CHAPTER II

Hanafi and Iqbal: A Dialogue

19th century posited itself for the Muslim World in the form of complete colonization
by the Western powers and the extreme tension between traditional faith and challenge
of modernity. It was the time when Islam came openly under fire by the Western
scholars and intellectuals for whom it stood not only as a symbol of backwardness but
also the major reason for the same in the Muslim World. Ernest Renan (1832-1892) is
one major and influential example according to whom Islam was absolutely
incompatible with both science and philosophy. In his doctoral thesis, Averroes et
l’Averroisme (1852: ‘Averroes and Averroism’), he upheld this view very audaciously.
He, in his lecture “Islam and Science” given at Sorbonne and published in the Journal
des Débats, March 29, 1883, attacked Islam and Arabs as innately incapable of doing
philosophy and producing science. His ruthless attack was responded by a number of
apologies one by Namik Kemal, the famous Ottoman writer, poet and activist.

Surprisingly enough, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh

(1848-1905) responded defensively. They were of the view that backwardness of the
Muslim World was not due to the Islam per se, rather because of the contemporary
Muslim understanding of the Islam. Afghani, more or less submitted to Renan’s
opinion, however, he replaced the word “Islam” with “religion”; agreeing with Renan
that almost all the religions exhibit such hostility or opposition towards reason. Perhaps
it would not be out of context to quote his original words here. He writes in response to
Renan, “If it is true that the Muslim religion is an obstacle to the development of sciences, can
one affirm that this obstacle will not disappear someday? How does the Muslim religion differ
on this point from other religions? All religions are intolerant, each one in its way. The
Christian religion, I mean the society that follows its inspirations and its teachings and is
formed in its image, has emerged from the first period to which I have just alluded; thenceforth

1
 free and independent, it seems to advance rapidly on the road of progress and science, whereas
Muslim society has not yet freed itself from the tutelage of religion. Realizing, however, that
the Christian religion preceded the Muslim religion in the world by many centuries, I cannot
keep from hoping that Muhammadan society will succeed someday in breaking its bonds and
marching resolutely in the path of civilization after the manner of Western society…No I
cannot admit that this hope be denied to Islam.” 1

This hope of Afghani definitely came true and the Muslim World soon started its march
towards this destination, that is, to bring religion (Islam) at par with science and modernization.
The first visionary who was the herald and harbinger of this voyage was Sayyid Ahmad Khan
(1817-1898) of India. It was he who first of all felt the need of a new Islamic theology of
modernity in the Muslim world to encounter the contemporary challenges faced by
Islam especially with reference to science. He called for a Jadid Ilm al-Kalam ( New
Theology)in his address to Anjuman-i- Himayat-i-Islam at Lahore in 1884. Muhammad
Iqbal (1877-1938), the philosopher, and famous as the Poet of the East, was the man
who fulfilled this vision of Sayyid Ahmad Khan with writing his Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam.

In the words of Mohammad Khalid Masud, “In our view the Reconstruction offers a new
Islamic theology of modernity in continuation to Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s call for Jadid Ilm al-
Kalam. As evident from the publications still appearing in South Asia with the title Jadid Ilm al-
Kalam, debate on the need for a new Islamic theology continues, although the objectifications of
modernity keep changing in the formulations of these new theologies. (He offers a recent
example of Muhammad Shahab al-Din Nadwi’s Jadid Ilm al-Kalam published by Majlis
Nashriyat Islam, Karachi, Pakistan in 1994). He further writes in the similar context,
“Muhammad Iqbal’s Reconstruction makes a major turning point in the growth of Islamic
theology of modernity after Sayyid Ahmad Khan. This work consists of a series of lectures that
he wrote and delivered in Lahore, Madras, Hyderabad, and Aligarh between 1924 and 1930. His
theology of modernity differed from that of Muhammad Abduh (d.1905) the founder of Islamic
modernism in Egypt who remained largely faithful to ancient Islamic theology. Iqbal observed
that the “concepts of theological systems, draped in terminology of a practically dead
metaphysics” could not help the reconstruction of religious thought. “The only course open to us
is to approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent attitude and to appreciate the
2
teachings of Islam in the light of that knowledge, even though we may be led to differ from those
who have gone before us”. Iqbal thus clearly endorsed Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s call for a new
theology by clearly rejecting ancient metaphysics as a dead science.”2

This chapter which is especially devoted to the comparison between Iqbal and Hanafi, intends to
highlight the salient features of Iqbal’s thought regarding reconstruction of religious thought and
his influence on the subsequent intellectual framework of Hanafi. The points of convergence
between the two thinkers will be emphasized particularly. However, the uniqueness and
individuality of the both will be paid due respect and points of divergence will also not be
ignored.

A systematic and methodical approach has been adopted to capture the ethos and spirit of this
dialogue. It is pertinent to mention here that most recently Hanafi has written a book on Iqbal
under the title of Muhammad Iqbal: A Philosopher of Subjectivity (2008) which indicates his
affinity with, and reverence for the great thinker.

Iqbal himself has explained his objective while writing Reconstruction in these words very
clearly and univocally, “During the last five hundred years the religious life in Islam has been
practically stationary. There was a time when European thought received inspiration from the
world of Islam. The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous
rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing
wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further
development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam. Our only fear is that
the dazzling exterior of European culture may arrest our movement and we may fail to reach the
true inwardness of that culture. During all the centuries of our intellectual stupor Europe has
been seriously thinking on the great problems in which the philosophers and scientists of Islam
were so keenly interested. Since the Middle Ages, when the schools of Muslim theology were
completed, infinite advance has taken place in the domain of human thought and experience. The
extension of man’s power over Nature has given him a new faith and fresh superiority over the
forces which constitute his environment. New points of view have been suggested, old problems
have been restated in the light of fresh experience, and new problems have arisen. It seems as if
the intellect of man is outgrowing his most fundamental categories----time, space and causality.

3
With the advance of scientific thought even our concept of intelligibility is undergoing a change.
The theory of Einstein has brought a new vision of the universe and suggests new ways of
looking at the problems common to both religion and philosophy. No wonder then that the
younger generation of Islam in Asia and Africa demand a fresh orientation of their faith. With
the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what
Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision and, if
necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam. Besides, this is not possible to ignore
the generally anti-religious and especially anti-Islamic propaganda in Central Asia which has
already crossed the Indian frontier. Some of the apostles of this movement are born Muslims,
one of them, Tawfik Fikrat, the Turkish poet, who died only a short time ago, has gone to the
extent of using our own great poet-thinker, Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil of Akbarabad, for the
purpose of this movement. Surely, it is high time to look at the essentials of Islam, in the hope
that this may, at least be helpful towards a proper understanding of the meaning of Islam as a
message to humanity. Also with a view to give a kind of ground-outline for further
discussion.”3[Emphasis added].

He has reiterated his aim in these words, “It may fairly be argued that in view of the more recent
developments of science, such as the nature of matter as ‘bottled –up light waves’, the idea of the
universe as an act of thought, finiteness of space and time and Heisenberg’s principle of
indeterminacy in Nature, the case for a system of rational theology is not so bad as Kant was led
to think.”4

Iqbal seems to be in a vigorous and rigorous state of mind to institute and launch a new and
fresh theology based on the findings of modern science. The above quoted passage, specifically
the underlined statements reveal the following aspects of his thought or better to say his
foundational principles on which he wants to build the edifice or superstructure of his theology:

i- Scientific progress of Europe is a continuation of Islamic intellectual tradition,

heritage and culture;
ii- There is absolutely no matter of apprehension to derive benefit from European
advancement in rationality and modern disciplines;

4
iii- Fresh interpretation of Islamic beliefs and even their reconstruction is quite justified
in the light of European thought.

The approach of Iqbal is spirited and confident. Like very many theologians of his time he is
not afraid of judging beliefs in the light of science. Either his vision was correct or erroneous,
valid or fallacious, is a separate issue (and to be dealt later)…..but his determination and
resolve to break the intellectual deadlock and stagnation are, nonetheless, laudable.

Iqbal, in a later lecture again revises his aspiration and intention behind these lectures in the
following words (partly quoted by Masud), “Nor can the concepts of a theological system,
draped in the terminology of a practically dead metaphysics, be of any help to those who
happen to possess a different intellectual background. The task before the modern Muslim is,
therefore, immense. He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely
breaking with the past. [Emphasis added].

Hassan Hanafi(b.1935)opened his eyes in the shackled, subjugated, impoverished, backward

and conspired against Muslim World when Iqbal was about to quit eternally from the scene.
He died (1938) when the would-be revolutionary Egyptian academic, thinker, philosopher,
activist and ideologue was a toddler. However, this child grew into a “modern Muslim” with
a commitment to fulfill the task set by Iqbal (underlined in the above passage) “to rethink the
whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past.” Hanafi devoted his
philosophical career to re-make, re-phrase and re-interpret the entire edifice of Islam
remaining loyal to its roots, that is, past and tradition. His enormous works including:
Tradition and Modernism, From Dogma to Revolution (Min al- aquida ila- al- thaura), Cultures and
Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue? And Contemporary Issues, are the outcome of this life-long
mission.

Hanafi has devoted a full length book of 584 pages to Iqbal under the title of, Mohammad Iqbal:
Faylasuf al-dhatiah, that is, Mohammad Iqbal: A Philosopher of Subjectivity as mentioned above.
Hanafi in the chapterization of the book himself has arranged the thought of Iqbal according to the
stopics in the order of priority. Most interestingly, he has selected the same scheme, which we wish to
pursue in this chapter, that is, Iqbal on Tradition and Modernity, further sub-divided into ideas
regarding ancient and Western heritage, theories of interpretation of Qur’an and on Ego or the Self. 5

5
 The subject is vast and very fascinating; however, keeping in view the limited time at our disposal for
the completion of the assignment, the dialogue has been limited to the following main themes:

A- Iqbal and Hanafi on the meaning and scope of modern science;

B- Iqbal and Hanafi on the discourse with Western Philosophy( Iqbal with special reference
to Henri Bergson and Hanafi with Phenomenology);
C-Iqbal and Hanafi on Ijtihad, that is, to reinterpret the Qur’an1;

So it is high time now to start with the identified areas.

A- Hanafi and Iqbal on the Meaning of Modern Science:

Before moving to Hanafi and Iqbal, it would be unfair, not to pay tribute to a personality,
who is the first Islamic modernist in the true sense of the word. He is the man who braved the
initial and ruthless blows of modernity directly but did not give in. He faced these attacks
heroically not only academically and intellectually, but in almost all the fields of practical
and political life. He fought the battle on multiple fronts and paved the way for the next
generation of travelers. This man was no other but Sayyid Ahmad Khan, whose
achievements we have acknowledged in the start of this chapter too.

He developed a new set of principles for the interpretation of Qur’an. In his Taqrir fi usul al
–tafsir (1892), he proposed 15 principles for the exegesis of Qur’an. The ninth principle
explains the relationship between the Qur’an as the word of God and nature as the work of
God. According to him, “There is no matter in Qur’an disagreeing with the laws of nature.”6

1
The name of the Holy Book has been spelled in this study as Quran and Qur’an; both are valid and correct.
1
Answer of Jamal al-Din to Renan’s Journal des Debats, May 18, 1883 in N. R. Keddie’s An Islamic
Response to Imperialism, P. 183.
2
Muhammad Khalid Masud, “ Iqbal’s Approach to Islamic Theology of Modernity”,(Paper presented in
Iqbal Memorial Lecture organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore, April 10,
2008), Pp. 2-3.
3
iii- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp.6-7.
4
Ibid, P.144.
5
Hassan Hanafi, Mohammad Iqbal: Faylasuf al-dhatiyah, Dar al-Madar al-Islami, Cairo, 2009, P.17.
6
Aziz Ahmad, “Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968”, Otto Harrasowitz, Wiesbaden,
1970, P.30

6
This is the main maxim which is carried forward by Iqbal and Hanafi, which has bestowed
that strength on them with the help of which they have examined modern science without
feeling any sense of inferiority or overwhelming- ness.

Iqbal has paid extraordinary attention to the nature and laws of nature. It is interesting to note
that he writes nature with capital N. He has laid emphasis on the Qur’anic message to study
laws of nature with a reflective attitude. Iqbal in his Reconstruction has specially and
insistently highlighted the anti-Classical spirit of Islam and Qur’an. He is of the view that
Qur’anic approach towards nature and reality is empirical, scientific and inductive. It
believes in the particular and the concrete instead of the universals and abstracts. It would be
fruitful to have a look on this passage of Iqbal’s, “No doubt, the immediate purpose of the
Qur’an in the reflective observation of Nature is to awaken in man the consciousness of that
of which Nature is regarded a symbol. But the point to note is the general empirical attitude
of the Qur’an which engendered in its followers a feeling of reverence for the actual and
ultimately made them the founders of modern science…..The Qur’an opens our eyes to the
great fact of change, through the appreciation and control of which alone it is possible to
build a durable civilization.”7[Emphasis added].

As per Iqbal’s analysis, one of the reasons of the failure of Asian cultures was to approach
reality exclusively from within and ignoring its outward aspect.8

For Iqbal there is practically no difference between science and prayer or worship. Since
Nature is the outward manifestation of Reality and its observation or study is no less than
prayer. Hence the scientist who is closely judging or investigating Nature is actually engaged
in an act of worship. In his own lucid words, “In fact prayer must be regarded as a necessary
complement to the intellectual activity of the observer of Nature. The scientific observer of
Nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality, and thus sharpens our inner
perception for a deeper vision of it……..The truth is that all search for knowledge is
essentially a form of prayer. The scientific observer of Nature is a kind of mystic seeker in
the act of prayer.9

7
7- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp. 11-12.
8
Ibid.

7
Perhaps Iqbal is more clear and categorical in the same outlook in the second lecture of the
Reconstruction, when he applies the philosophical test on the revelations of the religious
experience. He has almost identified therein nature with the self or “I-amness” of the Divine
Being. Let us have an interesting read from his text, “Now a self is unthinkable without a
character, i.e. a uniform mode of behaviour. Nature as we have seen is not a mass of pure
materiality occupying a void. It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and
as such organic to the Ultimate Self. In the picturesque phrase of Qur’an it is the habit of
Allah……………… Nature, then, must be understood as a living, ever-growing organism
whose growth has no final external limits. Its only limit is internal, i.e. the immanent self
which animates and sustains the whole……..Thus the view we have taken gives a fresh
spiritual meaning to physical science. The knowledge of Nature is knowledge of God’s
behaviour. In our observation of Nature, we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the
Absolute Ego; and this is only another form of worship.” 10 Nature is but God’ Sunnah, the
habit. For Iqbal, human body too, (just like nature) is the accumulated action or habit of the
soul.11 [Emphasis added].

(The underlined and highlighted as bold will be critically analyzed by the end of the section).

Hanafi assumes more or less the similar position when he proclaims, “A more healthy
approach to religion and science is to conceive both as motivation for knowledge. Both are
from an epistemological order. Both belong to theory of knowledge. Religion is an a priori
given knowledge according to major human needs. It is an answer to external questions of
life and destiny. It is an answer to a human quest given a priori for a maximum guarantee of
certainty: the creation of the world and the immortality of the soul. The question is a
posteriori; the answer is a priori, an example of an inductive-deductive method looked for
by many logicians to prevent human knowledge from the formalism of deductive systems
and from the positivism of pure experimentalism without rational foundations.12

10
Ibid, P.45.
11
Ibid, P.84
12
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vol.I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Center for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, Pp.453-454.

8
The fifth lecture of Reconstruction, Iqbal has exclusively devoted to the achievements of
Islam in the domain of knowledge, say science. The lecture no doubt carries some very
original and famous assertions of Iqbal, for instance his claim which he has justified with apt
examples, that “the birth of Islam is the birth of inductive intellect”. Another very novel and
worth-considering idea of Iqbal is regarding Prophet’s unique position in history. He says,
“……the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and modern world. In so far as
the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the
spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers
other sources of knowledge suitable to its new directions.”13

Hanafi’s position and stance are not very different from those of Iqbal, when he asserts
confidently, “Since it (science) needs hypothesis, religion as an a priori knowledge can
provide such hypothesis to be verified by the a posteriori science. Since Revelation, Reason
and Nature are from the same order, religion as a hypothesis would be easily verified in
science. Therefore, religion will have a double certainty, inwards and outwards. Science will
also have a double certainty in the premises and the conclusion”14.

Iqbal further unfolds the relation between Nature, Reason and Revelation in the fifth lecture
and writes, “ The Qur’an sees the signs of Ultimate Reality in the ‘sun’, the ‘moon’, ‘the
lengthening out of shadows’, ‘the alternation of day and night’, ‘variety of human colours
and tongues’, ‘the alternation of days of success and reverse among peoples’,-------in fact in
the whole nature as revealed to the sense perception of man……..This appeasl to the concrete
combined with the slow realization that, according to the teachings of the Qur’an, the
universe is dynamic in its origin, infinite and capable of increase, eventually brought Muslim
thinkers into conflict with Greek thought”.15

Iqbal says that, “This intellectual revolt against Greek philosophy manifests itself in all
departments of thought. I am afraid; I am not competent enough to deal with it as it discloses
itself in Mathematics, Astronomy and Medicine”.16 However, this relation has been very
beautifully elaborated by Hanafi: “Islam was founded on the model of identity between
revelation, reason and nature. The identity between revelation and reason produced
philosophy and mathematics: Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry and Music. The identity

9
between Revelation and Nature produced natural sciences: Physics, Chemistry, Medicine,
Pharmacology, Biology, Botanic, Mineralogy, and Geology. In this model there was no
distinction between mathematical, physical and human sciences. This model is based on the
harmony between the order of Revelation, the order of reason and the order of Nature”17.

Iqbal, however, because of his love for the “concrete” quotes specific examples from Islamic
history to prove the Muslims and the Arabs as the real precursors of Science. He very
earnestly quotes from Briffault’s Making of Humanity, “The debt of our science to that of
Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries of revolutionary theories; science owes a great
deal more to Arab culture, it owes its existence. The ancient world was, as we saw, pre
scientific……..What we call science, arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of inquiry, of
new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the
development of Mathematics in a form unknown to Greeks. The spirit and those methods
were introduced to the European world by the Arabs”. (P. 190). Iqbal has given the credit of
Theory of Evolution to Jahiz and Ibn-i- Maskwaih. Interested readers may see the fifth
lecture of Reconstruction in detail, that is, “The Spirit of Muslim Culture”.

Hanafi, on the other hand talks in more general terms. He sees no conflict or rift between the
two great institutions. According to him the difference between religion and science is only
in the levels of analysis and scope of vision not in the essence or substance. Though certain
risks are definitely there, one of which, is to interpret the religious text literally, deducing the
meaning only from grammar without depending on metaphors and human experience. He
warns against the dogmatic trends both in religion and philosophy. This point in the context
of Hermeneutics will be highlighted in the Section C of the present discussion regarding re-
interpretation of Qur’an and Ijtehad. Hanafi conceives religion and science not as rivals or
antagonists rather complementary to each other. He asserts, “Both religion and science are
not only sources of knowledge but also motivations for action. Religion is only a means to an
end, the perfect life, not an end per se. That is why there is no right and wrong religion but
only a dynamic and static religion. 18 This dynamism Iqbal discovered in “The Principle of
Movement in the Structure of Islam” of which the end product is a spiritual democracy, the
ultimate aim of Islam according to him.19 [Emphasis added].

10
Before moving towards the critical analysis of the two thinkers, it is beneficial to have a look
on another relevant passage of Hanafi, wherein he opines, “Praxis is the natural outcome of
Theoria. Perfection in this life is the prerequisite of felicity in eternal life. The principles of
religion are not closed dogmas, nor material things, nor holy historical institutions. They are
only powers to act, energy to be used and traces to be followed. Science is also a means to
master laws of nature for the benefits of human beings. It is the theoretical foundation of
technology. Technology aims at easy life. Perfection, the purpose of religion, does not
contradict easiness and efficiency, the aim of science. Religion gives the science the ethical
norms of technology. It prevents the use of energy for mass-destruction but only for peace. It
eliminates the negative side effects of science such as pollution, desertification and modern
disease. Christ was at the same time a prophet and a physician. Moses mastered the laws of
nature. Mohammad knew the laws of rise and fall of nations.”20

The discussion above leaves a healthy, satisfying and refreshing effect on the mind of the
reader. S/he heaves a sigh of relief and thanks that the Muslim World has not only produced
bigots, reactionary and anti-reason personalities who would declare sciences as witchcraft or
condemn scientific progress as a warfare and conspiracy against religion. “After all” we have
thinkers who are not afraid of this monster which has shaken the foundations of
ancient/organized religion since its inception; because the very first and basic conflict of the
conservatives and the moderns was founded on the premise that the discoveries of science
were not in accordance with the religious beliefs (of any religion).

However, the giants of modern and contemporary Muslim intellectual tradition appear very
certain and convinced, and, find absolutely no fissure and cleft between the two rivals. For
them the nature, revelation and reason are but one and the same thing. Hanafi has named
three very revered, venerated and esteemed prophets as scientists. These utterances are very
pleasant and encouraging, and most definitely the Muslim World is direly in need of this
rational approach, since on this critical juncture of history the already enfeebled and
debilitated Muslim World may not afford to have a conflict with science. Hence a
reconciliatory vision is imperative. But here appears a very critical question of truth versus
pragmatism. Can and should the truth be sacrificed for the sake of “doctrine of necessity”.
This is a separate and debatable issue, verily beyond the scope of this study for the primary

11
reason of paucity of time. However, a few comments are essential here to make some points
clear.

As far as the observation of the present author goes, Hanafi and Iqbal, both are working with
good intentions and as sincere thinkers they earnestly believe in their own systems of
thought. However, their general scheme of ideas is based, rather on oversimplification of
facts. Moreover, both philosophers have viewed the picture exclusively from the one side and
have ignored the opinion of opponents which deserves due appreciation as far as its
intellectual merits are concerned.

Is it justified to say that there is no difference between religion and science, whereas both
have different and mutually exclusive methods? One is based on faith, submission and
revelation while the other is founded on observation, experimentation, modification,
falsification and even on total rejection. Science never claims finality and absolute truth,
whereas religion starts from a mighty and unchallengeable claim that, “This is the Book
without any doubt, guidance for the fearing who believe in the unseen”21. A believer is not
supposed to observe, at first the visible and then by observation move towards the invisible.
On the contrary, s/he has to believe first in the unseen as an article of faith, and then
strengthen the pre-existing belief with the help of the “signs of Allah” prevalent in nature.
For this too, the guidance is required from revelation and a Divine messenger, because left
alone with reason, s/he may believe in any God or Creator not necessarily Allah. Moreover,
s/he may believe in many equally potent, autonomous and mutually cooperating gods instead
of the one, only, single and omnipotent God who has no rival or partner. This is a familiar
case or fate of the Natural Theology.

This is a very serious point to ponder and to say alone that religion is not dogma is not
enough to counter a weighty argument. Besides this, there are many other aspects of Iqbal
and Hanafi which are in need of thorough deliberation. Let us start with Iqbal. The main
inspiration of Iqbal has come from the then Modern Physics, which has today become a
century old and innumerable new ground-breaking developments have taken place in it. A
number of theories of Iqbal’s time have been revised, modified, improved or rejected. His
immense faith in Einstein’s Theory of Relativity is astonishing and amazing, he is

12
overwhelmed with the results of Einstein and is fondly eager to interpret or see Qur’anic text
in its light. His famous line in the first lecture requires special attention, “The theory of
Einstein has brought a new vision of universe and suggests new ways of looking at the
problems common to both religion and philosophy,” Strange, definitely strange. Neither
Einstein was a theologian nor does physics deal with religion at all. Sorry to say, the
discoveries of Physics, especially those of modern Physics deny through and through the role
of a wise creator behind the universe for whom some room could be made with the help of
Classical Mechanics which believed in the concept of force, action from the distance and
rigid laws of nature. Einstein, the exponent of the revolutionary theory which entirely
changed the picture of the universe was himself a non-believer. His own theory could not
convince him to testify the tenets of any religion including his own ancestral one.

It is interesting to note that a philosopher of Iqbal’s stature knew it well that physics deals
with the physical things and has no link with religion, theology or spirituality etcetera, as he
himself has acknowledged in the second lecture of the Reconstruction, “Thus physics studies
the material world, that is to say, the world revealed by the senses. The mental processes
involved in this study, and similarly religious and aesthetic experience, though part of the
total range of experience, are excluded from the scope of physics for the obvious reason that
physics is restricted to the study of material world, by which we mean the world of things we
perceive”22. It is surprising that knowing all this so explicitly, he used physics as an
apologetic method to prove the validity of religion.

Iqbal insists zealously on Modern Physics of which the one foundational rule is Uncertainty
Principle. Such an uncertain Nature may definitely not be equated with that God Who does
not change His habits! Moreover, the laws of nature are indifferent to human needs and
desires and at times yield untold suffering and pain to humanity. Should these be identified
with the habits of God? Iqbal has almost ignored this side of the picture. He has treated the
problem of evil in his third lecture briefly and then has associated it with the legend of Fall of
Adam. He has tried to interpret the legend symbolically assigning new meanings to the old
terms. His elucidation of the legend makes a very fabulous academic read but it is very
difficult and incomprehensible for an ordinary believer and reader.

13
Mohammad Iqbal’s reverence for science is not as deep and profound as it appears from the
outset. At places he is more than harsh towards the poor discipline and has used a word as
derogatory as “vulture” for it. See the passage that follows, “But we must not forget that what
is called science is not a single systematic view of Reality. It is a mass of sectional views of
Reality---fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together. Natural science
deals with matter, with life, and with mind; but the moment you ask the question how matter,
mind and life are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional character of the various
sciences that deal with them and the inability of that science, taken singly, to furnish a
complete answer to your question. In fact the various natural sciences are so many vultures
falling on the dead body of Nature, each running away with the piece of its flesh.23

At another place his position is hundred percent pro-religion and anti-science as he writes, “It
seems that the method of dealing with Reality by means of concepts is not at all a serious
way of dealing with it. Science does not care whether its electron is a real entity or not. It
may be a mere symbol, a mere convention. Religion, which is essentially a mode of actual
living, is the only serious way of handling Reality.”24

Most interesting to note, he has torn the phenomena of life and consciousness completely out
of the domain of sciences and declared them beyond the scope of mechanistic explanation. A
very detailed discussion on the same may be seen in the second lecture of Reconstruction,
wherein, Iqbal has quoted J. S. Haldane, Wildon Carr and Bergson in support of his
argument; rather these are the results of heavy influence of Bergson. Bergson in his Creative
Evolution has declared life as beyond the reach of Physics and Chemistry. Some passages
from the same are worth quoting here:

“Chemists have pointed out that even in the organic-not to go as far as organized- science has
reconstructed hitherto nothing but waste products of vital activity; the peculiarly active
plastic substances obstinately defy synthesis”.25

“To sum up those who are concerned only with the functional activity of the living being are
inclined to believe that Physics and Chemistry will give us key to biological processes.”26

14
“The fact is, neither one nor the other of these two theories, neither that which affirms nor
that which denies the possibility of chemically producing an elementary organism, can claim
the authority of experiment. They are both unverifiable, the former because science has not
yet advanced a step towards the chemical synthesis of a living substance, the second because
there is no conceivable way of proving experimentally the impossibility of the fact”27.

Bergson was right when he wrote these passages in 1907. Actually no living substance was
chemically synthesized till his death (1941). So he left the world with strong belief in his
theory. The case of Iqbal is also not different who passed away even three years earlier, that
is, in 1938. However, the destination of the chemical production of life in the laboratory was
not very far. This too, happened in 1952, when Stanley L. Miller and Harold C. Urey in their
famous Urey-Miller Experiment produced 20 different amino acids in the lab. They tested the
Alexander Oparin’s and J.B. S. Haldane’s hypothesis that life came into being through the
chemical processes which took place under the primitive conditions of the earth. These
conditions led to the formation of organic compounds through inorganic precursors. The
epoch-making results of this experiment on the origin of life were published in 1953, which
was conducted at the University of Chicago. 28 Amino acids are the building blocks of
proteins.

Therefore, these ideas might have some value 80 years ago, but in the contemporary age of
the very advanced Medicine, Biotechnology, Genetic Engineering, Cloning, Organ
Transplantation and Stem-Cell Research, they appear nothing but immature. The recent
advancements in Psychiatry and Neurology have almost replaced the obsolete ideas
regarding mind and consciousness. Contrary to Iqbal’s views, consciousness is not something
over and above the Physics, Chemistry and mechanistic explanations but is quite subject to
their laws. Our thoughts, ideas, consciousness, emotions and all other mental phenomena
respond to the psychiatric drugs. The flourishing discipline of Biochemistry has
revolutionized the world of medicine. It explores the relationship between Chemistry and life
or in the other words; it may be called Chemistry of life.

Bergson has a similar attitude towards Physics as well about which he opines, “The more
Physics progresses, the more it shows the impossibility of representing the properties of ether

15
or of electricity, the probable base of all bodies, on the model of the properties of the matter
which we perceive”.29

His disagreement with Kant is well known whom he has criticized rather vehemently. In the
similar vein he has written, “He (Kant) did not consider in his Critique of Pure Reason, that
science became less and less objective, more and more symbolical to the extent that it went
from the physical to the vital, from the vital to the psychical. Experience does not move, to
his view, in two different and perhaps opposite ways, the one conformable to the direction of
the intellect, the other contrary to it. There is, for him, only one experience, and the intellect
covers its whole ground. This is what Kant expresses by saying that all our intuitions are
sensuous, or, in other words, infra-intellectual”.30

What is the underlying current or logic of this approach? Why do Bergson and Iqbal harbour
this attitude towards sciences? Why do they oppose Kant so intensely? Their position is
clearly ambivalent which at times becomes openly hostile. The answer is that to
accommodate freedom of will, human volition, mysticism and intuition they need a non-
mechanistic explanation of the universe. They desire a world free from the categories of
space, time and causality wherein human individuality may grow without any restriction.
Bergson has concluded his Creative Evolution on the following passage which is the gist of
his entire philosophical endeavours:

“So understood, philosophy is not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of
human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates, a contact with the
creative effort: it is the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism and consequently
the true continuation of science—provided that we understand by this word a set of truths
neither experienced nor demonstrated, and not a certain new scholasticism that has grown up
during the latter half of the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old
scholasticism grew up around Aristotle”.31

He has warned philosophy against becoming physics in these words, “We must remember
that philosophy, as we define it, has not yet become conscious of itself. Physics understands
its role when it pushes matter in the direction of spatiality; but has metaphysics understood

16
its role when it has simply trodden in the steps of physics, in the chimerical hope of going
further in the same direction. Should not its own task be, on the contrary, to remount the
incline that physics descends, to bring back matter to its origins, and to build up
progressively a cosmology which would be so to speak , a reversed psychology?”32

While in the introduction of the same book he has expressed, “In fact, we do not indeed feel
that not one of the categories of our thought—unity, multiplicity, mechanical causality,
intelligent finality, etc.--applies exactly to the things of life: who can say where individuality
begins and ends”.33

Iqbal has written in the more or less similar spirit, “Modern Atomism is, however, unique. Its
amazing mathematics, which sees the world as an elaborate differential equation; and its
physics which, following its own methods has been led to smash some of the old gods of its
own temple, have already brought us to the point of asking the question whether the causality
-bound aspect of nature is the whole truth about it.”34

These points, however, will be thoroughly discussed in Section B of this study, wherein we
shall have a review of Iqbal in the context of Western Philosophy. Currently, this is the high
time, after this argument that we should move to the passages quoted as reference 7 and 11
above, which bear a great significance to our debate. Iqbal in the first lecture of
Reconstruction has beautifully elucidated the empirical and scientific spirit of Qur’an which
does not abhor the world of senses like Greek philosophy. Qur’an invites its reader again and
again to observe the order, purpose, regularity, uniformity and proportion of the material
universe. The persistent, consistent and repetitive stress laid on its fascinating design, rivers,
mountains, clouds, rains, winds, weathers, days, nights, fruits, flowers, flavours, colours,
fragrances, ferries, oceans, plains, animals, birds, fish, light, shadows, sun, moon, stars,
heavens, earth, institutions, men, women, creeds, languages, festivals, rites, rituals, and
immense variety of objects is a hallmark feature of Qur’an. Nature is definitely a premise
from which to infer conclusion is a duty of reflective and contemplative soul, according to
Qur’an. Hence the sentence of Iqbal that Nature is regarded as symbol is absolutely valid.
Hitherto no one may have any difference of opinion with him. However, he follows a
drastically different trajectory in the second chapter which is definitely startling for any

17
 theistic believer, for whom the world is a creation of God, Who had brought it into being out
of nothing (ex-nihilo) by uttering the word Kun (Be)35 as a result of His sheer sweet will
without any internal or external compulsion.

Here in the second lecture, Iqbal takes a pantheistic position when he identifies the Nature
and its manifestations with the Ultimate Self. The Ultimate Self which is unique and nothing
may be compared with Him36; His unity is pure and un-analyzable into parts. How can He be
declared identical with a universe so diverse and full of plurality and multiplicity? This is the
stance neither of philosophy nor of science, rather of Mysticism and quite in contrast with the
Shari’a. This sort of pantheism has led to crude polytheism in various ancient religions.
Moreover, to identify the theistic God with Nature and universe is an encroachment not only
on His essence, which is pure and simple, but is also a tempering with His existence which is
boundless. This is a sort of limitation imposed on Him.

The second point to ponder is the use of word Immanent by Iqbal which is a through and
through pantheistic term. It is the opposite of Transcendent. It would be fruitful to have a look
on the definition and the etymology of the two. The literal meaning of immanent is
“remaining within, indwelling, inherent, intrinsic, internal or subjective; hence limited in
activity, agency or effect to the subject or associated acts. It is a derivative of Latin immanens
which stands for to remain in or near. Philosophically speaking it is a term applied to a deity
which is believed to exist in all things throughout the whole process of creation”. 37A brief
explanation is going to be more helpful in appreciating the spirit of the point, “Immanence is
the quality of any action which begins and ends within the agent. Thus, vital action, as well in
the physiological as in the intellectual and moral order, is called immanent, because it
proceeds from that spontaneity which is essential to the living subject and has for its term the
unfolding of the subject's constituent energies. It is initiated and is consummated in the
interior of the same being, which may be considered as a closed system”38. [Emphasis added].

Before elaborating the same a hurried glance on Transcendence is essential. It means

surpassing others, pre-eminent or supreme, lying beyond the ordinary range of perception, being
above and independent of material universe. “The term transcendence, from the Latin
transcendere (to climb up), means to go beyond, surpass, or rise above, particularly what is

18
given in personal experience. In theology, transcendence is associated with the beyond-ness and
holiness of God, in the sense of the existence of God being prior to the physical cosmos and
exalted above it. Referring to divine ascent beyond the world, transcendence is frequently
contrasted with immanence, the presence of God in the world”.39

Now the meaning of Iqbal’s assertion that the study of Nature is actually the study of God’s
behaviour may be easily analyzed. There are two immediately relevant points here:

i- The study of God or His behaviour does not make the subject-matter of Science at all.
This is the purview of Theology, and Science is verily not Theology. No scientist, no
matter how devout believer he is, has ever claimed that he was studying either God or
His behaviour. This is basically a category mistake, mixing two separate areas of
inquiry which are mutually exclusive;

ii- To equate or identify God with the nature is clearly pantheism and in contrast with
the theistic spirit of Semitic tradition including Islam. A theistic God is creator and
may never ever be identical with His creature(s). On the other hand the pantheistic
God is not a willful creator, rather the universe proceeds from His being, as is
mentioned in the underlined statement above. This is known as Emanation. This
procedures leads towards a closed as well as a highly deterministic system as a logical
consequence. Whereas we have seen that Iqbal is a great critic of both ideas; he is a
staunch exponent of freedom of will and of an open and growing universe.

Being a very keen and brilliant thinker, Iqbal himself was aware of his own bend of mind;
therefore, he has acknowledged with great integrity that the intellectual view of Reality is
always pantheistic. When he defines in second lecture the Ultimate Reality as rationally
directed creative life, he admits frankly, “The operation of thought which is essentially
symbolic in character veils the true nature of life, and can picture it only as a kind of
universal current flowing through all things. The result of an intellectual view of life,
therefore, is necessarily pantheistic”.40

19
There are some other passages in Iqbal which present a very patent and obvious picture of
pantheism.

“The question of creation once rose among the disciples of the well- known saint Bayazid of
Bistam. One of the disciples very pointedly put the common sense view saying: ‘There was a
moment of time when God existed and nothing existed besides Him.’ The saint’s reply was
equally pointed. ‘It is just the same now’, said he, ‘as it was then’”.41

“Reality is, therefore, essentially spirit………I have conceived Ultimate Reality as an Ego;
and I must add now that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed. The creative energy of
Ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, functions as ego-unities. The world,
in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call atom of matter to the free
movement of thought in the human ego, is the self revelation of the ‘Great I am’. Every atom
of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in
the expression of ego-hood……Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the
perpetual flow of Divine life.”42

“Finite minds regard Nature as a confronting ‘other’ existing per se, which the mind knows
but does not make. We are thus apt to regard the act of creation as a specific past event, and
the universe appears to us as a manufactured article which has no organic relation to the life
of its maker, and of which the maker is nothing more than a mere spectator. All the
meaningless theological controversies about the idea of creation arise from this narrow vision
of finite mind. ………The real question which we are called upon to answer is this: Does the
universe confront God as His ‘other’ with space intervening between Him and it? The answer
is that from the Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event
having a ‘before’ or ‘after’. The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality
standing in opposition to Him. This view of matter will reduce both God and the world to
two separate entities confronting each other in the empty receptacle of an infinite space.”43

Here one thing must be made clear to be fair and just to the great thinker. When we say that
he leans towards pantheism, it does not mean the monistic approach of Spinoza or Wahdat-
al- Wajud of Ibn Arabi, for whom the substance is one and singular. (Though some eminent

20
scholars have identified him with Ibn Arabi too, see two last quotes of this section by Ali
Abbas Jalalpuri and Altaf Ahmad Azami). For Iqbal Ultimate Reality is essentially spiritual
and one but he is more in line with pluralistic Monadology of Leibniz. Though from the
Ultimate Ego, only egos may proceed, but all these egos are individual and different from
each other. Hence, Mohammad Iqbal in his approach is more akin to Wahdat-al-Shahud.

Iqbal’s combination of science, theology and philosophy makes a highly academic reading; it
is impressive and represents a brilliant and scholarly personality with very vast and
incredible study. Iqbal’s approach is first of its kind in the Muslim World, hence very
laudable and highly esteemed till date. However, the mix and blend of the various disciplines
and areas of thought, he has presented could not avoid serious criticism on account of some
inherent flaws, fallacies and inconsistencies.

Renowned Pakistani intellectual, Ali Abbas Jalalpuri, has found Iqbal ambivalent towards
pantheism, and Ibn Arabi. Moreover, his great reverence for pantheist poet Jalal al-Din Rumi
and his notions regarding the Absolute Ego and the Ultimate Self clearly indicate his strong
intellectual tendency towards pantheism.44

Similar objection, but in very strong words has been raised by eminent Indian scholar Altaf
Ahmad Azami, whose critique on Reconstruction was published first time in 1977.His views
may be summarized in the words as follows: Iqbal and Shaykh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi totally
agree with each other regarding man, God and the state of certitude. In Iqbal’s system there
is no difference between man and God. He has three main points of disapproval with Iqbal’s
overall framework of thought:

i- He studied Islamic theology in the light of Western thought. Scientific discoveries

may be used to support religious beliefs; however they do not provide light to
reconstruct Islamic beliefs of which the source is God and they are changeless;
ii- Religious experience is a dubious source of knowledge and not a trustworthy means
to perceive God;
iii- Iqbal has interpreted Quranic verses arbitrarily and out of context.45

21
It seems that we are perhaps digressing and entering into the realm of philosophy leaving the
discussion on science behind. Actually this is not the case; there are very many other relevant
points which have not been purposefully mentioned here, as these would be discussed under
philosophy. Since Iqbal and Hanafi are basically philosophers, hence in any narrative
regarding them, philosophy may not be barred from entry. Moreover, the topics are
overlapping and a water-tight compartmentalization is practically not possible.

Another very valid point here is selective approach of Iqbal while trying to prove his own
favourite pre-conceived ideas. Iqbal has not deduced results from Qur’an, rather has used
Qur’an in support of those ideas in which he already believes firmly. This is the personal
observation of the present author, which will be analyzed in detail under the section on
philosophy.

Before we move towards Hanafi, we may say that the intellectual endeavours of Iqbal in the
field of reconciliation between science and religion may never be forgotten and will be
remembered as a great contribution from a giant; but definitely they have flaws and
weaknesses of their own which are not beyond criticism.

Hanafi posits four major premises on the sameness of science and religion:

i- Science and religion are of the same epistemological order;

ii- Science presents a-posteriori questions regarding creation of universe and
immortality of soul, while religion provides a-priori answers;
iii- The only difference between religion and science is that of level of analysis and scope
of vision;
iv- The principles of religion are not closed dogmas, nor material things, nor holy
historical institutions. They are only powers to act, energy to be used and traces to be
followed.

Let us critically evaluate these one by one. Perhaps it won’t be easy for any reader and
student of philosophy to believe in the similarity of epistemological order between science
and religion. The basic and most fundamental difference between the two is that of means of
having and testifying knowledge. In religion the greatest source of knowledge is revelation,

22
and the revealed material is beyond any doubt. The believers, first of all, are not encouraged
to prove it at all; and even if they so desire, there is no means and method to do so. The
scientific method, on the other hand is based on observation, experimentation, verification
and falsification. Any scientific theory may be challenged, reaffirmed, modified and even
rejected at any time. With the availability of better resources, it may be improved and further
refined. Hence, the most significant difference between science and religion is that of
epistemological order, they may never be considered similar by any stretch of imagination.
Moreover, no belief of religion may be proved with the help of science at all. These are to be
accepted only on the basis of faith.

Science does put forward a-posteriori questions no doubt----but it never demands the answers
from the religion. It seeks the answers itself through hard work, meticulous observation,
patient experimentation and laborious process of verification. It is an onerous task which it
performs alone heroically and the most tragic aspect of this story is that after this entire
endeavour it rejects religion’s a-priori answers. Had it not been the case, why the conflict
should have arisen between the two???? As far as soul and its immortality are concerned, both
fall beyond the purview of science and have been never studied by it.

If we do believe in Hanafi that the only difference between the two is that of level of analysis
and scope of vision, this difference is not a small one, rather great with immense
repercussions. Here a sceptic or a critic may raise the question that science and religion differ
not only in analysis but in subject- matter, approach and methodology too. However, there are
some points too, where both coincide, but again the style of inquiry and ultimate results are
drastically apart. There is a variety of religions in the world, from Indian to Chinese to Iranian
to Semitic. All these sets of religions present different narratives regarding the creation of the
world and origin of life. None of these is empirically verifiable and all are so different from
each other that no two can be simultaneously believed. Here another controversy starts, not of
the rift between science and religion, but of inter-religious truth. Physics and Biology have
never affirmed the assertions of any religion. Six-day story of creation has nothing in
common with the advanced cosmological theories of Physics. Moreover, Biological sciences
do not believe in creation, but support evolution. Iqbal has tried to prove that evolution is also
a product of Muslim mind, if so; again this is in contrast with the Divine sense of creation. In

23
order to prove evolution, Iqbal in the third lecture of Reconstruction, has interpreted the
Legend of Fall with the help of far-fetched ideas. It seems that God just made and expelled
the Adam Himself and left the responsibility to interpret everything to the Madam Blavatsky.
Some specimen sentences of Iqbal in this regard will be interesting for any reader:

“Indeed in the verses which deal with the origin of man as a living being, the Qur’an uses the
words Bashar or Insan, not Adam…………The word Adam is retained and used more as a
concept than as the name of a concrete individual”46. [Italics original].

“I am, therefore, inclined to think that the Jannat in the Qur’anic narration is the conception
of a primitive state in which man is practically unrelated to his environment” 47.[Italics
original].

“Thus we see that the Qur’anic legend of Fall has nothing to do with the first appearance of
man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man’s rise from a primitive state of
instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and
disobedience.48”

“It is highly improbable that a being whose evolution has taken millions of years should be
thrown away as a thing of no use.”49

The actual case is this that Iqbal is inspired by Bergson’s Creative Evolution; these are the
ideas of Bergson regarding evolution which he has eagerly picked and fitted them within the
framework of Islam. He discovered the similar ideas in Rumi too and declared him a
harbinger of hope for mankind. In his own words he says, “It was Jahiz (d.255 A.H.) who first
hinted at the changes in animal life caused by migration and environment generally. The
association known as ‘Brethren of Purity’ further amplified the views of Jahiz. Ibn
Maskawaih (d. 421 A.H.) however, was the first Muslim thinker to give a clear and in many
respects thoroughly modern theory of the origin of man...……….The theory of evolution,
however, has brought despair and anxiety instead of hope and enthusiasm for life, to the
modern world………The world of today needs a Rumi to create an attitude of hope, and to
kindle the fire of enthusiasm for life.”50

24
In the context of the above quoted passages it would be enough to say that why should a God
competent enough to create rely on evolution?

Iqbal’s fascination with Bergson’s Creative Evolution will be debated in-depth under Section
B of this study.

The last statement of Hanafi requires special attention, wherein, he has given a clear-cut
verdict about the “nature” of religion. According to him, this is neither a closed dogma, nor a
collection of material things, nor a set of historical institutions. Here once again we find a
striking resemblance with Iqbal who says, “And religion, which in its higher manifestations is
neither dogma, nor priesthood, or ritual, can alone ethically prepare the modern man for the
burden of great responsibility which advancement of modern science necessarily involves.”51

The first question here is that when Hanafi and Iqbal use the world “religion”, which specific
religion they have in mind? Religion is a very broad term. And a religion may never be
treated as something over above the dogma or a well-defined and organized set of rites, rituals
and laws. A religion is definitely a collection of three Cs, that is: Creed, Code and Cult.
Therefore dogma, laws and institutions are inseparable from religion, and are its pillars and
building blocks. It is an interesting psychological fact that the believers like a rigid religion
instead of a flexible one. Because this immobility of religious beliefs is interpreted as
certitude and eternal truth, and this certainty is that emotional and psychological need of the
man, which science may not provide by virtue of its very nature. Thus dogma is the secret of
the survival of religion, without which it may not last. Since otherwise it would no longer
remain a religion rather would become some other discipline. The same has been identified
and pointed out by the contemporary historian Mohammed Hammad according to whom
Hanafi has divorced the revealed given data from dogma and history and thus has rejected all
historical manifestation of religious phenomena. Hence he has not only aroused the ire of the
Islamists but has also alienated the traditionalists and moderate Muslims alike. His
misunderstanding of the crisis of the Orientalism has contributed towards this fate.52

One of the important results drawn by Hanafi in the words of Bergson is: that there is no right
and wrong religion, but only a dynamic and static religion. Here the notice point is that

25
 according to Hanafi, the truth of a religion is based on a single criterion, that is, its dynamism
and mobility. So any religion, which adopts this principle may claim itself a true religion,
multiple religions may have this quality.

Concluding Remarks:

The reconciliatory efforts of both Hanafi and Iqbal are of great academic and intellectual
merit. Both enjoy a distinguished status in the modern and contemporary Muslim
philosophical thought. Both wish to bring the holy scripture at par with science or vice versa.
Both see no noticeable difference between the two, and if there is any, it may be removed
with the help of proper interpretation or has arisen due to the literal use of the language
etcetera. Iqbal, however, is one step ahead of Hanafi who has practically “deduced” scientific
theories from the Qur’an and has declared it the forerunner of science. His main motivation
and inspiration have come from Modern Physics in general and the Theory of Relativity in
particular. The constancy of speed of light has fascinated him exceptionally, and he has
applied it on the famous Qur’anic verse, “God is the light of the Heavens and of the earth”
(Al-(Qur’an, 24-35). He opines, “Personally, I think the description of God as light, in the
revealed literature of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, must now be interpreted differently”.
Why? “The teaching of modern physics is that the velocity of light cannot be exceeded and is
the same for all observers whatever their own system of movement. Thus, in the world of
change, light is the nearest approach to the Absolute.” 53 One of the underlying meanings of
this interpretation is that the Almighty was aware of the Relativity Physics since the times
immemorial and that is why He used the metaphor of light for Himself. In the other words,
Qur’an was already consistent with the revolutionary discoveries of Modern Physics and
these could have been discovered out of it if somebody would have paid due attention. Here
one may recall the familiar claims of the enthusiastic Muslims who after every new scientific
discovery declare that Qur’an has revealed the same fourteen hundred years ago. Had it been
the case, why didn’t they describe it before the science? Interestingly, this is the tendency of
almost all the believers, no matter whatever is their religion. People of various religions prove
the truth, modernity and scientific natures of their respective religions with the help of the

26
same science. One of the verses of the Qur’an has been used to prove Big Bang. “Do not the
disbelievers see that the heaven and the earth were closed-up mass, and then we opened them
out. And we made from water everything living. Will they not believe” (Al-Quran, 21:31).

Now the verse had been always there in the scripture, but no Muslim theologian or scientist
inferred Big Bang out of this, until this theory was propounded by the (Western) scientists.
This predilection is very dangerous not for the science but for the religion predominantly,
because the scientific theories remain in the constant process of revision, modification and
change. If one established theory is rejected, God forbidden, would you then say that the
scripture was wrong? (Such zealous persons have ignored the other drastic implications of the
theory for any religion, as it disproves and downrightly rejects the religious cosmologies).

(What a coincidence, just when this conclusion was being written, a team of three physicists
has won the Nobel Prize-2011 for Physics. They have very successfully revised a theory of
Modern Physics which stated that ultimately the speed of expansion of the universe would be
slowed down under the influence of gravity. The lead physicist of the team, Brian Schmidt told
that they have discovered that the universe is actually speeding up as it expands, and not
slowing as previously thought by the scientific community. Professor Schmidt told that by
using their examination of the strength of light coming from exploding stars called
'Supernovas' they could measure the speed of the expansion of the universe."We found that
the universe was speeding up, and that was completely unexpected and gravity was not
working as we had expected," said Professor Schmidt.

The other two members of the tem are Saul Permutter and Adam Reiss. They have discovered
that the universe is expanding at an accelerating pace, a stunning revelation-which has
revised the previous views in this regard. According to Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
they found that the light emitted by more than 50 supernovas was weaker than expected, a
sign that the universe was expanding at an accelerating rate. “For almost a century the
universe has been known to be expanding as a consequence of Big Bang about 14 billion
years ago.” The citation said. “However, the discovery that this expansion is accelerating is
astounding. The Academy said that the researchers were stunned by their own discoveries-----
they had expected to find that the expansion of the universe was slowing down. The discovery

27
 was, “the biggest shake-up in Physics, in my opinion, in the last 30 years”, said Phillip
Schewe, a physicist and spokesman at the Joint Quantum Institute, which is operated by the
University of the Maryland and the Federal Government. Written on 6th October, 2011 ).

