Padilla-Rumbaua Vs Rumbaua

10/22/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 596
G.R. No. 166738. August 14, 2009.*
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, petitioner, vs. EDWARD

RUMBAUA, respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Rule

on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC); A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC—which was promulgated on March 15, 2003 and
duly published—is geared towards the relaxation of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) certification that Republic v. Molina,
268 SCRA 198 (1997), required.—In Molina, the Court
emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages: (8) The
trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC—which this Court promulgated on March
15, 2003 and duly published—is geared towards the relaxation of
the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this
remedial regulation provides: SEC. 18. Memoranda.—The court
may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the
date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may
be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016df03a7344aecd3db4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/31
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua
Same; Same; Same; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial

measure, removed the mandatory nature of an Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) certification and may be applied
retroactively to pending matters—in effect, the measure cures in
any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior
to its promulgation.—The amendment introduced under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not
create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy
in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled
rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect, as we
held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, 535 SCRA 411 (2007):
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statues—they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in
rules of procedure. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure,
removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may
be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure
cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the
certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v.
Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006) and Navales v. Navales, 556 SCRA
272 (2008) have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of
certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between
the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the
presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial
requirement that he be certified to be present. From this
perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina
guideline on certification lacks merit.
Same; Same; Same; New Trial; Pleadings and Practice;
Attorneys; Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the
proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground
for new trial.—In the present case, the petitioner cites the
inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as
basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy.
That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in
handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would
159
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 159
justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary

diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The
negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited
in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation, 503 SCRA 704
(2006), where we explained: Blunders and mistakes in the conduct
of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a
ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons
for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so
long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that
the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or
learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional
commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new
trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the
instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; In Santos v.
Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and, (c) incurability—the defect should
refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.”—A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be

confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in the Interpretation and
Application of Article 36 of the Family Code.—We laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of
160
the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 399 SCRA 277

(2003), where we said: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation
of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4)

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x (5) Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characte-
161
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 161
riological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional

outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts… (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Same; Same; Same; The husband’s failure to greet the wife on
her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as
well as his acts of blaming her for his mother’s death and of
representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at

best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional
immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity; The
husband’s act of living with another woman four years into the
marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage.—In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal
to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it
was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As
the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to
cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a
scholar-
162
ship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The
respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to
send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of
blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing
himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount
to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not
necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s
act of living with another woman four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact,
petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and
faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; While the circumstance
alone that the psychologist’s conclusions about the husband’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her
by only one side does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of
bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application
of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we
discussed above.—We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were
based on the information fed to her by only one side—the
petitioner—whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist
for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve
the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account;

she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To make conclusions and
generalizations on the husband’s psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side is, to the mind of the Court,
not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.—We find these
observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
root cause of the respondent’s narcis-
163
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 163
sistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the

inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we
cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her
Report—i.e., that the respondent suffered “Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable”—is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the
various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used
as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this
same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s
condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about
to assume.—The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital
predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to
discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to
live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume

psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to
comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness. The psychological illness that
must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should
be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the
party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
then about to assume.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
164

Joselito A. Oliveros for petitioner.
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner)
challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,1
the decision dated June 25, 20042 and the resolution dated
January 18, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the
marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward
Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on
the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s

complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against
the respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to
live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to
extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his
mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his
transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao,

although he was cohabiting with another woman in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the REVISED RULES OF COURT.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, and
concurred in by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Associate Justice
Danilo B. Pine (both retired); Rollo, pp. 26-34.
3 Id., pp. 33-34.
4 Penned by Hon. Gil L. Valdez, Presiding Judge, Branch 29, RTC,
Boyombong, Nueva Vizcaya; Records, pp. 1-4.
165
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 165

Summons was served on the respondent through

substituted service, as personal service proved futile.5 The
RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if
collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no
fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.6
Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the
presence of collusion between the parties.7
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.8
The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the
Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all
hearings of the case.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate her charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were
childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya.
Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts
but the respondent’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the
respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he
found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air
Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer
engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that
they first have a “secret marriage” in order not to
antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were
married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner
and the respondent, however, never lived together; the
petitioner stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City,
while the respondent lived with his parents in Novaliches.
_______________
5 Sheriff’s Return, Id., p. 9.

