Open Source Investigation of Detention in Tibet

Open Source Investigation of Detention in Tibet by the Tibet Research Project, Version 1.
Satellite imagery was provided by Google Maps, Apple Maps, and their respective providers.
All research was independently generated and published. The latest findings, analysis, and document updates can be
found at www.tibetresearchproject.org. This website will also provide links for future researchers to contact the project
and submit information for review. All information will be handled with confidentiality; however, it is recommended to
take the necessary security measures on your end too to ensure that security is maintained for all parties.
Page | 1 Last edited 06 July 2021

Open Source Investigation of Detention in Tibet by the Tibet Research Project, Version 1.0
TABLE OF REVISIONS
This section outlines the revisions made to the document. As this research continues, future versions
may include updated information, newly discovered locations, and clarifications.
The report will be released with a new version number each time, and changes will be tracked in the
table below.
Version Date Summary of Changes

Completed
1.0-beta1 06 March 2021 Pre-publication release with initial findings. All data is open for
peer review and feedback.
1.0 06 July 2021 Publication Release:
- Added clarifications and updates to data
- Additional analysis of locations and context
- Updated info based on peer feedback
Updates or additions with the following locations:

2969191157, 2989391262, 2963491197,
2961490967, 2965291002, 2816185979,
2929387232, 2968591159, 3318888833, 3147993624, 2984391728
Removed duplicate location (3250580111).
CURRENT VERSION
1.0 – This version is the official publication release. It follows version 1.0-beta1, which was
released openly to the public to gain review and feedback. Therefore, the information in this
document is believed to be correct based on all the evidence presented with strong confidence.

CONTRIBUTORS
Due to the nature of the investigation, some individuals may prefer aliases or online usernames for
anonymity. This list of contributors only includes those who have consented to be named. Individual
contributions have been cross-checked and verified by the team, and care was taken to ensure that
individuals with the potential to disrupt the research were promptly removed from the research
group. Due to the research’s modular nature, with contributors offering to help research specific
sections, this document’s views or conclusions may not entirely reflect all contributors’ opinions.
This project would not have been possible without the help of all the named and unnamed
researchers volunteering their time. Thanks to their efforts, we were able to process a much larger
dataset and provide additional levels of scrutiny for all of our findings. In addition, the findings within
this report would not have been possible without the contributions from many academics, external
researchers, and organisations.
Table 1 - Contributors to this project (in no particular order)
Name/Call Sign Roles Key areas of contribution
Tom Jarvis Project Coordinator, Author, Primary image analysis and

Researcher geolocation, project coordination,
crowdsourcing, and verification
Robin Taylor Deputy Coordinator, Author, Project coordination, geolocation,

Researcher verification, analysis, author
Jenna Dolecek Researcher, Author, Editor Analysis, author, editorial
Chong XC Researcher, Author, Translator Verification, translation, analysis, and

geolocation
Investigator Zoose OSINT Researcher Data collection, analysis and

verification
Ernest P Researcher, Translator Location analysis, verification,

translation, and geolocation
Reece Morris Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis
Matthew Accurso Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis
Basti Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis
Jimothyyy Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis
...and many more operating under anonymity

CONTENTS
Table of Revisions ................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Current Version .................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Contributors .............................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Contents....................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
1 Scope ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
2 Declaration ....................................................................................................................................................................... 10
3 Acronyms and Definitions.......................................................................................................................................... 11
4 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.1 Background........................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Description of Labour and Re-education camps in China and their successors ...................... 14
4.3 Description of Tibetan Detention System ................................................................................................ 16
5 Methodology .................................................................................................................................................................... 17
5.1 Project Coordination......................................................................................................................................... 17
5.2 Investigation Process........................................................................................................................................ 17
5.2.1 Phase 1 – Data Collection ........................................................................................................................... 17
5.2.2 Phase 2 – Data Refinement ........................................................................................................................ 17
5.2.3 Phase 3 – Description .................................................................................................................................. 17
5.2.4 Phase 4 – Redacting Personal Details and Ethical Evaluation .................................................... 17
5.2.5 Phase 5 – Crowdsourcing Scrutiny......................................................................................................... 18
5.2.6 Phase 6 – Review ........................................................................................................................................... 18
5.3 Performed Activities ......................................................................................................................................... 18
5.3.1 Locating and identifying facilities........................................................................................................... 18
5.3.2 Online data gathering .................................................................................................................................. 19
5.3.3 Image Description and verification........................................................................................................ 19
5.4 Reference Codes.................................................................................................................................................. 19
5.5 Naming Procedure ............................................................................................................................................. 20
5.6 Limitations of this Research .......................................................................................................................... 21
5.6.1 Source Issues ................................................................................................................................................... 21
5.6.2 False Positives................................................................................................................................................. 21
5.6.3 False Negatives ............................................................................................................................................... 21
5.6.4 Misidentified locations ................................................................................................................................ 22
5.6.5 Imagery Limitations ..................................................................................................................................... 22
5.6.6 Selection Bias .................................................................................................................................................. 23

5.6.7 Missed Locations ........................................................................................................................................... 23

5.7 Defining a classification system ................................................................................................................... 24
5.7.1 Prison Classification ..................................................................................................................................... 25
5.7.2 A Note on Solitary Confinement Buildings ......................................................................................... 26
6 Findings in Tibet ............................................................................................................................................................ 27
6.1 Bulk Findings ....................................................................................................................................................... 27
6.1.1 Drapchi Prison (Tibet Autonomous Region Prison) ....................................................................... 36
6.1.2 Sangyip Prison Complex ............................................................................................................................. 51
6.1.3 Sitru (Tibet Autonomous Region Public Security Bureau Detention Centre) (Unit Number
4) (TAR PSB Detention Centre) ............................................................................................................................... 54
6.1.4 Utritru (Lhasa Prison) (Unit Number 5) .............................................................................................. 62
6.1.5 Unidentified, Lhasa, Tibet 2968591154 .............................................................................................. 77
6.1.6 Possible location of “Yitridu” ................................................................................................................. 79
6.1.7 Gutsa (Lhasa Public Security Bureau Detention Centre) .............................................................. 81
6.1.8 Gazha Prison .................................................................................................................................................... 84
6.1.9 Trisam RTL (Duilong) .................................................................................................................................. 85
6.1.10 Chushur (Chushu/Qushui) Prison ..................................................................................................... 92
6.1.11 Unidentified, Lhasa, Tibet 2963491197....................................................................................... 101
6.2 Other Tibetan Prisons ................................................................................................................................... 108
6.2.1 Unidentified, Quxu, Tibet 2935190741............................................................................................. 108
6.2.2 Locating and Verifying Powo Tramo .................................................................................................. 110
6.2.3 Powo Tramo Prison (Area no.2/Bomi Prison) 3001195609 ................................................... 123
6.2.4 Powo Tramo Prison (Area no.1 at Langqiu) 3006795564 ........................................................ 124
6.2.5 Nyalam Detention Centre 2816185979 ............................................................................................ 125
6.2.6 Snowland New Reception Centre, Shigatse, Tibet, 2924688863 ........................................... 129
6.2.7 Changdu 3109697204 .............................................................................................................................. 133
6.2.8 Unidentified, Changdu/Chamdo, Tibet 3114797161 .................................................................. 136
6.2.9 Naidong Prison 2921191762 ................................................................................................................ 137
6.2.10 Unidentified, Shiquanhe, Ngari Prefecture, Tibet 3250580112......................................... 139
6.2.11 Unidentified, Gongbu, Pomé County, Tibet 2988993249 ..................................................... 140
6.2.12 Unidentified, Nyingchi, Tibet 2968594324 ................................................................................ 141
6.2.13 Dazi County Detention Center 2986295771 .............................................................................. 142

6.2.14 Unidentified, Dunqiong, Seni District, Nagqu, Tibet China, Tibet 3153792028 .......... 143
6.2.15 Unidentified, Nagqu, Tibet 3146592042 ..................................................................................... 145
6.2.16 Unidentified, Dangquka, Damxung County, Tibet 3047991098 ........................................ 146
6.2.17 Unidentified, Sa'gya County, Tibet 2890388021 ...................................................................... 148
6.2.18 Unidentified, Shigatse, Tibet 2925188879 ................................................................................. 149
6.2.19 Unidentified, Gêrzê County, Tibet 3230684060 ....................................................................... 150
6.2.20 Unidentified, Lhunze, Tibet 2841192457 ................................................................................... 151
6.2.21 Unidentified, Mainling County, Nyingchi, Tibet 2921594208............................................. 152
6.2.22 Unidentified, Lhorong County, Tibet 3074295823 ................................................................. 153
6.2.23 Unidentified, Tibet-Nepal border, Tibet 2866087119 ........................................................... 154
6.2.24 Unidentified, Zedang County, Tibet 2922591757 .................................................................... 155
6.2.25 Unidentified, Lhatse, Tibet 2908587636 ..................................................................................... 156
6.2.26 Unidentified, Lhorong County, Tibet 3074295823 ................................................................. 157
6.2.27 Unidentified, Zogang County, Tibet 2967497842 .................................................................... 158
6.2.28 Unidentified, Markam County, Tibet 2968398590.................................................................. 159
6.2.29 Unidentified, Nyima County, Tibet 3179187236 ..................................................................... 160
6.2.30 Unidentified, Baqên Town, Tibet 3191894058......................................................................... 161
6.2.31 Unidentified, Gyaca/ Gyatsa County, Tibet 2914392589 ..................................................... 162
6.2.32 Unidentified, Arza, Lhari County, Tibet 3064493235 ............................................................ 163
6.2.33 Unidentified, Nyamo/Nyemo County, Tibet 2943890158 ................................................... 164
6.2.34 Unidentified, Banbar County, Tibet 3093894712 .................................................................... 165
6.2.35 Unidentified, Rutog County, Tibet 3338279727....................................................................... 166
6.2.36 Unidentified, Burang/ Purang County, Tibet 3029781174.................................................. 167
6.2.37 Unidentified, Baingoin County, Tibet 3139890008................................................................. 168
6.2.38 Unidentified, Amdo County, Tibet 3225991675....................................................................... 169
6.2.39 Unidentified, Bolo, Tibet 3085698270 ......................................................................................... 170
6.2.40 Unidentified, Comai County, Tibet 2844291428 ...................................................................... 171
6.2.41 Unidentified, Cona County, Tibet 2800091963 ........................................................................ 172
6.2.42 Unidentified, Gyantse, Tibet 2891689611 .................................................................................. 173
6.2.43 Unidentified, Biru County, Tibet 3147993624 .......................................................................... 174
6.2.44 Unidentified, Maizhokunggar County, Tibet 2984391728 ................................................... 175
6.2.45 Unidentified, Dagze District, Tibet 2967691353 ...................................................................... 176
6.2.46 Unidentified, Gonggar County, Tibet 2929191004 ................................................................. 177
6.2.47 Unidentified, Zongga, Tibet 2885585299.................................................................................... 178
6.2.48 Unidentified, Dranang County, Tibet 2924891336 ................................................................. 179
6.2.49 Unidentified, Lhatse, Tibet 2908587636 ..................................................................................... 180


6.2.51 Qiongjie County Detention Center 2903291686 ...................................................................... 182
6.2.52 Langkazi County Detention Center 2906592199 ..................................................................... 183
6.2.53 Unidentified, Coqên County, Tibet 3101885154 ...................................................................... 184
6.2.54 Unidentified, Jomda County, Tibet 3150298217 ...................................................................... 185
6.2.55 Unidentified, Jomda County, Sumu, Tibet 3159198388 ........................................................ 186
6.2.56 Unidentified, Sog, Tibet 3188793781 ........................................................................................... 187
6.2.57 Unidentified, Tsona County, Tibet 2799391956 ...................................................................... 188
6.2.58 Linzhou County Detention Centre 2989391262 ...................................................................... 189
6.2.59 Unidentified, Qonggyai County, Tibet 2903291687................................................................ 190
6.2.60 Unidentified, Lhodrag County, Tibet 2838990857.................................................................. 191
6.2.61 Unidentified, Nierong County, Tibet 3210792303 .................................................................. 192
6.2.62 Unidentified, Shantsa County, Tibet 3093888702................................................................... 193
6.2.63 Unidentified, Gergye County, Tibet 3239281141 .................................................................... 194
6.2.64 Unidentified, Dzayul County, Tibet 2865997458..................................................................... 195
6.2.65 Unidentified, Nang County, Tibet 2904793074 ........................................................................ 196
6.2.66 Unidentified, Dromo County, Tibet 2750188933..................................................................... 197
6.2.67 Unidentified, Drongpa County, Tibet 2977384031 ................................................................. 198
6.2.68 Unidentified, Gampa County, Tibet 2827788517 .................................................................... 199
6.2.69 Unidentified, Khangmar County, Tibet 2855889684 ............................................................. 200
6.2.70 Unidentified, Panam County, Tibet 2911089257..................................................................... 201
6.2.71 Unidentified, Rinpung County, Tibet 2923389843 ................................................................. 202
6.2.72 Unidentified, Sangri County, Tibet 2926392015...................................................................... 203
6.2.73 Unidentified, Dinggyê County, Tibet 2836987760 .................................................................. 204
6.2.75 Unidentified, Nagarzê County, Tibet 2897190399 .................................................................. 206
6.2.76 Unidentified, Ngamring County, Tibet 2929387232 .............................................................. 207
6.2.77 Unidentified, Shuanghu County, Tibet 3318888833 .............................................................. 208
6.3 Tibetan Prisons with Unconfirmed Locations..................................................................................... 209
7 False Positives .............................................................................................................................................................. 210

1 SCOPE
The scope of this investigation is to find and identify suspected prisons in Tibet. Few online resources
are discussing this topic, and while there are several websites for advocacy campaigns, none of them
have a complete database of publicly available coordinates. Therefore, an objective is to broaden the
understanding of detention across the whole region. Geolocating and verifying these prison locations
is necessary because most known prisons are in and around Lhasa, but there is little to no
information about prisons outside the capital city.
This research will refrain from identifying the goings-on inside the prisons, which may violate human
rights. Instead, it will take a broader look at locating and identifying all prisons to provide a
foundation for other researchers to investigate further and verify stories of detention of Tibetan
citizens by China’s government and potential human rights violations in said detention facilities.
However, additional information about reported human rights violations has been provided in
instances where it provides context on the location.
The hope is that this report closes a gap in the current research which lacks this vital information to
assist current and future researchers in this region or on this topic.
Primary Goals:
1. Assign coordinates to every detention centre and prison in Tibet.
2. Match known prisons to coordinates and verify through geolocation.
3. Close the gap in the current published research on the subject.
Secondary Goals:
1. Ensure that all research is accessible and verifiable through open source means.
2. Provide a dataset that can be adapted and improved upon for future research.
3. Provide the open source investigation and journalism community with a large-scale project
to develop OSINT skills and experience.
One point of clarification which should be made from the outset is that the findings in this report
should be considered on a per facility basis. In this project’s planning phase, it was decided that this
project’s sole reliance would be on open source content. It is hoped that future research using human
sources can be combined with these findings to produce a more comprehensive picture of the
situation.
This project aims to be extensive but not exhaustive due to its primarily single-individual
management and limited resources.