This was a simple and single example, only as one illustration that religious statements should
never be interpreted with the help of science. Hence the fundamental principle of Iqbal,
that is, to reconstruct religious beliefs in the light of modern science is not only fallacious but
also derogatory for the religion because it gives edge to the science on religion. There are two
points that need the attention of the reader:

i- Had there been no advancement in Modern Physics; had Einstein not propounded the
Theory of Relativity, then would the Qur’an have lost its “true” meaning? It shows its
desperate dependency on science, especially on Physics.

ii- If the Theory of Relativity is amended, then Qur’an should be amended or

reinterpreted accordingly? If it is abandoned altogether the Qur’an will also be
abandoned?

(Another coincidence, the Discover Magazine of Science and Technology reports in the issue of
January-February, 2012 that, “Runaway subatomic particles seem to be breaking cosmic speed
limit. If the results hold up, physicists have some explaining to do. Einstein, Relativity and much
of 20th –Century physics have come under assault from an esoteric but far-reaching experiment.
A collaboration of 174 physicists fired bursts of neutrinos from head quarters of CERN, the
European Organization for Nuclear Research, in Geneva Switzerland, to a detector, in Gran
Sasso, Italy. They tracked 16,111 of the ghostlike particles and measured how long they took to
complete the trip. After three years of experiments and intense analysis, the team reported in
September that neutrinos were arriving one 17-millionth of a second early.

The minuscule discrepancy revealed by the experiment, dubbed Opera (Oscillation Project with
Emulsion –tRacking Apparatus), has staggering implications. It seems to indicate the neutrinos
were travelling faster than light, violating what has long been regarded as an ironclad cosmic

28
law. If neutrinos really can do that, then Einstein’s theory of relativity, the backbone of modern
physics, could break down. Time could flow in reverse. Neutrino-based message could reach
recipients before they were sent. An effect could precede its cause, which would explode our
entire way of thinking about the universe.

The result was so peculiar that CERN physicists encouraged other scientists to look for design
errors in their experiment. Many quickly obliged……..Even the most skeptical scientists agree
that the experiment was carefully performed.

That credibility has led some brave physicists to confront a question both daunting and
electrifying: What if Opera results are correct and neutrinos really are thumbing their noses at
Einstein?”

Gregory Mone, “Faster than the Speed of Light”, Discover [ISSN 0274-7529, USPS#555-190],
Vol.33, No.1, January-February, 2012, Pp.15-16.(Published by Kalmbach Publishing Company,
21027 Crossroad Circle, P.O. Box 1612, Waukesha, WI 53187-1612) Added on 6th
January,2012.

Iqbal has given the credit of Theory of Evolution to Jahiz and Ibn Maskaweh; here two
questions may be raised again:

i- If this theory was put-forward by the Muslim scientists, it means that it is not in
contradiction with the Divine creation; then why the same theory by Darwin was so
overwhelmingly rejected by the Muslim World? It is being resisted till date;

ii- Unfortunately no one knows that this great idea originated in the minds of the Muslim
scientists, the world came to know it, when it was expounded by Darwin in 19 th
century.

It is interesting, rather not interesting but painful that when the Classical Physics enjoyed a
distinguished status in 19th century, Sayyid Ahmad Khan produced an exegesis of Qur’an
which was in accordance with the tenets of the Classical Mechanics and when it was replaced

29
by Modern Physics, Qur’an was immediately interpreted using its terminology! Here the
comment of Abu-Zayd is very pertinent, “This automatically implies that Qur’an is at the
mercy of the ideology of its interpreter. For a communist, the Qur’an would thus reveal
communism, for a fundamentalist it would be a highly fundamentalist text, for a feminist it
would be a feminist text, and so on.”54

Similarly Iqbal, being a Bergsonian has sought his philosophy in Qur’an too. He has traced
not only the serial and non-serial time in the two verses of Qur’an, but also has explained the
simple verses of Qur’an regarding coming of days and night in such a tedious manner that
they have nonetheless lost their clear and unambiguous meaning.55 Rahim Bakhsh Shaheen
has written a very interesting sentence in his book regarding the incomprehensibility of these
lectures when delivered in Lahore: “[Ghulam Jilani] Barq recalls that the language of these
lectures was so complicated and the thought presented was so subtle that no one among the
audience could understand these lectures.” 56 Same is the case with construal of Barzakh with
Helmholtz’s theory that nervous excitation takes time to reach consciousness. Here a curious
blend of mysticism and physiology has been applied on the Qur’anic concept of immortality
of the soul.57

A passage from Iqbal himself is going to be very interesting, “But since Muslims have always
sought the justification of their varying attitudes in Qur’an, even though at the expense of its
plain meaning, the fatalistic interpretation has had very far-reaching effects on Muslim
peoples. I could, in this connexion, quote several instances of obvious misinterpretation; but
the subject requires special treatment, and it is time now to turn to the question of
immortality”.58[Italics added]. However, Iqbal himself did the same very liberally in the
Reconstruction.

Hanafi, like Iqbal, has not quoted such specific examples---but he shares the same frame of
mind. He is not in the habit of interpreting Qur’an by quoting particular disciplines or
theories; however, he too finds basically no difference between the two. An amusing point,
here is that for both Hanafi and Iqbal, the true religion of the world is Islam alone, therefore,
they have found similarities with science in it. They might have chosen some other religion
too, having a very scientific spirit, but did not. The Baha’i religion is quite scientific rather its

30
fundamental principle is harmony between science and faith but it could not attract their
attention. Hanafi, however, is gracious and generous enough to name a few other religions in
this context, as he writes, “In ancient Eastern and Western cultures: China, India, Persia,
Egypt, Mesopotamia and Greece, religion and science were one discipline. Science came out
of religion. Ethics and politics in China aimed at realizing harmony in human and social
relations. Buddhist logic and Mathematics came out from principle of abstraction in
Buddhism. Astronomy was the outcome of Babylonian cosmology in Mesopotamia.
Chemistry and architecture were motivated by the doctrine of immortality of soul in ancient
Egypt. Aristotle was the philosopher and the naturalist at the same time. Even in Islamic
culture, the link between Eastern and Western cultures, science came out of the religion, not
against it. Islam was founded on the model of identity between revelation, reason and
nature”59. But, he too, has not mentioned Baha’i faith.

At another place, Hanafi has made a distinction between faith and reason, but soon he returns
to his favourite thesis, that is, the oneness of the two. He says, “The second model is the
identity between reason and scriptures. Both Revelation and Reason come from the same
order. Revelation is demonstrable, already verified in nature and history. Reason comes from
the same source of Revelation namely Divine knowledge. The function of revelation is to give
an a priori certitude on which human reason constructs any rational system for man, nature
and society. And to protect human knowledge from relativism, skepticism and agnosticism.
……Revelation can also shorten the time of research by giving primary working hypothesis
already verified in history given the long development of revelation parallel to the progress of
human consciousness, in order to leave the maximum human time for implementation of
revelation as an ideal structure of the world and the fulfillment of the Divine will on earth
according to human “Vice-gerancy” 60.

One may see, Iqbal peeping through this statement. The similarity is simultaneously
conscious and spontaneous. Former in the sense that Hanafi has had a very deep admiration
for Iqbal and latter in the sense that he himself thinks on the same pattern. Like the strengths,
weaknesses of the two philosophers are the same and both have committed nonetheless same
fallacies. Background for the stance adopted by both Hanafi and Iqbal is not difficult to
understand at all. Both were born to Muslim parents and carried a profound love, sympathy

31
and sense of attachment with their ancestral faith. Hanafi in his youth joined the Muslim
Brotherhood Movement too. Both felt a sense of loss on the current situation of the Muslim
World, both pined for the revival of the lost glory of Islam. Their dedication and devotion to
Islam is beyond question, that is why both are Muslims first and philosophers later. As the
pre-Ghazali philosophers tried to philosophize Islam; these two thinkers have endeavoured to
Islamize philosophy and science. To love one’s faith is every one’s right and there is nothing
wrong in it but there is one pertinent observation which must be mentioned, before we end
this section.

This leads to another tendency which has proved itself even more dangerous and harmful in
results and consequences. This is known as Islamization of knowledge, which is based on the
same idea that Qur’an is the source of entire scientific knowledge. This has been very
effectively explained by Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd as he writes, “Methodologically speaking
there is nothing new in Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s presupposition. However, the difference
between his interpretation and the classical commentaries lies in the domain of meaning---the
modern meaning—which considers science specially the natural science, to be the new
religion of secularism. Fascinated by the new world of science and discovery, he had to find a
way to integrate it into the Holy Scripture. I propose here that the Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s
effort to open the meaning of Quran to accept scientific findings is the embryo of what would
later develop into seemingly opposite directions, namely an emphasis on the scientific
supremacy of the Quran (al-Iskandrani 1880; 1883; 1897; al-Jawahiri 1971, al-Sharafi 1990:
69-76), and an emphasis on the ‘Islamization’ of knowledge and science. The first direction
shows that all scientific theories are implicitly alluded to in the Quran. Accordingly, the
miracle of the Quran extends beyond the classical theory of stylistic supremacy and takes in
scientific supremacy. The second, the Islamization of knowledge, seeks the Islamic roots of
modern knowledge.”61

Abu Zayd, also gives the reference of his own article regarding the scientific supremacy of
the Quran (al-ijaz-al-ilmi), published in the weekly supplement of Al-Ahram daily, 27th
October, 2000, P.2. According to the article, linking the Quran to the scientific theory, which
is changeable and subject to challenge apace with the development of human knowledge is
actually tantamount to damaging the divinity and the eternity of the Quran, the word of God.62

32
 Unfortunately Iqbal and Hanafi have committed the same fallacy in their respective efforts to
harmonize the two. However, at one place in his later writings, Hanafi has discouraged this
attitude in the following words which should be quoted here to be fair and honest to the
author: “In modern times, reformed interpretations appeared to cope with new circumstances
and the modern state of human knowledge and science. The scientific interpretation began to
cope with modern scientific discoveries, showing that the Qur’an had already referred to
them, if not directly, such as theory of evolution, at least indirectly, such as theory of
relativity. This interpretation began with the scientific discoveries of others, by external
scientific knowledge, known by reason and experimentation. Divine revelation followed
human knowledge and was conditioned by it. Since human knowledge is partial and
changing, Divine revelation became likewise. This interpretation gives Muslims the false
certitude that the Qur’an already includes all scientific discoveries. Therefore, they do not
need Western science. The West has science without faith, while Muslims have science and
faith. Transfer of scientific knowledge does not necessarily imply the adoption of the
scientific outlook.”63

It seems now the appropriate time to move to the section two of this study.

B- Hanafi and Iqbal on the Discourse with Western

Philosophy:

Both Hanafi and Iqbal drank deep from the Western tradition and had had their higher
education from renowned Western institutions. Both had eminent and well-known
philosophers as teachers, supervisors and guides. Both got the opportunity to have a very
meaningful interaction with Western thinkers and intellectuals. So it is quite natural that they
accepted the Western influence and developed their subsequent philosophical systems and
weltanschauungs mainly around the ideas of Western philosophers who inspired them most.
In this chapter we are going to critically evaluate following three positions:

i- Hanafi’s overall approach within the framework of Phenomenology specially

Husserl’s thought ;

33
 ii- Iqbal’s world-view in the perspective of Bergson’s philosophical structure ;

iii- Points of interception between Hanafi and Iqbal.

However, before we start our inquiry, it will be healthier to answer a query which may be raised
by any reader or analyst. Perhaps at the first sight this quartet of Iqbal, Hanafi, Husserl and
Bergson appears disjointed or far -fetched. Is there a common intellectual thread which joins an
Indian, an Egyptian, a German and a French thinker together? Does this study bear some
academic worth? The answer is definitely in affirmative. As a proof we provide a quote from a
well-known scholar who has recently accomplished a valuable work on Hanafi, that is, Carool
Kersten of King’s College London. Carool writes regarding the intellectual development of
Hanafi, “However, as a Muslim thinker intent on developing an Islamic methodology, Hanafi’s
own teleological orientation remains also very much informed by the same drives and objectives
as those of Mohammad Iqbal. To the latter teleology was not a preconceived goal, but a
‘progressive formation of fresh starts, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life
grows and expands’. Robinson interprets this ‘sense of personal responsibility and the centrality
of action on Earth’ suffusing Iqbal’s work as a prime example of what he calls ‘this-worldly
Islam’. Moreover, Robinson’s reference to the final words of The Reconstruction also points out
a parallel between Husserl and Iqbal’s interest in the development of the self or ego in the
context of Western philosophy which Hanafi took to heart”.64[Emphasis added].

Another such piece of information will further testify our claim and validity of our endeavour.

“A phenomenological methodology cannot be satisfied with a mere translation of terms and

expressions. On the contrary, it must encompass a radical or, in Roman Jakobson’s words,
‘creative transposition’ of the contents of things-in-themselves. Aside from remaining truthful to
Husserl’s dictum ‘zuruck zur sache selbst’ (back to the thing-in-itself), as a Muslim modernist
Hanafi also saw it as his task to complete the three-stage progression of Islamic reformist
project.65 As he considered The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam ‘the best
contemporary work in which this transposition clearly comes through’, Hanafi agreed with Iqbal
that the transposed culture of Islam must be rendered into the language of the transposing----that
is the European---culture because we are living in its epoch. More specifically, the discourse of

34
‘third- stage modernists’ such as Iqbal and himself is best phrased in terminology inspired by
Nietzsche and Bergson”.66 [Emphasis added].

The above quoted paragraphs show that our selected four thinkers are thoroughly interconnected
in their respective frames of reference. Not only this, rather they have mutually influenced and
inspired each other. Hence it may be quite fruitful to study them together under one title.

After this brief justification, we must come directly to the first question without further ado. This
question is, “what does Hanafi want to establish or do”? “What is his main intention or purpose
for which he has solicited light from Iqbal, Husserl and Bergson along-with his own
indefatigable efforts”?

Hanafi Vis-a -Vis Phenomenology

Husserl in his illustrious work Ideas, wanted to establish a “rigorous science”. However, this
endeavour led to solipsism, to overcome which Husserl introduced the notion of “the other” in
the part V of the Cartesian Meditation. This was the development of individual inter-subjectivity
which was taken to a collective level in the Crisis of the European Sciences with the introduction
of a Lebenswelt or “Life –World”. This “Life-World” has been named by Paul Ricoeur as the
“matrix of our existence”67. It is to be remembered that Paul Ricoeur was the supervisor of
Hanafi’s doctoral thesis at Sorbonne. Hanafi’s philosophical development and growth exhibits
more or less the same pattern. He also wished to develop a rigorous Islamic method for
philosophical investigation. (Before unpacking these ideas in detail and describing their
respective definitions, we are just narrating the background of Hanafi’s work. All the terms and
their context will be illustrated in -depth during due course.)

He had already made such an attempt in his doctoral theses. Study of Phenomenology in general,
and that of Husserl’s in particular influenced him to revisit his research plan so as to make an
Islamic model of Strenge Wissenschaft, that is, “rigorous studies”. His ultimate motive was to
show that reason, revelation and reality belong to the one and the same genealogy 68. Hanafi
started the study of revelation in the Islamic context and applied the results on the New
Testament as a case study69. “This engagement with material from two religious traditions”, in

35
the words of Carool Kersten, “can be considered as the equivalent of Husserl’s exploration of
inter-subjectivity, just as expanding his research project into the comprehensive three-pronged
critique of the intellectual histories of Islam, Europe, and the current cultural situation of the
Muslim world in his later Heritage and Renewal Project mirrors Husserl’s concerns with the
crisis affecting Western thinking and scholarship. The ‘radical life-crisis of European humanity’
which Husserl had tried to resolve in The Crisis parallels Hanafi’s constant preoccupation re-
establishment the unity of Islamic Sciences. It also points towards a progression along the lines
anticipated by Iqbal who, having declared Europe dead in its soul and Asia in its will, found that
salvation would need a ‘radical transformation of human condition’. After all, behind Iqbal’s
reconstruction of Islamic thought there also lay ‘the philosophy of life of Bergson and Nietzsche,
and the practical idealism of Fichte.”70

“Whereas Husserl’s The Crisis was the result of an attempt to absorb the concept of a ‘Life-
World’ into a transcendental phenomenology, Hanafi’s ambition to present an alternative,
philosophically grounded, method for studying Islam was triggered by a comparable state of
crisis he perceived in the field of Islamic Studies……..Hanafi’s sense of crisis was not limited to
the way Islam was taught and passed on by traditional Muslims, but also extended to Islamic
Studies as a field of modern academic investigation in both the Muslim World and the West,”71

However, before we proceed further with Hanafi, we will have to make a thorough review of
Husserl’s ideas, his philosophical position and the contribution he made in the field. Without
comprehending Husserl’s philosophy, Hanafi’s endeavours may not be fully appreciated.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), being the principal founder of Phenomenology is one of the most
influential philosophers of 20th century. He left a huge and mighty legacy behind. His philosophy
served as a gateway for Existentialism. The list of renowned philosophers, thinkers and authors
is long who were influenced by Husserl in some way or the other. Those who were inspired by
him directly include: Martin Heidegger, Adolf Reinach, Eugene Fink, Roman Ingarden, Max
Scheler, Edith Stein, Ludwig Landgarbe, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean –Paul Sartre, Nicolai
Hartmann, Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hermann Weyl, Rudolf Carnap, Paul
Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Marvin Farber, Hans Blumenberg and Colin Wilson etcetera. Hanafi is
no exception.

36
Four very pertinent questions require answer here, which are as under:

i- What is Phenomenology?
ii- Why did Husserl feel the need of Phenomenology?

iii- What is Phenomenological method?

iv- How did Hanafi apply this method on the religious and revealed text?

Note: A glossary of the terms widely used in phenomenology and common in both Husserl and
Hanafi is attached as Annex-A at the end of this chapter.

Now we are going to respond to these questions one by one and in detail. Husserl initiated
developing his philosophy of Phenomenology by the start of 20 th century. He is certainly the best
person to answer the first three questions. In his first land-mark work on Phenomenology, that is,
Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes about it, “Phenomenology is eo ipso, “transcendental
idealism”, though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense. It is not a psychological
idealism, and most certainly not such an idealism as sensualistic psychologism proposes, an
idealism that would derive a senseful world from senseless sensuous data. Nor it is Kantian
idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world
of things in themselves”.72 [Italics original].

He has further defined the function of Phenomenology that, “Phenomenological explication does
nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us all prior to any philosophizing, and
obviously gets solely from our experience---a sense which philosophy can uncover but never
alter, and which, because of an essential necessity, not because of our weakness, entails (in the
case of any actual experience) horizons that need fundamental clarification73”.[Italics original].

Husserl was quite dissatisfied with the all the philosophical systems and theories in vogue at the
time. Hence, he acutely felt the need of another authentic philosophy which he offered in the
form of Phenomenology. For Husserl, Phenomenology was the only philosophy; as he writes,
“Even in our fleeting glance at what is constituted in us--- in me always, in the meditating ego---
as a world, a whole universe of being, we naturally could not avoid being mindful of “others”

37
and their constituting. By means of the alien constituting constituted in my own self, there
becomes constituted for me (as has already been mentioned) the common world for “all of us”.
Here belongs also, of course, the constituting of a philosophy as common to “all of us” who
mediate together----ideally, a single philosophia perennis. But will our evidence stand firm, the
evidence of a phenomenological philosophy and a phenomenological idealism as the only
possibilities”.74 [Italics original].

He has reiterated his claim once again in the Concluding word of the Cartesian Meditations in
these words, “We can now say likewise that, in apriori transcendental phenomenology, all apriori
sciences without exception originate with an ultimate grounding, thanks to its correational
research, and that taken with this origin, they belong within an all-embracing apriori
phenomenology itself, as its systematically differentiated branches………….In other words: As
developed systematically and fully, transcendental phenomenology would be ipso facto the true
and genuine universal ontology--- not, however, just an emptily formal ontology, but also one
that comprised in itself all regional existential possibilities, and did so in respect of all
correlations pertaining to them”.75[Italics original].

In his famous and land-mark Vienna Lecture, which he delivered before Vienna Cultural Society
on 7th and 10th May, 1935 with the original title “Philosophy in the Crisis of European Mankind”,
he has identified the reason of Europe’s sickness in the following words, “How does it happen
that no scientific medicine has ever developed in this sphere, a medicine for nations and
supernatural communities? The European nations are sick; Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis.
We are by no means lacking something like nature doctors. Indeed we are practically inundated
by a flood of naïve and excessive suggestions for reform. But why do the so richly developed
humanistic disciplines fail to perform service here that is so admirably performed by the natural
sciences in their sphere?”76 [Emphasis added].

(The Vienna Lecture was later named as, “The Philosophy and the Crisis of European
Humanity”. It may be seen as Appendix I of The Crisis of European Sciences).

The vacuum created by the genuine humanistic sciences has led Europe to the spiritual sickness.
Husserl further asserts in the same address, “Blinded by naturalism (no matter how much they

38
attack it verbally), the humanists have totally failed even to pose the problem of a universal and
pure humanistic science and to inquire after a theory of the essence of spirit purely as spirit
which would pursue what is unconditionally universal, by way of elements and laws, in the
spiritual sphere, with the purpose of proceeding from there to scientific explanations in an
absolutely final sense”77.

The need of a genuine humanistic science, urged Husserl to construct a solid and apodictic
philosophy which he named phenomenology. Husserl began constructing Phenomenology as the
critique of Descartes’ cogito. In the First Meditation of the Cartesian Meditations he writes,
“Descartes himself presupposed an ideal of science, the ideal approximated by geometry and
mathematical natural science. As a fateful/ prejudice this ideal determines philosophies for
centuries and hiddenly determines the Meditations themselves. Obviously it was, for Descartes, a
truism from the start that the all- embracing science must have the form of a deductive system, in
which the whole structure rests, ordine geometrico, on an axiomatic foundation that grounds the
deduction absolutely. For him a role similar to that of geometrical axioms in geometry is played
in the all-embracing science by the axioms of the ego’s absolute certainty of himself, along with
the axiomatic principles innate in the ego----only the axiomatic foundation lies even deeper than
that of geometry and is called on to participate in the ultimate grounding even of geometrical
knowledge”.78 [Italics original].

However, Husserl is not satisfied either with the scientific or philosophical foundations set by
Descartes and wishes to return to the things themselves, mercilessly ignored by Descartes. The
level of his dissatisfaction may be gauged from the following statements of the Meditations and
The Crisis of European Sciences:

“After Galileo had carried out, slightly earlier, the primal establishment of the new natural
science, it was Descartes who conceived and at the same time set in systematic motion the new
idea of universal philosophy: in the sense of mathematical or, better expressed, physicalistic,
rationalism----philosophy as “universal mathematics”. And immediately it had a powerful
effect………Precisely those ideas which were supposed to ground this rationalism as aeterna
veritas bear within themselves a deeply hidden sense, which, once brought to the surface,
completely uproots it.”79 [Italics original].

39
“But science looks for truths that are valid, and remain so, once for all and for everyone…….By
them science believes, it can surpass in infinitum not only everyday knowing but also
itself…….According to intention, therefore, the idea of science and philosophy involves an
order of cognition, proceeding from intrinsically earlier to intrinsically later cognitions;
ultimately, then, a beginning and a line of advance that are not to be chosen arbitrarily but have
their basis “ in the nature of things themselves.” 80[Italics original].

“It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the
presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as
scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from “experiences” in which the affairs and
affair-complexes in question are present to me as “they themselves”.”81 [Italics original].

“We remember now the Cartesian principle for building genuine science: the principle of
absolute indubitability, by which every imaginable doubt (even though it were in fact
groundless) was to be excluded. If, by our meditations, we have acquired that principle in a
clarified form, there arises the question whether and how it might help us make an actual
beginning. In accordance with what has already been said, we now formulate, as an initial
definite question of beginning, the question whether it is possible for us to bring out evidences
that on the one hand, carry with them---as we now must say: apodictically---the insight that, as
“first in themselves”, they precede all other imaginable evidences and, on the other hand, can be
seen to be themselves apodictic.”82

“The purely theoretical –technical accomplishment is a miracle, even if through a transformation

of meaning, it is taken for science itself. It is something else to ask how far the exemplary
character of these sciences should be stretched and whether the philosophical reflections, which
were said to be responsible for the new conception of the world and world sciences, were at all
adequate.”83 [Italics original].

In the same vein, he further writes, before elucidating his own position and substitute
philosophy, “Philosophical knowledge is, according to Descartes, absolutely grounded
knowledge; it must stand upon a foundation of immediate and apodictic knowledge whose self-
evidence excludes all conceivable doubt………..A survey of his hitherto existing convictions,

40
acquired or taken over, shows him that doubts or possibilities of doubt arise on all sides. In this
situation it is unavoidable that, he, and anyone who seriously seeks to be a philosopher, begin
with a sort of radical, skeptical epoche which places in question all his hitherto existing
convictions”84.[Italics original].

But, Descartes, according to Husserl, neglected that epoche which has been given due weight -
age only by his phenomenological method or approach. He writes in the Second Meditation of
Cartesian Meditations, “Unlike Descartes, we shall plunge into the task of laying open the
infinite transcendental experience. The Cartesian evidence---the evidence of the proposition, ego
cogito, ego sum---remained barren because Descartes neglected, / not only to clarify the pure
sense of the method of transcendental epoche, but also to direct his attention to the fact that the
ego can explicate himself ad infinitum and systematically, by means of transcendental
experience, and therefore lies ready as a possible field of work. This field is completely unique
and separate, since it indeed relates likewise to all the world and all Objective sciences, yet does
not presuppose acceptance of their existence, and since thereby it separated from all these
sciences, yet does not in any manner adjoin them” 85. [Italics original].

However, according to Husserl, any philosophy which downrightly rejects the real world and
validity of subjective experience may not formulate a suitable epoche. In his own words, “But
how is this epoche supposed to accomplish this? If it puts out of play, with one blow, all
knowledge of the world, in all its forms, including those of the straightforward experience of the
world, and thus loses its grasp on the being of the world, how it is that precisely through the
epoche a primal ground of immediate and apodictic self –evidence should be exhibited?”86

He has answered the above question himself with great logical rigour, “The answer is: If I refrain
from taking any position on the being or nonbeing of the world, If I deny myself every ontic
validity related to the world, not every ontic validity is prohibited for me in this epoche. I, the
ego carrying out the epoche, am not included in the realm of objects but rather---if I actually
carry on the epoche radically and universally---am excluded in principle. I am necessary as the
one carrying it out”.87

41
The main position of Husserl which distinguishes him from that of Descartes’ is his insistence on
inseparableness of the real world from transcendental consciousness and subjectivity. In the
Third meditation of the Cartesian Meditations, he emphasizes on the same, “Yet, as a matter of
essential necessity, external experience alone can verify objects of external experience…
……….. That the being of the world “transcends” consciousness in this fashion (even with
respect to the evidence in which the world presents itself), and that it necessarily remains
transcendent, in no wise alters the fact that it is conscious life alone, wherein everything
transcendent becomes constituted, as something inseparable from consciousness, and which
specifically, as world consciousness, bears within itself inseparably the sense: world—and
indeed: “this actually existing” world.

Only as uncovering of the horizon of experience ultimately clarifies the “actuality” and the
“transcendency” of the world, at the same time showing the world to be inseparable from
transcendental subjectivity, which constitutes actuality of being and sense”88.

For Husserl transcendental subjectivity is the only genuine source of evidence which is the basis
of any true judgment or valid experience. Let us see how he defends his position, “It is clear that
truth or true actuality of objects is to be obtained only from evidence, and it is evidence alone by
virtue of which an “actually” existing, true, rightly accepted object of whatever form or kind has
sense for us----and with all the determination that for us belong to it under the title of its true
nature. Every rightness comes from evidence, therefore from our transcendental subjectivity
itself; every imaginable adequation originates as our verification, in our synthesis, has in us its
ultimate transcendental basis”89.

Husserl is pro-active in enumerating the dreadful effects hidden in the plain and simple denial of
the world of flesh and blood. In the first meditation of the Cartesian Meditations, he asserts
emphatically, “Not only can a particular experienced thing suffer devaluation as an illusion of
the senses; the whole unitary survey-able nexus, experienced throughout a period of time, can
prove to be an illusion, a coherent dream”. 90 Husserl is amazed that how can the sense-data be
rejected and the world of experience be denied at all? In Meditations, he is of the view, “ Other
men than I, and brute animals, are data of experience for me only by virtue of my sensuous
experience of their bodily organisms; and, since the validity of this experience too is called in

42
question, I must not use it. Along with other Egos, /naturally, I rose all the formations pertaining
to sociality and culture. In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding
life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that
is……………And besides: If I abstained---as I was free to do and as I did----and still abstain
from every believing involved in or founded on sensuous experiencing, so that the being of the
experienced world remains unaccepted by me, still this abstaining is what it is; and it exists,
together with the whole stream of my experiencing life. Moreover, this life is continually there
for me”91. [Italics original].

Husserl has identified the fallacies committed by Descartes in a very subtle manner. According
to him, Descartes has not actually carried through the original radicalism of his ideas and he has
not actually subjected them to the epoche (or “bracket”). Moreover, “ What Descartes actually
brought to light was in a certain sense superficial, in spite of its originality and widespread
effects. In addition, it loses its value by Descartes’ own interpretation of it. Namely: in wonder
over this ego, first discovered in the epoche, he himself asks what kind of an ego it is, whether
the ego is the human being, the sensibly intuited human being of everyday life. Then he excludes
the living body---this, like the sensible world in general, falls under the epoche-- and thus the ego
becomes determined, for Descartes, as mens sive animus sive intellectus.”92[Italics original].

How has this fallacy misled the subsequent philosophers? Husserl replies in these words, “This
nearly ineradicable naïveté is also responsible for the fact that for centuries almost no one took
exception to the “obviousness” of the possibilities of inferences from the ego and its cognitive
life to an “outside”, and no one actually raised the question of whether, in respect to this
egological sphere of being, an “outside” can have any meaning at all---which of course turns this
ego into a paradox, the greatest of all enigmas”.93

“As we all know, he emphasizes the indubitability of that proposition and stresses the fact that “I
doubt” would also presuppose “I am”.94

Descartes also ignored the other egos around him, since his obtrusive interest in objectivism as
the reason of his self-misinterpretation. Therefore, Husserl concludes with conviction, “Thus, in
truth, there begins with Descartes a completely new manner of philosophizing which seeks its

43
ultimate foundations in the subjective. Thus Descartes, however, persists in pure objectivism in
spite of its subjective grounding was possible only through the fact that the mens, which at first
stood by itself in the epoche, and functioned as absolute ground of knowledge, grounding the
objective sciences (or universally speaking, Philosophy), appeared at the same time to be
grounded along with everything else as a legitimate subject matter within the sciences, i.e., in
psychology……..Even more inaccessible to him, and naturally so, was the consideration that the
ego as it is disclosed in the epoche, existing for itself, is as yet not at all, “an” ego which can
have other or many fellow egos outside itself”.95 [Italics original].

What has Husserl to offer, if he is not satisfied with the objectivism of Descartes and the very
foundations of science and philosophy of his own day? This is his Transcendental
Phenomenology which is markedly different from the Transcendental Idealism of Kant. What is
the essence of this Transcendentalism? Husserl himself explains, “Transcendentalism, on the
other hand says: the ontic meaning [Seinssinn] of the pre-given life-world is a subjective
structure [Gebilde], it is the achievement of experiencing, pre-scientific life. In this life the
meaning and the ontic validity [Seinsgeltung] of the world are built up---of that particular world,
that is, which is actually valid for the individual experience………………Yet one is threatened
with absurdity here, for it first appears obvious that this subjectivity is man, i.e., psychological
subjectivity. Mature transcendentalism protests against psychological idealism and, questioning
objective science as philosophy, claims to have initiated a completely new sort of procedure, the
transcendental. Past philosophy has not even the slightest conception of a subjectivism in this
transcendental style. Effective motives for the appropriate change of attitude were lacking,
although such a change might have been conceivable from the direction of ancient skepticism,
precisely through its anthropologistic relativism” 96. [Italics original].

Husserl is aware that his transcendental phenomenology may be mixed with philosophy of
Descartes, so he has explained the difference more than once and has insisted on it. In the Crisis,
he elaborates once again that his system is distinct from that of Descartes:

“It is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common misunderstanding, to seek to attack

transcendental phenomenology as “Cartesianism” as if its ego cogito were a premise or a set of
premises from which the rest of knowledge (whereby one naively speaks only of objective

44
knowledge) was to be deduced, absolutely “secured”. The point is not to secure objectivity but to
understand it. One must finally achieve the insight that no objective science, no matter how
exact, explains or even can explain anything in a serious sense. To deduce is not to explain. To
predict or to recognize the objective zones of composition of physical or chemical bodies and to
predict accordingly---all this explains nothing but is in need of explanation. The only true way to
explain it is to make transcendentally understandable. Everything objective demands to be
understood. Natural scientific knowing about nature thus gives us no truly explanatory, no
ultimate knowledge of nature because it does not investigate nature at all in the absolute
framework through which its actual and genuine being reveals its ontic meaning: thus natural
science never reaches this being thematically……….It is, after all, a matter of the most radical
and most profound self-reflection of accomplishing subjectivity.”97

Subjectivity, as discussed above as well, for Husserl, remained a life-long occupation, interest
and enigma. What is subjectivity? What is its relation with objectivity? How far is this reliable?
What is the status of the “other souls” residing around? How can one’s subjectivity have the
knowledge of the “other subjectivity”? These questions have given birth to the ideas of Life-
World and Inter-subjectivity, which are the hall-mark terms of Husserlian philosophy. It is high
time that we should have discussion about the mentioned ideas. Husserl has devoted the entire
Part V of Cartesian Meditation to this issue. The notion of subjectivity has influenced Hanafi,
perhaps most amongst the all phenomenological concepts. According to Husserl human
subjectivity is a paradox because man is simultaneously the subject as well as the object of the
world. The philosophical problem regarding subjectivity has been posited by Husserl in this
form: “How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole
world, constitute it as its intentional formation, one which has already become what it is and
continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of intentionally accomplishing
subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects accomplishing in cooperation, are themselves only a
partial formation within the total accomplishment?”98 He has further clarified this paradox in
these words, “The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and
thus itself too. What an absurdity! Or is this a paradox which can be sensibly resolved, even a
necessary one, arising necessarily out of the constant tension between the power of what is taken
for granted in the natural objective attitude (the power of common sense) and the opposed

45
attitude of the “disinterested spectator”? The latter is, to be sure, extremely difficult to carry out
in a radical way, since it is constantly threatened by misunderstandings”99.

Ultimately he has offered the solution of the paradox with the help of his phenomenological
method and the techniques of self-reflection, epoche and phenomenological reduction: “But are
the transcendental subjects, i.e., those functioning in the constitution of the world, human beings?
After all, the epoche has made them into “phenomena”, so that the philosopher within the epoche
has neither himself nor the others naively and straightforwardly valid as human beings but
precisely as “phenomena”, as poles for transcendental regressive inquiries”.100 [Italics original].

When the problem of subjectivity is once settled, according to which every individual is not a
mere human being or an ‘I’, rather a phenomenon and an ego-pole; the issue of Intersubjectivity
is easy to handle. Husserl affirms confidently in this context, “This does not mean that our earlier
insights, already expressed as transcendental ones, were illusions and that it is not justifiable to
speak, in spite of the above, of a transcendental Intersubjectivity constituting the world as ,
“ world for all”, in which I again appear, this time as “one” transcendental “I” among others,
whereby “we all” are taken as functioning transcendentally……….Only by starting from ego and
the system of its transcendental functions and accomplishments can we methodically exhibit
transcendental Intersubjectivity and its transcendental communalization, through which, in the
functioning system of ego-poles, the “world for all”, and for each subject as world for all, is
constituted……….in other words, that each human being “bears within himself a transcendental
‘I’”.101[Italics original].

Subjectivity leads towards Intersubjectivity, which has always remained a challenge for Husserl.
In a rather long paragraph he has elucidated this concept very comprehensively and with literary
beauty. It reads, “Living wakefully in the world we are constantly conscious of the world,
whether we pay attention to it or not, conscious of it as the horizon of our life, as a horizon of
“things” (real objects), of our actual and possible interests and activities. Always standing out
against the world-horizon is the horizon of our fellow men, whether there are any of them
present or not. Before even taking notice of it at all, we are conscious of the open horizon of our
fellow men with its limited nucleus of our neighbours, those known to us. We are thereby
coconscious of the men on our external horizon in each case as “others”; in each case “I” am

46
conscious of them as “my” others, as those with whom I can enter into actual and potential,
immediate and mediate relations of empathy; [this involves] a reciprocal “getting along” with
others; and on the basis of these relations I can deal with them, enter into particular modes of
community with them, and then know, in a habitual way, of my being so related. Like me, every
human being—and this is how he is understood by me and everyone else---has his fellow men
and, always counting himself, civilization in general, in which he knows himself to be living”.102

Now what is this “civilization in general”, in which everyone knows oneself to be living? Most
definitely it is the Life-world [Lebenswelt] with which we are going to deal before concluding
Husserl. Life –world is a self-evident or the given universe which may be commonly observed
by the subjects. Intersubjectivity presupposes a life-world which unfortunately finds no space in
the world of natural sciences; whereas the humanistic disciplines and philosophy have equally
ignored it. Husserl very regretfully observes in this regard, “But now we must note something of
the highest importance that occurred as early as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of the
mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is really given
through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable----our everyday life-world. This
substitution was promptly passed on to his successors, the physicists of all the succeeding
centuries”103.

He further notes in the same context, “Thus all the occasional (even “philosophical”) reflections
which go from technical [scientific] work back to its true meaning always stop at idealized
nature; they do not carry out the reflection radically, going back to the ultimate purpose which
the new science, together with the geometry which is inseparable from it, growing out of
prescientific life and its surrounding world, was from the beginning supposed to serve: a purpose
which necessarily lay in this prescientific life and was related to its life-world104.” [Italics
original].

For Husserl the life-world of men, animals and plants is entirely different from the world of
geometry and mathematics, but it has never been given that value and worth which it deserves,
rather it has been contemptuously ignored. He laments, “To it, the world of actually experiencing
intuition, belongs the form of space-time together with all the bodily [korperlich] shapes
incorporated in it; it is in this world that we ourselves live, in accord with our bodily[leiblich],

47
personal way of being. But here we find nothing of geometrical idealities, no geometrical space
or mathematical time with all their shapes105”.

Is there any way out of this rut? Can this vicious circle be broken? How can we retrieve the lost
or rather never discovered life-world? Husserl has confidence in his method, in his
transcendental phenomenology that it may connect once again the humanistic disciplines and
philosophy with the estranged life-world. He is certain that, “It will gradually become clearer,
and finally be completely clear, that the proper return to the naïveté of life---but in a reflection
which rises above this naïveté---is the only possible way to overcome the philosophical naïveté
which lies in the [supposedly] “scientific character of traditional objectivistic philosophy. This
will open the gates to the new dimension we have repeatedly referred to in advance.106”

If we conclude the above discussion we would arrive at the following results:

The purpose of Husserl’s critique is:

i- Teleological-historical reflection upon the origins of Europe’s critical scientific and

philosophical situation;
ii- Presentation of science as a historical process, involving its own sort of tradition, its
inherited way of looking at the world and its unquestioned assumptions about itself,
derived from the past;

iii- Suggesting a thematic direction which opens up depth problems quite unknown to
ordinary history, which in their own way, are undoubtedly historical problems;

However, this elementary review of Husserl’s critique of the ailing Europe, the defects of
existing philosophical systems, flaws of humanistic sciences and crisis faced by a crumbling
culture was indeed a prelude so as to enabling us to switch-over to his worthy disciple, that is,
Hassan Hanafi of Egypt who internalized the views of his intellectual mentor and very sincerely
and meticulously applied them to the Islamic culture and philosophical understanding of religion,
revelation, holy scripture and its interpretation. Hanafi identified the same malaise, crisis, chaos,
directionlessness, collapse, breakdown, degeneration, fatigue and intellectual debacle in the
world of Islam which Husserl could identify in the Europe of 20th century.

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Hanafi finds within Phenomenology a remarkable resemblance with Islam, which we are going
to discuss in detail. He says, “Phenomenology is practiced in contemporary Islamic thought as a
spontaneous discourse appealing to the hearts and the minds of the masses. Present challenges in
the Muslim world are more than theoretical issues, but they are predicaments, pains and sorrows
requiring a Muslim Max Scheler to analyze the experiences of decolonization, liberation,
unification, social justice, development, identity and mass mobilization. Phenomenology became
in the reformist movement a popular discourse, a motivation for action, in order to transform a
neutral consciousness to a positional consciousness. Mohammad Iqbal, the Indo-Pakistani
philosopher and poet analyzed Islam in the individual and in history as a living experience. He
discovered, following the mystics the world of subjectivity. Khudi a term shares the same root
with the term Khuda. Man and God, are both subjectivity, universal and normative.”107

Hanafi further explains the relationship of Islam with phenomenology in the following words,
“Phenomenology in Islam does not only mean a survey of phenomenological studies in the
Muslim world: Translations, dissertations of books on Husserl and his disciples, the founders of
phenomenological ontology and applied phenomenology, but it means also the spontaneous birth
of phenomenology in each culture passing through the same circumstances as in western
contemporary philosophy. Phenomenology is a natural outcome of every culture threatened by a
bifurcation between Rationalism and Empiricism, between formalism and materialism and to
find a third way in a certain philosophy of life.

It also does not mean the accidental combination of some western philosophers, such as Henri
Corbin, between the two fields of expertise, Islam specially Islamism, an esoteric Batiniy, and
Hermeneutics especially Heidegger, finding himself as an expert-bridge between esoteric Islam
and phenomenological ontology, between Mysticism and Hermeneutics, adding a third
component from Jung’s Archetypes as a co-director of Oranos. The analysis of daily experience
is not only in Islamism or Mysticism but in other Islamic disciplines such as methodology of
Jurisprudence “Ilm Usul al-fiqh”.”108

Hanafi’s comparison of Qur’an/Islam with Phenomenology is amazing and makes an interesting

and illuminating reading. This passage is especially note-worthy, “The Qur’an, the first source of
Islam analyses human and social phenomena as Lebenswelt. The existence of God, the creation

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of the world and the immortality of the soul, the three major articles of faith in Abrahamic
religions are described as living experiences, as motivation for human praxis and foundations of
the good deeds. They are not dogmatic formal creed or material facts. Both levels are put
between brackets under the epoche. God is in the self, Gnwthi sauton of Socrates, In te rede
homine habitat veritas of Augustine. The world is felt as significance, as an eschatological sign
as described in Der Urspung der welt. History of the prophets is a lesson of piety and victory, an
analysis of the past as a lesson for the present in preparation of the future, from retention to
tension to pretension, the analysis of internal feeling of time. 109 Essences are universal but at the
same time they are real, implemented in human praxis. In Jurisprudence Reason can understand
reality. Vernunft and Virklichkeit are similar to subject and object. The Qur’an uses sometimes a
language written by Husserl himself. When Moses’ mother put her son in the box in water her
consciousness Fu’ad became empty, a distinction between empty and filled Bewusstsein. When
Abraham came down to Mekka finding no sustenance he prayed to God to make people incline
to his posterity certain kind of social intentionality. Invocation is Intentionality towards God.
Revelation itself is a Divine Intentionality towards man as well as a historical Intentionality
towards perfection as Lessing described in Der Erziehung des Menschlechen Geschlechts.
Certainty and doubt in faith, hope and despair in action, success and failure in endeavours are
living experiences described in Qur’an in a figurative speech to impress and to incite
imagination.”110

Hanafi narrates the history of link between phenomenology and Islam in a very effective and
interesting way. It is pertinent to note that he has mentioned here Iqbal once again and as per his
statement he finds great similarities between Iqbal’s views and phenomenology. “In
contemporary Islamic philosophy the first Islamic reading of Transcendental Philosophy was
done by Osman Amin in his famous work al-Juwaniya which means literally interiority 111.
There is no difference between Islamic classical philosophy by al-Farabi and al-Ghazali and
Islamic reformers such as Iqbal, al-Afghani, M. Abdou, al-Kawakibi, M. Abd-Razik, al-Aqqad
from one side and Cartesian and transcendental philosophy from other side. Al-Juwaniya is an
Arabic translation of “Transcendental” by Kant. The opposition between Juwani and Barrani is
similar to the opposition between Transcendental and Transcendent by Kant. Osman Amin did
not go further from Kant and Fichte to Husserl and his disciples. His knowledge was limited to

50
modern philosophy without being extended to contemporary philosophy. He was fond of the
clarity and simplicity of the French style more than the German obscure and complex one. He
read Kant through Goublot’s “The Philosophy of Kant”, which he translated into Arabic. He was
Cartesian more than Kantian”112.

The second such effort, that is, of bringing Islam and phenomenology closer was made by Hanafi
himself which was far more forceful and effective than the first one. In his own words, he
describes, “The second effort to make an Islamic reading of Phenomenology and
phenomenological reading of Islam is his disciple Hassan Hanafi’s in his French youth triology,
“Les methods d’exeges”, essai de reconstruction de la science des fondements de la
comprehension “Ilm Usul al fiqh”; “L’exegese de la phenomenology”, l’etat actuel de la
method phenomenologigne et son application au phenomena religieux; “ La phenomenology de
l’Exeges”, essai d’une hermeneatigne existentielle a partir du Nouvean Testament”.113

This, project, however, proved a land-mark and gradually became a life-long aim and objective
for Hanafi who devoted himself for the reformulation, re-description and reinterpretation of the
Islamic thought and disciplines. According to Hanafi, this triology has become a whole project at
three fronts:

First, the reconstruction of classical Islamic disciplines including i- Theology, ii- Philosophy, iii-
Mysticism and iv- Scriptural Subjects (Qur’an, Hadith, Tafsir, Sira, Fiqh) by using the
phenomenological method of Husserl which he implied in the Crisis of European Sciences.

Second, the phenomenological description of the development and the structure of European
consciousness and analyzing its sources, that is, the Greco-Roman, the Judeo-Christian and the
Pagan-Popular along with its development from the classical to the medieval to the modern
phase. Parallel to it the corresponding phases of Islamic consciousness were also identified as:
i-Classical Period, ii- Medieval Scholasticism and iii- Ottoman Period; whereas Post-modernistic
trends in the Western philosophy correlate with the Islamic upsergence in the Muslim World.

Third, the practical application of the Islamic reading of phenomenology and phenomenological
reading of Islam; the discourse was not confined to the academic and theoretical levels but was
applied to the socio-political issues in the manner of Max Scheler114.

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Another important work of Hanafi, Contemporary Issues, deals with the practical issues like
vocation of thinking, the role of thinker in the developed countries, authenticity, tradition and
modernity, culture and cultural dialogue, national character, liberation theology, dogma and
revolution, socialism and capitalism, peoples and institutions, popular proverbs and mass culture,
socio-political changes, disgust, indifference, dialogue, ideologies, fundamentalism and
secularism, violence and non-violence and conservatism and liberalism etcetera. These and other
allied topics paved the way for social phenomenology applied on the current situation of the
Muslim World.115

Most of the mentioned topics above will be discussed in detail under the Section C of this
chapter wherein we shall deal with the Hanafi’s position regarding Ijtehad and reinterpretation of
the holy text. Why did Hanafi feel the need of reconstructing the classical disciplines? It would
be beneficial to listen from him directly. Hanafi has named this process as, “Alternative Thinking
in Cultural Cycles”. (The very phrase reconstruction reveals a strong influence of Iqbal). The
reasons enumerated by him are as under:

a- According to Hanafi, in the last two centuries, translation work was done more in the
West, rather than in the East, which has diverted cultural world-view of Islam more
toward the West. Hence fundamentalism has grown as a reaction against this
Westernization. Therefore, a second cycle of cultural dialogue is essential with the world
to arrest the violent and aggressive reaction in the Muslim World. For this purpose it is
imperative that the classical Islamic disciplines are reconstructed in accordance with the
spirit of the (modern) age.

b- As per Hanafi, the Tradition includes Scriptural Sciences which solely depend on
scripture(s) as data and as methods of understanding. They are five: i- Qur’an, ii- Hadith,
iii- Tafsir, iv- Sira (t) and v-Fiqh. Unfortunately these were left as these were in the past
without any use of reason. Even relevant topics useful to modern times are not seen such
as reality or space in Asbab al-Nazul, time and progress in al- Naskh wa al- Mansukh.
Classical Hadith was more oriented towards the critique of narratives (Sanad) rather
than on the critique of the text (Matan). Tafsir is still piecemeal and longitudinal rather
115
Ibid.

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 than thematically and in width. Sira personifies the Message (of the Prophet) to the point
of falling into the personality cult with huge amplification of the image by extreme
veneration and glorification. Fiqh is still giving absolute priority to rituals (Ibadat) than
on the social relations (Mu’amalat). Therefore, Scriptural Disciplines need to be
reconstructed to bring them at par with the demands of modern circumstances. New
theological innovations, philosophical approaches, jurisprudential initiatives and mystical
outlooks will have to be conceived. Changing the old language with the modern one and
the levels of analysis and focus are necessary.

c- Traditional parlance has to be exchanged with the contemporary lexicon. Theological,

dogmatic, historical, legal and abstract terms are to be replaced with the human, open,
natural and concrete terms. Since if we want a dialogue with the West, we will have to
adapt ourselves to the modern idiom understandable by all. There are some terms which
have lost their previous meaning and have opted for the new ones. For instance, freedom
now does not mean liberation from slavery of an owner, now it stands for the access to
information, right to express, move, believe and choose etcetera. Similarly some new
phrases have been added to dictionary, which were previously non-existent, such as,
human rights, democracy, parliament, national liberation and mass-culture. Some terms
have either become obsolete or quite vague and ambiguous like Jihad, Dar-al-Harb and
Dar-al-Islam. These need either complete review or at least reinterpretation in terms of
resistance against foreign occupation, war of liberation and colonization.

d- It is a must now to switch over from the Theocerntrism to Anthropocentrism, from

Historicism to Humanism, from Dogmatism to Criticism and from Literalism to
Hermeneutics. This can be done in four Classical Scriptural Sciences, that is, i- Theology,
ii-Philosophy, iii- Jurisprudence and iv- Mysticism, opines Hanafi.116

For the scarcity of time at our disposal, we may not cover all the four above mentioned
Scriptural Sciences; thus, this study will confine itself to the detailed description of
Jurisprudence and Mysticism only. It is interesting to note that Hanafi himself has also
chosen the same two for the application of phenomenology, “Of these four rational Islamic

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 disciplines, ilm usul al-fiqh and Sufism hold the greatest potential for being turned into this
exact science because---and here Hanafi reiterated the argument made in the Method of
Exegesis---they represent methods not theories, as in the case of other two disciplines,
theology and philosophy”117. Moreover, ilm usul al-fiqh is the principal discipline related to
the legislative needs of the Muslim community; hence it should be used as a method to study
the revelation with a teleological orientation towards the outward aspect of human reality.
Hanafi considers it a dire need of Muslim Ummah in the present situation. The Muslim
World needs a descending revelation into the world than the upward movement towards
God.118 Sufism is dear to Hanafi, since it is a discipline wherein consciousness finds its most
articulate practical manifestations.

In the pages to follow we would see how Hanafi has applied phenomenological method on
these disciplines and how has he tried to reconstruct them in the light of Husserlian
principles. In the course of this we will come across some other terms of Phenomenology,
hitherto not-introduced.

