Handbook On Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes

Handbook on
Design and operation

of flexible pipes
Joint Industry Project: “Safe and Cost Effective Operation of Flexible Pipes”
- 2017 edition -
OC2017 A-001
NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean ii 2017 edition

OC2017 A-001
HANDBOOK
on DESIGN and OPERATION of FLEXIBLE PIPES
Editors: Dag Fergestad SINTEF Ocean

Svein Are Løtveit 4Subsea
Development of this Handbook is made possible through the Joint Industry Project (JIP):
"Safe and Cost Effective Operation of Flexible Pipes". 2011 - 2013.
This HANDBOOK is sponsored by: ConocoPhillips

Dong Energy
ExxonMobil
Lundin
Maersk Oil
Shell Norge
Talisman Energy
This HANDBOOK is an extended revision of the Handbook issued in 1992 (FPS2000 project):
Berge S. and Olufsen A. (eds.): "Handbook on Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes",
Sintef ReportSTF70 A92006, 1992-02-07.
All changes to this document should be coordinated with Dag Fergestad: Dag.Fergestad@sintef.no
©2017: NTNU / 4Subsea / SINTEF Ocean

ISBN 978-82-7174-285-0
Issued June 6th
Last revised 11.12.2017
SINTEF Ocean
Visiting address: Postal address:
Otto Nielsens veg 10, P.O. Box 4762 Torgard,
NO-7052 Trondheim Norway NO-7465 Trondheim Norway
Telephone: +47 464 15 000

Email: ocean@sintef.no
Cover photo: ©4Subsea AS
2017 edition iii NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

OC2017 A-001
Document history
STF70 A92006 - 07.02.1992
• First edition Handbook on Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes, FPS2000 "Flexible
Risers and Pipes" NTNF Research Programme, [Berge et al., 1992]
MT2014 A-001 15.04.2014
• Handbook on Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes, Vol.1 and Vol.2 (confidential),
JIP – Safe and Cost Effective operation of Flexible Pipes, 2011-2014 [Fergestad et al., 2014]
OC2017 A-001 06.06.2017
• Handbook on Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes, Vol.1 and Vol.2 merged and
edited. Confidential period expired. Some corrections and minor additions.
OC2017 A-001 12.12.2017
• corrected typing error in equation B1.61
NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean iv 2017 edition

OC2017 A-001 Preface
PREFACE
High pressure flexible pipes are increasingly being used in the offshore production of oil and
gas. Early experience with flexible pipes was gained since the late 1970s in relatively benign
environments. A breakthrough for flexible pipes as dynamic risers in the harsh environments
of the North Sea came in 1983/84 when it was decided to use a flexible dynamic riser system
on the Balmoral field.
For flexible pipes the initial challenges for field developments on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf were:
• Combination of severe environment and (at that time) deep water
• Fields with high temperature and pressure, combined with large quantities of gas
• Permanent installations with many risers, large investments and long field lives
• Stringent requirements with regard to safety documentation
In order to help meet the challenges related to floating production systems for oil and gas
the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Technical Research (NTNF) launched a three
year research program, Floating Production Systems (FPS2000), in 1989. One objective of
the program was to qualify flexible risers and pipes for use on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf. The first edition of the "Handbook on Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes",
[Berge et al., 1992] was also a deliverable from FPS2000. The effort was motivated by the
need for cost reduction of future field developments, both facing the shortcomings of fixed
platform technology available at that time, and the need for more economic robustness with
respect to experienced variations in the oil price.
With the increase in floater developments offshore Norway from 1993 to 2001, the number
of flexible risers increased from about 50 to more than 250. In 2013 there were 326 flexible
risers in service offshore Norway. The CODAM database administered by Petroleum Safety
Authority Norway (PSA Norway) reported 85 flexible riser incidents from 1995 to October
2013 including 60 "Major Incidents" with loss of containment or significant probability of
such loss, and incidents with high personnel risk. Most of the risers that have experienced
a major incident as well as other risers with confirmed unacceptable risk have been replaced
after risk assessments. More than 25% of the flexible risers offshore Norway has not met
their design service life [4Subsea, 2013].
In order to improve reliability related to operation of flexible risers there is need for coopera-
tion, improvements and systematic work. The starting point should be an industry consensus
of what is the current status and secondly promote and obtain standardization. With this as
the background the JIP - Safe and Cost Effective Operation of Flexible Pipes was established
in 2011 as a combined effort between Marintek / NTNU and 4Subsea AS. A key project
delivery is a revised and extended version of the Handbook on Design and Operation of
Flexible Pipes from 1992. The activities for the work-scope for the JIP are in short listed as:
• Repair methods for flexible pipes.
• Supporting tools for assessing the integrity of flexible pipe cross-section due to corrosion
damage of tensile armour wires.
• Supporting tools for tensile armour buckling of flexible pipes.
• Life time assessment of flexible pipes.
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Preface OC2017 A-001
• Reliability methods for integrity assessment of flexible pipes.

• Small scale fatigue testing of tensile armour wires from (sweet service) flexible risers
taken out of service after many years in operation.
• Characterization of surfaces of corroded tensile armour wires from flexible risers taken
out of service in relation to fatigue properties.
• Description and assessment of annulus environments for different segments of risers
under relevant operational scenarios including corrosion issues.
• Update of Handbook on Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes based on the 1992-
edition, the JIP project work and the JIP group experience.
The flexible risers from the Balmoral field were decommissioned after 23 years in service.
Samples of used and stored tensile armour wires were made available for fatigue testing to
the JIP through cooperation with the JIP "Riser End of Life" run by Flexlife. Along with
additional material from a decommissioned riser after 11 years in service (riser named North
Sea riser in this Handbook), fatigue properties of tensile armour wires subjected to annulus
corrosion have been tested and specimen surfaces have been examined and characterized.
The recommendations and guidelines given in this text are not intended to serve as regula-
tions, and there has been no attempt to write the Handbook in the style of a "recommended
practice". However, it is a hope that the Handbook may be useful for experienced and new
users of flexible pipes and to serve as reference literature for a new generation of flexible riser
engineers.
NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean vi 2017 edition

OC2017 A-001 Acknowledgements
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This Handbook has been prepared as a joint effort by Marintek, NTNU and 4Subsea, within
the Joint Industry Project - "Safe and Cost Effective Operation of Flexible Pipes". The
participating companies were:
ConocoPhillips
Dong Energy
ExxonMobil
Lundin
Maersk Oil North Sea
Shell Norge
Talisman Energy
The project was executed within a three year period from 2011 throughout 2013, with a
budget of NOK 10 500 000. The participating companies have played an important role
in this project, both through the Steering Committee and in technical terms through active
participation as an advisory group. Hence, the scope of work and project plans has been
worked out in close cooperation between the participants and the project group of Marintek,
NTNU and 4Subsea.
In order to meet the challenges related to floating production systems for oil and gas in
the North Sea the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Technical Research (NTNF)
launched a three year research program, Floating Production Systems (FPS2000), in 1989.
One overall aim of the FPS2000 program was to qualify flexible risers and pipes for the
Norwegian Continental Shelf, and one deliverable was the first version of the Handbook on
Design and Operation of Flexible Pipes (1992 edition). We are grateful to be able to use
the 1992 edition as a basis for this Handbook, which is now extended to include experience
from the operation of flexible pipes as well as updates on methods and technology since the
early 1990-ties.
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Introduction OC2017 A-001
INTRODUCTION
The intention of this section is to give a summary of the content and the organization of
the Handbook. The content is organized in chapters that are assembled in four main parts
following the life cycle of the flexible pipe.
The first part - Part A -Flexible Systems - describes the application of flexible pipe along
with the design process and some design considerations with emphasis on flexible risers and
flowlines (Chapter A1, Flexible pipe systems). Components are described (in Chapter A2,
Flexible Pipe Properties and Materials) by a layer by layer approach. Additional description
is provided on polymers for liners. Finally the number of experienced Failure modes (separate
chapter) has increased considerably since the original version of this Handbook in 1992. A
layer by layer failure mode description is given with reference to [API 17B, 2008] along with
detailed evaluations of selected flexible pipe layer failure.
The second part - Part B - Design and Analysis Tools - put emphasis on necessary tools
for evaluating flexible pipe systems during operation. Flexible pipe is a complex structure.
A chapter on Design analysis includes Cross section analysis tools which have developed
considerably during the past twenty years, along with a textbook section on Global analysis
focusing on flexible pipe systems, predominantly flexible risers, as outlined by Part A, Flexible
systems. Additional tools are Risk analysis methodology and Reliability analysis, forming a
basis for decision making for operational activities such as integrity management, assessment
of (remaining) lifetime and repair. The tools also contain awareness and guidance on how the
chemical environment within the complex pipe wall (Chapter B4, Annulus environment and
Corrosion) may develop over time and represent a threat to the pipe integrity by Corrosion
of the steel armour. Finally an overview of a large number of specified tests to be carried out
during the flexible pipe lifetime is given (Chapter B5, Test methods). The test specifications
are given by API documents; [API 17B, 2008] and [API 17J, 2008], an overview is given here
for completeness.
The third part is devoted to flexible pipe in operation - Part C - Operations. The part
starts out with a chapter on guidance, recommendations and activities for practical Integrity
management for flexible pipes which complies with and supplements existing rules and reg-
ulations. The need to document operational conditions and monitor the flexible pipe during
the entire lifetime has become more of an accepted practice. Whenever an unacceptable
integrity level is detected or operation goes beyond the design limit, Lifetime assessment
(separate chapter) needs to be performed. Guidance and practical advice for performing a
lifetime assessment is given here, with main emphasis on describing a systematic and practical
approach towards a decision on continued safe operation after damage, anomalies, change
of operational conditions or exceeding of original service- or design life. A layer by layer
approach is adopted as well. A decision might be to perform a repair of the pipe. Possible
Repair methods (separate chapter) are finally described along with activities to be performed
in relation to a repair process. A connection between failure modes, inspection methods and
repair is made and accompanied by recommendations and experiences.
The last part is Part D - Case Study. A representative flexible riser concept subjected to
typical North Sea conditions, is used to illustrate the following purposes:
• Actions taken should corrosion damage occur during operation of the riser
• Evaluations made should corrosion damage occur during operation of the riser
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OC2017 A-001 Introduction
• Highlight the implementation of methodologies described in the Handbook sections

from Chapter A2 to Chapter C3
• Document the underlying studies and evaluations made for the selected riser during
the course of the JIP
The Case Study part does not illustrate all sections of the Handbook, but should serve as
a good starting point for making decisions and also provides some examples. The following
chapters are included: Data basis, Small scale fatigue testing, Evaluation of specimen sur-
faces, Integrity assessment of damaged flexible pipe cross-sections, Integrity management,
Lifetime assessment and Reliability analysis.
The Case Study is based on the flexible riser concept denoted "North Sea Riser", with a
riser annulus that has been flooded during a significant period of its 11 years of service.
For the small scale fatigue testing and sample inspections of tensile armour wire, additional
information was obtained from samples of a 4" (ID) riser from the Balmoral field (23 years
of service, flooded).
Some additional description of the objectives and purposes of the different chapters within
the Parts of the Handbook is given in the following:
PART A: FLEXIBLE SYSTEMS
Chapter A1 "Flexible Pipe Systems"
The primary objectives of the chapter are to present:
• State of the art overview of flexible pipe systems in use today
• Flexible pipe design aspects
• Flexible riser system experience and guidance
• Flexible flowline experience and guidance
• Installation considerations and experience
The goal of this Chapter is to provide a background for understanding the specific design
challenges for flexible pipe systems. The scope is mainly related to submerged systems
(systems above water - such as topside jumpers - are not discussed in detail).
Chapter A2 "Flexible Pipe Properties and Materials"
The characteristic properties of a non-bonded flexible pipe are described. The basic com-
ponents of the pipe construction are discussed, layer by layer with respect to functionality
and characteristics. Some specifics concerning flowlines and smooth bore pipes as well as
bend stiffeners are discussed briefly. Polymers used for liner application in flexible pipes are
described in more depth.
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Chapter A3 "Failure Modes"
A comprehensive understanding of failure modes is essential for both the design phase and
operational phases:
• Design phase: ensure that pipes are designed with adequate consideration and measures
to resist relevant failure modes
• Operational phase: ensure that all relevant failure modes can be identified and assessed
in terms of remaining service life, safety margins and quantification of risks as part of
integrity management and lifetime assessment
This chapter of the handbook has been developed with the following purposes:
• Define concepts and terminology relating to failure modes
• Define a framework for assessment of failures in flexible pipes
• Present state of the art for relevant failure modes with description of failureand degra-
dation mechanisms, consequences and mitigations
• Present available and relevant failure statistics
• Provide guidance on how to address important failure mechanisms for evaluation of
the integrity of flexible pipes
The primary scope of this chapter is to provide basis for systematic Integrity Management
and Lifetime assessment of flexible pipes, where an understanding of flexible pipe degradation
and failure mechanisms is essential.
PART B: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS TOOLS
Chapter B1 "Design Analysis"
This chapter concerns tools and procedures for performing cross-section and global analysis
of flexible pipes. References are made to the API-specificationsfor criteria and requirements
to the design of flexible pipes.
The description of cross section analysis focuses on methods for analysis and design of non-
bonded flexible pipes with respect to known metallic layer failuremodes that can be described
by analytical or numerical methods and are part of the design requirements reflected in
[API 17J, 2008]. The failure modes addressed are:
• Overload, i.e. excessive yielding in the metallic layers
• Collapse of the cross-section due to external pressure
• Buckling of tensile armour
• Metal fatigue
• The effect of corrosion on metal fatigue and tensile armour buckling
Analytical formulas are included for assessment of mechanical properties and structural ca-
pacities for specific cases. These formulae are primarily given for verification purposes,
NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean x 2017 edition

enabling capacity and performance parameters to be calculated in a simple way and under
specific conditions.
The global analysis section is an up to date textbook section for the methods on global
analysis of the flexible pipe, predominantly flexible risers. The use of global analysis along
with simplified methods for evaluation of preliminary design is described. Prediction of
global response due to internal and external forces induced by waves and current is given.
Guidelines are given concerning the modelling of riser systems and forces. Furthermore,
various response analysis methods are described and compared both with respect to each
other and with reference to experimental results. Finally, different procedures for design
analysis are described.
Chapter B2, "Risk Analysis Methodology"
The objective of the chapter is to give an overview of the methods required for risk analysis
of flexible pipes.
The main steps associated with quantitative risk assessment (QRA) can be summarized as
follows:
1. Definition of system boundaries and identification of hazards
2. Development of fault trees and event trees
3. Evaluation of failure probabilities and consequences (risk matrix)
4. Development of decision networks (decision trees)
5. Definition of acceptance criteria
6. Risk reduction and/or risk mitigation
These topics are highlighted in relation to flexible pipe systems. Furthermore, evaluation
of probability of mechanical failure modes and the methods for risk-based riser integrity
management are elaborated.
The risk concept is first briefly discussed. The main steps of quantitative risk assessment
are next described in some more detail. Subsequently, methods and sources for evaluation
of the probability of failure for relevant critical events are reviewed. Consequence analysis,
acceptance criteria and decision making are also addressed.
Chapter B3, "Reliability Analysis"
In order to perform a risk assessment for a given flexible riser or flowline system, the potential
failure modes need to be identified. For some of the failure modes a certain amount of
relevant historical/empirical data may be available such that failure rates can be estimated.
However, in many cases such data are missing or they can be rather irrelevant due to
technological developments and improved production methods.
In many cases a mechanical model may be established corresponding to a given failure
criterion. Such a model is generally referred to as a limit state, which is typically defined in
terms of loads (or load effects) versus capacity terms. For some cases (such as for assessment
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of fatigue and wear) the accumulated load effect is relevant rather than its instantaneous
value.
Both the load effects and capacity associated with a particular limit state will frequently
depend on a number of parameters for which inherent variability is present. This implies
that they are more adequately represented as random variables than deterministic quantities,
which is accommodated within the framework of structural reliability analysis.
Another application of such analysis methods is represented by cases which are not directly
covered by existing design documents. Examples are life extension of flexible pipes beyond
the intended service life as well as requalification and reuse of pipes. Integrity management is
another example. Other examples of application are situations where additional information
is to be taken into account in a systematic and consistent manner, such as monitoring of
operation parameters, metocean characteristics, pipe damage, accident scenarios as well as
pipe annulus conditions.
Chapter B4 "Annulus Environment and Corrosion"
The annular space in flexible pipes contains the steel armours that provide the structural
support for containment of fluid and gas in the bore and the structural capacity required to
sustain pressure and carry axial, bending and torsion loads. The integrity of these armours
is essential. They are arranged within a confined annular space that makes it challenging to
model corrosion. The annulus conditions vary significantly between pipes in service and also
along a given pipe.
The purposes of this chapter are to:
• Define the span of possible conditions in flexible pipe annuli
• Identify to what extent relevant conditions in flexible pipe annuli can cause corrosion
• Review literature to identify knowledge and models that can be used to predict corrosion
under identified annulus conditions
• Develop guidance relating to corrosion caused by damage to the outer sheath in terms
of:
– Detection of damage of outer sheath
– Susceptibility for corrosion as a function of the location of cover damage
– Risk assessment and possible mitigation
The industry needs:
• Models and procedures to assess the susceptibility and probability for corrosion of
armours in flexible pipe annuli for relevant scenarios
• Solutions for monitoring, detection and predictions
• Guidance for how to deal with damage or other incidents
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Chapter B5 "Test Methods"
Testing is an important part of the design verification for a particular pipe design. Due to the
complex structure of flexible pipe and the multitude of possible failure modes, test methods
and procedures should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. An overview of methods for
mechanical testing of flexible pipes are given, with details on test specification given in
[API 17B, 2008], [API 17J, 2008] and referenced testing standards.
PART C: OPERATIONS
Chapter C1 "Integrity Management"
The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance and recommendations for practical
in-service integrity management (IM) for flexible pipes. The intention is to comply with
and provide guidance that is supplementary to the framework for integrity management in
[API 17B, 2008], [DNV-RP-206, 2008] and [DNV-RP-F116, 2009]. Recommendations on
the development and execution of Integrity Management Programs and on the evaluation of
the activities performed are presented.
The IM-program shall provide documentation of the flexible pipe’s integrity status, and ver-
ify and document acceptable integrity throughout the pipe’s (design) lifetime. Unacceptable
integrity level or operation outside the original design specifications requires a lifetime assess-
ment to be performed to determine conditions for continued operation of the pipe. Details
are given in C1, Lifetime Assessment.
Integrity management strategies adopted in today’s standards and guidelines are in general
risk based. The need for follow-up and monitoring of the pipe over its entire lifetime is
acknowledged and becoming universally accepted.
The main motivation for a comprehensive integrity management of flexible pipes is to ensure
safe and cost effective operation of flexible pipes. Replacement of a pipe is costly, and failure
of a flexible pipe may potentially be catastrophic with large economic impact.
Chapter C2 "Lifetime Assessment"
The scope of this chapter is to provide guidance and practical advice for performing a
lifetime assessment of flexible pipe systems. Main emphasis is to describe a systematic and
practical approach to determine if a flexible pipe can safely operate after sustained damages,
anomalies, change of operational conditions or exceeding the original service- or design life.
A work process for performing a lifetime assessment in a systematic manner is presented, a
process which is largely based on the information in [NORSOK Y-002, 2010] (Life Extension
of Transportation Systems). For lifetime assessment tasks other than expiry of service or
design life, relevant modifications are performed. A questionnaire based format to support
the engineer performing the lifetime assessment is presented. The questions are relatively
general and may be expanded on a case by case basis. Additional information sources may
be required depending on the nature of the lifetime assessment being performed.
Relevant industry references and experiences are presented. This is to illustrate typical key
issues, concerns and limitations during a lifetime assessment process. Two examples are
2017 edition xiii NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

presented more in detail; one related to lifetime extension and one to re-qualification of a
riser system.
Chapter C3 "Repair Methods"
This chapter addresses repair methods for flexible pipes including end-fittings. Ancillary
devices to flexible pipes such as bend stiffeners, buoyancy modules and friction clamps are
not discussed.
An overview of flexible pipe failure modes with evaluation of service experience, available
inspection methods and repair methods is presented. The overview shows that methods
for inspection and repair are available for only a limited number of the failure modes. The
failure statistics and available inspection and repair methods advocate the importance of
repair methods for the failure modes reviewed in this report:
• Outer sheath damage
• Restricted annulus vent flow
Re-termination of end fitting is applicable as a repair method for damages located near
the pipe ends. Re-termination of flexible risers normally requires that flexible manufacturer
provides new end-fittings and is responsible for the repair. A flowchart of the repair process
from detection of damage to continued operation (if proven viable) of the flexible pipe after
repair is given.
PART D: CASE STUDY
The Case Study illustrates some steps to be taken and evaluations to be made should
corrosion damage occur during operation of a given riser for a given situation. The damage
described and the operational scenario selected is believed to be typical in order to serve as
a representative example. For the JIP "Safe and Cost Effective Operation of Flexible Pipes",
the scenario of tensile armour with corrosion damage was selected. It is a hope that this
Case Study will highlight the implementation of methods and methodologies described in the
Handbook sections from Chapter A2 to Chapter C3. The underlying studies and evaluations
made for the selected riser during the course of the JIP are compiled in this Part.
The Case Study is generally based on the riser case "North Sea Riser". However, during
the JIP some studies were performed using the 4" (ID) riser from the Balmoral field as a
case: fatigue testing of armour wire in air, evaluation of corroded armour wire surfaces by
microscopy and application of in-air SN-curve for reliability evaluation. The results from the
studies based on the Balmoral riser are included where relevant in supplementing the results
from the North Sea Riser.
After describing the riser structures, necessary aspects of operational life are defined - along
with selected alternative scenario, Chapter D2.
Chapter D3 describes the fatigue testing performed for the corroded armour wire samples.
The testing performed is not sufficient to obtain SN-curves to be used in a reassessment
process, but provide valuable information on the effect of corrosion on the armour wires.
The study of the corroded armour wire samples continue in Chapter D4 by investigating the
corroded surfaces with the aim of obtaining yet more helpful data in understanding the effect
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of corrosion damage and how to measure the corrosion damage.

In Chapter D5 some structural aspects of tensile armour wires are studied; a) tension armour
wire failure due to corrosion; numerical analysis and methodology on how to account for wire
failures in the integrity assessment analysis, and b) lateral buckling analysis of tensile wires
and the effect of lay angle of the anti-buckling tape.
In Chapter D6 - Integrity management - a working methodology is described for transforming
the information tools from Handbook Chapter B2 - Risk Analysis Methodology, A3 - Failure
Modes and Chapter C1 - Integrity Management into an actual integrity management plan
for the case study riser.
Chapter D7 - Lifetime assessment presents an example of a lifetime assessment process for
the North Sea riser according to the work flow described in the Handbook Chapter C2 -
Lifetime Assessment and Chapter A3 - Failure Modes.
In Chapter D8 the basis for reliability analysis related to fatigue lifetime of specific flexible
riser configurations is elaborated. Initial reliability calculations are also performed with a
focus on the tensile armour. Fatigue damage due to the combination of wave action and
dynamic floater motion is considered along with different scenarios with respect to repair as
well as tensile wire failures.
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NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean xvi 2017 edition

Contents
A Flexible Systems 1
A1 Flexible Pipe Systems 3

A1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A1.2 Flexible Pipe Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A1.3 Flexible Pipe Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A1.3.1 Design stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A1.3.2 Standards and Recommended Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A1.3.3 Flexible Pipe Cross-Section Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A1.3.4 Flexible Pipe Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A1.4 Flexible Risers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A1.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A1.4.2 Riser configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A1.4.3 In-service experience overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A1.5 Flowlines and tie-ins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A1.5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A1.5.2 Selection of Flexible pipe (alternatives) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A1.5.3 Flowline restraint and tie-in flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A1.5.4 Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A1.5.5 Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A1.5.6 Design and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A1.6 Other flexible pipe systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A1.6.1 Offloading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A1.7 Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A1.7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A1.7.2 Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A1.7.3 Installation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A1.7.4 Post-Installation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A1.7.5 Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A2 Flexible Pipe Properties and Materials 65

A2.1 General remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A2.2 Pipe wall structure and materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A2.2.1 Pipe wall structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
A2.2.2 Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
A2.2.3 Liner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A2.2.4 Pressure armour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A2.2.5 Intermediate sheath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A2.2.6 Tensile armour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
xvii
A2.2.7 Composite armour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

A2.2.8 Anti-wear tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A2.2.9 Anti-buckling tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A2.2.10Thermal insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A2.2.11Outer sheath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A2.2.12Bend stiffener . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A2.2.13Smooth bore pipe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A2.2.14Flowlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A2.3 Polymers for liner applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A2.3.2 Relevant Aspects of Polymer Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
A2.3.3 Polymers used in Flexible Pipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A3 Failure Modes 97
A3.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A3.1.1 Description of document objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A3.1.2 Scope of document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A3.2 Definitions of concepts and terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A3.2.1 General concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A3.2.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A3.2.3 Probability of Failure (PoF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A3.2.4 Format for Description of Failure Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A3.3 Flexible Pipe Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A3.3.1 Overview of layer failures and failure causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A3.3.2 Detailed evaluation of selected flexible pipe layer failure causes . . . . 107
A3.3.3 Examples of Ancillary devices failure causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A3.4 Failure Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B Design and Analysis Tools 151
B1 Design Analysis 153

B1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B1.2 Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B1.3 Cross Section Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B1.3.1 General remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B1.3.2 Governing stress components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B1.3.3 Wire geometries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B1.3.4 Behaviour due to axisymmetric loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B1.3.5 Behaviour in bending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
B1.3.6 Buckling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
B1.3.7 Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
B1.3.8 Computational methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
B1.4 Global Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
B1.4.1 Use of global analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
B1.4.2 Weight and buoyancy; the effective weight concept . . . . . . . . . . 205
B1.4.3 Simplified analysis for preliminary design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
B1.4.4 Loads from internal fluid flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
B1.4.5 External loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
B1.4.6 Finite Element Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
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B1.4.7 Coupled Analysis Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

B1.4.8 Stochastic analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
B1.4.9 Vortex induced vibrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
B1.4.10Use of results from global analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
B1.4.11Quality assurance and quality control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
B2 Risk Analysis Methodology 289

B2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
B2.2 Risk-based approach: risk definition, classification and quantification . . . . . 291
B2.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
B2.2.2 Definition of risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
B2.2.3 Risk categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
B2.2.4 Derived risk measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
B2.3 Building blocks of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
B2.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
B2.3.2 Definition of system boundaries and identification of hazards . . . . . 293
B2.3.3 FMEA/FMECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
B2.3.4 HAZOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
B2.3.5 Event tree analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
B2.3.6 Fault tree analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
B2.3.7 Risk Matrix: Evaluation of failure probabilities and consequences . . 296
B2.3.8 Decision trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
B2.3.9 Acceptance criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
B2.3.10Risk reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
B2.4 Quantification of mechanical failure probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
B2.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
B2.4.2 Flexible pipe failure data based on test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
B2.4.3 Probabilistic evaluation of mechanical limit states, including time–
variation of loads and resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
B2.5 Risk-based Riser Integrity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
B2.6 Historical failure mechanisms and qualification of new technology . . . . . . 304
B2.6.1 Historical failure mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
B2.6.2 Qualification of new technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
B2.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
B3 Reliability Methods 307

B3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
B3.2 Mechanical Limit States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
B3.2.1 Limit states and levels of reliability analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
B3.2.2 A basic limit state formulation: Failure function and probability of
failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
B3.2.3 Time-varying characteristics of load-effects and capacity . . . . . . . 312
B3.3 Data Basis and Input Modeling Relevant for Mechanical Limit States . . . . 313
B3.4 Acceptance criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
B3.5 Analysis procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
B3.6 Reliability Analysis for the Fatigue Limit State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
B3.6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
B3.6.2 Example of application to fatigue assessment of a flexible riser . . . . 319
B3.7 Reliability Analysis for the Ultimate Limit State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
B3.7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
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B3.7.2 A Simplified Example of Application to a Flexible Riser Configuration 328

B3.8 Effect of Monitoring/inspection/repair on reliability level . . . . . . . . . . . 329
B3.9 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
B4 Annulus environment and corrosion 333

B4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
B4.2 Annulus environment and conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
B4.2.1 Definition of the annulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
B4.2.2 Permeation into the annulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
B4.2.3 Annuli environment evolvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
B4.2.4 Conditions affecting corrosion of armour wires . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
B4.2.5 Some relevant quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
B4.2.6 Summary of Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
B4.3 Corrosion issues in flexible pipe annuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
B4.3.1 Potential Consequences of Corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
B4.3.2 The role of the steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
B4.3.3 Corrosion mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
B4.3.4 Hole in the outside cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
B4.3.5 Effects on fatigue resistance from corrosion processes . . . . . . . . . 357
B4.4 Field experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
B4.4.1 Cases with severe corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
B4.4.2 Other field experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
B4.5 Summary and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
B4.5.1 Summary of field experience: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
B4.5.2 Key findings relating to CO2 corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
B4.5.3 Issues for concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
B4.5.4 Mitigation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
B4.5.5 Future challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
B5 Test Methods 367

B5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
B5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
B5.2.1 Prototype testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
B5.2.2 End termination tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
B5.2.3 Vacuum tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
B5.2.4 Factory acceptance tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
B5.2.5 On-board structural integrity test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
B5.2.6 Offshore structural integrity test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
B5.2.7 Materials testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
B5.3 Corrosion fatigue testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
B5.3.1 Test protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
B5.3.2 Specifications for the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
B5.3.3 Specimen preparation and fatigue loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
B5.3.4 Assessment of design criteria from SN-data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
B5.4 Fatigue testing of pressure armour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
C Operation 377
C1 Integrity Management 379
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C1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

C1.2 Key aspects of integrity management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
C1.2.1 Standards and Guidelines for Integrity Management . . . . . . . . . 381
C1.2.2 Governmental requirements and Company specific requirements . . . 382
C1.2.3 Information Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
C1.3 Risk Based Integrity Management for Flexible Pipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
C1.3.1 Pipe system boundaries and system components definition . . . . . . 382
C1.3.2 Classification and grouping of pipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
C1.3.3 Hazard identification and probability of pipe failure . . . . . . . . . . 383
C1.3.4 Consequence of pipe failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
C1.3.5 Risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
C1.3.6 Risk mitigation and development of an Integrity Management Program387
C1.4 Practical Integrity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
C1.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
C1.4.2 Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
C1.4.3 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
C1.4.4 Monitoring and monitoring data review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
C1.4.5 Integrity Review and Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
C1.4.6 When is repair advisable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
C1.4.7 Learning and improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
C2 Lifetime Assessment 411

C2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
C2.1.1 Objective and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
C2.1.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
C2.1.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
C2.1.4 Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
C2.2 Principles of lifetime assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
C2.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
C2.2.2 Process overview and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
C2.2.3 Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
C2.2.4 Assessment Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
C2.2.5 Lifetime Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
C2.2.6 Improved Condition Control, Mitigations and Modifications . . . . . . 425
C2.2.7 Documentation and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
C2.3 Standards and Guidelines for Lifetime Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
C2.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
C2.3.2 Process Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
C2.3.3 Detail Engineering Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
C2.4 Lifetime Assessment Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
C2.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
C2.4.2 System Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
C2.4.3 Condition Control Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
C2.4.4 Layer Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
C2.4.5 Ancillary Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
C2.5 Industry References and Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
C2.5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
C2.5.2 Flowlines Life Extension Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
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C2.5.3 Re-qualification example after outer sheath damage and annulus flood-
ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
C3 Repair Methods 467

C3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
C3.2 Repair method status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
C3.2.1 Overview of failure modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
C3.2.2 Market screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
C3.2.3 Evaluation of repair methods and general guidance on repair possibilities475
C3.2.4 Qualification of new inspection methods and repair methods . . . . . 475
C3.3 Planning for repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
C3.3.1 Damage assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
C3.3.2 Design and qualification of repair method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
C3.3.3 Execution of repair and verification of pipe integrity . . . . . . . . . . 479
C3.4 Repair methods for outer sheath damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
C3.4.1 Injection of inhibitor liquid in annulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
C3.4.2 Soft repair clamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
C3.4.3 Rigid clamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
C3.4.4 Structural repair clamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
C3.4.5 Design aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
C3.4.6 Casting repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
C3.4.7 Polymer welding of outer sheath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
C3.4.8 Examples of commercially available products for outer sheath repair . 496
C3.5 Repair methods to re–establish annulus vent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
C3.5.1 Installation of annulus vent clamp and drilling through outer sheath . 499
C3.5.2 Establish new vent ports for a pipe located inside a guide tube . . . . 502
C3.5.3 Cyclic vacuum and nitrogen pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
C3.5.4 Hydraulic pressurization of vent port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
C3.5.5 Drilling a new vent port through the end-fitting . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
C3.6 Re–termination of end–fitting as a repair method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
C3.6.1 Objective and application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
C3.6.2 Re-termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
C3.6.3 Subsequent inspection and maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
C3.6.4 Advantages and drawbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
C3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
C3.7.1 Track record for repair methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
D Case Study 515
D1 Introduction 517
D1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
D1.2 Case Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
D1.2.1 North Sea Riser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
D1.2.2 Balmoral Riser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520
D2 Data Basis 523

D2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
D2.2 Temperature and pressure records (operation pressure) . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
D2.3 Annulus pressure tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
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D2.3.1 Annulus gas sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524

D2.4 Stress cycle distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
D2.5 Sheath and corrosion damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
D2.6 SN-curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
D2.7 Parameter variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
D2.8 Available floater motion and position data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
D3 Testing 529
D3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
D3.2 Data provided by testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
D3.3 Small scale testing in air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
D3.3.1 Fatigue testing - general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
D3.3.2 Test procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
D3.3.3 Armour wire from North Sea riser tested in air . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
D3.3.4 Armour Wire from Balmoral riser tested in air . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536
D3.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
D4 Evaluation of specimen surface of tension armour samples from two different

risers 543
D4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
D4.1.1 Balmoral riser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
D4.1.2 North Sea riser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
D4.1.3 Material samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
D4.2 Surface characterization of fatigue specimens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
D4.2.1 Microscopy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
D4.2.2 Procedure for investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
D4.2.3 North Sea Riser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
D4.2.4 Discussion and summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
D4.3 Scanning electron microscopy of fatigue fracture surfaces of tensile armour . 552
D4.3.1 Microscopy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552
D4.3.2 Specimen description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552
D4.3.3 Discussion and summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
D5 Numerical evaluation of some integrity problems for flexible pipe cross-sections557

D5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
D5.2 Integrity assessment of damaged flexible pipe cross-sections . . . . . . . . . . 558
D5.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
D5.2.2 Stresses and stress component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
D5.2.3 FE analysis procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
D5.2.4 FE analysis of North Sea Riser section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
D5.2.5 FE analysis results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
D5.3 Lateral buckling analysis of flexible riser tensile armour wire . . . . . . . . . . 583
D5.3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
D5.3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
D5.3.3 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
D5.3.4 Analysis tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
D5.3.5 Model description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
D5.3.6 Analysis and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591
D5.3.7 Effect of anti-buckling tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
D5.3.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
2017 edition xxiii NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

D6 Integrity Management of North Sea Riser 601

D6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
D6.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
D6.3 Review of Selected Failure Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
D6.3.1 Carcass Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
D6.3.2 Carcass Axial Overloading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
D6.3.3 Pressure Sheath Embrittlement (Ageing of Polyamides) . . . . . . . . 608
D6.3.4 Tensile Armour Wire Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610
D6.3.5 Outer Sheath: hole in the outer sheath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 612
D6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616
D6.4.1 Failure Event Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616
D6.4.2 Unmitigated Risk Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 617
D6.4.3 Mitigated Risk Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
D6.4.4 Control Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
D6.4.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620
D7 Lifetime Assessment of North Sea Riser 621

D7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622
D7.2 Lifetime Assessment - North Sea Riser Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
D7.2.1 Lifetime Assessment Initiator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
D7.2.2 Lifetime Assessment Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
D7.2.3 Lifetime Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 624
D7.2.4 Lifetime Assessment Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 630
D8 Reliability 633
D8.1 Probabilistic Models and Reliability analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634
D8.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634
D8.1.2 Relevant failure functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634
D8.1.3 Random variables and probabilistic models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635
D8.1.4 Analysis method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636
D8.1.5 Acceptance criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636
D8.2 Assessment of remaining SN-lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636
D8.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636
D8.2.2 Scenario A: Initial assessment: In-air one-slope SN-curve . . . . . . . 637
D8.2.3 Scenario B: Initial assessment: SN-curve for corrosive environment
with full operation pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
D8.2.4 Scenario C: Lifetime estimation based on monitored data (i.e.pressure
reduction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
D8.2.5 Comparison of results for cases without sheath damage - Scenario A
- C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641
D8.2.6 Scenario D: Sheath damage with repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
D8.2.7 Scenario E: Sheath damage without repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643
D8.2.8 Comparison of base case results for all scenarios A - E. . . . . . . . . 644
D8.2.9 Scenario F: Carbon dioxide with reduced pressure: Multiple sources
of variability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
D8.2.10Scenario G: Sheath damage with repair: Multiple sources of variability 647
D8.2.11Scenario H: Sheath damage without repair: Multiple sources of vari-
ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
D8.3 Consideration of successive wire failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650
D8.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650
NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean xxiv 2017 edition

D8.3.2 Correlation properties between pairs of failure events . . . . . . . . . 650

D8.3.3 Consideration of possible failure sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
D8.3.4 Failure of first wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652
D8.3.5 Failure of second wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
D8.3.6 Failure of third wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654
D8.3.7 Failure of fourth wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
D8.3.8 Failure of fifth wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
D8.3.9 Failure of sixth wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
D8.3.10Summary of results for sequential wire failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660
D8.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 661
E Abbrevations, Units and Constants 663
E1 Abbreviations 665
E2 Units and Constants 669
2017 edition xxv NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

Part A
Flexible Systems
1
Chapter A1
Flexible Pipe Systems
Author: 4Subsea
3
Section A1.2
OC2017 A-001
A1.1 Introduction
The primary objectives of this Chapter are to present:

• State of the art overview of flexible pipe systems in use today
• Flexible pipe design aspects
• Flexible riser system experience and guidance
• Flexible flowline experience and guidance
• Installation considerations and experience
Items and recommendations addressed in [API 17B, 2008] and [API 17J, 2008] are not cov-
ered in any detail in this document, where it is relevant, supplementary information and cross
references are given.
A1.2 Flexible Pipe Systems
The chapter will provide the background for understanding the design challenges that are
specific to the flexible pipe systems. The scope of the present discussion is mainly related to
systems in water. Above water applications like topside jumpers are not discussed in detail.
A flexible pipe is constructed using a polymeric sealing material that contains the bore fluid,
multiple helical armoring layers that provide the required strength, and a polymer outer
sheath that prevents seawater from interacting with the armor wires. The construction
enables design of pipes with a lower allowable bending radius compared to homogeneous
pipes with the same pressure capacity (steel pipes typically require 25 times higher bend
radius).
There are two basic reasons for using flexible pipes instead of steel pipes:
1. The compliant structure allows for permanent connection between a floating support
vessel with large motions and subsea installations
2. Transport and installation is significantly simplified due to the possibility for prefabri-
cation in long lengths stored on limited sized reels and ease of handling
Reeling is also possible with steel pipes. However, the reeling process involves plastic yielding
and ovalization of the pipe, and the requirements to the handling equipment are high. Flexible
riser systems have become a standard solution for permanent connection of subsea systems
to floating vessels. Alternatives such as Steel Catenary Risers (SCR) may replace flexibles in
some applications like deep water risers systems for TLPs and Spar buoys, and floaters with
particularly favorable motions in deep waters.
In addition to dynamic flexible risers used to connect subsea installation with top side facil-
ities, flexible pipe are used as flowlines and jumpers connecting subsea equipment. Use of
flexible pipes subsea enables routing in crowded subsea layouts and reduces the installation
cost. This is covered in more detail in Section A1.4. Some illustrations and short descriptions
of the components included in a flexible pipe system are shown in Figure A1.1 , Figure A1.2,
Table A1.1 and A1.2.
NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean 4 2017 edition

Section A1.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.1: Typical flexible riser system and definitions, courtesy of 4subsea
2017 edition 5 NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

Section A1.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.2: Flexible pipe flowline and riser system examples, courtesy of 4subsea
Table A1.1: Common flexible pipe distinctions
Name Description
Flowline Pipe transporting fluid over large distances, that is primarily subject to static
loads
Jumper Short length of flexible pipe transporting fluid subsea or topside
Riser Pipe transporting fluid between subsea structure and topside structure, that
is primarily subject to dynamic loads

Section A1.2
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.2: Flexible pipe system components
Component Function
Annulus Ventilation To ventilate annulus gases.
System Gas will permeate slowly from the bore of the pipe into the annulus
between the inner pressure sheath and the outer sheath.
Unless the gas is ventilated, the pressure will build up in the annulus
until the outer sheath bursts and exposes the armor wires to the external
environment.
Bellmouth A cylindrical section with increasing radius used at the exit of I/J-tubes.
Used to support the pipe and avoid over–bending.
Bend restrictors Metal or polymer interlocking rings that restrict minimum bending radius
over a small length section. Normally only used in static applications,
commonly used subsea.
Bend stiffeners Tapered external polymer structure that gradually increases in radius and
bending stiffness over a small length section.
Common at pipe ends in dynamic applications.
Buoyancy modules Polymer foam modules that are clamped to the riser to provide buoyancy
and ballast modules or ballast.
Used to set up riser configuration to absorb floater movements and lower
topside hang-off tension.
Connectors Connector systems are fastened to the pipe ends and are used to lock
the pipe to topside and subsea structures.
I/J–tube Large diameter steel pipe fixed to the platform that shields the flexible
riser from waves and current.
I/J–tube seals Seals around the flexible riser at the I/J–tube exit to avoid sea water
circulation inside I/J–tube.
Instrumentation Sensors and measurements used for the system. E.g. flow rate, pressure
and temperature which are normally monitored both topside and subsea.
Subsea instrumentation signals are normally sent via an umbilical to the
main control room topside.
Subsea Manifolds A large subsea structure that combines the flow from multiple pipes into
one. Often used to gather the flow from separate wells into one flowline
that leads to the platform.
Mechanical protec- Extra outer sheath on risers close to topside and external structure cov-
tion and fire protec- ering end fitting.
tion
Mid-Water Arch Large subsea structure used to control riser hog bend positions. The hog
(MWA) bend of several risers are clamped to the top of the MWA which allows
a large number of risers to pass in a narrow sector without high-energy
interference problems.
Piggy back clamps Clamps that connect a small diameter riser to a larger diameter riser at
regular intervals to align riser configuration to each other.
PLEM/ PLET Pipe Line End Manifold/Termination are subsea structures used as con-
nection points between pipes or pipe and structures.
Pull-in heads/ Tools/items that are used to provide connection points for
installation aids winches/ROVs/Cranes or to manipulate the shape of the flexible pipe
during installation.
Repair clamps Used to seal off outer sheath defects that allow oxygen or seawater to
come into contact with armor wires.
Riser base Subsea structure that connects the riser to a subsea structure e.g. flow-
line.
Rock dumps Rock that has been dumped over a flexible pipe to provide trawl protec-
tion and prevent upheaval buckling.

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Component Function
SSIV The SubSea Isolation Valve is a subsea structure that allows for shutting
down a part of the flow circuit. The valves are operated via umbilicals.
Subsea buoys Large subsea buoy anchored by tethers. The hog bend of several risers
are clamped to the top of the buoy which allows a large number of risers
to pass in a narrow sector without high-energy interference problems.
Tether Anchor Base Subsea structure that anchors tethers used in riser configurations.
Tether Anchor Sys- A tether connecting a clamp on the riser to a tether anchor base Used
tem to limit the riser movement.
Tethers Fiber or steel wire rope used to hold clamps or buoys in place.
Trawl protection Subsea protection covers that are placed over flowlines to protect them
covers from being damaged by fishing trawls or dropped objects.
Trenches Trenches are used to lower the pipe below the seabed, usually as a
measure to provide trawl protection.
Turret Structure on weather–waning floating production units (FPSO) that re-
mains fixed when the vessel rotates.
All risers on weather–waning FPSOs are connected through a turret.
Some turrets can be disconnected and will remain floating at a certain
depth until they are retrieved and re-connected.
Umbilical A flexible pipe consisting of several smaller hydraulics and/or electric
signal lines. Umbilicals are used to operate subsea valves, compressors
and other subsea functions. Umbilicals transmit the pressure and tem-
perature instrument data.
X–mas tree A subsea structure that is placed on top of each well to control the flow
through a set of valves and instruments.
A1.3 Flexible Pipe Design
As a minimum, the flexible pipe consists of a flexible pipe section and two end fittings.
Bending stiffeners or bend restrictors are often used at the end fitting to protect the pipe
from excessive bending in the transition between the pipe and the stiff end fitting. The key
considerations for designing a flexible pipe are outlined in the following sections.
A1.3.1 Design stages
The main design stages for flexible pipe systems are as follows, [API 17B, 2008]:
• Stage 1 – Material selection
• Stage 2 – Cross-section configuration design
• Stage 3 – System configuration design
• Stage 4 – Dynamic analysis and design
• Stage 5 – Detail and service life design
• Stage 6 – Installation design
In Stage 1, the pipe material selection is made based on internal environment (transported
fluid), functional requirements, and material options. [API 17B, 2008] (Clause 6) contains
guidelines for material selection. Note, only a limited number of materials are covered by the

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
design standards used for flexible pipes. Use of new materials requires qualification. The pur-
chaser must be aware of the limitations for flexible pipes and the need for qualification if the
planned operation is outside the envelope of qualified products, e.g. very high temperature.
In Stage 2, the cross–section configuration and dimensions are selected based on the pipe’s
functional requirements. Pipe dimensions are often specified by the purchaser. Cross–section
design calculations and checks are typically carried out by the manufacturer using proprietary
software. In order for the manufacturer to supply pipes according to [API 17J, 2008] or
[API 17K, 2005] the design methodology including software validation shall be verified by an
independent third party.
Stage 3 involves selection of the system configuration, and is often partly or fully performed
by the purchaser.
For all flexible pipe systems the field layout will give boundaries for the system configuration,
e.g. spacing between mooring lines will limit the number of risers and flowlines in each
mooring sector, drill rig mooring pattern will limit flowline routing, flexible risers are normally
placed inside a zone with restricted access etc.
Interface description is of crucial importance and interface requirements should be agreed on

as early as possible.
For flowlines stage 3 involves protection design, e.g. no protection, trenching or rock dump,
routing, subsea interfaces including tie-ins etc.
For riser stage 3 typically involve selection of configuration, definition of riser base position,
definition of riser hang off and platform interface etc.
Stage 4 involves the more detailed design of the system. Stage 4 is normally performed by
the manufacturer.
For risers this task typically considers the dynamic response of the riser, subject to a series
of imposed loading conditions derived from the functional, environmental, and accidental
loads on the system. Issues to be addressed include possible interference with other system
components, riser tension and/or compression loads throughout the riser, minimum bending
radius (MBR), the top departure angle and interface loads (described by tension-angle or
moment and shear force).
For flowlines this stage includes preliminary analyses of installation, thermal insulation, up-
heaval buckling, seabed stability, tie in, system behavior during hydrotesting, etc.
Stage 5 includes service life analysis as it applies to the pipe and components.
Stage 6 completes the design process and involves the selection and design of the installation
system, including vessel, equipment, methodology, and environment conditions. Stage 6 re-
quires detailed global and local analyses to confirm the feasibility of the selected installation
system. This stage is in many cases critical for the pipe design, and it is therefore recom-
mended that preliminary installation analyses be performed at an early stage in the design
process. Installation is important for both risers and flowlines e.g. weather limitation, vessel
selection, type of lay spread, crushing loads are a potential issue for both risers and flowlines
from caterpillars etc.
Further details and recommendations for riser and flowline systems are included in section 4
and 5, respectively.

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
A1.3.2 Standards and Recommended Practices
All aspects of flexible pipe design and technology, from functional definition to installation,
are addressed in the standards and recommended practices
• [API 17J, 2008] (Non-bonded flexible pipe), equivalent to [ISO 13628-2, 2006]
• [API 17K, 2005] (Bonded flexible pipe), equivalent to [ISO 13628-10, 2005]
• [API 17B, 2008] (Recommended practice for flexible pipe), equivalent to [ISO 13628-11, 2007]
Ancillary components for flexible pipe systems are described in detail in [API 17L1, 2013]
and [API 17L2, 2013]. For more information on any design topic, refer to these standards
for details.
Supplementary standards for definition of hydrodynamic loads, sour service qualification,
integrity management etc. is required when designing a flexible pipe system, typically from
sources like:
• DNV
• NORSOK
• ASME
• NACE
• Company specific standards.
Use of supplementary standards is to some extent covered in other sections of this handbook.
A1.3.3 Flexible Pipe Cross-Section Components
Each layer of the flexible pipe has a specific design function as shown in Table A1.4. The
table shows the key components of a flexible pipe wall structure. The area between the
internal pressure sheath and the outer sheath is defined as the annulus of a flexible pipe.
Depending on whether the pipe is built with or without carcass, the pipe is classified as a
rough or smooth bore pipe. Pipes without carcass usually have an intermediate sheath layer
extruded onto the pressure armor to withstand external seawater pressure in case of outer
sheath breaches.
Table A1.3: Smooth and rough bore definitions
Definition Description
Smooth bore Flexible pipe without carcass, usually designed with a sealed inter-
mediate sheath.
Rough bore Flexible pipe with carcass. No sealed intermediate sheath required.
Table A1.4: Flexible pipe Components
Layer Function
Carcass Provides Internal Pressure Sheath with collapse resistance.
Internal Pressure Sheath Contains process fluid within pipe bore.
Pressure Armor Wire Provides radial compression resistance.
Partially supports internal sheath and contains internal pressure loads.

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Intermediate sheath Provides Internal Pressure Sheath with collapse resistance in case of
outer sheath breach for smooth–bore pipes.
Tensile Armor Wires Provides tensile strength and contain end-cap loads.
Partially supports containment of internal pressure loads.
Anti-friction layers Tape or thin extruded polymer that prevents metal-metal contact.
Anti-buckling layer High strength fiber composite that prevents radial or lateral buckling.
Insulation Provides thermal insulation for bore fluid if necessary.
Outer Sheath Prevents ingress of seawater and oxygen to the annulus.

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
A1.3.4 Flexible Pipe Design Considerations
Bonded and non–bonded structures
Figure A1.3: Typical non-bonded flexible pipe cross-section
(1) Cross section of Dunlop pipe (2) Cross section of Pag-O-Flex pipe
Figure A1.4: Bonded flexible pipe cross-sections (Illustration is old and cover design
proposed for high pressure applications. For bonded flexibles in other applications, see
[PSA Norway, 2009]).
Two different types of pipe construction are available as shown in Figure A1.3 and Figure
A1.4:
• Non-bonded structures where each component makes up a cylindrical layer that is able
to slide relative to the other layers
• Bonded structures where the armor elements and the pressure containing components
are molded into a single structure. All components are glued together as an elastic
composite material
The bonded structure is primarily used for short length jumpers in high dynamic applications.
Non-bonded structures are used in most applications, as shown tabulated in Table A1.5 and

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.6.
Table A1.5: Typical limitations
Item Bonded Non–bonded Comment

flexible pipes flexible pipes
[API 17K, 2005] [API 17J, 2008]
Length 12 - 100m Up to several Manuli is the only supplier capable of
kilometers making long length bonded hose for
some specific services.
Transported Normally not used for High Pressures Non-bonded pipes are normally
fluid high pressure gas Temperature up preferred for service with gas, unstable
service or high to 120°C crude or high temperature fluids
temperature service
Internal Up to 24 inches Up to 19 inches Large bore bonded pipes normally
Diameter delivered in 12m lengths.
Bending Excellent Good Bonded hoses are often preferred for
flexibility applications requiring high bending.
Table A1.6: Typical applications for bonded and non-bonded flexible pipes
Application Bonded flexible Non- Examples

pipe bondedflexible
pipes
Flowline Normally not Yes Subsea line from satellite wells to
manifold or riser base
Subsea Normally not Yes Short line connecting subsea units, e.g.
jumper test and service lines between individual
wells
Flexible In some cases Yes Lines from a subsea installation to a
riser floating platform.
Flexible risers may in addition be used

inside guide tubes to ease installation, in
this case the application may be
considered static.
Oil Yes, both reel Only in For oil offloading it is often required with
offloading systems and stationary dimensions exceeding the diameter limit
stationary systems system like for non-bonded pipes.
loading buoys Reeling based offloading systems are
normally designed with bonded hose due
to the low bending stiffness and the small
permissible bending radius for bonded
hoses
Jumpers Yes Yes Drilling applications (not included in
[API 17K, 2005] and [API 17J, 2008])
Turret jumpers on FPSO

Topside jumpers on TLPs
Long jumpers connection platforms

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Static or Dynamic Applications
Flowlines and subsea jumpers are static configurations that will normally experience the
largest loads during testing, reeling and installation. Non-bonded flexible risers are designed
to be fatigue resistant by use of anti-friction tape layers and fatigue resistant materials.
Bonded offloading hoses and other short jumpers are designed to withstand large dynamic
forces from frequent handling operations.
A set of design load cases are defined in the standards for a flexible riser system that covers all
events which may influence the component design or system operation, including installation,
operation, extreme and accidental events. Further details may be found in [API 17B, 2008].
Transported fluid
The fluid that is to be transported influences the design and must be taken into consideration
at a very early stage. The key considerations that have to be made are listed in Table A1.7.
Table A1.7: Transported fluid considerations
Issue Comment
Corrosive ele- The carcass of the flexible pipe is directly exposed to the fluid and the material
ments must be selected accordingly. AISI 304, AISI 316 or Super Duplex materials
are commonly used for flexibles. Use of other materials is often limited by the
manufacturing process which involves cold forming.
Fluid Density The design of flexible pipe systems should consider the effect of variations in
internal fluid density over the life of the project, particularly for riser systems
where a change in fluid density can change the shape of the riser configuration.
Gas diffusion Transported fluids containing gas, e.g. oil production and gas injection
service will give gas diffusion through the polymeric pressure barrier. For
non-bonded flexible pipes it is required to vent the annulus in the pipe
wall to avoid pressure build up and to consider the diffused gas when se-
lecting armour wire material. Due to the pressure build up in the pipe wall
a rough bore design with carcass to prevent collapse of the liner is normally used.
For bonded hose the elastomeric material must have sufficient blistering
resistance during rapid decompression of the pipe. This is challenging and
bonded flexible pipes with elastomeric liner are seldom used in gas applications.
See also Section A1.3.4

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Issue Comment
Gas Flow In- Gas flow in rough bore pipes has resulted in high frequency vibrations.
duced Vibrations Presently the main challenge has been for gas export systems where export
limitations, unacceptable noise and unacceptable vibration level has been
experienced. Similar noise in other rough bore flexibles transporting gas, e.g.
gas injection, has also been observed but generally speaking with less critical
vibrations
Experience is that mitigation of gas induced vibrations may be challenging,

typical mitigating actions to be considered are:
• Replace rough bore riser with smooth bore riser
• Limit gas flow
• Introduce silencers (dampening of acoustic noise)
Internal Friction The friction parameter varies significantly between smooth and rough bore pipes
because of the carcass construction in a rough bore pipe. The friction is strongly
influenced by the carcass characteristics, such as ID and profile dimensions
Design and Op- The armour wire dimensions are normally selected primarily based on pressure
erating pressure requirements. Design pressure conditions are normally governing for max stress
in wires and operating pressure has major influence on fatigue as the interlayer
contact pressure increase with pressure
Design and Op- The design and operating temperature is normally the governing criterion for
erating tempera- selection of polymer material. There are in addition other parameters which
ture must be considered when selecting polymer, e.g. pH, gas, depressurisation rate
etc. The polymer liner materials considered in [API 17J, 2008] are:
• PE (including XLPE)
• PA 11
• PVDF
Use of other materials requires qualification
Sand Production The fluid velocity is important, particularly if abrasive materials such as sand
are present in the produced fluids this can result in wear of the pipe’s internal
layer
Slug Flow In the case of two phase flow, the effect of slug induced vibration should be
considered
Sour or sweet This is normally governing for selection of steel material
service
Thermal insulation
Thermal insulation may be required to retain the desired temperature profile. Rock-dumping
and trenching of flowlines influence the thermal insulation of the pipe and must be included
in design considerations.
Gas venting – non–bonded pipe
Gas will permeate through the internal pressure sheath and into the annulus space between
the armour wires. Unless the gas is allowed to ventilate, the pressure will build up and even-
tually the outer sheath will burst. The outer sheath is supported by the external hydrostatic
pressure from the seawater, thus most of such outer sheath damages occur above, or close

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.8: Amount of gas permeation normally seen for typical transported fluids
Transported Gas permeation Comment

fluid rates
Water None
Reinjection of Low May contain gas and may have high temperature
Produced Water
Gas (Export, High Dry gas at high temperatures leads to the highest
Injection, Lift) permeation rates
Crude Oil None/low Exported oil that has been gas scrubbed usually has
(export) very low gas permeation
Production Oil None-Moderate Depends on temperature and amount of gas in the well
(from wells)
to the waterline. The outer sheath burst can also appear in areas of the outer sheath that
have been weakened during fabrication, installation or by cuts during operation.
Outer sheath bursts have been seen from pressure build ups of 5-10 bar in the annulus,
up to 20 bar for cross-sections with double outer sheaths. Most flexible pipe systems have
either a Gas Relief Valve (GRV) that opens at set differential pressure, or a gas ventilation
system topside, neither of which should be blocked. Flowlines and subsea jumpers are usually
equipped with GRVs at both end fittings, while risers should have a topside gas ventilation
system.
The transported fluid influences the rate of gas permeation, and a general overview of the
permeation rates are shown in Table A1.8.
Fire resistance
Extra fire resistance covers may be required, which is usually added as an extra protective
cover on the outer sheath of the pipe and end fitting.
Pigging and Through Flowline (TFL) requirements
Flexible pipes can be designed to be pigged with some restrictions on pigging types. Scraper
pigs are not suitable for flexible pipes and brush pigs are not suitable for smooth bore pipes.
If pigging is desirable, the pipe system should be designed with either a return loop or a
subsea pig receiver.
Table A1.9: Pigging restrictions for flexible pipes
Riser type Pigging equipment

Rough bore Brush, foam, polyurethane
Smooth bore Foam, polyurethane
If TFL service is required, the innermost layer should be constructed such that it will not
impede or be damaged by the passage of TFL tools. Reference is given to [API 17C, 2010]
for further description and design codes.

Section A1.3
OC2017 A-001
Corrosion protection
The flexible pipe system must be designed to protect the system components to corrosion,
and the common protection methods are listed below: Be aware of protection limitations
due to shielding.
1. coating
2. application of corrosion inhibitors
3. application of special metallic materials or cladding
4. specification of corrosion allowance
5. cathodic protection
The flexible pipe components are protected by the outer sheath and cathodic protection
through anodes placed on the end fitting. The anodes will start to protect the armor wires
in case of outer sheath breaches.
Splash zone requires extra attention due to limited protection of exposed steel in areas that
are not permanent submerged. With regards to armor wire corrosion, any hole in the outer
sheath within the splash zone is generally regarded as the worst case scenario due to lack of
continuous protection and high access to moisture and oxygen.
Piggy back lines
A flexible line is a piggy back line if it is clamped to another flexible or steel pipe. The line
should be protected from steel scuffing and potentially high temperature transfers from the
line that it is clamped to. Several design parameters must be considered:
1. Hydrodynamic interaction, including shielding, solidification, hydroelastic vibrations,
lift, and marine growth
2. Seabed interaction, particular attention to touch down area for risers and expansion
and tie in areas for flowlines
3. Relative motion between the lines
4. Relative changes in length between the two lines (particularly due to different pressure
and/or thermal expansion coefficients and axial stiffness between flexible and steel
lines)
5. Clamp loads
6. Loads and wear of the flexible pipe
7. Creep and long-term degradation of pipe and clamp materials
8. Internal pressure, tension, external pressure, bending and torsion-induced change in
cross-section geometry of the pipe
9. Trenching and flowline protection
10. Installation
11. Interface design, important for both riser systems and flowline systems

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.10: Umbilicals, ISU, IPB, Multibore
Product Description
Umbilical Several function bundled into one line, typically hydraulic hoses, service hoses,
signal cables, fiber optic cables. External armouring layers are often used to
protect the umbilical core.
Umbilicals are normally not manufactured by flexible pipe suppliers
Steel tube Umbilical with hoses replaced with steel tubes. Steel tubes give better performance
umbilicals than hoses in some applications.
External armouring layers are only used when required, e.g. riser sections
Steel tube umbilicals are normally not manufactured by flexible pipe suppliers
ISU Integrated Service Umbilical.
A flexible pipe used for service function in the center, typically 2”. Umbilical
functions surrounding the flexible pipe and armoring outside this.
Manufactured by flexible pipe suppliers.
IPB Integrated Production Bundle.
A flexible pipe used for production fluid in the center, typically 6”. Umbilical
functions surrounding the flexible pipe and armoring outside this.
Manufactured by flexible pipe suppliers.
Multibore Several flexible pipes bundles together. External armouring normally used to
protect and control the bundle.
Umbilicals, ISU, IPB, Multibore, etc.
Flexible pipes, hydraulic hoses, steel tubes, electrical cables and fiber optic cables may be
bundled. Several products are described in Table A1.10
Items to consider when designing a flexible pipe system including such lines are:
• More frequent maintenance and replacement may be required for such lines. Use of
experienced manufacturers is hence normally preferred
• Umbilicals requirements, in particular steel tube umbilicals may influence the entire
system design and should be addressed in the initial phases of system design
• Use of special bundled construction may have only one supplier
A1.4 Flexible Risers
A1.4.1 Introduction
The section of a flexible pipe system that connects the production unit to the first subsea
structure is called the riser section. This section experiences dynamic loading from the vessel
(production unit) motions and environmental loads, and must be designed considering loads
on all components. The riser system may include connectors, end fitting flanges, buoyancy
modules, subsea buoys, tethers, PLEMs and other components described in Section A1.2.
The choice of what components are required relies on the selection of the riser configuration,
environmental conditions and relevant standards.

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
A1.4.2 Riser configurations
General
This section addresses flexible riser configurations presently in use and describes pros and
cons associated with the various alternatives. Several of the configurations include a seabed
resting part. This part of the flexible riser system may have similar challenges as flexible
flowlines, ref. Section A1.5.2.
The selection of riser system configuration is based on water depth, vessel movements, en-
vironmental conditions, number of risers and interference issues. The simplest and cheapest
configuration is a free hanging catenary configuration consisting of a flexible pipe only and
where the subsea part of the flexible pipe is laying on the seabed and the upper end is con-
nected to the vessel. This riser configuration is sensitive to compression loads and fatigue at
the Touchdown Point (TDP) and is only feasible in some applications. Measures to compen-
sate for the limitations in free hanging configuration by e.g. inclusion of a buoyant section
are adding complexity to the flexible riser system. The most complex solutions involve large
structures on the seabed and challenging installation.
Table A1.11: Riser Configuration Summary
Configuration Complexity Typical Applications

Dynamic Low - Connections between platforms/vessels/subsea tower/buoys
Jumper
Free hanging Low - Commonly used offshore Brazil and whenever feasible
catenary - Fixed platforms (often with J-tube)
- TLPs and Floaters with low/moderate motions
- Benign wave climate
- Deep water.
Lazy Wave Moderate - Used in harsh environment and in systems where top tension
and TDP compression must be reduced
- Moderate and deep water
- Configuration may be used for floater with moderate to large
motions
- Few seabed area restrictions
- Riser motion is relatively large such that interference with
neighbor structures like mooring lines may be challenging
- Large riser movements on the seabed require spacing to subsea
equipment and wide riser corridor
- Configuration is sensitive to change in weight due to density
variation of internal fluid, marine growth, water absorption in
buoyancy material etc.

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Configuration Complexity Typical Applications

Tethered wave Moderate - Moderate/large motions
- Frequently used on Norwegian sector, in particular where indi-
vidual risers are preferred in a relatively crowded subsea layout
- Shallow to deep water
- Configuration may be used for floater with moderate to large
motion
- Riser motion is relatively large such that interference with
neighbour structures like mooring lines may be challenging
- Moderate riser motion on seabed which enable narrow corridors
- Riser anchor with tether in the touch down area require detail
attention to avoid over bending of riser and reliable long term
performance
- Configuration has moderate sensitivity to change in internal
contents density
Steep Wave Moderate - Moderate / large motions
- Similar to tethered wave but seabed termination is directly on
a subsea structure, typically with a bend stiffener
Chinese High - Offloading buoys
lantern - Configuration is unstable and reliable long term performance
is difficult to achieve
- Not common
Lazy S High - Used instead of lazy wave configurations when several risers
shall be installed in the same corridor or whenever buoyancy
element are not preferred
Steep S High - Moderate/large motions

- Interference anticipated
- Few number of risers
- TDP compression expected
- Large variation in riser size and content
- Limited seabed area available
Vertical tower Very High - Deep water projects

and jumper - conditions
- High thermal insulation requirements
Subsea Sup- Very High - Moderate/large motions
port - Interference anticipated
- High number of risers
- Large variation in riser size and content
Free hanging catenary
A free hanging catenary (see Figure A1.5)is the simplest configuration for a flexible riser. It
requires minimal subsea infrastructure, is relatively straight-forward and is the cheapest to
install. It is commonly used on floaters and TLPs in areas with low to moderate dynamic
vessel motion and on fixed platforms. The dynamic motion of the vessel is transferred to
the TDP, which may result in pipe compression for the downwards movements of the vessel.
This compression may lead to buckling and ’bird caging’ of the armour wires.
For fixed platforms, the flexible riser may be pulled through a J–tube to shield the pipe from
environmental loads.
Advantages include:

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.5: Free hanging riser configuration, courtesy of Orcina Ltd
• Simple configuration
• Simple installation
• Limited sensitivity to fluid density (apart from hang-off load variation)
Table A1.12: Free hanging catenary design challenges
Water
depth Challenges Comment
Shallow Over bending near TDP TDP experiences compression for
Motions low to moderate vessel motion.
Compression near TDP
Over bending near hang-off
Moderate Over bending near TDP Motions
Deep Hang-off tension (static and dynamic) High hang–off tension.
Over bending near TDP
Lazy wave
The lazy wave configuration Figure A1.6 consists of a flexible riser fitted with buoyancy and
optionally also weight modules along parts of the length. The configuration is designed to
decouple the TDP motions from the vessel motion by introducing a hog bend, thus allowing
larger vessel motion and the use of floaters in harsher climates. A horizontal hold-back
arrangement may optionally be installed to restrain riser movement and reduce the effective
tension in the seabed part of the riser.
The ’near’ and ’far’ position is often used to screen for suitable configurations. The ’near’

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.6: Lazy wave riser configuration, courtesy of Orcina Ltd
position refers to the minimum horizontal distance between riser ends, while the ’far’ position
refers to the maximum horizontal distance between riser ends. In the ’far’ position, the riser
hog and sag bends will straighten, and the riser length must be long enough to avoid a fully
stretched configuration. In the ’near’ position, the sag bend will lower towards the seabed
and hog bend will rise towards the surface. The riser length must be sufficiently low to avoid
excessive bending, hog bend contact vs. ship and sag bend contact vs. seabed.
The hog bend is also influenced by current and waves, thus interference challenges for these
configurations are not uncommon. No interference is allowed between buoyancy module
sections on neighbouring risers, and clashing energy has to be evaluated for any pipe-on-pipe
collisions.
The hog bend movements are also affected by the level of marine growth, content density,
water ingress in the buoyancy modules and loss of buoyancy modules. Risers placed next
to each other will move more similarly if the OD/weight ratios are approximately the same,
however, the riser stiffness will also affect the riser motions. Neighbouring risers with large
outer diameter difference and content density variations are prone to experience interference
in the upper catenary or buoyancy sections. Interference vs. anchor chains must also be
checked. The configurations are likely to move significantly based on current alone.
Interference in the upper catenary is common for crowded hang offs such as for turrets.
Shallow water applications in harsh environments are particularly challenging since the vessel
motions are large compared to the water depth available for setting up a robust riser config-
uration. If the hang-off has large heave motions, the risers may in some instances be unable
to move through the water at the same speed as the vessel, buckle out to the sides below
the bend stiffener and over-bend. High hang–off angles will increase the likelihood of such
buckling during large vessel motions. Typical hang-off angles are in the range 3-7 degrees
for deep water applications and up to 17 degrees for shallow water applications.

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.13: Lazy Wave design challenges
Water
Shallow Interference Designing a configuration with
Over bending near hang-off sufficient length to allow the
Over bending near TDP vessel movements for the far
Hog bend clashing into vessel in near conditions conditions while not clashing with
Over-pull in the far condition vessel or have seabed interference
Sag bend interference with seabed with sag bend in the near
Content density variation condition
Loss of buoyancy
Moderate Interference
Content density variation
Loss of buoyancy
Deep Interference
Hang-off tension
Loss of buoyancy
Advantages include:
• High floater offset tolerance
• Reduced top tension
• Reduced TDP loads
• Simple-moderate installation complexity
Steep wave
The steep wave is a variation of the lazy wave configuration, where the riser is connected
vertically to a riser base on the seabed. This allows for a more compact configuration with
less interference problems, but puts a large upwards tension on the riser base, both during
installation and operation. The installation process is more complex with either a vertical
tie-in of the riser to the riser base or with deployment of the entire riser base. See Section
A1.5.5 for more details on installation.
Advantages include:
• Moderate hog bend movement
• Moderately sensitive to content density variation

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.7: Steep wave configuration, courtesy of 4Subsea
Table A1.14: Steep wave design challenges
Water
Shallow Interference The high upwards tension on the
Over bending near hang–off riser base requires a robust design
Over bending near riser base of the subsea structure to avoid
Hog bend clashing into vessel in near conditions movement of the structure
Over-pull in the far condition
Loss of buoyancy
High riser base uprooting tension
High dynamic moments on riser base
Moderate Interference More complex than required in
Over bending near hang-off moderate environment
Over bending near riser base
Loss of buoyancy
Deep Interference More complex than required in
Hang–off tension moderate environment
Over bending near hang–off

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Pliant and reverse pliant wave
Figure A1.8: Reverse Pliant wave, courtesy of 4Subsea
The Pliant wave configuration is also a variation of the lazy wave, where the movements and
tension in the TDP are controlled by a tether anchor connected to the riser above the TDP.
The seabed section of a Pliant wave is tied back towards the platform, while the reverse
pliant wave is routed away from the platform as for the lazy wave configuration. The pliant
wave is used where the wells are located below the platform.
The configurations are also known as Tethered wave configurations.
Advantages include:
• Moderate hog bend movement
• Moderately sensitive to content density variation

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.15: Tethered Wave design challenges
Water
Shallow Interference A slack tether may cause snatch
Over bending near hang-off tension loads in the riser when
Over bending near TDP and clamp the tether is re-tensioned
Hog bend clashing into vessel in near conditions
Over-pull in the far conditions
Marine growth
Loss of buoyancy
Outer sheath abrasion in TDP
Slack in tether
Moderate Interference
Marine growth
Loss of buoyancy
Deep Interference More complex than required in
Hang-off tension moderate environment
Lazy and Steep S - Subsea Buoy
Figure A1.9: Lazy-S configuration, courtesy of 4Subsea.

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.16: Lazy S design challenges
Water
Shallow / Content variation for large bore risers Buoy stability and
moderate Marine Growth hydrodynamics.
Buoyancy loss
Seabed contact
Over-bending near hang–off
Over-bending near buoy/MWA
MWA clamp design
Installation
Deep As for Shallow and Moderate depths Buoy stability and
Hang-off tension hydrodynamics.
The anchored subsea buoy also known as a Mid Water Arch (MWA) is used to obtain the
S–configurations. The advantage is that many risers can be run over the same subsea buoy
with little or no interference. The interference that occurs is usually low energy clashing in
the upper catenary section. Main challenges include buoy instability from the riser’s weight
and flooded buoyancy compartments which influence the hog bend height and potentially
the stability. Adding new risers will significantly alter the buoy hydrodynamics.
The riser can be terminated vertically into a riser structure to create a Steep S or with
weights or tethers to create the Lazy S configuration.
Advantages include:
• High floater offset tolerance.
• Compact layout.
• Allows a large number of risers in same sector.
• Large reduction in TDP dynamics.
Lazy and Steep S - Riser Subsea Support (RSS)
The Riser Subsea Support (RSS) is a fixed subsea structure used to obtain the hog-sag
sections in the same manner as the Subsea Buoy. The interference against the structure can
be an issue, but there are no stability issues or variation in hog bend height.
Advantages include:
• Compact layout
• Allows a large number of risers in same sector
• No instability issues
• Not sensitive to riser content variation

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.10: Lazy-S with RSS, courtesy of 4Subsea
Table A1.17: Lazy S design challenges
Water
Shallow / Interference between risers and structure
Moderate Seabed contact
Over-bending near hang-off
Over-bending near buoy/MWA
MWA clamp design
Installation of a large RSS may be complex
Deep As for Shallow and moderate depths
Hang-off tension
Hybrid systems Chinese lantern
A Chinese lantern configuration (see Figure A1.11) is a typical configuration of the offloading
hoses on a CALM buoy. The hose has buoyancy modules attached and reinforced end
connections to maintain reasonable tension in the system and avoid over bending near the
ends.
Advantages include:
• Limited subsea space required
• Lower end moments than a lazy wave
For Chinese lantern design challenges, see Table A1.18.

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.11: Chinese lantern from a CALM buoy to the seabed, courtesy of Orcina ltd.
Table A1.18: Chinese lantern design challenges
Water
Shallow / Interference between risers
moderate Over-bending
Deep As for Shallow and moderate depths
Hang-off tension

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Vertical tower and jumper
Figure A1.12: Riser Tower with jumpers, courtesy Orcina ltd
Hybrid systems combine steel and flexible pipe systems. The hybrid systems currently known
are used for deep water locations with moderate wave loading to achieve a cost-effective
system. The fluid is transported in a steel riser connected subsea and to a large buoy located
at a certain depth. The buoy has sufficient buoyancy to keep the steel riser in tension at all
times. The platform is connected to the buoy via a catenary flexible jumper, with sufficient
length to allow the vessel to offset from the buoy as needed. If necessary, the platform
can disconnect from the buoy and retrieve the jumper to resume production. The system is
complex to install.
Advantages include:
• Use of cost effective thermal insulation
• Low production cost
• Not sensitive to fluid content density
• No seabed contact issues
• Compact solution
• Low top tension for all depths

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.19: Hybrid system design challenges
Water Challenges Comment

depth
Shallow Not presently used
Moderate Not presently used
Deep Buoy design
Buoy dynamics
Interference
VIV on tower
Dynamic Jumper
Figure A1.13: Dynamic jumper. (Base picture is courtesy Øyvind Hagen - Statoil ASA).

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.14: Dynamic jumper sagbend
Table A1.20: Jumper design challenges
Water Challenges Comment

depth
Shallow Interference Jumper vs. structure clashing
Moderate Overbending
Deep Handling
Compression
Dropped objects
Jumpers are often used to connect two platforms or vessels that are very close. The jumper
will hang between the riser and forming a single sag bend which will absorb the relative
motions of the vessels as well as the environmental loads. Bonded jumpers are commonly
used for offloading purposes.
Advantages include:
• Not sensitive to variation in fluid density
• Simple
A1.4.3 In-service experience overview
Figure A1.16 and Figure A1.17 sum up number of flexible risers per floater for FPSOs and
FPU for 2011, based on data from [Offshore Magazine Mustang Engineering, 2011]. By
investigating the data we may identify some trends and typical solutions by region. The list
is obviously not complete on all details; however some general observations may be done:

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.15: In-service Flexible riser system examples
Figure A1.16: Number of flexible risers connected to FPSOs per region in 2011 (based on
data from [Offshore Magazine Mustang Engineering, 2011])
• The largest no. of risers is found offshore Brazil, most of these systems are free hanging
configurations
• In the North Sea, flexible riser systems with additional flexibility, lazy, RSS or steep
configurations are mainly used, and number of risers per unit is often limited to about
20, although 3 units with several more risers are seen

Section A1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.17: Number of flexible risers connected to FPUs per region in 2011 (based on
data from [Offshore Magazine Mustang Engineering, 2011])
• In North America steel catenary risers connected to TLPs and spars has been frequently
used as an alternative to flexible riser systems, hence the number of flexible are low
• In Africa FPSOs are widely used typically with 10 - 20 flexible risers each
• FPSOs are in all regions widely used in relatively shallow water (50-150m) with typically
less than 12 risers, indicating that this solution now is attractive even at water depth
previously developed by fixed units
• The deepest installed FPSOs are in Brazil and North Americas with about 2500m
water depth with less than 10 flexible risers
• The deepest installed FPUs are also in Brazil and North Americas closing 2000m water
depth, and seems to be able to carry more flexible risers than the corresponding FPSOs

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
A1.5 Flowlines and tie-ins
A1.5.1 General
This section is focusing on guidance for flexible flowlines and tie-ins. The analyses are
closely linked with both flexible pipe design and system considerations for flowline and tie-
ins. Recommendations related to use of analysis tools are hence included in this flowline
section.
For both flexible risers and flexible flowlines the analysis tools section should be consulted
when selecting software and defining load cases.
Flexible flowlines are in most areas of the world left unprotected on the seabed. In the North
Sea, protection by trenching and rock dumping has been extensively used for trawl protection
and thermal insulation.
Flowlines typically have lengths in the range 1-5 km. Instead of mobilizing an expensive pipe
laying spread, it is often preferred to use flexible pipe installed from a dynamically positioned
vessel.
The functional requirements to a flexible flowline are generally the same as for a steel pipe.
However, for flowlines no dynamic loading or motions in the operational phase is expected.
The flexibility requirements are mainly related to the transport and installation phases. This
means that the bending flexibility requirement does not need to be associated with large
internal pressures.
Furthermore, a flowline will be subjected to only a few cycles of bending, depending on the
laying configuration.
Flexibility requirements are related to:
• Diameter of storage and transport reels
• Weight and tension control possibilities in the installation phase.
In general, the installation procedure can be designed to cope with the curvature limitations.
It may be difficult to maintain a tension controlled curvature in deep water because the
suspended pipe weight will be large compared to the required horizontal force. It may be
advantageous to design the pipe to be ’self-supporting’, so that the curvature is limited by
the bending stiffness.
Examples where the use of flexible pipe results in simplified flowline design or installation
include the following:
1. subsea flowline end connections where expensive or difficult operations, such as exact
orientation measurements for spool pieces or the use of large alignment equipment to
reposition the flowline, can be eliminated
2. situations involving gross movements and damage to flowlines because of mudslides
can be reduced through the use of compliant sections of flexible pipe
3. applications in which field hardware and flowline location change with the field’s pro-
duction characteristics, which may necessitate the recovery and reuse of flowlines
4. applications with uneven seabed to avoid seabed preparation

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
5. in deep water or severe environment applications, where flexible pipe installation is

economically attractive relative to rigid pipe installation
Flexible pipe flowlines generally range in internal diameter from 0.05m to 0.5m (2 inches
to 20 inches) although some low pressure bonded flexible pipes, such as oil suction and
discharge hoses, have internal diameters up to 0.91 m (36 inches). Section lengths are limited
by transport capabilities, and diameter is limited only by current manufacturing capability.
The functional requirements of a flexible pipe flowline are generally the same as for a steel
pipe flowline. Significant dynamic loading or motions are generally not experienced, so the
flexibility properties of flexible pipe simplify the project transport and installation phases.
A1.5.2 Selection of Flexible pipe (alternatives)
A flowline may be configured with flexible pipe throughout, or as a combination of rigid pipe
and flexible tails for tie-in sections (i.e. as an alternative to rigid tie-in spool). The following
factors influence the selection process:
• Flow Assurance
• Selected subsea equipment (determines hub capacity and tie-in tooling)
• Chemical composition, design pressure and temperature
Flow Assurance (transport of the production fluids) leads to specifications for:
• Pipeline length and diameter
• Minimum and maximum design pressures and temperatures
• Start-up temperature transition (downstream and local to subsea choke)
• Maximum/design flow rate (hottest)
• Minimum flow conditions (minimum flow rate, insulation needed - multiphase)
• Hydrate control strategy
• Insulation required - product arrival temperature and no-touch time during shut-down
• Pipeline heating system required (e.g. DEH, Bundle only with rigid pipe)
• Risk of undetected hydrate plug (can lead to damage for flexible pipe)
• Target for pressure loss per meter (based on flow velocity and arrival pressure require-
ments) e.g. smooth bore flexible pipe is suitable for water injection but is not suitable
where there may be pressure build up in the annulus. Flexible pipe internal carcass is
’rough’ with significantly higher pressure loss than rigid/smooth bore pipe
Subsea interfaces (equipment):
• Tie-in limitations/cost e.g. existing hubs may be designed for Flexible tie-in
• Routing complexity (congested tie-in approach favours flexibles)
Chemical composition of the transported fluid will influence material and installation related
issues:
• Material selection (Flexibles always include some CRA, if carbon steel pipe is suitable,
rigid pipe cost can be very competitive)

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• Availability/Competition for manufacturing, transport and installation (Procurement

strategy)
Installation:
• Pipeline length; Installation vessel reel capacity determines number of transit days for
transport and need for mid-line couplings
Flexible pipe can be routed directly to typical (standard) subsea manifolds/hubs. Flexible
jumpers are often used in combination with rigid pipelines, thus exploiting advantages of
flexible pipe for tie-in only. Making the complete flowline from flexible pipe avoids the
cost of PLETs; however this may not meet the functional requirements for the system with
respect to pressure loss, temperature upon arrival, or diameter. Selection between rigid
pipelines and flexible is a multi-discipline process dominated by system considerations. This
work is normally performed by the purchaser. In case of EPIC contracts it may be the EPIC
contractor’s scope to select.
A1.5.3 Flowline restraint and tie-in flexibility
The flowline should be divided into two distinct zones during the design process, i.e. the
’tie-in’ zone and the ’rest’. Intervention should be managed to avoid residual tension in
’tie-in’ zones and to maximise residual tension in the ’rest’.
A flexible pipe should be left free to move on the seabed if it is found that none of the
following justify the high cost and risks inherent in restraining the flowline using trench with
backfill, or rock placement.
• Insulation enhancement by burial
• Protection against dropped object design loads
• Protection against trawling activity
GRP covers, with rock placement against both sides for trawl deflection, is used where it is
necessary to allow the flexible pipe to move and provide trawl protection. More substantial
structural covers are used over hub porches and are provided by the template/manifold
supplier and usually referred to a ’near protection structure’. The ’near protection covers’
interface with the template, extend out 10-15m from the hub face, and are installed after
tie-in.
Mooring line and anchor footprints shall be avoided based on sensible routing. Probable
anchor location shall be given a wide berth (≈200m). If compromise is unavoidable due
to routing restrictions, a pre-installed anchor (e.g. pile with some recoverable rigging for
connection to anchor line), should be considered to mitigate risks associated with dropping
anchors with allowance for drag during pretensioning/seabed penetration and miscellaneous
tolerances.

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A1.5.4 Crossings
The field layout should be arranged so as to avoid crossings.
Crossings should be as few as possible and follow internal guidelines as to separation. Tran-
sitions on both sides of a crossing shall be constructed with consideration to avoid a UHB
challenge at the associated ’prop’. It seems that no background to the phenomena of Up-
heaval Buckling (and snaking for non-buried pipelines) is provided in the present document.
Since the present text is much concerned with upheaval buckling it seems that some (pos-
sibly) brief introduction to the phenomenon should be given as it is not guaranteed that all
readers are familiar with the associated physics.
Where crossing occurs, responsibilities and interfaces need special attention. In the event
that two different operators are involved, a protocol should be established based on applica-
tion/request for crossing being submitted by the crossing Party. The primary concern is to
identify and manage risk. The crossing shall be designed so that the lines can be operated
independently, neither line setting operating limitations on the other.
The first line (underneath) shall be stabilised laterally and axially (in so far as possible) at
the crossing. This may involve finding a suitably stabilised location on an existing line. The
second line shall be laid on a prepared (vertically profiled) path where sufficient separation is
provided by e.g. rock dump or matrasses. If the crossing line (second) is to be trenched, the
up/down transitions to trench depth shall be completed with sufficient distance before and
after the crossing to ensure that associated risks to the first line are as low as reasonably
possible. The vertical profile of the crossing, including transitions in/out of trench, shall take
into consideration upheaval buckling control. Pre-lay preparation of the crossing approaches
is part of the overall upheaval buckling design.
The pre-laid rock (or carpet) profile determines the vertical imperfection of the crossing
pipeline; it is an initiation point for upheaval buckling and will require rock cover to control
UHB. Key parameters for the pre-lay profile are:
• Minimum width at top of support (consider lay corridor width, tolerances, and the
probable footprint needed for post lay rock cover over the crossing line to control
UHB)
• Side slopes (as gradual and smooth as possible/practical for a rock placement vessel)
• Vertical installation tolerances of support and transitions relative to the seabed
• Minimum height of the support measured from the seabed (UHB design is sensitive to
height at crossing)
A1.5.5 Installation
Installation without intervention
The flowline should be laid with low back tension in order to minimise the risk of free spans on
the flowline. Flexible flowlines are well suited to service on undisturbed seabed if unrestrained.
The flexible flowline product is very robust with respect to vertical and horizontal curvature.

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If it is required to restrain the flowline under rock cover protection or within a trench with
backfill, then significant challenges arise in order to ensure that it remains under cover
throughout its service life. This leads to a much more complex and interactive offshore
campaign.
Offshore campaign planning
The following diagram highlights the interdependency of final analysis for a flowline, trenched,
backfilled, and topped up with rock cover where needed to control upheaval buckling (this
is a complex example for demonstration purposes, it is not a recommendation). The Out-Of
Straightness (OOS) survey data and the residual tension represent key components of UHB
control.
Implementation of residual tension into a flowline leads to an offshore campaign involving
analysis based on as-installed information and survey data from a range of vessels; Installation
vessel, Construction vessel, Survey vessel, Trenching vessel, Rock placement vessel and RFO
vessel.
Figure A1.18: Example time-line for offshore activity and pressure in the line (RFO = ready
for operation)
The goal in Figure A1.18 is to maximise residual tension in the flowline, thus reducing backfill
and rock placement requirements. Residual tension in the tie-in free spans shall be avoided.
There are many variations on the above sequence, with and without trenching, which can
also lead to a successful offshore campaign. The optimum sequence will be project specific
and should be addressed during the planning phase in parallel with the predictive analysis.
In many cases, protection covers are required in the tie-in area to protect against trawling and
dropped objects. The covers must be wide enough to allow for sufficient lateral movement
in the expansion loop. By protecting with covers rather than rock, (i.e. in combination with

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an expansion loop), the flowline can expand and retract when being subject to pressure and
thermal expansion cycles. The lateral position of the covers over the flowline is dependent
on the installation sequence. E.g. Positioning of covers prior to pressurisation should allow
for lateral movement in the line due to expansion, while positioning of covers post pres-
surisation should have space between cover and line for lateral movement in the opposite
direction (retraction) Once the flowline is pressurised, it should not be depressurised until it
is completely/properly restrained. If it is trenched, sufficient time to let the soil backfill in
the trench consolidate, must be included in the schedule. A survey of the pipe configuration
after trenching is normally the input needed to decide how much (if any) rock is required,
in addition to trenching/backfill, to lock in the residual tension and avoid UHB. A high
performance trencher in combination with a flat and uniform seabed will often lead to a pipe
configuration with sufficient burial to avoid rock placement after trenching. Planning of the
sequence of the offshore campaigns for pressurisation, trenching followed by survey and/or
rock dumping is important.
The predictive report includes a compendium of all analysis work leading up to receipt of
the first hand (as-installed) surveys from the offshore campaign. The predictive report is
superseded by the final report and associated surveys.
Trenching
There is a range of trenching alternatives and relevant experience from adjacent developments
is the best source of guidance for selection. Uniform conditions along the line are conducive
to successful and uniform trenching. Areas with Ice Berg scars or irregular bathymetry (both
often indicative of large local variations in seabed soil properties) lead to limited success, and
in extreme cases can have a negative effect with respect to Rock volume needed to control
UHB (i.e. deep trench in troughs (soft soil) and no trench at crests (stiff soil) along the
route will amplify vertical curvature).
Avoid compression in the line during trenching. Liquidised suspension behind the trenching
machine relieves compression and may allow it to accumulate to a degree that can disturb
trencher performance (lift – jump out of trench). A small reduction from the maximum
pressure is included in the above example schedule in order to relieve the compression level
associated with the threshold load needed to drive (grow) buckles prior to trenching.
Backfill is also a matter of taking advantage of relevant experience. It is important that
backfill which is liquefied during the trenching process (jetting) is given sufficient time to
recover some of its bearing capacity before it is expected to provide restraint. At least seven
days are used, however field specific evaluation is recommended.
Rock Placement
The following is an example rock dumping data sheet – summarizing the flow of information
from the UHB analysis to Rock Placement instructions offshore.
Check both lateral and in-line rock stability at all locations where the seabed slope exceeds
3°, taking into account local bathymetry (i.e. extent of area with slope both longitudinally
and transverse to pipe). Rock placement sequencing from low towards high may be required
in order to build up a s rock berm at some locations (i.e. support berm on low side first to

Section A1.5
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Figure A1.19: Example Rock–Placement Data sheet
ensure stability before rock placed on pipe). Rock consuming locations should be identified
as early as possible so that these may be avoided at the route selection phase.

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A1.5.6 Design and Analysis
Pipe soil interaction
For each of the construction stages identified in Figure A1.18, resistance between the flowline
and the supporting seabed soil is mobilised in a different manner. The main modes are axial,
lateral and uplift displacements for both the surface laid and buried cases.
Comprehensive guidance is provided by [DNV-RP-F110, 2007] for establishing the equivalent
friction coefficients that may be used to approximate resistance per unit length of flowline.
This resistance may then be used to construct force-displacement relationships to model the
interaction of the flowline with the seabed, assuming particular values of relevant parameters,
such as the strain required to mobilise peak resistance.
For the cases considered here, compatible axial, lateral and uplift force-displacement relation-
ships were established for critical burial and cover depths. Uncertainties are introduced by
this design approach that is not clearly considered by the guidance in [DNV-RP-F110, 2007].
The initial break-out resistance during lateral buckling under hydro-test conditions could be
readily predicted using [DNV-RP-F110, 2007]; however, lateral resistance at large displace-
ment is not explicitly covered. In this case, it is feasible that a berm may form adjacent to the
pipe during the lateral ’sweep’, and so require additional modelling to achieve an accurate
prediction of resistance. Upper and lower bound pipe/soil interaction curves in combination
with break-out and residual resistance phases for large displacements lead to a hysteretic
behaviour, and thus loading duration and sequence can be important.
Some of the uncertainty is managed by being consistent, e.g. when considering that pipe/soil
resistance is both leading to resistance (when locking in residual tension) and to load (allowing
build-up compression loads and/or expansion feed into an imperfection).
Following jet trenching operations, backfill on top of the flowline is expected to be in a
fluidised and super-loose state. An understanding of the time required for this backfill to
density, so that axial resistance and lateral restraint can be reliably mobilised, is critical
for calculating the axial tension that may be ’locked in’ to the system when the flowline is
depressurised. This time requirement introduced dependencies in the construction schedule.
For silty fine sand soils, the time period was taken to be seven days. Centrifuge testing is
recommended to quantify this in specific projects.
Lateral resistance of a buried pipeline is often considered to be so large as to be a trivial
consideration, e.g. virgin soil properties. When considering UHB to be a two dimensional
phenomenon i.e. with a degree of freedom in the vertical and axial plane, this is a convenient
assumption. However, in the case where horizontal curvature is significantly greater than
vertical curvature, then an estimate of the force-displacement response in both vertical and
lateral direction is required to accurately model the flowline system.
Flexible flowline bending stiffness and load history
The following section outlines challenges related to hysteretic pipe bending properties that
vary with internal pressure and temperature. Flexible pipes have complex bending stiffness
characteristics. For example the bending stiffness characteristics of a flowline may be pre-
sented as follows for bending relative to straight pipe. The curves represent a range of

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
pressures (e.g. ’P471’ = 471 bar) and temperature (’T79’ = temperature of internal fluid
79°C above ambient).
Figure A1.20: Example of flexible pipe bending stiffness curves. Hysteretic bending stiffness
envelope.
The initial bending stiffness of the pipe may be in the order of 10 000 kNm2 , i.e. approaching
the stiffness of a rigid spool. The stiffness changes when the bending moment level overcomes
the interlayer friction (stick/slip threshold) and the flexible pipe layers start to slide over each
other. The interlayer contact forces are dependent on internal pressure and thus for a given
friction coefficient the stick/slip threshold increases with internal pressure. The highest
stick/slip threshold in the above figure occurs at a bending moment of approximately 115
kNm, under a pressure test scenario.
The post slip stiffness is much lower and variations with temperature become evident because
the E modulus of the plastic layers varies with temperature. The steel layers are sliding over
each other in the post slip phase. Only the first quadrant of the bending stiffness is shown
in Figure A1.20. The pipe bending stiffness is thus hysteretic, so in the analysis, a complete
stiffness curvature envelope for a given pressure and temperature would be modelled as shown
in the figure.
It is important to consider the load history for a flexible pipe. The bending moments at a
flexible tail tie-in hub are an example where load history is important due to hysteretic pipe
bending during installation and tie-in.
During tie-in a flexible pipe is open ended and at ambient temperature; ’P0T0’. The resulting
tie-in free span configuration is determined by back-tension, weight distribution, level and
elevation tolerances, and a bending stiffness with a relatively low stick/slip threshold. The
operating phase starts some months later and some shake-down of residual bending moment
in the flexible can be expected in addition to the short term interlayer slippage occurring
during the installation. The flexible will migrate towards a pre-bent shape in-situ where
moments relying on interlayer friction are largely mitigated before start-up.
For an Operating scenario (expansion cycle), the hysteretic pipe bending stiffness corresponds
to the maximum pressure during the cycle and the start/static configuration corresponds to
a ’pre-bent’ tie-in configuration. This assumes that the change in bending stiffness due
to pressure and temperature variations precedes the corresponding elongation. Thus the
high bending stiffness associated with interlayer stick/slip is included in the expansion cycle
analysis and the advantage of a pre-bent flexible pipe is captured in the start configuration.
The pipe stiffness used in UHB analysis of the flowline, where it is restrained, takes into
consideration the fact that high stiffness will improve resistance to UHB (greater driving
force required for given curvature). The bending stiffness in UHB analysis is reduced to

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
50 % of the nominal stiffness as presented above. For a UHB analysis, fulfilling the UHB
acceptance criteria, the change in curvature is very small. UHB is dominated by the initial
curvature.
Survey data validation and interpretation
Survey quality is a key to good design and successful operation of covered pipelines, Rubbish
in, rubbish out! There is a need for multiple surveys during such a project, starting with
general routing and finishing with e.g. as–laid after rock-placement using pipe tracker to
confirm successful completion of the installation in accordance with documented design.
Figure A1.18 demonstrates a sequence of surveys and how they are integrated into the
offshore campaign in order to provide input to design/analysis. UHB analysis is on the
critical path to completion of rock placement and RFO.
Curvature is a double derivative of the survey geometry, thus amplifying spurious variations
inherent in raw survey data streams. Key stages in transforming a flowline survey into a FE
model for UHB are:
1. Kp data is considered as a label
2. Easting, Northing and top-of-pipe-elevation coordinates describe the pipe profile in 3D
3. The raw survey is visualised and patched/pruned e.g. bridge gaps and crop obvious
glitches
4. Each of the three patched/pruned coordinate streams are passed through a Blackman
filter (weighted moving average)
5. The filtered data streams are used to generate a FE model with exactly 1m long
elements (if survey at average 0.2m resolution, then intermediate data points are first
ignored at this step)
6. Analysis and reporting is relative to the FE analysis model from step 5
Focusing on step 4, an adaptation of ’Time’ domain filtering is used for the filtering process.
The three separate data streams are assumed to be time histories with equal time steps
(note gaps are patched in step 3). Important characteristics of the filter are that it should
not generate ripples at steps in the data, and it should not generate any phase shift in the
pseudo time domain as this would equate to moving the pipe in space in later steps.
Considering a moving average filter on a data stream, one uses a window function and a
convolution algorithm. Alternative window functions are presented in Figure A1.21 and the
basis for selection of a ’Blackman’ filter is presented in Figure A1.22.
In the example presented in Figure A1.22, the window is progressively applied to 31 sequential
data points to generate a ’filtered value’ for the mid-point (30 increments 0.2m resolution
is 6m window in this case). The Blackman window function is selected because it combines
’best’ coherence to the survey with ’best’ filtering of the curvature. The ’best’ selection
criterion is visual rather than numerical. This is demonstrated below where depth (top-of-
pipe elevation) and absolute three-dimensional curvature are presented for a 150m section
of survey data with a range of filter windows.
y comparison, the moving average (flat) filter leads to the largest change in the raw survey
data (depth) and though it usually leads to the lowest curvature, it does not do so consistently,

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.21: Filter windows overview
Figure A1.22: Examples filtering depth and curvature
some locations are higher than all other filters presented and the peak curvature locations
are offset from the curvature peak location in the original data. The weighted filters have
curvature peaks at the same Kp as in the original data. It is important to compare original
and filtered data, information herein may provide guidance but every survey can have its own
specific interpretation challenges.
Step 5 transposes the three filtered data streams back into three-dimensional space. The
filtered survey data streams are run through a script that generates a full 3D FE beam model
with exactly 1m long elements. Attached to each node are three non-linear springs that
point in the directions of the local coordinate system of the element. Horizontal and vertical
springs are very long in order to follow the expected axial displacements while remaining
nominally perpendicular.
The soil springs model the soil-pipe interaction. Each spring along the model is generated
from a call-up library of springs pre-solved from pipe/soil interaction simulations or empirical

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
formulae. The call-up library for the springs covers the range of soil types along the line, the
depth of lowering, depth of cover, and expected/design rock dump height and should have
resolution appropriate for UHB analysis.
Logic is included so that the FE analysis iterates automatically to a design rock dump profile
that meets the UHB acceptance criteria in [DNV-RP-F110, 2007] i.e. if the trenching and
backfill provide insufficient restraint.
Predictive UHB analysis and design for residual tension
Away from the end zones, one of the most important design considerations is UHB. Locking
in of pre-tension and curvature control are the primary design tools. The flowline should
be pressurised before being trenched to stretch it towards its maximum length in service
and the pressure is not released until at least one week after being trenched and buried and
rock-placement (as needed) is completed. One week after trench backfill is to allow the
liquidised backfill to recover sufficient capacity to restrain the pipe and lock in pretension
(residual tension).
During pressurisation for trenching, the elongation is resisted by pipe/seabed friction, and
this leads to compression corresponding to the driving force for feed-in of elongation into
expansion loops (buckles) along the line. Experience indicates that there are sufficient OOS
along the flowline to initiate buckles at regular intervals (lay with low back tension), such
that the driving force (compression) will not be high. However, it is a challenge to be sure
during predictive engineering phase, so evaluation of the need to provide some deliberate
OOS is a typical predictive engineering activity.
During trenching, the pipe is progressively suspended in frictionless slurry of liquidised seabed,
and there are indications that accumulation and release of residual compression (elastic strain
energy) during trenching can lead to significant local horizontal curvature within the trench.
This can be an advantage for UHB, but also a risk if challenging OOS is observed as-
trenched. It is recommended to consider reducing the pressure in the order of 15% from
the peak pressure during preparation for trenching to avoid residual compression related risk.
Predictive analysis should provide project specific guidance.
Trenching is not always a cost effective investment. For some soil conditions, trenching
has been observed to result in similar rock dumping volumes as a ’no trenching’ scenario.
A route specific assessment of geological / geotechnical conditions should identify this risk.
Successful trenching will lock in most of the pipe elongation, i.e. the elongation corresponding
to the pressure during the trenching campaign. UHB driving force will not initiate in service
until this locked in elongation is exceeded. The driving force corresponding to the locked in
elongation is referred to as residual tension. A locked in elongation level corresponding to
recurrent design conditions is a ’nice to have’ target for a flowline (but not in tie-in zones as
previously discussed).
In UHB analysis, rock is added incrementally at buckles that exceed the upward displacement
criterion under the effective UHB load. The ’add rock’ iteration process continues until the
DNV UHB capacity check is fulfilled throughout the line. The cover height increments are
commonly 0.2m of additional cover over a minimum length of 5m to each side of the node
under consideration.
For final UHB analysis, the as-trenched or rock dumped pipe survey is used and supersedes
all of the predictive analysis work.

