PHILOSOPHIES AND PEDAGOGIES OF MATHEMATICS

Boris Handal

The University of Sydney

Handal(at)ans.com.au

@ is replaced by (at) to stop the automatic garnering of email addresses by Spam factories - Editor

ABSTRACT

The paper discusses major philosophical stances on the nature of mathematics as

held by foundationalists and quasi-empiricalism supporters. It is argued that the
contrasting philosophical views between the two groups parallels in many respects
the pedagogical debate between behaviourism and socio-constructivism. It is also
argued that behaviourism has been influenced by foundationalist conceptions of
mathematics while socio-constructivism has been influenced by quasi-empirical
philosophies.
Introduction

Mathematical beliefs can be studied in the light of major philosophical and

pedagogical stances on the nature, teaching and learning of mathematics. The
philosophical and pedagogical stances portray well-structured representations that
have been sometimes the result of hundreds of years of collective reflection. These
macro stances are useful given their capacity to articulate a background from
which other relatively minor issues can be discussed. On the other hand, each
individual holds his or her own conception of mathematics teaching and learning.
These conceptions are unique in that they are the results of their own formal or
informal contemplation of reality. Both macro and micro conceptions of
mathematics are significant because they represent human beliefs that influence
instructional behaviour.

The Philosophy of Mathematics

The philosophy of mathematics, as a discipline, has dealt for many centuries with
the issue of what is the nature of mathematics. This age-old discussion is far from
being conclusive, rather it is evolving as each thinker contributes his or her view of
looking at the different facets which mathematics presents as a discipline. This
philosophical debate is indispensable since teaching and learning mathematics is
influenced by the perspective adopted, and because mathematics has had such a
central role in the advancement of societies that defining its nature, role and
methodology has become a central, ideological and cultural issue.

Early attempts to develop a methodological foundation of mathematics attempted

to vindicate it as a discipline free of error, that did justice to its arrogant and
secular epithets as the “most perfect of all sciences” (Lakatos, 1986, p.31), the
“mother” (Mura, 1995, p. 390), the “queen of all sciences” (McGinnis, Randy,
Shama, McDuffie, Huntley, King, & Watanabe, 1996, p. 17), “a science in its own
right” (Mura, 1995, p. 390). Others began to doubt the dogmatic assumption that
mathematics was actually an a priori, infallible enterprise, whose methodology
could be perfectly delineated and whose development was amenable to being
formulated through a formal and universal system. An alternative conception
therefore began to evolve in which mathematics was conceived as a fallible,
empirical or quasi-empirical discipline.

In the last century, the nature of mathematics became a central issue for
educationalists as it had been before for the philosophers. An individual’s
philosophy of education was thought to determine how we live our lives. A
personal philosophy of mathematics education ascertains the way we learn and
teach mathematics within the classroom and the school environment (Southwell,
1999). If mathematics is, as the Platonist tradition suggested, just an entity out
there waiting to be discovered then it will be enough for schools to present the
curriculum instruction as a mere collection of facts, definitions and algorithms. In
that regard, teaching mathematics would be like just transmitting an immutable
body of knowledge that students have to accept as a perennial fact without any
reasoning. However, if mathematics is a cultural, creative and empirical activity
then learners are in the position of constructing their own mathematical knowledge
regardless of how different their methodology may be from the canon of orthodox
and classical mathematics.

We owe the first attempts to secure an error-proof methodology of mathematics to

the Ancient Greeks. It was Euclid (365-275 B.C.) who dared to explain
mathematical reasoning through a consistent network of postulates, corollaries,
axioms and theorems. For nearly two millenniums, the academic community used
Euclid’s reasoning model to advance mathematical knowledge. However, it was
mainly Lobatchevsky (1793-1856) who dethroned Euclid’s infallibility by proving
that the fifth of Euclid’s five postulates was not absolutely true (Baldor, 1984).
Subsequent developments in mathematics showed that conventional methods of
mathematical proof led to other paradoxes and therefore the search for an
alternative infallible method became central at the beginning of this century.
Consequently, three paradigms were advanced to secure the foundation of
mathematics, namely, logicism, symbolism and intuitionism, and they become
known as the foundationalist movement.