 Application of Phenomenological Method on Jurisprudence(Fiqh)

Husserl always stood a North Star for Hanafi, from whom he received light and guidance. Hanafi
identified the great affinity between his Islamic method and that of Husserl’s Transcendental
Phenomenology. For Hanafi it is such an appropriate method, which may render following
services in excellent manner:

 Points to the way forward for religious studies and, in particular; exegesis;
 Can easily dissect history as the embodiment of the stumbling block that is dogmatic
theology;
 Possesses the necessary apparatus for the linguistic investigations needed for rigorous
interpretation of texts.119

Fiqh or Jurisprudence is the very first Islamic discipline which attracted Hanafi’s attention to
apply phenomenological method on and to make it an anthropocentric science of man from a
theocentric science of God. The reason for this choice he has thoroughly explained in his several
works. We would summarize them here in the words of a scholar, “Ilm Usul al-Fiqh for Hanafi

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is the supreme and most unique science that Islamic civilization ever produced. As an ilm al-
tanzil (a science that is capable of transforming revelation into inductive and experimental
methods), it is a practical science.

Having as its aim the protection of human interests it grounds itself on both rational istidlal
(demonstration) and experimental induction, within which human efforts (Ijtehad) find a wide
field of play. In contrast to mysticism (ilm al-Tasawwuf) for instance, usul al-fiqh accepts neither
illuminating concepts, since it basis itself on causation (ta’lil), nor theoretical beliefs since it sees
Allah as merely the lawgiver”.120

The PhD thesis of Hanafi consisting of three parts is his first attempt in this great experience.
The three parts have been translated into English with the following titles:

i- The Method of Exegesis;

ii- The Exegesis of Phenomenology;
iii- The Phenomenology of Exegesis.

Hanafi gave his thesis a subtitle, ‘La Science des Fondements de la comprehension “Ilm Usul al-
Fiqh”’ which indicates how transposition is made operational in the concrete sense. 121 Hanafi has
explained himself why has he translated the “ilm usul-al-fiqh” as “the science of the foundations
of understanding”? The reason is that asl (plural: usul) means root or foundation in Arabic on
which an edifice of the knowledge stands firmly. Hence foundation may be appreciated as the
reason of being or existence of something. While in the case of fiqh, this represents human
actions specially pertaining to the acts of judgment and decision-making. The second meaning it
gives is that of principle, which according to Hanafi stands at par with deductive reasoning.
Thirdly it may refer to revealed data as well which provides the material for analysis in Hanafi’s
project. Hanafi offers three variant translations for fiqh: i- Anonical Methodology, ii-
Methodology of Jurisprudence and iii- Understanding. Understanding? Such a far-fetched
meaning!!! Hanafi is aware of his daring venture, but he is satisfied because he is able to
correlate Fiqh with understanding in following three senses:

Understanding in exegesis means to become consciously aware of acts of judgments (1), made
through reasoning (2), on the basis of revealed source of knowledge (3), [……] similar to how

55
these aspects appear in the three different senses of the term ‘Asl’ as foundation, principle or as
source.122

Carool Kersten has noted that, “Conceived as a philosophical investigation, Hanafi implemented
his alternative method of analysis in an abstract fashion, but using experimental references that
were clearly inspired by Iqbal. As the point of departure for this new methodology, experience is
defined as:

A[n] event not in the sense of its material extensity but rather as psychological intensity. The
world is regarded [in terms of] conscious impressions not juxtaposed events. Experience is not
some kind of sensibility which determines the relation between an object and the senses but as a
concrete situation in everyday life in which consciousness is put to the test123.

Hanafi by converting the sacred disciplines from theocentric to anthropocentric has opted from
an ‘ascending inductive method’ and has given up his ‘descending deductive method’. This is a
major paradigm shift in his outlook. Again the forerunner is Iqbal who declared the birth of
Islam as the birth of Inductive intellect124.

The passage of Hanafi quoted enough is full reflection of Iqbal. A comparison here will not be
out of context to show that Husserl, Iqbal and Hanafi are the beads of the same string. Iqbal
writes in the similar tone, “The true infinity does not mean infinite extension which cannot be
conceived without embracing all available finite extensions. Its nature consists in intensity and
not in extensity………Extensively regarded I am absorbed by the spatio-temporal order to which
I belong. Intensively regarded I consider the same spatio-temporal order as a confronting ‘other’
wholly alien to me”.125

Towards consciousness, Iqbal holds similar views, “Yet the interpretation of the conscious
experience is the only road by which we can reach the ego……Consciousness is something
single, presupposed in all mental life…….Inner experience is the ego at work……The life of the

122
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, Pp. 131-132.
123
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Din wa’l- Thawra fi Misr 1952-1981, Vol. VI, Madbouli, Cairo, 1989, P.223.
124
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.101.
125
Ibid, P. 94.

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ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment
invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it
as directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience.”126

Husserl is not very different from Iqbal when he says, “Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos
of intentional processes. Moreover, it is not a chaos of types of constitution, each organized in
itself by its relation to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other words: The allness of
objects and types of objects conceivable for me---transcendentally speaking: for me as
transcendental ego ----is no chaos; and correlatively the allness of the types of objects, is not a
chaos either: noetically and noematically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect
of their possible synthesis”.127

We can easily assess here and agree with Hanafi that Iqbal’s Ego (Khudi) and Husserl’s
Transcendental Subjectivity are, nevertheless, one and the same entities.

In the second lecture of Reconstruction, Iqbal has asserted, “on the analogy of our inner
experience, then, conscious existence means life in time.128”

Compare it with the result Husserl has drawn in the Second Meditation of the Cartesian
Meditations, “The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other
syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all embracing consciousness of internal time.” [Italics
original].129

After this brief comparative analysis we come back towards the original discussion, that is, of
Hanafi’s study of the understanding of foundational principles (usul al- fiqh) in the light of the
phenomenological method. We have seen that eventually Hanafi turned towards the inductive
method; using Iqbal’s phraseology again, he concentrates now more on “real”, “particular” and
“concrete” instead of the “ideal”,“ general” and “abstract” in the Classical sense and spirit. This
approach will naturally divert one to the “practical lived experience” from the plane of the
supernatural and mysterious. This will make religion and its paraphernalia tangible, factual,
substantial and corporeal. This will definitely dispel the aura of the inexplicable, which had
encircled the religion and has presented it as something un-earthly and extra-human.

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In The Method of Exegesis, Hanafi has used Hermeneutics as a practical ‘this-worldly’ method.
And, all the other methods used, serve the same purpose: to alter ‘that-worldly’ into ‘this-
worldly’, ‘natural’ and ‘human’. Hanafi has so expressed it, ‘The method of reflective analysis of
everyday experience will find another battlefield. Every transcendent reality becomes immanent
reality. The transcendent going by the name of God becomes immanent in human consciousness.
The exterior becomes interior. The ‘descending’---- the material fact rises up to consciousness.
Everything becomes human. Man exists the moment he becomes conscious of himself.”130 [Italics
added].

Have you noticed Iqbal smiling out of this passage? If not, have a look on the following quote
from the third lecture of the Reconstruction, and you will find how close Hanafi and Iqbal are in
their respective use of Hermeneutics and other methods of interpretation.

“……..the Quranic legend of the Fall has nothing to do with the first appearance of man on this
planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man’s rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to
the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience. The Fall does not
mean any moral depravity; it is man’s transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of
self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a throb of personal causality
in one’s own being.”131 [Italics added].

It shows that for both Iqbal and Hanafi, human consciousness is the criterion of everything. Even
human existence depends on consciousness, without which man was/is virtually non-existent.
Both are the firm believers of subjectivity.

It is pertinent to mention here that Islam’s own approach is, nonetheless, anthropocentric. The
true religion is a genuine lived-experience which takes place in the inter-subjective Life-world.
That is why a prophet sent to any people always belongs to the same community and is never a
foreigner; he speaks the local language. The entire revealed literature is in the languages in
vogue in a particular community. It corresponds with the contemporary idiom. When Allah’s
prophet says, “I am a human like you” he is affirming that religion is anthropocentric and not
theocentric or supernatural; otherwise Allah might have appointed some extra-terrestrial beings
as his messengers. Allah, Himself has used anthropomorphic symbols for His Glorious Self, only

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to make the revealed material “human-friendly”, despite the fact that He is beyond any
comparison with any creature including humans.

Hanafi conceives God inside the human society, within the world and in the history. According
to him, “A revolutionary theology conceives God inside the world inside history, between the
masses and for the people. God is not outside but inside. He is not transcendent but immanent.
He is not unseen, untouchable, intangible, unknown, but he is known, near and familiar.”
132
[Italics added].

Before discussing it in detail, another very important concept by Hanafi needs to be brought into
notice. What happens when the Theology is converted into Anthropology? When God is made
immanent? The answer is simple: the vertical, hierarchical and top-down concept of the world is
changed into horizontal, linear and equal. Hanafi writes, “A revolutionary theology gets rid of
this hierarchical concept of the world and chooses a linear concept. All realities are on the same
level. No top and no base, no higher and no lower.”133 [Italics added].

Here once again Hanafi and Iqbal are standing in the same row, as both believe in the
immanence of God, negate hierarchies and come very close to Pantheism. This was discussed in
detail with reference to Iqbal in Section A of this chapter; however, a brief discussion here will
be interesting. Iqbal also does not believe in any hierarchical system and for him the idea of
finality of prophethood bears great significance. In the fifth lecture of the Reconstruction, “The
Spirit of Muslim Culture”, he writes, “In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the
need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in
leading strings; that, in order to achieve full self-consciousness, man must finally be thrown to
his own resources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant
appeal to reason and experience in Qur’an, and the emphasis it lays on Nature and History as
sources of human knowledge, are different aspects of the same finality.”134

But, does this linear concept of the world necessarily involve immanence of God and
subsequently pantheism too? (See the italicized lines above). Hanafi’s answer is in clear-cut
affirmation, as he has categorically asserted in one of the chapters (Religious Change and
Cultural Domination) of his earlier work, Religious Dialogue and Revolution, “From Theos to

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Pantheos: Religious societies in normal situations believe in Theos, high and transcendent. God
is per se by opposition to every other thing which is per aliud. The universe is cut into two
pieces: the summit and the base. The first is absolutely positive, and the second is absolutely
negative. In case of danger this duality is shaken. Once the world which is the negative side of
Theos is under domination negativity switches to positivity. The base shares the positivity of its
summit. Therefore, the unity between both is realized. Theos becomes Pantheos. The
revolutionary feels his aim everywhere. The ideal becomes real and the real becomes ideal. That
is why all revolutionary ideologies are of monistic type.”135 [Emphasis original].

Here Hanafi is more outspoken than Iqbal, whose pantheism is more or less symbolic; moreover,
he has never declared it so loudly. Here after this brief digression we turn back again to
phenomenology and its application on the foundational principles of Fiqh or Jurisprudence.

Now we have revealed data as the primary material available from Divine source, what we have
to do with it in order to humanize it? We, the human beings are the beings-in-the-world, who
have to convert this historical consciousness (revealed information) into the eidetic and active
consciousness. There are two major and important problems involved here:

i- Revelation as a lived experience was a privilege of the Prophet (PBUH) alone, how
can we internalize or appreciate this experience?
ii- How to transmit the revealed data across time (and in various cultures and contexts)?

Here again Hanafi has taken a bold step and has expressed his independence of thought in
answering the first question. It is going to be explained here: The traditional discipline of
Jurisprudence or Fiqh is based on the four conventional sources or authorities, viz,

The Qur’an;
The Traditions of the Prophet(PBUH);
Ijma (consensus of the scholars or Ummah);
Ijtehad (independent reasoning).

However, if we want to transform, ilm usul al-fiqh from a mere juristic tool into a philosophical
discipline subject to phenomenological review, its archaic terminology must be revolutionized.

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Hanafi himself has rendered this service and renamed the sources using his favourite
methodology of transposition. His new scheme of titles is as follows:

 Qur’an----Anonymous Experience;
 Tradition or Sunnah----Privileged Experience;
 Ijma----Intersubjective Experience;
 Ijtehad---- Individual Experience.

The narrators and interpreters of these sources are called in Arabic as Ravi, Mufassir and
Mukallaf or Mujtahid. 136

However, transcending the culturally specific connotations of Islamic dogma, law and theology,
these bold transmutations are reminiscent of Iqbal’s rereading of Ijtehad as the ‘principle of
movement in Islam’.137

Hanafi, nevertheless, entered here in the realm of Hermeneutics; however, for him the domain of
this field of study is far wider than merely commenting on the language. For Hanafi, the function
of Hermeneutics is to connect the language and words with their referential connections, that is,
the things-in-themselves. The method appears subjective in nature but Hanafi is sure that its
objectivity may be retained through Intersubjectivity or the cognitive role played by the
‘other’.138

In order to escape solipsism, Hanafi relies once more on Iqbal, whose notion of Khudi, that is,
‘ego’ or ‘selfhood’ comes to his rescue. As per interpretation of Hanafi, Khudi is “no other
subjectivity ‘as the centre of the world [and] nodal point of inter-subjectivity or community”. 139
Hermeneutics enables us to share the lived experience of the revealed data or historical
consciousness and we are able to understand and appreciate it with the help of eidetic and active
consciousness.

The second question was related to the mechanism associated with transmission of this revealed
date across the time, to break its spatio-temporal and socio-cultural boundaries; in the other
words to make the particular universal? To answer this difficult and highly technical question,
Hanafi relies on another technique of phenomenology, that is, reduction, bracketing or

61
suspension of judgment (epoche). This is the method, which according to Hanafi transforms the
religion into a rigorous human science and makes the temporal, timeless. How to apply this
technique, let us see in the words of Hanafi himself, “The reduction of religious matters is
constituted by the reduction of the text outside its historical context, that is to say, by setting
aside all circumstances in which the text finds itself, or by leaving aside any consideration of the
spatio-temporal determinations that relate a text to history.140”

In the words of Paul Ricoeur “This procedure enables consciousness to shed its original naïveté,
called natural attitude by Husserl, allowing it to discover its own capacity of giving sense to what
was previously taken as merely given” 141. Hence we may say that, “reduction removes a
limitation, and thus frees the whole sweep of consciousness”.142

Before concluding our discussion on the application of phenomenological method and Fiqh; a
few words about another phenomenologist who had marked impact on Hanafi. He is Max
Scheler, whose epistemology helped him to taking modern philosophy back into battle against
dogmatic theology. Hanafi has very often quoted and named Max Scheler with extreme affection
and reverence. His overall influence on Hanafi is profound, but it is his concept of ‘love’ which
has moved him most intellectually as well as emotionally. Perhaps Hanafi could see or find his
Muslim Max Scheler in the form of Iqbal, as the concept of ‘love’ in Scheler bears close affinity with the
Ishq (love) in the system of Iqbal. However, Iqbal’s inspiration regarding this concept had come from
mystic poet Jalal al-Din Rumi of Iran.

As per Scheler’s description, Phenomenology is an engagement of phenomena, while

simultaneously a waiting for its self-given-ness; it is not a methodical procedure of observation
as if its object is stationary. Thus, the particular attitude (Geisteshaltung) of the philosopher is
fundamental and decisive for the disclosure, or seeing, of phenomenological facts. This attitude
is fundamentally a moral one, where the strength of philosophical inquiry rests upon the basis of
love. Scheler describes the essence of philosophical thinking as "a love-determined movement of
the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all
possibles." 143 [Italics added].

Like Iqbal, Scheler too, believes that only when reason and logic have behind them the
movement of love and the proper moral preconditions, one can achieve philosophical

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knowledge.144 Love is likewise important insofar as its essence is the condition for the possibility
of the given-ness of value-objects and especially the given-ness of an object in terms of its
highest possible value. Love is the movement which "brings about the continuous emergence of
ever-higher value in the object--just as if it was streaming out from the object of its own accord,
without any sort of exertion...on the part of the lover. ...true love opens our spiritual eyes to ever-
higher values in the object loved."145 Iqbal also endured the throes of colonization, subjugation,
identity-crisis, social deprivation and political discrimination. He could see the solace, relief and
palliative of these woes of the nation in the soothing balm of love. Moreover, on the plane of
metaphysics, it is only the love which may convert a superior, strict, cold and transcendental
Deity into a loving, caring, warm and immanent God.

An instance of the same from Bergson will strengthen the case under discussion. He writes in the
third chapter of his famous work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, “Beings have been
called into existence who were destined to love and be loved, since creative energy is to be
defined as love. Distinct from God, Who is this energy itself, they could spring into being only in
a universe, and therefore the universe sprang into being”146.

This shows that according to Bergson, love is the motive force behind the entire creation. Here
we find again Iqbal, Hanafi, Bergson and Scheler at the same intellectual wavelength.

Now it is a high time to move towards the next part, that is the application of phenomenological
method on mysticism; however, before that an evaluation of the enormous work of Hanafi will
be quite appropriate. His efforts have been held in high esteem by many contemporary
philosophers, thinkers, scholars and critics. Brunschvig describes the reworking of a traditional
Islamic discipline by Hanafi as a great adventure [and] total reinterpretation of traditional usul
al-fiqh. It seeks not to just revive or modernize some of its concepts in the manner of Abduh or
Iqbal but attempts a complete rethinking, turning the book into yet another legal or sociological
study but the work of a well-versed philosopher147.

Michel Allard, in a review of The Method of Exegesis, has commented, “…..that nobody with an
interest in modern Islam could dispense with reading Hanafi’s book”.148

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With this brief discussion on phenomenological review of Jurisprudence, we now move to
Mysticism to see how Hanafi has interpreted the same in the phenomenological idiom.

 Application of Phenomenological Method on Mysticism(Tasawwuf)

Hanafi has very meticulously and methodically traced similarities between Phenomenology,
Mysticism and Islam. As a case study, he has selected eminent Iranian Sufi-Scholar Sadr-al-Din
Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Yahya Qawami Shirazi, (1571-1636) better known as Mulla Sadra.
His comparison of Sadra with Husserl makes a very interesting reading. Sadra was given the title
Sadr al- Muta’ allihin (Master of Theories) because of his multidimensional interests and skills
in Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism. His works are a beautiful blend of all the three,
however; finally he concentrated more on Theosophy. He also wrote the spiritual exegesis of
Qur’an. Being a noted representative of the famous, “School of Isfahan”, he made valuable
contribution to the promotion and revitalization of rationalism in Iran and particularly Shiraz. He
was an expert and authority on Illuminist Thought of Suhrawardi.

In 1602, he retreated to a small village outside the holy city of Qom, of which the name was
Kahak. Here he lived for five years in seclusion (Khalwat) and composed his major
philosophical, theological and mystical works. These included his masterpiece al-Hikmat al-
Muta’aliya fil Asfar al-‘aqliyyat al-arba’a, which means Transcendental Wisdom of the Four
Journeys of the Reason/Intellect. This work is popularly known as Asfar al-Arba’a (Four
Journeys). Hanafi has compared Husserl and Sadra and used the Four Journeys as a specimen.
This may also be treated as a Theosophical work.

Before moving to Sadra particularly, let us have a brief glance, how does Hanafi find Mysticism
in line with phenomenology generally. As we know in Mysticism, heart and feelings bear a
special significance. The mystic relies more on the testimony of heart as compared to reason.
Iqbal has also mentioned the same in the first lecture of the Reconstruction, “Knowledge and
Religious Experience” in the following words, “The ‘heart’ is a kind of inner intuition or insight
which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact

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with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is according to Qur’an,
something which ‘sees’ and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false.”149

Hanafi asserts the same and in his semantic analysis of some terms, as he writes, “The self Nafs
is a prominent theme in the Qur’an. It has several synonyms such as soul, Ruh, heart, Qalb
consciousness Fou’ad and chest Sadr. All terms share the same semantic field, the internal
world versus external world, the world of perception, knowledge, motivations, desire, hope, the
intercession between the external world and the superior world………Ikhwan al-Safa made the
self a special and independent fourth part in their system called al-Nafsaniyat wa al ‘Aqliyyat
putting together self and Reason. In contemporary Islamic thought, the self is a central topic in
modern poetry such as that of Mohammad Iqbal’s, the secret of the self, Asrar Khudi. In Urdu,
God Khuda and the self Khudi are from the same root. Western philosophy from Descartes’
Cogito to Husserl’s Cogitatum through Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Max
Scheler, E. Mounier, Bergson and J. Royce crystallized in transcendental philosophy is simply a
reconfirmation of the Islamic view on the self”.150

He further elaborates this similarity between words, phrases and philosophical traditions in the
same vein, “Fou’ad which means consciousness is linked to senses such as audition and sight as
an internal intention. Sometimes it is by itself an organ of sight, external and internal like a
vision. It means also moral consciousness. When a mother loses her child her consciousness
becomes empty like Moses’ mother leaving Moses in the Nile. Qalb, which means heart, refers
to the internal world as awareness, awakening and the condition of external perception. Sadr
means chest, the place of the heart, a spatial metaphor. Rouh, soul is the principle of life in
relation to the body, a secret and a challenge to human knowledge.”151

Hanafi compares these words and their meanings in the framework of various languages and
finds amazing similarities in them. For instance, “The Hebrew and Greek terms belong to the
same semantic field, Nefesh, Ruah in Hebrew and Psyche, Pneumena in Greek. Also in French
and German, the two terms, Seele and Geist, Ame and Esprit belong to the same semantic field.
Nafs in Arabic and Nephesh (or Nefesh) in Hebrew refer to acquiring knowledge from the verb
Naqash in Hebrew which means print or scribe, while the Arabic term Rooh or the Hebrew
Ruah are derived from the same root Ruh as wind”152.

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What does Hanafi want to show or prove by this semantic analysis and why are we focusing on
these instead of moving directly to Sadra and phenomenology? Indeed Hanafi is emphasizing on
the commonness among philosophy, language and the mystic tendencies of man. For him all
these are universal human assets and bear a strong link with phenomenological approach. He has
explained it himself as, “The relevance of this grammatical analysis is the communication in the
internal world between individuals and groups, the Intersubjective experience ………..the
theoretical and practical dimensions of the self are communicative, interchangeable,
transferable from a person to another and a generation to another to bridge solitude and
generation gap for the sake of mutual and intergenerationally response and responsibility”.153
[Italics added].

Hanafi discovers the same Intersubjective, interchangeable and transferable relation between
Husserl and Sadra or between phenomenology and Mysticism/Theosophy. Contrary to Fiqh,
Hanafi has kept this comparison sufficiently simple.

In the prelude he remarks, “The comparison is based mostly on the major works of Husserl while
in the case of Mulla Sadra is based only on “Transcendental Wisdom” the most systematic work
on theosophy. His other works are details or application of his systematic philosophy. Only
primary sources are used and not the secondary literature. Only Husserl’s works are mentioned
in general and as motivation and only al-Asfar.”154.

Without doubt, the Asfar is the most important work of the Sadrean corpus in which every
single problem of traditional philosophy is addressed from the point of view of Sadra’s
transcendent wisdom. Sadra structures the entire Asfar according to the four journeys of the
soul in the path of spiritual realization. The first journey is from the world of creation to the
Truth and/or Creator (min al-khalq ila’l-haqq) where Sadra addresses the questions of
metaphysics and ontology known also under the rubric of ‘general principles’ (al-umur
al-‘ammah) or ‘divine science in its general sense’ (al-’ilm al-ilahi bi’l-ma’na al-a‘am). It is
in this part of the Asfar that Sadra deals with the ontological foundations of his system
including such issues as the meaning of philosophy, being (wujud) and its primacy (asalah)
over quiddity (mahiyyah), gradation of being (tashkik al-wujud), mental existence (al-wujud
al-dhihni), Platonic Forms (al-muthul al-aflatuniyyah), causality, substantial movement,

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time, temporal origination of the world, the intellect, and the unification of the intellect with
the intelligible. The second journey is from the Truth to the Truth by the Truth (min al-haqq
ila’l-haqq bi’l-haqq).

In the second journey, we find a full account of Sadra’s natural philosophy and his critique
of the ten Aristotelian categories. Among the issues discussed extensively are the categories,
substance and accidents, how physical entities come to exist, hylé and its philosophical
significance, matter and form (hylomorphism), natural forms, and the roots of the hierarchy
of the physical order.

The third journey is from the Truth to the world of creation with the Truth (min al-haqq
ila’l-khalq bi’l-haqq) where Sadra goes into his reconstruction of theology, which is
discussed under the name of ‘metaphysics’ or ‘divine science in its particular sense’ (al-‘ilm
al-ilahi bi’l-ma’na’l-akhass). It is in this section of the Asfar that the theological dimension
of Sadra’s thought and his relentless attacks on the theologians (mutakallimun) come to the
fore. Among the issues Sadra addresses are the unity and existence of God and the previous
kalam proofs given of it, the ontological simplicity of the Necessary Being, the Names and
Qualities of God, God’s knowledge of the world, His power, Divine providence, speech
(kalam) as a Divine quality, good and evil (theodicy), procession of the world of multiplicity
from the One, and the unity of philosophy (‘wisdom’, hikmah) and the Divine law
(shari’ah).155

The fourth and final journey is from the world of creation to the world of creation with the
Truth (min al-khalq ila’l-khalq bi’l-haqq) where the great chain of being is completed with
psychology, resurrection, and eschatology.

The concept of “journey” (safar) has two closely related meanings in Sadra’s thought. First,
the intellectual journey of the traveler (salik) comes to an end in the present and posthumous
state of human beings. Second, the material and spiritual journey of the order of existence,
which begins with the creation of the world and the reality of being, is brought to full
completion in its ultimate return to God. This part of the Asfar provides a thorough
investigation of traditional psychology with material culled from the Peripatetic psychology

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of Ibn Sina and the gnostic views of Ibn al-‘Arabi. As in the other parts of the Asfar, Sadra
presents a critical history of the ideas and theories on the human soul from the Greeks to the
Muslim philosophers and theologians. Among the issues discussed are the soul and its
states, various powers of the soul in its interaction with the physical and intelligible world,
sense perception, imagination (takhayyul) and the imaginal world (‘alam al-khayal), his
celebrated doctrine that the soul is bodily or material in its origination and spiritual in its
subsistence’ (jismaniyyat al-huduth ruhaniyyat al-baqa’), impossibility of the
transmigration of souls (tanasukh), spiritual and bodily resurrection, and the reality of
heaven and hell156.

After this introductory sketch of Four Journeys and Transcendental Wisdom, this study is in a
better position to present Hanafi’s comparison of it with phenomenology clearly and
unambiguously.

Hanafi says that there are three basic rules in phenomenological method, that is, i- Reduction, ii-
Constitution and iii-Clarification; while the journeys of transcendental wisdom are four as
described above. We have to examine which rule is applicable to which journey. Let us start
from Reduction.

i- Reduction: In Ideen I, Husserl has identified reduction as the first rule in

phenomenology. It is, according to Hanafi, is applicable on the second journey of
transcendental wisdom, that is, from Reality to Truth. Reduction means putting the
material between brackets, epoche to liberate it from the typical outlook, “in order to
free cognition from positivism and the material world and the horizontal passage from
Reality to Reality in favor of a vertical passage from Reality to Truth”. 157 The
reduction of the fact maintains the essence and the material reality are put outside the
attention of the consciousness. However, in transcendental wisdom, reason is capable
enough to appreciate reality. The subject can apprehend the object, but this
apprehension is not static rather dynamic one. Reason becomes one with the object in
a process of ideation as has been described by Max Scheler. The object is lived by the
subject and hence the Being becomes extensive as well as intensive.

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ii- Constitution: As per Ideen II, the second most important rule in phenomenology is
Konstitution. Constitution according to Husserl is correlation of the objects with the
consciousness. Constitution corresponds with the second ascendant passage of
transcendental wisdom from Reality to Truth. In phenomenology time is a pure
quality as conceived by Augustine and Bergson (will be discussed in detail with
reference to Iqbal). The world is created in the moment of being felt in the
consciousness. Husserl has described it in Ursprung der welt. In transcendental
wisdom, time is linked to cosmological time as it appears in the problems of eternity
and contingency. God is eternal while the world is created in time.

iii- Clarification: It is the third rule of phenomenology. Clarification is step by step

distinction between confused essences. Distinctions are also made to discover
different levels of Being, its structure and unity. It corresponds to the third passage of
transcendental wisdom from Truth to Truth to be sure of clarity and simplicity of the
meaning, free from confusion and complexity158.

Hanafi finds another similarity between phenomenology and transcendental wisdom, as for
him both are cultural as well as religious visions. Following is the brief narration of the both:

i- Phenomenology and Transcendental Wisdom as Cultural Visions: Hanafi

declares phenomenology as the accomplishment of transcendental philosophy since
Descartes and Kant, from Cogito to Cogitatum, from Ich denke to Sachen selbst. The
subject and object are two poles of the same consciousness, called Intentionality.
Intersubjective experience is not only a cognitive experience between two individual
consciousnesses but also an accumulative, cultural and historical consciousness the
description of its structure and development is as under:

I-The Origin
a- Greco-Roman origin;
b- Judeo-Christian origin;
c- European popular culture.

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 II- Point of Departure: Cartesian Cogito

a- Ascendant line: Le rationalism;

b- Descendant line, Empiricism;
c- Juxtapositional unity: Critical Idealism;
d- Absolute Idealism.

III- Final Point: Phenomenology.

The similar cultural trajectory and combination of intellectual traditions may be observed in
transcendental wisdom. For instance, the synthesis of Islamic Logic of al-Farabi with the
illumination blend of Ibn Sina is the same assimilation of traditions as we have observed in the
case of European philosophy above. Transcendental wisdom is also a reformation of Hikmat al-
Ishrak of Suhrawardi and of al- Mabahith al- Mashriquia of al-Razi. It is an accomplished
merger of mystical tradition of Ibn ‘Arabi and al-Ghazali with the philosophical tradition of al-
Farabi159.

ii- Phenomenology and Transcendental Wisdom as Cultural Visions:

“Phenomenology is also a direct, indirect and virtual religious vision. In the direct
religious vision “God” appears as a formal or an objective Being. The object is put
between brackets in order to retain “God” as a living experience, a direction of human
consciousness in relation to the world, to culture and in history”.160
“The transcendental wisdom is already a religious vision of the world. The highest
cognitive power is a holy power Quwwa Qudsiya. A whole journey, “from truth to
truth” is already on a theory on the Necessary Being Wajab al-Wajud……..In
phenomenology, indirect religious vision appears in the reflections on certain
philosophical and mathematical themes which are religious themes conceived on the
level of consciousness and expressed on human, open and universal language such as:
The Absolute, The Universal, The Essence, The Ideal and The Pure. Transcendental

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 Idealism is an indirect religious vision. There is no difference between Fichte and
Jesus”161. [Italics added].

In Hanafi’s opinion the transcendental wisdom is also a certain kind of indirect

religious worldview, from nature through reason to God, and from God back to nature
through a soul. Finality in the soul and in the world is an indirect demonstration of the
existence of God as final cause. There is no room for absurdity.162

In the end, Hanafi concludes with conviction that the comparison between Husserl’s
phenomenology and Mulla Sadra’s Theosophy is relevant, not only philosophically, but also
historically. Husserl came at the end of the modern age (d. 1938 AD) while Sadra came at the
middle of Islamic mediaeval times (d.1640 AD) similar to Saint Bonaventura Itenerarium mentis
in Deum.163

After this discussion, we move to the next part of this study, that is comparative analysis of
Muhammad Iqbal and Henri Bergson.

Iqbal and Bergson Standing Side by Side:

Iqbal’s study of Western Philosophy is deep, keen and thorough and he has derived profound
motivation and stimulation from a number of Western philosophers. His thought was
predominantly influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Henri Bergson (1859-1941).
However, Henri Bergson has been expressly chosen for the present comparison besides reasons
already mentioned at the start of the Section B, that Iqbal and Bergson shared the fundamental
framework of thought extensively; they had a remarkably similar outlook regarding some most
essential and deep-rooted problems of philosophy. For instance, both of them:

i- Strive to avoid mechanistic interpretation of the life and the universe;

ii- Wish to overcome the categories of (a) - Time, (b) - Space, (c) - Causality;

iii- Want to make room for (a) - Intuition, (b) - Evolution, (c) - Individuality;

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 iv- Aspire to undo Kantian philosophy specially the Critique of the Pure Reason.

The underlying motive of these desires is to ensure human freedom and existence of a rational
and benevolent God. Besides, both Bergson and Iqbal long for the superiority of religion over
reason, therefore, they seek such a philosophical arrangement wherein these concepts and beliefs
may be adjusted and accommodated. Hence, both thinkers may be called “agenda-driven” or
“purpose-oriented” philosophers whose philosophy may guide someone towards “meaning of
life”.

Both philosophers have done wide-ranging, serious and intense work on their favourite themes.
Hence, it is not easy to cover it in a short study; however, we have adopted such a scheme that
maximum thematic coverage may be made possible. Keeping this in view the proposed
comparison has been sub-divided into the following two major segments:

1- Time-Space-Causality: This segment besides these three major categories will deal
with Intellect, Intuition, Consciousness, Freedom and Individuality;

2- Religious/Mystical Experience: The mystical or religious experience is a logical

corollary of the above mentioned concepts, because it is free of the Kantian categories
and incomprehensible with the help of intellect alone.

The other important concepts of Bergson, such as Creation, Evolution and Vital Impetus will fall
under Part C of this chapter wherein Iqbal and Hanafi will be appreciated in the context of
Ijtehad. It is important to note that Iqbal’s concept of Ijtehad is heavily influenced by the
evolutionary outlook of Bergson, specially his idea of Vital Impetus.

Remaining within this structure and pursuing the same outline, we shall try our best to do justice
with the great thinkers.

Segment 1:

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Bergson, in the introduction of the Creative Evolution, expresses the agony of his soul in the
following words, “In fact, we do indeed feel that not one of the categories of our thought—unity,
multiplicity, mechanical causality, intelligent finality, etc.—applies exactly to the things of life:
who can say where individuality begins and ends…….In vain we force the living into this or that
one of our moulds. All the moulds crack. They are too narrow, above all too rigid, for what we
try to put into them”164. Iqbal has the same impatience with these categories and wishes to break
them. In one of his Urdu verses, he complains to God in these beautiful words:

“My soul protests against Your Divine system;

Since You are without boundaries while I am confined in categories”

(Teri khudai se hai mere janun ko gila

Apne liye lamakan, mere liye chaharsoo!)

Unhappy Iqbal with limitations finds solace in the scientific theories of Einstein and
philosophical method of Henri Bergson wherein he sees sufficient hope to shatter the nexus of
categories. In the first lecture of Reconstruction, he says, “The extension of man’s power over
Nature has given him a new faith and fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his
environment. New points of view have been suggested, old problems have been re-stated in the
light of fresh experience, and new problems have arisen. It seems as if the intellect of man is
outgrowing its own most fundamental categories—time, space and causality”165. [Italics added].

However, to outgrow these fundamental categories, the intellect of man itself has to be
reinterpreted and remoulded; it will have to re-define its own role and purpose. Since the intellect
in its present shape is unable to overcome the categories and appreciate the life and universe in
their true verities. Bergson expresses the same that life challenges the essential categories of
thought: unity, multiplicity, mechanical causality, intelligent finality all fall short. The
understanding or intellect can only give us a construction of life that is artificial and symbolical,
since it makes the total activity of life shrink to the form of a certain human activity which is
only a partial and local manifestation of life. For Bergson theory of knowledge is inseparable
from a theory of life. Though he is not a phenomenologist in the approved sense of the word,

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however, the seeds of phenomenology may be traced in his philosophy. In his own lucid words,
he emphasizes, “On the other hand, a theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in
the general evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been
constructed nor how can we enlarge or go beyond them”.166

To “replace” intellect, the proposed theory of knowledge will have to rely more on “intuition”
which will enable it to tear away Kantian categories. The intense admiration for intuition, we
will find common both in Bergson and Iqbal. However, before moving further, it would be fine
to have a look at “intuition” itself; what do Bergson and Iqbal mean by it? Bergson is of the
view, “But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us. By intuition I mean instinct
that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of
enlarging it indefinitely…….Thus intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not
quite go into the category of many nor yet into that of the one, that neither mechanical causality
nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the vital process”167. [Italics original]

Iqbal on the other hand uses more or less the same terminology and declares intuition as higher
kind of intellect168. Both Bergson and Iqbal are not happy with Kant, because he could not
acknowledge the proper status of intuition and considered intellect as the only source of
appreciating reality. This we are going to discuss in detail, but here a sentence from Iqbal will
help us in understanding his concept of intuition. Iqbal compares Ghazali and Kant and then says
regarding Kant, “He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that
thought must necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with
serial time”.169 He further writes in the same context, “Both Kant and Ghazali failed to see that
thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its finitude”. 170 It is to be noted here that
“intuition” is that faculty which helps thought surpassing its own finitude. Hence intuition, as per
Iqbal, may be taken as a special faculty of knowledge which is though a part of intellect is,
nonetheless, superior to intellect.

This debate, however, may not move further without Kantian criticism of Bergson. Keith Ansell
Pearson analyzes in the Introduction of Creative Evolution that two essential points must be
appreciated in the criticism of Bergson regarding Kant. First, Bergson’s concept of metaphysics
is essentially different from that of Kant; second, the empirical study of organic changes in life

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needs to concern itself not with the spatial results of change but with the time taken by the
change.171 Bergson’s main objection to Kant is this that he perceives only “one kind of time”
hence considers metaphysics impossible. Iqbal and Bergson, on the contrary believe in more than
one systems of time.

Bergson comments on Kant that according to him an effective metaphysics would necessarily be
intuitive, while we human beings lack this intuition; hence metaphysics is impossible for human
mind. Bergson, has, however, restored or recovered this intuition with two main objectives in
view: i- to save the science from the charge of producing a relativity of knowledge, and ii- to
save the metaphysics from the charges of indulging into empty, idle and useless speculation.172

Bergson proceeds in the same direction while asserting, “He[Kant] did not consider, in his
Critique of Pure Reason, that science became less and less objective and more and more
symbolical, to the extent that it went from the physical to the vital, from the vital to the
psychical. Experience does not move, to his view, in two different and perhaps opposite ways,
the one comfortable to the direction of the intellect, the other contrary to it. There is for him only
one experience, and the intellect covers its whole ground. This is what Kant expresses by saying
that all intuitions are sensuous, or, in other words, infra-intellectual”.173[Italics original].

“…………But this duality of intuition Kant neither would nor could admit. It would have been
necessary, in order to admit it, to regard duration as the very stuff of reality and consequently to
distinguish between the substantial duration of things and time spread out in space. It would have
been necessary to regard space itself, and the geometry which is immanent in space, as an ideal
limit in the direction of which material things develop, but which they do not actually attain.
Nothing could be more contrary to the letter, and perhaps also to the spirit, of the Critique of
Pure Reason”174.

“At the root of these speculations, then, here are two convictions correlative and complementary,
that nature is one and function of intellect is to embrace it in its entirety. The faculty of knowing
being supposed coextensive with the whole of experience, there can no longer be any question of
engendering it. It is already given, and we merely have to use it, as we use our sight in horizon. It
is true that opinions differ as to the values of the results. For some, it is reality itself that intellect

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embraces; for others, it is only a phantom. But, phantom or reality, what intelligence grasps is
thought to be all that can be attained.”175

Bergson really seems annoyed by the three possible alternatives regarding the relationship of
mind and matter and says very peevishly, “But the truth is that there is a fourth, which does not
have occurred to Kant—in the first place because he did not think that the mind overflows the
intellect, and in the second place (and this is at bottom the same thing) because he did not
attribute to duration an absolute existence, having put time, a-priori, on the same plane as
space”176.

Bergson, being the philosopher of life in Hanafi’s parlance 177 puts a question to Kant in a strict
tone then answers himself most emphatically, “But between physical existence, which is spread
out in space, and non-temporal existence, which can only be a conceptual and logical existence
like that of which metaphysical dogmatism speaks, is there no room for consciousness and life?
There is unquestionably.178 [Italics added].

If so, why is Kant unable to appreciate it? Why do we ignore it? How can we apprehend it?
Bergson responses, “We perceive it when we place ourselves in duration in order to go from that
duration to moments, instead of starting from moments in order to bind them again and to
construct duration.”179 Then what should we do, what is the remedy? To appreciate real duration,
Bergson opines, “…….we must give up the method of construction, which was that of Kant’s
successors. We must appeal to experience---an experience purified, or, in other words, released,
where necessary, from the moulds that our intellect has formed in the degree and proportion of
the progress of our actions on things. An experience of this kind is not a non-temporal
experience. It only seeks beyond spatialized time in which we believe we see continual
rearrangements between the parts, that concrete duration in which a radical recasting of the
whole is always going on”180. Now we may understand the extraordinary pre-occupation of
Bergson and Iqbal with space and time which brings them closer to Einstein; and they discover
their heart’s desire in the Theory of Relativity.

Our next topic of discussion is definitely time intertwined with space; but let us first conclude the
intuition. As we have seen above Bergson has clearly showed his distrust in intellect because,

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“We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The intellect is
characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life 181. [Italics original]. The reliable friend
then is only intuition. This reliable friend, however, is unable to be functional in the time which
is appreciated by the common sense as perpetually passing and divided into past, present and
future. It needs a special sort of time which is called by Bergson “Duration” and at times, “Pure
Duration”. Thus we need a new concept of time associated with its necessary counterpart space;
in the configuration of which, intuition may be accommodated. What does Bergson mean by this
duration and how is it different from ordinary time? To which extent is it acceptable for Iqbal
whose creative ego is yearning for freedom from categories? Bergson himself defines duration
as, “For our duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if it were there would never be
anything but present---no prolongation of the past into actual, no evolution, no concrete duration.
Duration is that continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as
it advances.182”[Italics added]. Iqbal is here in perfect agreement with Bergson, as he says in his
own words, “Pure time, then, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our conscious experience, is not
a string of separate, reversible instants, it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind,
but is moving along with, and operating in, the present. And the future is given to it not as lying
before, yet to be traversed; it is given only in the sense that is present in its nature as an open
possibility”.183

Intellect deals with something thought while the intuition is concerned with something lived. The
thought falls within the mathematical time which may be measured with the help of a watch;
whereas, the lived experience which is purely psychic in nature and may be appreciated with the
help of intuition alone is beyond that time. Bergson has quoted and excellently simple and easy
example to explain such a difficult idea: “If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must,
willy nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time we
have to wait is not mathematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of the
material world, even if that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides with
my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract
or contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something lived”184. [Italics original].

Bergson wrote Creative Evolution in 1907, almost a decade before the propounding of Theory of
Relativity by Einstein. To some people he is the forerunner of Relativity, though he was not a

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physicist, even then, his ideas bear striking resemble with those of Einstein regarding relativity
of space and time. Iqbal, however, a great admirer of Einstein is not satisfied with his concept of
time, rather he is not even comfortable with Bergson’s, which we are going to discuss soon.
Iqbal has very thoroughly discussed the philosophical issues related to time, space and
movement in the second lecture of Reconstruction, under the title of, “The Philosophical Test of
the Revelations of Religious Thought”. In the same lecture he says, “Looking, however, at the
theory from the standpoint that I have taken in these lectures, Einstein’s Relativity presents one
great difficulty, i.e. the unreality of time. A theory which takes time to be a kind of fourth
dimension of space must, it seems, regards the future as something already given, as indubitably
fixed as the past. Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory. It does not
pass. Events do not happen; we simply meet them. It must not, however, be forgotten that the
theory neglects certain characteristics of time as experienced by us; and it is not possible to say
that the nature of time is exhausted by the characteristics which the theory does not note in the
interests of a systematic account of those aspects of Nature which cannot be mathematically
treated”185. [Italics added].

Two points are noteworthy in the passage of Iqbal quoted above, (the italicized ones); i- Iqbal
and Bergson believe in the freedom of human ego or Will, which is not possible in any set-up of
time in which future may be predicted, and, ii- They are not at home with the mathematical
concept of time and prefer psychic time, which is experienced by the living subjects, that is,
human beings.

Iqbal further strengthens his standpoint regarding the psychic nature of time in the third lecture
of the Reconstruction, “The Concept of God and the Meaning of Prayer” in these words, “The
right course is a careful psychological analysis of our conscious experience which alone reveals
the true nature of time. I suppose you remember the distinction I drew in the two aspects of the
self, appreciative and efficient. The appreciative self lives in pure duration i.e. change without
succession. The life of the self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from
intuition to intellect."186 [Italics added].

Before we proceed further with pure duration, appreciative and efficient self and other allied
concepts, let us remember an old friend whom we have not recalled since late. Yes, he is no

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other but Husserl, who has more or less the similar concept of time. In the second meditation of
the Cartesian Meditations, he defines “universal synthesis” as follows, “The fundamental form
of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is
the all embracing consciousness of internal time”187.[Italics original]. Here we may see a great
similarity of approach between the two great thinkers, rather among the three including Bergson.

The passage quoted above by Iqbal is sufficiently dense and does need thorough unpacking. But
who can unpack Iqbal? Definitely Iqbal himself; so let us have a deep glance on a relatively long
quote from Iqbal which is necessary here to understand all the difficult concepts. “Thus there is
nothing static in my inner life……constant change, however, is unthinkable without time. On the
analogy of our inner experience, then, conscious existence means life in time. A keener insight
into the nature of conscious experience, however, reveals that the self in its inner life moves from
the centre outwards. It has, so to speak, two sides which may be described as appreciative and
efficient. On its efficient side it enters into a relation which we call the world of space. The
efficient side is the subject of associationist psychology---the practical self of daily life in its
dealing with external order of things which determine our passing states of consciousness and
stamp on these states their own spatial features of mutual isolation. The self here lives outside
itself as it were, and, while retaining its unity as a totality, discloses itself as nothing more than a
series of specific and consequently numerable states. The time in which the efficient self lives is,
therefore, the time of which we predicate long and short. It is hardly distinguishable from space.
We can conceive it only as a straight line composed of spatial points which are external to one
another like so many stages in a journey. But time thus regarded is not true time, according to
Bergson. Existence in spatialized time is spurious existence. A deeper analysis of conscious
experience reveals to us what I have called the appreciative side of the self. With our absorption
in the external order of things, necessitated by our present situation, it is extremely difficult to
catch a glimpse of the appreciative self. In our constant pursuit after external things, we weave a
kind of veil around the appreciative self which thus becomes completely alien to us. It is only in
the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into the
deeper self and reach inner centre of experience. In the life-process of this deeper ego the states
of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of a
germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in

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which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the
totality of ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly
qualitative. There is change and movement, but change and movement are indivisible; their
elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. It appears that time of the
appreciative -self is a single ‘now’ which the efficient self, in its traffic with the world of space,
pulverizes into a series of ‘nows’ like pearl beads in a thread. Here is, then, pure duration
unadulterated by space”188. [Emphasis added].

Iqbal himself acknowledges that mystery of time is not easy to resolve 189. The renowned English
philosopher of 20th century, C.D. Broad has admitted very courageously in his book, Scientific
Thought “that time is the hardest knot in the whole of philosophy”. Iqbal submits to Augustine’s
profound words that: If no one questions me of time, I know it: if I would explain to a questioner
I know it not190. Iqbal argues, “Personally I am inclined to think that time is an essential element
in Reality. But real time is not serial time, to which the distinction of past, present, and future is
essential; it is part of duration, i.e. change without succession……..Serial time is pure duration
pulverized by thought ---a kind of device by which Reality exposes its ceaseless creative activity
to quantitative measurements. It is in this sense that the Qur’an says: And to Him is the change
of the night and of the day”191.

For Iqbal reality is spiritual in nature, as he repeats twice in two separate lectures of the
Reconstruction:

“Personally, I believe that the ultimate character of Reality is spiritual192”.

“Reality is, therefore, essentially spirit193”.

If reality is spirit, then as a logical corollary, the associated concepts of time, space, rest and
motion are also subjective and mental in nature.( That is the reason that Hanafi has titled him as
a “Philosopher of Subjectivity”).Iqbal is fully consistent here and has drawn similar conclusion.
He writes in the context of Asharaites’ Atomism, “It is obvious that motion is inconceivable
without time. And since time comes from psychic life, the latter is more fundamental than
motion. No psychic life, no time: no time, no motion”194. [Italics added].

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 Iqbal has paid well-deserved attention to space as well, but his major focus of attention like
Bergson is time. He has narrated the reason of the same in the most beautiful words, “The
problem of time has always drawn the attention of Muslim thinkers and mystics. This seems to
be due partly to the fact that, according to Qur’an, the alternation of day and night is one of the
greatest signs of God, and partly to the Prophet’s identification of God with Dahr (time) in a well
known tradition195. Indeed, some of the greatest Muslim Sufis believed in the mystic properties
of the word Dahr. According to Muhyuddin Ibn al-Arabi, Dahr is one of the beautiful names of
God, and Razi tells us in his commentary on Qur’an that some of the Muslim saints had taught
him to repeat the word Dahr, Daihur or Daihar. The Asharaite theory of time is perhaps the first
attempt in history to understand it philosophically196.”

As per Bergson, time is written, marked and engrafted---it is inscription. “Whenever, anything
lives, there is, open somewhere, a register in which time is being inscribed”.197 [Italics
added].One may note here the correspondence between Iqbal and Bergson. But the enigma of
duration is still there, how we can appreciate it. Iqbal has suggested that only the appreciative
self may surpass the serial time, Bergson, however, suggests a different method: “But do we ever
think the true duration? Here again a direct taking possession is necessary. It is no use trying to
approach duration: we must install ourselves within it straightaway. That is what the intellect
generally refuses to do, accustomed as it is to think the moving by means of the unmovable”. 198
Bergson has treated this difficult-to-handle topic at length in Chapter IV of the Creative
Evolution, under the sub headings of “Form and Becoming” and “Modern Science”. Both are
masterpieces on their own behest irrespective of the fact that we agree with the ideas presented
or not. The entire content of “Modern Sciences” is worth quoting but due to paucity of “space
and time” at our disposal we may appreciate here only random passages explaining Bergson’s
concept of time and duration. Their striking resemblance with Einstein’s relativity is worth-
noting and remarkable. Bergson does not agree with the modern science when it takes time as an
independent variable. Physicist is more concerned with the number of the units of duration, while
we as the conscious beings are more concerned with the units of duration themselves. 199 Why?
Because we feel and live the intervals themselves. Bergson asserts here enthusiastically, “Now
we are conscious of these intervals as of definite intervals. Let me come back again to the sugar
in my glass of water. (See quote 184 above). Why must I wait for it to melt? While the duration

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of the phenomenon is relative for the physicist, since it is reduced to a certain number of units of
time and units themselves are indifferent, this duration is an absolute for my consciousness, for it
coincides with a certain degree of impatience which is rigorously determined. Whence comes
this determination? What is it that obliges me to wait, and to wait for a certain length of psychic
duration which is forced upon me, over which I have no power?

……..why does the universe unfold its successive states with a velocity which, in regard to my
consciousness, is a veritable absolute...Why, in other words, is not everything given at once, as
on the film on the cinematograph? The more I consider this point, the more it seems to me that, if
future is bound to succeed the present instead of being alongside of it, it is because the future is
not altogether determined at the present moment…….This duration may not be the fact of matter
itself, but that of the life which reascends the course of matter; the two movements are none the
less mutually dependent upon each other. The duration of the universe must therefore be one
with the latitude of creation which can find place in it.”200 [Italics original].

