Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks

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Cybersecurity Incident
& Vulnerability Response Playbooks
Operational Procedures for Planning and
Conducting Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability
Response Activities in FCEB Information Systems
Publication: November 2021

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
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CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 3
Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 3
Scope ................................................................................................................................................. 3
Audience ............................................................................................................................................ 4
Incident Response Playbook .................................................................................................................. 5
Incident Response Process ................................................................................................................ 5
Preparation Phase.............................................................................................................................. 6
Detection & Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 10
Containment ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Eradication & Recovery .................................................................................................................... 15
Post-Incident Activities ..................................................................................................................... 16
Coordination ..................................................................................................................................... 17
Vulnerability Response Playbook ......................................................................................................... 21
Preparation....................................................................................................................................... 21
Vulnerability Response Process ....................................................................................................... 22
Identification ..................................................................................................................................... 22
Evaluation ........................................................................................................................................ 23
Remediation ..................................................................................................................................... 24
Reporting and Notification ................................................................................................................ 24
Appendix A: Key Terms ....................................................................................................................... 25
Appendix B: Incident Response Checklist ............................................................................................ 27
Appendix C: Incident Response Preparation Checklist ........................................................................ 35
Appendix E: Vulnerability and Incident Categories ............................................................................... 38
Appendix F: Source Text...................................................................................................................... 39
Appendix G: Whole-of-Government Roles and Responsibilities ........................................................... 41
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CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 2

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INTRODUCTION
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is committed to leading the response to
cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities to safeguard the nation's critical assets. Section 6 of
Executive Order 14028 directed DHS, via CISA, to “develop a standard set of operational procedures
(playbook) to be used in planning and conducting cybersecurity vulnerability and incident response
activity respecting Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Information Systems.” 1
Overview
This document presents two playbooks: one for incident response and one for vulnerability response.
These playbooks provide FCEB agencies with a standard set of procedures to identify, coordinate,
remediate, recover, and track successful mitigations from incidents and vulnerabilities affecting FCEB
systems, data, and networks. In addition, future iterations of these playbooks may be useful for
organizations outside of the FCEB to standardize incident response practices. Working together across
all federal government organizations has proven to be an effective model for addressing vulnerabilities
and incidents. Building on lessons learned from previous incidents and incorporating industry best
practices, CISA intends for these playbooks to evolve the federal government’s practices for
cybersecurity response through standardizing shared practices that bring together the best people and
processes to drive coordinated actions.
The standardized processes and procedures described in these playbooks:
• Facilitate better coordination and effective response among affected

organizations,
• Enable tracking of cross-organizational successful actions,
• Allow for cataloging of incidents to better manage future events, and
• Guide analysis and discovery.
Agencies should use these playbooks to help shape overall defensive cyber operations to ensure
consistent and effective response and coordinated communication of response activities
Scope
These playbooks are for FCEB entities to focus on criteria for response and thresholds for coordination
and reporting. They include communications between FCEB entities and CISA; the connective
coordination between incident and vulnerability response activities; and common definitions for key
cybersecurity terms and aspects of the response process. Response activities in scope of this playbook
include those:
• Initiated by an FCEB agency (e.g., a local detection of malicious activity or

discovery of a vulnerability)
• Initiated by CISA (e.g., a CISA alert or directive) or other third parties, including
law enforcement, intelligence agencies, or commercial organizations,
contractors, and service providers
The Incident Response Playbook applies to incidents that involve confirmed malicious cyber activity
and for which a major incident (as defined by the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] in
1
Executive Order (EO) 14028: Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity
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Memorandum M-20-04 2 or successor memorandum) has been declared or not yet been reasonably
ruled out. The Vulnerability Response Playbook applies to vulnerabilities being actively exploited in the
wild. As required by EO 14028, the Director of OMB will issue guidance on FCEB agency use of these
playbooks.
Note: these playbooks do not cover response activities that involve threats to classified information or
National Security Systems (NSS) as defined by 44 U.S.C.3552(b)(6). See CNSSI1010 3 for
coordination/reporting guidance for incidents specific to NSS or systems that process classified
information.
Audience
These playbooks apply to all FCEB agencies, information systems used or operated by an agency, a
contractor of an agency, or another organization on behalf of an agency. It is the policy of the federal
government that information and communications technology (ICT) service providers who have
contracted with FCEB agencies must promptly report incidents to such agencies and to CISA. 4
2
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-20-04: Fiscal Year 2019-2020 Guidance on Federal Information
Security and Privacy Management Requirements
3
Committee on National Security Systems
4
EO 14028, Sec. 2. Removing Barriers to Sharing Threat Information
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INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAYBOOK

This playbook provides a standardized response
process for cybersecurity incidents and describes When to use this playbook
the process and completion through the incident Use this playbook for incidents that involve confirmed
response phases as defined in National Institute of malicious cyber activity for which a major incident has been
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special declared or not yet been reasonably ruled out.
Publication (SP) 800-61 Rev. 2, 5 including For example:
preparation, detection and analysis, containment,
eradication and recovery, and post-incident • Incidents involving lateral movement, credential
activities. This playbook describes the process access, exfiltration of data
FCEB agencies should follow for confirmed • Network intrusions involving more than one user or
system
malicious cyber activity for which a major incident
• Compromised administrator accounts
has been declared or not yet been reasonably ruled
out. This playbook does not apply to activity that does not appear
to have such major incident potential, such as:
• Incident response can be initiated by several
types of events, including but not limited to: • “Spills” of classified information or other incidents
• Automated detection systems or sensor that are believed to result from unintentional
alerts behavior only
• Agency user report • Users clicking on phishing emails when no
• Contractor or third-party ICT service provider compromise results
report • Commodity malware on a single machine or lost
• Internal or external organizational hardware that, in either case, is not likely to result
component incident report or situational in demonstrable harm to the national security
awareness update interests, foreign relations, or economy of the
• Third-party reporting of network activity to
United States or to the public confidence, civil
known compromised infrastructure, detection
liberties, or public health and safety of the
of malicious code, loss of services, etc.
American people.
• Analytics or hunt teams that identify
potentially malicious or otherwise
unauthorized activity
Incident Response Process
The incident response process starts with the declaration of the incident, as shown in Figure 1. In this
context, “declaration” refers to the identification of an incident and communication to CISA and agency
network defenders rather than formal declaration of a major incident as defined in applicable law and
policy. Succeeding sections, which are organized by phases of the IR lifecycle, describe each step in
more detail. Many activities are iterative and may continuously occur and evolve until the incident is
closed out. Figure 1 illustrates incident response activities in terms of these phases, and Appendix B
provides a companion checklist to track activities to completion.
5
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-61 Rev. 2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
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Figure 1: Incident Response Process
Preparation Phase
Prepare for major incidents before they occur to mitigate any impact on the
organization. Preparation activities include:
• Documenting and understanding policies and procedures for incident response

• Instrumenting the environment to detect suspicious and malicious activity
• Establishing staffing plans
• Educating users on cyber threats and notification procedures
• Leveraging cyber threat intelligence (CTI) to proactively identify potential
malicious activity
Define baseline systems and networks before an incident occurs to understand the basics of “normal”
activity. Establishing baselines enables defenders to identify deviations. Preparation also includes
• Having infrastructure in place to handle complex incidents, including classified

and out-of-band communications
• Developing and testing courses of action (COAs) for containment and eradication
• Establishing means for collecting digital forensics and other data or evidence
The goal of these items is to ensure resilient architectures and systems to maintain critical operations in
a compromised state. Active defense measures that employ methods such as redirection and
monitoring of adversary activities may also play a role in developing a robust incident response. 6
6
For example, “Deception: Mislead, confuse, hide critical assets from, or expose covertly tainted assets to the adversary,” as
defined in NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 2: Developing Cyber Resilient Systems: A Systems Security Engineering Approach.
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Preparation Activities
Policies and Procedures all staffing resources that may draw from in-house
capabilities, available capabilities at a parent
Document incident response plans, including
agency/department, third-party organization, or a
processes and procedures for designating a
combination thereof. Conduct regular recovery
coordination lead (incident manager). Put policies
exercises to test full organizational continuity of
and procedures in place to escalate and report
operations plan (COOP) and failover/backup/
major incidents and those with impact on the
recovery systems to be sure these work as
agency’s mission. Document contingency plans
planned.
for additional resourcing and “surge support” with
assigned roles and responsibilities. Policies and Cyber Threat Intelligence
plans should address notification, interaction, and
Actively monitor intelligence feeds for threat or
evidence sharing with law enforcement.
vulnerability advisories from government, trusted
Instrumentation partners, open sources, and commercial entities.
Cyber threat intelligence can include threat
Develop and maintain an accurate picture of
landscape reporting, threat actor profiles and
infrastructure (systems, networks, cloud
intents, organizational targets and campaigns, as
platforms, and contractor-hosted networks) by
well as more specific threat indicators and
widely implementing telemetry to support system
courses of action. Ingest cyber threat indicators
and sensor-based detection and monitoring
and integrated threat feeds into a SIEM, and use
capabilities such as antivirus (AV) software;
other defensive capabilities to identify and block
endpoint detection and response (EDR)
known malicious behavior. Threat indicators can
solutions; 7 data loss prevention (DLP) capabilities;
include:
intrusion detection and prevention systems
(IDPS); authorization, host, application and cloud • Atomic indicators, such as domains and
logs; 8 network flows, packet capture (PCAP); and IP addresses, that can detect adversary
security information and event management infrastructure and tools
(SIEM) systems. Monitor for alerts generated by • Computed indicators, such as Yara rules
and regular expressions, that detect
CISA's EINSTEIN intrusion detection system and
known malicious artifacts or signs of
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) activity
program to detect changes in cyber posture. • Patterns and behaviors, such as analytics
Implement additional requirements for logging, log that detect adversary tactics, techniques,
retention, and log management based on and procedures (TTPs)
Executive Order 14028, Sec. 8. Improving the Atomic indicators can initially be valuable to
Federal Government's Investigative and detect signs of a known campaign. However,
Remediation Capabilities, 9 and ensure those logs because adversaries often change their
are collected centrally. infrastructure (e.g., watering holes, botnets, C2
servers) between campaigns, the “shelf-life” of
Trained Response Personnel
atomic indicators to detect new adversary activity
Ensure personnel are trained, exercised, and is limited. In addition, advanced threat actors
ready to respond to cybersecurity incidents. Train
7
EO 14028, Sec. 7. Improving Detection of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Incidents on Federal Government Networks
8
NIST SP 800-92: Guide to Computer Security Log Management
9
E0 14028, Sec. 8. Improving the Federal Government's Investigative and Remediation Capabilities
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might leverage different infrastructure against Active Defense

