6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

KEY CONCEPTS
! Nondemocratic regimes are often divided between authoritarianism and total-
itarianism.

! As with democracy, there are various and competing theories for the emer-
gence and perseverance of nondemocratic regimes.

! Coercion, co-optation, and personality cults are common means through

which nondemocratic regimes maintain their power.

! Nondemocratic regime types include personal and monarchical, military, one-

party, theocratic, and illiberal/hybrid.

! The general trend worldwide has been away from nondemocratic regimes,
though illiberal regimes seem to be growing in importance.

“M an is born free but everywhere he is in chains,” wrote Jean-Jacques

Rousseau in 1762. Since his time, democracy has emerged and
flourished in many places throughout the world. However, according to Free-
dom House, an American nongovernmental organization that monitors and
promotes open markets and democratic institutions around the world, over
half the world’s population still lives in societies defined as either “partly free,”
where significant personal liberties and democratic rights are limited, or “not
free,” where the public has little political freedom.1 In neither case can these
regimes be described as democratic.
In this chapter, we will look at the internal dynamics and origins of non-
democratic regimes. After defining these regimes and their relationship to
freedom and equality, we will look at their sources, addressing the puzzle of
why nondemocratic regimes are the norm in some countries but not in oth-
ers. Behind this lies the broader question of the origins of nondemocratic rule,
which will mirror our discussion in the previous chapter on competing expla-
141
142 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

nations for democratization. What variables are associated with nondemo-

cratic rule? This discussion of the possible sources of nondemocratic regimes
will lead us into an examination of how nondemocratic rulers maintain their
hold on power. Nondemocratic regimes display a great diversity; nevertheless,
we can identify and contrast a number of common features. Finally, we will
consider the future of nondemocratic rule. At the end of the Cold War, many
assumed that liberal democracy was the wave of the future. In recent years,
however, nondemocratic rule has shown an ability to adapt and thrive. The
“wave of democracy” may be facing a reverse tide. Whether this is true, and
with what implications, will be the final consideration of our chapter.

Defining Nondemocratic Rule

One of the challenges in studying nondemocratic regimes is that it represents
what we could call a “residual category.” Unlike democracy, which can be
defined and identified, nondemocratic regimes represent a wide array
of different kinds of systems, many of which bear little resemblance to
one another. This in turn leads to a proliferation of terms that are often used
interchangeably and indiscriminately: autocracy, oligarchy, dictatorship,
tyranny. Even more confusing, in some cases, nondemocratic regimes may
have more resemblance to democracies than to other nondemocratic regimes.
As a result, we tend to speak of nondemocratic regimes in terms of what they
deny their citizens, using democracy as the benchmark: restricted participa-
tion, restricted competition, restricted liberty. In many cases we will use the
term authoritarianism to cover many of these different forms of nondemo-
cratic rule.
If we want to speak of nondemocratic regimes as having more than sim-
ply the absence of democracy, however, we need some kind of definition to
work with. Scholars define nondemocratic regimes as those in which a polit-
ical regime is controlled by a small group of individuals who exercise power
over the state without being constitutionally responsible to the public. In non-
democratic regimes, the public does not play a significant role in selecting or
removing leaders from office; thus, political leaders in nondemocratic regimes
have much greater leeway to develop policies that they “dictate” to the peo-
ple (hence the term dictator). As one can imagine, nondemocratic regimes by
their nature are built around the restriction of individual freedom. At a min-
imum, they eliminate people’s right to choose their own leaders, and they also
restrict to varying degrees other liberties, such as freedom of speech or of
assembly. Nondemocratic regimes’ relationship to equality is less clear. Some
nondemocratic regimes, such as those under communism, limit individual
freedom in order to produce greater social equality. Others seek to provide
 Totalitarianism and Nondemocratic Rule 143

neither freedom nor equality,

existing only to enhance the IN FOCUS
power of those in control.2
There are various kinds of Nondemocratic Regimes
nondemocratic regimes. Non- • A small group of individuals exercises power over the
democratic leaders do not nec- state.
essarily rule in a capricious or • Government is not constitutionally responsible to the
arbitrary manner; indeed, non- public.
democratic regimes can have a • Public has little or no role in selecting leaders.
strong institutional underpin- • Individual freedom is restricted.
ning of ideology. As ideologies, • Nondemocratic regimes may be institutionalized and
fascism and communism, for legitimate.
instance, explicitly reject liberal
democracy as an inferior form
of social organization, favoring instead a powerful state and restricted indi-
vidual freedoms. This ideology provided the norms that fascist and commu-
nist nondemocratic leaders followed in places like Nazi Germany or the Soviet
Union. But other nondemocratic regimes are not ideological and may even be
anti-ideological in nature, asserting that the leadership speaks for “the peo-
ple.” In other cases, few if any substantial political ideas are evident among
those in power, whose rule is predicated simply on power for power’s sake
and the benefits that come with it. In these cases, it becomes difficult even to
speak of a regime, and the term regime is often used pejoratively by critics,
coupled with a leader’s name (such as the “Saddam Hussein regime” in Iraq).
This terminology reflects the critics’ view that all decisions flow from the ruler,
unfettered by political institutions of any sort. The leader, in essence, is the
regime.

Totalitarianism and Nondemocratic Rule

Before we go any further in our discussion, we should take some time to exam-
ine one particular concept that falls within the category of nondemocratic
rule: totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is a tricky and often misused term,
though quite distinct from authoritarianism. Totalitarianism connotes vio-
lence and terror, and so the word is often used in a partisan way to label a
political system that we particularly dislike. This problem of definition goes
back the earlier part of the last century. Many scholars used the term totali-
tarianism to describe Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and its satellite
states; others countered that the term was being applied as much for politi-
cal reasons as for any objective means of classification, equating fascism and
communism. Some thus called for abandoning the term altogether, claiming
144 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