6 Id., p. 15.
7 Resolution of August 11, 2000; Id., pp. 23-24.
8 Id., pp. 29-32.
9 Id., p. 33.
166

The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day

during the first six months of their marriage. At that point,
the respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear
that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his
application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their
marriage, the couple’s daily meetings became occasional
visits to the petitioner’s house in Fairview; they would have
sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent
enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his employment
with PAL.10
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their
secret marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince
him to go to the United States, but he refused. To appease
his mother, he continued living separately from the
petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner
during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her
greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent
indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The
respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s
death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage
brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner
severed her relationship with the respondent. They
eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioner’s
father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he
had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and
her mother went to the respondent’s house in Novaliches
and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it, he
denied having an affair with Cynthia.11 The petitioner
apparently did not believe the respondents and moved to
Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that
her discovery brought.12
_______________
10 TSN, November 23, 2000, pp. 1-13.

11 Id., pp. 13-14.
12 TSN, January 11, 1001, pp. 2-9.
167
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 167

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination

that communication between her and respondent had
ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also
presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;13
and the testimony, curriculum vitae,14 and psychological
report15 of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag
(Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she
administered the following tests on the petitioner: a
Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt
Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person
Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.16She
thereafter prepared a psychological report with the
following findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an

average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained intact.
She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into
most situations especially if it is within her interests. She is
pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations
from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to social
norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both
intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant
attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and
deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their
relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely
because of the mere belief that someday things will be much
better for them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity,
she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that
she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being
aggressive and very cautious at times—so as to fight with the
frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed
marriage.
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very
self-centered manner as he believes that the world
revolves
_______________
13 Records, p. 46.
14 Id., pp. 54-55.
15 Id., pp. 47-53.
16 TSN, February 22, 2001, p. 6.
168

around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to

deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an
extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do
actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards
others especially to that of petitioner.
REMARKS
“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it

goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age
does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will share
his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone.
Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let
love die—it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love
he/she expected.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that
love really happened for her towards the young respondent—who
used “love” as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the
confidence she extended towards him. He made her believe that
he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful—only to reveal
himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to
engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like
an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to suffer
Narcissistic Personality Disorder—declared to be grave, severe
and incurable.”17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of

April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies
of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:
“x x x x
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of
his wife. Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out
communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like
petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day; going out only on
occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to

have sexual intercourse.
_______________
17 Records, pp. 51-53.
169
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 169

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant

facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of
respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the
parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital
responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This
incapacity is “declared grave, severe and incurable.”
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between
petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin
Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.
SO ORDERED.”18
The CA Decision
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC

decision to the CA.19 The CA decision of June 25, 2004
reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the
nullification of the parties’ marriage.20
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s
psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the
respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality disorder;” it
did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed
to give the court an insight into the respondent’s
developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain
why she came to the conclusion that the respondent’s
incapacity was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires
the incapacity to be psychological, although its
manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence
presented must show that the incapacitated party was
mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have
known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them,
could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform
_______________
18 Rollo, pp. 40-41.

19 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
20 Annex “A”; Id., pp. 26-29.
170

the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case,

the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly
refused to live with her because of his parents’ objection to
their marriage.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the
CA
21
denied her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005.
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that—

1. the OSG certification requirement under
Republic v. Molina22 (the Molina case) cannot be
dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which relaxed the requirement, took effect only
on March 15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and
remanding the case to the RTC to recall her
expert witness and cure the defects in her
testimony, as well as to present additional
evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the
deficiencies in her psychiatric report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s
decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event
we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set
aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after
the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial
court’s decision and remanding the case for further
proceedings were not
_______________
21 Annex “A-1”; Id., pp. 33-34.

22 G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
171
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 171

proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish

respondent’s psychological incapacity.23
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the
memoranda they filed.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to
appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
“(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.” [Emphasis supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24—which this Court promulgated

on March 15, 2003 and duly published—is geared towards
the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina
required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:
“SEC. 18. Memoranda.—The court may require the parties

and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 104-124.

24 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
172

Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of

their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.”
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19,

2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered
despite the absence of the required OSG certification
specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003,
cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was
promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in
aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled
rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive
effect,25 as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de
Mangubat:26
“Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a

retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statues — they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in
rules of procedure.”
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed

the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be
applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the
measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse
on the certifica-
_______________
25 See Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141530, March 18, 2003,
399 SCRA 277.
26 G.R. No. 149508, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 411.
173
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 173

tion prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v.