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.23: Example of Analysis methodology for predictive analysis of flowline laid in a
pre-cut trench
UHB Final analysis
The residual tension used for final analysis is solved based on the as-laid survey, the pressure
cycle associated with the trenching campaign preparations, and the depth of burial and
cover achieved prior to subsequent depressurisation. The design case elongation applied to
the UHB model takes into account the residual tension in the line. The UHB model initial
shape is derived from as-trenched survey data. The design case elongation is applied to the
UHB model and an example of the deformed shape is presented on the following figure. The
z displacement is in the vertical (upheaval) direction and a scaling factor of 300 is used to
amplify the displacement.
The peak vertical displacement of the location with maximum vertical displacement is 3.6mm
(yellow range). This occurs at the same location in both views, but seems different due to

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
view point/origin.
Figure A1.24: Side view (almost - see axes) - vertical displacement flowline elongation (yellow
at Kp 0.342 in both views)
Figure A1.25: Top view - vertical displacement flowline elongation (yellow at Kp 0.342 in
both views)
The maximum is at a location where the initial vertical curvature is high and the initial
horizontal curvature is low as shown in Figure A1.26.
The horizontal soil resistance is approximately three times the vertical soil resistance for this
example, so there is a structural bias preventing horizontal displacement in the FE model.
However, the horizontal curvature is generally so much greater than the vertical curvature
that the flowline elongation is mainly absorbed by horizontal displacement in this example.
Thus at other locations along this section, some having marginally higher vertical curvature,
the horizontal curvature is high enough to mobilise pipe buckling in the horizontal plane.
These lateral buckles absorb most of the elongation and reduce the driving force at potential
UHB locations such as Kp 0.342.

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.26: Vertical and horizontal curvature along example flowline
Figure A1.27 shows the vertical displacement and the corresponding vertical profile (initial)
for the flowline plotted against Kp. Note the horizontal axes have different scales. At Kp
0.342 the vertical displacement is 3.6mm and this corresponds to a physical high point (hog
bend) on the flowline. This again provides a visual quality check on results.
The UHB analysis acceptance criterion typically used is as follows:
• γU R = 1.0 [API 17B, 2008] formula (21)[DNV-RP-F110, 2007], standard deviation of
survey accuracy is 0.05m.
• γU F = 1.15 [API 17C, 2010] formula (28)[DNV-RP-F110, 2007], i.e. safety class nor-
mal
The displacement in the upheaval buckle shall not exceed the displacement needed to mobilise
peak upward resistance taking into account γU R for the cover/resistance and γU F on the
load due to applied internal pressure and temperature. Residual tension is not factored.
Follow-on and Final UHB report
Follow-on resources are needed throughout the offshore campaign in order to provide advice
and support as needed during preparations for the offshore campaign, Rock dumping data
sheets are provided where relevant, and issue of a ’Final UHB report’ based on as-built data.
Expansion loops (isolate tie-in span from flowline)
Care is necessary to provide expansion loops to avoid end expansion being fed into the tie-in
free span. The tie-in free span has very limited capacity to absorb length changes between
the hub and the touch down point, and this may lead to very high interface loads on the hubs.
An adjacent expansion loop should be used to isolate the tie-in free span from flowline feed-in
or out. It is particularly important to apply the flowline restraint (rock dump) adjacent to

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
(1) Vertical displacement
(2) Pipe profile (depth - elevation)
Figure A1.27: Flowline vertical displacement and vertical profile
the tie-in free span with ambient pressure and temperature in the flowline so that it will
be biased towards compression due to elongation in operating phases. If restrained when
pressurised, high tension due to shortening of the pipe will arise during each shut-down cycle.
Avoid restraining of tie-in free spans with pressure in the line.
Flexible tail tie-in and in-place analysis
A flexible tail is taken as an example of flexible pipe subsea tie-in. Considerations are similar
for riser tail tie-in to a riser base, and for subsea Jumpers connecting subsea hub to hub. Use
bending restrictors at the end fitting transition as default. These may be removed, pending
risk/responsibility evaluation process with the Operator, the Installation Contractor and the
flexible pipe supplier.
The laydown configuration will be defined by the Installation Contractor and provide a start-
ing point for tie-in analysis. The tie-in analyses will provide a range of tie-in free span
configurations to be considered in the in-place analysis (with associated back tension and
touch down points). Account should be taken for tolerances and uncertainties. This is an
important interface that is difficult to coordinate as, quite often, the tie-in analysis is carried
out by the Installation Contractor and in-place analysis is in the flexible Pipe supplier scope
of work.

Section A1.5
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Loads on the hub are predominantly static (weight/buoyancy). Guidance: maximum design
moment is in the order of 1.3 times the static estimate. If more than 1.3, then heads-up,
something is outside typical range, e.g. hub very high, soil friction unusually high, modelling
error, and high tension due to restraint.
A flexible tail is typically arranged as shown in Figure A1.28 when tied in.
Figure A1.28: Covers and rock dumping overview
At both ends a free span is created when the flexible tail is pulled up to the interface hub and
tied in. It can be challenging to maintain interface loads within hub capacity using flexibility
in the tie-in free span alone, and it is therefore recommended to consider extension of the
tie-in zone into a horizontal expansion loop under expansion covers, i.e. allow for horizontal
displacement in a curve adjacent to the tie-in free spans. In the case of a short jumper, the
intermediate section may be rock dumped or covered as best suited for specific projects. A
flexible tail has thus five sections:
1. Template tie-in free span (e.g. arc length 0 to 20m)
2. Expansion covers over first expansion loop (e.g. arc length 20 to the 35m)
3. Rock berm (e.g. arc length 35 to 77m)
4. Expansion covers over second expansion loop (e.g. arc length 77 to the 122m)
5. PLEM tie-in free span (arc length 122 to 142m)
The load cases are applied as expansion cycles corresponding to the combined effect of the
pressure and thermal variations. An example is presented based on an expansion cycle of
0.018% relative to as-installed (ambient) length. The magnitude of nodal displacements
during this expansion cycle combined with 0.5m feed-in of the PLET, are presented in the
Figure A1.29. Movement is primarily under the expansion covers. The pipe is restrained to
within the resistance mobilisation displacement under the rock covered zone.
An example of loads cases for in-place analysis of a production jumper is presented in Figure
A1.30.
The interface loads at tie-in hubs are governed by the radius in the adjacent expansion loop
and pipe/soil friction. A range of expansion cycles corresponding to operating scenarios as
above leads to interface loads as follows, see Figure A1.31. The effective tension range
corresponds to mobilisation of the local expansion loop to absorb expansion (+/- 40 kN for
feed-out or pull-in to the tie-in free span). The moment range varies relatively little as it is

Section A1.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.29: Nodal displacement magnitude along Jumper P403T100 and 0.5 m PLEM
feed-in
Figure A1.30: Example of load case matrix for tie-in in-place analysis
predominantly static (submerged weight of the hang-off assembly, end fitting etc.) and the
tension range is well controlled.

Section A1.6
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.31: Hub loads, effective tension and moment combinations, at tie-in hub
(P403T100 is an example in-place load cycle correspond to a change of internal pressure
by 403 bar and contents temperature by 100°C. Note thermal expansion is based on average
wall temperature which is approximately midway between ambient (external) and internal
fluid temperature for un-insulated flexible pipe.
A1.6 Other flexible pipe systems
A1.6.1 Offloading
The following systems are used for offloading of hydrocarbons from FPSOs to tankers:
• Loading buoy moored a few kilometers away from the FPSO. Flexible risers and seabed
flowline often used as a permanent connection between the FPSO and the loading buoy.
Midwater e.g. camel shaped line with mid length buoyancy section has also been used.
Tanker connect to buoy, several alternatives used e.g. APL, SBM.
• Floating hose from FPSO to tanker midship manifold, ref. Figure A1.32. Bonded hose
from 10” to 24” internal diameter is normally used. The hose is normally stored on
reel between offloadings. Floating hoses are not used in harsh environment.
• Catenary hose suspended from an FPSO reel to a bow loading system on the tanker.
Submerged bonded hoses from 10” to 20” inside diameter are normally used. The
hose is stored on reel or in separate areas onboard the FPSO between offloadings.
This system is often used in harsh environment e.g. North Sea.

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
Figure A1.32: Floating hose offloading system, courtesy of Trelleborg Oil & Marine SA
A1.7 Installation
A1.7.1 Introduction
The installation phase cost for both rigid and flexible pipe systems are high compared to the
procurement and operation phases. While the rigid pipe systems require either equipment
to straighten oval pipe sections, weld stations at joints – or both, the installation phase for
flexible systems is shorter and requires less equipment. Depending on the size of the vessel,
a number of reels can be transported to the installation site in one mobilization phase, and
installed. The equipment and actions required for installation of flexible pipes are listed in
the following sections.
As an example, a pipe lay installation campaign for a flowline, jumper or riser to be wet-stored
will commence along these lines:
1. The manufacturer spools the pipe onto reels or reels the pipe onto a carousel.
2. If necessary, either the reels are transported to the site where the installation vessel will mobilize
or the installation vessel mobilizes at the manufacturer base
3. The installation vessel either lifts the reels onto the deck or reels the pipe onto a carousel in
the ship

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
4. The vessel moves to the installation site

5. ROVs are deployed from the vessel to provide observation possibilities and low-level interaction
6. Installation aids are deployed subsea
7. The vessel moves to the initial position for pipe initiation
8. The reel with the pipe to be installed is engaged in a reel drive system
9. Winches and cranes are used to transport the first end of the riser over lay tower and through
tensioners (caterpillars). The tensioners are closed around the pipe to take the weight it as it
is discharged from the vessel
10. The pipe is fed through the tensioners - tension and lay speed can be adjusted according to
the installation procedures
11. The pipe end is lowered down to the seabed and initiated towards a connecting structure or a
temporary clump weight
12. Sufficient length is deployed to lay the head of the pipe down on the seabed
13. When the head has been landed, the vessel starts to move along the route according to
procedure while feeding out pipe
14. Ancillary equipment is installed along the flexible pipe at a work table below tensioners
15. Either an A&R winch wire or the crane wire is connected to the second pipe end and is used
to lower the pipe in place on the seabed
16. A separate tie-in operation will be performed, which can be performed by either the same vessel
or a separate vessel at a later time
The installation phase includes large, high-cost equipment, which has a substantial mobilization-
cost. The additional cost of performing work with an installation vessel that is in-field is low
compared to the start-up costs, thus it is of great benefit to plan the offshore campaigns
accordingly.
The installation vessels have weather limitations on most activities, thus the majority of
activities are performed during late spring - summer – early fall, while the operations are
planned and analyzed in the winter months. Few vessels are able to operate in seastates with
HS more than 4 m. This means that even during summer, installation vessels will spend time
waiting for sufficient weather windows. If an operation requires 24 hours for completion,
the weather must be below the weather window restrictions for the whole period. This
complicates the detailed planning of the offshore campaign, and delays are not uncommon.
A1.7.2 Vessels
Capabilities
Various types of installation vessels are used to install subsea assets, see Table A1.21. The
day-rate of hiring a vessel is close to proportional to the size of the vessel. The larger
vessels usually have better station keeping capabilities, making them more suited for riser
installation/recovery operations which normally require close proximity to the production
units, see Figure A1.33 for a typical example. DP III class requirement [IMO MSC 645, 1994]
is becoming more and more common. Larger vessels are also able to store more equipment
onboard and do not require as many mobilizations, and the larger vessels have motion
characteristics that increases the possibility of crew change by helicopter. Hence, the total
cost of each vessel must be assessed for each individual project.

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.21: Vessel types
Vessel category Description

Supply vessel Used to transport equipment on deck, often used to base ROV operations
and dive support. Very common and comparatively low cost. Does not
have crane or winching possibilities.
Anchor handling Used to manipulate anchor systems. Comparatively low cost vessel with
vessel winch for anchor system interaction.
Light Used mainly for inspection and light subsea construction tasks. Are usually
construction fitted with ROVs and medium sized crane(s). Varying station keeping
vessel (IMR capabilities
vessel)
Offshore subsea Vessel with large cranes, pipe lay tower, large work ROVs and deck space
construction for pipe reels. Larger vessels have carousels where the pipes are stored.
vessel Vessels usually have very good station keeping (DP III class
[IMO MSC 645, 1994]) capabilities. The vessels have capability for
performing most installations operations offshore. Given the size and
complexity of the vessel, the pipe lay vessels are usually high-cost, with
large variation in price.
Figure A1.33: Typical large Offshore Subsea Construction Vessel with a VLS mounted at the
side of the vessel. Image courtesy of Emas AMC (www.emas.com)

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
Equipment
A list of equipment used for a typical offshore riser installation/recovery is included in Table
A1.22
Table A1.22: Installation vessel equipment
Name Description
Aft deck Large deck space on the aft of the vessel where all the installation
equipment is located. The aft deck is usually configured and outfitted
for each specific job
Carousel A rotating, cylindrical compartment used to store pipe or umbilicals
either on or underneath deck
Installation aids Sand bags, turning bollards, mattresses, clump weights, buoyancy
modules, subsea winches, lifting clamps
Lay tower Large tower structure that guides the pipe in a controlled manner
into the water. May be located aft, on either of the sides or over a
moonpool.
Moonpool Opening in the vessel where either equipment/ROVs are launched
through or pipe is installed through. Pressurised air can be used to
lower the water level
Reel Large cylindrical storage unit for pipes and umbilicals
Reeldrive Motorised equipment that holds and turns the reels.
system/Dolly
base
ROV Remote Operated Vehicle that is lowered into the water to perform
interactions with equipment or serve as observation posts. The ROV
pilot controls the ROV via an umbilical cord with hydraulic supply
lines and video transfer.
Deck tugger Used to handle pipe ends on deck and guide the pipe into the lay
winches tower
A&R winch Abandon Recover winch used to either lower or pick up pipe ends
from the seabed. Usually fitted as part of the lay tower
Sand bags Used to manipulate the routing of the pipes or build up pipe
Mats Used for landing objects on the seabed to avoid them sinking into the
soil.
Temporary Used as attachment points / hold-back resistance on the seabed or as
anchors / clump counterweights to buoyancy
weights
Vessel Crane Dictate how much weight can be manipulated on the seabed. Larger
vessels can utilize larger cranes. Usually heave-compensated.
A1.7.3 Installation Operations
General
The initiation of a large number of failure modes for flexible pipes can be traced to mistakes
that have been done during or events from fabrication, transportation or installation. Typical

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
non-conformances are related to handling issues, where the outer sheath is exposed to sharp
objects, over-bent or compressed, and it is important that handling issues are addressed and
mitigated by the installation contractors. Common non-conformances from installation are
shown in Table A1.23, and operations related to the flexible pipe installation are listen in
Table A1.24
Table A1.23: Common non-conformances from installation
Non-conformance Description
Damaged and pierced outer Sea water filled annulus with subsequent potential
sheath corrosion of armor wires and reduced pipe service life.
Compression The tensile armor wires may radially expand/birdcage,
possibly affecting cross-section strength and deform
outer sheath.
Open annulus vent port Same as pierced outer sheath.
Buoyancy not clamped Loss/movement of buoyancy module.
correctly
Over-bending Excessive straining and damage of pressure liner and
potential unlocking of pressure armour
Dropped objects Outer sheath damages, loss of equipment, damaging
subsea equipment
Attaching the end fitting to Incorrect attachment of the end fitting may lead to
reel damage to the end-fitting itself or over-bending of the
pipe
Bending stiffener Wrinkling of the bending stiffener. This will alter the
over-bending performance of the bending stiffener for a period, while
the bulges may return to their original shape after a few
years
Incorrect placement of tethers The riser configuration will not be as designed, the
consequence of this is project-specific.
Incorrect placement of The riser configuration will not be as designed, and the
buoyancy modules consequence of this is project-specific.
Touchdown area compression See Compression.
Damage neighboring Project-specific. Damage to the external sheath of
equipment other risers, high tension and movement of other subsea
equipment, tears in umbilicals.
Vessel drift-off and over pull The flexible pipe, the structure it is connected to and
/ over bending the installation vessel equipment may be significantly
damaged
Incorrect handling of clump The clump weights may come loose, fall onto
weights equipment or personnel. Large vessel motions while
handling clump weights may be hazardous.

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
Table A1.24: Common operations related to flexible pipe installation
Operation Description
Tie-in The pipe ends are connected to subsea structure.
Pipe-lay The pipe is laid along a predefined route.
Flowline retrieval Retrieval of flowlines.
Trenching Use of jet or other means to dig trenches for the flowlines to be
lowered below sea-bed. Trenching machines will usually lower
the pipe into the trench immediately before the trench walls
collapse.
Rock dumping The rock is dumped onto the pipe to provide trawl protection
and prevent upheaval buckling
Riser installation Installation of riser sections.
Riser replacement Removal of risers.
Subsea equipment instal- Installation of PLEM/PLETs, T-joints, SSIV and more.
lation
Flowline installation
During a typical flowline installation, the pipe is lowered to the seabed, usually using a VLS
or a HLS and by deploying installation aids to maneuver to and land the first pipe end in the
target box. Then the vessel moves along a predefined route and lays the pipe on the seabed.
The second pipe end is lowered using the crane and installed in the second end target box.
Typical problems encountered during flowline installation operations include:
• Pipe sliding along the sea bed
• Difficulties maintaining the correct tension
• Vessel drift-off
• Flexible pipe handling issues on the vessel
• Repair of outer sheath damages
Remember to
• Avoid over-bending
• Avoid sharp edges against outer sheath
• Maintain tension according to procedure
• Monitor touchdown point
Trenching
Specialized vessels are lowered onto the seabed to control the trenching process. The re-
motely operated vessel will jet or dig a trench while lowering the pipe into the trench.
Typical problems encountered during trenching operations include:
• Unexpected high density soil sections in the trenching route

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
• Trench wall collapse

• Over-bending of the pipe during transitions
Remember to
• Avoid sharp transitions
• Avoid sharp edges
• Verify the trenching is successful
Rock-dumping
Figure A1.34: Rock dumping illustration, courtesy of 4subsea
The rock dumping is performed by lowering a funnel on top of the flexible and dropping
rocks onto the flexible, see Figure A1.34. This provides trawl protection and more details
for the operation is found in Section A1.5.
Typical problems encountered during trenching operations include:

• Obtaining the required rock dump height
• Obtain the rock dump flow into the funnel

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
• Maintaining the correct vessel speed

Remember to:
• Maintain correct pressurization and content
• Avoid damage to outer sheath
Tie-in
The tie-in operation is required to connect the wet-stored pipe ends to the subsea structures.
Many proprietary tools have been developed for these operations, and issues regarded the tie
in process is discussed in detail in Section A1.5.
In general, the pipe end is fitted with a specific connector which corresponds to the subsea
structure that it will be connected to and that interfaces with a tie-in tool. Tie-in tools
are usually connected to and deployed with ROVs. A common procedure is for a ROV to
connect a wire onto the pipe end which is connected to the tie-in tool docked onto the subsea
structure. The wire is the winched until the pipe end is located near the subsea structure
connection. The tie-in tool then aligns and locks the head in the position and connects the
subsea structure. The tie-in tool is then retrieved.
Typical problems encountered during tie-in operations include:
• Subsea head being outside tolerances of tool
• Manipulation of pipe with winch/buoyancy to assist operation
Remember to:
• Install subsea head within tolerances of the tie-in tool required.
Flowline retrieval
In general, the operation is the tie-in, rock dump and flowline installation in reverse. The
pipe ends are left in a target box, the rock removed, the crane or/and A&R winch is used
to lift the pipe back onto the deck and the vessel starts reeling pipe onto the vessel.
Typical problems encountered during retrieval operations include:
• Damage to outer sheath due to process for removing rock dump
• Over-bending
• Burst of outer sheath due to annulus gas expansion
Remember to:
• Monitor Gas Relief Valves to verify gas is escaping the annulus
Riser installation
A riser installation usually involves installing a flexible pipe that is hung-off from a platform
and connected to a subsea structure or a connecting flowline on the seabed. Risers are

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
usually installed from reels. A riser can be installed with both the topside and the subsea
end as first end of the vessel depending on the type of riser configuration, but the latter is
the most common. An installation usually starts with initiating the subsea end towards a
connecting structure or an initiation clump weight. The subsea head is then landed and the
pipe is laid down on the seabed by moving the vessel in along a predefined route. Buoyancy
modules are fitted onto the pipe to form the hog and sag bend. The topside end (the second
end) is deployed from the vessel by lowering the head either with an A&R winch or by using
the crane and cross-hauling it to a winch wire from the platform. The installation vessel will
then disconnect from the riser, and the platform will pull the riser in and hang off.
When replacing existing risers, the new riser is normally installed between neighboring risers,
implying strict requirements to vessel station keeping capabilities and adherence to weather
criteria to avoid contact with existing risers.
Typical problems:
• Contact with neighboring risers and potential damage
• Damage to existing risers by ROV
• Installing risers in pliant waves require extensive movement of platform to install static
route underneath platform.
• Overbending of pipe
• Damage to outer sheath from installation equipment
Remember to:
• Perform detailed analysis of the operation to understand installation limitations
Riser Recovery
A riser recovery is in principle the reverse operation of a riser installation. Normally the
riser being recovered will be scrapped, implying less weather limitations to the operation.
Operations close to platforms are still as critical as for installation.
Typical problems:
• Contact with neighboring risers and potential damage
• Damage to existing risers by ROV
• Recovering risers in pliant waves require extensive movement of platform to install

static route underneath platform
• Old riser being stuck in mud
• Gas leaks from outer sheath breaches
Remember to:
• Perform detailed analysis of the operation to understand installation limitations

Section A1.7
OC2017 A-001
Subsea Equipment installation
Installation of subsea equipment is varied, and only a few general comments will be included
here. Large subsea structures like manifolds, X-mas trees and other equipment is not part
of the scope, thus the focus will be on PLEMs, SSIVs, seabed suction anchors and other.
A1.7.4 Post-Installation Procedure
After finishing the installation, the field will be cleaned for installation aids, the vessels
will de-mobilize and the as-built documentation is gathered in a Design, Fabrication and
Installation resume and delivered to the client.
A1.7.5 Documentation
The design documentation may change over time as the design and analysis iterations
progress. To obtain an overview of the installation package and as built configuration,
the following documents are useful.
Table A1.25: Documentation
Operation Description
Design, Fabrication and The DFI includes as build data sheets, non-conformances, and
Installation resume (DFI) configuration drawings.
Packing plan The packing plan shows the reels that are being transported.
Daily reports A journal that gives an overview of the activities on deck during
installation for each day, planned and completed activities for the
campaign.

Section A1.7
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Chapter A2
Flexible Pipe Properties and

Materials
Author: Stig Berge (NTNU), Morten Eriksen (4Subsea)
65
Section A2.1
OC2017 A-001
A2.1 General remarks
Non–bonded flexible pipe is a key to floating production of offshore oil and gas, and is used
in many and diverse applications:
• Production risers for oil and gas
• Water or gas injection
• Gas lift
• Oil or gas export
• Test production
• Drilling
• Well maintenance
• In–field flowlines
• Jumpers
Depending on the specific application the demands in terms of dimensions, strength, flex-
ibility, chemical compatibility, temperature tolerance and other properties may vary within
wide margins.
The main global strength characteristics of a flexible pipe are:
• Small bending stiffness; can be repetitively bent to a small radius of curvature and laid
from a reel
• Large volume stiffness and strength; containment of high pressure fluids, resistance
against external pressure and forces
• Large axial tensile stiffness and strength; can be deployed at large water–depths
These favourable properties come at the expense of properties that are less favourable:
• Small torsional stiffness and strength
• Small axial compressive stiffness and strength
Table A2.1: Characteristic properties of flexible pipe.
Property Comment
Flow related Relevant for transport function of the pipe
• Internal diameter • Transport capacity
• Pressure capacity • Pressure ranges
• Materials, • Chemical compatibility with respect to internal flow.
composition Prevention of diffusion and leakage

Section A2.1
OC2017 A-001
Support related Relevant for structural integrity verification for installation and
operation phases
• Bending flexibility
• Entire motivation for using flexible pipe
• Weight
• Governs requirement to tension capacity
• Radial compression
strength • Water-depth limitation
• Axial force capacity, • Relevant with respect to static and dynamic loading
torque behaviour
Table A2.2: Overview of support related properties
Property Symbol Comment, relations

Weight m mass per unit length
wa weight in air
ww weight in water, water filled
ρρ average material density of pipe wall
wa = mg
ww = mg(1 − ρw /ρρ )
Bending
Curvature RM IN,s Minimum radius of curvature, static, storage.
RM IN,s ≈ 5.5 − 7 · dext
RM IN,d Do., dynamic. RM IN,d ≈ 8 − 12 · dext
Bending moment - Complex relationship, also involving hysteresis
curvature relationship and visco-elastic properties.
Bending stiffness EI Simplest model. Some data available
Tension
Capacity Tmax Max allowable support force (effective tension)
Tc Collapse tension
Axial stiffness EA Elastic stiffness. Nonlinearities and hysteresis /
k visco-elastic properties may be significant but not
as important as for bending
Torque
Capacity θw Max allowable torsion angle
θc Collapse torsion angle
Torsional stiffness GIt Stiffness may be nonsymmetric
This combination of properties is obtained by a composite pipe wall, as shown in Figure

A2.1, combining steel and polymer materials in a non-bonded structure, i.e. each layer may
slide relative to adjacent layers. The basic concept of a flexible pipe is a fluid barrier made
from a flexible polymer that can be bent to a small radius of curvature, layer 2 in Figure
A2.1. The function of all the other layers is to provide strength, support and protection of
the fluid barrier, while maintaining the low bending stiffness of the pipe. This is achieved
by using helically wound steel armour in combination with flexible polymer materials, in a
non-bonded structure. The number and construction of the layers depend essentially on the
diameter and pressure rating of the pipe. Large diameter pipes for high pressure applications
may have around 20 layers in the pipe wall.
Flow related properties are related to the transport function and are mainly determined by
pressure capacity and internal diameter. These parameters may be measured and documented

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure A2.1: Typical cross section of a non-bonded flexible pipe. (Courtesy of GE Oil &
Gas)
fairly easily. Chemical compatibility and temperature tolerance are also important flow related
parameters that are not so easily documented.
A2.2 Pipe wall structure and materials
The wall of a flexible pipe including ancillary components is a composite structure (Figure
A2.1) where a wide spectrum of materials is used:
• Polymer materials
• Steel materials
• Synthetic fibres
• Foam materials
Each layer has a specific function and is interacting with the other layers. The complexity
of the structure may be illustrated by the range of elastic moduli of materials that are used,
Table A2.3. In addition to the range of elastic properties the materials also differ widely in
terms of strength, ductility, wear, creep, thermal expansion and other characteristics.
Table A2.3: Elastic moduli for flexible pipe materials.
Material Elastic modulus

(MPa)
Polyurethanes 2-12
LDPE 55-410
Polyamide 11 300-1300
PVDF 500-1600
XLPE 600-1500
HDPE 690-1800
Polyamide 12 1200-1550

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
Silica glass 71 000

Aramid fibre 124 000
Carbon fibre 165 000
Steel 210 000
The combination of materials that are used for a given flexible pipe design depends on the
specific application. [API 17B, 2008] gives a generic description of the grades of materials
that are used for the different layers. [API 17J, 2008] gives detailed specifications for the
qualification testing requirements. Herein a brief and descriptive review is given on each
layer and function, and the materials that are used based on [Berge and Glomsaker, 2004].
A2.2.1 Pipe wall structure
In Figure A2.2 is shown a pipe wall in more detail. As described above, the internal pressure
sheath (liner) is the fluid barrier. The polymeric liner has very little strength relative to the
forces that are acting, from the inside as well as the outside, and a number of additional
layers are added to provide strength and protection.
Figure A2.2: Pipe wall structure, in more detail.
A2.2.2 Carcass
The carcass is the innermost layer of a pipe, and the only metallic component that is in
direct contact with the fluid in the bore. The material must be compatible with the chemical
constituents of the transported liquids and/or gases. A wide variety of austenitic and duplex
stainless steels have been used as carcass materials for unbonded flexible pipes. The main
drivers for selection of material for carcass are corrosion resistance to operating environment,
mechanical strength and price.
For most applications austenitic stainless steel, typically AISI 304L, 316L or similar is used.
For less corrosive bore fluids carbon steel or ferritic stainless steel may be used. More demand-
ing applications may require high-alloy stainless steel (duplex), nickel-alloyed or molybdenum-
alloyed steel. Table A2.4 A2.4 gives a list of typical grades used as carcass materials in flexible

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
pipes, [Gudme and Steen Nielsen, 2009]. A procedure for qualification of carcass materials
is described by [Gudme and Steen Nielsen, 2009].
Table A2.4: Standard material grades considered as carcass grades.

Flexible Pipe Stress and Fatigue Analysis
Grade name UNS number Microstructure Yield (MPA) UTS (MPa)
Namely: Typical values Typical values
304L/316L S30403/S31603 Austenitic 270-350 520-670
1. Tensile layer
Lean duplex S32101 Duplex 580-700 700-900
2. Anti-friction layer
Duplex3. Outer sheathS32205 Duplex 600-800 750-1000
Super duplex
4. Hoop stressS32750
layer Duplex 750-900 900-1100
6Mo 5. Outer layer of tensile armour
S31254 Austenitic 340-430 680-900
6. Anti-wear layer
6Mo-high Ni layerN08367
7. Inner of tensile armour Austenitic 310-400 690-900
8. Back-up pressure armour
9. Interlocked pressure armour
10. Internal
Before going pressure
into the sheath
carcass machine the strips are welded into continuous lengths, usually by
11. Carcass
gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW). Weldability needs to be considered, [Tavares et al., 2010].
12. Anti-bird-cage layer
The function of the carcass is to provide strength against external hydrostatic pressure.
1.1.3 Cross section properties for nonbonded pipes
The carcass also provides strength to resist crushing loads during installation operations and
handling of dominating
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nonbonded pipe, as wellwill
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carcass description
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below:and abrasive particles.
The carcass
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machine the strip is formed as a helix of folded S-shaped strip which is geometrically locked
Carcass is often the innermost layer of the nonbonded pipe. The function of inter
each turn into the next, to form an interlocked tube, Figure A2.3. The cylindrical structure
locked stainless steel carcass is to provide resistance to the external hydrodynamic
providespressure
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and strength
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typicalTypical
profile ofcarcass profile.
the carcass [4]
The armour
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grades,gas
withintypical
the liner. During high
high yield
pressurestrength.
operations the liner will become saturated with gas, which will be released in the case
of a low pressure shut-down. For multilayer liners, if proper venting is not provided for the
slits between the layers of liner, pressure may 5 build up to cause collapse of the carcass. The
carcass is normally not designed for this condition, which must be avoided by design (venting
of the liner) or by operational restrictions. Also for single layer liners depressurisation may
be a problem. If the pressure drops rapidly, the restricted rate of flow through the carcass

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
may lead to build-up of pressure between the carcass and the liner that could cause collapse
of the carcass.
The collapse capacity is strongly dependent on whether the carcass is fully supported by
the surrounding structure (liner/pressure armour) or whether there is a gap. A gap may be
caused by several mechanisms:
• Stretching and possibly deformation of the carcass due to force of gravity.
• Shrinking of liner due to deplastification, possibly counteracted by swelling due to
absorption of hydrocarbons and/or gas.
• Pressure induced creep of liner into gaps in pressure armour profiles.
The forming of a carcass profile from metal strip is a cold-forming process. For a given
material there are technological limitations with regard to the thickness of a strip that can
be formed to a carcass profile like the one shown in Figure A2.3. The collapse strength
of the carcass, which is essentially determined by the stiffness (moment of inertia) of the
profile, has basic limitations for this reason. Collapse strength to resist hydrostatic pressure
as well as crushing loads from installation equipment may be a limiting factor for deep water
applications of large diameter pipe.
More compact and stiffer profiles are under development, [Rytter and Nielsen, 2002], that
may extend the deep water range of flexible risers.
Flexible pipe with a carcass layer are termed rough bore pipe. For transport of fluids with
no gas content, e. g. water injection, smooth bore pipe may be an option, with less flow
resistance and reduced cost.
A2.2.3 Liner
The liner is the sealing layer, made from a thermoplastic by extrusion over the carcass. In
some applications a multi-layer liner is used, with sacrificial layers on the inside and/or the
outside of the sealing layer. The purpose of the sacrificial layers is to provide protection
against the metallic components on the inside and the outside. The liner is exposed to
the fluid in the bore. The properties of the liner give the basic limits for the upper service
temperature of the riser and the chemical composition of the fluids that may be transported
through the line.
Different materials may be used, depending on the design conditions. Three generic classes
of materials used as liner are:
• High density polyethylene (HDPE) and cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE)
• Polyamide (nylon) (PA11 or PA12)
• Poly vinylidene fluoride (PVDF)
Within each class of materials a number of grades with a large variability in properties are
available. Some of the materials used are brand names, protected by patents or licenses
as shown in Table A2.5. There is a continuous development of polymer materials for liner
applications, and the table is not claimed to be complete.
A major criterion for selection of liner material is the design temperature. In general, HDPE
has very good chemical resistance and maintains good mechanical properties up to 60 °C.

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
Table A2.5: Polymers used in the liner for flexible pipes.
Material Description
Rilsan® PA11 + plasticizer
Solef® 60512 PVDF/CTFE (Copolymer with Chlorotrifluoro-
ethylene)
Solef® 1015/078 PVDF + plasticizer
Gammaflex® PVDF/HFP (Copolymer with Hexafluoro-
propylene)
Coflon® PVDF + plasticizer
HDPE/XLPE
However, hydrocarbons like crude oil, methane, methanol etc., are absorbed and may work
as plasticizer. Therefore, if the bore fluid contains hydrocarbons, HDPE may be used at low
and moderate temperatures only, generally below 20 – 30 °C. Crosslinking may in general
improve high–temperature properties and in addition reduce the absorption of hydrocarbons,
and thus XLPE may be used at somewhat higher temperatures than HDPE.
Polyamide materials may be used at higher temperatures but are very sensitive to humidity.
In the case of a high water cut, polyamide suffers from hydrolysis at elevated temperatures.
The main mechanism of hydrolysis of PA11 and PA12 is chain scissoring (reduced molecular
weight), causing brittleness. Prediction of service life in various environments has been a
major complication with this material, [Ottøy et al., 2001]. The Rilsan User Group (RUG),
which is a collaboration between a range of operators and suppliers, has developed a new
procedure for prediction of the life time and degradation rate for Rilsan® , published by
American Petroleum Institute (API) as a Technical Report [API 17TR2, 2003]. According
to [API 17TR2, 2003], the extrapolated service time for Rilsan® at 60 °C in a typical well
flow (humid, pH4) is 20 years. Nevertheless, Rilsan® is considered as the most used liner
material within the North Sea, [MCS Kenny, 2001].
PVDF may be used at higher temperatures, possibly 130°C with present brands. However,
typically 20% plasticizer is added to PVDF homopolymer, in order to improve processing
(extrusion) properties and reducing the possibility for defects like blisters. In contact with
hydrocarbons, the plasticizer tends to be extracted from the PVDF, leading to permanent
shrinkage of the material which again has contributed to several failure modes: Pull-out or
rupture of the liner at the end termination and collapse of the carcass due to pressurized
gaps in multilayer liners. The former problem has been mitigated by use of accelerated
deplastification of the end section of the liner before mounting of end termination.
Developments are ongoing for liner materials to improve processability and to increase the
high temperature performance, [MCS Kenny, 2001]. This development is mainly run by the
suppliers and the material industry.
Annulus
The section between the liner and the external sheath is the pipe annulus. This is an open
structure with no pressure barriers. In a pipe that is transporting a fluid under high pressure,
gas and liquid will permeate through the liner and cause pressure build-up in the annulus.
To prevent rupture of the external sheath, the annulus is vented at the end terminations,
typically at 1–2 bar overpressure.

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
In the as–fabricated state, void space in the pipe annulus is filled with atmospheric air.
During operation the chemical composition may change, for several possible reasons:
The outer sheath may become damaged, during installation or operation. This will lead
to sea water flooding of the annulus. Depending on the nature of the leak, sea water in
the annulus could be depleted of oxygen, or possibly saturated with air. If the leakage is
located above the sea level, ingress of air and salt moisture may take place. Efficiency of
cathodic protection is uncertain. Sea water may be combined with H2 S and/or CO2 due to
permeation from the well flow.
Over time diffusion of water vapour through the liner may lead to condensation of water
(H2 O) in the annulus. In combination with gaseous components like hydrogen sulphide
(H2 S), carbon dioxide (CO2 ) and methane (CH4 ) the condensation may lead to a corrosive
environment. In this case the environment will be anaerobic.
Risers which have been subjected to sea water ingress may be repaired, flushed with inhibitor,
and re-installed. Inhibitor fluid, possibly with some residual sea water and with CO2 or H2 S
due to permeation from the well flow, could have an effect on residual fatigue life.
These environments may have a significant effect on fatigue life of steel components, and
need to be considered in design and operation.
A2.2.4 Pressure armour
The primary function of the pressure armour is to back up the liner and to provide resistance
against the hoop stress caused by internal pressure. The pressure armour is also a strength
component with respect to external forces, e.g. crushing forces due to handling or accidental
loading.
The pressure armour is an interlocking profile made from rolled carbon steel with ten-
sile strength in the range 700 – 900 MPa. Three different profiles are currently in use,
Zeta/Flexlok, C–clip and Theta, Figure A2.4, Figure A2.5 and Figure A2.6. Some of these
profiles are protected by patents or licenses.
The interlocking of the pressure armour is a limiting factor for the minimum bending radius
of the riser. If this limit is exceeded, irreversible damage to the flexible line may occur,
Flexible
leading toPipe Stressofand
perforation the Fatigue
liner whenAnalysis
subjected to internal pressure.
Figure 1-4 cross section of Zeta- shaped pressure armour[4]

 Figure A2.4: Zeta/Flexlok
Double helically wound armours. interlocking profile used as pressure armour.
ForThe
highwound armours
pressure usuallythe
applications consists severallayer
interlocking tendons
may helically laid at around
be strengthened 30°-
by an additional
55°
layer of to the longitudinal
rectangular axis along
steel profiles thenot
that are flexible riser. The
interlocked, main function
cf. Figure A2.3. of wound
armour is to sustain axial and torsional loading. In addition, the flexibility of
nonbonded
2017 edition pipe is ensured by the slip between 73 the tendon
NTNU, and the
4Subsea andinner support
SINTEF Ocean
structures.
In this thesis, we focus on the slip behaviour of the tendons and the stress analysis
Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure A2.5: C-clip interlocking profile used as pressure armour.
Figure A2.6: Theta-shaped interlocking profile (two variants) used as pressure armour.
A2.2.5 Intermediate sheath
Smooth bore pipes with no carcass layer are vulnerable to external pressure from water ingress
into the annulus. If the external pressure is exceeding the collapse pressure of the liner, an
intermediate sheath must be provided, outside the pressure armour. The intermediate sheath
is generally made from the same materials as the liner.
A2.2.6 Tensile armour
The tensile armour is two or four layers of armour wire and provides strength against axial
stress caused by internal pressure and by external loads. The layers are counter-wound to
avoid torsion when axial loading is applied, Figure A2.1. The lay angle in most cases is 30
to 35 deg. The tensile armour also provides torsional strength to the pipe. However, for
torsional loads in a direction leading to unwinding of the outer layer of armour (bird–caging)
the strength and stiffness is poor.
The wire profile is rectangular, or close to rectangular, and is produced by cold rolling from
drawn rods of carbon or low alloy steel. In general, armour wire is not made from standardized
grades of materials, the grades are in most cases proprietary to each supplier of pipe. Heat
treatment (quench and temper or annealing) is applied as needed to limit the yield strength.
The strength is essentially governed by the carbon/alloy content and heat treatment. The
governing factor for the use of high strength steel is whether hydrogen sulphide (H2 S) is
present.
Before going into the armour spinning machine the wires are welded into continuous lengths,
usually by electrical resistance welding. Weldability needs to be considered. In dynamic

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
applications the tensile armour is subjected to fatigue loading, and fatigue strength of the
welds may be an issue.
Tensile armour is generally classified on the basis of ’sweet’ or ’sour’ service, following the
criteria given by NACE [NACE TM 01-77, 1996]. Sour service wire has tensile strength
(UTS) generally below 900 MPa. Sweet service wire has a tensile strength in the range
1200-1500 MPa. In many cases the strength of the tensile armour needs to be optimised for
specific designs, and other strength grades are also used.
The tensile armour alone carries the top tension of a riser, and is a critical component for
deep water applications. The development of deep water risers is a driver for the use of
higher strength steel, to reduce top tension. There is an ongoing activity to develop and to
qualify higher strength steels with resistance to corrosive environments, in particular H2 S,
cf., [Rubin and Gudme, 2006], [Désamais et al., 2007].
A2.2.7 Composite armour
Beyond 2 000 metres of water depth the weight of conventional flexible pipe becomes critical
not only for the pipelay equipment and vessel but also for the production floater. Substituting
the tensile steel armour with composite armour made from fibre reinforced polymer has a
potential of reducing the weight of pipe significantly.
[API 17J, 2008] specifies that it does not apply to flexible pipe that employs non-metallic ma-
terials for the pressure and tensile armour. However, in the next revision of [API 17B, 2008]
a dedicated Annex H will be included on ’Composite Armour for Unbonded Flexible Pipe’
with reference to [DNV-OS-501, 2009].
Carbon fibre composite armour has been qualified for flexible risers, [Do and Lambert, 2012],
and concepts are under development for ultra-deep water risers utilizing this technology,
[Do et al., 2013].
A2.2.8 Anti-wear tape
In a flexible riser subjected to cyclic bending the tensile steel armour wires will slide cyclically
relative to adjacent steel layers, with significant contact stress. If two layers of steel armour
are in direct contact, wear or fretting fatigue may take place. For this reason anti-wear
tape is applied between layers of steel armour. The tape is not leak-proof, and fluids in the
annulus may flow through the tape.
The materials used for the tape are thermoplastic tape like Rilsan® with a thickness of around
one millimetre. The tape is subjected to significant contact stress and large slip amplitudes.
Cumulative slip for a 20 year design may be of the order of 50 · 103 m. The tape must thus
retain a minimum strength at the temperature of the armour, and to be resistant against
wear, creep and other types of degradation mechanisms. If the tape fails during service,
fatigue life may become significantly shortened, [Berge and Sævik, 1993].
ISO 13628 does not specify any criteria with regard to the wear properties of anti-wear
tape, except general statements. Test procedures and qualification criteria are apparently
not established.

Section A2.2
OC2017 A-001
A2.2.9 Anti-buckling tape
Flexible pipe is vulnerable to torsion loading and to axial compression loading, which may
occur during installation and in shut-down conditions. These loading modes may lead to
radial buckling or ’bird–caging’ of the tensile armour and to lateral buckling of tensile armour
wires. For this reason anti-buckling tape may be provided outside the outer tensile armour
layer. Aramid or glass fibre reinforced tape is used for this purpose.
A2.2.10 Thermal insulation
In some cases thermal insulation of the pipe is required, made from foam materials or solid
insulation. The insulation layers are located between the tensile armour and the outer sheath.
A2.2.11 Outer sheath
The function of the outer sheath is to provide a seal against the sea water in order to
prevent corrosion and to give mechanical protection to the steel armour. The loads that are
typically applied on the outer sheath are impact, erosion and tearing as well as, in certain
cases, external or internal pressure. The material is extruded thermoplastic x96 in most cases
HDPE or Rilsan® . According to available information, MCS (2002), nearly 40% of the riser
failures are due to external sheath damage and most of these took place during installation.
A2.2.12 Bend stiffener
A flexible pipe is terminated with a end fitting where all layers are anchored and clamped in
a rather complicated structure. At the interface the transition in bending stiffness is of the
order 1:100. For bending loading of a pipe hanging from the end termination this will lead
to a very large stress concentration. The same is the case for a pipe being deployed through
an I–tube. A tapered bend stiffener is often used, to provide a gradual transition in stiffness
from the pipe to the end termination or the I-tube and to limit the curvature.
Bend stiffeners are made from polyurethane, which may be cured to a range of elastic moduli.
The mechanical connection to the end termination is provided by steel inserts. Bend stiffeners
may have a large size, several metres in length and more than 1.5 m diameter at the base
with a weight of more than 1.5 ton. The bend stiffeners need to be designed to the same
fatigue life as the pipe.
Figure A2.7: Polyurethane bend stiffener.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
A2.2.13 Smooth bore pipe
Flexible pipe with a carcass layer is termed ’rough bore’ pipe. For transport of fluids with
no gas content, e. g. water injection, ’smooth bore’ pipe without a carcass may be an
option, with less flow resistance and reduced cost. In the case of a damaged outer sheath
the external hydrostatic pressure will act against the polymeric liner. A smooth bore pipe
will thus have very little capacity against external hydrostatic pressure, and an anti-collapse
sheath may be required, located between the pressure and the tensile armours, to utilize the
collapse strength of the pressure armour.
A2.2.14 Flowlines
Due to the low cost of installation relative to steel pipe, nonbonded flexible pipe is often
used as in-field flowlines. In that case the tensile armour lay angle may be adjusted to the
’balanced’ angle at which the pipe is neutral with respect to fluctuations in the internal
pressure, i. e. there is no change in the length of the pipe due to pressure variations. In a
pipe with no pressure armour and the internal pressure being resisted by the tensile armour
alone the balanced lay angle is 54.7 deg. In pipes with pressure armour, which is generally
the case, the balanced lay angle depends on the proportion of steel in the pressure armour
and tensile armour respectively. The optimum lay angle is then typically 35 to 40 deg but
may lie outside this range in some cases.
A2.3 Polymers for liner applications
A2.3.1 Introduction
Purpose
The purpose of this is section of the handbook is to provide
• an overview of polymers used in flexible pipes. Together with
• an update on status on field experience and knowledge built over recent years.
The main focus is on performance and service life issues of polymers used as pressure sheath.
Disclaimer
The review and discussion presented is not intended to be exhaustive on the subjects but
address topics that to the knowledge of the author are relevant to the service life performance
of polymer materials.
Requirements and Guidance from ISO/API
The primary function of the pressure sheath is to provide adequate sealing for fluids and gas
in the bore to ensure the required containment within the bore.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
Industry requirements for design of the polymer layers and components in flexible pipes are
defined in [API 17J, 2008]. The design criteria are defined in Table 6.3 in [API 17J, 2008].
The section relating to the pressure sheath is shown below:
Figure A2.8: Section from Table 6.3 in [API 17J, 2008]
The background for the defined maximum strain limits is believed to be:
• When a flexible pipe is reeled on a reel with a diameter that is 12 times the diameter
of the pipe the maximum strain in the outside cover is 7.7 % for the inner layer on the
reel. This may originate from the cable industry where cables often have been reeled
on drums with diameters that are 12 times the cable diameter. When the outside
cover is strained to 7.7 % the pressure sheath is typically strained to 7 %. PVDF is
never used as an outside cover which may be reason why the maximum strain has been
specified as 7.0 %
• It has been suggested that the specific limitation on the maximum dynamic strain for
PVDF is taken from a qualification test that Coflexip (at that time) carried out for
a client where the maximum dynamic strain requirement was 3.5 %. The test was
positive and this strain criterion adopted.
Even though the defined requirements not necessarily seem to be derived directly from func-
tional requirements and material performance properties, field experience may be a good
indication that they have been adequate for designs and materials that have been used ex-
tensively to now. A Relevant question may be whether these requirements are stricter than
needed and therefore lead to more costly designs than needed. It should also be noted that
the table imply that the ISO 13628-2 is only valid for Polyethylene, Polyamides and PVDF
materials.
In principle the following 3 requirements should be met throughout the service life:
1. Adequate creep resistance under the operating conditions for the gaps between the
pressure armours.
2. Suitable ductile behaviour to meet the static and dynamic strain requirements with
adequate resistance against rupture and fatigue.
3. Adequate material performance to maintain sealing in the end fitting.
The meaning of ’adequate’ must be defined from the margins required to meet the risk
targets governing the integrity management for the pipes under consideration.
This section on Polymers in Flexible Pipes partly build on
• [API 17B, 2008], in particular Chapter 5 on materials and should be consulted for
reference.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
• [API 17TR2, 2003]

Guidance on use envelope in terms of temperature and pressure is available in these docu-
ments and these will be expanded on in later subsections.
A2.3.2 Relevant Aspects of Polymer Performance
The role of polymers in flexible pipes
The primary function of the pressure sheath is to ensure containment of fluids and gases
in the bore of the pipe throughout the service life for the pipe. This shall be achieved
through interaction with neighbouring steel layers and sealing arrangements in the end fitting.
The ideal pressure sheath would be a fully compliant layer performing its required function.
Nevertheless fundamental properties of the polymer layer, such as stiffness, ductility, creep,
thermal expansion, swelling, shrinking, permeation, thermal conductivity influence flexible
pipe designs, properties and function. An example is that the polymer layers contribute to
the overall bending stiffness of the pipes. Some polymers also have their own specific service
life issues and operational limitations due to chemical ageing.
Since the function of the polymer layer is achieved in combination with steel layers it is
also important to highlight some key differences in properties and performance of steel and
polymers.
Typical properties
Polymer structure A polymer molecule is a long chain of identical monomer units tied
together. A polymer is normally identified through the monomer (for example ethylene) and
a molecular chain can consist of several hundreds to several thousands monomer units. The
long molecules can be organised in a crystalline structure or as a disorganised amorphous
phase where the molecules are randomly entangled.
Thermoplastic materials used as pressure sheaths (and in other layers) in flexible pipes are
semi-crystalline thermoplastics with a mixture of crystalline and amorphous regions on a
microscopic level as illustrated in Figure A2.9.
The percentage volume of the material that is crystalline and the size of the crystalline region
will vary between materials and will influence the material properties.
One of the characteristics of the crystalline regions is a melt temperature, which is often
referred to as the melting temperature for the polymer. Above this temperature all the
material is a visco-elastic amourphous phase. Below the melt temperature the amourphous
regions remain visco-elastic. The viscosity and elastic properties will vary with temperature.
A thermoplastic material is also characterised by glass transition temperature Tg , below which
the amorphous phase becomes glassy (or frozen). The glass transition is not considered a
phase transition. Below Tg the viscosity of the amorphous phase change and there will
typically be an increase in stiffness. For relevant polymers there are no sharp step changes
in properties associated with Tg but there will typically be transitions in their temperature
dependence.
Stress - strain

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure A2.9: Illustration of a semi-crystalline polymer with a mixture of crystalline and

amorphous regions
General response The stress-strain behaviour of polymers is quite complex and it may be
useful to be aware of some key features. The curve in Figure A2.10 below shows a typical
stress strain relationship for a polymer (semi-crystallline thermoplastic) material.
The actual shape of the stress response curve will vary between materials and the strain at
break can range from 50 to 1000% for relevant materials when tested according to ASTM
D638 - 10 ’Standard Test Method for Tensile Properties of Plastics’ [ASTM D 638, 1977]
at room temperature. Key parameters that characterise the materials are:
• The tensile modulus in the elastic region -> represent the material stiffness during use
• Strain at yield -> defines the strain where plastic deformation sets in
• Stress at yield
• Elongation at break -> gives a measure of the ductility of the material
• Ultimate strength
Strain rate dependence The stress strain curve and therefore the derived parameters
depend significantly on the rate of the applied strain. The higher the strain rate the stiffer
the polymers and lower the ultimate elongation. When the strain rate becomes high enough
the material will become brittle loosing its ability to ductile deformation. It is therefore

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure A2.10: A typical stress-strain curve for a semi-crystalline polymer
important to ensure that mechanical properties used for design or response analyses have
been derived from testing made at strain rates that are representative for the application.
Temperature dependence The stress strain curve and all defined parameters will change
significantly with temperature. For a given material the tensile modulus and the yield stress
will go down and the ultimate elongation will increase when the testing temperature goes up.
Thus the polymer sheaths in a flexible pipe used for oil and gas production will exhibit different
mechanical response properties during shut down compared to the operational temperature.
In this context it is important to note that the axial, rupture and collapse strength of flexible
pipes are provided by steel layers and are therefore not influenced by the stress/strain response
of polymer layers.
Creep & stress relaxation In the temperature ranges of interest the polymers used in
flexible pipes exhibit viscoelastic properties. A constant load applied instantaneously (within
the elastic response limits) will initially create an elastic strain response but over time the
strain will increase due to slow viscous flow. The material will creep manifesting itself
through a couple of phenomena for pressure sheaths:
• Creep of material into gaps between supporting pressure armours.
• Stress relaxation when the sheath is strained over long time.
Key features to observe are:

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
• Stress relaxation will never be 100% - there will always be some remaining stress (or
elastic response).
• The viscoelastic behaviour is strongly temperature dependent in terms of
– The rate of creep and relaxation
– The degree of retained elastic deformation
Creep may induce orientation of polymer chains depending on the nature of the creep. This
may impose some change in the tensile modulus but is not considered a significant issue for
the function of polymers.
Ductile brittle transition Polymers used in flexible pipes will exhibit ductile properties
within the temperature ranges they are used. This means that when fractures are induced
during testing they will be ductile. However, when the temperature is reduced the material
will become more and more brittle and at some temperature the nature of induced fracture
will become brittle. This will be the ductile/brittle transition temperature.
When the strain rate used to induce fracture is increased the brittle/fracture transition
temperature will also increase. In a plot of strain rate versus temperature one can define
a curve where the material on one side will have ductile behaviour and on the other side
brittle.
When a material goes through ageing that make it more brittle the ductile brittle transition
will go up in temperature for a given strain rate.
During shut down and in particular cooling from gas expansion, when the temperature in
flexible pipes is low, the polymer materials will in general be closest to their ductile/brittle
transition and thus be most prone to brittle rupture or crack initiation. Clearly cool down
scenarios should be taken into consideration during design. For materials that loose ductility
through ageing the margin with respect to the ductile/brittle transition may decrease and
become a potential integrity issue.
Thermal expansion / contraction In flexible pipes the polymer sheaths are functioning in
close interaction with steel components. Differences in thermal response between polymers
and steel may have impacts on design and the function of pipes. Relevant polymers have a
thermal expansion coefficient that is in the order of a factor of 10 higher than steel. This
means that a pressure sheath that has very low residual stress at high operating temperatures
will experience increased stress during cool down as the steel components will limit the
thermal contraction.
Typical thermal conductivity coefficients for a relevant 150·10-6 /K

thermoplastic is:
While a typical value for steel is: 12·10-6 /K
Thermal conductivity The much lower thermal conductivity exhibited by polymers com-
pared to steel implies that the polymer layers govern the temperature profile through the
pipe wall. Most of the temperature drops will take place through the polymers.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
Typical thermal conductivity coefficients for a relevant 0.2 - 0-5 W /(m·K )

thermoplastic is:
While a typical value for steel is: 43 W /(m·K )
Permeation Contrary to steel, relevant polymers are permeable to several of the molecular
species found in fluids and gases the pipes are exposed to when used for oil and gas produc-
tion. Typically methane, ethane, CO2 , H2 S, water and other small molecules in gas or liquid
form will permeate through polymer sheaths or membranes. The permeability properties de-
pend on the solubility in the polymer of molecules in question and their diffusion properties
in the polymer. There are significant differences in permeability between polymers and the
rate of permeation vary with temperature.
The environment in the annulus will reflect the partial pressures of gases and vapours in the
bore and their respective permeability constants. Thus the polymer pressure sheath will act
as a filter allowing some species to get through more easily than others.
Blistering The solubility of gases in a polymer is proportional to the pressures (partial

pressures) of the respective gases. At high pressures the concentration of dissolved gas can
be substantial. If the pressure is reduced the dissolved gases need to escape to match the
concentrations of dissolved gases proportional to (in equilibrium with) their respective partial
pressures. If the pressure drop is too fast for the gases to escape they may form micro-voids
in locations such as impurities or at other imperfections where the bonding between molecule
chains is weak. Pressure build-up in these micro-voids may become sufficient to create larger
voids and lead to blistering with macroscopic voids.
Different polymer materials will exhibit different inherent resistance to blistering. The resis-
tance to blistering will normally go down with increasing temperature partly due to weaker
bonding between molecules in particular if the material swell. The acceptable maximum
pressure and associated depressurisation rate for a given material will typically go down
with increasing temperature. All relevant polymers could be brought to blister if the pres-
sure is high enough. Among relevant polymers used for pressure sheath in flexible pipes
Polyethylenes have the lowest resistance to blistering limiting their use envelopes in terms of
temperature and pressure.
The blistering tendency will depend primarily on the gas composition but also to some
extent on the fluid composition in particular if the fluid induces swelling. Thus resistance to
blistering must be verified under simulated production conditions at adequately high pressures
and depressurisation rates.
If blistering should become an issue for an existing pipe application one of the mitigations
would be to avoid rapid decompression and if possible limit the maximum pressure.
Volume change Some of the polymers used in flexible pipes are modified by the addition
of plasticisers to improve extrusion properties and make the materials more ductile. This
is the case for PA11 and PA12 and for some of the PVDF types used. The degree of
plasticisation varies from a few % to 20%. Plasticisers will under many typical exposure
conditions be extracted from the polymer to the surrounding environment causing reduction

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
in the volume of the polymer (density changes are generally small). This will generate
stresses in a sheath when it is not allowed to contract (as will be the case in the axial and
circumferential directions in flexible pipes). Parts of these stresses may relax due to the
viscoelastic properties of the polymers but not all. The thickness of the polymer sheaths will
go down and may reduce the friction to neighbouring layers. This can be problem for sealing
in end fittings and must be taken into consideration for design and fabrication.
On the other hand some polymer will take up certain molecular species that it may be exposed
to during service. This is quantified in terms of the solubility of a chemical substance in a
polymer material. Polyamides will for instance take up water and Polyethylene type materials
will take up hydrocarbons. This may for plasticised material compensate some of the volume
change from loss of plasticiser and un-plasticised materials may swell.
Polyethylene materials will swell when exposed to crude oil. This swelling will increase with
temperature and vary between types of Polyethylenes and will generate hydrostatic pressures
in materials that are fully confined as is the case for many pressure sheaths. The pressures
and forces generated from a confined material that is exposed to substances that cause
swelling will eventually become substantial when the temperature is increased.
Cracking Thermoplastic polymers will have varying susceptibility to crack initiation under
cyclic loading. PVDF is considered to be notch sensitive and the possibilities of crack
initiation must be taken into consideration in design and fabrication.
Within relevant temperature ranges the polyamides and polyethylenes used have low suscep-
tibility to crack initiation. However, if materials degrade and become brittle crack initiation
could eventually become an issue. Due to reduction in ductility with reduced temperature for
the polymers the susceptibility to rupture, crack initiation and crack growth will be highest
at low temperatures.
Another aspect of cracking is environmental stress cracking (ESC). This is a phenomenon
where the material in locations of high persistent stress may induce increased solubility to
certain chemicals that could be harmful for the polymer. This may lead to a local weakening
of the material that in turn will promote stepwise initiation and growth of cracks.
One of the criteria for selecting polymers suitable for use in flexible pipes has been to ensure
that that they do have very low susceptibility to ESC for oil and gas environment. However,
ESC could be of concern with some injection chemicals.
Structural changes It is the amorphous regions that are the origin of the high ductility
of thermoplastics. When a semi-crystalline material is exposed to elevated temperatures the
crystalline structure may change. The percentage volume of the material that is crystalline
and the average size of the crystalline regions may change. This may have impacts on bulk
properties such as stiffness and ductility.
Crazing Crazing is a phenomenon, also called whitening, where networks of micro-voids

develop in highly stressed parts of the material. The consequence of crazing is not fully
understood. There is a concern that crazing may affect the fatigue resistance. However,
crazing developing in front of a crack tip, due to high stress levels, may represent energy
absorption that slow down crack growth.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
Chemical ageing Polymer molecules may undergo chemical reactions caused by chemicals
species entering the polymer or by radiation. This may modify properties of the bulk material.
Such reactions may lead to chain cutting (reducing the length of the polymer molecules) or
cross-linking between molecules affecting the ability if molecules to move relative to each
other. Relevant reactions are:
• Oxidation leading to chain cutting in some material at high temperatures (in particular
polyethylene and polyamides). Many polymers will include antioxidants providing a
buffer against oxygen degradation.
• Hydrolysis where water takes part in a reaction causing chain splitting (in particular
polyamides)
• Acids, bases or other chemicals causing or promoting chain cutting
• Ultra Violate radiation inducing chain cutting or cross-linking
The main impacts of chemical degradation for key use properties will first be increased
stiffness and then embrittlement of the material.
Temperature dependence The ageing rates for the described processes, apart from radiation-
induced reactions, will increase with temperature. Typically reactions involved are charac-
terized by their respective activation energy. The probability of overcoming the activation
energy will increase with increasing temperature. Such processes obey the Arrhenius relation-
ship r =Ae-Ea/kT where r is the reaction rate, Ea is the activation energy, k is the Boltzmann
constant and T is temperature on the Kelvin scale. The implication is that these ageing
processes will become more severe when the temperature goes up and thus define upper
temperature limits for use. Hydrolysis of Polyamides is a good example of an ageing process
that leads to temperature limits for use.
Temperature use limitation Temperature is the parameter that to a large extent governs
the use range of polymers.
Increasing temperature will lead to:
• Softening and eventually excessive creep and blistering
• Increasing tendencies for structural changes (such as changes in crystallinity)
• Increasing swelling
• Enchanced ageing rates
On the other hand low temperatures will lead to:
• Brittleness that can lead to rupture and fatigue
• Generation of high stresses from cool down combined with differences in thermal ex-
pansion between polymers and steel

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
A2.3.3 Polymers used in Flexible Pipes
Overview
Table A2.8 identifies the different polymers in use as pressure sheath in flexible pipes.
Table A2.8: Different polymers in use as pressure sheath in flexible pipes
Type of Grade name Material Pipe Manu- Plasticiser Typical use envelope as
Polymer supplier facturers pressure sheath
PA11 RILSAN Arkema All 12% BBSA Typical upper temp 60 -
Polyamide BESNO P40 TL 80°C depending on pH
and required service
PA12 Evonik Wellstream 4-8% ? Typical upper temp 60 -
VESTAMID (patented) 80°C depending om pH
LX9020 and required service
TP30 (Technip Not known Technip Plasticised Claimed by manufacturer
trademark) (but quantity to be 10-15°C higher than
and type not PA11
known)
MDPE Several All 0
HDPE Several All 0 Up to 60°C(Max pressure

Polyethylene
limited by blistering)
Crosslinked PE - ? Technip 0 Up to 90°C (Max pressure
Crossflex (patented) limited by blistering)
(Silane cross
linking)
Crosslinked PE - ? NKT 0 Up to 90°C (Max pressure
IR cured XLPE (patented) limited by blistering)
(Peroxide cross
linking)
Coflon (Technip Arkema Technip 20% DBS
trademark) (KYNAR (may have
PVDF 50HDC changed over Up to 130°C
P900) time)
Gammaflex Arkema Technip 3% DBS
(Technip (KYNAR elastomer
trademark) 400 HDC particles
M800)
Coflon XD ? Technip 2.5% ?
(Technip
trademark)
Solef 1015 / 0078 Solvay Wellstream 19% DBS
(phased out?)
Solef 60512 Solvay Wellstream NKT 0%
(PVDF with
PVDF/CTFE
copolymer)
Polyamides
PA11 PA11, supplied as Rilsan from Arkema, has been used for pressure sheath in flexible
pipes for many years. It is based on amide bonding between monomer units consisting of a
linear chain of 11 Carbon atoms. The degree of crystallinity is 20-30%.
It is promoted as a polymer, which is easy to process, with good resistance to chemicals, high

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
impact, and wear strength. The grade used for pressure sheath is Rilsan BESNO P40 TL
contain 12% plasticizer by volume and an antioxidant package providing a certain capacity
against oxygen degradation. The tensile modulus of fresh fully plasticized material is around
310 MPa at room temperature while loss of plasticizer will increase this significantly (fully
de-plasticised and completely dry material has a tensile modulus around 1500 MPa). The
elongation at break is in the order of 300 - 400%.
At 23 °C Rilsan will absorb around 2.5% water by weight. It should be noted that the
water uptake in Rilsan is low compared to several other Polyamides such as PA6,6. The
water uptake will contribute to plasticization and compensate for some of the impacts on
mechanical properties from loss of plasticizer. It is the polarity (electrical dipoles) of the
amide bonds that is responsible for the relatively high solubility of water, which is a highly
polar molecule. Therefore other polar molecules such as alcohols (in particular methanol)
and acids will have a relatively high solubility in PA11. Most hydrocarbons have a low
solubility in PA11, which results in negligible swelling from exposure to crude oil. Aromatic
hydrocarbons (containing benzene rings) have a non-negligible solubility in PA11. Arkema
report blistering tests with no blistering after 20 cycles to 1000 bar at 90 °C with explosive
decompression rate.
Guidelines for use of PA11 is available in [API 17TR2, 2003]. It is generally accepted that
the main threat to PA11 is hydrolysis where water molecules react with the amide bonds
cutting the polymer chains. Fluids and gas from oil wells are depleted from oxygen and
oxidation is not considered an issue. Methanol is known to contribute to degradation, which
is believed to be a separate reaction termed methanolysis, which is similar to hydrolysis.
The chain cutting (scission) caused by hydrolysis reduces the average length (and weight) of
the polymer chains. When the molecular weight reaches a critical range the material starts
to loose ductility and becomes brittle. Eventually this may lead to cracking and full rapture.
The average Molecular weight has been adopted as the measure of degradation since it
allows quantification of the degree of degradation. The most common way of measuring
the molecular weight is through solution viscosity providing the Corrected Inherent Viscosity
(CIV). Based on field experience and laboratory testing a recommended initial acceptance
criterion of CIV= 1.2 dl/g has been defined. The basis for this is that PA11 pressure sheath
failure has been observed in the field with CIV on the inside surface up to 1.05 dl/g which
has been defined as the failure criterion.
The hydrolysis reaction rate increases with temperature. However, it is also known that
there will be a reverse reaction where scissioned chains will recombine. In principle this
would lead to a molecular weight plateau where the hydrolysis reaction rate and the reverse
recombination rate are equal. This has been demonstrated in laboratory tests primarily in
controlled water environments.
It is known that acids will enhance the hydrolysis reaction. The guidance in [API 17TR2, 2003]
provide temperature and pH dependent service life curves for ageing of PA11 to reach the
initial acceptance criterion of CIV=1.2 dl/g. There is also a curve to account for methanol
exposure.
The service life curves in [API 17TR2, 2003] provide pH dependence but do not provide any
discrimination between different types of acids. It is believed that the service life curves
are based on ageing in buffered solutions using chemicals that may not necessarily be those
generating acidity in oil and gas production environments. Thus there is no discrimination
between acids. The pH is defined for water in contact with PA11 while hydrolysis reactions in

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
the material will be governed by the concentrations of chemical species inside the material.
Different acids will have different solubilities in the PA11 thus it would be reasonable to
assume that the type of acid can play an important role.
In the context of the impact of acids it is worth taking note of the types of acids that can
be found in oil and gas production:
• CO2 is always present in varying abundance. It forms Carbonic acid when dissolved in
water.
• H2 S is present in sour service environments and is an acid in itself. The concentrations

can be negligible in some fields and relatively abundant in others.
• Water soluble organic acids such as methanoic (formic) acid, ethanoic (acetic) acid,
propanoic acid etc. Ethanoic acid is always the most abundant of these and the
concentration in produced water can be between negligible (less than 10 - 20 mg/l) to
more than 500 mg/l.
• Larger organic acids such as Napthenic acids are not soluble in water and stay in the
oil phase. The acidity of oil is measured in terms of Total Acid Number (TAN), which
is determined through titration. The TAN of crude oils varies significantly between
fields ranging from negligible (less than 0.05 mgKOH/g) to more than 5 mgKOH/g.
It is stated in [API 17TR2, 2003] that TAN below 3.5 mgKOH/g should not cause any
concerns. It is also important to note that there are large numbers of organic acids
that vary in structure and size. Thus the composition of acids in crude oil can be
substantially different between 2 fields with the same TAN value.
• Injection fluids.
In the Joint Industry Project SESAM PA11 [SESAM PA11, 2008]tests were carried out to
explore the impact of organic acids.
• Water soluble organic acids clearly enhanced the degradation. However, acetic acid
enhanced the degradation but was not the worst at the test temperatures which were
fairly high.
• A commercially available mixture of Naphthenic acids was mixed into a neutral oil.
It was demonstrated that at around 100 oC, the degradation was enhanced even at
concentrations as low as 0.5 mgKOH/g. It is not known how representative the tested
Naphthenic mixture is for typical high TAN crude oils.
[API 17TR2, 2003] reports field experience based on analysis of flexible pipes with PA11
pressure sheaths that have been retrieved from service and analysed. 4 of the pipes were
retrieved because of pressure sheath failures while others were retrieved due to suspicion of
severe degradation.
• Two of the failed pipes were risers, one with an inside CIV=1.05 and the other with
CIV= 0.95 next to the rupture. Both of these risers were exposed to crude oil with
a total acid number (TAN) of around 1 mgKOH/g. The riser with CIV=1.05 showed
signs of striations on the fracture surfaces indicating initiation and growth of a fatigue
crack on the inside surface.
• Two flowlines that failed, one with CIV=0.89 and one with CIV=0.81 dl/g. Both of
these lines have been exposed to relatively frequent batch treatment with methanol. It

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
is plausible to suspect that the methanol will have carried dissolved oxygen that may
have contributed together with the methanol to create the substantial degradation.
The temperature histories for the exposure of the different pipes retrieved vary in quality but
some histories are reasonably well known. There are indications of cases where the service
lives predicted from [API 17TR2, 2003] are over-conservative but also cases where they are
under-conservative. This suggests that the curves are not adequately discriminating between
different environments.
Field experience over recent years show indications that fields with TAN below 1 mgKOH/g or
with water soluble acid concentrations up in a few hundreds mg/l may cause more degradation
than expected from available models.
There is clearly a need to develop more discriminating and precise models for degradation
of PA11 in flexible pipes. A paramount issue, in relation to the development of service life
models, is that PA11 ageing tests in neutral and nominally similar conditions produce very
different results between laboratories. This is demonstrated in Figure A2.11 .
Figure A2.11: Comparison of the terminal CIV reported from different laboratories for ageing
of PA11 in nominally neutral environments. (Courtesy of Einar Øren, Statoil)
This shows the substantial variation in reported CIV equilibrium or terminal CIV level at the
end of tests. There is clearly a need to understand why different laboratories get such very
large differences in CIV from similar tests. Questions that are asked are:
• Is the oxygen control inadequate in some laboratories?
• How important is the ratio between sample volume and water?
• What impacts are there from renewing the fluid every time sample is retrieved?

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
• How important is the starting water quality?

These questions may be a good starting point for development of harmonized test procedures
to ensure reproducibility between laboratories. This would be a necessary starting point for
testing to develop better service life models to discriminate better between different exposure
conditions.
There are cases where the initial acceptance criterion, CIV=1.2dl/g, defined in [API 17TR2, 2003]
may be too strict. In particular for exposure environments leading to a high CIV gradient
through the thickness there may be good justifications for refining the acceptance criterion.
Failures of PA11 pressure sheaths suffering from excessive hydrolysis will take place through
either brittle fracture or through crack growth from the inside. Thus the margin against brit-
tle facture and the resistance against initiation of fatigue crack will define the actual margins
with respect to failure. A better understanding of the mechanisms and drivers would enable
development of more appropriate acceptance criteria.
Appropriate and adequately discriminating service life models and acceptance criteria should
be of very high value to the industry. In some fields it may save substantial costs for
replacement while other fields may operate PA11 pipes at a higher risk of failure than
accepted.
Summary of observations:
• PA11 pressure sheaths exposed to oil production (including water) have remaining
volatiles in the region of 4% - 7%. These volatiles will be plasticizer, water and some
amount of hydrocarbons. A corresponding reduction in volume will develop compared
to fresh material containing 12% plasticiser.
• PA11 pressure sheaths exposed to dry gas can loose more plasticizer and will not absorb
much water since the gas is dry.
• The nature of the degradation process is that the ageing is cumulative. Short periods
at high temperature only contribute to the ageing according to time and temperature.
• Be aware of batch treatment with chemicals such as methanol. They may carry suffi-
cient oxygen to have an impact on PA11 after many repeated treatments.
• Even in aged condition the ductility of PA11 will depend on temperature and exhibit
the lowest ductility at low temperatures. Thus aged PA11 pressure sheaths will be
most prone to fracture during cool down or at start-up after shut down when high
pressure may be re-applied.
• Operators that find that flexible pipes have expended more than 50% of their useful
lives according to [API 17TR2, 2003] and have been exposed to environments with
high concentrations of water soluble organic acids and/or crude oils with TAN above
0.25 mgKHO/g should consult with experts for advice.
• The anti-oxidant package in RILSAN was changed between 1995 and 2000. The
different manufacturers took the new formulation into use at different times.
PA12 PA12 was used to a limited extent as pressure sheath back in late 80ies and early
90ies.
Wellstream has qualified the PA12 grade Vestamid LX9020 from Degussa Evonik in 2006
and since that have delivered significant lengths of flexible pipes with this grade. The grade

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
is plasticized and was specially developed for application as pressure sheath in flexible pipes.
Publications from the material supplier and the pipe manufacturer claim that this PA12 grade
is better than PA11 Rilsan BESNO P40 TL in nearly all aspects from tests of the 2 materials
in parallel [Buchner et al., 2007]. However, some of the results they have published for PA11
are significantly worse than those that have been reported by other laboratories that have
tested Rilsan BESNO P40 TL. It would clearly be valuable to see testing of PA12 Vestamid
LX9020 by independent laboratories using harmonized test procedures.
The polymer structure is similar: PA12 has one more Carbon atom with 2 associated Hydro-
gen atoms for each monomer unit. Apart from this PA11 and PA12 are identical in terms
of the molecule structure but the average number of monomer units per polymer chain may
differ. The PA12 from Evonik will probably be plasticized differently compared to PA11
and it may contain other stabilizer packages. The degree of crystallization and size of the
crystalline regions may be different thus influencing some of the properties. It is very likely
that PA12 is going to be affected by similar issues as those that have been experienced for
PA11 but to different degrees.
The acceptance criteria and service life curves published in [API 17TR2, 2003] only apply to
the PA11 grade used as pressure sheath in flexible pipes and should not be used for PA12
unless adequate documentation is provided.
TP30 Technip published a paper in 2013 [Chollet and Do, 2013] reporting that they had
completed the qualification according to [API 17J, 2008] for a new Polyamide that they call
TP30. The paper provides no information of the structure of the polymer. It is claimed
that TP30 has improved hydrolysis resistance compared to PA11 and that it can be used at
temperatures that are 10 to 15 o C above the upper limits for PA11 depending on pH and
application. They report that permeation coefficients that are lower than for PA11 for both
methane and hydrogen sulfide and the blistering resistance is reported to give no blistering
after 20 cycles of 950 bar, 70 bar/min at 115 o C.
Many results are presented on graphs without dimension on one or both of the axes making
it impossible to make quantitative comparisons to results for other polyamides.
Testing of HPPA by independent laboratories would be valuable to determine how much
better than PA11 it is.
Polyethylene
Polyethylene is a low cost versatile polymer that comes in a variety of grades. It has good
chemical resistance against most of the chemicals relevant in oil and gas production but it
will degrade from exposure to oxygen at elevated temperature. However, one weakness is
the high solubility of hydrocarbons, which leads to swelling and limited blistering resistance
under rapid decompression in gas. These phenomena vary with grade type and increase with
temperature.
Polyethylene can also be sensitive to Environmental Stress Cracking (ESC) where crazing
and stepwise cracking is promoted by certain chemicals in high stress / high strain locations.
Some relevant treatment chemicals could promote ESC.
Polyethylene is characterized by density, which reflects the degree of crystallinity. Primarily
HDPE (High Density Polyethylene) and to some extent MDPE (Medium Density Polyethy-

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
lene) are used in flexible pipes as pressures sheath of outside cover. In general the higher
density improve properties such as swelling and blistering.
Pressure sheath applications for Polyethylene are limited to water injection and oil and
gas production and transport at temperatures normally well below 60 °C at relatively low
pressures.
Cross Linked Polyethylene (XLPE) One of the reasons Polyethylene is sensitive to

swelling and blistering is the relatively weak bonding (Van de Waals forces) between neigh-
bouring polymer chains in the amorphous phase. To enhance the use-boundary, techniques
have been developed to crosslink HDPE to establish links between molecule chains. There
are several ways to introduce cross-linking in but only two of these have proven to be suitable
for flexible pipe pressure sheath:
• Crosslinking by Silane, where Silicon atoms take part in the crosslinking between chains.
This method has been adopted for extruded flexible pipe liners by Technip and is
protected by a patent. The cross linking must be activated by circulation of hot water
after the flexible pipe has been completed with end fittings.
• Crosslinking with the help of peroxide that promote a direct Carbon-Carbon bond
between neighbouring chains. NOV has developed and patented a technique for flexible
pipes
[Procida and Nielsen, 2007] where the cross linking is activated just after extrusion
by heating with Infrared Radiation. This means that the cross linking takes place
at temperatures above where crystal formation starts in the polymer thus ensuring
crosslinking also in the crystalline phase.
Crosslinking will extend the use envelope both to higher temperatures and higher pressures.
The manufacturers claim that the use temperature can be extended to 90 °C and operating
pressure up to above 300 bar depending on temperature. The advantages from cross-linking
HDPE are:
• Reduced swelling in the temperature region 60 - 90 °C
• Improved blistering resistance
• Better creep resistance
Cross-linking by peroxide and IR radiation is claimed to ensure a higher cross-linking density
because the cross linking is done at temperatures above the formation of crystalline phase.
This may influence the crystal structure and thus provide somewhat different mechanical
properties than material cross-linked by Silane. But the differences may have limited im-
pacts on the performance of the material in the flexible pipe. The technique used by NOV
allows test samples to be taken of fully cross-linked liner before outer layers are put on and
integration of end-fittings. NOV report blistering tests documenting no blistering after 20
cycles of 345 bar, 80 bar/min at 90°C
Swelling, reduced creep resistance and blistering are the properties that define the use limit
for both PE and XLPE but with higher limits for XLPE. In Figure A2.12 the measured
swelling of one type of XLPE is shown as function of temperature in 2 different types of
crude oils.
These swelling curves are generated on free samples directly exposed to the fluid. A pressure
sheath in a flexible pipe is normally confined between the Carcass and the pressure armour.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure A2.12: Swelling as a function of temperature of one type of XLPE in 2 different crude
oils.
This means that the material is only allowed to expand to a limited degree and the tendency
to swelling will generate a hydrostatic pressure. The confinement may well improve the
blistering tendency and the softening from ingress of hydrocarbon species. However, the
forces generated from the tendency to swelling will at sufficiently high temperature produce
enhanced creep into available gaps and may eventually damage supporting structures. The
implication of this is that exposure of XLPE and HDPE to very high temperature (relative
to the design temperature) for a short period may cause permanent damage to supporting
components in the end fitting or to the Carcass.
Polyvinylidene Fluoride (PVDF)
PVDF is a chemically resistant polymer suitable for use at high temperatures. For flexible
pipes it has been the only pressure material for high temperature applications - above 90
°C. It is also the most expensive of the pressure sheath materials and it is the material type
that has created most pressure sheath related failures. The main chemical threat is alkaline
fluids, which may have to be taken into consideration for some injection chemical (amines,
sodium hydroxide)
PVDF is generally less ductile than the Polyamides and Polyethylene material and it is notch
sensitive in relation to initiation of fatigue cracks. The first PVDF formulation taken into use
by Technip was Coflon (Technip trade name), which contained 19% plasticizer (DBS). The
plasticizer will in hydrocarbon environments be extracted to a significant degree resulting in
corresponding shrinkage.
Axial (and circumferential) stresses are generated during cool down due to the differences in
thermal expansion coefficients between the PVDF and steel. The stresses generated during
cool down of PVDF tend to become much higher than for other polymers because:
• PVDF is typically used at the highest temperatures giving larger temperature changes

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
during cool down

• PVDF exhibit generally higher tensile modulus which in turn give higher stresses for a
given level of strain
The shrinkage due to loss of plasticizer in combination with axial stresses and the weight of
the Carcass resulted in pull-out of the Coflon pressure sheath from the sealing and anchoring
arrangement in the end fitting used by Technip before 1995. This resulted in design changes
for the sealing arrangement and better procedures including de-plasticization of the PVDF
prior to termination in the end fitting.
After the problems with the end-fitting pull-outs other alternative PVDF formulations have
also been taken into use with much lower or no plasticizer content. One of the new PVDF
grades is a copolymer where the other chemical groups have been introduced together with
VDF in the polymer chains to give the suitable properties for pressure sheaths. There has
also been a drive to develop more fatigue resistant formulations.
Because of the notch sensitivity of PVDF sacrificial sheaths have been introduced to protect
the main/middle sealing sheath in risers, in particular with Coflon barrier. There are now
2-layer and 1-layer solutions for PVDF barriers in risers depending on manufacturer and
material used.
There have been a number of cases where the Carcass has collapsed in pipes with 3 layers.
One of the explanations has been that under decompression and cool down hydrocarbon gas
dissolved in the polymer may collect between the inner sacrificial layer and the sealing layer.
When the drainage of the gas is not adequate in the axial direction the pressure build up can
be sufficient to induce collapse of the Carcass. This failure mode is typically limited to high
pressure/high temperature applications.
The different grades of PVDF will exhibit somewhat different properties and potential in-
tegrity issues will depend on the layer design. Thus the issues below will not necessarily apply
to the same degree from grade to grade and from manufacturer to manufacturer:
• Fatigue and notch sensitivity is a concern for PVDF materials. Thermal cycling with
large temperature variations is potentially a threat due to the differences in the thermal
expansion coefficient between steel and PVDF [Melve, 2001]. Quality control during
manufacturing and design solutions to avoid notches is recommended.
• There have recently been reports of tear out or fatigue of Carcass in the end fittings
in 3 layer Coflon pipes. It has been demonstrated that one of the causes can be un-
relaxed residual stresses from loss of plasticizer combined with stresses induced during
cool down and reduced friction to outside layers inducing forces in the Carcass that
can result in tear-out and fatigue [Farnes et al., 2013].
• Susceptibility to cracking at low temperatures and there have been cracking problems
in connection with manufacturing for non-plasticised grades.
• Crazing has been observed in PVDF liner. The consequence of crazing is not fully
understood. There is a concern that crazing may affect the fatigue properties.
Different manufacturers have different strategies for their PVDF pressure sheaths using 1
layer, 2 layers and 3 layer designs but the tendency is to go for 1-layer designs.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
General aspects and comparison
Material properties Some documented quantified performance properties of some of the

polymers are shown in the Table A2.9:
Table A2.9: Properties of some pressure sheath materials
Grade / Den- Melt- Tensile Tensile Thermal Ther-

name sity Pois- Glass ing Modulus at Modu- expansion mal
g/cm3 son tran- temp room temp lus at coefficient con-
ratio si- Tm C Mpa elevated 10-6 K ductiv-
tion temp. ity
Tg C W/(m·K)
PA11 / 1,03 42 182 310 (fresh) 170 at 110 (-30 -> 0.24
RILSAN increase with 60°C +50°C) (at 60
BESNO P40 loss of 165 at 230 (+50 -> °C)
TL plasticiser 80°C + 120 °C)
PA12 / 0,47 36 171 450 160 (+23 ->
VESTAMID +55 °C)
LX9020
TP30 ? ? 661 198 at 140 at 20 °C 0.26 at
(Technip) 100 °C 25 °C
HDPE 0.94 0,46 -80 120 - 500 - 1200 100 - 200 0.45 -
-0.98 130 0.52
Coflon 1100 600 at
(Technip 2000 60°C
trademark) (significant
plasticiser
loss)
Solef 1015 / 1.75 - -40 170 - 1700 - 2500 140 (at 0,2
0078 1.8 175 ambient)
Solef 60512 1.75 - 0,4 -40 170 - 1250 - 1400 800 (at 130 -> 180 0,2
(PVDF with 1.8 174 60 °C) (at ambient)
PVDF/CTFE
copolymer)
One important property that is missing in the table is permeability constants. These constants
depend on test conditions and the variation between reported (nominally comparable) values
is significant for several cases. A more in depth review is necessary to present useful data.
Guidance notes In connection with material selection of polymers for new pipes it is
important to identify all aspects of the exposure ranging from chemical composition of fluids
and gases (including injection chemicals), physical conditions such as temperature & pressure,
pH under production conditions, expected number of shut downs including pressure and
temperature excursions and rates of changes. It is important to note that the pH measured
in samples of formation water is not the pH under production conditions, which has to be
calculated based the alkalinity of the produced water and the partial pressure of acid gases
such as CO2 .
If the material proposed for the application has limited field experience or will be operating
close to or beyond earlier use limits, specific qualification tests should be carried out at harsher
conditions (accelerated) than the service conditions. The test conditions and acceptance
criteria should be determined with the involvement of experts on the performance of polymers
in flexible pipes.

Section A2.3
OC2017 A-001
The manufacturer should specify the exposure limits for all relevant parameters and define
what the consequence would be for operating outside these limits.
It is a good idea in many cases to install coupons taken from the extruded pressure sheath
in the production stream in an arrangement where the coupons are directly exposed to
all parameters of the flow. There should be enough coupons to allow periodic retrieval
throughout the expected service life (including possibilities for life extension)
To assess the performance of polymer pressure sheaths it is essential collect and store tem-
perature and pressure continuously for the full service life. It is also important to document
on a regular basis the composition of fluids and gases and record all instances of injection of
chemicals.

Chapter A3
Failure Modes
Author: 4Subsea, Svein Sævik (NTNU)
97
Section A3.1
OC2017 A-001
A3.1 Purpose
A3.1.1 Description of document objective
A comprehensive understanding of failure modes is essential for both the design phase and
operational phases:
• Design phase: ensure that pipes are designed with adequate consideration and measures
to avoid relevant failure.
• Operational phase: ensure that all relevant failure modes can be identified and assessed
in terms of remaining service life, safety margins and quantification of risks as part of
integrity management and lifetime assessment.
To meet the needs for insight into failure modes this chapter of the handbook has been
developed with the following purposes:
• Define concepts and terminology relating to failure modes.
• Define a framework for assessment of failures in flexible pipes.
• Present state of the art for relevant failure causes and ultimate failure modes with
description of failure and degradation mechanisms, consequences and mitigations.
• Present available and relevant failure statistics.
A3.1.2 Scope of document
The primary scope of this document is to provide basis for systematic Integrity Manage-
ment and Lifetime assessment of flexible pipes. Understanding of flexible pipe degradation
mechanisms are essential in such work.
This chapter is concentrating on important failure causes relevant for flexible pipes in oper-
ation. The following should be noted:
1. It is assumed that the flexible pipe has been successfully designed, manufactured and
installed according to [API 17J, 2008]. Failure mechanisms experienced during manu-
facturing and installation are hence not fully covered. Further, pipe designs are assumed
to have the required design safety margins when installed. There are examples of in-
stallation damages and design weaknesses which have had significant impact on long
term integrity and such long term effects are covered in the document, e.g. corrosion
due to cover damage and collapse due to design with multilayer pressure sheath
2. Important failure mechanisms experienced in operation are covered
3. Failure mechanisms which ultimately may have large consequences and significant or
unknown probability are covered
4. The probability of occurrence is briefly addressed by applicability, field experience and
operational conditions
5. The chapter concentrate on failure mechanisms on the flexible pipe itself, failure mech-
anisms for ancillaries are partly addressed but such failure mechanisms will be design

Section A3.2
OC2017 A-001
dependent and the failure mechanisms addressed should be considered as examples

only
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance on how to address important failure
mechanisms when evaluation integrity of flexible pipes. The basis for the selection of failure
mechanisms and associated assessment is best available knowledge in the JIP. It is recom-
mended that these failure mechanisms must always be addressed. However, when designing a
flexible pipe system or when using this document for IM or LTA purposes it is important that
all requirements in [API 17J, 2008] as well as all failure mechanisms listed in [API 17B, 2008]
are evaluated.
Further work on failure mechanisms is recommended. This would provide improved guidance
related to all relevant failure mechanisms for flexible pipes and to quantify the probability of
failure for the different failure mechanisms
A3.2 Definitions of concepts and terminology
A3.2.1 General concepts
Ultimate pipe failure
The ultimate failure of flexible pipes will lead to loss of pipe functionality. This will either
be loss of containment or blockage of the flow path. In more detail, it is possible to define
4 types of loss of functionality:
• Loss of containment - full pipe separation
• Loss of containment - leakage
• Blockage or restriction of the flow path caused by failure of a pipe layer (Carcass or
liner collapse)
• Blockage or restriction of the flow path caused by the bore medium & bore conditions,
or equipment used in pipe or well
It should be noted that blockage or restriction of the flow path caused by failure of a pipe
layer might lead to subsequent processes and events leading to loss of containment. Blockage
or restrictions of the flow path caused by the bore medium and bore conditions may in some
cases be removed. In such cases it is important to be aware that the method to remove a
blockage could introduce damages to pipe layers.
Examples of ultimate failure modes are:
• Progressive rupture of tensile armour leading to full opening of the bore of the pipe to
the surrounding
• Rupture of the outer sheath when there is a leakage from the bore to the annulus
• Collapse of the carcass

Section A3.2
OC2017 A-001
Layer failure
Loss of functionality of a flexible pipe will often be the result of a sequence of damage events
and/or time driven degradation mechanisms and layer (or component) failures.
Layer failure (or component failure) imply loss of layer (or component) functionality.
Loss of functionality of a layer will be the result of a time driven degradation process or a
damage event. This can be described in terms of a degradation mechanism, events, root
causes, failure mechanisms and consequences for the layer itself and for other parts of the
pipe structure. The root cause of the degradation in one layer may be loss of functionality
for another layer at an earlier stage.
In principle, layer failure where the degradation starts will be the result of operation outside
design limits, unforeseen events or design incompatibilities. Layers in which known degra-
dation mechanisms are taken into account during design should meet defined acceptance
criteria at the end of the design life.
Integrity management should be directed at maintaining adequate margins against the failure
modes (layer or component failures).
Detection of layer failure (through monitoring or inspection) is a valuable part of integrity
management, in particular for failure sequences where the subsequent route to loss of pipe
function gives adequate time for mitigation before ultimate pipe failure (for instance holes
in outer sheath, small leakages from bore to annulus, flow restrictions).
Failure mechanism
Pipe failures should be described in terms of the failure mechanism:

1. Initiation of failure and deterioration of the layer (or component)
• Time, event or condition based failure causes
2. Observed failure mode (layer or component failure)
• Local failure effect (consequences for the layer or component itself)
3. Failure of subsequent layer(s) governed by associated failure cause
4. The ultimate loss of pipe functionality
A3.2.2 Definitions
Failure causes includes the initiators, defects, processes and mechanisms generating damage
or degradation and which are the basic reason for a failure. Failure causes may be divided
into:
• Degradation mechanisms are time based physical or chemical mechanisms or pro-
cesses by which the pipe layer degrades. Examples are: corrosion, fatigue, creep,
embrittlement, erosion,
• Damage event. Examples are physical impact, unforeseen overloads loads, excessive
bending etc.; by nature these are event driven. This can also be impacts from changing

Section A3.2
OC2017 A-001
properties of other layers or components such as forces generated on the carcass from
changes in the pressure liner.
• Service loads are condition based threats to the pipe system such as changes in
operational parameters
Layer failure is the loss of layer functionality.
Failure mode is the manifestation of loss of functionality for a layer in the pipe cross section,
and it is the manner by which a failure is observed.
Local effect is the consequence of a failure on the layer itself, and is the actual damage to
the pipe layer
Subsequent effect is the consequence of layer failure on other layers or components of the
pipe, leading to the end-effect (ultimate pipe failure).
End-effect of a failure consists of two parts:
• The ultimate pipe failure mode is the manifestation of loss of pipe functionality, and
it is the manner by which the ultimate pipe failure is observed.
• The ultimate pipe failure effect is the consequence of loss of pipe functionality: either
loss of containment and/or blockage/restriction of the flow path.
Failure mechanism
Represents the chain of events, in terms of mechanisms and processes from the initial failure
cause to the ultimate pipe failure
Probability of Failure (PoF)
The probability of the Ultimate Pipe Failure often annualized
A3.2.3 Probability of Failure (PoF)
An important task in Integrity Management (IM) is to quantify the probability of failure as

function of time in service. IM should focus attention on failure causes with the highest
probabilities for leading to loss of pipe function.
IM rely on risk ranking where the risk is the product of Probability of failure PoF and
Consequence of failure (CoF). Failure causes are assessed in terms of remaining time to
loss of pipe function relative to required service life, relative utilization within Miner sum
frameworks or safety margins relative loss of pipe function. In principle these parameters
have to be converted to probability of loss of pipe function to enable consistent use in risk
assessment.
Some ultimate failure modes can be initiated by damage events taking place during installa-
tion or operation.
• Damage events that have been detected and documented constitute a condition that
has to be subjected to a separate assessment to determine the PoF based on calculated
remaining service life or reduced capacity.
• PoF that relate to damaging events that have not been detected or events that may
take place will typically be dominated by the probability of the event taking place.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
The probability of failure for ultimate failure modes that are initiated through long-term
degradation processes will be directly linked to the rate of degradation and the failure se-
quence following the initial layer failure.
It should be noted that the probability of failure in risk assessment is related to the ultimate
loss of function and will thus represent the combined barriers against failure of the layer
where the degradation process starts and for subsequent steps in the failure sequence.
A3.2.4 Format for Description of Failure Causes
One of the aims of this chapter is to identify relevant failure causes for all layers and compo-
nents and described these to a level where it is possible to identify the level of susceptibility
and estimate associated PoF. For each failure cause the following should be identified:
• Layer & layer function
• Material
• Applicability of failure cause for various pipe structures (design) and conditions
• Failure cause and promoting conditions
• Layer failure mechanism and the way it will manifest itself
• Acceptance criteria
• Procedure or models to predict remaining time to layer failure
• Identification of the operating or environmental conditions most likely to induce the

layer failure
• Consequence of layer failure with identification of events and mechanisms leading to

ultimate pipe failure
• Time scale for ultimate pipe failure after initial layer failure (imminent —>long term)
• Parameters that will influence the time from layer failure to full pipe failure
• How will the ultimate pipe failure manifest itself
• Probability of failure considerations for pipe loss of functionality
• Possible mitigations against unacceptably high PoF
• Monitoring, inspection & prediction: methods and strategies
• Operational field experience
Failure trees should be specified identifying all degradation mechanisms that lead to one
ultimate failure mode.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
A3.3 Flexible Pipe Failures
A3.3.1 Overview of layer failures and failure causes
This section presents a list of known layer failures and failure causes for flexible pipes
based on tables 30-31 in [API 17B, 2008] and a report from PSA Norway on flexible pipes
[Muren, 2008] and JIP provided information. The list is revised to include only failures which
imply loss of layer function. Defects in tables 30-31 in [API 17B, 2008] which are considered
as causes rather than failures are categorized accordingly in Table A3.1. A selection of the
failure causes are subject to a detailed evaluation in the next sections, also including ancil-
lary devices as tether clamp, tethers and buoyancy modules. The selection is based on the
dominant failures in historical data (details are given in Section A3.4 Failure Statistics) and
failures which are considered important although considered carefully addressed in design.
Table A3.1: Layer failures and failure causes - ref: [API 17B, 2008], [Muren, 2008] and JIP
provided information. Column ’Defect’ refers to appropriate section in [API 17B, 2008]
Pipe Defect Layer failure (loss Failure cause

Layer of layer - Failure drivers and initiators
functionality) - Degradation mechanisms and damage events
Carcass 1.2 Unlocking - Overbending
deformation or - Carcass axial overloading
carcass tear-off - Excess tension with bending
- Pigging damage
1.3 Collapse Excessive pressure differential across carcass wall:
- Pressure build-up between multilayer pressure
sheaths
- Rapid depressurization
- Gas release of dissolved gases in the pressure
sheath
- Hydrate melting in the wall (hypothesis)
Mechanical loads:
- Overbending of the pipe
- Mechanical crushing
Erosion, corrosion or wear resulting in thinning of
the carcass may lead to reduced collapse resistance
1.4 Circumferential - Carcass fatigue
crack or rupture (or –> Low cycle fatigue from loads imposed from the
fracture in carcass pressure sheath during shut down
strip) –> High frequency vibrations due to vortex
shedding at carcass cavities (in gas pipes)
- Carcass-to-carcass (wire-to-wire) wear or friction
- Rapid melting of hydrates formed inside the
carcass structure
- Stress corrosion resulting from high chloride
content of the transported commodity
- H2 S corrosion (pitting) of the carcass material

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001

Internal 2.1, Crack, hole or - Ageing embrittlement
pressure 2.2 rupture –> (PA11 (hydrolysis, oxidation),
sheath (2.4, –> PVDF (Deplasticization due to high
2.5, temperature. Some types of PVDF are increasingly
2.6, brittle at low temperatures),
2.7, –> HDPE (oxidation))
2.8) - Excess creep (extrusion) of polymer into gaps
between armours.
- Blistering
- Fatigue in polymer
- Collapse inducing excessive deformation strains
- Wear / nibbing due to abrasion between pressure
sheath and carcass and/or pressure armour
- Bonding between PVDF-sheaths (potential
fabrication defect in multilayer pressure sheath
structures)
2.3 Collapse Collapse a. Smooth bore: excessive pressure
differential across pressure sheath
b. Rough bore: associated with carcass collapse
(see above: Carcass)
Pressure 3.1, Individual or - Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) or sulfide stress
armour 3.4, multiple wire cracking (SSC)
layer 3.5 rupture –> ’High’ H2 S levels in particular when material
selection has not identified the need for sour service
steel
- Corrosion
–> Acid species such as CO2 diffusing from the
bore to a water filled annulus.
- Wire-to-wire wear and fatigue
- Excess internal pressure
- Failure of tensile or back-up pressure armour
3.2 Development of - Overbending
excessive gaps - Excess tension
between - Impact
neighbouring wires - Failure of tensile or back-up pressure armour
through unlocking - Radial compression (at installation)
or separation of very - Excess torsion (at installation)
long circumferential
cracks.
3.3 Collapse - Impact or point contact
- Excess tension
- Radial compression (at installation)
3.6 Longitudinal wire Wire-to-wire contact and local stress concentration
crack

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001

Back-up 4.1, Rupture (single wire - Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) or sulfide stress
pressure 4.4 or all wires) cracking (SSC)
armour –> ’High’ H2 S levels in particular when material
layer selection has not identified the need for sour service
steel
- Corrosion
- Acid species such as CO2 diffusing from the bore
to a water filled annulus.
- Excess internal pressure
- Failure of tensile or back-up pressure armour
4.5 Individual or - Wear due to abrasion between back-up pressure
multiple wire crack armour layer and (inner) pressure armour layer
- Fatigue
Tensile 5.1, Individual or - Corrosion leading to loss of cross section
armour 5.4, multiple-wire –> Acid species such as CO2 diffusing from the
layer 5.5 rupture bore to a water filled annulus
–> Oxygen corrosion resulting in sea water ingress
and renewal combined with inadequate cathodic
protection
- Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) or sulfide stress
cracking (SSC)
–> ’High’ H2 S levels in particular when material
selection has not identified the need for sour service
steel
- Excess tension or internal pressure
- Fatigue
- Rupture from Impact
- Deformation from impacts leading to reduced
fatigue life.
- Wear between steel armor layers and other layers
5.2 - Buckling of the - Excessive axial compression
pipe - Overtwist
- Buckling of tensile
wires: radial
(bird-caging) or
lateral buckling
5.3 Kinking - Impact or point contact
- Error/defect from design, manufacturing or
installation
- Installation
–> Handling on board vessel
–> Stroke back before subsea tie-in
Anti-wear 6.1, Excessive wear - Ageing leading to embrittlement
layer 6.2 leading to radial - Wear from excessive contact forces
contact between - Clustering (manufacturing)
armour layers in
dynamic pipes

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001

Insulation 7.1, Inadequate - Crushed layer
layer 7.2, insulation –> During installation
7.3 (potentially causing –> External overpressure
pipe clogging) –> Inadequate pressure resistance
- Flooded layer
–>Ingress of seawater (e.g. hole in outer sheath)
- Inappropriate design
Outer 8.1, Hole, tear, rupture - Impact

sheath 8.3 or crack - Wear or abrasion
(8.2) - Excessive annulus pressure build-up
- Ageing embrittlement and degradation
End fitting 9.1 Internal pressure - Pressure sheath shrinkage
sheath pull-out - Pressure sheath creep
- Loss of friction
- Tear of pressure sheath with inadequate ductility
9.2, Tensile-armour - See above: tensile armour wire rupture
9.6 pull-out (individual - Epoxy degradation (due to sour service or high
or all wires) temperature)
- Loss of friction
- Excess tension
9.3 Outer sheath - Outer sheath creep
pull-out - Excess annulus pressure
9.4 Vent-valve blockage - Blockage due to annulus fluids, foreign fluids or
objects from vent system, corrosion, fabrication
error
9.5 Vent-valve leakage - Corrosion - Seal failure
9.7 Failure of sealing - Erroneous / inadequate design, fabrication or
system (sealing installation
rings, etc.) - Excess internal pressure, tension or torsion
- Excessively low temperature
9.8 Crack or rupture of See above: pressure armour or back-up pressure
pressure armour or armour wire rupture
back-up pressure
armour
9.9 Crack or rupture of See above: tensile armour wire rupture
tensile armour
9.10 Structural failure of - Excess internal pressure, tension or torsion
end fitting body or - Inadequate design
flange - Hydrostatic collapse
- Corrosion or chemical degradation
–> Exposure to seawater (diminished anodes or
coating break down)
- Fatigue
- Brittle fracture
9.11 Cracking of pressure See above: internal pressure sheath (crack, hole or
sheath rupture)