different targets or switch to new infrastructure
FCEB agencies with advanced defensive
during a campaign when their activities are
capabilities and staff might establish active
detected. Finally, adversaries often hide in their
defense capabilities—such as the ability to
targeted environments, using native operating
redirect an adversary to a sandbox or honeynet
system utilities and other resources to achieve
system for additional study, or “dark nets”—to
their goals. For these reasons, agencies should
delay the ability of an adversary to discover the
use patterns and behaviors, or adversary TTPs, to
agency’s legitimate infrastructure. Network
identify malicious activity when possible. Although
defenders can implement honeytokens (fictitious
more difficult to apply detection methods and
data objects) and fake accounts to act as canaries
verify application, TTPs provide more useful and
for malicious activity. These capabilities enable
sustainable context about threat actors, their
defenders to study the adversary’s behavior and
intentions, and their methods than atomic
TTPs and thereby build a full picture of adversary
indicators alone. The MITRE ATT&CK®
capabilities.
framework documents and explains adversary
TTPs in detail making it a valuable resource for Communications and Logistics
network defenders. 10
Establish local and cross-agency communication
Sharing cyber threat intelligence is a critical procedures and mechanisms for coordinating
element of preparation. FCEB agencies are major incidents with CISA and other sharing
strongly encouraged to continuously share cyber partners and determine the information sharing
threat intelligence—including adversary protocols to use (i.e., agreed-upon standards).
indicators, TTPs, and associated defensive Define methods for handling classified information
measures (also known as “countermeasures”)— and data, if required. Establish communication
with CISA and other partners. The primary channels (chat rooms, phone bridges) and
method for sharing cyber threat information, method for out-of-band coordination. 14
indicators, and associated defensive measures
Operational Security (OPSEC)
with CISA is via the Automated Indicator Sharing
(AIS) program. 11 FCEB agencies should be Take steps to ensure that IR and defensive
enrolled in AIS. If the agency is not enrolled in systems and processes will be operational during
AIS, contact CISA for more information. 12 an attack, particularly in the event of pervasive
Agencies should use the Cyber Threat Indicator compromises—such as a ransomware attack or
and Defensive Measures Submission System—a one involving an aggressive attacker that may
secure, web-enabled method—to share with CISA attempt to undermine defensive measures and
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures distract or mislead defenders. These measures
that are not applicable or appropriate to share via include:
AIS. 13
• Segmenting and managing SOC systems
separately from the broader enterprise IT
systems,
10 13
See Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK® Mapping DHS CISA Cyber Threat Indicator and Defensive Measure
Framework for guidance on using ATT&CK to analyze and Submission System
report on cybersecurity threats. 14
NIST SP 800-47 Rev. 1: Managing the Security of
11
CISA Automated Indicator Sharing Information Exchanges
12
CISA Automated Indicator Sharing
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• Managing sensors and security devices analysis tools and sandbox software for analyzing
via out-of-band means, malware. Implement a ticketing or case
• Notifying users of compromised systems management system that captures pertinent
via phone rather than email,
details of:
• Using hardened workstations to conduct
monitoring and response activities, and • Anomalous or suspicious activity, such as
• Ensuring that defensive systems have affected systems, applications, and users;
robust backup and recovery processes.
• Activity type;
Avoid “tipping off” an attacker by having • Specific threat group(s);
processes and systems to reduce the likelihood of • Adversary tactics, techniques, and
detection of IR activities (e.g., do not submit
procedures (TTPs) employed; and
malware samples to a public analysis service or
• Impact.
notify users of potentially comprised machines via
email).
Detect Activity
Technical Infrastructure Leverage threat intelligence to create rules and
Implement capabilities to contain, replicate, signatures to identify the activity associated with
analyze, reconstitute, and document the incident and to scope its reach. Configure
compromised hosts; implement the capability to tools and analyze logs and alerts. Look for signs
collect digital forensics and other data. Establish of incident activity and potentially related
secure storage (i.e., only accessible by incident information to determine the type of incident, e.g.,
responders) for incident data and reporting. malware attack, system compromise, session
Provide means for collecting forensic evidence, hijack, data corruption, data exfiltration, etc.
such as disk and active memory imaging, and
See Appendix C for a checklist for preparation
means for safely handling malware. Obtain
activities.
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Detection & Analysis

The most challenging aspect of the incident response process is often accurately
detecting and assessing cybersecurity incidents: determining whether an incident
has occurred and, if so, the type, extent, and magnitude of the compromise within
cloud, operational technology (OT), hybrid, host, and network systems. To detect
and analyze events, implement defined processes, appropriate technology, and
sufficient baseline information to monitor, detect, and alert on anomalous and suspicious activity.
Ensure there are procedures to deconflict potential incidents with authorized activity (e.g., confirm that
a suspected incident is not simply a network administrator using remote admin tools to perform
software updates). As the U.S. government’s lead for asset response, CISA will partner with affected
agencies in all aspects of the detection and analysis process.
Detection & Analysis Activities

Collect and Preserve Data
Declare Incident
Collect and preserve data for incident verification,
Declare an incident by reporting it to CISA at
categorization, prioritization, mitigation, reporting,
https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ and alerting agency
and attribution. When necessary and possible,
IT leadership to the need for investigation and
such information should be preserved and
response. CISA can assist in determining the
safeguarded as best evidence for use in any
severity of the incident and whether it should be
potential law enforcement investigation. Collect
declared a major incident. Note: FCEB agencies
data from the perimeter, the internal network, and
must promptly report all cybersecurity incidents,
the endpoint (server and host). Collect audit,
regardless of severity, to CISA
transaction, intrusion, connection, system
Determine Investigation Scope performance, and user activity logs. When an
endpoint requires forensic analysis, capture a
Use available data to identify the type of access,
memory and disk image for evidence
the extent to which assets have been affected, the
preservation. Collect evidence, including forensic
level of privilege attained by the adversary, and
data, according to procedures that meet all
the operational or informational impact. Discover
applicable policies and standards and account for
associated malicious activity by following the trail
it in a detailed log that is kept for all evidence. For
of network data; discover associated host-based
more information, see NIST Computer Security
artifacts by examining host, firewall, and proxy
Incident Handling Guide, SP 800-61 r2. 15 Extract
logs along with other network data, such as router
all relevant threat information (atomic, computed,
traffic. Initial scoping of an incident to determine
and behavioral indicators and countermeasures)
adversarial activity may include analyzing results
to share with IR teams and with CISA.
from:
• An automated detection system or sensor; Perform Technical Analysis
• A report from a user, contractor, or third- Develop a technical and contextual understanding
party information and communication
of the incident. Correlate information, assess
technologies (ICT) service provider; or
• An incident report or situational anomalous activity against a known baseline to
awareness update from other internal or determine root cause, and document adversary
external organizational components. TTPs to enable prioritization of the subsequent
15
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2: Computer Security Incident
Handling Guide
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response activities. The goal of this analysis is to within the environment. These conditions will
examine the breadth of data sources throughout inform triage and post-incident activity. Assess
the environment to discover at least some part of networks and systems for changes that may have
an attack chain, if not all of it. As information been made to either evade defenses or facilitate
evolves and the investigation progresses, update persistent access.
the scope to incorporate new information.
Gather Incident Indicators
Correlate Events and Document Timeline
Identify and document indicators that can be used
Acquire, store, and analyze logs to correlate for correlative analysis on the network. Indicators
adversarial activity. Table 1 presents an example can provide insight into the adversary’s
of logs and event data that are commonly capabilities and infrastructure. Indicators as
employed to detect and analyze attacker standalone artifacts are valuable in the early
activities. 16,17 A simple knowledge base should be stages of incident response.
established for reference during response to the
Analyze for Common Adversary TTPs
incident. Thoroughly document every step taken
during this and subsequent phases. Create a Compare TTPs to adversary TTPs documented in
timeline of all relevant findings. The timeline will ATT&CK and analyze how the TTPs fit into the
allow the team to account for all adversary activity attack lifecycle. TTPs describe “why,” “what,” and
on the network and will assist in creating the “how.” Tactics describe the technical objective an
findings report at the conclusion of the response. adversary is trying to achieve (“why”), techniques
are different mechanisms they use to achieve it
Identify Anomalous Activity
(“what”), and procedures are exactly how the
Assess and profile affected systems and networks adversary achieves a specific result (“how”).
for subtle activity that might be adversary Responding to TTPs enables defenders to
behavior. Adversaries will often use legitimate, hypothesize the adversary’s most likely course of
native operating system utilities and scripting action. Table 1 provides some common adversary
languages once they gain a foothold in an techniques that should be investigated. 18
environment to avoid detection. This process will
Validate and Refine Investigation Scope
enable the team to identify deviations from the
established baseline activity and can be Using available data and results of ongoing
particularly important in identifying activities such response activities, identify any additional
as attempts to leverage legitimate credentials and potentially impacted systems, devices, and
native capabilities in the environment. associated accounts. From this information, new
indicator of compromise (IOCs) and TTPs might
Identify Root Cause and Enabling Conditions
be identified that can provide further feedback into
Attempt to identify the root cause of the incident detection tools. In this way, an incident is scoped
and collect threat information that can be used in over time. As information evolves, update and
further searches and to inform subsequent communicate the scope to all stakeholders to
response efforts. Identify the conditions that ensure a common operating picture. Note: see
enabled the adversary to access and operate Key Questions to Answer for guidance.
16 17
Derived from the MITRE ATT&CK® Framework. Note: this EO 14028, Sec. 8. Improving the Federal Government's
table is a representative sampling of common tactics, Investigative and Remediation Capabilities
techniques, and related logs, and is not intended to be 18
complete. See Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK® Mapping
Framework for guidance on mapping TTPs to ATT&CK to
analyze and report on cybersecurity threats.
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Key Questions to Answer

