Society as a Process

Author(s): Friedrich Baerwald

Source: The American Catholic Sociological Review , Dec., 1944, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1944),
pp. 238-243
Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3706605

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238 The American Catholic Sociological Review

Society as a Process
FRIEDRICH BAERWALD

Is it legitimate to ask within the framework of sociology what is

social reality? Obviously, as sociologists we are concerned with
what is vaguely referred to as facts. We try to know more and
more about them. Especially in this country methods of investiga-
tion are constantly refined and our statistical and methodological
conscience becomes more and more delicate. We abhor generaliza-
tion based on insufficient evidence and whenever we try to speak of
regularities and recurrences in a social field, we are careful to state
the tentativeness of such conclusions.
Let us assume, for a moment, that the endowment with research
funds and personnel in most of our universities becomes so abundant
that more and more people can be trained in scientific research
methods and can be set on projects of research and investigation:
what can we hope for in terms of increasing our knowledge of the
social process? There cannot be any doubt that a widening of such
research activities is most desirable. It will increase tremendously
the amount of information available for analysis of many sectors
of society. However, it is necessary to stress that there is a difference
between information, imperative though it is, and understanding.
There can be no understanding without a firm grasp of the realities
of a given condition. Conversely, it is possible to have information
* This paper is based on a phenomenological approach to sociology
which has been presented by the author at Fordham University since 1941.
'T'he concrete conditions under which scientific work must be carried out
at present make it impossible to give a more extensive presentation of
existential definition of society. The author hopes he will be able to do so
in due time. For the present, he would like to present this brief paper as
a starting point for discussion. For information on phenomenology com-
pare The Foundation of Phenomenology by Marvin Farber, Harvard
University Press, 1943, and The Philosophy of Edmvnd Husserl by E. Parl
Welch, Columbia University Press, 1941. An outstanding Catholic repre-
sentative of phenomenology is Mother E. Stein, O.S.B., of Cologne. Max
Scheler, at least in parts of his work, can be considered a Catholic phe-
nomenologist. Compare "The Meaning of Objectivism and Realism in Max
Scheler's Philosophy of Religion" by Hanna Hafkesbrink in Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, March 1942, pp. 291-308.

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 The American Catholic Sociological Review 239

and no understanding. Hence, it becomes apparent that informa-

tion is intelligible and usable only within a framework of under-
standing which as such lies outside the sphere of purely pragmatic
study. To posit the question - what is social reality? - there-
fore is an attempt to investigate into the type of framework that
must be established in order to give meaning to information.
To ask the question what is social reality is tantamount to ask-
ing what is society? Strangely enough, in most of the current texts
no real answer is given to that question. MacIver in his Society
states that "Society is a web of social relationships,...". Others
give similar "definitions" which are merely verbal circumscriptions
of the term society, but do not carry the concept beyond what is
already implied in the word society itself. It might be objected
that any definition of society other than a purely verbal enlarge-
ment on the term is impossible. Furthermore, it might be said that
such a definition is not necessary because sociology assumes society
as its prime data which as such does not need further analysis. This
view, however, is superficial and leaves sociology without firm foun-
dation. We think we can show that "society" is subject to a sub-
stantive definition in other than merely synonymous terms. Once
we have established such a definition of society, we have a clear
view of the background configuration of all social data. This
would establish the existential framework for the understanding of
social facts.
Let us begin with the refutation of the false psychological notion
of society as a state of mind according to which social reality is mere-
ly the discovery of reciprocity relations in one's own consciousness.2
One of the data of experience is the existence of people other than
ourselves which comes to us as the dependency experience of the
earliest phases of childhood.3
However, this prime experience points to an objective fact inde-
pendent of our process of cognition and leading to an understanding
not merely of the fact but of the general mode of coexistence. This
can be clarified further by investigating the nature of our dependency.
1 Maclver, R. M. Society - Its Structure and Changes, Hay Long and
Richard Smith, Inc., New York, 1931, p. 6.
2 Typical of this Kantian concept of society is G. Simmel, Durkheim
and Gurvitch, although they differ in the way in which society is conceived
as a psychological experience.
3 M. Heidegger in Sein und Zeit refers to "In der Welt Sein" as the
primary data of experience. However, this experience is transmitted to us
by the fact of coexistence and our relation to other existing beings.

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240 The American Catholic Sociological Review

It is based on the insufficiency of the individual to secure its own

survival. An individual left to himself cannot survive on a human
level, that is to say, in full development of his faculties, because he
is constantly confronted with insurmountable limitations of tim
and space.
His time framework is limited to his own existence and expe
rience. Hence, it is too narrow to allow for a full adjustment to
the problems of living if this has to be done unaided by others. His
space framework is similarly restricted. Left to his own devices, th
individual cannot acquire sufficient control over resources available
in space in order to secure his survival. The case of Robinso
Crusoe can serve as an illustration. Although he lived alone on a
island until the appearance of the good man Friday, he had available
even while isolated the accumulated experiences of generations facil-
itating his use of tools and his accommodation to a novel environ
ment. In addition to that, things that he rescued from the wrecked
ship served him to manfucature new instruments for the domina-
tion of the space to which he was confined. Hence, Crusoe's isola
tion on this island was merely geographical not social.
On the basis of these considerations, we can return now to the
fact of coexistence. We now see that coexistence of human beings
proceeds in a definite mode. It is a process in which the insufficient
individuals are linked together by extending through manifold
methods of cooperation their respective individual time and space
frameworks into larger systems of social time and social space, which
form the background of their existence. This yields the following
definition of society:
Society is the process of widening and deepening the range of
individual existences into systems of extended frameworks of time
and space.
Let us analyze this definition in some detail. In the first place
it is more than a mere verbal transcription of the word society into
synonymous terms. It establishes on a high level of generalization
what society is. It makes apparent that society is always in a state
of becoming. That is to say, this substantive definition of society is
dynamic and views society as a continuous process. From this view-
point, we can approach now the question asked at the beginning:
what is social reality? It is obviously more than a state of mind.
It is embodied in all concrete processes and institutions which factual-
ly or intentionally aim at extending individual time and space hori-
zons. That means that this continual social process underlies all

