suspending petitioner. The Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file
her opposition to the July 31 motion for the prosecution within 15 days from receipt
thereof.. Petitioner filed her opposition on August 22, 1995. On January 25, 1996, the
Sandiganbayan suspended petitioner from her position as Senator for 90 days.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day

preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an

incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support, specifically Section 13 of the said law which states that
any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act shall be suspended from office.

In Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the validity of Section 13 of RA 3019,
treating the suspension pendent lite of an accused public officer, may no longer be put
to issue. It applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act,
whether appointive or elective, permanent or temporary, career or non-career service.

In Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that preventive suspension is not a penalty
because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.

It is also settled that the use of the word “office” in Section 13 of RA 3019 indicates that
it applies to any officer which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.

The accused is given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the propriety of his
prosecution. However, it should be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the
criminal proceeding by way of motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, and should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged
in the information constitute the elements of an offense.
Petitioner claims that the amended informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the officials acts complained of were authorized
under EO 324.
However, in a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact
in the information. Hence, petitioner admitted the facts which constitute the elements of
the offense.
The pronouncement upholding the validity of the information filed behooved the
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to issue the order of preventive
suspension.

Also, the order of suspension prescribed in RA 3019 is different from that of Section
16(3) of Article Vi of the 1987 Constitution because the former is preventive (not a
penalty), and the latter is punitive imposed by either House of Congress upon its
members. RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress. The
doctrine of separation of powers simply recognized that each of the 3 co-equal
branches of government has exclusive prerogatives and effectively prevents one branch
from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of another.
 PLUNDER

GLORIA-MACAPAGAL ARROYO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and  PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas
(and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were
granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit
plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b)  of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then
President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices
and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating
with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public
treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for
bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt
against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas  then separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there
was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the
respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by
the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:

Procedural:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial
of the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:

1. Whether or not the State sufficiently   established the existence of conspiracy

among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of
plunder: (a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate
act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the
Prosecution?
RULING:

Re procedural issue:

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however,
that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order
that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the
conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be
limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise
of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that
the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct  grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty
to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the
existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their
collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the
Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express
agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging
conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of
the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the
sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but
rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A.
No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main
plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification,
but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused
to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The
main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the
information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they
are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the
offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind
was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10,
2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information
to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be
fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of
each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at

least Php50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten

wealth valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus
delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution
adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that
matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount.
There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or
Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury
(under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look
at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular
word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings
may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is
found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified
or restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for
one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or right used
improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs when “any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms
together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the
public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the
property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the
property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the
mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public
treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public
treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the
Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as
to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for
insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said
petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
 JOSEPH ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Summary:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed,
however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its
failure to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in
the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
Estrada, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means
or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
 death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech. (The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply
only to free speech cases, but not to penal statutes. )