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
A3.3.2 Detailed evaluation of selected flexible pipe layer failure causes
Carcass
Carcass collapse Evaluation of failure causes for carcass collapse is presesnted in Table
A3.2
Table A3.2: Carcass collapse
Layer & layer Carcass prevents collapse; protects pressure sheath from mechanical
function abrasion and to some extent also chemicals. However, the latter is mostly
a drawback with the possibility of chemicals being trapped behind carcass
prolonging the exposure
Materials Mainly stainless steel, see [API 17B, 2008]
Applicability of Applicable for any multilayer pressure sheath pipe designs.
failure cause for Very rapid depressurization of any rough bore pipe (Depressurization rates
various pipe within manufacturer’s limits are considered safe for single layer pressure
structures (design) sheaths).
and conditions. Any rough bore pipe with reduced collapse resistance due to erosion,
[Note limitations, corrosion, ovalization, excessive bending or mechanical damage.
ref Section A3.1.2]
Degradation Interlayer pressure build-up in the gap between carcass and pressure
mechanisms. sheath, or for pipes with multilayer pressure sheaths: between the pressure
sheaths, or pressure outside pressure sheath. Excessive pressure in annulus
due to liquid filling at large water depth.
At a sudden pressure drop in pipe bore, there is still an outside pressure
which exerts a pressure force on the pressure sheath and/or the carcass;
causing the ultimate collapse.
Layer failure I. Collapse due to high pressure in the annulus
mechanism and the Often due to hole in the outer sheath combined with reduced carcass
way it will manifest collapse capacity.
itself
II. Rapid depressurization (the most probable cause)
The mechanism depends on the cross section and number of pressure
sheaths. The failure and its three different modes are illustrated in Figure
A3.1 and Figure A3.2 .
Single layer pressure sheaths
Operation within operational limits and permissible depressurization rates
is considered safe.
Two layer pressure sheaths

The carcass and the second pressure sheath are both terminated in the
pipe ends. The first pressure sheath lying between the carcass and the
second pressure sheath is not terminated in the pipe ends. Hence, for a
pipe in operation, fluids will over time migrate through the end-fitting and
by diffusion through the inner pressure sheath and into the gap between
the first and second pressure sheaths. The pressure in this gap is then
approximately the same as the bore pressure. Slow depressurization is
required to avoid large differential pressures across the inner pressure
sheath. This is due to the small channel in the end-fitting. Thus, a rapid
decompression of the bore may cause carcass collapse.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Three layer pressure sheaths

Here the pipe wall structure is similar to the two layer structure with an
additional third pressure sheath on the outside of the second pressure
sheath. This layer is terminated in the pipe ends.
For a riser in operation, there will be diffusion through the pressure
sheaths. Dependent on the operational and environmental conditions, the
temperature gradient through the cross section may be so that the diffused
gas accumulates and possibly condensates in the gap between the second
and third pressure sheaths. This will in turn cause a pressure increase in
this gap. For a pipe operating at 200 bars it is estimated that soon after
pressure relief of the bore, a pressure of over 100 bars might be obtained in
the gap between the second and third pressure sheath. Slow process of
diffusion, slow depressurization is required to limit differential pressures
across the pressure sheaths. On the contrary, a rapid decompression of the
bore may cause carcass collapse.
III. Gas release of dissolved gases in the pressure sheaths

Reference is given to [Farnes et al., 2013]. This failure is applicable for
pipes with multilayer pressure sheaths operating at high pressures (≈
300-400 bars). Dissolved gases in the polymer are released and entrapped
between the second and third polymer layers, causing pressure build up
which ultimately results in collapse of the carcass and the two inner
polymer sheaths after bore depressurization.
IV. Bending of the pipe

The carcass collapse capacity is reduced in bending; the reduction is
significant close to MBR. Handling of the pipe may cause locally large
curvature. For significant bending close to MBR, hydrostatic pressure may
be sufficient to cause carcass collapse, all dependent upon the designed
carcass collapse capacity.
V. Hydrate melting in the wall (hypothesis)

This failure mechanism is at present not fully understood. However, the
components for hydrate formation may diffuse through the pressure
sheaths and hydrates may form in the gap between the pressure sheaths
under certain conditions (high pressures and low temperatures), during a
shut-down. Then due to heating (e.g. start-up with circulation of oil
during oil production) the hydrate melts and releases gas; resulting in a
significant pressure increase sufficient to cause carcass collapse.
The collapse manifests itself as carcass folding (typical heart shape) over a
distance of the pipe, as illustrated in Figure A3.3, possibly with rupture of
the carcass. The carcass collapse may progress in discrete steps: a starting
collapse manifested as a dent, and subsequently a total collapse at a later
depressurization event.
Differences are seen with respect to the number of collapsed layers. In case
of water and hydrostatic pressure in annulus, all layers (all pressure sheaths
and the carcass) may collapse.
Conditions - High operational bore pressure in combination with rapid
promoting depressurizations (frequent shut-downs)
degradation - Pressure sheath and carcass designs promoting interlayer pressure
build-up: In particular 3-layer pressure sheaths. Also promoted by
end-fittings manufactured with limited passage for interlayer fluids to
escape from the gap between pressure sheaths

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Acceptance criteria No permanent deformations are allowed.

for degradation
mechanism
Procedure or models - Full scale testing (performed by vendors)
to predict service - Diffusion calculations
life or PoF for layer - Analytical tools: Recommend 3D FEA
Identification of the - Shut down with rapid depressurization
operating or - Pipe bending
environmental
conditions most - Heating after hydrate events in bore
likely to induce the
ultimate layer loss
of functionality
Consequence of loss - Complete or partial bore obstruction
of layer functionality - Loss of containment (leakage)
with identification
of events and The pressure sheath(s) may be intact after the carcass collapse. However,
mechanisms leading it has lost its inner support and is vulnerable to pressure cycles: The
to ultimate pipe pressure sheath will then unfold to somewhat near its original shape when
failure the bore is pressurized and then collapse during bore depressurizations.
Repeated cycling will ultimately lead to rupture of the pressure sheath with
leakage to annulus and subsequently pipe leakage.
Time scale for loss Imminent: Bore flow obstruction
of pipe functionality
after initial loss of Medium-long term: Damage to pressure sheath progressing to loss of
layer function containment (leakage)
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will Bore flow obstruction: Carcass design and the pressure differential across
influence the time the sheath at the time of collapse, the result may vary from a beginning
from loss of initial collapse in form of a small dent to a near total pipe blockage.
layer functionality Loss of containment: Damage to pressure sheath in terms of crack
to full pipe failure initiation and/or pressure sheath deformation. The time to leakage is often
governed by the progression into pressure sheath.
How will the Loss of pipe function in terms of pipe blockage.
ultimate pipe failure Loss of containment: leakage.
manifest itself
Probability of failure 3-layer pressure sheaths: Very high, provided high operational pressures
considerations for and frequent/rapid depressurizations
pipe loss of
functionality 1 or 2-layer pressure sheaths: Low
Possible mitigations Operational procedures
against - Proper procedure for depressurizations.
unacceptable high - For multilayer structures subject to possible hydrate formation: Maintain
PoF high pressure after restart and bore heat-up
- Avoid breach in the outer sheath
- Avoid excessive bending after periods with high pressure production
Monitoring, - Annulus flow monitoring may provide early warning to avoid emerging
inspection & loss of containment.
prediction: methods - Pressure drop between subsea and topside pressure gauges may indicate
and strategies bore obstructions
- Internal inspection

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Operational field Many carcass collapses are experienced for 3-layer PVDF pressure sheath
experience risers after decompression from high operational pressures. Carcass
collapse is also experienced after seabed reconnection and local bending.
Figure A3.1: An example of possible pipe wall pressures
Figure A3.2: Carcass collapse mechanism for 1) Single layer 2) Two layer 3) Three layer
pressure sheaths

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure A3.3: Carcass collapse [Muren, 2008]
Carcass axial overloading Evaluation of failure causes for carcass axial overloadingis presented
in Table A3.3
Table A3.3: Carcass axial overloading
Layer & layer Carcass prevents collapse; protects pressure sheath from mechanical
prolonging the exposure.
Materials Mainly stainless steel, see [API 17B, 2008].
Applicability of Deepwater applications with high axial loading on carcass termination.
failure cause for Bore blockage (e.g. pigging, wax or hydrates).
various pipe Multilayer pressure sheath riser with axial load contributions from both
structures (design) gravity and polymer crimp.
and conditions.
Note limitations, ref
Section A3.1.2
Degradation A) Pipe blockage and large differential pressure
mechanisms. Initiation by pipe blockage in terms of wax or hydrate formation, slug or
erroneous pig.
The degradation is then promoted by applying a high differential pressure
across the blockage such as:
- Large inlet pressure at start up
- Injection at high pressure of chemicals/solvent to remove hydrates or wax

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
The pressure force due to the differential pressure across the blockage is
transferred by friction/mechanical coupling from the blockage to the
carcass, resulting in potentially large axial loads. This also applies for gas
producing pipes with liquid slugs where the differential pressure across the
slug is transferred by friction to the carcass at high flow velocities.
Subsequent progression is dependent on the radial contact between carcass

and the other layers in the cross section. Sufficient radial contact/coupling
may possibly save the carcass from axial overload.
B) Loss of radial contact between the inner layers

Reference is given to [Skeie et al., 2013]. In the absence of pipe
obstructions, the main axial load contributions in the carcass and the
pressure sheath(s) are due to gravity of the carcass and due to temperature
stresses in the pressure sheath(s). These axial loads are intentionally
transferred to the surrounding layers by friction and geometrical effects.
The radial contact between the inner layers may decrease over time due to:
- Changes in polymer properties (e.g. volume loss)
- Temperature and pressure effects
- Diffusion through the pressure sheaths or migration of fluids through the
end-fittings; resulting in interlayer pressurized gas/liquid pockets.
Dependent on the cross section, fabrication and operational conditions, the

loss of sufficient radial contact may allow for axial movement within the
pipe:
Either
- Axial movement of carcass relative to the remaining pipe
Or
- Axial movement of carcass and pressure sheath(s) relative to the
remaining pipe
Multilayer PVDF pressure sheaths are more vulnerable to the latter due to
possible volume loss in the PVDF over time.
The capacity against axial overloading is then dependent on the carcass
axial capacity, in combination with the axial capacity of the polymeric
pressure sheath in the latter case. Carcass axial overload is illustrated in
Figure A3.4
Layer failure The carcass geometry is important for the failure progression: the carcass
mechanism and the is intentionally manufactured with a nominal pitch allowing for some
way it will manifest extension or compression before taking significant load. Dependent on the
itself carcass geometry relative to the axial load direction, the carcass will either
reach the carcass profile limit for compression or the profile limit for
elongation. When reaching one of these limits, the carcass will start to
take significant axial load. The first of these limits to be exceeded will
govern the further progression. The carcass axial load capacity is generally
larger in compression than in elongation.
When the carcass axial load exceeds the axial capacity, the failure will
manifest itself in terms of carcass buckling, tear-off or spin out. In case of
a failure near the topside end, provided loss of radial contact over a
sufficient distance, the carcass - and possibly pressure sheath(s) - may fall
down several meters through the pipe bore. The distance of the fall will
then be limited by compression forces in carcass and radial contact with
surrounding layers.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Conditions - Fully extended carcass: the carcass does not allow for any additional
promoting extension before taking significant load.
degradation - Loss of radial contact in the cross section. This may be promoted by
changes in polymers over time, geometry and by interlayer liquids
- For blockage: Rapid pressure build-up without sufficient awareness on
pressure measurement
- Insufficient anchoring of the carcass in the end-fitting
Acceptance criteria Primarily dependent on the cross-section and the allowable utilization of
for degradation the axial capacity.
mechanism For multilayer pressure sheaths: low temperature and high pressure limits
may be established
Also dependent on
- Carcass condition (e.g. fully extended or nominal pitch)
- Dynamic or static section. Vertical dynamic sections are more critical.
Procedure or models Axial testing of carcass capacity, inspection of carcass condition and
to predict service comparison of the two.
life or PoF for layer See also description above for Acceptance criteria for degradation
mechanism.
Identification of the - Start-up sequences
operating or - Planned circulation at high pressure of chemicals for removal of pipe
environmental obstructions
conditions most - Pressure testing of cold riser
likely to induce the Important parameters:
ultimate layer loss - The location of an obstruction
of function - The amount and locations of liquids and gas in the pipe must be known
in order to calculate differential pressures
- Mechanical interaction between pressure sheath and layers inside/outside
Consequence of loss Worst case: Carcass pull-out near end-fitting. Dependent on end-fitting
of layer function design this may result in pull out of pressure sheath and pressure armour.
with identification
of events and Best case: Reduced collapse capacity. Damage to pressure sheath and
mechanisms leading possibly further progressive damage:
to ultimate pipe - If multilayer PVDF-pressure sheath: Axial loading in PVDF-sheath pulls
failure the carcass sections apart, leaving the pressure sheath exposed to carcass -
strip which may cause scratches in the pressure sheath. These scratches
may promote PVDF-fatigue when subject to temperature (or pressure)
cycles.
The failure will eventually result in pipe leakage and loss of containment.
The time scale is however significantly different for the best and worst case.
Time scale for loss Worst case: Carcass and pressure armour pull out in end-fitting, will
of pipe function cause leakage in very short time.
after initial loss of
layer function Dependent on the location of the failure and the cross section, the time
(imminent —>long scale may be from imminent to long term.
term)
Parameters that will - Location of the failure relative to end-fitting and high/low pressure end
influence the time - Cross section
from loss of initial - Variations in pressure and temperature
layer function to full - Localized concentrated dynamics
pipe failure
How will the The ultimate failure will be pipe leakage preceded by pressure rise in
ultimate pipe failure annulus. Pipe leakage may be avoided by swift and proper response to an
manifest itself increased annulus pressure.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Probability of failure Lower operational and applied pressures promote safe operation. An
considerations for example of risk evaluation for carcass capacity of selected risers is
pipe loss of function presented in [Farnes et al., 2013].
Possible mitigations - Operational procedures
against –> Avoid cold operation with high pressure
unacceptable high –> Operations should be planned with respect to carcass capacity.
PoF –> Care should be exercised at start-up and procedures for start-up should
reflect this failure mode.
–> During blockage (e.g. hydrate, wax or stuck pig) removal operation
this failure mode should be considered
Monitoring, Monitoring of pressure and temperature both subsea and topside,
inspection & particularly during start-up operation, to detect emerging pressure
prediction: methods differences and recognize the larger differential pressures.
and strategies
Internal inspections of carcass for comparison with carcass capacity.
Internal inspections should be performed after incidents where excessive
carcass axial loads are expected, such as after hydrate removals. The
carcass should be inspected both upstream and downstream of the hydrate
plug location.
Operational field The following degradation modes are observed in operation:
experience - Pipe blockage and large differential pressure
- Loss of radial contact between the inner layers
- Axial overload due to gravity and polymer crimp in multilayer pressure
sheaths.
Figure A3.4: : Sample testing and FEM analysis [Farnes et al., 2013]

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Carcass fatigue Evaluation of failure causes forcarcass fatigue is presented in Table A3.4
Table A3.4: Carcass fatigue
Layer & layer Carcass prevents collapse; protecting pressure sheath from mechanical
prolonging the exposure
Materials Mainly stainless steel, for details reference is given to [API 17B, 2008]
Applicability of Carcass fatigue is applicable to any dynamic rough bore pipes.
failure cause for
various pipe Consequence of carcass fatigue is most significant for pipes with PVDF
structures (design) pressure sheath due to risk for crack growth into pressure sheath.
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation Carcass should intentionally by design not have significant bending
mechanisms stiffness, and the carcass should have a nominal pitch allowing for some
(small displacement) extension or compression before taking significant
load. Typical carcass pitch lengths are heavily dependent on pipe
dimensions and manufacturer (Recent measurements performed of carcass
pitch length on a number of retrieved risers shows values in the range
13-22mm for 6”-9” ID risers (mainly pipes from one manufacturer)).
Initiation
I. Fabrication: Carcass too ’tight’, allowing for limited extension or

compression before taking load, which causes high contact forces
(increased bending stiffness) and high stresses in bending.
II. Sand or deposits in carcass profile limiting the extension/compression,

causing high contact forces (increased bending stiffness) and high stresses
in bending.
III. Dent or corrosion: limits (i.e. reduce) the extension and compression,
causing stress concentration (i.e. partly locked) carcass
IV. Fully stretched carcass

- Due to fabrication
- Developed over time in operation due to interaction with pressure sheath,
e.g. due to stresses in the pressure sheath induced from temperature cycles
and gravity of the carcass, see the Degradation mechanism in Section
A3.3.2 Carcass axial overloading.
V. Clamp or interface load, over MWA. Cause of ovalization, changes the

stress distribution, increased dynamic stresses in bending. MWA: All
loading in bending (all cycles) concentrated in one location: promoting
fatigue in the top section of the lower catenary
VI. Pigging. Incompatible pig may cause local carcass deformations which
in turn may provide weakened spots or points of stress concentration more
susceptible to fatigue

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Layer failure Carcass fatigue: Circumferential fracture for failures experienced in

mechanism and the operation. Fracture in carcass-strip (fracture parallel to pipe axis)
way it will manifest considered to be unlikely compared to circumferential fracture.
itself
Conditions - Dynamic bending loading: large magnitude and frequently occurring.
promoting - Reduced carcass flexibility due to the issues listed above under Initiation
degradation
Acceptance criteria Threshold value for stress level in carcass. Typically stress range above 1̃00
for degradation MPa
mechanism
Procedure or models Concern for probability of failure:
to predict service - Clamping: Clamps consisting of 2 half shells should be avoided,
life or PoF for layer particularly if exposed to bending. Clamps are recommended to be made
of 3 or 4 shells. In case of perfect fit of clamp, there are no differences
between 2 half shells and 3 or 4 half shells. However, due to fabrication
tolerances of the pipe, a poorer fit of the clamp may be the result. 3-4
shells provide a better distribution of contact force/stress
- Fully extended carcass
- Initial collapse, deformation or corrosion
Methodology: Structural model and evaluation

Identification of the - High dynamic bending promoting fatigue loading
operating or - Pressure and temperature fluctuations promoting the progression into
environmental polymer layers
conditions most
likely to induce the See description above of initiation (Degradation mechanisms) in
ultimate layer loss combination with conditions promoting degradation.
of functionality
Consequence of loss After carcass fracture:
of layer functionality - Reduced collapse capacity.
with identification Damage to surrounding layers:
of events and - If multilayer PVDF-pressure sheath: Axial loading in PVDF-sheath
mechanisms leading pulling the carcass sections apart, leaving the pressure sheath exposed to
to ultimate pipe carcass-strip which may cause scratches in the pressure sheath. These
failure scratches may cause PVDF-fatigue when subject to temperature (or
pressure) cycles.
Eventually resulting in leak from bore and subsequent pipe leakage.
If stiff carcass: after carcass circumferential fracture, concentration of pipe

curvature at fracture location.
Time scale for loss Long term
layer function
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will - Polymer properties: PVDF is sensitive to notches, such that it is
influence the time vulnerable when suffering from scratches and exposed to temperature
from loss of initial cycles
layer function to full - Carcass loading: Worse conditions with liquid in annulus and low bore
pipe failure pressure

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
How will the As for hole in pressure sheath: pipe leakage with loss of containment.
manifest itself
Probability of failure Probability reduced for new pipes as more QA on carcass is implemented.
considerations for
pipe loss of
functionality
Possible mitigations Generally, no mitigation actions in operation.
against
unacceptable high Possible modifications:
PoF - Re-termination if hot-spot near pipe end, move the most loaded point.
- Change average offset of installation, move the most loaded point.
- MBR: Add a margin to dynamic MBR. For riser over MWA, change MBR
for the pipe segment with fixed length (constant hot-spot for loading)
These actions must be confirmed with calculations/analysis.
Design: - Clamp: Use clamps made of 3 or 4 part shells, not 2 half shells.
- Fabrication follow up and QA in design. Carcass tolerances are now
improved in fabrication
Monitoring, Internal inspection to identify:
inspection & - Deposits
prediction: methods - Fully extended carcass
and strategies - Initial defects
- Fracture (at the correct time)
- Concentrated bending e.g. at tether clamps or bend stiffeners
There are several ways to perform carcass pitch measurements during an

internal inspection. There exist specific tools for these measurements.
However, some restrictions apply. In order to detect a fully extended
carcass, specific information on carcass profile is required: detailed as-built
data or a sample of the actual carcass.
QA in design and fabrication is important to reduce the probability of

occurrence for this failure mode.
Operational field Carcass fatigue resulting in ultimate pipe failure is experienced for one
experience pipe, ref. Figure A3.5 and Figure A3.6.
Illustrations of a carcass fatigue fracture and initiating fatigue fractures in pressure sheet are
shown inn Figure A3.5 and Figure A3.6.
H

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure A3.5: Carcass fatigue fracture ref. [Talisman Energy Norge AS, 2005]
Figure A3.6: Carcass fatigue: carcass strip and initiating fatigue fractures in pressure sheath,
ref. [Talisman Energy Norge AS, 2005]
Pressure sheath
Collapse of pressure sheath (Smooth Bore) Evaluation of failure causes for Collapse of
pressure sheath (Smooth Bore) is presented in Table A3.5.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Table A3.5: Collapse of pressure sheath (Smooth Bore)
Layer & layer function Pressure sheath ensures containment of fluids and gas within the
bore of the pipe
Materials Polyamide Polyethylene
Applicability of failure cause Only applicable to smooth bore flexible pipes, family I.
for various pipe structures Smooth bore risers are mainly used for water injection/transfer,
(design) and condition. Note however also used in gas export applications
limitations, ref Section A3.1.2
Degradation mechanisms. Pressure differential between pipe bore and annulus resulting in
repetitive collapse of pressure sheath
Layer failure mechanism and Failure mechanism:
the way it will manifest itself - Cyclic deformation of pressure sheath resulting in fatigue
failure of pressure sheath
or
- Severe deformation directly resulting in failure of pressure
sheath
Failure mechanism will depend on actual polymer properties at

the initiation- or repeated occurrence of the degradation
mechanism
The way the failure manifest itself:

- Upon re-pressurization of pipeline, after pressure sheath has
developed critical defect size, through thickness crack will occur
allowing fluid flowing into annulus
Temporarily blockage may occur due to pressure sheath

collapsing. After repeated cycling however, loss of layer
functionality is to be expected.
Conditions promoting - Rapid valve closure leading to vacuum in pipeline sections
degradation - Defects in intermediate sheath (if present)
- Flooded annulus increasing static pressure differential
- Failure of vent-system and trapped gas in annulus
- Annulus testing where Ptest > Pbore
- Unintended removal of internal fluid or internal pressure, e.g.
dewatering
Acceptance criteria for Pressure sheath fluid containment, i.e. no through sheath
degradation mechanism defects
Procedure or models to - Collapse capacity calculations
predict service life or PoF for - Verification of pressure differential between annulus and bore
layer (pressure monitoring data, annulus testing if availability of
vent-ports).
- Reference testing of pipeline cross section
- Leak testing of pipeline if critical defects are suspected.
- Caliper pigging should not be used to validate condition of
smooth bore pipe. All internal inspection should be performed
with care due to risk of unintentional damages to pressure
sheath.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Identification of the operating - Start-up and re-pressurization after event where bore pressure
or environmental conditions may have been below allowable operational- and design limits.
most likely to induce the - Upon flooding annulus - if bore pressure is less than external
ultimate layer loss of hydrostatic pressure. Where an intermediate sheath is used, this
functionality failure mode is only relevant if loss of layer function in
intermediate sheath is present.
- During annulus testing with incorrect procedures
Consequence of loss of layer - The ultimate failure occurs upon burst of outer sheath, i.e.
functionality with loss of containment.
identification of events and - Rupture and/or unlocking of armour wires may occur due to
mechanisms leading to inability to withstand bore pressure
Time scale for loss of pipe - Burst of the pipe could take place within seconds to hours
functionality after initial loss (maybe days) after the pressure sheath rupture or through
of layer function (imminent thickness crack.
—>long term) - Short term, in high-pressure systems imminent failure may
occur
Parameters that will influence - Operating pressure
the time from loss of initial - Pipeline cross section design, e.g. separate pressure armour
layer functionality to full pipe layer or 55deg structure
failure
How will the ultimate pipe - Pressure loss in bore.
failure manifest itself - Burst of the pipe or rupture of the outer sheath with release of
bore fluid (gas, water).
Probability of failure - Collapse capacity of pressure sheath
considerations for pipe loss of - Pressure sheath material type and condition
functionality
Possible mitigations against - Operational procedures, i.e. avoid rapid valve closure or
unacceptable high PoF depressurization rates through adjusted valve closing sequences
- Operational procedures, i.e. maintain positive pressure
differential between bore and annulus
- Vacuum breaker in pipe system
- Vacuum in annulus
- Annulus test procedures limiting test pressure differential
across pressure sheath
Monitoring, inspection & Pressure monitoring data review
prediction: methods and
strategies Annulus testing
- Verification of intermediate sheath functionality (if present)
- Verification of annulus conditions
- Vent-port capacity verification
Leak testing of pipeline if defect is suspected

Operational field experience - Several failure have occurred, resulting in loss of containment
and structural failure of cross section
- Failure have been due to rapid valve closure and
depressurizations resulting in bore vacuum combined with high
annulus pressure, failure of vent-system combined with previous
incidents, incorrect annulus testing combined with low bore
pressure.
- Indirect failures due to internal inspections after suspected
collapse, resulting in damages to pressure sheath and pressure
sheath failures.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Pressure sheath embrittlement (Ageing of Polyamides) Evaluation of failure causes

for pressure sheet emmbrittlement is presented in Table A3.6
Table A3.6: Pressure sheath embrittlement (Ageing of Polyamides)
Layer & layer Pressure sheath ensures containment of fluids and gas within the bore of
function the pipe
Materials PA11 - Rilsan BESNO 40 TL.
Considerations around threats to PA11 may also be applicable to other
Polyamides such as PA12 but the acceptance criteria are not directly
applicable to other grades of polyamides.
Applicability of Applicable to all pipes with PA pressure sheath.
failure cause for
various pipe
structures (design)
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation Embrittlement through polymer chain scission caused by hydrolysis
mechanism enhanced by elevated temperature and stimulated by acids and methanol
Layer failure Brittle rupture or crack growth through thickness.
mechanism and the The length of the rupture will depend on the degree of embrittlement of
way it will manifest the material and how it varies with position and the event initiating the
itself final rupture.
Fresh PA11 (and other relevant Polyamides) is generally very resistant to

fatigue. However, embrittlement of Polyamides from ageing will enhance
the susceptibility to crack initiation. In particular strong degradation on
the inner surface of a PA11 pressure sheath may lead to sufficient
brittleness for cracks to initiate. After initiation a crack may grow into
more ductile material. There is also a possibility that chemicals in the bore
fluid may promote the crack growth by ’ageing’ of material in the crack tip.
Cracks can develop both parallel to the axis and around the circumference.
Conditions Combination of ’high’ temperature and ’high’ concentration of acidic
promoting species, in water (CO2 and small organic acids) and in oil (naphthenic
degradation acids characterized by TAN), and alkalinity of the produced water. For a
given acid condition increased temperature enhances the degradation rate.
Oxygen can also degrade PA11. It may be introduced through use of batch
treatment chemicals with dissolved oxygen (in particular methanol) or
could be introduced through air leaking into transport or process
equipment. Oxygen induced degradation rates increase with temperature
for a given oxygen concentration like an Arrhenius process.
Acceptance criteria Through [API 17TR2, 2003] an acceptance criterion relating to a lower
for degradation bound on the average size of the molecular chains has been established.
mechanism This is measured in terms of Corrected Inherent Viscosity (CIV). The
initial acceptance criterion has been defined as CIV=1.2 dl/g with the
following recommendation:
’Once the initial acceptance criterion is reached, the pressure sheath has
aged significantly. In order to continue using the pipe, an analysis of
potential failure modes should be performed. This will aim to evaluate the
margin of safety and address risk and criticality.......:
It is suggested in the [API 17TR2, 2003] that operators may justify using
CIV=1.1 dl/g as the acceptance criterion for static applications of flexible
pipes.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Procedures or [API 17TR2, 2003] is the established industry guideline for predicting
models to predict service life and acceptance criteria. (There are ongoing industry activities
service life or PoF to develop improved methods for prediction of service life and acceptance
for layer criteria)
It is generally accepted that if it can be documented through coupons or

credible modeling that the CIV will stay above 1.2 dl/g through the service
life the PoF is acceptably low. Based on recent knowledge (several field
experience cases - no information in public domain at the time of writing):
- For conditions with acetic acid concentration below 40 ppm (by weight)
in produced water, pH>5.5, Crude oil TAN < 0.05 mgKOH/g and limited
batch treatment with methanol, compliance with the service life curves in
[API 17TR2, 2003] should ensure PoF= low
- When Acetic acid concentration < 200 ppm and TAN < 0.2 combined
with coupons that degrade no faster than predicted by service life curves
in[API 17TR2, 2003] then PoF = medium/low (depending on the degree
of utilization in relation to [API 17TR2, 2003]).
- With TAN>0.25 mgKOH/g or acetic acid concentration > 200 ppm (by
weight) PoF should be considered medium/high depending on the degree
of utilization in relation to the API model. Investigation of the impact of
the fluid conditions on PA11 is recommended.
- With frequent batch treatment (reaching the bore of the pipe) with
chemicals that can contain high levels of dissolved oxygen or other sources
of oxygen exposure the PoF = medium / high depending on frequency,
concentration of dissolved oxygen and the operational temperature when
production is restarted after the batch treatment.
Identification of the The ductility of polymers like PA11 will decrease with falling temperatures
operating or thus the embrittlement will be strongest at the lowest exposure
environmental temperatures. The thermal expansion coefficient of PA11 is much higher
conditions most than that of steel (typically 120 · 10−6 /K versus 12 · 10−6 /K) and this may
likely to induce the lead to build-up of stresses in the PA11 sheath during cool down.
ultimate loss of With this background the events and conditions that are most likely to
function for the lead to the final through thickness rupture is:
layer - Cool down due to reduced ductility and circumferential (and possibly
axial) thermal stresses that induce strains exceeding the strain at break
limits for the material at the cool down temperature
- During a shut-down coinciding with strong changes in bending inducing
axial strains exceeding strain at break limits.
- Pressure testing
Consequence of loss Leakage of the fluid and gases in the bore of the pipe into the annulus.
of layer function The leakage will be limited by the flow restrictions through the Carcass
with identification and the pressure armour layer.
of events and The leakage rate will depend on:
mechanisms leading - Length and separation of the through thickness rupture/crack
to ultimate pipe - Sealing capacity of the Carcass and the pressure armours
failure - Composition of the fluid - assume gas will leak through faster than fluids.
Time scale for loss Burst of the pipe could take place within seconds to hours (maybe days)
of pipe function after the pressure sheath rupture or through thickness crack.
layer function
(imminent —> long
term)

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Parameters that will Internal pressure, gas content, how the pressure sheath will rupture, and
influence the time sealing properties of the Carcass and the pressure armour.
from loss of initial
layer function to full
pipe failure
How will the Burst of the pipe or rupture of the outer sheath with release of
ultimate pipe failure hydrocarbons. This may be preceded with an increase in the rate of gas
manifest itself through the annulus vent.
Probability of failure See description above in Procedures or models to predict service life or
considerations for PoF for layer
pipe loss of function
Possible mitigations Operational Procedures:
against - Reduce (if relevant) use of batch methanol treatment.
unacceptably high - Keep the temperature during normal operation as low as possible
PoF Design:
- If a high PoF is based on uncertainties related to high TAN or high acetic
acid, coupons exposed to the flow environment will be valuable to
determine the impact provided the exposure temperature (in particular
temperature) can be documented.
Testing / Calculation:
- If coupons are not available, laboratory testing of PA11 in real crude
samples combined with simulated produced water conditions should be
performed. (Testing will provide data to make a more precise service
life/criticality estimate which may document a possibly lower PoF)
Monitoring, - Use of coupons exposed directly to the flow environment is a very good
inspection & contribution to the integrity management. The coupons should preferably
prediction: methods be exposed in a location where the temperature of the flow is high
and strategies compared to the exposure of the flexible pipe. Coupons should be retrieved
and analyzed periodically to determine the rate of degradation.
- Monitoring and recording of production conditions, in particular
temperature is essential. Recording of shut-down will also provide valuable
information.
- Take out samples from a liner. It may be possible to find ways of taking
out samples of the pressure liner for analysis without damaging the pipe.
(For instance take a sample from the end of the liner, which is outside the
sealing ring in the end fitting.
- Online annulus vent monitoring can provide a warning system where a
leakage through the pressure sheath can be detected before the outer
sheath burst to enable shut down and other risk containment measures.
Operational field PA11 Rilsan has been used extensively by the offshore industry. There
experience have been several reported failures for pipes in operation above 60 deg C.
More rapid degradation rate seem to be connected with significant use of
methanol batch treatment with possible oxygen problems or high TAN.
There are many reported cases where the PA11 pressure sheaths (analyzed
after retrieval) degrade significantly slower and less than predicted by the
service life model in [API 17TR2, 2003]. There are also cases where
coupons and material from retrieved pipes have shown a stronger
degradation than predicted by the model.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Fatigue and overload cracks in pressure barrier (PVDF) Evaluation of failure causes
for fatigue crachs in pressure barrier is presented in Table A3.7
Table A3.7: Fatigue and overload cracks in pressure barrier (PVDF)
Layer & layer Pressure sheath ensures containment of fluids and gas within the bore of
function the pipe
Materials PVDF grades
Applicability of All pipes with dynamic stresses in PVDF pressure sheath, e.g. thermal
failure cause for stresses or dynamic pipe bending.
various pipe
structures (design) PVDF exposed to excessive stresses, e.g. more than permissible bending
and conditions (UHB), impact loads or incidents during manufacturing or installation.
Section A3.1.2
- Degradation - Fatigue crack initiation and growth promoted by cyclic loading.
mechanisms. - Crack propagating from notch or overload location.
Layer failure Crack penetrating the sheath thickness leading to leakage from the bore to
mechanism and the the annulus. Such leakages will most likely initially be small and then
way it will manifest increase with the fatigue crack expansion.
itself
Conditions PVDF is notch sensitive with respect to crack initiation. The large
promoting difference in thermal expansion between PVDF and steel (typically
degradation 140x10−6 /K versus 12x10−6 /K) may lead to the development of high
stresses during cool down from high temperatures. The higher and faster
the temperature drop is the larger will the induced stress be. Other loads
such as weight may enhance the sensitivity to crack development.
Typically the most susceptible location is close to the termination in the
end fitting where the development of circumferential cracks has been
observed during testing.
Acceptance criteria In section 6.3.2.1.5 in [API 17J, 2008] it is stated that the thickness of the
for degradation pressure sheath shall ensure that cracks will not propagate through the
mechanism thickness. No considerations are made with respect to safety margins
Crack initiation is normally longer than the time for an established crack
to grow through the thickness. In this perspective the acceptance criterion
should be to avoid that crack initiation takes place.
Some PVDF materials have exhibited some susceptibility to brittle

cracking at low temperatures. Excessive cooling cycles or overload events
when the pipe is cold could represent increase in PoF. This kind of
cracking would be expected to be substantial when it occurs and would
show up un annulus vent rate.
Procedure or models For PVDF the probability of crack initiation will increase with the
to predict service - The magnitude of the temperature change during shut down
life or PoF for layer - The rate of temperature change (high rate will allow less stress relaxation
during cool down)
- The number of shut-down cycles
One approach could be to make comparison to other risers in service with
similar or harsher exposure with respect to crack initiation.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Identification of the The loss of layer function in terms of through thickness crack will most
operating or likely take place in connection with the cool down sequence in connection
environmental with a shut down.
conditions most
ultimate layer loss
of functionality
Consequence of loss Pipe burst or leakage
of layer functionality
with identification
of events and
mechanisms leading
to ultimate pipe
failure
Time scale for loss - Worst case: Burst could occur in seconds.
of pipe function - Best case: Leakage due to rupture of the outer sheath could take place
after initial loss of within hours to days after the pressure sheath rupture or through thickness
layer function cracks.
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will Internal pressure, gas content, how the crack continues to grow, and
influence the time sealing properties of the Carcass and the pressure armour.
layer functionality
to full pipe failure
How will the Burst of the pipe or rupture of the outer sheath with release of
ultimate pipe failure hydrocarbons. This may be preceded with an increase in the rate of gas
manifest itself through the annulus vent.
Probability of failure See above in Procedure or models to predict service life or PoF for layer
considerations for
pipe loss of
functionality
Possible mitigations Operational procedures:
against - Keep the number of shut downs as low as possible.
unacceptable high - Keep the cooling rate as low as possible
PoF - Control the rate of depressurization
Monitoring, - Online annulus vent monitoring can provide a warning system where a
inspection & leakage through the pressure sheath can be detected before the outer
prediction: methods sheath burst to enable shut down and other risk containment measures.
and strategies - Record the shutdowns in terms of frequency, magnitude of temperature
drop and cool down rate.
- Operational field - Experienced after notch induced by carcass fracture
experience - Leakage with unknown origin of flowlines with PVDF pressure sheath in
demanding applications (high bending) has been observed.
- Temperature cycling induced fatigue resulting in cracks in PVDF pressure
sheath in location of high curvature

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Pressure armour
Pressure armour corrosion: See corresponding description in Section A3.3.2
Pressure armour fatigue and unlocking Evaluation of failure causes for pressure armour
fatigue is presented in Table A3.8
Table A3.8: Pressure armour fatigue and unlocking
Layer & layer Inner pressure armour (not back-up spiral) provides the pipe resistance to
function internal pressure, support to resist external pressures and give strength for
mechanical crushing loads. The layer provides structurally support for the
internal pressure sheath
Materials Carbon steel, with carbon content dependent on the design requirements.
Typical yield strength in the range 650-1000 MPa. For details, reference is
given to [API 17B, 2008].
Applicability of Dynamic pipes with high operational pressure
failure cause for
various pipe
structures (design)
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation Possible initiation mechanisms for fatigue:
mechanisms. 1. Ovalization in bending
2. Manufacturing outside tolerances:
- Fully extended spiral with inadequate bending flexibility
- High inter-wire contact pressure giving high stresses during bending
3. Fretting: wire-wire friction
4. Transverse relative displacement and rotation in bending
Possible initiation mechanisms for unlocking:

1. Overbending
2. Impact
3. Excess tension
4. Pipe design and manufacturing:
- Size of wire interlock insufficient to avoid un-locking during
manufacturing, relevant for large bore pipes with thin hoop spiral layer and
stiff pressure sheath
- Wire welding or repair during manufacturing
- Manufacturing halts, e.g. guide roller problems
5. Failure of tensile or back-up pressure armour
6. Radial compression (at installation)
7. Excess torsion (at installation)
Layer failure Gap in pressure armour with polymer sheath extending into the gap and
mechanism and the subsequent breach of pressure sheath. Eventually resulting in pipe leakage
way it will manifest or pipe rupture with loss of containment.
itself

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Conditions Fatigue:
promoting Corrosive annulus environment
degradation -Annulus condition with access to oxygen (hole in the outer sheath)
- Bore conditions; particularly H2 S content if not designed for H2 S service,
and to a less extent CO2 content.
Inaccurate pressure armour profile design or fabrication; affecting load
transfer
High internal pressure and dynamic motion
Unlocking:
- Most flexible pipes have larger radial pressure on the hoop spiral during
operation than during manufacturing and installation. Unlocking during
normal operation is hence unlikely.
- Buried flexible flowlines may be an exception where high axial
compression due to thermal loads combined with upheaval buckling (UHB)
may give unlocking.
- Unlocking or partial un-locking (nub riding on nub) from manufacturing
will normally propagate during FAT pressure testing, however, this is not
always the case and detail evaluation is required before a pipe with a
potential unlocking is accepted for operation
- Unlocking or partial un-locking from installation will often not propagate
during SIT as the external pressure (tension and pressure induced) on the
hoop spiral is large and test pressure is lower
Acceptance criteria The fatigue life calculation shall be performed using a valid and
for degradation appropriate SN-curve and verified design tool.
mechanism Unlocking is not permitted
Procedure or models Fatigue:
to predict service There are robust global and local analysis methodology and tools available
life or PoF for layer for pressure wire fatigue calculations. Reference is given to
[API 17B, 2008] for details. The probability of failure is taken into
consideration through the methodology. The main points are:
- The development and choice of SN-curves
- The typical application of a safety factor (SF) of 10 between fatigue life
and fatigue service life,
- Reasonably conservative assumptions
Sensitivity calculations should be performed to assess the influence of the
main parameters on the resulting fatigue life.
Unlocking:
Detail FEM analysis of hoop spiral with neighbouring layers have
successfully been used for evaluation of manufacturing and installation
induced event with potential unlocking. The models need to take into
account complex contact conditions as well as time and temperature
dependent properties of the polymer layers.
Potential un-locking during UHB must consider relevant bending stiffness

distribution along the line, high bending stiffness far from the UHB due to
interlayer friction locking and temperature effects along the line are
important.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
For most hoop spiral designs the bending moment will have marked
increase when bending radius goes below locking radius. For events with
limited and known bending moment loads it may hence be possible to
compare the actual load with the pipe capacity. Note that this method
must never be used for load cases where pipe bending is controlled by
geometry or the bending load is uncertain.
Long term propagation of an unlock during normal operation will normally

not occur. The consequence will either be manifested quickly or develop as
a consequence of another event.
Identification of the High operating pressure and frequent dynamic bending

operating or
environmental Continued operation after bending incident
conditions most
ultimate layer loss
of functionality
Consequence of loss Unlocking of hoop spiral resulting in loss of integrity and possibly pipe
of layer functionality rupture.
with identification Normally more than one hoop spiral wire is used such that a single wire
of events and rupture will only result in a local hole in the pressure sheath underneath.
mechanisms leading
to ultimate pipe
failure
Time scale for loss - Short term, unlocking propagating until failure of pressure sheath
of pipe functionality - Long term;
after initial loss of –> Circumferential fatigue cracks of hoop spiral propagating until failure
layer function of pressure sheath is unlikely. However, such crack may get side branches
(imminent —>long giving wire rupture
term) –> Cross wire fatigue cracks due to repetitive ovalization, e.g. dynamic
contact with support structure
Parameters that will Parameters promoting shorter time to ultimate failure:
influence the time - Higher internal pressure will affect the time. Increased pressure increases
from loss of initial loading on both tensile and pressure armour
layer function to full - High temperature may contribute
pipe failure - Dynamics
How will the Pipe leakage (loss of containment).
ultimate pipe failure Pipe burst is possible.
manifest itself
Probability of failure Pressure armour fatigue: seldom/rarely
considerations for Pipe failure due to pressure armour fatigue: Very seldom
pipe loss of Unlocking due to overbending during manufacturing and installation
functionality observed as latent defect ultimately resulting in pipe leak
Possible mitigations Operational procedures:
against - Reduced bore pressure
unacceptable high Design:
PoF - Robustness in global configuration designs (dynamic response, upheaval
buckling)
- Increased size of hoop spiral dimension
Replacement:
Unlocking: pipe replacement. Generally no mitigating actions
available/possible

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Monitoring, - Annulus environment

inspection & - Pressure time series (see tensile armour fatigue)
prediction: methods - Pressure test record (instruments and piping disconnected)
and strategies
Operational field Unlocking experienced on pipe in operation. For known cases the initiation
experience of unlocking took place during fabrication, installation or accidental
impact.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Tensile armour
Tensile wire corrosion Evaluation of failure causes for tensile wire wire corrosion is pre-
sented in Table A3.9
Table A3.9: Tensile wire corrosion
Layer & layer All steel armour layers in the annulus:

function - Inner pressure armour and back-up spiral provides the pipe resistance to
internal and external pressures and mechanical crushing loads and provides
structurally support for the internal pressure sheath (the pressure armour
layer is omitted in family II pipes)
- Tensile wire provides axial structural capacity of the pipe (tensile wire
provide both axial and hoop strength for family II pipes)
Materials Carbon steel and Low alloy steel
Applicability of H2 S driven SSCC and HIC is only applicable to high strength steel.
failure cause for All other corrosion mechanisms are applicable to all armour wire steels
various pipe
structures (design) All corrosion mechanisms require the presence of a liquid water phase.
and conditions Most flexible pipes, including dry gas applications, will most likely have
Note limitations, ref condensed water in annulus.
Section A3.1.2
Degradation Different corrosion mechanisms:
mechanisms. - CO2 corrosion
- Oxygen corrosion
- COv corrosion enhanced by oxygen
- H2 S driven corrosion and cracking mechanisms
–> Sulfide Stress Corrosion Cracking (SSCC) requires high stress levels
relative to UTS.
–> HIC can take place at low stress levels.
Layer failure Corrosion can lead to:
mechanism and the - Reduced cross section of wires reducing the load bearing capacity. When
way it will manifest the capacity becomes lower than the applied load, wires will rupture.
itself - Surface irregularities and pitting that will reduce the fatigue resistance.
This may lead to premature crack growth and eventually rupture of wires.
- For hoop strain armours corrosion can lead to reduced resistance against
unlocking and longitudinal cracks. This may in the first instance lead to
wider gaps between pressure armour wires and possibly excessive creep of
the pressure sheath.
High strength armour wires suffering Sulfide Stress Corrosion Cracking
(SSCC) and HIC would fail through brittle rupture.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Conditions Several corrosion mechanisms can take place depending on design

promoting application and scenario. The highest risk scenarios are:
degradation - Breach in the outside cover, in particular in the vicinity of the splash
zone or above.
- H2 S in flexible pipelines with high strength steel armours, in particular
family II structures. The total pressure in the annulus of flow lines is the
sum of the hydrostatic pressure at the vent port and the differential release
pressure of the vent valves for pipes with intact outer sheath or just the
hydrostatic pressure if there are breaches in the outer sheath. When the
total pressure is high there will be correspondingly high partial pressures
for acid gases such as H2 S and CO2 .
This will in particular for H2 S increase the susceptibility for SSCC and HIC.
- Cases with other leakages of oxygen into the annulus
Cases with water condensing repeatedly (in vent tubes and other cold
locations in regions where the annulus is gas filled)
Acceptance criteria Acceptance criteria will be defined by damage leading to unacceptable
for degradation stress utilization or fatigue capacity.
mechanism
Procedure or models - CO2 corrosion in stagnant/confined water filled annulus is in the order of
to predict service 0.01 mm/year.
life or PoF for layer - A worst case estimate for corrosion in annulus with hole in the outside
cover is typically 1mm/year
Identification of the Situations with:
operating or - High amplitude stress cycles
environmental - High load
conditions most - Pressure testing
ultimate layer loss
of functionality
Consequence of loss Excessive corrosion in risers may lead to full pipe rupture and significant
of layer functionality release of gas and oil. When the load carrying capacity of axial armour
with identification layer goes below the applied load, the pipe rupture may be catastrophic
of events and with full opening to the bore of the pipe.
mechanisms leading
to ultimate pipe SSCC or HIC failures of armours in flow lines lead to gaps in the support of
failure the pressure sheath. The pressure sheath will eventually extrude through
the gap and create hole in the pressure sheath. Bore content will flow into
the annulus and relatively soon induce rupture of the outside cover.
Time scale for loss - Loss of pipe function will for risers take place immediately after loss of
of pipe functionality layer function.
after initial loss of - For SSCC or HIC cases it may take some time before the pressure sheath
layer function fails. (typically short to medium time)
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will For risers where the tensile layer fails due to applied load exceeding the
influence the time remaining load capacity the loss of pipe functionality will be imminent.
layer functionality
How will the For risers: Full pipe rupture
ultimate pipe failure For flowlines: Full rupture or major leakage
manifest itself

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Probability of failure PoF for loss of functionality for the pipe should be the same as loss of
considerations for layer functionality
pipe loss of
functionality
Possible mitigations For risers:
against - Avoid damage to outer cover as far as possible
unacceptable high - Ensure early detection and repair or exclude oxygen.
PoF For flow lines susceptible to SSCC and HIC:
- Reduce H2 S
- Reduce pressure
Monitoring, For risers: Vent gas monitoring and testing to detect outer cover breaches.
inspection & For SSCC and HIC issues: Monitor for H2 S increase in conveyed gas and
prediction: methods fluid.
and strategies
Operational field Some of the most serious failures of flexible pipes have been caused by
experience corrosion of armour wires. Based on available information failures or near
misses for flexible pipes can be summarized in the following:
- At least 4 risers - 1 in Africa and 3 in the North Sea region outside
Norway
- At least 2 near misses on risers - 1 in Norway and 1 in Africa.
- At least 7 flexible flow lines with high strength steel wires have failed
through mechanisms that are believed to be driven by H2 S. None of these
have been in Norway but have taken place in North Sea region, West
Africa and Arabian Gulf.
Many of these incidents represent cases with unacceptable high personnel

risks and all have resulted in significant cost to operators. All the riser
issues are related to outer cover damages and the best way to avoid this
would be to prevent cover damages. However, it is unlikely that the
industry will manage to eradicate outer cover damages completely. It is
therefore important to develop better understanding of the corrosion
mechanisms and influencing parameters to enable prediction capabilities.
There are examples where risers have survived long periods with breaches
in the outside cover and there are indicators such as breach location, type
of damage, pipe configuration that would lead to higher probability of
corrosion.
All the corrosion failures of flexible flowlines have come as surprises to the
operators. Retrospectively some of them seem to relate to H2 S but it has
not been possible for any of the cases to explain the full sequence of
events and detailed mechanisms. Knowledge gaps clearly exist.
It is premature to assume that issues will not appear related to corrosion

inside intact annuli.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Tensile wire axial compression failure Evaluation of failure causes for tensile wire awire
axial compression failure is presented in Table A3.10
Table A3.10: Tensile wire axial compression failure
Layer & layer Tensile wire providing axial structural capacity of the pipe
function
For details, reference is given to [API 17B, 2008].
Applicability of Deepwater pipes.
failure cause for
various pipe
structures (design)
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation - Compressive loads in riser due to ’reverse end cap’ effect and additional
mechanisms. bending.
- Bird caging above (in front of) caterpillar during deep water installation
The failure is most likely during installation and in the touch-down section
where the pipe may be exposed to true wall compression from the external
pressure end cap effect, and also bending promoting buckling.
The failure is also possible for installed pipes with low or no bore pressure,
and the failure is then expected at touch-down point or in another
dynamic section with bending.
Layer failure The compressive loads may cause buckling of the tensile wires. There are
mechanism and the two buckling modes for the tensile wires:
way it will manifest
itself Radial buckling:
- Lower energy mode: weak wire axis bending
- Prevented by
–> Anti-birdcage tape (commonly applied)
–> High external hydrostatic pressure (deep waters)
(Intact outer sheath and atmospheric annulus vent)
Lateral buckling:
- Higher energy mode: strong wire axis bending
- The resulting buckling mode will be the buckling mode with lowest
required energy. Hence, for lateral buckling to occur, radial buckling must
be prevented until exceedance of the required energy for lateral buckling.
- Buckling of wires will cause disorganization of the wires and shortening
of the pipe. This will in turn introduce increased loading on pressure
armouring and carcass, and may also result in outer sheath damage.
Corrosion of the buckled wires may ultimately result in wire breakage.
Conditions - Low internal pressure
promoting - Low pipe tension
degradation - Deep waters (i.e. larger external hydrostatic pressure)
- Bending
- Repeated dynamic cycling at touch down point
- Vessel dynamics may contribute to overcoming internal friction for the
tensile wires.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Acceptance criteria - Intact outer sheath (only for risers with atmospheric vent)
for degradation - No plastic wire deformation
mechanism - In case of plastic deformation, evaluate maximum strain in wires.
- Reliable anti bird cage tape
Procedure or models New analysis tools. Analytical methods and full scale testing.
to predict service
life or PoF for layer
Identification of the See description above under Degradation mechanisms.
operating or
environmental
conditions most
ultimate layer loss
of functionality
Consequence of loss Axial buckling is considered to be an ultimate loss functionality for the
of layer functionality tensile armour. The pipe is no longer suited for operation.
with identification Loss of containment is likely. Full pipe rupture is not unlikely.
of events and
mechanisms leading
to ultimate pipe
failure
Time scale for loss Imminent. See also description above under Consequence of loss of layer
of pipe functionality function
layer function
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will Not applicable. See description above under Consequence of loss of layer
influence the time function
layer functionality
How will the Loss of containment is likely. Full pipe rupture is not unlikely.
manifest itself
Probability of failure Low.
considerations for
pipe loss of
functionality
Possible mitigations Design:
against - Increased buckling resistance by application of anti-birdcage tape (mainly
unacceptable high to prevent radial buckling)
PoF - Increased wire dimensions
- Double outer sheath
Monitoring, ROV inspection at touch down during and after installation.
inspection & Visual inspection:
prediction: methods - Radial buckling: detect bird caging.
and strategies - Lateral buckling: Deformations of the outer sheath
- Pipe elongation when pressurized
Operational field Only experienced during installation and testing

experience

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Tensile armour wire fatigue Evaluation of failure causes for tensile armour wire fatigue
is presented in Table A3.11
Table A3.11: Tensile armour wire fatigue
Layer & layer Tensile wire provides axial structural capacity of the pipe
function
Typical yield strength in the range 650-1400 MPa. For details, reference is
Applicability of Dynamic service, most critical for high operational pressure.
failure cause for
various pipe
structures (design)
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation Initiation:
mechanisms. - Corrosive environment in annulus: Corrosion fatigue
- Intact pipe, dry annulus: Fatigue
The mechanism is stress cycling leading to wire breakage
Layer failure Typically, the inner tensile wires are the most critical with respect to
mechanism and the fatigue for intact pipes, while for a pipe with outer sheath damage and
way it will manifest corrosion, the local corrosion on the outer tensile wires may be governing
itself (for instance in the splash zone in damage cases).
The failure will manifest itself in terms of multiple wire breakage in the
most loaded tensile wire layer. Wire breakage may cause loss of axial
capacity and reduced radial support for the layers inside. Loss of axial
capacity may cause local failure resulting in leakage and possibly full pipe
rupture.
Wire breakage may also cause twisting of the pipe as the loss of intact
wires introduces an unbalance in the torsional force distribution
Conditions Changes from design premise:
promoting - Increased internal pressure which increase the wire stress, pipe bending
degradation stiffness and contact pressure
- Changed annulus environment
- Dynamic bending
- Excessive wear of the anti-wear tape between the metal layers, resulting
in steel-steel friction
- Unfavorable local design of bending stiffener, bellmouth or clamp on
devices
- Corrosion. Hence, degradation is promoted by:
–> Annulus condition with access to oxygen (hole in the outer sheath)
–> Bore conditions; particularly H2 S content, and to a less extent CO2
content.
Acceptance criteria The fatigue life calculation shall be performed using a valid and
for degradation appropriate SN-curve and a verified analytical tool.
mechanism Generally, only limited corrosive damage is allowed

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Procedure or models There are robust global and local analysis methodology and tools available
to predict service for tensile wire fatigue calculations. Reference is given to [API 17B, 2008]
life or PoF for layer for details. The probability of failure is taken into consideration through
the methodology.
The main points are :
- The development and choice of SN-curves
- The typical application of a safety factor (SF) of 10 between fatigue life
and fatigue service life.
- Reasonably conservative assumptions
Sensitivity calculations should be performed to assess the influence of the
main parameters on the resulting fatigue life.
Identification of the Worse annulus environment (SN-curve is ruling) and higher pressure than
operating or design.
environmental
conditions most
ultimate layer loss
of functionality
Consequence of loss Loss of integrity and possibly pipe rupture
of layer functionality
with identification
of events and
mechanisms leading
to ultimate pipe
failure
Time scale for loss Imminent after multiple wire rupture
layer function
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will Internal pressure can affect the time to pipe rupture.
influence the time
layer functionality
How will the Leakage or pipe rupture
manifest itself
Probability of failure The initial probability of pipe failure is low for an intact pipe where this
considerations for failure mode is handled by design.
pipe loss of Changes from design premise may affect the probability of failure.
functionality See description above for Conditions promoting degradation and Procedure
or models to predict service life or PoF for layer
Possible mitigations Modifications
against - Repair outer sheath damages
unacceptable high Design
PoF - Appropriate SN-curves (annulus environment)
Operational procedures
- Avoid ingress of seawater

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Monitoring, Inspection and monitoring

inspection & - Verify outer sheath integrity: annulus test
prediction: methods - Annulus monitoring (annulus gas and volume)
and strategies
Calculations
- Improved analysis models/methods
- Improved input data for fatigue re-calculation:
–> Measured response
–> Measured pressure time series
–> Measured environmental (weather) data
Operational field Experienced. Critical location could be in transition between pipe body
experience and end-fitting.
Corrosion will have significant negative effect on fatigue life and may have
contributed to experienced failures believed to be caused by corrosion.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Outer sheath
Impact, wear and pressure induced rupture creating hole in the outer sheath Eval-
uation of failure causes for impact, wear and pressure induced rupture creating hole in the
outer sheath is presented in Table A3.12
Table A3.12: Impact, wear and pressure induced rupture creating hole in the outer sheath
Layer & layer Outer sheath prevents the ingress of external fluids
function
Materials Hole, tear, rupture, wear - possibly ingress of seawater
Applicability of PA-11, PA-12, PE: HDPE, MDPE (medium density polyethylene); PU;
failure cause for TPE (thermoplastic elastomer)
various pipe
structures (design)
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation All pipes
mechanisms
Layer failure - Accidental impacts
mechanism and the - Blocked annulus
way it will manifest - Abrasive contact with seabed / line / other surface
itself - Handling/installation
- Manufacturing defects
Conditions I. Impact causing hole in the outer sheath.
promoting II. Blocked annulus vent causing pressure build up in annulus until burst of
degradation outer sheath.
III. Abrasive contact with seabed / line / guide tube, midwater arch /
other surface causing hole in the outer sheath
IV. Cut in outer sheath during handling
Further development dependent on location along the pipe: above water,

splash zone or subsea.
Acceptance criteria I. Exposed to falling objects: crane activities or scaffolding above pipe /
for degradation riser location.
mechanism II. Impact due to trawl board or broken mooring lines
III. Restricted annulus vent in combination with high diffusion rates
IV. Sharp edged attachments to neighboring structures, rough surfaces,
small spacing
V. Incidents during installation
Procedure or models Outer sheath integrity affects armour wire fatigue and corrosion
to predict service Inspection and models to evaluate susceptibility to wear
life or PoF for layer
Identification of the Operator’s actions to control the conditions promoting degradation.
operating or Assessment of the probability of the different causes, also taking into
environmental account external interfering activity and the actual integrity management
conditions most program.
ultimate layer loss
of functionality

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Consequence of loss Consequences of layer failure: corrosion (and wear) of armour wires, pipe
of layer functionality failure
with identification Causes for outer sheath failure:
of events and Accidental/unintended contact with other objects/structures
mechanisms leading Relative movement and wear between pipe and support structure, e.g.
to ultimate pipe guidetube, MWA or seabed
failure Installation/field specific: Crane activity, ship traffic, fishing/trawling
Time scale for loss The consequence of a hole in the outer sheath will depend on the location
of pipe functionality of the hole and on whether there is more than one hole. If the hole is in a
after initial loss of location that is submerged in sea water either continuously or
layer function intermittently the annulus will be fully or partially flooded with seawater.
(imminent —>long The degree of flooding will depend on whether the pipe configuration will
term) lead to trapping of gas pockets or whether oil leaking into the annulus from
the bore may block the sea water from reaching some parts of the annulus.
The potential threat to the integrity will primarily be corrosion of steel

armours and reduced fatigue resistance due to change of environment.
Further details are given in Chapter B4 Annulus environment and
corrosion.
Corrosion and fatigue may eventually lead to wire breakage with loss of
axial and/or radial capacity and possibly full rupture of the pipe with loss
of containment.
Parameters that will Corrosion & fatigue are long-term processes. A worst case scenario is a
influence the time hole in the splash zone which could lead to oxygen corrosion and rapid loss
from loss of initial of cross section resulting in failure in less than a year.
layer functionality
How will the - Changes in annulus environment compared to design
ultimate pipe failure - Location of damage: Above or below sea level / splash zone.
manifest itself - The corrosion impact on the fatigue life or load capacity
- Repair of the outer sheath damage
Probability of failure Loss of axial capacity (loss of pressure capacity).

considerations for Possibly full rupture of the pipe with loss of containment
pipe loss of
functionality
Possible mitigations High: Significant in the splash zone or if multiple holes (circulation)
against Medium: Above water
unacceptable high Low, provided repair: Submerged damage. Slow degradation. New designs
PoF shall account for de-aerated water filled (flooded) annulus (ref. proposed
change of [API 17J, 2008]).
Monitoring, Modifications:
inspection & Repair of outer sheath damage as soon as possible.
prediction: methods Injection of inhibitor
and strategies
Operational field - Regular (annual) annulus volume test, vent capabilities & annulus vent
experience rate (diffusion)
- Annulus monitoring
- External Visual inspection
Most frequently experienced failure mode.
There are indications that outer sheath bursts due to excessive annulus
pressure or other large breaches of outer sheath may be most critical.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Outer sheath embrittlement Evaluation of failure causes for outer sheath embrittlement
is presented in Table A3.13
Table A3.13: Outer sheath embrittlement
Layer & layer Outer sheath prevents the ingress of external fluids
function
Materials PA-11, PA-12, HDPE, MDPE (medium density polyethylene); PU; TPE
(thermoplastic elastomer)
Applicability of Pipes with polyamide outer sheath at high operational temperatures and
failure cause for external insulation e.g. ancillaries as dry bend stiffeners or buried pipes
various pipe
structures (design)
and conditions
Section A3.1.2
Degradation Embrittlement that can be caused by:
mechanisms - Hydrolysis (by water) and/or oxygen degradation of Polyamides.
- Oxygen degradation of Polyethylenes (HDPE, MDPE) and PU & TPE
Temperature (and to some extent chemistry) is a key parameter promoting
the degradation
Degradation by UV is also possible, but materials used for outer sheaths

above sea level should include protection against UV.
Details are given in Chapter B4 Annulus environment and corrosion.
Layer failure Sheath rupture or cracks growing through the full thickness. This will lead
mechanism and the to ingress of air or water depending on the position of the defect.
way it will manifest
itself
Conditions Embrittlement of the outer sheath will be of concern when the
promoting combination of bore temperature and outside insulation (bend stiffeners
degradation (or restrictors), under buoyancy modules or in sections covered by mud or
sediment) result in temperatures in the outer sheath that could lead to
high degradation rates.
Hydrolysis will also be affected by the chemistry in the annulus (in

particular any acids). Oxygen in the air or dissolved in water is also a
potential threat.
Acceptance criteria Maintain sufficient ductility to ensure adequate margin against rupture and
for degradation against crack initiation.
mechanism
Procedure or models Modelling of the temperature in the outer sheath as function of bore
to predict service temperature would allow determination of the temperature history. This
life or PoF for layer could be used in combination with degradation models to predict
remaining service life.
For outer sheaths using RILSAN BESNO P40 TL the [API 17TR2, 2003]
can be used (see pressure sheath embrittlement). It should be noted that
some manufacturers may use modified PA11 formulations for outer sheath
for which the criteria and models in [API 17TR2, 2003] cannot be applied.
For oxygen degradation criteria and models may have to be developed.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Identification of the The ultimate loss of function will probably be a brittle fracture of the outer
operating or sheath.
environmental
conditions most
ultimate layer loss
of function
Consequence of loss See the equivalent section under: ’Section A3.3.2 Outer sheath hole/wear’
of layer function
with identification
of events and
mechanisms leading
to ultimate pipe
failure
Time scale for loss See the equivalent section under: ’Section A3.3.2 Outer sheath hole/wear’
of pipe function
layer function
(imminent —>long
term)
Parameters that will See the equivalent section under: ’Section A3.3.2 Outer sheath hole/wear’
influence the time
layer function to full
pipe failure
How will the See the equivalent section under: ’Section A3.3.2 Outer sheath hole/wear’
manifest itself
Probability of failure See the equivalent section under: ’Section A3.3.2 Outer sheath hole/wear’
considerations for and the above Applicability of failure cause for various pipe structures
pipe loss of function (design) and conditions
Possible mitigations Modifications
against - Reduce the temperature or the thermal insulation of the outside.
unacceptable high - Repair of outer sheath if damage type and pattern allows.
PoF - Use of Inhibitor when rupture or cracks have been discovered and the
damage has been repaired
Monitoring, - Regular (annual) annulus volume test, vent capabilities & annulus vent
inspection & rate (diffusion)
prediction: methods - Continuous annulus monitoring
and strategies - Degradation models. Temperature sensors locally in bend stiffeners could
provide more accurate input data
Operational field Several layer failures have been observed - some detected visually and
experience others by annulus testing.

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
A3.3.3 Examples of Ancillary devices failure causes
General
Integrity of ancillary devices is important for safe operation of flexible pipes. This is reflected
in the design specifications where a separate standard and recommended practice are issued
to cover ancillary devices; [API 17L1, 2013] and [API 17L2, 2013]. As shown in the table
below, failure of ancillary devices may be critical for the flexible pipe integrity. Ancillary
devices and flexible pipe interfaces must hence be duly considered in design phase as well as
in integrity management of a flexible pipe.
Three examples are included in subsections below to serve as examples for how to use the
methodology. These examples are not intended to cover the most important failure modes
for ancillary devices.
Table A3.14: General
Ancillary In field experience Consequence Comment

Bending stiffener Failure has occurred on May result in riser loss
dynamic risers of integrity due to local
overbending, refer to
Section A3.3.2 Fatigue
performance will
normally be
unacceptable upon loss
of bend-stiffener
functionality, refer to
Section A3.3.2
Bend restrictor Failure has occurred on May result in loss of - Installation loads are
static flexibles integrity due to local important
overbending, refer to - Polymeric bend
Section A3.3.2 restrictors should not
be exposed to long
term loads
Bellmouth - Important interface as
bellmouth size and
shape may be critical
for integrity of flexible
pipe
Buoyancy and ballast - Loss of modules and - Outer sheath damage Examples are given in
module sliding of module clamp of flexible pipe Section A3.3.3 and
Subsea buoy clamp and have been experienced - Overbending Section A3.3.3
tether clamp - Loss and sliding of - Tether clamp failure
tether clamp has been may result in loss of
experienced containment
Tether Damaged tethers Tether failure may Example is given in
Riser and tether bases Twisted tethers result in loss Section A3.3.3
Tether hinge pin almost of containment
fallen off
Subsea buoy Important riser
interface. Criticality is
design dependent
Piggy-back spacer Design dependent

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Ancillary In field experience Consequence Comment

I/J-tube seals Design dependent
Pull-in heads Design dependent
Chinese fingers/cable Design dependent
grips
Connectors Design dependent
Load-transfering Design dependent
devices
Mechanical protection Design dependent
Fire protection Fire protection Reduced capacity
not designed to against fire
environment and falling
off
Sliding tether clamp
Evaluation of failure causes for sliding tether clamp is presented in Table A3.15
Table A3.15: Sliding tether clamp
Layer & layer function Tether clamp contributes to maintaining the riser configuration
Materials Tether clamp materials according to [API 17L2, 2013]:
- High strength structural steel
- GRP composites
Applicability of failure cause
for various pipe structures
(design) and conditions
Note limitations, ref Section
A3.1.2
Degradation mechanisms Loss of pretension and sliding clamp due to:
- Creep in polymer (outer sheath material)
- Erroneous pretension
- Bolt failure
Layer failure mechanism and Failure mechanism:
the way it will manifest itself - Clamp pulling the outer sheath. Most probably, outer sheath
torn, i.e. hole in outer sheath and ingress of seawater
- Excessive bending of the pipe, dependent on riser
configuration, possibly unlocking of pressure armour with
subsequent loss of containment
The way the sliding manifest itself:

- Small sliding movement: Detection by inspection
- Large sliding movement: Small change in riser configuration as
long as the clamp is sliding and have not lost contact with
tether and gravity base
Conditions promoting N/A
degradation
Acceptance criteria for No sliding allowed
degradation mechanism
Procedure or models to - Global analysis model: clamp loadings
predict service life or PoF for - Calculation: clamp capacity
layer - Testing of actual clamps.
Note on testing: Should be performed on an appropriate flexible
pipe, not on a steel pipe covered with polymeric layer

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Identification of the operating Max tension at the clamp location: Vessel in far offset and low
or environmental conditions pipe content density (gas filled).
most likely to induce the
ultimate layer loss of
functionality
Consequence of loss of layer The ultimate failure is due to the outer sheath damage causing a
functionality with corrosive environment in annulus
identification of events and
mechanisms leading to
Time scale for loss of pipe Long term.
functionality after initial loss
of layer function (imminent
—>long term)
Parameters that will influence - The annulus environment.
the time from loss of initial - Dynamic loading at the exposed section
layer functionality to full pipe - Inspection intervals (detection of progressing failure)
failure
How will the ultimate pipe - Outer sheath damage progressing to ultimate failure:
failure manifest itself –> Loss of axial capacity (loss of pressure capacity).
–> Possibly full rupture of the pipe with loss of containment
- Excessive bending of the pipe causing unlocking of pressure
armour with subsequent loss of containment
Probability of failure Low.
considerations for pipe loss of Most likely to occur during the first year after installation. The
functionality loading on the clamp is relatively static and only small variations
are expected over the clamp’s lifetime.
Possible mitigations against Design:
unacceptable high PoF - Accurate design taking creep into account, and with improved
tolerances.
Monitoring, inspection & - Visual inspection of clamp:
prediction: methods and –> Verify no sliding. –> Inspection to look for corrosion
strategies products, scratches and outer sheath anomalies near the clamp.
- Visual inspection of the pipe configuration including depth
measurements along the configuration. This is to be compared
with the as-installed survey report.
Operational field experience Not experienced

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Tether rupture
Evaluation of failure causes for tether rupture is presented in Table A3.16
Table A3.16: Tether rupture
Layer & layer function Tether contributes to maintaining the riser configuration
Materials Fiber ropes: synthetic tethers made from polyester, polyethylene
and/or aramid fiber - often coated.
Chain and wire ropes made from steel.
For details, reference is given to [API 17L2, 2013].
A3.1.2
Degradation mechanisms. Primarily wear.
Material dependent: Corrosion and hydrogen induced stress
concentration
Inappropriate design or excessive marine growth: Slack in wire,

resulting in tether snatch loads and increased maximum tether
loading.
Layer failure mechanism and Tether rupture may cause a significant change in the riser
the way it will manifest itself configuration. Dependent on the water depth and riser
configuration, the riser may possibly float to the surface.
Conditions promoting - Erroneous installation
degradation - Slack in tether, e.g. resulting in undesirable bending in sockets
- Excessive marine growth
Acceptance criteria for - No visible wear allowed
degradation mechanism - Intact outer hose on fiber ropes
- Corrosion level (limited corrosion allowed)
- No slack in tether
Procedure or models to Design.
predict service life or PoF for Tests and analytical methods.
layer
Identification of the operating Accidental event in extreme conditions:
or environmental conditions Maximum loading occurring with vessel in extreme offset (i.e.
most likely to induce the stretched/compressed riser configuration) and heavy dynamics.
ultimate layer loss of Minimum loading (possibly slack) occurring with extensive
functionality marine growth and heavy pipe content density, possibly
additional loss of buoyancy.
Consequence of loss of layer Dependent on riser configuration and field lay-out:
function with identification of - Interference, and possibly entanglement, with neighboring
events and mechanisms structures and lines with subsequent damages to those
leading to ultimate pipe failure structures: e.g. outer sheath damages, damages to ancillaries
and loss of buoyancy modules. Then, the neighboring structures
are more vulnerable.
- Excessive bending of the pipe
Time scale for loss of pipe Short term. During a heavy storm
function after initial loss of
layer function (imminent
—>long term)

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Parameters that will influence - Weather

the time from loss of initial - Small clearance to neighbouring structures
layer functionality to full pipe - PLEM near anchor point: increased risk of excessive bending
failure
How will the ultimate pipe Leakage or tear-off at pipe end interface resulting in loss of
failure manifest itself containment.
Probability of failure Damage to neighboring structures is more likely than damage to
considerations for pipe loss of the pipe itself.
functionality
For the pipe itself the probability of pipe failure is primarily
dependent on the riser configuration with respect to distance
between anchor and PLEM interface and the possibility for
excessive bending near the PLEM. Additionally, the FPSO Hull
may be close over the riser configuration with the possibility of
interference between riser and hull.
For an intact pipe system, the probability of failure is low.

After a tether rupture, the probability for pipe failure is medium.
Possible mitigations against Design.
unacceptable high PoF - Design to allow for tether rupture
- Verify by analysis (no loss of containment if loss of tether)
- Redundancy
–> Double tethers
–> Both vertical and horizontal tethers and anchors
Note: Although there may be redundancy in number of tethers,
if similar bolts are used throughout, the system is dependent on
the bolt quality.
Monitoring, inspection & Visual inspection of the tether system.
prediction: methods and Extreme vessel offsets (caused by accidental event) should
strategies trigger inspections of the tether system.
Elsewise: The riser must float to the surface in order to be
detected within reasonable time
Operational field experience Poor material quality of bolts is experienced causing lost
anchoring of tether clamp and changed riser configuration; riser
floating to surface.
Wear on fiber ropes is experienced in both clamp and anchor
ends (pad-eye)

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Altered buoyancy
Evaluation of failure causes for altered buoyancy is presented in Table A3.17

Altered buoyancy is here limited to lost or re-distributed buoyancy modules including excessive
marine growth. Mid Water Arches (MWA) are not considered.
Table A3.17: Altered buoyancy
Layer & layer function Buoyancy modules contributes to maintaining the riser
configuration
Materials Composite synthetic foam encapsulated by a polymeric external
skin, reference is given to [API 17L2, 2013].
A3.1.2
Degradation mechanisms - Clamp failure
- Splitting of or fallen off buoyancy modules
- Water ingress
- Hydrostatic collapse
Layer failure mechanism and One or more of the following:
the way it will manifest itself - Loss of buoyancy modules
- Re-distribution of buoyancy modules
- Excessive marine growth
This may result in one or more of the following:

- Change of riser configuration
–> Globally as a lower configuration
–> Locally as a ’camel hump’
- Reduced tether tension
- Increased top tension
- Changed conditions for interference
Conditions promoting - Events of interference
degradation - Erroneous installation
Acceptance criteria for - The amount of allowable water ingress (lost buoyancy) is given
degradation mechanism in [API 17B, 2008].
- Allowable number of lost buoyancy modules according to
[API 17B, 2008] and [API 17L2, 2013].
- Marine growth is accounted for in design.
Procedure or models to Robust global analysis methodology also accounting for loss of
predict service life or PoF for buoyancy modules. This is considered to be proven technology
layer
Identification of the operating Loss of buoyancy modules:
or environmental conditions - Insulated pipes may pose special challenges to clamping
most likely to induce the - Material selection
ultimate layer loss of - Installation
functionality - Interference
Consequence of loss of layer - Excessive bending
functionality with - Interference with possibility of entanglement
identification of events and - Slack in tether; increased loads in tether system. May
mechanisms leading to subsequently promote tether failure

Section A3.3
OC2017 A-001
Time scale for loss of pipe Long term.

functionality after initial loss Most critical just after installation and through the splash zone.
of layer function (imminent
—>long term)
Parameters that will influence - Dynamics
the time from loss of initial - Riser configuration
layer functionality to full pipe - Neighboring structures
failure
How will the ultimate pipe Dependent on the failure:
failure manifest itself Excessive bending of the pipe may lead to unlocking of pressure
armour with subsequent breach of pressure sheath and
ultimately pipe leakage (loss of containment)
Interference with entanglement may allow for several scenarios,
including outer sheath damages.
Probability of failure Low
considerations for pipe loss of
functionality
Possible mitigations against Design and installation:
unacceptable high PoF - Proper testing of clamp and buoyancy modules
- Proper procedures for installation
Modifications:
- Inspection and replacement of buoyancy modules
- Removal of marine growth
Monitoring, inspection & Visual inspection is recommended after the first storm in
prediction: methods and addition to an annual inspection.
strategies
Visual inspection of the buoyancy modules should assess the
relative spacing between each module, the absolute location of
each module with reference to the pipe end and the number of
buoyancy modules. Inspection to look for corrosion products,
scratches and outer sheath anomalies near the clamp.
Inspection of the pipe configuration including depth

measurements along the configuration. This is to be compared
with the as-installed survey report.
Proper documentation from installation is required to verify that

modules are in correct location.
Operational field experience - Axial sliding of modules is observed such that a module rests
on a neighboring module.
- Excessive marine growth lowering the entire riser configuration

Section A3.4
OC2017 A-001
A3.4 Failure Statistics
Historical data of failure and damage of flexible risers, jumpers and flow lines as presented in
the SureFlex- JIP reports [MCS Kenny State of the Art, 2010] and [MCS Kenny Guidance Note, 2010]
are considered representative. The incidents of flexible riser failure and damage are sorted
by failure and presented graphically in Figure A3.7. These data are collected worldwide.
However, a complete and comprehensive overview of all flexible pipe failures is not avail-
able. The data are in line with 4Subsea experience and data published by PSA Norway
[PSA Norway, 2013a], [Muren, 2008]. The most frequent failures are external sheath dam-
age (35%), ancillary device failure (10%) and carcass failure (10%). Among the elements
included in ancillary devices are buoyancy elements, bend stiffener, bend restrictors, in-
terface to turret or deck, riser base, tether base, mid-water arch and its riser interfaces
[MCS Kenny Guidance Note, 2010].
Figure A3.7: Flexible pipe failure / damage incidents [MCS Kenny State of the Art, 2010],
[MCS Kenny Guidance Note, 2010]
Historical data of flexible pipe incidents in the PSA Norway CODAM database in the period
1995 - 2012 are presented in Figure A3.8. The categorization of the failure entries are
performed with an interpretation of the individual failures as reported in the database. Each
entry in the database is counted only once although some of the reported failures may apply
to more than one category. Hence, there are some inaccuracies related to the exact numbers
in the figure.

Section A3.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure A3.8: Failure incidents for flexible pipes [PSA Norway, 2013a]

Part B
Design and Analysis Tools
151
Chapter B1
Design Analysis
Author: Carl Martin Larsen (NTNU), Svein Sævik (NTNU) and Jacob
Qvist (4Subsea)
153
Section B1.2
OC2017 A-001
B1.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this Handbook is to provide background and guidance on methods for
design and operation of flexible pipes. The intention is to give a better basic understanding of
mechanisms and conditions governing a rational design and operation. The recommendations
and guidelines in this text are not intended to serve as regulations, and there has been no
attempt to write the Handbook in a style of a ’recommended practice’.
Since the earlier days of the previous version of the Handbook [Berge et al., 1992], the flexible
pipe technology has developed by:
• Larger diameter pipes
• Higher internal and external pressure
• Higher temperature and flow rates
• New designs
• New materials
• New failure modes
The design analysis procedure may correspondingly be characterized by:
• Basic methods for global analysis have not changed; non-linear FEM time domain
analyses are dominant
• Research in 1992 is engineering practice in 2010
• Improved computers makes ’non-linear stochastic analysis’ available for design engi-
neers
• The analysis of the complex flexible pipe cross sections has developed significantly
• Calculation of response and fatigue damage from vortex shedding (VIV) has made
significant improvements. Uncertainties are still significant, but today’s models have
common understanding of the phenomenon and gives consistent results, which was not
the case in 1992.
• Coupling between global and local analyses
• Significant improvements in the model visualization during design work
This chapter of the Handbook briefly mentions the Design Criteria in Section B1.2 before
providing a more thorough description of Cross Section Analysis in Section B1.3. Based on
a description of stress components and wire geometries, the behavior due to axisymmetric
loads, bending and buckling is described, before commenting on computational methods.
In Section B1.4 aspects of the Global Analysis is covered, along with some fundamental
concepts of flexible riser behavior.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
B1.2 Design Criteria
The main source for requirements and criteria on flexible pipes are API and ISO. However,
very little background and guidance on methods is given in API / ISO, and the Handbook
is complementary to the available API / ISO documents. For the majority of flexible pipes
discussed in this Handbook the main specification is the [API 17J, 2008]. A descriptive
summary is listed below.
API Spec 17J:
• defines the technical requirements for flexible pipes that are designed and manufactured
to uniform standards and criteria.
• minimum requirements are specified for the design, material selection, manufacture,
testing, marking and packaging of flexible pipes, with reference to existing codes and
standards where applicable.
• applies to unbonded flexible pipe assemblies, consisting of segments of flexible pipe
body with end fittings attached to both ends.
• does not cover flexible pipes of bonded structure.
• does not apply to flexible pipe ancillary components.
• does not apply to flexible pipes that include non-metallic tensile and pressure armour
wires.
• the applications addressed by [API 17J, 2008] are sweet and sour service production,
including export and injection applications. Production products include oil, gas, water
and injection chemicals.
• applies to both static and dynamic flexible pipes used as flowlines, risers and jumpers.
• does not apply to flexible pipes for use in choke-and-kill line applications.
For guidelines on the use of flexible pipes API has provided recommended practice [API 17B, 2008].
Other relevant API specifications are:
• [API 17L1, 2013], Guidelines on Flexible pipe ancillary components
• [API 17L2, 2013], Recommended Practice for Flexible Pipe Ancillary Components
• [API 17K, 2005], Specification for Bonded Flexible Pipes
• [API 17E, 2010], Specification for Umbilicals
• [API 17C, 2010], Specification for Through Flowline (TFL) Systems
• [API 17TR2, 2003], The Ageing of PA-11 in Flexible Pipes
• [API 17TR1, 2003], Evaluation Standard for Internal Pressure Sheath Polymers for
High Temperature Flexible Pipes
ASTM, ref1 , and ISO, provides normative and informative references on material production
(steel, alloys, plastics), and on fabrication and testing of components.
1
American Society for Testing and Materials, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, West Conshohocken, PA 19428,
USA

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
B1.3 Cross Section Analysis
B1.3.1 General remarks
The understanding of pipe performance characteristics and related failure modes is important
for obtaining a reliable design of flexible pipe systems. The experience gained from flexible
pipe applications over the last two decades has identified a significant number of failure
modes. The performance with respect to these failure modes may be determined by the
use of analytical and computational methods in combination with testing procedures. A
detailed description of experienced failure modes and test methods are found in Section A3
and Section B5, respectively.
With reference to [API 17B, 2008], design of flexible pipes is carried out in stages:
• Material selection considering the temperature and chemical conditions in terms of pH
(sweet or sour service).
• Cross-section configuration design based on what to be transported (gas, oil, water)
and at which pressure rating.
• System configuration design based on the surrounding infrastructure and environment.
• Dynamic analysis design, identifying the curvature and tension extreme responses.
• Detail and service life design verifying that sufficient service life is obtained.
• Installation design, ensuring that the pipe can be safely installed.
The cross-section strength is governed by the steel helix layers and the design analyses used to
define the amount of steel needed are normally carried out according to the requirements of
[API 17J, 2008] which applies the allowable stress format. This means that a load condition
specific utilization factor is applied to the yield stress defining a stress limit that is not to
be exceeded. The cross-section design analysis is normally based on the pressure rating
and use of analytical models considering axisymmetric effects alone (internal and external
pressure, tension and torsion) and based on the mean stress approach. The latter means that
only stresses due to the axial load in the wires are included when calculating the stresses.
Secondary stresses in the wire due to bending and friction is not included. This relies on the
assumption that the flexible pipe is a compliant structure where the secondary stresses can
be taken care of by introducing a maximum curvature limit to ensure that no over bending
takes place.
This section focus on methods for analysis and design of non-bonded flexible pipes with
respect to known metallic layer failure modes that can be described by analytical or compu-
tational methods and are part of the design requirements reflected in [API 17J, 2008]. The
failure modes addressed here are:
• Overload, i.e. excessive yielding in the metallic layers.
• Collapse of the cross-section due to external pressure.
• Buckling of the tensile armour.
• Metal fatigue.
• The effect of corrosion on metal fatigue and tensile armour buckling.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Analytical formulas are included for estimation of mechanical properties and structural capac-
ities for specific cases. These formulas are primarily given for verification purposes, enabling
capacity and performance parameters to be calculated in a simplified way and under specific
conditions.
B1.3.2 Governing stress components
The nonbonded flexible pipe consists of a layered structure where each layer is free to slide
(under the restraint of friction) relative to each other. Each layer has its specific function as
described in Chapter A2, Flexible pipe properties and materials.
In order to understand the mechanical behaviour of flexible pipes it is important to clarify

which layers and stress components that contribute. In the general case, the stress compo-
nents include 3 normal stress components σ11 , σ22 , σ33 and 3 shear stress components σ13 ,
σ23 , σ12 , see Figure B1.1
Figure B1.1: General components of stress
The load response is primarily governed by the steel layers, however, the plastic layers influ-
ence how the load is shared between the layers. This is exemplified in Figure B1.2 showing
how internal pressure is transferred throughout a typical flexible pipe cross-section. This pipe
cross-section includes starting from the inside; the carcass, a pressure sheath, pressure spiral
wires in two layers, 4 layers of cross-wound tensile armour separated by antiwear tapes and
an external sheath.
It is seen that the carcass do not carry pressure (pressure on inside and outside of carcass is
the same), due to it’s corrugated structure. The plastic layers are in this example assumed
to have a Poisson’s ratio of 0.5. Hence, these layers behave hydrostatic (same stress in all
three directions) and the contact pressure (starting from internal pressure at the outside of
carcass) is seen to be transformed directly to the next steel layer. The contact pressure from
the tensile armour onto the pressure spiral wire results from the end-cap effect (tensioning
the tensile armour) and act as a support of the two pressure spiral wire layers, reducing the
associated pressure differential that need to be taken by the pressure spiral wires.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.2: Pressure distribution in a typical flexible pipe exposed to internal pressure
From the above it is clear that the stress state in each layer of a flexible pipe is in nature 3-
dimensional. However, since the steel layers are governing with respect to structural strength
and these basically consist of long slender curved beams, the primary load carrying effect will
be by membrane action. Hence, the primary stress components to be included in strength
calculations will be the axial stresses resulting from the axial load in each wire.
The wires are normally assumed to rest stress free in the helix configuration as the manu-
facturing procedure involves plastic straining. With reference to Figure B1.3 (a), this results
in an initial torsion κ1 and an initial normal curvature κ2 whereas κ3 = 0 along the helix.
Hence, curved beam theory that include the coupling between initial curvature, membrane
and bending effects is needed to describe the structural behaviour. The stresses are related
to the governing stress resultants defined in Figure B1.3 (b) and the load scenario, which
can be divided into:
• Axisymmetric loads that only change the length and diameter of the straight pipe
cylinder and with small relative deformations between wires. This includes tension,
torsion, internal and external pressure loads, the latter assuming that no local buckling
or collapse effects occur.
• Bending loads where the straight pipe cylinder is bent into a torus and where significant
relative deformations will occur between the wires.
The significant stress components are shown in Figure B1.4 and include components from
axial force (basis for strength calculation), torsion moment and bidirectional bending. The
components of shear stresses σ12 and σ13 related to the local shear forces Q2 and Q3 are
small and can be neglected.
For axisymmetric loads, the stresses related to torsion and bending are insignificant, hence the
stresses resulting from the axial load in the wire will govern. It is noted that for non-symmetric
pressure spiral wires, such as the Z-spiral, significant stresses may result from rotation as a
result of the M3 moment about the strong radial axis resulting in a significant stress gradient
along the cross-section, see Figure B1.5. However, since the spiral wire will be locked when
the gaps are closed, these stresses are not essential for equilibrium and can be neglected
in static strength calculations. This is one of the reasons why [API 17B, 2008] refers to

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) Initial torsion and curvature quantities
(2) Wire stress resultants
Figure B1.3: Definition or wire coordinate axes and mechanical quantities
the concept of mean stress when dealing with strength calculations, i.e. neglecting the
contribution from the bending moment resulting in each wire. It is noted that this approach
rests on the assumption that the steel material used have sufficient fracture toughness to
accommodate the involved strain level and where the minimum allowable curvature radius
will represent the limiting criteria with respect to controlling the total strain involved in most
cases.
For bending fatigue calculations, the axial, torsion and bending components need all to be
included for both the tensile and pressure armours. In the latter case, the bending process
also gives variation in σ22 , σ23 and σ33 that need to be taken into account, see Section
B1.3.5
Figure B1.4: Stress components - tensile armour
B1.3.3 Wire geometries
The tensile armour consists of flat rectangular profiles, with rounded corners to create a
smooth profile thus avoiding notch effects. For each layer, all wires are simultaneously cold

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.5: Longitudinal stress distribution in Z-profile
formed onto the pipe surface, 40−80 wires in each layer at lay angles 29o −55o . The fraction
filled ratio Ff is usually around 0.9. For the tensile armour, the fill factor is defined by:
nb
Ff = (B1.1)
cos α2πR
where n is the number of tendons in the layer, b is the width of the tendon, R is the mean
layer radius and α is the lay angle. The applied wire dimension depends on the pipe diameter,
some typical thickness/width mm values are 3/7.5, 5/17.5, 4/17.5, 6/12 and 6/15.
The pressure armour consists of interlocked spiral wires, normally 1-2 spiral wires per layer in
1-2 layers. The different manufacturers supply different geometries such as the Z-spiral, the
C-clip and the Theta-clip. Different wire configurations are illustrated in Figure B1.6. For
high pressure applications a rectangular back up spiral wire may be applied to increase the
pressure capacity. The fraction filled ratio is normally in the range of 0.85 for these layers.
For the pressure armour and carcass, the fill factor is normally defined by:
nA
Ff = (B1.2)
Lp t
where Lp is the pitch length of the n spiral wires in the layer (normally 1 or 2) with cross-
section area A. The pitch length is defined as:
2πR
Lp = (B1.3)
tan α
The carcass is manufactured from a flat steel plate and formed into a corrugated profile as
illustrated in Figure B1.7. A typical fill factor is 0.55.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) Tensile armour geometry (2) Z-layer
(3) Theta (Technip) layer with back-up (4) C-Clip (NKT)

spiral
Figure B1.6: Tensile armour profile and alternative pressure spiral configurations
Figure B1.7: Carcass corrugated profile - principal outline
B1.3.4 Behaviour due to axisymmetric loads
General
In this section, the behaviour due to axisymmetric loads, i.e. i.e. tension, torsion, internal
and external pressure loads will be explained in terms of an analytical approach assuming
that the cylindrical straight pipe shape is kept during deformation. It is noted that with
respect to external pressure loads this assumes that no local buckling or collapse effects will
occur. Buckling effects are treated separately in Section B1.3.6.
As noted above, the response due to axisymmetric loads are primarily governed by the
response of the metallic layers which all consist of helices. The wires are normally assumed
to rest stress free in the helix configuration as the manufacturing procedure involves plastic
strains. With reference to Figure B1.3, the initial torsion κ1 and curvatures components κ2
and κ3 along the helix can be expressed by the lay angle α and the helix radius R as:

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
sin α cos α
κ1 = (B1.4)
R
sin2 α
κ2 = (B1.5)
R
κ3 = 0 (B1.6)
The long and thin wires can be described by curved beam theory and the wire equilibrium
equation when only considering axisymmetric loads can be written as [Sævik, 2011]:
− κ2 Q1 + κ1 Q2 + q3 = 0 (B1.7)
− κ2 M1 + κ1 M2 + Q2 = 0 (B1.8)
where Qi and Mi respectively represent the forces along and moments about the X i axes
defined in Figure B1.3 and q3 is the contact line load in the radial direction. For the slender
armour wire, the contribution from Mi and Q2 is small and can be neglected, This means
that wire equilibrium can be described by the axial load Q1 alone. The contact pressure line
load q3 is then obtained from Eq. B1.7 and Eq. B1.5 as:
sin2 α
q3 = κ2 Q1 = Q1 (B1.9)
R
Axial loading
Primary effects By considering all steel layers and neglecting the contribution from the
plastic layers, pure axial equilibrium yields:
Na
(B1.10)
X
2 2
nj σ11j Aj cos αj = Tw = T + πpint Rint − πpext Rext
j=1
where Na is the number of contributing layers, Tw is the true wall tension, nj is the number
of wires in layer j, σ11j is the axial stress in the layer, Aj is the cross-section area, T is
the effective tension (the total cross-section resultant), pint is the internal pressure, pext is
the external pressure, Rint is the internal pipe radius where the internal pressure is acting
(normally outside the carcass) and Rext is the external pipe radius where the external pressure
is acting (depend on whether damaged outer sheath is to be assumed). It seen that since
the lay angle of the pressure spiral wire is close to 90o , the axial load is primarily taken by
the tensile armour layer.
For a two layered cross-wound structure where the lay angles are assumed to be equal in size
but opposite in lay direction (torsion balanced), the below formulas can be used to estimate
the stresses in the tensile armour.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Tw Tw
σt = = (B1.11)
nAt cos α 2πRttot Ff cos2 α
where n is the total number of tensile armour wires, At is the area of the wire, ttot is the
thickness including both layers and Ff is the fill factor. By assuming same fill factor and
number of tendons for the two layers, the nominal external pressure from the tensile armour
layer onto the pressure spiral wire can further be approximated by:
q3 σt At sin2 α Tw sin2 α nj b Tw tan2 α

pt = 2 Ff = 2 Ff = 2 = (B1.12)
b Rb 2nj cos α Rb cos α2πR 2πR2
where R is taken to be the mean layer radius.

With reference to Figure B1.8 and Figure B1.9, the axial strain in the helix can be described
by standard beam quantities at the cross-section centre and the radial motion u3 of each
layer as:
sin2 α
ε11 = cos2 αp + u3 + R sin α cos ατp (B1.13)
R
Figure B1.8: Kinematic quantities for axisymmetric deformation
where p and τp are the overall pipe strain and torsion at the pipe centre, cfr. Figure B1.8
and Figure B1.9. The axial stiffness of the two layered pipe can then be obtained by assuming
no torsion coupling, i.e. neglecting the last term in Eq. B1.13 and using energy principles
as:
EA = nEAt cos α(cos2 α − νa sin2 α) = EFf cos2 α(cos2 α − νa sin2 α)2πRttot (B1.14)
where νa is the apparent Poisson’s ratio defined by the relation between axial straining and
radial contraction:

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.9: Infinitesimal segment strain
u3
νa = − (B1.15)
Rp
The first term in Eq. B1.14 describes the stiffness contribution from the tensile armour,
whereas the second term describes the softening effect of the radial contraction associated
with the helix. For nonbonded pipes with a stiff pressure armour and carcass, νa ∼ 0.2.
Consequently, the first term in the stiffness expression in Eq. B1.14 dominates. It should also
be noted that the expression in Eq. B1.14 assumes small geometric deformations and that
the layers remain in contact. The last assumption signifies that initial gaps introduced during
fabrication or due to the load condition may influence the axial pipe stiffness significantly.
This is particularly the case for compressive axial loads.
Figure B1.10 shows experimental results on the axial load -relative elongation behaviour of
an 8m long 4" Technip smooth bore dynamic pipe, [Skallerud, 1991a], with zeta layer and
pressure back-up layer. The results are presented for different levels of internal pressure and
signify:
• Relatively little hysteresis
• Axial stiffness ranging from 11.05-21.05 MN, depending on internal pressure
Figure B1.11 indicates that increasing frequency increases the hysteresis, but the stiffness is
not significantly affected. The discontinuity at the loop ends are due to resolution problems
at the high frequency, and is not a physical effect of the pipe. It is likely that the hysteresis
seen for high frequencies is caused by visco-elastic effects induced by the plastic layers.
The results showed that a linear relation can be assumed between axial force and strain with
an associated equivalent damping ratio less than 3 % for the tested pipe.
For a given design, νa can also be calculated based on information given in terms of the axial
strain at a given internal pressure and the axial stiffness. The axial strain at a given pressure
p can be approximated as:
2
(1 − 2νa )pint πRint
p = (B1.16)
EA
which can be used to find νa , in most cases giving the same value of ∼ 0.2 for the standard
non-bonded pipe (not 55o designs with no pressure spiral wire).