Bergson reaches a very subtle conclusion regarding the difference between Classical and Modern
Physics and also the need of a parallel discipline. He concludes, “To sum up, while modern
physics is distinguished from ancient physics by the fact that it considers any moment of time
whatever, it rests together on a substitution of time-length from time-invention.” 201
[Italics
original].

At the same time, he affirms the growth of another kind of knowledge with its characteristics,
which will specially adjust intuition: It seems then that, parallel to this physics, a second kind of
knowledge ought to have grown up, which could have retained what physics allowed to escape.
On the flux itself of duration science neither would nor could lay hold, bound as it was to the
cinematographical method. The second kind of knowledge would have set the cinematographical
method aside. It would have called upon the mind to renounce its most cherished habits. 202 This
last sentence underlined by myself reminds us of the favourite assertion of Iqbal: It seems as if
the intellect of man is outgrowing its most fundamental categories---time, space, and causality.

What would this “new discipline” do according to Bergson? “We should no longer be asking
where a moving body will be, what shape a system will take, through what state a change will

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pass at a given moment: the moments of time, which are only arrests of our attention, would no
longer exist; it is the flow of time, it is the very flux of the real that we should be trying to
follow.”203 [Italics added]. This knowledge, in Bergson’s view will not be as useful or pragmatic
as the existing sciences including physics are for mankind. However, it would yield some special
sorts of benefits. For instance “…... it will even go against certain natural aspirations of the
intellect; but, it succeeds, it is reality itself that it will hold in a firm and final embrace. Not only
may we thus complete the intellect and its knowledge of matter by accustoming it to install itself
within the moving, but by developing also another faculty, complementary to the intellect, we
may open a perspective on the other half of the real. For, as soon as we are confronted with true
duration, we see that it means creation…….Thus will appear the necessity of a continual
growth of the universe, I should say of a life of the real. And thus will be seen in a new light the
life which we find on the surface of our planet, a life directed the same way as that of the
universe, and inverse of materiality. To intellect, in short, there will be added intuition” 204.
[Italics original, emphasis added].

So finally Bergson has identified “duration” with “creation” and has become herald of an ever-
growing universe before Einstein. This universe which is free from the clutches of mechanical
causality and cruel hold of the intellect will nourish another faculty, that is, “intuition” which
will beautifully complete an incomplete picture. Before moving to Iqbal’s similar ideas studded
sophisticatedly with Qur’anic verses, a look on a passage from Bergson would further facilitate
us, “But, for a Science that places all the moments of time in the same rank, that admits no
essential moment, no culminating point, no apogee, change is no longer a diminution of essence,
duration is not a dilution of eternity. The flux of time is the reality itself, and the things we study
are the things which flow. It is true that of this flowing reality we are limited to taking
instantaneous views. But, just because of this, scientific knowledge must appeal to another
knowledge to complete it.”205

Iqbal, in the very first lecture of Reconstruction, “Knowledge and Religious Experience” has
affirmed almost all the results of Bergson within the Islamic context. The metaphor of time and
the cycle of day and night as a sign of Divine design inspire him immensely. In his poetic and
literary style he says, “In fact, this mysterious swing and impulse of the universe, this noiseless
swim of time which appears to us, human beings, as the movement of day and night, is regarded

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by the Qur’an as one of the greatest signs of God: ‘God causes the day and the night to take their
turn. Verily in this is teaching for men of insight’. (Al-Qur’an, 24:44)206.

Iqbal also believes in a growing universe which is not Newtonian rather Einsteinian and
Bergsonian in nature. His critique of a closed universe with objective time and space, we are
going to cover soon. Iqbal asserts, “It is not a block universe, finished product, immobile and
incapable of change. Deep in its inner being lies, perhaps dream of a new birth:

‘Say----go through the earth and see how God has brought forth all creation; hereafter will He
give it another birth.’ (Al-Qur’an, 29:20)207.

Compare the following quote of Bergson with the matching verses of Qur’an explored by Iqbal.

“The universe is not made, but is being made continually. It is growing, perhaps indefinitely, by
the addition of new words.”208

‘He (God) adds to his creation what He wills’. (Al-Qur’an, 35:1).209

“‘Everyday does some new work employ Him’. (Al-Qur’an, 55:29), says the Qur’an. To exist in
real time is not to be bound by the fetters of the serial time, but to create it from moment to
moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation. In fact, all creative activity is free
activity”210.

The Ultimate Reality for Iqbal is God, whom he gives the name of the Ultimate Ego. This
Ultimate Ego is also interpreted by Iqbal in the lexicon of Bergson. Just observe, “The Ultimate
Ego is, therefore, neither infinite in the sense of spatial infinity nor finite in the sense of the
space-bound human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the
Ultimate Ego consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity of which the
universe as known to us is only a partial expression. In one word God’s infinity is intensive, not
extensive”211. [Italics added].

“And thus will be seen in a new light the life which we find on the surface of our planet, a life
directed the same way as that of the universe, and inverse of materiality” if we read this line of
Bergson quoted above and then contrast it with the Iqbal’s chain of reasoning that follows, we

84
will discover the same underlying idea here: “Hard his lot and frail his being, like a rose-leaf, yet
no form of reality is so powerful, so inspiring and so beautiful as the spirit of man! Thus in his
inmost being man, as conceived by the Qur’an is a creative activity, an ascending spirit who, in
his onward march, rises from one state of the being to another:

‘It needs not that I swear by the sunset redness and by the night and its gatherings and by the
moon when at her full, that from state to state shall ye be surely carried onward’. (Al-Qur’an,
84:16-19).212[Italics added].

“To intellect, in short, there will be added intuition”, this prediction of Bergson, has been
complemented and supplemented by Iqbal in these words. Islam and Qur’an have affirmed this
great and subtle source of knowledge hundreds of years ago. Therefore, Iqbal, Islam and Bergson
are completely at par with each other. Muhammad Iqbal writes in the first lecture of his book,
“In the interest of securing a complete vision of Reality, therefore, sense-perception must be
supplemented by the perception of what Qur’an describes as Fuad or Qalb, i.e. heart:

“God has made everything which he has created most good; and began the creation of man with
clay; then ordained his progeny from germs of life , from sorry water; then shaped him, and
breathed of His spirit unto him, and gave you hearing and seeing and heart: what little thanks do
ye return? (Al-Qur’an, 32: 7-9). [Italics original].

The ‘heart’ is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on
the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with of Reality other than those open to sense-
perception. It is according to Qur’an something which ‘sees’, and its reports, if properly
interpreted are never false”213.

It may not be denied at all that Bergson influenced Iqbal’s thought heavily. This overwhelming
influence is not limited to his philosophical discourse rather is more evident and pronounced in
his Urdu poetry, which may not, unfortunately be quoted here. Iqbal has constructed his
intellectual superstructure on the philosophical infrastructure of Bergson and fitted it within the
Islamic framework, embellished with intelligently selected Qur’anic verses and Prophetic
traditions. Iqbal, however, is an extremely well-read scholar and one is awe-inspired by the depth
and extent of his enormous study while going through the Reconstruction. No doubt, Bergson is

85
the major and most potent source of his inspiration but he has studied other contemporary
philosophers, historians, scientists, psychologists, sociologists and mathematicians as well in
detail and quoted them extensively in the favour of the theses he wishes to establish beyond
doubt. A thorough review of the Reconstruction leaves the immediate impression on the reader
that the author is profoundly pre-occupied with the problem of time, which is not a
philosophical, intellectual or academic problem for him rather is an existential issue. Iqbal’s grip
on the various theories of time is remarkable and the wide range of analysis amazing and
incredible. From Iraqi to Einstein, from Zeno to George Cantor, from Mir Damad to Whitehead
and from Mulla Dawwani to Ouspensky, he has missed none (these are not exhaustive examples,
only a random choice from Iqbal’s long list). He has divided time into the serial time, real time,
time without succession, eternal now, human time, divine time, time of the gross bodies, atomic
time, and time during the mystical experience and so forth. So every researcher is morally
obliged to give a full-fledged coverage to Iqbal’s concept of time. Though it a great topic in its
own self on which a complete doctoral dissertation may be attempted, yet, we will try to be as
brief and concise as possible. Iqbal has criticized his soul-mate Bergson as well during his
discussion, which will be highlighted too, during due course.

Iqbal has dealt with the problem of time extensively in second and third lectures and then again
in fourth lecture with reference to ego. With time he has associated the philosophical concepts of
freedom and determinism and has analyzed them in a masterly manner. Following is the detailed
exposition of Iqbal’s deliberations on time.

We have discussed earlier that Iqbal has drawn attention to the importance of the problem of
time. Time has continuously engaged the minds of Muslim thinkers since it has been identified
with God by the Prophet (Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). In the philosophical history
of Islam it were the Asharaites who propounded a well-thought theory of time, which is also
known atomic time. Iqbal is not satisfied with their approach since their theory necessarily
supposes an empty moment between two individual nows. Iqbal diagnoses their fault in
conceiving time in a purely objective manner; a fallacy committed by the Greek philosophers
and Newton jointly. Newton has described time as ‘something which in itself and from its own
nature flows equally’. This metaphor of Newton’s according to Iqbal is beset with difficulties
since it equates time with a flowing stream. There are serious flaws in it, since we cannot know,

86
how a thing is affected which is immersed in this stream and what is the behaviour of those
objects which are outside this stream. Moreover, if we take time on the analogy of the stream, we
may not make any adequate idea of its beginning, end, banks, length, breadth and depth etcetera.
We would need a separate time to measure the flow or ‘passage’ of this objective time and yet
another time to measure the second time; and this will go up to infinity. Iqbal appreciates
Asharaites’ attempt of atomic time, since being practical Arabs they could not deny the reality of
time like the Greeks, and, being the early philosophers they could go to this extent only214.

Iqbal cites many other ingenious examples from the history of Muslim thought that
objectification of time gives rise to how many theological and religious problems, since this time
may not be applied to God and his ever-ongoing creative activities. He quotes Mulla Jalaluddin
Dawwani from his book, Zaura and the Sufi poet Iraqi in this context. Iqbal has special
admiration for Dawwani who had had, somehow or the other, the idea of relativity even in his
own age, hundreds of years before the Modern Physics. Iqbal pays tribute to him in the following
words, “Mulla Jalauddin Dawwani in a passage of his Zuara, which reminds the modern student
of Professor Royce’s view of time, tells us that…………. But Mulla takes good care to add that a
deeper insight into the nature of succession reveals its relativity, so that it disappears in the case
of God to Whom all events are present in a single act of perception 215”. (Does not this sort of
Divine knowledge entail determinism and fatalism?).

Iqbal continues the argument with reference to Iraqi, “The Sufi poet ‘Iraqi’ has a similar way of
looking at the matter. He conceives infinite verities of time, relative to the various grades of
being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies which
arises from the revolution of the heavens is divisible into past, present, and future……….The
time of immaterial beings is also serial in character……..Divine time---time which is absolutely
free from the quality of passage, and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence of
change. Thus Divine time is………..freed from the net of causal sequences, is gathered up in a
single super-eternal ‘now’.”216

Iqbal, after this erudite analysis arrives at the result that a “purely objective point of view is only
partially helpful in understanding the nature of time. The right course is a careful psychological
analysis of our conscious experience which alone reveals the true nature of time.”217

87
He then reminds the reader of the distinction between the appreciative and efficient self. It is the
appreciative self which lives in pure duration, that is, change without succession. The life of the
self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, and
atomic time is born out of this movement.218

As mentioned earlier, Iqbal is not satisfied with the concept of time presented by Relativity
Physics, despite the fact that he holds Einstein in high esteem. His major objection is that the

218
Ibid.
9
Ibid, Pp.72-73.
13
13- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M.
Saeed Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp.100-101.
14
14- Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vol.I (The Meridian Thought),
Book Center for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, Pp.454.
15
15- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M.
Saeed Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P. 102.
16
Ibid.
17
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vol.I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Center for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.451.
18
18- These are the phrases borrowed from Bergson used in his last philosophical work, Two Sources of
Morality and Religion. This concept of the religion will be thoroughly discussed in Section C of this study.
Sobia Tahir
19
19- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M.
Saeed Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006 P.142.
20
20- Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vol.I (The Meridian Thought),
Book Center for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, Pp.454-55.
21
Al-Qur’an, 2:1-2
22
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006 P.26.
23
Ibid, Pp.33-34.
24
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006 P.145.
25
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.22.
26
Ibid, P. 23.
27
Ibid, P. 24.
28
Lazcano, A., Bada, J.L., “The 1953 Stanley L. Miller Experiment: Fifty Years of Pre-biotic Organic
Chemistry”, Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, 33 (3), June 2004, Pp. 235-242.
29
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.233.
30
Ibid, P.229.
31
Ibid, P.236.
32
Ibid, P.134.
33
Ibid, P. xxxv
34
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp.146-47.
35
Al-Qur’an, 36-72.
36
Ibid, 42:11, (There is nothing like Him; and He is the Hearer, the Seer).
37
Encyclo, Online Encyclopaedia, http://www.encyclo.co.uk/define/immanent, visited on 30/09/2011.
38
Catholic Encyclopaedia, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07682a.htm, visited on 30/09/2011
39
Encyclopaedia.com, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Transcendence.aspx, visited on 30/09/2011.

88
theory insists only on the mathematical characteristics of time and neglects its psychological
angles as it is experienced by human beings. He says that the time of Einstein is neither pure
duration of Bergson, nor the serial time. He does not agree with Einstein that time is the fourth
dimension of space and quotes Russian writer Ouspensky’s book Tertium Organum in the favour
of his stance. Ouspensky argues that a new dimension in the distance, separating events in the
order of succession, is incommensurable with dimensions of three -dimensional space as a year

40
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006 P.48.
41
Ibid, P.53.
42
Ibid, P. 57-58.
43
Ibid, Pp. 52-53.
44
Ali Abbas Jalalpuri, Iqbal ka Ilm-i-Kalam, Takhliqat, Lahore, 2003.
45
Altaf Ahmad Azmi, Khubat-i- Iqbal: Aik Mutala’a, Dar al- Tadhkir, 2005, Pp. 13-17.
46
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006 P. 66.
47
Ibid, P. 67.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid, P. 95.
50
Ibid, P.96-97.
51
Ibid, P.149.
52
Mohammed Haddad, “Pour Comprendre Hasan Hanafi”, Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes , 1998, PP. 68-
69.
53
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.51.
54
54-Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam
University Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P. 91.
55
55- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M.
Saeed Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.39.
56
Rahim Bakhsh Shahin, Awraq-i- Gum Gashta(Urdu), Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1975,P.193.
57
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.95.
58
Ibid, P.89.
59
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue? Vol.I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Center for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.451.
60
Ibid, Pp. 446-447.
61
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P.31.
62
Ibid, P. 36.
63
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.I, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, Pp. 492-493.
64
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.117.
65
See page------ of the Introduction above. Sobia Tahir
66
Ibid, Pp. 130-131.
67
Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1967,
P.45
68
Hassan H anafi, “Al- Din wa’l Thawra fi Misr 1952-1981, Vol. VI. Madbouli Press, Cairo, 1989, P.242.
69
Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “ ‘Ilm
Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Cairo,1965, P.51.

89
is incommensurable with Saint Petersburg. This is also difficult for us to conceive because we
are at home with three dimensional space ; hence a fourth dimension also appears to us
something like Euclidean space. Iqbal, however, is not in consonance with the Russian author
since he, according to him, is in search of serial time which separates the events in the order of
succession. This time is disgusting for Iqbal, because it is not a genuine creative movement and
the future events are also not fresh happenings but the things already given in an unknown
space.219
70
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.119-120.
71
Ibid, Pp.121-122.
72
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, P.86.
73
Ibid, P.151.
74
Ibid, P. 87.
75
Ibid, P.155.
76
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, tr. David Carr, Northwestern University Press,
1970,P.270.
77
Ibid, P.273.
78
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, Pp. 7-8.
79
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, tr. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, 1970,
Pp. 73-74.
80
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960,P.12.
81
Ibid, P.13.
82
Ibid, P.16.
83
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, tr. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, 1970,
P. 66.
84
Ibid, Pp.75-76.
85
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960,P.31.
86
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, tr. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, 1970,
P.77.
87
Ibid.
88
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, P.62.
89
Ibid, P. 60.
90
Ibid, P.17.
91
Ibid, P.19.
92
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, tr. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, 1970,
P.79.
93
Ibid, P.80.
94
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960. P.22.
95
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, tr. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, 1970,
Pp. 81-82.
96
Ibid, P.69.
97
Ibid, P. 189.
98
Ibid, P.179.
99
Ibid, P.180.
100
Ibid, P. 183.
101
Ibid, Pp.184-186.
102
Ibid, P. 358.
103
Ibid, P.49.

90
If the real time or the pure duration is succession without change and appreciative self is aware
of it too, then why we cannot understand it easily? Why its apprehension is so difficult for us?
One of the reasons, Iqbal describes, is the limited vocabulary and structure of ordinary language
which may not express this sort of inner experience in appropriate words. It is only the courtesy
of the appreciative self which does not give up and continues its corrective efforts to convert
broken pieces of the serial time into a complete whole of a personality. “Pure time” , Iqbal
defines, “then, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our conscious experience, is not a string of

104
Ibid, P. 50.
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid, P.59.
107
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, Pp.429-430.
108
Ibid, Pp. 427-28.
109
This “internal feeling of time” will be discussed in detail with reference to Husserl, Iqbal and Bergson, in
the next segment of the Section B. Sobia Tahir
110
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, Pp.428-429.
111
Hassan Hanafi, Theosophy and Phenomenology, Islamic Studies, Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1989, Pp.
347.
112
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.430.
113
Ibid, P. 431( The first is his these principale de Doctort d’etat a la Sorbonne en 1966 dirigee par R.
Brunschwicg. The second and the third are his these secondaire dirigee par P. Recoeur and discussed by J. Guitton.
The two other members were H. Laonst and H. Gouhier. The first is printed in Cairo by High Council of Arts,
Letters and Social Sciences in 1965. The second is published by Dar-al-Fikr al-Arabi, Cairo, 1967, while the third is
printed by Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1987).
114
Ibid, Pp.431-432.
116
Ibid, Pp. 470-73.
117
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Taurath wa’l Tajdid: Mawaqifuna min al-Taurath al-Qadim, al-Markaz al-Arabi li’l-
Bahath wa’l Nashr, Cairo, 1980, P.186.
118
Ibid, P. 196.
119
Hassan Hanafi, L’Exegese de la Phenomenology:l’Etat Actuelle de la Methode Phenomenologique et son
Application au Phenomene Religieux, Dar- l- Fikr-al-Arabi, Cairo, 1966, P.63.
120
Wahyudi,Y., The Call: “ Back to the Quran and Sunna”: A Comparative Study of the Resources of
Hasan Hanafi, Muhammad Abed Al- Jabri and Nurcholish Madjid, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: Institute of
Islamic Studies, McGill University,2002, Pp. 170-171.

121
For the definition and detail of transposition see Chapter I of the Study, “Biography and the Intellectual
Trajectory of Hassan Hanafi”. Sobia Tahir
126
Ibid, P. 81-82.
127
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960,P.54.
128
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.38.
129
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, P.43.
130
Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Cairo,1965,P.cclxii.

91
separate, reversible instants; it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is
moving along with, and operating at the present. And the future is given to it not as lying before,
yet to be traversed; it is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open
possibility.220 (cf. above the references 179 and 180).

A very pertinent question arises here, from the theological and religious point of view. If
according to the Iqbal’s interpretation of time, future is not given, it has not yet happened, it is an
131
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp. 67-68.
132
Hassan Hanafi, Religious Dialogue and Revolution, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1977, Pp. 205-206.
133
Ibid,P.206
134
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.101.
135
Hassan Hanafi, Religious Dialogue and Revolution, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1977, P.143.
136
Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Cairo,1965,P.552.
137
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.137.
138
Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Cairo,1965,P.ccix.
139
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.137.
140
Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Cairo,1965,P.ccxii.
141
Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston,
1967, P.147.
142
Ibid,P.18.
143
Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, tr. Bernard Noble, Harper &Brothers, New York, 1960, p. 74.
144
Ibid, P.77.
145
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1954.P.57.
146
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1935,
P.257.
147
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, Pp.141-142.
148
Michel Allard, “Un Essai d’Anthropologie Musulmane,” Travaux et Jours 32, Paris, 1969, P.83.
149
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.11.
150
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.415-416.
151
Ibid, P.416.
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid, P.417.
154
Ibid, P.478..
155
Ibrahim Kalin, Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), http://www.cis-ca.org/voices/s/sadra.htm. Visited on
19.12.2011.
156
Ibid.
157
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.486-487.
158
Ibid, Pp. 487-489.

92
open possibility and so on, then what is the status of the destiny or fate, which is an article of
faith for every believer? This is a thorny and contentious issue, hotly debated and politically
motivated right from the early days of Islam. So far no satisfactory solution has been provided
which may reconcile the Divine omnipotence, omniscience, foreknowledge and pre-destination
with human freedom and Divine justice. All the possible schemes of reconciliation either suffer
from logical contradictions or are prejudiced and narrow, ignoring the other side. In the modern
Muslim thought, Iqbal, no doubt is the greatest, the most powerful and effective exponent of
159
Ibid, P.492.
160
Ibid, P.493.
161
Ibid, P.494.
162
Ibid.
163
Ibid, P.496.
164
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.xxxv.
165
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.6.
166
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.xxxvii.
167
Ibid, P.114.
168
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.2.
169
Ibid, P.4.
170
Ibid, P.5.
171
Keith Ansell Pearson, “Introduction to Creative Evolution”, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P. xix.
172
Ibid.
173
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.229.
174
Ibid, P.230.
175
Ibid, P.123
176
Ibid, P.132.
177
Hassan Hanafi has written a book on him under the title, Bergson, Philosopher of Life. Sobia Tahir
178
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.230.
179
Ibid, P.231.
180
Ibid, P.231-232.
181
Ibid, P.106.
182
Ibid, P.3
183
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp. 39-40.
184
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.6.
185
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.31.
186
Ibid, P.61.
187
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960,P.43.

188
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.38-39.
189
Ibid, P.46.
190
Saint Augustine, The Confessions, xi, 17; cf Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, I, 140, where
Augustine’s observation is quoted in connection with ‘destiny’.
191
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp.46-47.

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human freedom. His approach is praiseworthy and healthy, but he is sheerly one-sided and has
neglected a large number of Qur’anic verses which openly proclaim utter determinism.

However, coming back to the original topic, we have to see how Iqbal interprets the word,
“Taqdir”, meaning destiny or fate in Arabic and Urdu. No one else may describe it in more
impeccable words, then he himself has, “It is time regarded as an organic whole which the
Qur’an describes in as Taqdir or the destiny---a word which has been so much misunderstood
both in and outside the world of Islam. Destiny is the time regarded as prior to the disclosure of
its possibilities. It is the time freed from the nexus of causal sequence----the diagrammatic
character which the logical understanding imposes on it. In one word, it is time as felt and not as
thought and calculated…….Time regarded as destiny forms the very essence of the things. As
the Qur’an says: ‘God created all things and assigned to each its destiny’. The destiny of a thing
then is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inward reach of a

192
Ibid, P.31.
193
Ibid, P 57.
194
Ibid.
195
The Prophet (PBUH) said, “Do not vilify time, for time is God”.
196
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp. 58-59.
197
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.11.
198
Ibid, P. 191.
199
Ibid, Pp. 214-216.
200
Ibid, Pp. 216-217.
201
Ibid, Pp. 218.
202
Ibid.
203
Ibid, Pp.218- 219.
204
Ibid, P.219
205
Ibid.
206
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.8.
207
Ibid.
208
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.155.
209
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.8.
210
Ibid, P. 40.
211
Ibid, P.52.
212
Ibid, P. 10.
213
Ibid, Pp. 12-13.
214
Ibid, P.59.
215
Ibid, P .60.
216
Ibid, Pp. 60-61.
217
Ibid.
219
Ibid, P.32.
220
Ibid, Pp.39-40.

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thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, serially actualize
themselves without any feeling of external compulsion. Thus the organic wholeness of duration
does not mean that full-fledged events are lying, as it were, in the womb of Reality, and drop one
by one like the grains of sand from the hour –glass. If the time is real, and not a mere repetition
of homogenous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in
the life of Reality is original, giving birth to absolutely novel and unforeseeable.” 221[Italics
added].

Iqbal has also briefly discussed the unreality of time, which was one of the favourite doctrines of
Professor McTaggart. It is to be remembered that Professor John McTaggart Ellis was the
supervisor of Iqbal at Cambridge in 1905. He was the same person who advised Iqbal to
submit his thesis, “Development of Metaphysics in Persia”, in any of the German
Universities to have a PhD degree. McTaggart was a Hegelian like T. H. Green and F.H.
Bradley; all of them believed in unreality of time. Time, according to McTaggart is
unreal because any moment of time is simultaneously past, present, and future. Queen
Anne’s death, for instance, is past to us; it was present to her contemporaries and future
to Williams III. Thus the event of Anne’s death combines characteristic which are
incompatible with each other. Iqbal does not agree with this argument since according to
him, “It is obvious that the argument proceeds on the assumption that the serial nature of
time is final. If we regard past, present and future as essential to time, then we picture
time as straight line, part of which we have travelled and left behind, and part lies yet
untraveled before us. This is taking time, not as living creative moment, but as a static
absolute, holding the ordered multiplicity of fully-shaped cosmic events, revealed
serially, like the pictures of a film, to the outside observer. ………..The answer to Dr.
McTaggart’s argument is that the future exists as only an open possibility, and not as a
reality. Nor can it be said that an event combines incompatible characteristics when it is
described both as past and present. When an event X does happen, it enters into an
unalterable relation X with other events that have happened before it. These relations are
not at all affected by the relations of X with other events which happen after X by the
further becoming of Reality. No true or false statements for these relations will ever

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 become false or true. Hence there is no logical difficulty in regarding an event as both
past and present”222.

As far as unreality of time is concerned, Bergson denied the teleological (purpose-oriented)

character of reality, since according to him; teleology also makes the time unreal. How?
Bergson explains that until the portals of the future are not open to the Reality, it is not
free and creative; if not free and creative then unreal. Iqbal partly agrees with the
argument, since purpose has two meanings in his opinion:

i A pre-ordained purpose: This is a purpose which has been already defined with all its
minute details in which everything is fixed and determined with pre-set goals and
objectives. Such a purpose or teleology would reduce the universe into a stage on which
all the actors are mere puppets who are playing their given roles according to a written
script. This scheme of things would not be different from mechanism or fatalism. In such
a universe human and divine freedom would lose their meanings without any free and
responsible moral agents. Most definitely, time will be unreal in such a universe.
According to Iqbal, “The world-process, or the movement of the universe in time, is
certainly devoid of purpose, if by purpose we mean a foreseen and----a far-off fixed
destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world process with purpose
in this sense is to rob it off its originality and its creative character……..A time process is
not a line already drawn. It is a line in drawing---an actualization of open possibilities 223”.

ii An open-ended purpose: However, there is some other sort of purposes too. There is
another kind of teleology as well, which arises from our mind and consciousness and, has not
been set for us by an alien being or power. Mental life is teleological too, because it always cuts
and moulds new purposes and fresh ideals for it, though it has no distant and far-off goal to
regulate it. Verily the universe is not purposeless in this sense, since it’s Creator has not made it
merely as a sport:

“We have not created the Heavens and the Earth and whatever is in between them as a sport. We
have created them but for a serious end: but the greater part of them understands it not.” (Al-
Qur’an, 44: 38-39).

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“Verily in the creation of the Heavens and in the Earth, and in the succession of the night and of
the day, are signs for men of understanding, who standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in
mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and the Earth, and say, ‘Oh, our Lord! Thou hast
not created this in vain’. (Al-Qur’an, 3:190-91).

Hence, the universe with all its details and particulars is serving an open-ended purpose, a
purpose which has not been pre-written in the annals of destiny or fate. Iqbal himself says in this
regard, “To my mind nothing is more alien to the Qur’anic outlook than the idea that the universe
is a temporal working out of a pre-conceived plan. As I have already pointed out, the universe,
according to the Qur’an, is liable to increase. It is a growing universe and not an already
completed product which left the hand of its maker ages ago, and which is now lying stretched in
space as dead mass of matter to which time does nothing, and consequently is nothing.”224

Here, through critique of Bergson, Iqbal reaches his notion of the Ultimate Reality and the Self;
the same Self (Khudi) which is the pivotal point of his philosophy and poetry. It is an interesting
and absorbing reading to see how Iqbal has derived that Self from the time rather from Pure
Duration. He argues, “A critical interpretation of the sequence of time as revealed in our selves
has led us to a notion of the Ultimate Reality as pure duration in which life, thought and purpose
interpenetrate to form an organic unity. We cannot conceive that unity except as the unity of a
self----an all embracing concrete self---the ultimate source of all individual life and thought. I
venture to think that the error of Bergson consists in regarding pure time as prior to self to
which alone pure duration is predicable. Neither pure space nor pure time can hold the
multiplicity of objects and events. It is the appreciative act of an enduring self only which can
seize the multiplicity of duration---broken up into an infinity of instants----and transform it
organic wholeness of a synthesis. To exist in pure duration is to be a self and to be able to say ‘I
am’. Only that truly exists which can say, ‘I am’. It is the degree of the intuition of ‘I amness’
that determines the degree of a thing in the scale of being”.225 [Italics added].

Before moving to the space, it is pertinent to have a brief glance on the views of Bergson
regarding, creation, God and freedom within his overall system. These are the logical derivates
of his ideas regarding time and evolution. Creation, as per Bergson, is a continuous and ongoing
process; it is a free activity without any end or objective. The universe is in the process of

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becoming, it is not a finished product. If this is the case, then why do we believe in complete
creation destined for some end and determinism? Bergson answers this tedious question in a very
simple yet sophisticated manner. His style is logical and convincing. He pleads, “The myth that
spreads over the existence of the universe comes in great part from this, that we want the genesis
of it to have been accomplished at one stroke or the whole of the matter to be eternal. Whether
we speak of creation or posit an uncreated matter, it is the totality of the universe that we are
considering at once. At the root of this habit of mind lies the prejudice, the idea, common to
materialists and to their opponents, that there is no really acting duration, and that the absolute
—matter or mind—can have no place in concrete time, in the time which we feel to be the very
stuff of our life. From which it follows that everything is given once for all, and that it is
necessary to posit from all eternity either material multiplicity itself, or the act of creating this
multiplicity, given in block in the divine essence. Once this prejudice is eradicated, the idea of
creation becomes clearer, for it is merged in that of growth. But it is no longer the universe in its
totality that we must speak226.” [Italics added].

He explains his point more thoroughly at another place in these words, “Everything is obscure in
the idea of creation if we think of things which are created and a thing which creates, as we
habitually do, as the understanding cannot help doing. It is natural to our intellect, whose
function is essentially practical, made to present to us things and states rather than changes and
acts. But things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things,
there are only actions”227.

However, if there is no such “thing” which is creating other “things”; then who is God? And
what is His nature, what are His essential attributes and traits? “God,” he says, “thus defined, has
nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation so conceived, is no
longer a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely” 228. But –we will have to
cultivate another faculty to fully appreciate this phenomenon, intellect alone, perhaps, may not
help here. “Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes of intellect alone, which grasps only the
already made and which looks from the outside, but with the spirit, I mean with the faculty of
seeing which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up, somehow, by the
twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say, into
light”.229

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Iqbal agrees with him in some of the cited points, while criticizes him on some others. For
instance he is in full agreement with Bergson that Ultimate Reality is a great and free creative
movement. Moreover, in this boundless creative energy of the Ultimate Reality, deed and
thought are identical230. Iqbal wants to establish by this, like Bergson that in the creative process
of God, we may perceive only action and not a thing, creating other things. “The world, in all its
details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement
of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the ‘Great I am’” 231 Iqbal traces the roots of
this argument from Shihabuddin Suhrawardi Maqtul to Hegel to Lord Haldane’s Reign of
Relativity.232

Iqbal has tried to explain all this into the idiom of science and his cherished modern physics. In
the second lecture of Reconstruction wherein he has dealt with all these problems of space, time,
matter, energy, motion and rest etcetera, he has devoted a full-length paragraph for the nature of
universe and Ultimate Reality as a free creative movements and has explained all these hard-to-
grasp subjects in a language as familiar and easy as possible. He describes, “On the analogy of
our conscious experience, then, the universe is a free creative movement. But how can we
conceive movement independent of a concrete thing that moves? The answer is that the notion of
‘thing’ is derivative………..In fact, physical science has reduced all things to
movements……..What we call things are events in the continuity of Nature which thought
spatializes and thus regards mutually isolated for the purpose of action. The universe which
seems to us to be a collection of things is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but
an act.”233

Here Iqbal also raises some points of dissent with Bergson, out of which regarding the
teleological character of history we have already discussed above under the headings of pre-
ordained purpose and open- ended purpose. Iqbal is unable to believe in a totally unbridled, blind
and capricious will with the name of Reality which is running this complex without any end for
mere picnic.

230
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.57.
231
Ibid.
232
Ibid.
233
Ibid, P.41.

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Iqbal asserts with confidence that, “Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly un-illuminated by
the idea. Its nature is through and through teleological”. 234 But why did Bergson, the most well-
known and impressive philosopher of his age could not appreciate this point? Why did he
commit this fallacy? Iqbal has pin-pointed the flaw of his entire reasoning. According to him,
Bergson’s philosophy ends in an insurmountable dualism of will and thought. He has done so
because he has taken a partial view of intelligence. He considers intelligence an entity which is
functional in space alone and may deal with only the mechanical categories. Its area of operation
is exclusively matter. Iqbal elaborates the fallacy of this approach in this manner, “.........thought
has a deeper movement also. While it appears to break up reality into static fragments, its real
function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to various
levels which experience presents…….The movement of life, as an organic growth involves a
progressive synthesis of its various stages……It is determined by ends, and the presence of ends
means that it is permeated by intelligence. Nor is the activity of intelligence possible without the
presence of ends”.235

It is now time to move towards the last topic of the relatively lengthy Segment 1, that is, Space.

Space is the second category which Kantian philosophy declares an essential form of intuition,
which our mental apparatus may not escape; hence all of our judgments are subject to this
category. Iqbal and Bergson, as we have repeated several times, are not in agreement with this.
However, it is relevant to mention that space has proved itself less problematic with both as
compared to time. Bergson in Creative Evolution is least concerned with space and has stressed
fully on i-time, ii- refutation of mechanical explanation of evolution and phenomena of life and
consciousness. The detailed discussion of both thinkers regarding time, we have already covered;
and that of mechanical causality and evolution lies outside our research plan, because of limited
time. Iqbal, however, during his intensive review of Relativity and Muslim Theology has given
sufficient coverage to space. In the pages to follow, we shall see his analysis of the space in
comparison with Bergson wherever possible.

Iqbal in the second lecture of Reconstruction, which is most important and elaborate with
reference to space, time, movement and allied concepts, has described the spatio-temporal
complex in the phraseology of Bergson. According to Bergson, the nature of thought is serial;

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hence, it cannot deal with continuous motion. To appreciate motion, the thought has to divide it
into small portions or intervals of stationary points. The same operation of thought when works
on these actually dynamic entities; it presents them to us as series of immobilities. “The co-
existence and succession of these immobilities is the source of what we call space and time”.236

Iqbal has explored the history of the concept of space in a very diligent manner. He has discussed
the objective view of space connected with Newton in these words, “The scientific view of
nature as pure materiality is associated with the Newtonian view of space as an absolute void in
which things are situated. This attitude of science has, no doubt, ensured its speedy progress; but
the bifurcation of a total experience into two opposite domains of mind and matter has forced it,
in view of its own domestic difficulties, to consider the problems which, in the beginning of its
career, it completely ignored”237. It is somewhat similar point; Husserl has raised regarding
Cartesian dualism.

Iqbal has developed a complicated and lengthy argument in connection with various theories
prevalent about space in different eras. He has started his case from a question: Is space an
independent void in which things are situated and which would remain intact if all things were
withdrawn?238 This question is based on the latest discovery (of Iqbal’s time), that is,
mathematical sciences which proved that a pure materiality or an independent enduring stuff
situated in an absolute space is totally out of question. Iqbal goes back to Zeno of Elea (490-430
BC) to probe the question of space. Zeno’s famous paradoxes, we need not quote here, try to
prove the illusory or better to say unreal character of movement. He wishes to prove that Reality
is one, indivisible and immutable. Simultaneously they prove the unreality of space as well.
These paradoxes have been the source of interesting and active debate in the philosophical
circles since thousands of years.

Amongst the Muslim philosophers, Iqbal proceeds, these were the Asharaites who denied the
infinite divisibility of space and time, since if it were possible, then movement within the space
and time would have been impossible. They believed in the existence of infinitesimals; to them
space, time and movement were composed of points which might not be further subdivided. As a
logical corollary of this thesis, time and space were finite and movement possible. 239 It was,

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however, Ibn Hazm, who rejected their argument mathematically and modern mathematics has
confirmed him.

In 20th century Bergson and Bertrand Russell refuted Zeno with the help of their respective
philosophical methods. For Bergson change is the ultimate or fundamental Reality, while
movement is essential for change. Zeno has denied the reality of change due to wrong
appreciation of space and time. Russell’s argument is based on the George Cantor’s Theory of
Mathematical Continuity, which is the basis of most important discoveries of modern age. Zeno
presupposes a discontinuous space and time, where there is a “distance” between two points of
space and two instants of time. How can a body move in “non-space” and “non-time”, therefore
he declared movement impossible or illusory. Cantor’s revolutionary contribution to
mathematics declared space and time as continuous which led Zeno’s argument to rejection.

Iqbal, however, is not in agreement with Russell or Cantor, and has presented his criticism in the
following passage, “Thus Bertrand Russell proves the reality of movement on the basis of
Cantor’s theory of continuity. The reality of movement means the independent reality of space
and objectivity of Nature. But the identity of continuity and the infinite divisibility of time or
space is no solution of the difficulty. Assuming that there is a one-one correspondence between
the infinite multiplicity of instants in a finite interval of time and an infinite multiplicity of points
in a finite portion of space, the difficulty arising from divisibility remains the same. The
mathematical conception of continuity as infinite series applies not to movement regarded as an
act, but rather to picture of movement as viewed from the outside. The act of movement, i.e.
movement lived and not as thought, does not admit of divisibility.”240

Iqbal’s argument is not easy to grasp, one should frankly admit; especially his divisions of “act”,
“thought” and “lived” demand not only intense mental labour but also a very vivid and rich
imagination to be understood. Luckily, Iqbal himself has interpreted it in the third lecture of the
Reconstruction, which we shall quote and discuss a little later.

Note: As per M. Saeed Sheikh’s research, this argument quoted in the name of Russell is not his,
but of H. Wildon Carr’s made during the course of his exposition on Russell’s views on the
subject. The interested readers may consult his book, The General Principle of Relativity, P.36

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From Cantor and Russell, Iqbal moves to Einstein, who considers space as real but relative to the
observer, hence the objective space of Newton’s is rejected. The observed object is variable; its
size, shape and even mass change with the position and speed of the observer. However, in the
third lecture, “The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer”, he has turned attention once
again towards the space and time, rather more to space. He is discussing here the relation of the
Absolute Ego (God) with the space; that either It is space-bound or not? If not, what does Its
infinity mean? One part of the answer is simple: since the Ultimate Reality is spiritual, hence
beyond time and space, particularly space. Second part is sophisticated, for which it would be
better to depend on his own wording, “Moreover, as we have seen before, temporal and spatial
infinities are not absolute. Modern science regards nature not as something static, situate in an
infinite void, but a structure of interrelated events out of whose mutual relations arise the
concepts of space and time. And this is the only other way of saying that space and time are
interpretations which thought puts on the creative activity of the Ultimate Ego. Space and time
are the possibilities of the Ego, only partially realized in the form of our mathematical space and
time. Beyond Him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close
Him off in reference to other egos.”241

However, if space is nothing beyond the creative activity of God, and is neither a confronting
‘other’existing per se, as Iqbal has declared, then where does it exist? What is its locus? Iqbal
has responded very confidently that all such meaningless theological controversies have emerged
due to the misperceptions of the finite minds. He has rephrased the wrong question in the right
words, “The real question which we are called upon to answer is this: Does the universe confront
God as His ‘other’ with space intervening between Him and it? The answer is that, from the
Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event having a ‘before’ and
‘after’. The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him.
This view of the matter will reduce both God and the world to two separate entities, confronting
each other in the empty receptacle of an infinite space………..The world of matter, therefore, is
not a stuff co-eternal with God, operated upon by Him from a distance as it were. It is, in its real
nature, one continuous act which thought breaks up into a plurality of mutually exclusive
things”.242 Here Iqbal has successfully explained what does he mean by “one continuous act of

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creation” and has explicitly stated his considered views regarding the placement of the universe
in the scheme of creation. He has categorically asserted that:

i- Universe has no separate existence other than God;

ii- It was not created at a specific moment of time in the past.

Both of these assertions have peculiar and unique logical consequences, as they make Iqbal stand
in the row of committed pantheists. Pantheism is a subtle snare into which Iqbal gets entrapped
somehow or the other. He knows it well and has very honestly acknowledged that, “The
operation of thought which is essentially symbolic in character veils the true nature of life, and
can picture it only as a kind of universal current flowing through all things. The result of an
intellectual view of life, therefore, is necessarily pantheistic,”243 Now he has affirmed this
pantheism by declaring indirectly that the universe lies inside the being of God, and is being
emanated from Him; if not created in past, it is definitely emanated as declared by the pantheists.
He has repeated his stance at another place in more or less the same words: The universe, as we
have seen before, is not an ‘other’ existing per se in opposition to God. It is only when we look
at the act of creation as a specific event in the life-history of God that the universe appears as an
independent ‘other’. From the stand-point of all-inclusive Ego, there is no ‘other’. In Him
thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating, are identical.244

However, we are not going to prolong this debate since it has been sufficiently discussed in Part
A of this study.

It is, however, surprising to note that just at the start of the mentioned (third) lecture, Iqbal has
rejected the pantheistic interpretation of the verse, “God is the light of the Heavens and the
Earth” on the pretext that it violates the individuality of God and makes him an amorphous all-
pervasive entity.245 Individuality, either human or divine is very dear to Iqbal; one common
reason for his philosophical affinity for Bergson is latter’s insistence on individuality. Both of
them have vehemently opposed causality and mechanism, since they do not provide ample space
for individuality to grow. The creative evolution of Bergson is without any end and objective,
because teleology presupposes a ready-made pre-conceived product and not an INDIVIDUAL,
who is not the replica of the already existent but a gifted, chosen being who has the capability of

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transforming humanity and creating a revolution on the earth. The Individuality is the same,
which has been named as Khudi by Iqbal and Transcendental Subjectivity by Husserl. This we
shall elucidate in the Segment 2 of the same part, under the heading of religious/mystic
experience.

However, before moving to the Segment 2, the last quote of this segment by Iqbal pertaining to
causality would be very enlightening, which reads, “The truth is that the causal chain wherein we
try to find a place for the ego is itself an artificial construction of ego for its own purposes. The
ego is called upon to live in a complex environment, and he cannot maintain his life in it without
reducing it to a system which would give him some kind of assurance as to the behaviour of
things around him. The view of the environment as a system of cause and effect is thus an
indispensable instrument of the ego, and not a final expression of the nature of Reality. Indeed in
interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby
acquires and amplifies its freedom”. (Iqbal uses simultaneously ‘he’ and ‘it’ for the ego).

This beautiful passage tells us that causality is an artificial facilitating apparatus created by ego
itself. Ego is actually not bound by it rather surmounts nature with its help and enjoys greater
freedom. Who is that ego, benefitting from such a privileged position? This is definitely that ego
in which ‘individuality’ has reached a certain standard point of maturity and hence it is able to
have a direct contact and communication with the Ultimate Ego or Reality. Let us have a
thorough survey of this ego in the Segment 2, that is, religious/mystical experience.

Segment 2:

Poet of the East and Bergson have remarkably similar views on the topic. Both believe in the
validity rather superiority of the knowledge achieved through this experience. Importance and
significance of this mystical experience in their respective philosophical systems may be
assessed from the fact that Iqbal has started the Reconstruction from the same; the first lecture of
it is named, “Knowledge and Religious Experience”. Whereas Bergson has written his
masterpiece Creative Evolution to pave the way for a person in whom individuality has reached
its peak and he is able to break the rigid and static world-order to replace it with a dynamic,
active, energetic and vibrant one. His other and the last great work, The Two Sources of Morality

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and Religion, is almost entirely dedicated to prove supremacy of mysticism over the organized or
traditional religion, whom he has named static religion as well.

Iqbal delivered his lectures comprising Reconstruction from 1928-29, whereas Bergson
published The Two Sources of Morality and Religion in 1932. Hence it is may be asserted with
reasonable certainty that Iqbal influenced Bergson in the development of his ideas regarding
mysticism, its specific frame of mind and validity. It is a fact beyond doubt that special sort of
intellectual harmony existed between the two contemporary philosophers. They had common and
shared outlook regarding very many problems of philosophy, theology, religion, politics and life
as such. A present- day French philosopher has given the name of “intellectual affinity” to the
mental and emotional relationship which existed between Iqbal and Bergson. There are some
reliable evidences that both met at Paris in some part of 1931. Iqbal, probably from his return
from 2nd Round-Table Conference at London stayed shortly at Paris specially to see Bergson.
The letter was not feeling well, but received Iqbal very warmly and cordially. Both exchanged
ideas for sufficiently long hours. Iqbal and Bergson regularly corresponded too. The result in the
form of strong mutual influence is in front of us.

In the shortest possible words, if we wish to define the mystic, then he is a person who has
overcome the Kantian categories and is able to break the space-time -causality nexus; may live in
pure-duration, has surpassed the intellect and is at the level of intuition. Having all these
characteristics, he may have the direct experience of the Reality and consequently with the
vigour and boundless energy of this experience brings a mighty and sustainable revolution. He
causes lasting change in human behaviour and character and transforms it forever.

But how is this great personality born? What are the pre-conditions of his birth? Which sort of
socio-cultural milieu nurtures his genesis, growth and development? All these questions need a
little bit more elaboration of Bergson’s conception of consciousness and in Creative Evolution.
We may recall that both Iqbal and Bergson consider life and consciousness beyond mechanical
explanation; it has been discussed at length in Part A. In the third chapter of Creative Evolution,
Bergson writes under a subheading of “Mankind”, “With man, consciousness breaks the chain.
In man, and in man alone, it sets itself free. The whole history of life until man has been that of
the efforts of consciousness to raise matter, and of the more or less complete overwhelming of

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consciousness by the matter which has fallen back on it. The enterprise was paradoxical, if,
indeed, we may speak here otherwise than by metaphor of enterprise and of effort. It was to
create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom, to make a machine which
should triumph over mechanism, and to use the determinism of nature to pass through the
meshes of the net which this very determinism has spread.”246 [Italics added].

He continues in the same spirit, “It is in this quite special sense that man is the “term” and the
“end” of evolution. Life, we have said, transcends finality as it transcends the other categories. It
is essentially a current sent through matter, drawing from it what it can.247”

In this path of evolution, human consciousness acquired some special faculty not owned by any
other living organism. But during further journey, it lost this faculty and relied more on intellect.
Whereas its salvation lies definitely in regaining the treasure it threw away as something useless
or spare. Let us see what he has said in his own words, “It is true that it has not only abandoned
cumbersome baggage on the way; it has also had to give up valuable goods. Consciousness, in
man, is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it seems, to have been also
intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of the
consciousness: intuition goes to the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction,
and finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter. A complete and perfect
humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full
development. And in between this humanity and ours, we may conceive any number of stages,
corresponding to all the degrees imaginable of intelligence and of intuition.248”

But why does all this happen? Why does life follow the path of evolution at all? Why do intellect
and intuition come into being and adopt their respective roles? Who guides them and why? Who
is the propagator of consciousness and compels it untie the shackles of mechanical causality?
This is nothing else but the push of life, the famous Élan Vital or Vital Impetus of Bergson. This
impulse has nothing to do with the external factors and it is something strictly and purely
internal. It is simultaneously the endogenous guide, stimulant and motivator of life in divergent
directions of evolution. As Bergson, himself explains, “The evolution of life in the double
direction of individuality and association has therefore nothing accidental about it: it is due to the
very nature of life249”. [Italics added]. It is pertinent to mention that the one direction, that is,

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intellect leads to association, while the other, intuition turns towards individuality. Hence a
mystic is the product of the same push of life, the changing realities of world and conditions of
life produce him or create him spontaneously. However, their trajectory or the route of action
does need a thorough investigation. Here the starting point for us is to see which sort of
environment promotes which faculty and which institutions. How someone endowed with
intuition; the “gifted man” in the terminology of Bergson is raised and brought onto world-stage?
To answers these interesting and important questions we have to explore The Two Sources of
Morality and Religion, the last work of the philosopher of life.

“………not only how society “constraints” individuals, but again how the individual can set up
a judge and wrest from it a moral transformation. If society is self-sufficient, it is the supreme
authority. But, it is only one of the aspects of life; we can easily conceive that life, which has had
to set down the human species at a certain point of its evolution, imparts a new impetus to
exceptional individuals who have immersed themselves anew in it, so that they can help society
further along its way”250.

To proceed with this line of argument we have to have acquaintance with two very familiar sets
of phrases used by Bergson in the context of the topic. These are “Open and closed societies”
and “Open and closed morality”. Any reader of philosophy immediately recalls Karl Popper
when listens to the phrase, open and closed society. However, the fact of the matter is that it was
Bergson who first of all introduced these two terms. According to Bergson, the earlier and
elementary human societies were essentially the closed societies; which were small
agglomerations to which people were drawn by instincts. However, such close societies exit till
date “their essential characteristic is nonetheless to include at any moment a certain number of
individuals and exclude others”.251 These closed societies may be very large in size like our
current communities, countries and nations. These societies were and still are very large in
number. An open society on the other hand is used as a singular by Bergson. An open society is
that which includes entire humanity without any distinction. Similarly, the closed morality deals
with those obligations of man which are necessary for the stability, solidarity and sustainability
of that society. This morality is generally based on instinct. Open morality, on the other hand is
beyond every boundary and is all-inclusive. It aims at the welfare and well-being of entire
humanity. Bergson differentiates the both in this way, “Hence, between the first morality and the

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second, lies the whole distance between repose and movement. The first is supposed to be
immutable. If it changes, it immediately forgets that it has changed, or it acknowledges no
change. The shape it assumes at any given time claims to be the final shape. But the second is a
forward thrust, a demand for movement; it is the very essence of mobility”.252

Dante Germino of University of Virginia, in his research paper, “Henri Bergson: Activist
Mysticism and the Open Society”, has made a very simple, clear and coherent comparison of the
closed and open society, as given below:

Closed morality Open Morality

Based on pressure Based on inspiration

Aims at self-preservation Aims at fuller life
Static, immobile Dynamic, progressive
Gives feeling of pleasure, well being Gives feelings of joy
Derived from society Derived from God
Applies to one's fellow-citizens Applies to all men and all life
Repose Movement

This easy and readable distinction between open and closed moralities will facilitate us very
much to comprehend the personality and methodology of the mystic and the nature of his
experience.