2 DECLARATION
I declare that all the information contained within was written in good faith, and all efforts were made
to ensure accuracy. Any errors in this document will be faults in analysis rather than an attempt to
spin a political narrative or spread disinformation. This research was driven by an interest in utilising
open source investigative techniques in a human rights context. All data was obtained through non-
classified open-source means or by reaching out to organisations that provided additional
information.
This project was not funded, is not associated with any organisation, and was primarily completed
by a small team with additional crowdsourced help from online journalists and researchers who
kindly volunteered their time and knowledge. Best efforts were dedicated to ensuring images were
correctly attributed.
Naming in this document has been inconsistent with any particular language; instead, the names for
locations have been based on the most commonly known/referenced names online. 3 This improves
online searchability and comprehensiveness for those with limited knowledge, as the authors,
contributors, and researchers did. Understandably, Tibetan sources wanted only Tibetan names to
be used to be authentic to Tibet and undermine China’s claim to the region. However, we believe the
system in place maintains impartiality and will aid future research. 4
During the investigation process, attempts to hinder research by obscuring content were identified.
Chinese State-controlled media sources were seen to have amended their articles at the exact places
where information was taken and referenced in this research. This was observed in articles more
than a year old, with changes only to remove the information and not for editorial or clarity purposes.
We obtained information from one Chinese article dating from 2017 that a known facility may have
been split into two locations. Within days of it being included in the (then) publicly visible working
document, it was edited at that paragraph to remove such information. Since these potential attempts
to obstruct the process were identified, the report was removed from public view until complete.
Researchers were instructed to archive all websites they used as sources. Whether this was a case of
a Chinese counterintelligence effort to prevent information from being analysed and disseminated,
or perhaps just a series of coincidences, it was outside our scope and skillset to investigate further.
For this reason, I would like to call on researchers to persevere in the face of censorship as they tackle
future investigations into this subject. I would also like to highlight the importance of digital security
and precautions that all investigators must consider when conducting digital research.
- Tom Jarvis, Research Coordinator and Lead Author
3 It is worth noting that this document was edited in British English and that some locations with “centre” in the name
may also be referred to as “center” in online sources. When carrying out your own investigations, ensure that this is
considered.
4 Much of the online information is written in Chinese. Another reason for using the most common names is that it allows
for better peer-review and easier replication of the methodology.

3 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

CCP – Chinese Communist Party
ID - Identification
Laogai – Abbreviation for Láodòng Gǎizào (劳动改造) or reform through labour facility
Laojiao – Re-education through labour facility
OS – Open source
OSI – Open source investigation
OSINT – Open source intelligence
OST – Open source techniques
Ref – Reference
PRC – People’s Republic of China
TAR – Tibet Autonomous Region
UN – United Nations
XUAR – Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

4 INTRODUCTION
4.1 BACKGROUND
In recent years, United Nations (UN) experts and human rights watchdogs have called for renewed
attention towards human rights violations in Tibet by the Chinese state 5. Many of these violations
happen behind prison walls and within detention centre cells 6. Thus, this research aims to bridge a
current gap in academic research by creating a public dataset of prisons and detention centres for
future human rights researchers and investigations.
There are only two provinces in China where Han Chinese citizens do not make up the predominant
ethnic group: Tibet and Xinjiang. These two regions are perhaps the most well-known to human
rights researchers due to China’s oppressive detention schemes and forced labour programs. 7 Both
regions have been classed as open prisons 8,9 meaning advanced technology is being employed to
monitor and control citizens in the regions – including the mandatory installation of government-
developed mobile phone applications which monitor devices to identify dissident behaviour. 10
Tibet and Xinjiang both have strong cultural identities among their citizens, which results in
“splittism”, a term used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to describe non-conformity with
Chinese values. The Communist Party views protests and campaigns in the region as national threats,
resulting in up to 50% of cases “endangering state security” originating from these regions. 11 Xi
Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China since 2013, has pushed for cultural assimilation
and national unity in minority regions of China, leading to further securitisation.
Following the incorporation of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China in 1950, Tibet and its
inhabitants have experienced various uprisings, an exiled Dalai Lama, social and political reforms,
and anti-separatist campaigns. Tibetans are an ethnic group comprising roughly 6 million in-and-
around what is now the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). 12 Tibetans have been ill-treated and
suppressed by the PRC based on their culture and religion. The infamous Great Leap Forward is
estimated at causing the deaths of anywhere between 200,000 and one million Tibetans. 13 The
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s saw thousands of monasteries destroyed or damaged, sacred books
burned, and monks and nuns were imprisoned, tortured, and/or killed. A brief liberalisation of
relations between Tibet and China in the 1970s and 80s led to a short economic and religious revival
in Tibet. 14 However, the following decades were marked by an increasingly hard-line approach
5 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006
6 https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/china-tibetan-monk-dies-beating-custody
7 Horowitz, S., Yu, P. Holding China’s West: Explaining CCP Strategies of Rule in Tibet and Xinjiang. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI
20, 451–475 (2015).

8 https://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/exile/5418-a-giant-open-prison-tchrd-annual-report-on-human-rights-in-
tibet
9 Ibid
10 Godbole A. Stability in the Xi Era: Trends in Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang and Tibet Since 2012. India Quarterly.
2019;75(2):228-244. doi:10.1177/0974928419841787
11 https://d18mm95b2k9j1z.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/24-Laogai-The-Machinery-of-Repression-in-
China.pdf
12 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/yarbook2003_e.pdf
13 Minority Right Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - China : Tibetans,”
Refworld, November 2017, https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d3dc.html.

14 Barnett, R. (2016) ‘Imagining the borderlands: managing (to prolong) conflict in Tibet’, Nations & Nationalism, 22(4),
pp. 706–724. doi: 10.1111/nana.12252.

towards Tibetans by the various CCP governments through regulating religion and culture,
modernising its economy and importantly, upgrading its security apparatus in Tibet. 15
While China has legislation “to guarantee citizens’ freedom of religious belief”, there are regulations
in place to prevent practitioners of religion from challenging the “unification of the state”. 16 This law
also enables China to directly control the religious decisions regarding identifying the Dalai Lama’s
successor and other significant figures. In February 2020, Chinese authorities implemented new
“Measures on the Administration of Religious Groups”, which tightened Government control on
religious groups and enhanced surveillance. 17 These changes have made all unregistered groups
illegal. Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns are one of the most oppressed groups in Tibet. They have
faced imprisonment, house arrest, and public surveillance. Tibetans face prison sentences for acts as
simple as storing pictures of the Dalai Lama. 18,19
Both Tibet and Xinjiang have been subject to ethnic assimilation, including incentivised interethnic
marriages. An example of this is the Qiemo county government in Xinjiang, which offered interethnic
couples 10,000 RMB (£1,125 GBP/$1,550 USD) annually for five years and subsidising education,
housing and offering boosted employment prospects. 20
However, Xinjiang and Tibet differ in the cultural perception of the splittist opposition to the region’s
Chinese control. While there have been many violent protests in both regions, the perception of
violence in Xinjiang was much more akin to terrorism than in Tibet. This was particularly profound
after the USA’s 9/11 attacks, which led to negative associations with Islam in much of the world,
including China.
Since 1950, when China reasserted control over Tibet, the region has been fraught with tension and
resentment. Outbreaks of violence and protests initially led to the Lhasa Uprising in March 1959,
which led the Dalai Lama to escape to Dharamsala, India, where he led the Tibetan Government in
Exile before stepping down to focus on religious matters. 21 Calls for the Dalai Lama’s return and
relinquishment of Chinese control in Tibet has led to a “splittist” mindset in many Tibetans, resulting
in a Chinese crackdown to prevent secession attempts. China has gone through phases of repressive
measures against Tibet, with the 1980s seeing a much more liberal attitude, including the brief re-
opening of monasteries and temples. This led to a short period of economic and religious revival in
Tibet. 22 Since 1989, when large-scale anti-Chinese demonstrations marked 30 years of the uprising,
the situation has become more oppressive, starting with two years of martial law. The following years
saw a significant decline in protests, and it was only until 2008 that large scale protests resumed.
15 Melvyn C. Goldstain, “Tibet and China in the Twentieth Century,” in Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers (University
of Washington Press, 2004), 208.
16https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-on-the-management-of-the-reincarnation-of-living-
buddhas-in-0
17https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2020%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20FINAL
%201223.pdf
18https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/government-policy-on-tibetan-reincarnation-leads-to-
expulsions
19 https://tchrd.org/tibetan-monk-imprisoned-for-dalai-lama-pictures-released-after-two-years/
20 Leibold, J. (2013). Ethnic policy in China: Is reform inevitable? (Policy Study No. 68, p. xii). East West Center. Retrieved
from https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps068.pdf
21 https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2020/07/court-statistics-on-splittism-inciting.html
22 Barnett, R. (2016) ‘Imagining the borderlands: managing (to prolong) conflict in Tibet’, Nations & Nationalism, 22(4),
pp. 706–724. doi: 10.1111/nana.12252.

Figure 1 – Map of Tibet including all claimed areas
Tibet is in the West of China, sitting underneath Xinjiang and Qinghai. It covers a vast area but has a sparse distribution of settlements and
very few large towns due to harsh, mountainous terrain. Image Source: Wikimedia Commons
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR AND RE-EDUCATION CAMPS IN CHINA

AND THEIR SUCCESSORS
Mao Zedong/Tse-tung – also known as Chairman Mao – was the head of the CCP from 1949-1976. In
1955, the CCP implemented administrational punishments known as laojiao (re-education through
labour) and laogai (reform through labour or RTL). The intention was to root out potential dissidents
working in government, petty criminals, drug abusers, and those the Party disapproved of. 23 In the
case of laojiao, any citizen could receive it as a sentence (though minorities were particularly
vulnerable) without any legal proceedings or trials. Also, practically any citizen could recommend
their neighbour for laojiao.
On the other hand, laogai was used to reform those who did not “utilise their labour capacity” or
those who did “not engage in proper employment”. 24 The use of laojiao and laogai has not been
consistent since their implementation nearly 70 years ago and has varied in both scale and manner.
However, it has had a profound impact on the people of Tibet and the XUAR. One of the critical
distinctions between the two is that the government does not consider laojiao prisoners to be
convicted criminals. 25 This has significant implications for statistics as these inmates are not counted
towards official tallies.
23 Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a Healthy Heart Attitude,’” 5.

24 Fu Hualing, “Re-Education through Labour in Historical Perspective,” Cambridge University Press, December 2005, 5.
China.pdf

It is believed that the RTL system was used to circumvent some of the criminal reforms following the
Tiananmen Square Massacre – only enacted after international pressure – as a result of it existing
outside of the criminal justice system. 26 In an attempt to divorce itself from the bad international
press the laogai and its human cost received, the Chinese government stopped using the term laogai
in the early 1990s, replacing it instead with the more internationally “acceptable” term jianyu, or
prison. 27 China also passed a significant amendment to its Criminal Law in 1997, which included a
revamping of sentences and political crimes.28 This effectively broadened the state’s ability to send
people to RTL by replacing the term “counter-revolutionary crimes” with “crime of endangering
national security”. In the early 2000s, RTL became a way to punish those who did not meet criminal
punishment criteria. 29 This has been used to detain associates of those sentenced to prison. During
this period, torture was prevalent, and many prisoners died as a direct result. China is said to have
reduced Tibetan political prisoner death figures by releasing prisoners in poor health. 30
The RTL system was abolished on November 15th 2013, with The Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress fulfilling the commitment on December 28th 2013. However, this has been
met with scepticism. Many RTL centres remain open, converted into drug rehabilitation centres that
operate similarly to RTL camps. 31 It is believed that any inmates who were sentenced with drug
offences were not released from the system, while prisoners convicted of other offences walked free.
It is also thought that another mechanism for detention has been deployed, known as “custody and
education”. 32 This new form of detention is known as “Education Transformation Centres”. 33
Looking north to Xinjiang, it is clear that re-education camps are still an effective mechanism for the
state to manage “subversive” ideologies. 34
A report written by Adrian Zenz for the Jamestown Foundation in September 2020 discussed new
policy implementation in 2019 and 2020 promoting the “systematic, centralised, and large-scale
training and transfer of “rural surplus labourers” to other parts of the TAR, as well as to other
provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)”. 35
As part of Xi Jinping’s goal to eradicate poverty, poverty alleviation reports from Tibet use similar
language as the laogai and laojiao. Descriptions match those from nearly five decades prior: strict-
military management will reform backwards thinking, fix lazy people, and dilute the negative
influence of religion. 36 The report proclaims over half a million Tibetans, mostly farmers and nomads,
were subject to training in labour camps within the first seven months of the reform. 37 Of these
26 https://www.scribd.com/document/200839882/Special-Report-Gulags-of-Tibet#download
China.pdf
28 Truex R. Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
2019;63(4):1032-1052. doi:10.1177/0022002718770520
29 Fu Hualing, “Re-education Through Labor in Historical Perspective,” (2005) China Quarterly 81
30 https://www.state.gov/report/custom/dfe713986b/
31 http://fileserver.idpc.net/library/IDPC-briefing-paper_China-drug-treatment.pdf
32 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-camps-idUSBRE9AT0AY20131130?edition-redirect=uk
33 https://bit.ly/39CC3tv
34 https://web.archive.org/web/20200807015550/http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-08/16/c_1124886316.htm
35Adrian Zenz, “Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet” (China Brief, 2020).
https://jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-
comes-to-tibet/. Accessed 29-1-2021.
36 Adrian Zenz, “Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet”.
37 Ibid