• What was the initial attack vector? (i.e., How did the adversary gain initial access to the network?)
• How is the adversary accessing the environment?
• Is the adversary exploiting vulnerabilities to achieve access or privilege?
• How is the adversary maintaining command and control?
• Does the actor have persistence on the network or device?
• What is the method of persistence (e.g., malware backdoor, webshell, legitimate credentials, remote tools, etc.)?
• What accounts have been compromised and what privilege level (e.g., domain admin, local admin, user account, etc.)?
• What method is being used for reconnaissance? (Discovering the reconnaissance method may provide an opportunity for
detection and to determine possible intent.)
• Is lateral movement suspected or known? How is lateral movement conducted (e.g., RDP, network shares, malware, etc.)?
• Has data been exfiltrated and, if so, what kind and via what mechanism?
Table 1: Example Adversary Tactics, Techniques, and Relevant Log and Event Data
Tactic Common Techniques Log and Event Sources Indicators

Phishing, redirect, and payload
Phishing [T1566], Drive-by servers (domains and IP
Compromise [T1189], Exploit Email, web proxy, server addresses), delivery mechanisms
Initial Access
Public Facing Application [T1190], application logs, IDS/IPS (lures, macros, downloaders,
External Remote Services [T1133] droppers, etc.), compromised
credentials, web shells
Host event logs, Windows

Command and Script Interpreters Invocation of command or scripting
event logs, Sysmon, anti-
Execution [T1059], Exploitation for Client interpreter, exploitation, API calls,
malware, EDR, PowerShell
Execution [T1203] tools, malware, payloads
logs
Account Manipulation [T1098],

Host event logs, Scheduled Tasks, registry keys,
Persistence Scheduled Task/Job [T1053], Valid
Authentication logs, Registry autoruns, etc.
Accounts [T1078]
Mismatch of users and

Exploitation of Remote Services
applications/credentials, workstation
Lateral [T1210], Remote Session Hijacking Internal network logs, host
to workstation communication,
Movement [T1563], Software Deployment event logs, Application Logs
beaconing from hosts not intended
Tools [T1072]
to be internet accessible, etc.
Brute Force [T1110], Modify Authentication Logs,

Credential LSASS reads, command or scripting
Authentication Process [T1556], Domain Controller Logs,
Access interpreters accessing LSASS, etc.
Man-in-the-Middle [T1557] network traffic monitoring
Firewall, Web Proxy, DNS,

Application Layer Protocol [T1071],
C2 Network Traffic, Cloud C2 domains, IP addresses
Protocol Tunneling [T1572]
activity logs, IDS/IPS
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Firewall, Web Proxy, DNS,

Domains, URLs, IP addresses,
Exfiltration [T1041], Exfiltration Over Network Traffic, Cloud
IDS/IPS signatures
Alternative Protocol [T1048] activity logs, IDS/IPS
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Third-Party Analysis Support (if needed): third-party assistance is responsible for

coordinating with CISA and facilitating access
For potentially major incidents, agencies needing
during the incident response, including access to
assistance can reach out to CISA. Each FCEB
externally hosted systems.
agency has a Federal Network Authorization
(FNA) on file with CISA to enable incident Adjust Tools:
response and hunt assistance. When seeking
The IR team should use its developing
outside assistance, the default first action by the
understanding of the adversary’s TTPs to modify
impacted agency should be to activate their
tools to slow the pace of the adversarial advance
standing FNA and request CISA assistance.
and increase the likelihood of detection. The focus
Based on availability, CISA may provide a threat
should be on preventing and detecting tactics—
hunting team to assist. 19 CISA may collaborate
such as execution, persistence, credential access,
with other agencies—such as the National
lateral movement, and command and control—to
Security Agency (NSA) or U.S. Cyber
minimize the likelihood of exfiltration and/or
Command—to provide expertise or supplement
operational or informational impact. IOC
CISA’s capabilities.
signatures can be incorporated into prevention
Agencies may also bring on a third-party IR and detection tools to impose temporary
service provider to assist. Such providers operational cost upon the adversary and assist
supplement rather than replace the assistance with scoping the incident. However, the adversary
provided by CISA. The NSA National Cyber can introduce new tools to the network and/or
Assistance Program (NSCAP) 20 provides a list of modify existing tools to subvert IOC-centric
accredited IR providers. An FCEB agency using response mechanisms.
19 20
Level of CISA analysis support will be determined by National Security Agency (NSA) National Security Cyber
resources available and priority of incident. Assistance Program
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Containment
Containment is a high priority for incident response, especially for major incidents.
The objective is to prevent further damage and reduce the immediate impact of the
incident by removing the adversary’s access. The particular scenario will drive the
type of containment strategy used. For example, the containment approach to an
active sophisticated adversary using fileless malware will be different than the
containment approach for ransomware.
Key containment activities include:

Considerations
When evaluating containment courses of action, • Isolating impacted systems and network
segments from each other and/or from
consider:
non-impacted systems and networks. If
• Any additional adverse impacts to mission this is needed, consider the mission or
operations, availability of services (e.g., business needs and how to provide
network connectivity, services provided to services so missions can continue during
external parties), this phase to the extent possible.
• Duration of the containment process, • Capturing forensic images to preserve
resources needed, and effectiveness evidence for legal use (if applicable) and
(e.g., full vs. partial containment; full vs. further investigation of the incident.
unknown level of containment), and • Updating firewall filtering.
• Any impact on the collection, preservation, • Blocking (and logging) of unauthorized
securing, and documentation of evidence. accesses; blocking malware sources.
• Closing specific ports and mail servers or
Some adversaries may actively monitor defensive other relevant servers and services.
response measures and shift their methods to • Changing system admin passwords,
evade detection and containment. Defenders rotating private keys, and
should therefore develop as complete a picture as service/application account secrets where
possible of the attacker’s capabilities and potential compromise is suspected and revocation
of privileged access.
reactions to avoid “tipping off” the adversary.
• Directing the adversary to a sandbox (a
Containment is challenging because defenders form of containment) to monitor the actor’s
must be as complete as possible in identifying activity, gather additional evidence, and
adversary activity, while considering the risk of identify attack vectors. Note: this
allowing the adversary to persist until the full containment activity is limited to advanced
scope of the compromise can be determined. SOCs with mature capabilities.
Containment activities for major incidents should Ensure that the containment scope encompasses
be closely coordinated with CISA. all related incidents and activity—especially all
adversary activity. If new signs of compromise are
Containment Activities
found, return to the technical analysis step to re-
Implement short-term mitigations to isolate threat scope the incident. Upon successful containment
actor activity and prevent additional damage from (i.e., no new signs of compromise), preserve
the activity or pivoting into other systems. evidence for reference or law enforcement
investigation, adjust detection tools, and move to
eradication and recovery.
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Eradication & Recovery

The objective of this phase is to allow the return of normal operations by eliminating
artifacts of the incident (e.g., remove malicious code, re-image infected systems)
and mitigating the vulnerabilities or other conditions that were exploited. Before
moving to eradication, ensure that all means of persistent access into the network
have been accounted for, that the adversary activity is sufficiently contained, and
that all evidence has been collected. This is often an iterative process. It may also involve hardening or
modifying the environment to protect targeted systems if the root cause of the intrusion and/or initial
access vector is known. It is possible that eradication and recovery actions can be executed
simultaneously. Note: coordinate with ICT service providers, commercial vendors, and law enforcement
prior to the initiation of eradication efforts.
• Developing response scenarios for threat

Execute Eradication Plan actor use of alternative attack vectors.
Take actions to eliminate all evidence of • Allowing adequate time to ensure all
compromise and prevent the threat actor from systems are clear of all possible threat
maintaining a presence in the environment. actor persistence mechanisms
(backdoors, etc.) as adversaries often use
Ensure evidence has been preserved as more than one mechanism.
necessary. Threat actors often have multiple
persistent backdoor accesses into systems and After executing the eradication plan, continue with
networks and can hop back into ‘clean’ areas if detection and analysis activities to monitor for any
eradication is not well orchestrated and/or not signs of adversary re-entry or use of new access
stringent enough. Therefore, eradication plans methods. If adversary activity is discovered after
should be well formulated and coordinated before completion of eradication efforts, contain the
execution. If the adversary exploited a specific activity, and return to technical analysis until the
vulnerability, initiate the Vulnerability Response true scope of the compromise and initial infection
Playbook below to address the vulnerability during vectors are identified. If no new adversary activity
eradication activities. is detected, enter the recovery phase.
Eradication Activities Recover System(s) and Services