Bergson is of the opinion that “The result of this investigation is clear; it is for closed, simple
societies that the moral structure, original and fundamental in man, is made. I grant that the
organic tendencies do not stand out clearly to our consciousness. They constitute, nevertheless,
the strongest element of obligation.” 253Bergson declares the purely static morality as infra-
intellectual and the purely dynamic one as supra-intellectual. The first one is the intention and
choice of the nature, while the second one is the creation and contribution of man’s genius254.
The closed societies are composed of men who bow their head before the authority of closed
morality which in turns guarantees them security and the preservation of the self and the species.
There are some men who are genius; genius is of two types, genius of the mind as well as genius
of the will. Latter is the man who places himself in the current of the vital impetus again. As we

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have seen and analyzed thoroughly that the activity of the vital impetus is beyond prediction.
Similarly “genius defies all anticipations. Through those geniuses of the will, the impetus of life,
traversing matter, wrests from it, for the future of the species, promises such as were out of the
question when the species was being constituted”. 255 Intelligence also supports the process. It so
happens that “intelligence, expanding through its own efforts, has developed unexpectedly. It has
freed men from restrictions to which they were condemned by the limitations of their nature. This
being so, not it was impossible that some of them, specially gifted, should reopen that which was
closed and do, at least for themselves, what nature could not possibly have done for mankind.” 256
[Italics added].

These “freed men” are actually mystics in the Bergsonian terminology, who are the exceptional
souls who sense their kinship with the soul of Everyman. They do not remain within the limit of
the group and have immense love for entire humanity. These men are the supreme outcome of
the vital impulse which brings them to the central stage at a specific moment in the evolution of
life. Their personalities are marked by love, which is the very essence of the creative effort. 257

“True mystics simply open their souls to the oncoming waves…….they prove to be great men of
action, to the surprise of those for whom mysticism is nothing but visions and raptures and
ecstasies. That which they have allowed to flow into them is a stream flowing down and seeking
through them to reach their fellow- men; the necessity to spread around them what they have
received affects them an onslaught of love. A love which each one of them stamps with his own
personality. A love which is in each of them an entirely new emotion, capable of transposing
human life into another tone.” 258 One may see Iqbal’s ideas chirping behind the words of great
French philosopher. Iqbal has used both the words, “mystic” and “prophetic”; however, he has
made a distinction between mystical and prophetic consciousness. There is a great harmony
between the two thinkers regarding the ideal of love. The same love resonates in Iqbal’s poetry
as Ishq which makes a dry reed sing and converts it from a dead straw to a soulful and vibrant
flute pulsating with life! The same flute which is complaining of separation from its companion,
from its source and is desperate for reunion. The hues and nuances of Pantheism are worth-
noting.

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However, before moving further, a brief introduction with two of Bergson’s special terms will be
essential. These are the Static and Dynamic religions. (These terms immediately make us recall
Hanafi’s position regarding religion when he asserted that there is not right or wrong religion but
only are static or dynamic religion. See reference no.18 above in Section A of this study). We
would try to be as concise as possible so as to avoid digression. Bergson has devoted a very
lengthy chapter to the idea of a static religion; however, he has very comprehensively defined it
at one place, “Static religion, such as we find it when it stands alone, attaches man to life, and
consequently individual to society, by telling him tales on a par with those with which we lull
children to sleep. Of course they are not like other stories. Being produced by the myth-making
function in response to an actual need and not free from pleasure, they counterfeit reality as
actually perceived, to the point of making us act accordingly”.259 This is the level of intelligence.
But can this static structure may be broken, is it possible for someone to receive fresh energy
from the impetus of life and revolutionize everything? Definitely! This man is mystic and the
new order he is going to create will be dynamic religion. How? What will be his roadmap and
which faculties would he need in the process? Bergson answers with certainty, “Not through
intelligence, at least not through intelligence alone, could he do so: intelligence would be more
likely to proceed in the opposite direction……………., it does not attain any reality. But we
know that all around intelligence there lingers still a fringe of intuition, vague and evanescent.” 260
According to Bergson, a soul strong and noble enough is capable of utilizing this fringe of
intuition. He will convert the static religion into the dynamic one addressing a society
comprising all humanity. His detachment of every particular thing will become attachment to life
in general. Here Bergson raises a relevant question and asks would it be justified to call this later
attitude a religion? Since, in approach and outlook, mysticism or the dynamic religion is
markedly different from the static religion. “Yes”, Bergson replies, “there are many reasons to
use word religion in both cases. In the first place mysticism---for that is what we have in mind—
may, it is true, lift the soul to another plane: it none the less ensures for the soul, to a pre-eminent
degree, the security and serenity which is the function of static religion to provide. But we must
above all bear in mind that pure mysticism is a rare essence, that is generally found in diluted
form……..In defining mysticism by its relation to the vital impetus, we have implicitly admitted
that true mysticism is rare.”261

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Now we come to the core question? What does a mystic feel? What happens to him? What is the
content of that condition or the state which is known as the mystical experience? In the simplest
words what is meant by the mystical experience? Bergson has responded to these questions very
explicitly and thoroughly (how did he come to know? This we shall discuss in criticism), “It (the
mystical soul) does not directly perceive the force that moves it, but it feels an indefinable
presence, or divines it through a symbolic vision. Then comes a boundless joy, an all absorbing
ecstasy or an enthralling rapture: God is there, and the soul in God. Mystery is no more.
Problems vanished, darkness is dispelled; everything is flooded with light. But for how long? An
imperceptible anxiety, hovering above the ecstasy, descends and clings to it like a
shadow………For it shows that the soul of the great mystic does not stop at ecstasy, as at the end
of a journey………Its life, then, is not yet divine. The soul is aware of this, hence its vague
disquietude, hence the agitation in repose which is the striking feature of what we call complete
mysticism: it means that the impetus has acquired the momentum to go further………The final
phase, characteristic of great mysticism is imminent. To analyze this ultimate preparation is
impossible, for the mystics themselves have barely had the glimpse of its mechanism.”262 [Italics
added].

It is time now to switch-over to Iqbal and see what he says regarding mystical experience. Iqbal
is an ardent advocate of this experience right from the very beginning and the main purpose of
his erudite six lectures is to prove the validity of mystic experience. He applies two types of tests
to it, that is, philosophical test and the pragmatic test. These, especially the latter will be
discussed here in detail. As mentioned earlier, Iqbal has started the Reconstruction from the same
topic. Iqbal, a very competent and capable lawyer as well, pleads in favour of the religious
experience fervently and brings the testimony of the personality as exalted, sublime and adored
as the Prophet (PBUH) of Islam. He writes, “The revealed and mystic literature of mankind bears
ample testimony to the fact that religious experience has been too enduring and dominant in the
history of mankind to be rejected as mere illusion… …….The facts of religious experience are
facts among the other facts of human experience and, in the capacity of yielding knowledge by
interpretation, one fact is as good as another. Nor is there anything more irreverent in critically
examining of this region of human experience. The Prophet of Islam was the first critical
observer of psychic phenomena. Bukhari and other traditionalists have given us the full account

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of his observation of the psychic Jewish youth, Ibn Sayyad, whose ecstatic moods attracted the
Prophet’s notice. He tested him, questioned him and examined him in various moods. Once he
hid himself behind the stem of a tree to listen to his mutterings. The boy’s mother, however,
warned him of the approach of the Prophet. Thereupon the boy immediately shook off his mood
and the Prophet remarked: ‘If she had let him alone the thing would have been cleared up’”.263

Iqbal, however, has lamented the approach of those researchers including Macdonald who could
not appreciate the spirit of the Prophet’s observation, which was purely scientific and empirical.
Even the Muslim intellectuals could not comprehend the profundity of the matter; it was only the
Ibn Khaldun who could better understand the significance of the phenomenon. Iqbal has
highlighted the inadequacy of modern psychology to analyze fully the subliminal levels of
consciousness, and for which only “normal” states of consciousness are worth-considering alone.
Iqbal has enumerated five major characteristics of the mystical experience, which resemble very
much with those mentioned by Bergson. These are as under:

a- Immediacy: It is immediate like all other human experiences. As other experiences may
be interpreted, similarly, mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge
of God. The immediacy means that God may be known as any other object, since; He
is not a mathematical entity without any reference to experience. [Emphasis added].

b- Unanalyzable Whole: Mystic experience is a whole or totality which cannot be

decomposed or analyzed in part. “The mystic state brings us into contact with the total
passage of Reality in which all the stimuli merge into one another and form a single un-
analyzable unity in which the ordinary distinction of the subject and object does not
exist”264. [Emphasis added].

c- Intimate Association with the Unique Other Self: Mystic state is a moment of intimate
association with a Unique Other Self, transcending, encompassing and momentarily
suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience. Considering its content
the mystic state is highly objective and cannot be regarded as a mere retirement into the

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 mists of pure subjectivity. But you will ask me how immediate experience of God, as an
Independent Other Self, is at all possible. The mere fact that the mystic state is passive
does not finally prove the veritable ‘otherness’ of the Self experienced. [Emphasis
added].

d- Incommunicability: Since the quality of the mystic experience is to be directly

experienced, it is obvious that it cannot be communicated. Mystic states are more like
feelings than thought. The interpretation which the mystic or the prophet puts on the
content of his religious consciousness can be conveyed to others in the form of
propositions, but the content itself cannot be transmitted. The incommunicability of
mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling,
untouched by the discursive intellect. Iqbal quotes here the Qur’anic chapter “The Star”,
mentioning the ascension of the Prophet (PBUH) and declares it the psychology of the
experience, not the content. (The chapter was revealed, however, by God and not
described by the Prophet (PBUH) personally; it was not difficult for God to narrate the
content of the experience). [Emphasis added].

Iqbal has repeated the same in the last lecture of the Reconstruction, “Is Religion
Possible?” It may, however, be said that the level of experience to which concepts are
inapplicable cannot yield any knowledge of a universal character, for concepts alone are
capable of being socialized. The standpoint of a man who relies on religious experience
for capturing Reality must always remain individual and incommunicable.

e- Unreality of Serial Time: Mystic for the time being feels him detached from the serial
time, however, this is a temporary phase and he restores his relationship with serial time.
The mystic state in respect of its uniqueness remains in some way related to
common experience. For the purpose of knowledge, then, the region of mystic
experience is as real as any other region of human experience and cannot be ignored
because it cannot be traced back to the sense-perception265.[Emphasis added].

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 Iqbal mentions at another place [Is Religion Possible?], “Another Muslim Sufi poet,
‘Iraqi’ insists in the plurality of space- orders and time-orders and speaks of Divine Time
and Divine-space. It may be that what we call the external world is only an intellectual
construction, and there are other levels of human experience capable of being
systematized by other orders of space and time-levels in which concept and analysis do
not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience”266.

Schematically we should start our critical analysis from Bergson regarding the mystic condition
and its salient features. But some of the points in the assertions of Iqbal are so glaring and
obvious that they demand earlier attention. Unfortunately the description of Iqbal does not make
a coherent whole and is least helpful in understanding the nature of such an important
experience. If we copy the highlighted lines above and analyze them, we will find ourselves with
a mixture of contradictory statements which are not consistent with each other. In point ‘c’
above, Iqbal has given two entirely different statements in a single paragraph, that is:

i- The mystic state is highly objective;

ii- The mystic state is passive.

Note the following lines:

i- God may be known as any other object;

ii- (In mystic experience) distinction of the subject and object does not exist;
iii- The mystic state in respect of its uniqueness remains in some way related to common
experience;
iv- (The mystic) experience is to be directly experienced. Therefore,
v- Its content itself cannot be transmitted.

It is surprising to note that mystic experience at a time is ordinary, like any other object but
private and direct. On the other hand in which distinction of the object and subject fades!!!
Moreover, it is so individual that its content cannot be transmitted. But in some way is related to
common experience. There are two very conspicuous points to be noticed:

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 i- How can God be known as an ordinary object, while He is unlike anything in the
world. (Al-Qur’an, 42:11).
ii- Moreover, by virtue of its very nature mystic experience is something extra-ordinary
and special. How can it be declared common?
iii- If the distinction of object and subject is lost, is it nothing but undiluted pure
pantheism?
iv- If it is absolutely unique and personal, in which sense of the word it is objective?
v- It is incommunicable, cannot be transmitted, then how do people know about it? How
does the mystic/prophet explain it?
vi- If the content of mystic experience is incommunicable, what is the content of the
propositions? What do the propositions describe then?

The last question bears special significance since Bergson too, has acknowledged above that to
analyze this ultimate preparation is impossible, for the mystics themselves have barely had the
glimpse of its mechanism. So the matters which are not very clear to the first person, how were
they revealed to the third persons, that is, Bergson and Iqbal? Have they ever met with some
active mystics and Sufis? What is the source of this mysterious knowledge which cannot even be
elaborated and elucidated in legible language? May, the religion meant to guide the entire
humanity be founded or based on such an unclear and dubious experience, which is neither
replicable nor demonstrable?

Iqbal, being conscious of this serious objection has justified the incommunicability of the mystic
experience in the form of the following argument. According to him, religious experience is the
climax of religious life, since one discovers in it the ego as an individual deeper than his
conceptually describable habitual self-hood.267 “It is in the contact with the Most Real that the
ego discovers its uniqueness, its metaphysical status, and the possibility of improvement in this
status. Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually
manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological
transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories”.268

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 It seems that the fundamental task for Iqbal is to reject “logical categories”; the entire edifice of
religious experience has been constructed to keep it beyond the categories and to defy Kant.
Iqbal, in justifying and validating the mystic/religious experience reveals his disgust again for
science in the passage to follow, “It seems that the method of dealing with Reality by means of
concepts is not at all a serious way of dealing with it. Science does not care whether its electron
is real entity or not. It may be a mere symbol, a mere convention. Religion, which is essentially a
mode of actual living, is the only serious way of handling Reality. As a form of higher
experience it is corrective of our concepts of philosophical theology or at least makes us
suspicious of purely rational process which forms these concepts”269.

As we have quoted above in Section A, that Altaf Ahmad Azami has rejected religious experience
as a very dubious source of knowledge which is not reliable without the guidance of a clear
revealed text. Actually as per the opinion of Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal proposed
mystic/religious experience as a basis for scientific experiment since it offers common ground for
both science and religion. His second objective was to make Islamic thought acceptable for
modern Muslim mind, specifically youth. Regretfully, according to Azami both purposes failed
because the Iqbal’s discussion of the ideas is so difficult and complex that it may not be fully
understood even by the experts, let aside the youth. Azami sums up his critique in the following
words, “…….the religion whose possibility Iqbal discusses…..is not a religion that men need.
Iqbal’s argument of compatibility between science and religion (higher mysticism) is
fallacious”270.

Azami firmly insists that scientific and religious/mystical experiences have nothing in common.
Besides, scientific experience is not limited to a few privileged persons like religious experience.
Iqbal was misled by the belief that the Ultimate Reality may be traced from the material world.
The Qur’anic view of nature and the universe does not agree with that of higher mysticism.
Hanafi has mentioned four forms of rhetoricism, pernicious to religious studies: i-tautology, ii-
apologetics, iii- rhetoric and iv- intuitionist approach. This intuitionist approach, by definition
resembles very much with that of the religious experience of Iqbal. Hanafi has defined it as,
“every immediate expression of intensions, visions, or grasping of immanent primary truths of the

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religious, without any regard for scientific demonstration, proof, or analysis”. 271 If our
interpretation is not wrong, Hanafi himself is not very much in agreement with the religious
experience.

Bergson, nevertheless, has tried to annul this argument with a lengthy counter-argument which is
sufficiently interesting to be quoted here: though abridged: For it is alleged that the experiences of
the great mystics are individual and exceptional, that they cannot ,therefore, be compared to a
scientific experiment and cannot possibly solve problems. There is a great deal to be said on this
point. In the first place, it is by no means certain that a scientific experiment, or more generally an
observation recorded by science, can always be repeated or verified…………:but the mystic too
has gone on a journey that others can potentially, if not actually, undertake.” 272 Anyhow, he has
acknowledged with great frankness and integrity that, “On the contrary, mysticism means
nothing, to the man who has no experience of it, however slight.”273

The next important point is the retention of the mystic’s own personality during the experience
since the traditional mysticism (which is strictly opposed by Iqbal) believes in the merger of the
finite in the infinite. How can the finite sustain itself in the presence of the infinite? It has to lose
its individuality and identity in the presence of the Higher Self. Conversely, Bergson and Iqbal
do not agree with it, since the individuality the mystic has attained with so much labour, hard-
work, industry and toil should not be lost under any condition. Bergson is very confidant here
that a person in whom the individuality and ego-hood have reached a definite level of maturity is
not going to melt under any temperature. He has lucidly expressed, “A soul strong enough, noble
enough to make this effort would not stop to ask whether the principle with which it is now in
touch is the transcendent cause of all things or merely its earthly delegate. It would be content to
feel itself pervaded, though retaining its own personality, by a being immeasurably mightier than
itself, just as an iron is pervaded by the fire which makes it glow.”274

Iqbal says in the same vein, “Who can be the subject of this exception but those in whom the ego
has reached the very highest point of intensity. And the climax of this development is reached
when the ego is able to retain full self-possession, even in the case of direct contact with the all-
embracing Ego. As the Qur’an says of the Prophet’s vision of the Ultimate Ego:

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 ‘His eye turned not aside, nor did it wander’. (53:17).
This is the ideal of perfect manhood in Islam. Nowhere has it found a better literary expression
than in a Persian verse which speaks of the Holy Prophet’s experience of Divine illumination:
‘Moses fainted away by a mere surface illumination of Reality: Thou seest the very substance of
Reality with a smile’. Pantheistic Sufism obviously cannot favour such a view, and suggests
difficulties of a philosophical nature. How can the Infinite and the finite egos mutually exclude
each other? Can the finite ego, as such, retain its finitude besides the Infinite Ego? This difficulty
is based on a misunderstanding of the true nature of the Infinite. True infinity does not mean
infinite extension which cannot be conceived without embracing all available finite extensions.
Its nature consists in intensity and not extensity; and the moment we fix our gaze on intensity, we
begin to see that the finite ego must be distinct, though not isolated from the Infinite”275.

Iqbal returns to the same question on the very last page of the Reconstruction, rather ends it on
this. He says, “The end of the ego’s quest is not emancipation from the limitations of
individuality; it is on the other hand, a more precise definition of it. The final act is not an
intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will
with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through
concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action. It is a moment of
supreme bliss and also a moment of great trial for the ego.”276

Another vey very germane and significant matter which we are going to discuss now is of the
sanity and mental soundness of the people who report religious experience and declare
themselves either prophets or the mystics. People who listen to divine voices or have visions, are
they not deluded or have hallucinations in fact? How can we believe in them while we are unable
to replicate their experience, additionally they may not describe it in ordinary language. So what
proof do we have of their intellectual normalcy? A person whose is narrating an experience
beyond normal consciousness, is his own consciousness normal? This is a major question falling
simultaneously in the domains of history and psychology.

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Both Bergson and Iqbal have defended their position on mysticism, but it is a matter-of fact that
the stance of Iqbal is very strong and elaborate, supported well by the arguments from
contemporary psychologists.

Bergson has expressed his amazement that how the great mystics can be classed with the
mentally diseased? He elucidates, “They talk of their visions, their ecstasies, and their raptures.
These are phenomena which also occur in sick people and which are part of their malady. An
important work has lately appeared on ecstasy regarded as a psycho-asthenic manifestation
(Pierret Janet, De l’angoissa a’ l’ extase). But there exist morbid states which are imitations of
healthy states; the latter are none the less healthy, and the former morbid. A lunatic may think he
is an emperor…………..In just the same way it is possible to parody mysticism, and the result
will be mystic insanity: does it follow that mysticism is insanity?” 277 Bergson replies this
question himself with great vigour, “There is no denying that ecstasies, visions, raptures, are
abnormal states, and that it is difficult to distinguish between the abnormal and the morbid. And
such has been the opinion of the great mystics themselves. They have been the first to warn their
disciples against visions which were quite likely to be pure hallucinations. And they generally
regarded their visions, when they had any, as of secondary importance, as way side incidents;
they had had to go beyond them, leaving ecstasies and raptures far behind, to reach the goal,
which was identification of divine will with the human will. The truth is that these abnormal
states, resembling the morbid states, and something doubtless very much akin to them, are easily
comprehensible, if we stop to think what a shock to the soul is passing from the static to the
dynamic, from the closed to the open, from everyday life to the mystic life. When the darkest
depths of the soul are stirred, what rises to the surface and attains consciousness takes on there, if
it be intense enough, the form of an image or emotion. The image is often pure hallucination, just
as the emotion may be meaningless agitation. But they both may express the fact that the
disturbance is a systematic readjustment with a view to equilibrium on a higher level: the image
then becomes symbolic of what is about to happen, and the emotion is the concentration of the
soul awaiting transformation. The latter is the case of mysticism, but it may partake of the other;
what is only abnormal may be accompanied by what is distinctly morbid; we cannot upset the
regular relation of the conscious to unconscious without running a risk. So we must not be
surprised if nervous disturbances and mysticism sometimes go together; we find the same

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disturbances in other forms of genius, notably in musicians. They have to be regarded merely
incidental. The former have no more to do with mystical inspiration than the latter with
musical.”278

Bergson repeats more or less the same argument at another place in similar words, “We have
disposed of those which consist in asserting that no mystic is sound in the head and that all
mysticism is a pathological state. The great mystics, the only ones that we are dealing with, have
generally been men and women of action, endowed with superior common sense: it matters little
that some of them had imitators who well deserved to be called “crazy” or that there are cases
when they themselves felt the effect of extreme and prolonged strain of mind and will; many a
man of genius had been in the same condition”.279

Iqbal presents a very cogent argument regarding the uniqueness and rarity of mystic experience.
Why it is reserve for some chosen few? He is of the firm opinion that Psychology is unable to
grasp the profundity of the mystic experience, since, “Psychologically speaking, all states,
whether their content is religious or non-religious, are organically determined. The scientific
form of mind is as much organically determined as the religious. Our judgment as to the creation
of genius is not at all determined or even remotely affected by what our psychologists may say
regarding its organic conditions. A certain kind of temperament may be a necessary condition
for a certain kind of receptivity; but the antecedent condition cannot be regarded as the whole
truth about the character of what is received. The truth is that the organic causation of our
mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or
inferior in point of value.”280[Italics added].

Iqbal quotes a passage from William James’ The Verities of Religious Experience, wherein he
has mentioned the dilemma of the Christian mystics. He says that it was difficult to differentiate
between the really divine miracles and the malice of the demon, which the religious person
twofold more the child of hell he was before. Iqbal affirms James that it is really the problem of
all mystics and not of Christian mystics exclusively. The demon or Satan does interfere with the
religious state as a Qur’anic verse stands as a testimony: “We have not sent any Apostle or
Prophet before thee among whose desires Satan injected not some wrong desire, but God shall

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bring to naught that which Satan has suggested. Thus shall God affirm His revelations, for God is
Knowing and Wise.” (Al-Qur’an, 22:52).

Iqbal also quotes a relevant passage from The Meaning of God in Human Experience, by
W.E.Hocking and concludes positively, “A purely psychological method, therefore, cannot
explain religious passion as a form of knowledge. It is bound to fail in the case of newer
psychologists as it did fail in the case of Locke and Hume”281.

Though Iqbal has haughtily rejected that Science with any of its branches is able to understand
and explain the religious experience, but has returned to his favourite thesis in the seventh and
the last lecture of his book; wherein he has once again strongly tried to prove that religion and
science are actually one. He makes a distinction between outer and inner and external and
internal behaviour of Reality. Science deals with its outer nature, whereas religion is concerned
with the inner one. Let us appreciate the spirit of the ensuing passage, “The truth is that the
religious and the scientific processes though involving different methods are identical in their
final aim. Both aim at reaching the most real……….religion……..is far more anxious to reach
the ultimately real than science. ………The scientific and the religious processes are in a sense
parallel to each other.”282 The only difference in the eye of Iqbal is that in scientific research ego
is exclusive or an outside observer, while in the religious endeavour it is inclusive, inside the
process and an existential participant of the experience.

Iqbal continues his argument in favour of the meaningfulness and normality of the mystical
experience. He affirms emphatically, “These experiences are perfectly natural, like our normal
experiences. The evidence is that they possess a cognitive value for the recipient, and, what is
much more important, a capacity to centralize the forces of the ego and thereby to endow him
with a new personality. The view that such experiences are neurotic or mystical will not finally
settle the question of their meaning and value. If an outlook beyond physics is possible, we must
courageously face the possibility, even though it may disturb or tend to modify our normal ways
of life and thought. The interests of truth require that we must abandon our present attitude. It
does not matter in the least if the religious attitude is originally determined by some kind of
physiological disorder. George Fox may be a neurotic; but who can deny his purifying power in

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England’s religious life of his day. Muhammad, we are told, was a psychopath. Well, if a
psychopath has the power to give a fresh direction to the course of human history, it is a point of
highest psychological interest to search his original experience which has turned slaves into the
leaders of men, and has inspired the conduct and shaped the career of whole races of mankind.
Judging from the various types of activity which emanated from the movement initiated by the
Prophet of Islam, his spiritual tension and the kind of behaviour which issued from it, cannot be
regarded as a response to a mere fantasy inside his brain. It is impossible to understand it except
as a response to an objective situation generative of new enthusiasm, new organization, new
starting points”283. [Italics added].

Iqbal and Bergson have applied the same test to evaluate and assess the genuineness or fakeness
of the religious experience. We may recall that Iqbal has tested the religious experience with the
help of two criteria in the Reconstruction, that is, philosophical and pragmatic. To refresh our
memory we may read his quote again: “Religious experience, I have tried to maintain, is
essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be
communicated to others, except in the form of a judgment. Now when a judgment which claims
to be the interpretation of a certain region of human experience, not accessible to me, is placed
before me for my assent, I am entitled to ask, what is the guarantee of its truth? ……Happily we
are in possession of tests which do not differ from those applicable to other forms of knowledge.
These I call the intellectual test and the pragmatic test.”284

The pragmatic test means to judge something with the help of its fruits, that is, results, outcomes
and consequences, while the intellectual test is more akin to the roots or origin of any
phenomenon. As per Iqbal, the intellectual test is applied by the philosopher, while the pragmatic
one falls within the domain of the prophet.285

For both Iqbal and Bergson, the significance of the religious experience lies in the return of the
prophet/mystic to the world with renewed vigour and a message for humanity. “Hardly had these
mystics come back from Heaven to the earth, when they felt incumbent on them to teach
mankind”, Bergson writes in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. He further elaborates,
“They had to tell all men that the world perceived by the eyes of the body is doubtless real, but

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there is something else, and that something else is no mere possibility or probability, like the
conclusion of an argument, but the certainty of the thing experienced.”286

Iqbal, however, makes a very fine and subtle distinction between the prophet and the mystic
regarding their respective conditions and subsequent roles and duties. Iqbal says in his first
lecture regarding the both, “Both the mystic and the prophet return to the normal level of
experience, but with the difference that the return of the prophet, as I will show later , may be
fraught with infinite meaning for mankind”.287

Iqbal as per his promise explains the significance of the return of the prophet from the state of
union to the world and humanity in the fifth lecture of Reconstruction, of which the title is, “The
Spirit of the Muslim Culture”. He starts this discourse from a famous saying of the Saint Abd al-
Quddus of Gangoh, “Muhammad of Arabia ascended the highest heaven and returned. I swear by
God, that if I had reached that point, I should never have returned.” 288 Iqbal admires this
statement very much, which according to him is matchless and unique in the entire Sufi literature
of the world which might differentiate between the psychological states of a mystic and a
prophet so beautifully. He is fond of the brevity of Gangohi who has settled such a difficult
matter in one sentence only. According to Iqbal, the mystic first of all does not wish to return
from the ecstasy of that unitary experience. Secondly, if he does come back, his return does not
bear any extra-ordinary significance to humanity. On the other hand, “The prophet’s return is
creative. He returns to insert himself into the sweep of time with a view to control forces of
history, and thereby to create a fresh world of ideals. For the mystic the repose of ‘unitary
experience’ is something final; for the prophet it is awakening, within him, of world-shaking
psychological forces, calculated to completely transform the human world. The desire to see his
religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in the prophet. Thus his
return amounts to a kind of pragmatic test of the value of his religious experience.289”

Iqbal draws superb and fascinating philosophical conclusion from the religious experience of the
prophet and its consequences for humanity. He further illuminates the nature and significance of
the prophet’s experience in these words, “In its creative act the prophet’s will judges both itself
and the world of concrete fact in which it endeavours to objectify itself…………Another way of

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judging the value of a prophet’s religious experience, therefore, would be to examine the type of
manhood that he has created, and the cultural world that has sprung out of the spirit of his
message.290” He highlights the underlying logic of the finality of prophethood in this way, “A
prophet may be defined as a type of mystic consciousness in which, ‘unitary experience’ tends to
overflow its boundaries, and seeks opportunities of redirecting and refashioning the forces of
collective life. In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depths only to
spring up again, with fresh vigour to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of
life………..[As a result] In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its
own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot be forever kept in leading
strings; that, in order to achieve full consciousness, man must finally be thrown back on his own
resources291.”

Hence we may conclude that the religious experience of the prophets bears a unique value and
that of the Prophet (PBUH) of Islam was the most specific and precious in the history of
mankind. The experience was so rich, enormous and all-embracing that its enormity harbingered
its end. It was so complete that nothing was left outside its ambit. In the same lecture, Iqbal has
criticized Oswald Spengler for his misinterpretation of Islam. Spengler, according to Iqbal could
not appreciate the significance of the finality of prophethood in Islam. In his critique of The
Decline of the West, Iqbal has pointed out the fallacies of Spengler’s thought. He writes …
“Spengler fails to appreciate the cultural value of the idea of finality of prophethood in Islam. No
doubt, one important feature of Magian culture is a perpetual attitude of expectation, a constant
looking forward for to the coming of Zoroaster’s unborn sons, the Messiah, or the Paraclete, of
the fourth Gospel. I have already indicated the direction in which the student of Islam should
seek the cultural meaning of the doctrine of finality in Islam. It may further be regarded as a
psychological cure of the Magian attitude of constant expectation which tends to give a false
view of history” 292.

So the religious experience of the Prophet (PBUH) has given two eternal and priceless gifts to
the humanity and civilization:
i- A perfect code of life in the form of Islam and its teachings;

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 ii- A sense of responsibility and freedom to mankind based on their trust in their own
capabilities. Now no guidance will come from the heavens and man will have to
depend on his own reason and intellect.

However, before moving to the next point pertaining to the religious experience, we would like
to have a detailed review of Bergson’s philosophical evaluation of the mystical return. Bergson
like Iqbal explains the condition of the mystic in this way, “He has felt truth flowing into his soul
from its fountainhead like an active force. He can no more help spreading it abroad than the sun
can help diffusing its light. Only, it is not by mere words that he will spread it” 293. We would
definitely want to know, what is the stimulant behind this message? Why does he work so hard,
for which cause, what purpose? Bergson answer is not only simple and direct but also according
to our expectations. Yes, this is love, which motivates a mystic to propagate the message to all
mankind. This love is not only for God, but also for entire humanity. Mystic loves all human
beings with the divine love. It may be recalled that the concept of love is the one cherished by
Iqbal, Bergson, Hanafi and Max Scheler. This is going to be discussed in detail shortly.

Bergson, in his fervour of mysticism, challenges the philosophers very assertively regarding their
inability to replicate the services rendered by mystics. “Would the philosophers themselves have
laid down so confidently the principle, so little in keeping with everyday experience, of an equal
participation of all men in a higher essence, if there had not been mystics to embrace all
humanity in one simple indivisible love”?294

Mystics, in Bergson’s opinion are the guides and leaders of the philosophers. In the last pages of
the dynamic religion, he has told us, “It [mysticism] would never for an instant have thought of
becoming completely itself, if certain representative of it had not succeeded, by an individual
effort added to the general work of life, in breaking through the resistance put up by the
instrument, in triumphing over materiality---in a word in getting back to God. These men are the
mystics. They have blazed a trail along which other men may pass. They have, by this very act,
shown to the philosopher the whence and whither of life.295”

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The next important and relevant question is that what a mystic would achieve through this love
which is brimming from his being after the distinctive experience. “What it wants to do, with
God’s help, it is to complete the creation of the human species and make of humanity what it
would have straightaway become, had it been able to assume its final shape without the
assistance of man himself. Or to use words which mean, as we shall see, the same thing in
different terms: its direction is that of the vital impetus; it is this impetus itself, communicated in
its entirety to exceptional men who in their turn would fain impart it to all humanity and by a
living contradiction change into creative effort that created thing which is a species, and turn into
movement what was, by definition, a stop”.296

Therefore, in short, it is the vital impetus which leads a mystic to that stage of individuality,
which enables him1 to receive divine illumination. After receiving that light, the enlightened
man brightens the entire humanity. To which extent this endeavour is successful? This question
may become the topic of another full-length research, and is beyond the scope of the present
study.

The last and vital question is about the nature and role of love in mysticism. What love is and
what is its mechanism of action? If we study the Urdu and Persian poetry of Iqbal, the concept of
love will emerge prominent, distinct and pre-dominant. Love, according to Iqbal is an immense
force which is capable of greatest achievements. Iqbal sees love moving, running and circulating
like blood behind every human endeavour of great import and worthiest consequences. From the
ascension of the Prophet (PBUH) to the conquest of Spain, from the sacrifice of Abraham to the
Battle of Badr, every event is a manifestation of love (Ishq).

For Bergson, love is a “creative energy”, wherein the mystic sees the very essence of God.297
“Has this love an object”? He questions. Then answers himself with great reassurance, “Let us
bear in mind that an emotion of a superior order is self-sufficient” 298. This love has a very clear
roadmap and it knows its job pretty well, “Granted the existence of a creative energy which is
love, and which desires to produce from itself beings worthy to be loved, it might indeed sow
space with worlds whose materiality, as the opposite of divine spirituality, would simply express
the distinction between being created and creating, between the multifarious notes, strung like

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pearls, of a symphony and the indivisible emotion from which they sprang. In each of these
worlds vital impetus and raw matter might thus be complementary aspects of the creation”299.
For Bergson the universe owes its existence to love: Beings have been called into existence who
were destined to love and be loved, since creative energy is to be defined as love. Distinct from
God, Who is this energy itself, they could spring into being.300

A lot may be said about this point, that is, its validity and efficacy; but now it would be better to
conclude this debate, the rest will be covered under the concluding remarks. The last section of
the discussion on mysticism is metaphysics. We have seen during the course of its history, in
every era, in every region, mysticism has not confined itself to intuition, love, feeling and
emotion; rather it has produced profound, splendid and dignified metaphysics. Iqbal has treated
this question very seriously and soberly and has acknowledged that the religion starting from
pure feeling does end at metaphysics. Bergson, on the other hand has almost rejected the idea
and his attitude towards metaphysics is, nonetheless, humiliating and insulting. It would be
interesting to have a critical look on his style, “We have shown elsewhere that part of
metaphysics moves, unconsciously or not, around the question of knowing why anything exists
---why matter, or spirit, or God, rather than nothing at all? But the question presupposes that
reality fills a void, that underneath Being lies nothingness, that de jure there should be nothing,
that we must therefore explain why there is de facto something? And this presupposition is pure
illusion………the idea of abolition of everything is self-destructive, inconceivable; it is a pseudo-
idea, a mirage conjured up by our imagination. But for some reason we have stated elsewhere,
the illusion is natural: its source lies in the depth of the understanding. It raises questions which
are the main origin of metaphysical anguish. Now, for a mystic these questions simply do not
exist, they are optical illusions arising, in the inner world, from the structure of human
intelligence, they recede and disappear as the mystic rises superior to the human point of view.
And, for similar reasons, the mystic will no more worry about the difficulties accumulated by
philosophy around the “metaphysical” attributes of Deity: he has nothing to do with properties
which are mere negations and can only be expressed negatively; he believes that he sees what
God is, for him there is no seeing what God is not. It is therefore on the nature of God,
immediately apprehended on the positive side, I mean on the side which is perceptible to the
eyes of the soul, that the philosophers must question him”301.[Italics added].

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So as we have seen, Bergson has simply dismissed metaphysics in favour of mysticism. For him
metaphysical questions are simply illusions produced by a defective intellectual outlook.

Iqbal, however, has given due respect to metaphysics and has also explained why mystical
experience yearns or strives for a metaphysical expression. Iqbal has mentioned in the first
lecture of Reconstruction, “It must, however, be noted that mystic feeling, like all feeling, has a
cognitive element also; and it is, I believe, because of this cognitive element that it lends itself to
the form of idea. In fact, it is the nature of feeling to seek expression in thought. It would seem
that the two---feeling and idea---are the non-temporal and temporal aspects of the same unit of
inner experience.”302 He further continues the same line of argument in these words, “Thus you
will see that it is because of this essential nature of feeling that while religion starts with feeling,
it has never, in its history, taken itself as a matter of feeling alone and has constantly striven after
metaphysics. The mystic’s condemnation of intellect as an organ of knowledge does not really
find any justification in the history of religion”303.

We shall assess critically Iqbal’s position in our concluding remarks. It is now the time to wind
up this lengthy debate. Why not to end it on an optimistic note of Bergson. “Let a mystic genius
but appear, he will draw after a humanity already vastly grown in body, and whose soul he has
transfigured. He will yearn to make of it a new species; for every species means a collective halt,
and complete existence is mobility in individuality……..Tomorrow the way will be clear, in the
very direction of the breath which had carried life to the point where it had to stop. Let once the
summons of the hero come, we shall not all follow it, but we shall all feel that we ought to, and
we shall see the path before us, which will become a high way if we pass along it. At the same
time, for each and every philosophy the mystery of the supreme obligation will be a mystery no
longer: a journey had been begun, it had had to be interrupted; by setting out once more we are
merely willing again what we have willed at the start. It is always the stop which requires
explanation and not the movement”304.

Let us wait for the golden tomorrow and the arrival of the mystic and move towards concluding
remarks.

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Concluding Remarks:

The above pages covered our detailed review of the two great Muslim philosophers, Muhammad
Iqbal and Hassan Hanafi. Both are the eminent philosophers of the Muslim World and we may
genuinely take pride in them. The scholarship and depth of both is beyond any doubt and their
contribution to the academic and intellectual arena is immense. They were studied in the
background of two great Western philosophers, Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl. We tried to
understand their dialogue, discourse, communication and interaction with Western thought in
general and with Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl in particular. Apparently all the four hail
from separate countries, wrote in different languages and had had diversified backgrounds.
However, there are very many common points which connect them with each other irrespective
of the spatio-temporal disparity. All the four are:

o Dissatisfied with the existing philosophies and their respective methods;

o In favour of the new, energetic and future-oriented outlooks;

o The champions of human dignity, freedom and self-esteem;

o Believers of subjectivity and individuality somehow or the other;

o Striving to liberate philosophy from the outdated patterns of thought and establish it on
firm groundings;

o Heralds of open society, dynamic religion, universal love and humanitarian values;

o Inclined towards pantheism except Husserl.

Hanafi stands distinguished in the galaxy of the contemporary Muslim philosophers and thinkers.
His is a multifaceted personality with quite expanded areas of interest ranging from religion to
revolution, from theology to anthropology and from inter-faith dialogue to cultural harmony. He
is simultaneously a teacher, a reformer, an activist, an ideologue and a non-conformist rebel.
Religious Dialogue and Revolution (1977) is a concrete and profound effort to bring the three
Abrahamic religions together on behalf of Hanafi. His triology, i) Les Methodes d’Exegese

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l’Exegese de la Phenomenologie, ii) La Phenomenology de l’Exegeses, iii) La method Islamique
Generale introduced him to the world as an Islamic Modernist. While other studies and works on
Christian Philosophy, Spinoza, Lessing and Sartre along with his two volumes under the title of
Contemporary Issues have made him one of the illustrious modern Arab ideologues. One of his
flagship projects, that is, Renewal and Heritage will be discussed thoroughly in the forthcoming
part of the present study.

Hanafi has rendered great services on many fronts; but the most remarkable one is the appraisal
of the classical Islamic disciplines from a fresh, novel and unique angle with great practical
implications. As we have seen before in our Section B, that Hanafi applied phenomenological
method to Muslim Jurisprudence and Transcendental Wisdom of Mulla Sadra. His command on
all these disciplines along with phenomenology is literally fascinating. The way he has applied
Husserlian phrases on the Qur’an, Fiqh and Mysticism is simply brilliant. To refresh the memory
the reference numbers 108, 129 and 151-52 above may be visited again.

To bring Theology into the embrace of Anthropology is another bold and far-reaching step of
Hanafi. He has humanized the religion brining it from the aloofness and detachment of heavens
to the hustle and bustle and life of the earth. Hanafi has very competently shown that the essence
of religion in its very nature is human. Since it is the human consciousness which receives it
from the divine source and again it is the human consciousness which interprets, communicates
and propagates it. Here Hanafi’s stance is quite different from that of Iqbal and Bergson, since in
their cases, the religious experience is beyond communication. He was deeply influenced by
Edmund Husserl, hence was studied in his perspective.

Hanafi’s other contribution is his own political theology, which he has divided into the left and
the right. Hanafi compared the vertical, right-wing and conservative theologies of Roman
Catholicism, mysticism and theosophy with the horizontal, progressive and leftist theologies
since the latter blossom ultimately in anthropology 305. He quotes the example of Scripturalist
Protestantism which freed itself from the clutches of the tradition especially with the help of
liberal theology. Hanafi holds it in high esteem since it is much closer to anthropology.

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Iqbal enjoys a distinct, exceptional, exclusive, unique and matchless reputation in the Muslim
World. He is one of the most influential thinkers the world of Islam has produced in 20 th century.
Iqbal’s thought is enthusiastic and full-blooded. His message is thoroughgoing and hearty. His
voice is forceful and vigorous. In the enfeebled and enslaved Muslim scenario he appears as a
harbinger of hope and prophet of a new era. He wishes to populate new towns and cities and is
not an imitator of Kufa and Baghdad. [One of his Urdu verses]. That is why the stagnation of
Muslim thought was an unbearable tragedy for Iqbal: “During the last five hundred years
religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary. There was a time when European
thought received inspiration from the world of Islam.” 306 Iqbal, the philosopher of life, the
thinker of progress and the poet of freedom desperately wished to break that inactivity and
dullness. So he became the first drop of rain himself and created stormy ripples on the tranquil
rather sleeping waters of Muslim theology. Being a great admirer of Bergson and Einstein, he
wished to “reconstruct” the religious thought in Islam. His age was very tumultuous and
turbulent politically speaking but simultaneously very rich and fertile scientifically and
philosophically. Iqbal’s dynamic personality absorbed all the shades and nuances of his
spectacular era and then combined all these colours and hues in the rainbow of Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam. Reconstruction is a magnificent blend of religion, theology, modern
physics, philosophy, psychology, jurisprudence, biology and mysticism besides innumerable
other disciplines. It may be said confidently that Iqbal is the first Muslim thinker to use
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach in the study of religion. Reconstruction will
stand till eternity as a glowing evidence of Iqbal’s scholarship. One may differ with Iqbal’s
approach and results, but there can be no two opinions regarding the depth of his knowledge and
breadth of his analysis. His high-brow style of writing has a taste and flair of its own. Modern
physics besides the philosophy of Bergson was the greatest source of inspiration for Iqbal. One
of the main purposes of the Reconstruction was to reinterpret or if necessary to reconstruct the
basic Islamic beliefs in the light of the findings of the Theory of Relativity.

This was, nevertheless, extraordinarily courageous attempt on behalf of Iqbal; but he not only
delivered these innovative lectures publicly but also published them in the book form. The great
Muslim scholar Syed Suleiman Nadwi (d.1953) being the first critic of Iqbal, advised him not to
publish it, however, Iqbal stuck to his decision307. As expected it caused a stir in the tradition-

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bound and conservative India of 1930s. Iqbal had to face the decrees of apostasy and atheism
from various religious scholars, but he braved all this with stoical forbearance. The seven
lectures of Iqbal will continue to provide food for thought for the generations to come and will
irradiate the intellectual horizon forever with their dazzling luminosity.

Though it has been discussed at length that which motives led Hanafi and Iqbal to get inspiration
from their respective contemporary thought and the thinkers? However, a little recapitulation and
identification of some underlying Psycho-social factors would not be out of context. It is neither
surprising nor objectionable at all to be impressed or influenced by some school of thought or
tradition; rather the opposite is not humanly possible. Any receptive and sensitive thinker may
not help to escape the spirit of the age. It is, nonetheless, impossible to be totally immune to the
contemporary ideas and movements. Moreover, the idealization and romance are the inseparable
traits of human personality. One needs someone to glorify and to be exalted in the position of a
mentor in every period of one’s life; it is equally true in all aspect of life including the realm of
intellect and philosophy. So Iqbal and Hanafi are no exceptions. Being very highly educated,
they got opportunities to meet and closely interact with the most famous and celebrated
philosophical personalities of their time. They studied at the prestigious institutions of Europe
and had had very fruitful and productive exposure to the West and its cultural heritage.

So it is quite natural and normal that both were influenced by the towering minds and powerful
trends of their respective ages. Moreover, it has often been observed that the age, at which one
enters into the academic institutions, is highly susceptible to influence and suggestion. In Iqbal’s
time (early 20th century) Bergson’s personality and philosophy had almost become a cult. He was
a living legend, the most celebrated philosopher of pre-WWII era. Similarly in 1960s, who could
go elsewhere than Paris for higher studies and ignore the dominant trends of Phenomenology and
Existentialism? The influence of Phenomenology was too overwhelming to be resisted, that too
by a young boy from an underdeveloped and exploited Muslim country of Africa, who could
identify a balm for his painful wounds in the humanitarian approach of Max Scheler. So we do
not get surprised when Hanafi feels that at places Qur’an seems to be written by Husserl. See
reference 110 above. Phenomenology was a benevolent asylum for an anguished soul.

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The case of Iqbal is not very different, a young reflecting man from the injured, insulted and
enslaved India, who simultaneously is greatly shocked by the decline of the Muslim World
cannot find better tutors than Nietzsche and Bergson. Nietzsche’s aggression does relieve the
deprivation of a subjugated soul yearning for lost self-respect. His emphasis rather over-
emphasis on ego is also a sort of reaction. Bergson provides him an even protective shelter when
he refuses to acknowledge Kantian Categories. How exalted one may feel, when one rejects such
grand entities such as space, time, matter, substance, movement and most of all intellect by a
single stroke of pen! The urge of freedom is overpowering in Iqbal. He wishes to smash every
boundary. His body is striving for freedom from the British; which leads him to the active
politics and he emerges as a Muslim leader and spiritual father of Pakistan. His soul, on the other
hand, wants to get rid of and outgrow the mechanistic bondage of the cosmos. He quests for a
life and universe which are following intuition, and are beyond the borders of space, time, matter
and causality. Only such a scheme of things may lead to that individuality, ego, self or Khudi,
which is really liberated and enjoys almost divine freedom.

Syed Qutb drew great inspiration from Iqbal regarding the strong, vigorous and creative self;
however, gradually he started drifting away from him. One of the reasons was his reliance on the
other South Asian thinkers such as Abul Ala Maududi and Abul Hasan Nadwi as per Binder’s
analysis.308 There was another reason too, of Qutb’s gradual estrangement with Iqbal; Qutb was
dissatisfied with Iqbal’s exaggerated celebration of ego and his ‘intellectual aimlessness’.309

Iqbal’s deliberate dislike for science is somehow or the other a reaction against the dominant
Europe, since it is science which is responsible for the uplift of Europe and downfall and decline
of the Muslim World. Regarding science, we find three very clear and distinct approaches in
Iqbal:

i- Partial or complete acceptance, to the extent, it may be reconciled with Islam and
Qur’an;
ii- Total and complete rejection where it does not fit into the Bergsonian-cum-Islamic
model;

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 iii- Ascription of modern theories of science to the Muslim scientists/mystics/thinkers
indiscriminately. (The word indiscriminately has been intentionally used here, since,
Iqbal has supported those theories as well which are in clearest contradiction with the
revealed Scripture, such as Evolution).

This selective outlook is a regretful hallmark of the entire philosophy of Iqbal. But it is inevitable
for those philosophers who carry a purpose, cause or pre-conceived ideal in their minds. So they
are bound to develop their philosophies in such a frame which fulfils and matches with their
ideal. Iqbal’s is the similar case. The most tragic outcome of this approach is a more reactionary
than academic attitude. The same reaction is most pronounced in Iqbal. This is the reaction of an
Indian Muslim who has lost his glory, power, dominance and hey-day.

The same disgust for categories and classical physics is actually that deep-seated rejoinder of an
Indian, Asian, Oriental inhabitant, and specially of a Muslim who has been defeated and
humiliated by the products of that technology which is based on classical physics founded on
absolute space, time, rest and motion. Had Iqbal survived till 1945, he would have seen that his
ideal modern physics had played far more ghastly havocs with the children of Adam.

However, the more appropriate and adequate question here is: Is this approach justified or good?
An endless debate may ensue and lengthy arguments may be offered either in favour or against.
We have already discussed and agreed that this attitude is neither unique nor bad; it is quite
normal and natural. The real matter to be explored is that to which extent the acceptance of
someone else’s model is warranted or defensible? Can somebody’s exclusive and specific
philosophy be applied to another framework intellectually, morally and consistently? The answer
is not very difficult or technical. Everyone has the full right to be predisposed towards anyone,
but the real responsibility of the influenced thinker starts when he tries to interpret or reinterpret
some existing system with the help of that borrowed philosophy. Here in the current study, this
burden lies on the shoulders of Hanafi and Iqbal who have very sincerely tried to see Qur’an in
the light of Husserl and Bergson.

The most admirable feature of Bergson and Husserl is their dissatisfaction and discontent with
the trends of philosophy current in their age. They, nevertheless, introduced and transfused very

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strong, powerful and commanding new ideas in philosophy of the West. Both are reputed and
respected philosophers. When we turn towards the Muslim World, we find the same in the
persons of Iqbal and Hanafi for whom the decadent state of the Muslim World is unbearable and
they are very unhappy on the intellectual stagnation of their people. They want to invigourate it
with a new, healthy and energetic spirit. This intention too, is very adorable without the slightest
doubt. However, the question starts from where they seek support from some contemporary
Western philosopher and try to interpret Islam or Qur’an according to his philosophy. This
situation is not new in the Muslim World; it is the repetition of an old tradition started in 8 th and
9th Century BEC by the Muslim theologians and philosophers who tried to Hellenize Islam. As
we have seen in the concluding remarks of Section A, that when we Philosophize Islam, a second
similar trend immediately appears from the opposite direction, that is, Islamization of Philosophy
or knowledge, which as per Abu-Zayd is more dangerous in repercussions for Islam. See
reference 61-62 above. So this trend of Muslim philosophers is not new. For a considerably long
time Aristotle and Neo-Platonism provided them a path to follow and they very ingeniously
explained Islamic concepts in Hellenic terms. However, they could not help staggering against
some very glaring contradiction.