Reyes27 and Navales v. Navales28 have since confirmed and
clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the
Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although
Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the
parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the
presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial
requirement that he be certified to be present. From this
perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina
guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’
decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further
reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She
argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial
was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago,
and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would
allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits
in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party,
the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve
the ends of justice.
We do not find her arguments convincing.
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally
proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an
aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a
judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a
new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In
addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the
grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against by
ordinary prudence, and by reason of
_______________
27 G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353.

28 G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272.
174

which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been

impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have
discovered and produced at the trial, and that would

probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy
of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for
a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy.
That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity
prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not
been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo
that the petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the
negligence that would justify a new trial must be
excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against. The negligence that the
petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:29
“Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in

the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial.
If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases,
there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel
could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will
put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors
by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of
conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.”
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the

petitioner’s requested remand.
_______________
29 G.R. No. 167245, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 704.
175
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 175

Petitioner failed to establish the

respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that “a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of
Appeals,30 the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)

juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect
should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It
must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
“(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the
nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
_______________
30 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
176

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.

Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time
of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.”
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
177
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 177

and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the

case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.”
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we

established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity
must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These requisites must
be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must
be confined only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define
“psychological incapacity,” fleshing out its terms is left to
us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.32
We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v.
Velez-Ting33when we explained:
_______________
31 Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81.
32 Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123.
33 G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.

178

“It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize

in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.”
In the present case and using the above standards and

approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.
a.Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the

root cause, gravity and incurability of
respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the
respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her;
(b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her
birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards
during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single
in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his
mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in
fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the
“psychological incapacity” that the law requires, and should
be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v.
Bier,34 we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor—an adverse integral element in the
respondent’s personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his
_______________
34 Supra note 33.
179
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 179

essential marital obligations—had to be shown and was not

shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to
cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible,
but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological
illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent
merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing
his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of
antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet
the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during
special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner
for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single
in his visa application, could only at best amount to
forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not
necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years

into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself
admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when
they were going steady and for a time after their marriage;
their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had
some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections,
however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he
had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage
that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and
obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:35
“Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to

take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
or per-
_______________
35 Supra note 29.
180

version, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and

the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due
to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said
rule.”
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court

testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions
about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based
on the information fed to her by only one side—the
petitioner—whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify
the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony
and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed

above.36 For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the
respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did
not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how
he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s
probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the
petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves
around him”; and who “used love as a…deceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards
him.” Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of “love”;
made a generalization that respondent was a person who
“lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,” and who
engaged “in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look
like a fool”; and finally concluded that the respondent’s
character traits reveal “him to suffer Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Anti-
_______________
36 See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319.
181
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 181

social Personality Disorder declared to be grave and

incurable.”
We find these observations and conclusions
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
root cause of the respondent’s narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature
of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus,
we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion
in her Report—i.e., that the respondent suffered
“Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable”—
is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from
her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the

petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess
her own psychological condition, this same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition.
To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent’s psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s
subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies
attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that
she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties
were married, respondent was already suffering from a
psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she
came to the conclusion that
182

respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To directly

quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as
Exh. “E-7,” there is a statement to the effect that his character
traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of
antisocial personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please
explain in layman’s word, Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder
cannot accept that there is something wrong with his own
behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the
world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding financial
and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact
that respondent abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a
narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply
because they love themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly,
narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and
gratification without the help of others and this is where the
petitioner set in.
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral

manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is already
considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As
I say this, a kind of developmental disorder wherein it all started
during the early formative years and brought about by one familiar
relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family.
Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child
disorder. [sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?
A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long
before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part of the
petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of
the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]
183
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 183

xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is
now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you describe the
character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic]
because an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering
activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of
another person, and this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated
psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep
seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological incapacity?
[sic]
A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would
say incurable in nature and at this time and again [sic] the
psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor
of not being able to give meaning to a relationship in terms of
sincerity and endurance.
Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the
respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?
A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative
years and so if it takes enough that such psychological incapacity of
respondent already existed long before he entered marriage,
because if you analyze how he was reared by her parents
particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis
developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional
havoc when he reached adult age.
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent
never had an inkling that his behavioral manifestation connotes
pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit
again that such behavior of his connotes again pathology simply

because the disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to himself
but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other party involved.
184

xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the
respondent never appeared at my clinic.
Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning
wife to annul their marriage with her husband in general, what can
you say about the respondent?
A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give
meaning to their relationship. If you analyze their marital
relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start
of the [marriage], the respondent to have petitioner to engage in
secret marriage until that time their family knew of their marriage
[sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his
marital obligation to the petitioner.
xxxx
COURT:
Q:Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner,
can you really enumerate the specific traits of the respondent?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the
dependent attitude of the respondent.
Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky
simply because he never had a set of responsibility. I think that he
finished his education but he never had a stable job because he
completely relied on the support of his mother.
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something
specific?
A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the
part of the mother merely because respondent happened to be the
only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship
[sic] developed between
185
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 185

the son and the mother simply because the mother always
pampered completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed
to develop his own sense of assertion or responsibility particularly
during that stage and there is also presence of the simple lying act
particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional
imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent
refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact
they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or
completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty
hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner,
knowing that respondent indulge with another woman it is very,
very traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts to
feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship,
and clinically this falls under antisocial personality. 37
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very

vague and inconclusive, thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up
to this very moment, no scientific could be upheld to alleviate their
kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other
person suffering from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic
personality will never admit that they are suffering from this kind
of disorder, and then again curability will always be a question.
[sic]38
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially

described the general characteristics of a person suffering
from
_______________
37 TSN, February 22, 2001, pp. 8-17.

38 TSN, February 22, 2001, p. 17.
186

a narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show

how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these
traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence
requires for the nullity of a marriage—namely, gravity,
incurability, existence at the time of the marriage,
psychological incapacity relating to marriage—and in her

own limited way, related these to the medical condition she
generally described. The testimony, together with her
report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or
linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very
general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich
in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most
notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what
extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it
was already present at the time of the marriage; and the
effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and
his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities
of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the
petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her
diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the
petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the
prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only
the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires,
of course, that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non to arrive at such declaration.39 If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.40 No such independent evidence, how-
_______________
39 See Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA
755.
40 See Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28,
2007, 517 SCRA 123.
187
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 187

ever, appears on record to have been gathered in this case,

particularly about the respondent’s early life and
associations, and about events on or about the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony
and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that
revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the
petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the
conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of

the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities
of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus;
none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the
better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his
determination to improve himself through studies, his care
and attention in the first six months of the marriage,
among others. The evidence fails to mention also what
character and qualities the petitioner brought into her
marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family
opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent
to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this
allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important
because not a few marriages have failed, not because of
psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses,
but because of basic incompatibilities and marital
developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses
likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few
married couples have likewise permanently separated
simply because they have “fallen out of love,” or have
outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their
younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for
the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts
for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner’s
evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to
support the conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the
respondent should be nullified on the ground of the
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
188

The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital

predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to
discharge his marital obligations, particularly the
obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As
we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that
must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to

deprive the party of his or her awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was then about to assume.41
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we
DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and
January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales** (Actg. Chairperson), Carpio,*** Chico-

Nazario**** and Leonardo-De Castro,***** JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
_______________
41 Supra note 34.

** Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second Division effective
August 1, 2009 per Special Order No. 670 dated July 28, 2009.
*** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
August 1, 2009 per Special Order No. 671 dated July 28, 2009.
**** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
June 3, 2009 per Special Order No. 658 dated June 3, 2009.
***** Designated addtional Member of the Second Division effective
May 11, 2009 per Special Order No. 635 dated May 7, 2009.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Padilla-Rumbaua Vs Rumbaua

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Padilla-Rumbaua Vs Rumbaua

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Padilla-Rumbaua Vs Rumbaua

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

10/22/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 596

G.R. No. 166738. August 14, 2009.*

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, petitioner, vs. EDWARD

Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Rule

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua

Same; Same; Same; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 159

Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua

justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary

and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua

the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 399 SCRA 277

itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4)

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 161

Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua

riological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional

representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua

diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account;

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 163

Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua

sistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the

live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joselito A. Oliveros for petitioner.

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s

transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao,

1 Under Rule 45 of the REVISED RULES OF COURT.

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 165

Summons was served on the respondent through

5 Sheriff’s Return, Id., p. 9.

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day

10 TSN, November 23, 2000, pp. 1-13.

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 167

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to

“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of

occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to

17 Records, pp. 51-53.

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 169

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC

18 Rollo, pp. 40-41.

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case,

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that—

21 Annex “A-1”; Id., pp. 33-34.

VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 171

proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish

Carpio-Morales (Actg. Chairperson), Carpio,* Chico-