that it had no real scholarly utility. However, totalitarianism remains a valu-

able concept, especially if used consistently and judiciously.
What then is the difference between totalitarianism and other forms of
nondemocratic rule? There are several important elements. Totalitarianism is
a form of nondemocratic rule with a highly centralized state and a regime
with a well-defined ideology that seeks to transform and fuse the institutions
of state, society, and the economy. Unlike other nondemocratic regimes, the
main objective of totalitarianism is to use power to transform the total insti-
tutional fabric of a country according to some ideological goal. Finally,
because of the ambitious goals of totalitarianism, violence often becomes a
necessary tool to destroy any obstacle to change.3 The use of terror not only
destroys enemies of the totalitarian ideology but, as the political philosopher
Hannah Arendt pointed out, also shatters human will, destroying the ability
of individuals to create, much less aspire to, freedom.4 Under these condi-
tions, the use of terror and violence is common in order to break down exist-
ing institutions and remake them in the leadership’s own image. This is not
to say that any violent regime is totalitarian. The central issue is to what end
that violence is used. Totalitarianism often emerges when those who have
come to power profess a radical or reactionary political attitude, both of which
reject the status quo and see dramatic, often revolutionary change as indis-
pensable and violence as a necessary or even a positive force toward that goal.
Many countries in history have been controlled by leaders with totalitarian
aspirations, but few of these leaders have been able to put their theories to prac-
tice. The Soviet Union under the rule of Josef Stalin from the 1930s to the 1950s
is commonly viewed as totalitarian, with most domestic institutions radically
restructured, most aspects of private life controlled by the state and the Com-
munist Party, and millions imprisoned and executed toward those ends. Nazi
Germany is also commonly viewed as a totalitarian regime, although in some
areas, such as the economy, changes were relatively few. Other fascist regimes,
such as Italy during World War II, lacked the capacity and power to be totali-
tarian, even though they openly aspired to be so. Similarly, while China during
the Cultural Revolution of the
1960s experienced widespread
IN FOCUS violence against people and insti-
Totalitarian Regimes . . . tutions, the fragmentation of the
Communist Party and the state
• Seek to control and transform all aspects of the state, was quite different from totali-
society, and economy. tarianism. As we see, in spite of
• Use violence as a tool for remaking institutions. a more precise definition, we
• Have a strong ideological goal. find totalitarian a difficult word
• Have arisen relatively rarely. to apply, making it liable to sub-
jective, rather than objective, use.
 Origins and Sources of Nondemocratic Rule 145

In the modern world, only communist North Korea can still properly be
described as totalitarian, dominated by an elaborate ideology that covers all
aspects of life and is backed by violence, widespread fear, and the absence of
even small personal freedoms. By way of comparison, a country such as Iraq
under Saddam Hussein, although highly oppressive, could not be described
as totalitarian because it lacked a strong ideology and in many ways was less
centralized than outsiders imagined. Saddam Hussein’s primary goal as Iraq’s
leader was to maintain and expand his own political power as an end in itself.
In spite of this, critics often described Iraq as a totalitarian society. Similarly,
Iran is frequently described as a totalitarian system, but though one might
describe the current regime as embodying a “totalist” ideology, large swaths of
the state, society, and economy function with varying degrees of independence.
To sum up, nondemocratic rule is a political regime in which power is
exercised by a few, unbound by public or constitutional control. The public
lacks not only the right to choose its own leaders but also other personal lib-
erties that those in power may see as a threat, such as freedom of speech or
assembly. Totalitarianism, as a particular form of nondemocratic rule, is dis-
tinguished from other forms of nondemocratic rule by its totalist ideology that
seeks the fundamental transformation of most domestic institutions and the
potential use of violence toward that end.

Origins and Sources of Nondemocratic Rule

Now that we have defined nondemocratic regimes, we might consider their
emergence and perseverance. Recall that in the last chapter we spoke about
some of the competing explanations for why democracy comes about. In a
number of these explanations, the survival or elimination of nondemocratic
regimes was implicit. So let’s return to these arguments, with an emphasis on
nondemocratic perseverance rather than decline. As always, there is no sin-
gle or dominant explanation for nondemocratic regimes, and the explanatory
power of any theory may be limited by space or time.

Modernization and Nondemocratic Rule

Recall that one of the central assertions of the behavioral revolution was that
with modernization, societies would become more urban, educated, and polit-
ically sophisticated, creating the basic conditions that would catalyze democ-
racy. And indeed, there is a strong correlation between societies that lack
modern institutions and nondemocratic rule. Societies that are poor and
poorly developed are less likely to have democracy for a number of reasons,
which we noted in Chapter 5. First, such societies are more likely to be highly
146 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

unequal—what little wealth there is in society is likely to be concentrated in

the hands of a few individuals. As a result, there is a strong incentive for those
with economic power to also want to monopolize political power in order to
fend off any challenges from the public to redistribute that wealth. In the com-
mon political science dictum “no middle class, no democracy,” the absence
of a middle class will likely result in nondemocratic rule. There are notable
exceptions, such as India, but in most cases a combination of poverty and
inequality are strongly correlated with nondemocratic rule.
Even where modernization has taken place, nondemocratic rule may be
the outcome—and even replace existing democratic regimes. In contrast to
our previous expectations, modernization can be a disruptive and uneven
process. Urban areas may experience the sudden transformation of institu-
tions and norms while rural areas lag behind; technological benefits, from
telephones and Internet access to roads and schools, may be enjoyed by some
and unavailable to others. Similar disruptions and shifts in economic insti-
tutions (such as from agricultural to industrial) and social institutions (such
as changes in gender relations or increased secularism) can generate insta-
bility. Modernization can also trend backward, with increased inflation or
unemployment, destabilizing the political order. Where a sufficient number
of individuals feel disoriented by change, this can pave the way for political
movements and leaders who promise to restore “order” and reconcile the ten-
sions between old institutions and new. This can bring down a democratic
regime if it is seen as incapable of reconciling the tensions or pitfalls of moder-
nity. In fact, one important observation to make is that these nondemocratic
movements are often driven by the direct beneficiaries of modernization, such
as students and urban intellectuals, who have gained the organizational and
ideological tools to articulate an alternative political vision to the status quo.
We should be clear, however, in what we are not arguing. First, while non-
democratic rule may be correlated with poverty and inequality, this is not to
say that the former necessarily leads to the latter. We have ample examples
of nondemocratic regimes that have been highly equal societies, particularly
communist ones like the Soviet Union or Cuba, whose ideology was predi-
cated on eliminating differences between rich and poor. Similarly, we can find
cases where the standard of living is high, like Singapore or Kuwait, but which
lack democracy. Regime type and poverty or inequality do not correlate neatly,
though in general, nondemocratic countries tend to be found among those
countries whose per capita GDP at purchasing-power parity is below $7,000.

Elites and Nondemocratic Rule

Modernization theory has taken a beating over time as an overly optimistic

and deterministic vision of political and economic change. In the previous
 Origins and Sources of Nondemocratic Rule 147

chapter, however, we noted that modernization theory has found new life in
the idea that democratization may be more likely under conditions where
there is not simply economic development but also a relatively equitable dis-
tribution of those resources. Elites may be more willing to share power when
they have fewer fears of losing economic opportunities in the process. Accord-
ingly, highly unequal societies will reinforce nondemocratic rule, and in fact,
the longevity of nondemocracy may be precisely due to the fact that rivals for
power seek control specifically so that they can enrich themselves. The state
under these conditions becomes a tool to siphon off resources and maintain
control. Given these higher levels of inequality, those in power may be par-
ticularly loath to surrender power, not only because they may be forced to
give up their assets but because they may lose their lives as well. The threat
of revolution may make these systems particularly unlikely to provide much
in the way of participation, competition, or liberty.
One particular variant of this argument that has gained currency of late is
what is referred to as the “resource trap” theory of development. The resource
being referred to here is natural resources, such as oil, gas, or minerals. While
these might be a source of great wealth, the puzzle is why so many resource
rich countries are development or democracy poor. According to this theory,
the existence of natural resources acts as a barrier to modernization and democ-
racy, for several related reasons. First, resources in the ground give leaders the
wealth necessary to run the state without taxation. This means those in power
need not bother themselves with the taxation and representation trade-off; since
they do not need to tax the people, they can also effectively ignore their polit-
ical demands. Even worse, natural resources tend to stunt the development of
a modern economy and middle class, since neither is of concern to those in
power (and in fact may represent a threat). The result is that wealth is highly
concentrated in the hands of those in power. Under these conditions, nonde-
mocratic rule can effectively subsidize itself, so long as the resources last and
have a market. Oil is clearly the most obvious example of a resource trap, but
diamonds, gold, or timber could also serve this function.