500,000 rural surplus labourers, nearly 50,000 were transferred to other parts of TAR and an
additional 3,100 to other provinces in China. 38
One example of this is the Changdu Golden Sunshine Vocational Training School Co., Ltd. A
“Vocational and Technical School” at coordinates [31.18708729, 97.09174058]. It was established
on May 17th, 2016, with a registered capital of 2 million yuan. 39 It is believed that there are many
places like this; however, locating them was beyond the scope of this research.
4.3 DESCRIPTION OF TIBETAN DETENTION SYSTEM

There are three officially recognised prisons in Tibet. Drapchi, Utritru, and Powo Tramo. 40 This is far
fewer than the number of prisons identified in this report. This report presents a list that includes
facilities that have been verified as prisons and detention centres. It will not be exhaustive, and there
are many more structures and compounds which have been marked as “possible” in the raw dataset.
The process for detention in Tibet involves several stages. 41 When people are initially detained for
interrogation, they are taken to detention centres, generally for up to six months. During this time,
they cannot communicate with the outside world and are limited to interacting with cellmates and
interrogators. Gutsa [Ref-2965791183] is the Lhasa detention centre, and Sitru [Ref-2969191157],
also in Lhasa, is the principal detention centre for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Throughout
Tibet, there are also many county-level and prefecture-level detention centres for detaining suspects
before they are sent to the Lhasa authorities. 42
38 Ibid
39 https://www.qcc.com/firm/2c897100b8f62d1e93e84b6a6432e187.html
40 https://web.archive.org/web/20100223154327/http://www.tchrd.org/publications/topical_reports/drapchi_prison-
2001/
41 https://www.tchrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Behind-Bars_1998.pdf
42 Ibid

5 METHODOLOGY
5.1 PROJECT COORDINATION
This project relied heavily on crowdsourced analysis and verification in the latter phases of the
research. Discord was the messaging application used for communication and sharing of links and
imagery. The Discord group was set up with various channels for different focuses and discussions
for the process, investigator security, and tutorials. Discord analysis methodology involved creating
individual channels for each focus location and channels for newly discovered sites. In addition,
Discord was used to discuss the project’s direction and ensure that facts were verified.
5.2 INVESTIGATION PROCESS

The investigation process was modelled after the Intelligence Cycle 43 to suit this investigation’s
needs.
5.2.1 Phase 1 – Data Collection

a) Manual location of prisons and possible detention facilities in towns, cities, villages, and
remote areas of Tibet. This will be done by broad searches of the area’s satellite imagery and
guided by any intelligence from section b.
b) Obtaining all documents and references to prisons and detention facilities and bringing them
to attention.
c) Image collection for verification and leads. Including social media analysis.
d) Witness collection for verification and leads.
5.2.2 Phase 2 – Data Refinement

a) Connecting known prisons to their coordinates and noting key metrics such as perimeter
length, area, and the number of watchtowers.
b) Correctly identifying prisons and, if name unknown, ensuring they have a unique ID.
c) Identifying possible prisons and detention centres and marking them as “possible” for
additional research.
d) Identifying references to facilities without known candidates and referring back to Phase 1.
5.2.3 Phase 3 – Description

a) Identifying all essential features which will help inform future iterations of Phase 1 and Phase
2.
b) Obtaining critical information on all prisons and detention centres, such as perimeter, area,
and the number of watchtowers.
c) Verifying each facility identified
d) Identifying false positives and archiving them.
e) Establishing key dates, such as date built, date(s) expanded, and date demolished.
5.2.4 Phase 4 – Redacting Personal Details and Ethical Evaluation

Ensuring the document is safe to distribute in Phase 5 involves removing any sensitive details
[limited to personal identifiable information] which may compromise individuals or sources. Note
that closed-source information has not been used, so this should not impact the integrity of data.
43 https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/facttell/intcycle.htm

5.2.5 Phase 5 – Crowdsourcing Scrutiny

a) Opening up the research to online contributors in a controlled manner to allow for scrutiny
and peer analysis.
b) Addressing all feedback and revisiting details that are flagged as concern points.
5.2.6 Phase 6 – Review

a) Compiling the research and running additional checks on all data found.
b) Sending the complete document and dataset to be reviewed by individuals and organisations
who may be interested.
5.3 PERFORMED ACTIVITIES

This section aims to provide an overview of how locations were discovered and analysed. There were
multiple ways in which the data was obtained, each of which is outlined below.
5.3.1 Locating and identifying facilities

This section outlines the process flows that were followed to complete the information for each
location. Classification refers to assigning Class A, B, C, or D designations to each location based on
assessing the security and size (see 5.7). Identification is the process of determining the prison’s real
name based on open source information, while verification uses analysis to confirm the identification
is correct.
Process Flow 1
Imagery search ➔ Classification ➔ Identification ➔ Verification ➔ Submission
Process Flow 1 was the most common process for obtaining information in this project. Many of the
locations were identified by satellite imagery searches which involved scanning Google Earth for
possible locations and marking them down. These findings were then classified as detention facilities,
potential hits, or rejected. From here, attempts to identify the location involved searches for
references to detention in that region. If matches were found, they were verified and submitted to
the report.
Process Flow 2
Imagery search ➔ Classification ➔ Failed identification ➔ Submission as “Unidentified”
When locations could not be identified, they were submitted as “unidentified” locations. These
locations can be re-examined later as new information arises.
Process Flow 3
Information obtained ➔ Check against “Unidentified” locations ➔ Identification ➔ Verification ➔
Submission
Process Flow 3 covered the steps when the information was obtained about a detention facility first.
Whenever any new information was found online regarding locations, it was checked against the
unidentified locations for potential matches. Following this, the findings were verified against
available information and imagery and then submitted.

Process Flow 4
Information obtained ➔ Information collection ➔ Search imagery ➔ Identification ➔ Verification
➔ Submission
Process Flow 4 outlines the steps when the information was obtained about a location, but there was
no match with locations discovered in the project. This method relied on additional research to
determine where to start the search, the search criteria, and any clues about what to look for. Once a
location was determined, it went through the same verification process to ensure accurate findings
before submitting.
5.3.2 Online data gathering

Obtaining information from open sources online was key to verification and location identification.
The process involved identifying every location name and running searches in various search engines
to find all mentions and images. From there, information was aggregated and sources evaluated. The
quality of information was low for many sources, so they were flagged for additional investigation
and verification.
One of the most prominent search engines used was Baidu, which allowed better searches of Chinese
media and government websites. The process for Baidu included translating prison names into
Chinese and finding alternative names. When suggested searches were relevant, they were also
investigated to produce additional leads or search terms to broaden the search radius and counter
some of the selection biases inherent in search engine use.
All images found were saved and allocated to folders. Images deemed to be useful were flagged for
geolocation and verification.
5.3.3 Image Description and verification

Image analysis was a crucial task in the identification and verification of facilities. It involved
standard methods of highlighting key features and obtaining additional imagery to perform
comparisons and determine matches. Due to the variation in dates that images may have been
captured, the analysis was performed on contemporary and historical satellite imagery.
Tools such as Photoshop and other image editing software highlight the analysis and connect ground-
level and satellite imagery. Some images were enhanced or lightly edited to improve visual clarity.
Another key component of satellite imagery analysis was determining the dates of construction,
expansion, and decommissioning facilities. For this, historical satellite imagery was used, and dates
of change were noted. Due to the low resolution of historical satellite imagery, some data entries are
given with date ranges. This information could also be referenced against known dates of
construction or expansion for additional verification of the locations.
5.4 REFERENCE CODES

Each facility identified has been given a reference code to allow for simplified data management. The
reference code is generated from a location’s coordinates, meaning every location in this report has
a unique code. All coordinates were converted into a decimal format for ease of handling and URL
generation.

The reference code formula takes the most significant Latitude and Longitude figures and
concatenates them into a reference code, meaning they become linked together. It is a new system
designed for and first used in this report.
Figure 2 - Google Sheets Formula for Generating Ref-Codes
=IFERROR(CONCAT(LEFT(VALUE(REGEXREPLACE(I6,"[^[:digit:]]",
"")),5),LEFT(VALUE(REGEXREPLACE(J6,"[^[:digit:]]", "")),5)))
Where I is Latitude and J is Longitude. The digit “5” is used to tell the formula to take each value’s
first five digits. The rest of the code strips the punctuation from the values and concatenates them
into a single code.
As such, all researched facilities will have a designated Reference Code which will appear as, for
example, [Ref-12345678]. Readers can use these uniquely identifying codes to reference the Bulk
Findings in Table 6 in section 6.1.
5.5 NAMING PROCEDURE

Due to the issues of limited information, many prisons may be unidentified. This has led to the
creation of a naming convention to ease identification.
A formula was generated to ensure that all unidentified prisons were named in a standardised way
to keep data clean. This format generates: “Unidentified”, [City/Town], [Region], [Reference
Code]
It also ignores prisons with known names and preserves those names to improve searchability once
the results are published.
Figure 3 - Google Sheets Formula for Naming “Allocated Name” fields
=IFERROR(IF(REGEXMATCH(E2, "Unidentified"),(CONCATENATE(E2,", ",P2,", ",Q2,"

",L2)),(CONCATENATE(E2," ",L2))))
Value E (in yellow) is the official name; it posts that value as the Allocated Name, plus the reference
number. Where the official name is listed as “Unidentified”, it takes columns P (City/Town), Q
(Region), and L (Reference Code) and concatenates them into a comma-separated name.

5.6 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

This section outlines the methodology’s limitations, identifies potential areas where errors may
arise, and describes how these issues can be reduced.
5.6.1 Source Issues

Sources are few and far between on this topic, and many references included in this document
demonstrate that. The majority of links are from newspapers and campaign organisation websites,
each of which come with their own bias and potential shortcomings. These reports and references
generally rely on witness testimonies from a highly politicised region. Information conflicts will be
highlighted, and sources will be referenced in footnotes.
5.6.2 False Positives

While fenced-off areas with tall buildings may be signs of re-education and detention, they may also
be schools and worker housing. Likewise, facilities matching that description with running tracks are
standard features for Xinjiang facilities, but there needs to be a way to ID them apart from schools.
This is where the contextual analysis of each location is critical.
Example of false-positive identification
An example of a false positive is the Sa’gya Monastery. On initial impressions, it seems like a secure
facility used for detention (albeit a remarkably old one); however, it is an old monastery.
Sa’gya Monastery satellite view. Sa’gya Monastery identified after verification

during Phase 3. 44
5.6.3 False Negatives

Some facilities may not have typical features such as watchtowers; these will be much harder to ID.
For this reason, reasonably liberal use of allocating “possible” marks to locations was recommended
to researchers exploring the region. This will increase the amount of data but reduce the chance of
less obvious locations slipping through.
44 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/13/c_137465779_6.htm

Figure 4 – Trisam Prison as an example of a false negative
Trisam is an example of a detention facility that may not be flagged due to its lack of watchtowers.
It is for this reason that all possible locations found are marked for further evaluation.
5.6.4 Misidentified locations

Due to a severe lack of information published by the Chinese government and different names based
on several different regional language variants, some locations are challenging to verify. There is a
possibility, especially when there are multiple facilities in an area, that they have been misidentified.
All conclusions reached in this document were based on research and supporting evidence. Where
doubt remained, locations were classed as “unidentified”, and additional information or supporting
evidence for their possible identities was included in the analysis.
5.6.5 Imagery Limitations

Imagery limitations include lack of historical satellite imagery and widespread lack of street-level
images. Google Earth and Satellites.Pro, which are the primary satellite imagery resources for this
project, have limited resolution and few recent images in some places, leading to outdated
information. Open source maps and satellite imagery providers may show different imagery

depending on the date of capture, so several imagery sets were analysed to ensure the best views of
locations were obtained.
Likewise, the lack of dates available for imagery meant some dates of facility creation, expansion, and
decommission might be within several years. It also means the newest facilities may not have been
detected at all. To reduce the impact of this, all locations were analysed across multiple dates, and
searches for known locations were not conducted solely on the most recent imagery.
The lack of street view images and local images on social media is a big hurdle due to their verification
value. Efforts to resolve this included finding local photos, and key tourist locations nearby were
highlighted to ensure the best search possibilities.
5.6.6 Selection Bias

One of the methods for locating prisons and related facilities of interest was locating urban centres
where they were likely to be established. This adds a selection bias due to prisons in towns/cities
being much more likely to be discovered. To help reduce this issue, searches along major roads and
in remote regions were also conducted.
Another type of selection bias was the search engine process. Search engine results will prioritise
certain websites over others based on relevance to the search parameters and site optimisation.
Likewise, with language and spelling variations, known place names may not show results if they
differ in spelling. Multiple versions and search terms were used for each search to ensure a broad
range of data was obtained and so overly broad or specific search parameters did not obscure crucial
information. Searches were conducted in English and Chinese across several search engines,
including Google, Baidu, Bing, and Yandex.
5.6.7 Missed Locations