Restore systems to normal operations and
• Remediating all infected IT environments
(e.g., cloud, OT, hybrid, host, and network confirm that they are functioning normally. The
systems). main challenges of this phase are confirming that
• Reimaging affected systems (often from remediation has been successful, rebuilding
‘gold’ sources), rebuilding systems from systems, reconnecting networks, and recreating
scratch. or correcting information.
• Rebuilding hardware (required when the
incident involves rootkits). Recovery Actions 21
• Replacing compromised files with clean
versions. • Reconnecting rebuilt/new systems to
• Installing patches. networks.
• Resetting passwords on compromised • Tightening perimeter security (e.g.,
accounts. firewall rulesets, boundary router access
• Monitoring for any signs of adversary control lists) and zero trust access rules.
response to containment activities.
21See NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery

for additional guidance.
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• Testing systems thoroughly, including environment. To validate that normal operations

security controls. have resumed, consider performing an
• Monitoring operations for abnormal independent test or review of
behaviors.
compromise/response-related activity. To help
A key aspect to the recovery is to have enhanced detect related attacks, review cyber threat
vigilance and controls in place to validate that the intelligence (including network situational
recovery plan has been successfully executed awareness), and closely monitor the environment
and that no signs of adversary activity exist in the for evidence of threat actor activity.
Post-Incident Activities
The goal of this phase is to document the incident, inform agency leadership,
harden the environment to prevent similar incidents, and apply lessons learned to
improve the handling of future incidents.
Adjust Sensors, Alerts, and Log Collection Perform Hotwash

Add enterprise-wide detections to mitigate against Conduct a lessons-learned analysis to review the
adversary TTPs that were successfully executed effectiveness and efficiency of incident handling.
during the incident. Identify and address “blind Capture lessons learned, initial root cause,
spots” to ensure adequate coverage moving problems executing courses of action, and any
forward. Closely monitor the environment for missing policies and procedures.
evidence of persistent adversary presence.
The primary objectives for the analysis include:
Advanced SOCs should consider emulating
adversary TTPs to ensure recently implemented • Ensuring root-cause has been eliminated
countermeasures are effective in detecting or or mitigated.
mitigating the observed activity. This testing • Identifying infrastructure problems to
should be closely coordinated with a blue team to address.
• Identifying organizational policy and
ensure that they are not mistaken for true
procedural problems to address.
adversary activity. • Reviewing and updating roles,
responsibilities, interfaces, and authority
Finalize Reports to ensure clarity.
Provide post-incident updates as required by law • Identifying technical or operational training
and policy. 22 Work with CISA to provide required needs.
artifacts, close the ticket, and/or take additional • Improving tools required to perform
protection, detection, analysis, or
response action.
response actions.
22
CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines
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Coordination
Coordination is foundational to effective incident response. It is critical that the FCEB
agency experiencing the incident and CISA coordinate early and often throughout
the response process. It is also important to understand that some agencies have
special authorities, expertise, and information that are extremely beneficial during an
incident. This section highlights these aspects of coordination.
Coordination with CISA

CTI, that can help agencies throughout the IR
Cyber defense capabilities vary widely. For this
lifecycle. The full list of cybersecurity services
reason, coordinating involves different degrees of
available to the FCEB are listed in the CISA
engagement between the affected agency and
Services Catalog, page 18. 23
CISA. As a baseline, every cybersecurity incident
affecting an FCEB agency must be reported to Reporting requirements for FCEB agencies are
CISA. For organizations with mature security defined by FISMA and actioned by CISA. See the
operations efforts, reporting and information numbered circles in Figure 2 for reporting and
sharing are key to assisting others. coordination activities that should be a part of the
IR process. See Appendix B, #11, for a
Agencies also leverage CISA’s cyber defense
companion checklist to track coordination
services to supplement their own IR capabilities.
activities to completion.
CISA provides a variety of services, such as
threat hunting, analytics, malware analysis, and
Figure 2: Numbered IR Coordination Activities
23
CISA Services Catalog, First Edition: Autumn 2020
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It is essential for the affected department or number for the incident and (2) a risk rating based
agency to closely collaborate and coordinate with on the CISA National Cyber Incident Scoring
CISA on each step in the IR flow chart. Some of System (NCISS) score. 26, 27
the essential coordination and communication
activities are defined by the numbered circles.
3) Share IOCs, TTPs, data
Each number corresponds to a description below: The affected FCEB agency share relevant log
data, cyber threat indicators with associated
1) Inform and Update CISA
context (including associated TTPs, if available),
The FCEB agency provides situational awareness and recommended defensive measures with CISA
reports to CISA, including: and sharing partners. Sharing additional threat
information is a concurrent process throughout
• Notifying CISA within 1 hour of incident
the containment phase. Incident updates include
determination as directed by OMB M-20-
the following:
04. Note: FCEB ICT Service providers
should provide notification of cyber • Updated scope
incidents in accordance with FCEB • Updated timeline (findings, response
Agency Contracting Officer (CO) efforts, etc.)
requirements, which include National • New indicators of adversary activity
Security System (NSS) reporting • Updated understanding of impact
requirements. 24 • Updated status of outstanding efforts
• Where applicable, notifying their • Estimation of time until containment,
appropriate Congressional Committees, eradication, etc.
their Office of Inspector General (OIG),
and OMB Office of the Federal Chief 4) CISA Shares Coordinated Cyber Intelligence
Information Officer (OFCIO) as directed by CISA—in coordination with the intelligence
OMB M-20-04. community and law enforcement—shares related
• Providing incident updates to CISA as cyber intelligence to involved organizations.
appropriate until all eradication activities
are complete or until CISA agrees with the 5) Report to Federal Law Enforcement
FCEB agency that the incident is closed. The FCEB agency reports incidents to federal law
• Complying with additional reporting enforcement as appropriate.
requirements for major incidents as
mandated by OMB and other federal 6) CISA Determines Escalation
policy. 25 CISA or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
determines if the incident warrants Cyber Unified
2) CISA Provides Incident Tracking and NCISS
Coordination Group (C-UCG) escalation, and, if
Rating
so, recommends establishment of a C-UCG in
Within one hour of receiving the initial report, accordance with the provisions of PPD-41 §
CISA provides the agency with (1) a tracking V.B.b. C-UCG is the primary mechanism for
24
internal reporting chain of the organization, CISA must
EO 14028, Sec. 2. Removing Barriers to Sharing Threat receive the major incident report within 1 hour of major
Information incident declaration.
25
Per OMB M-20-04, appropriate analysis of whether the 26
incident is a major incident will include the agency CIO,
27
CISO, mission or system owners, and, if it is a breach, the OMB M-20-04
Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP). Regardless of the
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coordination between and among federal agency will confer with CISA to ensure all
agencies in response to a significant cyber appropriate actions have been taken. CISA will
incident as well as for integration of private sector evaluate these materials and:
partners into incident response efforts.
• Determine that the incident is adequately
7) Provide Final Incident Report addressed, and close the CISA ticket.
• Determine if additional response actions
The FCEB agency provides CISA post-incident
must be completed and request the
updates as required.
agency complete them prior to closing the
8) CISA Conducts Verification and Validation ticket.
• Request more information, including log
To ensure completion of recovery, CISA will
validate agency incident and vulnerability data and technical artifacts.
response results and processes. Validation • Recommend the use of CISA or other
assures agencies that they are meeting baseline third-party incident response services.
standards, implementing all important steps, and Affected FCEB entities must take CISA-required
have fully eradicated an incident or vulnerability. actions prior to closing the incident. Working with
For all incidents that require the use of the affected FCEB entities, CISA determines the
playbook, agencies must proactively provide actions, which vary depending on the nature of
completed incident response checklists and a the incident and eradication.
completed incident report to close the ticket. If an
agency is unable to complete the checklist, the
Intergovernmental Coordination
In a broader context, FCEB cyber defensive operations are not alone in tackling major incidents.
Several government departments and agencies have defined roles and responsibilities and are
coordinating across the government even before incidents occur. These roles and responsibilities can
be described in terms of concurrent lines of effort (LOEs): asset response, threat response, intelligence
support, and affected agency response; together these LOEs ensure a comprehensive response. Table
2 summarizes the LOEs for agencies in responding to cyber security incidents.
Table 2: Federal Government Leads for Lines of Effort per the NCIRP 28
Line of Effort Role Lead Federal Agency

Threat Conduct investigative activity and execute courses of action Department of Justice through the FBI
Response intended to mitigate the immediate threat; facilitate information and National Cyber Investigative Joint
sharing and operational coordination with asset response. Task Force (NCIJTF)
Asset Conduct response activities with FCEB agencies to protect Department of Homeland Security
Response assets, mitigate vulnerabilities, and reduce impacts of cyber (DHS) through the CISA
incidents. Coordinate with threat response and provide
guidance on how to best utilize federal resources.
Intelligence Facilitate building of situational threat awareness and sharing Office of the Director of National
Support of related intelligence; the integrated analysis of threat trends Intelligence (ODNI) through Cyber
and events; the identification of knowledge gaps; and the Threat Intelligence Integration Center
ability to degrade or mitigate adversary capabilities. (CTIIC)
28
National Cyber Incident Response Plan
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For major incidents or incidents that may become major, CISA is the “front door” for agencies for asset
response. CISA will work with affected FCEB agencies to determine their needs, provide
recommendations for services, and coordinate with other agencies (e.g., NSA) to provide a whole-of-
government response. By serving as a single coordination point, CISA can ease the burden on FCEB
agencies by facilitating the assistance available across the government.
Depending on the nature of events and involved organizations, FCEB agencies may also work directly
with other LOE lead agencies in support of those LOEs. Figure 3 identifies the organizations providing
the types of data and information that inform incident detection, analysis, and response.
The whole-of-government roles and responsibilities are outlined in Appendix G.
Figure 3: Whole of Government Asset Response
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VULNERABILITY RESPONSE PLAYBOOK