Society and Nondemocratic Rule

This discussion returns us to the idea of civil society. Recall that we defined
civil society as a fabric of organizations created by people to help define their
own interests. These are not necessarily political, and in fact, the vast major-
ity of them have no specific political content. Sports groups, collectors and
enthusiasts, religious and other organizations all form civil society. It is com-
monly argued that civil society is crucial to democratic life because it allows
individuals to organize, articulate their preferences, and form networks that
cross normal economic, social, or political divides. Civil society is thus com-
148 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

monly viewed as a crucible for democratic action, laying the groundwork for
democratic institutions.
Conversely, many authoritarian systems are characterized by the absence
of civil society. This can be the specific result of those in power, who have
taken steps to harass, absorb, monitor, or destroy any form of independent
action outside of the state and those in power. Civil society may also have lit-
tle precedent in society or be hindered by significant ethnic or other societal
divisions that dissuade people from forming organizations across these insti-
tutional barriers. The result can be a society that is more familiar with view-
ing the state as a primary arena for social organization, or that thinks
of association more in terms of mass movements and protest. Sometimes
both of these go hand in hand in what is known as populism. Populism is
not a specific ideology and in fact draws much of its power from an anti-
institutional approach. But generally, populism carries within it the view that
elites and established institutions do not fully represent the will of the peo-
ple and that a new movement, free from ideology and often led by a charis-
matic leader, can usher in a new order. Where civil society is weak, populism
may find more fertile ground.
Finally, it is also possible that civil society may emerge alongside a non-
democratic regime but may itself take on nondemocratic tendencies, espe-
cially where more democratic forms have been repressed by the state. Across
parts of the Middle East there are strong civil society movements rooted in
Islamic fundamentalism, but these organizations, while opposed to current
nondemocratic regimes, wish to take their place, not democratize them.

International Relations and Nondemocratic Rule

International influences can support and contribute to nondemocratic rule.

The most obvious way can be through occupation. While the occupation of
Japan and Germany led to democratization, in Eastern Europe, Soviet con-
trol after World War II brought an end to democratic movements and elimi-
nated much of civil society. Some countries, like Czechoslovakia, saw their
vibrant prewar democracies quickly dismantled and replaced with commu-
nist rule. In more indirect situations, imperialism has contributed to nonde-
mocratic rule in various ways. Borders badly drawn by imperial powers, as
we discussed in Chapter 2, have created many countries with ethnic and reli-
gious divisions that make consensus building difficult and authoritarianism
an effective way to monopolize power over other groups. Imperial institutions,
from infrastructure and education to state institutions, have similarly fostered
authoritarianism by contributing to such things as uneven modernization and
weak state autonomy and capacity. Finally, other states and international
organizations may also support or sustain authoritarian control. During the
 Origins and Sources of Nondemocratic Rule 149

Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States backed authoritarian
rulers against democratic forces in order to maintain or expand their influ-
ence. The United States played a significant role in overthrowing the demo-
cratically elected government in Iran in 1953, fearing that the prime minister
was tilting toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union crushed revolts in Hun-
gary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. With the rise of China and the move
away from democracy in Russia, these two countries have become important
supporters of nondemocratic regimes in Africa and the Middle East through
investment and diplomatic support in the international community. Iran and
Venezuela, too, have sought to use their oil wealth to support like-minded
regimes.

Culture and Nondemocratic Rule

Let us return to the idea of political culture, which argues that there are dif-
ferences in societal institutions—norms and values—that shape the landscape
of political activity. In the previous chapter we discussed the controversial
idea that there may be a culture of democracy or liberty that must be a pre-
condition for institutionalized democracy, and that certain cultures may, for
whatever reason, hold these values while others do not. By way of extension,
it could be argued that there are nondemocratic political values as well. If we
return to our map of political culture in Chapter 3, we can see an array of
countries whose cultural values tend more toward authority over individual
freedom. This may be a function of modernization or something more fixed
in the cultural landscape of these societies, raising the controversial question
of modernization versus Westernization. In contrast to modernization theory,
which essentially views “Western” and “modern” concepts as the same, cul-
ture is much more fixed, according to some scholars; they believe that mod-
ernization will not necessarily lead to Westernization, meaning the adoption
of such values as secularism, individualism, and liberal democracy. Nonde-
mocratic rule in this view is not the absence of democracy—it is its own set
of values.
Let’s look at some specific examples. A common argument is that democ-
racy is a unique product of interconnected historical experiences in Europe,
such as Christianity (particularly Protestantism), the emphasis on individual-
ism and secularism, the development of the nation-state, ideology, early indus-
trialization, and the development of capitalism, among others. These factors,
the argument goes, allowed for the creation of democracy as a regime built
on liberal values that emphasize freedom—what we typically call “Western”
societies. In contrast, some have asserted that under Islam, political power
and religious power are one and the same: laws are seen not as societal insti-
tutions to protect or advance individual rights, but as codes handed down by
150 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Figure 6.1 REGIONS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, 2008

Free Partly free Not free

100

80
Percentage of countries

60

40

20

0
Sub- Middle Asia Americas Europe World
Saharan East & Pacific
Africa North
Africa

Source: Freedom House.

Allah that are to be observed and defended, and democracy is essentially anath-
ema to the will of God. Cultural arguments can also be found in what has
been called the “Asian values” debate. Proponents of the idea of Asian values
argue that Asia’s cultural and religious traditions stress conformity, hierar-
chy, and obedience, which are more conducive to a political regime that lim-
its freedom in order to defend social harmony and consensus. The philosophy
of Confucianism is frequently cited in this regard, with its emphasis on obe-
dience to hierarchy and its notion of a ruler’s “mandate from heaven.” The
ruling elite stands as a parental figure over the people, acting in the public’s
best interest but not under its control. As the former Malaysian prime min-
ister Mahathir Mohamad, one of the major proponents of “Asian values,” has
put it, “When citizens understand that their right to choose also involves lim-
its and responsibilities, democracy doesn’t deteriorate into an excess of free-
dom. . . . These are the dangers of democracy gone wrong, and in our view
it is precisely the sad direction in which the West is heading.”5
As you might imagine, there are many both inside and outside societies
with Islamic or Confucian traditions who reject the idea that these or any
other cultures create a culture of nondemocratic rule. These countries and
 Nondemocratic Regimes and Political Control 151