Logicism is basically a form of Platonist realism in which mathematics is seen as a

set of abstract realms that exist externally to human creation. According to
logicists, all mathematical concepts can be reduced to abstract properties that can
be derived through logical principles. Logicism has been criticised because of its
failure to enunciate an unerring system of mathematical truth, its discourse lacking
appropriate discussion of basic mathematical concepts such as plane, line, sets and
so on. Logicism has also been criticised for its obsession for strict logical
reasoning, leaving little room for intuition and conjecture which many see as
powerful generators of creative thinking (Goodman, 1986).

Formalists share the logicist view that logic is necessary, however they argue that
mathematical knowledge is brought about through the manipulation of symbols
that operate by prescribed rules and formulas and whose understanding should be
accepted a priori. Formalism has been criticised because of the little space left for
creative thinking, the unfeasibility of creating an inclusive mathematical system
due to the need for a concomitant extensive list of definitions, properties, rules and
the like, and the reifying of the mastery of mathematical symbolism over
meaningful inference and intuition.

In the intuitionist tradition, mathematics is conceived as an intellectual activity in

which mathematical concepts are seen as mental constructions regulated by natural
laws. These constructions are regarded as abstract objects that do not necessarily
depend on proofs. Brouwer, the founder of Intuitionism, rejects the classical stance
of categorising proofs as either true or false and instead argues that other
possibilities for claiming mathematical truth should be allowed as academically
acceptable. For Brouwer, mathematical induction comes before and it is
independent of logic. Likewise, intuition and imagination are seen as early and
necessary psychological stages in the process of invention. The main critics to
intuitionism argue that mathematical constructions are not only mentally but also
socially constructed. These critics also argue that absolute freedom of thought is
detrimental to mathematical rigor. It has also been said that intuitionists’ biggest
downfall lies in enunciating their theory using formalist methods (Goodman, 1986).
The crisis and failing of the three traditions described above in securing
mathematics as an abstract, absolutist, universal and infallible system was followed
by an increasing interest in exploring mathematics as an activity which was
practical, fallible, situated and socially and personally constructed. The movement
was labelled “quasi-empirical” because it proposed that mathematics did not
actually belong to the category of hard sciences such as physics in which
something out there is to be discovered. Instead, mathematics is a human creation
born of and nurtured from practical experience, always growing and changing,
open to revision and challenge, and whose claims of truth depend on “guessing by
speculation and criticism, by the logic of proofs and refutations…" (Lakatos, 1976,
p. 5). According to Polya (1986), mathematics is both demonstration and creation.
Demonstration is achieved by proofs while creation consists of plausible reasoning
that includes guessing. Mathematical methods therefore are not perfect and cannot
claim absolute truth. Mathematical truth is not absolute but relative because in fact
truth is time dependent (Grabiner, 1986) and space dependent (Wilder, 1986).
Time dependent because what is scientifically true today might be a falsehood in
the future as theoretical assumptions change, as occurred with the theories of
Euclid and Ptolomeus. Mathematical methods are also space dependent because
different peoples and different cultures have different ways of doing and validating
their mathematical knowledge (Ascher, 1991).

The transition from the foundationalist approach, with its emphasis on pure
mathematics, to the quasi-empirical approach was followed by a renewed interest
in the application of mathematics. As seen above, for the foundationalists the realm
of mathematics was made of abstract constructs, a fact that took them away from
an emphasis on application of mathematics (Robitaille & Dirks, 1982; Rogerson;
1989). If pure mathematics is to have any value by itself, however, then it cannot
be attained by sacrificing the value of and engaging in the application of
mathematics.