There is a likelihood that some facilities will be missed due to human error. This is compounded by
the low-quality satellite imagery in some areas that may conceal the locations of interest

5.7 DEFINING A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

The value of classifying prisons and facilities helps quantify the detention system’s scale and allows
for more in-depth research in the future. It also prioritises more extensive facilities and those with
more infrastructure, which may be mass-detaining individuals beyond a typical crime rate. This
rating system generally correlates with security level; however, it is primarily based on aerial
analysis, and some examples may be more or less secure than their respective counterparts.
There are two main types of detention in China: Detention Centres and Prisons
- Detention centres are subdivided into Administrative Detention Centres - managed by the
local security department and typically for sentences of around 15 days, and General
Detention Centres - used for suspects of ongoing criminal investigations or fixed-term
imprisonment of fewer than three months. Detention centres generally do not require
prisoners to do labour; however, those detained for extended periods may have to.
- Prisons are generally much more extensive and are separate for adult men, women, and
juveniles. Most prisons in China operate under the penal labour system, whereby inmates
must work (generally in manufacturing roles). Prisons in China are allegedly underfunded,
and so prisons rely on their labour to generate the necessary revenues to operate
successfully.
The rating system below reflects this information, with most Class C facilities falling into a detention
centre category, and most Class A facilities are classed as prisons. Class B facilities have been
identified in our research as either. It is important to note that the classification system is a general
categorisation and does not directly define a location as either a prison or a detention centre but
identifies features that could help identify other prisons in the future.
While the number of watchtowers typically plays a large role in the classification, some facilities may
be allocated a class more reflective of their size (e.g., a very small Class C-sized facility with more than
two watchtowers would still be classed as Class C).
This system was created for the research in this report and was designed to help with identification.
It is not based on any existing framework and instead was made for rapid categorisation and
prioritisation of locations.
Page | 24 www.tibetresearchproject.org 06 July 2021

5.7.1 Prison Classification

Class A
Class A facilities are identified in this research as the most extensive facilities with the highest
capacity. This generally reflects a higher security level; however, some facilities may match the
parameters and be no more secure (or even less secure) than a Class B facility. Class A facilities
generally resemble large, secure re-education centres and prisons in Xinjiang. However, this is not a
static template.
- Large prison/secure facility with high walls and watchtowers.

- Large perimeter and area.
- Multi-storey building and residential blocks.
- Area may be subdivided into smaller walled-off divisions within the outer perimeter.
- Any (otherwise) Class B facility which features a radial solitary confinement building should
be listed as Class A.
Class B
Class B facilities generally match the profile of medium-sized high-security prisons. However, it is the
broadest category with variation in security levels. Class B facilities are likely to have a relatively high
capacity and are expected to be most common in larger urban environments as “central” prisons or
detention centres. Particular distinctions may be made, such as “Class B (Large)” to differentiate the
findings further. Some Class B locations may be large detention centres (officially classed) rather than
prisons.
- Medium prison facility with (generally) four or more watchtowers. 45

- Several buildings contained within.
- Any (otherwise) Class C facility which features a radial solitary confinement building should
be listed as Class B.
Class C
Class C facilities are expected to be smaller, local detention centres. Due to their small size, they are
generally expected to have a smaller inmate population than Class B facilities but maybe no less
secure.
- Small facilities (generally rural) with (typically) fewer than four watchtowers.
- Small perimeter and area.
- Few buildings inside.
Class D
Class D is a category that encompasses all other facilities likely to be a prison/detention centre/RTL.
- Facilities with walls or fences that do not have watchtowers.
Locations with fewer watchtowers may still be allocated to Class B if they are significant in scale or have multiple
45
walled off sections dividing the facility.

Table 3 – Examples of Prisons in Each Class
Class A Class B Class C Class D
Utritru Gutsa 46 Unidentified [Ref- Trisam

[Ref-2968591159] [Ref-2965791183] 2968591154] [Ref-2963890981]
5.7.2 A Note on Solitary Confinement Buildings

In this investigation’s broader dataset, 47 several prisons have buildings that resemble Philadelphia’s
Eastern State Penitentiary solitary confinement building design. 48 This radial detention building
template has been adopted worldwide. Similar-looking buildings in the investigation have been
deemed to be suspected solitary confinement buildings combined with other key prison features.
Class C facilities featuring these were elevated to Class B; Class B facilities featuring them were
upgraded to Class A.
Table 4 – Examples of radial solitary confinement buildings
Eastern State Penitentiary’s Similar radial structure seen in Similar radial structure seen in
radial plan, Philadelphia, USA. Dongchuan Prison (Qinghai)47 Xichuan Prison (Qinghai)47
(Image source: Wikimedia 3659510179 3664410167
Commons) 49
The use of this building style was not identified in any prison in Tibet; however, it is included to allow
this methodology to be transferrable to our future publications, including locations of interest in the
regions surrounding Tibet.
46 It is worth noting that Gutsa is a detention centre rather than a prison, albeit a very large one, hence the classification.
47 Note that the prisons identified with solitary confinement buildings were outside the borders of the TAR so are not
included in this document. They are, however present in the broader dataset and will be published in the future.
48 https://statesofincarceration.org/story/eastern-state-penitentiary-normalization-solitary-confinement
49 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eastern_State_Penitentiary_aerial_crop.jpg

6 FINDINGS IN TIBET
6.1 BULK FINDINGS
The following list outlines the findings in this report. It lists locations with their Official Name – where known – and has a code-generated
title, the Allocated Name, based on its location and reference code. This system allows for fast searching of locations, and, in the case of
incorrect official names, the location’s reference code will remain static. Fields that were not filled were either due to no data or insufficient
satellite resolution to determine accurate measurements. NOTE: facilities are designated a Reference Code that will correspond with
the below table. In individual sections, the codes will look like [Ref-123456789].
Table 5 – Bulk findings of detention facilities in Tibet
Official Reference
Allocated Name Class Coordinates City/ Town Region Watchtowers Perimeter (m) Area (m²)
Name Code
Utritu (Lhasa Utritu (Lhasa
29.6846935,91.1 182,317.98
Prison/Outri Prison/Outridu) A 2968591159 Lhasa Tibet 11 2,122.85 m
5675547 m²
du) 50 2968591159
Unidentified,
29.68525453,91.
Unidentified Lhasa, Tibet C 2968591154 Lhasa Tibet 2 220.36 m 2,935.15 m²
15448533
2968591154
Unidentified,
29.63490451,91.
Unidentified Lhasa, Tibet C 2963491197 Lhasa Tibet 2 1,027.33 m 50,460.34 m²
19717101
2963491197
Chushur
Chushur
(Chushu/Qushui) 29.55185984,90.
(Chushu/Qus B 2955190968 Lhasa/Quxu Tibet 5 728.74 m 33,314.77 m²
Prison 96841697
hui) Prison
2955190968
50 The coordinates of this location have been updated since the reference code was generated to better reflect the centre of this location. The reference code remains
fixed and matches the original coordinates.
Unidentified, Quxu, 29.3518375,90.7
Unidentified C 2935190741 Quxu Tibet 2 183.95 m 2,093.11 m²
Tibet 2935190741 4154015
Changdu RTL
Changdu RTL 31.09629258,97. Changdu/
(possible) B 3109697204 Tibet 6 795.46 m 39,604.95 m²
(possible) 20477809 Chamdo
3109697204
Unidentified,
31.14789453,97. Changdu/
Unidentified Changdu/ Chamdo, C 3114797161 Tibet 3 260.66 m 3,901.31 m²
16111381 Chamdo
Tibet 3114797161
Unidentified,
32.50584905,80. Shiquanhe,
Unidentified Shiquanhe, Ngari, C 3250580112 Tibet 2 315.34 m 6,123.03 m²
11219832 Ngari
Tibet 3250580112
Unidentified,
Gongbu,
Gongbu, Pomé 29.88933547,93.
Unidentified C 2988993249 Pomé Tibet 2 180.68 m 1,963.62 m²
County, Tibet 24932996
County
2988993249
Dazi County Dazi County
29.86239754,95.
Detention Detention Center C 2986295771 Bome Tibet 1 160.9 m 1,570.93 m²
77180314
Center 2986295771
Unidentified,
Tibet-Nepal 28.66046477,87. Tibet-Nepal
Unidentified C 2866087119 Tibet 2 150.88 m 1,395.91 m²
border, Tibet 11961388 border
2866087119
Unidentified, Ulan
Ulan County
County (Wulan 36.93039926,98.
Unidentified C 3693098486 (Wulan Tibet 2 204.27 m 2,606.32 m²
County), Tibet 48688465
County)
3693098486
Unidentified, Ulan
Ulan County
County (Wulan 36.9317385,98.4
Unidentified C 3693198487 (Wulan Tibet 2 303.42 m 5,724.29 m²
County), Tibet 8784812
County)
3693198487
Unidentified, Dunqiong,
Dunqiong, Seni Seni
31.53747119,92.
Unidentified District, Nagqu, B 3153792028 District, Tibet 4 477.43 m 13,811.88 m²
0285312
Tibet China, Tibet Nagqu,
3153792028 Tibet China
Unidentified,
31.46588307,92.
Unidentified Nagqu, Tibet B 3146592042 Nagqu Tibet 4 406.3 m 10,316.26 m²
04264391
3146592042
Unidentified,
Dangquka,
Dangquka, 30.47956351,91.
Unidentified C 3047991098 Damxung Tibet 2 210.94 m 2,505.73 m²
Damxung County, 0985764
County
Tibet 3047991098
Unidentified,
28.90303499,88. Sa'gya
Unidentified Sa'gya County, C 2890388021 Tibet 2 129.84 m 1,052.14 m²
02189153 County
Tibet 2890388021
Unidentified,
29.25196902,88.
Unidentified Shigatse, Tibet C 2925188879 Shigatse Tibet 2 296.45 m 5,406.55 m²
87951503
2925188879
Unidentified, Gêrzê
32.30682845,84. Gêrzê
Unidentified County, Tibet C 3230684060 Tibet 2 245.94 m 3,662.26 m²
06038807 County
3230684060
Unidentified,
28.41122607,92.
Unidentified Lhunze, Tibet C 2841192457 Lhunze Tibet 1 171.81 m 1,846.65 m²
45772441
2841192457
Unidentified,
Mainling
Mainling County, 29.2154004,94.2
Unidentified C 2921594208 County, Tibet 2 161.31 m 1,615.27 m²
Nyingchi, Tibet 0801391
Nyingchi
2921594208
Unidentified,
30.74281148,95. Lhorong
Unidentified Lhorong County, C 3074295823 Tibet 2 135.07 m 1,104.39 m²
82379833 County
Tibet 3074295823
Unidentified,
29.67416769,97. Zogang
Unidentified Zogang County, C 2967497842 Tibet 2 111.48 m 709.88 m²
84227945 County
Tibet 2967497842
Unidentified,
29.68378009,98. Markam
Unidentified Markam County, C 2968398590 Tibet 2 124.62 m 967.86 m²
59014608 County
Tibet 2968398590
Unidentified,
31.79100699,87. Nyima
Unidentified Nyima County, C 3179187236 Tibet 2 227.71 m 3,150.73 m²
23639757 County
Tibet 3179187236
Unidentified,
31.91899462,94.
Unidentified Baqên Town, Tibet C 3191894058 Baqên Town Tibet 2 216.51 m 2,869.2 m²
05817359
3191894058
Unidentified,
Gyaca/
Gyaca/ Gyatsa 29.14345734,92.
Unidentified C 2914392589 Gyatsa Tibet 1 178.49 m 1,946.14 m²
County
2914392589
Unidentified, Arza,
30.64456919,93. Arza, Lhari
Unidentified Lhari County, Tibet C 3064493235 Tibet 2 228.88 m 3,210.53 m²
23558586 County
3064493235
Unidentified,
Nyamo/Nyemo 29.43824157,90. Nyamo/Nye
County, Tibet 15805323 mo County
2943890158
Unidentified,
30.93889935,94. Banbar
Unidentified Banbar County, C 3093894712 Tibet 2 150m
71240476 County
Tibet 3093894712
Unidentified,
33.38213119,79. Rutog
Unidentified Rutog County, C 3338279727 Tibet 2 167.27 m 1,749.09 m²
7277124 County
Tibet 3338279727
Unidentified,
Burang/
Burang/ Purang 30.29719253,81.
Unidentified C 3029781174 Purang Tibet 2 144.47 m 1,287.02 m²
County
3029781174
Unidentified,
31.39880342,90. Baingoin
Unidentified Baingoin County, C 3139890008 Tibet 2 200.94 m 2,561.82 m²
00858618 County
Tibet 3139890008
Unidentified,
32.259467,91.67 Amdo
Unidentified Amdo County, C 3225991675 Tibet 2 223.09 m 3,054.75 m²
598519 County
Tibet 3225991675
Unidentified, Bolo, 30.85684785,98.
Unidentified C 3085698270 Bolo Tibet 2 170 m 1727.85 m²
Tibet 3085698270 27068542
Unidentified,
28.44268664,91. Comai
Unidentified Comai County, C 2844291428 Tibet 2 151.51 m 1,353.68 m²
42813789 County
Tibet 2844291428
Unidentified, Cona
28.00017711,91. Cona
96309455 County
2800091963
Unidentified,
28.91654726,89.
Unidentified Gyantse, Tibet C 2891689611 Gyantse Tibet 2 174.48 m 1,863.64 m²
61143125
2891689611
Unidentified, Biru
31.47978803,93.
Unidentified County, Tibet C 3147993624 Biru County Tibet 2 271.78 m 4,462.13 m²
62476596
3147993624
Unidentified,
Maizhokunggar 29.84380395,91. Maizhokung
County, Tibet 72873832 gar County
2984391728
Unidentified,
29.67622203,91. Dagze
Unidentified Dagze District, C 2967691353 Tibet 2 211.19 m 2,581.56 m²
35352488 District
Tibet 2967691353
Unidentified,
29.29176367,91. Gonggar
Unidentified Gonggar County, C 2929191004 Tibet 2 186.21 m 2,145.47 m²
00460132 County
Tibet 2929191004
Unidentified,
28.85540049,85.
Unidentified Zongga, Tibet C 2885585299 Zongga Tibet 2 126.06 m 982.69 m²
29956292
2885585299
Nyalam Nyalam Detention
28.16162124,85.
Detention Centre C 2816185979 Nyalam Tibet 1 146.97 m 1,299.71 m²
97945546
Centre 2816185979
Unidentified,
29.24888777,91. Dranang
Unidentified Dranang County, C 2924891336 Tibet 2 125.9 m 970.24 m²
3368916 County
Tibet 2924891336
Snowland
Snowland New
New 29.24649596,88.
Reception Centre C 2924688863 Shigatse Tibet 3 380.27 m 6,805.28 m²
Reception 86345846
2924688863
Centre
Unidentified,
29.08505648,87.
Unidentified Lhatse, Tibet C 2908587636 Lhatse Tibet 1 168.81 m 1,566.44 m²
63603487
2908587636
Unidentified,
29.31760061,88.
Unidentified Shigatse, Tibet C 2931788813 Shigatse Tibet 2 388.41 m 8,850.8 m²
81330849
2931788813
Qiongjie
Qiongjie County
County 29.032246,91.68 Qonggyai
Detention Center C 2903291686 Tibet 2 122.6 m 938.69 m²
Detention 644773 County
2903291686
Center
Langkazi
Langkazi County
County 29.06569205,92. Langkazi
Detention Center C 2906592199 Tibet 1 111.95 m 766.39 m²
2906592199
Center
Unidentified, Sêrxü
32.97472006,98. Sêrxü
10465526 County
3297498104
Unidentified,
31.01874056,85. Coqên
Unidentified Coqên County, C 3101885154 Tibet 2 179.48 m 1,890.48 m²
15403756 County
Tibet 3101885154
Unidentified,
31.50278022,98. Jomda
Unidentified Jomda County, C 3150298217 Tibet 2 141.88 m 1,144.58 m²
21754977 County
Tibet 3150298217
Unidentified,
Jomda
Jomda County, 31.59198198,98. Unable to
Unidentified D 3159198388 County, Tibet 0 Unable to verify
Sumu, Tibet 38837302 verify
Sumu
3159198388
Unidentified, Sog, 31.8873775,93.7
Unidentified C 3188793781 Sog Tibet 2 185.06 m 1,994.45 m²
Tibet 3188793781 8100778
Unidentified,
27.9937081,91.9 Tsona
Unidentified Tsona County, C 2799391956 Tibet 2 150.66 m 1,416.49 m²
5607235 County
Tibet 2799391956
Linzhou
Linzhou County
County 29.89333744,91. Linzhou
Detention Centre C 2989391262 Tibet 2 218.46 m 2,513.63 m²
2989391262
Centre
Unidentified,
29.03227248,91. Qonggyai
Unidentified Qonggyai County, C 2903291687 Tibet 2 182.13 m 2,060.8 m²
68789286 County
Tibet 2903291687
Unidentified,
28.38947446,90. Lhodrag
Unidentified Lhodrag County, C 2838990857 Tibet 3 191.92m 1231.21 m²
85727555 County
Tibet 2838990857
Unidentified,
32.10791864,92. Nierong
Unidentified Nierong County, C 3210792303 Tibet 2 200m 2400 m²
30361577 County
Tibet 3210792303
Unidentified,
30.93853286,88. Shantsa
Unidentified Shantsa County, C 3093888702 Tibet 2 204.02 m 2,484.64 m²
7022849 County
Tibet 3093888702
Unidentified,
32.39286251,81. Gergye
Unidentified Gergye County, C 3239281141 Tibet 2 154.13 m 1,475.69 m²
14197613 County
Tibet 3239281141
Unidentified,
28.65984863,97. Dzayul
Unidentified Dzayul County, C 2865997458 Tibet 2 175.32 m 1,891.96 m²
45815479 County
Tibet 2865997458
Unidentified, Nang
29.04705412,93. Nang
Unidentified County, Tibet C 2904793074 Tibet 2 122.36 m 885.84 m²
07469948 County
2904793074
Unidentified,
27.5017446,88.9 Dromo
Unidentified Dromo County, C 2750188933 Tibet 2 112.27 m 740.04 m²
3386375 County
Tibet 2750188933
Unidentified,
29.7734827,84.0 Drongpa
Unidentified Drongpa County, C 2977384031 Tibet 2 168.36 m 1,669.56 m²
3170364 County
Tibet 2977384031
Unidentified,
28.27733499,88. Gampa
Unidentified Gampa County, C 2827788517 Tibet 2 105.07 m 670.37 m²
5178715 County
Tibet 2827788517
Unidentified,
28.55823296,89. Khangmar
Unidentified Khangmar County, C 2855889684 Tibet 2 135.93 m 1,129.72 m²
68499388 County
Tibet 2855889684
Unidentified,
29.11082031,89. Panam
Unidentified Panam County, C 2911089257 Tibet 2 140.29 m 1,228.91 m²
25782206 County
Tibet 2911089257
Unidentified,
29.23369814,89. Rinpung
Unidentified Rinpung County, C 2923389843 Tibet 2 170.67 m 1,756.53 m²
84331515 County
Tibet 2923389843
Unidentified,
29.26326442,92. Sangri
Unidentified Sangri County, C 2926392015 Tibet 2 147.39 m 1,358.53 m²
01509994 County
Tibet 2926392015
Unidentified,
28.36963587,87. Dinggyê
Unidentified Dinggyê County, C 2836987760 Tibet 1 216.04 m 2,910.2 m²
76095467 County
Tibet 2836987760
Unidentified,
29.23604114,88.
Unidentified Shigatse, Tibet B 2923688885 Shigatse Tibet 1 711.35 m 24,700.11 m²
88513977
2923688885
Unidentified,
29.59945071,91.
Unidentified Lhasa, Tibet C 2959991092 Lhasa Tibet 2 196.02 m 2,364.84 m²
09250767
2959991092
Unidentified,
29.59884217,91. 2959891091
Unidentified Lhasa, Tibet C Lhasa Tibet 2 246.22 m 2,935.45 m²
09104777
2959891091
Unidentified,
28.97175846,90. Nagarzê
Unidentified Nagarzê County, C 2897190399 Tibet 2 126.27 m 984.06 m²
39958819 County
Tibet 2897190399
Unidentified,
29.29356114,87. Ngamring
Unidentified Ngamring County, C 2929387232 Tibet 2 150.74 m 1,438.82 m²
23276024 County
Tibet 2929387232
Unidentified,
33.18829627,88. Shuanghu
Unidentified Shuanghu County, C 3318888833 Tibet 2 200 m 2,400 m²
83392798 County
Tibet 3318888833
Figure 5 - Map of Lhasa showing the location of Drapchi and Sangyip Prison, note that Sangyip
is in the rough location of Utritru
This map shows the rough locations of several prisons in Lhasa. Image Source: In Exile from the
Land of Snows: The Definitive Account of the Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest,
(Author) John Avendon 51
51
http://content.randomhouse.com/assets/9780804173384/pdfs/Aved_9780804173384_In%20Exile%20from%20the%
20Land%20of%20Snows_Historic%20Tibet.pdf