the peoples within them are far too diverse to speak of one set of values.
Differences in history, religion, social structure, and other institutions have
led to an array of different and overlapping ideas that are in a continuous
process of interaction and reinterpretation. Confucian thought, just like the
Bible in the West or the Koran in Islamic countries, can be interpreted in
very different ways. Recall that in the previous chapter we noted that not
long ago, it was asserted that certain forms of Christianity created cultures
more amenable to authoritarian rule. Roman Catholicism emphasized hier-
archy and the power of organized religion over the state, while Orthodox
Christianity in Eastern and Southern Europe fused religious and political
authority in a single head. Yet nondemocratic rule in societies with these reli-
gious traditions has also given way since the 1970s. Cultural arguments may
inform the content of nondemocratic or democratic institutions, but we should
be wary of making sweeping arguments about culture and regime type.
Let’s sum up. There are numerous explanations for nondemocratic rule,
and these arguments are contingent on time and space—what might be the
explanation for one country at one point in time may be irrelevant in another.
The lack of modernization or its disruptive nature may reinforce nondemo-
cratic rule. Elite strategies and the fear of sharing power can also help sup-
port nondemocratic rule, especially when natural resources are in play. A weak
civil society at home and support abroad can also play an important role.
Finally, culture can be a factor in shaping the contours of nondemocratic insti-
tutions, but whether this can explain authoritarianism itself is much more
questionable and contentious. The intersection of these forces can explain how
and why nondemocratic rule comes to power.

Nondemocratic Regimes and Political Control

We have so far covered some of the main explanations for the establishment
of nondemocratic regimes. In addition, we should consider how these systems
stay in power. In liberal democracies, we take the system of government for
granted; so long as participation, competition, and liberty are provided and
defended, democracy can continue, often even in the face of inequality, eco-
nomic crisis, and civil or international conflict. We assume that for nonde-
mocratic regimes, however, their existence is much more precarious, held in
place only by fear and vulnerable to revolution at any moment. This is a mis-
leading image. Nondemocratic regimes vary in their mechanisms of political
control, some of which can generate legitimacy like that found in democratic
systems. A consideration of the means of nondemocratic rule will give us a
sense of this complexity.
 152 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Coercion and Surveillance

One feature that we initially, and perhaps primarily, associate with nonde-
mocratic regimes and especially with totalitarianism is the use of coercion.
Coercion can be defined as compelling individuals by threatening harm to
their lives or livelihoods. Compliance and obedience with regime goals are
often enforced through the threat or use of force against the population, send-
ing a clear signal that those who oppose the regime or government will be
dealt with harshly: loss of job or access to certain resources, arrest, detention
without trial, torture, death. In an extreme example, in the 1970s several non-
democratic regimes in Latin America used “death squads” made up of police
or military troops to target individuals suspected of harboring political views
opposed to the regime. These individuals were abducted by the death squads
and murdered, frequently after torture. In some cases, their bodies were
dumped in the open as a warning to others who dared to question the regime;
in other cases, the victims simply joined the thousands of the “disappeared,”
individuals abducted and never seen again.
In other regimes, violence has been used even more indiscriminately. When
Stalin consolidated his totalitarian rule in the Soviet Union in the 1930s he car-
ried out what are known as “purges,” widespread arrests that decimated the
ranks of the Communist Party and the state bureaucracy. Former leaders of the
1917 revolution, city mayors and local party bosses, high-ranking officers in the
army and navy, university professors, scientists, diplomats, and many others were
detained, tortured, coerced into confessing during “show trials,” forced to impli-
cate others in their supposed crimes, and either sent to forced labor camps or
executed. The targets of the purges were not limited to the party or the state;
writers, artists, students, farmers, and workers were also among those accused
of political sabotage and anti-Soviet views. It is not known how many died in
these purges; estimates range from 5
million to 20 million. Undoubtedly, in
IN FOCUS the vast majority of these cases, the
Nondemocratic Means of Control
victims were innocent; yet this was
unimportant to Stalin’s regime. By
• Coercion: public obedience is enforced through violence making everyone fear that he or she,
and surveillance. too, can be arrested, the public can be
• Co-optation: members of the public are brought into a controlled and even turned against
beneficial relationship with the state and government, itself, with all fearing that they will be
often through corporatism or clientelism. denounced by someone else. The use
• Personality cult: the public is encouraged to obey the of arbitrary arrests, torture, disap-
leader based on his or her extraordinary qualities and pearances, and murder continues to
compelling ideas. be common in many nondemocratic
regimes.
 Nondemocratic Regimes and Political Control 153

Another important means of control is the ability to maintain a close watch

over the population. Surveillance allows the government to prevent opposi-
tion from organizing and also instills uncertainty among the population—who
is being watched? Surveillance may be conducted through the use of an inter-
nal security force, or “secret police,” charged with monitoring public activity,
spying on individuals, and interrogating members of the public suspected of
political activity hostile to the regime. In some countries, surveillance has
included widespread telephone tapping and the creation of a huge network
of public informers, where nearly anyone may be the eyes and ears of those
in power. With the rise of the Internet and cellular technology, surveillance
has become more sophisticated, including the ability to monitor certain forms
of communication, such as e-mail or text messages.

Co-optation: Corporatism and Clientelism

The prevalence of coercion and surveillance in some nondemocratic regimes may

again give the impression that those in power must be ever vigilant against the
public to prevent opposition or revolution that might spring up at any time. But
not all regimes need or choose to rely on punishment or surveillance as a cen-
tral means of control. Another method they may use is co-optation, the process
by which individuals outside of an organization are brought into a beneficial
relationship with it, making them dependent on the regime for certain rewards.
Although co-optation is not unique to nondemocratic regimes, it tends to be
much more widespread under such regimes than under democracy, which is
usually more suspicious of such favoritism as contrary to the democratic process.

C O R P O R A T I S M Co-optation can take many forms. The most structured form

is corporatism. Recall from Chapter 4 the term neocorporatism, in which busi-
ness, labor, and the state engage in bargaining over economic policy. In its
earliest form, however, modern corporatism emerged as a method by which
nondemocratic regimes attempted to solidify their control over the public by
creating or sanctioning a limited number of organizations to represent the
interests of the public and restricting those not set up or approved by the
state. These organizations are meant to replace independent organizations
with a handful that alone have the right to speak for various sectors of soci-
ety. For example, under a corporatist regime, churches, labor unions, agri-
cultural associations, student groups, neighborhood committees, and the like
are all approved and funded by the state. Nonsanctioned, alternative organi-
zations are not allowed.
Unlike the overlapping memberships, competition, and ever-changing
nature of civil society and political parties in a pluralistic society, corporatism
154 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