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.10: Axial elongation behaviour of a 4" Technip pipe. Loading frequency = 0.1
Hz, [Skallerud, 1991a]
Figure B1.11: Axial elongation behaviour of a 4" Technip pipe. Loading frequency = 0.5
Hz, [Skallerud, 1991a]
Existing methods for the determination of pipe response to axial tension are fairly reliable.
However, this is not the case for axial compression, which is a more complex area. Dur-
ing installation and shut-down conditions where the pipe bore may be exposed to external
overpressure, the tensile armour will be in compression, even if the effective tension is pos-
itive. This may lead to radial gaps followed by radial or transverse buckling of the tensile
wires, leading to overall torsion instability. For deep water pipe designs, anti-buckling tapes
may be applied on the outside of the outer tensile armour to limit the radial motions and
formation of gaps. The instability failure mode was reported by Bectarte and Coutarel
[Bectarte and Coutarel, 2004] describing both bird caging (radial failure) and lateral buck-
ling. Test procedures for lateral buckling were described that included the effect of cyclic
bending. A computer model was also mentioned, but no details with respect to methods
or results were given. The methods used to validate the pipe capacity with respect to this
failure mode include laboratory testing, Deep water Immersion Performance (DIP) testing
and mathematical models. Reference is given to Section B1.3.6.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Bending and torsion in the wire due to axial wire loads The change in lay angle
induced by the beam deformation quantities also leads to small changes in the curvature of
the wire about the weak axis of the wire and torsion. These quantities can be approximated
by [Sævik, 1992]:
sin3 α cos α sin3 α cos α

ω1 = p − u3 + cos4 ατp (B1.17)
R R2
sin2 α cos2 α sin2 α cos2 α

ω2 = − p + u3 + (2 sin α cos3 α + sin3 α cos α)τp (B1.18)
R R2
where ω1 represents the change in torsion and ω2 is the change in normal curvature. As
noted above, the contribution from the above quantities can normally be neglected due to
the small tensile armour cross-section and the limited overall axial strain allowed for in flexible
pipes. It should, however, be noted that for torsion unbalanced structures consisting of large
helical elements, the contribution is significant and should be included. The above equations
have been compared to FE analysis and are considered valid as long as the helix lay angle is
not significantly altered [Sævik and Li, 2013].
Bending stresses induced by axial wire loads at end fittings Axisymmetric loads is
associated with small changes in the initial lay angle. In the end fitting where the wires are
terminated, this change in lay angle may be restrained. In the case of restraint, this will give
rise to local bending stresses, [Thorsen, 2011]. Longitudinal stresses due to bending will add
to the total axial stress and this may possibly constitute a danger when it comes to fatigue
of the pipe, specially if it is reasonable to believe that metal to metal contact occurs.
In the unloaded configuration the angle between the tensile armour wires and the longitudinal
axis of the pipe (the lay angle) is α0 , see Figure B1.12.
Figure B1.12: Definitions related to the wire behaviour at end fitting, [Thorsen, 2011]
As the pipe is axially strained, the curve which the wires follow must change. If no end
restraints are present, the change in lay angle would be the same at all points along the
wire, and the wire would assume a path like the red one in the figure. The new lay angle is
denoted α1 . The displacement pattern (α1 ) and wire strain (11 ) is only possible when no
end restraints are present. The wire is in fact fixed at the end fitting, meaning that the lay

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
angle must remain at α0 at the end fitting and gradually increase towards α1 as one moves
away from the end. This is illustrated in Figure B1.12 with a blue line. Therefore the actual
change in lay angle is introduced as the variable η(X 1 ), meaning that the new lay angle at
any point along the wire is given as α0 − η(X 1 ) which in the limit reaches the change in lay
angle γ. For the no friction case, the local bending stress about the wire strong axis can be
approximated as [Thorsen, 2011]:
M3 1
σ11 ' 1.73Eγ cos αp 2 (B1.19)
M3
where σ11 is defined in Figure Figure B1.5(a) and γ is the change in lay angle. Eq. B1.19 has
been used to calculate numerical values for a wide range of pipe strain. The calculations have
been performed assuming standard steel properties and the results are shown in Figure B1.13,
where the ratio between local bending stress and axial stress are shown for two different wire
dimensions. The blue line shows results for a wire of width 9 mm and thickness 3 mm, while
the red line shows a larger wire of width 15 mm and thickness 6 mm. The radius of the pipe
is 0.1 meters and the lay angle is 35◦ in both cases.
Figure B1.13: Analytical results for the ratio between bending and axial stress.,
[Thorsen, 2011]
As seen in the figure, the bending component grows larger relative to the axial stress as the
stress increases, and the bending stress exceeds 6 % of the axial stress for an axial stress
above 500 MPa. The rate of increase in bending stress is relatively large at low strain levels,
but it does however decay as the axial stress increase. Even so, the relative magnitude of
bending stress continues to increase. It is also observed that the two curves in the figure are
located very close to each other despite the relatively large differences in wire dimensions.
A major limitation of the analytical model is the assumption of zero friction, Friction will
restrain the wire motion and force the wire into the new lay angle over shorter length. FE anal-
yses have been carried out to investigate the effect of friction in a single wire [Thorsen, 2011]
for wire dimensions 9 x 3 mm wire and 15 x 6 mm. The results are presented in Figure B1.14
and Figure B1.15.
As seen, the friction greatly increases the bending stress at the end fitting and for a two
layered structure, one may experience a localized bending stress of approximately 16 %

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.14: FE results for end fitting bending stress, 9 x 3 mm wire, [Thorsen, 2011]
Figure B1.15: FE results for end fitting bending stress, 15 x 6 mm wire, [Thorsen, 2011]
of the axial stress if the pure axial stress is 400 MPa. This is significant, and should be
considered in fatigue evaluations of the armour wires if significant dynamic tension occurs.
It is however noted that all the above calculations rests on the assumption that the armour
wires are fully fixed at the end fitting. The accuracy of this assumption depends on the end
fitting construction, and more detailed analyses taking the end fitting behaviour into the
calculations should be performed in the general case.
Torsion
Excessive torsion may give lock-up of the wires causing ”birdcaging” or structural damage
to the pipe. This is not a very likely failure mode under normal operational conditions
where the torsional loads are small. However, there have been cases of excessive torsion
during pipe installation, which have caused failure in the pipe. An axial tensile force will
prevent torsional damage. This positive effect is normally taken into account by verifying

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
the torsional strength for a tensile force not greater than the minimum axial force predicted
from the dynamic analysis of the riser system. The torsional resistance from all Na resisting
layers must equal to the torsional moment Mt given as:
Na
(B1.20)
X
nj σ11j Aj Rj sin αj = Mt
i=1
The major contribution to the torsional resistance comes from the helically wound tensile
armours, which leads to the following formula for a quick evaluation of the stresses in the
tensile layers:
Mt
σ11 = (B1.21)
RnAt sin α
where n is the total number of wires in the armouring layers, At is the cross section area
of each wire and R is the mean radius of the armouring layers. Again, two tensile armour
layers with equal but opposite lay angles have been assumed. By combining Eq. B1.21 and
Eq. B1.13, disregarding the p and u3 components, the following expression may be used
for an approximate evaluation of the torsional stiffness of the pipe
GIt = nAt ER2 sin2 α cos α = EFf sin2 α cos2 α2πR3 ttot (B1.22)
The above formulas assume that all layers remain in contact. It should be pointed out that
there is an asymmetry in the torsional stiffness. When the pipe is twisted, gaps will tend to
occur between the layers as one layer will tend to move outwards and the other inwards. The
presence and location of these gaps therefore depends on the direction of the applied moment,
the load condition and the pipe design (A 55o degree structure will behave different from a
standard 35o structure). Considering a standard 35o structure and load cases dominated by
tension and internal pressure, the tensile armour will be squeezed against the pressure armour
and the torsion stiffness will be high. In cases where axial compression occurs, eg. during
installation, the tensile armour will be supported by the soft outer sheath/anti-buckling tape
and the torsion stiffness will be lower.
Experimental studies of the torsional behaviour of a 4" Technip pipe are reported [Skallerud, 1991a].
The pipes exhibit torsional behaviour which is similar to the axial behaviour shown in Figure
B1.10, although the hysteresis is less dependent on the load frequency, the latter most likely
being caused by friction induced in the pressure armour and due to the relative rotation
between layers. Since friction effects are sensitive to the gap conditions, the torsion damping
will vary with the load condition. However, the results showed that a linear stiffness relation
can be assumed between torque and torsion as for the axial load case.
Internal and external pressure
Bursting of a pipe by excessive internal pressure can occur if the pipe is not properly designed,
or if the maximum internal pressure is considerably underestimated. However, if the internal
pressure is known this failure mode is not likely to occur, see Section A3. The design pressure
includes operating pressure and allowances for surges or other factors affecting the internal

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
pressure. This should be combined with atmospheric external pressure. For selection of
design parameters, see [API 17J, 2008].
When a pipe is subjected to internal pressure the load will be carried by the tensile and
pressure armour layers. The equilibrium between stresses and radial forces may be expressed
by the following equation:
Na
nj σ11j Aj sin2 αj 1
(B1.23)
X
= 2π(pint Rint − pext Rext )
j=1
Rj cosαj
where Na is the number of pressure resisting layers. The first term on the left hand side is
related to the axial force in the wires which when multiplied by the normal curvature gives the
radial line load, as in Eq. B1.9, whereas the cos1αj term describes the relative amount having
this line load per unit length of pipe. A good approximation is to assume that the plastic
sheaths transmit pressure, i.e. there is no pressure differential through the plastic layers .
The interlocked carcass does not carry any part of the internal pressure. Consequently, the
pressure resisting layers are the pressure spiral wire layers and the cross-wound armour layers,
with the pressure spiral wire layers taking the major role.
Eq. B1.23 and Eq. B1.1 may be combined to arrive at the following expression for the tensile
armour contribution to burst pressure resistance:
ttot
ph = Ff σu sin2 α (B1.24)
R
where ttot is the total thickness of the double tensile armour layers, R is the mean radius
of the helical armour layers and σu is the ultimate tensile strength of the layer. Eq. B1.11
may be used to derive the following expression for the tensile armour contribution to end cap
pressure resistance:
R
pa = 2 2
2 ttot Ff σu cos α (B1.25)
Rint
In the case of no zeta or back-up pressure layer, the stress in the helical armours alone must
balance the hoop and end cap effects of the internal pressure, i.e. ph = pa . Assuming
Rint ∼ R, this gives tan2 α = 2, or α = 54.7o . This is the "neutral" or "balanced " lay angle
at which there is no tendency for the helical armour to change shape under load. Since a pipe
is usually reinforced by several layers, the balanced angle will depend on the relative amount
of steel in the helical armour layers and the pressure layers. The optimum lay angle is then
typically 35 − 40o , cf. [Nielsen et al., 1990]. The contribution to burst pressure resistance
from the pressure layers, pp may be obtained from the following expression
Np
tj
(B1.26)
X
pp = Ff j σuj
j=1
R
where tj denote the thickness of pressure spiral wire layer number j and R is the mean radius
of the Np pressure layers, respectively. The fill factor Ff j for pressure spiral wire layer j.
The total hoop pressure resistance is then obtained by summing the contribution from each
layer as:

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
phoop = pp + ph (B1.27)
The burst pressure is then given by the smallest of phoop and pa i.e. hoop and axial resistance:
pb = min(phoop , pa ) (B1.28)
In pipe design, the lay angle is usually chosen to give equal burst resistance in the axial
and hoop directions. The procedure for burst pressure calculations, described above, is quite
simple and straightforward. Experimental results, reported by [Chen et al., 1992] , show that
the above procedure gives quite reliable estimates of burst pressure. The average deviation
from test results was reported to be within 3%, and with a maximum deviation of 7-8%.
B1.3.5 Behaviour in bending
General
The bending behaviour of flexible pipes is a more complex phenomenon to analyse than
the axisymmetric load case. The flexural response shows a pronounced hysteresis behaviour.
This is illustrated by the moment/curvature relation in Figure B1.16 The hysteresis behaviour
of nonbonded pipes may be explained by the internal slip mechanism. Such pipes have a
number of helical reinforcing layers, which tend to slip relative to each other when the
pipe is bent. This is particularly the case for the two crosswound tensile layers. When the
curvatures are small, slip is prevented by the internal friction between the layers, giving a high
initial tangent stiffness, EIs , corresponding to the sum of contributions from all layers when
assuming plane surfaces remain plane as for standard beam theory. The moment needed to
overcome the friction forces, Mf , is called the friction moment. Mf depends on the contact
pressure between pipe layers, and consequently on the loads applied to the pipe. When the
friction moment is exceeded, the curvature varies linearly with the moment variation. The
slope of this line corresponds to the elastic bending stiffness EIe represented by the sum
of contributions from elastic bending of the plastic layers and each individual wire. This
stiffness is rather low and the main part of it is due to the stiffness of the plastic sheaths.
It should also be noted that when the direction of the curvature is changed, the change in
moment has to exceed twice the friction moment before reversed slip behaviour occurs.
Figure B1.16: Typical moment curvature relation for non-bonded flexible pipe

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Minimum bend radius
Excessive bending can lead to local buckling destruction of the pipe as the interlocking el-
ements or helical armour elements interfere and touch each other as well as plastic layer
overstraining. [API 17J, 2008] defines the minimum bend radius from the concepts of min-
imum storage radius, ρs , and the minimum locking radius, ρl , needed to cause unlocking
of the interlocked layers where a primary requirement is that ρs is always greater than ρl .
Different safety factors are then applied based on the load type and condition to prevent
damage when the pipe is bent in dynamic, static, installation and storage configurations, see
Section A3 for a more detailed description of related failure modes.
The locking radius at which contact occurs between elements within the different helical
layers, may be computed when the layer geometry is known. Figure B1.17 shows the relevant
geometric quantities for both the tensile armour and the interlocked profiles used in the
pressure armour. The locking radius is found considering the bending strain needed to close
the gap at the tensile or compressive sides of the pipe. For the interlocked profiles, this can
be formulated at the compressive side where shortening occurs as:
Lp R Lp bmin
= − (B1.29)
n ρl n sin α
and at the tensile side where elongation occurs;
Lp R bmax Lp
= − (B1.30)
n ρl sin α n
For the tensile armour, either of the above equations apply and can also be calculated on
the basis of the fill factor as:
R
ρl = (B1.31)
1 − Ff
The locking radius for the pipe is taken to be the largest ρl for all helical layers. In order
to maintain integrity of the plastic layers, this is governed by the maximum allowable strain,
see [API 17J, 2008]. This gives the following limit for the bending radius of the plastic layer:
R
ρ = (B1.32)
lim
The minimum bend radius is established from considering both ρ and ρl and including
relevant safety factors as specified in [API 17J, 2008].
Stresses and stress resultants related to the tensile armour
As stated above, the static reference stress level in the tensile armour is given by the mean
static effective tension and associated internal and external pressures. This gives a mean
axial stress and associated contact pressures that governs the friction moment. In a flexible
riser the tension and external pressure will vary along its length, hence the friction moment
will also change along the riser. Further, due to the differences in contact pressure between
layers, the response in terms of dynamic stresses due to bending induced by floater motion
and hydrodynamic loads will be different between layers. Hence, the nature of dynamic

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.17: Geometrical properties of armour layers relevant for minimum radius predicition
stresses will be characterized by both variation between layers and along the length of a
flexible riser.
For the tensile armour layers, the dynamic stresses will consist of an axial friction stress
associated to the slip between layers, axial stresses from dynamic tension and local torsion
and bending stresses resulting from the components of global curvature along each wire.
Local wire bending stresses in tensile armour In the stressed state, the local bending
behaviour can be described by assuming that each wire follows an assumed path along
the curved pipe surface and application of differential geometry. With regard to which
path each wire will follow, there are two assumptions that have been commonly used, see
[Feret et al., 1986b] and and [Sævik, 1993] and Figure B1.18:
• The Geodesic
• The Loxodromic
The loxodromic curve represents the curve that would represent the initial path of each wire
on the circular cylinder as if the path was fixed relative to the surface. The geodesic represents
the shortest distance between two points, respectively on the tensile and compressive sides
of the pipe along the same helix. It has no transverse curvature and both longitudinal and
transverse slip relative to the loxodromic is needed to reach the geodesic path as illustrated
in Figure B1.18.
As a result of bending, shear forces will build up between each wire and the pipe until slip
starts. Due to the relative large axial stiffness of each wire, longitudinal slip is enforced
to eliminate the length difference between the compressive and tensile sides of the pipe.
However, based on the work by Sævik [Sævik, 1993], the transverse wire displacements

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.18: Definition of curve paths
towards the geodesic will be restrained by transverse friction forces. Hence, the dynamic
bending torsion and curvature in each wire, ωip , will be somewhere between the solution
given by the above limit curves. If no slip is assumed, the loxodromic curve applies and the
torsion and curvature quantities can be determined with reference to Figure B1.19 as:
Figure B1.19: Definition of curvature quantities
ω1p = sin α cos3 α cos ψβ2 (B1.33)
ω2p = − cos4 α cos ψβ2 (B1.34)
ω3p = (1 + sin2 α) cos α sin ψβ2 (B1.35)
where β2 is the global curvature at the cross-section centre and ψ is the angular coordinate
starting from the lower side of the pipe, see Figure B1.19.
However, since longitudinal slip is unavoidable, this will change the curvature quantities
even if no transverse slip occurs. If no axial friction is assumed, the longitudinal relative
displacement is given by:
cos2 α
u1 = R2 sin ψβ2 (B1.36)
sin α

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
which then changes the above torsion and the weak axis curvature into:
ω1p = 2 sin α cos3 α cos ψβ2 (B1.37)
ω2p = − cos2 α cos 2α cos ψβ2 (B1.38)
where it is noted that the transverse curvature ω3p (bending about strong axis of the flat
wire) is unaffected.
The corresponding quantities along the geodesic curve which assumes both longitudinal and
transverse slips are , [Sævik, 1992]:
1
ω1p = − sin α cos α[ − 3] cos ψβ2 (B1.39)
sin2 α
ω2p = −3 cos2 α cos ψβ2 (B1.40)

ω3p = 0 (B1.41)
The slip towards the geodesic also involves a transverse slip component in addition to the
longitudinal component in Eq. B1.36:
R2 cos2 α
u2 = [ + 2 sin α] sin ψβ2 (B1.42)
tan α sin α
Moment-curvature behaviour and associated friction stresses As noted above, the

pipe initially behaves as a rigid pipe according to Navier’s hypothesis during increased bend-
ing. At a certain point, however, the shear stress at the neutral axis of bending will exceed
the shear capacity governed by friction and slip will occur between layers. With reference to
Figure B1.19, considering plane deformation only i.e. β2 6= 0, the axial force Q1 in the wire
before slip is given by:
Q1 = −EAt cos2 αR cos ψβ2 (B1.43)
The associated shear force q1 per unit length along the wire needed to fulfil the plane surfaces
remain plane condition is obtained by differentiating the above equation with respect to the
length coordinate X 1 and applying the relation ψ = sinRα X 1 :
q1 = EAt cos2 α sin α sin ψβ2 (B1.44)
where the maximum is found at the pipe neutral axis of bending as for standard beam theory.
The shear stress increases until the maximum possible shear stress q1c is obtained:
q1c = µ(q3I + q3I+1 ) (B1.45)
where µ is the friction coefficient and the index I refers to the inner and outer surfaces of
the wire. The critical curvature β2c is then found by equating q1 and q1c as:
µ(q3I + q3I+1 )
β2c = (B1.46)
EAt cos2 α sin α

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
and the maximum stress at the outer fibre of the pipe at this stage is:
µ(q3I + q3I+1 )R
(B1.47)
sin αAt
which is noted to be a factor π/2 less than the value found by equilibrium assuming full slip
along the quarter pitch helical path.
Assuming harmonic helix motion and no end effects, an arbitrary cross-section can be divided
into two zones as illustrated in Figure B1.20 where one part of the cross-section will be in
the slip domain (Region II), whereas the other will still be in the stick-domain (Region I).
Considering one quarter of the cross-section and at the tensile side (the upper right part of
Figure B1.20), the transition between these two regions can be defined by the angle ψ0 :
Figure B1.20: Cross-section slip zone
ψ0 β2
ψ0 = = (B1.48)
sin ψ0 β2c
where β2 represents the actual curvature of the cross-section at any stage beyond slip. At
this stage, the stress distribution along Region II in the considered cross-section quarter can
be expressed by:
µ(q3I + q3I+1 )R
σ11 (ψ) = ψ (B1.49)
sin αAt
whereas he stress in Region I can be expressed by:
µ(q3I + q3I+1 )R
σ11 (ψ) = E cos2 αRβ2 (sin ψ − sin ψ0 ) + ψ0 (B1.50)
sin αAt
where it is noted that at full slip ψ = ψ0 = π2 , the cross-section stress reaches its full value
given by:
π µ(q3I + q3I+1 )R
σ11 = (B1.51)
2 sin αA

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
The associated bending moment can be found by integration, utilizing symmetry and con-
sidering the layer as a thin shell layer with thickness t as:
µ(q3i + q3i+1 )
Z ψ0
2 3
M = 4Ff cos αR t[ ψdψ
0 sin αAt
π (B1.52)
µ(q3I + q3I+1 )
Z
2
2
+ E cos αβ2 (sin ψ − sin ψ0 ) + ψ0 sin ψdψ]
ψ0 sin αAt
From the above, the start slip bending moment contribution from each layer is found to be:
R2 µ(q3I + q3I+1 )n πR3 cos2 αµ(q3I + q3I+1 )

Mc = = Ff (B1.53)
2 tan α b sin α
whereas the full slip bending moment from the same layer is determined to be:
2R2 µ(q3I + q3I+1 )n 4R3 cos2 αµ(q3I + q3I+1 )

Mf = = Ff (B1.54)
π tan α b sin α
It is noted that the difference between this two moment values is a factor π4 which is in
agreement with the value obtained when comparing the initial and full yield bending moments
for a steel pipe having a perfect elastic-plastic material characteristic.
Figure B1.21: Moment curvature contribution from each layer
By application of Eq. B1.48 and Eq. B1.52 a moment curvature diagram can be constructed
for each layer as illustrated in Figure B1.21. This diagram represent the friction contribution
to the moment curvature relation from each tensile armour layer and can be represented as
a three-linear function. The contact pressure will vary between layers and the total moment
curvature diagram will therefore include a sum of three-linear relations, one for each layer.
However, since the transition to start slip to end slip is small in terms of curvature increase,
the diagram can be approximated as sum of bi-linear relations and the contribution from
one tensile armour layer to the bending stiffness before slip can be found by dividing the slip
bending moment of Eq. B1.53 with the slip curvature in Eq. B1.46. The bending stiffness
contribution from friction in each layer can then be written as:

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
4
β2 ≤ β2c : EIs = Ff cos4 απR3 t
π (B1.55)
4
β2 > β2c : EIs = 0
π
This gives the following total bending stiffness relation for the flexible pipe:
Nt
(B1.56)
X
EI = EIe + Ff j cos4 αj πRj 3 tj f (β2 , β2cj )
j=1
where f is a function that is 1 for β2 ≤ β2cj and 0 for β2 > β2cj for each layer i. It is
noted that for dynamic loading the slip curvature range will be twice the amplitude limits
described above. EIe represents the sum of elastic contributions from the plastic layers and
local wire bending. The local wire bending contribution is also influenced by the wire tension
which increases the geometric stiffness against bending. By assuming the loxodromic curve
representation for the tensile armour, the following expression may be applied to estimate
EIe :
Npl
X π
EIe = Ej [(Rjo )4 − (Rji )4 ]
j=1
4
Nt
1X
+ nj [Gj I1j 4 sin2 αj cos5 αj + Ej I2j cos3 αj cos2 2αj + Ej I3j cos αj (1 + 2 sin2 αj + sin4 αj )]
2 j=1
Nt
X cos8 αj cos4 αj
+ Ff j σ11j πRj 3 tj [9 cos4 αj sin2 αj + 6 cos2 αj + 6 cos4 αj + 2 + + 4]
j=1
sin αj sin2 αj
(B1.57)
Since, the behaviour of the plastic layers is sensitive to temperature and the geometric
stiffness and slip limit depend on pressure and tension, several moment-curvature relations
may have to be used in strength calculations, depending on the condition to be evaluated.
It is also to be noted that the above model is based on the assumption that no significant
end effects are present, i.e. the curvature takes place away from the end fitting where each
wire is anchored. In cases where this is not the case, more advanced formulations based on
individual wire modelling using general or specialized FE softwares, may be needed.
For most cases, however, the moment-curvature based model presented above have proven
to give good stress and fatigue estimates for the tensile armour as compared to test data,
see [Sævik, 2011].
Influence of shear deformations in the tape layers If the tensile armour is supported
by thick plastic layers, shear deformations might occur. If that is the case, plane surfaces
no longer remain plane before the slip begins. The shear stress between the wire and the
antiwear layer will then be governed by the inherent shear deformations and the tape material
shear modulus. This is illustrated in Figure B1.22
By equilibrium, the following differential equation can be formulated along the wire:
EAu1,11 − ku = −ku1p (B1.58)

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.22: Shear deformation model
where u1p is the displacement corresponding to plane surfaces remain plane from Eq. B1.36
and k is the shear stiffness parameter defined by:
b Ep b
k=G = (B1.59)
t 2(1 + ν)t
where Ep is the Young’s modulus of the plastic layer. By only considering the particular
solution, the following solution is obtained for the slip curvature:
sin2 αEA µ(q3I + q3I+1 )

β2c = [1 + ] (B1.60)
kR2 EA cos2 α sin α
It is seen that the k parameter will cause the slip curvature to increase, hence reducing the
stress in the stick domain at a given curvature.
In [Skallerud, 1991a] and [Skallerud, 1991b] the results from testing two 4 inch pipes in
bending at variable pressures were presented. The inner tensile armour in the two pipes were
respectively supported by 1.5 mm and 2 mm antiwear layers and in the latter case the two
armour layers were separated by another 2 mm antiwear layer. The results from these tests
are presented together with the results obtained by the BFLEX software, [Sævik, 2015] in
Figure B1.23 and Figure B1.24. The model includes using both the plane surfaces remain
plane assumption in Eq. B1.46 and the shear slip model in Eq. B1.60 given above. The
initial straight line illustrates the pre-slip bending stiffness calculated analytically from Eq.
B1.56. It is seen that the shear model seems to describe the slip transition better than the
plane surfaces remain plane model. However, the plane surfaces remain plane model will
be conservative in a fatigue calculation and since the resulting stress is sensitive to the k
parameter selected, a large number of model tests are needed in order to provide sufficient
confidence level in the above shear interaction model.
Stresses related to the pressure armour
With respect to bending stresses in the pressure armour, there are two significant contribu-
tions to consider with reference to Figure B1.1:

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.23: Correlation between model and bending tests, Pipe 1 [Skallerud, 1991a]
Figure B1.24: Correlation between model and bending tests, Pipe 2 [Skallerud, 1991b]
1. Bending induced longitudinal σ11 stresses in the hoop direction.
2. Stresses introduced in the cross-section plane, primarily σ22 , σ23 and σ33 stresses.
Longitudinal stresses Due to the large lay angle and interlocked nature of the pressure
armour, the relative displacements and associated longitudinal friction stresses introduced
by bending will be insignificant and can be neglected. Further by studying Eq. B1.33-Eq.
B1.35, the only first order term in cos α is found for the transverse curvature in Eq. B1.35.
Hence, in terms of bending fatigue calculations it is common practice to only include this
term with respect to local elastic bending of each wire.
The Carcass and the pressure spiral wire acts to keep the cross-section circular. During
bending, however, ovalization and membrane stresses will be introduced due to the following
effects with reference to Figure B1.25:

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
1. The reaction forces due to the support from bending restrictors, bend stiffeners or
other external structures termed the Tension and shear force differential effect.
2. The bending moment itself termed the Bending moment effect.
3. The shear stresses resulting from the variation of contact pressure in the tensile armour,
termed the Shear stress membrane effect.
With respect to the Tension and shear force differential effect, the reaction line load q
resulting from plane pipe bending about the Z 2 axis in Figure B1.3 can be described by
standard beam theory as:
δQ
q= + T β2 (B1.61)
δZ1
where Q is the shear force, T is the effective tension and β2 is the global curvature. The
line load q results in an intensity w and the resulting ovalization bending stresses can be
estimated by using the circular ring formula of Table 9.2 in [W.C.Young and Budynas, 2002].
The Bending moment effect comes primarily from the plastic layers and the tensile armour
due to friction and elastic bending. The bending stresses in these layers in combination with
global curvature gives an harmonic squeeze load intensity w given by:
M
w= cos ψβ2 (B1.62)
πR2
where M is the total bending moment. This effect will act to increase the ovalization.
The Shear stress membrane effect does not cause additional ovalization bending stresses.
However, realising that the friction stress introduced by bending in the tensile armour will
cause an increased tensile stress and contact pressure at the tensile side and a subsequent
reduction at the compressive side, this must be balanced by simultaneous variation in the
pressure armour hoop stresses to fulfil equilibrium at any section in the hoop direction. This
requires that the variation in contact pressure is balanced by shear stress and normal stresses
at the tensile/pressure armour interface.
This will not result in additional ovalization bending moments, however, at the tensile side
there will be a reduction in the hoop stress (reduction in the axial force and the longitudinal
stress) and at the compressive side there will be an increased hoop stress in the pressure
spiral wire. An illustration of the longitudinal stress variation resulting from the above effects
is seen in Figure B1.26
Stresses in the cross-section plane As noted in Section B1.3.2 the interlocked nature of
the pressure spiral wire causes stresses in the cross-section plane due to the axi-symmetric
loads, primarily σ22 , σ23 and σ33 stresses with reference to Figure B1.1. During bending,
the pressure spiral wires are forced into the overall pipe curvature. This causes two effects
relevant with respect to dynamic variation and fatigue:
1. At the tensile and compressive sides each winding will be forced to move relative to
each other
2. At the same sides the nubs and valleys will be opened or closed in order to accomodate
the overall pipe curvature
The first of the above effects will cause friction to be mobilised at the metal interfaces
giving rise to variations in the σ22 and σ23 components. The second effect will primarily

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.25: Physical effects related to ovalisation
Figure B1.26: Longitudinal stress variation in pressure spiral wire
cause variations in the σ33 and σ23 components. As illustrated in Figure B1.27 for the
Z-spiral this can be looked upon as a thick cantilever beam exposed to a pair of varying
point loads. Since the length/height ratio of the beam is small, shear stresses are important
and so also are the local geometries in terms of the profile curve radii with respect to stress
concentrations. These stresses are therefore more difficult to describe by analytical methods.
Using general FE softwares is an alternative, however, challenges with regard to selecting
appropriate boundary conditions and computational effort have been noted. Special FE
models have been developed to overcome these problems, see [Sævik et al., 2001]
B1.3.6 Buckling
Collapse
Excessive external pressure may lead to collapse of the pipe. Collapse usually involves flat-
tening of the pipe which impedes the flow through it. However, this is not considered to be
a critical failure mode since the design depth is usually well defined. This is also reflected in

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) σ33 - State 1
(2) σ33 - State 2
Figure B1.27: Variation in σ33 during a bending load cycle
design recommendations for flexible pipes, where the safety factor is smaller than for bursting
strength, see [API 17J, 2008]. The ultimate depth rating is to be verified for atmospheric
internal pressure. When a pipe is subjected to external pressure, the loads are carried by
the helical pressure layers and the interlocked carcass, all having a lay angle close to 90o .
However, the collapse pressure given by the producers is often taken as the collapse strength
of the interlocked carcass, disregarding the contribution from the other pressure spiral wire
with regard to pressure load sharing. This is based on the pessimistic view that the outer
sheaths may have been damaged in such a way that the external pressure acts directly on
the inner plastic sheath. Therefore the interlocked carcass is normally designed to carry the
full external pressure alone, however, the contribution in terms of bending stiffness support
in the hoop direction from the other pressure layers is normally included.
The external pressure needed to initiate carcass collapse can be calculated based on the
method by Timoshenko [Timoshenko and Gere, 1963]. The Timoshenko approach is based
on considering the bending moment in a steel ring having an initial imperfection characteristic
described by the function Rδ0 cos 2ψ, see Figure B1.28, where δ0 represents the initial ovality
either caused by manufacturing tolerances or bending loads. This definition of δ0 is consistent
with the API definition (Dmax −Dmin )/(Dmax +Dmin ). According to API [API 17B, 2008],
if specific information about the actual carcass is not available, the initial ovality to be used
for collapse calculations should not be less than 0.002.
If no gaps are present between the pressure armour layer, the elastic buckling pressure of the
carcass may be determined as the sum of contributions from the carcass and the pressure

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
armour layers as:

Np i
3EIeq
(B1.63)
X
pcr =
i=1
R3
where R is the radius of the carcass and EIeqi is the equivalent ring bending stiffness of each
layer per unit length of pipe. For a cylinder:
Et3
EIeq = (B1.64)
12(1 − ν 2 )
where ν is the Poisson’s ratio. For the carcass and the pressure layers:
EI20
EIeq = Kn (B1.65)
Lp
where n is the number of tendons in the layer, Lp is the pitch and I20 is the smallest inertia
moment. For the non-symmetric carcass and Z-shaped profiles the weakest axis will be the
0
X 2 in Figure B1.7 and being obtained as:
I3 + I2 1 q
I 20 = − 2
(I3 − I2 )2 + 4I32 (B1.66)
2 2
K is a factor that depends on the lay angle and the moment of inertia in the section. For
massive cross-sections K ' 1.
The equivalent stiffness may also be determined from a static ring test carried out on a piece
of the carcass. Such a test consists of measuring the deformation δ of an interlocked carcass
subjected to a radial force F as shown in Figure B1.29. The equivalent ring bending stiffness
may then be determined from the following relation:
Figure B1.28: Timoschenko collapse model
EIeq π 2 F
3
=( − ) (B1.67)
R 4 π δ
The maximum bending moment introduced by the combined action of external pressure and
the eccentricity parameter u0 can then be found from:
u0
Mmax = pR (B1.68)
1 − ppcr

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.29: Ring stiffness test
which has a direct analogy to Euler buckling analysis of imperfect beams. Collapse is assumed
to occur when the outer fibre stress from bending and hoop stress in the carcass reaches the
yield stress of the carcass material. Generally, if a residual stress σr occurs in the outer fibre,
the yield stress σf will be reduced to an effective available yield stress σf e as:
σf e = σf − σr (B1.69)
The residual stress can be estimated based on assuming that the cross section is fully plastified
at constant ultimate stress σu during manufacturing and that elastic unloading occurs to
zero moment. In that case, the residual stress can be calculated as:
Wp
σr = σu − σu (B1.70)
We
where Wp is the plastic area moment and We is the elastic area moment.
Collapse will then occur when:
tEpRu0 pR
σf e = p + (B1.71)
2EIeq (1 − pcr ) tFf
where t is the overall radial thickness of the carcass and the carcass fill factor Ff is determined
from Eq. B1.2. The above leads to the following second order equation to determine the
collapse pressure p:
Ff tσf e Et2 Ff Rδ0 pcr σf e tFf

p2 − ( + pcr (1 + ))p + =0 (B1.72)
R 2EIeq R
where it is noted that if it can be assumed that there is full contact between the carcass
and the other pressure spiral wires, EIeq will be the sum of contributions from the carcass
and the other pressure spiral wires. According to Chen et.al. [Chen et al., 1992] if the gap
between the carcass and the other spiral wires in a 6" flexible pipe is greater than 2.5 mm, the
support effect from the other spiral wires can be neglected and the EIeq will be determined
by the carcass contribution alone. This may result in a significantly reduced external pressure
collapse capacity.
If the pipe is exposed to bending and external reaction forces, this will increase the ovality
δ0 an thus reduce the capacity.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Tensile armour buckling
General During installation and shut-down conditions where the pipe bore is exposed to
external overpressure, the tensile armour will be in compression, even if the effective tension
is positive. This may lead to local radial and transverse buckling of the tensile wires, leading
to overall torsion instabilities. This failure mode was reported by Bectarte and Coutarel
[Bectarte and Coutarel, 2004] including both bird caging (radial failure) and lateral buckling.
Test procedures for lateral buckling were described that included the effect of cyclic bending.
A computer model was also mentioned, but no details with respect to methods or results
were given. The methods used to validate the pipe capacity with respect to this failure
mode included laboratory testing, Deep water Immersion Performance (DIP) testing and
mathematical models.
With respect to mathematical models Tan et al. described the behaviour of tensile ar-
mour wires under compression [Tan et al., 2006]. A strain energy approach for modelling
the buckling and post-buckling behaviour of the wires is outlined, but no expressions or
results were presented. However, some test results were presented stating that lateral buck-
ling of the wires was observed under cyclic bending and wet annulus conditions. Vaz and
Rizzo [Vaz and Rizzo, 2011] presented a finite element (FE) model, studying the influence
of friction, interlayer contact conditions and anti-buckling tape capacity on the collapse load
behaviour under pure external pressure loading but no bending, identifying four different
modes of failure, depending on the amount of friction and the properties of the anti-buckling
tape. Based on FE analysis Brack et.al. [Brack et al., 2005] pointed out the importance of
radial gaps, interlayer friction and the torsional resistance from the anti-buckling tape with
respect to the axis of individual wire buckling. Østergard et. al [Østergaard et al., 2011]
presented a model that was capable of describing the coupling between the individual wire
buckling and overall global behaviour for combined external pressure and bending loads, how-
ever, assuming zero friction to provide conservative estimates of the buckling load. Sousa
et.al. [de Sousa et al., 2012] presented correlation studies between FE analysis and full scale
testing describing the coupling between wire buckling and bird caging failure.
With reference to the above, the buckling process my be divided into two different categories:
• Radial buckling
• Transverse buckling
Radial buckling
The radial failure mode is also known as bird-caging, and was first observed in 1989 [Bectarte and Coutarel, 20
This failure mode can occur as an interaction process having contributions from the following
physical effects:
1. Failure of supporting layer (anti buckling tape) as a result of the outward squeeze
pressure from underlaying layers.
2. Elastic buckling without tape failure.
3. Yield failure of the wires
where the latter will be the most likely one to occur.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
The first mode above is not really a buckling failure, it is simply triggered by the loss of
support. When the ultimate strength of the anti buckling tape is exceeded, a sudden radial
expansion of the tensile armour layers will take place. The second mode is a true buckling
phenomenon which is quite similar to buckling of a straight beam on an elastic foundation.
When the annulus is flooded, there is nothing but the layers on the outside of the tensile
armour to restrain radial expansion. Thereby, it is the anti buckling tape alone that must
carry the radial pressure due to expansion of the tensile armour, and it is the ultimate strength
of the anti buckling tape that will determine the critical external pressure.
The external pressure leads to a compressive load which further will give a contact pressure
acting on the anti buckling tape, see Figure B1.31(a). By considering the hoop stress in the
thin tape layer and assuming that the tensile armour and tape lay radii are approximately
the same, the external axial force needed to trigger this failure mode Pb1 of a two layered
structure can be estimated as:
R nt σut At sin2 αt
Pb1 = [ + 2πEs ut ts ] (B1.73)
tan2 α cos αt Rt
where R is taken as the mean radius of the tensile armour layers, ut is the ultimate strain
of the anti buckling tape, Es is the sheath Young’s modulus, σut is the tape ultimate stress,
nt is the number of tape filaments, At is the cross-section area of the tape filament, αt is
the tape lay angle, ts is the sheath thickness and Rt is the tape radius.
The second radial failure mode is an elastic buckling mode, as also noted by
[Vaz and Rizzo, 2011], where the armour wires deflect radially in a sinusoidal pattern. The
solution to a similar problem, which is buckling of a straight beam on an uniform elastic
support is described in [Søreide, 1985]. The critical load can also be found based on curved
beam theory and will include contributions from bending of the wire and the straining of
the elastic foundation. In this case, the foundation is the anti buckling tape/outer sheath,
and their stiffness will be a governing factor. In the analyses performed here, it is assumed
that each wire behaves equally, meaning that there is no interaction between wires. The
total number of wires are taken into account by scaling the stiffness of the supporting tape.
Hence, the buckling load may be determined by looking at a single wire.
The elastic foundation stiffness c will have contributions from both the anti-buckling tape
and the outer sheath. The spring stiffness contribution from the outer sheath c1 is found
from considering one wire width’s contribution to the hoop stiffness found as:
q2 2π Es ts
c1 = = cos α (B1.74)
u2 n R
where ts is the sheath thickness, Es is the sheath Young’s modulus and n is the number of
armour wires. For the antibuckling tape, the corresponding radial stiffness parameter c2 is
determined to be:
q2 nt EAt sin4 αt cos α

c2 = = (B1.75)
u2 n R2 cos αt
where EAt is the tape’s axial stiffness, αt is the tape lay angle and nt is the number of tape
plies.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.30: Assumed radial buckling shape
As the tensile armour wire is restrained from deflecting inwards due to the large stiffness of
the underlying layers, it is assumed that it only deflects outwards. A possible buckling shape
is shown in Figure B1.30.
By assuming a sinusoidal buckling shape:
mπX 1
u = u0 sin (B1.76)
l
the critical buckling load Q1,cr of one single wire can be expressed by using the Principle of
Minimum Potential Energy and assuming straight beam theory as:
m 2 c l
Q1,cr = π 2 EI2 ( ) + 2 ( )2 (B1.77)
l π m
It is seen that the elastic buckling load depends strongly upon ml , the number of half waves
per unit length. The critical load will be the lowest possible, and may be found graphically
by plotting the solution for different ml or by differentiating Eq. B1.77 with respect to ml ,
which in terms of the minimum axial force in each wire needed to cause buckling gives:
(B1.78)
p
Q1,cr = 2 EI2 c
where n is the number of armour wires.

Finally, the axial load capacity including the contribution from all wires can be obtained from
Eq. B1.78 as:
Pb2 = n cos αQ1,cr (B1.79)
The axial force leading to wire yield failure is calculated as:
Pb3 = n cos ασy A (B1.80)

where σy is the yield stress of the wire having a cross-section area A.
Intuitively, the critical radial buckling axial force may be taken to be the smallest of the
quantities Pb1 , Pb2 , Pb3 from Eq. B1.73, Eq. B1.79 or Eq. B1.80. However, since it

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Table B1.1: ANALYTICAL BUCKLING FORCE VERSUS DE SOUSA ET.AL. RESULTS
D
Assumption Pb1 Pb2 Pb3 L Pr ad
Tape+Sheath 1.24 4.33 5.36 2.14 0.82
Tape 1.04 3.98 5.36 2.13 0.72
is reasonable to believe that there will be interaction between these modes of failure, an
interaction formula is proposed to determine the resulting axial load that governs radial
failure Prad :
1 1 1 1
= + + (B1.81)
Prad Pb1 Pb2 P3
Three flexible pipe specimens were tested by Sousa et.al. [de Sousa et al., 2012] under axial
compression until tape failure, where it is noted that the specimens were exposed to a
constant compressive axial force until radial failure occured.
The developed formulas describing radial failure are sensitive to which assumptions that are
applied. With respect to the radial capacity failure as formulated in Eq. B1.73, the tape
will dominate independent of whether or not the sheath is participating in the displacement
process. Using Eq. B1.73, the corresponding axial force capacities are 1020 kN for the no
outer sheath case and 1110 kN by including both layers. On the other hand, the sheath
will influence the radial stiffness and the results obtained by either using straight beam (SB)
theory according to Eq. B1.79. In Table B1.1 the sensitivites are demonstrated. In the table
the capacities have been normalized with respect to the average capacity encountered during
the tests of 256 kN. It is seen that Eq. B1.79 gives good correlation, however, somewhat
on the conservative side. The number of half waves per diameter, D L , is found to be around
two, which appears to be in good agreement with the observations from the picture shown
for the actual failure [de Sousa et al., 2012].
Lateral buckling
As shown in Figure B1.31 there are two fundamental different conditions in terms of available
friction acting to resist the buckling process: the intact outer sheath condition and the
damaged outer sheath condition where the damaged outer sheath condition is consistent
with the assumption made with respect to carcass design, see Subsection B1.3.6. As a result
of the end cap force, the two tensile armour layers will be squeezed against the anti-buckling
tape creating a gap between the tensile armour layers and the pressure spiral wire. If the
anti buckling tape is sufficiently strong to prevent radial buckling, the wire has only one way
to go, and that is sideways. The friction forces available to resist buckling is smallest for the
inner layer, hence the inner layer will loose its axial load capacity first. The buckling process
will therefore be initiated in the inner layer. As the axial load capacity is reduced in the
inner layer, this must be compensated by a loss in the axial compression forces in the outer
layer as well to keep the cross-section in torsion balance. Hence the pipe must rotate in the
same direction as the lay angle of the outer layer. Anti buckling tapes that are wound in the
outer layer lay direction will therefore contribute to circumvent this behaviour by providing
additional radial support acting to maintain some of the overall axial and torsion stiffness.
When exposed to cyclic loading, a certain plastic rotation will, however, take place during
each cycle until overall torsion failure of the cross-section occurs.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) Contact pressure distribution - damaged con-(2) Contact pressure distribution - intact condi-
dition tion
Figure B1.31: Contact pressure distributions for pipe exposed to external pressure during
intact and damaged outer sheath conditions, red = tensile armour, green = pressure spiral
wire, yellow= carcass, blue = plastic layer, rubber blue=antibuckling tape
Table B1.2: COMPARISON BETWEEN LATERAL BUCKLING LOADS
Case [Østergaard, 2012a] Proposed model Test result (kN)

model (kN) (kN)
6 inch pipe 100 93 160
8 inch pipe 256 226 400
14 inch pipe 157 139 269
Under the assumption of no friction, a conservative estimate of the buckling load can be
obtained from the curved beam differential equation as:
cos α
Plat = P1 = n [GJ sin4 α + (4EI2 + EI3 − GJ) sin2 α cos2 α] (B1.82)
R2
The results from Eq. B1.82 has been compared to the test and analytical results obtained
by [Østergaard, 2012a] for three different pipe dimensions, see Table B1.2. It is noted that
these tests were based on cyclic bending and simulating the end-cap force only, i.e. assuming
damaged outer sheath condition. The test value reported in the table is further taken as
the largest axial force that did not cause a grow in overall torsion deformation of the test
specimen during repeated cyclic bending. It is seen that the proposed model is well correlated
with the Østergaard model. The effect of friction is to increase the buckling capacity. The
cyclic tests done by Østergaard shows that the maximum compressive load that can be
allowed without ultimately causing pipe damage when exposed to cyclic loading is a factor
1.7-1.9 higher than the value predicted by the above equation assuming no friction.
Wire buckling capacity
An estimate of the buckling load is then obtained as the minimum of Plat and Prad .

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
B1.3.7 Fatigue
General
The fatigue life of dynamic flexible risers is in most cases performed by a three step procedure:
1. A global analysis in order to obtain time series of tension, curvatures or end angles
representing the annual fatigue load.
2. A local stress analysis transforming the global quantities into time series of stress.
3. The stress time series is transformed into classes of stress ranges and the fatigue
damage calculated by application of the Miner sum.
The Miner sum is given by:
N
ni
(B1.83)
X
D=
i=1
Ni (∆σi , σ̄i )
where ni is the number of occurrences of a certain stress range ∆σi at mean stress σ̄i and
the number of allowable cycles Ni given from an S-N diagram based on the following format:
lgNi = lg a − m lg(∆σi ) (B1.84)
where lg a and m are constants obtained by fatigue testing considering the expected annulus
environment.
Normally, the tensile armour is taken as the governing layer with respect to metal fatigue.
The tensile armour is made of cold formed carbon steel with high yield stress and a limited
corrosion resistance. Until mid nineties common fatigue design practise was based on as-
suming dry air environment, relying on an intact outer sheath and no leakage of gas from
the bore to the annulus. Assuming that no welds were present in the dynamic section of
the flexible pipe, the fatigue limit approach was applied where no stress range was allowed
to exceed the defined limit, which for non-welded cold formed steels under in-air condition
is in the range 400-600 MPa. At the early stages, the pipe designs were further based on
not having antiwear tapes between the tensile armours and using wear models to estimate
the cross-section reduction of the tensile armour as a function of time. This was based on
Archard’s formula considering the distance of relative displacements, the contact pressure,
the wear coefficient and the material penetration hardness, see [Feret et al., 1986b]. Fatigue
failure was assumed to occur when the mean stress due to the loss of tensile armour cross-
section caused the stress range to exceed the fatigue limit, normally defined at 106 cycles of
constant amplitude loading.
During the fatigue tests on two 4 inch flexible pipes [Sævik et al., 1992a] and
[Sævik et al., 1992b], fretting effects due to metal to metal contact was identified as a pos-
sible failure mechanism. Fretting occurs if an alternating stress in one direction is combined
with contact stresses in the transverse direction, which may cause crack growth initiated
from the contact surface. Since then anti-wear tapes have been introduced to avoid this
failure mode is now rarely seen. One critical section where fretting may still be an issue, is
the top end fitting where the tape layers are removed to allow anchoring the wires in the end
fitting.
It is noted that the performance of the anti-wear tapes is sensitive to parameters as operating
temperature, manufacturing tension and thickness. If the temperature is too high, the layer

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
may simply melt whereas too thin or too large manufacturing tension can cause tape breaking
due to the shear loads introduced by the tensile armour sliding process. Extruded anti-
wear layers further need sufficient venting to avoid damage from annulus pressure build-up.
Normally this is obtained by making vent holes in the layer, however, if these are too few or
too small, the armour sliding process my ultimately close these and the venting is lost.
During the nineties it was realised that the in-air annulus assumption cannot be assumed,
both due to a number of failures found in the outer sheath causing sea water ingress and
leakage of corrosive ingredients such as H2 S and CO2 from the bore into the armour annulus.
The fatigue limit approach was therefore replaced by the Miner sum approach defined above.
Mean stress correction
Using the principles outlined in [Sines and Waisman, 1959] one way of formulating the cri-
terion for a multi-axial fatigue failure can be stated in terms of the Von Mises equivalent
stress range as:
2 2 2
∆σ = (∆σ11 + ∆σ22 + ∆σ33 − ∆σ11 ∆σ22 − ∆σ11 ∆σ33 − ∆σ33 ∆σ22
1
2
+ 3∆σ12 2
+ 3∆σ13 2 2
+ 3∆σ32 ) (B1.85)
= A − α(σ̄)β
The constants A, α and β can be determined from fatigue testing at three different mean
stress levels, i.e. expressing how sensitive the number of cycles needed to cause fatigue
failure is with respect to the variation in the mean stress σ̄ at a certain stress range.
Fatigue testing of tensile armour wires is normally carried out by uni-axial testing either by
keeping the mean stress or the R − ratio constant, where:
σmin
R= (B1.86)
σmax
It is noted that a positive value is needed to avoid compression. Therefore armour wire
testing in tension-tension mode is normally carried out for R-ratios in the range 0.1-0.5. The
stress range applied in a fatigue test at a given R-ratio can be expressed in terms of the
mean stress as:
1−R
∆σ = 2σ̄ (B1.87)
1+R
which means that each fatigue test at a given stress range for a fixed R-ratio represents a
data point along a straight line in the Haig diagram as illustrated in Figure B1.32.
In many cases, only one R-ratio is available and it is therefore common practice to use either
of the Goodman or Gerber assumptions to transform between different mean stress levels, see
Figure B1.32. This is done by transforming the calculated stress range ∆σ into the stress
range ∆σ0 this would correspond to at zero mean stress (R = −1) using the Goodman
or Gerber assumptions and the calculated mean stress. Using the Gerber assumption the
transformation reads:
∆σ
∆σ0 = (B1.88)
1 − ( σσ̄u )2
where σu is the ultimate stress of the material. In the Goodman case the transformation is:
∆σ
∆σ0 = (B1.89)
1 − ( σσ̄u )

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.32: The Haig diagram
For a given S-N diagram defined by a certain R-ratio the corresponding value at R = −1
using the Gerber assumption is:
∆σ ∗
∆σ0 = ∗ (B1.90)
1 − ( (1+R)∆σ
2(1−R)σu )
2
and by applying the Goodman assumption:

∆σ ∗
∆σ0 = ∗ (B1.91)
1 − ( (1+R)∆σ
2(1−R)σu )
where ∆σ ∗ represents the stress range to be used in the S-N diagram to find the number
of cycles until failure for each load case. The stress range ∆σ ∗ is found by equating Eq.
B1.88 and Eq. B1.90 which for the Gerber case will give a second degree equation in ∆σ ∗ .
The same procedure is applied for the Goodman case, equating Eq. B1.89 and Eq. B1.91
resulting in a linear equation for ∆σ ∗ .
For high pressure cases, the multi-axial alternating stress of the pressure armour in combina-
tion with high mean stresses may cause the pressure spiral wire to be the governing layer with
respect to fatigue. For the Z-spiral, high mean stresses may result both from the manufac-
turing procedure and longitudinal stresses introduced by transverse curvature when closing
the gaps during onset of pressure, see Figure B1.5. Such stresses may be circumvented by
applying an elevated fabrication test pressure (FAT).
Mean and dynamic stresses in the tensile armour
A flexible riser hanging from a floater will be exposed to cyclic loads from top motions
and hydrodynamic effects resulting in cyclic riser motions and global responses in terms of
tension and curvature variations. This results in dynamic longitudinal and shear stresses in
the tensile armour where the longitudinal stress represents the most important contribution
with respect to fatigue. The longitudinal stress and associated mean stress being input to
the fatigue calculation consists of different contributions. For the tensile armour cases these
are:
Q1 ,T Q1 ,F M2 M3
∆σ11 = ∆σ11 + ∆σ11 + ∆σ11 + ∆σ11 (B1.92)

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
Q1 ,T Q1 ,F
where ∆σ11 is the stress range from dynamic tension variation, ∆σ11 is the dynamic
M2
stress range from friction effects, ∆σ11 is the dynamic stress from bending about the wire
M3
weak axis and ∆σ11 is the stress range from bending about the wire strong axis.
Considering one load cycle, the stress response at one point in the wire cross-section exposed
to a β2 curvature cycle at constant tension and pressure will typically look like the one in
Figure B1.33. The steep part of the curve is primarily governed by the stick regime where
the armour behaves as a stiff pipe until the layer friction is exceeded and the stress increase
from that point will be governed by local bending of the wire. Since the rate of stress
increase in the stick regime is much higher than for local elastic bending of the wire, small
curvature ranges often governs the fatigue life. This is specially the case for corrosion fatigue
calculations where no cut-off is applied in the fatigue curve (all stress ranges counts in the
Miner sum).
The stick slip behaviour depends on the contact pressure conditions, whether the outer sheath
is intact or not or whether the load condition is dominated by external as illustrated in Figure
Figure B1.31 or by internal pressure and tension as illustrated in Figure B1.34. It is difficult
to accurately describe this behaviour for all load conditions by a simple analytical model
and therefore computational models are needed to accurately capture these conditions in the
general case, see [Feret et al., 1986a], [Often and Løtveit, 1990], [Custodio and Vaz, 2002]
and [Sævik, 2011].
Figure B1.33: Typical stress history and fatigue calculation procedure
For a typical flexible riser, the most critical section will be the upper hang off where the
contact pressure conditions are dominated by internal pressure and tension. In this case the
inner tensile armour will be exposed to the largest contact pressures and associated friction
stresses and will therefore govern the fatigue behaviour. By assuming:
• No end effects, i.e. the dynamic curvature acts away from the end fitting
• Plane loading
• Two-layered torsion balanced pipe with lay angle magnitude α, mean helix radius R,
wire area At , width b and summed layer thickness ttot = 2t
• The pipe is exposed to a constant mean true wall tension T̄w (from effective tension
and internal pressure), dynamic effective tension ∆T , mean curvature β̄2 and dynamic
curvature ∆β2
the mean stress and the stress range can be estimated from the geodesic and loxodromic

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) Contact pressure distribution - damaged condi-

tion
(2) Contact pressure distribution - intact condition
Figure B1.34: Contact pressure distributions for pipe exposed to internal and external pres-
sure for intact and damaged outer sheath conditions, red = tensile armour, green = pressure
spiral wire, blue = plastic layer
assumptions respectively as:
T̄w
σ̄11 = − 3EX3 cos2 α cos ψ β̄2 (B1.93)
2πRttot Ff cos2 α
∆T
∆σ11 =
2πRttot Ff cos2 α
3T̄w bµ tan2 α
+ min ( cos ψ, ER cos2 α cos ψ∆β2 ) (B1.94)
4Ff At R sin α
+ EX3 cos2 α cos 2α cos ψ∆β2
+ EX2 (1 + sin2 α) cos α sin ψ∆β2
where it is noted that the wire coordinates X 2 and X 3 must be varied to include all four
corners of the wire and the circumferential coordinate ψ varied to ensure sufficient cross-
section resolution of the fatigue calculation.
Mean and dynamic stresses in the pressure armour
The mean and dynamic stresses in the pressure armour include the three-dimensional stress
state where the σ11 , σ22 , σ33 and σ23 are the governing components as outlined in Section

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
B1.3.4 and section B1.3.5. The stress levels and associated variations are sensitive to the
cross-section geometry and local contact conditions and cannot be described by a simple
analytical model. One way of describing the stress range and associated mean stress used
as input to the fatigue calculation procedure as described in Section B1.3.8 Bending and
fatigue is to use the Von Mises approach by only neglecting the components of bending
shear stresses as:
q
∆σ = 2 + ∆σ 2 + ∆σ 2 − ∆σ ∆σ − ∆σ ∆σ − ∆σ ∆σ + 3∆σ 2 (B1.95)
∆σ11 22 33 11 22 11 33 33 22 32
q
σ̄ = 2 + σ̄ 2 + σ̄ 2 − σ̄ σ̄ − σ̄ σ̄ − σ̄ σ̄ + 3σ̄ 2
σ̄11 22 33 11 22 11 33 33 22 32 (B1.96)
The effect of corrosion failures in terms of bursting and fatigue performance
Under the condition that some tensile armour wires fail in one layer due to corrosion or
corrosion fatigue, this will have several consequences:
• The axial load capacity will be reduced. Hence, for a given true wall tension, axial
elongation takes place.
• Further in order to keep the torsion balance, a torsion rotation of the cross-section in
the helix direction of the failed layer will take place.
• The mean and dynamic stresses will increase both in the tensile armour and in the
pressure spiral wire.
The number of tensile armour wire failures that can be accepted depends on the loading
conditions and the material state, however, important questions are whether the failure
happened in the inner tensile armour layer and whether multiple failures have occurred at
the side of each other. If the latter is the case, the pressure spiral wire will start to loose
support involving excessive local moments at the span shoulders which may lead to burst
failure, see Figure B1.35. Due to the large number of tensile wires, this will generally be
more critical than the loss in axial load capacity. Having this in mind, one important issue is
whether it is possible to detect torsion rotation before risking overload failure in the pressure
spiral.
The effect in terms of torsion (rotation per length) τp can be estimated by applying Eq.
B1.13 and studying the resulting stiffness relation in tension and torsion. By assuming a two
layered tensile armour with opposite layer angles of same magnitude consisting of in total n
wires of which nf wires have failed in one layer (no anti-buckling tape):
nf
Tw
τp = n
n (B1.97)
(1 − 2 nf ) E2πR ttot Ff cos3 α sin α
2
By application of the above it is concluded that it will be very difficult to conclude with
respect to how many wire failures that have actually occurred from such calculations. The
main reason for this is that a significant number of failures are needed to obtain a rotation
that can be measured, whereas the number of allowed failures in the inner tensile armour
will typically be < 10. However, it may be possible to identify which of the outer or inner

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
tensile armours that has failed. If the inner armour has failed, the pipe will tend to rotate
in the inner armour lay direction to increase the strain in the inner armour and reduce it in
the outer armour to keep the torsion balance.
Figure B1.35: Stress in the pressure spiral wire due to lost tensile armour support
Generally the above effects need to be evaluated on a case to case basis by FE analysis.
If it is concluded that the risk for burst failure is small, the fatigue life needs to be re-evaluated
taking the stress concentrations from the corrosion failure into account. Due to the nature
of a corrosion failure in the tensile armour, the change in the conditions of stress will be
both in terms of increasing the axial force in the wires and by introducing additional bending
moments that were not present before failure. Having identified the increase in mean and
dynamic stress from the failure, noting that the primary effect is related to changing the
wire axial force distribution within the layer, see [Ji, 2012], it’s effect on the stress range and
mean stress can be evaluated by:
Q1 ,∗ Q1
∆σ11 = ∆SCF Q1 ∆σ11 (B1.98)
Q1 ,∗ Q1
σ̄11 = SCF Q1 σ̄11 (B1.99)
where * denotes the modified stress range and mean stress with reference to the nominal
intact values. ∆SCF Q1 is the stress concentration factor describing the increase in the axial
¯ Q1 is the associated mean stress concentration factor
stress range during a cycle and SCF
describing the increase in the mean axial stress from the failure.
The effect of corrosion in terms of lateral wire buckling
Corrosion will reduce the inertia moment of the cross-section and hence reduce the lateral
buckling capacity Eq. B1.82. If an even corrosion factor c is assumed so that the corroded

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
wire width b∗ = b(1−2c) and the corroded wire thickness is t∗ = t(1−2c) then the associated
lateral buckling capacity reduction factor can be obtained from Eq. B1.82 as:
Fb = (1 − 2c)4 (B1.100)
B1.3.8 Computational methods
General
The general FE softwares such as ANSYS® , MARC® , ABAQUS® have become increasingly
popular with regard to analysing stresses in flexible pipes.
The major advantage of these tools is that arbitrary geometry, kinematic and material effects
can be modelled. However, due to the large number of degrees of freedom (DOFS) needed
to describe the inherent complexity of a flexible pipe, long computing times still limits ap-
plication of these tools with respect to standard engineering analyses and they are therefore
mostly used to investigate special effects where the required model length is limited. In the
following, the relevance of alternative methods for stress and fatigue analysis are discussed.
Axisymmetric stress analysis
Axisymmetric stress analysis of flexible pipes can be carried out by several approaches:
1. By analytical methods.
2. By use of general FE softwares.
3. By specialised tools based on the concentric layer approach.
For the bursting and tension failure modes the gaps between layers will be closed before
reaching the ultimate capacity. Hence, these can in most cases be adequately described by
analytical methods similar to those outlined in Section B1.3.4.
However, when it comes to more advanced load cases or fatigue evaluations, these relies
on correctly describing the initial conditions with regard to the gaps and contact pressures
between layers. In order to cover all relevant load combinations for a flexible riser, more
advanced methods that consistently describe layer interaction is therefore needed. Due to
the assumptions that can be made considering the layered structure of flexible pipes when
exposed to axisymmetric loads, specialized procedures gives a significant computation benefit
as compared to general FE softwares and these are therefore rarely used for standard design
analyses.
Specialised procedures for calculating the axisymmetric layer response of flexible pipes have
been dealt with by many authors. The main reference is the pioneering work by Ferét and
Bournazel [Feret et al., 1986a] who formulated a model based on the following principles:
1. Divide the flexible pipe into a set of concentric layers.
2. Describe the strain resulting in each layer from the overall pipe axial strain quantities
p and τp in Figure B1.8 and Figure B1.9, i.e. all layers are forced to respond in the
same 2D plane.
3. Each layer is allowed to move and deform radially.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
4. For the plastic layer, the strain kinematics is based on thin shell theory (11 and 22
), however, also including the 33 term from the contact pressure and the 23 term
introduced by pipe torsion τp .
5. For the helix layers, the strain kinematics is based Eq. B1.13, however, also including
the 33 term from the contact pressure and the 22 from hydrostatic pressure.
6. Assume linear elastic behaviour and apply Hooke’s law for describing the stess-strain
relation for each layer.
7. Establish algebraic equations for each layer based on the above, linking the response of
each layer in terms of radial, torsion and axial motions to the external true wall force,
torsion moment, external and internal pressures. The algebraic equations include the
gap between layers as separate unknowns which is similar to treating the contact
pressure as Lagrange multipliers in the algebraic equations.
The above procedure still represent the state of the art in terms of flexible pipe axisym-
metric stress analysis and was implemented in the CAFLEX computer program which also
is an integrated part of the BFLEX program system, see [Feret and Momplot, 1989] and
[Sævik, 2014].
Later similar algorithms have been presented, see e.g. [McNamara and Harte, 1989], [Often and Løtveit, 1990].
Several modifications have been proposed to the above procedure serving different purposes.
Custodio and Vaz [Custodio and Vaz, 2002] studied the axisymmetric response of umbilical
cables, introduced improvements to previously published models with regard to allowing non-
linear material models and [Sævik, 2011] presented an extension of the Ferét model to take
circumferential gaps into account. Skeie [Skeie et al., 2012] proposed a similar model based
on treating the contact conditions as an optimization problem, resulting in a similar set of
equations.
Bending and fatigue stress analysis
Tensile and pressure armour bending stress analysis can be carried out by several approaches:
1. By analytical methods.
2. By use of general FE softwares.
3. By specialised FE tools.
Tensile armour Analytical methods according to the principles outlined in Section B1.3.5
is widely used in the industry for tensile armour fatigue calculations. By additionally including
the non-linear moment curvature relation as outlined in Section B1.3.5 in the global analysis,
accurate results may be obtained taking the load carrying capacity of the flexible pipe into
account. These methods, however, relies on the assumption of constant curvature and no
end effects.
In cases where severe bending gradients are present, i.e. mostly cases of severe bending that
is not controlled by external measures such as bending stiffeners or bending restrictors, the
resulting stresses may be underestimated. That is also the case where the length from the
end fitting where each wire is anchored to the curved section is short, typically less than half
of a pitch length, depending on the loading condition.

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
The above may be of special concern for installation load cases and for full-scale test program
designs. In the latter case, the specimen length is limited and the challenge is to design the
test program in such a way that it simulates the operation load cases in a realistic way without
introducing test specific failure modes. Such failures have been observed as specimen pig-
tailing changing the mean stress and stress range levels giving reduced life during testing.
In order to simulate such behaviour FE analysis is needed either by general or specialised
software where of each wire is modelled. This can be done by either combinations of volume,
membrane, shell and beam elements in combination with layer contact and friction models.
Pressure armour The pressure armour requires representation of both longitudinal σ11
stresses and the σ22 , σ33 and σ23 stress components in the cross-section plane.
This can be obtained by analytical models that are calibrated with respect to testing such as
the TECHNIP SLPM model, by application of general FE tools or by specialised software,
see [Sævik, 1999] and [Sævik et al., 2001].
The models need to include the longitudinal stress variation resulting from ovalisation as
outlined in Section B1.3.5, the friction introduced in the nubs and valleys resulting from
relative motions between winding and the alternating lift and close effect as described in
Section B1.3.5.
Special cases
There are several cases which can only be modelled by general FE softwares. This includes:
• Localized loads from other mechanical devices such as tensioners, caterpillars, clamps
etc.
• Bend stiffener and end fitting details
• Redistribution of stresses due to wire failures.
• Buckling effects including annulus pressure induced collapse.
• Manufacturing and installation effects.
• Carcass end fitting slip effects.
Example of such models are shown in Figure B1.36 - Figure B1.38

Section B1.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) Pipe and bend stiffener FE model (2) End fitting FE model
Figure B1.36: Example FE model including pipe, end fitting and bend stiffener in MARC®
(4subsea)
(1) Annulus pressure collapse FE model detail (2) Carcass collapse FE model detail
Figure B1.37: Example FE model to analyse Carcass collapse from annulus pressure build-up
in MARC® (4subsea).
(1) Carcass cross-sestion FE model detail (2) Overall FE model detail
Figure B1.38: Example FE model to analyse Carcass and end fitting slip in MARC® (4subsea).

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
B1.4 Global Analysis
B1.4.1 Use of global analyses
Initial design
Global analysis is usually performed as an integrated part of the riser system design and
concept selection. The global analysis is typically performed at various stages of the project
with various levels of detail, from an early concept study to the detail design phase.
In the very early concept study phase of a field development the level of detail required
may be limited to only static analyses in order to provide sufficient confidence in feasibility.
However, as the project phases approach riser delivery the required detail level of the global
analysis increases significantly. A large set of load cases is typically required to demonstrate
the fitness for purpose of the riser system.
In the detail design phase the global analysis is often performed as an iterative process with
the following analysis steps:
1. Suggestion of a suitable riser system concept
2. Extreme analysis
3. Interference analysis
4. Fatigue analysis
Any or all of the 4 steps may be driving the design, but for many riser systems one may
perform the analyses sequentially, i.e. start out with finding an appropriate starting point
for a riser configuration. This may often be done with static analysis only and sometimes
through analytical solutions, e.g. catenary equations etc. During any of the 4 steps one may
have to reiterate to step one.
Once a riser system concept has been selected, the riser section lengths and various ancil-
lary equipment properties have been determined (often through experience but occasionally
through optimization routines), the extreme analysis can commence. The extreme analysis
is a dynamic analysis applying either regular or irregular waves as a load input. The purpose
of this analysis is to verify the integrity of the riser system during extreme events, i.e. often
environmental loading with annual occurrence probability of 10-2 or even down to 10-4 is
applied. In addition to extreme environmental conditions the riser system may experience
extreme events like vessel mooring system damages, or alternatively the riser may see ex-
treme temperature and pressure. Often the full set of extreme load cases may be combined
to a significant number of different cases and it may take skill to determine which cases
are governing. If the governing set of load cases can be kept to a minimum, the iteration
on configuration design is greatly simplified. Tools for period/frequency screening are often
handy to determine peak load drivers.
The initial extreme analyses are usually performed with a pinned riser at the top end to
determine input to the bend stiffener design. Subsequent analyses are then performed with
bend stiffener included with the purpose of verifying the riser/bend stiffener design and
obtaining interface loads.
Following an understanding of the riser system extreme response, interference analyses may

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
be performed. This may be to determine any interference between riser-riser, riser-mooring,

riser-platform/vessel or riser-subsea structure. Depending on the nature of the environmental
conditions of the field the initial interference analysis may be a quasi-static analysis with
extreme current loading only. This often provides a good indication of governing interference
load cases, however for some systems the waves are the interference drivers. The interference
analysis should include the full design range of operational criteria, e.g. variation in marine
growth, variation in density contents etc.
Often the last step in a global analysis is to perform fatigue analysis, i.e. document the
service life of the armour layers. The global fatigue analysis is performed by simulating the
operating conditions, such as pressure-dependent hysteretic bending stiffness, applying wave
scatter diagram (either full scatter diagram or lumped in to a selection of wave classes) and
extraction of fatigue loads for local analysis. If sufficient fatigue life is not found a redesign
of the riser cross section or some ancillary equipment may be necessary. Steps 1-4 above
may then have to be performed again.
Validation of the global analysis for fatigue is often a good option at this stage. The selection
of sea state included in the analysis should demonstrate a shared contribution by a reasonable
number of sea states. Simulation time of fatigue sea states is often limited, say for instance
30 - 60 minutes. The analysis should demonstrate that a further increase in simulation time
does not have significant impact on fatigue damage.
There are several commercial software packages available for performing global analysis. The
most commonly used are:
• OrcaFlex (by Orcina)
• Deeplines (by Principia and IFP)
• Flexcom (by MCS Kenny)
• RIFLEX (by SINTEF and MARINTEK) [Fylling et al., 1995]
Design verification
As a part of the delivery of a riser product the riser suppliers are usually required to document
that their products are fit for purpose. This will often include the performance of a global
analysis of the riser system. The purchaser of the risers may require that the global analyses
performed by the riser supplier are verified by a third party.
As global analyses can be quite complex there are many sources for discrepancies between
results from analyses performed by the riser supplier and a third party. For any discrepancies
found it is important that a stepwise approach is used in finding the sources for deviation.
A typical start is to compare static loads in a Start-Of-Life (SOL, initial buoyancy, no marine
growth) and then move on to End-Of-Life Condition (EOL, final buoyancy, full marine growth
profile).
When a static agreement has been found, the next typical step is to compare the vessel
response in a regular Airy wave. The Response Amplitude Operator (RAO) is a common
source of mistakes as there are many different formats and conventions used, and these may
not always be described in full detail. It is hence always wise to evaluate the RAO inputs and
to perform a visual check of the vessel motion in waves with different periods and headings.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
When an agreement has been found on the vessel motion, the next major hurdle is the
comparison of environmental data input and riser/ancillary equipment properties, incl. bend
stiffener stiffness.
One of the critical properties of the riser should be examined carefully, that is, how the
stiffness of the riser is defined in the global modeling. In most cases, nominal elastic stiffness
is used as a simplification. However, a hysteretic moment-curvature relation may be used as
input as well.
Hydrodynamic properties of riser and ancillaries may vary significantly and a critical evalua-
tion of these should be performed. When performing verification of fatigue analyses it may
sometimes be difficult to initially directly compare fatigue damage or service life when S-N
data is not available to the verifying party. So it is often a good idea to compare at response
level.
Installation of risers
Global analysis is used extensively in installation analysis of flexible risers. The global analysis
is used at various stages through the project phase and onboard platforms and installation
vessels.
The goal of the analysis is to evaluate the installability of the riser configuration by:
• Ensuring that the riser configuration is installable
• Identification of critical parts of the installation and splitting of the installation se-
quence into phases that may be performed separately
• Determining behavior, including loads on riser and ancillary equipment during instal-
lation, e.g. MBR at touch down , MBR over installation chute and top tension
• Determining installation loads (required winch capacities and/or tensioner hold-back
and squeeze force)
• Determining requirements to installation vessel and/or platform positioning during the
installation
• Determining installation limitations, e.g. w.r.t. weather criteria
• Creation of lay tables with required lay back and installation procedure input
Early evaluation of the installability of the configuration may be performed implicitly, i.e.
by engineering judgment or experience. However, proper global analysis should always be
performed during the detail design phase.
In general, visual checks of the model/riser behavior in the global analysis model are advised
in order to obtain a proper understanding of the operation.
An important part of the installation analysis is to determine contingency plans for the various
phases of the installation process, to ensure that the operations can be aborted safely at all
times in the event of unexpected complications or onset of severe weather conditions.
Extra care should be taken when evaluating the process of lowering risers and other equipment
through the splash zone, due to the possibility of slamming loads on the equipment and snatch
loads on the lifting arrangement.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Re-analysis during system lifetime
Global re-analysis of risers is often performed during system lifetime. Re-analysis is required
if risers are to be replaced or additional risers to be installed. Also a lifetime assessment of a
riser system will require re-analysis. In both cases it is important to account for new relevant
input information to the analyses e.g.:
• Updated standards and operator technical requirements
• Updated metocean specifications
• Updated vessel/platform data (RAO and offsets)
• As-built, as-installed and as-surveyed data
In case of a riser system life extension it is suggested to initiate the work with a gap analysis
to determine if input information to the analysis and current requirements have changed
from the original design analysis.
B1.4.2 Weight and buoyancy; the effective weight concept
A key feature of slender marine structures is that the global geometry is strongly related to
axial tension. The main contribution to stiffness versus lateral loads from waves and current,
origins from axial tension. Equilibrium is obtained by change of geometry and hence also
change of axial force direction. This type of stiffness is referred to as ’geometric stiffness’,
which gives a contribution to structural stiffness in addition to the traditional beam stiffness.
Geometric stiffness
Figure B1.39 illustrates a simple example of geometric stiffness. The structure consists of a
rope with constant tension T and is exposed to a concentrated load F at the midpoint of a
free span with length L
Figure B1.39: Rope structure with concentrated load
The deformation will lead to a change of direction of the rope, which means that the rope
forces will have a horizontal component at the point load. Equilibrium is obtained when the

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
sum of the horizontal components is equal to the external load. From the figure we can see
that the equilibrium condition can be written as:
F = 2 T · sin α (B1.101)
If we assume that the displacement is small, we can write
2δ
sin α = tan α = α = (B1.102)
L
where δ is the displacement at the load and L the length of the free spanning rope. The
relation between force and displacement can hence be found as
4T
F = δ = KG δ (B1.103)
L
which means that the geometric stiffness for this case is
4T
KG = (B1.104)
L
The geometric stiffness terms are easily found for beam elements in a finite element for-
mulation, and will always be directly added to the ordinary stiffness matrix for a beam
element. The linear version of the geometric stiffness matrix from beam tension is described
by [Larsen, 1976], while [A. Engseth, 1988] present a non-linear formulation that allows for
unlimited rotations.
Buoyancy effect
Figure B1.40 shows a vertical pipe in water. The pressure acts perpendicular to the pipe wall,
which means that the pressure resultant on a pipe element is zero. The pressure resultant
on the pipe from surface to bottom is hence also zero.
Figure B1.41 shows a part of an inclined pipe that is isolated form a continuous pipe between
the seafloor and a floating vessel. In this case we will not have any end cap pressure, which
means that the forces p1 Ae and p2 Ae are not present. Ae is the external area of the pipe,
and the pressure pe at water depth h is given by the well known relationship
pe = ρe g h (B1.105)
where h is the water depth and ρe is the density of surrounding water. The vertical force
from buoyancy BV is given as the weight of displaced water (Archimedes), but since the end
cap forces are not present the effect of buoyancy will become different from what Archimedes
stated. The sum of the end cap forces is an axial force BT . By subtracting this force from the
vertical buoyancy force BV , we can find the net buoyancy force on the inclined, continuous
element, BR , see Figure B1.41 c:
BR = ρ g A L cos α (B1.106)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.40: Illustration of buoyancy on a vertical pipe
Figure B1.41: Pipe segment in a continuous pipe
The consequence of this is that the net buoyancy force will depend on the orientation of the
element. A vertical pipe will not have buoyancy forces along its length, but a horizontal pipe
will have buoyancy forces according to Archimedes’ law. Hence, forces from buoyancy will
become non-conservative, which causes formal problems for calculation of static and dynamic
equilibrium. It is, however, possible to obtain a load description that leads to displacement
independent forces, which will be shown in the following.
Figure B1.42 b shows all forces that act on the element. Bending moment and curvature
are not considered, but the main observation and conclusion from this discussion are not
influenced by this simplification. Figure B1.42 a shows the forces acting on the segment.
They consist of axial stress resultant σx (Ae − Ai ), external and internal pressure pe and
pi , and weight of the pipe itself wp · dl. This condition can be described as a sum of
three contributions that are illustrated on Figure B1.42 b, c and d. External pressure on
an equivalent closed pipe element is shown on Figure B1.42 b. External end cap pressures

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.42: Forces on a section of a continuous pipe
are included, which means that the pressure resultant becomes vertical and found from
Archimedes’ law:
BV = ρe g Ae dl (B1.107)
End cap pressure is also included from internal pressure on Figure B1.42 c, and the resultant
must be equal to the weight of the content:
Wc = ρi g Ai dl (B1.108)
The third contribution is illustrated on Figure B1.42 d, and is simply found as the difference
between a and (b+c). The weight of the pipe and axial stresses are included, but also end
cap pressures in opposite direction that are needed to balance the non-existing pressures on
b and c. By summing up vertical and axial forces on Figure B1.42 b, c and d, we will obtain
the ’effective weight’ we and ’effective axial force’ Te :
Effective weight: we = wp + ρi g Ai − ρe g Ae
(B1.109)
Effective axial force: Te = Tσ + pe Ae − pi Ai
where Tσ is the axial stress resultant given as σx (Ae − Ai ). Equilibrium can be found
by consideration of effective weight and effective axial force (often referred to as effective
tension), or by use of the real weight and pressure resultant, and axial stress resultant. Both
methods are correct, but use of effective weight is far more convenient.
Note that the effective axial force is used to calculate the axial force for beam buckling, and
also the geometric stiffness due to tension in a slender beam. The effective weight/effective
tension concept is used in all computer programs for static and dynamic analysis of marine
risers, and does not represent any loss of accuracy.
If the effective weight concept is used, we have to calculate stresses by use of the relationship
between stress resultant and effective force. However, if the ’real’ weight and pressure

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
resultant are used, axial stress will become a direct result from the analysis, but the effective
force need to be calculated if geometric stiffness or buckling conditions are wanted.
Effective weight and axial force have been found without considering bending moments or
pipe curvature. It is possible to include these effects, but the end results in terms of effective
axial force and weight will no be influenced. The effective axial force may also be used to
calculate equivalent stresses in the pipe cross section, see [Sparks, 1984].
B1.4.3 Simplified analysis for preliminary design
Initial analysis of lazy wave configuration
The purpose of this type of analysis is to have an easy way of generating an initial design
of a lazy wave riser. Initial design means to define needed buoyancy and position of the
buoyancy zone in order to obtain sufficient flexibility with respect to upper end motions
without excessive bending or axial tension.
The starting point for this type of analysis is a riser without horizontal force. By neglecting
the influence from bending stiffness, the riser will have three vertical sections as illustrated
on Figure B1.43. Note that the figure shows a horizontal distance between the sections that
ideally should not be there.
Figure B1.43: Initial condition of lazy wave riser. Upper end is assumed to be below or at
sea surface level.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Definitions
Segment 1 is the lowest segment that partially rests on the bottom. In the initial
condition a length L1 is vertical and the effective tension TB is zero at the
touch-down point.
Segment 2 is the segment with uniform buoyancy. Its total length is L2 . This segment
will in the initial condition have a horizontal tangent at a distance zU from
the upper end (or surface on the figure). This point is referred to as the
upper bend. Note that a horizontal tangent means that tension in the
riser must be zero in the initial condition since the horizontal force is zero
and the pipe has no shear force.
Segment 3 is the segment that ends at the floater. Segment length is L3 . This
segment will in the initial condition have a horizontal tangent at a
distance zL from upper end. This point is referred to as lower bend. The
effective axial force at upper end will be TT .
wi Effective (or submerged) weight per unit length of segment i (N/m).
D Vertical distance from upper end to bottom.
Figure B1.44: Initial condition and design parameters, Case 1.
An acceptable design will have allowable bending at the two bends in a ’near’ position, and
allowable tension at upper end in a ’far’ position. Vertical equilibrium and compatibility equa-
tions can be established and allow for calculation of unknown design parameters. Solutions
will be given for three different design situations.
Option 1: Initial positions of upper and lower bend, and effective weight of segments
given; segment lengths can be calculated
When wanted positions of bends and effective weight of all segments are known, it is possible
to calculate the needed lengths of the segments. According to Figure B1.44 we have 6

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
unknown length parameters, but we have also 6 equations; 4 are based on compatibility and
2 on vertical equilibrium:
Length of segment 1: L1 = D − zu − L6
Length of segment 2: L2 = L4 − L6
Length of segment 3: L3 = Z1 + L5
(B1.110)
Total length of riser: L1 + L2 + L3 = D + 2(zL − zu )
Equilibrium bottom - upper bend: L6 w2 + L1 w1 = 0
Equilibrium of reversed section: L4 w2 + L5 w3 = 0
w2 (zu − D
L1 =
w1 − w2
(D − zu − L1 )w2 + zL w3 − w2 [D + 2(zL − zU ) − L1 ]
L3 =
w3 − w2
L2 = D + 2(zL − zU ) − L1 − L3 (B1.111)
L5 = L3 − zL
L6 = D − zU − L1
L4 = L2 − L6
Option 2: Effective weight of segments given, and also the length of buoyancy zone
and upper segment. Calculation of position of bends.
The unknown parameters are
Tension of upper end TT
Length of suspended part of segment L1
1
Vertical position of upper bend zU
Vertical position of lower bend zL
For this case we will have 3 equilibrium equations and one that defines compatibility:
Equilibrium top - lower bend: TT = w3 ZL

Equilibrium bottom - upper bend: (D − L1 − ZU )w2 + L1 w1 = 0
(B1.112)
Global equilibrium: L1 w1 + L2 w2 + L3 w3 = TT
Global compatibility: L1 + L2 + L3 − 2(ZL − ZU ) = D
Standard manipulation of these equations gives the following solutions:
2A1 w1 + A2 w1 w2 − 2A3 w1 + A3 w2
zL =
2w 1w3 − w2 w3 − 2w1 w2
A2 w1 − A3 − w3 zL + 2zL w1
zU = (B1.113)
2w 1
A3 + w3 z L
L1 =
w1
The A parameters are found from Eq B1.112 and given by:

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
A1 = −Dw2
A2 = D − L2 − L3 (B1.114)
A3 = −L2 w2 − L3 w3
Option 3: Initial positions of upper and lower bends, effective weight of upper and
lower segments, and length of upper segment given. Length and effective weight of
buoyancy segment must be calculated.
Vertical equilibrium at the initial position can be applied to calculate the needed length
and weight of the buoyancy segment if the wanted bend positions are given. The unknown
parameters are L1 , L4 , L5 , L6 and w2 . These can be found from the following relations:
L5 = L3 − zL
L4 = zL − zU − L5
L5 w3
w2 =−
L4 (B1.115)
(D − zU )w2
L1 =
w2 − w1
L6 = D − zU − L1
Catenary theory for analysis of lazy wave riser
Figure B1.45 shows the geometry of a lazy wave riser and defines all necessary geometry
parameters. If the horizontal force H and all weights and segment lengths are known, and
the bottom segment is assumed to be sufficiantly long to maintain zero vertical force at the
bottom end, the unknown parameters will be:
Suspended length of lower segment L1
Vertical position of upper bend z2
If these parameters can be found, the riser geometry can easily be calculated from classical
catenary theory.
It is not possible to find a direct solution for the two unknown parameters. An iterative
procedure must therefore be established. Firstly, a relation between L1 and z2 must be
found, and secondly we need to have equations that describe compatibility for all segments.
The vertical position of the connection between segment 1 and 2 (bottom and buoyancy
segments) is z2 . For given horizontal force the following relation between z1 and L1 is
known from catenary theory:
s
2z1 H
L1 = z12 + (B1.116)
w1
At the connection between segment 1 and 2, tension in the riser can be found by considering
segment 1 or the part of segment 2 between the connection point and upper bend. This is
possible since we assume that there is no shear force in the riser. Hence we have:

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.45: Geometry for lazy wave riser
T1 = H + w1 z1 = −T2 = −[H + w2 (z2 − z1 )] (B1.117)
Note that w2 in Eq B1.117 is negative since the buoyancy for segment 2 obviously will be
larger than its weight. If we assume z2 to be known, we can solve this equation with respect
to z1 :
w2 z 2
z1 = (B1.118)
w1 − w2
By introducing Eq B1.118 into Eq B1.116 we can find a relation between L1 and z2 without
other unknowns:
" 2 #0.5
w2 z 2 2Hw2 z2
L1 = − (B1.119)
w1 − w2 w1 (w1 − w2 )
Compatibility can be checked by adding the vertical projection of all segments and compare
this sum to the known vertical distance between upper and lower end. Additional parameters
are defined in Figure B1.46
The vertical distances z3 and z4 are given by:
Hq Hq
z3 = 1 + β32 − 1 + β22
w3 w3
(B1.120)
Hq H
z4 = 1 + β22 −
w2 w2
The angles at segment boundaries and upper end can also be found when the segment
lengths, the horizontal force and riser weights are known:

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.46: Definition of geometry parameters
w1 L1
β1 =
H
w2 L2
β2 = β1 (B1.121)
H
w3 L3
β3 = β2
H
Finally we can find the vertical position of upper bend z2:
z 2 = D − z3 + z4 (B1.122)
Equations B1.119 to B1.122 can be solved by iteration if weights, L2 , L3 and H are known.
The following scheme may be applied:
1. 1. Assume an initial value for z2 ; z20 ;
2. Calculate L1 from Eq. B1.119
3. Calculate the angles at segment boundaries from Eq. B1.121
4. Calculate z3 and z4 from Eq. B1.120
5. Calculate z2∗ from Eq. B1.122
6. Compare the assumed value z20 to z2∗
7. • a) If the difference is smaller than a pre-set error tolerance, the calculated values
are accepted as the final result
• If the difference is too large, a new assumption for z2 is found from

z21 = z2i−1 + (z2∗ − z2i−1 )f
where f is a factor that from experience should give a fast convergence. For most
cases of practical interest 0.3 is recommended.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Stiffened catenary
The stiffened catenary method is probably the most successful attempt to find an approximate
solution to the shape of a slender beam lifted at one end from a horizontal plane. The method
was originally suggested by [Plunkett, 1967] and later applied by [Dixon and Rutledge, 1968]
to find the configuration and stresses in a pipeline suspended between the sea floor and an
inclined ramp that is free to rotate and hence give a moment free upper end of the pipeline.
These boundary conditions are identical to the ideal conditions for a catenary riser, which
means that the method should be well suited to analyse this type of structure. The method
is limited to analyse a uniform beam loaded by its own weight only. Varying cross section,
buoys or current forces can therefore not be considered. [Larsen, 1976] extended the method
to account for a constantly curved stinger as frequently applied for pipelaying. A detailed
discussion on the limitations of the method is also found in this reference. The theoretical
foundation of the method will be briefly outlined in the following. The catenary riser in its
simplest version may be described as a beam with small bending stiffness loaded by its own
weight only. The idea of the stiffened catenary solution is that the bending stiffness causes
secondary effects in boundary regions only, and that the deviation from the simple catenary
solution can be found as a rapidly converging series expansion.
Figure B1.43 shows a beam element. The moment equilibrium of this element is seen to be
given by:
dM
= H cos θ − V sin θ (B1.123)
ds
where s is a length coordinate following the pipe axis and have its origo at the touch-down
point. Notations are defined in Figure B1.44
By introducing the well-known moment - curvature relationship
dθ
M = −EI (B1.124)
ds
to Eq. B1.122, we have:
d2 θ
EI + H cos θ − V sin θ (B1.125)
ds2
A non-dimensional curve coordinate z is introduced. At the point where z = 0 we have zero

vertical force in the beam. At upper end z = 1, and at the touch-down point z = z0 where
z0 is unknown, but always negative. All global beam parameters are defined in Figure B1.48.
Eq. B1.125 is made non-dimensional by introducing the z coordinate and the following
non-dimensional parameters:
ML dθ H EI
m= = − ;h = ; α2 = (B1.126)
EI dz wL wL3
L is the (unknown) length between the point on the beam where V = 0 and upper end, and
w is the submerged weight per unit length of the beam. Hence, wL is equal to the vertical
force at upper end of the beam. Eq. B1.125 can now be written as:

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.47: Element in suspended beam
Figure B1.48: Global beam configuration and definition of boundary conditions
d2 θ
α2 + h cos θ − z sin θ = 0 (B1.127)
dz 2
An approximate solution to this equation that satisfies the actual boundary conditions was
found by [Plunkett, 1967] and given as
h α 1 αh 1

θ(z) = tan 1
− 3 − q1 (z) + 5 exp − q2 (z) (B1.128)
z h2 α (h2 + 1) 4 α
q1 and q2 are functions found by integration from lower and upper end respectively. These
integrals are given by
Z z
1
q1 (z) = (x2 + h2 ) 4 dx
z0
Z 1 (B1.129)
1
2 2
q2 (z) = (x + h ) dx 4
z
The first term of Eq. B1.128 is recognized as the classical catenary equation. The second
term gives the correction to this solution from bending stiffness of the beam suspended
between the actual point z and the seafloor, while the third term introduces the influence
from bending in the upper part of the beam.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
The accuracy of the method depends on how well the influence from bending is described
by these two terms. [Plunkett, 1967] has shown that the series these terms are developed
from are absolutely convergent if two conditions are satisfied:
0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1
(B1.130)
α2 < h3
Eq. B1.128 gives the angle at any position along the beam as function of a set of non-
dimensional coefficients. Coordinates may then be found by a simple numerical integration
procedure. For the case that the horizontal force at upper end is known, the coefficients
are seen to depend on two unknowns, L and z0 . These are found from a nonlinear relation
between the vertical distance from upper end to bottom, D, and the characteristic length L:
" #
D p 2 1 h2
(B1.131)
p
= h + 1 − h2 + z0 + α2 √ − 2
L h · (h2 + z0 )0.75 (h + 1)2
In addition the following relation for z0 is valid:
α
z0 = − √ (B1.132)
hL
Eq. B1.131 can be solved for the unknown length L by a standard iterative procedure. All
non-dimensional parameters are then available and the angle θ can be calculated from Eq.
B1.128 and Eq. B1.129 at any position. It can also be shown that the angle at upper end
of the riser is given by:
αh
θt = tan1 (h) + (B1.133)
(h + 1)1.25
While the horizontal force is constant along the entire length of the riser, the vertical force
can be found by:
V (z) = w · L · z (B1.134)
Total force, axial force and shear force can now be found from well known relationships:
p
T = V 2 + H2
A = H cos θ + V sin θ (B1.135)
Q = V cos θ − H cos θ
Note that the axial force found from this equation is the so-called effective axial force and
not the axial stress resultant.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
B1.4.4 Loads from internal fluid flow
Non-stationary internal fluid flow will cause time varying forces in a flexible riser, and hence
also lead to structural vibrations. It is also well known that riser dynamics may influence
internal flow. This means that riser dynamics and internal flow should be analysed by use
of an integrated simulation model. Such models have been published, but are normally not
used for riser design. Three cases of influence from internal flow will be discussed in the
following:
• Stationary flow in a pipe with constant internal diameter
• Slug flow; quasi static, dynamic, and coupled riser dynamics/flow models
• High frequency vibrations
Stationary flow in a pipe with constant internal diameter
Figure B1.49: Geometry and forces in a pipe segment with stationary internal flow
Figure B1.49 shows a pipe segment with length ds. The segment has a radius of curvature of
R, the density of the fluid is ρ1 , internal cross section is Ai , and the flow velocity is u. The
acceleration related to the change of flow direction in the bend will lead to a force acting
outwards and perpendicular to the tangent to the pipe. The magnitude of the force on this
segment will be given by
ds
Fn = ρi Ai u2 (B1.136)
R
This force must be counteracted by a change of pipe forces. If we neglect the shear forces –
which normally is a valid assumption for flexible risers – we realize that the vertical component
of tension increase must be given by
Fn
∆Tn = (B1.137)
2
Since we are dealing with small angles dθ, we can write

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
2 ∆Tn ds
∆T = , dθ = (B1.138)
dθ R
By combining these equations we can see that tension increase from a stationary flow becomes
independent of the curvature:
∆T = ρi Ai u2 (B1.139)
The consequence of this equation is that stationary internal flow does not influence the shape
of a riser. During an acceleration or deceleration period there will be a transient dynamic
response, but the shape of the riser will be the same before and after these transient periods.
The only exception is related to possible cross section effects form varying pressure.
We have two options for including the effect from a stationary fluid flow in a static analysis:
1. Neglect the lateral forces in the analysis, but calculate axial stress resultant from the
relationship
Tσ = Te − pe Ae + pi Ai + ρi Ai u2 (B1.140)
where Te is the effective axial force that is a result from the static analysis when
effective weight is applied.
2. Include the lateral forces according to Eq. B1.136, but increase the effective axial
force according to Eq. B1.139. Note that this method will give lateral forces that
depend on the deformations, which may cause problems for an iterative search for static
equilibrium. If this approach is applied the axial stress resultant must be calculated as
Tσ = Te 0 − pe Ae + pi Ai = Te + ρi Ai u2 − pe Ae + pi Ai (B1.141)
The two methods will lead to identical results both with regard to shape and axial stress,
but the first method should be preferred for ordinary riser analyses. For further details see
[Back-Pedersen, 1991].
Slug flow; quasi–static model
A slug with total mass Ms travels through a flexible pipe at constant velocity vs . An approxi-
mate solution for this case can be found by use of a quasi static model, see [Fylling et al., 1988].
Figure B1.501 shows the static shape of the pipe without slug.
The radius of curvature at the position with horizontal tangent is given by
H0
R0 = (B1.142)
we
where H0 is the horizontal force in the pipe and we is the effective pipe weight per unit
length. At the instance of time when the slug with a length of ls and total mass of qsls
passes the point on the pipe with horizontal tangent, there will be a vertical force Fs from
the slug given by
!
v2
Fs = qs ls = ms g + s ls (B1.143)
R0

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
(1) Initial condition (2) Forces including slug
Figure B1.50: Quasi static slug model
The horizontal force H at this point must increase since the moment must be zero at the
end support:
x
Hs = H0 + qs ls (B1.144)
z
The curvature in the sag bend during the slug passage can now be approximated by:
!
Hs v2
Rs = ; ws = we + qs = we + m s g + s (B1.145)
ws R0
The bending moment relative to the static bending moment can be expressed by the ratio
of the curvature radii:
Mslug R0
= (B1.146)
Mstatic Rs
Slug flow; simple dynamic model
A simplified analysis of slug flow can be carried out as a non-linear time domain analysis with
prescribed slug velocities through the pipe. The mass matrix must be updated according to
the defined slug position at every time step in the simulation, and forces from gravity and
centripetal acceleration must be added to other force contributions. This type of analysis is
available in the RIFLEX computer program.
Formally the following equation is solved
M(t) r̈ + C ṙ + K(t) r = F(t) (B1.147)
The forces are illustrated on Figure B1.51.

Note that both curvature and inclination must be found at the slug position in order to
calculate the centrifugal force component. The gravity force from the slug mass must also
be added to the ordinary force vector. The travelling mass will not introduce these forces
by the inertia term in Eq. B1.147, since the mass matrix takes care of inertia effects from
structural acceleration only. A Coriolis’ force term may also be relevant for cases with high
velocities combined with large pipe response, see [Fylling et al., 1995].

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.51: Travelling slug in a flexible pipe
Advanced slug-flow model
It is well known that slug flow will give vibrations, but also that dynamic changes of the pipe
geometry will have an influence on the slug flow development. Hence, in order to analyse
this type of fluid-structure interaction, an integrated simulation of slug flow and mechanical
vibrations should be carried out. A program system based on this principle is described by
[Ortega et al., 2012]. The system consists of one program for calculation of two-phase slug
flow dynamics, and another program for dynamic response of risers. Both programs apply
a time integration method, but the two codes need to exchange information during the
integration process. Information exchange is established by making a federation based on
High Level Architecture (HLA). The flow code computes the flow development in a flexible
pipe spanning between two fixed ends. The input flow at one end must be defined, and also
the position at discrete points along the suspended riser. This program applies a Lagrangian
tracking model for slugs that are considered as objects in the flow model. The liquid slugs
are treated as incompressible units whereas the gas bubbles are treated as compressible units,
see Figure B1.52.
Figure B1.52: Definition of slug and bubble regions
Riser dynamics is computed by a computer program based on a finite element formulation.

This program may also account for wave loads and end motions from a floating vessel. By
use of the HLA standard, these two programs can carry out synchronized time integration

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
and exchange information for each time step.
Figure B1.53: Snapshots if flexible riser subjected to slug flow. From [Ortega et al., 2012]
Figure B1.53 shows snapshots of the geometry for a lazy wave flexible riser. The oscillations
are caused by slug flow only. The dynamic response is seen to be significant, and is caused
by change of gravity forces from oil and gas inside the riser, and the time varying inertia
forces from the internal flow. This type of analysis can be used to study the influence on
riser stresses from slug flow, but also how the two-phase flow is influenced by riser dynamics
in a situation with waves and vessel motions. Examples of results from coupled analyses are
presented in Figure B1.54. Further details are given by [Ortega et al., 2013].
Singing risers
Flexible risers will often have a corrugated inner liner. The offshore petroleum industry has
experienced ’singing risers’, which is a loud whistling sound followed by unexpected vibrations
in the fixed pipe system coupled to the riser. This phenomenon is caused by a complex
interaction between fluid dynamics (vortex shedding), acoustics (pressure propagation) and
structural vibrations (response in rigid pipe system). Experiments and numerical models have
been applied to increase the insight and establish guidelines from first principles, but there are
still unanswered questions. The only safe way to avoid this type of unwanted response has in
some cases been to limit the gaf flow speed, which of course is an unwanted situation. Key
results from a large research project at SINTEF are presented by [Reinen, 2008]. Figure B1.55
illustrates an experiment by [Kristiansen et al., 2011] that investigated vortex formation and
pressure propagation in a corrugated pipe.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
(1) Tension at upper end (2) Liquid superficial velocity through a cross
section
Figure B1.54: Results from integrated analysis of flexible riser subjected to slug flow and
wave effects
Figure B1.55: Experimental investigation of ’singing riser’
B1.4.5 External loads
Introduction
External loads from waves and current on slender structures can be defined without account-
ing for the influence from the structure on the incoming flow (diffraction). This means that
the loads can be found from Morison’s equation. Key features of this load model are:
• The force has one drag term linked to the projected area of the cylinder, and one
inertia term linked to the volume.
• Drag forces are non–linear and must be calculated from the relative velocity. In its
simplest one–dimensional form this equation reads:

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
1
FD = ρw CD D |vw − vs | (vw − vs ) dL (B1.148)
2
where
FD Drag force on a section with length dL

ρw Density of water
D Diameter of cylinder
vw Velocity of water
vs Velocity of structure
• Inertia (volume) forces are linear and have contributions from the Froude–Kriloff term
(undisturbed fluid flow, follows fluid acceleration) and one term from the presence of
the structure (follows relative acceleration):
πD2
Froude-Kriloff term :FF K = ρw aw,N dL (B1.149)
4
πD2
Presence of structure:FS = ρw CM (aw,N − r̈s,N ) dL (B1.150)
4
where
FF K Froude–Kriloff force
aw,N Acceleration of fluid perpendicular to pipe axis
r̈s,N Acceleration of structure perpendicular to pipe axis
CM Added mass coefficient; 1.0 for circular cross section
These force components are normally reformulated to an added mass term in the mass
matrix in a finite element model, and an external force term in the load vector:
πD2
Added mass: ρw CM dL
4 (B1.151)
πD2
External force: ρw (CM + 1) aw,N dL
4
In addition to these components that always will be present in waves, there might also be
forces related to vortex induced vibrations (VIV) or slamming. VIV is normally assumed to
be initiated by current while slamming forces may occur on partially submerged pipe sections
in very steep waves.
Flow characteristics
Morison’s equation contains the empirical coefficients CD and CM . These depend on the
flow condition normally characterised by the non-dimensional parameters Reynolds number,

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Keulegan-Carpenter number and the frequency parameter β, and also cross section shape
and surface roughness. The non-dimensional parameters are defined by
uD ua T Re D2
Re = ; KC = ; β = = (B1.152)
ν D KC νT
where ν is the kinematic viscosity of the fluid, ua is the amplitude of a periodic wave induced
velocity and T is the wave period. For fresh water at 20°C the value of ν is 1.01·10−6 m2 s−1 .
Re origins from the ratio of inertia force and viscous force, while KC represent a memory effect
from the ratio of a characteristic traveling amplitude for a fluid particle and the diameter of
the cylinder. Large KC values define a flow situation similar to current, which means that a
vortex shed from the cylinder will never return to the cylinder.
Figure B1.56: Vortex shedding patterns for varying Re, from [Lienhard, 1966] as reported by
[Blevins, 1990]
Figure B1.56 illustrates the vortex shedding patterns for varying Reynolds number. The three
regimes of interest for flexible risers are the stable subcritical regime (104 < Re < 3 · 105 ),
the critical regime (3 · 105 < Re < 3 · 106) and the super-critical regime (Re > 3 · 106 ). The
transition between sub-critical and critical regimes is caused by the boundary layer, which
changes from laminar to turbulent. Most model tests will be carried out in the subcritical

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
regime, while full scale structures often will experience super-critical conditions. This makes
the use of model tests for investigating the behaviour of slender structures like flexible risers
questionable. Figure B1.57 shows the variation of the drag coefficient for a smooth cylinder
with Reynolds number. Note that both axes are logarithmic. The drag coefficient is seen to
drop considerably in the critical flow regime. The critical regime is therefore often referred
to as ’the drag crisis’.
Figure B1.57: Drag coefficient for a circular cylinder as function of Re,

[Sarpkaya and Isacson, 1981]
The added mass coefficient will not show large variations with Re to the same extend as the
drag coefficient. The reason is that added mass is less influenced by viscous effects than
drag. However, when it comes to KC number and the β parameter, both CM and CD will
be influenced. This is illustrated in Figure B1.58. These curves can be applied in a time
domain simulation of structures subjected to current and waves.
Cross-section shapes and surface roughness
Since the transition from sub-critical to critical flow is followed by transition from laminar to
turbulent boundary layer, surface roughness will have an influence. Roughness will initiate
turbulence for lower Re values than seen for a smooth surface. Figure B1.59 illustrates this
effect, but also the trend to give less drag reduction within the ’drag crisis’. Large roughness
will completely eliminate drag reduction, which is the reason for not apply reduced drag
coefficients in design analyses. The drag coefficient will depend on the shape of the cross
section, which in illustrated on Figure B1.60.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.58: Variation of added mass and drag coefficients for varying KC and β, ref.
[Sarpkaya and Isacson, 1981]
Figure B1.59: Influence of roughness on Cd, ref. [Hoerner, 1965]
Figure B1.60: Drag coefficients for typical cross sections, ref. [Hoerner, 1965]

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
(1) Pipe with arbitrary orientation (2) Circular and non-circular cross sections
Figure B1.61: Force components from current
Forces from current, static analysis
The direction of incoming flow can be arbitrary relative to the orientation of the structure,
but it will always be possible to define a local coordinate system with a tangential and a
normal flow component as illustrated in Figure B1.61. Calculation of drag from the normal
flow component is referred to as the ’cross-flow principle’ and is an established standard
for slender structure. If the cross section is circular, the normal flow component will give a
load component in the same direction as the flow. However, for non-circular cross sections
one must normally know the drag coefficient for specific flow directions given by symmetry
properties as illustrated in B1.61. This leads to different drag force equations for the two
types of cross sections:
Circular cross section: Drag force will act in the direction of the normal flow component:
1
FN = ρw CD D |vN | vN dL (B1.153)
2
Non-circular cross section with two symmetry axes
q
FN = FN 1 2 + FN 2 2
1
FN 1 = ρw CD1 D1 |vN 1 | vN 1 dL (B1.154)
2
1
FN 2 = ρw CD2 D2 |vN 2 | vN 2 dL
2
An alternative to the above equation for non-circular cross sections is to have direction
dependent drag and lift coefficients, which normally is not the case.
It is easy to realize that if we apply (B1.154) to a circular cross section we will have a
force resultant different from what (B1.153) gives. We must therefore apply different sets of
equations for the two classes of cross sections. A non-symmetric cross section in constant

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
current will be exposed to the so-called Munk moment that will lead to torque in the riser.
The moment can be calculated from the following equation:
MM unk = ρw vN 1 vN 2 (π CM 1 D12 + π CM 2 D22 ) dL (B1.155)
where CM1 and CM2 are the added mass coefficients for orthogonal symmetry axes. Other
parameters are defined in Figure B1.62
Figure B1.62: Munk moment
Tangential drag forces are in particular important for long risers with large dynamic axial
displacements. Catenary riser linked to a floater with large heave motions is a typical example.
The tangential force on a pipe section with length dL can be calculated from the following
equation:
1 2
FT = CDt ρw DvR dL
2 (B1.156)
CDt = CD (0.03 + 0.55 sin α) cos α
where α is the angle between the pipe tangent and vector of relative velocity vR. The force
is seen to be zero if the flow is perpendicular to the pipe, and 3% of the ordinary drag force
for zero angles. The tangential drag force will depend on surface and shape parameters that
are not accounted for in this equation, but the equation should give reasonable values of
tangential drag forces for ordinary flexible pipes. Buoyancy elements on a riser will have
a strong influence on drag forces. The flow will become more three-dimensional, and the
cross-flow principle becomes questionable. A commonly used simplification is still to apply the
cross-flow principle and calculate the lateral drag force from the normal velocity component:
1
FN = CD ρw DH |vN | vN dL (B1.157)
2
vN is the normal velocity component and DH is a hydrodynamic diameter that gives a correct
projected area of the riser section with buoyancy modules, see Figure B1.63.
The drag coefficient should be taken as for ordinary circular cross sections unless data from
tests of the actual design is available.