Drapchi Prison had 968 inmates, including around 200 women, with 726 (75%) of them being ethnic
Tibetans. 58
It is not labelled as a prison on maps, and there are various business labels attached. For instance, as
a children’s nursery and a furniture store, both inside the prison walls on Google Earth. This may be
due to deliberate censorship; however, it has been determined that many of the satellite images in
the region are not correctly aligned, and it may be down to simple technical errors. The prison has
gained notoriety due to its strong management and treatment of prisoners.
One answer on a Chinese forum claimed that this prison was the only women’s prison in Tibet. 59 This
matches information from Human Rights Watch (HRW), which suggests it may be the only official
location for women prisoners in Tibet, though this information is dated. Additional analysis of a
documentary featuring the prison showed that women were indeed detained at this facility. 60
Drapchi is believed to have seven main units: five for criminal detention and two for political
prisoners. 61 This information may now be out of date due to the known transfer of political prisoners
to Chushur and Powo Tramo prisons. 62
One of the most notorious units is Drapchi’s "rukhag (unit) 3", 63 where five nuns died in 1998 after
severe maltreatment. In 2002, the first prison hospital in Tibet was established at Drapchi Prison
with a total investment of more than 15 million yuan. Sources say it covers more than 20 acres and
is separated from the Tibet Autonomous Region prison (Drapchi) by a wall. There are three buildings:
the outpatient building has four floors, the inpatient department has three floors, and the living area
has one floor. 64,65
China claims that "The Tibet Autonomous Region Prison aims to create a "modern and civilised
prison". 66 According to the same source, between 1997 and 2004, it had invested "more than 60
million yuan in the construction of software and hardware facilities, which has improved the overall
appearance of the prison".
59 https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/151164045.html
60 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AwGMLOQK-ZQ
61 https://web.archive.org/web/20100223154327/http://www.tchrd.org/publications/topical_reports/drapchi_prison-
2001/
62 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prisons_in_the_Tibet_Autonomous_Region
63 https://www.savetibet.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rukhag3.pdf
64 http://news.anhuinews.com/system/2002/05/28/000024432.shtml?mydnzrsrplufriho
65
https://web.archive.org/web/20210127193037/http://news.anhuinews.com/system/2002/05/28/000024432.shtml?
mydnzrsrplufriho
66 http://news.cri.cn/gb/3821/2004/08/07/148@258330.htm

Figure 6 - Drapchi's Singing Nuns
Looking from the window,

Seeing nothing but the sky,
The clouds that float in the sky
I wish were my parents
We, the captured friends in spirit.

We might be the ones to fetch the jewel.
No matter how hard we are beaten
Our linked arms cannot be separated
The cloud from the east

Is not a patch that is sewn;
The time will come when the sun
From beneath the clouds shall appear.
I am not sad. If asked why.

Days will follow days
And the time of release
From here will occur
A song from Drapchi's "singing nuns" (1993), housed together in Unit 3 of Drapchi Prison in
Lhasa 67 , who had their sentences increased to 17 years for 'spreading counter-revolutionary
propaganda' after they had recorded songs on a tape-recorder smuggled into their cells. Four of
the nuns committed group suicide by stuffing scarves in their mouths. 68
Drapchi and Delapuxie

This project’s researchers believe that Drapchi and Delapuxie prison are the same. This has been
confirmed after reaching out to campaign groups. However, it is noteworthy that they are listed
independently in The Laogai Handbook. 69 This resource has faced criticism from academics for its
lack of transparency on where its information was obtained.
67 Alexandra Schultheis (2007) Reading Tibet: Area Studies, Postcoloniality, and the Politics of Human Rights, South Asian
Review, 28:1, 87-105, DOI: 10.1080/02759527.2007.11932504
68 View from Drapchi Prison. Index on Censorship. 1998;27(6):134-134. doi:10.1080/03064229808536475
69 https://laogairesearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/33-Laogai-Handbook-2007-08.pdf

Figure 7 – Drapchi Prison

Figure 8 – Historical imagery shows renovations and upgrades to the prison in the months
following the abolishment of the RTL system
Historical satellite imagery shows several changes. Most notably is the removal of the tunnel
greenhouses used for farming labour referenced in the documentary on this prison. 70

Figure 9 – Historical image of Drapchi Prison taken in 2000 with units highlighted
Image analysis of Drapchi prison with the image captured in early 2000. Taken via screenshot with
legend included. 71
71 https://www.savetibet.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rukhag3.pdf

Figure 10 – Verification of image claiming to be Drapchi Prison revealed it was incorrectly

identified
Alleged Baidu Street View image of Drapchi Prison, taken in 2018. 72 It should be noted that the
watchtowers seen here are square rather than circular, which conflicts with our obtained satellite
images. The image more closely resembles the hill and watchtowers of Utritru prison on the
northern border and the road facing the hill [29.68712039,91.15835124]. One flat-roofed
watchtower has red-lining close to a pointed roofed one, with another pointed roof further away.
Note the wall seen here is not the perimeter wall but the road wall. The perimeter wall is concealed
behind the wall in view.
72 https://savetibet.org/chinas-control-state-in-lhasa/16-drapchi-view-grab-1000/

Figure 11 – Drapchi Prison as it appears on Google Earth and Maps showing incorrect location
markings
Google Earth image shows several non-threatening locations have been listed in the perimeter of
the facility. This could be poor location marking or an attempt to conceal the location's nature.

Figure 12 – Satellite imagery displaying people present in the prison yards
This close-up view from Google Earth shows a large number of people in the secure yards.

Figure 13 – Image allegedly captured inside Drapchi Prison
Image was captioned Tibet Autonomous Region Prison 73
73 https://www.163.com/dy/article/DSGP8V8U0514Q0KM.html

Description of documentary showcasing Drapchi Prison

A video titled "Tibet Prison 西藏监狱" premiered on YouTube on December 10th 2019, and was a
Chinese documentary on Drapchi Prison. 74 It was uploaded by VideoChinaTV and is a 56-minute
overview of the prison. Analysis of the video became a priority as it offered a unique insight into the
detention in Tibet. The documentary was deemed a heavily biased source. Information obtained was
limited to structural identification of the prison and verification of the location rather than the
analysis of inmates' well-being. This was conducted using video editing software to extract important
frames that showed the prison structures or easily identifiable features which could be cross-
referenced with satellite imagery and online images. All the frames that were analysed are available
on the Tibet Research Project’s website. 75
The findings confirmed the footage showed Drapchi Prison before the RTL system was abolished as
some of the footage was as old as 2004 (see Figure 18).
Figure 14 – Broad view of prison identified in footage created by frame stitching
Frame stitching of the video allowed a broader view of the location and provided useful insights
for geoverification.
75 https://tibetresearchproject.org/drapchi-prison-documentary-image-stills/

Figure 15 – Verification of frame from the documentary "Tibet Prison" shows that footage was
taken at Drapchi
This image shows the

verification of a frame
from the YouTube video
"Tibet Prison".
The satellite imagery used

initially was the latest
imagery available and had
a few differences. Most
notably, the watchtower
in the background is
absent. The watchtower
this footage was taken
from was positioned too
far to the right for the
angle to be correct.
Several clues were critical

to the analysis of this
image. The presence of a
flag and buildings in the
background was crucial
for picking the correct
yard. Shadows in the
satellite imagery confirm
that the flagpole matches
the selected location. The
greenery in the left
section has been changed
between the dates
imaging.