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 The American Catholic Sociological Review 241

social groupings and all types of cooperation and is their ultimate

aspect. It is the reality behind the manifestations of the social
process in its innumerable concrete forms.
I leave it to the imagination of the reader to take any social
group beginning with the family up to complicated structures of
political associations and to subject them to this analysis. They all
have in common this most general aspect of time and space exten-
sion of the participating individuals. What distinguishes them is
the direction of their frameworks. This concept of direction is
immediately implied in our definition of society as a process. There
cannot be any social grouping which is not subject ultimately to
the question of wherefrom and whereto. The directional drive is
therefore one of the most fundamental aspects of all social groups.
The question may very well be asked: what can be gained by
this type of definition? It could be objected for instance that the
specific frameworks which distinguish one social group from another
can also be defined by analyzing the implied or overt objectives of
particular groups. However, to analyze groups according to their
specific purposes presents great difficulties. There are many cases
where groups start for one purpose and continue to function but
now for an altogether different purpose without making formal
changes in their structure. Consequently, a sociological analysis of
group life based merely on what group members say they are aiming
at will lead at best to a superficial behavioristic analysis. Another
danger in relying too much on group purposes is to slip concepts
of what groups ought to do into a purely sociological analysis. A
consideration of intrinsic ends of groups is necessary for an evaluation
of the results of group action under the aspect of social ethics. But
this leads beyond the realm of sociology proper which is concerned
with the actualities of the process of coexistence.
The definition leads to the possibility of what can be called a
situational analysis of groups and the participating individuals.
Because groups are constantly engaged in the tying in of individual
frameworks in their extension and in the definition and redefinition
of their direction, a group can at any moment be studied under the
aspect of the condition of its framework. Inasmuch as the continua-
tion of an effective framework is a prerequisite to the functioning of
the group, the group situations, its degree of integration, coordina-
tion of the participants and its efficiency in terms of its directional
drive are subject to an analysis which can be based on the objective
ground of the social process as time and space extension.

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242 The American Catholic Sociological Review

Since it is merely the purpose of this paper to outline this ap-

proach to sociology, it may suffice to illustrate its practical applica-
tions in three instances. Obviously, the problem of social time
assumes paramount importance in this system. It covers all the
processes of tradition which link individuals here and now with
their predecessors. Tradition in this sense has to be understood
strictly as a process. As such it is continuous and establishes the
backward extension of the time framework. However, there is a
forward extension of this framework. No group can continue un-
less it has at least an implied idea of its future possibilities. They
form the effective motives for the present behavior of the members.
Group participation in this sense means the effective sharing of the
backward and forward extension of social time frameworks. It
can only be hinted in this connection that this is a way to ana
the impact of what is usually termed "heredity." It serves to bri
out its purely sociological aspect as contrasted to the biological p
which has no place in sociology proper. Furthermore, this concept
be used as an analytical tool to survey difficult borderline are
society where questions of competing group memberships a
allegiances create friction. Lastly, this approach brings into f
all processes of informal and moral education, of art and literatu
and other such manifestations as particular aspects of the backw
and forward extension of the social time framework.
Similarly, the concept of social space opens a wide vista of social
phenomena which can be arranged in a meaningful manner. Social
space is defined by the validity of institutions within its confines.
To illustrate: legal systems, money systems, educational systems
are mostly linked to definitely defined spacial areas. Hence, the ex-
tension of individual space frameworks always implies a particular
form of participation in these systems and the non-participating in
others. "Environment" in this sense is the totality of participation
in specific space frameworks and not merely the impact of climatic
and geographical conditions on individuals.
If follows that the much discussed problem of the predominance
either of heredity or environment is really a wrong question. In reality,
heredity represents the time aspect; environment, the space aspect of
the coexistential drive in which all individuals are involved in specific
ways thereby differentiating them from all other individuals.
With this statement we arrive at the last conclusion we want to
mention in this paper. Inasmuch as society is a continuous process,
requiring the constant knitting, renewal and redefinition of extended

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 The American Catholic Sociological Review 243

framework of time and space, the "status quo" of any given group
is a merely fictitious state. In reality, no family community of an
kind or association ever remain in the same condition. On the
other side, just because society is a process, no social group can
to continue as such unless it makes constant efforts to maintain and
strengthen its framework relationships. A weakening of these ex-
tensions will lead to social disintegration.

Fordham University, New York, N. Y.

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