One of the most straightforward and effective means for an
When to use this playbook
organization to prioritize vulnerability response and protect
Vulnerabilities in scope for this
themselves from being compromised is by focusing on playbook are those actively exploited
vulnerabilities that are already being actively exploited in the "in the wild," namely, any vulnerability
wild. This playbook standardizes the high-level process that that is observed to be used by
agencies should follow when responding to these urgent and adversaries to gain unauthorized
high-priority vulnerabilities. It is not a replacement for existing entry into computing resources.
vulnerability management programs in place at an agency but
instead builds on existing vulnerability management practices. A standardized response process
ensures that agencies, including CISA, can understand the impact of these critical and dangerous
vulnerabilities across the federal government.
Vulnerabilities that this playbook addresses could be observed by the impacted agency, CISA, industry
partners, or others in the related mission space. Most vulnerabilities will have common vulnerabilities
and exposures (CVE) descriptors. In other cases, agencies might encounter new vulnerabilities that do
not yet have a CVE (e.g., zero-days) or vulnerabilities resulting from misconfigurations. Appendix D
provides a companion checklist to track response activities to completion.
Preparation
Effective vulnerability response builds on strong vulnerability management. Ensure that effective
vulnerability management practices are being followed. 29 Such practices include building and
maintaining robust asset management that includes inventorying:
• Agency-operated systems and networks,

• Systems and networks that involve partnerships with other organizations, and
• Systems and networks operated by others, including cloud, contractor, and
service provider systems.
Have a process in place to understand the relevance of vulnerabilities to the environment by tracking
operating systems and other applications for all systems. Understand all systems might have
vulnerabilities and the implication of potential vulnerabilities on operations.
29
NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 3: Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies
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Vulnerability Response Process

Standard vulnerability management programs include phases for identifying, analyzing, remediating,
and reporting vulnerabilities. Figure 4 describes the vulnerability response process in terms of standard
vulnerability management program phases.
Figure 4: Vulnerability Response Phases
Identification
Proactively identify reports of vulnerabilities that are actively exploited in the wild by
monitoring threat feeds and information sources, including but not limited to:
• CISA resources; for example:

o CISA/US-CERT National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) products,
which include the weekly bulletins containing vulnerability summaries,
and
 Note: all agencies should subscribe to NCAS products. 30
o CISA Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01, Managing
Unacceptable Risk of Known Vulnerabilities, which is continually updated
with vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild.
 Note: subscribe to NCAS products for all BOD 22-01 vulnerability
updates, which are announced via Current Activities.
• External threat or vulnerability feeds, such as NIST’s National Vulnerability
Database, 31 that can also show vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild outside
FCEB agencies.
30
CISA National Cyber Awareness System
31
NIST National Vulnerability Database
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• Internal SOC monitoring and incident response, which can detect vulnerabilities
being exploited at an agency.
Capture additional information about the vulnerability to help with the rest of the
response process, including the severity of the vulnerability, susceptible software
versions, and IOCs or other investigation steps that can be used to determine if it
was exploited.
Evaluation
First, determine whether the vulnerability exists in the environment and how critical
the underlying software or hardware is, using methodologies such as Stakeholder-
Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC). 32 Existing patch and asset
management tools are critical and can be used to automate the detection process
for most vulnerabilities. For actively exploited vulnerabilities, use the “rapid
response” processes in these tools (e.g., CDM). In rare cases, such as one-off misconfigurations and
zero-days, additional manual scans may need to be performed. Binding Operational Directives (BODs)
or Emergency Directives (EDs) issued by CISA may also list specific technical steps to evaluate
whether a vulnerability exists.
If the vulnerability exists in the environment, address the vulnerability itself—as described in the
Remediation section below—and determine whether it has been exploited in the agency's environment.
Use existing best practices to find signs of exploitation, including:
• A sweep for known IOCs associated with exploitation of the vulnerability.

• Investigation of any abnormal activity associated with vulnerable systems or services, including
anomalous access attempts and behavior.
• Completion of any detection processes in CISA directives.
• If needed, collaboration with a third-party incident responder.
If the vulnerability was exploited in the environment, immediately begin incident response activities as
described in the Incident Response Playbook.
At the end of the Evaluation phase, the goal is to understand the status of each system in the
environment as:
• Not Affected. The system is not vulnerable.

• Susceptible. The system is vulnerable, but no signs of exploitation were found, and
remediation has begun.
• Compromised. The system was vulnerable, signs of exploitation were found, and incident
response and vulnerability remediation has begun.
32
Prioritizing Vulnerability Response: A Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization
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Remediation
Remediate all actively exploited vulnerabilities that exist on or within the environment
in a timely manner. In most cases, remediation should consist of patching. In other
cases, the following mitigations may be appropriate:
• Limiting access;
• Isolating vulnerable systems, applications, services, profiles, or
other assets; or
• Making permanent configuration changes.
Existing patch management tools and processes can be used to regularly patch all vulnerabilities. Use
“rapid response” processes—as described in the Evaluation section above—in those tools for
vulnerabilities that are being actively exploited in the wild.
In cases where patches do not exist, have not been tested, or cannot be immediately applied promptly,
take other courses of action to prevent exploitation, such as:
• Disabling services,
• Reconfiguring firewalls to block access, or
• Increasing monitoring to detect exploitation.
Once patches are available and can be safely applied, mitigations can be removed, and patches
applied.
As systems are remediated, keep track of their status for reporting purposes. Each system should be
able to be described as one of these categories:
• Remediated. The patch or configuration change has been applied, and the
system is no longer vulnerable.
• Mitigated. Other compensating controls—such as detection or access
restriction—are in place and the risk of the vulnerability is reduced.
• Susceptible/Compromised. No action has been taken, and the system is still
susceptible or compromised.
Reporting and Notification

Sharing information about how vulnerabilities are being exploited by adversaries can
help defenders across the federal government understand which vulnerabilities are
most critical to patch. CISA, in partnership with other federal agencies, is
responsible for the overall security posture of the FCEB. As such, CISA needs to
maintain awareness of the status of vulnerability response for actively exploited
vulnerabilities. This awareness enables CISA to help other agencies understand the impact of
vulnerabilities and to narrow the time between disclosure and vulnerability exploitation. Agencies must
report to CISA in accordance with Federal Incident Notification Guidelines, Binding Operational
Directives, or as directed by CISA in an Emergency Directive.
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APPENDIX A: KEY TERMS
Term Definition Source
A compulsory direction to federal executive branch, civilian departments, and
Binding agencies ("agencies") for purposes of safeguarding federal information and
Operational information systems. DHS develops and oversees the implementation of binding Section 3553 of
Directive operational directives pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act title 44, U.S. Code
(BOD) of 2014 (FISMA). Federal agencies are required to comply with these DHS-developed
directives.
In response to a known or reasonably suspected information security threat,

vulnerability, or incident that represents a substantial threat to the information security
of an agency, the Secretary of Homeland Security may issue an ED to the head of an
Emergency
agency to take any lawful action with respect to the operation of the information Section 3553 of
Directive
system, including such systems used or operated by another entity on behalf of an title 44, U.S. Code
(ED)
agency for the purpose of protecting the information system from, or mitigating, an
information security threat. This authority has been delegated to and may be issued
with the signature of the Director of CISA.
FCEB Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agencies (FCEB Agencies) include all agencies EO 14028, Sec.10
Agencies except for the Department of Defense and agencies in the Intelligence Community.
FCEB
Information Those information systems operated by Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agencies EO 14028, Sec.10
Systems but excludes National Security Systems (NSS).
An occurrence that— (A)actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, EO 14028, Sec. 10
Incident the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information or an information system; or 44 U.S.C.
(B)constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, 3552(b)(2)
security procedures, or acceptable use policies.
ICT Service Information and communications technology (ICT) service providers - includes IT, OT, EO 14028, Sec.2
Providers and cloud service providers (CSPs).
Any incident that is likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security OMB
interests, foreign relations, or the economy of the United States or to the public Memorandum
confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people. 33 M-20-04: Fiscal
Agencies should determine the level of impact of the incident by using the existing Year 2019-2020
incident management process established in National Institute of Standards and Guidance on
Major
Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-61, Computer Security Incident Federal
Incident
Handling Guide, or A breach that involves personally identifiable information (PII) that, Information
if exfiltrated, modified, deleted, or otherwise compromised, is likely to result in Security and
demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or the economy Privacy
of the United States, or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and Management
safety of the American people. 34 Requirements.
33
Using the CISA Cyber Incident Scoring System, this includes Level 3 events (orange), defined as those that are
"likely to result in a demonstrable impact to public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign
relations, civil liberties, or public confidence"; Level 4 events (red), defined as those that are "likely to result in a
significant impact to public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, or civil liberties";
and Level 5 events (black), defined as those that "pose an imminent threat to the provision of wide-scale critical
infrastructure services, national government stability, or the lives of US persons."
34
The analysis for reporting a major breach to Congress is distinct and separate from the assessment of the potential
risk of harm to individuals resulting from a suspected or confirmed breach. When assessing the potential risk of
harm to individuals, agencies should refer to 0MB M-17-12.
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Term Definition Source

National Security Systems (NSS) are information systems as defined in 44
U.S.C.3552(b)(6).
(A)The term “national security system” means any information system (including any
telecommunications system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an
agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency—
(i)the function, operation, or use of which—
National (I)involves intelligence activities;
Security (II)involves cryptologic activities related to national security; 44
Systems (III)involves command and control of military forces; U.S.C.3552(b)(6)
(NSS) (IV)involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or
(V)subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or
intelligence missions; or
(ii)is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of
Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
(B)Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that is to be used for routine
administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and
personnel management applications).
Cybersecurity
Information
Vulnerability The term "security vulnerability" means any attribute of hardware, software, process, Sharing Act of
or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a security control. 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-113, § 102
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CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
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APPENDIX B: INCIDENT RESPONSE CHECKLIST