6.1.2 Sangyip Prison Complex

Officially known as the People's Armed Police (PAP) Number 1 Branch (Chinese: Di yi zhidui - Unit
No. 1) 79, Sangyip is a military and prison complex located in Lhasa, Tibet. It is well known for the
political detention of Tibetans throughout its history, which is believed to have started in 1964.
Articles often refer to prisoners detained in Sangyip Prison; however, it is essential to note that
Sangyip includes several prisons (units) all under the same banner. 80,81 References to Sangyip as a
prison complex date back as far as 1994. 82 Before this, it is unclear whether the complex existed due
to the evolving nature and reformations of Tibet's prison systems, coupled with a lack of information
and transparency.
Sangyip Prison's scale is challenging to determine due to mixed information describing which units
are part of it. From an analysis of open source information, Sangyip Prison is comprised of five or six
units, of which four are commonly referenced:
- PAP Number 1 Branch (may not be a specific location, instead referring to the three below)
- Sangyip (Yitridu/Yizhidui)
- Seitru (Sitru) (Unit 4)
- Utritru (Outridu) (Unit 5)
Despite the similarities between the names Sangyip (Yitridu) and Utritru (Outridu), they are
believed to be separate. 83,84 Yitridu is believed to have been adapted from an RTL camp and may be
used as a forced job placement centre 85 , but contemporary sources to corroborate this are scarce. It
is believed to be a semi-custodial facility and, primarily, a military camp. Sources describe inmates at
Sangyip being forced to hammer rocks in a quarry on a nearby mountain. 86 This work was most likely
carried out in a unit near Utritru, given its proximity to a mountain. In 1997, another facility was
constructed and alleged to be a possible location for the sixth unit of the Sangyip complex. 87 However,
another source suggests that Sangyip may have been a single facility up until 1998. 88
Perhaps the most challenging part of investigating this complex is the assortment of names and
variations in spelling. Particularly noteworthy is the various conflations and mistranslations between
variants of Sangyip and Utritru [2968591159].
80 Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious Prisoners, by Asia Watch Committee (U. S.) (Author),
Robin Munro (Editor), Mickey Spiegel (Editor)
81 Page 86-87 of "Cutting Off the Serpent's Head: Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995" by Robert Barnett and HRW.
82 Detained in China and Tibet A Directory of Political and Religious Prisoners, By Robin Munro, Mickey Spiegel, Asia
Watch Committee, 1994, ISBN:9781564321053, 1564321053

83 Prisons and Prison Systems: A Global Encyclopedia by Roth, M.P., Pages 266-267
84 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/China4.htm
85 This differs from a forced labour camp in that it is not viewed as criminal detention. It is of concern that forced
job placement centres may be used as either punishment or ethnic segregation in attempt to retrain Tibetans to
further homogenise with traditional Chinese culture.
86 https://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/12/10/Fulbright-scholar-confined/5191850194000/
87 https://tchrd.org/lhasas-new-prison-facilities/
88 https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pubweb/PRISONST.htm

Table 6 – The name variations and alternative spellings for Sangyip and Utritru demonstrating
similarity in phonetic pronunciation
Sangyip and Utritru Spelling and Name Variations
Sangyip Utritru [2968591159]
Yitridu (potentially a single unit in Sangyip too) Utritu, Outridu, Unit Number 5, Wuzhidui,
Authitu
Table 7 – Sangyip Prison units' locations
Name Reference Coordinates Details

Sitru 2969191157 29.69115449,91.15785966 Prison
Utritru 2968591159 29.6850411,91.15916768 Prison
Unidentified 2968591154 29.68525453,91.15448533 Prison/Detention
Centre
Yitridu N/A 29.69382388, Possible location
91.16736717

Figure 19 - Sangyip Prison units in the North-east of Lhasa,
Red indicates prisons Sitru, Utritru, and an unidentified prison [Prison 2968591154], possibly part of Utritru or the larger Sangyip
Complex. Blue indicates locations that may have been linked to forced re-education or labour. Blue locations are unconfirmed and
speculative; however, the blue location in the top right may be the location of Yitridu due to the presence of military vehicles – possibly
matching it to the military camp that Yitridu was converted into. 89
Figure 20 – Sitru Detention Centre

Figure 21 – Sitru as seen in 2009 prior to rebuild
Image shows Sitru as seen 3rd March 2009 before the detention centre was rebuilt. This is the
structure seen as far back as 2005, before which satellite imagery is not available.

Figure 22 – Sitru undergoing rebuild
This image from 6th March 2014 shows the original facility demolished with the Northern
watchtowers intact. The last imagery before this was September 2013, which showed the facility
still intact.

Figure 23 – Construction of new Sitru Facility in same location
Image dated 20th October 2014 showing the new facility being constructed.

Figure 24 – Completion of Sitru
Image dated 2nd October 2015 showing the facility complete or near completion.

Figure 25 – Expansion of Sitru
Image dated 11th October 2018 shows additional cell blocks constructed, which appear to roughly
double capacity. No imagery of the construction is available on Google Earth

Figure 26 – Addition of sports court
Imagery dated 26th January 2020 shows the addition of sports court and clear shadows from the
wire fencing,
Based on the wide variety of sources and corroborating evidence, this location has been verified
with high confidence.

however, in 2002, a new dedicated prison hospital was established at Drapchi to cater to more
complex requirements. 104 In 2020, the public bidding announcements revealed that the prison was
to undergo a refit for buildings 1-8, including room maintenance and renovation, roof waterproofing,
circuit renovation, and other infrastructure renovations. 105,106
Figure 27 - Utritru (Lhasa Prison)
2020 satellite imagery of Utritru Prison (Lhasa Prison). Different sections are visible and were
generally upgraded at different times. The bottom right section with three large buildings was built
in 2013, with walls and watchtowers added in 2014. Note that there is an additional facility across
the road to the left of the crosshairs. This is listed as Prison 2968591154, which is also believed to
be part of the Sangyip Complex.
104 http://news anhuinews.com/system/2002/05/28/000024432.shtml?mydnzrsrplufriho

105
http://s000.tinyupload.com/file_uploaded.php?file_id=02254335778803591710&del_id=64655705323753543156&gk=
hosting
106 http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/cggg/dfgg/gkzb/202007/t20200722_14697016.htm

Figure 28 - Verification of Baidu Street View Imagery showing misattribution
Image above 107 captioned "Drapchi prison, as seen on Baidu Street View, August 2018. (Screenshot:
ICT)". However, analysis suggests that this is Utritru prison based on the nearby visible mountain
and the watchtowers visible.
Location of watchtowers (29.68729605,91.15702689 ) from a removed Baidu Street view image

listed as Drapchi Prison; however, analysis demonstrates it is Utritru. Note the flat-topped
watchtower and two pointed red-topped watchtowers behind it, which seem to be slightly further
away from the road wall.
107 https://savetibet.org/chinas-control-state-in-lhasa/16-drapchi-view-grab-1000/

Figure 29 – More recent Baidu Street View imagery reveals the image had been misidentified.
Baidu Street view shows the same watchtowers and yellow feature, with matching hillside in
confirming that the prison shown is indeed Utritru. Note that the road was undergoing work when
the streetview car took the imagery this dates the image between October 2015 and December
2016 when it was repurposed as a dual-carriageway. Also note the barbed wire visible above the
wall.
Figure 30 – Street View in Baidu shows censorship of watchtowers
When exploring this road on Baidu Street View, it was noted that the watchtowers had been
censored from particular angles but not others. It is uncertain whether the censorship was
intended to remove the watchtowers from all the imagery or if only certain angles were deemed
to require censorship.

Figure 31 - Horizon Description of imagery from inside Utritru Prison
Baidu image search results above. 108
Google Earth geolocation [29.684719, 91.156603]
108 http://sft.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/ztzl/zzjj/201909/t20190923_95773.html

Figure 32 - Horizon Description of imagery from inside Utritru Prison
Rough horizon match of Baidu search image 109 with Google Earth 3D view of mountains. The third
image has the building roughly overlaid to show how the ground-level view would look. Note: The
3D Earth did not allow the "camera" to go entirely to ground level, so the horizon view angle is
slightly higher than it should be.
109 https://ss2.baidu.com/6ON1bjeh1BF3odCf/it/u=2660154764,2958321414&fm=27&gp=0.jpg

Figure 33 - Geolocation of Imagery from Inside Utritru Prison
Image of guards allegedly lined up in Utritu Prison. Key aspects such as the electricity lines and the
gatehouse were identified.

Figure 34 – Geolocation of image of guards lined up in Utritru Prison (Figure 25)
Analysis and verification of the image in Figure 33 show that it was taken inside Utritru prison.

Figure 35 – Image from the same square inside Utritru showing a different angle
Another view of the same square, with the image taken from a different angle and facing west.

Figure 36 – Utritru Prison visible from Miqiongri Temple
Utritru is Visible in the bottom left of this image 110, as seen from Miqiongri Temple.
110 https://bit.ly/3lmzssd

Figure 37 – Google Earth view of Utritru from Miqiongri Temple
Utritru (seen in yellow outline), as seen in Google Earth from the same location as Figure 36.

Figure 38 – View from inside building in Lhasa Prison
This image comes from a government press release on Lhasa Prison (Utritru) 111 showing the
interior of a building. It shows the mountain in the background, and the buildings match the
analysis of the layout.
111 http://sft.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/ywxx/jygl/202102/t20210209_192788.html

Figure 39 – Uncensored angles of the watchtowers from Baidu Street View
Despite censorship of some angles of the watchtowers, they were visible at a certain point in the
Street View. It appears to be an accidental inclusion due to censorship from other angles.

Figure 40 – Baidu Street view showing smaller watchtower and large building in perimeter
A view from the road on the West side of Utritru, seen in Baidu Maps. It shows a watchtower
(29.68445131,91.15498291) and a large building with 15 rows of windows across the width
(29.68377459,91.1554841)

Figure 41 – Inmates visible in satellite imagery
January 2021 imagery shows prisoners visible in the Western cell blocks. This includes prisoners
in formation in the bottom courtyard. This matches a trend since late 2019; inmates are regularly
seen in these courtyards, but with no signs of life in other courtyards (the last date showing people
in courtyards is 22nd October 2019). This may lead to the conclusion that the prison is not at
capacity or that prisoners in the Western blocks receive more outdoor freedom.

Figure 43 – Baidu Street View imagery
View of location via Baidu Street View showing high walls, a watchtower (29.68534629,
91.15472188), and wire fencing. The building in front matches imagery with ten rows of windows
per floor. This image is believed to have been taken from 29.68579272,91.15505694.

Figure 45 - 2018 Imagery Showing Military Vehicles in Suspected Camp
2018 imagery from Google Earth shows many vehicles likely to be military, which is evidence
towards the hypothesis that this is a military camp. Note that the vehicles appear to be dark
green/green-camouflaged. There also appears to be several non-military vehicles, including what
appears to be two white busses and a white van – most likely personnel transport.

Figure 46 – Gutsa Detention Centre
Gutsa Detention Centre is located adjacent to the InterContinental Lhasa Holy Land Paradise Hotel,
from which the shadow is visible in the bottom right of the image and the walkway around the
hotel’s pond.