Foundationalists’ overvaluing of pure mathematics neglected the fact that the

origin and goal of mathematics was the search for solutions to humanity’s
proximal environment. In fact, one of the merits of Euclid’s geometry is that he
designed his deductive method from empirical evidence (Baldor, 1984).
Mathematics therefore had grown parallel to and serving the so-called hard
sciences and it is this practical and interactive experience to which mathematics
owes most of its greatness (Putnam, 1986). For Putnam (1986), the greatness of
mathematics did not reside only in its ability to go beyond the realm of concrete
entities, nor in the beauty of their proofs, but in its concomitant power in providing
utilitarian solutions to the bewildered homo sapiens in their settlement on earth.
Influence of the Philosophy of Mathematics on the Pedagogy of Mathematics

The formalist and logicist paradigms, as Hersh (1979) and Rogerson (1994) have
argued, have had a strong influence on mathematics education in this century and
therefore have shaped the way teachers and students have learned what
mathematics is. The New Mathematics wave, set theory, the emphasis on notation,
symbolism, functions and relations, more stress on analytical rather than
descriptive geometry, and behaviourist perspectives on education have certainly
been part of the foundationalist legacy which influenced the school mathematics
curriculum and models of teacher education in the world (Laurenson, 1995;
Moreira & Noss, 1995; Robitaille & Dirks, 1982; Thom, 1986).

As the second half of the last century continued to evolve, the international
mathematics education community was keener to consider and adopt the quasi-
empirical conception of mathematics, no matter how eclectic this view was. Major
reform documents such as the U.S. Curriculum and Evaluation Standards for
School Mathematics (National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, NCTM,
1989), Professional Standards for the Teaching of Mathematics (NCTM,
1991), Assessment Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 1995), Principles
and Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 2000), the U.K. Cockcroft
Report (Cockcroft, 1982), the National Statement on Mathematics for Australian
Schools (Australian Education Council, 1991), the Statement of Principles for
Mathematics K-12 and The Nature of Mathematics Teaching and Learning (Board
of Studies New South Wales, 1996) were inspired in different degrees by the
principle of “knowing mathematics is doing mathematics” (NCTM, 1989, p.
7) thus reflecting the quasi-empirical approach.

The quasi-empirical approach parallels in many respects the main tenets of the
socio-constructivist theory, although it is worthy to note that while the former
constitutes a philosophical view on the nature of mathematics, the latter focuses its
attention on the psychological underpinnings of teaching and learning mathematics.

For many years, there has been a debate in education on the advantages and
disadvantages of socio-constructivism and behaviourism. These two philosophies
on teaching and learning mathematics can be depicted as two contrasting views
and both have influenced the way mathematics is being taught in schools (Marland,
1994).

Socio-constructivism, or constructivism in shorter terms, as opposed to behaviorist

models of teaching and learning, claims that knowledge should not be transferred
from one individual to another in educational environments. For constructivist
educationalist, knowledge must be actively constructed as the learner is an entity
with previous experiences that must considered as a “knowing being”. Learning is
therefore seen as an adaptive and experiential process rather than a knowledge
transference activity (Candy, 1991). As learners encounter new situations, they
look for similarities and differences against their own cognitive schemata. These
contrasts, also called cognitive perturbations, are the end-product of conflictive
knowledge waiting to be resolved through reorganizing schemes of knowledge
(Phillip, 1995).

In constructivist terms, learning depends on the way each individual learner looks
at a particular situation and draws his/her own conclusions. People therefore
determine their own knowledge based on their own way of processing information
and according to his/her own beliefs and attitudes towards learning (Biggs &
Moore, 1993). Constructivism therefore gives recognition and value instructional
strategies in which students are able to learn mathematics by personally and
socially constructing knowledge. Constructivist learning strategies include more
reflective oriented learning activities in mathematics education such as exploratory
and generative learning. More specifically, these activities include problem solving,
group learning, discussions and situated learning (Murphy, 1997; Wood, Cobb, &
Yackel, 1991).