Section B1.4
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Figure B1.63: Definition of the hydrodynamic diameter DH
Tangential drag is more complicated since there will be a strong interaction between the
individual buoyancy elements. [Huse and Reitan, 1990] carried out a set of experiments with
buoyancy elements as shown on Figure B1.64.
Figure B1.64: Buoyancy element used in MARINTEK tests [Berge et al., 1992]
A varying number of such elements were mounted on pipe segments with varying spacing.
Tests with one element were used as a reference, and results were used to find the effective
tangential drag coefficient for segments with N modules. Figure B1.65 shows the results for
tests with one buoyandy module as function of the KC number. Large KC values can be
considered to be valid for current.
Figure B1.65: Tangential drag coefficient for pipe with one buoyancy module
[Berge et al., 1992]
Figure B1.66 show the interaction coefficient IB as function of KC, spacing between modules

Section B1.4
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SB relative to the diameter of the buoyancy module. Figure B1.67 illustrates how NB can
be defined from the geometry of the riser, and the parameters that defines the geometry
parameters.
Figure B1.66: Interaction coefficient IB as function of KC number, spacing and number of

modules [Berge et al., 1992]
The use of these results in a practical analysis can be described in steps as follows:
1. Define segment length, LB and number of modules in each segment, see Figure B1.67
2. Find the coefficient valid for one module, CD1 , from Figure B1.65 . Note that the
values on this figure is strictly valid for the actual design of the tested buoyancy module
3. Find the interaction coefficient IB for each segment based on number of modules,
spacing and actual KC number. Large KC values are valid for static cases with current
(1) (2)
Figure B1.67: Definition of parameters for riser with buoyancy modules

Section B1.4
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4. Calculate the coefficient that defines the tangential force on the segment from
CDT,N = CD1 NB IB (B1.158)
5. Calculate the tangential drag coefficient to be used for calculation of force on an

element in the actual segment from
πDB2
CDT = CDT,N (B1.159)
4 DH LB
where DH is the hydrodynamic diameter to be used in the final force calculation

6. Calculate the force on an element with length dL from
1
FT = CDT ρw DH |vT | vT dL (B1.160)
2
Wave Models
Most riser analyses will deal with stochastic waves, but regular waves may still be applied
in some cases. Aspects of stochastic analysis will be discussed in Section B1.4.8, but some
comments regarding modelling of waves will be given here.
Regular waves are often represented by the linear Airy wave theory [Airy, 1845]. This theory
is valid for an infinitesimal wave height. The solution is therefore inconsistent in the sense
that it describes the motion of a water particle without accounting for its change of position
in the fluid. The theory can therefore not give values for flow velocity or acceleration in a
wave crest, and the absence of fluid between mean water level and a wave trough is not
formally described. Extrapolation of the wave potential in a wave crest - either by use of the
exponnential function, linear extrapolation or by using the surfce values to give a constant
profile in the crest - is in general not recommended since wave forces will become overesti-
mated. A better way to improve the theory is to apply Wheeler stretching [Wheeler, 1970] or
to move the profile for pressure, velocity and acceleration to the instantaneous sea surface,
see Figure B1.68.
Irregular waves are normally described by a summation of linear wave components. Extrapo-
lation of the individual wave components to instantaneous free surface will give meaningless
results. Wheeler stretching or move of profiles similar to what is suggested for regular waves
is a reasonable way to improve load calculation.
There exist a large number of wave theories that represent improvements of the simple Airy
theory. Stokes non-linear theory [Stokes, 1847] has later been solved to 5th order
[Skjelbreia and Henderson, 1961]. The wave potential is solved to the actual free surface
to fifth order, and the result is a wave profile that is asymmetric: the wave crest is far
steeper than the wave trough, and the theory can predict accelerations and velocities to
the actual free surface. This wave model should always be preferred for regular wave cases.
Irregular waves are normally described by summation of linear wave components. A theory
for describing irregular waves to second order exist and might be applied in riser analysis
[Mei, 1983].

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
A better description of near breaking waves is the Stream function theory [Dean, 1965]. The
Solitary wave theory [Munk, 1949] gives a good representation of waves in the surf zone,
and predicts a wave that do not have a trough but travles above mean water level only. A
periodic shallow water wave is described by the Cnoidal theory [Korteweg and Vries, 1895].
An important feature of linear wave theory is that there will not be any mass transport of
water. This is in contrast to theories of higher order, and also to observations of ocean
waves. Wheeler stretching will give a mass transport, while moving the velocity profile to
actual free surface will not - at least not for deep water waves. The difference between these
two methods will in most cases be minor.
A good description of wave theories for engineering applications is given by [Dean and Dalrymple, 1984].
Figure B1.68: Use of linear wave theory to describe profiles to true surface
Forces from waves; dynamic analysis
Due to direct wave actions and top end excitation from wave induced floater motions, marine
risers will be subjected to oscillatory fluid flow. A considerable effort has been made over
the last decades to develop practical load models for slender structures. Models based on

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
numerical methods for fluid forces - often referred to as computational fluid dynamics (CFD)
- are available, but not as a tool for engineers due to extreme computing time. Morison
equation with constant coefficients is the only model in common use, and uncertainties with
regard to coefficients are accounted for by sensitivity analyses and safety factors, confer
[Lienhard, 2010].
The general equation for the lateral hydrodynamic force on a slender member can be written
as
πDV2 πDV2
FN,H (r̈N , aN,w , vN,rel ) = [−CM r̈N + (CM + 1) aN,w
4 4 (B1.161)
1
+ C D DD |vN,rel |vN,rel ]
2
The first term represent added mass and will normally be included in the mass matrix. The
second term gives forces from fluid acceleration. The diameter Dv must give the correct
average volume of the pipe over the length dL. The third term gives the drag force according
to the cross-flow principle. The diameter DD must give the correct projected area of the
pipe. A ’hydrodynamic diameter’ is often applied for non-circular cross section. Note that if
the same diameter is used for the drag and inertia terms for arbitrary cross section shapes,
the coefficients must be scaled in order to obtain the correct forces.
A pipe with constant diameter will not have tangential added mass since the tangential
resultant of the dynamic pressure will be zero. The hydrodynamic mass will therefore be
anisotropic. Figure B1.69 shows an inclined element in a local and global coordinate system.
If added mass is zero in the local XL direction, we can find the inertia forces in the global
coordinate system from
" # " #" #
FXG sin2 α − cos α · sin α aXG
= ma,Y L (B1.162)
FY G − cos α · sin α cos2 α aY G
These terms must be included in the global mass matrix, which means that use of a consen-
trated (diagonal) mass matrix is inadequat for modelling of hydrodynamic mass of slender
structures.
Figure B1.69: Added mass on an inclined element
Added mass in tangential direction for a riser with buoyancy elements will, however, not be
zero, but will still be different from latheral added mass. The terms to be included in the
global mass matrix from tangential added mass can be found as

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
" # " #" #

FXG cos2 α cos α · sin α aXG
= ma,XL (B1.163)
FY G cos α · sin α sin2 α aY G
These matrices must of course be extended for a 3D analysis. When it comes to selection
of actual values of hydrodynamic coefficients, one have to follow recommendations form
guidelines and design specifications. Some general comments may, however, be given:
• Added mass for circular cylinders should be taken as 1.0. Figure B1.58 indicates
significantly lower values, in particular for low values of β - or Re. For ordinary pipes
in waves of practical interest, however, added mass seems to be quite stable.
• In a sensitivity study to find variation of the response from varying CD it is important

to keep in mind both the excitation amd damping effects of drag forces. The most
unfavorable situation in a dynamic analysis will be a large CD in the wave zone, and
a low value at large water depth where drag will add damping.
• Many riser types will consist of a number of pipes like drilling risers with their ’kill and
choke’ lines. Coefficients will be direction dependent, but often not known in detail
for the actual Reynolds number. The need for paramerer variations for such cases is
obvious.
B1.4.6 Finite Element Models
The finite element method is a general numerical technique for solving differential equations
applied on field problems. Important applications in addition to structural analysis are hy-
drodynamics, temperature distribution, magnetism and rock mechanics. The continuum is
divided into a number of elements, and the elements are linked at nodes. Interpolation func-
tions and state variables at nodes are applied to describe the field parameters within each
element. A set of algebraic equations for the unknown node parameters can be established
and solved. The quality of the solution depends on the ability of interpolation functions to
describe the state variables within the element, and the characteristic size of the element.
Compatibility for deformations and equilibrium between external and internal forces are the
two basic requirements that have to be satisfied in structural analysis. This is ensured by
introducing a material law that relates stresses to strains and leads to a stiffness matrix.
In static analysis, a set of global equilibrium equations relates internal and external forces
at each node for unknown displacements. Node displacements are found by solving these
equations, and the deformations, strains and stresses within the elements can either be found
from the interpolation functions or directly from the element stress resultants. A dynamic
analysis additionally includes velocity and acceleration at each node in order to include inertia
and damping forces in the equilibrium equations.
By using a linear finite element method, deformations and stresses are found without ac-
counting for the fact that deformations will change the geometry or material properties of
the structure. Deformations will hence always become proportional to the load. A non-
linear solution will update geometry and material properties on the basis of deformations
and strains by introducing load increments in combination with equilibrium iteration. Hence,
linear analysis cannot be applied in cases where deformations become large relative to the
global geometry, or if stresses exceed the proportionality limits for the actual material.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
A finite element analysis must start from a stress free condition or from a condition with
known initial stresses. Non-linear effects will always be present for static analyses of flexible
risers due to large deformations relative to a stress free condition. Dynamic response might
however, be adequately analysed by linear methods, but non-linear analyses are normally
preferred. The simplest way of analysing flexible risers is to find a static shape from catenary
theory (see Sect. B 1.4.3) and apply a linear method for calculating the dynamic response
as a perturbation of the static shape. Note that a linear dynamic analysis will calculate the
dynamic response with reference to a static condition, and hence include dynamic forces
only, while a non-linear dynamic analysis must apply the sum of static and dynamic loads in
the calculations.
The reasons for applying non-linear analysis for flexible risers are not only large displacements
and non-linear material behaviour. The geometric stiffness (see B 1.4.2.1) is linked to the
tension in the riser, which often will have large variations in a dynamic condition. Contact
between the riser and the sea bottom, and stick/slip between layers in the cross section are
examples of other non-linear effects that often need to be accounted for.
Beam and bar elements
Beam elements are normally used for all flexible riser analyses. However, one may still apply
bar elements during initial design in order to find global geometry and optimum distribution
of buoyancy elements for steep and lazy wave configurations. It might be convenient to
apply a simple catenary model for static analysis (see Sect. B 1.4.3) combined with a linear
2D dynamic analysis with bar elements to investigate dynamic effects.
The stiffness matrix for a 2-D bar element (see Figure B1.70 and Eq. B1.164 ) will have
contribution from the elastic stiffness defined by modulus of elasticity E, cross section area
A and element length L, and geometric stiffness defined by axial tension P:
Figure B1.70: 2D bar element
     
1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 x1
EA  0
 0 0 0  P 0 1
 0 −1

 y1 
 
KBar,E =  , KBar,G = , v =   (B1.164)
L −1 0 1 0 L 0 0 0 0 x2 
 
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 y2
The physical interpretation of the geometric stiffness matrix is that it accounts for the
contribution to restoring forces from the change of direction of the axial force, see Section
B1.4.2
The 2-D beam element will have end rotations as additional degrees of freedom, see Figure
B1.71. The elastic stiffness terms related to rotations are found from elementary beam

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
theory. The geometric stiffness matrix will now be modified since end rotations will influence
the direction of the axial force, see Eq. B1.165.
Figure B1.71: 2-D beam element
 
0
 
x1
0

6
5 Symm 
  y1 
2L2
 
 L
P 0 − 10
 θ 
, v =  1 ,

KBeam,G =  15  
L0 0 0 0 x2 


6 L 6  

0 − 5 10 0 5

  y2 
L 2 2L2
0 10 − L30 0 L θ2
 10 15
 (B1.165)
EA
L
 0 12EI
Symm
 
L3

− 6EI 4EI
 
 0
L2

KBeam,E =  L 
 EA 0 0 EA 
 L L 
 0 − 12EI − 6EI 0 12EI
 
L3 L2 L3 
6EI 2EI 6EI 4EI
0 L2 L 0 L2 L
Note that the above matrices are local in that sense that the x axes are horizontal. These
matrices have to be transformed and assembled in a global stiffness matrix to represent the
entire structure for an arbitrary geometry of a riser. The mass matrix for a 2-D beam element
is shown in Eq. B1.166. This matrix is found by use of the same interpolation functions as
the stiffness matrix, which means that the mass matrix is consistent.
 
140
 0
 156 SYMM 

ρAL  0 −22L 4L
 2 
M= (B1.166)

70 0 0 140
 
420 
 

 0 54 −13L 0 156 
0 13L −3L 2 0 22L 4L2
So-called concentrated mass matrices were often used in the early days of finite element
history in order to reduce computing time and needed memory in computers. A concentrated
mass matrix is diagonal, but has no relevance for today’s element models. One important
argument against the concentrated mass matrix for application on flexible risers is that added
mass cannot be correctly described. Acceleration in one direction will give inertia forces in
the perpendicular direction for and arbitrary oriented beam in water, which is impossible to
describe by a diagonal mass matrix.
A beam element without any limitations for translations and rotations is needed in order to
describe the global deformations of a flexible riser. This can only be achieved by applying

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
nonlinear analysis based on a so-called co-rotated ghost reference system, which will be
described in the following.
Figure B1.72: Degrees of freedom for a 3-D beam element
Figure B1.72 shows the 12 degrees of freedom that are needed to describe the deformation
state for a 3D beam. An initial stiffness matrix for this beam can be found in the same way
as for the 2D case. The only new type of deformation from Eq. B1.165 is rotation. What
is important for the 3D case with large displacements is the description of rotations and the
stress analysis.
3D rotations are not true vectors that can be described by components in a base coordinate
system in the same way as translations. What is needed is to define a local coordinate system
to each end, and fix this to the cross section. In a general deformation state with bending and
torsion we need to know the directions of the local axes by their direction cosines. Instead
of three rotations at each nodes, we need a 3x3 matrix to define the actual position of the
local coordinate system, see Figure B1.73.
Figure B1.73: Local coordinate system to describe cross section rotations
Figure B1.74 illustrates how the global displacements and rotation vectors are used to define

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
the deformations of an element. Once the element deformations are found, internal forces
(bending and torsion moments, shear and axial forces) can be found from elementary beam
theory. Non-linear material behaviour may also be accounted for. Note that the stress
analysis for each element is based on the assumption that local deformations are small.
This is not an important limitation of the method since the large global displacements is
dominated by rigid body motions.
Figure B1.74: Global displacements and local deformations for stress analysis
A large number of textbooks and publications present the finite element method for static
and dynamic analysis. [Livesley, 1964], [Zienkiewicz, 1971] and [Clough and Penzien, 1975]
should be mentioned among the classical FEM literature, while [Cook et al., 1975] provides
a more modern book on finite element theory. The 3D non-linear beam element and its
application is described by [Mathisen, 1990] and [A. Engseth, 1988].
Riser/ seafloor interaction
Several flexible riser configurations will have a contact zone on the sea bottom that varies
with time. This represents a non-linear effect that may have a small influence on the global
behaviour of the riser, but the local effect might still be significant. Modelling of this
interaction should therefore be given some attention.
Figure B1.75 illustrates 3 different models that might be applied in a linear dynamic analysis.
Model 1 is truncated at the touch-down point, and is assumed to have fixed positions but
moment free rotation at the end. A dynamic response of the riser will transport energy to
this end, and all energy will be reflected. Model 2 includes a riser segment on the seafloor,
and linear springs are introduced to model the interaction between the riser and the seafloor.
these springs will give a distributed reflection of energy, but the local bending moment will
be strongly influenced by the stiffness of the springs. The third model includes dampers in
parallel to the springs, and will therefore absorb some of the energy and reflect a smaller
amount than for the other models.
Figure B1.76 presents results from a fatigue analysis where the first and second models have
been used. The truncated model will eliminate the bending moment at the touch-down
point, while the model with bottom springs will have maximum fatigue damage at the first
node with bottom contact. The height of this peak depends strongly on the stiffness of the
spring, and will almost always give a conservative estimate of fatigue at this point. One
may also observe that the first peak for the truncated model is higher that for the model

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
with bottom springs at the same location. The reason for this is the concentrated energy
reflection from the end support of the truncated model.
Figure B1.75: Alternative models for riser - seafloor interaction.
Figure B1.76: Fatigue damage along a riser with truncated model and model with bottom
springs
The results on Figure B1.76 are obtained form linear analyses, which means that the springs
may have experienced tensile forces. A more realistic model is therefore to apply a non-linear
dynamic analysis, and account for varying contact length during a simulation. Figure B1.77
illustrates the difference between interaction forces in a linear and non-linear time domain
simulation. Since a linear analysis will have constant stiffness, tensile forces in the springs
may occur, and a node without initial bottom contact will not experience any interaction
force during a simulation even if the node penetrates into the sea floor. Both effect will lead
to increased bending moment close to the first contact node in the static condition.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.77: Spring forces in a linear and non-linear analysis
Figure B1.78 shows snapshots of the deformations close to the touch-down point from linear
and non-linear time domain analyses. The linear model will give symmetric snapshots, while
a non-linear model will prevent penetration and allow nodes to leave the bottom by adjusting
the contact springs.
Another effect that will influence stresses in the touch-down zone is friction between the
riser and the sea floor. This will in particular be important for distribution of axial force
along the length of the pipe with seafloor contact, and bending stresses caused by response
perpendicular to the catenary plane. Figure B1.79 shows the hysteresis curve for friction
forces on the pipe by using a simple dry friction (Coulomb) model. The friction force will
increase for increasing displacement, but the pipe will start to slide at a force level determined
by the local friction coefficient. Sliding will take place at constant force, but unloading will
follow a linear curve as soon as the external force reverses. This process can easily be included
in a non-linear time domain simulation. Figure B1.80 shows local stresses from a variety of
models for interaction between riser and seafloor. Note that the high and low friction models
in frequency domain will give identical results.
Details from analyses of catenary risers with varying models for sea floor interaction are
presented by Larsen and Passano (2006).

Section B1.4
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Figure B1.78: Comparison of vertical deformations for linear and non-linear bottom springs

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.79: Dry friction model for horizontal displacements
Figure B1.80: Local bending stresses close to the touch-down point from various models

Section B1.4
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Static analysis
The most general way to find the static condition for a flexible riser system is to define a
stress free condition and introduce load contributions in a specific sequence until all static
effects are included. Load types will normally consist of
• Volume forces (weight and buoyancy)
• Prescribed displacements at nodes with given boundary conditions
• Friction forces between riser and sea bottom
• Temperature and pressure
• Current forces
This list can also represent a recommended sequence for how the load groups are introduced.
The initial (stress free) condition cannot have any curvature, and will hence be significantly
different from the static shape. Figure B1.81 illustrates how one end of the riser must be
moved down to the sea bottom, while the other must be moved to the termination point on
a floater. The initial position may be defined at an arbitrary level, but should preferably be
submerged in order to have buoyancy. The two ends need not to be at the same level, but
the distance between the ends must be identical to the true length of the unstressed riser.
Figure B1.81: Initial and static condition of a lazy wave flexible riser
Number of load increments within a load group might be high - often of the order of 100.
This is in particular the case for the prescribed displacements as shown on the figure. Note
that equilibrium must be obtained for each load increment, which might be difficult at some
intermediate end positions between the initial and final positions.
Equilibrium iteration will preferably follow the Newton-Raphson scheme. This is illustrated
on Figure B1.82 . Equilibrium requires internal forces to be equal to external forces at all
degrees of freedom. Since the orientation of than element will influence current forces, both
external and internal loads may vary with displacements, and the stiffness matrix will not be
identical at the start and end position for an increment. Hence, the iteration will become
a combination of load and equilibrium iteration. Both external and internal forces must
therefore be calculated a number of times for each increment.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.82: Illustration of combined load and equilibrium iteration
Damping models
The main contributor to damping of most flexible riser system is the hydrodynamic damping
on parts of the riser without significant wave induced water particle velocities. However,
structural damping may also be important and should therefore be accounted for.
The mechanism for structural damping is complex, and requires a detailed analysis of cross
section deformations including strains in non-metal layers, contact forces, ’stick and slip’
and friction between layers. It is feasible to include this type of analysis in a global dynamic
simulation, however, the computational time will increase. An alternative strategy is to use
local cross section analyses to tune parameters for more simple damping models.
It is formally possible to define a non-linear model for structural damping by hysteresis curves
for bending deformation of a cross section. Such models will require storage of recent time
histories of bending at each node, and hence increase computing time and data storage.
This type of model will vary not only from one cross section design to another, but also with
temperature and pressure. Simplified global damping models are therefore in many cases
preferred.
The Rayleigh damping model is often applied for structural damping. The model defines a
damping matrix C as a weighted sum of the stiffness and mass matrix K and M:
C = α1 M + α2 K (B1.167)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
where α1 and α2 are coefficients that define the damping ratio ξ from the equation
1 α1

ξ(ω) = + α2 ω (B1.168)
2 ω
Figure B1.83: Damping ratio for α1 = 0.01 and α2 = 0.02
From Eq B1.168 it is seen that the α1 will give high damping at low frequencies, while α2 will
give increasing damping for increasing frequencies. Figure B1.83 shows the damping ratio as
function of frequency. The blue line presents the values from Eq. B1.167, while the red line
gives the stiffness proportional contribution only. There are good reasons for using α1 = 0 for
flexible risers. One reason is that damping may easily become too high for low frequencies,
but it is also important to note that a mass proportional damping will give damping from
rigid body motions in the same way as inertia forces will do. This damping contribution is
not desired since rigid body motions are damped by drag forces. A damping matrix with the
same structure as the stiffness matrix will give damping from bending deformations, which is
a reasonable assumption. The red line defines damping from the α2 term only. The damping
ratio is seen to increase from 0.5 to 2 % between period values of 12.56 to 3.14 seconds. One
may argue that the stiffness proportional damping should follow the elastic stiffness matrix
and not be influenced by the geometric stiffness matrix. The argument is reasonable, but it
might be difficult to estimate the damping ratio for this case since the contributions from
the two stiffness matrices are difficult to define.
Some time integration procedures like the Newmark beta family can introduce numerical
damping by adjusting integration parameters and length of the time step. When using this
type of damping it might be difficult to identify the actual damping level, in particular how
damping varies with time step and load frequency. A general rule is therefore to avoid
numerical damping and instead have a stiffness proportional Rayleigh damping.
The Rayleigh damping model can be applied for both time and frequency domain analyses.
The model may also be used for non-linear simulations, but the simple relationship for
damping ratio given i Eq.B1.168 is formally not valid. Rayleigh damping is still recommended

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
for ordinary design analyses, but should be avoided for cases with boundary condition changes
like riser installation and accidental loss of integrity.
Damping is important for cases where load frequencies are close to one or several eigenfre-
quencies for the riser. Hydrodynamic damping from drag forces will normally be a domination
damping effect, but structural damping might dominate for axial vibrations and systems in
air. Such cases need special considerations, and should be checked for unphysical damping
effects when approximate damping models are used.
Some more info on structural damping may be found in [API 17B, 2008] [MCS Kenny, 2006]
and [Berge et al., 1992]
Frequency domain analysis
Time domain simulation is the standard method for dynamic analysis of flexible risers. How-
ever, fatigue analyses can with acceptable accuracy be carried out in frequency domain, confer
[Larsen, 1992]. In addition, most commercial programs for calculation of vortex induced vi-
brations apply frequency domain methods. The frequency response method combined with
a three-dimensional finite element model is well suited for this application since the loads
from vortex shedding are normally considered to act at one frequency or at a limited number
of discrete frequencies.
Using standard finite element notation the dynamic equilibrium equation may be written as
M r̈(t) + C ṙ(t) + K r(t) = R(t) (B1.169)
If the external loads R(t) are harmonic, but not necessarily in phase at all degrees of freedom,
a complex load vector X can be applied to define amplitudes and phase angles. The time
varying load will then be given as
R(t) = X eiωt (B1.170)
The response will appear at the same frequency as the load, and will also be given by a
complex vector and a harmonic time variation. Hence we have
r(t) = x eiωt (B1.171)
By introducing the hydrodynamic mass and damping matrices dynamic equilibrium can now
be expressed as:
− ω 2 (MS + MH ) x + iω(CS + CH ) x + K x = X (B1.172)
The damping matrix CS represents structural damping and will normally be assumed to be a
linear combination of the mass and the stiffness matrix (see Section B1.4.6), known as the
Rayleigh damping matrix. CB contains terms from hydrodynamic damping. The solution
can now be found from

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
x = H(ω) X
−1 (B1.173)
H(ω) = −ω 2 (MS +MH ) + i ω (CS +CH ) + K
The hydrodynamic damping matrix CH represents damping from drag forces. Since these
forces depend on the response velocity, Eq. B1.173 must be solved by iteration, confer
Krolikowski and Gay (1980). See also Section B1.4.7 for stochastic analysis in frequency
domain.
Mode superposition
Mode superposition is a method for calculating the response in a continuous system where
the response is expressed as a linear combination (weighted sum) of selected mode shapes.
The method represents an extension of generalized coordinates, but it is based on the same
basic principles. The method has some similarities with the Rayleigh-Ritz (R-R) technique for
calculation of eigenfrequencies for continuous systems. However, the arbitrary basic shapes
in R-R are now replaced by known eigenmodes. The starting point for modal superposition
is hence:
(B1.174)
X
r(t) = si φi qi (t) = Φ q
Here is a known modeshape, qi (t) are time-dependant weight functions that must be calcu-
lated from a dynamic analysis. The weight functions determine the contribution from each
mode shape to the total deformation state. It is important to know that the weights can
change their relative quantity with time, hence the deformation is not necessarily a time
scaling of a particular shape.
By introducing Eq. B1.174 to the dynamic equilibrium equation and neglect damping, we
will obtain a set of uncoupled equations. The reason why the equations are uncoupled is that
modeshapes are orthogonal - one mode cannot be defined as a linear combination of other
modes. Another way of understanding orthogonality is to realize that each mode provides
unique information - other modes are not able to give the same information. The uncoupled
set of equations can be written as:
       
m̄1 0 q̈1 k̄1 0 q1 p̄1
 m̄2   q̈ 
 2

k̄2
q 
 2
 p̄ 
 2
  +    =   (B1.175)
 
·  ·  ·  ·   · 

 
0 m̄N q̈N 0 k̄N qN p̄N
Line i will now give a second order differential equation for weight factor i:
m̄i q̈i + k̄i qi = p̄i (t) (B1.176)
where the modal parameters are given by
m̄i = φTi M φi m̄i = φTi M φi p̄i (t) = φTi (x)p(t) (B1.177)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Damping must be introduced for each modal equation, normally in terms of a damping ratio
ξ:
c̄i c̄i c̄i

q
ξi = = = q c̄i = 2 ξi m̄i k̄i (B1.178)
c̄crit,i 2 m̄i ω0,i 2 m̄i k̄i
The differential equation for each modal weight factor will now be given as:
m̄i q̈ + c̄i q̇ + k̄i q = P̄i (t) (B1.179)
This equation can now be solved by conventional methods; in frequency domain if the load
can be described by harmonic components or by time integration for arbitrary load histories.
Drag forces gives coupling between the modal equations since they are nonlinearly related to
the relative velocity. The only advantage by the use of mode superposition will then be to
apply a significantly lower number of modes than degrees of freedom in the finite element
model.
Time domain analysis
Time domain calculation of the coupled set of equations for all degrees of freedom in the
finite element model is the most frequently used approach for dynamic analysis of flexible
risers. Two classes of methods might be used:
• linear analysis where the system matrices remain constant, and the dynamic response
is calculated as a perturbation of the static condition
• non-linear analysis where the geometry is updated for each time step during the sim-
ulation
The two approaches are illustrated in Figure B1.84
Formally we can describe the linear dynamic analysis as
Mr̈ + Cṙ + KrDY N = RDY N (t) = RT OT (t) − RST AT IC (B1.180)
Dynamic stresses can be calculated directly from the dynamic displacements and aded to
the static values. External forces i a linear analysis must be the difference between total and
static forces. This is in particular important to have in mind if current forces are present in
the static analysis, and the static condition includes waves. Because of the non-linear term
in Morison’s equation we have to add current velocity to the wave induced velocity, calculate
the drag force and subtract the current force.
It is also important to realize that the hydrodynamic forces must be calculated with reference
to the static shape of the riser. If an updated geometry is applied, one will calculate an
incorrect dynamic response since forces will get local directions relative to the riser that are
inconsistent to the geometry that is represented by the stiffness matrix. Forces that should
act perpendicular to the riser will get an unwanted tangential component.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.84: Linear and non-linear dynamic analysis
A linear time domain simulation should include load iterations at each time increment since
drag forces must be calculated from the initially unknown relative velocity. This load iteration
will in most cases - and for short time increments - have a fast convergence.
The Newmark β family is a convenient procedure for time integration. One may, however,
experience unphysical variations of accelerations when using parameters that gives zero ar-
tificial (or numerical) damping. An alternative is to use Wilson’s method or introduce some
numerical damping by adjusting parameters in Newmark’s method. It is recommended to
test the numerical procedures for new applications.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
A non-linear analysis should preferably carry out equilibrium iteration for every time incre-
ment during a simulation. Total loads including weight and buoyancy must be present, and
the present geometry must always be considered when calculating the external loads. The
dynamic equilibrium equation is normally reformulated to consider incremental parameters:
I − FkI ) + (Fk+1
D − F D ) + (F S S
(Fk+1 k k+1 + Fk ) = Rk+1 − Rk
I D
Rk = Fk + Fk + Fk S
∆rk = rk+1 − rk
∆ṙk = ṙk+1 − ṙk (B1.181)
∆r̈k = r̈k+1 − r̈k h i
Mk ∆r̈k + CIk ∆ṙk + KIk ∆rk = Rk+1 − FkI + FkD + FkS
The index k defines the time increment, superscript I is inertia forces, D is damping forces
and S is stiffness or restoring forces. KIk and CIk refer to incremental stiffness and damping
matrices and together with displacement and velocity increments they will give incremental
restoring and damping forces. Inertia forces are different since an inertia force always will
appear as the instantaneous acceleration and mass matrix.
The last equation must be solved for each time increment, and normally one have to carry
out a combined equilibrium and load iteration in order to ensure correct hydrodynamic forces
and internal stress resultants. Note that the final equation in (B1.181) is strictly valid only
if M is constant. Since M will vary with the displacements both due to transformations
and added mass, a correction of inertia forces is also needed as a part of the iteration. This
procedure is time consuming but has still become a standard method for dynamic simulation
of flexible risers.
Wilson’s method for time integration is difficult to apply on non-linear systems since the
solution is found by an interpolation between an artificial time increment with dynamic
equilibrium, and the real time increment. This is done in order to maintain a stable solution
for linear systems, but a non-linear system must calculate all forces at the same time instant
without any approximations. The Newmark procedure has shown to give excellent results
for non-linear analysis of marine structures.
Integration methods are often split into explicit and implicit methods. Explicit methods give
a set of linear equations for each time increments that can be solved directly, while some
implicit methods will need iteration for each time increment. Some implicit methods like
’Newmark beta family’ and ’constant average acceleration’ can become explicit by simple
reformulation of the set of equations.
More important than explicit versus implicit methods is how procedures behave with respect
to stability. Some integration schemes are conditionally stable, which means that the length
of the time increment is limited to a fraction of the shortest eigenperiod in the finite element
model. This will lead to extremely short time increments and hence too long computing time
in particular for non-linear stochastic simulations. Use of unconditionally stable methods is
therefore recommended.
B1.4.7 Coupled Analysis Models
The traditional model for global dynamic analysis of flexible risers applies pre-calculated
forced displacements as boundary conditions for upper end, Morison’s equation for calculation

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
of hydrodynamic loads from current and waves, and a 3D beam element model to represent
the riser structure. The low frequency and wave frequency motions should be calculated
from the same wave record as applied in the dynamic analysis for calculation of forces.
This type of model should give a fairly good result for riser displacements, axial forces and
bending moments in the pipe, but may still not provide all needed information for design
verification. The need to link the global riser model to other computer programs is therefore
present - either by direct communication between programs during the simulation or by post
processing of key results. Examples of such analysis models are
• Coupled analysis of floater motions and riser dynamics
• Coupled analysis of riser dynamics and internal non-stationary flow
• Coupled analysis of riser dynamics and hydrodynamic loads based on computational
fluid dynamics (CFD)
• Post-processing of results from global riser analysis for calculation of local stresses in
individual components in the cross section
• Post-processing of results for the design of bending restrictors
Comments related to these options will be given in the following.
Riser dynamics and floater motions
The traditional way for calculation of floater motions and stresses in risers and anchor lines
is to apply two sets of uncoupled analyses:
1. Floater motions are initially found as the sum of wave-frequency and low frequency
components. The wave frequency component is calculated by use of transfer functions
that has to be found from potential theory. Frequency dependent added mass will be
accounted for, but anchor lines must be modelled as linear springs. Time histories of
motions in a given sea state may then be generated by Fast Fourier Transform. Random
phase angles for wave components must be known. The slowly varying component is
normally found in time domain by use of stochastic wind forces and wave forces from
the same wave record as applied for the wave frequency calculation. Anchor lines and
risers without heave compensation may in this calculation be introduced as non-linear
massless springs.
2. Dynamic response in anchor lines and risers are found by introducing known motions as
boundary conditions at the connection points. Such analyses are normally carried out
in time domain in order to represent drag forces correctly. If low frequency motions are
neglected, the forced motions are found directly from the transfer functions, and con-
sistent time histories for motions and wave generated fluid velocities and accelerations
can easily be found prior to the stochastic dynamic simulation.
The uncoupled approach gives acceptable results for shallow water depth since non-linear
restoring forces, damping and inertia effects from anchor lines and risers have minor influence
on wave frequency motions. However, increasing water depth will lead to increased mass
of anchor lines and riser, and also increased damping from these members. Low frequency
motions will in particular be strongly influenced by line dynamics, and the need for coupled
analysis becomes obvious. Coupled analysis must be carried out as a non-linear time domain
simulation in order to give the best possible result. A particular problem will be to represent

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
frequency dependent added mass for the floater, but this effect is taken care of by use of
retardation functions.
In the late 90–ties [Ormberg et al., 1997] and [Ormberg and Larsen, 1998] published models
for coupled analysis. Comparison between uncoupled and coupled analysis for an FPSO
with turret mooring was illustrated by [Ormberg et al., 1998]. There is a large number
of publications about coupled and uncoupled analyses of floaters with anchor lines and
risers. ITTC had a specialist committee on deep water mooring that discussed analysis
options, confer [Aage et al., 1999]. Other important contributions are [Heutier et al., 2001]
and [Garret, 2005].
Riser dynamics and internal fluid flow
It is well known that a steady state flow through a flexible pipe with uniform cross section
will not influence the global shape of the pipe. Axial stresses will, however, be influenced,
but the effect of the flow can be calculated subsequent to a static or dynamic analysis. If
the flow is non-stationary, dynamic effects may lead to vibrations. Slug flow is one example,
and acceleration or deceleration of the flow will also give dynamic effects. A particular effect
will be important for slug flow since the vibrations of the pipe will influence slug formation
and propagation. An integrated riser response and slug flow analysis will hence be needed
to give a correct result in such cases.
Figure B1.85: Global response from slug flow, quasi-static and dynamic simulations
A simplified slug flow model was used by [Fylling et al., 1988] to investigate the response
from a point mass travelling through a flexible pipe at constant speed. The global geom-
etry is shown on Figure B1.85, and results from quasi-static and dynamic simulations are
presented by snapshots. The difference between the two methods is significant, and caused
by transient dynamic effects and the centrifugal forces that are neglected in the quasi-static
model, [Fylling et al., 1988]. Other slug flow models published at that time followed similar
principles, [Patel and Seyed, 1989].
The Riflex model had no feedback from the dynamic oscillations of the riser to the slug flow.
The purpose of the work by [Ortega et al., 2012], [Ortega et al., 2013] was to combine a slog
flow model and a dynamic riser response model. The slug flow model has been developed by

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
(1) (2)
Figure B1.86: Snapshots of global shape (a) and end tension variation from slug flow in still
water, waves and slug flow combined with waves ([Ortega et al., 2013])
[Nydal, 2010] and can describe the development of two-phase flow in a pipe with prescribed
flow input and dynamic chance of the riser shape. The riser and flow programs were coupled
by use of HLA technology [IEEE Standard, 2010], which provides data flow between the
programs and a synchronization of the two time integrations. The results from this type of
model is not only the dynamic shape and tension in the riser (see Figure B1.86a), but also
data to describe the internal flow process (see Figure B1.87).
Figure B1.87: Liquid superficial velocity for slug flow in still water an waves
[Ortega et al., 2013]

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Numerical models for hydrodynamic forces
Morison equation is normally used to calculate hydrodynamic forces on slender structures.

This load model is far from perfect, but is easy to use and gives results of acceptable accuracy
in most cases. There are, however, situations when more sophisticated models are wanted.
Slamming loads in steep waves, loads on curved pipes and buoyancy segments, and loads
causing vortex induced vibrations (VIV) are examples. [Nestegård et al., 2004] applied a
slamming model to calculate forces of short duration on guide tubes for protection of flexible
risers in the splash zone. These loads could be pre calculated and added to ordinary Morison
type loads in the simulation. A similar approach for calculating loads on curved pipes by a
numerical method was investigated by de [de Vecchi et al., 2009]. Strictly speaking these
cases are not examples of coupled analyses, but illustrates how additional load components
can be introduced in a riser analysis.
VIV is a classical example of strong interaction between structural response and the local
hydrodynamic loads. Today’s approach for engineering purposes is to apply empirical load
models, but these are not able to give reliable results in all cases. The approach may be
described as an iterative process where the load on a specific cross section is calculated by an
empirical model and parameters defined from the response at the same cross section. Con-
vergence is obtained when all local loads are in agreement with the corresponding response.
For a given frequency this means that the response amplitude defines the load amplitude,
and that the phase angle of the response velocity corresponds to the phase of the load that
transfers energy between the fluid and the structure. This means that the fluid is not a real
part of the analysis model, but is substituted by empirical parameters.
The only way to include the fluid in this type of analysis is to apply a numerical method for
calculation of flow patterns, velocities and thereby also dynamic pressure variations on the
structure. An early attempt to this type of analysis was published by [Hansen et al., 1988].
The fluid model applied a 2D ’vortex-in-cell’ method that is an approximate way to solve the
Navier-Stokes equation (NSE) for high Reynolds numbers. This method is computationally
efficient compared to the use of finite elements, and could be applied with reasonable speed
on the computers that were available at that time.
Further development of combined computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and structural dy-
namics gave models based on 2D finite elements to solve NSE combined with turbulence
models, [Halse, 1997] Figure B1.88, direct numerical simulations (DNS) that eliminated the
use of turbulence models, [Evangelinos et al., 2000], and 3D DNS models combined with
a flexible beam, [Bourguet et al., 2011] Figure B1.89. This figure illustrates the type of
information that becomes available from a 3D DNS simulation. The aim is to calculate hy-
drodynamic forces, but it is also possible to see the complex vortex shedding formation and
hence be able to understand the process that leads to the forces. This approach will hopefully
replace the use of empirical methods for VIV calculations in the future, but computers must
become cheaper and far more powerful than today.
B1.4.8 Stochastic analysis
When dealing with dynamic analysis and stochastic processes, the terms ’time domain’ and
’frequency domain’ are often used. The two ’domains’ represent alternative ways of describing
processes and performing calculations, which will be described in the following.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.88: Use of 2D CFD combined with a flexible beam for VIV calculation of free
spanning pipeline, [Halse, 1997]
A frequency spectrum is a way of presenting a Gaussian process that shows the intensity (or
energy) of the process as a function of the frequency. Mathematically this type of spectrum
is the Fourier transform of the auto correlation function for the process, and is referred to
as the ’auto spectrum’. This is in contrast to the ’cross spectra’ applied for description of
correlated stochastic processes. A cross spectrum is defined as the Fourier transform of the
cross correlation function for two processes, and is needed to describe phase relations in
multi degrees of freedom systems.
An auto spectrum represents a Gaussian process, and if all spectrum moments can be calcu-
lated, the spectrum gives a complete description of the statistical properties of the process.
Hence, standard deviation, zero up-crossing frequency, bandwidth and the distribution of indi-
vidual maxima and extremes can be found without any statistical uncertainty. The frequency
domain representation of a process (auto spectrum) is therefore a complete description and
contains all necessary statistical information about the process.
If we measure the sea surface elevation in a limited time interval, we have a ’realisation’ of
the stochastic process. If the statistical properties of the wave process remains unchanged
and we measure for a new time interval, we will have a new realisation from the same process.
The two time records will be different, and if we estimate the standard deviation and other
statistical parameters from the records, the two sets of estimates will be different, and none
of them can be taken as the true values for the background process.
This means that estimates of statistical parameters from a record will have a statistical
uncertainty, and the only way to reduce the uncertainty is to increase the length of the
record. Dealing with time domain analyses will therefore require estimation of statistical
parameters, and we should also be able to quantify the level of uncertainty for our estimates.
A broad presentation of methods for stochastic analysis of marine structures is given by
[Næss and Moan, 2013].

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.89: Wake visualization in a linearly sheared current. Maximum velocity at bottom
equal to 1.1, minimum at top equal to 0.3. (a) Re=110; (b) Re=330; (c) Re=1,100.
Reynolds number based on maximum velocity. Length to diameter ratio = 180. From
[Bourguet et al., 2011], provided separately by Michael Triantafyllou
Wave spectra
A large number of wave spectrum equations exist. These have been proposed for use in
design of marine structures by individuals or organizations, and they help designers to apply
stochastic theory for sea loads in a rational way. The most frequently used spectra are
• Pierson-Moskowitz, based on wave data from the North Atlantic Sea
• JONSWAP (JOint North Sea WAve Project, proposed after a large multi-national wave
measurement project in 1968-69

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
• ITTC, proposed by International Towing Tank Conference

• ISSC, proposed by International Ship (and Offshore) Structures Congress
• Torsethaugen two-peak spectrum, proposed by Torsethaugen to combine wind gener-
ated waves with swell.
The general equation for the Pierson-Moskovitz wave spectrum is as follows:
A B

[S(ω) = 5 exp − 4 (B1.182)
ω ω
A, B: Constants that define the wave spectrum A = 0.0081 g 2 , where g is the acceleration
of gravity = 9.81 m s−2 B = 0.74 (g/v)4 , where v is the wind speed at 19.5 meters above
sea surface ω Wave frequency (radians per seconds) = 2π/T, where T is the wave period in
seconds = 2πf, where f is the wave frequency in Hz.
The general equation for spectrum moments is defined by:
Z∞
mn = S(ω) · ω n dω , n = 1, 2, , , (B1.183)
0
Significant wave height, HS , defined as the average value of the 1/3 highest waves is found
from m0 , which is the area of the wave spectrum:
v2 √
HS = 0.21 = 4 m0 (B1.184)
g
Mean frequency, rad/sec, corresponding to the centre of gravity of the wave spectrum:
g m1
ω1 = 1.14 = (B1.185)
v m0
Average zero up-crossing period in seconds can be found from:
m0
r
3
− 14
TZ = 2π B 4 = 2π (B1.186)
m2
Relations between spectrum moments and the parameters A and B are given by:
A
m0 = 4B
m1 = 0.306 A 3/ (B1.187)
√ B 4
π √A
m2 = 4 B
By combining Eq. (3.29) and (3.31) with the definition of B, we have
4A 0.0324 g 2
B = 2 = (B1.188)
HS HS
By use of this relationship we can define the wave spectrum by the significant wave height
instead of the wind speed. An example of a P-M wave spectrum is given on Figure B1.90.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.90: Pierson-Moskowitz wave spectrum for v = 25 m/s, corresponding to HS =

13.4 m
Generation of wave records
If we know the auto spectrum of a process, a realisation of limited duration can be established
by an inverse Fourier transform formally given as:
N
(B1.189)
X
x (t) = [an cos ωn t + bn sin ωn t]
n=1
Here an and bn are independent Fourier coefficients found from the auto spectrum and ωn
is the frequency for the nth component. Instead of using sine and cosine components, one
component cn and a random phase angle εn are often seen:
N
(B1.190)
X
x (t) = cn sin (ωn t − εn )
n=1
The Fourier transformation means that we use the complete frequency domain representation
of the process to go to the time domain where we have a sample of the process with limited
duration. Two samples will be different if the sets of random parameters in the above
equations are different.
Figure B1.91 shows 10 harmonic components taken from the spectrum shown on Figure
B1.90, while Figure B1.92 presents a short part of a time series of the sum of the harmonic
components.
Method 1. Use of stochastic amplitudes

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.91: Harmonic components from the wave spectrum in Figure B1.90.
Figure B1.92: Short sample of a stichastic wave process
Using sine and cosine functions, both an and bn should be independent stochastic variables:
N
(B1.191)
X
x (t) = [an cos ωn t + bn sin ωn t]
n=1
Both should be taken from a Gauss distribution with zero mean and variance given by
σa2n = σb2n = σn2 = Sx (ωn ) ∆ωn (B1.192)
Note that this method will require 2N independent variables in order to define a sample
with N frequencies. The result of this method will become a sample from a true Gaussian

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
process. The variance that may be estimated from each sample will vary from one sample
to another, as is the case for true stochastic process. Such samples will also give correct
estimates for statistical parameters for individual maxima end largest amplitude in a limited
period of time. Note also that the relative value of an and bn will define the phase angle for
this component.
Method 2. Use of one stochastic amplitude and stochastic phase
It is also possible to generate samples with correct statistical properties by using the cosine
series with a random phase:
N
(B1.193)
X
x (t) = cn sin (ωn t − εn )
n=1
A stochastic amplitude cn must be considered:
q
cn = a2n + b2n (B1.194)
As an and bn are Gaussian distributed with identical parameters, cn will be Rayleigh dis-
tributed with a variance equal to the sum of the variances for the two components. Hence,
the standard deviation of the stochastic amplitude cn will be given by:
q q √
σcn = σa2n + σb2n = 2 Sx (ωn )∆ ωn = 2 σn (B1.195)
The Rayleigh distribution is given by

1 y 2
FY (y) = 1 − exp[− ( ) ] (B1.196)
2 σ
where σ is the only free parameter. The variance of this distribution is given by
σY 2 = 2σ 2 (B1.197)
By combining the three equations above we may write the Rayleigh distribution for the cosine
amplitude cn as
1 cn 2
FCn (cn ) = 1 − exp[− ( ) ] (B1.198)
2 σn
The stochastic amplitude can now be found by the following procedure
1. Draw a random number p from an even distribution in the interval [0, 1]
2. Calculate the random amplitude cn by solving the equation for the Rayleigh distribution
with respect to cn :
1 cn
p = 1 − exp[− ( )2 ] (B1.199)
2 σn
or q √
cn = ln(1 − p) 2 σn (B1.200)
By introducing the known relation for σn we have
q q q
cn = ln(1 − p) 2 Sx (ωn )∆ ωn = ln(1 − p) · c∗n (B1.201)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
where c∗n is the deterministic amplitude of a harmonic component, found from the auto
spectrum by q
c∗n = 2 Sx (ωn )∆ ωn (B1.202)
The phase angle εn is related to the stochastic amplitudes by
bn
εn = tan−1 (B1.203)
an
εn must be evenly distributed in the interval [0, 2π].
Note that this method will have the same number of random variables as the first method,
and will give time records with the same statistical properties. This method is simpler
to implement as it uses random numbers from even distributions and one trigonometric
function only, in contrast to the first method that must handle Gauss distributions and two
trigonometric functions. This method is therefore more often applied than the first.
Method 3. Use of deterministic amplitudes and stochastic phase In this case the
Fourier transformation will follow the equation
N
c∗n sin (ωn t − εn ) (B1.204)
X
x (t) =
n=1
where the component amplitude c∗n is deterministic and given from the auto spectrum ac-
cording to Eq. B1.202). The phase angles εn are independent stochastic variables taken
from an even distribution in the interval [0, 2π]. A random number generator may be used
to generate these parameters.
When using this method, the generated time records will always have a variance exactly equal
to the variance found by integrating the auto spectrum. This is, as previously mentioned,
not the case for a sample of limited length from a real Gaussian process.
The samples produced by this method are therefore not samples from a true Gaussian process,
and will not have the correct statistical distributions for extremes. They will also show
differences in grouping effects for individual maxima as compared to samples from true
Gaussian processes. These shortcomings might become important when samples are used to
generate second order wave forces and when dynamic simulations are used to estimate the
variability of extreme responses as is the case in a reliability analysis.
This method is frequently applied as it is the simplest method. In spite of its theoretical
weaknesses the method will give a correct distribution for individual maxima, which in most
cases is the result of primary interest.
General comments on time series generation The methods that have been described
here have a common limitation with respect to length. If the frequency interval is ∆ω, the
time record will start to repeat itself after a period cn given by
2π
TP = (B1.205)
∆ω
Periodicity is illustrated on Figure B1.93, where the record is seen to repeat itself after
50 seconds. This feature can be useful for stochastic time domain simulation of dynamic
systems. In a time domain analysis there will be a transient phase in the simulation until
damping has eliminated the influence from the initial condition. This period cannot be

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.93: Illustration of periodic time series
included in a statistical analysis of the time record. Since the record is periodic with period
TP , the condition at TP is a perfect match to the initial condition at T=0. By continuing
the time integration beyond TP we can obtain a record with length TP without any influence
from the initial condition, and the full length can be used to estimate statistical parameters.
This is in particular useful for simulation of systems that have some eigenfrequencies lower
than the wave frequencies since the associated modes will have a long transient period.
Simulation of articulated towers subjected to first order wave forces is an example. The
pendulum mode will have an eigenfrequency below the wave frequency range and hence
contribute to the response during a large number of wave periods.
Calculation of the spectrum function from a measured record If we have a time record
of limited length T, the spectrum for the process that we assume to be the source for
the sample, Sx (ω), may be estimated by taking the Fourier transform of the time history.
Formally the Fourier transform of a function x(t) may be expressed as
2π RT 2π RT
ai = T x (t) sin (ωi t) dt bi = T x (t) cos (ωi t) dt
0 0
ωi = i · 2π
, i = 1, 2, , , , N ∆ω = 2π (B1.206)
T T
q
1 2
xi = a2i + b2i Sx (ωi ) = 2∆ω xi
Number of frequency components N must be sufficiently large to represent the frequency

content in the signal x(t) with wanted accuracy. The spectrum found when applying these
equations on a measured signal will often show large variations from one discrete frequency
to the next. Smoothing techniques are therefore often applied.
Using these equations will involve numerical integration to find the Fourier coefficients ai
and bi . This type of computation is time consuming if long time series are handled. In many
cases more than 10.000 time increments and frequency components might be involved.
In order to speed up the computation, special numerical techniques have been developed,
known as Fast Fourier Transforms (FFT). Use of FFT will give a considerable reduction as
compared to straightforward use of the given equations, but some restrictions will apply.
The time increment ∆T and the frequency discretization ∆ω must be constant, and there
will be a fixed relationship between number of time increments N∆T , number of frequency

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
components N∆ω , time length of the generated record T, and cut-off frequencies ωmax and
ωmin . These relations will become as follows
∆T = T /N∆T N∆T = 2N∆ω ∆ω = 2π/T

(B1.207)
ωmin = ∆ω ωmax = ∆ωN∆ω
The use of this method is discussed more in detail by [Tucker et al., 1984]. Verification
of generated time series . Random numbers are needed to produce a record of stochastic
waves. It is not easy to produce a large number of genuine random numbers. However,
several algorithms have been made to generate ’pseudo random numbers’. By specifying a
seed number, the algorithm will be able to generate a long sequence of ’random’ numbers.
The second number is a function of the seed, the third number is a function of the second
number etc. A good algorithm can generate a long sequence without hitting the original
seed number and hence avoid giving a periodic series of numbers.
Sophisticated tests of randomness exist, but it is also possible to have a simple control of the
quality of the wave record that is produced by use of the pseudo random phase angles. Mean
value and variance of the record will be correct unless there are errors in the computer code,
but parameters linked to higher order moments of the probability density function might be
used as indicators for accepting records.
Skewness is an indicator for symmetry of the probability density function and is found from
N
1
x3
P
N i
mP D,3 i=1
γ= 3 ≈ !3 (B1.208)
2 N 2
mP D,2 1
x2i
P
N
i=1
where mP D,N is the nth order moment of the probability density function, N is number of
time increments, and xi is the discrete value of the process (sea surface elevation in our case).
Skewness for a true Gaussian process is zero, and if the calculated value from a generated
record is significantly different from zero one should not apply the record in a simulation.
Kurtosis represents the property of the tails for the probability density function and is found
from fourth and second moments:
N
1
x4
P
mP D,4 N i
i=1
kx = ≈ (B1.209)
m2P D,2
!2
N
1 P 3
N x i
i=1
Kurtosis for the Gauss distribution is 3. Higher values indicate that the tail is higher than
for a Gaussian distributed variable, which means that the sample contains more large values
(positive and negative) than predicted by the Gauss distribution. Lower values tell that the
sample contains less large values that wanted. The statistical variation of kurtosis between
short samples might be large since x4 is a strong function, but long samples should have
kurtosis close to 3.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Short term statistics
The fundamental assumption for short term statistics of waves is that the sea surface elevation
is a stationary, ergodic Gaussian process with zero mean value. The three terms may be
defined as follows:
• Stationary means that the statistical properties of the process are constant in time
during an observation period
• Ergodic implies that all statistical information about the process is contained in each
and every realization [Næss and Moan, 2013])
• A process is Gaussian if a set of measurements (process values) taken at time t + n ·
δ, n = 1, 2, 3, , , , fits a Gaussian distribution, see Figure B1.94.
Figure B1.94: Illustration of process values (blue lines) and individual maxima (red lines)
The variance σx2 of the process x(t) can be found from the spectrum:
Z∞
σx2 = m0 = S(ω) dω (B1.210)
0
The bandwidth ε of a process indicates the range of frequency that contains significant
energy. The mathematical definition of the bandwidth parameter for a Gaussian process is
given by
m22
ε = 1− (B1.211)
m0 m4
mn in Eq. B1.210 and B1.211 is the nth order moment of the spectrum, see Eq B1.183.
A narrow banded process (ε = 0) will have one individual maximum between each zero up-
crossing, and all maxima will be positive, while broad banded processes may have multiple
maxima between zero up-crossings, and also negative maxima, see Figure B1.95.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.95: Illustration of broad banded (red dotted line) and narrow banded (blue line)
processes
The distribution of individual maxima (see Figure B1.94) will depend on the bandwidth
parameter, and is in general known as the Rice distribution (see Figure B1.96) given as
h 2
i √ h 2
i h q i
fXa (xa ) = σx 2π
ε
√ exp − 2σx2aε2 + 1−ε2
2σx2
xa xa
exp − 2σ 2 · 1 + erf xa
ε
1−ε2
2σx2
x x
where
Rx −t2
erf (x) = √2 e dt
π
0
(B1.212)
Figure B1.96: Transition from Gauss to Rayleigh distribution by the Rice distribution,
The Rice distribution will be reduced to the Rayleigh distribution for a narrow-banded process
(ε = 0). Hence, the probability density function for individual maxima will become
!
xa x2
fXa (xa ) = 2 exp − a2 , xa ∈ [0, ∞] (B1.213)
σx 2σx
Note that the variance for the Gaussian process is the only parameter for the Rayleigh
distribution. Hence, if we know the wave spectrum, we also know the distribution of individual

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
maxima in a wave record. The other extreme value for the bandwidth parameter is ε = 1.
This means that the frequency bandwidth is unlimited, which tells that all frequencies have
equal intensity in the process. The distribution for individual maxima will then become the
Gaussian distribution defined by
!
1 x2
fXa (xa ) = √ exp − a2 , xa ∈ [0, ∞] (B1.214)
2π · σ x 2σx
Figure B1.96 illustrates how the Rice distribution defines a transition between the Gauss
and Rayleigh distributions. In design we often want to know how large the largest wave or
response, xmax, might be during a given duration of a sea state. Figure B1.97 illustrates how
this type of distribution can be established. The process must be observes for several periods
of time with duration T, and the largest individual maximum in each sample is recorded.
The new sample consist of a number of largest maxima among N maxima, xmax, where N
is given by
T
N = , T̄ is the average time between each zero up − crossing (B1.215)
T̄
Figure B1.97: Definition of the extreme value distribution
Note that the distribution of individual maxima in a sea state is independent on the obser-
vation period, while the extreme value distribution depends on T. Figure B1.98 shows all
distributions that have been discussed in this section; Gauss, Rice and Rayleigh, together
with extreme value distributions for varying duration.
Two characteristic values from the extreme value distribution are often applied as reference
values in structural design:

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.98: Distributions for individual maxima (Gauss, Rice and Rayleigh distributions)
together with extreme value distributions for varying sea state durations, [Berge et al., 1992].
• The expected largest, or mean value:

√
0.5772

X̄max,N = σx 2 ln N + √ (B1.216)
2 ln N
• The most probable largest :

√
Xmax,N = σx 2 ln N (B1.217)
The most probable largest corresponds to the maximum for the extreme value distribution
since the value has the larges probability density.
Long term statistics
The short term distribution for individual maxima (Rice or Rayleigh distributions) is valid for
a specific sea state defined by its wave spectrum. The sea state is normally uniquely defined
by the significant wave height Hs and a characteristic wave period TP or TZ . In design we
want to have a similar relationship for waves and response that is valid during the entire
lifetime of a structure. Two types of statistical information are then required:
• Long term statistics of sea state parameters
• Statistics for individual maxima in each sea state
Long term statistics of sea states will often be presented by frequency tables for observed sea
states with given combinations H S and T P . Figure B1.99 shows an example of this type of
table with data from the Ekofisk field in the North Sea. Frequency tables might be defined
for summer and winter season, and also split up in classes of dominating wave direction α.
This type of data may be applied to define empirical distributions for sea state parameters.
Haver and Nyhus (1986) proposed to use a marginal distribution for Hs , FHs (hS ), and a
conditional distribution for Tz for given HS , FTz |Hs (Tz |HS ). Data for the marginal distribution
is found in the left column in the frequency table in Figure B1.99.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.99: Example of frequency table for observed sea states defined by HS and TP , all
seasons and directions, [Myrhaug and Lian, 2009].
If the long term distribution for sea state parameters is known, the long term distribution for
individual maxima can be found as a weighted sum of short term distributions
(B1.218)
XXX
QXa (xa ) = QXa |Hs,T z,α (xa |HS , TZ , α) · w(HS , TZ , α)
HS TZ α
The weight function for a specific sea state w(HS , Tz , α) must represent the probability for
an arbitrary maximum to appear in this sea state. This probability must be the product of
the probability for the sea state to occur (from the frequency table) and the ratio between
the average and actual zero up-crossing period g(Tz ):
w(HS , TZ , α) = P (HS , TZ , α) · g(TZ )

(B1.219)
mean TZ all sea states
g(TZ ) = TZ actual sea state
The long term distribution is normally presented as the cumulative probability of being larger
than, QXa(xa), and a logarithmic scale is used for the probability on the horizontal axis, see
Figure B1.100.
If the average zero up-crossing period is 6.3 seconds, there will be 108 individual maxima
during 20 years. A second horizontal axis can now be made to present number of waves that
exceeds a given level during 20 years. Since the vertical axis in this example is positioned at
a probability level of 10-8, the N axis indicate that only one maximum will in average exceed
the xa value at the intersection between the probability function and the vertical axis. This
means that Xmax, 20 on Figure B1.100 is the amplitude level that in average will be exceeded
every 20th year, which means that this amplitude has a return period of 20 years. The third
axis on Figure B1.100 presents the return period in years, which in general can be calculated

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.100: The long term distribution for individual maxima
by solving the equation
T̄Z
QXa (xa,N ) = (B1.220)
N · 365 · 24 · 60 · 60
where xa,N is the individual maximum that has a return period of N years. Eq. B1.220 must
be solved by iteration for a given value of N.
Stochastic analysis in frequency domain
If a linear structure is subjected to a regular wave with amplitude ςa and frequency ω, the
response amplitude xa can in general be written as
xa (ω) = Hx (ω) ςa (ω) (B1.221)
(49) Hx (ω) is the transfer function for the actual response type, and gives a relationship
between the wave amplitude and the response amplitude for the actual frequency. The
transfer function will normally consist of a hydrodynamic and a mechanical component.
The hydrodynamic part gives a relationship between the wave and the external load on the
structure, while the mechanical part defines the retationship between the load and dynamic
response. The relation between a bar in the wave spectrum S(ωi ) ∆ω and the amplitude of
a regular wave component that is represented by this bar is given by (see Eq (B1.202)).
1 2
ζ = S(ωi ) ∆ωi (B1.222)
2 ai

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
By combining Eq (B1.221) and (B1.231) we understand that the response spectrum can
easily be found if we know the wave spectrum and the transfer function:
Sx (ω) = Hx2 (ω) · Sς (ω) (B1.223)
This type of calculation is frequently applied for calculation of vessel motions since we
can assume that the motion components are uncoupled. Figure B1.101 illustrates that the
response spectrum may have two peaks; one quasi-static peak at the wave spectrum peak,
and one at the eigenfrequency of the structure. Not that this is not necessarily the case,
but an illustration of what may happen. Another observation is that the phase information
between the wave and response is not taken care of in Eq B1.223.
Figure B1.101: From wave spectrum to response spectrum, linear system
Dynamic analysis of flexible risers will almost always be carried out by use of finite elements.
In this case we are faced to a multi-degree-of-freedom system, which cannot be solved by use
of Eq B1.223 . One obvious reason is that the degrees of freedom are structurally coupled,
and that the phase angle between response components must be known in order to calculate
stresses.
Dynamic equilibrium for a finite element model can be formulated by relating the sum of
inertia, damping and restoring (stiffness) forces to external forces:
M r̈ + C ṙ + K r = R(t) (B1.224)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
This equation can be solved in frequency domain by restricting the load vector to be harmonic
and limiting the application to linear systems. The load and response vectors R and r can
now be written as:
R = X eiωt ; r = x eiωt (B1.225)
The dynamic equilibrium equation can now be written as
(K + i ω C − ω 2 M) x = X
or : x(ω) = H(ω) X(ω) (B1.226)
where : H(ω) = (K + i ω C − ω 2 M)−1
The H matrix is the complex frequency response function. Each element in the H matrix,
hij , represents the transfer function between a load in degree of freedom j and the response
in degree of freedom i. By the use of a complex load vector, the phase information between
load components is included. The complex frequency response matrix will define the phase
between load and response. Hence, the complex response vector will describe both the
magnitude of the response at all degrees of freedom and their phase angles. A stochastic
analysis in frequency domain means that we have to reformulate Eq. B1.223 by introducing
Eq B1.226. In order to represent the phase information correctly both for the loads and also
for the response, we have to include the cross spectra in addition to the auto spectra in the
calculation. The solution for one frequency can hence be found from the following equation:
Srr (ω) = H(ω) SLL (ω) H∗T (ω) (B1.227)
where the SLL matrix contains the complex load spectrum terms and Srr the complex response
spectrum terms for the actual frequency. The main diagonal carries the auto spectrum terms
(real values), while the terms Sxx,ij = Sxx,ij
∗ give the complex cross spectra terms where
phase information is contained. The * symbol defines the complex conjugate operator.
Eq. B1.227 gives us the solution for one single frequency. We need to find the solution
for a large set of frequencies (100 is a typical number) in order to find the spectrum for
the response and hence define its statistical distribution. Formally we can illustrate the
computation process by Figure B1.102.
If we have calculated the load spectra for N frequencies, we will hace the auto spectra terms
on the main diagonal. Hence, the set of SLi Li (ωn ), n = 1, 2, , , , 100 contains all auto spectra
terms that we need to define the auto spectrum Si (ω). By replacing SLi Li with Sri ri we
have the response spectrum for degree of freedom i. Once the spectra for deformations are
found, spectra for stresses can be calculated by introducing standard equations for cross
section analyses. Note that since phase information is carried through the computation, we
can have correct stresses from combined action of axial forces and bending moments.
To apply this method to flexible risers we have to include an iteration since the drag forces are
non-linear. The procedure for this type of iteration is described by [Krolikowski and Gay, 1980].
One may argue that this type of computation is far more complex than straightforward
time integration, even for non-linear systems. The reason why frequency domain analyses
still are in use, is that the statistical analysis following the response calculation becomes
simple. The spectrum of stresses becomes available, and fatigue damage can be found

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.102: Illustration of the stochastic analysis process
from closed form equations. Non-linear analysis is mandatory for extreme response estima-
tion, but fatigue may be calculated with acceptable accuracy in frequency domain, see also
[Leira and Remseth, 1985].
Stochastic response analysis, time domain
Time domain analysis is today the standard method for calculation of dynamic response of
slender marine structures. The main reason is that most limitations we have in frequency
domain methods are easy to overcome in time domain. This is in particular true for non-
linear drag forces and forces in the wave zone since such effects can be accounted for even
if the system matrices are kept constant.
The main difference between time and frequency domain from a statistical point of view is
that the frequency domain analysis will calculate the response spectrum, while time domain
will produce a sample of the stochastic response process. All needed statistical information
is available from the spectrum, but from the time record we have to estimate statistical
parameters. One may state that frequency domain will give a result with a large model
uncertainty but without any statistical uncertainty, while time domain will reduce the model
uncertainty but at the expense of an inherent statistical uncertainty. The only way we have
to reduce the statistical uncertainty is to extend the duration of simulations.
Statistical uncertainty will play a different role for fatigue calculation than for extreme re-
sponse estimation. Fatigue will be strongly linked to the variance of the stress process, while
extremes are described by the tail of the distribution. It is also important to note that extreme
sea state will not be important for fatigue since the average duration per year is low, see

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.103. Hence, linear (frequency domain) analyses will therefore often give sufficient
accuracy for fatigue analysis, but will be inadequate for extreme response estimation.
Figure B1.103: Illustration of contribution to fatigue damage versus significant wave height,
tensioned steel riser in North Sea environment, from [Larsen and Passano, 1987]
A key issue for stochastic time domain analysis is to establish probability distributions for
individual maxima from the calculated response history. Rayleigh and Rice distributions (see
section Section B1.4.8) are valid for Gaussian processes only, and should not be used to
describe the statistics of individual maxima from a time domain simulation.
The Weibull distribution is formally an asymptotic distribution for the lowest value of a vari-
able with a lower limit. This distribution is, however, flexible with its 2 or 3 parameters, and
is therefore often applied as a simple empirical distribution. The two parameter distribution
is defined by a scale parameter σ and a shape parameter η, see Figure B1.104:
η−1 η
η x x
fX (x) = exp − ; x≥0, η≥0, σ>0 (B1.228)
σ σ σ
The moments for this distribution is given by
Z∞
n

mn = n n
x fX (x) dx = σ Γ 1 + (B1.229)
η
0
where Γ is the ordinary gamma function. The expectation value E[X] and variance Var[X]
are given by
E [X] = σΓ 1 + η1
h i (B1.230)
Var [X] = σ 2 Γ(1 + η1 ) − Γ2 (1 + η1 )
The three parameter Weibull distribution is a transformation of the two parameter model by
introducing the location parameter µ:
X = Y −µ (B1.231)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B1.104: The two parameter Weibull distribution (from [Moan et al., 1980])
which gives
η y − µ η−1
η
y−µ

fY (y) = exp − (B1.232)
σ σ σ
Expectation value and variance will now be given by

1
E [Y ] = µ + E [X] = µ + σΓ 1 + η
h i (B1.233)
V ar [Y ] = V ar [X] = σ 2 Γ(1 + η2 ) − Γ2 (1 + η1 )
The Weibull distribution will become identical to the Rayleigh distribution for µ =0 and
η=2, and the exponential distribution for µ=0 and η=1.
Extreme response estimation
It is easy to estimate extreme response at any probability level or return period from a known
distribution of individual maxima xa . If the probability of being smaller than a given value
xmax is given by FXa (xmax ), than the probability for all maxima among N to be smaller
than xmax will be given by
FXmax (xmax ) = P (Xmax < xmax ) = [FXa (xmax )]N (B1.234)

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
This probability is the same as the probability for xmax to be the largest among N individual
maxima. Formally we can use Eq. B1.234 to estimate extremes in a sea state or from a
long term distribution of individual maxima if we accept that individual maxima are Rayleigh
distributed. However, the response in flexible riser systems are strongly influenced by non-
linear effects like drag forces and time varying stiffness due to tension variations. We will
therefore not be able to have an analytical definition of the distribution of individual maxima.
We have to estimate this distribution from our sample of response histories, and our estimates
will always have a statistical uncertainty.
Extreme response in a given sea state If individual maxima Xa are Rayleigh distributed,
the distribution for the largest among N maxima will be given by
" !#N
−x2max
FXmax (xmax ) = 1 − exp (B1.235)
2σx2
Two response levels are often referred to in design; the most probable largest and the mean
value of the largest maximum during a specific storm duration. The most probable largest
corresponds to the peak in the extreme value distribution, see Figure B1.97 and Eq. B1.216
and Eq. B1.217. If the distribution of individual maxima is unknown, we have to estimate
the distribution FXa in Eq B1.234. It is normally difficult to identify the inherent statistical
uncertainty, but we easily understand that the only way of reduce the uncertainty is to carry
out very long simulations.
Figure B1.105: Illustration of statistical uncertainty, wave amplitudes from spectrum
Figure B1.105 illustrates the statistical uncertainty related to extreme values from a record.
Ten wave records with 2 hours duration are generated from the same wave spectrum by using

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
different seed numbers for generation of pseudo-random phase angles. Each line represents
the result from one simulation. The largest, second largest, third largest etc values from
each sample have identical probabilities to be exceeded, but varying magnitude. By plotting
probability and magnitude from each sample, we can have a good visual impression of the
uncertainty. The largest wave amplitude is seen to vary between 13.8 and 16.8 meters. The
10 % largest maxima are included on the figure.
Figure B1.106: Illustration of statistical uncertainty; maximum bending stresses in tensioned

riser during one hour, 100 samples from same wave spectrum, but varying set of phase
angles, [Passano, 1994]
The variation of extremes for response will often become larger than for wave amplitudes
because of non-linear effects, usually dominated by the drag forces. Figure B1.106 illustrates
this point. The largest stress during one hour simulation from 100 records with identical
wave spectrum but varying phase angles are shown. The variability is seen to be largest in
the wave zone, but is significant along the total length of the riser.
Estimation of distribution parameters from sampled data (i.e. individual maxima from sim-
ulation) is offered by commercial software like Matlab, and will not be described here. Sta-
tistical uncertainty related to extreme response estimation for flexible risers is discussed by
[Sødahl, 1991].
A practical approach may be to make several 3 hours realizations of the response in the
design sea state. 30 cases is often used, but number of realizations should be based on the
wanted statistical confidence for the final estimate, which again depends on the consequence
of failure and applied safety factors. The largest response maxima in each sea state can be
applied in a variety of methods to estimate an extreme value. The Gumbel distribution is
frequently applied. This problem is discussed in detail in [Næss and Moan, 2013].
Estimation of lifetime extreme response
The most consistent way to estimate lifetime extreme response is to establish a long term
distribution for the actual response parameter. When dealing with non-linear systems like
flexible risers in waves, a large number of long non-linear simulations are needed. Short term
distributions must be estimated for each response parameter and sea state, which makes
this approach time consuming. Statistical uncertainty will be present in each short term
distribution, and should be found for the final estimate for the extreme response.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Use of design waves is inadequate for obvious reasons, but an alternative to long term
statistics is to identify a design storm and a probability level for the lifetime extreme in this
sea state. Two approaches for use of design storms have been applied for flexible risers - the
contour line method (CLM) and the approximate long term distribution (ALTD). The contour
line method was proposed by [Winterstein et al., 1993] and has been used for several types
of structures, see [Haver and Kleiven, 2004]. The idea is to apply the long term distribution
for sea states (frequency table for Hs and Tp ) to identify extreme sea states with equal
return period, see Figure B1.107.
Figure B1.107: Contour lines for sea state parameters. The red line represents
combinations of Hs and Tp with return period of 50 years, modified figure from
[Nygaard and Mathiesen, 2008] (Courtesy of Statoil)
The variance for the actual response parameter (i.e. tension or curvature in the riser) can
be estimated from non-linear time domain simulations in these sea states, and the sea state
that gives the largest variance is defined as a design sea state. The short term distribution
for the response in this sea state must be estimated from a longer simulation in order to
have an acceptable statistical uncertainty for tail of this distribution (large response levels).
The most difficult parameter to estimate is, however, the probability level (or return period)
for the lifetime extreme response in the actual sea state. Formally this probability must be
found from a long term distribution based on a large set of time domain simulations. One
may however, define the probability level from experience or apply obviously conservative
approximations. Hence, the response amplitude with hundred years return period may be
found as the response amplitude with 3 hours return period in the selected design sea state.
An alternative to the contour line method was proposed by [Larsen and Passano, 1990]and
applied to flexible risers by [Larsen and Olufsen, 1992]. The method applies frequency do-
main analyses to estimate a long term distribution, and a time domain simulation in a design
sea state found from the long term distribution. The analysis can be described in steps as
follows:
Step 1: Establish an approximate long term distribution This distribution should be

based on a set of dynamic analyses in frequency domain, preferably including stochastic
linearization of drag forces, see [Leira and Olufsen, 1992]. These analyses gives the response
spectrum and hence also the variance and Rayleigh distributions of the response for the

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
selected sea states. Number of sea states in this selection will normally be below 20 since
contributions to the tail of the long term distribution from moderate and calm sea states
can be neglected. A typical selection of sea states is shown on Figure B1.108.
Figure B1.108: Selected sea states to define an approximation for the long term distribu-
tion for extreme response estimation, modified figure from [Nygaard and Mathiesen, 2008]
(Courtesy of Statoil)
The long term distribution PL can be found from a weighted sum of short term distributions
PS , confer also Eq. B1.218
NR
(B1.236)
X
PXLa (Xa > xa ) = PXSa (Xa > xa |HS , TP )i · PHS TP (HS , TP )i · w(T̄,TP )
i=1
NR is number of sea states, PHs,T p is the short term distributions and w is the same weight
factor as shown in Eq. B1.218. All short term distributions are Rayleigh distributions found
from the variance of the response in the actual sea state.
Step 2: Approximate extreme value An approximation to the extreme response with
return period D years, x∗D , can be found by solving the equation
1
PXLa (Xa > x∗D ) = (B1.237)
ND
where ND is the total number of response zero up-crossings during D years, counted for the
NR selected sea states only.
Step 3: Identification of the design storm The contribution from each sea state to the
total probability 1/ND can be found from the individual elements in the summation in Eq
B1.236:
PXSa (Xa > x∗D |HS , TP )i · PHS TP (HS , TP )i · w(T̄,TP )i (B1.238)
These contributions can be ranked, and the sea state with the largest contribution must be
the most important sea state for the extremes of the actual response parameter. Another

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
type of information is also achieved, namely the probability of the extreme value in the actual
sea state, which is given by
PS = PXSa (Xa > x∗D |HS∗ , TP∗ ) (B1.239)
where HS∗ , T P ∗ means the sea state that gives the largest contribution to the long term
distribution at the actual response level, and x∗D is the estimate for the lifetime extreme
response. PS is now the probability of the lifetime extreme to appear in this sea state.
Step 4: Estimation of extreme response for the actual sea state The final estimation of
the lifetime extreme response xD can now be found from a non-linear time domain simulation
in the design sea state defined by H S ∗, T P ∗. The result from the simulation can be used to
estimate the probability distribution for the response in the actual sea state. The lifetime
extreme response xD can then be found from the equation
FXa (xD ) = PXDa (Xa > xD ) = PS (B1.240)
where PS is given in Eq. B1.239 and FXa is the short term distribution for the response in
the design sea state.
It should be noted that the design sea state that is found in this way may vary from one
response type to another, and the probability level for the lifetime extreme in the design sea
state will also vary. The fundamental assumption for this method is that the non-linear effects
are equally important for all sea states used to find the approximate long term distribution.
Note that the probability level 1/ND in Eq. B1.237is the same in the approximate long
term distribution as for a correct distribution. Hence, the sum of probabilities in Eq. B1.236
is correct. If non-linearities have equal influence, we also realise that each contribution to
this sum can be correct even if the estimated response level x∗D is different from the final
estimation xD .

Section B1.4
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B1.4.9 Vortex induced vibrations
The topic of vortex induced vibrations (VIV) is not covered by this editionn of the text. This
complex and important part of the hydrodynamic load models, and the corresponding effects
upon the hydrodynamic coefficents to be used, is beyond the scope of the present Handbook
edition.
B1.4.10 Use of results from global analyses
Bending stiffener design
Design of bend stiffeners is usually designed in 3 steps.
1. Determination of input loads
2. Determination of bend stiffener geometry and material
3. Verification of the design
The determination of input loads is most often carried out with a pinned model, i.e. a model
that is free to rotate at the end. Tension-angle relationships are extracted from extreme
analysis using the pinned model, and the envelope is plotted from all governing load cases.
In some cases this approach may be too conservative with regard to angle and it may then
be beneficial to include a dummy bend stiffener in the global model in order to reduce the
computed angle response. In this case the angle should be extracted at the bend stiffener
tip or even further away from the end, ensuringn that the correct bending moment at the
root of the bend stiffener is captured.
The main purposes of the bend stiffener design step is to find a geometry that keeps the
curvature of the riser below the critical limit and at the same time
1. minimize the amount of bend stiffener material (to reduce cost)
2. ensure that it can be produced, e.g. with appropriate cone dimensions (to reduce cost)
The optimum bend stiffener geometry may either be found trough analytical approximations,
through finite element software or through ’trial-and-error’ methods in the global analysis
model, see e.g. [Sødahl, 1991].
The design should finally be verified by global analysis for both soft and stiff conditions, i.e.
in hot and cold operational conditions. The verification analysis should check that the riser
bending is within its limits and that the bending stiffener strain is within the allowable.
When a feasible or optimum bend stiffener design has been found with regard to extreme
loads, the design procedure may be re-performed to better distribute the curvatures in lower
seastates, i.e. improving the fatigue performance.
Detailed stress analysis of cross-section
Reference is given to Section B1.3

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Fatigue damage calculation
For dynamic risers the governing load contribution is normally assumed to be 1st and 2nd
order wave and current loads in combination with associated floater motions. In addition
VIV may also be a concern, however, according to the state of art of today wave and VIV
loadings require different response models. Whereas, the nature of wave responses includes
large response amplitudes that requires a non-linear response model, most VIV models of
today assumes a linear frequency domain model and small response amplitudes. In order to
describe the extreme responses the effect of VIV is included in the time domain model in
terms of selecting the drag coefficient such that drag amplification from VIV is included. For
fatigue calculations the fatigue damage is obtained from separate models where the total
damage is calculated as the sum of the wave and the VIV contributions.
The damping from bending hysteresis will influence the dynamic response and this is par-
ticularly the case for VIV calculations. In a time domain procedure this can be handled
directly by applying an elastic-plastic material model for the pipe in bending, however, small
time steps are needed to pass the stick-slip transition zone. Therefore, most irregular wave
response analysis is still based on linear beam elements and application of equivalent viscous
damping models. Since the bending hysteresis damping is amplitude dependent (frequency
independent) different equivalent damping coefficients may have to be used from load case
to load case. For VIV frequency response models, the equivalent damping coefficient re-
lated to each mode can be handled by iteration according to the procedure proposed by
[Sødahl et al., 2011]. The moment curvature diagram needed for such procedures can be
obtained from full-scale measurements or from mathematical models as outlined in Section
B1.3.5. For the time domain equivalent damping case one alternative is to establish two
linear material models, one based on the stick bending stiffness and one based on the slip
bending stiffness, see Figure B1.16. For the load cases where the slip curvature is not ex-
ceeded standard material damping (no hysteresis) is used whereas for the remaining load
cases an equivalent damping coefficient including both material and hysteresis damping is
used, or alternatively by a moment curvature hysteresis model.
The wave fatigue calculation is in most cases performed by a two step procedure: A global
analysis in order to obtain the tension, curvatures or end angles followed by a local stress
analysis to transform the global quantities into time series of stress used as basis for calculat-
ing the final damage as a Miner sum. There are different strategies for local stress analysis
in use. Among these are:
1. in combination with analytical stress models allowing direct transformation of the
global time series into time series of stress.
2. Global irregular wave analysis in combination with a filter based on the outputs from
non-linear FE analysis of the cross-section, transforming the time series of global re-
sponses into time series of stress.
3. Global irregular wave analysis calculating harmonic responses in terms of tension and
curvature variations and use this as input to analytical models or non-linear FE stress
analysis.
4. Global irregular wave analysis in combination with direct non-linear FE analysis. As
the non-linear FE stress model is too time consuming to allow direct transformation of
the global time series, the global responses need to be transformed, by e.g. rainflow
counting, into classes of regular harmonic tension, curvature or end angle variations

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
prior to calculating the stresses. This means that choices need to be made with
regard to which global response quantity to be used as basis for the rainflow counting
procedure. By e.g. selecting the major curvature component as the master quantity,
the time instants at which each curvature range is calculated need also to be used
when calculating the other response ranges such as the tension ranges.
5. Global regular wave analysis resulting in harmonic timeseries of tension and angle/curvature.
Care needs to be taken in this appraochc with respect to eigenfreuent vibration. Once
the time series of stress have been established on an annual basis, the fatigue in each
layer can be calculated by the Miner sum approach as outlined in Section B1.3.7
Interference analysis
Interference analysis is often performed as a part of the original design analysis. Interference
should, if applicable, be checked between:
• Riser and riser/umbilical
• Riser and mooring
• Risers and platform/vessel
• Riser and seabed structures
• Riser and seabed
The interference analysis may be performed with various levels of detail. Often the initial
interference evaluation is performed as a quasi-static screening with current load and ves-
sel/platform offset applied. The quasi-static approach is used to find governing load cases to
which subsequent dynamic analysis is applied. Alternative approaches are to extract clear-
ance results from the entire (or part of) extreme load case matrix or to base the interference
load case selection on visual inspection of the extreme load case simulations.
Various levels of detail may be included in the determination of hydrodynamic coefficients,
e.g. Reynolds number dependent drag coefficients or wake models.
If Reynolds dependent drag coefficients are used in the analysis the quasi-static approach
should be used with care, as the riser drag loads can change significantly between the quasi-
static and dynamic analyses, and results can hence be misinterpreted.
Wake models are generally computationally heavy and hence problematic to use in the riser
system design phase where design iterations are often required.
The design requirements w.r.t. interference is usually determined by the operators’ technical
requirements and standards and may be evaluated in the following forms:
• Minimum distance of clearance in an extreme event
– In case of interference/clashing it is good practice to:
∗ Determine impact velocities (or clashing energy)
∗ Evaluate limiting sea states (environment) and frequency of occurrence
• Possible crossing of risers under or over objects such as mooring lines, risers and
umbilicals as well as over seabottom structures as flowlines, spools, etc.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
Loads from the latest wave are often sufficient in a regular wave analysis approach. However,
when extracting interference results care should be taken if only results from the latest wave
are used. If contact is not modeled, the riser may in some scenarios move through and
past the interfering object for which the software wrongfully may report positive clearances.
If contact is modeled in the global analysis, interference results from the latest wave may
suffice.
Interference analysis between risers should take into account various combinations of internal
density and possible installation of new (marine growth free) risers between old marine growth
covered risers.
B1.4.11 Quality assurance and quality control
General remarks
Flexible marine risers are quite complicated systems with regard to mechanical behaviour.
Significant nonlinearities related to loads, global geometry and cross-section characteristics
are present. In addition, stochastic methods are needed to handle the design principles
in a rational way. The types of analyses involved in design are therefore complex, from
mathematical, numerical and statistical points of view.
The complexity of the problem increases the probability of errors. It also makes the detection
of errors more difficult. The reason for this is that unexpected results might easily be
explained as effects from nonlinearities or other types of complex behaviour, and are therefore
accepted instead of being subjected to a more critical review.
In general, the best method of quality assurance will obviously be to apply a well reputed
computer program, and have a qualified staff to do the job. However, even the best program
can have hidden bugs or be misused, and humans are never perfect. Quality control of design
analyses must therefore never be limited to the verification of the applied computer program,
but be an integrated part of the design process.
Verification of computer programs
In recent years, several computer programs for the analysis of flexible risers have been devel-
oped. These programs apply various methods for static and dynamic analysis, and models
for loads, damping etc. are also different. This is why the International Ship and Offshore
Structure Congress (ISSC) initiated a study to compare the results from different computer
programs. Riser data and environmental conditions were defined in addition to standards for
result presentation. The purpose of the study was to investigate the modelling uncertainty
in connection with design analysis of flexible risers. Furthermore, to define a ’benchmark’
test case and make results available to designers and users of such programs. A complete
description of this work is presented by [Larsen, 1991].
The test cases involve the following types of analyses:
• static analysis, buoyancy and gravity,
• static analysis, in-plane and out of plane current,
• eigenvalue analysis,

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
• dynamic analysis, forced upper end motions,

• dynamic analysis, forced motions and waves
The intention was to allow for a stepwise verification, involving new parts of the computer
program and new model parameters in each step. A computer program is always tested as
a part of the QA/QC process during its development, and commercial programs normally
work as intended. However, all experience indicates that every large computer program has
hidden bugs that normally do not influence the results. Such bugs may suddenly give rise to
errors if the program is used in a new way, like rare combination of options or on problems
on the border of the program’s intended application. Therefore a computer program should
never be trusted and users should never accept results without a critical review from an
experienced person.
When installed on a new computer and introduced to a new group of engineers, it is important
to check that the program works as intended. In addition, the new users should be qualified
to use the program. Generally, a standard set of input files are delivered with the program,
and results can be compared to a facit. A more comprehensive test that also involves the
personnel is to define a problem and have at least two engineers working independently. The
job must include establishing all needed input parameters from the physical description of
the system, preparing the input files and evaluating the results. The previously mentioned
standard cases can serve as test problems in this kind of work.
Verification of models
The term ’model’ means in this context the mathematical and numerical procedure estab-
lished by a computer program on the basis of a specific set of input parameters provided by
the user. Such a model may have errors since it does not represent the physical reality in an
adequate way. Known limitations or inaccuracies are of course present due to simplifications
in the applied methods, e.g. Morison’s equation. Such limitations should be specified by
the programmers and are hopefully known to the user. Even if a program works perfectly
according to its intentions, unexpected errors may occur due to:
• Use of a program outside its limitations
Example: Some programs neglect lateral friction between the riser and the sea floor.
Such a program should not be used on problems where a long section of the pipe rests
on the sea floor and lateral deformations are present.
• Lack of understanding of the mathematical model related to the actual prob-
lems.
Example: Application of a Rayleigh damping model to represent structural damping
of non-bonded pipes.
• Inadequate discretization
Example: Too long elements, too long time increments or too large frequency intervals.
• Lack of consistency between data sources
Example: Many riser analysis programs are linked to other computer programs by data
files, or results are transferred manually. Data for static offset and motion transfer
functions of anchored vessels are typical examples. A special attention must be given
to transfer functions. There is no international standard for definition of phase angles
between motion components, and transfer functions for rotations may be related to

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
wave amplitudes or wave surface angles at mean water level. Some definitions will
normally be obvious for asymptotic values (long wave periods). However, the general
rule for use of transfer functions is to check the definitions for the actual provider.
• Errors and misunderstandings
Example: Input parameters must be calculated from an engineering description of a
riser system. This process gives unlimited possibilities for errors.
Control of results
Quality control costs and these costs must always be seen in relation to consequences of
errors and the probability of avoiding errors by quality control. It is therefore not possible
to give general rules about how quality control should be carried out, but some advice and
hints can be stated.
• Use of independent computer programs
Many institutions have more than one computer program for flexible riser analysis. A
typical situation is that one simple 2-dimensional cable program is available in addition
to a more sophisticated tool. In this situation it is possible to establish two independent
models and perform some initial calculations for verification of the established model.
Such calculations could be:
– Initial configuration
– Static analysis for a set of current profiles
– Eigenvalue analysis
• Two independent models.
Two engineers may prepare input files for the same problem independently. The two
models can then be used for some initial analyses, and the results can be compared.
• Discretization check
If a large number of analyses are to be carried out, an initial check of the discretization
(time increments and element lengths) should be performed by running some adequate
examples. If the results from a refined discretization are close to the results from the
ordinary model, the model can be accepted. Note that this control must cover all
required response parameters. It is well known that bending moments will need shorter
element lengths than axial forces to obtain the same level of accuracy.
• Decay of transient effects
A time domain solution is always influenced by the initial values of displacements,
velocities and accelerations. This part of the solution is called the homogeneous or
transient solution, in contrast to the particular or steady state solution. Transients
influence the initial part of a stochastic simulation. Consequently, this part should never
be considered when calculating statistical parameters from a simulated time series.
When using FFT to generate time records of motions and wave induced velocities
and accelerations, one may apply the initial part of the record as a continuation of the
record. This is possible since the result at the end of the simulation is the perfect initial
condition for the analysis since the time record is periodic. By continuing the analysis
in this way, a longer record will be available for the succeeding statistical analysis of
the response.

Section B1.4
OC2017 A-001
For regular wave cases, the problem is avoided simply by analysing several successive
wave periods and using the results from the last period only. Systems with very long
eigenperiods compared to the actual wave period may have transients that continue
for a long time, say 10 periods or more. A typical example here is a disconnected riser
A good control of the influence from transients is obtained by producing a time plot of
a displacement taken at a position along the riser where a long period eigenmode has
a maximum value. An equivalent regular wave analysis can be performed to determine
the length of a transient period present in a stochastic analysis.
• Control of stochastic simulations
Another type of error that may influence the results of a stochastic analysis is failures
in the numerical processing. Normally, such failures are immediately discovered as
they lead to a lack of convergence or instabilities and, hence, give meaningless results.
However, some kinds of failures are more sophisticated and need special attention. An
example here is the process of random number generation (see also Section 4.3.2.2)
that may fail and thereby produce a series of numbers with hidden correlations. This
results in a non-Gaussian wave process and, consequently, also in errors in the statistical
description of the response, e.g. estimated extreme values. The best precaution here
is always to check the quality of the wave process by computing the variance, skewness
and kurtosis, and compare these values to the known facit:
Variance ≈ HS 2 /16
Skewness ≈ 0.0
Kurtosis ≈ 3.0
In connection with stochastic analyses one should always plot the spectra of calculated
time records in addition to the estimated probability distribution. The response spectra
together with the (linear) transfer functions and a wave spectrum can easily indicate
if some significant errors have been introduced.
In conclusion, one can state that the best quality assurance system one can have is
well qualified engineers to do the job. In addition, time should be allowed for a careful
detailed evaluation and control analyses on the basis of the actual project.

Section B1.4
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Chapter B2
Risk Analysis Methodology
Author: Bernt Leira, NTNU
289
Section B2.1
OC2017 A-001
B2.1 Introduction
The main steps associated with quantitative risk assessment (QRA) can be summarized as
follows:
1. Definition of system boundaries and identification of hazards
2. Development of fault trees and event trees
3. Evaluation of failure probabilities and consequences (risk matrix)
4. Development of decision networks (decision trees)
5. Definition of acceptance criteria
6. Risk reduction and/or risk mitigation
These topics are highlighted in the following in relation to flexible pipe systems. Further-
more, evaluation of probability for mechanical failure modes and the topic of risk-based riser
integrity management are elaborated.
types of failure modes and the associated initiating events need to be identified. For some
of the failure modes a certain amount of relevant historical/empirical data may be available
such that failure rates can be estimated directly. However, in many cases such data are
missing or they can be rather irrelevant due to technological developments and improved
manufacturing methods. All the same, it may be possible to identify the mechanical failure
modes which lead to different types of failure events and hence estimate the associated
probabilities of failure by consideration of relevant mechanical models.
This requires that the specific models which represent a given failure criterion are identified,
and these are generally referred to as mechanical limit states. For flexible pipes, a layer-
by-layer and component-by-component approach is typically applied for identification of the
failure modes which correspond to such mechanical limit states.
The mechanical limit states are frequently defined in terms of loads (or load effects) versus
capacity terms. For some cases (such as in connection with assessment of fatigue and wear)
the accumulated load effect is applied rather than its instantaneous value. Both the load
effects and capacity associated with a particular limit state will frequently depend on a
number of parameters for which inherent variability is present. This implies that they are
more adequately represented as random variables than deterministic quantities.
In the present chapter, the risk concept is first briefly discussed. The main steps of quanti-
tative risk assessment are next described in some more detail. Subsequently, methods and
sources for evaluation of the probability of failure for relevant critical events are reviewed.
Consequence analysis, acceptance criteria and decision making are also addressed.
Risk-based Riser Integrity Management (RIM) of flexible risers is also briefly considered.
This topic involves e.g. the task of assessing the effect of inspection and monitoring of
flexible pipes and evaluating the implications of the findings which arise from these activities
with respect to decision-making and required actions. This includes decisions related to the
need for repair, protective measures, remaining time in operation and future replacement or
decommissioning of the flexible pipe.

Section B2.2
OC2017 A-001
The objective of the present chapter is to give an overview of the methods which are required
for risk analysis of flexible pipes. Further details related to the various failure modes, also
including new types of such modes, are given in Chapter A3 of the present Handbook.
The same applies to available failure statistics. Regarding risk assessment based on a more
elaborate layer and component oriented approach, reference is made to Chapter C1 ( Section
C1.4) Practical Integrity Management.
B2.2 Risk-based approach: risk definition, classification and

quantification
B2.2.1 General
The risk concept is first reviewed. However, it should be kept in mind that in addition to
the risk as such, the ’benefit’ (e.g. in terms of income/utility) which is associated with a
given operation/activity will also enter the picture when assessing the viability of a specific
system. Hence, an optimization of the total benefit will be a relevant criterion as well as risk
minimization.
B2.2.2 Definition of risk
The risk concept is here defined as the expected consequences associated with a given activity.
For an activity with n events where each event is characterized by a corresponding probability
of occurring (i.e. Pi ) and a consequence (i.e. Ci ) the risk (i.e. R) is similarly defined by :
n
(B2.1)
X
R= P i · Ci
i=0
For the case of a single event, the risk becomes simply the product of the corresponding
probability of that event times the consequence. For the case of an ’infinite number of
possible outcomes’, e.g. where each event corresponds to a specific value of an operation
parameter for a flexible pipe system, the summation becomes an integral expression.
B2.2.3 Risk categories
There are three main risk categories:

1. Risk of human injuries and fatalities
2. Risk of environmental damage
3. Risk of financial losses
Generally, all three aspects need to be considered separately for each risk assessment. The
relative importance of the three categories represents a multi-criterion decision-making issue.
The relative weighting of the different categories will in some cases depend on the stakeholder
which is involved.

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
B2.2.4 Derived risk measures
Based on the outcome event frequencies (probabilities) for a particular Event Tree (see
Section B2.3.5), derived risk measures can be obtained. These vary according to the category
of persons that are affected by the outcomes, with the main distinction being between the
workforce and the public in general. Some of these risk measures are briefly summarized
here:
Risk to Workforce
Annual risk The annual risk may be expressed as Potential Loss of Life which corresponds
to the probability of fatalities per year for all the personnel involved in a particular operation.
It is a risk measure which is valid for the whole installation rather than for a single individual.
Individual risk The Individual Risk expresses the probability per year of fatality for one
individual. For the operating personnel of an installation an Average Individual risk can also
be computed.
Fatal accident risk The Fatal Accident Rate is defined as the potential number of fatalities
in a group of people exposed for a specific time interval to the activity in question. Generally,
this rate is expressed as a probability of fatality per 100 million exposure hours for a given
activity.
Risk to Public
FN curve FN curves or F/N plots (also referred to as ’Cumulative Frequency Graphs’) are
probability versus consequence diagrams where ’F’ designates the frequency of a potential
event and ’N’ denotes the number of associated fatalities for that event. Such graphs tend
to be highly relevant for selection of the risk acceptance criterion to be applied. Frequently,
they are also imposed by the Regulator. Hence, these curves will be considered in more detail
in connection with acceptance criteria discussed below.
Regarding risk to the public, contour maps of physical effects (e.g. pressure levels due to
explosion, concentration of oil pollution due to an accidental release) and individual risk can
also be applied.
B2.3 Building blocks of quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
B2.3.1 General
The building blocks which are summarized in the Introduction to this chapter are elaborated
in the following.

Section B2.3
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B2.3.2 Definition of system boundaries and identification of hazards
For flexible pipe systems, a main distinction is made between on-bottom pipes (e.g. intra-field
flowlines) and risers. A particular system can comprise one or both of these sub-systems.
Furthermore, a clear specification of the other components to be included in the system
under consideration is required. This applies e.g. to which parts of the pressure regulation
system, safety valves and process equipment that are to be included in the risk analysis. The
surrounding area which is influenced by a failure of the system also needs to be identified.
For an oil or gas leakage with the possible sequence of events that are initiated by such a
leakage, the extent of this area can be very large.
A hazard is typically referred to as a failure event for the flexible pipe system. Occurrence
of a hazard is therefore also referred to as a system failure event. Identification of hazards
comprises all events which might have an adverse consequence to people, environment or
economy. There are a number of procedures that can be applied in order to support this
process of hazard identification. These have been developed out of various engineering
application areas such as the chemical, nuclear power and aeronautical industries. Examples
of such are:
• Qualitative Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
• Quantitative Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
• Risk Screening (HAZID)
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Further details of these procedures are given e.g. in [Stewart and Melchers, 1997], [Vinnem, 1999],
[Aven, 1992] and [Rausand and Høyland, 2004].
In the following sections, a brief review and summary of the procedures associated with
FMEA/FMECA and HAZOP is first given. Subsequently, application of so-called event trees
and fault trees are discussed
B2.3.3 FMEA/FMECA
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) often represents the first step of a systems reli-
ability study, see e.g. [Rausand and Høyland, 2004], [BS 5760-5, 1991], [IEC 60812, 1985],
[MIL-ST-1629A, 1980] and [SAE-ARP 5580, 2001]. For each component of the system, the
potential failure modes and their corresponding effects on the other parts of the system are
summarized in specific FMEA worksheets.
If criticalities and priorities are assigned to the failure mode effects, the FMEA is referred to
as a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). In the literature, sometimes no
distinction is made between FMEA and FMECA such that the latter is applied in order to
describe both types of analysis.
An FMEA is mainly a qualitative analysis while FMECA may comprise some gross quantitative
features. Such analyses are best suited at the design stage for a system. Design areas where
improvements are required in order to meet specified reliability requirements can then be
identified. An updated FMECA may serve as an important tool in relation to design reviews
and inspections.