Figure 47 – Unverified account of torture in Gutsa in 1990
“An especially painful torture consisted of wiring one finger on each of my hands,
while I was seated on a chair, and connecting them to an electric installation. As the
handle on the installation was turned a full circle, I felt every single part of my body
being seized by a powerful electric current. The intensity of the shock would fling me
across the room, invariably rendering me unconscious. The interrogators would,
however, try to revive me by slapping me and throwing water on me. Often the wires
would snap, and then they had to reconnect them. People subjected to this method of
torture most often had to be taken directly to the hospital. This instrument of torture,
I learned later, had been newly installed. There were about 500 prisoners it Gutsa, all
females but for a few children, and almost all undergoing varying sentences for
politically offending the Chinese. About 40 of them were nuns.”
An extract from an account by a nun from Tsamkhung Nunnery in Lhasa – Namzol Tendzin, age
18 at the time – who claims to have been detained in Gutsa in January 1990 after preparing to
celebrate Tibetan new year. 119 This account of detention is unverified.
Figure 48 – Gutsa Detention Centre visible from drone footage of the nearby hotel.
Gutsa Detention Centre is partially seen in drone imagery120 of the Intercontinental Lhasa Paradise
Hotel. This image also shows the hotel’s pond and its walkway, as seen in Figure 31.
119 https://web archive.org/web/20201021225242/https://www.prisonmindfulness.org/a-tibetan-nun-in-gutsa-
prison/
120 https://www.pond5.com/stock-footage/item/93206398-drone-flyover-intercontinental-lhasa-paradise-hotel-lhasa-ti

Figure 49 – Baidu Street view images
Baidu Street View 121 images of Gutsa shows watchtowers in matching locations and the distinct
shape of the hotel in the background in the second image. The lack of buildings visible inside is
consistent with the satellite imagery showing single-storey cell blocks.
6.1.8 Gazha Prison

It is suspected that Gazha Prison is the same as Gutsa Detention Centre. Firstly, according to the
Laogai Handbook 2007-2008, the exact location of Gazha is unknown; however, it says Gazha Prison
lies approximately 10km to the east of Lhasa. Upon inspection of satellite imagery, Gutsa Detention
Centre lies to the east, but it is not clear where the start location of the 10km estimate was
made. Furthermore, few other identified detention facilities fit within this range. Secondly, there are
zero mentions of Gutsa Detention Centre in the handbook, which is peculiar considering its
reputation. Translated Chinese and Tibetan sources have referred to the Lhasa City Detention Centre
as Guzha (phonetically similar to Gutsa). 122
121 http://bit.ly/3cKXVU8
122 https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shaoshuminzu/dz1-02012018104052.html. Accessed 30.01.2021

Figure 50 - Trisam

Figure 51 – The original main areas of Trisam shown in contemporary imagery
Image of Trisam RTL 127 and its three main areas identified from old imagery. 128 The findings were
that the facility's modernisation could mean that Trisam was repurposed into a forced education
centre following the RTL programme's alleged closure.
127 https://savetibet.org/chinas-control-state-in-lhasa/19-sat-images-report-trisam_former-area_new-walls-but-no-
towers-1000/
128 https://savetibet.org/chinas-control-state-in-lhasa/Hostile%20Elements

Figure 52 – Old image alleging to be Trisam Prison
A very old image claiming to be of Trisam Prison, most likely before 2004. This structure is believed
to no longer exist in the form viewed here. 129 There has been no indication of a different prison
with the same name in addition to Trisam RTL, so this image remains unverified.
Duilong RTL
There is very little information about a facility under this name, and it was initially investigated
separately from Trisam. However, it is believed to be the same location. Mentions are vague and refer
to “prisons” in the area 130 rather than definitive evidence of a prison under that name. The Laogai
Handbook 131 describes it as being located in Toelung (Chinese, Duilong [堆龙]), or Doilungdêqên
District (Telling Dechen) County, Lhasa City. Duilong RTL (the name under which it was initially
discovered) may now be known as Duilong Compulsory Isolation and Rehabilitation Center. 132 Image
analysis suggests that it is in the same location as the facility listed as Trisam. Sources on this prison
are hard to come by and are all very pro-Chinese state.
China.pdf
130 https://savetibet.org/chinas-control-state-in-lhasa/

Figure 53 – Image alleged to show Duilong Compulsory Isolation and Rehabilitation Centre
believed to be Trisam
Caption from source: “Conduct health check for drug rehabilitation trainees”. 133

Figure 54 – Alleged image of Duilong Compulsory Isolation and Rehabilitation Centre, believed
to be Trisam
Caption from source: “12/14 Organize detoxification trainees to do exercises”. 134 This image was
vital in determining that Duilong was the same location as Trisam, based on the internal fence and
perimeter wall cutting off a portion of the sports pitch and the tall tower in the background.

Figure 54 – Alleged image of Duilong Compulsory Isolation and Rehabilitation Centre
Satellite imagery of Trisam [2963890981] matches the image in Figure 54 and 36. Notable features
include the wire fence cutting off a corner of the sports pitch, the sports pitch itself, the perimeter
wall, and the background tower.

Drapchi. 140 Inmates also reported that the prison held some inmates in solitary confinement. 141 The
visit's outcome led to the conclusion that political prisoners' transfer to and segregation in this newer
prison may have reflected the authorities’ concern of political prisoners interacting with criminal
prisoners in other prisons in Lhasa.
Chushur (Qushui) Prison, Lhasa, Tibet. This image depicts the most likely location based on
research in this project. However, it is disputed.
140 https://savetibet.org/un-special-rapporteur-on-torture-condemns-maltreatment-of-tibetan-prisoners-in-rare-
eyewitness-report/
141 Ibid

Chushur/Chushul Prisons Information issues/conflicts
Table 8 – Possible locations listed for Chushur Prison and conclusion of the Description
Reference Coordinates Information

2955190968 29.55185984, A geoverification and research effort concluded that this location is correct
90.96841697 for Chushur, also known as Chushul or Qushui. A significant amount of
geolocated imagery is claimed to be from Chushur at this location, and
multiple sources contain evidence corroborating this conclusion.
2935190741 29.3518375, This location has been listed as the location for Chushur. However, verification
90.74154015 indicates that this claim is false.
Figure 55 – Alternative claim of Chushur Prison location
The campaign website TibetTruth claimed that the prison was instead located at [29.358802,
90.75684722]. 142 This location was thoroughly investigated and did not match other sources.
However, this location remains under scrutiny and does not match the typical profile of a secure,
modern prison described in several other sources. It does match one claim that the location is
48km South-west of Lhasa.
142 https://tibettruth.com/tibet-prisoners/

There was a significant conflict of information regarding the identities and location(s) of Chushur
and Chushul prisons. This led to an extensive search for open source information, imagery, and
communications with several campaign groups to verify each organisation's claims.
The main issue stems from sources stating either:

- Chushur and Chushul are the same place (just variants of spelling) and is known as Qushui in
Mandarin, as well as Qüxü (�་�ར). 143
- Chushur and Chushul are two distinct places
Where sources indicate they are distinct, they generally agree that:
- One is in Lhasa city
- One is 48km southwest of Lhasa city
However, various sources disagree on which one is which and some claim the reverse of others. Sites
such as the TCHRD’s have included references to both Chushur and Chushul prisons in articles. After
communicating with the organization, it was clarified that TCHRD believes they are in the same
location, and the names were used by their writers interchangeably.
An image from TibetTruth (Figure 55) claims the prison is located in Qüxü, roughly 48km southwest
of Lhasa. 144 Attempts to verify the image suggest it is incorrect. Additionally, near the image's
location is a suspected detention centre [Ref-2935190741], which is more likely to be an appropriate
location to detain people. The source’s quality has been disputed, and other organisations and
sources have provided verifiable information.
The website FreeTibet claims that Chushul prison is distinct and is said to be “located 48 kilometres
southwest of Lhasa, and despite being a relatively new facility, it has already gained an infamous
reputation.” 145 A search was conducted to locate any other appropriate facilities and, besides the
aforementioned detention centre, there was no appropriate alternative facility located. This led to
the conclusion that these claims were either false or outdated enough to be unverifiable based on
historical imagery.
Verifying location of Chushur Prison

The International Campaign for Tibet lists Chushur Prison at a location determined to be at
[29.55185984, 90.96841697] in Lhasa. 146 ICT describes the prison: “Chushur Prison is referred to by
local people as ‘a prison near Drolma Lhakhang’, a temple on the main road leading south from Lhasa
towards Shigatse, and its technical name is believed to be in Chinese ‘Ni dang zhuang wa chang’, or
Nyethang (Chinese: Nidang) Brick and Tile Factory.”It also states that “Chushur Prison is also
described by some sources as being ‘near Trisam’.” 147
The location used in this document is roughly 9.6km away from Trisam. It has been determined to be
the most corroborated and verifiable location for “Chushur” prison, with TCHRD agreeing that
Chushur and Chushul are the same locations.
143 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Q%C3%BCx%C3%BC
144 https://tibettruth.com/tibet-prisoners/
145 https://freetibet.org/chushul-prison
146 https://savetibet.org/chinas-control-state-in-lhasa/
147 https://savetibet.org/new-prison-in-lhasa-increased-surveillance-for-political-prisoners-oppressive-cell-blocks/

Figure 56 – Descriptive graphic created to promote discussion and demonstrate the concluded
location of Chushur Prison
The International Campaign for Tibet’s information on Chushur prison lines up with satellite
imagery 148 and is consistent with information from other sources and Qushui County lines defined
on Google Earth.
148 Satellite image acquired from Google Earth.

Figure 57 – Geolocation of imagery believed to have been taken from Qushui Prison, as found on
Baidu search
Image 1. A Baidu search for 曲水監獄 (Qushui prison) produces the above image as a result
initially from a Chinese government web page that has since been removed. The analysis shows
essential verification features: Red: Water tower, Yellow: Building with three protrusions, Light
Blue: Building with wider protrusion and a small gap between the next building, Dark Blue: Internal
building within the perimeter, and Purple: Trees and gardening. 149
Image 2. Verification of Baidu's image using Google Earth imagery shows very close matches to all
key features identified. Also, road paths match and the red-tiled edges of buildings are visible.
149 https://ss3.bdstatic.com/70cFv8Sh_Q1YnxGkpoWK1HF6hhy/it/u=1037576404,2089763939&fm=26&gp=0.jpg

An archived image from Baidu street-view also indicates its location and can be compared with the
suspected location's satellite imagery. The verification process here gives reasonable confidence that
the Baidu street view image depicts the same facility. However, it is worth noting that this image was
pulled from the International Campaign for Tibet’s website and could not be independently found on
Baidu due to it being removed. Meaning, the original name of the location on Baidu could not be
viewed or corroborated.

Figure 58 – Archived Baidu street view imagery which is claimed to show the front of Qushui
Prison
A street view image from Baidu, 150 shows 曲水監獄 (Qushui prison). The image seems to feature a
glitch or censorship. It displays what essentially appears to be a copy and pasted section on the
front of the building. The image has since been removed from Baidu. Key features to note are the
tall section of a building behind the front structure, satellite dishes on one side, the railing on the
right side of the crossing, and the glitch/censorship on the front of the building. These are
compared with satellite imagery, and a confident match was made verifying this image as part of
the same facility. This image has been geolocated in Figure 59.
150 http://bit.ly/3cHMso3

Figure 59 – Geolocation of Figure 58
Google Earth satellite comparison of the archived Baidu street view image for verification.
The analysis above has led our researchers to conclude that this location is correct. Due to the mixture
of information quality, future research needs to consider what sources are used. While this
conclusion comes with high confidence of accuracy, it is recommended that future research is done
using human sources to strengthen the analysis.
with confidence. However, due to the wide range of claims, information from human sources
would help increase confidence.

Figure 61 – 2021 Imagery shows this location undergoing expansion.
Image from 2021 shows that the facility has been upgraded or is in the process of being upgraded.
A new, second perimeter with at least three watchtowers and a possible foundation for a fourth is
visible. The last imagery showing the facility in its previous form was 11th November 2019.

Figure 64 – Military base near Ref-2959991092 and Ref-2959891091
Satellite view of the military base, which appears to encompass the two detention centres [Ref-
2959991092 (Pink), Ref-2959891091(orange)]. This may indicate that these locations could be
military detention, particularly for facility [Ref-2959891091].

Figure 67 - Unidentified, Quxu, Tibet 2935190741

6.2.2 Locating and Verifying Powo Tramo
Note: Due to the various versions of names for this prison, the decision was made to
keep them as they were presented in each source. This means that should they be
discovered to be distinct locations or incorrect, the information can easily be extracted
and differentiated.
Powo Tramo (Tibetan name) is also known as Zhamu Prison, Bomi Prison, Bomi Second Prison,
Prison Number 2, or Tibet Autonomous Regional No. 2 Labour Reform Detachment, 152,153 is located
400 miles east of Lhasa 154. It is a significant centre for the detention of political prisoners where all
Tibetans with heavy sentences were sent in 2001. At its height, the prison was linked to more than
10,000 prisoners within the complex. This was while it was still designated as an RTL/Laogai. In
January 1998, TCHRD was able to determine 11 political prisoners were in detention there.
It has or has had several sub-sections in nearby areas, with one called Powo Zhunghar. 155 China has
acknowledged an RTL detachment – believed to have been opened in 1962 – near Tramo, in Powo
County, near Nyingtri. 156
Initially, the Tibet Autonomous Region Public Security Department's second labour reform team,
Powo Tramo, was established in the 1980s under the Tibet Autonomous Region Public Security
Department's management. After policy changes in 1992, the RTL team was transferred to the Tibet
Autonomous Region Judicial Department. The RTL team was then changed to Bomi Prison (official
Chinese name) in the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1994 157.
It was one of the hardest prisons to locate due to the conflict of information across various sources.
This led to the investigation obtaining all known sources and clues to the location and evaluating
each one. A TCHRD article lists the location as “the labour camp in Powo Tramo county in Kongpo
(Chinese: Nyingchi)” and describes Powo Tramo as a prison complex – including a unit known as
Damchu. 158 Another article describes a sub-section known as Powo Zhunghar 159.
One of the most reliable sources, the Laogai Handbook, 160 lists Powo Tramo in Qiongduo (Qingduo)
village in Bomi County [Ref-3006795564]. Further research and contact with TCHRD led to the
conclusion that the facility located at Qiongduo (Qingduo) village is what the Chinese call “Prison
Area no.1 at Langqiu”. A TCHRD researcher claimed that it is an older facility in partial disuse, with
the current facility being in Runa village, south of Qingduo town [Ref-3001195609].
The current understanding is that both locations may be referred to by the name “Powo Tramo”, with
both locations being part of the same “complex”, as described by TCHRD. This is supported in a 2019
news article about “warning education” and “compliance”, which describes Bomi Prison and Bomi
152 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/136000/asa170412000en.pdf
153 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/136000/asa170362000en.pdf
154 https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pubweb/PRISONST.htm#N_1_
155 Page 86-87 of "Cutting Off the Serpent's Head: Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995" by Robert Barnett and HRW
157 https://www.beichengjiu.com/biologys/223328.html
158 https://tchrd.org/profile-monks-life-in-one-of-the-most-dreaded-prison-in-tibet/