According to behaviourism focuses on the manipulation of external conditions to

the learner to modify behaviours that eventually lead to learning. In a behaviourist
oriented environment completion of tasks is seen as ideal learning behaviour and
mastering basic skills require students to move from basic tasks to more advanced
tasks. In addition, learning is considered a function of rewarding and reinforcing
student learning. Likewise, the emphasis is on correct answers rather than of
partially correct answers (Elliot, Kratochwill, & Travers, 1996). Inspired by linear
programming theories developed particularly during the Second World War,
learning and teaching in behaviourist terms is a matter of optimizing and
manipulating the instructional environment towards the fulfilment of rigidly and
specifically designed educational objectives.

In addition, behaviourists saw the student’s affective domain as different from the
cognitive domain. The Bloom Taxonomy, for example, classifies educational
objectives in cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains (Krathwohl, Bloom, &
Masia, 1964). They categorised emotions “as imaginary constructs” that are causes
of behaviour (McLeod, 1992). Consequently, behaviourists assume that certain
emotions and attitudes can influence behaviour, although, in general, affective
issues are neglected (McLeod, 1992). Teachers’ and students’ minds were seen as
“black-boxes” or machines (Shavelson & Stern, 1981) in which attitudes and
behaviour occur somehow or even are not relevant (Nespor, 1987).

It has been said that behaviourism emphasizes a process-product and teacher-

centredness model of instructions that have been prevalent in classroom teaching
and in teacher education programs in the twentieth century (Marland, 1994). A
behaviourist teaching style in mathematics education tends to rely on practices that
emphasize rote learning and memorization of formulas, one-way to solve problems,
and adherence to procedures and drill. Repetition is seen as one of the greatest
means to skill acquisition. Teaching is therefore a matter of enunciating objectives
and providing the means to reach those objectives and situated learning is given
little value in instruction (Leder, 1994). This over emphasis on procedures and
formulas resembles traditional formalist and logicist ideas.

It is worthy to add that while most of the literature on mathematics education

revolves around the dialogue between the constructivist and the behaviourist
movements, it is apparent that their differences have been described by
educationalists and reform documents under other educational terms. These terms
basically discriminate between the teaching of specific facts and a type of
instruction that fosters independent thought (Schmidt & Kennedy, 1990). It must
be noted that, like any other theoretical model, these representations are
oversimplification of reality and therefore many educational variables are excluded.
Figure 1 shows the different terms used in those discussions.
Figure 1

Divergent Views in Mathematics Education

Behaviourist Constructivist
Source
Perspective Perspective
Behaviourism Constructivism Candy (1991)
O’Laughlin & Campbell
Traditional Progressive
(1988)
Mimetic Transformational Jackson (1986)
Basic skills Higher order thinking Schmidt & Kennedy (1990)
Content Process Schmidt & Kennedy (1990)
Positivist Relativist Laurenson (1995)
Sosniak, Ethington, &
Subject-centred Child-centred
Varelas (1991)
Emphasis on qualitative
Transmission of factual and
transformations
procedural Sosniak et al. (1991)
in the character and outlook of
knowledge
the learner
Euclidean Quasi-empirical Lerman (1983)
Absolutist Fallibilist Lerman (1983)
Technical-Positivism Constructivism Taylor (1990)
Traditional Nontraditional Raymond (1997)
Perry, Howard, & Tracey
Transmission Child-centredness
(1999)
Transmission Constructivist Nisbet & Warren (2000)

Summary

This paper has reviewed the debate between foundationalism and quasi-empirical
supporters on the nature of mathematics and between constructivist and
behaviourist proponents on the nature of teaching and learning mathematics.
Foundationalism is represented by the logicism, formalism and intuitionism
movements that were very popular in the first half of the last century. These
philosophical and psychological stances, acting as macro beliefs, have in turn
influenced the way students, teachers, schools and the education system in general
have thought about what mathematics is and how it should be taught and
learned. It was also argued that educational processes have been largely influenced
by foundationalist and behaviourist ideas. Consequently, many teachers may
perceive mathematics as a discipline firmly grounded in a world of rules and
procedures and disembodied from personal experience. Such a view, once
translated to the classroom environment, leads the way to a type of instruction that
might have little to do with current constructivist oriented reform principles.
REFERENCES

Ascher, M. (1991). Ethnomathematics: a multicultural view of mathematical idea. .California:

Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

Australian Education Council (1991). A national statement on mathematics for Australian

schools. Melbourne: Curriculum Corporation.