We find Hanafi and Iqbal in, nevertheless, the similar situation. First of all like their
predecessors they too have selected an Imam from the West, and tried to fit Islam into his dye
and mould. It is a paradox of Muslim philosophers since ages that even when they criticize the
West, they find their ultimate gurus from the West. The academic worth of Hanafi’s work is
definitely beyond doubt, but had there been no Husserl, what he would have done? An old
question wants itself to be repeated here: If Qur’an and all the scriptural sciences are just
phenomenological in nature; why didn’t any Muslim philosopher introduced the world with
phenomenology? They waited for thirteen centuries after the revelation of Qur’an in Arabia for
the emergence of phenomenology in Germany, so that both may be proved exact replica of each
other. In the same sense every philosophy from Marxism to Existentialism or from Structuralism
to Post-modernism may be brought out of Qur’an only with some effort and hard work. Hanafi in
2006, during a Seminar organized by Alexandria Library compared the Qur’an with a
supermarket where one takes what one wants to take and leave what he does not want. In the
same manner Hanafi himself chose phenomenology from Qur’an to pick.

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Hanafi has traced and found Islam even in Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity as well. He has
compared him with Mu’tazilites too. He has made an interesting observation, typical of the
Muslim intelligentsia, if only had Feuerbach studied Islam, he could have saved himself the
trouble of writing the Essence of Christianity. According to Hanafi, modern European
Philosophy is ‘nothing but an attempt to approach the humanism of Islam’. Converting the
vertical axis into a horizontal one and converting the Kingdom of Heaven into the Kingdom of
Earth, Islam has beaten Feuerbach by thirteen centuries. 310 One may easily discover the echo of
Iqbal in these assertions of Hanafi. Iqbal also nurtured similar ideas in the first lecture of the
Reconstruction where he said, “The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however,
is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is moving towards the West. There is
nothing wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further
development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam.”311 [Italics added].

This statement is beyond any comment; if Islam is spiritually moving towards the West and the
West is accomplishing the cultural goals of Islam, then where does lay the rift and unbridgeable
gulf? Why both parties are still at loggerheads with each other, fighting against each other and
considering each other the arch rival and foes????

Hanafi has responded to the above mentioned objection in the following passage in the context
of “thematic interpretation of Qur’an” (the topic going to be addressed in the next Section):
“Since thematic interpretation is using a philosophical language and some technical vocabulary,
related to phenomenology, it can be accused quickly of being the victim of Westernization.
Humanism, Rationalism, Criticism, Activism, all belong to West. This is really cruel, giving the
West the monopoly of discovery and innovation, as if the West is the only culture which
discovered Humanism, Rationalism, Activism and Socialism. These values exist in every culture.
Western philosophical vocabulary in the last two centuries has become very common and usual
in contemporary Arab and Muslim discourse, like Greek terminology in classical philosophy.
Modern philosophical vocabulary, including phenomenology, is used as a means of expression.
The content is endogenous. What Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were for the ancients, Kant,
Hegel, and Husserl may be for the moderns”.312 [Italics added].

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Is this statement a defence or confession? If these values exist in every culture, why does every
culture borrow them from the West, ancient or modern? The vocabulary of any other culture
does not become either familiar or popular except of West!!!Where does the fault lie?

Iqbal has indulged himself in theology and tried to reconcile contradictory divine attributes
sometimes with the help of Einstein and sometimes with the assistance of Bergson. His attempt
was very laudable per se, but he quite innocently believed that he, with the amalgam of various
disciplines, far-fetched interpretations of Qur’anic verses and stipulations of new phrases will
solve those enormous questions which could not be solved by the best brains of Islam in
centuries. Three dominant trends may be clearly seen in Iqbal’s theological debates:

i- Over simplification or complete denial of some very critical issues by declaring them the
creation of “finite minds”, “classical physics”, “inadequacy of language” and
“compulsion of logic” etcetera,
ii- Total one sided and selective approach both in religion and in sciences,

iii- Personal interpretations of the Qur’anic verses at the cost of their clear and categorical
meanings.

Iqbal has dismissed the issue of createdness of Qur’an as the organic relation of feeling and idea.
Both the word and idea, as per Iqbal, emerge at a time from the womb of feeling, but thought
divides them into temporal order; hence a non-issue comes into being that which preceded the
other.313

Being an ardent representative of human freedom he has played havoc with the divine attributes
of foreknowledge and omnipotence. In his overwhelming zeal for the human freedom he has
declared, “He [God] has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power and freedom”. 314
At another place he writes, “Of all the creations of God he [man] alone is capable of consciously
participating in the creative life of his Maker” 315. These assertions are more than shocking for
any Muslim, who believes that Allah has absolutely no partner since He is One without any
partaker. Altaf Ahmad Azami has begged pardon for Iqbal from Allah, “May God forgive Iqbal.
These lectures contain mostly such views that may be clearly declared infidel (kufr) and
idolatrous (shirk)”.316

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Human freedom in comparison with the divine omnipotence, omniscience and justice has always
remained a burning issue for the Muslim philosophers. The second issue is that of creation and
destiny. Iqbal has dismissed both issues and has ascribed their emergence to the weaker intellect
and inadequate approach of the preceding theologians. The wrong view of divine omniscience is
the outcome of pre-Einstein physics: “In fact, Divine knowledge regarded as a passive
omniscience is nothing more than the inert void of pre-Einstein physics, which confers a
semblance of unity on things by holding them together, a sort of mirror passively reflecting the
details of an already finished structure of things which the finite consciousness reflects in
fragments only………..Consequently, we can attach no meaning to the word ‘creation’, which
has a meaning for us only in view of our own capacity for original action. The fact is that the
whole theological controversy relating to predestination is due to pure speculation with no eye on
the spontaneity of life, which is a fact of actual experience. No doubt the emergence of egos
endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a
limitation on the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego”317

Then how should divine knowledge be explained at all? Iqbal responds, “Divine knowledge must
be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own
right are organically related. By conceiving God’s knowledge as a kind of reflecting mirror, we
no doubt save His foreknowledge of future events; but it is obvious that we do so at the expense
of His freedom. The future certainly pre-exists in the organic whole of God’s creative life, but it
pre-exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines”.318

Iqbal has also tried his best to deal with the question with the help of Bergson’s pure duration.
One reason for his acceptance of Bergson is a different conception of time, that is, the Pure
Duration---the change without succession---according to Iqbal is to safeguard free creative
activity of ego and to make room for evolution. We have studied his distinction between serial
and non-serial time. Divine time is non-serial in character which is not divided into past, present
and future, it is a single and eternal “now”. It is actually the pure duration unadulterated by
space. Iqbal expresses this idea in the following way, “If we look at the movement embodied in
creation from the outside, that is to say, if we apprehend it intellectually, it is a process lasting
through thousands of years; for one Divine day, in the terminology of the Qur’an, as of the Old
Testament, is equal to one thousand years. From another point of view, the process of creation,

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lasting through thousands of years, is a single indivisible act ‘swift as a twinkling of an eye’. It is
however, impossible to express this inner experience of pure duration in words, for language is
shaped on the serial time of our daily efficient self”319

Again Iqbal says something about creation, which besides the criticism of finite minds is a
mixture of mysticism and modern physics. “Finite minds regard nature as a confronting ‘other’
existing per se, which minds knows but does not make….. ………All the meaningless
theological controversies about the idea of creation arise from this narrow vision of the finite
mind……..From the Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event
having a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality in
opposition to Him. …….We have seen before that space, time and matter are the interpretations
which thought puts on the free creative energy of God… …….The world of matter, therefore, is
not a stuff co-eternal with God, operated upon by Him from a distance as it were. It is, in its real
nature, one continuous act which thought breaks up into a plurality of mutually exclusive
events320.”

There is a very simple verse in Qur’an, which may be understood by anyone without the slightest
difficulty, “And it is He who hath ordained the night and the day to succeed one another for
those who desire to think on God or desire to be thankful” Al-Qur’an, 25:62. Iqbal, however, has
interpreted it in a tedious manner so as to fit it in the configuration of Bergson’s thought. He
explains it: “A critical appreciation of the sequence of time as revealed in our selves has led us to
the notion of the Ultimate Reality as pure duration in which thought, life, and purpose
interpenetrate to form an organic unity. We cannot conceive this unity expect as the unity of the
self----the ultimate source of all individual life and thought.” 321 Almost the similar objection has
been raised by Salman Rashid, according to whom, Iqbal’s interpretation of Qur’an is very
unscrupulous, particularly with reference to the verses which refer to change. Iqbal infers
concept of time from these verses and concludes subsequently that Quran confirms Bergson’s
concept of time.322

From the very conception of the time, Iqbal has put forward his elaboration regarding fate,
destiny or Taqdir. This as we know, is a very serious problem of Muslim philosophy and
theology. Iqbal wishes to uphold divine as well as human freedom along with divine justice. He

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has dealt with the issue in the second and fourth lectures respectively. It has been said in the
Qur’an, “All things We have created with a fixed destiny: Our command was but one, swift as
the twinkling of an eye”. Al-Qur’an, 54- 49-50. Iqbal has interpreted this view of destiny in the
following way, “It is time regarded as an organic whole that the Qur’an describes as Taqdir or
the destiny----a word which has been so much misunderstood both in and outside the world of
Islam. Destiny is the time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed
from the net of the causal sequence……..In one word, it is time as felt and not as thought and
calculated…………The destiny of a thing then is not an unrelenting fate working from outside
like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the
depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external
compulsion”.323 [Italics added].

This is an excellent attempt on the behalf of Iqbal which must be appreciated. However, by
declaring the destiny as “inner possibility” of a thing he could not fully save us from
determinism. At little reflection reveals that inner possibilities are but potentialities of a thing,
which it is going to actualize. And what it would actualize; the same potentialities which are
“inner possibilities” in the parlance of Iqbal. And these “inner possibilities” are, nonetheless,
predetermined. These are the “inner possibilities” of a mango seed which develop into a mango
tree; they may never convert mango tree into an apple tree. We may only say at this situation:
The problems, either of life or of philosophy may never be resolved by the stipulation of new
words, terms and phrases. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that Hamilton Gibb has described
Iqbal as, “the most interesting figure in the whole modern Islamic community, but also
intellectually more elusive.”324

Iqbal has dealt with the question of destiny again in “The Human Ego-His Freedom and
Immortality”, where he has acknowledged that the idea of destiny runs throughout the Qur’an. 325
However, he is not in agreement with the most degrading type of fatalism which is used by the
critics of Islam. This fatalism is associated with the word Qismat. Iqbal attributes it to three
factors: i) Philosophical thought, ii) political expediency and iii) Gradually diminishing force of
the life impulse. Additionally the tragedy of Karbala proved itself decisive for the case of

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fatalism, because, “Now the practical materialism of the opportunist Umayyad rulers of
Damascus needed a peg on which to hang their misdeeds at Karbala, and to secure the fruits of
Amir Muawiyah’s revolt against the possibilities of a popular rebellion326”.

Iqbal is right to a certain extent, definitely the culprits of Karbala, exploited the ideas of
predestination and fate in their favour to cover their crimes against humanity. But it may never
be denied that they only used the verses of Qur’an to support their case, they did not make them.
Such verses were already present in the Book in a sufficiently large number. As far as the
personal enumeration of the present author goes, the number of verses supporting fatalism
outnumbers those in favour of freedom by a large margin. Iqbal being a very profound scholar of
Qur’an has totally ignored those verses. A few examples presented below will show that the
Qur’an itself negates many well-maintained theses of Iqbal very strongly.

 “No calamity falls on earth or in yourselves but is inscribed in the Book of

Decrees----before We bring it into existence----Verily all is easy for Allah”. Al-
Qur’an, 57:22.
 “Say: "Nothing shall ever happen to us except what Allah has ordained for us.  He is
our Maula (Lord, Helper and Protector)."  And in Allah let the believers put their
trust”. Al-Qur’an, 9:51.

 “And everything small and big is written (before it falls or is done by the doer)”. Al-
Qur’an, 54:53.

 “To whosoever amongst you who wills to walk straight and you will not until Allah
wills, the Lord of the worlds.” Al-Qur’an, 81:28-29.

 “If your Lord so willed, everyone on earth would have believed, all together. Will
you then compel people until they become believer”? Al-Qur’an, 10:99.

These are very few examples, since all of them may not be quoted here; however, even these are
enough to jeopardize the entire argument. Since centuries Muslim thinkers, philosophers,
intellectuals and theologians have been trying hard to reconcile these verses with those asserting
freedom of will. This is the true problem. To ignore them completely and highlight freedom

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alone is not the solution but the escape or oversimplification. Unfortunately Iqbal has done the
same.

Ali Abbas Jalapuri considers Iqbal a theologian instead of a philosopher because his main
objective in the Reconstruction is to defend religion in general and Islam in particular; whereas
philosophy is a perennial, continuous and free intellectual effort, which cannot be subjected to a
creed or faith. Like Ghazali and Razi, Iqbal is a theologian who is reconstructing religious
thought in the light of modern intellectual trends and scientific discoveries. Jalapuri finds Iqbal
better than Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Shibli as he is well-versed in modern philosophy.
According to Jalalpuri, Iqbal’s approach towards life was philosophical in his early poetry and
during the writing of his doctoral dissertation, but in his later life he adopted a revivalist
approach to the problems.327

Jalalpuri faults Iqbal’s theology for the following three elements:

i- Arian immanent rather than the transcendent concept of God that led him to
pantheism;
ii- Eclectic adaptation of modern philosophical theories of Fichte’s ego and Bergson’s
theory of time;

iii- Selective and arbitrary interpretation of the Qur’anic verses.

It is interesting rather painful to note that Iqbal and Bergson are not the first to challenge
causality to accommodate faith, this attempt even more forcefully has already been made by
Asharaites in general and Ghazali in particular. The denial of the system of cause and effect
caused irreparable loss to the Muslim World in the fields of Science and Technology. Had one
Ghazali not been born, the Muslim World would have produced one thousand Galileos. The
eminent Pakistani intellectual Fazlur Rahman, however, disagreed with Gibb that Iqbal’s thought
is less faithful to ‘the Qur’anic matrix of ideas’ than Asharaites’ theology, which almost
represents an ‘almost total distortion of Islam’. 328 But he could not deny this observation of Gibb
that Iqbal’s reconstruction was primarily based on contemporary elements of thought instead of
Qur’an. Javed Majeed derived the result from Reconstruction that the nature and spirit of Iqbal’s

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study of Islam is interrogative; but it suspends any final judgment on what Islam actually
means.329

In the end a few words about the religious experience, from which Iqbal has started his
illustrious lectures and ended at the same. Throughout the book he defended this experience with
all sorts of possible arguments and validated it with the help of philosophical as well as
pragmatic tests. Unfortunately this experience is not clear and even a scholar like Iqbal with all
his brilliance and eloquence could not fully explain what this experience actually is. This has
been discussed at length above and we are not going to repeat these arguments here. Altaf
Ahmad Azami, however, has found most of the discussions in the Reconstruction, unclear and
confused. Azami also doubts the authenticity of the religious experience without the guidance of
a clear revealed text. Iqbal opted for religious experience because it is beyond the Kantian
categories since Kant had declared metaphysics impossible. (Iqbal and Bergson, within the heart
of their hearts do believe that Kant is right). Religious experience was/is outside the causal
nexus. But Iqbal had to admit and accept that religious experience does start from a feeling but
cannot restrict itself to the feeling alone. It constantly strives for metaphysics. Please see the
reference 303 above.

Is not it a failure or grave shortcoming of the religious experience that it opts for the same system
from which it has fled? The religious experience develops a complete philosophical skeleton to
become comprehensible which draws question mark on its uniqueness. Moreover, a very
pertinent question may not be avoided here. This religious experience is of which religion for
Iqbal? In the case of Bergson, he recognizes mystics in Indian and Greek religions too, but
considers only Christian mystics as complete, true and genuine ones. For Iqbal perhaps the true
religious experience would be of Islam, hence, the Ultimate Reality will go on changing with the
already established faith of the mystic. If he is a Muslim, the Ultimate Reality will be Allah, in
case of Hindu mystic, it is Brahma and if he is Greek in origin the Reality perceived is definitely
Zeus. Thus the mystic will affirm the same deity with the help of experience in which he already
believes.

Finally the concept of love common both in Iqbal and Bergson! Bergson has made a distinction
between two methods of literary composition. “The second one,” in his words is “as providing

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the image of the creation of matter by form, is what the philosopher must have in mind in order
to conceive as creative energy the love wherein the mystic sees the very essence of God”330.
[Italics added].

Bergson declares the divine creative energy as love. Therefore, this universe is a result and
outcome of love, consisting of beings who love and wish to be loved. What a beautiful and
literary idea of the world! In its narration it is more poetical then philosophical. But only one and
the last question from Bergson and any other conscientious being reading this paper: Can a world
so full of pain, suffering, misery, evil, oppression, injustice and cruelty be declared a product of
love? Nay, this is not based on love, rather on might is right. Here the big fish swallows the
smaller one. Nature is red in tooth and claw; it is a dog-eat-dog world which may not support a
loving, benevolent and kind deity. A world teeming with diseases, disabilities, hunger and war
may not reflect love or a loving creator. How can a merciful Lord see His face in the pools of
blood amidst fire and burning human flesh? The creative energy may still be love, but only in the
rich and fertile imagination of Iqbal and Bergson-----not in the real world!!!

C- Hanafi and Iqbal on Ijtehad and the Reinterpretation of

Qur’an:

“Revelation has four degrees of realization in time, being a whole spectrum between the
universal and the particular. The Qur’anic text is the most universal corresponding to human
nature itself, to the conformity of human experience, to people’s wisdom as expressed in the
folklore and in popular proverbs in particular. Revelation is identical to nature. The Hadith is a
second particularization with more human input and more details in time and space which can

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serve as proto-types of repeated situations. The Ijma’ is the third concretization, vox dei vox
populi. The Ijtehad is the fourth and last one, a self confidence in human understanding.
Revelation and reason are identical.”331

“Ijtehad, the fourth source of law follows the same rule, the intrusion of space, time and
individual effort of understanding within the sacred text. Human reason implements the same
purpose as Divine will, the adaptation of the sacred to the profane, the realization of Eternity in
time.”332

“The reconstruction of rational religious sciences is in fact a way to interpret revelation itself by
returning to the first origins from which they emerged and [determining] how traditions turned
into [various] rational sciences, which then become models for the current attempts of turning
revelation into the exact science.”333

The above quoted paragraphs reveal clearly the stand-point of Hanafi regarding the significance,
relevance and value of Ijtehad in all ages and especially in the present era. His emphasis on the
need of modern and up-to-date interpretation of the revealed scripture is also quite evident. The
Section ‘C’ of this chapter we have specially designated to the topic of Ijtehad and reconciliation
between Tradition and Modernity in Islam by means of reinterpretation of the holy text. Hanafi
started this grand project under the title of “Heritage and Renewal” formally in 1991 with the
publication of his book, An Introduction to the Discipline of Occidentalism: Our Attitude
towards the Western Heritage. The purpose of this impressive academic venture is to reconstruct
Islam. Hanafi, being a devoted disciple of Iqbal wishes to retain his vocabulary and loves the
phrase “reconstruction”. Hanafi has absorbed valuable elements from Iqbal’s thought regarding
modernizing the religion, fresh understanding of the revelation and bringing Islam at par with the
needs and demands of the current time. Both Iqbal and Hanafi believe that the religion should
reflect the spirit of the age.

If we may recall the previous section of this study, we have seen a classification of religions
made by Bergson. He has divided the religions into two categories, that is, Static and Dynamic.
The former is a product of closed morality woven by the closed society. The difference between
the closed and open moralities Bergson states as follows, “Hence between the first morality and

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the second, lies the whole distance between repose and movement. The first [static] is supposed
to be immutable………But the second [dynamic] is a forward thrust, a demand for movement; it
is the very essence of mobility.”334 (See reference 252 above for recapitulation).

The closed morality gives rise to the closed religion of which the chief function is myth-making.
One of its important responsibilities is to act as a defensive reaction of nature against the
dissolvent powers of intelligence.335 It is also a defensive reaction of nature against the
representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of death. 336 All the verities of closed religions
which are believed-in by the stagnant societies perform the following duty besides the above
cited ones: They are the defensive reactions of nature against the representation, by the
intelligence, of a depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect
desired.337

Dynamic religions are quite the opposite; they flourish in the open societies which have given
birth to great, extra-ordinary, strong and powerful personalities under the influence of the
forward impetus of life or the vital impulse. This Élan Vital induces these exceptional men to
perpetual growth, change and progress.

Both Iqbal and Hanafi are the great admirers of Bergson and have been inspired profoundly by
him. Both have derived their idea of religion by him, it may be recalled that Hanafi has repeated
a Bergsonian saying regarding religion, we quoted in Section A: There is no right and wrong
religion, but only a static and dynamic religion. See the reference 18 above. We would see that
Iqbal has surmised his concept of Ijtehad and Mujtahid from the philosophy of Bergson.
However, Bergson has called the upholders of the dynamic religion mystics. Bergson writes
about these people, “Those leaders of humanity drawing men after them, who have broken down
the gates of the city, seem indeed thereby to have placed themselves again in the current of the
vital impetus…………., it was not impossible that some of them, specially gifted, should reopen
that which was closed and do, at least for themselves, what nature could not possibly have done
for mankind”338. [Italics added].

“To place oneself once again in the current of vital impetus and to reopen that which was closed”
is perceived as Ijtehad according to Iqbal. Iqbal is one of the greatest exponents of the

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modernising Islam and Ijtehad in the Muslim World during 20th century. His sixth lecture in the
Reconstruction, “The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam” is specially assigned to
this task. Iqbal did a ground-breaking work in the field which was the forbidden tree at the time
and no one could dare to discuss it publicly in a tradition-bound and conservative India. Iqbal has
defined Ijtehad this way in his lecture, “The word literally means to exert. In the terminology of
Islamic law it means to exert with a view to form an independent judgment on a legal question.
The idea, I believe, has its origin in a well-known verse of the Qur’an-----‘And to those who
exert We show Our path’. We find it more definitely adumbrated in a tradition of the Holy
Prophet. When Mu’adh was appointed ruler of Yemen, the Prophet is reported to have asked him
as to how he would decide matters coming up before him. ‘I will judge matters according to the
Book of God’ said Mu’adh. ‘But if the Book of God contains nothing to guide you?’ ‘Then I will
act on the precedents of the Prophet of God’. ‘But if the precedents fail?’ ‘Then I will exert to
form my own judgment.’”339

Iqbal has also mentioned the three types of Ijtehad according to the four recognized schools of
Islamic (Sunni) Law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanabli). These schools recognize three
degrees of Ijtehad: (i) complete authority in legislation which is practically confined to the
founder of the school, (ii) relative authority which is to be exercised within the limits of a
particular school, and (iii) special authority which relates to the determining of the law
applicable to a particular case left undetermined by the founders.340 Iqbal in his lectures is more
concerned with the first type of Ijtehad, which guarantees complete authority in legislation. Iqbal
further explains his purpose, “The theoretical possibility of this degree of Ijtehad is admitted by
the Sunnis, but in practice it has always been denied since the establishment of schools,
inasmuch as the idea of complete Ijtehad is hedged round by conditions which are well nigh
impossible of realization in a single individual. Such an attitude seems exceedingly strange in a
system of law based mainly on the groundwork provided by the Qur’an which embodies an
essentially dynamic outlook on life.” 341

Iqbal has enumerated three very cogent reasons for this regrettable situation which are as under:

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 a- Rationalist Movement, as a reaction of which the conservative scholars considered it a
force of disintegration and a danger for the stability of Islam; hence they found strict
adherence to Shariah as a binding force for Islam;
b- The rise and growth of ascetic Sufism and the spirit of other-worldliness in later Sufism
obscured the socio-political vision of the brilliant Muslim intellectuals. The important
worldly matters were dealt by those mediocre people who could only blindly follow the
tradition;

c- Fall of Baghdad, played such a havoc with the World of Islam, that its survival was not
less than a miracle. The conservative thinkers of Islam, therefore, concentrated all of their
energies on the preservation of a uniform social life for the entire Muslim Ummah. For
this purpose they resisted all innovations in the law of Sharia with full force.342

Iqbal has beautifully explained this situation with his strong belief in the emergence of the gifted
individual pulsating with the Élan Vital who brings any people out of this decadence. “Thus a
false reverence for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a people’s
decay……….The only effective power, therefore, that counteracts the forces of decay is the
rearing of self-concentrated individuals. Such individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They
disclose new standards in the light of which we begin to see that our environment is not wholly
inviolable and requires revision.”343

Iqbal has shed further light on the same explaining why the doors of Ijtehad have been closed in
Islam which according to Qadi Shaukani, was permitted even in the life of the Holy Prophet
(PBUH). “The closing of the door of Ijtehad”, Iqbal continues, “Is pure fiction suggested partly
by the crystallization of legal thought in Islam, and partly by that intellectual laziness which,
especially in the period of spiritual decay, turns great thinkers into idols. If some of the later
doctors have upheld this fiction, modern Islam is not bound by this voluntary surrender of
intellectual independence.”344

However, Iqbal feels that the modern age and its relevant problems demand that the Muslim
World should revisit its legal code, jurisprudence (Fiqh) and related disciplines. These problems
mentioned by Iqbal were both internal and external, which we are going to discuss a little later.

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Iqbal has written in the same vein, “I know the Ulema of Islam claim finality for the popular
schools of the Mohammadan Law, though they never found it possible to deny the theoretical
possibility of a complete Ijtehad. I have tried to explain the causes which, in my opinion,
determined this attitude of the Ulema, but since things have changed and the world of Islam is
confronted and affected to-day by new forces set free by the extraordinary development of
human thought in all its direction, I see no reason why this attitude should be maintained any
longer. Did the founders of our schools ever claim finality for their reasoning and
interpretations? Never. The claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to reinterpret the
foundational legal principles, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of
the modern life is, in my opinion, perfectly justified. The teaching of the Qur’an that life is a
process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the
work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems”.345[Italics and emphasis
added].

Iqbal asserts emphatically, “Equipped with penetrative thought and fresh experience the world of
Islam should courageously proceed to the work of reconstruction before them. This work of
reconstruction, however, has a far more serious aspect then mere adjustment to the modern
conditions of life.”346

The natural question arising in the reader’s mind is definitely about those reasons and causes
which compelled such a great thinker to focus on this issue. The reasons were simultaneously
theoretical and practical, academic and human. The most tragic situation was those of Muslim
women in India specially Punjab, where they could not have divorce from their undesirable
husbands until they declared themselves apostates. Iqbal has lamented on this sorry state of
affairs and said, “Nothing could be more distant from the aims of a missionary religion. The Law
of Islam, says the great Spanish jurist Imam Shatibi in his Al-Muwafaqat, aims at protecting five
things----Din, Nafs, Aql, Mal and Nasl. Applying this test I venture to ask: ‘Does the working of
the rule relating to apostasy, as laid down in the Hidaya, tend to protect the interests of the Faith
in this country? In view of the intense conservatism of the Muslims of India, Indian judges
cannot but stick to what are called standard works. The result is that while peoples are moving
the law remains stationary”347.

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The academic reason which stimulated Iqbal to work thoroughly on Ijtehad and Jurisprudence
was a book written by a European critic titled Mohammedan Theories of Finance. It was
published by the Columbia University in 1916. The name of this author was Aghnides as per the
research of Muhammad Khalid Masud. He was a Greek national settled in Turkey. The said book
was actually his doctoral thesis wherein he has comprehensively discussed the systems of Zakat
and Kharaj in Islam. In his dissertation he declared the Islamic Jurisprudence and general Law of
Islam as inflexible and unable to face the challenges of modern life. According to him the nature
of Islamic law is mechanical. When Iqbal found this book and read it in detail he made it his
obligation to refute the claim of the author. Hence Iqbal deliberated meticulously on the topic of
Ijtehad and produced this unrivaled lecture which is a landmark in the history of the subject348.

Let us see the nature, scope and perspective of Iqbal’s proposed Ijtehad. Iqbal was quite
impressed by the Turkish model and has quoted Halim Sabit, Said Halim Pasha and eminent poet
Ziya Gokalp during his discourse. We are going to discuss here Iqbal’s notions in detail and
analytically. A paragraph from him, here, will be quite interesting and thought-provoking. Iqbal
says, “Passing on to Turkey, we find that the idea of Ijtehad, reinforced as broadened by modern
philosophical ideas, has long been working in the religious and political thought of the Turkish
nation. This is clear from Halim Sabit’s new theory of Muhammadan Law, grounded on modern
sociological concepts. If the renaissance of Islam is a fact, and I believe it is a fact, we too one
day, like the Turks, will have to re-evaluate our intellectual inheritance. And if we cannot make
any original contribution to the general thought of Islam, we may, by healthy conservative
criticism, serve at least as a check on the rapid movement of liberalism in the world of Islam .”349
[Italics and emphasis added]. A really shocking and startling statement!!! Iqbal who has accepted
the responsibility of reconstructing the religious thought in Islam voluntarily and courageously is
himself afraid of the liberal movement in the Muslim World and wishes to check it by
conservative criticism? If conservation is the ultimate objective, what is meant by Ijtehad,
modernization or reconstruction???

Before moving further, let us have a brief and interesting discussion on the very word
“reconstruction” by the distinguished Pakistani scholar and Specialist of Iqbal Studies,
Muhammad Khalid Masud. Masud writes, “Iqbal preferred the term reconstruction to
reformation. Reconstruction conveys the sense of re-building while reform essentially means to

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correct or re-shape. The process of reform demands certain basic change to the character or
shape of certain things. Reconstruction on the other hand stresses building something anew so
that it may restore the original condition. It may imply reaction. But since, according to Iqbal, the
original state in Islam is universalism and dynamism, reconstruction would mean, to build again
in order to return to universal and dynamic Islam.”350 [Emphasis added].

Sorry to say this statement of Muhammad Masud is purely an apology on the behalf of Iqbal.
The above quoted and underlined definition of “reconstruction” is utterly arbitrary. The word
means to build something again, but it never implies the adherence to the original shape. One
may introduce radical changes in the previous structure while reconstructing without committing
any self-contradiction. On the contrary reform, renovation, refurbishing stand for the betterment
within the given framework without disturbing the main features. The original quote from Iqbal
would strengthen and testify our position, “With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is
necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the
conclusions reached by her can help us in revision and, if necessary, reconstruction of
theological thought in Islam.”351 [Italics added].The statement is univocally indicating that
reconstruction is a step further than revision or reform.

However, coming back to the conservatism of Iqbal, another quote is worthy of note, “We
heartily welcome the liberal movement in modern Islam, but it must be admitted that appearance
of liberal ideas in Islam constitutes also the most critical moment in the history of Islam.
Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration………Further, our religious and
political reformers in their zeal for liberalism may overstep the proper limits of reform in the
absence of check on their youthful fervour.352”

It is quite incredible that the same Iqbal, who has regretted on page 120 of his book that fresh,
vigorous and novel thought was deliberately suppressed in the world of Islam to preserve the
integrity of Ummah, is himself afraid of the liberal movements on the page 129 of the same book
!!! Iqbal has also joined the rank of those conservative thinkers who in his own words “focused
all their efforts on the one point of preserving a uniform social life for the people.” 353 He has
almost contradicted which he has said previously as, “‘The verdict of history’, as a modern

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writer has happily put it, ‘is that worn-out ideas have never risen to power by the people who
have worn them out.354’”

Perhaps for the similar tendency, Wilfred Cantwell Smith has declared Iqbal simultaneously a
progressive and a reactionary. According to him Iqbal, “was a poet, not a systematic thinker, and
he did not hesitate to contradict himself” 355. He further opines that Iqbal was, “an unoriginal
thinker…….much of his philosophy is but an Islamization oh Nietzsche and Bergson”356.

Iqbal on the one hand admires Turkey for being active on the way to Ijtehad and appreciates it in
the following words, “The truth is that among the Muslim nations of to-day, Turkey alone has
shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to self consciousness. She alone has claimed her
right of intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from the ideal to the real----a transition which
entails keen intellectual and moral struggle. To her the growing complexities of a mobile and
broadening life are sure to bring new situations suggesting new points of view, and necessitating
fresh interpretations of principles which are only of an academic interest to a people who have
never experienced the joy of spiritual expansion.”357

On the other hand he refutes all the proposals of Ziya Gokalp regarding the gender equality and
equal rights of man and woman in Islam. Iqbal quotes a long poem of Ziya with these remarks,
“In another passage the poet gives his ideal of womanhood. In his zeal for the equality of man
and woman he wishes to see radical changes in the family law of Islam as it is understood and
practiced to-day.”358 Some relevant parts of Ziya’s poem as quoted by Iqbal are as under:

“The foundation of the nation and the state is the family!

As long as the full worth of a woman is not realized, national life remains incomplete.

The upbringing of the family must correspond with justice;

Therefore, equality is necessary in three things---in divorce, in separation, and in inheritance.

As long as the woman is counted half the man as regards the inheritance and one-fourth of man
in matrimony, neither the family nor the country will be elevated.

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For other rights we have opened national courts of justice;

The family on the other hand we have left in the hands of schools”359

The assertions of Ziya have rationale, they are cogent, weighty and sound, hence demand
attention. But here Iqbal has become a traditional apologetic with age-old and worn-out
rationalizations. He has, rather expressed his doubts regarding the knowledge and understanding
of the poet. He responds to Ziya in these words, “With regard to the Turkish poet’s demand, I am
afraid he does not know much about the family laws of Islam. Nor does he seem to understand
the economic significance of the Quranic rule of inheritance. Marriage, according to
Muhammadan Law, is a civil contract. The wife at the time of marriage is at liberty to get the
husband’s power of divorce delegated to her on stated conditions, and thus secure equality of
divorce with her husband. The reform suggested by the poet relating to the rule of inheritance is
based on a misunderstanding. From the inequality of their legal shares it must not be supposed
that the rule assumes the superiority of males over females. Such an assumption would be
contrary to the spirit of Islam………..While daughter, according to the Muhammadan Law, is
held to be full owner of the property given to her by both the father and the husband at the time
of her marriage; while further, she absolutely owes her dower-money which may be prompt or
deferred according to her own choice, in lieu of which she can hold possession of her husband’s
property till payment.360” [Emphasis added].

This strange argument of Iqbal’s will be analyzed a little later. He further strengthens his position
by saying that the husband supports his wife throughout his life and she has no economic
responsibility on her shoulders. He concludes in a more out of the ordinary way, “It you judge
the working of the law of inheritance from this point of view, you will see that there is no
material difference between the economic position of sons and daughters, and it is really by this
apparent inequality of their legal shares that the law ensures the equality demanded by the
Turkish poet.” 361[Italics added].

It is not known to the present author, which culture Iqbal is discussing in these passages, since
for people belonging to South Asia, especially Indo-Pak Sub-continent, these assertions are no
more than a joke. One may not expect such false justifications from a scholar like Iqbal!!!

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The counter-arguments are as under:

i- Absolutely no property is given to women at marriage either by the father or by the

husband. They do receive some jewelry, dresses, utensils and piece of furniture from
father, that too according to his economic status. Some girls even do not receive this.
It is called ‘dowry’ which is considered a social evil and a sick institution. It is often
said that Indian Muslims have adopted this ‘menace’ from Hindus. A number of times
laws have been passed against this practice.
ii- Dower-money, or Haq-Mehar, as it is called in our culture, has no match with the
share in property. It is mostly such a meager amount that a woman may not sustain
herself even for two days even if this amount is paid in full. More often than not
women do not demand it except in the case of a divorce. And how can a woman hold
his husband’s property? It is bizarre and incomprehensible. No one can hold another
one’s property without the legal consent and power of attorney, which no husband
gives to his wife. If there are rare exceptions where husbands do gift properties to
wives, these are personal choices not rules or laws.

iii- Every Muslim or a legist knows that a wife gets only 1/8 of her husband’s property,
how can this even scanty share compensate the half given by the father?

iv- Moreover, has Iqbal ever thought for those women who could not get married due to
different reasons? Who would compensate them and how? It means that economic
justice (if any) for women is associated essentially with marriage. An unmarried or
celibate woman may not demand it.

v- There is no guarantee that a woman definitely gets married to a man equal to her
father is economic status. He might be lower; in this case how would she be
compensated according to the formula of Iqbal?

Iqbal not only wishes to introduce no change in the existing laws but is an ardent and
enthusiastic supporter, as is evident from the following two passages taken from the same sixth
lecture. In one rather lengthy paragraph he is very cautiously trying to make room for change but
with more force is advocating conservatism:

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“…………life moves with the weight of its own past on its back, and that in any view of social
change the value and function of the forces of conservatism should not be lost sight of... ………
No people can afford to reject their past entirely, for it is their past that has made their personal
identity. And in a society like Islam the problem of a revision of old institutions becomes still
more delicate, and the responsibility of the reformer assumes a far more serious aspect.” 362 (Such
a justification may be made by a Hindu reformer in the favour of caste system, that this makes
the personal identity of Hindu religion, or to abolish untouchability is a very delicate matter).

“Modern society with its bitter class-struggles ought to set us thinking; and if we study our laws
in reference to the impending revolution in modern economic life, we are likely to discover, in
foundational principles, hitherto unrevealed aspects which we can work out with renewed faith in
the wisdom of these principles”.363

So …….if conservatism is so important, profitable and useful; if the existing laws are teeming
with wisdom, then what is the ground of Ijtehad at all? Which sort of Ijtehad is required by the
Poet of the East, why and how? As per the statement of Muhammad Khalid Masud, “…..while
writing on ijtehad, Iqbal was extremely conscious that he was dealing with a very sensitive
subject. He apprehended opposition from the conservatives especially ‘ulama’.”364

However, this extreme caution has marred the very spirit and purpose of the lecture and it has
become a muddle of hopeless contradictions. We would have expected more courage and
consistency from such a great thinker and scholar. That is why Wilfred Cantwell Smith declares
the lecture on Ijtehad, “the least good lecture”365 in the Reconstruction. As per his opinion, the
sixth lecture is excellent on principles but falters on particular cases. Iqbal favours Ijtehad
theoretically but on specific questions of women, eating and drinking, he hesitates to innovate.366

He further comments, “The lecture contains the book’s only pleas for conservatism. It condemns
the religious radicalism.”367

It is worth noting that Iqbal is all praise in his lecture for the staunchest conservative personalities and
movements produced by the world of Islam. Renowned revivalist Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) is the first
most important name in this list. A hallmark of Islamic revivalists is their strong dislike and contempt for

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i- Theology, ii- Philosophy and, iii- Mysticism. Ibn Tayimyyiah is forerunner of Wahabism, Sanusim and
many other conservative movements in Islam. Let us have a brief idea of his thought:

“In his Minhaj as well as in other books, Ibn Taymiyyah boldly declares that theology and Philosophy
have no place in Islam…………..In Minhaj as well as in his Majmuat-al – Tafsir, Ibn Taymiyyah cites
the opinion of Imam Ahmad and Abu Yousuf who said that he who would seek knowledge with the help
of scholastic theology (Kalam) would turn into an atheist. He also mentions the opinion of Imam Shaf’i
that theologians should be beaten with shoes and palm-branches, and paraded through the city so that
people may know the consequences of the study of theology.

In his Tafsir Surat al –Ikhlas, he tells us that early leaders (aslaf) tabooed theology since it was vanity,
falsehood, and saying unfitting things about God”368.

It is ironical that al-Ghazali declared the philosophers infidel, and the same title was used for him by Ibn
Tayimyyiah who accused him of using reason and logic in religion. Another unforgivable sin of al-
Ghazali was his great admiration for Mysticism which was vehemently abhorred by Ibn Tayimyyiah.
Mohammad ibn Abd al- Wahab (1702-1792), the second favourite in the list of Iqbal was the
characteristic product of Ibn Tayimyyiah, who being a Hanbalite was a staunch and violent opponent of
Philosophy and Mysticism. He revived the spirit of Imam Hanbal in 18 th century and crushed the
philosophical thought in Islam with as much aggression and violence which could be matched with those
of Kharijites. Mohammad Ibn Ali Sanusi played almost the same role in Algeria, and fought against the
Western culture. His Sanusi movement was conservative in outlook and revivalist in nature. Both the
movements being politically motivated kept the enlightenment away from the Muslim masses and
promoted tradition, intolerance and scorn for moderation and modernity in the guise of religious reform.
Iqbal is found to be an admirer of Sanusi movement as well. He writes about all of them:

“But the spirit of Ibn Taymiyyah’ s teachings found a fuller expression in a movement of immense
potentialities which arose in eighteenth century , from the sand of Nejd, described by Macdonald as the ‘
cleanest spot in the decadent world of Islam’. It is really the first throb of life in modern Islam. To the
inspiration of this movement are traceable, directly or indirectly, nearly all the great modern movements
of Muslim Asia and Africa, e.g. the Sanusi movement, the Pan-Islamic movement and the Babi
movement, which is only a Persian reflex of Arabian Protestantism. The great puritan reformer,
Muhammad Ibn Abd al- Wahab, who was born in 1700, studied in Medina, traveled to Persia, and finally
succeeded in spreading the fire of his restless soul throughout the whole world of Islam. He was similar to
Ghazali’s disciple, Muhammad Ibn Tumart-----the puritan Berber reformer who appeared amidst the

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decay of Muslim Spain and gave her a fresh inspiration.” 369 Iqbal, however, acknowledges that the spirit
of Wahabi movement was essentially conservative and its vision of the past was wholly uncritical 370.

Muhammad Khalid Masud in his worthy and knowledgeable book on Iqbal has written about his overall
approach in connection with rationalism, “In order to appreciate Iqbal’s attitude towards rationalism it
should be remembered that, on the whole, Iqbal belonged to the romantic school of thought and hence we
find in a degree of antipathy to rationalism. Accordingly, Iqbal values passion more than reason. He
regards intuition and religious experience worthier than logic and intellect.” 371 Due to this romantic
outlook Iqbal has an irresistible emotional, dreamy and passionate attachment with the past. In one of his
Urdu couplet he has acknowledged that his verse is seeking after the past fire and his entire endeavour is
but the looking for the lost ones. See also the reference 362 above. That is the main reason that his
conscious mind admits and accepts the worth, value and need of the change; but at the same time his
unconscious rejects and repulses it with equal force. Hence when it was proposed that India should adopt
the Swiss Code of Inheritance as a uniform civil code, Iqbal intensely opposed it. His words are as under:

“The adoption of the Swiss code with its rules of inheritance is certainly a serious error which has arisen
out of the youthful zeal for reform, excusable in a people furiously desiring to go ahead. The joy of
emancipation from the fetters of a long-standing priest-craft sometimes drives a people to untried course
of action.”372 Iqbal considered this sort of modernization another form of taqlid and condemned it in very
strong words, “Let those people be happy; With the Call to Modernity; Who consider it only; A night of
pleasure; However, I fear that the; Slogan of modernism; Is an excuse in the East to ape the West”. 373

On the contrary, the audacity and steadfastness of the contemporary Indonesian scholar, Manawir Sazdali
(b.1925) is quite deserving of praise who has taken a firm stand on the issue of women’s inheritance
despite strong opposition. Sazdali was the minister of religious affairs in Indonesia during late 1980s. He
believes in renewal of Islam through re-actualization. His pivotal argument is that the present day
Muslims should be encouraged to precede with Ijtehad honestly so that Islam may be made more
responsive to the needs of today’s Indonesia. He has concentrated specially on the topic of Muslim Laws
of Inheritance. Qur’an stipulates that sons inherit twice as much as daughters. Sazdali believes that this
regulation appears contradictory to the very notion of justice. A number of religious scholars appreciate
this but remain silent deliberately so as to not to touch the Islamic principle. They have devised other
methods, for instance, hibah, which is distribution of property among children, on their own terms, during
the life-time of parents374.

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However, Sazdali has not kept his re-actualization approach to the issue of the inheritance alone. “A
closer outlook at the framework of his theological thought seems to suggest that he is inclined to argue
that there are some Qur’anic stipulations---particularly those associated with societal—non-ritual matters
—which are no longer compatible with the demands of the present era ( e.g., inheritance law, slavery
etc.). In the case of inheritance, the religious text should be interpreted in accordance with the social
circumstances in Indonesia, i.e., women should inherit the same as men. In this respect he mainly
(although not exclusively) relies on the practices and examples of the Second Caliph, Umar b. al-Khattab,
who, due to changing social circumstances is said to have applied policies which did not fully comply
with the stipulation laid out by the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet” 375.

Sazdali, had to face harsh criticism for his views; by Rifyal Kabah, who is simultaneously a Justice of
Supreme Court and a teacher of Law. He is of the view that Sazdali should appreciate the fact that the
revealed scriptures may not be interpreted with pure reason alone 376.

It is very interesting to note that Iqbal’s political philosophy or better to say ideology is also a derivative
of his views on Ijtehad. It would be constructive and fruitful to have a concise glance on his political
ideas, including form of government, electorate, democracy and roles and functions of a Muslim
Assembly or Parliament. We find a sort of unified train of reasoning in Iqbal’s system as far as Modern
Physics is concerned. His idea of a State and the political system in that State is also based his overall
inspiration gained through the Modern Physics. The second source is, nonetheless, Turkey. Regarding the
nature and function of Islamic State, he opines, “The essence of Tauhid, as a working idea is equality,
solidarity and freedom. The state, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform these ideal
principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human
organization……….The Ultimate Reality, according to the Qur’an, is spiritual, and its life consists in
temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is
secular is, therefore, sacred in the roots of its being. The greatest service that modern thought has
rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religion, consists in its criticism of what we call material
or natural----a criticism which discloses that the merely material has no substance until we discover it
rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a
scope for the self realization of the spirit.” 377 Hanafi holds exactly the similar views in his essay, “What
does the Qur’an as a sacred text mean?” (See the references 438 and 439 below).

The passage means that an Islamic State is one wherein Ultimate Reality or God realizes its immense
creative possibilities through material manifestations in space and time. The idea is not difficult to
understand since any student of philosophy may identify Hegel speaking through the diction of Iqbal.

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This is but a blend of Absolute Idealism and Modern Physics. In this sense, the State is a theocracy and
God materializes His ultimate aims through it, but He does so in the realm of matter, space and time.
Therefore, there is no difference in Islam between the worldly and the divine. Since no such dualism
exists in Islam, so there is no issue of the separation between the Church and the State.

Iqbal also quotes the example of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey which has exercised power of
Ijtehad in connection with the institution of Khilafat. According to the Sunni Law, the appointment of an
Imam or Khalifah is absolutely indispensible. “The first question”, in the opinion of Iqbal, “that arises in
this connexion is this---Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey’s Ijtehad is that
according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in the body of persons, or an
elected Assembly. The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, as far as I know, have not yet
expressed themselves on this point. Personally I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly
necessary to argue this point. The republican form of Government is not only thoroughly consistent with
the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world
of Islam”378.

However, Iqbal has not explained the new forces which have been “set free in the world of Islam”. It is
quite impressive that Iqbal has not only acknowledged the worth of democratic dispensation but has also
recommended it for the Muslim World and declared it in accordance with the spirit of Islam. Conversely
in his Urdu and Persian poetry he has expressed very negative ideas about it and, nevertheless, censured
it. In a well-known Urdu couplet of his he declared it a system in which people are ‘counted’ and not
‘weighed’. In his famous Persian verse he compared the popular voters with asses and said that millions
of asses may not be equal to one human. Unfortunately these ideas of Iqbal were highly appreciated and
publicized by the dictators and non-representative regimes of Pakistan. Hence Iqbal was presented as a
reactionary intellectual who does not believe in the collective wisdom of the masses. He very often
mentions democracy as ‘Western democracy’ whose face is bright but the inner-self is dark as night. At
one place he has considered monarchy and ‘democratic drama/sport’ as one and the same thing. These
inconsistencies have damaged his repute very much as a progressive thinker and he has been generally
high-jacked by the intransigent elements, right-wingers, religious extremists and despots. His real
revolutionary spirit has been kept hidden from the people. If we study his views in the perspective of
Ijma, the third source of legal reasoning in Islam; we would honestly judge that he does believe in the
validity of public opinion. For further elaboration of Iqbal’s view regarding form of government, election,
Caliphate and popular opinion please see references 386 and 387 below.

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Ijma is the third source of law in Islam which stands for the consensus of scholars on a specific issue or
problem regarding which no precedence may be found in either Qur’an or Hadith. Iqbal has shown regret
on the matter that such a significant source of law has almost remained practically dead and the Muslim
Ummah has not derived befitting benefit from it. It was a matter of great academic debates in early Islam
but due to some reasons was deliberately not developed into an active institution. 379 Iqbal himself has
expressed the idea that perhaps its development into a permanent institution was against the political
interests of the monarchs arisen in the world of Islam after the conclusion of the Pious Caliphate.
Especially the Umayyad and Abbasside Caliphs found their interests safeguarded and preserved more by
the individual Mujtahid(s), since it is always easier to pressurize one man than the large Assembly. 380
Iqbal further elaborates his thesis on Ijma, “It is, however, extremely satisfactory to note that the pressure
of world-forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind of modern
Islam the value and possibilities of the idea of Ijma. The growth of republican spirit and the gradual
formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitute a great step in advance. The transfer of the
power of Ijtehad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative Assembly which, in
view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form Ijma can take in modern times………In
India, however, difficulties are likely to arise for it is doubtful whether non-Muslim legislative assembly
can exercise the power of Ijtehad”. 381 [Italics added]. Basically this was the idea behind his famous
address of Allahabad in 1930, wherein he presented the idea of a federation of the Muslim majority
provinces. This was the way he wanted to safeguard Islam in the peninsula and also pave the ground for
would-be Ijtehad. His exact words are as follows, “I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated
Muslim state in the best interest of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from
an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp of that Arabian
Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into
closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times” 382.

Iqbal has concluded his discussion on Ijma on a very relevant question and a very adequate and
appropriate answer of the same. For the purpose of Ijtehad, the legislative assemblies of the Muslim
countries should have members competent in Sharia Law who may not only interpret them properly but
may also bring them at par with the demands of modern times. Since otherwise the assembly may make
grave mistakes through erroneous interpretations. He, however, is not satisfied with the Iranian
arrangement according to the Constitution of 1906. It provided a separate ecclesiastical committee of
religious scholars to guide the legislative activity of the assembly. The entire intricate set-up is in the
background of Shiite beliefs and jurisprudence which Iqbal finds not free of dangers. However, it may be
tried temporarily in the Sunni states on experimental basis. 383

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Iqbal, finds imperative to give due representation to religious scholars in any Muslim assembly (not in
favour of a separate body like Iran) to help and guide it during free discussion on questions relating to
law. “The only effective remedy for the possibilities of erroneous interpretations is to reform the present
system of legal education in Muhammadan countries, to expand its sphere, and to combine it with an
intelligent study of modern jurisprudence”.384

The political situation in the Muslim World and the proposed role of Ijma attracted Iqbal’s attraction as
early as in 1908. He wrote an article “Islam and Caliphate” which was published in Sociological Review,
London. The main emphasis of Iqbal in this article was the same that the institution of Caliphate is
republican in nature, essence and spirit. It is an elected form of government based on public opinion.
According to Iqbal, Islamic political thought evolved around two major principles:

i- The Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eyes of
Law. There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system;
ii- As per the Law of Islam, there is no distinction between the Church and the State. The State
with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but is a unity in which no such
distinction exists. The Caliph is not necessarily high priest of Islam. He is not the
representative of God on earth. 385

Iqbal defined Ijma as a principle which had all the characteristics of a legislative institution.
According to Iqbal, the trust of political governance is vested into the Muslim Ummah, and not in any
single individual. Through elections the collective will of the Ummah expresses itself in the form of
elected forum. He has written as quoted by Masud, “It is clear that the fundamental principle laid
down in the Qur’an is the principle of election”. 386

Iqbal also wishes the laymen to participate in legal discussions, since they too have a keen insight in
these affairs. In his words, “In this way alone can we stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our
legal system, and give it an evolutionary outlook”.387

This was an overall view of the Iqbal’s concepts regarding Ijtehad, so now we should move to the
second great thinker of this study, that is, Hassan Hanafi. Let us see what he says in the context of
Ijtehad and the reinterpretation of the Qur’an.