Second Prison as two distinct locations. The article was edited in 2021, days after the project shared
this observation. 161,162,163
It is understood that Bomi Prison is still active based on analysis of mid-2020 government tenders
for the “Repair and reform the guard service room of Bomi Prison, including all the contents in the
construction drawings and the engineering quantity list”. 164 Additionally, in late 2020, a government
tender for the “Maintenance Projects of Bomi Prison, Bomi Prison, Tibet Sewage System and
Interview Room Reconstruction” was published. 165,166
Bomi Prison is allegedly affiliated with a Penal Enforcement Office, which has the role of “reviewing
the commutation of criminals with a suspended death sentence and life sentence in Bomi County
Prison”. 167 If this source is correct, then the prison holds people with severe sentences. However, the
source does not look official, so it must be read with a degree of scepticism.
It is also potentially linked with Guangdong prison via management or policy. Li Jingyan, head of the
counterpart support delegation of the Guangdong Provincial Department of Justice, pledged: “[The]
judicial administration system of Guangdong Province will regard the security, stability and career
development of Bomi Prison as its own business, and use the management mode and advanced
experience of Guangdong Province’s prison work to develop infrastructure, project promotion, talent
training, technical support, and multi-faceted cooperation”. 168,169
The discovery of a peach blossom festival in Nyingtri, Bomi and Qingduozhen (Qingduo Town)
allowed for a search of travel blogs and photographers to identify any prison references 170. A tourist
exploring the area’s blossom described the prison as the “most beautiful prison” after driving through
“Galang Village, Runa, Qingduo, Dongyou, Yuxu, Xumu”. 171 This supports the current hypothesis that
Powo Tramo is [Ref-3001195609].
161 https://www.sohu.com/a/327264342_736516 [Website]

162
|cat%20/etc/passwd# [Archived web page pdf]
163 [Footnotes here refer to altered article and archived PDF before alteration]. This prompted a major overhaul of security
in the project and led to worries that the project may have triggered a counter-intelligence task to limit the information on
the subjectand modify the articles used as references to delegitimise claims.
164
https://web.archive.org/web/20210112024417/http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/cggg/dfgg/gkzb/202008/t20200803_147639
30.htm
165 http://www.qianlima.com/zb/detail/20201026_198777543.html
166 http://s000.tinyupload.com/index.php?file_id=58496734208197820353
167 https://web archive.org/web/20210112025546/http://m.iicha.com/jg/2342356
168 http://sft.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/ztzl/dkzy/201909/t20190923_95825.html [website]
169
transfer [Archived web page pdf]
170 http://www.mafengwo.cn/i/3053588.html
171 https://gs.ctrip.com/html5/you/travels/2436/3488448.html

There are several conflicting sources and locations presented online:
- 400 miles east of Lhasa

- In Kongpo (Chinese: Nyingtri) 172, 173
- In Tramo County, Nyingtri Prefecture (Ch: Pomi in Linzhi Prefecture) 174
- In Bome (Bomi, Pome) county 175
- Far away from Nyingchi city 176
- Bomi Prison is located in the Tibet Autonomous Region Nyingchi County, Nyingchi, more than
200 km away from the city, Bomi County, 30 kilometres, is located in the mountain plateau,
behind regulatory conditions, difficult living conditions 177
However, evaluation of sources and verification attempts show that the most likely candidate is [Ref-
3001195609].
172https://savetibet.org/new-prison-in-lhasa-increased-surveillance-for-political-prisoners-oppressive-cell-blocks/
173 https://unpo.org/article/15863
174
https://web.archive.org/web/20100223154327/http://www.tchrd.org/publications/topical_reports/drapchi_prison-
2001/
175 https://www.refworld.org/docid/5391ba15a.html
176 http://sft.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/ywxx/jygl/201909/t20190923_96092.html
177 http://mkjy.gd.gov.cn/xwzx/content/post_237923.html

Figure 68 – A Tweet was able to give a rough location for a suspected prison
This tweet 178 was able to give a rough location in which to begin the search. It was considered an
unverified and untrusted source, so all initial findings based on it were evaluated and verified.
178 https://twitter.com/SFTHQ/status/844962780478423040/photo/1

Figure 70 - Geolocation of Alleged image of Bomi Prison
Possible match of image 180 alleging to be taken at Bomi Prison with Ref-3001195609. It is worth
noting that the image is confirmed to be the right orientation and has not been flipped due to the
text on the flag, which reads: “Tibet Bomi Prison … Group”. The back left building has a matching
grey roof, though it is worth noting that the blue-roofed building is red in the outdated satellite
imagery. The red-roofed building spanning across the image from the right extends behind the
edge of the building on the left, as seen in the aerial image.
Horizon analysis reveals a match with Google Earth 3D views.
180 https://www.sohu.com/a/327264342_736516

Figure 71 - Independent verification of flag image at Prison 3001195609. Note buildings have
changed due to different imagery date.
Independent verification of image using alternative date. Note the paths' orientation, the external
staircase, the playing court orientation, and the grassy areas' proportions. This satellite imagery
appears to show an older view before the taller building E was added.

Figure 72 – Geolocation of image taken in Bomi Prison
Li Jingyan, head of the counterpart support delegation of the Guangdong Provincial Department of
Justice, allegedly at Bomi prison 181 at Ref-3001195609. This image shows barbed wire fencing on
the left and back sides. This could either mean that it was taken in the corner or that the building’s
roofs are lined with barbed wire. The mountains in the back help orient the image. It is believed to
have been taken roughly on the image below's crosshairs (30.012400, 95.609620). Other
possibilities include either of the matching yards immediately south.
It should be noted that there is no watchtower visible, as the satellite imagery would suggest; this
could be evidence that it is in one of the other yards. All other buildings line up, and the horizon is
a close match in Google Earth 3D imagery. Additional features are the gap between the inner L
building and the top wall/building in the top right corner and how it doubles up with the other part
of the building on the bottom, which you can also see in the above image behind the far-right man’s
neck.
181 http://sft.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/ztzl/dkzy/201909/t20190923_95825.html

Figure 80 – Alleged image of Nyalam Prison
Image 186 showing Nyalam Prison.
186 https://savetibet.org/seven-of-18-tibetans-repatriated-from-nepal-still-imprisoned-new-prison-in-shigatse-
designated-for-tibetan-refugees/

Figure 81 – Google Earth user-uploaded image showing Nyalam Detention Centre
Image 187 of Nyalam Detention Centre showing watchtowers. Note that the blue-roofed building on
the right matches the one in Figure 80. Also, note that the watchtower circled (right) matches that
in other imagery.
187 https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/p/AF1QipOTdabkPfPDvdsnP5ln8CfcNsOnzbqUM5U8bFSr=h1440

Figure 82 – Geolocation of Nyalam Prison 2816185979
A: Building is seen in the background in the original picture. B: The same type of rooftop is visible.
It is not very common in prison structures which often have flat roofs. C: similar roof structure. D:
similar wall structure and a gap where the gate is located. E: Path behind/next to structure A. F:
wall structure on an angle to structure B, and a rooftop structure is visible within the walls. This
satellite imagery is from December 2005. The prison was under construction in 2007 and finished
in 2009.
with confidence.

Figure 83 - Snowland New Reception Center
Google Earth 2005
Google Earth 2019

Figure 84 - Snowland New Reception Center undated image
The “Snowland New Reception Center,” a prison in Shigatse for Tibetans caught attempting to flee
to or return from India or Nepal. Photo Courtesy of Lynx Photos.

Figure 85 – Verification of Snowland Reception Center
Based on a description, 191 verification efforts were needed to identify the Dechen Podrang area,
the traditional summer residential area for the previous Panchen Lamas. A search for tourist
information shows that this location is known as 班禅新宫 in Chinese. 192 Baidu Maps and other
tourist guides pointed to the location above, matching the description of a marshy area. The
description of the Snowland New Reception Centre claims it is Southwest across the marsh. The
identified location matches this description; however, it must be noted that there were no other
corroborating sources identified.
191 https://savetibet.org/seven-of-18-tibetans-repatriated-from-nepal-still-imprisoned-new-prison-in-shigatse-
designated-for-tibetan-refugees/
192 https://www.exploretibet.com/attrations/shigatse-and-gyangtse/Summer_Palace_of_Panchen_Lamas_1988.html

Figure 86 – Changdu Prison

Figure 87 – Image from a source highlighting the location
Image Source: @rajfortyseven, 194,195 who claims that inmates were moved to “Nagchu gulag” after
the facility was demolished.
194https://www.tchrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Behind-Bars_1998.pdf
195https://theprint.in/defence/china-claims-it-has-no-gulags-but-satellite-imagery-shows-3-new-ones-coming-up-in-
tibet/190940/

Figure 89 - Naidong Prison

Figure 95 – Image from an article on Tibetan “gulags”. 199
This image is from an article depicting Tibetan “Gulags” it shows the location and has buildings
annotated. There was no evidence in this investigation to support or discredit the buildings'
identification highlighted as indoctrination centres. However, no supporting evidence was
provided in the article to back the claims.
199 https://theprint.in/defence/china-claims-it-has-no-gulags-but-satellite-imagery-shows-3-new-ones-coming-up-in-
tibet/190940/

Figure 98 – Baidu Street View of Location
Baidu Maps Street View of the location shows square watchtower. This does not match current
imagery. However, it does match imagery from 2010, which, unfortunately, is the second most
recent image.
Figure 99 – Verification of Baidu Street View
Verification of the street view shows that this location matches Figure 98, despite looking different
in current imagery. The above satellite image was taken on 22nd February 2010 and shows a square
watchtower (red circle), the pylon (yellow circle), the gate (green circle), and the position of the
vehicle (yellow-filled circle). The area in purple was also verified with a match of the building, the
crossroads and the bridge crossing the river (out of view).

6.3 TIBETAN PRISONS WITH UNCONFIRMED LOCATIONS

These locations were researched, however, there were no relevant leads to confirm their existence
or location. They appeared in several web searches, but they all linked back to the same sources or
were only listed by name, with no additional information which could be used as leads.
Table 10 – List of prisons in Tibet with unconfirmed locations
Name Other Names Information Possible Search Area

Rikaze RTL Unknown Unknown Unknown
Situola Prison Unknown Unknown Unknown
The table above features prisons that have been referenced online; however, no information has been
discovered about them. Situola Prison is particularly unexpected as it is listed as a prison in the
Laogai Handbook 206, from which all other mentions online cite.

7 FALSE POSITIVES
This list outlines some of the locations listed as False Positives. These have been determined using
various methods, and evidence vs proof has been differentiated to allow readers to differentiate
between confident and definite conclusions. It should be noted that this list does not include all
locations flagged. Instead, it only includes locations that slipped through our initial assessments and
were flagged later in the process.
Allocated Coordinates Evidence/Proof

Name
Sagya 28.90534811, Confirmed to be a monastery rather than a detention centre. 207

Monastery 88.01819531
(Unidentified,
Sa'gya County,
Tibet
2890588018)
Unidentified, 29.677966, TCHRD researcher feedback is evidence to support this

Nyingchi, Tibet 94.370102 conclusion. “There is no reason to suppose this is even a
2967794370 detention facility.”
Possible, Lhasa, 29.63433019, This location is most likely a military base due to military
Tibet 91.24119492 vehicles' regular presence in historical imagery. Many green
2963491241 vans and trucks spotted, as well as mobile artillery. There is a
cargo container crane identified and a training obstacle course.
The facility also features trenches and a possible nearby firing
range. These finds lead to the conclusion that it may be a
military camp or training centre.
Unidentified, 29.326911, A large Class D facility that may be a false positive, possibly a
Shigatse, Tibet 88.825058 military base. This is based on the lack of watchtowers and the
2932688825 presence of an obstacle course which is common in similarly
identified military bases.
207 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/13/c_137465779_6.htm

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Open Source Investigation of Detention in Tibet by the Tibet Research Project, Version 1.

Page | 1 Last edited 06 July 2021

Version Date Summary of Changes

Updates or additions with the following locations:

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Table 1 - Contributors to this project (in no particular order)

Name/Call Sign Roles Key areas of contribution

Tom Jarvis Project Coordinator, Author, Primary image analysis and

Robin Taylor Deputy Coordinator, Author, Project coordination, geolocation,

Jenna Dolecek Researcher, Author, Editor Analysis, author, editorial

Chong XC Researcher, Author, Translator Verification, translation, analysis, and

Investigator Zoose OSINT Researcher Data collection, analysis and

Ernest P Researcher, Translator Location analysis, verification,

Reece Morris Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis

Matthew Accurso Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis

Basti Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis

Jimothyyy Researcher Geolocation, verification, analysis

...and many more operating under anonymity

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5.6.7 Missed Locations ........................................................................................................................................... 23

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6.2.50 Unidentified, Shigatse, Tibet 2931788813 ................................................................................. 181

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- Tom Jarvis, Research Coordinator and Lead Author

for better peer-review and easier replication of the methodology.

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3 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

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20, 451–475 (2015).

Refworld, November 2017, https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d3dc.html.

pp. 706–724. doi: 10.1111/nana.12252.

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pp. 706–724. doi: 10.1111/nana.12252.

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Figure 1 – Map of Tibet including all claimed areas

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR AND RE-EDUCATION CAMPS IN CHINA

23 Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a Healthy Heart Attitude,’” 5.

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4.3 DESCRIPTION OF TIBETAN DETENTION SYSTEM

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5.2 INVESTIGATION PROCESS

5.2.1 Phase 1 – Data Collection

5.2.2 Phase 2 – Data Refinement

5.2.3 Phase 3 – Description

5.2.4 Phase 4 – Redacting Personal Details and Ethical Evaluation

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5.2.5 Phase 5 – Crowdsourcing Scrutiny

5.2.6 Phase 6 – Review

5.3 PERFORMED ACTIVITIES

5.3.1 Locating and identifying facilities

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5.3.2 Online data gathering

5.3.3 Image Description and verification

5.4 REFERENCE CODES

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Figure 2 - Google Sheets Formula for Generating Ref-Codes

5.5 NAMING PROCEDURE

Figure 3 - Google Sheets Formula for Naming “Allocated Name” fields

=IFERROR(IF(REGEXMATCH(E2, "Unidentified"),(CONCATENATE(E2,", ",P2,", ",Q2,"