Baldor, J.A. (1984). Geometria Plana y del Espacio. Madrid: Codice.

Biggs, J., & Moore, P. (1993). The process of learning. Sydney: Prentice Hall.

Board of Studies NSW. (1996). Stage 5 support document for Advanced, Intermediate and
Standard Courses. Sydney: BOS.

Candy, P. C. (1991). Understanding the individual nature of learning. In Self-direction for lifelong
learning: A comprehensive guide to theory and practice. (pp. 249-278). San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.

Cockcroft, W.H. (Chair) (1982). Mathematics Counts. HMSO: London.

Elliot, S.N., Kratochwill, J., & Travers, J.F. (1996). Educational psychology: Effective teaching,
effective learning. Dubuque: Brown and Benchmark Publishers.

Goodman, N.D. (1986). Mathematics as an objective science. In T. Tymoczko (Ed.), New

directions in the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 79-94). Boston: Birkhauser.

Grabiner, J.V. (1986). Is mathematical truth time-dependent? In T. Tymoczko (Ed.), New

directions in the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 201-214). Boston: Birkhauser.

Hersh, R. (1979). Some proposals for reviving the philosophy of mathematics. Advances in
Mathematics, 31, 31-50.

Jackson, P.W. (1986). The practice of teaching. New York: Teachers College Press.

Krathwohl, D.L., Bloom, B.S., & Masia, B.B. (1964). Taxonomy of educational objectives:
Handbook II. Affective domain. New York: Longman.

Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematics discovery. London:
Cambridge University Press.

Lakatos, I. (1986). A Renaissance of Empiricism in the recent philosophy of mathematics? In T.

Tymoczko (Ed.), New directions in the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 29-49). Boston:
Birkhauser.

Laurenson, D.J. (1995). Mathematics and the drift towards constructivism: Are teacher beliefs
and teaching practice following the beat of the same drummer?. NCSSSMST Journal, 1(2), 3-7.

Leder, G.C. (1994). Research in mathematics education – constraints on construction? In G. Bell

(Ed.), Challenges in mathematics education: Constraints on construction. Proceedings of the
17th Annual Conference of the Mathematics Education Research Group of Australasia (pp. 31-48).
Lismore: MERGA.
Lerman, S. (1983). Problem-solving or knowledge-centred; the influence of philosophy of
mathematics teaching. International Journal of Mathematics Education for Science and
Technology, 14(1), 59-66.

Marland, P.W. (1994). Teaching: Implicit theories. In T. Husen, & T.N. Postlewaite (Editors-in-
chief), The international encyclopaedia of education (pp. 6178-6183). New York: Pergamon.

McGinnis, J.R., Shama, G., McDuffie, A., Huntley, M.A., King, K., & Watanabe, T.
(1996). Researching the preparation of specialized mathematics and science upper
elementary/middle-level teachers: The 2nd year report. Proceedings of the Annual Conference of
the National Science Teachers Association, St. Louis, Missouri. (ERIC document ED 395 792.)

McLeod, D.B. (1992). Research on affect in mathematics education: a reconceptualization. In D.

Grows (Ed.), Handbook of research on mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 575-596). New
York: Macmillan.

Moreira, C., & Noss, R. (1995). Understanding teachers’ attitudes to change in a

Logomathematics environment. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 28(2), 155-176.

Mura, R. (1995). Images of mathematics held by university teachers of mathematics

education. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 28(4), 385-399.