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
In some cases, an FMECA can involve a coarse-grained categorization of the failure rate and
the severity corresponding to the specific failure modes which are being considered. FMECA
is best suited for systems where the system failure most likely will be caused by failure of
single components. However, for systems with a fair degree of redundancy this approach
may lead to examination of a large number of component failures that do not have any
significant consequences for the system as a whole. For such systems a fault tree analysis is
much more relevant.
B2.3.4 HAZOP
’Hazard and Operability Analysis’ (HAZOP) is usually applied in connection with planning
and design of process plants, see e.g. [AIChe, 1985] Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Pro-
cedures and [the Hazop Study Guide, 1977] Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies (the
Hazop Study Guide). This can be performed as a complete risk assessment for the whole
plant or as a pre-study for certain critical parts of the plant. The analysis is usually based
on the drawings of the process plant and the instrument system (P& I diagrams), and the
objective is to identify possible safety-related or operational problems that may arise during
in-service operation or maintenance of the process plant. The main focus of a HAZOP is to
identify possible problems rather than to find relevant solutions to the problems.
The analysis itself is carried out by a HAZOP group which typically consists of a leader, a
secretary and 4-6 process specialists. A significant part of the analysis is performed in the
form of ’brainstorming’ meetings. This analysis process poses strong demands on the abilities
of the leader who should have extensive experience and background from similar analyses.
The starting point for each brainstorming session is usually a major component of the plant
such as e.g. a storage tank or a compressor. Each pipe flow into the unit, or out from it, is
then analyzed one by one. The individual pipe flows are referred to as ’Study Nodes’. For
each ’Study Node’ it is aimed at identifying the normal condition as well as deviations from
this normal condition. The reasons for the deviations and the potential consequences which
are associated with them are then addressed by means of ’Guide Words’ which are applied
for the purpose of stimulating the brainstorming process.
B2.3.5 Event tree analysis
An Event Tree is used to develop the consequences of an event. It gives a pictorial represen-
tation of the logical order in which the different events in a system can occur. An Event Tree
is constructed by defining an initial event and works forward in time considering all possible
subsequent events until the consequences are known. The initial event is usually placed on
the left and the corresponding branches are drawn to the right. Each branch represents a
particular scenario which corresponds to a particular sequence of events and terminates in
an outcome.
The initial event is usually expressed as a frequency (events/year) and the subsequent splits
are expressed as probabilities (events/demand). This implies that the final outcomes are
also represented in terms of frequencies (events/year). Figure B2.1 illustrates a very simple
example of an event tree related to the initiating event of a continuous gas release.
In Figure B2.1, f1 designates the frequency (in events/year) of the initiating event and the
probabilities at the different branching points are denoted by p1 , p2 . . . p6 . The uppermost

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B2.1: Simple example of an Event Tree
branch in this event tree corresponds to the scenario that there is a continuous gas release
as the initiating event and that the non-return valve (NRV) is working such that the final
outcome is a safe release (SF). The associated frequency (number of events per year) for
this final outcome is accordingly expressed as fU pper branch = f1 · p1 , which is based on the
assumption that the two events are statistically independent from each other.
In this example it is assumed that no manual isolation of the release is possible. If this could
be possible, the event tree would contain one additional intermediate branching point and
additional final outcomes. Furthermore, in many cases there are more than two options at
each branching point (which in the present example are of the yes/no type). This implies
that the number of outputs at each branching point corresponds to the number of possible
alternative events.
B2.3.6 Fault tree analysis
Compared to an Event Tree the ’Fault Tree’ analysis works in the opposite direction. A Fault
Tree starts at a possible system failure mode (top event or undesirable event) and then works
backwards. The strategy is to identify events (fault events) which may contribute to a failure
event. These events are enumerated in logical sequences through logical connections (logic
gates). The Fault Tree is both a qualitative and a quantitative technique. Qualitatively it
is used to identify the individual scenarios (so called cut sets) that lead to the top (fault)
event, while quantitatively it is used to estimate the probability (frequency) of the top event.
A component of a Fault Tree has one of two binary states, either in the correct state or in a
fault state. An example of a very simple Fault Tree related to the failure of a valve is given
in Figure B2.2 .
It is observed that each of the basic sub-events in this figure in turn can be expressed in
terms of even more basic events, which implies introduction of more branches in the tree
structure. The logic gate in the present example is of the OR type. There are also logic
gates of the AND type which requires that all of the ’in-going’ events take place for the
output from the gate to be activated.
As a Fault Tree represents a logical formula it is possible to calculate the probability of the
top event by ascribing probabilities to each basic event (denoted by p1 and p2 in Figure
B2.2), and by applying the probability calculation rules. When the events are independent,
and when the probabilities are low it is possible to roughly estimate the probability of the
output event for an OR gate as the sum of the probabilities of the input events. Hence, for

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B2.2: Simple example of a Fault Tree
the present example it is obtained that p3 ≈ (p1 + p2 ). (If the logic gate were an AND gate
and the input events were independent, the probability of the output event would be the
product of the two probabilities of the input events.)
B2.3.7 Risk Matrix: Evaluation of failure probabilities and consequences
Evaluation of failure probabilities
The different events for which evaluation of associated probabilities are required can be
quite diversified. The main difference is between events which are directly related to human
activities and those that do not explicitly involve human actions. The first category requires
that the probabilities of human errors, slips and mistakes are dealt with. The second category
is concerned with evaluation of failure probabilities for the individual components and sub-
systems as such. For this category, two different approaches can be applied: direct application
of observed failure rates for electrical and mechanical components is one option, and use of
structural reliability methods for mechanical components represents another option.
Observed failure rates are available in various types of empirical data bases, and supplemen-
tary information can also be obtained from laboratory testing. Limitations associated with
empirical data obtained from past experience is that frequently there have been significant
technical developments associated with industrial products throughout the years. Hence,
application of historical data can lead to significant errors in estimation of failure rates for
products which are being applied at present. This needs to be kept in mind when such
empirical data are to be utilized. One possibility will be to apply only the part of the data
which is found to be relevant for the particular case to be analyzed.
Quantification of failure probabilities for mechanical components is discussed in more detail

in Section B2.4 below (and in Chapter B3). The focus is on flexible pipe sections since these
constitute the main topics of the present handbook.

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
For some of the relevant failure mechanisms of flexible pipes it may not always be possible
to quantify the failure probability in numerical terms. This implies that in some cases more
qualitative measures are applied (e.g. low, medium and high probability)
Consequence analysis
In accordance with the three different types of risk, there are three main types of conse-
quences:
1. Human injury and fatality
2. Environmental damage
3. Financial losses.
The estimation of consequences given failure of the system requires a good understanding of
the system and its interrelation with the surroundings. Accordingly, very specialized types of
analysis skills and computer software may be required. For consequence assessment related
to explosion and fire, application of calibrated computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software
is frequently made. The same applies to oil dispersion in the ocean once a release has taken
place.
The risk matrix concept
The arrangement of accident probability and corresponding consequence in a Risk Matrix

can be a suitable visualization of risk in cases where many accidental events are involved
and/or where calculation of a single risk value is difficult. A schematic structure of such a
matrix is shown in Figure B2.3 . It is observed that the matrix is separated into three regions
which correspond to low, medium and high risk, respectively. Clearly, the high risk region will
generally correspond to unacceptable conditions. For the medium risk region, reduction of
risk needs to be considered. This is discussed in further detail in connection with acceptance
criteria below.
B2.3.8 Decision trees
Decision trees are applied in order to compare the expected costs associated with different
alternative system concepts. A decision tree can be considered as a special case of an event
tree. For each branch of the tree, the consequences of the corresponding events are listed in
addition to the probabilities. The expected consequences (i.e. quantified in terms of cost if
this is possible) which are associated with each outcome of the tree can then be computed
as a basis for decision-making.
B2.3.9 Acceptance criteria
General
In some cases, the accepted risk level can be formulated directly in terms of a given fixed
value. More generally, acceptable regions are specified in relation to the risk matrix as

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B2.3: General layout of risk matrix
shown in Figure B2.3 above. Furthermore, the risk level can be specified in terms of derived
measures such as values of Fatal Accidental Rates (FAR) or alternatively FN-curves. In some
cases, risk reduction needs to be considered if events with non-acceptable risks are identified.
The question regarding which reduced risk level should be aimed at is frequently based on
the so-called ALARP principle as discussed in the next section.
The ALARP principle
The ALARP principle refers to the risk level and designates ’As Low As Reasonably Possible’,
see e.g. [Sharp et al., 1993]. Sometimes this is replaced by the concept ’As Low as Reason-
ably Attainable’ (ALARA). The background for this notation is the transition zone between
the non-acceptable region of the risk-matrix and the low-risk region where both the conse-
quences and the probabilities are small. In the transition zone it is frequently possible to
move as far as wanted towards the low-risk region. However, this is a usually a matter of
cost, time and effort. Hence, the situation can easily arise that the additional resources
which are required to reduce the risk even by a small amount become disproportionate with
these resources. It is natural to consider such a point (or risk interval) to be the minimum
risk that reasonably be achieved. Such a criterion may seem to be quite subjective, but for
a given type of system it may also be possible to translate this requirement into quantified
specifications.
Target failure probabilities and safety classes
Excluding the ’external damage sources’ of pipe failure and considering the probability of
mechanical failure due to the load effect exceeding the mechanical strength, it is possible
to identify probability levels which are considered to be adequate. For metallic pipes, such

Section B2.3
OC2017 A-001
probabilities are given e.g. in [DNV-OS-F201, 2010] and in [DNV-OS-F101, 2007]. These
probability levels are also highly relevant for flexible pipes. The target values for dynamic
risers are reproduced in Table B2.1
Table B2.1: Target failure probabilities as function of safety class for metallic risers according
to [DNV-OS-F201, 2010]
Target failure probabilities (annual per riser) versus

safety class for metallic risers
Safety class
Low Normal High
10−3 10−4 10−5
[DNV-OS-F201, 2010]: Dynamic Risers
It is generally possible to compute the inherently implied failure probabilities for pipes which
are designed according to past and present design standards. This will reflect the reliability
level which is found to be acceptable within the industry. In some sense, this will correspond
to the ALARP criterion for engineering design as such. If new design formats, design guide-
lines or design standard are to be developed, these inherently implied probability levels can
be applied as target (average) values for the updated codified rules.
The convenience of a permissible value of the probability of failure versus time is illustrated
in Figure B2.4. In this figure, the failure probability for a flexible pipe system increases with
time e.g. due to corrosion and fatigue. At certain points in time a transition from one
safety class to a lower one takes place. If the new safety class is found to be unacceptable,
some measures need to be introduced. This could e.g. correspond to upgrading of the pipe
system, replacement, shut-down, modification of operation parameters etc.
In this figure the annual probability of failure is applied. In some cases the annual probability
is quite low while the cumulative failure probability becomes unacceptable after a sufficient
time in operation. Accordingly, limits should also be specified for the cumulative value of
the probability of failure.
In Figure B2.4, it is also illustrated how the amount of test data may influence the permissible
time in operation. An increasing number of tests will reduce the scatter as measured by the
variance of the data. If the mean values of the strength parameters are constant for increasing
sample sizes this reduction of scatter will hence imply smaller probabilities of failure.
For an increasing number of tests it is increasingly likely that ’weak samples’ will be en-
countered if such exist. This may sometimes tend to a reduction of the mean value of the
strength. In rare cases this may lead to a decrease of the characteristic strength properties
rather than an increase. However, the confidence in the results will increase which results
in a more proven design basis. This is also discussed in connection with qualification of new
technology in Section B2.6.
B2.3.10 Risk reduction
If the estimated risk is too high as compared to the maximum acceptable level (or above the
ALARP range), risk reduction and risk mitigation must be considered.

Section B2.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B2.4: Example of computed failure probability versus time in operation
Risk reduction can be achieved by reduction of the probability of occurrence. In practice risk
reduction is normally performed by a physical modification of the considered system (e.g. by
introduction of sensors and warning systems). This also includes the possibility of modifying
the operation parameters (e.g. maximum internal pressure or normal operating pressure).
Risk mitigation is implemented by modification of the system such that the consequences of
an accidental event are lowered. This can be achieved e.g. by application of control systems
of different types.
B2.4 Quantification of mechanical failure probability
B2.4.1 General
As seen above, quantification of failure probability is a very important part of the risk analysis.
Such a quantification is required for all the different steps of each branch of the fault tree
or event tree. This may be a challenging task, especially in relation to quantification of
probabilities for events which involve human interaction. This is outside the main scope of
the present handbook, and in the present section we focus solely on quantification of the
probabilities associated with mechanical failures.
B2.4.2 Flexible pipe failure data based on test results
Based on mechanical testing, probabilistic models of the associated physical properties can
be established. This applies both to the ultimate limit state (e.g. yield stress) and the fatigue

Section B2.4
OC2017 A-001
limit state. For both cases flexible pipes represent materials for which extensive test data
are not available, such that dedicated testing for the particular metallic alloys and plastic
materials is required. Furthermore, the internal and annulus fluids in flexible pipes represent
corrosive environments with time-varying composition for which extensive additional testing is
typically required. This applies for example to fatigue testing and establishment of relevant
SN-curves to be applied for design. The scatter in the SN test data forms the basis for
identification of probabilistic models for the fatigue capacity. Further details of such testing
are given in Chapter B5 of the present handbook.
In some cases, results from full-scale measurements are also available. Similarly, probabilistic
models of the environmental processes and the corresponding external loads frequently require
result from full-scale measurements and simulation in hydrodynamic laboratories.
Samples from decommissioned riser pipes that have been in operation for a number of years
are sometimes available. By extracting samples from such pipes and subject these to testing
under controlled laboratory conditions, the effect of relevant aggressive environments and
corrosion defects on the fatigue properties can be assessed. Damaged pipes have also been
instrumented and tested in strength laboratories.
B2.4.3 Probabilistic evaluation of mechanical limit states, including time–

variation of loads and resistance
As the loads on floating structures are mainly due to the effects of wave-, wind and current,
their statistical properties will fluctuate as functions of time. The same will accordingly apply
to the load effects in risers and mooring lines which are attached to these structures. The
resistance will also in general be a function of time e.g due to deterioration processes such
as corrosion (unless this is counteracted by repair or other types of strength upgrading).
Furthermore, a typical situation is that the extreme load effects will increase with the length
of the time interval which is considered (i.e. the 20 year extreme value is higher than the
10 year extreme value, and the 3-hour extreme load-effect during a storm is higher than the
1-hour extreme load-effect).
This situation is illustrated by Figure B2.5 for a relatively long time horizon. Here, t denotes
time, and t0 = 0 is the start time. The second ’time slice’ is at 10 years, and the third slice
is at 20 years. The corresponding probability density functions of the mechanical resistance
and the load effect are also shown for each of the three slices.
The structural component will fail if (at any time during the considered time interval)
Z = R(t) − S(t) < 0 (B2.2)
where Z is referred to as the safety margin. The probability that the event described by B2.2
will take place can be evaluated from the overlap of the two probability density functions
fR (r) and fS (R) at each time step, as shown in Figure B2.5. At t = 0 and t = 10 years,
these two functions barely touch each other, while at t = 20 years, they have a significant
amount of overlap. The latter case represents a resulting significant increase of the failure
probability.
If it is chosen to use time-independent values of either R or S (or both), the minimum value
of the function in Equation B2.2 during the interval [0,T] should be applied, where T denotes
the design life time or the duration of a specific operation under consideration. In relation

Section B2.5
OC2017 A-001
to the maximum load effect, an extreme value distribution is relevant, such as the Gumbel
distribution (also referred to as the type I asymptotic form). Similarly, the probability density
and distribution functions of the minimum value of the resistance is relevant. For durations
of the order of a few days or less, simplifications can typically be introduced, since decrease
of the strength properties on such limited time scales usually can be neglected.
The variation of the density functions will be different for the different types of limit states.
For the fatigue limit state (FLS), the physical load effect corresponds to the cyclic stress time
history. The resistance is characterized by the parameters of the SN-curve. However, for the
purpose of reliability calculations, it is more convenient to apply the permissible Miner sum as
’derived resistance parameter’. This is a time-independent quantity which can be represented
by a (time-invariant) random variable. The ’derived load effect’ will now correspond to the
(random) cumulative damage which is obtained from the probability distribution of the cycle
range of the stresses (also comprising the SN-parameters. If other deterioration processes
are also present (such as corrosion), the ’derived load effect’ will clearly increase with time
also for this type of limit state.
Based on the probability density functions of the load effect and resistance, the failure
probability can be computed. The more overlap of the upper tail of the load effect density
function with the lower tail of the resistance density function, the higher the failure probability
becomes. With reference to Figure B2.5, it is seen that the width of the probability density
function for the resistance typically increases with time (while the height of the peak decreases
as the total area under the density function is equal to 1.0). The location of the peak is also
shifted to lower values. For the probability density function of the load effect, the location
of the peak is shifted upwards with time (while both the dispersion and the peak height
are constant). The combined effects of these features imply that the overlap interval of
the density functions increases with time which means that the probability of mechanical
failure will be significantly higher at t = 20 years than at t = 0. Hence, for mechanical
components in general and flexible pipes in particular the development of the probability
density functions with time must be predicted with sufficient accuracy in order to compute
the resulting variation of the corresponding failure probability..
Expressions for evaluation of this probability are elaborated in Chapter B3 of the present
handbook.
B2.5 Risk-based Riser Integrity Management
Risk-based Riser Integrity Management (RIM) can be considered as a systematic framework

for keeping the risks associated with riser operation within acceptable limits that also takes
into account the results from inspection, monitoring and repair. Here, only an overview of
the topic is given while further details are given in Chapters C1, C2 and C3.
A layout of the risk-based integrity management process is given in Figure B2.6. The first two
steps correspond to the risk analysis process which was outlined in the previous sections, also
including risk reduction and risk mitigation. The continuous risk reduction in the lower part
of the figure is based on measurements and observations which are made during operation,
inspection and possible repair of the system. Based on such additional information, decisions
related to future operation and time of decommissioning are facilitated.
Figure B2.7 illustrates some more particular details of the feedback process in relation to

Section B2.6
OC2017 A-001
Figure B2.5: Illustration of the time-varying marginal probability density functions (Pdfs) of
resistance, R(t), and extreme load effect S(t). (Note: Density functions are artificially scaled
to the same maximum value)
Figure B2.6: General layout of risk-based management process
assessment of future corrosion, fatigue and ageing of polymers for the case of an aggressive
annulus environment. Experience from past operation and all relevant information about
present conditions are applied in order to assess the present level of corrosion and fatigue
damage. This is combined with intrinsic knowledge about the material properties and planned
future operation characteristics which allows prediction of the remaining time in operation
at an adequate safety level.

Section B2.6
OC2017 A-001
Figure B2.7: Particular considerations related to risk management in connection with corro-
sion and fatigue
B2.6 Historical failure mechanisms and qualification of new

technology
B2.6.1 Historical failure mechanisms
A summary of historical failure mechanisms as reported by one particular operator based on

15 years of riser experience is given in [Olsen and Rongved, 2002]. This summary can be
considered to be quite representative for the accumulated experience at that time.
Degeneration of the Rilsan pressure sheath was observed. Studies concluded that use of
Rilsan as the inner thermoplastic sheet at temperatures above 65o C makes hydrolysis of the
polymer a prevailing degradation mechanism.
Regarding the outer sheath it was found that vent ports had been blocked and that the
pressure increase in the annulus resulted in burst of the outer sheath. Another failure mode
of the outer sheath was mechanical damage during installation and replacement operations.
In one case the sheath was damaged when it was hit by a dropped object from the platform.
Furthermore, riser annuli were found to be flooded by seawater after installation due to
missing vent plugs.
Vacuum testing of the risers indicated that there was water in the annuli in several risers.
The indication of water-filled annuli resulted in a change of the design philosophy. The
resulting corrosive environment had to be taken in account. Reanalyses of the risers were
found to be required by applying new input regarding S-N curves for the relevant materials
with the modified curves being established for a corrosive environment.
Risers with PVDF pressure sheath were experience to have some problems with leakage in the
end termination. The plasticizer in the polymer layer was washed out by the hydrocarbons
in the riser flow. Several temperature cycles could in some cases result in loss of anchoring
of the pressure sheath in the end termination. A fracture mechanics approach to assessment
of PVDF pressure sheaths was outlined by [Melve, 2001].

Section B2.7
OC2017 A-001
Hence, it was found that ’internal causes’ associated with the pipe materials and pipe design
as well as ’external causes’ due to damage triggered by external events contributed to the
failure statistics.
Further details of flexible pipe failure mechanisms are given in Chapter A3 of the present
handbook. where also references to more recent databases are given such as those of PSA
and HSE, see also the SUREFLEX JIP reports, [MCS Kenny State of the Art, 2010] and
[MCS Kenny Guidance Note, 2010].
B2.6.2 Qualification of new technology
New designs of flexible pipes are continuously being considered. Modifications with respect
to the geometrical layout of individual layers, the number of layers and/or new material
properties are frequently proposed. Qualification of such new designs may as a first step
involve extensive numerical analysis and small-scale sample testing. However, in the case of
such modified design of flexible pipes, there could also be new types of failure mechanisms
for the flexible pipe which are caused e.g. by interaction between the different materials
and the different layers. Accordingly, systematic test programs for integrated pipe sections
and full-scale pipe systems will generally be required in addition to testing of samples for
the individual layers. In addition, expert opinions related to identification of potentially new
failure mechanisms should be sought.
Identified failure modes can be submitted to a ranking based on the risk analysis procedures
which are outlined above. Clearly, modifications of the new design will be required if the risk
associated with any of the failure mechanisms is within the unacceptable region.
The long-term behavior of new pipe designs is also an important issue. Extended monitoring
and inspection during installation and operation of the pipe system will typically be required
in order to ensure adequate safety and performance.
Qualification of novel pipe design will in general be an iterative process. Based on feedback
from the numerical analysis and the various experiments, modifications to the proposed
design will often be necessary. This modification process is repeated until the specified
design criteria are satisfied.
General procedures for qualification of new technology are found e.g. in [DNV-DSS-401, 2012]
and [DNV-RP-A203, 2012] .
B2.7 Concluding remarks
In the present chapter the risk concept is first introduced, and subsequently the main steps
related to a risk assessment of flexible pipe systems are summarized. Key items related to risk
assessment of flexible pipes are then focused upon. In particular, methods for quantification
of the probability of mechanical failure are considered in more detail as well as relevant
acceptance criteria.
Further details related to some of the key topics which are highlighted in the present chapter
can also be found in other parts of the present Handbook. Examples are:
• Flexible pipe failure modes (Chapter A3)

Section B2.7
OC2017 A-001
• Reliability methods (Chapter B3)

• Assessment of damaged pipes (Chapter B4)
• Mechanical testing (Chapter B5)
• Riser Integrity Management (Chapter C1)
• Lifetime Assessment (Chapter C2)
• Repair Methods (Chapter C3)
Hence, it is emphasized that main factors related to prevention of failure of flexible pipe
systems is a good understanding of the mechanical failure modes and their interrelation with
relevant modes of operation for the pipe system throughout its lifetime.

Chapter B3
Reliability Methods
Author: Bernt Leira, NTNU
307
Section B3.2
OC2017 A-001
B3.1 Introduction
failure modes need to be identified. For some of the failure modes a certain amount of
relevant historical/empirical data may be available such that failure rates can be estimated.
However, in many cases such data are missing or they can be rather irrelevant due to
technological developments and improved production methods.
Still, it is frequently possible to establish a clearly defined mechanical model which corre-
sponds to a given failure criterion. This model is generally referred to as a limit state, which
is typically defined in terms of loads (or load effects) versus capacity terms. For some cases
(such as for assessment of fatigue and wear) the accumulated load effect is relevant rather
than its instantaneous value.
Both the load effects and capacity associated with a particular limit state will frequently
depend on a number of parameters for which inherent variability is present. This implies
that they are more adequately represented as random variables than deterministic quantities,
which is accommodated within the framework of structural reliability analysis.
Another strong source of demand for application of such analysis methods is represented
by cases which are not directly covered by existing design documents. Examples are life
extension of flexible pipes beyond the intended service life as well as requalification and reuse
of such pipes. Integrity management is another example.
Other examples of application are situations where additional information is to be taken
into account in a systematic and consistent manner. Such updated information can e.g.
be related to monitoring of operation parameters, metocean characteristics, pipe damage,
accident scenarios as well as pipe annulus conditions
B3.2 Mechanical Limit States
B3.2.1 Limit states and levels of reliability analysis
In engineering design, distinction is typically made between different categories of limit states
and associated design criteria. The three most common categories are the Serviceability Limit
State (SLS), the Ultimate Limit State (ULS) and the Fatigue Limit State (FLS). Many riser
design guidelines also introduce the so-called Accidental Limit State (ALS) in order to take
into account the possibility of unlikely but serious event sequences.
The accidental events to be designed against are typically obtained by application of quantita-
tive risk assessment (See Chapter B2). The requirement related to which accidental events
that are to be considered also takes into account the probability for the events to occur.
For static applications the accidental events typically include impact from trawl boards and
dropped objects. For dynamic applications, accidental events which are typically considered
include one or more mooring lines broken and partial loss of buoyancy.
Engineering design rules are generally classified as Level I reliability methods. These design
procedures apply point values for the various design parameters and also introduce specific
codified safety factors (also referred to as partial coefficients) which are intended to reflect
the inherent statistical scatter associated with the parameters.

Section B3.2
OC2017 A-001
At the next level, second-order statistical information (i.e. information on variances and
correlation properties in addition to mean values) can be applied if such is available. The
resulting reliability measure and analysis methods are then referred to as a Level II reliability
methods. At Level III, it is assumed that a complete set of probabilistic information (i.e. in
the form of joint density and distribution functions) has been established.
In the following, procedures at Level III are focused upon as they allow the most accurate
types of models to be applied.
B3.2.2 A basic limit state formulation: Failure function and probability of

failure
The common basis for the different levels of reliability methods is the introduction of a so-
called failure function (or g-function) which represents a particular mechanical limit state as
discussed above. The failure function gives a mathematical definition of the failure event
in mechanical terms. In order to be able to estimate the failure probability, it is necessary
to know the difference between the maximum load a flexible pipe is able to withstand, R
(often referred to as resistance), in addition to the loads it will be exposed to, Q, and
the associated load effects S. The latter are typically obtained by means of (more or less)
conventional structural analysis methods. For this ’generic’ case, the ’g-function’ is then
expressed as:
g(R, S) = R − S (B3.1)
As an example, R may correspond to the permissible fatigue damage for the flexible pipe
and S will then correspond to the estimated fatigue damage after a specific period of time
at the most critical cross-section. Failure of the pipe is then assumed to occur if the latter
(accumulated response) quantity exceeds the permissible fatigue damage.
Hence, for positive values of this function (i.e. for R>S), the structure is in a safe state.
Hence, the associated parameter region is referred to as the safe domain. For negative
values (i.e. R<S), the structure is in a failed condition. The associated parameter region is
accordingly referred to as the failure domain. The boundary between these two regions is the
failure surface (i.e. presently corresponding to the line R=S). The reason for application of
these generalized terms is that the scalar quantities R and S in most cases are functions of
a number of more basic design parameters. This implies that the simplistic two-dimensional
formulation in reality involves a much larger number of such parameters corresponding to a
reliability formulation of (typically) high dimension.
Here, a brief introduction is given to the basis for the Level III structural reliability methods
which are required in the subsequent sections. Further details of these methods are found
e.g. in [Melchers, 1987], [Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982] and [Madsen et al., 1986].
When concerned with waves, wind and dynamic structural response, it is common to assume
that the statistical excitation and response parameters are constant over a time period with
a duration of (at least) 1 hour. This is frequently referred to as a short term statistical
analysis. A further assumption is typically that the stochastic dynamic excitation processes
(i.e. the surface elevation or the turbulent wind velocity) are of the Gaussian type.
If the joint probability density function (or distribution function) of the strength and the
extreme load effect, i.e. fR,S (r, s) is known, the probability of failure can generally be

Section B3.2
OC2017 A-001
expressed as
ZZ
pf = P (Z = R − S ≤ 0) = fR,S (r, s)drds (B3.2)
R≤S
where the integration is to be performed over the failure domain, i.e. the region where the
strength is smaller than or equal to the load effect. It is also noted that the computed failure
probability refers to the same time period that the joint density refers to (e.g. 1 hour, 1
season, 1-year).
This is illustrated in Figure B3.11, where both the joint density function and the two marginal
density functions fR (r) and fS (s) are shown (the marginal functions are obtained by a one-
dimensional integration of the joint density function with respect to each of the variables
from minus to plus infinity). The joint density function can then be split into two separate
pieces as shown in part B3.12 and B3.13 of the same figure. The failure probability can
then be interpreted in a geometric sense as the volume of the joint density function which is
located in the failure domain, i.e. the part of the plane to the right of the line R=S (i.e. the
region for which S>R). This corresponds to the slice of the volume of the joint probability
density function (pdf) which is shown in Figure B3.13.
For the case of independent variables, the joint density function is just expressed as the prod-
uct of the two marginal density functions. The resulting expression for the failure probability
then becomes:
ZZ
pf = P (Z = R − S ≤ 0) = fR (r) · fS (s)drds (B3.3)
R≤S
where it is assumed that R and S are independent. By performing the integration with
respect to the resistance variable, this can also be expressed as
Z +∞
pf = P (Z = R − S ≤ 0) = FR (x) · fS (x)dx (B3.4)
−∞
where Z x
FR (x) = P (R ≤ x) = fR (r)dx (B3.5)
−∞
This situation is illustrated in Figure B3.2 where the two marginal density functions now are
shown in the same plane. The interval which contributes most to the failure probability is
where both of the density functions simultaneously have non-vanishing values (i.e. in the
range between 1 and 3.5 for this particular example).
The integral in Equation B3.4 is known as a convolution integral, where fR (r) denotes the
cumulative distribution function of the mechanical resistance variable R. Closed-form expres-
sions for this integral can be obtained for certain distributions, such as Gaussian distributed
R and S variables.
The resistance probability density function in Equation B3.3, fR (r), is frequently represented
as a Gaussian or Lognormal variable. The density function of the load-effect, fS (s), typically
corresponds to extreme environmental conditions (such as wind and waves) and is frequently
assumed to be described by a Gumbel distribution, see e.g. [Gumbel, 1958] . For this case,
a closed- form expression for the failure probability can not be obtained in general.

Section B3.2
OC2017 A-001
(1) Joint probability density function (pdf) of R

and S
(2) Safe domain volume (R>S) (3) Failure domain volume (R<S)
Figure B3.1: Illustration of failure probability when it is interpreted as a volume

Section B3.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure B3.2: Marginal densities projected into same plane for the case of independent vari-
ables.
The present ’load effect versus capacity’ formulation can be applied to all different kinds
of limit states. In the present application the fatigue (FLS) and ultimate (ULS) criteria
are mainly focused upon. In the former case, the derived load effect corresponds to the
accumulated fatigue damage which is obtained from the long-term stress-cycle distribution.
The derived capacity will then correspond to the permissible value of the Miner–Palmgren
sum. For the ultimate limit state the load effect will correspond to the extreme response
during a specified reference period (e.g. 1–year, 10–years or 100–years). The capacity will be
the ultimate capacity which is intrinsic to the particular failure mode that is being considered
(e.g. cross–section force resultants, stress, curvature).
B3.2.3 Time-varying characteristics of load-effects and capacity
The time-varying nature of load-effects and capacity were already discussed in Chapter B2.5.
Here, only a brief summary is given in connection with the illustration shown in Figure B3.3
. Here, t denotes time, and t0=0 is the start time. The second ’time slice’ is at t=10 years,
and the third slice is at t=20 years. The corresponding probability density functions of the
mechanical resistance and the load effect are shown for each of the three slices.
The figure illustrates that the structure will fail if (at any time during the considered time
interval)
Z = R(t) − S(t) < 0 (B3.6)
where Z is referred to as the safety margin. The probability that the event described by
Equation B3.6 will take place can be evaluated from the amount of overlap by the two
probability density functions and at each time step, as shown in Figure B3.2 by application
of Equation B3.3 or Equation B3.4. At t = 0 and 10 years, the two density functions barely
interact, while at t = 20 years, they have a significant amount of overlap. The latter case
accordingly represents a significant increase of the failure probability.

Section B3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B3.3: Illustration of the time-varying marginal Pdfs of resistance, R(t), and extreme
load-effect S(t)
If it is chosen to use time-independent values of either R or S (or both), the minimum value
of Equation B3.6 during the interval [0,T] must be used, where T denotes the design life
time or the duration of a specific operation under consideration. In relation to the maximum
load effect, an extreme value distribution, such as the Gumbel distribution, (also referred
to as the type I asymptotic form) is typically applied. Similarly, the probability density and
distribution function of the minimum resistance value is relevant.
The variation of the density functions will be different for the different types of limit states.
For the fatigue limit state, the ’derived resistance’ can e.g. correspond to the permissible
cumulative damage. This is a time-independent quantity (which may still be represented
by a (time-invariant) random variable). The ’derived load effect’ will now correspond to
the (random) cumulative damage which is obtained from the probability distribution of the
stress cycles (also involving the SN-curve parameters). If other deterioration processes are
also present (such as corrosion), the ’derived load effect’ will clearly increase with time also
for this type of limit state.
B3.3 Data Basis and Input Modeling Relevant for Mechanical

Limit States
The data basis is clearly essential for an adequate reliability assessment. This applies to the
basis for estimation of probabilistic models in relation to flexible pipe capacity as well as
probabilistic models for load effects. Some of the relevant parameters are of a general type

Section B3.4
OC2017 A-001
while others are intrinsic to the particular case that is being analyzed.
Examples of the general (’state of the art’) category are probabilistic models related to
environmental modeling, global and local response analysis and material properties (e.g. yield
stress and fatigue capacity). These models are based on accumulated knowledge related
to design, testing and operation of flexible pipes as well as other types of slender marine
structures (e.g. mooring lines, tendons, metallic risers and pipelines)
Comparisons between measured and calculated stresses in flexible pipes based on applica-
tion of optical fibers are reported in [Andersen et al., 2001] , [Sævik and Ekeberg, 2002] and
[Sævik, 2011]. For damaged pipes, comparisons between measured and computed stresses
are made e.g. in
[De Sousa et al., 2011]. At the level of global response of flexible risers, results obtained by
application of different computer programs were compared by [Larsen, 1991]. Comparisons
between computation and full-scale measurements are reported e.g. in [Otteren and Hanson, 1990],
[Hanson et al., 1994].
In relation to material properties of flexible pipes, multiple studies have been performed. Just
to mention a few publications, plastic materials have been investigated by [Dawans et al., 1998],
[Berger et al., 2011], [Shen et al., 2011].
A summary of relevant metallic materials and their properties is given by [Colquhoun et al., 1990].
Relevant requirements to such materials are given in [API 17J, 2008]. Results from fa-
tigue testing of metallic specimens in various corrosive environments are reported e.g. in
[Berge et al., 2008] and [Charlesworth et al., 2011].
Examples of the probabilistic models for the case–specific category are those based e.g.
on available pressure and temperature records, measured floater motions and time series
of environmental parameters at the particular site that is being considered. Examples of
recorded pressure and temperature time histories are given e.g. by [Binet et al., 2003], see
the time-traces which are reproduced in Figure B3.4.
When sufficient data are available, the best statistical model among relevant analytical ex-
pressions can be found. Various statistical test methods exist in order to quantify the ’suit-
ability’ of a specific model in relation to a particular data set. Such methods are most
established for univariate (’one-dimensional’) probability models. More efforts are generally
required for multivariate models, in particular related to the modeling of correlation proper-
ties, see e.g [Kiureghian and Liu, 1986]. This implies that there will typically also be stronger
requirements to the amount of available data for such cases.
As a main observation, it is very important that the probability distributions of the loadd
effects as well as the resistance/capacity variables are validated by seasurements or test data.
If such data is lacking then the sensitivity of the computed results to distribution variations
should be studied and new tests carried out.
B3.4 Acceptance criteria
Procedures for Quantitative Risk Assessment are described in Section B3.5. As discussed,
the ALARP principle is typically applied in order to decide whether risk mitigation is required.
Having introduced adequate mitigation measures at the flexible pipe system level, adequate
mechanical design of the individual components is subsequently required.

Section B3.4
OC2017 A-001
(1)
(2)
Figure B3.4: Examples of (a) pressure record and (b) temperature record, from
[Binet et al., 2003]

Section B3.5
OC2017 A-001
Relevant target structural reliability levels (specified in terms of probability of failure) are also
discussed in Section B3.5. The target value depends on the safety class which is relevant,
and the safety class in turn depends on the consequences of failure. Three different safety
classes are defined in [DNV-OS-F201, 2010] in relation to metallic risers. For safety class
low, a target failure probability of 10−3 is applied, for safety class normal the probability 10−4
and for safety class high the value is 10−5 . These values refer to annual failure probability
per riser.
B3.5 Analysis procedures
In most applications of reliability analysis, the load effect and resistance terms which enter
the failure function are in turn functions of a number of more basic design parameters.
The random static load effects and the random capacity in the failure functions can frequently
be expressed directly in terms of the basic variables. Such relationships can be obtained based
on performing deterministic load effect analyses for different values of the relevant input
parameters. For example, multidimensional polynomial expressions can be established that
fit the functional relations as closely as required. This approach is referred to as response
surface techniques. An example of application in relation to fatigue reliability analysis of
flexible risers is given e.g. in [Leira et al., 2005].
On the other hand, the dynamic response is generally represented in terms of random pro-
cesses. This implies that the statistical parameters (e.g. standard deviation, skewness and
kurtosis) which characterize the dynamic response distributions can be determined as func-
tions of the basic variables. Hence, the fitted response surfaces are related to the statistical
parameters instead of a characteristic value (i.e. point value) of the response. This is due
to the fundamental statistical variability associated with the sea-elevation and consequently
the response processes.
The main steps of the reliability assessment comprise the following:
1. Step (i): Specification of the failure criterion (Limit State function) and corresponding
random variables.
2. Step (ii): Variation of basic parameters and identification of corresponding response
surface polynomials.
3. Step (iii): Calculation of failure probabilities and importance factors for the random
variables.
In relation to the third step, a number of different techniques are available for calculation of
the failure probabilities. These techniques can broadly be classified into two main categories,
i.e. those based on Monte Carlo simulation methods and those based on local approximation
of the failure surface by first- or second-order mathematical expressions (i.e. in the vicinity of
the so-called design point). Further details related to both categories of methods are given in
[Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982], [Madsen et al., 1986] and [Melchers, 1987]Melchers.
The basic principle behind Monte Carlo simulation techniques is to generate a statistical
sample based on pseudo-random number algorithms. Such algorithms are readily available
in many standard software packages such as Excel, Matlab, Maple, Mathcad etc. For a
given sample, the number of outcomes which result in failure is simple divided by the total

Section B3.5
OC2017 A-001
number of outcomes to provide an estimate of the failure probability. By generating samples

of adequate size, probabilities of any magnitude can in principle be estimated. The main
drawback associated with this technique is typically the significant computational effort which
is required for small failure probabilities since this demands large sample sizes.
In relation to the second category of methods, the simplest approximation to the fail-
ure surface is based on is based on first-order (i.e. linear) expressions, which is the ba-
sis for the so-called FORM (First Order Reliability Method) technique. An example of
such a linear 3D approximation at the design point in normalized space is shown in Fig-
ure B3.5. The search for the design point is performed in a normalised space by means
of the so-called Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm. Transition from basic variable space to the
normalised space is based on the Rosenblatt transformation. Further details of this cat-
egory of methods are found in [Pickands, 1952], [Cornell, 1969], [Hasofer and Lind, 1974],
[Colquhoun et al., 1981], [Hohenbichler and Rackwitz, 1981], [Hohenbichler and Rackwitz, 1983].
Associated Second-order methods (SORM) are described e.g. in [Breitung, 1984] and [Tvedt, 1987].
Figure B3.5: Example of FORM approximation of failure surface in normalized 3D space and
associated design point.
In relation to FORM/SORM techniques, the parameter region where the highest accuracy is
requested will hence be in the neighborhood of the design point. This is the neighbourhood
where the highest contribution to the failure probability is located. A priori it may be
anticipated that for load variables this neighbourhood will correspond to values well above
the mean value. For resistance variables, lower fractiles (i.e. below the mean value) of the
probability distributions are relevant.
Hence, an initial estimation of the location of the design point can frequently be made. Initial
reliability analyses are then performed by first making a rough fit of the response surface
expressions over a relatively wide parameter range around this region. Based on the resulting
design point, more refined fitting is subsequently made for a restricted range. Information on

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
the more precise location of the design point also allows the relative importance of the various
random variables to be computed. This is quantified in terms of the directional cosines of
the radius vector at the design point, see e.g. [Madsen et al., 1986] and [Melchers, 1987].
Designating the distance from the origin to the design point in the normalized space by β,
the failure probability is computed as
pf = φ−1 (β) (B3.7)
where φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function
B3.6 Reliability Analysis for the Fatigue Limit State
B3.6.1 General
For reliability analysis related to the fatigue failure mode, the load effect term in Equation
B3.6 corresponds to the accumulated fatigue damage as a function of time. Due to the
parameters which are input to the fatigue damage calculation being random variables, the
left-hand side of the expression is also a random variable. The permissible threshold value
is 1.0 for the fatigue damage (i.e. corresponding to R(t) = 1.0 in Equation B3.6) which
is based on the Miner-Palmgren hypothesis for summation of partial damage contributions.
However, as there is a significant model uncertainty related to this summation method the
threshold value is also generally represented as a random variable (with a mean value of 1.0).
Generic models are frequently based on lognormal probability models for both the ’derived
resistance’ and the ’derived load’ terms. Based on such a model the resulting failure function
can be expressed as:
g(R, S) = R − S(t) = R − D(t) (B3.8)
where R represents the lognormal distributed capacity (i.e. Miner Sum) with a mean value of
1.0, and the lognormal variable D(t) corresponds to the accumulated fatigue damage (also
containing the SN-curve parameters). The statistical parameters of the latter are generally
functions of time. A simple illustration of the resulting density functions and their relative
location as a function of time is given in Figure B3.6. The mean value of the damage
increases linearly with time for the present example (i.e. µD (t) = 0.004 · t) , and the
variance is presently taken to increase in proportion to t1.5 (i.e. σD
2 (t) = 0.00002 · t1.5 ). It
is seen that the probability density function of the accumulated damage has an increasing
overlap region with the density function of the permissible damage. At time unit t=100 the
probability of failure calculated according to Equation B3.2 is computed (by FORM) as pf
= 0.02 which reflects the proximity of the density functions at that time.

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
Figure B3.6: Example of time variation of probability density functions related to fatigue
reliability.
Table B3.1: Base case lifetimes in years corresponding to different internal conditions
Case Condition Pressure Armour Tensile armour

1 No H2 S, Inhibited Fluid 400 yrs 2000 yrs.
2 H2 S, Inhibited Fluid 60 yrs 120 yrs.
B3.6.2 Example of application to fatigue assessment of a flexible riser
Introduction
As an example of a reliability analysis related to the fatigue limit state for a particular flexible
riser system, a configuration of the lazy-wave type is considered. The riser is terminated at
the upper end by a bending stiffener which is attached to an FPSO at a water depth of around
450m. The wave environment corresponds to rough North Sea conditions. For the initial
period of operation, i.e. the first 15 years, the internal fluid is non-aggressive. Subsequently,
a rather fast increase of the content of H2 S takes place, and after an additional period of
1 year (i.e. after 16 years in operation) the fluid in the annulus reaches the maximum H2 S
concentration. For the subsequent period this concentration remains constant.
The fatigue damage is first calculated with all analysis parameters being equal to their base
case (i.e. design values) . The results are shown in Table B3.1 for both the pressure and
tensile armors for the two different annulus conditions (i.e. with and without H2 S). It is
seen that the pressure armor is more critical than the tensile armor with respect to fatigue
lifetime for both of the internal fluid conditions. Furthermore, it is observed that the annulus
condition has a very strong influence on the lifetime (through the SN-curve parameters).
Parameter variations and response polynomials
Each of the input variables are subsequently varied at a number of different levels and the
fatigue damage is recalculated for each case. The relevant parameters to be varied for the
present configuration are the following:

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
• Riser drag coefficient used in global analysis models

• Floater dynamic surge amplitude
• Floater dynamic heave amplitude
• Floater dynamic pitch amplitude
• Floater static offset from reference position
• Armour wire friction coefficient used in local pipe analysis models
• Internal pressure
These parameters correspond to the random variables in the upper half of Table B3.2.
By dividing the damage for each analysed case with the ’design damage’ (i.e. corresponding
to the base case), response surface polynomials for the resulting normalized damage are
fitted for each of the design parameters.
The response surface polynomial for this normalized damage of the pressure armor which
corresponds to parametric variation with respect to the drag coefficient is shown in Figure
B3.7 (corresponding to the SN-curve which applies to the H2 S condition). For this par-
rrticular parameter fatigue calculations were repeated withthe normalized drag coefficient at
95 % and 105 % of the base case value (i.e. 100 %). As observed, the variation of the
fatigue damage is almost linear for the interval of the drag coefficient which is considered.
A positive increment of 15 % leads to an increase of the fatigue damage of around 6 %.
Figure B3.7: Response surface polynomial for (normalized) fatigue damage versus the (nor-
malized) drag coefficient for pressure armor (longitudinal direction). (SN-curve corresponds
to H2 S being present)
The response surface polynomial for the floater surge amplitude is shown in Figure B3.8,
and it has a shape which is quite similar to that for the drag coefficient. The increase of the
fatigue damage is around 4% for a scaling factor of 1.1 for the surge amplitude.
The relationship between the fatigue damage and the heave amplitude is shown in Figure
B3.9. The curve is slightly non-linear for the present case. An increase of the scaling factor
of 15% leads to an increase of the fatigue damage of around 1%, which is quite negligible.
This variation is hence neglected in the following analysis.
The relationship between the fatigue damage and the pitch amplitude is shown in Figure

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
Figure B3.8: Response surface polynomial for the (normalized) fatigue damage versus the
scaling factor for the surge motion (H2 S conditions)
scaling factor for heave motion (H2 S conditions)
B3.10. Again, the shape is almost linear. A positive increment of 15% leads to an increase
of the fatigue damage of the order of 20%.
The fatigue damage versus the static vessel offset is shown in Figure B3.11. As mentioned
above, the mean value estimated from the measurements is around 0.5 when normalized
with the value that was applied at the design stage (i.e. 45m relative to a given reference
position). The fatigue calculations are performed for a number of offset scaling factors which
are quite symmetric around this value. It is seen that if a static offset for the floater equal
zero is relevant, the fatigue damage would be slightly less than 40 % of the base case value.
If the offset is increased to 60m, the fatigue damage would be around 140 % of the base
case damage (which corresponds to an offset of 45m)
The response surface polynomial for the friction coefficient is shown in Figure B3.12. This
curve is quite linear for the range which is considered. The percentage variation in fatigue
damage is roughly of the same order as the percentage variation of the friction coefficient.
The resulting curve for the internal pressure within the range of interest is given in Figure

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
scaling factor for pitch motion (H2 S conditions)
static floater offset in meters (H2 S conditions)
B3.13. The base case value corresponds to the operation pressure that was assumed at the
design stage. The polynomial is represented by a straight line. However, it must be noted
that for large upward deviations from the operation pressure a quite nonlinear and rapid
increase of the fatigue damage will be observed.
Reliability analysis
As a next step, the response surface polynomials are incorporated as part of the failure
function (i.e. limit state function). In this way, the accumulated fatigue damage (i.e. the

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
(normalized) friction coefficient (H2 S conditions)
(normalized) internal pressure (H2 S conditions)
’derived load effect’) is expressed as a function of the base case damage (referring to either
of the two annulus conditions) in addition to the design parameters which are considered as
variables. Hence, the failure function can now be formulated on the following form:
g(X) = XF ail − D(Top , X2 , X3 . . . XN )

(B3.9)
= XF ail − DT ref (X2 , X3 . . . XN ) · (Top /Tref )
where X1 = XF ail is a random variable which represents the Miner-Palmgren sum at failure,
X2 , X3 , . . .,XN are random variables related to the riser system which correspond to the
parameter variations just described. Top is the time in operation for the riser system (i.e. time
during which fatigue damage accumulation takes place). Tref is a given reference duration
(which here is taken to be 1 year), and DT ref (. . .) is the estimated fatigue damage for the
same reference duration (i.e. 1 year). The last factor in Eq.B3.9 is due to the proportionality
of the accumulated fatigue damage with respect to elapsed time in operation.
Subsequently, the variation in fatigue damage as a function of the random variables (i.e.
X2, X3,. . .,XN) is factored out and represented by a separate function. This is a smooth
analytical function which is obtained as the product of the fitted response surfaces for the

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
individual parameters. Each of the ’control points’ which define the polynomials of the
response surface is obtained by performing a dynamic response analysis by means of the
Finite Element Method also including calculation of the fatigue damage. The resulting
explicit form of the first factor in the second term in Eq. B3.9 then becomes:
DT ref (X2 , . . . , XN ) = DT ref,Basecase (Nref · f (X2 , . . . , XN ) (B3.10)
The subscript ’Basecase’ here refers to the value of the damage which is obtained as a result
of the base case fatigue design analysis for the given pipe layer and for the given internal
fluid condition.
The last factor on the right-hand side in Eq. B3.10 is further normalized such that when all
the random variables are equal to their base case values (i.e. design values), the response
polynomials all have a value equal to 1.0. Furthermore, normalized random variables are
introduced. This is achieved by dividing each variable with its corresponding base case
value. The base case values are here taken to be equal to the values applied for design of
the riser system. Accordingly, the following set of new variables are introduced:
Y1 = X1 /X1,Basecase
Y2 = X2 /X2,Basecase
(B3.11)
···
YN = XN /XN,Basecase
The normalized version of the failure function is then obtained as:
g(X) = Y1 − DT ref,Bscs (Nref ) · f (Y2 , Y3 . . . , YN ) · (Top /Tref ) (B3.12)
where Nref is the number of sstress cycles during the reference time period for the base case
analysis.
The cumulative failure probability as a function of time can subsequently be expressed in
terms of the failure function (by introducing the time as a variable instead of the fixed
duration Top ):
Pf (T ) = P (g(X, T ) < 0) = P ([Y1 − DT ref,Bscs (Nref ) · f (Y2 , Y3 · · · , YN ) · (T /Tref )] < 0)

(B3.13)
This probability can now be computed for a sequence of durations (corresponding to increas-
ing values of the time in operation). Having calculated the cumulative failure probability, the
incremental failure probability for an arbitrary ’sub-period’ (i.e. mainly one-year increments)
can then also be evaluated by taking the difference between the cumulative probability at
the end and at the start of this specific ’sub-period’.
The failure function in Equation B3.13 is combined with the probabilistic models in order
to compute the reliability measure (i.e. the reliability index, or equivalently: the failure
probability). The applied probabilistic models are summarized in Table B3.2. Note that
four of the random variables represent model uncertainties, i.e. global and local analysis;
environmental description and Miner sum at failure.

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
Table B3.2: Probabilistic models relevant for fatigue reliability of flexible risers (N= Gaussian,
L = Lognormal)
Variable Distr Base Mean value St.dev.

Case
Drag coefficient L 1.0 1.0 0.20
Surge ampl., Xs * L 1.0 1.0 0.05
Pitch ampl., Xp * L 1.0 1.0 0.05
Static offset L see information in text
Friction coefficient L 1.0 1.0 0.10
Int. pressure L 1.0 1.0 0.05
3D load and resp.effects, N 1.0 1.0 0.05
X3s **
Global anaysis N 1.0 1.0 0.05
Local anaysis N 1.0 0.9 0.15
Env. Descr.** L 1.0 1.0 0.05
Miner-Palmgren sum at L 1.0 1.0 0.30
failure
Intercept of SN-curve L Mean value of Log10 K St.dev. of
varies Log10 K varies
* The surge and pitch transfer function amplitudes are multiplied by the same respective
scaling factor for all frequencies.
** The variables representing uncertainty related to analysis method, environmental

description and 3D load and response effects are assumed to apply for the stress range
rather than the fatigue damage. These variables are hence exponentiated to a power
equal to the m-exponent of the SN-curve in the reliability calculations.
The floater position is found to have a (non-dimensional) mean value of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.125, with a Lognormal model found to be a proper choice. Both of these
values are normalized by the mean static offset which was assumed at the design stage, i.e.
45m. The statistical model is based on measurement for a period in operation of 15 years.
The internal pressure is found to have a mean value of 1.0 and a standard deviation of 0.03
based on the same measurement period. Both of these values are normalized by the normal
operation pressure which was applied during the design phase. As observed, the standard
deviation which is estimated from measurements is smaller than the value which was assumed
a priori (i.e. referring to Table B3.2).
The procedure which is applied for calculation of the failure probability is presently based on
the so-called FORM approach as explained above. As mentioned, Monte Carlo simulation
methods would offer a good alternative (and supplement) to such calculations.
All the random variables are presently assumed to be stsatistically independent. Pairwise cor-
relation can be included e.g. by applicaiton of the so-called Nataf model in a straightforward
manner
Transition between different annulus conditions (i.e. a rapid increase of H2 S concentration
in the annulus for the present riser configuration) requires that the calculation scheme is
supplemented by an additional step. This step amounts to representation of the fatigue
damage at the time of transition as a random variable. The permissible remaining value
of the accumulated fatigue damage (with H2 S being present) will hence also be a random
variable. A further description of this procedure is given in [Leira, 2009].

Section B3.6
OC2017 A-001
The failure probability is computed by application of Eq. B3.7

The variation of the failure probability for the time span starting from 15 years and upwards
is shown in Figure B3.14. It is found that a failure probability level of 10−4 is reached after
a time in operation of around 32 years. A failure probability level of 10−3 per year is reached
slightly after 41 years in operation.
Figure B3.14: Failure probability per year versus time in operation
A summary of the time in operation until the three different probability levels of 10−5 , 10−4
and 10−3 are reached is provided by Table B3.3.
Table B3.3: Summary of time in operation versus failure probability per year.
Time of failure prob. level [yrs]

10−3 10−4 10−5
41.0 32.5 26.5
The variable with the highest importance factor in the reliability analysis is the Miner sum
uncertainty contributes with 32%, and the intercept of the SN-curve contributes with 24%.
The variable which represents 3D load and response effects contributes with around 10%
and the same applies to the global analysis uncertainty.
Note that interaction between corrosion and fatigue is not considered in the present analysis.
If a linear (proportional) model of the corrosion process is applied (i.e. corresponding to a
constant annual corrosion rate), a linear variation of the associated ’stress increase factor’ is
also relevant. In addition, possible stress concentration factors would need to be considered,
somewhat depending on the shape of the corrosion defects. Further details related to this
topic are given in Chapters B4 and B5 of the present Handbook.

Section B3.7
OC2017 A-001
B3.7 Reliability Analysis for the Ultimate Limit State
B3.7.1 General
Reliability analysis in relation to the extreme response level exceeding a specific capacity
threshold can be based on the failure function from Equation B3.6 above, i.e.:
g(R, S) = R − S(t) (B3.14)
where the capacity threshold presently is represented by a time-invariant random variable.

The time-varying load term S(t) can also be replaced by its extreme value (i.e. SE,T ) during
a specific time interval, T. For a short-term condition this gives:
g(R, S) = R − SE,T (B3.15)
where the load effect distribution function is considered in more detail in the present section.
For reliability formulations involving a deteriorating threshold, a sequence of stationary con-
ditions need to be analyzed. A conservative approximation which leads to simplified calcula-
tions can be based on application of the statistical resistance parameters which correspond
to the end of the time interval under consideration. This implies that the extreme loading is
assumed to occur at the time when the capacity reaches its lowest value.
Based on the distribution function for local maxima, the corresponding extreme value distri-
bution for a given duration T can be obtained. The number of local maxima for a narrow-band
process during this period can be estimated based on the zero-crossing frequency as:
σ̇ · T
N = νx+ (0) · T = (B3.16)
2πσx
Here, σx is the standard deviation of the response process, is the standard deviation of the
response process; σ̇x is the standard deviation of the corresponding velocity process and
νx+ (0) is the zero-crossing frequency
A plot of the resulting density function of the Gumbel type (see [Gumbel, 1958]) is shown in
Figure B3.15 below for increasing values of the exponent N (in the range from 50 to 5000).
x
The ordinate axis in the figure corresponds to the normalized extreme value, i.e. z = σE,Tx
.
The figure clearly shows the increase of the mean value for increasing values of the exponent
N.
The extreme value density function in general needs to be evaluated by consideration of
all the sea-states corresponding to a specific scatter diagram. Basically, two different ap-
proaches can be applied. The most correct approach will be to express the parameters of
the extreme-value distribution in terms of the sea-states characteristics (typically in terms
of significant wave height, Hs , and peak period, Tp ). Alternatively, a long-term distribution
of the relevant response quantity can be established by well-established procedures. The
corresponding extreme-value distribution is subsequently obtained by exponentiation of the
long-term distribution. The latter approach implies that the sea-state variables are taken
care of outside the reliability analysis itself.

Section B3.7
OC2017 A-001
Figure B3.15: Extreme value density function for increasing N (i.e. number of local maxima
for the parent Gaussian process)
B3.7.2 A Simplified Example of Application to a Flexible Riser Configuration
To exemplify calculation of failure probability in relation to the ultimate limit state, we

consider potential failure due excessive curvature of a riser cross-section. The following
characteristics are given:
• The permissible minimum curvature is assumed to be reduced due to degradation of
the pipe materials with time. The permissible bending radius is taken to be 75% of
the minimum bending radius capacity (MBR) of the pipe, i.e. 0.75 · MBR.
• The static bending radius is represented as a deterministic value which is 50% of the
minimum bending radius, i.e. 0.5 · MBR.
• The annual extreme dynamic curvature is assumed to be represented by a Gumbel
distribution. The 90% fractile of this distribution is applied as a deterministic value in
a preliminary analysis (the fractile is evaluated when all the design parameters are at
their base case value). This value is equal to 14.5% of the MBR, i.e. 0.145 · MBR
and corresponds to one particular sea-state which is found to be the most critical one
for bending of the relevant cross-section.
The statistical variability of the drag coefficient is taken into account for the dynamic response
component. The expression relating the normalized value of the 90% fractile of the extreme
curvature distribution (i.e. normalized by the base case value), to the normalized drag
coefficient is given by the following second-order polynomial expression: y = (1.35 · x2 −
2.04 · x + 1.70), where y is the normalized extreme curvature and x is the normalized drag
coefficient. The statistical model for the drag coefficient is the same as that applied in the
previous example, i.e. a Lognormal variable with a mean value of 1.0 and a coefficient of
variation equal to 0.20. In addition, a variable which takes into account the analysis model
uncertainty is included. This variable corresponds to the ratio between the computed critical
load effect divided by the true one. It is represented by a Gaussian distribution with a mean
value of 1.0 and a coefficient of variation equal to 0.15.

Section B3.8
OC2017 A-001
At a very early stage of the analysis, the following simplistic version of the failure function
is accordingly applied:
g(X1 , X2 ) = M BR · [0.75 − 0.15 · X2 · {1/(1.35 · (X1 )2 − 2.04 · X1 + 1.70)} − 0.50]

(B3.17)
where X1 corresponds to the normalized drag coefficient and X2 represent the model uncer-
tainty factor. It is noted that values of X2 which are smaller than 1.0 is more critical than
values larger than 1.0.
The incremental probability of failure per year in operation is mainly constant (as long as
this failure probability is low). The probability computed based on the failure function in
Equation B3.17 is found to be 4.8 · 10−5 , which is acceptable if safety class normal is set as
the target. For safety class high, this value is not quite satisfactory.
Regarding the relative ranking of the random variables, the variability of the drag coefficient
contributes by around 84% to the failure probability, while the model uncertainty related to
the load effect analysis contributes by the remaining 16%.
In the present simplified example, a single extreme sea state was applied as a basis for the
reliability assessment. In order to identify such a critical sea state, a more comprehensive
analysis involving a number of different sea states generally needs to be performed. The
three main steps of the reliability analysis can then be summarized as:
1. Identify potentially important (Hs ,Tp ) combinations for the response quantities en-
tering the specific failure function. This can be based on previous experience and/or
simplified response analysis methods.
2. Fit initial relations of response quantities and their statistical parameters as functions
of the basic parameters. Most emphasis is put on relatively accurate fitting for the
identified (Hs ,Tp ) ranges.
3. Perform a reliability analysis with corresponding localization of design points for the
various g-functions. If the design values of (Hs ,Tp ) deviate too much from the assump-
tions in step (1), a second iteration involving steps (2) and (3) must be performed. If it
is considered necessary, refined fitting of the functional relations can also be performed
in a more restricted neighborhood around the design point.
The attractiveness of this procedure lies in the possibility of monitoring the various steps
of the calculation process. A fully automated reliability analysis with response analyses
performed blindly, might miss important physical aspects. Furthermore, convergence to
local instead of global design points could easily occur. An important aspect of the present
scheme is that the response analyses should not miss nonlinear phenomena that may tend
to increase the extremes significantly.
B3.8 Effect of Monitoring/inspection/repair on reliability level
During operation of a specific flexible pipe system, measurements and observations collected
as part of monitoring and inspections are typically obtained. In some cases repair (e.g. by
application of riser clamps) is also performed. This implies that additional information (as
compared to that available at the design stage) becomes available. Monitoring methods and
integrity assessment of flexible risers are e.g. summarized in the reports from the Sureflex

Section B3.8
OC2017 A-001
JIP [MCS Kenny Guidance Note, 2010] and [MCS Kenny State of the Art, 2010], see also
relevant Chapter C1 of the present handbook for further information.
When considering such additional information, it is important to make an assessment of the
associated accuracy. This applies e.g. to the noise level inherent in measurement records, as
well as probability of detection for various types of defects. In relation to repair actions, the
updated capacity of the pipe after the repair needs to be estimated.
Some of the additional information is of the negative type. An example is increasingly
corrosive environment which was not foreseen during design. Other types of information are
of the positive type. Examples are smaller observed floater offset than assumed during initial
design or lower internal pressure levels than applied during the design phase. A screening of
the most critical riser configurations based on a gross assessment of operation parameters
and experience is performed e.g. by [Lemos et al., 2008].
Based on measurements obtained during a certain period in operation, updated statistical
models can be established. As examples, we may designate the initial probability density of
the floater offset by and the initial probability density for the internal pressure by fθF O (θF O )
. The corresponding updated probability densities can then be obtained by application of
Bayes formula. These updated density functions are expressed by:
fθF O |XF O (θF O |xF O ) = CF O · fxF O,obs|θF O (xF O,obs |θF O ) · fθF O (θF O ) (B3.18)
and similarly for the internal pressure:
fθIP |XIP (θIP |xIP ) = CIP · fxIP,obs|θIP (xIP,obs |θIP ) · fθIP (θIP ) (B3.19)
where fxF O,obs|θF O (xF O,obs |θF O ) is the likelihood function for the measured offset (or some
derived characteristics), conditional on the statistical parameters which are contained in the
vector θF O . Similarly, fxIP,obs|θIP (xIP,obs |θIP ) is the likelihood function for the measured
pressure record. The constants CFO and CIP are the respective normalization coefficients
for the resulting density functions.
As an example of application of the Bayesian updating procedure, the probability distribution
of the mean value of the riser operation pressure is considered. The initial (i.e. prior)
probability density function for the mean pressure is assumed to be Gaussian with a mean
value of 100 bar and a standard deviation of 20 bar (i.e. a variance of 400 bar2 ). After a
certain time in operation, a number of 1000 observations (i.e. 1000 pressure measurements)
have been accumulated. These observations are found to be well fitted by a Gaussian
distribution with a mean value of 70 bar and a standard deviation of 5 bar (i.e. variance of
25 bar2 ).
By applying the relevant expressions for updating the mean value and standard deviation of
the probability density function for the mean value of the (mean) operation pressure, the
new mean value becomes 72.7 bar and the new standard deviation is 2.6 bar. This implies
that the scatter associated with updated distribution is significantly less than for the initial
one. Here it has been assumed that the initial distribution was based on 100 observations,
which implies that the relative weighting of the initial information and the measurements is
100 to 1000. From Figure B3.16, it seen that the updated density function accordingly has
a very peaked shape.

Section B3.9
OC2017 A-001
Figure B3.16: Example of Bayes updating related to the probability density function which
characterizes the mean value of the internal riser pressure.
It is also possible to update the probabilistic models in a continuous way based on processing
of the measured data at regular time intervals (e.g. one-year intervals). This will imply that
significant weight is put on the measurements if the density functions are updated at each
interval. Based on the updated probabilistic models, the estimated reliability (or equivalently:
failure probability per year) can then also be updated by application of the new probabilistic
models.
B3.9 Concluding remarks
In the present chapter, reliability calculations corresponding to well-defined mechanical limit

states for flexible pipes were outlined. Example calculations were performed for the fatigue
limit state (FLS) and the ultimate limit state (ULS).
For the fatigue limit state, the time-dependent fatigue reliability of the tensile and pressure
armours for a specific riser configuration was focused upon. A procedure for incorporation of
relevant full-scale measurements related e.g to surface floater motion, internal pressure and
other internal flow parameters is also described. Furthermore, the method which is applied
for calculation of failure probabilities is also described in some detail.
The reliability analysis procedure is applied for assessment of a specific riser configuration
for the purpose of illustration. As a basis for the assessment, measurements of internal riser
pressure and surface floater offset are utilized and three different target safety levels are

Section B3.9
OC2017 A-001
considered.
The obtained results are based on some key features (which are reflected by the measure-
ments) which imply that application of standard fatigue design methods will give conservative
results. These features are mainly:
• Results from dedicated fatigue testing are available
• The measurement of operation pressure implies that the initially assumed scatter as-
sociated with the pressure basically is remove. Furthermore, the recorded pressure is
slightly lower than the value applied at the design stage.
• The (mean) static offset position obtained from the measurements is around half the
value which was applied at the design stage.
For riser configurations where these features are not present, the results will change ac-
cordingly. Clearly, it is also assumed that there are no defects (e.g. due to manufacturing,
transportation or accidental damage) in the relevant pipe layers.
The second example was a simplified reliability analysis of extreme curvature, which repre-
sents the ultimate limit state. The probability of exceeding a reduced bending capacity was
estimated for the future time in operation of the riser system.
Multiple applications of the present reliability analysis procedure can be envisaged. One ex-
ample is calibration of more refined design formats than those presently being applied. This
can e.g. be achieved by introduction of partial safety factors instead of a single usage factor.
Initial work in this direction can be found in [Løtveit and Often, 1990], [Leira and Mathiesen, 1995].
Other applications can be the ability to specify the required quality of the data basis in
order to apply the presently codified safety factors. Situations where non-standard values of
these factors are demanded in order to achieve a sufficient reliability level can hence also be
identified.

Chapter B4
Annulus environment and corrosion
Author: 4Subsea
333
Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
B4.1 Introduction
The annular space in flexible pipes contains the steel armours that provide the structural
support for containment of fluid and gas in the bore and the structural capacity required
to carry axial, bending and torsion loads. The integrity of these armours is essential. They
are arranged within a confined annular space in a way, which makes it challenging to model
corrosion. The annulus conditions vary significantly between pipes in service and also along
a given pipe.
Corrosion damage and cracks on armour wires are difficult to detect and characterise in detail
by inspection through the outside cover or from inside the bore of the pipe. Locations with
the highest stresses and consequences of failure will typically be under bend stiffeners where
access for inspection is even more difficult.
Damage to the outer cover with subsequent ingress of seawater or exposure to air is a likely
scenario based on field experience. There is no surprise that seawater ingress and exposure
to moist air may cause problems in particular in locations where cathodic protection is
non-existent or inadequate. However, corrosion concerns related to condensed water in the
annulus or seawater ingress from cover damages well below the sea level, in combination with
acid gases from the bore, must also be addressed. In-service field experience for flexible pipes
is still limited and there may well be corrosion issued that have not yet been experienced.
The industry needs
• Models and procedures to assess the susceptibility and probability for corrosion of
armours in flexible pipe annuli for relevant scenarios
• Solutions for monitoring, detection and predictions
• Guidance for how to deal with damage or other incidents.
Testing and monitoring of the conditions in the annulus through the vent ports provide
information that may be useful for assessing the probability for corrosion. In principle leakage
in the outer cover in topside jumpers and in the upper part of risers can be detected and
the flow rates and composition of the vent gas can be determined with suitable equipment
and verified procedures. Increased insight and understanding of the annulus environment is
continuously developed, and there are still challenges to derive accurate information on the
integrity of the armours with respect to corrosion.
The purposes of this chapter of the Handbook are to
• Define the span of possible conditions in flexible pipe annuli.
• Identify to what extent relevant conditions in flexible pipe annuli can cause corrosion
• Review literature to identify knowledge and models that can be used to predict corrosion
under identified annulus conditions.
• Develop guidance relating to corrosion caused by damage to the outside cover in terms
of:
– Detection of outside damage
– Susceptibility for corrosion as function of the location of cover damage
– Risk assessment and possible mitigation

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
B4.2 Annulus environment and conditions
B4.2.1 Definition of the annulus
The annulus in flexible pipes is defined as the annular space between the pressure sheath and
the outside cover as illustrated in Figure B4.1 and Figure B4.2.
Figure B4.1: Picture of flexible pipe to define the annular space. (Base picture, ref.
[Muren and Gjendal, 2011])
Figure B4.2: Schematic illustration of the layers through the annulus cross section
The pressure and tensile steel armour layers are in many pipe structures separated by anti-
wear layers that will influence how fluids and gases distribute and flow in the annulus. The
steel armours and the anti-wear layers will normally occupy 85-95% of available space in the
annulus. The gaps between armours and gaps between tape layers will be filled with air air
or preferably an inert gas (FAT) and some lubrication oil after manufacturing.
The cross section profile of tensile armours is rectangular with slightly rounded corners.

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
Dimensions of the armour wires vary with pipe dimension and design. On average the gap
between neighbouring armours in a layer will be between 0.5mm to 1.5mm but the gaps
within one layer may vary more than this around the circumference. The total available free
space is between 5 and 15% of the layer volume.
The anti-wear layers can be either polymer tape or extruded thermoplastics sheaths.
• The tapes used are typically 50 - 100mm wide helically wound with a separation of
around 10mm.The thickness is typically from 0.25mm to 2 mm. The gaps between
the tape layers represent narrow channels for fluid and gas flow and ensure that there
is flow communication between the free volumes in consecutive armour layers.
• If the anti-wear layer is an extruded polymer sheath the flow connection between armour
layers depend on punched holes through the layer and this has on occasions been
observed to be insufficient. The consequence of poor flow communication between
layers may lead to different environments in the radial direction in the annulus.
• Many pipes for static applications have no tape between armour layers creating a more
open pattern for fluid flow between layers.
The armours will from manufacturing normally be covered by a lubrication oil. Depending
on the amount and type, excess oil may collect in available free space in low points during
storage and possibly redistribute during operation. Oil films on steel surfaces will provide
protection against corrosion until the film is broken down or washed or worn away.
Dynamic flexible risers will experience dynamic loads and bending. This will result in armour
wires moving relative to anti-wear tape. This relative movement with high contact forces
may damage surface films or surface layers in locations with sliding contact. The oil layer
may be partly removed and protective oxides or corrosion salt layers on steel surfaces may
be destroyed. Bending of flexible pipes may also lead to contact wear between neighbouring
hoop armour layers possibly damaging surface salts that may protect against corrosion.
The steel armours are made from carbon steel or low alloy steels with ultimate strength
ranging from 700 to 1400 MPa depending on design and application. In cases of sour service
(H2 S) the material must comply with the NACE standard MR0175 Materials for use in
H2 S-containing environments.
Axial armours are electrically connected in the end fittings typically by welding or loaded
metal to metal contact to a steel ring that again is connected to the steel body of the end
fitting. This should ensure that the axial armours are in electrical contact with each other
and with the steel end fitting bodies of the pipe.
B4.2.2 Permeation into the annulus
The annulus is sealed from the bore of the pipe by the pressure sheath and from the external
environment by the outside cover. When the pipes are new the gas in the free volume is air
at close to atmospheric pressure (probably somewhat depleted in oxygen due to oxidation
processes).
The pressure sheaths are permeable to small molecules in the bore such as H2 O, CO2 ,
methane and ethane. The permeation rates depend on different parameters ranging from
their fugacity (partial pressure), temperature, type of polymer, sheath thickness etc. Other
small molecular species such as H2 S, formic acid and acetic acid, that are present in bore to

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
varying degrees, will also permeate through pressure sheaths into the annulus. (also larger
hydrocarbon molecules than those mentioned here will permeate but the rates will generally
be lower).
Permeation rates are governed by permeability constants that depend on solubility and diffu-
sion properties for a gas in the polymer. The permeability constants vary with temperature
and will also depend on the pressures. When polymer lose plasticisers, swell or age in other
ways the permeability constant will also change to some degree. The overall permeation
rates for a gas will be proportional to its partial pressure (or fugacity) in the bore of the pipe
relative to its partial pressure in the annulus. The ’pressurized’ contact between the outside
of the pressure sheath and the inside of the axial armours will provide partial shielding for the
permeating gases to escape and thus reduce the total permeation rates. Many parameters
influence the permeation and some of them will change through the field life. It is also
important to note that it may take long time to establish steady state for permeation from
the bore to the annulus.
There will also be permeation from the annulus through the outside cover and vice versa
from the outside into the annulus. This is normally considered to be very low due to low
partial pressure differences and lower temperature. However, this may be important for
Hydrogen (from CO2 corrosion processes) and for subsea flow lines vent directly to the sea
and may build up annulus pressures exceeding the hydrostatic pressure. This may lead to
significant differences between the partial pressures of gases in the annulus and the outside
sea environments where the concentrations of these gasses are low. Permeation through the
outside covers may thus become non-negligible.
B4.2.3 Annuli environment evolvement
Initial conditions
When a new pipe is taken into use permeation from the bore will start and the gas environ-
ment will soon be dominated by permeating gases. The total pressure in the annulus will
depend on the vent arrangement.
Risers will normally vent at the top to atmospheric pressure either directly or via valves that
may introduce a slight pressure drop. Direct ventilation to atmosphere should be avoided to
avoid ingress of air. When there are no fluids blocking the annulus the annulus pressure is
expected to be the same along whole pipe. If the vent rates are very high there may be a
slight pressure gradient along the pipe annulus. A steady state condition in terms of pressure
and gas composition will typically be reached fairly soon.
Subsea flow lines will vent directly to the sea through vent valves. Gas will be released when
the annulus pressure exceeds the outside hydrostatic pressure plus the necessary differential
release pressure for the vent valve. Thus the total annulus pressure will typically be higher
in subsea flexible flow lines than in risers. It will therefore typically take longer for the
pressure and gas composition in the annulus of the flow line to reach steady state conditions.
High total pressure in the annulus will normally result in higher partial pressures of gases
contributing to corrosion, such as CO2 and H2 S.
The composition would initially reflect the permeation rates of the different gases from the
bore of the pipe. In some cases the partial pressures of the permeating gases build up in the
annulus to levels that are non-negligible compared to their partial pressures in the bore. The

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
permeation rate will go down to reflect the reducing difference between the partial pressure
in the bore and in the annulus. This may affect the gas composition in the annulus.
If corrosion reactions take place in the annulus the gas composition may be substantially
modified in particular through production of Hydrogen from CO2 corrosion.
Impacts of changing temperatures on gas in the annulus
When a confined amount of gas undergoes changes in temperature there will be a corre-
sponding change in pressure and/or volume that can be described in terms of the ideal gas
law:
P1· V1/T1 = P2· V2/T2 = nR
Where n is the amount of gas and R is the ideal gas constant. This means that if the
temperature in the annulus drops the pressure of the gas in the annulus will go down cor-
respondingly under the assumption that the amount of gas remains the same. A drop in
temperature of around 30 °C will result in a pressure drop of around 10% if the annulus is
sealed off. Gases permeating into the annulus will compensate some of the pressure drop
but in many cases the temperature drop during shut down will be faster than the rate of
compensation from permeation.
When there is no valves blocking the reverse flow or there are holes in the outside cover,
the pressure reduction will be compensated by sucking gas or liquids into the annulus. Thus
if the pressure in the annulus is defined by the outside pressure, the gas in the annulus will
contract by about 10% for the 30 °C drop in temperature. To compensate for the reduction
in volume of gas (or liquid) will be sucked into the annulus. This could be air or water if
there is a subsea hole in the outside cover.
The reverse effect will take place when the temperature goes up as for instance at start up
of production. The gas will expand and lead to enhanced vent flow.
When assessing the effects of temperature changes on the gas in the annulus it is necessary
to take into consideration the rate of permeation into the annulus during cool-down periods.
Condensation of water
If the temperature on layers / components in the annulus is below the dew point for the water
vapour building up in the annulus, water will condense and a liquid water phase may build
up. Condensation would typically take place on ’cold’ outer layers during normal operation
or on any layers during shut down when the temperature goes down. When the temperature
goes up again some or all of the condensed water may evaporate depending on conditions.
Available permeation models can in principle be used to calculate whether water condensation
will take place and how fast a liquid water phase may build up.
Initially the condensed water will most likely exist as dew on the coldest surfaces. If sufficient
condensation take place for water to run down from inclined surfaces it will tend to collect
in low points such as sag bends, bottom ends of risers or low points in flexible flow lines.
• When the volumes are limited water accumulating in low points will initially only occupy
the lower parts of the circumference. Gas permeating from lower parts of the riser will
flow above the water in low points.

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
• When water builds up to a level where it occupies the full circumference of the pipe-
annulus in low sections the flow of gas becomes more complex. In steady state sit-
uations the gas pressure will build up to a level where gas can escape (possibly in-
termittently) through water columns in the direction of the top end fitting where the
gas is vented. A possible situation with condensed water building up in the annulus is
shown in Figure B4.3 where the pressure in a gas pocket in the hog has built up to
compensate for the water column above the sag bend. The release of gas up through
the annulus may be intermittent as a burping phenomenon that has been observed for
risers in service.
Figure B4.3: Possible case with gas pocket in hog in a annulus with build up of condensed
water
Gas pockets will contract when the temperature is reduced as discussed in sub-section B4.2.3.
The interface between condensed water and the gas will move: water columns in the annulus
will shift taking armours out of water in some locations and into water submergence in others.
Condensed water will get into equilibrium with the gas and the different gases will dissolve to
concentrations that reflect their partial pressures and their solubility in water at the prevailing
temperatures. Water vapour will exist at a concentration in the gas phase that corresponds
to the dew point for the temperature at the water/ gas interphase. If corrosion processes
take place the respective gases, ions and salts from the corrosion reactions build up in the
water. CO2 corrosion will produce Hydrogen and result in build up of bicarbonates and
Iron-carbonate that will precipitate as a solid film on steel surfaces when the concentration
gets high enough.
Situations have been experienced where the pressure in the annulus in the hog has exceeded
the burst pressure of the outside cover (annulus pressure minus the outside hydrostatic
pressure) and resulted in outer cover rupture.
Water condensing in vent tubes Water condensation in vent tubes is a potential source
of water running back into the annulus. For many riser configurations the top end will see
the highest static and dynamic loads on the tensile armours. Thus the consequences from
corrosion may be high

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
Seawater ingress
Water may enter the annulus through holes in the outside cover. Holes may result from
impacts, contact with sharp objects, wear, rupture caused by excessive pressure in the annulus
or cracking of aged outer covers. How water entering from a hole in the outer cover distributes
in the annulus will depend on the location of the hole, the configuration of the pipe and how
water will flow along the armour layers. Gas pockets will establish in high points (hog in
risers or high points on the sea floor sections). The hydrostatic pressure from water columns
building up in the annulus will compress gas trapped in pockets. Just after an ingress event a
temporary steady distribution of water will be reached followed by a period where permeating
gases may increase the pressure in gas pockets and push some water out again. A possible
scenario where a gas pocket in the hog is still expanding before a steady state has been
reached is shown in Figure B4.4.
Figure B4.4: Example of distribution of water in annulus with hole in the outside cover,
before steady state has been reached.
A steady state will eventually be reached where the total rate of gas permeation into the
annulus is equal to the rate of gas escaping through holes and vent ports.
However, temperature changes will disturb the steady state situation due to the effects
described in Section B4.2.3. A rapid temperature drop may lead to ’fresh’ seawater being
sucked in through holes in the outer cover to compensate for the volume reduction of gas
pockets.
Renewal of seawater Consider a case with a 50 m long gas pocket in the hog, a hole in
the outside cover below the sea level and no gas pockets below the water column on the well
side of the hog, as indicated in Figure B4.4. Assume that the temperature in the annulus
is T1=40 °C (313 K) and that the amount of gas in the gas pocket stays constant. If the
temperature in the annulus drops to T2=10 °C (283 K) there will be a reduction by around
10% in the product P*V. The pressure will go down as the water level in the section between
the sag and the hog will creep up towards the hog. However, the change in V will be higher
than the change in P. The length of the gas pocket would in realistic cases go down by 3-4m.

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
Thus an amount of fresh (aerated) seawater corresponding to the free annulus volume of 3-4
m of pipe will be sucked into the annulus through the hole in the outside cover.
Thus temperature changes in a riser with holes in the outside cover will result in a pumping
effect for seawater. It is also possible to foresee pumping effects from ballasting changes and
slow drift on FPSOs as well as waves. For fixed installations tidal variations may also be
relevant.
A very concerning scenario would be two or more holes in the outside cover. This may
lead to fresh seawater entering one hole while annulus water escaping through another. The
possibility of circulating water will among several things depend on the relative locations of
the holes and temperature distributions. Continuous renewal of fresh seawater may lead to
armour wires away from holes being exposed regularly to oxygenated water.
Ingress of air
In the splash zone If a hole in the outside cover is located in the splash zone the armour
wires inside the hole will regularly be exposed to moist air and seawater with a high oxygen
level. It is assumed that anodes or impressed current systems will protect the directly exposed
armours when the location of the hole in the outside cover is submerged. When a hole
is located in the splash zone the protection will only be effective when the hole is fully
submerged in the sea. When the hole is above the sea level steel armours near the hole will
not be protected while being exposed to fresh seawater and air.
Above the sea level Holes in the outside cover above the sea level will lead to ingress
of air that often will be saturated with water. Depending on arrangements rain water and
water spray from the sea may also enter the hole. The degree of exposure to air inside the
annulus will depend on hole size and geometry and conditions in the annulus. It could range
from a small hole where vent gas would be escaping most of the time to cases where air
could circulate through the armour wire structure. A concerning scenario is cracking of the
outer cover under a bend stiffener due to ageing. This may produce long and complex crack
patterns and even partial separation of the outside cover and give constant oxygen exposure.
A key question when air enters the annulus is whether a water phase is present for significant
times in combination with CO2 potentially creating conditions for enhanced corrosion.
In a pipe with one or several holes in the outside cover of a riser located only above the sea
level there have been examples where the water level in the annulus is at the same level as
the lowest edge of the lowest hole. This requires either sufficient water in the annulus from
condensation or ingress of rainwater or sea spray.
From the vent system One should also be aware that unfortunate designs of vent systems
could lead to air being sucked into the annulus when gas in the annulus contract during cool
down associated with shut down. This could be a problem when venting goes directly to air
via short tubes. This would possibly combine with water condensing in the vent tubes and
running back into the pipe annulus.
It is also worth noting that situations have been observed where water from the annulus of
one riser has been pushed into the annuli of other risers through a common vent system.

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
B4.2.4 Conditions affecting corrosion of armour wires
Surface protection of armour wires
The tensile armours will from manufacturing be covered with a layer of oil.. From pipes
taken out of service it is observed that this coverage vary between individual wires and along
wires, and areas without oil are observed, e.g. in contact areas between wires.
An interesting question is how well and how long the oil film on the exposed surfaces may
protect against corrosion.
• Is it possible that localised break down of protective oil films may result in small steel
areas being directly exposed to the environment?
Exposure of armour wires
Gas permeating through the pressure sheath will enter the annulus in the gaps between the
pressure armours. During operation the pressure sheath is supported by the inside surface
of the pressure armours resulting in high pressure ’sealing’ contact so that permeating gases
must enter in the gaps between the wires as indicated in Figure B4.5 below (detail from
Figure B4.2).
Figure B4.5: Illustration of permeating gases entering the annulus in the gap between the
pressure armours.
The pressure armour is thus the first layer exposed to gases permeating from the bore. The
gaps between the armours may be filled with water, there may be condensed water films on
the armour surfaces or they may be filled with dry gas with water vapour below the dew
point.
When the gaps between armours are water filled chemical constituents may go directly into
solution in the water or exist within gas bubbles. This may lead to a concentration of some
chemical species that is higher in the water between the pressure armours than in the water
surrounding the axial armours. Diffusion and convection will tend to even out concentration
gradients but the paths may be narrow and partly obstructed by anti-wear layers. This
may lead to significant time constants (or delays) associated with this transport process. If
chemical constituents react with steel at rates that are higher than the ’transport’ delay it is
possible that the pressure armour would be more strongly affected than other armour layers.
The scenario with water films on the armour surfaces may also lead to higher reaction rates
on the pressure armour layer. Higher concentrations of harmful chemical species in the gas

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
will lead to correspondingly higher concentrations of these species dissolving in the water
films.
Corrosive constituents and their abundance Corrosion of steel armours in annulus envi-
ronments depends on the presence of a liquid water phase and is driven by acids, acid formers
or oxygen. O2 may promote corrosion either as pure O2 corrosion, or by influencing CO2
corrosion processes preventing formation of effective protective films. It is also observed that
O2 corrosion of armour wires prior to CO2 corrosion (without O2 ) may result in significantly
increased CO2 corrosion rates.
Typical acids or acid formers that may permeate through the pressure sheath are
• CO2 from produced gas or dissolved in crude oil. CO2 dissolves in water according
to Henry’s law and a small fraction of the dissolved CO2 reacts with water to form
Carbonic acid H2 CO3
• Organic acids such as Formic (CHOOH), Acetic (CH3 COOH) and Propanoic (CH3 CH2 COOH)
acids). (Acetic acid is always the most abundant of the organic acids in oil and gas
production environments)
• H2 S is an acid present in some oil reservoirs and develop in some ageing reservoirs due
to stimulation by water injection.
The permeation rates for acid gases will, when a steady state has been reached, depend
on its permeation coefficients in the polymer used as pressure sheath, the thickness of the
polymer layer and it will be proportional to its partial pressure in the bore of the pipe (or
difference between the partial pressures in the bore and the annulus)
Possible sources of oxygen can be
• Ingress of seawater with naturally dissolved oxygen into the annulus.
– Full flooding is a one time event and carry correspondingly limited oxygen
– Pumping effects in the annulus due to temperature changes or sea level variations
relative to the riser. This may lead to repeated ingress of oxygenated seawater
with a limited reach into the annulus from the location of a hole.
• Air sucked into the annulus through faulty annulus vent systems or leaky seals between
the end-fitting and the outside cover.
• Air ingress when the outside cover is damaged above the sea level.
Solution of annulus gases in water
The concentration of dissolved acid gases in the water in the annulus will be proportional to
their partial pressures and their solubility (Henry’s law). It is important to know the partial
pressures of potentially harmful gases in the annulus. In a dry annulus the concentrations
of the permeating gases will reflect their partial pressures in the bore and the permeation
coefficients. If CO2 corrosion takes place hydrogen gas will be generated and become a part
of the gas composition. If the hydrogen content becomes significant the partial pressures of
the other constituents will go correspondingly down in a steady state situation (when the
annulus is venting to a fixed pressure). It is also worth noting that if the temperature in

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
an annulus with a fluid water phase is relatively high the water vapour may be a significant
fraction of the gas phase if it is venting at a pressure just above one atmosphere.
In partially water filled annuli there may be gas pockets that are pressurized by water ’column’.
The pressure in a gas pocket trapped in the hog of a riser with a hole in the outside cover
higher up on the riser may end up at a pressure corresponding to the hydrostatic pressure in
the sea at the level of the riser sag. This could be well above 10 bar and would lead to higher
partial pressures for all constituents. If the pressure builds up ’rapidly’ after damage to the
outside cover the composition of the gas will stay constant and the partial pressure for each
constituent will increase by the same factor. (the fugacity - describing real gases - will not
necessarily increase by the exactly the same factors, but close enough). The consequence of
the increase in partial pressures will be a corresponding increase in the concentration of the
dissolved gas in the water in contact with the gas pocket. This will modify the composition
of the water and will have impact on acidity alkalinity. After a gas pocket has formed by
flooding of the annulus, a new steady state will form over time. The gas composition in the
annulus will adapt to the modified permeation rates reflecting the new conditions. It is also
important to be aware that the steady state conditions in the water phase will not only adapt
to the changes in the gas phase but also to changes in corrosion related reactions. This will
lead to changes in the concentrations of ionic species in the water.
The annuli of flexible flow lines vent directly to the sea at the water depth of the vent
ports. The steady state pressure in the annulus will reflect the hydrostatic pressure plus the
differential relief pressure of the vent valve. The steady state annulus pressure can be very
high in some flow lines with correspondingly high partial pressures of the constituents such
as acid gases. The total permeation rates in combination with dimensions of the annulus
will determine the time for the pressure to reach steady state. This can take long time -
months to years - depending on design and conditions.
Possible impacts from the polymers
It is known from literature that some polymers may acidify water they are exposed to,
especially when the material is fresh. This could be caused by stabilizers (eg plasticisers,
antioxidants) leaching out of the polymer and it could also be small polymer molecules
(oligomers) with acid end groups found in Polyamides. The amounts will be limited and
will probably be most pronounced in early parts of the pipe life. An effect of inhibition
is observed in laboratory corrosion experiments for polymers taken from intact pipe cross
sections. However, there are variations between pipe designs and vendors where some designs
do not exhibit any or negligible inhibiting effect. Experiments suggest this inhibition affects
CO2 corrosion, but not in the presence of O2 .
B4.2.5 Some relevant quantities
The large area of exposed armour wire surface compared to the available volume of water
has been identified as an important parameter for long-term corrosion in flexible pipe annuli.
As an example the ratio of water volume to steel surface area has been calculated for one of
the axial armour layers in a typical 10” flexible pipe. The results are as follows:
• Taking all surfaces of all armours in the layer into consideration gives: 0.016 ml/cm2

Section B4.2
OC2017 A-001
• Taking only the edges of the wires (assume shielding of surfaces in contact with anti-
wear tape): 0.056 ml/cm2
For the same case estimates have been made of the amount of oxygen that would enter with
ingress of fresh sea water compared to the steel surface. Assuming that only the edges of
the armour wires are exposed there will be 0.4 µg/cm2 (oxygen / surface area of armour
wire edges).
In connection with transport of permeating gases from the pressure sheath to the axial armour
layers in a pipe with hoop strain armour the following example may be useful to understand
the rates. We consider a 7.5” ID pipe and calculate a permeation rate of 0.15 l/day/m at
STP for an internal pressure of 150 bar. Assume that gas escape from the polymer sheath
only in the gaps between the pressure armours. The length of the gap can be calculated for
1m of pipe. Based on gap-to-gap separation of 10mm the length of the spiraling gap is 68m
in a 1m length of pipe. For every 1 cm length of gap there will be 6·10-10 mol/min/cm of
methane escaping from the pressure sheath. If all the gas over one cm length of the gap
went into forming a bubble in water in the gap it would take around 9 minutes to generate a
1 mm diameter spherical bubble if the pressure is close to atmospheric and correspondingly
longer at higher pressures. Typically the concentration of acid gases will only be a fraction
of the gas in a bubble forming on the annulus side of the pressure sheath.
B4.2.6 Summary of Scenarios
The scenarios for how armour wires in flexible pipes can be exposed inside the annuli are
found i Table B4.1 :
Table B4.1: Summary of exposure scenarios for armours wires in the annulus of flexible pipes
Exposure scenarios for Comments / issues to be considered

armour wires in the annulus
Dry gas no condensation Low water contents in permeating gases
Intermittent wetting of surfaces Typically condensation will take place during shut down.
Condensed water forming on a dry surface will be non-buffered
unless salts on the surfaces dissolve immediately
Submerged in water phase Water phase will be stagnant and most probably reach a steady
(Condensed water or sea water) state condition defined by constituents and chemical reactions.
Taken in and out of the water Surfaces may dry out in periods between re-submergence in
phase due to contracting and ’stagnant’ water phase.
expanding gas pockets
Periodically exposed to fresh The concern is that pumping effects from expanding /
seawater in the vicinity of a contracting gas pockets or from changes in sea level relative to
hole in the outside cover the riser may expose armours shielded from cathodic protection
to sufficient oxygen to contribute to harmful corrosion
In the vicinity of a hole exposed This scenario is of significant concerns because of fresh
to splash zone conditions seawater and air and periods without any cathodic protection.
In the vicinity of a hole Ingress and renewal of air in locations where the armours are in
locatedabove the sea level - contact with water will affect the corrosion conditions
exposed to air
In the annulus just below the Newly condensed water will not be buffered by salts and may
entry to the vent tubes become more corrosive than stagnant water in other locations
condensing water may run back in the annulus
to the annulus

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
Hoop strain wires in contact Hoop strain wires will in several pipe designs create and
with the pressure sheath represent a complex path for gases permeating out of the
pressure sheath to reach other armour layers. For chemicals
species with a relatively high reaction rate may lead to
preferential reaction on the surfaces of the hoop strain layer
The concentration of harmful gases dissolving in condensed water or from water ingress will
be proportional to their partial pressures in the gas phase in the annulus and the higher the
total pressure the higher the partial pressures will be.
Thus the total pressure in the annulus gas phase is important and we must consider the
following scenarios:
• Annulus vent in flexible risers normally vent to atmospheric pressure and will operate
a little above 1 bar
• In risers with partially water filled annuli there may be gas pockets compressed by
water columns in the annulus. Variations will be large but one can foresee situations
with several tens of bars in gas pockets
• The annuli in flow lines vent to the sea at the depth of the vent ports. The hydrostatic
pressure in the sea plus the differential release pressure of the release valves will define
the release pressure. Thus the annulus pressure depends on the depth of the flow lines.
The typical availability of corrosive constituents can be present in flexible pipe annuli in the
following ranges:
CO2 : from a fraction of 1 bar up to few bar in the annulus

H2 S: from negligible to several 10s of mBar (and even higher in extreme cases)
Acetic acid: traces have been found in annuli but permeation models do not cover acetic
acid
O2 : well aerated sea water contains around 8 ppm by weight of dissolved oxygen. This goes
somewhat down with water depth.
For acid gases it will be their partial pressures in the bore, properties of the pressure sheath
and the conditions in the annulus that will define their partial pressures in the annulus.
Assessment of corrosion must take into consideration that the armour wires will be covered
by a oil film from manufacturing. As long as the film is intact it will provide significant
protection against corrosion. Processes and mechanisms to break down or remove the oil
film may be important for understanding and modeling corrosion on armour wires.
Dynamic flexible risers will experience dynamic loads and bending. This will result in armour
wires moving relative to anti-wear tape. This relative movement with high contact forces
may damage surface films or surface layers in locations with sliding contact. The oil layer may
be partly removed and protective oxides or corrosion salt layers may be destroyed. Bending
of flexible pipes may also lead to contact wear between neighbouring hoop armour layers
possible destroying surface layers that may protect against corrosion.

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
B4.3 Corrosion issues in flexible pipe annuli
B4.3.1 Potential Consequences of Corrosion
There are in principle three concerns with corrosion of armour wires in the annulus:
• Loss of metallic cross section leading to reduced load capacity that eventually could
lead to rupture and loss of containment.
• Reduced fatigue resistance caused by a combination of increased stress levels due to
reduced metallic cross section and corrosion generated surface irregularities or notches
that generate local stress concentrations which will be sites for crack initiation
– General corrosion will in itself lead to increased surface irregularity
– Surface conditions and local variations in chemistry may lead to the generation
of pitting corrosion. These will represent sites with stress concentration and
corresponding reduction in service lives
– Corrosion mechanisms that generate crack like defects such as sulfide stress corro-
sion cracking and hydrogen induced cracking that can result from H2 S in materials
that are not suitable for such service.
• Impacts from the corrosion process on the fatigue resistance - modification of the SN
curve for long-term fatigue.
An essential question is the threshold of shapes and sizes of defects that will lead to reduced
fatigue resistance and the sensitivity to increasing defect sizes.
Failure of load carrying armour wires can lead to full pipe ruptures with the potential of
significant release of hydrocarbons.
In a corrosive environment the fatigue resistance of relevant steels will go down since the
corrosion processes influence both the crack initiation and the growth process. These effects
are addressed in Chapter Section D1 (Sections D3 - D4).
B4.3.2 The role of the steel
The steels used for axial armours and pressure armours in flexible pipes are either carbon
steels or low alloy steels. Typical compositions are shown in Table B4.2.

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
Table B4.2: Typical compositions of steels used for axial armours and pressure armours in
flexible pipes, [Dupoiron and Taravel-Condat, 2003], [Rubin and Gudme, 2006]
C Mn Si S P Cr Mo Al
Low Alloy 4130 0.33 0.73 0.28 0.003 0.009 1.03 0.18 –
(Technip)
C35 grade 2 0.36 0.75 0.2 0.008 0.007 0.05 – –
(Technip)
Sour-800 (NKT) 0.6 0.70 0.25 0.003 0.01 – – 0.04
The microstructure of the steel is the key to the required properties. This is achieved through
controlled heat treatment processes. The manufacturers may have developed these processes
for the steels they use. A key challenge for the manufacturers is to select or develop and
qualify steels that have adequately high strength for sour service applications.
In terms of corrosion it is worth asking whether there will be any inherent differences in
the corrosion resistance between types of armour wires due to differences in the steels. It is
known that the formation of protective films on steel surfaces as part of the corrosion process
is one of the most important contributors to limit the corrosion rate for relevant corrosion
processes. This is discussed in detail for CO2 in [Dugstad, 2006]. It is reported in the liter-
ature [Schmitt and Horstemeier, 2006] that the strength and quality of iron-carbonate films
forming during CO2 corrosion will be influenced by the microstructure of the steel. Thus the
’inherent’ corrosion rate may vary between steels with similar mechanical properties. There
is no open information available from the manufacturers to determine whether differences
in corrosion resistance exist between the steels used in armour wires. The way to find out
would be to run comparative corrosion tests on relevant samples.
It is also to be expected that the condition of steel surfaces in terms of oxides and other
deposits after manufacturing also affect the susceptibility to corrosion. Again this can only
be determined through comparative testing.
B4.3.3 Corrosion mechanisms
Pure CO2 corrosion
The CO2 corrosion reactions A key focus for corrosion of armour wires in flexible pipes has
been CO2 whether the water phase is from condensation or seawater ingress. The oxygen
contained in a single flushing with oxygenated seawater will produce negligible corrosion
unless the oxygen is replenished. When the oxygen has been consumed it will primarily be
impacts from the acid gases permeating from the bore of the pipe that will be of concern.
The reactions for CO2 corrosion can be written as:
CO2 (in water) + H2 O <–> H2 CO3 (Carbonic acid)
H2 CO3 <–> H+ + HCO−
3
HCO3 - <–> H+ + CO2−

3
Fe + 2H2 CO3 + -> Fe2+ + 2HCO−

3 + H2
Fe2+ + CO2 −3 -> FeCO3

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
The corrosion rate is strongly dependent of the pH of the electrolyte (here referring to
condensed water or seawater with dissolved CO2 ). It is important to note that the corrosion
reaction leads to formation of hydrogen gas. Hydrogen may permeate out through the outer
sheath, and the remaining hydrogen in the vent gas could represent a signature within the
vent gas composition.
The CO2 corrosion process will lead to formation of FeCO3 which will precipitate when the
concentration of the involved ions reach a limiting concentration. Protective films of FeCO3
will develop on steel surfaces. These films will contribute to keeping the corrosion rate low.
Advantage of the annulus confinement There are concerns that CO2 should lead to
longer term corrosion issues for steel armours in the annulus of flexible pipes even in pipes with
intact outer covers. The condition in the annulus of a flexible pipe is, however, characterized
by the following features that we have discussed in previous sections:
• There is a lot of steel surface compared to the space available for water. The water
volume to steel surface ratio V/S is in the order of 0.03 ml/cm2
• The annulus space is confined leading to non or limited change out of water
• The gas phase is continuously renewed by permeating gases
This has been noticed by several research groups looking at potential corrosion issues in the
annulus of flexible pipes [Clements, 2003] [Clements, 2008], [Désamais and Taravel-Condat, 2006],
[Désamais et al., 2007], [Désamais and Taravel-Condat, 2009], [Dupoiron and Taravel-Condat, 2003],
[Ethridge and Cayard, 1997], [Félix-Henry, 2007], [Joel, 2009], [Klust et al., 2011], [Remita et al., 2007],
[Remita et al., 2008a],
[Remita et al., 2008b], [Ropital et al., 2000], [Rubin and Gudme, 2006], [Santos et al., 2011],
[Taravel-Condat and Désamais, 2006b], [Taravel-Condat and Désamais, 2006a], [Underwood, 2002].
A paper by [Ropital et al., 2000] was one of the first papers published on this matter and
was based on work by Technip. They reported corrosion tests with S/V ranging from 100 to
0.25 ml/cm2 in well controlled cells.
Tests were carried out for periods of 500 to 3000 hours at 20°C under one atmosphere of 100%
CO2 . Under these conditions the NORSOK CO2 prediction model gives a yearly corrosion
rate of 3.7 mm/year. The NORSOK model does not take account of confinement and the
high steel surface to water volume ratio. The results obtained by [Ropital et al., 2000] are
shown in Figure B4.6.
The average corrosion rate with VS = 0.25 was 0.005 mm/year after 813 hours. Monitoring
during the testing showed that the pH and the dissolved iron content increase to much
higher levels than predicted by corrosion models (pH 5.2 -> 6.2, iron content 100 ppm ->
600ppm). The high iron content is referred to as super-saturation. Thin protective layers of
iron carbonate FeCO3 (Siderite) was found on the steel surfaces in tests with low S/V ratio.
The authors also reported results from a similar test at 80°C with V/S=0.17. Similar results
were obtained with much lower corrosion rates than predicted by NORSOK and higher pH
and iron content. The corrosion rate was about twice what was observed at 20°C (since the
tests were carried out at atmospheric pressure the partial pressure of CO2 was 0.53 bar due
to the higher water vapour pressure at 80°C)
Technip has continued the work reported in [Ropital et al., 2000] including tests with small
amounts of H2 S. Results have been published in a number of partly overlapping papers.

