Sps Torrecampo Vs Alindogan

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G.R. No.

156405             February 28, 2007

SPS. GIL TORRECAMPO and BRENDA


TORRECAMPO, Petitioners
vs.
DENNIS ALINDOGAN, SR. and HEIDE DE GUZMAN
ALINDOGAN, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on


Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated
November 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68583.

The facts are:

On May 24, 1997, spouses Jose and Lina Belmes executed a


deed of sale in favor of spouses Dennis and Heide Alindogan,
respondents, over Lot No. 5524-H and the house constructed
thereon located in Rawis, Legazpi City.

On July 4, 1997, Lina Belmes wrote respondents wherein she


delivered the constructive possession of the house and lot to them.
However, on July 5, 1997, before they could take actual
possession of the property, spouses Gil and Brenda Torrecampo,
petitioners, and spouses Jonathan Lozares and Jocelyn
Torrecampo, entered and occupied the premises.

Despite respondents’ repeated demands, petitioners failed and


refused to vacate the property. Thus, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 10, Legazpi City, a Complaint
for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 9421.1avvphi1.net

In their Answer to the complaint, petitioners claimed that on March


25, 1997, spouses Belmes received from them ₱73,000.00 as
advance payment for the sale of the house and lot. On April 8,
1997, petitioners and spouses Belmes executed a "Contract to Buy
and Sell" covering the same property. The parties agreed as
follows: that the total consideration is ₱350,000.00; that upon the
signing of the contract, petitioners shall pay spouses Belmes
₱220,000.00; and that the balance of ₱130,000.00 shall be paid
upon the issuance of the certificate of title in the names of
petitioners. To complete the agreed partial payment of
₱220,000.00 mentioned in the contract, petitioners paid spouses
Belmes ₱130,000.00, but the latter refused to accept the amount.
Thus, on July 7, 1997, petitioners filed with the RTC, Branch 18,
Tabaco, Albay, Civil Case No. T-1914, a Complaint for Specific
Performance against spouses Belmes.

On July 14, 2000, the RTC, in Civil Case No. 9421, now before us,
rendered a Decision3 in favor of respondents, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby


rendered:

a) declaring the plaintiffs as the owners and entitled to the


possession of the lot in question more particularly described in par.
2 of the complaint including the improvements thereon;

b) ordering the defendants or anyone acting for or with them to


vacate the premises; and

c) directing the defendants and/or their agents to turn over the


possession of the property in question to the plaintiffs.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court held that the transaction between petitioners and
spouses Belmes is a mere contract to sell. Thus, the latter did not
transfer ownership of the house and lot to petitioners.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,4 affirmed


in toto the RTC judgment.

In affirming the trial court’s finding that the transaction between


petitioners and spouses Belmes is a mere contract to sell, the
Court of Appeals held:

Thus, we shall now look into the transaction entered into by the
defendants with the Belmeses, with reference to the intention of
the parties. The Contract to Buy and Sell reads:
"That whereas, the vendor agreed to sell and the vendee agreed to
buy the above-described parcel of land, together with
improvements therein, for the sum of Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P350, 000.00), Philippine currency, under the
following terms and conditions xxx"1awphi1.net

The tenor of the afore-quoted provision of the contract clearly


confirms that the transaction between the transaction between the
defendants and the Belmeses was not a contract of sale, as
defined by Art. 1458 of the Civil Code. The reason for the same
was clearly explained by defendants’ own witness, Lourdes Narito,
during her direct examination. She testified that herein defendants
themselves refused to enter into a contract of sale and execute a
deed of sale unless and until the Belmeses will transfer the title to
the property. This was the reason why a mere contract to sell was
executed. x x x (Emphasis ours)

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997


Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we review only errors of
law and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate
court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater
force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in
complete agreement on their factual findings, as in this case. Here,
the facts relied upon by the trial and appellate courts are sustained
by the record. There is no reason to deviate from their findings.5

Nevertheless, in order to put rest all doubts on the matter, we hold


that the agreement between petitioners and spouses Belmes is not
a contract of sale but only a contract to sell. The distinction
between a contract of sale and a contract to sell is well-settled:

In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee


upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership
is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated,
in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property
and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the
vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract,
payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of
which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. (Underscoring
supplied)6
Indeed, the true agreement between petitioners and spouses
Belmes is a contract to sell. Not only did the parties denominate
their contract as "Contract to Buy and Sell," but also specified
therein that the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
₱130,000.00 is to be paid by petitioners upon the issuance of a
certificate of title. That spouses Belmes have in their possession
the certificate of title indicates that ownership of the subject
property did not pass to petitioners.

In Ursal v. Court of Appeals, et al.,7 we held:

Indeed, in contracts to sell the obligation of the seller to sell


becomes demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive
condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price by the
buyer. It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that the
seller becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing
sold to the buyer. Prior to the existence of the contract of sale, the
seller is not obligated to transfer the ownership to the buyer, even
if there is a contract to sell between them.

Petitioners further contend that when respondents bought the


property on May 24, 1997 from spouses Belmes, they knew that
the same property was previously sold to them (petitioners).
Therefore, since respondents are buyers in bad faith, ownership of
the property must pertain to petitioners who, in good faith, were
first in possession.

The argument is misplaced.

Petitioners invoke Article 1544 of the Civil Code which reads:

Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the


person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry
of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the


person who in good faith was first in possession; and in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith. (Emphasis ours)
The above provision does not apply to the instant case considering
that the transaction between petitioners and spouses Belmes is a
mere contract to sell, not a contract of sale.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed


Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 2002 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68583.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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