arranges society such that each organization is empowered by the state to

have a monopoly of representation over a given issue or segment of society
(meaning that no other organization may act in that area or speak on that
issue). State, society, and the market under corporatism are viewed as a sin-
gle organic body, with each element cooperating and performing its own spe-
cific and limited role and subordinate to the state and regime.
Corporatism can be an effective form of control, as it gives the public a
limited influence (or at least the pretense of influence) in the policy-
making process. Farmers or students have an official organization with
elected officers and resources that are meant to serve their interests. In
return, the regime is able to better control the public through these insti-
tutions, which are funded and managed by the state, and civil society is mar-
ginalized or eliminated. For the average individual, a state-sanctioned
organization is better than none at all, and many willingly participate in the
hope that their needs will be met.
Many nondemocratic regimes have used variants of corporatism as a
means of control. It is an integral part of totalitarianism, but it also existed
in nontotalitarian Spain and Portugal up to the 1970s. In Spain, for example,
a single political party organized most business and labor interests together
into a limited number of “syndicates” that represented both owners and work-
ers in different sectors of the economy. Communist regimes are similarly cor-
poratist. In Cuba, for example, all labor is organized under a single union
directly controlled by the state, and independent unions are illegal. Although
different in form and degree, in all corporatist regimes we see the presence
of a limited number of organizations used to represent and direct societal
interests, bringing the public under organized state control.

CLIENTELISM A less structured means by which states may co-opt the pub-
lic is through clientelism, whereby the state co-opts members of the public
by providing specific benefits or favors to a single person or small group in
return for public support (such as voting in elections). Unlike corporatism,
clientelism relies on individual patronage rather than organizations that serve
a large group of people, and it is more ad hoc than corporatism. Clientelism
does not require a set of sanctioned and licensed organizations but can tar-
get and respond to individuals and groups as those in power see fit, trading
benefits for particular forms of support.
In both corporatism and clientelism, the state has a number of perquisites
it can use in co-opting individuals. Jobs within the state or in state-run sec-
tors of the economy, business contracts or licenses, public goods such as roads
or schools, kickbacks and bribes are a few of the tools in its arsenal. Such
largesse often leads to rent seeking, a process in which political leaders essen-
 Nondemocratic Regimes and Political Control 155

tially rent out parts of the state to their supporters, who as a result control
public goods that would otherwise be distributed in a nonpolitical manner.
For example, leaders might turn over control of a nationalized industry, pro-
viding supporters with jobs and the ability to siphon off public funds from
that branch of the state.
In general, co-optation may be much more successful than coercion at
maintaining nondemocratic regimes, since many in the public may actively
support the regime in return for the benefits they derive. Political opposition
is dealt with not through repression and violence but by incorporating one’s
opponents into the system and making them dependent on it, or withholding
such largesse. Such a regime, however, faces limitations. Corporatist and clien-
telist institutions can run out of benefits with which to pacify the public;
national industries or resources can drag on the economy, run out, or decline
in value. In addition, in a regime where economic resources are doled out for
political reasons, problems may emerge as productive resources are siphoned
off to secure the acquiescence of the public. At its worst, such a regime can
decline into a kleptocracy (literally, “rule by theft”), where those in power seek
only to drain the state of assets and resources. As these resources dry up, co-
optation can quickly unravel.

Personality Cults

Nondemocratic regimes may also reinforce their rule through emphasis on

veneration of the leadership—essentially an emotional appeal to legitimize
rule. The most extreme example is what is known as a personality cult. First
used to describe Stalin’s rule in the Soviet Union, a personality cult refers to
the promotion of the image of a leader not merely as a political figure but as
someone who embodies the spirit of the nation, possesses endowments of wis-
dom and strength far beyond those of the average individual, and is thus por-
trayed in a quasi-religious manner as all-wise, all-seeing, all-knowing. In other
words, personality cults attempt to generate a charismatic form of authority
for the political leader from the top down by convincing the public of the
leader’s admirable qualities. In one recent example, in Turkmenistan, Saparmu-
rat Niyazov, president from 1990 until his death in 2006, dubbed himself “Turk-
menbashi,” or “Father of the Turkmen,” and built his personality cult around
such trappings as changing the months of the year (renaming April after his
mother and January after himself) and constructing a large, gold-leaf statue
of himself that rotated during the day to follow the sun.
The media and culture play a vital role in a personality cult, promoting it
through all aspects of daily life—news reports, public rallies, art, music, films,
and other imagery of the leader. Successes in the country are attributed to
156 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

the power of the leader, and mistakes are blamed on the mortal flaws of the
public or on external enemies. Cults of personality may also be coupled to
coercion; the public may not believe the praise, but no one is willing to say
so. This is especially the case where charismatic power has faded over time
to become little more than a facade, held up only by force. Under these con-
ditions, there is always the chance that the cult will crack, leading to a rapid
political decompression. This occurred in Romania in 1989, when Nicolae
Ceauşescu, the self-styled “conductor” of his country, was shown on national
television reacting in a stunned and confused manner when attendees at a
public rally he was addressing suddenly grew hostile. Within hours, revolu-
tion had swept the country, and within three days, Ceauşescu and his wife
had been executed by firing squad.
Personality cults may also take a weaker but still powerful form. In Iran,
the image of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei adorns shops and bill-
boards around the country, and he is viewed as a conduit to God. Yet in spite
of his power, few Iranians would view him as a kind of deity in his own right
or believe that has superhuman powers. In recent years, Latin America has
produced a number of populist leaders whose personal charisma and sym-
bolic power are significant. Most notable of these is Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela, known for his regular presence in the media, including unscripted
speeches on national television that can last for several hours. His personal
popularity is strong and amplified by the state-run media, but it would be a
stretch to call this a personality cult. Chávez remains, in the eyes of the pub-
lic and in his own political communication, an exceptional, but still flawed,
human being.
Looking back over what we have discussed so far, we find that nonde-
mocratic regimes come to power and stay in power in various ways: some of
these ways are “carrots” (reward for compliance and support), others “sticks”
(threatened or actual punishments). It also follows that some people, perhaps
even a majority, may therefore view the regime as legitimate. They may agree
with the regime’s ideology, be direct beneficiaries of its rule, venerate its lead-
ers, or simply fear political change. The idea of nondemocratic legitimacy may
be hard for us to accept. Particularly in Western democracies, there is the
assumption that in every nondemocratic regime, the people are simply wait-
ing for the chance to install democracy. This belief is an exaggeration. Non-
democratic regimes can be just as institutionalized and stable and legitimate
as any democratic regime, enjoying some, or even a great deal of, public sup-
port, especially if benefits are widespread enough, coercion limited, and polit-
ical change viewed as fraught with risk. Many, for example, would suggest
that the current Chinese regime enjoys widespread public support and that
the public has little interest in democratization, which it views as potentially
undoing the economic progress of the last twenty years.
 Models of Nondemocratic Rule 157

Models of Nondemocratic Rule

By now it should be clear that nondemocratic regimes may emerge for dif-
ferent reasons and may persist in different ways by using, to different degrees,
tools of coercion and support. Based on these characteristics, political scien-
tists often classify these regimes into a number of specific forms of rule. The
most commonly seen forms are personal and monarchical, military, one-party,
theocratic, and illiberal/hybrid regimes. Personal rule is based on the power
of a single strong leader who typically relies on charismatic or traditional
authority to maintain power. Under military rule, in contrast, the monopoly
of violence that characterizes militaries tends to be the strongest means of
control. One-party rule is often more corporatist in nature, creating a broad
membership as a source of support and oversight. Theocracies, though lim-
ited in number, derive their power from their claim to rule on behalf of God.
Finally, in illiberal or hybrid regimes, the basic structures of democracy exist
but are not fully institutionalized and often not respected. In many if not most
of these cases, we find the institutions we are familiar with in liberal democ-
racies: heads of state and government, legislatures and judiciaries, and vari-
ous forms of elections. But these institutions do not rest on the rule of law,
in which the public and those in power are subject to the legal order. In the
absence of the rule of law, these institutions reflect the preferences of those
in power.