With Hanafi it is going to be an ambitious venture since Hanafi has devoted almost all of his academic
and philosophical life to the pursuit of this question. We shall discuss him in the larger ambit of his
prestigious project of Heritage and Renewal (Al-Turath wa’l Tajdid) which deals with the thorny and

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delicate subject of Tradition and Modernity in Islam. Hanafi has dealt with all these topics not only with
phenomenological method but also has employed Hermeneutics, Thematic Interpretation and Liberation
Theology. He has expressed himself besides Ijtehad on the matters like Hermeneutics and Revolution,
Religious Dialogue and Revolution, Culture(s) and Civilization, Theology and Anthropology, Religion
and Politics, Political Islam, and Islam and Democracy etcetera. His philosophical and religious theories
have gained more importance after the Arab Spring and the latest political developments in Egypt, since
he is simultaneously a philosopher, a religious reformer, Mujtahid and an ideologue. We shall try our
level best to do justice with his diversified and rich academic dimensions in this part of our study.

Hanafi himself has introduced his intricate, grand and multi-faceted project that it may be considered
history of ideas but because of the specific implementation of Ijtehad as used in jurisprudence, it is also
an ideology aiming at unification of four rational disciplines. He has relied more on the Qiyas or the
reasoning by analogy in jurisprudence, hence his entire endeavour may be labeled as Minhaj Fiqhi or
juristic method. This method Hanafi used in The Methods of Exegesis. However, he converted it from a
juristic tool to a philosophical methodology in Ilm Usul al-Fiqh.388

The four rational disciplines mentioned above are: i- Foundations of Jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh), ii-
Doctrinal Foundations (Usul-al-Din), iii-Philosophy (Hikma) and, iv Sufism (Tasawwuf). Hanafi finds
greatest potential in the first and last mentioned above to be converted into exact sciences because unlike
philosophy and theology these are actually methods and not theories. Hanafi writes, “As the principle
discipline concerned with meeting the legislative needs of the new Islamic community, Ilm Usul al-Fiqh
is a method for studying revelation but with a teleological orientation towards the outward aspects of
human reality. This makes it a most important discipline because the current situation in the Muslim
World has a more acute need for a descending revelation into the world than in an upward movement
towards God”.389 Since Hanafi always insisted on converting theology into anthropology, he wants to
transform Doctrinal Foundation of Islam, Ilm Usul-Din too into a human science. The Ilm Usul-Din when
connected with a progressive or liberation theology may be refashioned into an ideological tool. 390
Liberation Theology, in the words of Harvey Coax first and foremost a theology of praxis based on the
conviction that all human thought is actually a form of action 391. Hanafi’s ideology of Leftist Islam has
also its roots in Liberation Theology, while the Tradition and Modernity project is also linked with the
same392. This will be discussed in detail a little later.

The most important contribution of Hanafi in the study of the topic of Ijtehad and reinterpretation is the
use of Hermeneutics especially phenomenological Hermeneutics. As per Carool Kersten, it is the key
which unlocks the rest of his work 393. It is the mastery and command of Hanafi on both Islamic heritage

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and the Western academic study of religions, due to which, Charles Adams has declared him as one of the
representatives of the assertive new Muslim intellectuals 394.

After this prelude or the introductory remarks, we come now to the original topic of Ijtehad and
reinterpretation to see what Hanafi has said and done in the field. According to Hanafi, reinterpretation is
the device, apparatus and mechanism to bring tradition at par with modernity and heritage in consonance
with the contemporary demands. For Hanafi, tradition and heritage have a larger connotation as compared
to the believed one till date. Moreover, the scope of cultural heritage or tradition is wider than religion
since it includes social, political and historical elements as well. Hence to reinterpret it, we may not
restrict ourselves to its officially documented, preserved and theorized section, rather we have to
concentrate on the less tangible manifestations of a culture’s ethos which express themselves through
popular ways, Sufi practices, axioms, maxims, proverbs in jurisprudence and other accepted manners to
articulate religious sentiments 395. The novelty and strength of Hanafi’s method lie in its theoretical
foundation. This is based on the ascending and descending lines of analysis, as used in the Methods of
Exegesis. Both methods complement each other in Hanafi’s exposition. The two parallels are as under:

i- Study of the contemporary Muslim World and its historical legacy;

ii- Reinterpretation and re-evaluation of the same legacy and heritage in the light of current
situation.

“Extrapolating from the transposition of the traditional terminology of ilm ususl-al-fiqh, the wider
Islamic heritage must be rephrased in what was now called mantiq al-tajdid al-lughawi or ‘logic of
linguistic renewal’ of the other disciplines of traditional Islamic learning. Taken as a ‘field of
reflection’, Hanafi said that heritage is open to multiple readings because the text corpora of traditions
are in themselves empty of meaning. While these earlier readings were not wrong at the time,
clinging to archaic interpretations leads to an anachronistic understanding of the Islamic tradition.” 396

But how can such a gigantic task be accomplished? Hanafi has started from phenomenological
method and used the familiar terms of reduction or bracketing to be applied to all civilizational flaws
obscuring the first meaning of the text’. The fixation of meaning may be deferred until ‘the limits of
meaning have been transcended’ and consciousness can reconstruct the original meaning. 397 Again the
question is how to do it? Hanafi proposed the following methods:

i- Stipulating neologisms through radical transposition into a terminology derived from Western
Philosophy;

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 ii- Applying allegorical and metaphorical readings;
iii- Retrieving knowledge expressed in folk-wisdom.398

Some more approaches in the similar connection are as follows:

i- Shifting from the phenomenological to the existential; new meanings may also be
presented as a discovery of different ways of being-in-the-world;
ii- While according to yet another formulation, consciousness is reconstituted by stripping
archaic ways of thinking of their cultural connotations in combination with an analysis of
the present situation in order to capture, ‘spirit of the time’;
iii- Comparison of the both above (i and ii) with each other than bringing the idealized
or eidetic of the first analysis in line with the demands of the age or era determined
through the second exercise. [Emphasis added].

The third method (highlighted) actually forms the real objective of Hanafi, that is, the reconstruction of
all Islamic disciplines including revelation (through reinterpretation). 399

Carool Kersten has appreciated Hanafi’s technique in the following words, “These approaches are based
on the premise that all Islamic disciplines have emerged from unmediated, philological, intuitive or
allegorical readings of revealed texts. By identifying the negative and positive aspects of the fields of
traditional Islamic learning, they are then transposed into a language better equipped to deal with
contemporary circumstances400.”

It is evident from the above discussion that Hanafi is primarily and profoundly concerned with
the language. He is not satisfied with the out-worn and old-fashioned idiom with the help of which the
Islamic disciplines are interpreted. Here one may naturally ponder: Is the issue of language so important?
Or can with the help of a better expression we may make our understanding better and modern? The
answer is in affirmative. A number of contemporary Arab philosophers and thinkers have felt such need.
The most prominent amongst them is Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri. Al- Jabri (1936-2010), in his magnum
opus, that is, Critique of Arab Reason has analyzed those factors, which, according to him are responsible
for the failure of enlightenment in the Arab/Muslim World and have widened the gulf between tradition
and modernity. One of these is the Epistemology and structural boundaries of grammar in vogue in the
Muslim world. Al-Jabri himself holds structural boundaries responsible for the failure of modernizing
process in the world of Islam. These structural boundaries pose a threat and hindrance in the way of
scientific approach, reasoning and discourse. In the words of Dr. Sonja Hegasy, “His work revolves

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around the issue of how knowledge is produced. This has led Al-Jabri to investigate the grammar of
Arabic language, as well as Muslim law, theology, mysticism, rhetoric and philosophy. According to Al-

Jabri these fields exhibit the same structure of knowledge production. He claims that the method of
analogy is deeply rooted in the Arab-Islamic cultural sphere, as this method was carried over from Islamic

jurisprudence to all other fields of science.

In the science of religious interpretation (ulum al-bayan), the unknown is always classified below that of
the already known. Reasoning in the natural sciences (ulum al-burhan) is, by analogy, based solely on
deduction. Mysticism (ulum al-irfan), on the other hand, has meant for most intellectuals a retreat into the
private sphere, so that here, as well, no momentum towards modernization can arise.” 401

The interesting and important question here is: why outdated and incompetent epistemological
systems are still being adopted by the Muslim thinkers? One of the most influential contemporary
scholars of Islam, Mohammad Arkoun (1928-2010) has explained it in these words: The problem is that a
particular version of Islamic thought has been sanctified as a consequence of developments in the late
classical period, and especially due to the influence of al-Shafi'i (d. 820). Ever since, Muslims have been
prisoners of categories of meaning standardized centuries ago, whereas the genius of the early Muslims
was that they themselves were able to adapt to changing historical circumstances by interpretations that
differed from those held by their predecessors. Another difficulty is that Shafi'ian and Ash'arite
epistemologies are entrenched because of the cooperation among political regimes, establishment ulama,
and dissident clerics/populists, all of whom fear that abandoning the ahistorical approach to knowledge
will lead to their marginalization in society. Yet, without the careful application of critical methodologies
from modern philosophy, social science, and linguistics, Muslims will always have to gravitate within the
orbit of a closed cognitive system that is increasingly irrelevant to their contemporary needs.402

However, the hitherto proposed solution of this problem is not very substantial or even respectable. This
is simply to borrow phrases, terminologies, expressions and vocabulary from the West and the Europe to
deal with the requirements of the modern time. Hanafi is determined to bring the Muslim World out of
this quagmire and to overcome their sense of inferiority. He is confident enough of his method and
declares courageously that the logic and language consequential of the Ilm Usul al-Fiqh are better and
improved than those of the dogmatic theology of the West. “So whereas European philosophical jargon
offers a richer language, the schema developed in The Method of Exegesis provides the Muslim World
not only with a home-grown general method of philosophical investigation but also with a methodology
which, thanks to its inherent coherence, stability and integrity, can find general application beyond the
Islamic tradition”403.

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Hanafi added a new dimension in the use of Hermeneutics and expanded its scope since in Christian
thought; it is considered generally a religious science like other religious disciplines. In Christianity it has
never being recognized as a principle tool which may lead to new forms of reflection including linguistic
analysis, historical critique and practical realization 404.

Let us examine how Hanafi has enriched this branch of knowledge with his innovative approach and
contribution. In one of his very significant books on the related issues, Cultures and Civilization: Conflict
or Dialogue, he has analyzed “Islamic Spectrum as Historical Tension”. In this essay he has surveyed a
very basic yet very bold question: Is there a mainstream Islam? Quite unexpectedly, courageously and
honestly Hanafi has answered NO. There is no such entity as ‘pure’, ‘real’ or ‘original’ Islam contrary to
popular belief or conception. Islam being a global and universal religion practiced in all parts of the world
with so many local shades and hues; a fathomless ocean in nature, it cannot be confined in a single
narrow style and mode. In Hanafi’s view, “The Muslim World is so diversified that it is very difficult to
fix a mainstream Islam neither in history, nor in geography, nor in worldview.” 405 Even one, single,
unified title to represent all verities of Islam is a wrong approach, “Islamic thinking is not only political
Islam but it includes also cultural Islam and even major trends in Islamic Studies. Political Islam wants
power while cultural Islam aims at enlightenment. New trends in Islamic Studies want to renew Islamic
methods of research and of thinking as a long term policy for a more sustainable renaissance.
Fundamentalism may not be a mainstream Islam but a part of political Islam which itself is a part of
cultural Islam which itself is a part of Islam in history” 406. This internal diversity and multiplicity in Islam
at one hand made it a great pluralistic religion while on the other hand it is a source of extreme historical
tension among various groups of different outlooks. Regarding this tension Hanafi writes, “This spectrum
in Islamic thinking is very normal since it expresses a historical tension in Islamic culture between two
forces, one forward, the other backward, one to the future, the other to the past, a normal tension since the
Muslim world is living in this century, its renaissance, the conflict between the old and the new, the
fathers and the sons, the classic and the modern. This historical tension is behind the Islamic spectrum. It
is a tension in time which expresses itself as a tension in thinking and practicing, in methods and
behaviour”.407 From this prologue or introduction, Hanafi moves to the tension between the text and the
reality which is directly linked to the problem of the interpretation and Hermeneutics. Hanafi’s paragraph
is lengthy but worth-quoting in our present context, “There is a big theoretical tension between text and
reality. A fundamentalist discourse is based on the text as an argument of authority, while a post-
fundamentalist is based on reality, the analysis of socio-political setting of Muslim societies. The
difficulty of the text is to take it out of context, linguistically and historically. Any text can be used
differently according to the interpreter, while factual analysis is based on direct evidence. It is the same
tension between tradition and reason. A fundamentalist classical discourse is based on previous dogmatic

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and legal tradition, while a post fundamentalist one depends on rational analysis and the argument of
reason. There is also a third tension between the focus of the Worldview between Theocerntrism and
anthropocentrism. The fundamentalist discourse is still theocentric………The post-fundamentalist
discourse is more human. It confesses that it is a human discourse, right or wrong, which permits dialogue
and revision. A fourth tension exists between Dogma and Ideology. A fundamentalist discourse is
dogmatic one. A dogma is the matter of belief, obedience and resignation, while a post fundamentalist
discourse has a clear awareness of its ideological orientation. In traditional societies theology plays the
role of ideology in a modern society. The fifth tension is between rituals and morals”408. [Italics added].

So how these identified tensions are to be resolved? One way is to make reason the basis of scripture. The
function of reason is to reach, on its own, through evidence and inference the truth. Hanafi has repeated
here his favourite model of three orders: i- the order of revelation, ii- the order of reason, and, iii-order of
reality409. See reference 14 above. According to Hanafi, only to laud Western Rationalism is not
sufficient. The real job is not to follow blindly Descartes and Kant or the Western Enlightenment. It was
the pattern of 19th century, “an external, easy, transferable, elitist model; not an internal, difficult,
creative, popular model”.410 The real and practical solution for the Muslim World is gradual shift from
authoritarianism to liberalism. This is not only a socio-political shift alone, but a complete paradigm shift,
a total change in the cultural worldview which needs to be reconstructed from a historical phase to
another. However, at the same time Hanafi acknowledges that it is a task too gigantic to be accomplished
by a single individual; it is rather the work of several generations 411.

This –but should not be concluded that Hanafi has shirked his own responsibility. He has made as much
valuable contribution as he could and is still making. It is a time to have a glimpse on Hanafi’s worthy
input in the grand project. Under the title of “Hermeneutics and Revolution”, he identifies the role and
function of Hermeneutics. However, it should be kept in view that Hanafi is the one of the greatest
exponents of revolution, in the Muslim World generally and in the Egypt particularly. Hermeneutics
according to him is the tool not only for bridging the gap between the tradition and modernity but also for
paving the way for the revolution. Hanafi states, “In the Third World countries, Religion and Revolution
are two legalities, one of the past and the other of the present……Sometimes, these two legalities
contradict each other in a competing and even in a conflicting manner. Consequently, the society becomes
divided between traditionalist and modernists……..In order to preserve the National Character and
maintain continuity in history, a methodology is needed. Hermeneutics is this device, performing a
peaceful passage from religion to revolution, and unifying the two legalities in one, the right to interpret
the past for the sake of the present and to read the tradition in favour of the revolution”.412[Italics added].

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Hanafi asserts that Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation; while to interpret actually means to
understand and to execute. For instance the violinist is an interpreter and the text is like a musical note,
which needs to be understood and realized. Since hermeneutics was the earlier form of Phenomenology,
and later its fulfillment, it can reshuffle Phenomenology, as a practical science. Hence Phenomenology
not only becomes a Theory of Knowledge or a Theory of Being but also a Theory of Oriented Action as is
the case in Behavioural Sciences. Hanafi has not only defined Hermeneutics but also has explained its
mechanism of interpretation under the “Text and Meaning”. According to Hanafi, any text itself is empty.
Its meaning comes from the living experience of the present. The text which originated in the past in a
retrospective vision is filled by content from the present, in a prospective vision. Hermeneutics is a
procedure by which homogeneity in time, a continuous flux from the past to the present to the future is
realized. Thus the text itself is formal. It needs a material content coming from the living experience of the
present. The text needs a passage from the Formal to the Transcendental, as Husserl did for Logic. 413
[Italics and emphasis added].

Hanafi wishes to see the text free from the clutches of history. He admits that verily the text originally
originates in a specific historical background but with the passage of time it becomes an independent
source of value. Though it (text) is born in history but it lives and survives in meta-history. According to
Hanafi, the text carries its own reduction and constitution (in Phenomenological sense) within itself.
Therefore, the text starts in the historical contingency but ends in ideational necessity. It moves from the
relative to the absolute and from the particular to the universal 414.

All these premises are correct but the reader may raise the question about the methodology of
interpretation. Hanafi answers very precisely that to interpret is to make a double movement:

i- From the text to the reality;

ii- From the reality to the text.

The first is realized through the amphibological principles of language and the second through the
Zeitgeist. Because language without reality is void and reality without language is blind. “Die Sprache ist
dass Haus des Siens”415. This is a dense paragraph wherein the phrases and expressions used need further
elaboration. The very first is amphibological principle. An amphibological phrase or sentence is that
which can be interpreted in two ways: usually because of the grammatical construction rather than the
meanings of the words themselves. For instance the phrase, “the boy on the chair with a broken leg” is an
amphibology. Zeitgeist, the famous German term means, Spirit of the Age.

Hanafi is of the opinion that the amphibological principles give the interpreter the freedom to read
himself and his society in the text. The text has double sides according to the double social structure in

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every society. So what is the role of the interpreter? His/her role is to lay the text on one of its sides; thus
amphibological principles include simultaneously the literal and the figurative, the exoteric and the
esoteric, the univocal and the equivocal, the precise and the vague and the particular and the general. 416

Hanafi justifies this amphibological use within the social structure. According to him social structure is
also double, that is, rich and poor, oppressor and the oppressed, authority and opposition, minority and
majority, elite and masses, ruler and the ruled. The role of interpreter is to change the status quo, namely
the domination of the first on second and to generate a power-struggle between the two poles in favour of
the second against the first, for the sake of social change as a peaceful and gradual revolution 417.

Hanafi further states that the double structure of text and of society generates two similar trends in the
Hermeneutics. The one is conservative and the other is progressive. The conservative Hermeneutics treats
the text as literal and independent. It is considered as a norm or standard against which reality is
measured. Whereas in progressive Hermeneutics reality is taken as fundamental and text is adjusted in
accordance with the reality. Conservative Hermeneutics considers the text a value per se and an end in
itself, while the progressive Hermeneutics considers the text only a tool… ………Conservative
Hermeneutics is formal, void of content, mystic, dogmatic, theocentric and historical; while progressive
Hermeneutics is material, full, social, open, anthropocentric and meaningful. The conflict between these
types is indeed a struggle between two social forces.” 418

Here Hanafi takes the opportunity to define Theology of Liberation, which according to him is “nothing
else except this phenomenological passage, through Hermeneutics, from Tradition to Revolution. It can
reformulate itself to a rigorous discipline purifying itself from emotionalism, dogmatism and
institutionalism. This phenomenological rigour can be extended to Hermeneutics as a tool of development
in the Third World”419.

Theology of Liberation, a Christian product in origin has been used and defined by Hanafi in a novel and
purposeful manner. We shall discuss it in detail during due course, but now for the time being we shall
confine ourselves to the problem of interpretation, rather reinterpretation. However, before moving
further with Hanafi, another example of hermeneutical interpretation by a contemporary Iranian
theologian and scholar will not be out of context, rather engaging and interesting. Like Hanafi,
Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari (b.1939) is an expert of Hermeneutics and a scholar and admirer of
Christian Theology. Shabestari is a proponent of modern Islam and in Hermeneutics; he has founded and
established a new science which offers a novel view on Islamic thought. He is confident that by the
application of Hermeneutics on Qur’anic exegesis all problems may be resolved. He has written a
valuable book on the topic under the title of Hermeneutik, ketab va sonnat (Hermeneutics, the Book [the
Qur’an], and the Sunnah). He has taken inspiration from both Gadamer and Dilthey. 420

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Shebestari has also explained in detail the concept of “epistemological interest”; it is a very significant
concept of hermeneutics with the help of which one may reach close to objectivity while reading the texts
or to the possibility of dependable cognizance in the words of Habermas. Habermas, however,
categorically concludes that no text may be fully understood. Shabestari extends the Habermas’ doctrine
of epistemological interest to the interpretation of Qur’an and holds the views that all interpreters have
their definite epistemological interests while reading and explaining the text. Hence all of their
hypotheses are also based on the same interests. According to Shabestari you may find any system in
Qur’an (economic, political, and legal etcetera) you wish because the text answers only those questions
which are put to it. So anyone may find those answers which one is seeking for. The finest example is of
Baqir al-Sadr who could trace an Islamic economy from Qur’an since he so desired. 421 The same has
been described by Hanafi in the following words, “The Qur’an now is a book which does not speak by
itself but through interpreters. The Qur’an per se is silent. It speaks once it is heard or read. Since the
contemporary reader lives in another time, more than fourteen centuries after, his psychology, his
mentality, his intention and his anguishes are different”. 422 The subject of text and textual interpretation
will be thoroughly discussed below.

Hanafi in one of his important works, Islam in the Modern World has written a very detailed and rich
article on the subject of interpretation. In this chapter he has explained various methods of interpretation
popular and in-vogue during the various phases of the history of Islam. However, he himself has focused
on thematic interpretation as the most valuable, authentic and fruitful method. Hanafi has not only
enumerated the different methods but has also discussed their pros and cons. The brief introduction with
these will be interesting as well as informative.

a- Longitudinal Interpretation: Hanafi writes, “Until now, Qur’anic interpretation has been done
from Surat Al-Fatiha to Surat Al-Nas, Surat after Surat, verse following verse, from right to left,
according to the written order of Surats, considered dictated by the Prophet himself. 423 The huge,
voluminous classical commentaries of the Qur’an (Tabari, Ibn Kathir, Al- Zamakhshari), even
modern ones like Al-Manar of Rashid Redha and Fi Zilal al-Qur’an by Sayyed Qutb are done
accordingly”.

Its advantages are as under:

 Provides the maximum historical, linguistic and social information about the text;
 Follows the traditional scriptural order of the Qur’an;

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  Helps to know the approach, intellectual level , understanding and historical background
of the commentators;

However, it has specific disadvantages, for instance:

 Repeats the same themes in several Surats which is then covered partially;
 Duplicates the same idea many times without developing a coherent and global
concept;
 Lacks an overall structure or framework;
 Mostly is very heavy and large, hence difficult to read and grasp;
 Confuses knowledge with information;
 Mostly consists of cold, un-useful and obsolete information, while the reader is in need
of living, useful and contemporary knowledge.

b-Disciplinary Interpretation: This too, falls within the category of the traditional commentary
following the classification of the major Disciplines of Islam, that is, i- Qur’an , Hadith, Tafsir, Sira
and Fiqh, ii- Kalam (Theology), Hikma (Philosophy), Usul al-Fiqh(Jurisprudence) and , Tasawwuf
(Mysticism), iii- Mathematics, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy, Physics, Medicine,
Pharmacology, Botany and Biology, and iv- Philosophy, Rhetoric, Geography and History. This sort
of the commentary, however, strengthens more the specific discipline and less the Qur’an.
Disciplinary interpretation is actually the start of thematic interpretation, going to be explained soon.
Following is the example of some disciplinary interpretations:

 Philological Interpretation: Stresses more on language, phonetics, syntax, stylistics and

rhetoric. Language is treated as an end in itself. Language on the other hand is a tool for
something else, that is, to discover the reality. Language itself is not reality. Main
example is interpretation is:
---Al-Zajjaj, I’rab al-Quran, Cairo.

 Legal Interpretation: Is primarily based on the premise that the gist and heart of the
revelation is law and the jurists are the guardians of revelation. This is a very limited type
of interpretation, mostly obsolete and more loyal to the Schools of Jurisprudence. Major
Examples are:
---Al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Quran, Cairo (Hanafite);
-- -Abu Bakr Ibn-Arabi, Ahkam al-Quran, Cairo (Malikite);

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 ---Alkia Al-Harrasi, Ahkam al-Quran, Cairo (Shafite);
---Al-Tilani, Al- Thamarat Al-Yani’a, Cairo, (Zaydite).

 Historical Interpretation: Is written by historians, using their knowledge twice, once in

writing history and the other time in writing commentary. In such an interpretation,
reality is confined to only those circumstances in which the Holy Book was revealed.
Sometimes to fill certain gapes, Jewish sources are also used. The whole interpretation is
based on an implied theory of correspondence, “adequatio ratio in rei” to prove it a book
of history instead of a book of wisdom. That is why all historical interpretations commit
the same fallacy which is called in Islamic tradition, “interpretation through narratives”
(Al-Tafsir bi al-Ma’thur). Its prominent examples are:
--- Al-Tabri, Jami Al-Bayan Fi Tafsser Al-Quran, Cairo;
---Al-Thaalibi (Abdelrahman), Al-Jawahir al-Hisan, Algiers;
---Al-Fayruzabadi (Abu Tahir, Tanwir Al-Miqias min Tafsir Ibn Abbas, Cairo.

 Theological Interpretation: Is concerned more with the doctrinal opinions of the political
sects to be used as weapons against the opponents. Doctrine of predestination is a
familiar example. Some doctrines were the justification of the status quo and some were
simply hypotheses without foundation and practical implication. Some famous examples
include:
---Al- Quadi Abd el-Jabbar, Tanzil Al-Quran An-Al-Mata’in, Cairo;
---Abdelatif Al-Karzani, Muqadimmat Mir’at Al- Anwar wa Mishkat Al-Asrar, Ajam;
---Al-Hassan Al-Askari, Tafsir, Tabriz.

 Philosophical Interpretation: Is a later development of the theological interpretation. It is

interested in philosophical issues concerning the God, the world, man, destiny, prophecy,
eschatology and Imamate. It has soft corner for Mutazilites, mystics and neighbouring
cultures. It defends all the three with vigour. Its basic tool is Ta’wil. However, it goes far
into speculative analysis and depends solely on pure reason and is heavily influenced by
the Greek thought. It sacrifices socio-political realities for the sake of a utopia. Its well-
known examples are:
---Fakhar-ud-Din Al-Razi, Mafatih Al-Ghaib, Cairo;
---Al-Badawi, Anwar Al-Tanzil wa Asrar Al- Ta’wil, Cairo;
---Abu Hayyan , Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, Cairo;

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 ---Al-Kazin, Al-Bab Al-Ta’wil Fi Maani Al-Tanzeel, Cairo.

 Mystical Interpretation: Intended to strengthen the mystical opinion within the

community, against their opponents mainly jurists. Esoteric interpretation was reaction
against the strictly legal and exoteric interpretations of the jurists. Mystical interpretation
transformed the entire text into the metaphor and made very overwhelming theoretical
refinements. As a result, pathos took over reason, isolation became the road to spirituality
and predestination overpowered the free will. Some mystical interpretations are:
---Abd Al-Razik Al-Kashani, Tafsir Ibn Arabi, Cairo;
---Abu Abd Al- Rahman Al- Sullami, Haqaiq Al-Tafsir, Cairo;
---Najm Al-Din Daya, Ala’al-Dawla Al-Bayanafqi; Al-Tawilat Al-Najiyya, Cairo.424

 Scientific interpretation: Is the product of modern times which tries to reconcile the
Qur’an with the new forms of human knowledge and scientific theories. It is based on the
idea that all scientific knowledge pre-existed in Qur’an and it did make some explicit or
implicit references towards them. But as know that science is based on observation and
experimentation; these commentaries presuppose that Divine revelation followed human
knowledge and was conditioned by it. Moreover, this interpretation gives the believers the
false idea that all scientific discoveries are already there in Qur’an. Its main examples are:
---Tantawi Gohari, Al-Jawahir Fi Tafsir Al-Qur’an Al-Hakim, Cairo;
--- Abuzeid Al-Damanhuri, Al-Hidaya wa Al-Irfan, Cairo.

 Socio-political Interpretation: Is one of the modern interpretations closest to the thematic

interpretation, going to be discussed soon. In the words of Hassan Hanafi, “It begins with
present socio-political circumstances and uses the text as a critical tool in order to see the
distance between the Real and the Ideal. Qur’anic interpretation is a social critique of
Muslim societies. The text is the form; the actual reality is the content. The interpretation
is directed towards social change, taking into consideration the major problems in the
Muslim World, joining theory to practice, going beyond classical interpretations, linking
the text to present times”425.
Some such attempts by the very renowned personalities are as follows:
---Muhammad Abdou, Tafsir Juz Amma, Cairo;
---Rashid Redha, Tafsir Al-Manar, Cairo;
---M.M. Al-Maraghi, Al-Durus Al-Dunya, Cairo.

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 However, it too has shortcoming and flaws of its own and resembles more or less the
longitudinal interpretation. One finds textual analysis still dominant as compared to
reality in these interpretations.

 Aesthetic Interpretation: Is the last amongst the modern interpretations. It interprets the
text as a metaphor. It is a living and existential experience wherein a conscious and
aesthetic relation is established between the text and the person, resulting in a very
subjective discourse—because individual consciousness without objective reality is
reduced to mere subjectivity. The interpreter focuses on the beauty, literary style,
persuasion, rhetoric and grammar of emotions. This sort of commentary impresses the
reader very much but it lacks both reality and rationality. The greatest example of this
method is :
---Sayyed Qutb, Fi Zilala Al-Qur’an, Cairo.
The aesthetic interpretation produces strong admiration for the text in the reader but does
not succeed in building nations and in transforming societies. 426

C-Thematic Interpretation: The third type of interpretation is thematic interpretation, which in the
opinion of Hanafi avoids the lacunae of both longitudinal and disciplinary commentaries. Its merits
are as follows:

 It interprets the Qur’an by not only deducing its meaning from the text, but also induces it
from reality. It concentrates not only on explaining (Auslegn) but also on understanding
(Verstehen). It pays equal attention to knowing (Wissen) and also on being aware of,
(Besinnen).
 The interpreter is not only a receiver of meaning, but also a giver. He receives the meaning
and puts it in a structure, which is simultaneously rational and real. Since Reason and Reality
are the same, thematic interpretation is the discovery of the original identity between
Revelation, Reason and Nature, according to Hanafi.
 It not only analyzes but also synthesizes; not only divides the whole into the parts but also
joins the parts into the whole. It penetrates into the core of the issue and brings and focuses
on the object.
 Thematic interpretation, as per Hanafi is, “discovering something new between the lines,
adding to the common knowledge to unknown and the articulating, going into a deeper level
of the text which corresponds to another level of consciousness. Interpreting is almost writing
a new text, the reflection of a Scripture in the mirror of the individual consciousness” 427

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The very next question which occurs to us is about the technique, methodology, premises, rules and
regulations of this cherished method. Hanafi has narrated these very meticulously and in detail in the
Islam in the Modern World. We would try here our best to be comprehensive as well as very precise and
concise.

Premises are prior to the rules of the method; actually they formulate the philosophical foundations of the
method, which in the case of Hanafi are based on Phenomenology. The premises are as under, quoting
maximum the language used by Hanafi, himself.

1- Revelation is put between brackets, neither affirmed, nor denied. The interpreter does not
question about the origin of the same, either Divine or human. He is more concerned with
WHAT and not with HOW. The question of origin is related to Genesis, while thematic
interpretation deals with the Essence. For it a text is only a text, no matter it is Divine or human,
sacred or profane, religious or secular.
2- As stated above, the Qur’an is taken as any other text since the distinction between the holy or
mundane is not an issue of general Hermeneutics at all. Moreover, Qur’an and specially Hadith
are the transmutation of human language, Arabic or foreign words and even utterances
pronounced by the believers and non-believers alike. 428
3- There is no true or false interpretation, right or wrong understanding. There are only different
efforts to approach the text from different interests, for different motivations. The conflict of
interpretation is a conflict of interests. An accurate explanation of the text, according to linguistic
principles is a mere tautology. The distance of time between the moment of utterance and the
moment of explanation is over fourteen centuries, which makes a theory of equation between the
text and its interpretation almost impossible.
4- There is not a one and single interpretation of the text, there may be, rather there are many
interpretations based on the different approaches of the different interpreters. An interpretation of
the text is essentially pluralistic. The text is only a vehicle for human interests and even passions.
The text is a mere form; the interpreter fills it with content from time and space.
5- The conflict of interpretation is essentially a socio-political conflict, not even a theoretical one.
Theory indeed is an epistemological cover. Each interpretation expresses the socio-political
commitment of the interpreter. Interpretation is an ideological weapon, used by different socio-
political powers to maintain or the change the status-quo429.

Rules of thematic interpretation have been described as under, brevity, however, has been kept in view.

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1- Socio-political commitment is essential since interpreter is never neutral; he is committed to a
cause. He is a reformer, social actor and a revolutionary. He identifies himself with the
downtrodden. Sitz im Leben is not only for the text but also for the interpreter.
2- Interpreter looks for something, though he may not know for sure what he is seeking? He is not
neutral but has alliances. He is searching solutions for problems. Asbab-Al-Nazul is based on the
same principle that reality has priority over text.
3- Interpreter makes the synopsis of all the verses concerning a single theme and reads them
together, so that their major orientation may become manifest. The Qur’an is not interpreted as
the Holy Qur’an but the Qur’anic Lexicon.
4- Linguistic forms are classified; since language as a form of thought is a leading thread to the
meaning.
5- After linguistic analysis, the interpreter concentrates on building the structure of a thing going
from meaning to the object, from noesis to noema. The meaning and the object are the same
thing, two facets of the same intentionality.
6- The next step is the analysis of the actual and factual situation. The interpreter then looks toward
ground realities, that is, poverty, oppression, violence of human rights, disparity in power and
unjust distribution of wealth. He collects quantitative and statistical data, because social
diagnostics of reality is another way to understand the meaning through dynamic application and
test of the text in the external world.
7- Then precedes the comparison between the Real and the Ideal. “By building the structure, giving
the qualitative theme, analyzing factual situation, and giving the quantitative status of the theme
as a socio-historical phenomenon, the interpreter draws the comparison between the ideal
structure, deduced by content-analysis from the text, and the factual situation induced from
statistics and social sciences. The interpreter lives between text and reality, between the ideal and
the real, between the Sein Sollen and the Sein, in Hegelian terms, between Being and
Nothingness, Becoming emerges”430.
8- Finally, there is description of the modes of action. Once the distance is measured between the
Ideal and the Real, between the Kingdom of Heaven and the Kingdom of Earth, action emerges as
the ultimate step in the process of interpretation. The interpreter himself switches from text to
action, from theory to practice, and from understanding to changing. Logos and praxis converge
in bridging the gap between the Ideal and the Real. This is done by finding means of
communication between two worlds, adapting the ideal to be closer to the real and changing the
real to be closer to the Ideal. Gradual steps, time and combined efforts are required, without

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 skipping steps or using violence. The complete realization of the Ideal and the idealization of the
Real are the natural processes of Reason and Nature 431
9- Thematic interpretation is based on three intersecting circles, sharing the same centre: Being
(Sein), Being- with –the- others (Mitsein) and Bein-in-the-World (Aussein, In-der- Welt-Sein).
Being is the individual consciousness and, therefore, core of the world. Being- with -the- others
indicates the social and the Intersubjective human world. Being-in – the- World refers to the
relation of individual consciousness with nature, that is, the world of things. 432 This last point is
also referred to as “Scheme of Thematic Interpretation.”

Hanafi has also answered some possible objections on the thematic interpretation, the brief description of
which is as follows:

1- Thematic interpretation while dealing with the text of the Qur’an treats it as an ordinary text
without making any distinction between the Divine and human or holy or profane. Hence, it may
lead to the negation of the prophecy and denial of the revelation. However, to judge the divinity
of the text is beyond the scope of thematic interpretation. Thematic interpretation is concerned
with the fact that the text is in Arabic language, revealed at a certain time in a particular space
addressed to a specific community with a practical purpose to improve it for the better. What is
prior to these facts falls within the domain of Theology and not in the Thematic Interpretation 433.
2- The thematic interpretation is relativistic; it never claims finality or the ultimate truth. It is not an
interpretation which is valid till the end of the world. Here the words of Hanafi are worthy of
attention, “Once every interpreter or every generation interprets the Qur’an according to his
interests, the eternal meaning of the Qur’an will disappear. Human passions and inclinations
would destroy the objectivity of meaning. What would be the criteria of validity in case of
contradictory interpretations? How would the reader, the follower and the believer choose
between different conflicting interpretations? The answer is an eternal meaning of the Qur’an is
a hypothesis, a presupposition, and a theoretical case which cannot be known practically . The
interpreter is a human being, living in a human condition, having his own inclinations and
interests. It would be pretentious for him to claim that he can give the eternal meaning to the
Qur’an. There is no theoretical validity but only a conflict of power” 434.[Emphasis added]
3- Thematic interpretation may be accused of Marxism, given the high and clear commitment for
the poor, the oppressed and the wretched of the earth. Social justice, labour as a source of value,
rejection of surplus value, common ownership of means of production; all are Marxist
components. According to Hanafi, such elements are not due to Marxism, but appeared in it
because of conditions of workers in Germany during 19 th century. Whereas in the Arab and the

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 Muslim World, colonialism, oppression, social injustices, mal-distribution of wealth, poverty,
ignorance, dictatorship, tyranny, autocracy are given socio-political conditions paving the way for
Marxist ideology. Early Islam was also accepted by the marginalized and the poor of the Mecca.
4- Thematic interpretation uses the philosophical terminology and jargon associated with
phenomenology; it can be accused quickly of being the imitator of the West. Hanafi argues to
justify it that in the last two centuries, Western philosophical vocabulary has become a house-
hold item, just like the Greek terminology in the earlier Muslim Philosophy. Modern
philosophical vocabulary is only used as a means of expression in the thematic interpretation, the
content is endogenous. What Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were for the ancients, Kant, Hegel and
Husserl may be for the moderns435.

Hanafi has explained thematic interpretation in detail, very clearly, univocally, without any ambiguity
or fear of any sort. He is novel, fresh, energetic, bold, and courageous and not afraid of his
conservative compatriots and fellow-believers spread across the world. Like Iqbal, he is neither
hesitant nor ambivalent. He is confidant of his views and able to state them categorically. Unlike his
mentor Iqbal, he faces the problems with steadfastness, and does not withdraw or retreat immediately
in case of pressure and criticism from the traditionalists. These are all his merits and plus points.
However, his outlook and approach are not totally free of flaws and some valid and serious points of
difference may be raised regarding them. Most of the objections he himself has enlisted above and
tried to address them. However, a reader may notice that he is not replying the observations, rather is
insisting on them forcefully. If we go back to his premises 3, 4 and 5 above, we find some astounding
statements, for instance:

 There is no true or false interpretation, right or wrong understanding. There are only
different efforts to approach the text from different interests, for different motivations.
 The text is only a vehicle for human interests and even passions. The text is a mere form; the
interpreter fills it with content from time and space.
 Each interpretation expresses the socio-political commitment of the interpreter.
Interpretation is an ideological weapon, used by different socio-political powers to maintain
or the change the status-quo.

These seemingly very perturbing statements will be dealt with in detail, by the end of this chapter in the
Recapitulation and Concluding Remarks. Here we should only keep in mind the word “text” used
repeatedly by Hanafi.

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Now we come to those answers which Hanafi himself has given in response to these very tangible
objections. Hanafi himself has acknowledged that (his) thematic evaluation carries within it the Marxist
elements. He is absolutely right since he has unconditionally declared that thematic interpretation is an
ideological weapon in the conflict of power; and an interpreter is a human being with particular
inclinations and passions who fills the empty text with meaning of his own preference. Since he has a
very soft-corner for Marxism, and is the founder of Islamic Left in Egypt, he has seen the Qur’an too in
the same perspective. There is nothing wrong in being a Marxist even today though the ideology after its
demise is resting in the museum of history with other artifacts. As far as human welfare, dignity, equality,
justice, economic well-being of the people, social uplift of the poor and liberation from slavery,
oppression and tyranny and freedom from hunger, disease and poverty are concerned, no conscientious
human being may deny these. The human and democratic values are respected in the entire civilized
world. If Hanafi, Iqbal or any other Muslim philosopher proves that they are perfectly compatible with
Islam and Qur’an, then this is definitely a great service. However, to extract complete Marxist ideology
with its well-set agenda and precise terminology is not only strange but also un-warranted.

The answer to this dilemma, to a certain extent, has been provided Abu Zayd that as long as the Qur’an is
dealt with only as a text----implying a concept of an author (i.e. God as divine author) ---one is forced to
find a focal point of gravity to which all variations should be linked. This automatically implies that the
Qur’an is at the mercy of the ideology of its interpreter. For a communist, the Qur’an would thus reveal
communism, for a fundamentalist it would be a highly fundamentalist text, for a feminist it would be a
feminist text, and so on.436 (Quoted already in the context of Iqbal, see reference no.54 above). Hanafi
too, stands at par with Iqbal in interpreting Qur’an with pre-conceived favourite doctrines. Moreover, the
values cherished by Hanafi are nevertheless associated with Western Capitalism and its allied institutions;
these have no relation with Marxism as such, which was/is a worst form of dictatorship and state
oppression. As far as the distribution of wealth and resources is concerned, Qur’anic stance is quite in
contradiction with Marxist ideology. However, these debates are beyond the scope of the present study.

Our next point of discussion in connection with Hanafi is also very important; that is, the question: What
does Qur’an mean as a TEXT? If we see the second line of the above paragraph, the quote of Abu Zayd,
we find the sentence, “as long as the Qur’an is dealt with only as a text----implying a concept of
author…………” Abu Zayd wants to say that a number of relevant problems arise in interpretation when
the Qur’an is treated as a text, written down by an author, definitely God. This approach makes it
susceptible to multiple interpretations, each reflecting the personal outlook of the author. Hanafi is also
cognizant of this issue and he has analyzed it in an in-depth article, “What does the Qur’an as a sacred
text mean”? Moreover, if it is not a text, then what it is? Here we would like to see what is the standpoint

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of Hanafi in this matter ? Hanafi states that the Qur’an has been mentioned by many words and nouns by
Allah; for instance, Bayan—declaration, Hoda—guidance, Nur---light, Rahmah---mercy, Hikmah---
wisdom, Bushra---Glad tidings and Mawaiz---advice….etcetera. All these words, according to Hanafi
indicate the essential relation between the Qur’an and the consciousness. It is an Intention as an
intentional horizon. It is content not a form, an action not a text. The sacred is intention, not the text; not
the word but human intentionality. 437 [Italics added].

He further adds that the Qur’anic text has a context, but not within the text, but in reality. In the classical
expression it is called Asbab al-Nuzul. The revelation was sent on request and appeal when there was a
question within the e society. The question was raised by a person or by a group, the solution proposed by
the revelation was known by simple reason. Revelation, reality and reason are identical. If revelation is
sacred, reason and reality are also sacred. 438[Italics added].

The Qur’an refers to religions in Arabian Peninsula before Islam such as Judaism, Christianity,
Sabeanism, Brahmanism, Zoroastrianism and idolatry. If revelation is sacred, history of religions in
Arabia is also sacred. If the final lesson is sacred, all the previous lessons till the final one are also
sacred. That is why there is no distinction of sacred and profane in history as per Qur’an. History of
prophecy is itself a history of various peoples as expressed in the prophetic narratives of the Qur’an; Noah
and his people including his son, Abraham and his people including his father, Moses and the Pharaoh,
Jesus, the Scribes and the Parisians, Mohammed and the tribal history of Arabia. 439 [Italics added].

Hanafi says that before reaching an ordinary reader, Qur’an has passed through several levels of
concretization:

i- First of all it was identical with divine essence and was meaning without words; which in
Husserlian terminology is called, vorpredacative Erfahrung;
ii- Then it was brought outside the divine essence and preserved in the Lauh-al-Mahfouz,
presupposing words in some language;
iii- From preserved tablet it was carried to respective prophets by the angel Gabriel in definite
languages;
iv- Its insertion in the mind and heart of the Prophet(PBUH) is another level of concretization;
v- Then its utterance in life-sound by the Prophet(PBUH) is the next level;
vi- Then Qur’an as heard, written and learnt by heart by the companions makes the sixth stage of
concretization;
vii- The seventh stage is its compilation and standardized single version by the third pious caliph,
Othman Ghani.440

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 This argument shows that though in origin the Qur’an is purely divine but as an end-product, it has
great human contribution. (So if divine origin is holy and sacred, the human factor is definitely sacred
too. Author)

In the end Hanafi concludes excellently and emphatically, “The sacredness of the Qur’an is not the
idolatry of the text but the implementation of its meaning in the real world, transforming revelation as an
ideal system to a world system. Revelation and reality are two sides of one sacredness. A Qur’anic text
which is not implemented in the world and the world that is going to the opposite direction is a profane
text. The sacredness of the Qur’an is the realization of its potentiality to reality. The Qur’an printed in
silver and gold, covered by lane, kissed by the lips, touched by the hand to have a baraka, exchanged by
the heads of states as a gift, put in the salon as a nice piece of decoration and exposed in Museums is a
new form of idolatry. Liberating occupied territories, freeing the citizens, implementing social
justice, unifying the Ummah, preserving its identity, making it self-reliant with a higher cause are
sacred. Reality may be the real sacred text. The sacred text is only its phantom 441. [Emphasis added].

In this sense of the word Hanafi means that Qur’an is content not a form, an action not a text . The
sacred is intention, not the text; not the word but human intentionality. Now we are able to understand the
statement of Abu Zayd that as long as Qur’an is treated as a text written by an author, its various
ideological interpretations may not be avoided. (See reference 436 above).

The Iranian theologian and religious scholar Hassan Yussefi Eshkewari (b.1950), is completely in
consonance with Hanafi regarding the textual interpretation. He has chosen the verse 193 of the Sura 2 to
elaborate his example. The verse reads, “And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for
God. But if they desist, then let there be no hostility except among wrong-doers”. The verse may be
interpreted that Muslims have a duty to fight infidels forever and ever, and to convert them all to Islam.
Eshkewari, however, is of the opinion that this verse had a specific historical background, that is, battle of
Hudaybiya. The verse only refers to that one particular political situation: the infidel Meccans should be
resisted because they have sinned against the Prophet’s community. This does not mean that all humans
should be confronted till eternity, or until they pay homage to one True God. He, like Hanafi suggests the
long History of Asbab al-Nuzul (reason for Revelation) clearly suggests that how irrational many radical
Isalmisists are in arguing that every Qur’anic statement should be taken literally, and that every single one
of these is valid now and forever more 442. This is exactly the meaning and intention of Hanafi when he
said that an eternal meaning of the Qur’an is a hypothesis, a presupposition, and a theoretical case which
cannot be known practically.

Another argument regarding the text is quite pertinent and it is a good place in the discussion to mention
it. As we have already quoted above in Section “B” of this study that there are some terms which have

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lost their previous meaning and have opted for the new ones. For instance, freedom now does not
mean liberation from slavery of an owner, now it stands for the access to information, right to
express, move, believe and choose etcetera. Some phrases and related issues no longer exist in
the modern world such as spoils of war, concubines, slaves, and Dhimmi (non-Muslim citizens of
the Islamic state). Similarly some new phrases have been added to dictionary, which were
previously non-existent, such as, human rights, democracy, parliament, national liberation, mass-
culture, cloning, organ transplantation, and stem cell medicine ,assisted fertility and surrogate
mothers etcetera. Some terms have either become obsolete or quite vague and ambiguous like
Jihad, Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Islam. These need either complete review or at least
reinterpretation in terms of resistance against foreign occupation, war of liberation and
colonization.

As we know that the Hermeneutics has occupied Hanafi’s attention since long; he has analyzed this
subject in detail in one of his earlier works, Religious Dialogue and Revolution. The first chapter of the
same, that is, “Hermeneutics as Axiomatics-An Islamic Case” is worth reading. It is actually a paper of
Hanafi which he presented in the International Congress of Learned Societies in the Field of Religion
(The Society of Scientific Study of Religion) at Los Angeles, 1 st-5th September, 1972. Its entire content
may not be quoted here due to the paucity of space; however, a few passages would definitely enrich this
study and would add to the clarity of old concepts besides introduction of a few new phrases.

In the very essay, Hanafi describes Hermeneutics not only as a science of interpretation but also a
discipline which describes the passage of revelation from the stage of words to the stage of the world. It is
the science of the process of revelation from the letter to the reality, from Logos to Praxis, and also the
transformation of revelation from the Divine Mind to human life. He enumerates here three stages of
hermeneutical understanding:

i- Historical criticism, which guarantees the authenticity of the Scripture in history;

ii- Interpretation of the Scripture in rigorous sense, dealing essentially with the language and
historical circumstance from which the Scripture originated;
iii- Realization of this meaning in human life, which is the final goal of the Divine Word 443.

These three steps may be explained in phenomenological terminology as well; in phenomenological

language, we may say that Hermeneutics is the technique which determines the authenticity of the text
and its degree of certitude. Its explanation is as under:

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 i- “Historical consciousness,” which determines the authenticity of the text and the degree of its
certitude;
ii- “Eidetic consciousness”, which defines the meaning of the text and makes it rational;
iii- “Practical consciousness”, which takes the meaning as theoretical base for action and leads
revelation to its final goal in human life and in the world as an ideal structure in which the
world finds its perfection.444

While explaining Hermeneutics as Axiomatics, Hanafi says that it means the description of
hermeneutical process as a rational, formal, objective and universal science. “The relation between
Hermeneutics and Scriptures is like the relation between axiomatics and mathematics. Like axiomatics,
hermeneutics has to put in advance all its axioms and try to solve in advance all the hermeneutical
problems without any reference to data revelata”445. There are two types of Hermeneutics: general
Hermeneutics and the special Hermeneutics. The special one is called Hermeneutics Sacra, which deals
with the interpretation of the sacred texts in accordance with the rules mentioned above 446. [Emphasis
original].

Hermeneutics as Axiomatics traces out its way between two common extremes: the practical exegesis
and the Philosophical Hermeneutics. Practical exegesis is a pure philological analysis of the text very
near to philologia sacra. Hermeneutics as axiomatics eliminates the distinction between Hermeneutics
and exegesis. It is simultaneously a theoretical and applied science. Now the very next question is if
Hermeneutics as Axiomatics deals with the revelation, what is the data revelata? Is it history, some
exceptional event, an act, certain person or any word? The answer is that revelation is neither history, nor
event, nor act, nor any person. Revelation is not something tangible; it is rather acoustic, that is, words
with sounds and meanings. Logos does not mean Event or Persona, but only a Word, that is, language 447.
[Emphasis original].