Note: the incident response playbook for incidents that involve confirmed malicious cyber activity
for which a major incident has been declared or not yet been reasonably ruled out.
Action Date
Step Incident Response Procedure
Taken Completed
Detection & Analysis
1. Declare Incident
1a. Perform initial categorization of incident. 35
1b. Designate agency incident coordination lead.
1c. Notify CISA and, if applicable, law enforcement.
2. Determine Investigation Scope

2a. Identify the type and extent of the incident.
2b. Assess operational or informational impact on organization’s mission.
3. Collect and Preserve Data

Collect and preserve the data necessary for incident verification,
3a. categorization, prioritization, mitigation, reporting, attribution, and as potential
evidence in accordance with NIST 800-61r2.
Log all evidence and note how the evidence was acquired, when it was
3b.
acquired, and who acquired the evidence.
4. Perform Technical Analysis

4a. Develop a technical and contextual understanding of the incident.
Based on analysis thus far and available CTI, form a hypothesis of what the
4b.
adversary was attempting to access/accomplish.
Update scope as investigation progresses and information evolves. Report

4c.
most recent findings and incident status to CISA.
Terminating condition: Technical analysis is complete when the incident has

been verified, the scope has been determined, the method(s) of persistent
access to the network has/have been identified, the impact has been
4d.
assessed, a hypothesis for the narrative of exploitation has been cultivated
(TTPs and IOCs), and all stakeholders are proceeding with a common
operating picture.
35
OMB M-20-04
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Action Date
Taken Completed
Correlate Events and Document Timeline
4e. Analyze logs to correlate events and adversary activity
Establish an incident timeline that records events, description of events, date-

4f. time group (UTC) of occurrences, impacts, and data sources. Keep updated
with all relevant findings.
Identify Anomalous Activity

Assess affected systems and networks for subtleties of adversary behavior
4g.
which often may look legitimate.
Identify deviations from established baseline activity - particularly important to

4h. identify attempts to leverage legitimate credentials and native capabilities and
tools (i.e., living off the land techniques).
Identify Root Cause and Enabling Conditions

Attempt to identify the root cause of the incident and collect threat information
4i.
that can be used in further searches and inform subsequent response efforts.
Identify and document the conditions that enabled the adversary to access
4j.
and operate within the environment.
Assess networks and systems for changes that may have been made to either
4k.
evade defenses or facilitate persistent access.
Identify attack vector. This includes how the adversary accessing the
4l.
environment (e.g., malware, RDP, VPN).
Assess access (depth and breadth). This includes All compromised systems,
4m.
users, services, and networks.
Gather Incident Indicators

4n. Review available CTI for precedent of similar activity.
Analyze adversary tools. Assess tools to extract IOCs for short-term

4o.
containment.
Identify and document indicators that can be used for correlative analysis on
4p.
the network.
Share extracted threat information (atomic, computed, and behavioral

4q. indicators, context, and countermeasures) with internal response teams and
CISA.
Analyze for Common Adversary TTPs

Identify initial access [TA0001] techniques (e.g., spearphishing, supply chain
4r.
compromise).
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Action Date
Taken Completed
If access is facilitated by malware, identify associated command and control
4s.
[TA0011] (e.g., identify port, protocol, profile, domain, IP address).
Identify the techniques used by the adversary to achieve code execution

4t.
[TA0002].
4u. Assess compromised hosts to identify persistence [TA0003] mechanisms.
Identify lateral movement [TA0008] techniques. Determine the techniques

4v.
used by the adversary to access remote hosts.
Identify the adversary’s level of credential access [TA0006] and/or privilege

4w.
escalation.
Identify the method of remote access, credentials used to authenticate, and

4x. level of privilege. If access is by legitimate but compromised application (e.g.,
RDP, VPN), identifies the method.
4y. Identify mechanism used for data exfiltration [TA0010].
Validate and Refine Investigation Scope

4z. Identify new potentially impacted systems, devices, and associated accounts.
4aa. Feed new IOCs and TTPs into detection tools.
Continue to update the scope and communicate updated scope to all

4bb.
stakeholders to ensure a common operating picture.
5. Third-Party Analysis Support (if needed)

Identify if third-party analysis support is needed for incident investigation or
5a. response. CISA may recommend use of another agency or a third-party for
intrusion detection and incident response support services.
Invoke Federal Network Authorization (FNA) to enable CISA incident

5b.
response and hunt assistance. 36
Coordinate and facilitate access if incorporating third-party analysis support

5c.
into response efforts.
Coordinate response activities with agency service providers for systems

5d.
hosted outside of the agency.
6. Adjust Tools
Tune tools to slow the pace of advance and decrease dwell time by
6a.
incorporating IOCs to protect/detect specific activity.
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Action Date
Taken Completed
Introduce higher-fidelity modifications to tools. Tune tools to focus on tactics
6b. that must be used by the adversary to obtain operational objectives (e.g.,
execution, credential access, and lateral movement).
Containment
7. Contain Activity (Short-term Mitigations)

Determine appropriate containment strategy, including:
• Requirement to preserve evidence
7a. • Availability of services (e.g., network connectivity, services continuity)
• Resource constraints
• Duration of containment steps
7b. System backup(s) to preserve evidence and continued investigation.
Coordinate with law enforcement to collect and preserve evidence (as

7c.
required by (Step 3a) prior to eradication, if applicable.
Isolate affected systems and networks including:

• Perimeter containment
7d. • Internal network containment
• Host-based/Endpoint containment
• Temporarily disconnect public-facing systems from the Internet, etc.
7e. Close specific ports and mail servers. Update firewall filtering.
Change system admin passwords, rotate private keys and service/application

7f.
account secrets where compromise is suspected revoke privileged access.
Perform blocking (and logging) of unauthorized accesses, malware sources,

7g.
and egress traffic to known attacker Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
Prevent Domain Name Server (DNS) resolution of known attacker domain

7h.
names.
Prevent compromised system(s) from connecting to other systems on the

7i.
network.
Advanced SOCs may direct adversary to sandbox to monitor activity, gather

7j.
additional evidence, and identify TTPs.
7k. Monitor for signs of threat actor response to containment activities.
Report updated timeline and findings (including new atomic and behavioral
7l.
indicators) to CISA.
If new signs of compromise are found, return to technical analysis (Step 4) to

7m.
re-scope the incident.
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Action Date
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Terminating condition: Upon successful containment (i.e., no new signs of
7n. compromise), preserve evidence for reference and law enforcement
investigation (if applicable), adjust detection tools, and move to eradication.
Eradication & Recovery
8. Execute Eradication Plan

Develop a well-coordinated eradication plan that considers scenarios for
8a. threat actor use of alternative attack vectors and multiple persistence
mechanisms.
8b. Provide incident status to CISA until all eradication activities are complete.
8c. Remove artifacts of the incident from affected systems, networks, etc.
8d. Reimage affected systems from clean backups (i.e., ‘gold’ sources).
8e. Rebuild hardware (if rootkits involved).
8f. Scan for malware to ensure removal of malicious code.
8g. Monitor closely for signs of threat actor response to eradication activities.
Allow adequate time to ensure all systems are clear of threat actor persistence
8h. mechanisms (such as backdoors) since adversaries often use more than one
mechanism.
8i. Update the timeline to incorporate all pertinent events from this step.
8j. Complete all actions for eradication.
Continue with detection and analysis activities after executing the eradication
8k. plan to monitor for any signs of adversary re-entry or use of new access
methods.
If new adversary activity is discovered at the completion of the eradication

8l. step, contain the new activity and return to Technical Analysis (Step 4) until
the true scope of the compromise and infection vectors are identified.
8m. If eradication is successful, move to Recovery.
9. Execute Eradication Plan

Restore agency systems to operational use: recovering mission/business
9a.
data.
9b. Revert all changes made during incident.
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Action Date
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9c. Reset passwords on compromised accounts.
9d. Implement multi-factor authentication for all access methods.
9e. Install updates and patches.
Tighten perimeter security (e.g., firewall rulesets, boundary router access

9f.
control lists) and zero trust access rules.
Test systems thoroughly (including security controls assessment) to validate

9g. systems are operating normally before bringing back online in production
networks.
9h. Consider emulating adversarial TTPs to verify countermeasures are effective.
Review all relevant CTI to ensure situational awareness of the threat actor
9i.
activity.
Update incident timeline to incorporate all pertinent events from Recovery

9j.
step.
9k. Complete all actions for recovery.
Post-Incident Activities
10. Post-Incident Activities

Document the incident, inform agency leadership, harden the environment to
10a. prevent similar incidents, and apply lessons learned to improve the handling of
future incidents.
Adjust Sensors, Alerts, and Log Collection

Add enterprise-wide detections to mitigate against adversary TTPs that were
10b.
successfully executed.
Identify and address operational “blind spots” to adequate coverage moving

10c.
forward.
Continue to monitor the agency environment for evidence of persistent

10d.
presence.
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Action Date
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Finalize Reports
10e. Provide post-incident updates as required by law and policy.
Publish post-incident report. Provide a step-by-step review of the entire

10f.
incident and answer the Who, What, Where, Why, and How questions.
Provide CISA with post-incident update with seven (7) days of resolution or as
10g.
directed by CISA in the Federal Incident Notification Guidelines.
Work with CISA to provide required artifacts, close the ticket, and/or take
10h.
additional response action.
Perform Hotwash
Conduct lessons learned analysis with all involved parties to assess existing
10i.
security measures and the incident handling process recently experienced.
10j. Identify if agency IR processes were followed and if they were sufficient.
Identify any policies and procedures in need of modification to prevent similar