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure B4.6: Corrosion rate as function of the ratio of water volume to steel surface area.
Plot produced from paper by [Ropital et al., 2000]
Both Wellstream (GE Oil and Gas) and NKT (now NOV) have performed similar testing and
assessment and reported results that to a large extent support the results and assessment from
Technip. [Clements, 2008] in the paper from 2008 presented a summary of published results
together with the latest (at the time) testing results from Wellstream. On a log-log plot of
yearly corrosion rate versus V/S he fitted a non-linear curve to these points and extrapolated
this beyond V/S=0.03 ml/cm2 which is a typical value for flexible pipe annuli. The measured
data point with the lowest V/S was at a value of around 0.2 ml/cm2 . At V/S=0.03 ml/cm2
the fitted curve would predict a corrosion rate of 0.00015 mm/year. The number of data
points used in the plot is limited and the extrapolation carries significant uncertainty but it
suggests that the in water filled, anaerobic and confined annuli the corrosion rates will be
low.
These conditions are not taken account of in corrosion models like the NORSOK CO2 cor-
rosion model.
Potential CO2 corrosion issues Other acids permeating into the annulus or leaching from
polymeric layers will disturb (reduce) the high pH conditions and may create a somewhat
higher corrosion rate than with CO2 only. The availability of other acids from permeation will
govern this additional corrosion effect. Reported investigations on CO2 corrosion in flexible
pipe annulus have to limited degrees addressed this issue.
In steel pipelines one of the concerns with CO2 corrosion is top of line above a gas phase
where condensing water will run down along the pipe wall. The running water will take with
it the ions providing the buffering capacity that will be generated by the corrosion process.
Freshly condensed water will be un-buffered and start with a high corrosion rate. When
this process keeps going the corrosion rate can be much higher than in a stagnant water
environment with small V/S ratio. It is difficult to predict if similar processes can take place
on steel armours in flexible pipe annuli. It could in principle go on in gas pockets such as in
the hog if the water vapour pressure is high enough. Further investigation through modeling
and possibly testing would be necessary to identify whether such situations may exist.
CO2 corrosion as discussed above will not generally lead to pitting on a homogeneous steel
surface. Published test results do not report any significant pitting effects. However, on

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
surfaces, which are partially protected by oil or grease or where the surface layer may be
damaged due to relative movement of contacting surfaces, the corrosion processes may take
place on limited areas where the surface protection is destroyed. This can lead to higher
localized corrosion rates that may lead to pit like corrosion defects. The susceptibility for
such corrosion patterns should be investigated by testing and by dissection of flexible pipes
that have been taken out of service.
Summary of potential corrosion issues related to CO2
• Can high partial CO2 pressure in gas pockets pressurized by water column or in subsea
flow lines lead to higher corrosion rates than reported in the literature?
• Could good protection by oil films invalidate the assumed high ratio between steel
surface and water volume?
• Can situation exist where water continuously or intermittently condense and run down
on surfaces taking with it the ions creating the buffering capacity and thus cause high
corrosion rates when water continues to condense?
• Can corrosion patterns develop leading to pitting like patterns?
The effects of H2 S
In many oil field production environment the level of H2 S is very low and can be ignored as
a potential corrosion mechanism. But there are fields, which naturally contain a lot of H2 S.
Some fields that start up with negligible H2 S levels experience growing concentrations due
to SRB (Sulfide Reducing Bacteria) activity as a result of water injection. Thus there are
more and more cases where H2 S is becoming a concern.
Typically the reaction of H2 S with steel can be written in the following way:
H2 S (in water) -> H+ + HS− (in water) -> 2H+ + S−
Fe (metallic) -> Fe2+ -2e− (in water)
Fe2+ + S− + 2H+ + 2e− -> FeS + 2H -> FeS + H2
Iron Sulfide FeS has a low solubility and would precipitate on the steel surfaces. It has also
been reported [Sun and Nesic, 2007] that there can be a direct reaction between sulfide ions
and Iron on the steel surface forming a very thin layer of FeS in the form of Mackinawite.
Iron sulfide films tends to provide very good protection against corrosion but local damage
to such films may create sites for localised corrosion to develop.
However, in flexible pipe applications H2 S will mainly be accompanying CO2 , which in most
cases will be in much higher abundance than H2 S. The main concerns with H2 S are expected
to be:
• Influences from H2 S on the CO2 corrosion process
• Potential of Sulfide Stress Corrosion Cracking (SSCC) and Hydrogen induced Cracking
(HIC) in high strength steels
Possible Effects from H2 S on CO2 Corrosion [Taravel-Condat and Désamais, 2006b]

report corrosion tests with different amounts of H2 S (up to 1% compared to CO2 ) and

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
showed that the confinement and low V/S ratio produce similar increases in pH compared
to model predictions as for CO2 on its own. They report corrosion rates of 0.025 and 0.030
mm/year (at 20 °C and 80°C respectively) for tests with 0.1 bar H2 S together with around
0.9 bar CO2 in a confinement of V/S=0.2 ml/cm2 .
Desamais and Taravel-Condat [Désamais and Taravel-Condat, 2006] report from a long-term
full scale test with exposure to both CO2 and H2 S that the corrosion rates have been
measured to be in the range 0.005 - 0.015 mm/year.
In a review by [Schmitt and Horstemeier, 2006] of fundamental aspects of CO2 corrosion it
is pointed out that mixing in H2 S can significantly change the corrosion rates depending on
the conditions. H2 S will react with the Iron Carbonate film formed by CO2 corrosion. In
steady state gas compositions the protective film on the steel surfaces may be dominated
by carbonates or sulfides or mixtures depending on absolute and relative partial pressures
of CO2 and H2 S. In some situations H2 S can be beneficial but there are cases where the
corrosion rates increase because of H2 S compared to a pure CO2 system. Based on available
information it is not possible to say whether situations with enhanced corrosion rates on steel
armours in the annulus can develop as a result of increasing H2 S concentrations.
A. Dugstad of IFE (ref [Dugstad, 2013]) has pointed out that H2 S may react quickly with
FeCO3 resulting from the CO2 corrosion. This may lead to gradients in the H2 S concentration
in particular in the radial direction due to high consumption rates. There may be a concern
that in the transition between H2 S influenced and pure CO2 dominated conditions that
variations with time can lead to higher corrosion rates. This is an issue that may have to
be investigated in further details. It may be that there are signatures in the generation of
hydrogen gas that might be detected through annulus vent monitoring.
Potential for SSCC and HIC The main concern with H2 S is Sulfide Stress Corrosion
Cracking (SSCC) and Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC) in high strength steel. This con-
cerns steels with hardness exceeding a threshold and since hardness tend to be proportional
to the ultimate yield strength the SSCC issue relates to steels with a UTS exceeding a
threshold. Steels that exceed these thresholds can still be resistant to SSCC and HIC de-
pending on composition and heat treatment. The [NACE TM 01-77, 1996] standard defines
the requirements and test procedures to qualify specific materials.
Both SSCC and HIC are caused by atomic hydrogen diffusing into the steel structure where
they may collect in micro-voids/inclusions and combine to form hydrogen molecules and build
internal pressures that cause cracking or blistering. H2 S corrosion lead to the formation of
atomic hydrogen and sulfides tend to prevent hydrogen atoms H to combine to molecular
hydrogen H2 that would end up as gas. This leaves higher concentrations of atomic hydrogen
close to the steel surfaces than for instance with CO2 corrosion. The concentrations of atomic
hydrogen will depend on the partial pressure of H2 S and the pH of the electrolyte
SSCC takes place in susceptible materials that are under high stress (relative to their yield
strength). Cracking typically starts in locations with the highest stresses, which could be in
surface irregularities creating stress concentrations. Rather than a single crack a network of
fine feathery-branched cracks will form.
HIC is a mechanism that does not require high stress levels to be present but may take place
in materials with hardness above a threshold level. It is thought to be linked to long drawn
out inclusions and will often appear as internal blister-like defects.

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
There are examples where flexible pipes, in particular flow lines with high annulus pressures,
designed for sweet service have failed due to H2 S related cracking because the reservoir turns
sour with time. The observed damage patterns and locations do not necessarily fit what would
be expected from SSCC and HIC. Thus the industry may benefit from developing further
knowledge and insight into the potential corrosion mechanisms when H2 S builds up in the
annuli of flexible pipes.
Effects from oxygen
Pure Oxygen Corrosion Corrosion of steel in seawater with dissolved oxygen can be de-
scribed by the following full reaction:
2Fe + O2 + 2H2 O -> 2Fe(OH)2
Further reactions with oxygen and water will also lead to other end products such as Fe(OH)3 .
The reaction is clearly dependent on the availability of oxygen. The corrosion rate will
directly depend on the concentration of dissolved oxygen and be influenced by parameters
such as temperature and to a limited extent on pH. With constant concentration of oxygen
the corrosion rate increases with temperature.
In seawater the corrosion rate will be limited by Calcium Carbonate, CaCO3 , deposits forming
on the steel surface. In seawater saturated with air and with continuous removal of surface
deposits the corrosion rate will be around 0.6mm/year at 20 °C, [Bardal, 1994]. In reality,
due to calcareous deposits, it turns out to be around 0.1 - 0.2 mm/year for uncoated steel in
moving seawater without protection by anodes or impressed current systems. Since oxygen
corrosion is also limited by the supply of oxygen the corrosion rates become fairly low when
the movement of the water is limited. Other corrosion products building on steel surfaces
will contribute to slowing down the corrosion rate.
In the splash zone exposed steel surfaces are intermittently submerged in seawater and
exposed to air a significant fraction of the time. In such situations the steel surfaces may be
covered by water films most of the time and protective deposits may be washed away. This
may lead to a good availability of oxygen and corrosion rates up to 0.4 mm/year have been
reported on other steel components [Bardal, 1994] in such conditions.
Possible impacts from Oxygen on other corrosion processes The main concern from
repeated ingress of oxygen, through aerated water or air, may be the impacts oxygen could
have on other corrosion processes. The paper by [Schmitt and Horstemeier, 2006] state that
Oxygen in CO2 systems exhibits a strong effect on the corrosion rate and facilitates the
formation of localized attack. Oxygen may damage the protective iron carbonate film (and
the high pH) created from CO2 corrosion in a confined annulus. With poorer protection by
carbonate films and lower pH the CO2 corrosion rate may increase significantly. Examples
referenced in [Schmitt and Horstemeier, 2006] are not directly relevant for the conditions in
annulus but magnitude of the effects (0.5 mm/y per ppm of oxygen) should create concerns
also for annulus corrosion in locations with ingress of air. The effects of O2 on CO2 corrosion
are also studied in recent experiments performed by IFE.
Relevant scenarios are situations where oxygen can enter and disturb low CO2 corrosion rates.
One scenario is air entering through the vent system or leakages in the sealing between the
end fitting and the outer cover. Combined with the possibility of water condensing in the

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
vent tubes and CO2 in the vent gas it is possible to see cases of concern. The most frequent
source of oxygen ingress would be holes in the outside cover which is discussed in Chapter
B4.
Possible impacts from oxygen on H2 S dominated corrosion processes should also be of con-
cern. For instance ingress of aerated seawater into the annulus of subsea pipes with high
partial pressures of H2 S could change the corrosion mechanisms and corrosion rates. It is
known that oxygen will react with hydrogen sulfide to form elemental sulphur that is a strong
corrosion agent for steel. Other mechanisms could also be relevant.
Other potential influences on corrosion
There may also be other chemical constituents that influence the susceptibility to corrosion.
One possibility is chloride in the seawater that might have an impact on pitting corrosion by
creating local damage to protective films.
B4.3.4 Hole in the outside cover
Holes in locations submerged in seawater
Corrosion from a single flooding Possible scenarios for ingress of water and air as a result
of holes through the outer cover have been described in Chapter B4.2. A hole in the outer
cover of a riser below the sea level will lead to partial flooding of the annulus of the riser
with gas pockets trapped in high points such as in the hog for many riser configurations.
A typical concentration of oxygen in seawater in equilibrium with air is a round 8 ppm by
weight. In the water filled part of the annulus the water volume and therefore the amount
of available oxygen in ratio to steel surface area is low. If the oxygen is evenly distributed
over the steel areas of the edges of the tensile armour wires for a typical pipe design there
will be 0.4 µg/cm2 (oxygen / surface area of armour wire edges). If all the oxygen is
consumed through the oxygen reduction cathodic reaction the amount of Iron going into
solution would correspond to 1.4 µg/cm2. Distributed evenly over the edges of the tensile
armours this corresponds to 1.8 nm (10-9 m). Thus the oxygen from 1 flooding will represent
a negligible potential material loss from oxygen corrosion.
Direct exposure to seawater and cathodic protection Armour wires that are directly
exposed to flowing/moving seawater will primarily be exposed to oxygen driven corrosion.
Unprotected corrosion rates under these conditions would typically be up to the range 0.1 to
0.2 mm/year as described in Chapter B4. The highest corrosion rates will be found where
the flow speed of water is highest and will decrease with reduced flow speed (for seawater in
direct contact with steel surfaces).
If the configuration of the damage to the outside cover provides some shielding from the
flowing water but still allow direct exposure to the seawater the pure oxygen driven corrosion
rate is expected to be lower than a damage case that gives direct exposure to the flowing
water.
Most risers and flow lines are equipped with cathodic protection systems such as anodes
or impressed current systems. These systems are expected to provide adequate protection

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
potentials for directly exposed armour surfaces. This requires that the anode system has
been designed with adequate reach to cover the full length of pipe to be protected and with
sufficient capacity to provide protection over the service life.
[Festy et al., 2004] have reported investigations of cathodic protection efficiency. A simula-
tion cell was made to investigate the protection efficiency under the cover in a hole with good
exposure to oxygenated seawater. CO2 bubbling was also included in the test to simulate
annulus environment. The results showed that steel under a simulated cover was adequately
protected well beyond the reach of the oxygen. The simulation of gaps or channels for water
in the annulus deviated from the structure in a real annulus so the results may not be fully
representative. The test did not include any simulation of ’pumping’ actions that can drive
oxygenated water into the annulus away from the hole. The test was not set up to investigate
the protection of internal armour layers.
Effects of renewal of seawater - mixture scenarios In locations where seawater is contin-

uously renewed the environment will be dominated by oxygen in the seawater. An important
question is how far into the armour wire structure will pure seawater corrosion dominate?
This will most probably depend on the actual outer cover damage, its location and whether
there are conditions that will have pumping actions that regularly ’pump’ seawater in and
out of the hole. Permeating gases will partly be venting through a hole in the outer cover.
This may ensure relatively good supply of CO2 to saturate seawater-reaching regions of the
annulus fairly close to a hole.
One can foresee, in a region in the vicinity of a hole, a scenario where CO2 dominated
anaerobic conditions have developed before a pumping event, such as a cool down, drives
fresh seawater to this region. Oxygen will dominate over CO2 for a period until CO2 regains
domination either because of water being driven in the opposite direction or CO2 building up
from the transport of permeating gases. What impacts such oxygen exposure have on the
CO2 corrosion and how frequent must such event be to create long-term corrosion issues is
not understood.
Another relevant question is how much oxygen is necessary to disturb the iron carbonate
films sufficiently to push the CO2 corrosion rate to a level where it will represent a concern?
It is worth noting that seawater has a pH around 8, which could contribute to limit the
corrosion threat?
Summary of questions and issues:
• To what extent and how often is the seawater renewed in the annulus in the vicinity
of a hole in the outer cover as function of
– type and location of cover damage?
– pipe configuration?
– operation and other exposure conditions?
• Will possible patterns of seawater renewal create conditions in the annulus water that
will lead to enhanced corrosion rates to levels that would be of concern?
• To what extent will cathodic protection help to limit potential corrosion pattern?
• What is the reach of effective cathodic protection into the annulus relative to the reach
of renewed oxygenated seawater?

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
• The uncertainties relating to these issues should encourage

– Investigations to understand the threat and quantify issues
– Ensure that damage to outside covers are repaired as soon as possible
Holes above the sea level and in the splash zone
Holes in the splash zone will regularly or in periods repeatedly be exposed to seawater. Steel
surfaces that are directly impacted by seawater will:
• In periods be covered by water films rich in oxygen
• If the water impacts are vigorous they may damage protective corrosion deposits
• When the hole is above the water there is no effects from cathodic protection
The corrosion rates from oxygen could be up to 0.4 mm/y.
Waves that take a hole in and out of submergence will induce some pumping actions -
possibly compressing gas pockets in the downwards direction and forcing water upwards in
the annulus. The upward reach will be bounded by the wave height but flow impedance
along the annulus combined with the submergence period will probably contribute to limit
the reach. The consequence is that oxygenated water will be flowing in and out of parts of
the annulus above a hole that is going in and out of submergence. Anti-wear layers will also
impede the flow of water both in and out during a wave period and may contribute to partial
trapping of water. Periods with high waves may lead to wetting of sections of the annulus
that in following periods will not get in contact with fresh sea water. This may lead to CO2
domination in water that may be partially trapped.
There is a multitude of possible exposure combinations that can exist for armour wires under
and in the vicinity of holes in the splash zone. It is difficult to predict possible corrosion
patterns but there are possibilities for high corrosion rate scenarios including oxygen, CO2
and combinations.
For holes that are located above the splash zone the main threat will be ingress of air
possibly in combination with ingress of rain water and/or seawater spray. It is possible that
the annulus will have filled up with water to the level of the hole. In such cases there will be
water in the annulus below the hole and water vapour may condense in the annulus above
the hole. Any pumping effects will result in air being sucked in rather than oxygenated water
if the holes had been submerged in seawater. On the other hand holes in outside covers in
locations that are shielded from exposure to running water, as for instance inside I-tubes, may
not lead to water filling of the annulus. The armours may stay dry depending of temperature
conditions in relation to the dew point of water in the gas transported in the annulus. Thus
a variety of conditions may exist with varying mixtures of water, oxygen and the corrosion
threat must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
There have also been reports in the industry of outside covers cracking due to ageing under
bend stiffeners in applications with relatively high temperatures. This will lead to possible
combinations of oxygen and CO2 and a key question is whether condensed water may exist
in this part of the annulus. The temperature in the annulus would be high, which should not
lead to condensation of water but then there may be the possibility of water condensing in
vent tube running back to the annulus. Again potential issues have to be assessed based on
configurations and operating conditions.

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
B4.3.5 Effects on fatigue resistance from corrosion processes
Introduction
Fatigue of armour wires is in many cases a limiting factor for the design life of flexible risers.
Until a few years ago, fatigue design was based on SN data obtained by component testing
in air, with the implicit assumption that the environment in a pipe annulus is benign with
regard to fatigue of armour wires. Service experience has shown that a pipe annulus may
contain species that are aggressive with respect to steel, and could affect fatigue strength
significantly. In a consistent design methodology these effects should be taken into account.
The essential components of dynamic loading of a flexible riser are global bending and tension.
For shallow water risers bending loading will in general be dominating, and concentrated to
the top end and (depending on the configuration) sag and hog bends and the touch-down
zone. Deep-water risers in a catenary configuration will to a larger extent be subjected also
to fluctuating tension in the top end, due to inertia and drag forces.
Fatigue design of armour wire is based on empirical SN-curves from component testing.
A number of programs have been and are being carried out to determine SN-curves for
simulated annulus environments. Most of the data is confidential. Some general results will
be discussed here, based on [Berge et al., 2008].
Environmental effects on fatigue strength
In the as-fabricated state, void space in the pipe annulus is filled with atmospheric air.
However, for several possible reasons the chemical composition of the annulus may change
during operation, as discussed throughout this chapter.
A corrosive environment may have an effect on fatigue strength through two different pro-
cesses:
1. The long term cumulative effect of exposure to a corrosive environment may lead to
deterioration of the surface of the armour, in particular by pitting corrosion. A number
of studies have shown that pitting corrosion to a depth in the range 50-100 m may
have a significant effect on fatigue strength of steel plate, due to an enhanced fatigue
notch factor. Service experience has shown that armour wire in a flooded annulus
may become subjected to pitting. However, no studies have been reported to give
quantitative data on the effect on fatigue strength of armour wire.
2. A corrosive environment may interact with the cycle-by-cycle fatigue damage process
(slip band formation, fatigue crack initiation and growth). A number of environmental
effects may lead to accelerated fatigue damage (anodic dissolution of iron leading to
accelerated slip band formation or fatigue crack initiation and growth, local hydrogen
effects causing embrittlement and stress corrosion, and so on). On the other hand,
corrosion products (iron carbonate FeCO3 , iron sulphide FeS) may form a protective
layer, and reduce the detrimental effect of the environment. The relatively large scatter
that is often observed in corrosion fatigue testing may be attributed to the competition
between corrosive and protective processes.
It is important to note that a corrosion fatigue test to obtain an SN-curve normally is carried
out over a time span of weeks or possibly some few months. The long-term cumulative effect

Section B4.3
OC2017 A-001
of corrosion damage is thus not considered.
Annulus environments
The factors of annulus environments that are most important for fatigue strength and need
to be considered in design and in testing are discussed below.
Sea Water Ingress It is known from service experience that sea water flooding of flexible
pipe due to leakage through holes in the external sheath or faulty vent valves is a scenario
with a relatively high probability. The following issues need to be addressed:
• Effect of cathodic protection - possible shielding at some distance from the point of
leakage.
• Chemistry of seawater, in particular oxygen level inside the annulus and also the pos-
sibility of microbial induced corrosion as sulphide reducing bacteria may develop in
stagnant sea water.
• Diffusion of gases from the bore, in particular CO2 and H2 S, partial pressures.
Diffusion from bore Similar issues arise with respect to diffusion from the bore:
• Rate of diffusion of water vapour, condensation in the annulus.
• Ionic content in condensed water.
• Diffusion of gases from the bore, in particular CO2 and H2 S, partial pressures.
Repaired pipe Pipes that are subjected to seawater ingress may be flushed and repaired,
and then re-installed. The following issues arise:
• Time frame for inspection and repair before corrosion fatigue damage may take place.
• Effect of inhibitor, possibly with residual seawater, CO2 and H2 S, on residual life.
Diffusion from bore - prediction models Prediction models have been developed for
diffusion of species from the bore, based on Fick’s laws, e.g. [Last et al., 2002]. The models
may be used for prediction of annulus environment, in particular condensation of water and
concentration of gases. A generic problem is that due to the number of parameters a test
matrix to cover all possible design cases becomes very large. Test parameters are discussed
more in detail in Chapter B5.
Environmental parameters for design and test simulation In corrosion fatigue testing
to obtain design criteria (SN-curves) it is important to simulate operational conditions as
truly as possible. For annulus environments this is a very difficult task, due to the large
variability of possible scenarios. Another complication is that the conditions in an annulus
are dynamic - gases (H2 S and/or CO2 ) that diffuse through the liner will be consumed
by chemical reactions with the steel. The conditions in a water-filled annulus in terms of
partial pressures are thus very different from the nominal composition of the gas that diffuses
through the liner. The current approach in design is to characterise the annulus environment
by the nominal parameters, i.e the partial pressures of gases calculated from the diffusion
models and disregarding consumption by chemical reactions. In testing the electrolyte is
bubbled with a gas of the same composition. Simulation of the environment in testing is
thus based on nominal parameters. Testing is discussed more in detail in Chapter B5 Test
Methods.

Section B4.4
OC2017 A-001
Current status
Service experience shows that armour wire in flexible risers may be exposed to aggressive
environments. The detrimental effect on fatigue strength may be significant, in particular for
long lives, [Berge et al., 2008]. There is a need for fatigue design criteria for a large number
of design cases, specified by:
• Material grade, strength class
• Environmental factors
• Load parameters
Several programs have been carried out or are on-going with the aim of establishing such
fatigue design criteria. However, very little information is public domain, and no standard
industrial practice has been established. A further problem is that test data tends to be
considered ’in-house’ to the respective suppliers of flexible pipe, valid for proprietary brands
of wire only. It would be beneficial for the industry if SN-data instead were presented and
analysed on the basis of generic strength classes, for the following reasons:
1. The variability that in some test series is observed between different brands of armour
wire (within the same strength class) is in most cases hardly significant. The scatter-
bands are in many cases overlapping, and no systematic trend is seen to indicate that
one brand is superior relative to other brands. It is likely that the variability is of type
batch-to-batch rather than brand specific.
2. If SN-data were analysed on the basis of brand, each SN curve would represent one
batch of material only. This would lead to much narrower scatter-bands than what is
obtained if data representing many batches are pooled together. The design criteria
that would be derived from this procedure could become unconservative.
3. In many cases fatigue design is carried out with no knowledge of which supplier will
provide the riser. Using brand specific SN-curves would be complicated for such cases.
The analysis of SN-data that is underlying the current design codes for welded steel struc-
tures, [Gurney and Maddox, 1973], is based on data that deliberately were pooled from as
many sources as possible, taken to represent materials and welding technology at large. In
this way generic and robust design criteria were obtained that could be applied world-wide,
provided basic quality requirements were met. In the same way, generic fatigue design criteria
for flexible risers should be developed, to be sufficiently robust to be applied independent of
brand.
For products that may be claimed to have better properties than what is given by the generic
SN-curves there is still an option to use optimised design criteria for that specific product,
provided the improved properties can be documented.

Section B4.4
OC2017 A-001
B4.4 Field experience
B4.4.1 Cases with severe corrosion
Subsea pipelines
An early paper reporting corrosion in the annulus was from a trial use a flexible pipe for gas
lift with high H2 S (2.5%) and CO2 (6%) contents, [j. Al-Maslamani, 1996]. It culminated
in failure after 3 years. Gas leakages were observed from several locations on both the riser
and flow line sections. The leakage rates to the sea went up and down with the pressure in
the bore suggesting holes in the pressure sheath.
A one meter section of the flow line was retrieved for dissection and assessment. Pictures in
ref. [j. Al-Maslamani, 1996] give clear impression of severely corroded and ruptured armours.
Cracks and ruptures in the armours had clear signs of SSC, Hydrogen Induced Cracking and
Hydrogen embrittlement confirmed by metallographic investigation. It was suggested that
the hardness was higher than specified by NACE MR0175 for sour service steels. They also
reported unacceptable steel structure in the surface of the pressure armour.
There was no discussion of the possible sequence of event - whether the pressure sheath had
ruptured first or whether water in the annulus had led to ruptures and loss of support for
the pressure sheath. The clear message is that selection and qualification of steel for sour
service is essential.
Today we know about several cases where subsea flexible pipeline have failed due to corro-
sion/cracking of armour wires in the annulus: at least 3 cases in the North Sea, 1 in the
Arabic Gulf and 2 cases I Africa. The main suspicion is increasing levels of H2 S that have
led to SSCC or related issues for high UTS armours. There is a growing need to understand
the causes to limit future impacts.
Severe corrosion of armours in risers
Very limited Information about cases where operators have experienced corrosion leading to
pipe failures or near misses is available in the public domain. Some information has been
provided through presentations in open forums and some information has spread through the
industry. To our knowledge about corrosion issues with risers are:
• At least 4 riser failures caused by corrosion resulting from hole in outside cover:
– 1 in UK sector
– 1 in West Africa
– 2 in South North Sea
A couple of these have led to catastrophic failures.
• At least 3 occurences where severe corrosion was detected in time for corrective action
– 2 in North Sea
– 1 in Africa

Section B4.5
OC2017 A-001
We do, however, not know the specific corrosion mechanisms that have led to the failures
whether it has been oxygen driven corrosion, oxygen + CO2 or CO2 + H2 S with oxygen. We
believe that all the failures originated from holes in the outer cover located in the sea level
region or below. One of the near misses was due to damage well above the sea level.
In the years after the 2014 revision of this handbook corrosion issues are experienced related
to outer sheath wear and wear of armour wires. Additionally, in two separate cases suspected
corrosion processes are due to the combined effects of O2 and CO2 , and due to CO2 and
acids in the annulus.
Figure B4.7 and Figure B4.8 have been included to illustrate issues without reference to
specific cases.
Figure B4.7: Corroded armour wire after breach of external sheath, [Out, 2010] (Courtesy
of Hans Out,Shell)
B4.4.2 Other field experience
There are several cases where potentially concerning corrosion attacks have been found on
armour wires from flexible pipes retrieved for other reasons. In some cases the damage has
been equivalent to or more severe than the corrosion pits found on samples from the North
Sea Riser and the Balmoral Riser that gave significantly reduced fatigue life compared to
predictions from SN curves for new wires.
Information available points to the need for better understanding of corrosion mechanisms in
the annulus and what level of surface damage they can create. If relatively modest corrosion
takes place in locations that represent hot spot for fatigue loads the fatigue life for a riser
can be significantly reduced, ref. Figure B4.9.
There are numerous cases where damages to outside covers have been detected and repaired
in time to avoid significant reduction in integrity [Anderson et al., 2007].

Section B4.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure B4.8: Armour wire corrosion (Courtesy of Statoil)
Figure B4.9: Example of pitting in axial armour wires [Nordsve, 2007]

Section B4.5
OC2017 A-001
B4.5 Summary and recommendations
B4.5.1 Summary of field experience:
Pipe failures - loss of containment where corrosion was the main mechanism:
• At least 4 riser failures caused by corrosion resulting from hole in outside cover:
– UK Sector
– West Africa,
– 2 in South North Sea
• At least 6 pipeline failures have been caused by sulfide stress cracking or HIC of high
strength steel armour wires stimulated by H2 S or cathodic protection of deformed
armour wires inside damaged outside cover.
– Arabic gulf
– Africa
– South North Sea
– UK Sector
• At least 3 near misses on risers where severe corrosion was detected in time for cor-
rective action
– North Sea
– Africa
4Subsea knows of at least 5 cases where ’significant’ corrosion attack has been found on
armour wires from flexible pipes retrieved for other reasons. On theses wires the corrosion
damage has been equivalent to or more severe than the surface damage found on samples
from the North Sea Riser and the Balmoral Riser that came out with strong indications of
significantly reduced service life.
There are numerous cases where damages to outside covers have been detected and repaired
in time to avoid significant reduction in integrity.
B4.5.2 Key findings relating to CO2 corrosion
There is strong evidence that CO2 corrosion rates on steel armours in anaerobic water phases
in flexible pipe annuli are low - typically below 0.01 mm/year. The reason for this is the low
ratio between available water volume and the steel surface area in a confined annuls. This
will be the case for both condensed water and ingress of seawater.
Presence of acids or ingress of oxygen into CO2 corrosion systems may lead to significantly
enhanced corrosion rates.

Section B4.5
OC2017 A-001
B4.5.3 Issues for concern
Hole in the outside cover.
• Below sea level the main concern will be the reach and frequency of renewal of oxy-
genated seawater (pumping effects). There may be potential corrosion threats where
oxygen may mix in with CO2 or if conditions vary between CO2 dominated and oxy-
gen dominated. There are also uncertainties regarding the effectiveness of cathodic
protection, due to shielding effects, for armour wires in the vicinity of a hole in the
outside cover.
• Holes in the splash zone can lead to conditions with high corrosion rates. To mitigate
severe loss of integrity, damage to outside covers should be detected very early -
preferably within weeks or a few months.
• Holes above water can lead to serious corrosion depending on location. Issues are:
– Damage patterns and vent system lay-out that lead to renewal of oxygen.
– Possible enhanced corrosion in situations with mixtures of Oxygen and CO2 (&
Oxygen and H2 S)
– Condensation and formation of thin water films on armour wires
• A situation with multiple holes in outside covers with possible circulation of seawater
or air from one hole to another is a high risk scenario.
Other issues
• Growing H2 S concentration in pipes with high strength steel - can lead to major
corrosion / cracking damage
• Mixtures of H2 S and CO2 - can this lead to unforeseen corrosion damage
• Possible top of line CO2 corrosion - should be investigated
• Possible enhanced CO2 corrosion in connection with local damage of protective Iron-
carbonate films (relative movement of contacting surfaces)
• Possible unforeseen effects of annuli with high total pressure with correspondingly high
partial pressures of acid gases.
B4.5.4 Mitigation:
Motivation
Many of the serious corrosion issues experienced by the industry cannot be removed by design
of the flexible pipes. It is essential for the industry to implement procedures, work practices,
monitoring solutions and inspection programs to
• in the first instance, avoid damages or incidents that can lead to corrosion and
• secondly make sure that incidents or damages leading to corrosion in the annulus are
detected as soon as possible.

Section B4.5
OC2017 A-001
During Installation
Many incidents of outer cover damage take place during installation. The consequences
can be serious. It is therefore essential to implement procedures and work practices during
installation that limit the chance of damage to the outside cover. If damage should occur it
is essential that these are detected and repaired appropriately as soon as possible.
During Operation
In the operational phase the following mitigations are recommended

• Annulus vent should not be ventilated directly to the atmosphere, but either be directed
to a closed vent system or ventilated through a pressure valve to avoid ingress of oxygen
through the vent port and into the annulus
• By all means avoid blockage of the annulus vent system:
– Blocked venting systems will lead to rupture of the outside cover.
– Establish continuous monitoring or periodic inspection to verify adequate venting
– Ensure periodic annulus testing to measure the flow rate (flow impedance) through
the vent system.
• Limit the chance of falling objects and impacts that can damage the outer cover.
– Ensure a strict system for reporting incidents that could have caused cover dam-
age.
• Identify whether cracking of the outside cover under the bend stiffener is a potential
issue based on the operating temperature and the thermal gradient through the pipe
wall and bend stiffener.
– If at risk, carry out modeling and implement possible mitigation (lower tempera-
ture / limit access of oxygen etc)
• Implement monitoring or inspection system to detect outside cover damage early
enough to repair in time:
– A hole in or just above the splash zone should be detected within weeks or months.
– Annulus vent testing is a cheap and effective way to detect outside cover breaches
in the upper part of risers
– Regular visual inspection
– Be aware of possible rupture of outside cover in the hog because of high pressure
in gas pockets with a high water column in the annulus. (The risk can be assessed
from configuration and measurement of free volume in the annulus in the top of
the riser)
– Regular ROV inspection to search for cover breaches
• Verify functional cathodic protection over the entire service life of the flexible pipe
• Assess the chances of Sulfide Stress Cracking or Hydrogen Induced Cracking based on
possible increase in H2 S and material used for armour wires.

Section B4.5
OC2017 A-001
Limit impacts of outer cover damages
• Implement inspection and monitoring procedures to ensure early detection of cover

damage
• Carry out assessment of corrosion scenarios and risk when a cover damage has been
detected
• Ensure that damages are repaired as soon as possible to avoid/limit possible corrosion
damage
• Immediate attention must be given to situation where there are multiple damages to
the outside cover that can lead to circulation of seawater or air.
B4.5.5 Future challenges
To deal appropriately with integrity issues related to potential corrosion of steel armours in
the annuli of flexible pipes there is a need to develop more knowledge and insight about
annulus conditions and realistic corrosion scenarios such as:
• Conditions and corrosion in the annulus in the vicinity of holes in the outside cover
• The potential impacts of H2 S, in particular for sweet service armours in field that turn
sour
New knowledge about the processes must be combined with better solutions for monitor-
ing and detection of corrosion threats such as characterization of signatures from relevant
corrosion processes:
• Equipment and procedures to enhance the quality of annulus vent monitoring and
testing
• Develop new methods for annulus monitoring and inspection to detect damage pro-
cesses
• Address potential corrosion issues to enable prediction capabilities
In the long term the cost of developing sufficient knowledge and insight will be small compared
to consequences of not being able to deal with the integrity threats in a diligent way.

Chapter B5
Test Methods
Author: Stig Berge (NTNU)
367
Section B5.2
OC2017 A-001
B5.1 Introduction
Testing is an integral part of flexible pipe technology. [API 17B, 2008] and [API 17J, 2008]
specify a large number of tests to be carried out during the phases of the life of a flexi-
ble pipe concept; design, qualification, characterisation, fabrication, acceptance, installation,
commissioning and operation. The objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the dif-
ferent types of tests that are specified. Details are found in [API 17B, 2008], [API 17J, 2008]
and referenced testing standards.
In addition, procedures for corrosion fatigue testing that is not detailed in the API documents
are described in some detail.
B5.2
B5.2.1 Prototype testing
There are two objectives of prototype (qualification) testing [API 17B, 2008]:
• Evaluate the performance (i.e. structural, functional, fabrication) of a new or estab-
lished pipe design (verification test).
• Qualification of an established pipe design for use outside its previously qualified en-
velope.
Prototype tests are generally carried out with full scale sections of pipe with end terminations,
or medium scaled sections comprising only the layers required for the test, with or without
end terminations. Many of the tests are destructive.
The number and range of prototype tests that can be performed on a flexible pipe is extensive,
and requires for many tests special and expensive test rigs. The requirements for prototype
testing are thus subject to agreement between the manufacturer and the purchaser. As an
alternative to prototype testing the manufacturer may provide objective evidence that the
product satisfies the design requirements. Objective evidence is defined as documented field
experience, test data, technical publications, finite element analysis or calculations that verify
the performance requirements.
Prototype tests are furthermore classified into three classes:
• Class I: Standard prototype tests, as most commonly used
• Class II: Special prototype tests, used regularly to verify specific aspects of performance,
such as installation or operating conditions
• Class III: Tests used only for characterisation of the pipe properties.
In [API 17B, 2008] detailed guidance is given on the type of tests for each Class, with
specifications for the test procedures and acceptance criteria. A brief summary is given here.
Class I tests The objective of Class I tests is to document the basic strength properties of a
pipe; burst pressure, axial tension, hydrostatic collapse and cyclic temperature test of PVDF.
Class II tests The objective of Class II tests is to document properties that are important
for specific applications, in installation or operation; full scale fatigue test, crush strength

Section B5.2
OC2017 A-001
test, combined bending and tensile test, sour service test, etc. The number of tests is large,
for unbonded pipe 13 tests are listed in [API 17B, 2008].
Class III tests Class III tests, also termed characterisation tests are normally carried out
as part of a prototype test program. The objective is to measure properties of a pipe that
cannot readily be determined on the basis of design calculations. Properties that are assessed
on the basis of testing are bending stiffness, torsional stiffness, axial compression strength,
abrasion resistance, etc., cf. [API 17B, 2008].
Validation tests Prototype testing is not only a test of pipe performance, but also a test of
the design methods used. The tests may thus be used to validate the design methods and
tools, in particular software.
B5.2.2 End termination tests
End terminations are complicated structures where all load-carrying components in a pipe
wall are anchored, in principle with at least the same capacity and service life as in the pipe
wall. The sealing layers (liner and outer sheath) must be sealed with a sufficient pressure
capacity and endurance. Proof of capacity is to a large extent based on testing and - for
established designs - service experience.
Testing of end terminations is integral to many of the prototype tests. But tests have been
developed for specific testing of end terminations. The problem that is addressed is the
anchoring and sealing of the liner. Under thermal cycling, e.g. during a shut-down of the
riser, the liner will shrink and expand thermally, and large axial stresses will be developed.
This applies in particular to polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF), which is the preferred material
for high temperature applications. The anchoring and sealing is provided by mechanical
clamping of the liner. The axial thermal stress may cause slippage in the anchoring, and
over time (many cycles) pull-out of the liner. Some PVDFs require an addition of a plasticiser
to improve on the extrusion process. The plasticizer is volatile, and over time the loss of
plasticizer leads to volumetric shrinkage of the liner, and loss of anchoring force.
Two special tests are specified in [API 17B, 2008] for testing of end terminations and liner
material under cyclic thermal loading, one for liners with plasticizer and one for liners without.
The tests require full scale or medium scale models with end terminations.
B5.2.3 Vacuum tests
In a vacuum test the annulus of a pipe is partially vacuumed. The test may be applied with
two objectives:
1. To demonstrate that the sealing layers (liner and outer sheath) are leak-proof.
2. To investigate (for a pipe in operation) whether the annulus is dry or water-filled.
B5.2.4 Factory acceptance tests
Factory acceptance testing (FAT) is a procedure for verification that a pipe is manufactured
to the requirements of [API 17J, 2008]. The following tests are specified:

Section B5.2
OC2017 A-001
• Hydrostatic pressure test, in general to 1.5 times the design pressure for risers and 1.3
times the design pressure for flowlines and jumpers
• Gauge test to detect blockages and gross deformations
• Electrical continuity and isolation test to ensure that the cathodic protection system
will be efficient and the carcass is electrically isolated from the end terminations
• Gas venting test to demonstrate that the gas-relief system for the annulus is functioning
properly
• Sealing test to confirm the integrity of the external sheath and sealing/crimping of the
external sheath at the end fitting.
The hydrostatic pressure test is mandatory for all pipes. The other tests apply according to
relevance for the specific pipe design.
B5.2.5 On-board structural integrity test
The on-board structural integrity test (SIT) is required if a pipe is fully retrieved and repaired
on-board an installation vessel, and when the structural integrity have been affected. SIT is
a pressure test to a specified pressure.
B5.2.6 Offshore structural integrity test
The offshore structural integrity test (SIT) is required post-installation if the pipe is repaired
in-situ and when the structural integrity have been affected, or to re-assess the integrity
versus suspected damage/reduced resistance. SIT is a pressure test to a specified pressure.
B5.2.7 Materials testing
A wide range of materials are used to build a flexible pipe cross section; stainless steel, carbon
steel, extruded polymers, polymer tape, composite fibre tape. In operation the materials are
subjected to a complex range of loadings; static and dynamic stress, aggressive environment,
thermal cycles and abrasive action. Documentation of the material properties is therefore
important.
In [API 17J, 2008] is listed a large number of tests for characterisation of materials (approx-
imately 65 normative standards, plus a large number of informative references). These are
in most cases standardised tests from a number of organisations:
• American Petroleum Institute (API)
• American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
• American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
• Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
• European Committee for Standardization (CEN)
• International Organisation for Standardization (ISO)
• Lloyds Register (LR)

Section B5.3
OC2017 A-001
• National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE)

It is outside the scope of this handbook to give a discussion of these test methods, ex-
cept giving some very brief comments on two tests of specific significance for flexible pipe
applications.
One specific test of metallic components stands out as particularly important, the NACE test
for resistance to sulphide stress cracking and stress corrosion cracking in H2S environments,
NACE TM 01-77. The distinction between sweet and sour service armour wire is essentially
based on this test.
Polymer materials for liners are to be tested extensively with respect to mechanical, chemical,
thermal and abrasive resistance. The [API 17TR2, 2003] specification for testing of ageing
of polyamide PA-11 was specifically developed for riser applications. Polyamides at elevated
temperature and with presence of water are susceptible to hydrolysis. Over time the polymeric
structure breaks down and the material starts cracking. Under acidic conditions the aging
will be accelerating. The [API 17TR2, 2003] gives criteria for the service life of polyamide
liners.
B5.3 Corrosion fatigue testing
As discussed in Chapter B4 the annulus of a flexible pipe in many cases may be subjected to
a range of corrosive environments. The fatigue strength may be significantly affected by the
environment and fatigue design should be based on empirical SN-curves from component
testing in the relevant environments.
B5.3.1 Test protocol
Corrosion testing is non-standard, and a test protocol has been worked out, [Berge, 2007]Berge
(2007). The protocol provides detailed description on test procedures and parameters. Rec-
ommendations are given on:
• specifications for the environment
• specimen preparation
• fatigue loading procedure
• data processing, assessment of design SN-curves
Methods and procedures for corrosion fatigue testing of armour wire are presented and dis-
cussed in several papers, [Berge et al., 2003], [Berge et al., 2008], [Rubin and Gudme, 2009],
[Santos et al., 2011]) and [Clements et al., 2012]. A brief review is given here, mainly based
on the test protocol, [Berge, 2007].
B5.3.2 Specifications for the environment
Two different aqueous environments are specified, ASTM sea water and distilled water with
1000 ppm of chloride (to simulate the industrial environment of pipe manufacture). Use of
inhibitor is case dependent, and needs to be specified for each case. Buffers should not be

Section B5.3
OC2017 A-001
added, such that the environment is allowed to stabilise at a natural level of pH. The pH
level should be monitored during testing.
Three mixtures could be used, of high purity gas, with composition defined by the respective
partial pressures:
• CO2 (+ N2 )
• H2 S (+ CO2 )
• H2 S + CO2 (+N2 )
Test conditions are assumed to simulate environmental conditions in an annulus, with a large
ratio of steel area relative to liquid volume. It is recommended to use steel wool or steel chips
to create a large surface area. The steel wool/chips should not be in galvanic contact with
the specimens. In the case of testing in CO2 environment a pre-conditioning time of 2 days is
advised for establishing super-saturation of iron in the solution. In H2 S environment the con-
ditioning is extended to 4 days, in compliance with procedures of [NACE TM 01-77, 1996].
Unless close to a leak in the outer sheath the annulus environment is anaerobic. If even
small amounts of oxygen are allowed into the test chamber, test conditions could become
significantly more onerous. For this reason great care must be taken in equipment design and
test procedures to prevent oxygen ingress. It is recommended that the test cell and piping,
unless all metal, is double wall with annulus either purged with gas (pure N2 ) or flushed with
oxygen free water which has been purged with N2 . Oxygen levels need to be monitored, and
a general requirement is that oxygen concentration in the electrolyte is below 5 ppb at all
times, preferably below 1 ppb.
A generic problem is that due to the number of parameters a test matrix to cover all possible
design cases becomes very large. Test parameters investigated in a single test programme
and discussed by [Berge et al., 2008] are listed below:
Aqueous environment
• None (air)
• Sea water
– aerated
– anaerobic
• Condensed water
– ionic content
Cathodic protection
• Yes
• No
Gas diffusion
• H2 S (balanced with CO2 )
• CO2 (balanced with N2 )
• H2 S + CO2 (balanced with N2 )

Section B5.3
OC2017 A-001
Partial pressures of H2 S (plus combinations balanced with N2 )

• 0.1 mbara
• 1.0 mbara
• 10.0 mbara
Partial pressures of CO2 (plus combinations balanced with N2 )
• 0.1 bara
• 0.5 bara
• 1.0 bara
• 2.0 bara
• 3.0 bara
Temperature
• Room temperature
• Elevated temperatures
– 60 °C
– 90 °C
Loading parameters
• Loading frequency
• R-ratio/mean stress
Additional requirements
• Testing in aqueous environments with H2 S and/or CO2 requires conditioning (pre-
charging) before loading is applied.
• For anaerobic conditions the requirement is O2 < 5 ppb, preferably O2 < 1 ppb.
• Super-saturation of Fe++ in aqueous environments.
In addition, grade of armour material is an essential parameter, with a rough distinction
between sweet service and sour service steels.

Section B5.3
OC2017 A-001
B5.3.3 Specimen preparation and fatigue loading
Specimens should be taken from a pipe, to include technological factors from the production
process, i.e. plastic deformation and possible deterioration of the surface condition. Testing
should always be on specimens with the original surface, with no machining or surface
preparation that could affect fatigue life. Straightening of the wire should be carried out by
hand rolling or similar process, with minimum plastic deformation. A test area representing
minimum 50 mm length of wire is advised.
Axial and bending loading is considered to be equivalent. With axial loading alignment must
be controlled to avoid secondary bending. Bending loading may be applied as three- or four-
point bending, or cantilever bending. Bending tests must be calibrated against strain gauge
measurements. Specific guidance is given on the design of bend test fixtures and procedures
for displacement controlled bending tests to avoid effects of shake-down of residual stresses.
Constant amplitude loading is recommended, at constant R-ratio or constant mean stress.

The parameters should correspond to in-service stress conditions for armour wire. R-ratio R
= 0.1 or a mean stress in the range 250 - 300 MPa are typical values. Testing to obtain
design criteria for deep water risers may require higher mean stress. Models are available
for assessment of the effect of mean stress or R-ratio, on fatigue strength, the Goodman
or Gerber model. For tests carried out at a constant R-ratio the recommended values are
suitable reference points for application of these models.
For assessment of a fatigue design curve, testing should be carried out in the high cycle
region, generally at N ≥ 105 cycles. Tests that lead to plastic deformation of the armour
wire are non-valid. The main contribution to the fatigue damage for typical riser applications
is for stress ranges 50 < ∆S < 350 MPa, corresponding to fatigue life in the range N >
106 cycles. As a general rule, SN-data at the high cycle end are the most relevant ones for
assessment of design curves.
The choice of loading frequency is a vexing point in corrosion fatigue testing. Corrosion
fatigue is a time-dependent process, involving chemical reactions at the metal surface, trans-
port of reaction products in the electrolyte, and hydrogen permeation into the metal. It
is well known that if the loading frequency in a fatigue test is too high, the effect of the
corrosive environment on fatigue strength may become reduced and in the limit eliminated.
[API 17B, 2008] recommends a maximum loading frequency of 0.5 Hz for corrosion fatigue
testing. At this frequency the testing time to 107 cycles is 230 days. This is prohibitively
long for a testing program involving a large number of test cases. The consequence of the
API recommendation is that test data will be limited to a range below approximately 2·106
cycles, and extrapolation of SN curves to the 107 range (which is the range that in most
design cases gives the major contribution to the fatigue damage) becomes very uncertain,
cf. Figure B5.1.
Fortunately, data indicate that the frequency effect in corrosion fatigue of armour wire is
small, [Berge et al., 2008]. A number of pilot tests were reported for several environments,
showing no significant frequency effect in the band 0.2-2.0 Hz. For this reason testing has
been carried out at 2.0 Hz to fatigue lives into the 107 cycles range, apparently with realistic
results.

Section B5.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure B5.1: Uncertainty in extrapolation of SN curve to long lives (schematic).
B5.3.4 Assessment of design criteria from SN-data
Assessment of fatigue design criteria from a given sample of SN-data may be carried out
following the procedure that was applied for development of the current fatigue design criteria
for steel structures, Gurney and Maddox (1973). The method is often referred to as the
’mean minus two standard deviations’ procedure, giving an SN-curve with a notional 2.3 %
probability of failure. More refined statistical procedures are also available, e.g. from ASTM
E739 (2004) [ASTM E 739, 2004].
Assessment of design criteria from SN-data is not straight forward. As evidenced by the
number of test parameters the statistical population of SN-data is highly multivariate. The
test results may be affected by hidden parameters, and the data samples tend to be small and
exhibit large scatter. The dominating problem is that no quantitative models for prediction
of fatigue strength, or effect of the various parameters, are available - the analysis and the
interpretation of the data are empirical.
A particular challenge due to the small sample sizes is to distinguish between sample-to-
sample variations (within the same statistical population) and variations that are caused by
change in parameters and have a physical origin. For this reason statistical analysis of the
data in most cases must be coupled with engineering judgement.
B5.4 Fatigue testing of pressure armour
Fatigue is strongly influenced by component properties. For pressure armour, local geometry
(stress concentration factor) and technological factors (surface condition, residual stress, tex-
ture) may significantly affect fatigue strength. Testing of fully machined material specimens,
e. g. hour-glass specimens, may give unrealistic results.
Fatigue failures of pressure armour have been reported from full scale tests, caused by fatigue
cracks growing in the hoop direction (longitudinal to the wires). The cause of the failures was
apparently dynamic stress in the cross-wire direction. To simulate this, a bi-axial test fixture
was developed, Figure B5.2, [Berge et al., 2001]. The methodology for fatigue assessment
is as follows:
• Fatigue life data is recorded from the tests in terms of load range per unit length of
wire (N/m).

Section B5.4
OC2017 A-001
• By finite element modelling the geometry, loading and boundary condition of the test
specimen is simulated, to give an SN curve in terms of hot spot stress range.
• Using the same finite element model for the wire geometry, the loading and boundary
conditions of a wire in a pipe is simulated, for assessment of hot spot stress.
In this way, the difference in boundary conditions for the wire between the test condition and
in a full scale pipe is compensated. The test thus simulates real life conditions with regard
to the following factors: Full scale armour profile and notch effects, as-fabricated surface,
residual stress from fabrication, contact pressure, and direction of stress.
Figure B5.2: Fixture for cross-wire fatigue testing of pressure armour. Here are shown Zeta
profiles, the same principle applies to testing of C-clip and Theta profiles. Dynamic loading
is applied horizontally, static contact pressure (vertical) is provided by proving ring.
The procedure has been used for assessment of fatigue design criteria for various profile
geometries for pressure armour.

Part C
Operation
377
Chapter C1
Integrity Management
Author: 4Subsea
379
Section C1.1
OC2017 A-001
C1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance and recommendation for practical in-
service integrity management (IM) for flexible pipes. The intention is to comply with
and provide guidance that is supplementary to, the framework for integrity management in
[API 17B, 2008], [DNV-RP-206, 2008] (Riser Integrity Management), and [DNV-RP-F116, 2009]
(Integrity Management of Submarine Pipeline Systems). In particular this Chapter C1 of the
Handbook presents recommendations on the development and execution of Integrity Man-
agement Programs and on the evaluation of the activities performed therein.
The IM-program shall provide documentation of the flexible pipe’s integrity status, and verify
and document acceptable integrity throughout the pipe’s (design) lifetime. Unacceptable
integrity level or operation outside design requires a lifetime assessment to be performed to
determine conditions for continued operation of the pipe. Details are given in Chapter C2
Lifetime assessment.
Integrity management strategies adopted in today’s standards and guidelines are in general
risk based. The need for follow-up and monitoring of the pipe over its entire lifetime is
acknowledged and becoming universally accepted.
The main motivation for comprehensive integrity management of flexible pipes is to ensure
safe and cost effective operation of flexible pipes. Replacement of a pipe is costly, and failure
of a flexible pipe may potentially be catastrophic with large economic impact.
This excerpt from Section 5.3.3 of the publication Risk level in Norwegian petroleum industry
by PSA-Norway [PSA Norway, 2013b] is illustrative of the current industry status (Official
translation by PSA-Norway):
”It is an invariable regulatory requirement (Section 57 of the Facilities Regulations concern-

ing pipelines) that ’for flexible pipeline systems and pipeline systems of other materials
than steel, utilisation factors and any load/action and material factors shall be stip-
ulated so that the safety level for such systems is not lower than for steel pipelines
and steel risers’. Looking at the incident frequency for flexible risers, one could question
whether this requirement has been met and whether the complexity of safely operating flex-
ible risers has been adequately communicated in the organizations. There are also grounds
for questioning whether the industry does a good enough job in handling the challenges
associated with operating existing flexible risers and pipelines that are continuously ageing,
in addition to designing and installing new ones. The industry needs to address the following
improvement areas:
• Updating standards with the most recent experience
• integrity management of flexible risers with continuous monitoring and systems for
documenting operations history, which are actively used in follow-up
• ensure good training and expertise throughout the organization responsible for follow-
ing up integrity
• clear and unambiguous responsibilities for safe operation and integrity management
• the industry must do a better job at sharing information between companies in order
to ensure continuous improvement throughout the sector

Section C1.2
OC2017 A-001
• the industry must actively commit to research and development in order to increase
knowledge about flexible risers
• quick and precise incident reporting associated with pipelines, risers and subsea facili-
ties”
C1.2 Key aspects of integrity management
C1.2.1 Standards and Guidelines for Integrity Management
Introduction
A framework for integrity management of flexible pipes is found in [API 17B, 2008], [DNV-RP-F116, 2009]
and [DNV-RP-206, 2008]. In particular the latter recommended practice presents guidance
on the development and execution of an Integrity Management Program for flexible pipes
and on the evaluation of the activities performed therein. The methodology in the three
references is considered mutually consistent. The methodology for Risk Based Integrity Man-
agement as described in Chapter B2 Risk Analysis Methodology in the present handbook
and in [DNV-RP-206, 2008] has been adopted.
Integrity of a pipe is established in design. The choices made in the design phase should
be taken with due consideration of the requirements for in-service Integrity Management
including access for in-service inspection and facilities for testing and monitoring activities.
Learning should be taken from previous and ongoing integrity management activities. The
importance of a lifecycle perspective is emphasized, even from the early design stage, when
planning for integrity management: the operational conditions over the pipe’s entire lifetime
should be taken into account, both through use during a part of its lifetime and planned
future use (potential re-use).
In-service Integrity Management Process
An overview of the in-service (flexible pipe) integrity management process is provided in

terms of the key steps shown in Figure C1.1.
Figure C1.1: Overview of the Integrity Management Process (Ref: Figure 2-1 in
[DNV-RP-206, 2008])
The foundation for developing an IM-program is identification and assessment of potential

failure causes and damage scenarios. The probability of failure (PoF) and consequence of
failure (CoF) must be determined to establish risk rating for comparison against the risk
acceptance criteria.

Section C1.3
OC2017 A-001
An Integrity Management Plan consisting of inspection, testing and monitoring activities

should be developed based on the risk assessment. Details on the process of hazard evalua-
tion, risk assessment and development of an IM-Plan are given in Section C1.3.
Implementation and execution of the Integrity Management Plan comprises:

• Perform the defined activities (testing, inspection and monitoring as required)
• Review and evaluate the results from each activity
• Perform regular integrity review to assess the pipe’s integrity
Detailed guidance on the practical Integrity Management is given in Section C1.4.
DNV RP-F206 [DNV-RP-206, 2008] recommends periodic loopbacks to include new learning
and improvements into the Integrity Management system. The learning and improvements
should include review of the present integrity management system, its effectiveness, suitability
and possible improvements. It should also include new experiences in the company and in
the industry. Further details are given in Section C1.4.7.
C1.2.2 Governmental requirements and Company specific requirements
There are global and regional variations in legislation and governmental requirements to
integrity management for pipes used in offshore petroleum production and transportation.
Additionally, there are variations in the extent and content of Company specific requirements.
With reference to the legislation in Norway and the United Kingdom, the intent of these
requirements is foremost to ensure safe operation. The requirements are typically expressed
in general terms, as opposed to the specific guidance found in standards and guidelines. In
the legislation, the operator is required to assess and evaluate the potential risks and to
implement plans and actions the operator considers to be reasonable and necessary.
C1.2.3 Information Handling
There should be a document register and database providing overview and containing all
relevant information for a specific flexible pipe: documents, line data, historical infor-
mation, test and inspection data and reports and monitoring data, reference is given to
[DNV-RP-206, 2008] section 3 for details. The time series containing monitoring data should
include essential information, such as source item instrument, time of disconnected/off-line
instrument, and any modification from the original files due to identified errors. The docu-
ment register should enable both version control and tracking of documents.
C1.3 Risk Based Integrity Management for Flexible Pipes
C1.3.1 Pipe system boundaries and system components definition
In the present chapter, the pipe system boundaries are the pipe end-fitting flanges. All
ancillary devices clamped or connected to the pipe are included in the pipe system.

Section C1.3
OC2017 A-001
The proposed assessment strategy is a layer-by-layer approach, referring to the layers in

the pipe cross section. Ancillaries are presented component-by-component: bend stiffeners,
buoyancy modules, tether clamps, tethers, etc. Further, for each layer, relevant failure causes
are identified.
C1.3.2 Classification and grouping of pipes
In order to facilitate efficient development of an Integrity Management for a field or installa-

tion with multiple flexible pipes, it is common to classify or group pipes with similar properties
and operational characteristics and develop an integrity management plan intended for an
entire group of pipes, rather than making specific plans for each pipe. However, there are
varying experiences with this approach. Although the idea may look promising at a first
glance, there may still be sufficient variations across the pipes that the approach may not be
suitable.
C1.3.3 Hazard identification and probability of pipe failure
Evaluation of failure modes and probability of pipe failure
A list of failures and failure causes categorized by layer is given in Chapter A3 Failure Modes
and detailed evaluations are presented for selected failure causes. When establishing an IM-
program, all failure causes should be subject to evaluation according to the tables in Section
A3.2 and Section A3.3 in Chapter A3 Failure Modes.
The evaluation shall include an assessment of probability of the ultimate pipe failures (loss
of pipe function) and consequences of these failures. Hence, the probability of ultimate pipe
failure as function of time shall be assessed, being the combined probability of the layer
failure (a single failure mode) and the probability of development of a layer failure into a
pipe failure. The definition of ultimate pipe failure is given in Chapter A3 Failure Modes and
the parameters affecting the consequences are described in Section C1.3.3. The risk for each
layer failure is defined as the product of probability of ultimate pipe failure and consequence
of ultimate pipe failure.
The probability of failure should ideally be quantified in terms of yearly probability. This could
in principle be calculated from extensive field experience. However, for flexible pipes many of
the failure modes are associated with specific pipe designs, certain operating conditions and
use regimes that will limit the number of relevant cases making it meaningless to determine
adequately precise failure statistics. There is a high risk of including non-relevant applications
in the statistics.
For some layer failures it may be possible to define yearly probability of failure based on
extensive laboratory testing such as some cases of fatigue of steel wires. For others it is
necessary to make qualitative estimates of the probability of failure based on knowledge
of the degradation mechanisms, qualification, laboratory testing and field experience for
comparable applications.
A typical approach is to estimate the range of the expected remaining service life and deter-
mine a qualitative probability of failure for next year. The criteria for classification of PoF

Section C1.3
OC2017 A-001
can be related to whether defined time limits are exceeded. However, it is essential to take
uncertainties duly into consideration in such an approach.
Defects from fabrication and installation
Known defects Defects or initiation of failure may occur during fabrication or installation.
All non-conformances from original design shall be documented, including any anomaly or
event. A Design Fabrication Installation (DFI) resume should be established, and reference
is given to [DNV-OS-F101, 2007] Dynamic Risers (sec. 12 H200) for details on the required
content of the DFI resume. Prior to bringing the pipe into service, all anomalies and non-
conformances should be checked and accepted. In case of acceptance of minor faults or the
initiation of a specific failure, the impact on the probability of pipe failure shall be evaluated.
These known defects should be managed as described in the section above, Section C1.3.3.
Unknown (latent) defects Unknown (not detected) and latent defects from fabrication
and installation represent uncertainties which result in an elevated probability of pipe fail-
ure compared to what is expected from the evaluation of failure causes, refer to Section
C1.3.3, which is performed under the assumption that the pipe is in accordance with design
specifications. This uncertainty should be addressed in terms of an increased effort in the
IM-program with more inspection, testing and monitoring than predicted by an isolated risk
assessment of an intact pipe, ref section 3.3.1. A typical basic IM-program is presented in
Table C1.1 (in Section C1.3.6 . As safety precaution, to detect incipient pipe failures result-
ing from undetected failure mechanisms, operators should consider putting in place increased
monitoring efforts to that could detect precursors to pipe failures such as: wire rupture, pipe
twist and increased vent rates.
New technology
Flexible pipes used in offshore oil and gas production were developed in the 1960ies and taken
into use in the 1970ties. Compared to the use of steel pipes the flexible pipe technology is
still very young. Applications have become more challenging with time in terms of harsher
environments, increasing water depths and production conditions. Flexible pipes are complex
multilayer structures with challenging combinations of steel and polymers with a potential
multitude of degradation mechanisms and failure modes.
As with all new technology for offshore, new designs have to undergo extensive qualification
programs. This is required in [API 17J, 2008] / [ISO 13628-2, 2006] and should ideally
ensure detection of all performance and integrity issues but evidently qualification testing
has not detected all. The qualification programs, including accelerated tests for instance,
are in general not able to properly reproduce the actual conditions experienced by the pipe
to such an extent that all failures can be properly evaluated and ruled out.
Integrity issues that were discovered early in the use of flexible pipes have been solved
adequately by the industry either by design modifications or tighter use envelops. However,
published statistics shows and increasing number of reported failures. New issues have been
discovered over recent years and it would not be surprising if yet more appear over coming

Section C1.3
OC2017 A-001
years. The industry has to be prepared to deal with these and hopefully detect well before
pipes fail and preferably early enough to initiate cost effective mitigating actions.
The challenge is to implement integrity management programs that could facilitate detec-
tion of new degradation mechanisms. This requires methods and techniques that provide
screening and monitoring of overall performance and features that could reveal anomalies.
As a minimum, the complete list of basic inspection, testing and monitoring methods listed
in Table C1.1 (in Section C1.3.6) should be incorporated in an IM-program when employing
new technology to a flexible pipe. All relevant continous monitoring methods is recom-
mended used as the experience with new technology is occurrence of new or unexpected
failure modes.
C1.3.4 Consequence of pipe failure
The operator must identify the consequences and the parameters influencing the conse-
quences of potential pipe failure. The consequence categories should reflect the risk cate-
gories described in Section C1.3.5. Reference is given to Chapter B2 Risk Analysis Method-
ology.
A few aspects to consider are described in the following. The consequences of a pipe failure
are dependent on the type of ultimate failure, on the location of the damage and on specific
conditions for the pipe and installation - and in particular the combination of these aspects.
Consequences to be considered should include impact on:
• Personnel (health and safety)
• Asset (in addition to the pipe itself)
• Environment
• Economy (for the operator; loss of production, claims and liability)
• Reputation
• Other
As described in Chapter A3 Failure Modes, there are two main types of ultimate pipe failure
(i.e. loss of function):
• Blockage or restriction of the flow path caused by failure of a pipe layer or by the bore
medium & bore conditions
• Loss of containment - full pipe rupture or leakage limited by intact steel layers
The consequences of a flow restriction will in general have low impact on personnel, asset,
environment and reputation. The economic consequence will to a large extent depend on the
operation and type of pipe. Depending on the cause, the blockage may have the potential to
be removed (e.g. removal of hydrates or wax). The possible consequence on pipe integrity
involved with removing a pipe blockage should be considered.
The consequence of loss of containment will depend on the pipe content (e.g. water, oil, pres-
surized hydrocarbon gas), the leakage rate (i.e. differential pressure and leakage path; small
hole or full pipe rupture), location of the leakage and the potential exposure to personnel.

Section C1.3
OC2017 A-001
• A full pipe rupture leakage from a high pressure gas riser inside or just under a turret
can lead to dramatic scenarios with fatalities and loss of key facilities
• A leakage of a production flowline, with a high water cut, close to a step out well away
from manned installations will lead to some oil spillage to the sea with a magnitude
depending on how early it is discovered
C1.3.5 Risk assessment
In the process to identify the level of integrity and needs for mitigating measures the operator
of a flexible pipe system should perform a risk assessment for all identified potential layer
failures and failure causes. Risk is defined as probability of failure (PoF) multiplied by
consequence of failure (CoF). The resulting risks should be associated with ultimate pipe
failure before mitigating actions. Details on the risk analysis methodology are given in
Chapter B2.
Many operators will have defined their own procedures for quantification and assessment
of risks often developed for other types of equipment. These procedures may have to be
tailored for application to flexible pipes in particular in relation to categorization of PoF and
CoF.
An example of a risk matrix is given in Figure C1.2 reproduced from [DNV-RP-F116, 2009].
Figure C1.2: Example of a risk matrix ([DNV-RP-F116, 2009], Table 4–1

Section C1.3
OC2017 A-001
There are additional risks due to the potential hazards described in Section C1.3.3, Section
C1.3.3 and Section C1.3.3:
• Known defects (from fabrication and installation): In case of such defects resulting
in an increased probability of pipe failure, this should be accounted for in the risk
assessment for known failure modes as outlined in the above.
• Unknown defects (from fabrication and installation): The risk is expected to be larger
at an early stage.
• New technology. There is an increased risk due to the increased probability of failure
associated with new technology.
When performing the risk assessment, attention should be given to how the governing risk
may change over time. Time dependent processes (e.g. fatigue and polymer degradation)
may be a low risk (low annual probability of failure) in the early life of the pipe and increasing
risk towards the end of the pipe life, while unknown (latent) defects may be a high risk in
the early life and decreasing risk over time when building confidence.
C1.3.6 Risk mitigation and development of an Integrity Management Pro-

gram
When the risk assessment identifies unacceptable risk levels, possible mitigating actions (or
measures) that can reduce the risk rating should be identified. This shall be incorporated in
an Integrity Management Plan [DNV-RP-206, 2008].
Mitigating actions including intervals for inspection, testing and monitoring should be eval-
uated for all failure causes based on the resulting risk rating (Section C1.3.5).
A new risk assessment should be performed after selection of mitigating actions for all failure
causes. Any risks above the acceptance criteria should be reassessed in terms of alternative
mitigations. This process should be repeated until all risks are below the risk acceptance
criteria. It should be noted that mitigations in terms of inspection, testing and monitoring
will not in themselves reduce identified risks but the findings (after assessment of data) may
facilitate reduction in the risk rating.
All identified mitigating actions or measures must be combined into an Integrity Manage-
ment Plan including detailed written procedures. Recommendations for the execution of the
activities are provided in Section C1.4.
From experience a typical minimum scope of activities are employed in an IM-program to

any flexible pipe irrespective of risk considerations. However, there are reasons to differen-
tiate between dynamic risers and static flowlines. The risk based approach described herein
may then provide other mitigation actions in addition to these basic activities. The basic
inspection, testing and monitoring activities frequently used in IM-plans for any flexible pipe
are listed in Table C1.1 along with typical intervals for inspection, testing and data review.
Note that the listed intervals and sampling frequencies should be interpreted as guidance,
and the actual intervals and frequencies shall be based on a specific risk assessment.

Section C1.4
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Table C1.1: IM:Basic inspection, testing and monitoring activtites and intervals (months)
Inspection /testing intervals [month]

Inspection, testing and monitoring activities Flowlines Risers
Inspection
External visual inspection (Above sea ) NA 1
External visual inspection (Subsea ) 24 24
Internal visual inspection R R
Cathodic protection survey 24 24
Sonar / pipe tracker 12 - 48 NA
Testing
Annulus volume test NA 12
Annulus ventilation test NA 12 *
Annulus vent rate test (for comparison:diffusion) R 12
Annulus gas sampling R 12
Polymer coupon sampling 36 36
Bore fluid characteristics measurements NA R
Pressure test R R
Monitoring Data review intervals (month)
Operational temperature monitoring (including 6* 6
valve position: open/closed) (Typical sampling (Typical rate: 1
rate: 1hour mean) hour mean)
Operational pressure monitoring (including valve 6* 6
position: open/closed) (Typical sampling (Typical sampling
rate: 1min) rate: 1min)
Bore flow monitoring /Pressure loss R R
Annulus volume monitoring NA R**
Annulus vent monitoring NA R**
Notes:
R: limited to cases of suspected error or damage
NA: Not applicable
*: driven by other action - practical to perform simultaneously
**: continuous monitoring of high risk risers
C1.4 Practical Integrity Management
C1.4.1 Introduction
Inspections, testing and monitoring are performed to control that the lines are operated
within the specified operating envelopes and to detect potential accidental events (e.g. im-
pacts), developing damages or degradation processes. Exceedance of the limits may lead to
a shortened service life or line failure. A list of possible methods for inspection and integrity
monitoring along with related industry practice is presented in Table C1.2:

Section C1.4
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Table C1.2: Inspection and integrity monitoring methods and related industry practice
Inspection and monitoring method Industry Practice

Pressure testing offshore (hydro test) Common: Used to demonstrate no leak or
- Offshore leak test (OLT as defined in structural integrity (mostly after installation)
[API 17J, 2008])
- Structural integrity test (SIT as defined in
[API 17J, 2008])
Internal pressure and temperature monitoring Common
Bore fluid characteristics including sand Common. Sand detection / monitoring
detection/monitoring commonly used on subsea production systems
where sand erosion is an issue
External Visual inspection: General visual Widely used
inspection (GVI) and close visual inspection
(CVI). Including cathodic protection survey
In-line coupon monitoring Widely adopted in new systems
Annulus volume test Widely adopted
Annulus ventilation test Widely adopted
Annulus vent monitoring Widely adopted
Annulus gas sampling (including on site gas Widely adopted
measurement)
Sonar Common for long distance flexible flowlines.
Not applicable to short jumpers and risers.
Internal gauging Often used during commissioning
Radiography Above sea only. Used in several applications
with variable success rate from inconclusive to
excellent pictures. Digital processing is
recommended. Subsea equipment under
development.
Curvature monitoring Standard system exists. Not commonly used
for flexible pipe systems
Internal visual inspection Limited to cases of potential/suspected internal
damage
Fiber optic tensile wire strain monitoring within Limited. Qualified and in use offshore in Brazil
flexible pipes for monitoring of tensile wire rupture
Eddy current methods Limited
Laser leak testing Limited
Annulus temperature monitoring Limited (installed offshore, but limited
operational experience)
Ultrasonic inspection Limited. In development
X-ray based tomography Successfully used in R&D but no known
offshore experience
Torsion monitoring Used in Brazil
Acoustic emission (for detection of tensile wire Limited offshore experience
or carcass failure)
Non-intrusive stress monitoring (sensors based Campaign based inspection
on changes in the magnetic properties of
armour wires in response to applied stress)
Online vent gas analysis In development
Note: Indirect riser monitoring methods like top end excursion, sonar based systems, tension
measurements, and H2 S measurements etc. are not included in the table.
The present report concentrates on basic inspection, testing and monitoring methods included
in an integrity management system. For completeness, other common or widely adopted

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
methods are included although they are usually not performed regularly. Attention is given
to the following methods:
Inspection
• External visual inspection
• Internal visual inspection (usually not performed regularly)
• Cathodic protection survey
• Sonar
Testing
• Annulus volume test, annulus ventilation test, annulus gas sampling
• Polymer coupon sampling
• Bore fluid characteristics measurements
• Pressure test (usually not performed regularly)
Monitoring
• Operational temperature monitoring (including valve position: open/closed)
• Operational pressure monitoring (including valve position: open/closed)
• Bore flow monitoring
• Annulus vent monitoring
The present report describes how to perform these activities and implement this into an in-
tegrity management system including data review, evaluation and reporting. The Sureflex JIP
and the Sureflex Guidance Note ([MCS Kenny State of the Art, 2010] [MCS Kenny Guidance Note, 2010])
are recognized as providing descriptions of these methods. However, the Guidance Note needs
additional explanation. The present report emphasizes guidance and recommendations for
review and evaluation of these activities.
Note that the recommendations for test or inspection intervals or sampling frequencies should
be interpreted as guidance, and the actual intervals and frequencies shall be based on specific
risk assessment.
Further, it is also of importance to have strict procedures and reporting tools in place to
facilitate swift and proper actions in the event of line anomalies, as well as consistent handling
of anomalies.
The inspections, testing and monitoring records shall be reviewed by technical experts on a
regular basis. This is proposed to be done during a regularly issued status report. The status
assessment shall reflect the asset’s capability for safe and reliable operation. Critical findings
that are revealed through the status assessment shall be mitigated through a dedicated action
task list with deadlines and responsibilities.
C1.4.2 Inspections
External visual inspection

Section C1.4
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Purpose General visual inspection (GVI) is performed to detect gross damages to the
flexible pipe and its ancillaries. The survey should preferably cover the entire pipe length.
Close visual inspection should be performed at critical areas both subsea and above sea level.
Description Subsea inspections are normally performed by use of ROV. General visual
inspections have limited capabilities in detecting smaller damages; this is particularly the
case for pipes with marine growth or with large dynamic motions. Inspections may further be
restricted by bend stiffeners, guide tubes and difficult access near interface to an installation
or vessel, or by trenching and rock dumping. Subsea inspections of flexible pipes will in
general only detect failure modes that have already developed into a gross component failure
(e.g. sliding clamp) or pipe failure (leak). Several failure modes progress from the internal
pipe structure and are thereby not visible before they result in loss of bore containment in
one way or another. Still, leaks can occur without being detected by topside instrumentation
such as flow- and pressure monitoring. Regular subsea line GVI is therefore important in
the context of detecting smaller line leaks that has not (yet) developed into a full loss of
containment.
Based on experience and pipe configuration, some areas may be selected for close visual
inspection. Examples are given below.
Recommendations An external visual inspection survey should comprise the following:
• Surface inspection of the external sheath to identify wear/abrasion or damaged

external sheath. Bubbles and/or liquid escaping from the external sheath may indicate
a damaged external sheath or loss of containment (micro leaks)
• Assess the pipe lay-out configuration and as a minimum identify the depth and
location of touch down point, hog and sag bends (for risers in wave or S-configurations)
• Assess the condition of ancillaries and verify that ancillaries are in position, a few
examples:
– Buoyancy modules: verify the number, location and spacing of modules
– Mid-water arch: look for wear and surface defects (dropped objects), assess
marine growth and anodes
– Tether clamp: look for corrosion products, scratches, dents or buckles in the
outer sheath near the clamp, inspect the connection between clamp and tether
– Tether: Verify tension and angle of tether, verify configuration of the tether
arrangement, verify intact outer hose on tether (look for wear and signs of degra-
dation), inspect connections to clamp and gravity base (look for wear in pad-eye),
look for wear and corrosion products
– Gravity base: Verify location and orientation of gravity base, look for signs of
movement of the gravity base (sand dunes or local depressions/scour in the ground
near the gravity base)
• Inspection of previous repairs (clamps, polymer welds) and previously reported

anomalies (to capture development/progress of a possible failure).

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
• Inspection of end fitting to reveal any excessive corrosion on the steel surface,
coating degradation, cracks or end fitting seal failures. For the end-fittings that are
inside housing or covered in insulation, the inspection shall seek to inspect the housing
or insulation while the inspection objectives remain the same.
• Inspection of bend restrictors and guide tube ducts to look for excessive corrosion
or restrictor malfunction such as component unlocking. A bend restrictor anomaly may
be an indication of a problem that is developing and the anomaly must be assessed by
expert personnel.
• Inspection of rock dumped sections to check for rock dump coverage, bubbles and
detect and inspect the external sheath at exposed sections, emerging buckling (prior
to exposure of the pipe), change in shape of rock dump.
• Inspection of all gas relief valves (GRV), for pipes equipped with such, to reveal
any anomalies that may indicate insufficient venting capacity. Excessive marine growth
or any other obstruction that may limit venting capacity shall be removed. Note that
the GRVs are fragile and may be damaged by ROV intervention. Bubbles escaping
from GRVs are normal behavior for a line in production, but any observations shall still
be reported and reviewed, also the absence of bubbles shall be reported.
• Perform anode potential reading where possible; details are given in Section C1.4.2.
• Look for protruding surfaces or excessive marine growth that may lead to external
sheath damage, particularly near bending restrictors, end of rock dump and at guide
tube exits
Unburied / exposed sections shall be continuously evaluated with respect to risk of trawl,
anchor or dropped object damage.
Evidence of upheaval buckling may sometimes be difficult to locate unless the pipe is lying
uncovered in a trench or clearly protrudes above the seabed/rock berm. For covered pipes,
sonar techniques could be applicable, see Section C1.4.2. Occasionally, pipes can lose cover
through upheaval creep that is a gradual lifting of sections of the pipe, without any effect on
pipe integrity (i.e. no bend radius problems etc.). In such cases, visual inspection shall seek
to identify the unburied sections, any spans or damage and comparison between periodic
GVI records should be used to determine if upheaval is gradually increasing or presenting a
risk of trawl, anchor or dropped object damage.
Topside GVI should include inspection of end-fitting and pipe hang-off arrangement to assess
the structural integrity and to identify any ongoing excessive corrosion process. Evidence
of hang-off movement must be reported. The inspection in its most simple form may be
performed on the daily area inspection. Further, the annulus vent system should be subject
to topside CVI to reveal any anomalies related to corrosion, routing or operational errors
(valves etc.). The CVI of the topside annulus vent system includes a surface inspection of
the most central parts of the ventilation system to verify that the system is intact, that
no unreported modifications have been performed and that no damage to the tubing has
occurred. All valves on the system shall be checked to be in the correct position.
General data at the time of survey should be obtained and reported, including vessel draught,
location and orientation, pipe operational condition and pipe content density, sea level (water
depth) including tide and environmental conditions such as current and wave.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
General visual inspections are recommended at regular intervals; annually for hydrocarbon-
carrying or critical risers or flowlines and at least biannually for pipes not containing hydro-
carbons. If other testing or monitoring data indicates line rupture or leakage, the line should
as soon as possible be subject to an external general visual inspection along the entire length,
in addition close visual inspection should be performed at selected areas.
Evaluation of inspection results Any anomalies shall be documented systematically with

video and reviewed by expert personnel. Close visual inspection should be performed where
specific issues or defects are identified. Results from the inspection should be compared to
those from previous inspections and the as-installed survey. Non-conformances and deviations
reported and accepted during previous inspections and as-installed surveys should always be
included in report appendix. The external sheath GVI should be coupled with a dropped-
objects reporting protocol in order to ensure that visual inspections of the pipe are conducted
after any incident considered likely to have resulted in a dropped object falling on or close to
the pipe or its ancillary equipment. The same applies to critical work being conducted near
a flexible pipe.
Internal visual inspection
Purpose Internal visual inspection is usually not performed regularly as part of an IM-
program. This inspection is often limited to cases of potential or suspected internal damage.
The internal visual inspection is used to identify bore flow obstacles and to assess the con-
dition of the carcass (or pressure sheath in smooth bore pipes), in addition to its historical
use for assessment of pressure sheath crimping in end-fitting.
Description Internal visual inspection requires shut-down of the pipe, and the inspection
will often require preceding flushing or cleaning of the pipe’s internal. Access to bore for the
internal inspection camera is often obtained by disconnecting topside process piping close to
the end of the flexible pipe. In addition to the pure visual inspection, the inspection could be
combined with different measurement tools, such as carcass profile or ovality measurements.
Recommendations Internal visual inspection should be performed after incidents with

(potential) or suspected internal damage, and when old pipes are checked for potential re-
use. After removal of hydrate/wax plugs, the carcass should be inspected both upstream
and downstream of the hydrate plug location.
Evaluation of inspection results No permanent deformation of the carcass is allowed in

dynamic sections. For static sections, fit for purpose analysis shall be done. No significant
axial movement inside end-fittings is allowed. In cases where carcass axial overload is a
concern, the carcass pitch (e.g. fully extended) should be evaluated to assess the utilization
of the carcass capacity.
Cathodic protection survey

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Purpose The purpose is to assess the functionality of the cathodic protection and to
assess the anode consumption; extensive anode consumption indicating an ongoing corrosion
process.
Description The cathodic protection potential is measured by the use of probes measuring
the electric continuity and anode potential. Anode consumption is assessed by an estimate
from visual inspection of the anode system. The visual inspection is inaccurate also due to
the anode properties; the outer part of anodes may become fluffy and porous such that the
solid part of the remaining anode may be significantly smaller than what appears from a
visual inspection.
Recommendations When measuring anode potential, direct contact with bare metal should
be ensured. If in doubt of contact with metal, it is advised to make a scratch in the metal
coating. The exact location of test/measurement should be documented to allow for re-
peatability of the test.
Observed or reported significant anode consumption should lead to a check of the anode
design report. In response to confirmed significant anode consumption, there should be
actions to investigate the cause in addition to replacement of depleted anodes. Potential
causes include electric connection to surrounding structures. Reduced cathodic protection
(reduced amount of anodes and an increased rate of anode consumption) make the pipe
more vulnerable to outer sheath damages.
Evaluation of inspection results Assessing the anode consumption is difficult and de-
pendent on experience, although fresh anodes (close to 100%) and anodes almost depleted
(<10%) are more easily identified. Be aware that reported values from a survey may be
misleading.
Requirements and acceptance criteria for cathodic protection of subsea pipelines are provided
in [NORSOK M-503, 1997] (NORSOK Cathodic protection) and the references herein. For
further details on cathodic protection, reference is given to [DNV-RP-B401, 2010] (Cathodic
Protection Design) and [DNV-RP-F103, 2010] (Cathodic Protection of Submarine Pipelines)
.
Sonar
Purpose Sonar is applicable to long distance flexible flowlines, not for short jumpers and
risers. The purpose is to assess the pipeline’s configuration and detect deviations, e.g.
upheaval buckling of the pipe, loss of cover, burial depth, free spans, etc. Sonars may also
be mounted near the topside end (below a turret) for topside monitoring of riser configuration
(movement and angles/declination) and bend stiffeners; primarily to verify that structures
are in place. Permanent monitoring could be considered near interfaces/connections to
provide an early warning for pollution or leakage by applying sonars capable of leak detection
(detection density variations). This is applicable to MEG in seawater and oil in seawater
(although this is expected to be detected more directly visually if light is available). Such
leak detection is applicable to static sections and more difficult in dynamic sections.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Description Ship-borne sonar is now widespread for flowline application and is likely the
preferred method. The side scan sonar survey may also be performed by a vehicle equipped
with sonar which is either towed by a ship, mounted on an AUV (autonomous underwater
vehicle), or mounted on a ROV which in turn is connected to a survey vessel. Anyway, the
vessel/unit carrying the sonar will be moving along the pipeline to obtain a picture of the
pipeline configuration, surrounding seabed topology, dropped objects and structures.
Recommendations To assess upheaval buckling it is recommended to perform inspections

regularly to inspect for change in free span and potential progressing or emerging upheaval
buckling. Further, the pipe should be inspected to verify the burial depth, configuration and
that expansion covers are in place.
Evaluation of inspection results The results should be compared to the as-installed and
as-laid reports as well as to preceding reports to identify any changes. The inspection should
also assess changes to seabed features such as erosion, slides and piles of drill cutting. Any
initial leak detection by sonar should be followed by a close visual inspection for further
investigation.
C1.4.3 Testing
Annulus volume testing
Purpose The purpose of the annulus free volume test is to evaluate outer sheath integrity
and monitor annulus liquid filling/blockage. The riser annulus is expected to stay dry or
have a slow liquid filling over time depending on the diffusion through the pressure barrier
and condensation, normally calculated by the manufacturer based on operational data. The
integrity of the external sheath and presence of permeated liquid is important input to service
life assessments. Potential micro leaks from bore may be interpreted as annulus water filling.
Description of the test The normal annulus free-volume test is recommended to be per-
formed by pressurizing the riser annulus to 3 barg with Nitrogen (or another inert gas) from
a bottle with a known volume. Then by measuring the pressure drop in the Nitrogen bottle
and the pressure build-up in the riser annulus, the free annulus volume can be calculated.
The calculation should account for the temperatures in the bottle and in the annulus.
There are additional test methods supplementary to the recommended 3barg positive pressure
test, these are: vacuum testing, stepwise positive pressure test (1-2-3 barg test) and test by
filling a small volume of liquid (e.g. MEG).
Vacuum testing may be an alternative to the normal positive pressure test under certain
conditions. This test may be combined with a positive pressure test to obtain a higher
differential pressure or in combination with a lower positive pressure than normal in case of
limitations in maximum allowable pressure. Vacuum testing may also be used in combination
with a 1-2-3-barg test. Vacuum testing could also be used as a standalone test. However,
vacuum testing is considered less accurate than the positive pressure test to 3barg.
A stepwise positive pressure test (1-2-3 barg test) may be performed subsequent to a normal
annulus test as a check of extraordinary test results and when suspecting breached outer

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
sheath. The test is performed in the same manner as the normal positive pressure test:
annulus is pressurized in steps to 1barg, 2barg and 3barg, and for each step the annulus
pressure is stabilized and the free volume is calculated.
A test by filling a small volume of liquid (MEG) may be performed subsequent to the normal
and stepwise pressure tests in case of unclear results or when suspecting a breached outer
sheath. After the regular annulus test, a known amount of liquid (MEG) is injected into
the annulus. Subsequently, a new regular annulus test is performed. The resulting free
annulus volumes from the two tests are then compared. An intact outer sheath is indicated
if the difference between the two calculated free annulus volumes corresponds to the injected
amount of liquid.
Recommendations Caution should be exercised when applying a positive pressure test on

the following pipe systems:
• Smooth bore pipes: Generally, these pipes have less collapse resistance and are vulner-
able to pressure differences across the pressure sheath (i.e. between bore and annulus).
The test procedure and the applied test pressure should be adjusted to account for the
pipe collapse capacity with ample margin. This is of particular importance for condi-
tions with an empty bore or a low bore pressure (or vacuum). Smooth bore pipes may
have a polymeric Intermediate sheath terminated at the pipe ends, encapsulating the
pressure armour. There is then an inner annulus between the pressure barrier and the
intermediate sheath and an outer annulus between the intermediate sheath and outer
sheath. Radial forces due to overpressure in the outer annulus are then transferred to
the pressure armour and not to the pressure barrier.
• Pipe systems with gas relief valves (GRV): The test procedure and applied test pressure
should be adjusted to account for the release pressure on the valves. Unintended
opening of the valves will produce a wrong test result. Possible liquid filling height in
annulus must be accounted for.
• Risers in wave or S-configurations with large height differences between sag and hog
bends: Breach of the outer sheath might be a risk for risers in such configurations
with liquid filled annulus where gas pockets may form in sections along the pipe,
expected to be located in hog bends. Due to the height differences and the varying
internal density (liquid/gas) of the annulus along the pipe, there will be variations
in the differential pressure across the outer sheath. The critical case would be a gas
pocket extending from bottom of the sag bend to top of the hog bend. The resulting
differential pressure across the outer sheath at the top of the hog bend will then be
due to the external water column over the vertical distance of the internal gas pocket
and the additional internal test pressure. The outer sheath typically has a capacity
to withstand a differential pressure in the order of 7 barg (dependent on temperature,
time, manufacturing tolerances, scratches etc).
In any event, care should be taken to avoid the annulus pressure exceeding the capacity of
the outer sheath. If there are indications that the exerted pressure results in an annulus
pressure above the test pressure, due to a significant pressure drop/increase across the vent
port, corrective actions must be taken to avoid exceeding outer sheath capacity, e.g. reduced
test pressure and limited test time. Ventilation, in terms of flow out of the vent port, should
be verified after the pressurization period.
After having pressurized the annulus, there should be sufficient time to allow for stabilization

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
of the annulus pressure. A constantly decreasing pressure indicates a leakage, either in the
test equipment assembly, in the end fitting or in the outer sheath. This is described in more
detail below. This is described in more detail below.
The importance of a consistent test methodology for every test of a pipe is emphasized in
order to limit the inaccuracies. It is recommended to perform periodic annulus volume tests.
The test interval is dependent on the use and operational condition of the pipe: Annual
testing is recommended for pipes with no expected anomalies, carrying hydrocarbons at high
pressure. The test interval should be set to capture any new damages before they reach a
critical level. Frequency of testing is of importance when establishing the time of an outer
sheath breach. More frequent testing should be considered in case of nearby activities with
probability of damage or known accidental events and for pipes where an outer sheath breach
is critical. Corrosion and fatigue is expected to be an increasing problem in the future as the
new revision of the [API 17B, 2008] allows for a higher utilization of armoring wires which
implies a reduced steel area, and correspondingly reduced margin for corrosion damages.
Evaluation of test results The resulting annulus test volume is compared to the refer-
ence volume and earlier annulus volume test measurements. The reference volume should
preferably be the post-installation volume, but can alternatively be either the theoretical free
volume or FAT volume.
For a riser in operation, slow filling or blockage of the annulus in the configuration low point
is expected due to condensation of gas diffused through the pressure barrier. This can be
monitored by performing annulus volume testing at regular intervals. Any sudden changes
may be identified and should then be investigated as necessary. Different causes for liquid
filling of the annulus are experienced on pipes in operation: liquid filling due to diffused gases
through the pressure sheath, ingress of seawater due to outer sheath breach or due to missing
vent plug in subsea end-fitting, micro-leakage from bore to annulus through end-fitting and
liquid filling through platform vent system (liquid from neighboring risers).
Slow filling of the test medium into the annulus during testing could be encountered in pipes
with porous insulation layers in the annulus due to micro channels in these layers which
provide narrow passages for the gas and due to the potentially significant volumes in these
structures.
A test which is unable to obtain pressure build-up would normally indicate a leakage in the
test equipment or in the connection onto the piping, vent port or the flare system. A re-test
should then be performed after having verified leak tight test equipment and ensured no leaks
in any connections or piping system. A re-test then unable to obtain any pressure build-up
indicates a hole in the outer sheath above sea water.
Liquid filling to sea surface is the first indication of a hole in the part of the outer sheath
located below the sea level. Due to the communication through a hole, the applied test
pressure (3barg) is expected to lower the water column inside the pipe by 10m per 1barg
test pressure. Hence, the measured free volume indicating liquid filling to sea surface will be
the annulus volume corresponding to the length of the pipe above water and the additional
length due to lowering of the water surface (approximately 30m at 3barg). A free volume
corresponding to liquid filling to sea level and a stabilizing pressure at 3barg then indicates
that the hole is located 30m or further below the sea surface. A free volume corresponding
to liquid filling to sea level and a stabilizing pressure less than the feeding pressure (3barg)
indicates a hole below the sea surface and above 30m below the sea surface.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
In case of an outer sheath breach located below the sea level, the resulting volumes from a
stepwise positive pressure test (1-2-3 barg test) should increase fairly linearly as the pressure
is gradually increased from 1barg to 2barg and 3barg. For a pipe with intact outer sheath,
the calculated volumes should ideally be nearly identical for all three pressures. Further, in
case of a riser in wave or S-configuration, compressibility of any gas pocket formed in the hog
bend region may lead to results which may be misinterpreted as a breached outer sheath. It
should be noted that all testing at small differential pressures as 1barg and 2barg inevitably
introduces uncertainties in the test results.
Annulus volume testing has the potential to detect a hole in the outer sheath located above
seawater and down to a water depth of approximately 20-30m depending on test pressure,
and may have the potential to detect a hole below 30m relying on water filling of the annulus.
The capabilities of annulus testing are limited by the pipe configuration. In particular this
relates to risers in wave or S-configuration and to pipe segments located on the seafloor with
an inclination (due to seabed topology) from the test side (e.g. in a section from TDP to
subsea end-fitting).
For pipes with a measured free volume corresponding to a free distance down to the sag
bend, limited information can be deduced about the condition of the annulus further down
towards the subsea end. Examples are observed where the anticipated liquid in the sag bend
(indicated from annulus testing) may have a local extent while the remaining part of the
annulus further down could be dry or liquid filled in sections. Despite this limitation, outer
sheath breaches are expected to manifest themselves over time in terms of liquid filling to
the sea level. For the purpose of differing between ingress of sea water and condensation
processes, time span is of importance. This is another argument for annual annulus testing.
Annulus Ventilation Flow Test
Purpose For most risers, gas is diffusing through the pressure liner and in to the annulus
void, and to some extent further out of the external sheath. To avoid pressure build-up in
the annulus and subsequent outer sheath breach, the diffused gas has to be ventilated out
through the annulus vent ports. Normally, risers have three vent ports and preferably all
ports should be connected to a vent system. Over time, the vent port flow may be restricted
and it is thus necessary to perform flow capacity check at regular intervals to enable early
detection of any flow restriction. Additionally, a minor hole initiating in the pressure sheath
may manifest itself in terms of an increased diffusion rate.
Description The vent port flow capacity is measured by using a flowmeter. The flowrate
through the individual vent ports are measured after the free volume test is performed, i.e.
flow out of annulus with normally 3barg overpressure in riser annulus. If all three riser vent
ports are accessible and connected to the vent system, the flow rate should be measured
through all three vent ports individually.
Recommendations Periodic measurement of the annulus vent flow capacity is recom-

mended and the activity is considered an important integrity check of the flexible riser. The
recommendations for test intervals are similar to those given for annulus testing in Sec-
tion C1.4.3: Annually for pipes with no expected anomalies, carrying hydrocarbons at high

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
pressure. More frequent testing should be considered for pipes with known restricted vent
flow.
In any event, care should be taken to avoid the annulus pressure exceeding the capacity of
the outer sheath. If there are indications that the exerted pressure results in an annulus
pressure above the test pressure, due to a significant pressure drop/increase across the vent
port, corrective actions must be taken to avoid exceeding outer sheath capacity, e.g. reduced
test pressure and limited test time.
Evaluation of test results The assesment of vent system functionality should be related
to each riser’s individual design diffusion rate. The riser design diffusion rate is normally
given in the Flexible Pipe Design Report or Operating and Maintenance Manual, or has been
documented by a more detailed diffusion analysis elsewhere. The design diffusion rate is the
calculated amount of gas flow from riser annulus during riser operation at design parameters,
however often omitting the permeation through the outer sheath.
The following definitions to assess the vent system functionality are recommended:
Table C1.3: Assessment of vent system functionality
Functionality Evaluation Criteria Description

Categories
Ok - Above 4 x riser design Excess vent flow capacity is available; vent flow
diffusion rate failure is not expected in the near future.
AND
- practical to perform an
annulus volume test
AND
- Not decreasing trend in vent
flow rate since FAT and
previous vent flow tests
Restricted - Above riser design diffusion Vent system flow is partially blocked, and the flow
rate and less than 4 x riser capacity is reduced. The vent system has enough
design diffusion rate flow capacity to avoid larger pressure-build up in
OR riser annulus.
- Decreasing trend in vent
flow rate since FAT and
previous vent flow tests
Less than Less than riser design diffusion The vent flow capacity is less than the diffusion
design rate design values and hence not acceptable. Further
actions are recommended to increase the flow.
When the flow is this low complete blocking of the
vent ports are also likely. Until the flow is
re-established more frequent testing or monitoring
is required if the design values are not reduced.
If only a single vent-port is functional, similar
consideration may apply due to loss of redundancy
Blocked Not measurable No communication to riser annulus through vent
ports. Vent system does not have capacity to fulfill
its purpose. Pressure build-up in riser annulus is
likely, and mitigation actions should be taken
immediately.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Annulus Gas Sample Collection
Purpose An annulus gas sample is taken to evaluate if the annulus gas contains corrosive
gases such as H2 S, O2 , CO2 , or H2 indicating that a CO2 -corrosion process is ongoing, and
may also provide indication of potential pressure sheath leakage.
Description One or two annulus gas samples are extracted by using a vacuum pump or
by direct filling from a pressurized annulus into a non-diffusing test bag and shipped to a
laboratory for analysis of gas composition.
Recommendations Continuous monitoring of the annulus gas composition allows for a

more direct surveillance of a suspected ongoing corrosion process and may also provide an
early warning of an emerging breach in the pressure sheath, or an end fitting seal problem.
Evaluation of test results The annulus gas samples are analyzed to establish the composi-
tion and amount (fraction) of different compounds and the development over time (trends).
Light hydrocarbons are expected to diffuse through the pressure barrier while heavy hydro-
carbons are expected to be kept in the bore. Hence, the presence of heavy hydrocarbons in
the annulus gas may indicate a possible bore leakage (permanent or minor at start up and
shut down). The presence of both H2 and CO2 may indicate an ongoing corrosion process
in the annulus (of tensile or pressure wires).
On Site Gas Measurement
Purpose On site gas measurements are normally performed to detect the presence of H2 S.
Online gas measurements may also be integrated in the annulus gas vent monitoring unit.
Description The gas sample measurement can be performed by using indicator tubes,
where annulus gas is drawn through.
Recommendation The testing for H2 S may be performed on pipes where its presence is
anticipated to verify conditions according to design: annulus environment, permeation rates
and the concentration’s development over time (trend).
Evaluation of test results For a flexible pipe annulus containing water or moisture, the
majority of any H2 S present in the annulus is assumed to react with iron iones in the water,
hence limited H2 S is measured in the vent gas. Thus, it may be difficult to test for H2 S.
For a flexible pipe with a dry annulus (e.g. the upper riser section close to topside end), the
presence of H2 S in annulus is not expected to react with the iron and hence it is expected
to be measured in annulus gas.
Sudden increase in concentration should be further investigated including the possibility for
a bore leakage.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Polymer coupon sampling
Purpose Polymer coupon sampling is at present relevant for PA-11 only, and is a supple-
ment to ageing calculation as coupons provide a more accurate and direct measurement of
the degradation.
Description The coupons are immersed in the process stream and arranged either in racks
or as single discs or samples. Coupons are then sampled over the lifetime of the pipe and
the coupons are sent to laboratory for analysis.
Recommendation Polymer coupons should preferably be located at that end of the pipe
most likely exposed to the maximum temperature; predominantly the upstream end of the
pipe. Higher temperatures typically promote PA-11 degradation. The subsea well is typically
the high temperature end on a production riser. To ease the sampling of coupons from
such riser systems, the coupons might be located near the topside end. The results from
these coupons must then take into account the temperature difference between the topside
and subsea ends. To compensate for the temperature difference, it may also be possible to
place the coupons in a test spool with the same process flow at an elevated temperature
corresponding to the conditions at the high temperature end.
Evaluation of test results The coupons may be sampled at regular intervals to obtain a
trend line or to verify ageing calculation at the time when the calculated ageing is close to
the limit. The typical testing of sampled coupons includes measurement of the Corrected
Inherent Viscosity (CIV) and tensile testing if the coupon size permits. The test results should
be correlated with records of temperature and temperature degradation analyses. Additional
information and guidance on polymer ageing and degradation and polymer coupons are given
in Chapter A3 Failure Modes in the present handbook.
Bore fluid characteristics measurements
Purpose Bore fluid characteristics measurements are performed to verify operation of the
pipe within design limits for corrosive conditions (carcass and annulus environment) and for
degradation assessment of pressure barrier and other polymer layers. Sand content is used
to assess erosive conditions.
Description Measurement of bore fluid properties is either assessed by analysis of samples

or by online instruments (H2 S/CO2 ). In any case, bore fluid monitoring is often performed
in topside process system.
Recommendations When interpreting the bore fluid characteristics measurements, it is

important to have knowledge and understanding of the specific process lay-out. Dependent
on the subsea and topside process lay-out, obtaining representative samples for a specific
riser may be difficult. In everyday production several wells/risers are often connected to a
common manifold, and the samples collected are a mix from multiple wells. Sampling from
a test separator would be beneficial. During well testing, one single well is run through a

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
’test separator’ and samples for that specific well may be collected. Another source for bore
fluid characteristics is reservoir models and results from production test during exploratory
drilling. This is often the only source for bore fluid characteristics during design of the pipe
system. For installations where all wells produce from the same reservoir or the bore fluids
are similar across the risers, representative samples are more easily obtained.
Bore fluid characteristics should be measured periodically, upon changes in reservoir zone for
production or at least every 5 years.
Ageing issues may be heavily dependent upon information on acidity and pH for crude and
water phase. Water samples should be taken by expert personnel according to procedures
for the purpose of laboratory testing.
Measuring low levels of H2 S may require special equipment and procedures.
Evaluation of measurements The following parameters should be established: Gas/oil

ratio (to be seen in relation to type of pipe: GI, WI, OP), water cut, amount and partial
pressure of gas components (in particular H2 S and CO2 ), TAN, additive chemicals, sand
production and bore fluid pH.
Pressure test
Purpose Pressure testing is usually not performed regularly as part of an IM-program. A

pressure test is usually performed on lines that are recently installed and lines that have
been out of service for years. A hydrostatic pressure test is appropriate in determining the
immediate general condition of a static flow line or riser because it applies loads in the
principal directions of the in-service loads. The pressure test will therefore provide a measure
of confidence that the line has a residual life given that the maximum operation pressure is
sufficiently below the test pressure. In case of suspected material loss due to corrosion, a
pressure test and subsequent de-rating to a lower pressure may be appropriate for continued
short term operation.
Description [API 17B, 2008] distinguish between two types of pressure tests dependent
on the applied pressure: a leak test is performed at 1.1 times the design pressure and a
structural-integrity test is performed at 1.25 the design pressure. For details, reference is
Recommendations Latent defects triggered by internal pressure may be detected by a

pressure test. Pressure tests are often performed with the pressure and temperature instru-
mentation isolated from the pipe. Hence, it is important to document pressure tests and
ensure test data are properly stored. Pressure tests are often seen as extensive operations and
include the change of bore medium (hydrotest). Performing pressure test with hydrocarbons
and/or gas in bore requires a separate risk assessment. If possible, perform pressure test at
temperatures reasonably close to operational temperatures (recommended due to possibly
undesired additional loading from low temperature and high pressure / in case of armour
defects, higher temperature during test will provoke failure during pressure test). If possible,
monitor pipe twist during testing.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Evaluation of test results For non-torsionally stable pipes, compare observed twist to
design values. For torsionally stable pipes, no torsion should be observed during pressure
testing. If possible, check elongation of pipe and check against design values. The test
acceptance criteria in terms of pressure and time are given in [API 17B, 2008].
C1.4.4 Monitoring and monitoring data review
Temperature and pressure monitoring
Purpose Temperature and pressure monitoring is used to monitor exceedance of opera-

tional limits and records of temperature may be used for polymer ageing calculations while
records of pressure may be used to evaluate critical pressure surges and cycles.
Description The monitoring activity includes evaluation of the maximum and minimum
values in addition to time series over the lifetime of the riser. Monitoring of product temper-
ature and bore pressure should be applied to all flexible pipe system. Maximum temperatures
and pressures are most likely to occur at the upstream end of the pipe, while minimum tem-
perature occurs at the end of pressure bleed which could be either upstream or downstream.
For a riser used for production, the upstream end would be at the wellhead side and the
downstream end at topside end. Opposite for a pipe used for gas injection, the upstream
end would then be topside end and downstream end at the wellhead side. (topside end for
a riser).
Recommendations Temperature and pressure monitoring instruments should preferably

be located as close as possible to the flexible pipe itself (ideally inside the flexible). In case
process equipment (such as cooler or separator) and valves are located between the pipe
and the instrument, care must be taken to ensure understanding of the process and what is
actually measured: an assessment should be made on temperature and pressure measurement
relevance. Preferably the pipe should be instrumented at both the inlet and outlet. In case
of one instrument only, the instrument should preferably be located at the upstream end as
this is most likely exposed to the most extreme conditions. For pipes missing downstream
or upstream instruments, temperature and pressure must be assessed by calculations, flow
models or by extrapolation of values. This will clearly introduce uncertainties and prohibit
full utilization of the pipe.
Recommended period of sampling is 1 hour average for temperature instruments (Due to
heat capacity. Slow variations compared to pressure). Recommended period of sampling is
1 minute for pressure. Records of temperature and pressure history shall be maintained for
the lifetime of the structure and assessed on a yearly basis. The temperature assessment
shall be coupled with pressure barrier degradation analyses. EV data should also be stored,
it is sufficient to have sampling when opened and closed.
Bore flow monitoring
Purpose Flow - or flow rate - monitoring is a strategy for detecting both bore flow obstruc-
tions and loss of containment as this may be indicated by a sudden drop in flow or changes
to bore pressure-flow ratio without other changes in operational conditions.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Description The flow rate is monitored directly by on-line instrumentation with direct
communication to the control room.
Recommendations Observed irregular events should be immediately investigated by expert

personnel. Possible causes of bore flow obstructions are wax deposits, hydrate formation and
collapse of carcass and/or pressure sheath, while possible causes for loss of containment are
significant leakage or full pipe rupture.
Annulus vent monitoring
This section should be read in light of Section C1.4.3 and Section C1.4.3 on annulus volume
testing and annulus ventilation flow test, respectively.
Purpose Continuous annulus vent monitoring is an extension of the periodic annulus vol-
ume and ventilation flow tests and is appropriate where additional surveillance is required.
As such, the purpose of continuous annulus vent monitoring is primarily to detect any un-
expected vent performance in terms of increased annulus pressure and/or flow rate, or a
reduced flow indicating restricted (or blocked) vent flow through the vent ports. Available
annulus vent monitoring systems also provide monitoring of the free annulus volume. A
hole in the outer sheath above sea level may be detected either in terms of a sudden loss
of overpressure. Equivalent to standard annulus volume tests, the free annulus volume may
also be estimated based on depressurization rates and vent flow: The starting point is then
an intentional pressure build up in annulus (e.g. to 3barg). This is then succeeded by flow
measurements of vent gas during the depressurization of annulus (e.g. to 1 bar). The free
annulus volume may then be calculated from the pressure drop in annulus and the total
outflow during the depressurization.
Description Dependent on the purpose and installation, the monitoring system may be
directly connected to the control room and alarms may be set to predefined levels.
Recommendations Successful implementation of annulus vent monitoring requires accom-

panying procedures for actions upon significant deviations and extraordinary results. These
procedures and the interpretation of the results must take into account changes in flow rate,
pressure and free volume due to changes in operational conditions.
Overview of the monitoring data review process
The monitoring data review process is characterized by the following main tasks which are
further described in the next sections:
1. Verify system data and compile input data
2. Assess data quality and coverage
3. Data review:
(a) Maximum and minimum values

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
(b) Operational envelope (histogram) and hours above limit

(c) Differential pressure along the pipe
(d) Pressure and temperature cycles
(e) Polymer ageing (applicable for nylon-polymers: PA11/PA12)
(f) Thermal fatigue (applicable to PVDF pressure barriers)
(g) Check of findings
Input Requirements
As part of performing the monitoring data review, field engineers should be conferred to verify
if any events related to the flexible lines have occurred in the relevant time period; examples
are line hydrostatic pressure tests, EV-tests, system modifications or line relocations between
different subsea X-mas trees, crossovers in the process facilities or similar. This check allows
for a better understanding of the received data, and thus helps ensure correct interpretation
of any findings made.
System P&ID’s are necessary to identify the correct instruments, valves and to enable un-
derstanding of the system logic and layout. The monitoring review should include a check
ensuring that the latest revision is utilized for describing the system layout, i.e. revision
control.
Files containing the time stamped data for pressure, temperature, EV and choke position
are to be obtained. The following should be specified when making an enquiry for this
information:
• Platform or Plant ID
• Riser ID
• Instrument TAG
• Instrument type
• Time period (UTC-format)
• Required output format e,g 01-NOV-10 21:30:54,78
• Required file name format e.g. EV-13-0001.csv
• Sampling rate, typically 1 sample/min (temperature and pressure data)
• Filters assigned to the measurement
Assembling the system layout and checking for any updates since last reporting period should
be performed as part of updating the data. Any changes are to be described in the report
to allow tracking of the history.
Assess Data Quality and Coverage
Typical is to utilize data sampled with 1 minute period to allow short-term variations to
be included in the review. Sampling rates at longer intervals than 1min is in general not

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
recommended. In events related to possible pressure surges, due to rapid closure of vales
with high flow velocity, sample data interval required is significantly reduced, e.g. as low as
< 0.1 seconds.
The data received should, as a general requirement, have coverage above 90%, provided that
the missing data are sufficiently distributed. Depending on the type of data missing, e.g.
time-spans or single points spread out through the relevant time period lower coverage may
be utilized while considering the impact on the analysis and possibly highlighting the deviating
quality when reporting. It is important to include incidents where the instruments are not
connected, such as leak tests performed directly at flange. Calculation of coverage is not
relevant for time series which only contains samples when changes occur in the measurement
values. However, then the instrument should be verified to be ’alive’ and online.
Where possible, the instrument representing the most severe service conditions should be
used for performing the analysis, i.e. the ’hot-end’ or ’high-pressure end’.
Normally the instruments contain redundant sensors, and these should be compared against
each other to rule out possible error-sources affecting the quality of the data. Typical errors
include a stable offset or high-frequency ’noise’ in reported values.
Maximum and minimum values for temperature and pressure, including hours above
limits
The time series shall be checked against the threshold limits defined by the flexible manu-
facturer or relevant technical recommendations (operator specific). Normally this includes
both operational- and design limits. Short periods, typically in the order of 10 hours (1-2%
of the time), outside the operational limits are normally not critical for the pipe. If the pipe
is operated outside operational limits for longer periods, a new lifetime calculations shall be
performed (fatigue and liner ageing). Design limits should not be exceeded at any time.
Both the maximum and minimum value and the accumulated time above the set limit are
reported. For smooth bore lines it is emphasized that the minimum pressure shall be checked
to identify if the line has experienced vacuum conditions. The minimum temperature shall
also be checked, in particular for risers with PVDF pressure liner.
Observed values which are clearly erroneous, e.g. values from pressure testing of valves where
the riser bore has been shut-in or instrument failures have occured, may be omitted in the
reporting of found maximum/minimum values, but a note shall be made of the applicable
time periods or incidents for later tracking.
Operational envelope
The operational envelope is developed over time to enable a simple visualization of the
flexible service conditions. The histograms in Figure C1.3 and Figure C1.4 show examples
of the accumulated time for a given range of pressure and temperature.
Differential pressure along the pipe
The typical differential pressure, or another relationship, between subsea and topside instru-
ments should be established at normal operation. The pressure time series should then be

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure C1.3: Example of operating temperature histogram
Figure C1.4: Example of operating pressure histogram
investigated for abnormal changes in the differential pressure. A sudden change in differ-
ential pressure may indicate a collapse of the carcass and/or pressure liner on multi-layer
configurations or other flow restrictions due to accumulation of deposits or similar.
The differential pressure is affected by the flow medium, temperature and bore pressure, and
no single value can normally be identified, but the check may enable an early detection of
progressing failure. This will require continuous monitoring and proper understanding of the
underlying process.
A similar check can be made for temperature data, but this is not standard practice at
present.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
Pressure and temperature cycles, rate of decrease and increase
This check is mainly valid for pipes with a multi-layer pressure sheath where rapid and
repeated increase or decrease in pressure or temperature can pose a threat to the pipe integrity
or lines subject to blistering of pressure sheath. Several failure causes exist: shock loading of
the cross section ’slugging’ effects or the inability to equilibrate pressure or temperature along
the length or through the cross section resulting in abnormal force distributions. For single
layer pressure sheaths, extremely rapid depressurization of the bore is in general required
to cause collapse. At present, this check is performed for pressure data only, and not for
temperature data. Where fatigue cracks in the pressure barrier (PVDF or aged PA) or
PVDF axial termination issues are identified as risks, shutdowns should be recorded in terms
of frequency, magnitude of temperature drop and cool down rate.
The flexible manufacturer normally states limits for the pressure and/or temperature rates in
the documentation. Alternatively, if no relevant reference information is available, 4Subsea
recommends using the following standard values: pressure drop rate should be below 1
Bar/min, and total differential pressure should be below 2/3 of the collapse capacity of the
cross section. The pressure increase rate should be held below 5 bar/min. Rapid changes
always lead to higher polymer stresses.
The valve and choke position data should be assessed to verify if the measurements really
correspond to what is experienced by the flexible pipe. This check is emphasised as many of
the findings are erroneous due to operation of valves or shut-in systems where the instruments
do not represent the bore conditions at that time instance. This is illustrated by two typical
scenarios:
1. EV test is performed by pressurizing the topside end with EV-closed. Pressure is never
experienced by the riser.
2. EV is closed and the top side piping is depressurized. A very high depressurization rate
is observed, but never experienced by the riser.
Any occurrences outside the defined limits shall be reported.
Polymer ageing (PA-11 pressure barriers)
Estimation of ageing effects is performed for flexible lines with PA11 polymer pressure liner.
The ageing calculation is performed according to the methodology given in [API 17TR2, 2003].
This method is generally recognized to carry significant uncertainties, though it is empha-
sized that ageing effects due to chemical incompatibility or other effects are not taken into
account. It is therefore important to recognize that the check performed is for screening
purposes, and cannot be used directly to validate the integrity for the pipeline. (work is
ongoing to update [API 17TR2, 2003])
In the method outlined in [API 17TR2, 2003], full utilization (cumulative ageing of 1.0)
corresponds to the acceptance criterion of CIV=1.2 dl/g. The value of 1.0 indicates that
the service life is expired. The utilization factor is calculated based on the Miner sum of
the contributions from total operational time at each temperature and pH. In this work, the
operational envelope (histogram) described in Section C1.4.4 may be utilized. The value
for pH may be found by calculation based on knowledge about bore fluid composition or
review of bore fluid composition monitoring. Due to the inability of the calculation method

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
to accurately represent the actual material degradation, a refined ageing study is advised to
be initiated when approaching end of calculated service life. Any large changes in the ageing
rate should be further checked; this normally indicates change of operating conditions. To
improve the accuracy of the polymer ageing assessment, ageing calculations should be used
in combination with coupon sampling/testing and bore fluid composition measurements.
If the input data is of sufficient quality and with a high level of coverage as described in
Section C1.4.4, the time series can be utilized directly with the relevant corrections between
measurement point and the most critical PA11 liner position. Typically, the time series will
still include some erroneous or missing values for some time-instances. At these instances,
values should be inserted to the time series. The value should be selected based on either
of the two below:
• For time series with missing point-values or missing short time periods: utilize
a ’typical’ maximum value based on the remaining data. If no typical value can be
found, or if the typical value is close to the threshold limit, the operational limit value,
as defined in the riser DFI, is to be used. This normally produces a conservative result.
• For time series with missing data for extended time periods; extrapolating the
available data based on the previous or following time period based on engineering
judgment. This approach requires a sufficiently stable operational profile and should
only be used for limited time spans.
If there is a lower level of coverage or if the data is found to be erroneous or misleading, there
will be substantial uncertainties and it will generally not be possible to determine ageing of
PA-11 based on operational data.
Thermal fatigue of pressure sheaths (PVDF and aged PA)
Thermal fatigue can occur in PVDF and aged PA pressure barriers as a result of stress
development during cooling of the pipe, particular due to shut-downs. The number of
allowable temperature drops is to be specified by the manufacturer. A temperature drop
is defined as a drop from the normal operating temperature over some extent of time;
this does not include small temperature fluctuations. Further details on thermal fatigue
of the pressure sheath are given in Chapter A3 Failure Modes in the present handbook.
Similar considerations should be applied to cases where the PVDF liner termination may be
questioned [Fergestad et al., 2017].
Check of findings
The findings from the monitoring data review should be subject to a detailed check of the
physical realism and the validity of the measurements. This should include
• Check of pressure versus temperature data: The data should be qualitatively evaluated
to assess the operational condition at the time of interest; ’operational like’ or ’shut-
down like’.
• Check for possible instrument errors; sudden spikes very local in time, drifting in-
strument readings, sudden zero values or other default values indicating instrument
errors.