Let us see, how do the three above mentioned branches of Hermeneutics, that is, Historical, Eidetical and
Practical work? A brief account is as under:

The Historical: Historical criticism must be completely independent of all kinds of theological,
philosophical, mystical, spiritual or even phenomenological criticism. It deals with two kinds of words.
First kinds of words are those which are transmitted to the prophet by God through the Holy Spirit and
dictated by the prophet to the scribe. This is called the verbatim revelation. First kind of words is only the
prerogative of the prophet not to be shared by anyone else. These are divine words in origin. Second type
of words is by the prophet himself not dictated by God. These may be words, deeds and consents but not
dreams, night visions or ecstatic states.

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Hermeneutics does not deal with the nature of the relation between god and the prophet and how the
prophet received the divine words, but it deals with these words uttered in history and communicated
from man to man. It does not take the words in its vertical dimension but in its horizontal one. If
revelation fulfills its condition of authenticity in history then it is infallible, otherwise the vise versa. 448

The Eidetical: After determining the degree of historical authenticity of scripture, follows the second
problem of interpretation. Like historical criticism, interpretation is not a matter of religious or
institutional authority, church, synagogue or councils etcetera; but only according to the grammatical
rules and historical situations from which the text originated. All scriptures must be interpreted by the
same rules. There are no dogmas which may determine the meaning in advance. The interpreter may not
start with any presupposition. Nothing precedes the rules of grammar and language. No faith precedes the
linguistic analysis of the text and the research for meaning. The interpreter starts as a tabula rasa.

The linguistic analysis of a scripture is a simple means leading to the meaning. For instance, phonology
belongs to the language as such to control the reading of the text, but it is still below the meaning, while
morphology, lexicology, and syntax introduce us directly into the problem of meaning. Morphology
describes the forms of the words, the verb, the noun, the article. It can give us the significance of tenses of
the verb regarding time, the meaning of different forms of nouns regarding things and persons referred to,
and the shade of meaning given by different usage of article. The use of verbal nouns may indicate
realities in action, in transformation as a process and not fixed as facts 449.

Hanafi further elucidates the Eidetical interpretation by telling us that every word has three meanings:

 Etymological: Which guarantees the reality of revelation and prevents the metaphysical,
theoretical and formal interpretations of the text;
 Usual: It binds revelation to particular community in time and space and adjusts it in a specific
situation;
 New: It is the sense that revelation confers upon the word. It is the raison d’être of the revelation.
It gives a new direction to human thought and action. It provides a push for the human
progress.450

The Practical: The Process of understanding is succeeded by the problem of the realization of the
revealed word into actual life. It is the accomplishment of Logos through praxis. This is possible through
Positive Theology, which does not study facts or institutions but the transformation of revelation from
theory to practice. The positivity of the revelation does not lie in its foundation on material facts but in the
realization in the actual world. The realization of revelation in the world and human life occurs through
the realization of the divine precepts. A divine command is not an absolute order regardless of context

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and structure in human life; rather it is a command because it defends human interests and prevents evil
and damages. Every command is based on reason; it expresses not only divine will but also positive
foundations. Revelation intends to realize Kingdom of Heaven on earth through an ideal world-
structure.451

Liberation Theology is another concept introduced by Hanafi in the World of Islam. It is very much
related to the medley of his ideas discussed above. A little recapitulation from the previous part will be
very useful here.

“Liberation Theology, in the words of Harvey Coax is, first and foremost a theology of praxis based on
the conviction that all human thought is actually a form of action. Hanafi’s ideology of Leftist Islam has
also its roots in Liberation Theology, while the Tradition and Modernity project is also linked with the
same.”(See references 391 and 392 above).

“Here Hanafi takes the opportunity to define Theology of Liberation, which according to him is ‘nothing
else except this phenomenological passage, through Hermeneutics, from Tradition to Revolution. It can
reformulate itself to a rigorous discipline purifying itself from emotionalism, dogmatism and
institutionalism. This phenomenological rigour can extend to hermeneutics as a tool of development in
the Third World’.” (See reference 419 above).

We have deferred this discussion till an appropriate place in the study. Now it is the adequate stage to
elaborate it. Liberation Theology is actually a political movement which started in Latin America during
1950s-1960s. It was a reaction against the social injustice, economic exploitation and poverty prevalent in
that region. The movement was initiated by the Roman Catholic Church. Its nomenclature owes its
existence to the Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutierrez in 1973. He is also the author of the well-known book,
Theology of Liberation. The basic philosophy of this movement was to interpret the teachings of Christ as
pro-poor and masses-friendly; to liberate the down-trodden from the shackles of destitution, hunger and
disease. Besides Latin American, Liberation Theology has Black and Feminist varieties as well. Marxism
too has influenced Liberation Theology heavily.

Hanafi is the exponent of the Muslim Liberation Theology and as we know he bears all the necessary
credentials for the same, that is, political activism and pre-dominant influence of Marxist ideology.
Hanafi has defined his idea of Liberation Theology very comprehensively and at length in the following
passage, “Given the importance of the cultural dimension in socio-political development, the ideological
identity in traditional and developing societies appears in theologies of liberation. They are not confined
to monotheistic religions. They are common to all oppressed societies, when tradition appears as self-
defensive mechanism against external oppression and internal domination” 452. Hanafi further elaborates

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the same, “Theology of liberation can preserve the cultural identity of traditional and developing societies
by bringing secular progressivism of the elite and traditional conservatism in history, otherwise used by
oppressive powers as means of social control. It can help in the process of De-Westernization of the
intellectuals and reconstruction of mass-culture. It creates the unity of national culture and preserves its
historical continuity. It can fulfill two popular demands, the affirmation of cultural identity and realization
of national interests.453 According to Hanafi, Theology of liberation is a gift or essentially a new
contribution from the Third World to the revolutionary heritage of mankind. He believes that the
liberation Theology may offer itself as rigorous branch of Political Theology which may replace the
classical Sociology of Religion.454

Hanafi has discussed Liberation Theology once again in the second volume of Islam in the Modern
World, as the most viable paradigm of the religious dialogue and inter-faith harmony. In Hanafi’s
opinion, Liberation Theology may derive benefit from all previous theologies and is able to transcend
their limits. Its positive points, which provide it an edge over all other strategies, are as under:

a- It gives absolute priority to praxis over theory. Its main objective is to challenge the status-quo
instead of rationalizing it. Hermeneutics of suspicion has no place in it, since reality is prior to
text in Liberation Theology. In the real-world-situation, poverty, exploitation and oppression are
so obviously visible that obscurity of any text may not hide them.
b- Liberation Theology supports the poor against the rich and the oppressed against the oppressor. It
highlights the miseries of the underdog and those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of colour, creed and race.
c- Liberation Theology stands with the crushed and the downtrodden in their struggle against the
powers of imperialism, colonialism and exploitation. It is not only a new theory, but also the
herald of a New World Order in practice. The debates and dialogues take place not in the huge
and stately Theological Seminaries but in the common places of struggle between the
revolutionaries, freedom fighters and the theologians.
d- The goal of Liberation Theology is not religion per se, but the human welfare. Humanity is the
object of major interest for Liberation Theology. Religions and Ideologies are meant for human
beings and not vice versa.
e- Liberation Theology is firstly a liberation from theology and primacy of dogma and secondly a
liberation through theology. Because what is eternal in man is the purest and deepest motivation
for praxis. The highest implementation of faith is not committing mischief and doing good deeds
on the Earth.455

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 Reconstruction of theology has always remained a cherished mission for Hanafi since his youth like
Iqbal. Amongst his earlier works, Religious Dialogue and Revolution is very important and most
famous. In this work too, Hanafi seems inspired by Liberation Theology. In the article “Religion and
Revolution”, he has presented an Islamic Model which discusses various brands of theology and their
relationship with status quo and revolution and conservatism and modernity respectively.

As per the familiar views of Hanafi, there is no single or eternal theology which is beyond time and space.
Theology always expresses the Spirit of the Age. Hanafi views every age with two kinds of spirits: one is
in accordance with the institutional religion which is always rigid, conservative and static; while the other
represents progressiveness, flexibility and dynamism. The first one saves the interests of the elite and the
ruling classes and subsequently opposes change and jealously maintains the status quo; while the second
one is pro-poor and the oppressed. Besides conservative and progressive, Hanafi has divided theology
into i- left and right, ii- revolutionary and reactionary, iii- capitalist and socialist, iv- feudalist and
populist, v- royalist and republican, vi- dictatorial and democratic, and vii- black and white ones. Every
type and shade of theology represents the respective brand of religion.

Here a question naturally arises: what is then really a true religion? Hanafi answers in his particular
energetic style, “Religion in its real spirit was always a revelation. Revelation came to liberate the
human consciousness from all kinds of oppression, material or moral…….Revelation had a function
which was the liberation of mankind from all kinds of constraints. Liberation of Israel from the political
dictatorship of Pharaoh, from the Babylonian captivity, from the legalism of law and the authority of
Rabbis.”456 [Emphasis original].

According to Hanafi, “Revolution is the nature of man. Since the beginning of life, revolt expressed the
Nature of Man……..History of mankind is history of liberation pushed by Revolution and done by the
nature of man. [Hence] The only possible theology is theology of liberation 457. The salient features of this
theology are as under (At times Hanafi uses Religion and Theology interchangeably):

i- A revolutionary theology (liberation theology), like every other theology is “Science of God”,
speaking etymologically. God is traditionally defined as Absolute Power, Perfect Being and
Eternal Presence etcetera. He is the central power. This kind of theology is a product of
patriarchic, feudalistic and capitalist societies. Theology and society structure nourish each
other. Patriarchic societies promote always transcendental and remote image of God. But the
revolutionary theology conceives Him as immanent present in the society, history and heart
of man. He lives alongside people among the masses. He is not outside but inside.

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ii- A revolutionary theology does not believe in the hierarchical concept of the world and opts
for a linear concept. In the other words, in a revolutionary theology, the relationship between
man and man is not vertical rather horizontal. This leads to a classless society based on
equality. In the past the conservative theology took the Intensio as a model of perfect life,
while the revolutionary theology takes the Extensio as model of ideal life. The two poles of
human life are not up and down, but forward and backward in the same line 458.
iii- A reactionary theology believes in the dichotomy of the body and the soul and considers the
soul superior and prior to body. The soul is spiritual and clean while the body is material, evil
and vile. A revolutionary theology, on the contrary, unifies the man again by abolishing this
division. The distinction between soul and body are actually the hypocrisy of a capitalistic
society.
iv- Any institutional religion is always conservative and promotes dogmatic and reactionary
theology. Institutional religion based on authority vested into different individuals. A religion
without authority is more akin to be revolutionary, wherein there is no central power and
everyone is responsible for one’s deeds. Same is the difference between Catholicism and
Protestantism. A religion without authority and institutions is actually a religion of a free
man. This religion will nurture a revolutionary theology.
v- A religion with priesthood again will be an institutional, conservative and reactionary religion
which divided men between the clergy and the laymen. It leads to the concept of two worlds:
one true and the other void of truth; one superior and the other inferior, one holy and the other
profane. On the other hand, any religion without the institution of clergy has more chances to
become a revolutionary religion. In this religion, temporal is the spiritual and the spiritual is
temporal. This religion does not have a false division of the sacred and profane. 459
vi- Formal religions rely heavily on the rituals and ceremonies which are performed in
specifically designed places of worship in a typical manner. At times outer symbols are given
so much importance that the real spirit of the worship literally dies. Whereas the
revolutionary religion does not have any cults, for it the entire earth is the Temple.
vii- A conservative theology is the one which over-emphasizes the importance of the tradition and
defends its absolute validity. The defence of the tradition is tantamount to affirmation of the
authority of past over the present and future. Progressive theology on the other hand relies on
the scripture, which is not tradition bound and may be interpreted according to the demands
of any era. The right of the individual to interpret shakes the foundations of the tradition.
viii- A conservative theology interprets on the basis of textual arguments while in the progressive
theology the interpretation is based on reality. Mostly the former is more concerned with

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 safeguarding the interests of the ruling elite. The progressive theology keeps the values of
human dignity, social justice, liberation and equality in view.
ix- Any reactionary theology treats dogmas as things, persons or institutions which exist really in
the actual world or history. In the other words it affirms auto-existence and auto-sufficiency
of dogma. However, in revolutionary theology, dogmas are only motives for action; they
survive only through human action and not through its own-self. Phenomenology, according
to Hanafi may lead to a revolutionary theology, because it puts the material facts and dogmas
in brackets and tries to seek the true meaning460.
x- In the end, it should be noted forever, that any theology which is based on consolation is
always reactionary in nature, because it always affirms the status quo and strengthens your
belief in the fate. Consolation washes away the revolutionary spirit produced by the misery
and agony. At times Eschatology serves the same purpose. Consolation is the major term
which includes all the passive values such as resignation, reliance, patience and contentment
etcetera.461 [Emphasis and italics added].

If we wish to conclude Hanafi’s entire enterprise in one sentence, it is the famous statement of Bergson
that there is no right or wrong religion, rather only a static and dynamic one. Therefore, the revolutionary
or liberation religion and theology for Hanafi are dynamic one, while the conservative and reactionary are
static by nature.

So far we have studied in detail Hanafi’s efforts to reconcile tradition with modernity, his concept of
Ijtehad and reinterpretation of the Qur’an, his worthy contribution in the Ilm Ususl al-Fiqh and other
branches of Islamic disciplines, his phenomenological approach regarding the religious matters, his
profound interest in Hermeneutics, thematic interpretation and finally liberation or revolutionary
theology. Now it is the time to wind-up the discussion with a critical evaluation of all of Hanafi’s
endeavours along with Iqbal.

Recapitulation and Concluding Remarks:

This comparative study of Iqbal and Hanafi consisted of three Sections: A, B and C; wherein the
views of both philosophers were discussed with reference to Modern Science, Western
Philosophy and Ijtehad and Re-interpretation of Qur’an. We have evaluated extensively the two

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first named and now is the turn of the third and last section on Ijtehad and reinterpretation. Iqbal
and Hanafi are both the towering intellectual figures of the Muslim World, who have enriched
the Muslim philosophical tradition with their precious views. Both are the worthy sons of Islam
who wish to see their religion distinguished in the world capable of moving with the changing
times and keeping abreast of the contemporary demands. Both have dedicated their energies and
time to this great mission and made valuable and fruitful contributions in the field.

Mohammad Iqbal’s services for the cause of the Muslim World are unforgettable and his
landmark work, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam has served as a signpost for
many generations of Muslim thinkers representing diversified schools of thought. Iqbal stands as
an ideal for Hanafi, whose ideas and approach are heavily influenced by his philosophical
outlook. The section ‘C’ dealt with the most important and vital issue of our age, that is to bring
Islam and the Holy Scripture at par with the modern era. We have seen the efforts of both
philosophers in detail and now are in a position to appreciate and evaluate them critically,
impartially and dispassionately.

Mohammad Iqbal delivered his famous lecture on the topic under the title, “The Principle of
Movement in the Structure of Islam”, with extreme caution because the environment of a very
traditionalist and conformist India was not suitable for such discussions. Iqbal’s intention was
definitely good and positive but his very guarded, shielded and fortified style practically crushed
the entire spirit of his great effort. The views of Iqbal on Ijtehad are so scared and anxious that
he seems to be more a defender of tradition and conservatism. Moreover, Iqbal has more often
than not contradicted himself in the same discourse; he moves forward with great force and
energy and then immediately retreats with the similar backward impetus. This attitude of his is
simultaneously surprising and wearisome. To avoid repetition we are not going to quote here
everything again, to recapitulate references 349-356, 360-363, 366, 369-370 and 373 may be
seen above.

Wahid al-Din has reported that as far as rights of women were concerned, Iqbal stressed on them
in theory but in personal practice, he was a strict traditionalist 462. However, his personal life and
practices are beyond the interest and scope of this research. This may, conversely, be said that he

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was extremely conservative in his outlook regarding women even in theory. His arguments to
justify the half share of daughters in the inheritance of father we have seen above.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith acknowledges the stature and contribution of Iqbal as a pioneer to
recognize the need of the hour and to respond to it; yet he feels that Iqbal was not fully aware of
his destination. That is why, “Not being aware of the path to it, he let himself and his followers
open to being misled”463. He simultaneously attracted and misguided both the progressives and
the conservatives. According to Smith, Iqbal’s influence was not single; hence “To integrate his
divergences would be misleading464”.

H. A. R. Gibb has written regarding the “The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam”,
that “In his sixth lecture, which deals with the problem of law and society, the unresolved
conflict between the two currents of his thought is most clearly displayed 465”. The two different
currents, Gibb is referring to are reformist and apologetic. “Gibb illustrates his remark by
referring to Iqbal’s dynamic outlook of the Qur’an, which to him represents Iqbal’s reformist
current. On the other hand Iqbal’s justification of Islamic law especially with reference to
women’s right of inheritance represents the apologetic current466”.

Clinton Bennet is able to see the seed of neo-traditionalism in Iqbal’s thought. According to him,
because of Iqbal’s focus on Shari’a as the core concept in Islam, Iqbal is a precursor to the neo-
traditionist Mawlana Mawdudi.467

Fazlur Rahman in one of his essays traces the paradox of Islamic modernism in Iqbal when he
rejects the idea of allegiance to the West but continues admiring its scientific achievements.
Rahman opines that this ambivalent attitude towards West hindered the progress of Islamic
modernism because opposition and admiration are not compatible with each other. Moreover,
according to his analysis, the literature and romanticized Muslim contribution to science largely
remained apologetic because it does not make any critical study of history of religion and science
in Islam. It does not speak about the continuous religious resistance to rational sciences. This
attitude also encourages ignoring clear-cut boundaries between science and religion in the
West.468 He further writes, “Apologetic controversial literature created a barrier against further
modernist development”469

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All these critical remarks are not intended to undermine the great contribution of Iqbal in the
promotion of modern Muslim philosophical thought in 20th century. Indeed he is one of those
thinkers in whom the Muslim World may genuinely take pride and he did a lot to break that
intellectual stagnation to which the Islamic thought was subject since many centuries. He was
courageous enough to at least agitate those issues which were considered a forbidden tree in the
era he lived. Moreover, every thinker and philosopher is a product of his background, culture and
age. Keeping all the details in view we may not restrict ourselves from thoroughly appreciating
Iqbal. He belonged to a deeply religious family and had great reverence for religion. He had
limits and restrictions of his own beyond which he could not go. He stimulated many questions
including the problem of legal reforms and Ijtehad, however, could not resolve any one in a
satisfactory manner. A number of points he left for the “future theologians of Islam”. He must
not be judged from the results he has derived rather from the impact he has produced. It may not
be denied that his impact is still very strong and the after-currents of his thought are inspiring
and motivating the new theoreticians of Islam to contemplate and reflect till date. He is a beacon-
house of which the light will continue to illuminate the path for those who wish to tread on this
difficult way.

Hassan Hanafi’s involvement and input in the field of Ijtehad and reinterpretation of the Qur’an
are literally immense and valuable. He has spent almost his entire life in the same pursuit.
Hanafi’s merits may be summarized as under:

i- He is profound, thorough and consistent; his approach is focused and arguments well-
knit.
ii- He is never self-contradictory and follows the pattern set for himself persistently and
with perseverance;

iii- He is never directionless, nor suffers from “intellectual aimlessness”; his thought is
clear and categorical;

iv- He is systematic and methodical; though he is under the influence of Husserl and
Phenomenology, he applies and uses them with extreme skillfulness;

v- His canvas is vast and study is strong; he is humanitarian and compassionate;

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 vi- He is well versed in the issues and problems of the contemporary Muslim World and
wishes to solve them with sincerity and intellectual integrity;

vii- He is courageous and innovative, not afraid of taking daring steps, may face
persecution, opposition and victimization.

viii- His results are thought-provoking and at times astounding and startling;

ix- His model is demonstrable and replicable; he believes in applied philosophy, in

Praxis than Theoria;

x- One may disagree with him but may not deny the value and appeal of his views.

If we turn back and have a glimpse of Hanafi’s views which we have already discussed in detail,
we will find three main statements which may be declared findings, results and outcomes of
Hanafi’s intellectual labour so far. These are as follows:

i- There is no true or false religion, rather only a static and dynamic religion;
ii- There is no true or false interpretation, right or wrong understanding. There are only
different efforts to approach the text from different interests, for different
motivations.

iii- There is no true or false interpretation, right or wrong understanding. The text is only
a vehicle for human interests and even passions;

iv- Interpretation is an ideological weapon, used by different socio-political powers to maintain

or the change the status-quo.

As far as the first proclamation is concerned, we know well that it is a famous line taken from
Bergson’s last work, Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Iqbal and Hanafi both are the
ardent adorers of Bergson and are under his heavy influence. However, Hanafi has done justice
with this statement and has proved with cogent arguments that Islam is not a static religion
rather is a dynamic framework flexible enough to respond to the changing human needs in
every age. For the critical analysis of the last three we would have to study some other sources

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 and opinions, amongst which that of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd’s is directly linked with these
points. So, it would be better to have a short review of some other contemporary philosophers,
thinkers and intellectuals who have tried to handle this thorny subject. Through this appraisal
we would be able to comprehend that the issue as such is so technical, difficult and delicate that
it is actually not easy to deal with it. Nevertheless, Muslim thinkers have faced all these hurdles,
endured opposition and presented remarkable ideas and solutions.

Muslim World has a galaxy of luminaries who hold very novel and bold ideas regarding
modernity, Ijtehad and reinterpretation of the Qur’anic text. Some very prominent are of
Egyptian origin. One of the distinguished names is Amin al-Khuli (1895-1966). In the words of

221
Ibid, P.40.
222
Ibid, P.46.
223
Ibid, P.44.
224
Ibid.
225
Ibid, Pp.44-45.
226
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, Pp.154-
155.
227
Ibid, P.159.
228
Ibid, P.160.
229
Ibid, P.161.
234
Ibid, P.43.
235
Ibid, P.42.
236
Ibid, P.41.
237
Ibid, P.28.
238
Ibid.
239
T.J. de Boer, “Atomic Theory (Muhammaden), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol.II, Pp.202-203,
and Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occidentalism, Pp.34-35.
240
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.30.
241
Ibid, P.52.
242
Ibid, P.52-53.
243
Ibid, P.48.
244
Ibid, P.62.
245
Ibid, P.51.
246
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, P.169.
247
Ibid, P.170.
248
Ibid, P.171.
249
Ibid, P.167.
250
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, Pp.100-101.
251
Ibid, P.30.
252
Ibid, P.58.
253
Ibid, P.56.
254
Ibid, P.64.
255
Ibid, P.58.
256
Ibid, P.57.

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 Nasr Abu Zayd, “The winds of tajdid (renaissance) were permeating the Egyptian life when
Amin al-Khuli (1895-1966) started his career as a professor at the Cairo University’s faculty of
letters”470. He applied the method of tajdid to the study of language (nahw), rhetoric (balaghah),
Quranic interpretation (tafsir), and literature (al-adab)………….As long as renaissance and
tajdid imply moving and awakening, the starting point should be thorough and intensive study
of old tradition, in every field of knowledge. Al-Khuli’s motto was: “the first step for any real
innovation is to fully analyze tradition” (awwalu tajdid qatlu l-qadimi bahthan).471 (al-Khuli
257
Ibid, P.95.
258
Ibid, P.99.
259
Ibid, P.210-211.
260
Ibid, P.212.
261
Ibid, P.213.
262
Ibid, P.230-231.
263
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.13.
264
Ibid, P.15.
265
Ibid, Pp.15-18.
266
Ibid, Pp.144-45.
267
Ibid, P.45.
268
Ibid.
269
Ibid, Pp.145-46.
270
Altaf Ahmad Azami, Khutbat-i-Iqbal: ek Mutala’a, Dar al- Tadhkir, Lahore, 2003, P.266.
271
Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Cairo,1965,P.Clxxvi.
272
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, P.245.
273
Ibid, P.237.
274
Ibid, P.212.
275
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.94.
276
Ibid, Pp.156-157.
277
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, Pp. 228-229.
278
Ibid, Pp.229-230.
279
Ibid, Pp.244-245.
280
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp.18-19.
281
Ibid, P.21.
282
Ibid, P.155.
283
Ibid, Pp.149-150.
284
Ibid, P.21.
285
Ibid, P.22.
286
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, P.233.
287
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.18.
288
Ibid, P.99.
289
Ibid.

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 1961:82; 128; 180). Otherwise, the result will be loss rather than reconstruction (tabdid la
tajdid).472

Two disciples of al-Khuli, Ahmad Khalafallh (1916-1998) and Shakuri Ayyad (1921-1999)
accompanied by a lady Aisha Abd al-Rahman (1913-1998) applied Khuli’s literary method in
Quranic studies and came to limelight besides becoming very controversial. It is interesting to
note that Sayyid Qutb, the celebrated ideologue of modern Islamic fundamentalism also applied

290
Ibid.
291
Ibid, Pp.100-101.
292
Ibid, P.115.
293
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, P.233.
294
Ibid, P.234.
295
Ibid, Pp.257-258.
296
Ibid, Pp.234-235.
297
Ibid, P.254.
298
Ibid.
299
Ibid, P.256.
300
Ibid, P.257.
301
Ibid, Pp.251-252.
302
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.17.
303
Ibid, Pp.17-18.
304
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, Pp.311-312.
305
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.165.
306
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.6.
307
Interested readers may see Muhammad Khalid Masud’s Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Religious Thought,
published by Islamic Research Institute Islamabad in 1996.
308
Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies, Chicago University Press,
Chicago, 1988, P.172.
309
Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid
Qutb, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1992, Pp.103-105.
310
Hasan Hanafi, “Al Ightirab al-Dini Inda Feuerbach”, Alam al-Fikr 1, 1979, P.53.
311
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.6.
312
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.I, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, P.509.
313
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.18.
314
Ibid, P.64.
315
Ibid, P.58.
316
Altaf Ahmad Azami, Khutbat-i-Iqbal: ek Mutala’a, Dar al- Tadhkir, Lahore, 2003, P.13.
317
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.63.
318
Ibid.
319
Ibid, P.39.

197
 the similar literary method to the Scripture in the beginning of his career. Khalafallh attempted
his M.A. thesis under the supervision of al-Khuli of which the title was Jadal al- Quran or the
Polemics of Quran. He applied the method of his teacher and mentor to it. Subsequently he got
himself registered for PhD on the topic of al- Fann al-Qasasi fi l-Quran al-Karim (The Art of
Narratives in Quran) and further developed the method of his professor. The first step was to
collect the Quranic stories and the second was to arrange them in chronological order (tartib al-
nuzul) because this would enable analysis according to their original context including the social
environment, the emotional state of the Prophet and the development of the Islamic method.
320
Ibid, Pp.52-53.
321
Ibid, P.44.
322
Salman Rashid, Iqbal’s Concept of God, vide Tahsin Firaqi, “Jalwa Khun Gasht-o-Nigahe ba Tamasha na
rasid”, Iqbal 84, Iqbal Academy, Lahore, 1986, Pp.416-417.
323
Ibid, P.40.
324
Hamilton Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, University of the Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947, P.59.
325
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.87.
326
Ibid, P.88.
327
Ali Abbas Jalalpuri, Iqbal ka Ilm-i-Kalam, Takhliqat, Lahore, 2003, P.19.
328
Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1982, Pp. 132-33.
329
Javed Majeed, Muhammad Iqbal: Islam, Aesthetics and Post -colonialism, Routledge, London, 2009, P.96.
330
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, P.254.
331
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P. 384.
332
Ibid.
333
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Turath wa’l Tajdid: Mawaqifuna min al-Turath al- Qadim, al- Markaz al- Arabi li’l-
Bahth wa’l Nashr, Cairo, 1980, P.173.
334
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton,
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, INC., New York, 1935, P.58.
335
Ibid, P.122.
336
Ibid, P.131.
337
Ibid, P.140.
338
Ibid, P.57.
339
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp.117-118.
340
Ibid, P.118.
341
Ibid.
342
Ibid, Pp.118-120.
343
Ibid, P.120.
344
Ibid, P.141.
345
Ibid, P.133-134.
346
Ibid, P.142.
347
Ibid, P.134.
348
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtehad, Iqbal Academy Lahore, 1995, P.76
349
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.121.
350
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtehad, Iqbal Academy Lahore, 1995, P.121.

198
 This contextualization is going to uncover the original semantic level of the Quranic narration
and the level of understanding of the Arabs at the time of revelation. 473
Nevertheless, he
soon became aware of the dilemmas involved and was compelled to conclude that stories of
Quran are allegories, amthal, not intended to convey historical facts. He quoted some classical
sources such as al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, Zamakhshari, and al-Razi and also some modern ones
such as Abduh in support of his thesis. According to Khalafallah, these stories being amthal fall
in the category of mutashabihat and are ambiguous. To overcome their ambiguity, the classical
351
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.6.
352
Ibid, P.129.
353
Ibid, P.120.
354
Ibid.
355
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, Sheikh Ashraf Publishers, Lahore,
1963, P.106.
356
Ibid, P.146.
357
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P.128.
358
Ibid, P.128.
359
Ibid.
360
Ibid, Pp.134-135.
361
Ibid, P.135.
362
Ibid, P.132.
363
Ibid, P.135.
364
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtehad, Iqbal Academy Lahore, 1995, P.181.
365
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, Sheikh Ashraf Publishers, Lahore,
1963, P.148.
366
Ibid.
367
Ibid.
368
Serajul Haque,” Ibn Taymiyyah”, A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed., M. M. Vol. II, Sharif, Allagauer
Heimatverlag GmbH., Kempten, Germany, 1963, reprinted in Pakistan by Royal Book Company, Karachi-3, 1983,
P.799.
369
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, p. 121.
370
Ibid.
371
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtehad, Iqbal Academy Lahore, 1995, P.113.
372
A.R.Tariq, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, Shaykh Ghulam Ali, 1973, P.132.
373
Ibid.
374
Munawir Sazdali, “Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam” in Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam, Pustaka Punjimas,
Jakarta, 1988, Pp.1-11.
375
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P.62.
376
Rifyal Kabah, “Bawalah kepada kami al-Qur’an yang lain, atau Gantilah” in Munawir Sizdali, Polemik
Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam, Pustaka Punjimas, Jakarta, 1988, Pp.60-61.
377
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, Pp. 122-123.
378
Ibid, Pp.124-125.
379
Ibid, P. 137.
380
Ibid, Pp.137-138.

199
 commentators have stuffed their commentaries with the previous Judeo-Christian tradition,
which is called Israiliyyat in Arabic. The literary approach, on the other hand, surpasses this
difficulty because it is not concerned with the historical data and its authenticity. It also
differentiates between the jism al-Qissah, that is, the narrative structure and the meaning of the
story………….The body of such stories may appear historical, but their meaning or message
does not necessarily reflect history. Unlike the historian, the writer is entitled to poetic license in
using history for literary composition.
381
Ibid, P. 138.
382
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtehad, Iqbal Academy Lahore, 1995, P.119-120.
383
Ibid, P. 139.
384
Ibid, P. 140.
385
Ibid, P. 139.
386
Ibid.
387
Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, edited and annotated by M. Saeed
Sheikh, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 2006, P. 138.
388
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Turath wa’l Tajdid: Mawaqifuna min al-Turath al- Qadim, al- Markaz al- Arabi li’l-
Bahth wa’l Nashr, Cairo, 1980, P.201.
389
Ibid, P. 196.
390
Ibid, P. 205.
391
Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1984, P.136.
392
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Yasar al- Islami: Kitabat fi al-Nahda al-Islamiyya, Self-published, Cairo, 1981.
393
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.142.
394
a-Charles J. Adams, “The History of Religions and the Study of Islam” in Kitagawa and Eliade, 1967, Pp.
177-193.
b-Charles J. Adams, “Foreword” in Martin, 2001, Pp. vii-ix.
395
a- Hassan Hanafi, Al-Turath wa’l Tajdid: Mawaqifuna min al-Turath al- Qadim, al- Markaz al- Arabi li’l-
Bahth wa’l Nashr, Cairo, 1980, Pp. 10-15.
b- Hassan Hanafi, Qadaya Muasira 1: Fi Fikrina-al-Muasir, Dar al-Tanwir, Beirut, 1981, Pp. 120-128.
396
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.159.
397
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Turath wa’l Tajdid: Mawaqifuna min al-Turath al- Qadim, al- Markaz al- Arabi li’l-
Bahth wa’l Nashr, Cairo, 1980, Pp.165-166.
398
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.160.
399
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Turath wa’l Tajdid: Mawaqifuna min al-Turath al- Qadim, al- Markaz al- Arabi li’l-
Bahth wa’l Nashr, Cairo, 1980, Pp.166-168.
400
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.160.
401
Sonja Hegasy, Portrait of the Philosopher Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Critique of Arab Reason,
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/ show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-884/i.html. (Visited on 19th March,2012).

402
Shahrough Akhvi, Book Review on “Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic
authenticity by Robert Lee”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 30, Issue 3, 1998, Pp. 461-62.

403
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.142.
404
Ibid.

200
 Why did these stories, their narrative and their historical authenticity become a problem for both
persons? In the words of Abu Zayd, “The major dilemma for Khalafallah and his professor was
the state of schizophrenia into which the Muslim state of mind became entrapped when dealing
with the modernization of Muslim societies’ socio-political structures. This dilemma is not
limited to historical authenticity; it also refers to the future of Islamic thought. It is remarkable
that Khalafallh invariably used the phrase Islamic reason, al-aql al-Islami, in dealing with
problems concerning the comprehension of the Qur’an. For example he explains how al-aql al-
405
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.156.
406
Ibid.
407
Ibid, Pp.170-171.
408
Ibid, P.171.
409
a-Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Impremeire Nationale , Le Cairo,1965, Pp.309-321.
b- “Revelation, Reason and Nature”, a reading in al-Qanun Fi al-Tibb of Ibn Sina, Philosophy and Epoch
Review, No.1, Cairo, Pp. 107-130.
410
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.190.
411
Ibid, Pp.190-191.
412
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.II, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, P.206.
413
Ibid, P.211.
414
Ibid.
415
Ibid.
416
a-Hassan Hanafi, Les Methodes d’Exegese: Essai sur la Science des Fondements de la comprehension “
‘Ilm Usul al Fiqh”, Conseil superieur des Arts, des Letters et des Sciences Socials, Impremerie Nationale, Le
Cairo,1965,Pp.176-184.
b- Hassan Hanafi, Religious Dialogue and Revolution, Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1977, Pp.15-37.
417
Ibid, P.212.
418
Ibid.
419
Ibid, P.213.
420
Hermeneutik, ketab va sonnat (Hermeneutics, the Book [the Qur’an], and the Sunnah), Tehran, 1996, P.23.
421
Ibid, P.38.
422
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, Pp. 188-189.
423
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.I, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, P.484.
424
Ibid, Pp.487-492.
425
Ibid, P.493.
426
Ibid, P.494.
427
Ibid, P.487.
Interested readers who read Arabic, may also see:
Hassan Hanafi, “Do we have a theory of interpretation? Which comes first: a theory of interpretation or a
method of analysis of living experiences? Returning to the source or returning to nature? In Contemporary Issues,
Vol.I, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, Cairo, 1976. Pp. 175-178, (Arabic).
428
Hassan Hanafi, “Revelation and Reality” (Al-Wahy wa Al-Wa’qi), A Study in Asbab Al-Nazul” in Islam
and Modernism, Dar Al-Saqi, London, 1990, Pp.133-175, (Arabic).
429
Hassan Hanafi, “Difference in Interpretation or Difference in Interests” in Religion and Revolution in
Egypt, 1952-1981, Vol. VII, and “Right and Left in the Religious Thought” , Madbouli, Cairo, 1989, Pp. 117-120,
(Arabic).
430
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.I, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, Pp.499-500.

201
 Islami, being so concerned with the historical authenticity, is unable to recognize the ethical and
spiritual dimensions of the Qur’anic stories”474. Al-aql al-Islami is also unable to explain why
the story is repeated, or why the details differ when it is repeated.475

Even more problematic are the apparent contradictions of historical and scientific knowledge in
the Quranic stories.476

431
Ibid, P.500.
432
Ibid, P.501-502.
433
Hassan Hanafi, “Levels of Qur’anic Texts, Adab wa Naqd”, Monthly Review, Cairo, May, 1993, Pp.21-22.
434
Ibid, P.508.
435
Ibid, P.508-509.
436
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P. 91.
437
Hassan Hanafi, Cultures and Civilizations, Conflict or Dialogue, Vol. I (The Meridian Thought), Book
Centre for Publishing, Cairo, 2006, P.380.
438
Ibid, P.382.
439
Ibid, P.385.
441
Ibid, P.391-392.
442
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P. 72.
443
Hassan Hanafi, Religious Dialogue and Revolution, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1977, P.1.
444
Ibid, Pp. 1-2.
445
Ibid, P. 2.
446
Ibid.
447
Ibid, Pp. 2-3.
448
Ibid, Pp.4-7.
449
Ibid, P. 14.
450
Ibid.
451
Ibid, Pp.18-19.
452
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.I, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, P.522.
453
Ibid, P.523.
454
Ibid.
455
Hassan Hanafi, Islam in the Modern World, Vol.II, Dar Kebba Bookshop, Heliopolis, 1995, Pp. 221-222.
456
Hassan Hanafi, Religious Dialogue and Revolution, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1977, P.203.
457
Ibid.
458
Ibid, Pp.206-207.
459
Ibid, Pp.207-208.
460
Ibid, Pp.210-211..
461
Ibid.
462
Wahid al-Din, Ruzgar-i- Faqir, Lion Art Press, Lahore, 1964, Vol.II, Pp.59f.
463
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, Sheikh Ashraf Publishers, Lahore,
1963, P. 144.
464
Ibid, P. 107.
465
H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1947, P.100.
466
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtehad, Iqbal Academy Lahore, 1995, P.203.

202
Al-Khuli wrote the introduction to the second edition of al-Fann al-Qasasi (Cairo, 1957)
wherein he mentioned the case of Taha Husayn. He is very categorical and resounding in
declaring that the literary approach towards Quran is the only possible way of saving the Muslim
intellectuals from schizophrenia; by this way they may truly believe in Islam and the holy Quran
without necessarily believing the historical authenticity of the stories mentioned in Quran. It is to
be remembered that Taha Husayn was alleged by the Egyptian Parliament of insulting Islam and
was sent for a trial. However, the Public Prosecutor prior to the formal beginning of the trial
declared him innocent, but he had to remove the controversial parts from his book which he
published with a new title of Fi l –Adab al-Jahili. Taha Husayn considered the Quranic story of
Abraham’s arrival in Mecca along with his wife Hagar and son Ishmael, to be an old oral
narrative popular even before the revelation of Quran. According to Husayn, this story was
designed to ease tension between pagan Arabs, the original inhabitants of Yathrib, and the Arab
Jewish tribes who had settled in the city. Islam used this story for two purposes:

i- To locate itself in the context of Judeo-Christian tradition;

ii- To establish its priority as a monotheistic religion (over Judaism and Christianity), .

Taha Husayn’s thesis asserted that this story should not be taken as historical reality. He set his
assumption on the basis of linguistic situation in the then Arabian Peninsula.477

In short the Discourse of Tajdid, seeks to establish that “The Quran is neither a book of
science, nor of history, nor of political theory”. It is a spiritual and ethical book of guidance, in

467
Clinton Bennet, Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the Issues and Debates, Continuum, London,
2005, P. 22.
468
Fazlur Rahman, “ Islamic Modernism: Its scope, Method and Alternatives”, International Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies , Volume 1, Issue 04, Cambridge University Press, October 1970, P. 317-373.
469
Fazlur Rahman, “The Impact of Modernity on Islam”, ed. Edward J. Jurji, Religious pluralism and World
Community, Interfaith and Intercultural Communication, Brill, Leiden, 1969, P. 253.
470
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P.55.
471
Amin al-Khuli, Manahij Tajdid fi ‘l-Nahwa wa’l –Balagha wa’l Tafsir wa’l Adab (Method of Renewal in
Grammar, Rhetoric, Interpretation of Qur’an and Literature), Cairo, 1961, Pp. 82, 128, 180.
472
Ibid, P.143.
473
Ahmad Khalafallah, Al- Fann al-Qasasi fi l-Quran al-Karim (The Art of Narratives in the Quran), Cairo,
1972, P.15.
474
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P.57.
475
Ahmad Khalafallah, Al- Fann al-Qasasi fi l-Quran al-Karim (The Art of Narratives in the Quran), Cairo,
1972, P.37-40.

203
which the stories are used to fulfill the same purpose. Therefore, the Quranic stories are
narratives meant to serve ethical, spiritual and religious ends. It is, however, a fatal
methodological error to take them as purely historical facts478. [Emphasis added].

Amin al-Khuli, Ahmad Khalafallah and Taha Husayn deserve a special honour and tribute for
their depth, insight, vision and most of all intellectual integrity that they reached a clear-cut
conclusion and did not hesitate to present it publicly despite obvious hazards. They were quoted
here to show the vastness of the topic, its significance in our age, diversity of opinion and the
difficulties involved.

Now we move towards a towering scholar, who happens to be not only Hanafi’s contemporary
rather his compatriot and pupil at Cairo University. Yes, we are referring to Nasr Hamid Abu
Zayd (1943-2010), whom we have quoted off and on throughout this chapter, however, now, we
shall look into his own views related to modernity, interpretation of Qur’an, Ijtehad, Shariah and
allied issues. His ideas will enlighten us on the seemingly controversial judgments of Hanafi, on
which the criticism was deferred till this stage.

Abu Zayd has used first person singular for his narration, hence it will be more appropriate to
quote his original words as such. He writes, “Studying the history and methodology of classical
exegesis, I became aware of the fact that there is neither an objective nor an innocent
interpretation. Theologians have long established a hermeneutical principle deduced from a
specific verse of the Quran (3:7) that divided the Quran into ‘ambiguous’ and ‘revocable’
(mutashabih) verses on the one hand , and ‘clear’ and ‘irrevocable’(muhkam) verses on the
other.479Hence, they logically agreed that the irrevocable should be the norms to interpret, or
rather to disambiguate, the revocable. Hermeneutically they agreed, but when it came to the
interpretation of this principle they disagreed. Every group decided to their own theological
position that what was revocable and what was irrevocable. In the end, what was considered
revocable by a given group was considered irrevocable by their opponents and vice versa. And
so, the Quran became a battlefield for adversaries to situate their political, social and theological
positions.480”

204
After this brief but comprehensive explanation of Abu Zayd, we are able to appreciate these
results of Hanafi clearly and without any prejudice: There is no true or false interpretation, right
or wrong understanding. There are only different efforts to approach the text from different
interests, for different motivations. Interpretation is an ideological weapon, used by different
socio-political powers to maintain or the change the status-quo.

Abu Zayd further elucidates the sources of Jurisprudence (Fiqh), Shariah and Ijtehad in the
following words, “The epistemology of constructing law was established on the basis of
deduction and induction from the foundational scripture after the prophetic tradition, the Sunnah,
was canonized as a revelation equal to Quran in its legal authority. In addition to these two
sources, ijma (consensus), especially of the first generation, was annexed as a third source. Some
jurists rejected it but it was accepted by the majority. The fourth source was ijtehad in the form
of syllogism or analogy; this was not commonly accepted. Ijtehad was practically restricted to
the application of the technique of ‘analogy’, qiyas, which is to reach a solution of a certain
problem solely by comparing its position to a similar problem previously solved by any of the
other three sources, i.e. the Quran, the Sunnah, or the consensus. The whole body of the sharia
literature, as expressed in the four major Sunni schools, at least, is based on the aforementioned
principles. This means that sharia is a man-made production and there is nothing divine in it.
Nor can one claim its validity regardless of time and space.”481 [Italics added].

The above conclusion of Abu Zayd supplements that of Hanafi, that “There is no true or false
interpretation, right or wrong understanding. The text is only a vehicle for human interests and
even passions”.

In this context Abu Zayd asserts quite definitively that, “In conclusion, to claim that the body of
sharia literature is binding for all Muslim communities, notwithstanding space and time, is
simply to ascribe divinity to human historical production of thought. If this is the case, there is
no need to establish a theocratic state claimed as Islamic. Such a demand is nothing but an
ideological call to establish an unquestionable theo-political authority; this would recreate a
devilish dictatorial regime at the expense of the spiritual and ethical dimension of Islam”. 482

205
From this point he moves towards the issues of modernity, Hermeneutics and interpretation of
Quran, wherein he again is very clear, logical and univocal: “At this point, I should address the
issue of social and political stagnation in the Muslim societies. It is not Islam that is unable to
accept modernization, but the contemporary Muslim. The real obstacle to modernization is
Muslim thinking, in particular the Muslims have been taught to think over a long period of time.
They think that modernization will erode their religion and identity because, in the past, identity
has been exclusively linked to the religion. This brings me to the modern history of the Islamic
world and its relationship with Europe…………..It is now appropriate to show the reader how I
have developed Quranic hermeneutics so far. Initially, I started as a proponent of the Quran as a
text that should be subjected to a textual analysis. In my book, Mafhum al-Nass (The concept of
the Text, first published 1990) I introduced the historic and linguistic dimension of the Quran by
critically rereading the classical sciences of the Quran (ulum al-Quran), concluding that Quran
was a cultural production, in the sense that pre-Islamic culture and concepts are re-articulated via
the specific language structure. I stressed that, although the Quran became a producer of new
culture, any genuine hermeneutics has to take into consideration the pre-Islamic culture as the
key context without which ideological interpretation will always prevail”483.

The very last assertion of Abu-Zayd is the most meaningful which highlights the reason for the
ideological interpretations and commentaries. It also shows clearly that a non-ideological
interpretation is possible if the pre-Islamic culture and concepts are kept in view. Here we raise
our note of dissent with Hanafi, according to whom interpretation is an ideological weapon.
Actually Hanafi himself is an ideologue, a stalwart adherent of Marxism. Unfortunately like
many other upholders of some specific creed, he has sacrificed his great intellectual and
academic effort at the altar of ideology and has advanced Marxism at the cost of Qur’an, just like
his mentor and spiritual guide Muhammad Iqbal, who made Qur’an a vehicle for the promotion
of Bergsonian philosophy.

Abu Zayd proceeds further in the same vein, “………I added the human dimension to the
historical and cultural dimensions of the Quran. I presented the concept of the Quran as a space
of Divine and human communication. …….In this enterprise, I employed a number of
methodological approaches, including semantics and semiotics, in addition to historical criticism
and hermeneutics, which are neither generally applied nor appreciated in the traditional Quranic

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studies in the Muslim World. I focused on the vertical dimension of revelation, wahy in Arabic,
i.e. the communicative process between God and the Prophet Muhammad which produced the
Quran.484

“Being so deeply involved in the debate around the present hot issues of modernization of
Islamic thought and/ or Islamization of modernity, I started to realize that, just like the classical
theologians, both the modernists and their opponents are trying to situate their position in the
Quran by implicitly or explicitly claiming its status as a text. As a text, it should free of
contradiction; given that God is the author……. I therefore, developed my thesis on the human
aspect of the Quran one step further, moving from the vertical to the horizontal dimensions of
the Quran. ……..What I mean is the dimension that is embedded in the structure of the Quran
and which was manifest during the actual process of communication. Realization of this
horizontal dimension is only feasible if we shift our conceptual framework from the Quran
as ‘text’ as to Quran as ‘discourse.’485 [Emphasis added].

Abu Zayd has further elaborated the concept of ‘text’ and ‘discourse’: “For Muslim scholars, the
Quran was always a text from the moment of its canonization until the present moment. Yet, if
we pay close attention to the Quran as discourse or discourses, it is no longer sufficient to re-
contextualization one or more passage in the fight against literalism and fundamentalism, or
against a specific historical practice that seems inappropriate for our modern context. Similarly,
it is not enough to invoke modern hermeneutics to justify the historicity and hence the relativity
of every mode of understanding, while in the meaning claiming that our modern interpretation is
more appropriate and more valid. What these inadequate approaches produce is polemic or
apologetic hermeneutics”486.

Abu Zayd has concluded his argument very lucidly in this way: Without rethinking the Quran
and without re-invoking its living status as a ‘discourse’, whether in academia or in
everyday life, democratic and open hermeneutics cannot be achieved. But why should the
hermeneutics be democratic and open? Because it is about the meaning of life. If we are serious
about freeing religious thought from power manipulation, whether political, social, or religious,
and want to empower the community of believers to formulate ‘meaning’ we need to construct
open democratic hermeneutics. The empirical diversity of religious meaning is part of human

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diversity around the meaning of life in general, which is supposed to be a positive value in the
context of modern life. To connect the question of meaning of Quran to the meaning of life,
it is now imperative to note that the Quran was the outcome of dialogue, debate, argument,
acceptance and rejection, both with pre-Islamic norms, practices and culture, and with its
own previous assessments, presuppositions and assertions487. [Emphasis added].

Abu Zayd’s construal and analysis have helped us in solving a number of riddles associated with
the nature of Qur’an, interpretation, re-interpretation, enlightenment of the Muslim World, and
clash with the West and modernization etcetera. It has also facilitated us in thoroughly
understanding the theses maintained by Hanafi.

Carool Kersten has very rightly evaluated Hanafi a cosmopolitan Muslim intellectual who
transformed the study of religion into anthropology or human science. This has left deep
impressions on his hermeneutics. “On a level of communication, it has translated into a sustained
interest in critically examining the Islamic heritage and re-expressing it in a new language,
whereas on the ideological level it forged a humanist orientation with a teleology directed
towards the emancipation of the developing world”.488

Hanafi has rendered invaluable and monumental services for the cause of modern and practical
Islam which is humanistic, open and democratic; is based on social justice, equality, human
dignity and respect for other religions and rights of the other people. All these are not mere
slogans or empty rhetoric; he has provided us with a demonstrable, replicable and sustainable
model of Ijtehad and interpretation of Qur’an which may help us reaching a valid result in any
difficult or controversial situation. He has fought very steadfastly against the deep-seated myths
regarding the mainstream Islam on the one hand, and the only true interpretation of Qur’an, on
the other. Giving due deference and respect to tradition, he has paved a very strong, solid and
durable path to march ahead and achieve the destination of modernity. His Renewal and Heritage
Project is an honor and pride for the entire Muslim World.

We would like to end this study with the words of Mohamed Haddad that keeping in view his
contribution for religious reform and Islamic Liberation Theology and the launch of the Heritage

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and Renewal Project at the beginning of the fifteenth century of Islamic calendar positions
Hanafi as the potential Mujaddad or ‘renewer’ of his age.489

ENDNOTES:

440
Ibid, P.387-388.
476
Ibid, Pp.40-41.
477
Taha Husayn, Fi Shir al- Jahili, (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), Cairo, 1995, Pp.33-35.
478
Amin al-Khuli, Fann al- Qawl (The Art of Discourse), 2nd Edition, Cairo, 1957.
479
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P.93.
480
Ibid.
481
Ibid, P.94.
482
Ibid, P.95.
483
Ibid, P.96-97.
484
Ibid, P.97.
485
Nasr Haimd Abu Zayd, Rethinking the Quran: Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics, Humanistics
University Press, Utrecht, 2004.
486
Nasr Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought- A Critical Historical Analysis, Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam, 2006, P.98.
487
Ibid, P.98-99.
488
Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the study of Islam, Hurst &
Company, London, 2011, P.170.
489
Mohamed Haddad, “Pour Comprendre Hasan Hanafi”, Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 61, Paris, 1998,
PP.68-69.

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