Personal and Monarchical Rule

Personal and monarchical rule is what usually comes to mind when people
think of nondemocratic rule, perhaps because long before modern politics,
states, or economies came into being, people were ruled by powerful figures—
kings and Caesars, emperors and sultans, chiefs and caudillos. Drawing from
charismatic or traditional legitimacy, personal and monarchical rule often
rests on the claim that one person alone is fit to run the country, with no clear
regime or roles to constrain that person’s rule. Under this form of rule, the
state and society are commonly taken to be possessions of the leader, to be
dispensed with as he (or, occasionally, she) sees fit. The ruler is not a subject
of the state; rather, the state and society are subjects of the ruler. Ideology
may be weak or absent, as the ruler justifies his control through the logic that
he alone is the embodiment of the people and therefore uniquely qualified to
act on the people’s behalf. This claim may be coupled with a strong person-
ality cult or a reliance on the traditional authority of bloodlines.
In some cases, personal or monarchical rule relies less on charismatic or
traditional authority than on a specific form of co-optation known as patri-
monialism. Patrimonialism can be seen as a form of clientelism, in that those
158 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

in power trade benefits for political support—a patron-client relationship.

However, under patrimonialism, the benefits are not distributed among soci-
ety but instead are limited to a small group of regime supporters inside the
state itself. This ruling group gains direct benefits in return for enforcing the
ruler’s will. The state elite swear allegiance to the leadership in return for per-
sonal profit (that is, a kleptocracy). This is a form of co-optation, although
under patrimonialism, it is only the ruler’s own personal followers who ben-
efit. All others in society tend to be held in check by force.
An example of personal rule based on patrimonialism was found in Zaire
(now the Democratic Republic of Congo) under the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko
from 1965 until 1997. Although he once commanded a great deal of charis-
matic legitimacy, over time Mobutu increasingly used patrimonialism as a
way to maintain his power. In particular, Mobutu built his patrimonial regime
around Zaire’s abundant natural resources, such as diamonds, gold, copper,
and cobalt. These resources were used by the regime not to benefit the coun-
try as a whole but as Mobutu’s personal treasury; he siphoned off the profits
from these resources to enrich himself and his followers. The result was a
coterie of supporters who were willing to defend Mobutu in order to main-
tain their economic privileges.6 This system of dependence and economic
reward helps explain how Mobutu maintained power for more than three
decades while Zaire’s per capita GDP dropped two-thirds from the 1970s to
the 1990s.
While monarchies have waned, they remain powerful in parts of the Mid-
dle East, such as Saudi Arabia. Personal rule remains common in Africa and
typically coupled to patrimonial regimes that are enriched through control
over natural resources or trade.

Military Rule

A second form of nondemocratic regime is military rule. Once considered

relatively unusual, military rule became much more common over the past
half century, particularly in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. Where
governments and states are struggling with legitimacy and stability, often as
a result of modernization, and where there are high levels of public unrest or
violence, the military has sometimes chosen to intervene directly in politics,
seeing itself as the only organized force able to ensure stability. This view is
often combined with a sense among military leaders that the current govern-
ment or regime threatens the military’s or the country’s interests and should
be removed. Military rule may even have widespread public support, espe-
cially if people believe that the strong arm of the military can bring an end
to corruption or political violence, prevent revolution, and restore stability.
Military rule typically emerges through a coup d’état, in which military
 Models of Nondemocratic Rule 159

forces take control of the government by force. In some cases, military actors
may claim that they have seized control only reluctantly, promising to return
the state and government to civilian rule once stability has been restored. This
was the case in Thailand in 2006 when the military deposed the prime min-
ister, but then returned the country to democratic rule in 2007. In recent years,
the Turkish military has similarly threatened military action against the rul-
ing Islamist party, claiming that its religious orientation conflicts with the
country’s secular constitution. Often, under military rule, political parties and
most civil liberties are restricted; civilian political leaders or opponents of mil-
itary rule are arrested and may be killed or disappear. The use of coercion is
a common aspect of military rule, since by their nature, militaries hold an
overwhelming capacity for violence.
Military rule typically lacks a specific ideology, although some military
leaders espouse radical or reactionary political attitudes. Military rule also
tends to lack any charismatic or traditional source of authority, meaning that
if the military seek legitimacy in the eyes of the people, they often must fall
back on rational authority. One particular variant of military rule that reflects
this logic is known as bureaucratic authoritarianism, a regime in which the
state bureaucracy and the military share a belief that a technocratic leader-
ship, focused on rational, objective, and technical expertise, can solve the prob-
lems of the country—as opposed to “emotional” or “irrational” ideologically
based party politics. Public participation, in other words, is seen as an obsta-
cle to effective and objective policy making and so is done away with. In the
1960s and 1970s, bureaucratic authoritarian regimes emerged in a number of
less-developed countries as rapid modernization and industrialization gener-
ated a high degree of political conflict. State and industry, with their plans
for rapid economic growth, clashed with the interests of the working class
and peasantry, who sought greater political power and a larger share of the
wealth. This increasing polarization in politics often led business leaders and
the state bureaucracy to advocate military rule as a way to prevent the work-
ing class and the peasantry from gaining power over the government.7
Over the past thirty years, many bureaucratic authoritarian regimes have
transitioned to democracy. However, there remain some noteworthy exam-
ples. Russia now might be viewed as a bureaucratic authoritarian regime,
where those in power have tended to come from within the secret service or
military, including Vladimir Putin. Supporters of military rule believe that dis-
pensing with democracy can help facilitate modernization and development;
they point to cases like South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile as success stories.
But this is a problem of selection bias, where we have only looked for cases
of economic success. If we concentrate instead on military rule, we can find
many more cases that led to instability, the loss of life, and poor economic
development, such as much of Central America.
160 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