Murphy, E. (1997). Characteristics of constructivist learning and teaching. Universite Laval,

Quebec. Available: http://www.stemnet.nf.ca/~elmurphy/emurphy/cle3.html.

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (1989). Curriculum and evaluation Standards for
school mathematics. Reston: NCTM.

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (1991). Professional standards for the teaching of
mathematics. Reston: NCTM.

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (1995). Assessment standards for school

mathematics. Reston: NCTM.

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. (2000). Principles and standards for school
mathematics. Reston: NCTM.

Nespor, J. (1987). The role of beliefs in the practice of teaching. Journal of Curriculum
Studies, 19(4), 317-328.

Nisbert, S., & Warren, E. (2000). Primary school teachers’ beliefs relating to mathematics
teaching and assessing mathematics and factors that influence these beliefs. Mathematics
Education Research Journal, 13(2), 34-47.

O’Laughlin, M., & Campbell, M.B. (1988). Teacher preparation, teacher empowerment, and
reflective enquiry: A critical perspective. Teacher Education Quarterly, 15(4), 25-53.

Phillip, D.C. (1995). The good, the bad, and the ugly. The many faces of
constructivism. Educational Researcher, 24(7), 5-12.

Perry, B., Howard, P., & Tracey, D. (1999). Head mathematics teachers’ beliefs about the
learning and teaching of Mathematics. Mathematics Education Research. Journal, 11, 39-57.
Polya, G. (1986). Induction and analogy in mathematics. In T. Tymoczko (Ed.), New directions in
the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 99-102). Boston: Birkhauser.

Putnam, H. (1986). What is mathematical truth? In T. Tymoczko (Ed.), New directions in the
philosophy of mathematics (pp. 49-66). Boston: Birkhauser.

Raymond, A.M. (1997). Inconsistency between a teacher’s beliefs and practice. Journal for
Research in Mathematics Education, 28(5), 550-576.

Robitaille, D., & Dirks, M. (1982). Models for the mathematics curriculum. For the Learning of
Mathematics, 2(3), 3-21.

Rogerson, A. (1989). The human and social context for problem solving, modelling and
applications. In W. Blum, M. Niss & I. Huntley (Eds.), Modelling, applications and applied
problem solving: Teaching mathematics in a real context (pp. 49-55). England: Ellis Horwood.

Rogerson, A. (1994). Symbols as cultural communication – A historical and didactical

perspective. Paper presented at the 46th International Meeting of the CIEAEM, Toulouse, France.

Schmidt, W.H., & Kennedy, M.M. (1990). Teachers’ and teacher candidates’ beliefs about subject
matter and about teaching responsibilities. (ERIC document ED 320 902.)

Shavelson, R.J., & Stern, P. (1981). Research on teachers’ pedagogical thoughts, judgements,
decisions, and behavior. Review of Education Research, 51(4), 455-498.

Sosniak, L.A., & Ethington, C.A., & Varelas, M. (1991). Teaching mathematics without a coherent
point of view: Findings from the IEA Second International Mathematics Study. Journal of
Curriculum Studies, 23, 119-131.

Southwell, B. (1999). The lowdown on the philosophy of mathematics

education. Reflections, 24(1), 44-47.

Taylor, T. (1990). Mathematical attitude development from a Vygotskian

perspective. Mathematical Education Research Journal, (4)3, 8-23.

Thom, R. (1986). “Modern” mathematics: An educational and philosophic error? In T. Tymoczko

(Ed.), New directions in the philosophy of mathematics (pp. 67-78). Boston: Birkhauser.

Wilder, R. (1986). The cultural basis of mathematics. In T. Tymoczko (Ed.), New directions in the
philosophy of mathematics (pp. 185-200). Boston: Birkhauser.

Wood, T., Cobb, P., & Yackel, E. (1991). Change in teaching mathematics. American Educational
Research Journal, 28(3), 587-616.