10k.
incidents from occurring.
Identify how information sharing with CISA and other stakeholders can be
10l.
improved during IR.
10m. Identify any gaps in incident responder training.
Identify any unclear or undefined roles, responsibilities, interfaces, and

10n.
authorities.
Identify precursors or indicators that should be monitored to detect similar

10o.
incidents.
Identify if agency infrastructure for defense was sufficient. If not, identify the
10p.
gaps.
Identify if additional tools or resources are needed to improve detection and

10q.
analysis and help mitigate future incidents.
Identify any deficiencies in the agency incident response planning process. If

10r. no deficiencies identified, identify how the agency intends to implement more
rigor in its IR planning.
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Action Date
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Coordination with CISA
11. Coordination with CISA

Notify CISA with initial incident report within 1 hour after incident
11a.
determination. 37
Receive incident tracking number and CISA National Cyber Incident Scoring
11b.
System (NCISS) priority level from CISA.
Comply with additional reporting requirements for Major incidents as

11c.
mandated by OMB and other federal policy. 38,39
11d. Provide incident updates until all eradication activities are complete.
Report incident updates to include:

• Updated scope
• Updated timeline (findings, response efforts, etc.)
11e. • New indicators of adversary activity
• Updated understanding of impact
• Updated status of outstanding efforts
• Estimation of time until containment, eradication, and recovery are
completed
Share relevant atomic and behavioral indicators and countermeasures with
11f.
CISA throughout the IR process.
11g. Provide post-incident updates as directed by CISA.
ICT service providers and contractors who operate systems on behalf of

11h. FCEB agencies must promptly report incidents to such agencies and directly
report to CISA whenever they do so.
37
38
Per OMB M-20-04, appropriate analysis of whether the incident is a major incident will include the agency CIO,
CISO, mission or system owners, and, if it is a breach, the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP). Regardless of
the internal reporting chain of the organization, CISA must receive the major incident report within 1 hour of major
incident declaration.
39
OMB M-20-04
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APPENDIX C: INCIDENT RESPONSE PREPARATION CHECKLIST

Step Incident Response Preparation Action Date
Taken Completed
1. Policies and Procedures
Document agency Incident Response plan with procedures for
1a. escalating and reporting major incidents and those with impact on
agency mission.
Document procedure for designating agency incident coordination

1b.
lead.
Identify key incident response personnel and responsibilities.

1c.
Provide POC names, phone numbers, and email addresses.
Identify system owners and Information System Security Officers

1d.
(ISSOs).
Identify system IPs, system security plan, system/enclave

1e.
boundaries, mission essential status, etc.
Document contingency plan for additional resourcing or “surge

1f.
support” with assigned roles and responsibilities.
2. Instrumentation
Implement detection and monitoring capabilities to include AV,
EDR, DLP, IDPS, logs, net flows, PCAP, and SIEM to provide
2a.
accurate picture of agency infrastructure (systems, networks, cloud
platforms, and contractor-hosted networks).
Establish a baseline for systems and networks to understand what

2b.
“normal” activity is to enable defenders to identify any deviations.
2c. Implement EINSTEIN capabilities.
2d. Implement CDM capabilities.
Ensure logging, log retention, and log management comply with EO

2e.
14028, Sec 8.
3. Train Response Personnel

3a. Train and exercise agency and staffing personnel to prepare for
major incidents.
3b. Conduct recovery exercises to test full organizational COOP

(failover/backup/recovery systems).
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Taken Completed
4. Cyber Threat Intelligence
Monitor intelligence feeds for threat or vulnerability advisories from
4a. a variety of sources: government, trusted partners, open source,
and commercial entities.
4b. Integrate threat feeds into SIEM and other defensive capabilities to
identify and block known malicious behavior.
Analyze suspicious activity reports from users, contractors/ICT

4c. service providers; or incident reports from other internal or external
organizational components.
4d. Collect incident data (indicators, TTPs, countermeasures) and share

with CISA and other partners (law enforcement, etc.).
4e. Set up CISA Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) or share via Cyber
Threat Indicator and Defensive Measures Submission System.
5. Active Defense
For those with advanced capabilities and staff, establish active
defense mechanisms (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, honeytokens,
5a. fake accounts, etc.,) to create tripwires to detect adversary
intrusions and to study the adversary behavior to understand more
about their TTPs.
6. Communications and Logistics

Establish a communications strategy. This includes:
• Defining an out-of-band email communication protocol
6a. • Designating a war room
• Establishing a comm channel (phone bridge or chat room)
6b. Establish procedures mechanisms for coordinating major incidents

with CISA.
Designate CISA reporting POC. Provide POC name, phone number

6c. and email address. Implement info sharing format and platform to
CISA.
6d. Define methods for handing classified information and data, if

required.
7. OPSEC
Segment/manage SOC systems separately from broader enterprise
7a. IT systems. Manage sensors and security devices via out-of-band
means (network, etc.).
7b. Develop method to notify users of compromised systems via phone

rather than email.
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Taken Completed
7c. Use hardened workstations to conduct monitoring and response
activities.
7d. Ensure defensive systems have robust backup and recovery

processes.
Implement processes to avoid “tipping off” an attacker to reduce

7e. likelihood of detection of IR-sensitive information (e.g., do not
submit malware samples to a public analysis service or notify users
of compromised systems via email).
8. Technical Infrastructure
8a. Establish secure storage (i.e., only accessible by incident
responders) for incident data and reporting.
8b. Implement capabilities to contain, replicate, analyze, and

reconstitute compromised hosts.
8c. Deploy tools to collect forensic evidence such as disk and active
memory imaging.
8d. Implement capability to handle/detonate malware, sandbox

software, and other analysis tools.
8e. Implement a ticketing or case management system.
9. Detect Activity
9a. Implement SIEM and sensor rules and signatures to search for
IOCs.
9b. Analyze logs and alerts for signs of suspicious or malicious activity.
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APPENDIX E: VULNERABILITY AND INCIDENT CATEGORIES

CISA has adopted the following common set of terms to improve clarity for Federal Civilian Executive
Branch (FCEB) agencies for reporting to and updating CISA. 40
Incident – Per the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), as codified at 44
U.S.C. § 3552(b)(2): An occurrence that (A) actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority,
the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information or an information system; or (B) constitutes a
violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use
policies.
Major Incident – Per the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-20-04 or
subsequent memo, a major incident is either:
1. Any incident that is likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign
relations, or the economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public
health and safety of the American people. 41 Agencies should determine the level of impact of the
incident by using the existing incident management process established in the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 900-61 Revision 2, Computer
Security Incident Handling Guide.
or,
2. A breach that involves personally identifiable information (PII) that, if exfiltrated, modified, deleted,
or otherwise compromised, is likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security
interests, foreign relations, or the economy of the United States, or to the public confidence, civil
liberties, or public health and safety of the American people. Major incident determination is
required for breaches involving PII of 100,000 or more people. 42
Breach – Per OMB Memorandum M-17-12 or subsequent memo: The loss of control, compromise,
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or any similar occurrence where (1) a person other
than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information or (2) an
authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information for other than
authorized purpose.
Event – Per NIST SP 900-61 Revision 2: An event is any observable occurrence in a system or network.
Vulnerabilities:
• Internal discovery of potential compromise leveraging a vulnerability
• Known exploitation of vulnerability (NVD tagged entries; wide-spread public reporting; viable
proof-of-concept exploit released, etc.)
40
CISA Federal Incident Reporting Requirements (draft)
41
Using the CISA Cyber Incident Scoring System, this includes Level 3 events (orange), defined as those that are
"likely to result in a demonstrable impact to public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign
relations, civil liberties, or public confidence"; Level 4 events (red), defined as those that are "likely to result in a
significant impact to public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, or civil
liberties"; and Level 5 events (black), defined as those that "pose an imminent threat to the provision of wide scale
critical infrastructure services, national government stability, or the lives of US persons."
42
The analysis for reporting a major breach to Congress is distinct and separate from the assessment of the potential
risk of harm to individuals resulting from a suspected or confirmed breach. When assessing the potential risk of
harm to individuals, agencies should refer to 0MB M-17-12.
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APPENDIX F: SOURCE TEXT

This is a list of sources used in FCEB incident and vulnerability response.
Responsible Source Title Category

Organization
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity
DHS Authorities
Strategy
DHS/CISA National Cyber Incident Scoring System (NCISS) Standards
US-CERT Federal Incident Notification Guidelines

DHS/CISA Standards
(FING)
Best Practices for Victim Response and Reporting of

DOJ Best Practices
Cyber Incidents
Sharing Cyber Threat Information Under 19 USC §

DOJ Law/Statute
2702(a)(3)
Executive Branch National Cyber Strategy of the USA Authorities and Standards
EO 13691: Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity

Executive Branch Executive Order
Information Sharing
Executive Branch PPD-41: United States Cyber Incident Coordination Authorities
Executive Branch Nation Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP)
EO 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure

Executive Branch Authorities
Cybersecurity
EO 13900: Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal

Networks and Critical Infrastructure
M-20-04, Fiscal Year 2019-2020 Guidance on Federal

Executive Branch/OMB Information Security and Privacy Management Authorities
Requirements
Antitrust Policy Statement on Sharing of Cybersecurity

DOJ; FTC Authorities and Standards
Information
Executive Branch NSPD-54/HSPD-23: Cybersecurity Policy Authorities
EO 13719: Commission on Enhancing National