One-Party Rule

Commonly associated with totalitarianism, one-party rule is a regime in

which a single political party monopolizes politics, with other parties banned
or excluded from power. The ruling party serves several functions. It helps to
incorporate the people into the political regime through membership and par-
ticipation. Typically, the party incorporates only a small minority of the pop-
ulation—in most communist countries, for instance, party membership was
less than 10 percent—but this still means that hundreds of thousands or mil-
lions of people are party members. One-party rule is often also combined with
a larger corporatist regime of public control.
Through membership, the party can rely on a large segment of the pub-
lic that is willing to help develop and support the policies of nondemocratic
rule as well as to transmit information back to the leadership on develop-
ments in all aspects of society. Single-party regimes are often broken down
into smaller units or “cells” that operate at the university, workplace, or neigh-
borhood level. These units report back to higher levels of the party, help deal
with local problems and concerns, and keep tabs on society as a whole. No
area is untouched by the presence of the party, and this helps to maintain
control over the public.
In return for their support, members of the party often are granted priv-
ileges that are otherwise denied to the public at large. They may have access
to certain resources (better health care or housing, for instance) that non-
members do not; positions in government and other important areas of the
economy or society may also be restricted to party members. One important
result of such membership is that a large group of individuals in society
directly benefits from the regime and is therefore willing to defend it. This
pragmatic membership, however, can backfire: those who embrace party
membership only for the personal benefits and not out of any ideological con-
viction may quickly desert the leadership in a time of crisis.
Finally, the party serves as a mechanism of mobilization. The leadership
uses the party as an instrument to deliver propaganda that extols the virtues
of the current regime and government; it relies on its rank-and-file members,
through demonstrations and mass rallies, to give the appearance of wide-
spread public support and enthusiasm for the leadership. If necessary, it also
uses party members to control and harass those who do not support the
regime. However, co-optation is the primary mechanism that ensures com-
pliance and support.
One-party regimes are often associated with communism and fascism and
were present in all cases of totalitarianism. However, they also can be found
around the world as part of a variety of nondemocratic regimes. Other par-
ties may exist, but they typically are highly restricted by the government so
 Models of Nondemocratic Rule 161

that they cannot challenge the current regime. For many years, this was the
case in Mexico, which was dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party,
or PRI. Cuba, North Korea, China, Vietnam, and Laos are other examples of
one-party regimes, each controlled by a single communist party.

Theocracy

Theocratic rule is probably the hardest form of nondemocratic rule to describe

and analyze, though it probably is one of the oldest forms of rule. Although
theocracy can be defined as, literally, “rule by God,” where the faith is the
foundation for the political regime, such a regime can be founded on any
number of faiths and variations within them. Thus, in theory, a Christian
theocracy might look completely unlike a Jewish one, drawing on very dif-
ferent texts, traditions, and interpretations of the faith. Another problem with
a definition of theocracy is that there are currently very few examples of theoc-
racies around the world. In fact, some scholars would say there is none. How-
ever, we can observe some commonalities and elements of theocratic rule,
even if such a system does not exist in pure form. In Chapter 3, we noted that
one of the recent challenges to ideology has been the rise of fundamentalism,
which we defined as the fusion of religion and politics into an ideology that
seeks to merge religion and the state. Such a merger, where faith is the sole
source of the regime, would render democratic institutions as subordinate or
in contradiction to the perceived will of God. In the vast majority of cases,
such a goal remains hypothetical. Yet we can note cases where theocratic
institutions are present and powerful.
Iran is the best example of a country that could be described as a theoc-
racy. In 1979, revolution overthrew the existing secular monarchy, ushering
in a new government headed by the cleric Ayatollah Khomeini. For many
years, Khomeini had the idea of an Islamic government, which was put in
practice in Iran. Most important, in the Iranian system, the traditional forms
of secular government (executive, legislature, judiciary) are mirrored by
unique institutions that are controlled by religious leaders. Thus, the Supreme
Leader, a religious figure, holds power over the president, while a Guardian
Council can reject legislation and candidates for office for being insufficiently
Islamic. Afghanistan, too, could be described as a theocracy between 1996
and 2001, lacking any constitution and relying on local clerics to rule on judi-
cial matters based on their interpretation of Islamic law.
In a more mixed form, Saudi Arabia combines both monarchical and theo-
cratic forms of rule. Politics is monopolized by the ruling family, and the king
also acts as the supreme religious leader. Judicial and other matters must con-
form to Islamic law and are enforced by the Mutawwai’in, or morality police.
Conversion from Islam in Saudi Arabia and Iran is punishable by death, and
162 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

IN FOCUS
Types of Nondemocratic Rule

Type Definition Primary Tools of Control

Personal and Rule by a single leader, Patrimonialism: supporters

monarchical with no clear regime within the state benefit
rule or rules constraining directly from their alliance
that leadership with the ruler (corruption)
Military rule Rule by one or more Control of the armed forces,
military officials, often sometimes also allied with
brought to power business and state elites
through a coup d’état (bureaucratic authoritarianism)
One-party Rule by one political Large party membership helps
rule party, with other groups mobilize support and maintain
banned or excluded public control, often in return
from power for political or economic
benefits
Theocracy “Rule by god”; regime Religious leadership and
based on holy texts as political leadership fused into
foundation for regime single sovereign authority
and politics
Illiberal Rule by an elected Manipulation of democratic
regimes leadership, through procedures, such as vote
procedures of questionable rigging or harassment of
democratic legitimacy opposition

other faiths or sects within Islam are brought under strict control or banned
outright. Many have suggested that other countries in the Middle East, such as
Iraq or Egypt, could eventually move toward a theocracy; surveys, however, pro-
vide a more mixed picture of the public’s desire to fuse religion and state.8 As
with fundamentalism, we should not confuse religiosity, or even greater reli-
gion in politics, with a desire for theocracy. In fact, many of the strongest crit-
ics of Iran’s theocracy are some of its most prominent religious leaders.

Illiberal/Hybrid Regimes

Our last example is perhaps the most important for us to consider, since it
seems to be growing in prominence around the world. In fact, Figure 6.1,
 Models of Nondemocratic Rule 163

shown earlier, includes a large group of countries that are categorized as nei-
ther “free” nor “not free,” but as “partially free,” falling somewhere between
democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Examples would include Venezuela,
Turkey, and Thailand. These regimes go by a number of names, such as semi-
democratic regimes, quasi-democratic regimes, or electoral democracies. They
are what we will term illiberal or hybrid regimes; scholars use both of these
terms to mean the same regime type, though each term captures a different
aspect of this particular form. By illiberal, we mean that they do not fully
institutionalize liberty, while the idea of a hybrid speaks to a combination of
democratic and nondemocratic institutions and practices. We will use the
terms illiberal and hybrid interchangeably.
What do illiberal or hybrid regimes have in common? These regimes fea-
ture many of the familiar aspects of democracy, though with important qual-
ifications. As a starting point, while the rule of law may be in place, it is weak.
As a result, all the democratic institutions that rest upon the rule of law are
weakly institutionalized and respected. Thus, executives, legislatures, and judi-
ciaries have their respective arenas of authority; the public enjoys the right
to vote; elections take place on a regular basis; and political parties compete.
But these institutions and processes are circumscribed or unpredictable in
ways inconsistent with democracy. Executives typically hold an overwhelm-
ing degree of power. This power is often concentrated in a presidency of a
semipresidential system that limits the ability for removal. Moreover, presi-
dents in illiberal systems often rely on referenda to bypass the state and con-
firm executive power. Legislatures in turn are less able to check the power of
the executive, and judicial institutions such as constitutional courts are often
packed with the supporters of those in power. In addition, while political com-
petition may exist on paper, parties and groups are restricted or harassed.
Government monopolies over print and electronic media are used to deny the
opposition a public platform while the judicial system is used to harass them.
The military or state-run industries can also be used by those in power to
compell their members to vote and act as instructed. Elections are manipu-
lated through changing electoral rules, barring candidates from running, vote-
buying, or intimidation.
Illiberal regimes in many ways represent a gray area between nondemoc-
ratic and democratic rule. Although these regimes look much like democra-
cies on paper, they are much less so in practice. The big question here is
whether illiberal regimes are transitional, in the process of moving from non-
democratic to democratic rule (or vice versa), or a new form of nondemoc-
racy that uses the trappings of democracy to perpetuate its control.
Increasingly we are seeing more of the latter: the spread of democratic insti-
tutions but with circumscribed participation, competition, and liberty.9
164 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

I N S T I T U T I O N S I N

ACTION
POPULISM IN AN ILLIBERAL
REGIME: HUGO CHÁVEZ
AND VENEZUELA

The rise to power of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela has been an interesting example
for political scientists who study the intersection among populism, illiberalism, and
natural resources. A former army officer jailed for a failed coup in 1992, he was
elected president in 1998 by a strong majority of the vote. Since then, Chávez has
sought to carry out dramatic change in the country through means that have polar-
ized the international and domestic community. Many of these changes are rooted
in socialist or at least populist ideas, concentrating on the needs of the poor over
the wishes of the elites; they have included increased education and health care in
what is a highly unequal society. At the same time, the president has asserted greater
control over the country’s oil industry, which provided the means by which the pres-
ident can influence domestic and international affairs. The media, once strongly crit-
ical of Chávez, has been stifled by laws that prohibit slandering elected officials and
the refusal to relicense one of the largest private television stations known for its
hostility to Chávez. Chávez has also been given the power to rule by decree in cer-
tain areas, effectively bypassing the legislature, and he has sought to ban members
of the opposition from running in local elections. In the international arena, Chávez
has combined his political platform and oil revenues to forge ties with such coun-
tries as Cuba and Iran, and with other populist leaders in Latin America.
But to illustrate the complexity of illiberal regimes, Chávez does not enjoy
unchecked political power. His presidency has been hindered by term limits, which
require that he step down in 2013. In 2007, Chávez called for a national referendum
to eliminate term limits but it was defeated in the polls; a decree to increase the
powers of the intelligence services was rescinded after a public outcry, and mem-
bers of the military have criticized what they see as the politicization of the military.
At the same time, a second referendum to eliminate term limits passed in 2009,
which may pave the way for more nondemocratic actions by the president. A clear
transition to a fully democratic or authoritarian regime is probably the least likely
result.

In Sum: Retreat or Retrenchment

for Nondemocratic Regimes?
Although nondemocratic regimes exhibit an amazing diversity and flexibility
in maintaining political control, the global trend over the past half century
has been away from this form of rule. In the early part of the last century,
democratic countries were few and beleaguered, wracked by economic reces-
 In Sum: Retreat or Retrenchment for Nondemocratic Regimes? 165

sion, whereas nondemocratic regimes and totalitarianism in particular,

backed by communist and fascist ideologies, seemed to promise radically new
ways to restructure state, economic, and societal institutions. The German
philosopher Oswald Spengler summarized these views in his 1922 work The
Decline of the West: “The era of individualism, liberalism and democracy, of
humanitarianism and freedom, is nearing its end. The masses will accept with
resignation the victory of the Caesars, the strong men, and will obey them.
Life will descend to a level of general uniformity, a new kind of primitivism,
and the world will be better for it.10
Yet the exact opposite has taken place. In spite of the rise of illiberal and
hybrid regimes, Figure 6.2 shows that the number of countries classified as
“not free” and “partly free” has declined dramatically over just the past thirty
years. In 1992, only a quarter of the global population lived in free societies;
but in 2008, this had risen to nearly half. Why this decline in nondemocratic
regimes? We have advanced economic, political, and societal arguments
regarding the sources of nondemocratic rule and democratization. One final
explanation may be that nondemocratic rule has lost much of its mobilizing
power. Fifty years ago, ideologies predicated on nondemocratic regimes could

Figure 6.2 AUTHORITARIANISM IN DECLINE, 1977–2007

Free Partly free Not free

100

80
Percentage of countries

60

40

20

0
1977 1987* 1997 2007
Year

*1987 data is from November 1986–November 1987.

Note: The total number of countries changes due to increases in the number of countries Freedom House
rated each year.
Source: Freedom House
166 CH. 6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES

mobilize people with visions of a world to be transformed. However, in the

aftermath of World War II and the Cold War, there is no longer any strong
ideology that combines the absence of individual freedom with some broader
goal. Leaders may claim that limitations on political rights are necessary for
political stability or economic development, but they no longer offer any real
alternative vision for politics. It is increasingly difficult to justify nondemo-
cratic regimes through any universal set of ideas.
Does this mean that the days of nondemocratic regimes are numbered?
Perhaps. There may in fact come a time when all societies are democratic,
and nondemocratic rule, like slavery, is an aspect of human behavior con-
signed to history and the margins of global society. However, we cannot know
what new or perennial issues may again give power and purpose to nonde-
mocratic rule. Will inequality clash with freedom? Will people someday come
to see the absence of freedom as a benefit rather than a form of bondage?
Might a new religious or secular vision of human life reject democracy as anti-
quated or profane? Perhaps what we now enjoy is simply a brief aberration
in the long human history of nondemocratic rule.

NOTES
1. See the Freedom House website at www.freedomhouse.org.
2. For an excellent discussion of the bewildering varieties of nondemocratic rule, see
Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Nondemocratic Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
This work was originally published in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby,
eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
3. Linz, Totalitarian and Nondemocratic Regimes.
4. Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1951).
5. Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara, Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the
Coming Century (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1996), p. 82.
6. For details, see Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial
Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics, 46, no. 4 (1994), pp.
453–489.
7. Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Non-democratic Regimes:
Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies,
1973).
8. See “Iraqi Public Rejects Iranian Model but Wants Major Role for Islam in Gov-
ernment,” Program on International Policy Institute, 14 June 2005, www.pipa.org;
also “Iranians Egyptians, Turks: Contrasting Views on Sharia,” Gallup, 10 July
2008, www.gallup.com.
9. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Wash-
ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003); Arch Pudding-
ton, “Findings of Freedom in the World 2008—Is the Tide Turning?” Freedom in
the World Report 2008, www.freedomhouse.org
10. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (New York: Knopf, 1928), p. 347.