Cybersecurity
EO 12333: United States Intelligence Activities, as

Executive Branch Authorities and Standards
amended
Executive Branch EO 14029: Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity Authorities and Standards
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Organization
Health Industry Cybersecurity Information Sharing Best
Health SCC Authorities and Standards
Practices
Executive Branch Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 Law/Statute
Executive Branch USA Freedom Act Law/Statute
PL 114-113 [6 USC § 651-674]: Cybersecurity and Law/Statute

Executive Branch
Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2019
Executive Branch 32 CFR § 236.4 Law/Statute
Executive Branch US Patriot Act Law/Statute
PL 113-292 Law/Statute
Executive Branch [codified in 6 U.S.C.]: The National Cybersecurity
Protection Act of 2014
PL 107-296 Law/Statute
Executive Branch
[codified in 6 U.S.C.]: Homeland Security Act of 2002
44 U.S.C. § 3551: Federal Information Security Law/Statute

Executive Branch
Modernization Act of 2014
Executive Branch National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace Authorities and Standards
SP 900-53 rev4/5: Security and Privacy Controls for

NIST Authorities and Standards
Information Systems and Organizations
SP 900-30 rev.1: Guide for Conducting Risk

Assessments
SP 900-37 rev.2: Risk Management Framework for

NIST Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Authorities and Standards
Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy
SP 900-39: Managing Information Security Risk:

Organization, Mission, and Information System View
NISTIR 9296: Integrating Cybersecurity and Enterprise

Risk Management (ERM) (Draft)
SP 900-61 Rev. 2, Computer Security Incident Handling

NIST Standards
Guide | CSRC (nist.gov)
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APPENDIX G: WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This is a list of incident response and vulnerability response government roles and responsibilities.

Organization
• Coordinates the development and implementation of the federal
government’s policies, strategies, and procedures for responding to
significant cyber incidents.
• Receives regular updates from the federal cybersecurity centers and
agencies on significant cyber incidents and measures being taken to
Cyber Response resolve or respond to those incidents. • PPD-41
Group (CRG) • Collaborates with the Counterterrorism Security Group and Domestic • NCIRP
Resilience Group when a cross-disciplinary response to a significant cyber
incident is required.
• Identifies and considers options for responding to significant cyber
incidents, and makes recommendations to the Deputies Committee,
where higher-level guidance is required.
• Coordinates a communications strategy.
• Primary mechanism for coordination between and among

federal agencies in response to a significant cyber
incident as well as for the integration of private sector
partners into IR efforts.
• The CRG may request the formation of a Cyber UCG.
Cyber Unified • A Cyber UCG may also be formed when two or more
• PPD-41
Coordination Group federal agencies* that generally participate in the
National Security Council (NSC) Cyber Response Group • NCIRP
(C-UCG)
(CRG) request its formation. *These include relevant
Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs).
• Identifies and recommends to the CRG, if elevation is
required, any additional federal government resources or
actions necessary to appropriately respond to and
recover from the incident.
• Lead agency for asset response activities.

• Collaborates with industry and government partners to help organizations
understand and counter critical infrastructure and cybersecurity risks
associated with the malicious activities of nation-state and non-state
actors.
• Coordinates Government-wide efforts on information security policies and
practices; compiles and analyzes agency information security data;
develops and conducts targeted operational evaluations, including threat • PPD-41
and vulnerability assessments; and hunts for and identifies threats and • CISA Act of
vulnerabilities within Federal information systems. 2018
• Centrally collects and manages FCEB and ICT service provider incident • FISMA (44
DHS/CISA information per EO 14028. USC 3553(b))
• Provides CTI to agencies directly or at scale. When sharing CTI with an • EO 14028
agency, or multiple agencies, CISA will communicate with the agency (Secs. 2,6)
SOC, and depending on the severity, may include the agency CISO along • NCIRP
with additional POCs the agency has explicitly designated for the
information exchange.
• Communicates with the affected FCEB Agencies to understand the nature
of the cyber incident or vulnerability.
• Disseminates intelligence and information learned during the IR response
to other federal agencies for awareness and threat-informed defense.
• When sharing at scale, CISA publishes to cisa.gov (such as https://us-
cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts). Information too sensitive to publish is distributed
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Organization
via alternative avenues into the FCEB space, such as the weekly agency
SOC call, HSDN, or classified networks.
• Hosts FCEB agency incident coordination call. Provides recommendations
on actions, data to collect/check.
• Advises FCEB of available resources to assist in response, including
CISA, FBI, NSA, and third-party entities.
• Upon request, provide analysis, expertise, and other technical assistance
to the affected FCEB agency. Available cybersecurity services can be
found on page 18 in the CISA service catalog. 43
• Provides informational webinars to educate FCEB agencies on targeted
cyber threats and mitigations.
• Reviews and validates FCEB agency's incident response and remediation
results upon completion of the incident response.
• Lead agency for threat response activities.

• Law enforcement investigation, forensics, and mitigation activities to
support interdiction of the threat actor. • PPD-41
• Provide attribution that may lead to information sharing. • NCIRP
DOJ/FBI/NCIJTF • Other LE
• Disseminates intelligence and information learned during the response to
FCEB Agencies. authorities
• Investigation of FCEB agency incidents that may have a criminal nexus.
• Share intelligence, including attribution.
• Coordinates with CISA for cyber response as directed by CISA Federal

Incident Notification Guidelines and the IR playbook.
• Provides additional notification to OMB, OFCIO, Congress, OIG, if • PPD-41
applicable.
• CISA Act of
• Reports incident to law enforcement, as appropriate.
• Notifies stakeholders of actions they need to take. 2018
• Provides cyber threat indicators with available associated context, to • Federal
include associated TTPs if available, and recommended defensive Incident
measures to CISA and sharing partners. Notification
FCEB Agency • Allows access and assists third-party incident responders when requested Guidelines
by CISA. (FING)
• Provides network and system log information (including ICT provider logs) • FISMA (44
to CISA upon request per EO 14028, Sec 8.
USC 3553(b))
• Maintain business and operational continuity.
• Comply with legal and regulatory requirements. • EO 14028
• Engage in communications with employees or other affected individuals. (Secs. 2,6)
• Conduct incident response within FCEB and its subcomponents, ensuring
that the agency-level SOC has operational control of incident response
activities.
• Report cyber incidents to FCEB agencies and directly report to CISA when
doing so.
• Collect and preserve data, information, and reporting relevant to
cybersecurity event prevention, detection, response, and investigation on • EO 14028
ICT Service all information systems over which they have control, including systems
Providers (Sec. 2)
operated on behalf of FCEB agencies.
• Share data, information, and reporting as set forth under EO 14028,
section 2.
• Collaborate with federal cybersecurity or investigative agencies in their
investigations of and responses to incidents or potential incidents on
43
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Organization
Federal Information Systems (FIS), including implementing technical
capabilities, such as monitoring networks for threats in collaboration with
agencies they support, as needed.
National Security • Coordinates the Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG): the interagency
and private sector partner coordination mechanism to take immediate • PPD-41
Council (NSC)
response actions to a cyber incident of specific severity and scale.
• Lead agency for intelligence support and related activity.

• Provide classified threat reporting on cyber adversaries and other national
security topics.
• Coordinates intelligence collection. • PPD-41
ODNI/CTIIC • Provides attribution. • NCIRP
• Provides situational awareness, shares of relevant intelligence
information, integrated analysis of threat trends, events, and support to
interagency efforts to develop options to degrade or mitigate adversary
threat capabilities.
• Homeland
• Incident response support may come from CISA, other government Security Act (6
entities (such as FBI, NSA), or commercial vendors upon request from the USC 659)
Third-Party • Federal
agency or from CISA
Analysis Support Network
• Available CISA cybersecurity services can be found on page 18 in the
Authorization
CISA service catalog. 44
(FNA)
• Provide intelligence support in response to cyber

incidents and vulnerabilities. • EO 12333
National Security • Provides attribution information. • NSD-42
Agency (NSA) • Provides technical support upon request. • PPD-41
• Provides threat response, asset response and intelligence support to
NSS/other systems.
44
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Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks

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Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks

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Publication: November 2021

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 2

The standardized processes and procedures described in these playbooks:

• Facilitate better coordination and effective response among affected

• Initiated by an FCEB agency (e.g., a local detection of malicious activity or

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 3

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 4

INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAYBOOK

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 5

Figure 1: Incident Response Process

• Documenting and understanding policies and procedures for incident response

• Having infrastructure in place to handle complex incidents, including classified

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 6

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 7

might leverage different infrastructure against Active Defense

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 8

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 9

Detection & Analysis

Detection & Analysis Activities

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 10

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 11

Key Questions to Answer

Tactic Common Techniques Log and Event Sources Indicators

Host event logs, Windows

Account Manipulation [T1098],

Mismatch of users and

Brute Force [T1110], Modify Authentication Logs,

Firewall, Web Proxy, DNS,

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Firewall, Web Proxy, DNS,

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 12

Third-Party Analysis Support (if needed): third-party assistance is responsible for

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 13

Key containment activities include:

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 14

Eradication & Recovery

• Developing response scenarios for threat

Eradication Activities Recover System(s) and Services

21See NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 15

• Testing systems thoroughly, including environment. To validate that normal operations

Adjust Sensors, Alerts, and Log Collection Perform Hotwash

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 16

Coordination with CISA

Figure 2: Numbered IR Coordination Activities

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 17

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 18

Line of Effort Role Lead Federal Agency

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 19

The whole-of-government roles and responsibilities are outlined in Appendix G.

Figure 3: Whole of Government Asset Response

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 20

VULNERABILITY RESPONSE PLAYBOOK

• Agency-operated systems and networks,

CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 21

Vulnerability Response Process

Figure 4: Vulnerability Response Phases