Section C1.4
OC2017 A-001
• Check of choke and valve (such as ESV) position at the time of the measured data to
verify that the instrument readings are representative for the conditions experienced
by pipe. This is dependent on the location of the instrument relative to any choke
or valve. As an example, in case of a closed valve located upstream of a topside
instrument, the instrument is isolated from the pipe and thus not valid for the pipe.
Similarly, the instruments should be checked to have been in service, online and not
being by-passed.
C1.4.5 Integrity Review and Reporting
Integrity review should be performed periodically and should also be triggered by events
such as extreme weather or vessel response, accidents or suspected damage and deviating
operational conditions. The review should include review of inspection, testing and monitor-
ing activities and additional reports such as dropped objects reporting and survey. Integrity
review should be documented by status reporting, recommended to be performed annually.
Events or conditions outside design limits should be subjected to an integrity assessment as
described in Chapter Chapter C2 Lifetime Assessment.
C1.4.6 When is repair advisable?
Anomalies and non-conformances should in general be subjected to an integrity assessment as

described in Chapter Chapter C2 Lifetime Assessment before assessing the need and feasibility
for repair. Exceptions are pre-qualified damages and associated pre-qualified repair methods,
examples are outer sheath damages during installation which may be repaired by polymer
welding. Under such circumstances repair may be performed without performing the regular
integrity assessment.
C1.4.7 Learning and improvement
Periodic loopbacks are strongly recommended in order to include new learning and improve-
ments into the Integrity Management system. The learning and improvements should include
review of the present integrity management system and new experiences in the company and
in the industry. This should include:
• Incident investigations and new knowledge of failure causes and layer failures
• New methods for inspection, testing, monitoring and repair
• New knowledge of properties related to materials, layers and components
• New analytical methods and tools
There is at present no established practice for this. The operator is encouraged to strive
to stay up-to-date and seek advice from the recognized experts in the company and in the
industry. Proper experience transfer in the industry is reflected in authority requirements
and requires designated arenas and systems for sharing safety critical information in the
industry. Today’s practice for sharing knowledge in the industry is primarily by development
of standards. Amendments to the standards reflect established industry learning, and there
will always be a delay from the time where the experience is gained until the implementation
in standards.

Chapter C2
Lifetime Assessment
Author: 4Subsea
411
Section C2.1
OC2017 A-001
C2.1 Introduction
C2.1.1 Objective and Scope
The scope of this chapter is to provide guidance and practical advice for performing a
lifetime assessment of flexible pipe systems. Main emphasis is to describe a systematic and
practical approach to determine if a flexible pipe can safely operate after sustained damages,
anomalies, change of operational conditions or exceeding the original service- or design life.
C2.1.2 General
Flexible pipe technology may still be considered immature given the relative short time in
use for an expanding range of operating conditions. Significant developments in material
technology and analysis methods have been made by both suppliers and operators as time
has elapsed, resulting in continuous improvements to both the design integrity level and
ability to perform the integrity management activities.
There are several positive experiences where successful service life extensions or continued
operation based on modified operational criteria has provided a large benefit to the operator.
However, the experience shows that the complex interaction occurring in the multi-layer
structure of a flexible pipe presents significant challenges to both safe- and cost effective
operation of the flexible pipe system. Examples illustrating this are cases where flexible lines
have been replaced pre-maturely or where failure has occurred for flexible lines in spite of
having been accepted for extended life.
In general, each operator is responsible for maintaining an acceptable safety level. The
importance of having a systematic approach towards maintaining the safety level throughout
the lifetime of an asset is emphasised. This requires the responsible personnel to actively
develop their knowledge and experience when operating flexible pipe systems.
C2.1.3 Limitations
This chapter on life time assessment of flexible pipes is limited to the flexible pipe body and
end-fittings for unbonded flexible pipes.
Ancillary equipment is only briefly covered - see Section C2.4.5. These components may
often require a different approach and assessment methodology. For some components,
replacement is often the preferable course of action as compared to extensive assessment
work.
Government regulations at the location of the asset may determine the formal process and
requirements for documenting safe operation of the system. Implications due to national
regulations and legislation is not within the scope for this chapter.
Relevant standards or guidelines are referred to in order to avoid re-production of informa-

tion presented elsewhere. However, when considered necessary for the completeness and
readability of this text, some information will be included in full.

Section C2.2
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C2.1.4 Contents
Section C2.2 presents a work process for performing a lifetime assessment in a systematic
manner, largely based on the information in [NORSOK Y-002, 2010] Life Extension of Trans-
portation Systems. For lifetime assessment tasks other than expiry of service- or design life,
relevant modifications are performed.
Section C2.3 presents reference publications, guidelines and standards relevant for performing
lifetime assessment, along with references to other sections of this handbook.
Section C2.4 presents a questionnaire based format to support the engineer performing the
lifetime assessment. The checks are relatively general, and may be expanded on a case by
case basis. Depending on the nature of the lifetime assessment being performed, additional
information sources may be required.
Section C2.5 briefly presents relevant industry references and experiences. This is to illustrate
typical key issues, concerns and limitations during a lifetime assessment process. Two exam-
ples are presented more in detail; one related to lifetime extension and one to re-qualification
of a riser system.
An example of a lifetime assessment process for a realistic case of a flexible riser is presented
in Chapter Section D1 - Case study, Chapter D7.
C2.2 Principles of lifetime assessment
C2.2.1 General
The term Integrity may be considered in two different perspectives:

1. Structural integrity
2. Operational integrity
Structural integrity of a system is normally defined as the ability of the system to perform
its functions, i.e. for a flexible pipe the ability to contain and convey the fluid for the
relevant imposed loads. Operational integrity introduces additional requirements, e.g. system
availability, time for repairs, availability of spare components. The term integrity will for this
chapter always refer to structural integrity if not specifically mentioned otherwise.
An integrity acceptance limit is selected based on a confidence level describing the relation
between load and response or time and degradation, i.e. what can be interpreted as a safety
margin towards flexible pipe failure.
During the design phase, based on the available information for service parameters and known
degradation mechanisms, the system is developed to maintain a satisfactory integrity level for
the design life. Additional margin is often added due to selection of conservative parameters
or analysis methods in determining the degradation rate.
Removing the conservatism between the integrity level at the end of the current service-
or design life and the acceptance level threshold, may enable flexible pipe systems to be

Section C2.2
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Figure C2.1: Life-time attribution for flexible pipes:

Gap #1 is based on fully utilizing the available knowledge and tools to document a lifetime
beyond what was selected as a minimum requirement from field development premises. The
documentable lifetime of the flexible pipe may be significantly longer than the overall field
service- or design life dependent on service conditions.
Gap #2 is based on the lack of analysis and inspection tools to correctly predict when the
line is at the border of failure, and thus includes the necessary safety factors and precautions
in managing the flexible pipe integrity.
operated for an extended time period with a significant cost reduction and benefit to the
operator.
It is not yet possible to exploit the full integrity life (ultimate lifetime), i.e. take the flexible
pipe out of operation at the critical point prior to failure. This is due to the limitations
in determining the actual integrity level. Developing more refined inspection techniques
and analysis tools as well as gathering knowledge from inspection of decommissioned and
recovered systems will help to reduce the uncertainties.
The design integrity level (including the expected, normal subsidence over time (e.g. fatigue,
wear)) is to be monitored and maintained through the service life by the Integrity Manage-
ment System (IMS), as described in Chapter C1 - Integrity Management. The validity of
the original design life assessment may be challenged due to important parameters deviating
from design phase assumptions or due to randomly occurring incidents or accidents. The
threats can be divided into three main categories based on their nature of occurrence:

Section C2.2
OC2017 A-001
• Event based (dropped objects, dragged anchor, land slide)

• Condition based (changes in operational parameters, injection fluids)
• Time based (fatigue, wear, polymer degradation, insufficient corrosion protection)
Additionally, updated industry experience or knowledge may also require revising the original
design life assessment.
In case of identifying an invalid integrity model, a Lifetime Assessment (LTA) should be
initiated to verify that the system is fit for continued operation for the remaining required
service life.
C2.2.2 Process overview and Methodology
The process of performing a lifetime assessment can be described by a flowchart as shown

in Figure C2.2. This flowchart is similar to those presented in [ISO/TS 12747, 2011] and
[NORSOK Y-002, 2010]. As the latter concern lifetime extension, the flowchart in Figure
C2.2 is mildly modified to include the general lifetime assessment process.
The activities presented in Figure C2.2 are described individually in the sections below:
• Assessment Initiator: Section C2.2.3
• Assessment Premise: Section C2.2.4
• Lifetime Assessment: Section C2.2.5
– Diagnostic: Section C2.2.5
– Prognostic: Section C2.2.5
• Condition Control, Mitigations or Modifications: Section C2.2.6
• Documentation and Implementation: Section C2.2.7
The lifetime assessment process need to conclude on the following two questions:
1. Is the current integrity level above acceptance limit?
Question answered by a diagnostic process, evaluating the integrity level at the time.
2. Is the predicted integrity level at the end of specified service life above acceptance
limit?
Question answered by a prognostic process, modelling the integrity level at the current
time.
The lifetime assessment conclusion may be one of four possible, i.e. to decommission the
flexible pipe at:
1. At current time due to unacceptable integrity level
2. At a specific time before original service- or design life
3. At the end of original service- or design life
4. At the end of extended service- or design life

Section C2.2
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Figure C2.2: Lifetime Assessment Process Overview
The decision is ultimately based on a combination of both technical (including safety),

economical and operational aspects.
C2.2.3 Initiators
The different types of assessment initiators can be divided in six main categories:
1. Change of design code or methodology
2. Change of operational function
3. Change of operational conditions
4. Relocation
5. Damages / anomalies
6. Exceeding service- or design life (lifetime extension)
The initiator typically determines the required detail level and work scope. Initiating due
to change of design code may for example require a high level risk assessment. Others,

Section C2.2
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e.g. a minor change in operational conditions may only require a ’spot-check’ of relevant
parameters. Finally, e.g. life extension may be subject to authority approval and formal
restrictions during the process.
Change of design code or analysis methodology
The design tools and analysis methodologies are continuously improved, including update of
the industry best-practice standards.
Verifying the integrity degradation model based on the updated best practice may be nec-
essary after an initial gap analysis. Depending on the level of probability and consequence,
i.e. risk level these gaps should be closed to ensure the continued safe operation.
Relevant experiences are listed below:
• Working stress versus limit state design
• On-bottom stability / upheaval buckling
• Polymer ageing models - e.g. [API 17TR2, 2003], for polyamide materials
• Fatigue calculation methodology
Change of operational function
Flexible pipes have often been used in new operational functions . This may be relevant for
e.g. converting a flexible pipe designed for oil production into a gas injection pipe or vice
versa.
It is expected that the original design documentation is found to be invalid for the new
conditions, thus a full qualification is normally required covering all aspects considered for
a new design and installation. This includes verifying that the polymer and steel materials
are compatible with new fluid type and operating conditions, updated or new stress and
fatigue calculations and so on. As the materials and cross-sectional design is already pre-
determined, work is focused on verifying the integrity degradation model and optimizing the
system layout, e.g. global configuration, intervention work where possible etc.
Change of operational conditions
During field and system design, a multitude of assumptions are made based on the best
available data. As operation commences, real life data is gathered. If assumptions made in
the design basis are found to be non-conservative or erroneous, a re-qualification should be
performed. This should provide an updated integrity degradation model verifying that the
flexible pipe system can be operated safely within the intended service life.
Relevant examples are listed below:
• Metocean criteria updates (more severe conditions)
• Reservoir fluid data (deviating from design, souring)
• Temperature / pressure profile (normal operation, shut-in)

Section C2.2
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Relocation
Relocating flexible pipes happens rather infrequently, but is relevant. Relocation has mainly
been done for riser systems and for topside- or subsea jumpers. For long flowlines relocation
experience is limited. Due to the requirement for extensive intervention work with uncertainty
in current condition of the flowline, the overall risk level for such an operation is considered
high. Generally, flowline relocation, i.e. full length, should be avoided for trenched or
rockdumped sections. However, re-routing of tie in loops, (a limited length at either end of
the flowline), involving deburial has been performed several times.
For a flexible pipe to be used for a different, but similar service, (i.e. no changes that affects
the design documentation) the re-use is straightforward provided the remaining service life
is acceptable. Verification that the new service conditions are similar or less severe than for
the previous installation is recommended to be performed with detailed attention. Minor
changes may have significant effects in terms of risk level.
For flexible pipes to be relocated and used in new conditions, similar requirements as de-
scribed in Section C2.2.3 and Section C2.2.3 apply. Depending on the level of difference,
the documentation process may turn out to be similar as for a new installation, i.e. a full
qualification of the existing pipe.
For both intra- or inter field relocations, the flexible pipe may be recovered to shore. This
enables further detailed inspection, testing, repair or modification work than what is feasible
while offshore. This provides an increased level of confidence when assessing the current
condition and integrity of the flexible pipe.
Relevant examples are listed below:
• Flexible pipe re-located subsea only to a different well with the same production profile
and fluid properties as the previous well
• Flexible pipe recovered from field, inspected and tested onshore and re-qualified for
use on a new field
Damages / anomalies
The need for a re-qualification after experiencing some type of damage to the flexible pipe
is perhaps the most likely and frequent occurrence requiring a lifetime assessment.
Relevant examples of damages and anomalies are listed below; (the list not being exhaustive)
• Installation and handling damages
– Overbending, twist or kinking
– Compression in system leading to armour wire bird-caging
– Tension overloading during pull-in
– Crushing loads above design limit (from caterpillars)
– Installation with open vent-ports resulting in seawater flooding annulus volume
– No vent-system installed leading to outer sheath burst short time after start-up
of production

Section C2.2
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– Outer Sheath damages where armour wires are exposed / flooding of annulus and
subsequent fatigue/corrosion issues (lines not designed for flooded annulus)
• Impact damage
– Dropped objects, Trawl board / anchor snagging or vessel impact leading to
∗ deformation of armour wire / polymer layers
∗ compromising MBR
∗ outer sheath damages and annulus flooding
• Extreme events
– Weather conditions exceeding the accidental cases from design
– Vessel motion/excursion exceeding the accidental cases from design
• Operation outside design limitations
– Temperature - operation (long-term) and design (short-term)
– Pressure - operation (long-term) and design (short-term), depressurization or loss
of pressure incidents or cycling for smooth bore designs
– Depressurization rate (both multi- and single layer)
– Bore fluid composition
∗ H2 S, CO2 , Organic acids, injection or treatment chemicals not approved for
use, sand production (particle size, flow velocity)
– Hydrate event - removal using differential pressures
– Buckling compromising MBR (lateral and upheaval)
– Marine growth exceeding design criteria leading to change in global configuration
and increased hydrodynamic loading
– Loss of buoyancy elements leading to change in global configuration
Some of the damages and anomalies may be resolved through reviewing documentation
alone. For example, design limits for a component may be set based on an overall system
philosophy, while the component alone may have surplus capacity and thus not affecting the
current integrity level. In other situations, where for example the material qualification limits
are exceeded, the assessment may require extensive analytical work or testing of materials in
components to conclude on their integrity status.
Damages during installation will, if no critical defects are identified, result in the flexible pipe
being considered to have integrity level similar to design. Exemption is typically where a
change of condition is resulting, e.g. annulus flooding if not covered by design assumptions.
Confidence in the assessment may be higher than otherwise due to availability of detail
information for the damage occurrence, thus providing the necessary input data for analysis.
Damages occurring during the operation phase are often more difficult to assess due to
difficulties and limitations in obtaining accurate input data. Changes in material properties,
development of interlayer effects, ’material memory’ or possible uncertainty in key input
parameters increase the complexity in the analysis compared to an installation damage.
Such assessments may therefore prove significantly more challenging.

Section C2.2
OC2017 A-001
It is not possible to give detailed recommendations for all types of damages or anomalies
presented in this chapter. Individual flexible pipe applications may differ significantly in terms
of layout, operational conditions and cross-section designs. For some anomalies, e.g. outer
sheath damage, tether failure or sliding tether clamp, engineering guidance as presented in in
Chapter A3 - Failure Modes may be referenced. Similarly, where the analytical models exist,
these can be utilized in a similar manner as for a design situation to assess the criticality and
possible impact on integrity level.
Exceeding service- or design life
The number of installed flexible pipes approaching the end of their service and design life
is rapidly increasing. Operation beyond original service and design life by safely utilizing
remaining capacity may be a major value contributor for the field operators.
The types of re-qualifications discussed in previous chapters are normally performed for only a
single or a few flexible pipes at a time. A lifetime extension process is often performed jointly
for several flexible pipes across differing applications with differing design characteristics (e.g.
production, gas lift/injection, water injection).
A clear set of definitions and nomenclature is essential for assessing a lifetime extension work
scope. There is substantial differences in terms and definitions used in the most relevant
set of standards and guidelines, which may lead to confusion or wrongful interpretation. For
instance [API 17J, 2008] does not define Design Life, but use the term Service Life according
to the following definition: ’period of time during which the flexible pipe is designed to fulfil
all specified performance requirements.’
In [API 17B, 2008], the term Design Life is not defined, but used extensively within the
recommended practice . It is natural to assume that this is to be interpreted as Service Life
in line with [API 17J, 2008].
[DNV-RP-F116, 2009] Integrity management of submarine pipeline systems defines both
Design Life and Service Life:
Design life: The design life is the period for which the integrity of the system is documented
in the original design. It is the period for which a structure is to be used for its intended
purpose with anticipated maintenance, but without requiring substantial repair.
Service Life: The time length the system is intended to operate. The service life is a part
of the application toward authorities.
The definitions above are used in this handbook, which is also in agreement with [NORSOK Y-002, 2010].
There are then two main requalification scenarios after exceeding the service life or design
life:
1. Service life is expired: however the integrity level of a flexible pipe is not necessarily
at the end of the documented integrity time period, i.e. design life, and may have
substantial remaining capacity for extended operation. Documenting that the current
integrity level is in line with or higher than the design prediction is then the key
requirement for extended service life.
2. Design life is expired: at the end of design life, the integrity level is not documented.
The flexible pipe may still have remaining integrity life which a lifetime extension
process seeks to exploit. The work is normally more comprehensive than for the former

Section C2.2
OC2017 A-001
scenario, and may require both extended material testing programs and destructive
testing from recovered reference flexible pipes.
Experience shows some main areas that should be given attention:
• Initiating life extension process at an early stage:
Often the life extension process is only started upon reaching end of current service or
design life, leaving little or no time to perform the assessment and required additional
inspection or testing. As a consequence, the flexible pipe may have to be taken out of
service until proper documentation is completed and available.
• The quality of the Integrity Management System (IMS):
The availability and quality of documentation and process or inspection data is a
key factor, affecting both the assessment confidence level and the time necessary to
perform the work. With a good IMS system the work to assess current integrity may
already be completed which reduces the work load during a lifetime extension process.
C2.2.4 Assessment Premise
General
An assessment premise should be prepared to document details on background, objective and

any requirements for the assessment, e.g. reporting format, communication requirements,
and authority or company regulation. The assessment premise should be as detailed as pos-
sible. For a lifetime extension this would include a fully updated design premise according to
[API 17B, 2008]. Similar for an identified damage, a full description including system layout,
high quality photography, video and sketches describing the location, extent of damage and
any geometrical parameters should be included. Assumptions made must be clearly stated
and should be conservative.
Design Code or Standard
The selection of design code or standard to be used is important. Typically the following
applies:
1. Re-qualification within original design life and minor repair
(a) Original design code and revision
(b) Possibility to perform a risk assessment to assess consequence of new requirements
or design codes changes
2. Extensive repair or modification work
(a) Updated design code and revision or a detailed risk assessment showing no sig-
nificant increased risk level as compared to new design requirements
3. Lifetime extension
(a) Updated design code and revision or a detailed risk assessment showing no sig-
nificant increased risk level as compared to new design requirements

Section C2.2
OC2017 A-001
[API 17B, 2008] provides no explicit guidance on this issue.

[NORSOK Y-002, 2010] presents the possibility to use the original design codes or standards
(including revisions) in performing either lifetime assessment or life extension. However, it
is also recommended to at least perform a gap analysis comparing new or updated codes or
standards to identify any possible risks.
[DNV-RP-206, 2008] Riser Integrity Management is more restrictive and states that for re-
qualification of risers (including extending design life) that ’The same safety level shall apply
for lifetime extension of an existing riser as would apply for the design of a new riser ’,
explicitly requiring the use of updated design codes and standards. It is difficult to justify
anything other than using the best available knowledge. This may reduce the conservatism
in early designs at a time of more limited knowledge, or impose new restrictions to maintain
the required safety due to identified shortcomings in previous design codes
C2.2.5 Lifetime Assessment
A systematic approach is required to establish if the integrity level is acceptable, both at

the current time and at the end of the required lifetime. A support may be found in the
questionnaire in Section C2.4 which presents a review list for the system. The questionnaire
should be used in combination with the detailed engineering guidance from Chapter A3 -
Failure Modes to establish the current integrity level.
The lifetime assessment is typically performed in a sequence, as presented in the following.
Sourcing and Structuring Information
The availability and quality of documentation covering all phases and events from design
through installation and operation is a key factor for the outcome of the lifetime assessment.
The quality and implementation of the integrity management system is a determining factor
as lack of critical information may result in prematurely decommissioning of the system.
The following list shows an example of data required to perform the screening and subsequent
detail analysis for a typical life extension process. For several other assessments, a similar
list would be relevant with minor exceptions due to specific nature of the assessment being
undertaken.
Table C2.1: Information Relevant for Lifetime Assessment - Example listing
Lifecycle Type Type(sublevel/comment)

Phase
Engineering, Design Design premise / basis
Fabrication Documentation Design report
Installation Pipe data sheets
Phase Dynamic analysis report
Service life reports (fatigue analysis, polymer ageing,
corrosion)
Ancillary component design reports (cathodic protection
system, buoyancy elements, bending restrictors, bending
stiffeners, tether clamps, etc.)

Section C2.2
OC2017 A-001
Lifecycle Type Type(sublevel/comment)

Phase
Manufacturing Non-conformance report
Report Fabrication data book
As-built data
Operation and
Maintenance Manual
Installation Installation report Procedures
Phase Non–conformance / deviation report
Anomaly reports
As-built reports and
drawings
Operation Integrity Assessment
Phase or Status Reports
Line Connection Comment: may be included in status reports / other
history information management system.
P&IDs (instruments,
coupons, layout)
Inspection, Test and GVI and CVI (topside, subsea)
Repair (ITR) reports Global configuration - nominal, as-built and current
inspection results
CP inspection data (potential measurements, anode
depletion)
Annulus test data
Pressure tests (leak, structural integrity)
Coupon samples
Repair Reports (outer sheath, vent-system etc.)
Operational Data Pressure data
Temperature data
Flow data
Choke/ESV settings (used for interpretation of pressure,
temperature data)
Bore fluid data - including sand production
Injection & treatment chemical type and usage
Anomaly Record Comment: typically this should be available through
either individual reports or through periodically issued
integrity status assessments
Modification reports Comment: modifications directly affecting the system; i.e.
replacement of components, changes to configuration etc.
Example of major modification: flexible re-termination

Metocean data Comment: mainly relevant for dynamic service flexible
pipes; however may be applicable to static service, e.g.
considerations related to seabed current velocities
Vessel motion data Comment: mainly relevant for dynamic service flexible
(if recorded) pipes
The work of sourcing, structuring and reviewing the documentation is a major task in its
own. Experience is that this work phase is often time consuming and differ a lot depending
on the quality level of the IMS.

Section C2.2
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Screening Phase
The screening phase should establish the level of feasibility for performing the lifetime assess-
ment. The objective is to establish confidence level and support decision making for either
to carry out or stop the detailed lifetime assessment work.
The key topics to be given attention for the decision to continue or abort a lifetime assessment
process are listed below. An equipment review form, similar to [NORSOK Y-002, 2010],
Table B.1 may be used as a basis for completing the screening phase. An extended table is
presented in Section C2.4.2
Diagnostic Assessment
The diagnostic integrity assessment is a detailed review of the current status of the flexible
pipe system based on the available historical information. The objective is to provide a best
possible status at the time of reporting, and thus also establishing a valid baseline as an
input for the prognostic assessments.
[NORSOK Y-002, 2010], identifies four main types of condition control which describe how
the asset integrity level may be controlled:
Table C2.2: Condition Control Basis
Type Definition Comment

Condition No integrity ’Install and forget’ approach - experienced, but not
unknown management system common. The quality level of the IMS may be low, de
(IMS) established facto rendering the current condition as unknown
Condition Operational Normally the level of verification performed through the
by design parameters monitored IMS through periodic review or inspection work.
to be within design If not performed, this is typically the initial review work
limits to be performed to identify any critical anomalies
Condition Operational data Where possible, the integrity degradation model from
by available and design may be calibrated or verified through analysis tools
operational Structural integrity utilizing real data as compared to assumptions from
experience may be assessed design phase work - i.e. improved condition control
Condition is Physical condition of In general there is very limited possibility to accomplish
quantified structure measured this for flexible pipes.
through For some components or layers, the condition may be
direct mea- measured directly - as for polymer coupons or cathodic
surement protection potential level.
The expressions ’by design’ and ’by operational experience’ typically indicates the level of
control one is confined to, in combination with relevant industry experience for the subject
application.
Limited possibilities exists for direct quantification of the flexible pipe condition. The pos-
sibility for direct measurements allows for an increased confidence in the assessment carried
out, removing possible overly conservative assumptions or in fact identifying severe degra-
dation not previously detected. Examples of such direct measurement methods are polymer
coupon sampling, cathodic protection potential measurements, anode depletion, armour wire
inspection (after outer sheath damage) and similar.

Section C2.2
OC2017 A-001
Prognostic Assessment
The prognostic integrity assessment should verify an acceptable integrity level at the end of
the required service life . The work is based on the current status defined by the diagnostic
integrity assessment. Calculation models, where available, are used to predict the develop-
ment based on an assumed future operational service profile and relevant time dependent
degradation mechanisms, such as:
1. Fatigue analysis (steel armour layers and polymer materials (PVDF)
2. Polymer degradation (applicable to polyamide materials)
3. Anode material consumption (Ancillary system component, however included in this
list for completeness)
4. Corrosion due to CO2 and H2 S in annulus for steel armour layers or internal carcass
5. Erosion of internal carcass
6. Wear in both metallic layers and polymers.
Relevant calculation models are similar to those used during the design phase, covering
global analysis and service life. One of the main issues is that design tools may assume
intact pipe cross section as input for the analysis. Damages or local defects often complicate
the methodology used for the initial design phase analysis.
The need to perform a new prognostic assessment is often driven by new operating conditions
due to annulus flooding, requirement for continuous operation at higher pressures or life
extension considerations. For dynamic service systems fatigue is by experience often the
driving factor for the analysis work followed by polymer degradation.
Re-analysis of the anode material consumption model may prove necessary for life extensions.
This is seldom encountered within the original design life due to the margins added in the
design phase.
Corrosion and erosion design rates are normally conservative, providing some margin for
changes in operating conditions or life extension. The quantification of the actual degradation
is difficult, limiting the exploitation if experiencing less severe degradation than assumed in
design.
The requirement for material re-qualifications or prototype testing may be relevant due to
e.g. souring of reservoirs or other changes in the produced fluids, increasing temperatures or
use of treatment chemicals not covered in the original qualification program. [API 17J, 2008]
specifies requirements for material qualification testing or prototype testing
C2.2.6 Improved Condition Control, Mitigations and Modifications
The assessment performed for both diagnostic and prognostic integrity level may conclude
that the predicted integrity level is not sufficient. Identifying possible improvements in
condition control basis, mitigating actions or modifications may be evaluated to reduce
conservatism in the diagnostic or the prognostic assessment. If not sufficient or unsuccessful,
the possibility of system- or operational modifications may be pursued. Relevant examples
for all types are described in the following sections.

Section C2.2
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The feasibility of the proposed improved condition control method, mitigation or modification
must be reviewed and evaluated based on several requirements besides technical integrity,
e.g. cost profile, asset availablility, timeframe for execution of modification and several other
factors. This is not discussed further here.
Condition controls
If the current integrity level is shown unacceptable, the following methods for improved
condition control are normally used:
• Fatigue
– using actual bore pressure values (historic data) compared to design assumptions
– using temperature dependent bending stiffness and hysteretic behavior
– tuning of interlayer friction
– refinement in finite element modelling, i.e. 3D compared to in-plane
– response measurements
– more accurate modeling of dynamic load history (vessel motion historic data)
• Polyamide degradation
– Refining calculation by [API 17TR2, 2003], using actual temperature data com-
pared to design assumptions
– Assessing effect of bore fluids compared to normally utilized pH4 curve from
[API 17TR2, 2003]
– Polymer coupons sampling and verification
• General corrosion of armour wires
– Refining corrosion model based on measured bore fluid composition and / or
levels of permeation rate and annulus gas samples
– Include service profile as long periods of time with flexible pipe depressurized and
at low temperature lead to reduced availability of corrosive elements in annulus
• Use of novel inspection techniques
– Several techniques are available or being developed, e.g. radiography and eddy-
current systems allowing mainly localized inspection that may provide data for
improved calculations or by direct quantification of condition
Mitigations and Modifications
Examples of mitigations for improved prognostic assessment if the predicted integrity level
is shown unacceptable, are listed below:
• reduce the system loadings or exposure to decrease integrity level degradation rate
– reduced pressure rating

Section C2.2
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– reduced temperature through choking or additional coolers

• reduction of aggressive bore fluid components for gas lift or export systems
• installation of monitoring systems that allow sufficient reaction time before the degra-
dation drops below acceptance level, i.e. end operation at the actual threshold level
allowing some additional service time
• reduction in required service life, e.g. plan for replacement before in integrity level
becomes unacceptable.
Examples of modifications for improved prognostic assessment, if the predicted integrity level
is found unacceptable:
• Injection of inhibitor fluid in annulus (flushing, filling)
• intervention work - supporting structures, rock-dump, additional buoyancy
• repair work, e.g. re-termination of riser to remove damaged section or replacement of
GRVs - refer to Chapter B3 - Repair Methods for Flexible Pipes, including warnings
related to HSE issues on flexible riser re-termination.
C2.2.7 Documentation and Implementation
The lifetime assessment work should be closed by a documentation and implementation

phase. This includes reporting all assessment work according to normal engineering practice,
implement any required modifications or changes to the physical system or procedures, and
update the integrity management system as applicable.
The outline presented in [ISO/TS 12747, 2011] may be used for preparing the documentation
and reporting. The main topics to cover are listed in Table C2.3.

Section C2.3
OC2017 A-001
Table C2.3: Contents of the life extension report. Source: [ISO/TS 12747, 2011], Table 1
Section Description
Executive Overview of life extension process
Summary
Introduction Description of pipeline location, history and the purpose of the life extension
requirement
Conclusions The findings of the life extension assessment, including
- remnant life and associated life extension period
- required legislative approvals
- deviations from original design basis and non-conformances
- deviations from current legislation and codes
- corrosion, fatigue and wall thickness assessment results
- any residual risks
- risk mitigation measures
Recommendations Recommendations for remedial measures or further inspection and
assessment, necessary to justify life extension
License, permit License holder, owner and operator structures and agreements; past, present
agreements and and future regulatory agreements should also be addressed
organizations
Design and Summary of pipeline system design and construction, including
construction - original design requirements, codes and specifications
- review of original design against current design codes
- description of any difficulties or unforeseen events prior to start-up
- construction methods (particularly new or non-standard methods)
Operation Review of operational history and a summary of future operations
Current Integrity Review of the current integrity of the pipeline system, including
of the pipeline - condition of the pipelines, risers and tie-in spools
system - condition and functionality of safety critical items such as ESDVs
- internal corrosion assessment, accounting for any chemical injection
- condition of coatings and CP systems
- assessment of the effects of any repairs or modifications
- fatigue assessment
- assessment of the effects of any changes in land use or settlement
- review of identified anomalies
Life Extension Description and findings of the life extension assessment covered by Clause 9
Assessment of [ISO/TS 12747, 2011]
Studies Identification of any specific work or studies (past and future) that may have
an impact on the pipeline and its life extension
References References to all documentation used during the compilation of the report
Appendices Useful information, such as
- inspection and monitoring records used to assess pipeline integrity
- calculations performed during the life extension assessment
Table C2.3 is prepared for life extension of rigid pipelines, but may also be used for flexible
pipe systems. This also applies for the type of assessment being performed, for e.g. damage
assessments or other re-qualification purposes some sections may be omitted partially or in
whole.
As a key note, it is important to ensure that the whole system within the defined work
scope is fully covered. Interface management towards other parallel assessments, especially
applicable for lifetime extension, is important in order to avoid conflicting requirements.

Section C2.3
OC2017 A-001
C2.3 Standards and Guidelines for Lifetime Assessment
C2.3.1 Overview
Several papers and reports have been published on the topic of flexible pipe integrity man-
agement and integrity- or lifetime assessment. SINTEF Technology and Society, on behalf
of Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA), published in 2010 an extensive report ti-
tled ’Ageing and Life Extension for Offshore Facilities in General and for Specific Systems’
[Hokstad et al., 2010].
The report provides an overview of issues related to ageing and management of life extension
for offshore facilities. This includes both a description of principle aspects for an assessment
process and typical ageing phenomena along with possible challenges, including a specific
study for pipelines, risers and subsea systems with focus on physical degradation. The report
has served as the main input in terms of current best practice based on the extensive literature
review reported.
Performing integrity- or lifetime assessment work can be described by two levels, both re-
quiring their set of available protocols and guidance information:
1. Process guidance
2. Detail engineering guidance
The currently most important flexible pipe standards relevant for such guidance are listen in
Table C2.4:
Table C2.4: Flexible Pipe References for Lifetime Assessment
Standard. Design Title Comment

Code or Technical
Specification
[API 17J, 2008] Specification Defines the minimum design integrity level through
[ISO 13628-2, 2006] for Unbonded stating the requirements for service life analysis and
Flexible Pipe minimum requirements to which each layer and
material shall perform.
[API 17B, 2008] Recommended Provides detail guidance related to design, analysis,
[ISO 13628-11, 2007] Practice for manufacture, testing, installation and operation.
Flexible Pipe
Limited information for flowline and jumper systems
as such systems specific requirements and advisory is
not included.
Provides recommended allowable degradation levels

(Table 5) - however difficult to accommodate in
practice for some of the components (layers).
Limited information on re-qualification as it only cover

re-use after recovery to shore (Chapter 12). High-level
(low detail) guidance to assess condition is included
and may be used for reference.
[API 17TR2, 2003] The Ageing of Guideline for degradation modeling of polyamide
PA-11 in polymer material used in flexible pipes.
Flexible Pipes

Section C2.3
OC2017 A-001
Standard. Design Title Comment

Code or Technical
Specification
[NORSOK Y-002, 2010]Life Extension Part of several guidelines prepared for use on
for Norwegian controlled assets, see OLF guideline 122 -
Transportation Norwegian Oil and Gas Association recommended
Systems guideline for the Assessment and Documentation of
Service Life Extension of Facilities.
Provides detailed information for process guidance and

may be used to design a lifetime extension process by
Company.
Includes less detailed engineering guidance: should be

supplemented by detail engineering guidance on failure
mechanisms and modes.
[DNV-RP-F116, 2009] Integrity Report specifically covers rigid submarine pipelines
Management only (not flexible). High-level process guidance is
of Submarine relevant and may be used for reference.
Pipeline
Systems
[DNV-RP-206, 2008] Riser Integrity Report mainly concerns integrity management and
Management initiating events leading up to lifetime assessment.
Less detailed engineering guidance relevant for flexible
pipes.
[ISO/TS 12747, 2011] Recommended Report covers rigid submarine pipelines only (not
practice for flexible). High-level process guidance is relevant and
pipeline life may be used for reference.
extension
Similar approach as for [NORSOK Y-002, 2010]
C2.3.2 Process Guidance
The overall process of performing a lifetime assessment is described similarly in several

standards and guidelines:
[NORSOK Y-002, 2010], provides a full overview of the work involved and includes some
general engineering guidance. The standard is intended to be used for lifetime extensions, but
the guidelines and work methodology is valid for lifetime assessment and lifetime extension.
DNV recommended practices [DNV-RP-F116, 2009], and [DNV-RP-206, 2008], should be
regarded as supplementary to [NORSOK Y-002, 2010], as they include guidance relevant for
both in-service integrity assessment and life extension. Their main objective and scope is
however integrity management guidance. [DNV-RP-F116, 2009] only covers rigid pipelines;
however the general principles apply also to flexible pipes.
[API 17B, 2008], mainly Chapter 12.3 Pipe Evaluation, is not regarded to include sufficient
detail or guidance for the process of performing a lifetime assessment or lifetime extension.
C2.3.3 Detail Engineering Guidance
When selecting acceptance limits for pipe integrity assessment, guidance is given in both
[API 17J, 2008] and [API 17B, 2008], as these state requirements for material properties

Section C2.3
OC2017 A-001
and utilization rates.

[API 17B, 2008], Chapter 5 Pipe Design Considerations, includes recommendation on per-
missible levels of degradation in the service life analysis. However the presented criteria are
not specific and for some layers / components it is impossible to confirm acceptable status
for the flexible pipe while in operation, based on this reference only.
The detail engineering guidance for flexible pipes available in the public domain is limited.
This is in contrast to rigid pipeline systems where the industry has developed best practices
for assessment of several damages or defects. Refer to the paper ’Pipeline Defect Assessment
Manual’, [Cosham and Hopkins, 2002].
Before performing a lifetime assessment, triggered by any of the issues listed in Section C2.2,
it is recommended to review the detail engineering guidance provided in Chapter A3 - Failure
Modes. This section includes guidance for several experienced failures, suggested acceptance
criteria, as well as procedures or models to predict service life or Probability of Failure (PoF).
Where relevant, other standards or guidance notes are referenced. Combined, these form
a set of guidelines enabling the responsible engineer to arrive at a conclusion on lifetime
assessment in a consistent manner.
[DNV-RP-F116, 2009], includes an overview of damages/anomalies versus assessment codes
for rigid submarine pipeline systems. A similar overview for flexible pipe systems, see Table
C2.5, will be further improved when agreements are made for assessment codes for experi-
enced damages, anomalies or degradation processes.
Table C2.5: Damage and Anomaly versus Assessment Code or Guideline
Damage / Code / Guideline Comment

Anomaly
Metal Loss Corrosion - not Tensile and pressure armour strength may be assessed based
available on permissible utilization ratios specified in [API 17J, 2008]
Wear - not
available
Corrosion - not Carcass strength may be assessed based on permissible
available utilization ratios specified in [API 17J, 2008].
Wear - not Carcass erosion may be assessed based on reference
available code/guideline.
Erosion
[DNV-RP-O501, 2007]
Outer Manufacturer Manufacturers typically presents basic level of guidance in
Sheath guidelines an ’Operation and Maintenance manual’ - no common
Damage standard.
Different approaches or assessment guidelines may apply
between through thickness damages or superficial damages.
A minimum pressure capacity sufficient to allow
functionality of GRVs and performing annulus testing
without affecting the layer integrity may be used as a
guidance, e.g. typically minimum 3 bar(g).
Exposure [DNV-RP-F107, 2010] ’Risk Assessment Of Pipeline Protection’ - provides
(seabed) guidance on a risk based approach to assess criticality of
interference with riser and pipelines from accidental events
(impact, dropped objects etc.)

Section C2.3
OC2017 A-001
Damage / Code / Guideline Comment

Anomaly
Anode [DNV-RP-F103, 2010]/Code / guideline is developed for steel pipes and is
depletion / [NORSOK M-503, 1997]developed further by individual flexible pipe suppliers to
Protection cover flexible products.
Potential Issues related specifically to flexible, e.g. protection
potential decay along a continuous length of flexible pipe, is
not covered in full and requires assumptions to be made.
These may differ between operators and vendors.
Fatigue of [API 17B, 2008] Additionally, fatigue, in a combination with localized metal
steel loss (e.g. pitting corrosion), may require local FE-analysis to
armours determine stress concentration factors to be applied.
Polymer [API 17B, 2008] / [API 17B, 2008] specifies allowable degradation, however
degradation [API 17TR2, 2003] this requires material testing and possibly destructive
testing.
[API 17TR2, 2003] gives guidance for ageing of polyamide

materials - no guidelines for ageing of other polymer
materials exists in public domain.
The use of [API 17TR2, 2003] may produce both
conservative and non-conservative results as it does not
consider all relevant input parameters (update planned).
Displacement, [API 17TR2, 2003] Steel pipeline codes or guidelines may provide guidance to
Upheaval / some extent applicable to flexible pipe. However, these do
Buckling, [DNV-RP-F110, 2007] not provide the full extent of guidance required.
Free Span Several individual additional guidelines or procedures have
been developed to cover the additional requirements,
however not commonly available.
Impact [DNV-RP-F107, 2010] Table 5 - Impact capacity and damage classification of
Damage flexible pipelines and risers.
Special test program may be required to assess actual
damages as referenced guideline may be conservative.
Over [API 17J, 2008] Specified MBR for the actual service to be used as
bending acceptance criteria.
Observed bending radius which may un-lock or damage
interlocked hoop spiral should be considered an
unacceptable damage which require replacement or
extensive evaluation/test. Similar consideration may apply
to carcass layer based on functional requirements.
Polymer strain criteria as in [API 17J, 2008] or special
evaluations/tests.

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
C2.4 Lifetime Assessment Questionnaire
C2.4.1 General
A questionnaire based format is used in the following sections to support the assessment of
the flexible pipe system integrity. The questionnaire is intended to support the flexible pipe
engineer in identifying deviations from the design basis, detecting relevant failure modes or
other areas of concern for the flexible pipe integrity. Where available, references to sources
for detailed information is included.
The cost associated with performing an extensive lifetime assessment may in some cases high
compared with decommissioning and / or replacement. This option needs to be assessed,
however, such considerations are not part of the scope for the Handbook.
An overall system screening questionnaire, Table C2.6, may be used in an early phase to
assess the confidence and probability of a successful outcome.
The type of condition control available may be evaluated by Table C2.7.
The layer assessment questionnaire is provided in Table C2.8 through Table C2.17. The
use of these tables may depend on the initiation of the lifetime assessment process. An
assessment due to an identified anomaly may need an evaluation of both system, all layers
or only a single layer / component.
C2.4.2 System Screening
Table C2.6: Screening Questioner
Purpose Check Question Guidance

/ Num-
System ber
Type
Doc. Q Is Engineering, Refer to Table C2.1 for example list
Review 1.1 Fabrication and
Installation phase
documentation
available
Q Is operation phase Refer to Table C2.1 for example list
1.2 documentation
available
Q Is design premise The design premise or design basis assumptions is
1.3 reviewed and found key for verification of validity for current- and future
valid for current operating conditions
and/or future service If the original design premise is found to be invalid
requirements for several key design input parameters, it is to be
expected that the lifetime assessment work may
require substantial resources.

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

/ Num-
System ber
Type
Q Is non-conformance Non-conformances from design, fabrication and
1.4 record available and installation phase should always be reviewed. For the
been reviewed for intended service- or design life and assumed
continued validity operational conditions, it may be that
non-conformances were acceptable. For extended
service or changes in operational conditions it is
important to assess if this conclusion is still valid, or
if risk level may increase
Integrity Q Is operational data Operational data includes temperature, pressure,
Manage- 1.5 reviewed for any bore fluids etc.
ment deviations from design
System premise and prescribed This type review is often performed as part of a
Input limitations? period status assessment. If not performed, this
needs to be included in full for the lifetime
assessment scope of work.
Q Are all previous Similar considerations as for Q 1.4 apply; the
1.6 anomaly assessments previous conclusion may show to be invalid given
reviewed for time extended service- or design life or for changes in
restrictions in regards operational conditions
for assessment validity
Q Are existing risk As the risk assessments are key to conclude, these
1.7 assessments valid may need to be updated to reflect current knowledge
Updates are typically due to industry experience,

change of design codes, findings made during
review(s)
This includes an evaluation of identified failure

modes to assess if risk assessment should be updated
due to improved knowledge or due to new threats
Q Are there any The possible impact on the current lifetime
1.8 identified anomalies assessment needs to be considered as a minimum.
that are not processed Including the anomalies in the current lifetime
or are pending assessment may be beneficial to ensure consistency
conclusions and improved decision basis in regards to
determining the integrity- and risk level
Q Is a gap analysis The gap analysis may be required dependent on the
1.9 between original and assessment premise and lifetime assessment initiator
current design code (re-qualification or lifetime extensions).
performed
If gap analysis is applicable, the screening phase
should include an evaluation of possible impact on
integrity- and risk level as a minimum.
The final lifetime assessment documentation should

include a detail assessment of impact on integrity-
and risk level.

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

/ Num-
System ber
Type
Q Is Industry experience Public domain publications are important sources of
1.10 for similar type of information.
cross section design
and/or operational The information is normally used as input for
conditions, anomaly or determining the risk level. As parameters between
damage reviewed the reference set and subject flexible pipe may differ
significantly the direct application of data should be
treated with caution to maintain conservatism.
Ancillary Q Are all ancillary and The ancillary and supporting systems functionality
Equip- 1.11 supporting systems are key to the flexible pipe performance.
ment checked and verified as
and fit-for-service per their For detail engineering guidance refer to
Support individual requirements [API 17L1, 2013], and [API 17L2, 2013].
Systems and design codes
a. Hang-off structure
b. Annulus ventilation
system
c. Bend stiffener
d. Clamp (tether,
MWA)
e. Tether line
f. Buoyancy modules
g. Anchor/riser base
structure
h. MWA structure
i. Bend restrictors
j. Cathodic protection
system
k. Seabed protection
Modifi- Q Are there any previous Identifying possible deviations from original design
cations 1.12 modifications or documentation is important.
or repairs performed
Repairs The initiating cause, type of modification or repair
selected and possible impact on integrity- and risk
level should be assessed.
Q Is the modification or If there are modifications or repairs that are
1.13 repair sufficiently improperly documented, additional inspections or an
documented increase in assessment scope may be required.
Typical examples include repairs of outer sheath

performed during installation. If no documentation
proving the outer sheath integrity being restored
after repair, it may be impossible to avoid highly
conservative assessment assumptions.
Q Is the modification or Mainly relevant for lifetime extensions where the
1.14 repair system repair system itself may require a replacement or
documented for lifetime extension.
current and/or future
service requirements

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
C2.4.3 Condition Control Basis
Table C2.7: Condition Control Basis Questionnaire
Purpose/ Type Check Number Question Guidance

System
Information Q 2.1 Monitoring Data (up- Key requirement for assessing both current and
Availability and downstream) predicted integrity level.
for analysis, a. Pressure Sample data with 1 minute intervals required
calibration b. Temperature to identify transients and performing pressure-
of c. Choke setting or temperature cycling evaluations. In events
calculation d. Valve related to possible pressure surges, due to rapid
models or position/setting (ESV, closure of vales with high flow velocity, sample
direct quan- PMV, PWV) data interval required is significantly reduced,
tification of i.e. as low as < 0.1 seconds.
condition Valve position settings is used to exclude
possible erroneous data, e.g. shut-in while
doing pressure build-up tests up- or downstream
In the absence of any historical pressure and
temperature data, the assessment may be
severely limited in regards to determining the
integrity level with required confidence level.
Q 2.2 Bore fluid Data is important for all assessments of
a. Sand particle size / polymer and steel material compatibility as well
type as determining any possible anomalies or
b. H2 S and CO2 partial changing production profiles not covered by
pressures design premise.
c. Total Acid Number In the absence of any historical data for bore
(TAN) fluid composition, the assessment may be
d. Chlorides severely limited in regards to determining the
concentration integrity level with required confidence level.
e. Water Cut
f. Injection chemicals
(type, treatment
frequency)
Q 2.3 Annulus Environment Annulus environment data is important for all
a. Permeation rate assessments of polymer and steel material
b. Gas Sample compatibility as well as determining any
composition possible anomalies or changing production
c. Free volume profiles not covered by design premise. The
d. Liquid type (if data is key input for corrosion and fatigue life
filled/flooded) calculations, i.e. SN-curve to be applied.
e. Injected inhibitor
fluids Annulus environment data is further used for
f. Possibility for detecting possible defects in pressure containing
back-flow from layers and to verify outer sheath integrity.
atmosphere or
downstream vent The data is used in combination with input
system data from Q 2.2.
g. Possibility for
leakage through GRVs

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

System
Q 2.4 Load and response data Wave and vessel motion data normally are
a. Wave data updated during the service life of a field due to
b. Vessel motion improved statistics and/or vessel/platform
c. Riser motion modifications or improved calculations
The data is highly relevant for global system

analysis and fatigue life calculations.
It is required to verify, as a minimum, that the

original design data remains valid
Q 2.5 Degradation Coupons If available, this data provides a direct

d. Polymer coupons quantitative status for applicable materials and
e. Corrosion coupons layers.
f. Erosion coupons
g. Flexible The use of data needs to consider any possible
cross-section length impacts of location of coupons compared to
from actual / reference critical location in system.
flexible pipe system
The use of destructive testing of flexible pipes
may be required if uncertainty in condition
control level and thus integrity- and risk level
cannot be concluded.
The latter approach is typically relevant for

lifetime extension where multiple lines are
subject for an assessment, and using a single
line for testing is overall beneficial
Riser Q 2.6 Inspection data for Verify if riser configuration is within envelope
Systems riser configuration: from global analysis and in accordance with
a. Hog depth and as-built inspection data.
position along length
of riser Variations in bore fluid density, marine growth
b. Sag depth and outside design envelope or partial loss of
position along length buoyancy are examples of deviations lending the
of riser configuration different than design condition
c. Touch-down point
position along length In the absence of any inspection data, the
of riser assessment may be severely limited in regards
d. All support systems to determining the integrity level with required
present and active confidence level.
Q 2.7 Is riser and/or vessel Verify if riser motions is within envelope from
motion data available global system analysis - ref. Q 2.4.
Normally direct measurement is not available,

however observations by ROV / GVI data may
provide some level of verification.
Dedicated measurement campaigns using both
dry- and subsea sensors may provide valuable
input data for fatigue calculations.

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

System
Flowline/ Q 2.8 Is flowline/jumper Depending on field location, there may or may
jumper system possible to not be a requirement for covering the seabed
Systems inspect? sections for protection purposes. An inspect
able system provides substantially better data
for any assessment.
Emphasis to be placed on location of
intermediate connections due to possible
sealing/connection related issues. Inspection
team must be aware that gas bubbles may emit
at GRVs - the rate may be used for assessing if
normal range or possible leakage.
Note - where several segments are used, some
may be altogether covered including both
end-fittings, i.e. condition by design at best
(for most parameters)
Q 2.9 Is cover level/depth Used for verifying no upheaval- or lateral
and/or global buckling as well as comparison with
configuration (routing) requirements for impact- and/or over trawling
possible to inspect and protection
verify

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
C2.4.4 Layer Assessment
Carcass
The carcass layer function is maintained if it provides

1. Sufficient resistance against hydrostatic collapse
2. Protects polymer layers from abrasive particles
3. No obstructions - i.e. not collapsed
Layer integrity is thus to be documented by
1. Minimum thickness
2. No discontinuities - i.e. tear off
3. No diameter reduction above acceptance criteria
Table C2.8: Layer Assessment - Carcass
Check Assessment Guidance

Num- Question
ber
Q 3.1 Is flow rate below Flow rates impacting integrity level is mostly relevant for
design assumption production lines where abrasive particles may be present in
transported fluids, thus impacting erosion calculations.
Flow rates are normally monitored closely; thus data should be

available for checking against design assumptions. Flow rates
above design assumptions may render the erosion calculations
invalid, requiring updating to verify that unacceptable loss of
collapse resistance does not occur.
Q 3.2 Is any sand Typically only limited time of sand production is allowed for in
production design (start-up of new wells).
recorded
Continued sand production combined with high flow rates (see Q
3.1) should trigger an erosion assessment to verify if pipe design
provides a sufficiently high integrity level for the required service
lifetime.
Refer to failure description Carcass Collapse (Chapter A3 -

Failure Modes).
Q 3.3 Are any If any events are identified, which may have resulted in high
hydrate/blockage differential pressures across blockage, the historical pressure data
of bore events should be checked for to determine risk for having exceeded the
recorded carcass load capacity.
Refer to failure description Carcass Axial Overloading (Chapter

A3 - Failure Modes)

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num- Question
ber
Q 3.4 Are there any Performed pigging may prove no tear-off, significant collapse or
internal inspection deformations above acceptance criteria (visual inspection
and/or pigging pigging, gauge pigging)
runs performed
Visual inspection is valuable for all failure mechanisms related to
carcass failure modes.
Pigging is however in itself a possible initiator of failure modes;
proper procedures and equipment is emphasized for internal
inspections.
Q 3.5 Is the cross-section Several failures has occurred where the carcass has collapsed.
a multi-layer Initial failure mode has in some events triggered failure modes
pressure barrier related to the pressure barrier.
structure
For any multi-layer, high pressure application it is recommended
to review to failure description Carcass Collapse (Chapter A3 -
Failure Modes)
Q 3.6 Has pipe bore been Prolonged exposure to seawater is normally not allowed due to
directly exposed to risk of gross and local corrosion damages to carcass.
seawater for any
significant amount Stagnant conditions may also trigger Microbiological corrosion
of time, e.g. wet mechanisms depending on bore content other than seawater.
storage,
disconnected from Refer to failure description Carcass Collapse and Carcass Axial
subsea connection Overloading (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)
point or other
without sealing
cap
Q 3.7 Is there any High curvature combined with possible local reduction in carcass
curvatures in the collapse capacity increases risk of failure if outer sheath integrity
system near is lost, transferring the hydrostatic load onto the carcass layer.
limiting MBR, Refer to failure description Carcass Collapse (Chapter A3 -
with hydrostatic Failure Modes)
pressure equal or
close to calculated
collapse resistance
Q 3.8 If possibility of In shallow waters the pressure sheath alone may provide collapse
severe carcass resistance sufficient to withstand hydrostatic pressure. Mitigating
degradation - can action may consider including operational procedures ensuring
pressure sheath that internal bore pressure is maintained at a level equal to
alone provide hydrostatic level, thus reduce risk of collapse.
sufficient margin
towards collapse For damages which may have separated the carcass profile, the
possibility for damages to pressure barrier layer needs to be
included. Operation without carcass support is normally not
acceptable.
Pressure Barrier
The pressure barrier layer function is maintained if it provides
1. Contains conveyed fluid

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

1. Material properties within requirements for
(a) strength
(b) toughness
(c) ductility
(d) creep resistance
(e) Permeation (affects annulus environment)
2. Accumulated fatigue below threshold limit - only applicable for specific polymer ma-
terials (PVDF)
3. No operation outside design limitations
Table C2.9: Layer Assessment - Pressure Barrier

Num- Question
ber
Q 4.1 Is polymer coupons Polymer coupons provides important data and should be used for
or reference pipe material analysis where significant material degradation is
samples with similar suspected.
exposures available
allowing material Flexible pipes with similar exposures that have been recovered, if
property testing dissected and inspected, may provide supporting information.
The similarity in operational conditions should be evaluated to
ensure conservatism.
Availability of material samples may show that the material

properties are within requirements, verifying layer integrity
remains intact from severe time degradation.
Q 4.2 Is any leak test Leak test may prove that no significant loss of containment is
performed in recent present, however there is a possibility for micro-leakages through
times end-fitting sealing arrangement or micro-voids in material that
are not detected during a leak test.
Q 4.3 Is current Online monitoring systems are normally the best available data
permeation rate source - intermittent sampling should be cross referenced for the
in-line with or than operational conditions at the time for performing the test.
lower design value Differences in measuring methods, calibration of equipment and
Is any increase in reporting detail may render data inconclusiv.
permeation rates Upon identifying elevated permeation rates, detail assessment
apparent from test should be undertaken due to possible pressure barrier layer
data trending defects, i.e. loss of containment.
Refer to failure description Pressure Sheath Enbrittlement
(Ageing of Polyamides) (Section A3 Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num- Question
ber
Q 4.4 Is annulus gas The presence of such constituents may indicate a direct flow
samples checked for path between bore and annulus.
non- Different polymers have differing diffusion- and permeation
diffusive/permeating characteristics - see Chapter A2- Flexible Pipe Properties and
constituents Performance.
Upon identifying abnormal annulus gas constituents, detail
assessment should be undertaken due to possible pressure barrier
layer defects, i.e. loss of containment.
Q 4.5 Are there any Sensor location and recording interval is critical for confidence in
events where assessment.
temperature or Pressure testing is often not recorded in data acquisition system
pressure is below or due to valve settings - thus necessary to check individual test
above operating- or reports.
design limitations, Smooth bore pipes are especially vulnerable for minimum bore
including pressure pressure (vacuum) conditions; this should be included in the
testing check out operational data.
Profiling of temperature or pressure decay along length may
support assessment if lack of upstream sensors (critical end).
Normally, short term excursions above operating pressure- and
temperature limits will not present a high-risk for the integrity
level.
Exceeding design pressure- and temperature limits are considered
as severe with possible immediate or long-term effect on integrity
level. Detail assessment should be undertaken to assess criticality
of event(s), i.e. calculation of armour wire utilization or testing
of material degradation for similar loading.
Q 4.6 Are there any events Operation and Maintenance manuals from the flexible pipe
where pressurization suppliers normally state a limiting pressurization and
or de-pressurization de-pressurization level.
rates is above Exceeding of these limits presents risk related to polymer
threshold limits blistering, shock loading and carcass collapse.
If no operational data is available, an evaluation of possible
maximum rates may be performed, based on system layout and
operational procedures.
Damages to the carcass may result in triggering failure modes
related to the pressure sheath. For any multi-layer, high pressure
application it is recommended to review to failure description
Carcass Collapse (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes).

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num- Question
ber
Q 4.7 Is the bore fluid Design assumptions normally includes conservative estimates.
composition The verification of bore fluid composition compared to these
checked and verified estimates is important to validate the design assumptions, and
against design should normally be performed by the integrity management
assumptions system.
Possibility for already occurred or expected changes to
transported fluid should be assessed. Some possible reasons for
rendering design assumptions invalid are; changes in reservoir
characteristics or well completion, modification of topside
equipment, change of operational service etc.
Accurate data per transportation segment may be difficult to
obtain due to comingled flow in some production systems.
Reliance on well completion or initial phase test production data
may be needed if no updated reservoir fluid testing or modeling
has been performed.
Q 4.8 Is the use of The operation and maintenance manual provided by flexible pipe
injection chemicals supplier normally includes listing of approved chemicals and their
(type, concentration.
concentration) Use of chemicals other than those approved presents a high-risk
checked and verified for possible failure modes related to polymer degradation. Detail
against approved assessment and possible material compatibility tests may be
types evaluated based on the chemical type.
Q 4.9 Are there any The approval of such non-conformances is possible, and may
non-conformance impact lifetime assessment if the reason for approval is currently
related to pressure invalid; e.g. change of operational function.
sheath
under-thickness
from fabrication
Q 4.10 Is pressure barrier Comparison between calculations and actual condition using
material a polymer coupons, thus establishing confidence in calculation
polyamide type model, is recommended in the initial life phase.
If yes - is ageing Risk of failure due to polymer ageing is increasing over the
calculation showing service life time.
less than 5 years Calculations from design is normally performed using the
remaining service maximum operation temperature; if actual temperature is
life significantly lower a substantial capacity may remain.
Refer to failure description Pressure Sheath Enbrittlement
(Ageing of Polyamides) (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)
Q 4.11 Is pressure barrier If polymer material is initially fatigue susceptible, refer to failure
material a PVDF description Fatigue cracks in pressure barrier (PVDF, aged PA)
type (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
Pressure Armour
The pressure armour layer (including back-up spiral) function is maintained if it provides
1. Capacity to support radial loads from bore- and external pressure
1. Utilization level below threshold limits - [API 17J, 2008]
2. Accumulated fatigue below threshold limit
3. Gap size below design value - i.e. no unlocking or significant deformation
4. No significant wear at sliding surfaces
Table C2.10: Layer Assessment - Pressure Armour
Check Assessment Question Guidance

Num-
ber
Q 5.1 Is annulus environment To be based either on diffusion and permeation calculations
checked and verified based on bore fluid composition or by direct measurements
against design on annulus gas samples and permeation rate.
assumptions Known outer sheath damage(s) affects the type of annulus
a. H2 S partial pressure environment to be assumed in evaluation.
b. CO2 partial pressure If higher than assumed values of corrosive elements are
c. Liquid filled / dry identified, material qualification records should be reviewed
to identify limiting values - these may be substantially higher
than design input.
Q 5.2 Is general corrosion The calculation model utilize a mole balance between
material loss corrosive elements and iron. Thus the consumption rate may
calculation valid based be calculated based on steady-state annulus conditions.
on current/predicted
annulus environment
Q 5.3 Are there known outer Known outer sheath damages(s) affects the corrosion rate -
sheath damage(s) with calculations may be performed based on recommended free
loss of external barrier corrosion rates in seawater/air available in public domain.
and possibility of If materials susceptible to embrittelement (high strength, low
localized corrosion alloy) are used in tensile armours, the consequence of outer
sheath breach must include assessment of hydrogen induced
stress cracking (HISC) and similar failure mechanisms.
Q 5.4 Is utilization ratio at Including updated general or localized corrosion calculations.
current and end of
required service life
within limits in
[API 17J, 2008] for all
design load cases
Q 5.5 Is accumulated fatigue A high level of conservatism may be present due to use of
calculations valid assumed pressure levels during design phase. If significantly
lower pressures are recorded, significant reductions in
accumulated fatigue may be gained.
Q 5.6 Is predicted remaining
fatigue life sufficient for

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num-
ber
Q 5.7 If pressure level is at
high end of typical
range - is there any
wear prediction models
available or possibility
to use radiography in
highest utilized area
Q 5.8 Are there any events in Installation phase or intervention work is considered as most
service history related critical, i.e. accidental events.
to possible violation of For flowlines upheaval- or lateral buckling may be relevant.
MBR During normal operation sufficient limit between allowable
MBR and armour profile locking radius is prescribed by
[API 17B, 2008]
Q 5.9 Is any leak test Leak test may be used for calculating minimum remaining
performed in recent material based on an assumption that yield and failure will
times. occur at utilization equal to 1.0. In absence of leak tests, the
highest operational pressures may possibly be used as a
baseline for calculations.
Re-calculating allowable pressure based on a maximum
utilization per design code can then be performed - normally
only with significant reductions in allowable load input.
Predicting a material loss rate, the time span from current
date to reaching maximum utilization from normal operating
conditions can be performed to establish criticality level.
Difference between normal operating pressure- and design
pressure (is important to determine if reduction in risk level
is applicable based on such a calculation.
For a scenario where operational pressure is close to the
design pressure, there is less margin between the normal,
operational loading and thus also the forced loading during a
leak test pressure) determines the level of confidence for an
integrity assessment purpose. Failure may either in fact be
triggered by the leak test, or occur in short time afterwards
due to continued degradation.
Intermediate Sheath (Anti-Collapse)
The intermediate sheath or anti-collapse layer is normally used only for smooth bore pipes.
The layer provides
• Barrier between internal - and external environment
• Material properties within requirements for
– strength
– toughness
– ductility
• No through layer defects

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
Table C2.11: Layer Assessment - Intermediate Sheath (Anti-Collapse)

Number Question
Q 6.1 Is ’inner annulus’ Some end-fitting designs allow independent testing of the inner-
and ’outer annulus’ and outer annulus, thus providing positive confirmation of both
possible to monitor annulus conditions.
or test either Dependent on the reason for having an intermediate sheath there
separately or jointly is differing considerations:
a. For smooth bore risers, the intermediate sheath is normally
introduced to transfer the hydrostatic loading onto the pressure
armour, in case of loss of outer sheath integrity. Tensile armours
may be located both in the inner- and outer annulus.
b. For designs where the intermediate sheath is used to divide
the steel armour layers from insulation layers.
Depending on the cross section design, it may be of key
importance to test either only the inner or both annulus volumes.
See Q 6.2
Q 6.2 If no separate test Depending on the measured volume, it may be that either the
possibility: is inner or outer annulus is flooded.
annulus free volume Outer sheath damages, other than large, abnormal damage,
tests in line with would normally only lead to flooding the outer annulus volume.
calculated values for If inner annulus volume is found to be flooded, based on
only ’outer annulus’ comparison between measured free volumes and calculations, the
or ’inner annulus’? loss of anti-collapse function is lost. This is normally only
applicable for smooth bore risers; if the pipe design incorporates
a carcass this may provide partial or full resistance against
collapse from hydrostatic loading.
In any event, the reason for flooding of both inner- and outer
annulus should be determined (damage to intermediate and/or
outer sheath, leakage through end-fitting sealing arrangement,
condensed permeated gas). Subsequent possible impact on
service life from corrosion or fatigue degradation mechanisms
should be evaluated.
Operational procedures may be considered to ensure bore
pressure remains above the hydrostatic pressure, if the pressure
barrier and/or carcass is not sufficiently able to withstand the
hydrostatic pressure loading.
Q 6.3 Is annulus free Any abrupt changes in free volume (increase, decrease) may be
volume tests trend used to detect possible loss of function.
data indicating any Dependent on vent-port configuration, and possibility for testing
abrupt increases in independently or jointly, the results should be compared to either
free volume previous test data of calculated annulus free volumes to identify
most probable scenario; e.g. loss of intermediate sheath sealing
in end-fitting, damage to outer sheath, leakage from bore to
inner annulus etc.

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Number Question
Q 6.4 Is there a possibility If the riser is a smooth bore design, the loss of intermediate
for having operated sheath layer function, and thus anti-collapse protection, combined
with ’empty bore’ or with low bore pressure increases risk of pressure barrier collapse.
with vacuum Reviewing the operational data, to exclude possible events
conditions after last triggering collapse should be performed. Operational procedures
confirmation of may be considered to ensure bore pressure remains above the
intact intermediate hydrostatic pressure, if the pressure barrier and/or carcass is not
sheath layer sufficiently able to withstand the hydrostatic pressure loading.
Q 6.5 Is there any planned Pressure sheath damage with subsequent leak into inner annulus
internal inspection will result in large radial gaps in pipe wall and major shortening
or other activity of the pipe as the intermediate sheath will act as pressure barrier
which may increase
risk of damage to
pressure sheath
Tensile Armour
The tensile armour layer function is maintained if it provides

• Capacity to support tensile loads
• Torsional stability
• Utilization level below threshold limits - [API 17J, 2008]
• Accumulated fatigue below threshold limit
Table C2.12: Layer Assessment - Tensile Armour

Num- Question
ber
Q 7.1 Is annulus To be based either on diffusion and permeation calculations
environment based on bore fluid composition or by direct measurements on
checked and verified annulus gas samples and permeation rate.
against design Known outer sheath damage(s) affects the type of annulus
assumptions environment to be assumed in evaluation.
a. H2 S partial If higher than assumed values of corrosive elements are identified,
pressure material qualification records should be reviewed to identify
b. CO2 partial limiting values - these may be substantially higher than design
pressure input
c. Liquid filled / dry
Q 7.2 Is general corrosion The calculation model utilize a mole balance between corrosive
material loss elements and iron. Thus the consumption rate may be calculated
calculation valid based on steady-state annulus conditions
based on
current/predicted
annulus
environment

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num- Question
ber
Q 7.3 Are there known Known outer sheath damages(s) affects the corrosion rate -
outer sheath calculations may be performed based on recommended free
damage(s) with loss corrosion rates in seawater/air available in public domain
of external barrier If materials susceptible to embrittelement (high strength, low
and possibility of alloy) are used in tensile armours, the consequence of outer
localized corrosion sheath breach must include assessment of hydrogen induced
stress cracking (HISC) and similar failure mechanisms
Q 7.4 Is utilization ratio at Calculations should include for general or localised corrosion.
current and end of
within limits in
[API 17J, 2008] for
all design load cases
Q 7.5 Is accumulated A high level of conservatism may be present due to use of
fatigue calculations assumed bore pressure levels during design phase. If significantly
valid lower pressures are recorded, significant reductions in
accumulated fatigue may be gained
Q 7.6 Is predicted
remaining fatigue
life sufficient for
Q 7.7 Are there any events Differentiate between effective compression and true wall
in service history compression as they relate to different failure modes.
related to possible
high tension- or
compression outside
design assumptions
a. Overpull during
installation
b. Vessel motion
higher than
assumed for design
Q 7.8 Are there any Severe torsion or twist of the pipe, changing with internal bore
indications of severe pressure, may indicate tensile armour wire breakage - resulting in
locked-in twist (i.e. severe torsional imbalance.
torsion) in the pipe, Depending on pipe design, the rotation angle per length may be
or does it twist calculated to assess if the measured rotation angle is abnormal or
when pressurized within expected range.
from ambient During leak testing, pipe twist may be monitored to assess any
abnormal torsional behavior, [Marinho et al., 2007]

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num- Question
ber
Q 7.9 Is any leak test Leak test may be used for calculating minimum remaining
performed in recent material based on an assumption that yield and failure will occur
times at utilization equal to 1.0. In absence of leak tests, the highest
Other high pressure operational pressures may possibly be used as a baseline for
events may also be calculations.
used - normally Re-calculating allowable pressure based on a maximum utilization
though the highest per design code can then be performed - normally only with
loadings are seen significant reductions in allowable load input.
during leak testing Predicting a material loss rate, the time span from current date
to reaching maximum utilization from normal operating
conditions can be performed to establish criticality level.
Difference between normal operating- and design pressure is
important to determine if reduction in risk level is applicable
based on such a calculation.
For a scenario where operational pressure is close to the design
pressure, there is less margin between the normal, operational
loading and the forced loading during a leak test. Failure may
either in fact be triggered by the leak test, or occur in short time
afterwards due to continued degradation.
Pipes with reduced pressure rating must consider all accidental
and design pressure events such as shut-in and surge pressures

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
Anti-Wear Protection
The anti-wear layer function is maintained if it provides

• Separation between steel layers
• Material qualifications if outside design assumptions
Table C2.13: Layer Assessment - Anti-Wear Protection

Num- Question
ber
Q 8.1 Is annulus Any use of corrosion inhibitor injected into annulus, or raw
environment seawater exposure should be checked against material
checked and verified qualification
against design
assumptions for
material used as
layer separation
Q 8.2 Is there experience If the anti-wear layer is made of polymer materials where a
with similar known time dependent degradation model exists, this may be
materials and time utilized to assess integrity level
dependent
degradation
Q 8.3 Is the pipe used in If tape layers are used to provide the anti-wear protection, the
dynamic application possibility for dislocation of the tape layers should be considered.
with possibility for Several dissections of used pipe shows that there is indeed a
dislocation of possibility for dislocation in local areas, especially if tape layers
separation layer are laid side-by-side instead of large overlaps or fully extruded
layers.
For layers fully extruded the possibility of dislocation can be
excluded.
Q 8.4 Is the contact Metal-to-metal wear is highly dependent on the contact pressure
pressure levels between the steel layers, determined by the bore pressure.
sufficiently high to For high-pressure systems, the risk related to degradation and
introduce wear or failure mode triggering upon loss of anti-wear protection layer
fretting as a may be assessed based on calculations models in Chapter B1 -
degradation Design Analysis.
mechanism For low-pressure systems, the risk is significantly reduced, and
normally not a significant driver for integrity level degradation.

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
Anti-Buckling Protection
The anti-buckling layer function is maintained if it provides

• Load bearing capacity to restrain tensile armour wires
• Material qualification is outside design assumptions
• Inspection beneath outer sheath (destructive testing)
Anti-Buckling Protection is presented in Table C2.14
Table C2.14: Anti-Buckling Protection

Number Question
Q 9.1 Is annulus Any use of corrosion inhibitor injected into annulus, or raw
environment seawater exposure should be checked against material
checked and verified qualification
against design
assumptions for
material used as
anti-buckling
protection
Q 9.2 Is there experience Several high-temperature risers dissected show that significant
with similar degradation of tape layer had occurred. The tape had partially
materials and time dissolved or melted - leaving the tape ineffective
dependent
degradation
Q 9.3 Is the pipe exposed Global analysis result may be used to determine if loss of
to high compression anti-buckling protection introduces an increased risk for tensile
(true wall) during armour buckling.
normal operation If analysis results shown that there is a substantial tension in the
armour wires, for all operational conditions, the risk associated
with loss of the anti-buckling protection layer may be considered
negligible.
Q 9.4 Is there any findings High risk area is near touch-down point, as this area us
from inspections susceptible to compression loads (true wall).
indicating Refer to failure description Tensile Wire Axial Compression
dislocation of Failure (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)
armour wires

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
Insulation Material
The insulation layer function is maintained if it provides

• U-value below requirement
• No significant ’thinning’ which may affect ancillaries
• Temperature drop along line within requirements for arrival temperature
• Verifying no movement of ancillary equipment
Table C2.15: Layer Assessment - Insulation Material

Num- Question
ber
Q 10.1 Is the measured The loss of insulation may be evident by comparing initial- and
temperature loss current temperature drop, for similar bore fluids and pressure
between upstream levels, between upstream and downstream temperature sensors.
and downstream Significant changes may show that the insulation material is
end of the flexible degraded.
pipe system in The assessment needs to consider possible seawater flooding of
accordance with annulus or insulation layer and impact on insulation properties.
design calculations
Q 10.2 Is arrival The loss of insulation layer function is mainly associated with
temperature flow assurance. Direct consequences for the pipe integrity is not
sufficient to meet expected.
flow assurance
requirements
Q 10.3 Is there any findings Movement is often identified due to partial/full removal of
from inspections marine growth in localized areas at ancillary attachments
indicating Refer to failure description Sliding Tether Clamp and Altered
movement of Buoyancy (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)
clamped ancillaries
(tether or MWA
clamps, buoyancy
modules, other)
Q 10.4 Are any ancillary Clamping of ancillaries on insulated flexible pipe is difficult and
devices clamped on. possible damages to the pipe as well as malfunction of the
clamped on device must be checked - e.g. close visual inspection
Outer Sheath
The outer sheath (and intermediate) layer function is maintained if it provides

• Barrier between internal- and external environment
• Material properties within requirements for
1. strength
2. toughness

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
3. ductility
• No through layer defects
Table C2.16: Layer Assessment - Outer Sheath

Num-
ber
Q 11.1 Is annulus possible to monitor or For any loss of outer sheath integrity, refer to failure
test: description Impact, wear and pressure induced rupture
a. Is annulus free volume tests in creating hole in the outer sheath (Chapter A3 - Failure
line with calculated values or FAT Modes)
values
b. Is annulus free volume tests
trend data indicating any abrupt
decreases or increases in free
volume
c. Is refined testing using
stepwise pressure increases or
injection of known amount if fluid
to verify no breach
d. Are GRVs possible to inspect
and monitor to verify function
Q 11.2 Are there any findings from Relates to risk of experiencing loss of layer integrity in
inspections showing local future due to ongoing degradation or latent defect that
damages, continuous abrasion or may be triggered in normal operation.
interference with other For buried flowlines/jumpers it is not possible to visually
structures/components inspect for anomalies resulting in a lower confidence in
layer integrity if no other inspection method is available
Q 11.3 Are there any findings from Movement is often identified due to partial/full removal of
inspections indicating movement marine growth in localized areas at ancillary attachments.
of clamped ancillaries (tether or Refer to failure description Sliding Tether Clamp and
MWA clamps, buoyancy modules, Altered Buoyancy (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes).
other)
Q 11.4 Are there any previous repairs Repairs should be regarded to restore layer integrity if
performed proven sealing capacity.
Previous clamp-on repairs should be given attention as
they present a higher risk for loss of barrier towards
external environment.
Q 11.5 Are there any areas resulting in This is normally only regarded as relevant for
high insulation and possible high-temperature systems. Higher risk areas are beneath
temperature driven degradation a. Bend stiffeners
modes b. Buoyancy modules
c. Clamps (tether and MWA)
d. Bend-restrictors
e. Buried sections
Failure is expected to manifest at high-strain areas, i.e.
high curvature.
Refer to failure description Outer Sheath Embrittlement
(Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num-
ber
Q 11.6 Is the outer sheath exposed to No known defects have occurred attributed to UV
UV-radiation exposure, and is considered low risk. Additionally such
areas of the system are normally inspectable or possibly
even available to extract a material sample.
Failure is expected to manifest at high-strain areas, i.e.
high curvature.
End Fitting
The end-fitting function is maintained if it provides

1. Anchoring of all loading bearing layers
2. Sealing integrity between terminated layers
3. Structural capacity to withstand all design loads
1. No dislocation or pull-out of layers
2. No dislocation of sealing components
3. No significant material loss (external and internal)
Table C2.17: Layer Assessment - End Fitting

Num- Question
ber
Q 12.1 Is the surface End-fittings which are accessible, can be inspected and controlled
coating intact directly.
Where the end-fitting is inaccessible (located inside closed
guide-tube, buried etc.) the condition of cathodic protection
system is critical to limit corrosion.
Q 12.2 Are there any Similar considerations as in Q 12.1 applies.
observations of
significant corrosion
on end-fitting body
or fasteners (bolts,
nuts or studs)
Q 12.3 Is electrical Some cathodic protection systems require a discontinuity
discontinuity between the flexible pipe and adjacent structure.
between riser The discontinuity may be verified through direct measurements if
and/or hang-off and end-fitting is accessible.
remaining structure
verified

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001

Num- Question
ber
Q 12.4 Are the jumper Applicable to subsea end of risers or flowlines, where the
wires between end-fitting is accessible.
bracelet anodes and Especially important for intermediate connections where there is
end-fitting verified a significant distance to other structures that could have, in
to be intact event of damage to jumper wire, provided the required cathodic
protection
Q 12.5 Are there any If oily fluids have been observed in the vent-system, this may
observations of oily indicate minor leaks in internal sealing arrangement.
fluids in ventilation This inspection is normally only possible for the topside
system end-fitting, with the connection point for annulus testing near
the end-fitting.
Q 12.6 Is pressure barrier Loss of volume may affect sealing integrity due to reduction in
material expected to effective compression fit. Coupons may be used for reference to
swell or loose assess relevance of failure mechanism
volume exposed to
bore fluids
Q 12.7 Are there any Early PVDF end-fitting termination designs are high-risk due to a
indications of number of experienced failures
possible loss of layer If suspected failure related to anchoring of tensile wires or other
anchoring or internal steel components, radiography may be evaluated to
pull-out of layers document status
For fluid integrity the use of permeation rate and annulus testing
may be used to document status
Q 12.8 Is the seal Included to alleviate interface management.
arrangement Dependent on sealing material (steel, polymer, elastomer) time
towards dependent degradation mechanisms may be applicable.
downstream/
upstream piping
system evaluated for
time dependent
degradation
mechanisms
Q 12.9 Are there Annulus vent gas should be checked for traces of bore fluids and
indications of excessive vent rates.
leakage from bore Leakage in end-fitting seals will influence annulus vent rates and
into annulus annulus gas composition. Annulus monitoring may be used if
through end-fitting such failure modes are suspected.
sealing arrangement
C2.4.5 Ancillary Components
Ancillary components are important for the performance and integrity of a flexible pipe. As
part of a lifetime assessment, the functionality and integrity level of such components may
be of key importance to conclude on the flexible pipe integrity. The ancillary components
should be included for any lifetime assessment of the overall system, e.g. especially relevant
for lifetime extension.
Components to be evaluated include amongst several others:
• Bend stiffener

Section C2.4
OC2017 A-001
• Buoyancy elements
• MWA, support towers or anchor bases (structures)
• Clamps (tether or MWA)
• Tether (steel or fibre materials)
• Bend restrictors
• Hang-off structure
• Connection clamps between flexible pipe sections, topside- or subsea structure interface
• Cathodic protection (CP) system
Main reference for flexible pipe ancillary equipment are [API 17L1, 2013] and [API 17L2, 2013].
[API 17L1, 2013], and [API 17L2, 2013], presents specifications and recommendations for
flexible pipe ancillary equipment, respectively. The latter contains a section on integrity
management (including relevant failure modes) for each system component.
[NORSOK U-009, 2011] Life extension for subsea systems, includes specific guidance for
some ancillary components. In Annex H guidance is given for tether and buoyancy compo-
nents, which may be used in addition to [API 17L1, 2013] and [API 17L2, 2013].
The standards provide a good overview of important functional requirements and design
parameters , valuable upon undertaking a lifetime assessment.

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
C2.5 Industry References and Experiences
C2.5.1 General
A list of experiences is shown in Table C2.18 to highlight key topics related to lifetime
assessments. Two examples are presented in more detail for the illustration of common
issues or concerns during re-qualification.
Table C2.18: Industry References and Experiences List
System and Assessment Comment

Assessment Initiator
Riser to single satellite Possible to repair through Failed due to excessive carcass
well, failure of carcass in re-termination; updated global- axial force, without proper design
topside end-fitting and fatigue analysis due to for this load.
shortening of catenary length
Relocation of risers Onshore repair and inspection, Performed in line with guidance
between fields utilizing including re-termination. from [API 17B, 2008]
same vessel (FPSO Re-analysis of fatigue due to requirements for flexible pipe
moved) flooded annulus. PA11 reuse in similar conditions.
investigations,
Gas-lift riser system During lifetime assessment, the Analysis based on
lifetime extension riser system was found to have an [API 17TR2, 2003] showed
integrity level below acceptance sufficient remaining lifetime,
limits due to PA11 degradation. however coupons were more
degraded than calculated. Further
investigations required destructive
testing of the riser identified as
most critical.
Coupons had not been sampled

regularly - likely to have been
detected at an earlier stage
Production flowline Not possible to confirm condition Not possible to confirm outer
system lifetime and remaining service lifetime due sheath integrity or any damages
extension to inaccessible CP system occurring during
components installation/operation, thus
reliance on CP system was found
to be critical.
Production flowline Predicted souring of reservoirs Utilizing actual pressure and
lifetime extension leading to increased H2 S levels in temperature data the qualification
bore fluids. limit could be adhered to.
Combined uncertainty due to
Diffusion and permeation other corrosion processes resulted
assessment concluded that in an overall too high risk level
operation at design limits was not
within material qualification
limits, thus decommissioned at
end of design life

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001

Gas export riser system Extended lifetime after extensive Initiation of lifetime extension
re-analysis of global configuration work was done at a too late
and fatigue life due to non- stage, rendering the system unfit
conservative original design for service due to lacking
parameters compared to current documentation. Integrity
best practice Management system was not
effective, i.e. unsuccessful in
documenting history of
operational parameters
Over bending, i.e. Extensive testing of reference The availability of a sample pipe
violation of MBR limit, cross section proved that no section from the actual
of gas export riser significant damage was likely to production run enabled the
during installation have occurred, and with testing to be performed with
subsequent successful pressure minimum conservative
testing line was re-qualified to be assumptions on as-built profiles
within design conditions and details.
Re-qualification of Annulus test program detected Possible stress concentrations or
gas-lift riser after outer damage in splash-zone - exposure stress re-distribution due to
sheath damage. time approximately 2 years, i.e. localized damages not
time since last positive annulus investigated in detail. In
test. retrospect close visual inspection
Re-qualified based on updated using divers should probably have
fatigue analysis showing large been performed.
remaining fatigue life.
Re-qualification of Damage identified initially in Fatigue analysis method by
gas-lift riser after outer submerged part of riser, later in today’s best practice compared to
sheath damage. splash zone due to vessel draft original design process may reveal
change. other critical failure mechanisms
than the initiator of the
During re-qualification, the most analysis/assessment.
severe fatigue concentration spot
was found to be not at outer
sheath damage location, but at
bend-stiffener end.
Gas lift flow line Re-qualification aborted due to Impact damages are typically
suffering impact damage uncertainty in impact energy, difficult to successfully re-qualify.
- caused by dragged time for exposure of armour wires Limited accuracy of input data
anchor line and associated high risk if failure often results in highly
in operation conservative evaluations with
negative outcome.
Gas export flow line Re-qualification should initially Project showed the importance of
system pressure increase not be required as system design assessing all previous
included the higher pressure level non-conformances and challenge
as part of the load cases. the conclusion based on current
However, project execution or future predicted situation.
approved a non-conformance of
less cover depth than required for
the higher pressures levels to
restrain upheaval buckling.

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001

Production riser Investigations of recovered pipe Project showed the importance of
decommissioned due to showed that a key integrity developing knowledge related to
fatigue life expiry concern, not included in the annulus corrosion and
lifetime assessment, was local implementation of additional
corrosion on tensile armour wires condition control mechanisms.
reducing the layer capacity and
creating fatigue hot-spots
C2.5.2 Flowlines Life Extension Example
General
An operator commissioned work to assess and execute a lifetime extension study for a
single flexible pipe system. Work was performed according to the approach described in
[NORSOK Y-002, 2010] Lifetime Extension of Transportation Systems guideline.
System Description
The system consisted of a static riser segment and several flowline segments. All were
of similar cross sections with minor additional re-enforcing layers in the riser cross section
(double outer sheath and increased armour wire thickness). A simplified system layout is
shown in Figure C2.3:
System Screening
The systems had been thoroughly reviewed few years earlier while establishing an integrity
management program. This included a test and inspection, assessment of threats, risk level,
necessary short- and long term modifications and an integrity management plan.
The system review is summarized by the following notes:
1. Documentation had been sourced and organized during the IM work. Some key in-
formation was missing, such as modification and repair reports from the installation
phase
2. System review had recently been carried out, and there were no non-closed anomalies
or findings that needed to be assessed during the lifetime extension work
3. Current design premise and risk assessments were found to be valid for the required
extended time period
4. Gap analysis was performed with the conclusion that original design criteria were more
conservative than current revisions. One exception was identified for the cathodic
protection system where current requirements for anode mass is based on a significantly
higher exposed steel surface area
5. Industry experience for flexible pipes having been a similar time in service was limited.
There were no identified industry concerns for similar applications or service history.

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
Pressure
Temperature
Instrument
Instrument
~200m
Hang off
MWL
Intermediate
connection between
pipe segments
Carrier pipe Bend restrictor

J-tube duct
Polyurethane
Well
Figure C2.3: Riser and flowline system schematic
Condition Control Tools
Condition control tools were assessed to identify possible areas of concern. The following
was observed:
1. Direct quantification of ageing of pressure barrier possible due to presence of coupons

in topside process piping
2. Operational experience could be gathered for pressure, temperature, and annulus gas
and bore fluid sampling. The data for pressure and temperature was however in-

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
complete as data for initial years was not possible to retrieve, requiring conservative
assumptions to be used for this time interval
3. No information was available from visual inspections due to the riser being inside
guide-tube, while the flowlines was covered due to protection and upheaval buckling
requirements. Only topside end-fitting was accessible.
Layer Assessment
A layer assessment was performed with no findings except two areas of concern:
1. Pressure barrier condition due to calculated remaining lifetime less than 5 years
2. Armour wire condition due to uncertainty in flowline annulus condition (dry, condensed
liquid from permeation or flooded with seawater. The riser annulus condition was
possible to test, providing verification of current annulus condition. )
Pressure Barrier Condition
The evaluation was undertaken based on [API 17TR2, 2003]. A modelling of the polymer
degradation can then be performed in a quantitative manner. Temperature data was unavail-
able for the first approximately 8 years of service time, requiring a conservative temperature
to be used for this period. From that time on accurate data was available for calculations.
Resulting values indicated that time for reaching the degradation acceptance level for the
polymer material was imminent for all possible temperature scenarios (50, 55 or 60°C) -
see Figure C2.5. Calculations were performed by the pH 4 curve as a common conservative
approach due to partially incomplete bore fluid and chemical usage data.
To verify the calculated results, polymer coupons was extracted from the topside piping for
material analysis. A typical coupon setup is shown in Figure C2.4. The spool piece contains
5 individual coupons allowing several samplings during the lifetime. The coupon includes
both the carcass and the polymer pressure barrier layer similar to the flexible pipe, but not
the remaining layers.
Figure C2.4: Left: Coupon Spool Piece. Right: retrieved coupon sample
The results from actual material testing see Figure C2.5 for comparison toward calculations,
showed that sufficient integrity level was present for the required extended service life. Some

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure C2.5: Polyamide degradation based on [API 17TR2, 2003]. Figure shows reduction of Cor-
rected inherent viscosity (CIV), an indirect measure of molecular weight and material ductility, as
function of time in operation. Gap indicates difference between lowest calculated CIV value and
lowest measurement from coupons. Blue line represents the temperature profile (historical data) -
horizontal section in left part represents time where assumption has to be made due to unavailability
of measurement data. Different assumptions were used - only one temperature profile line is shown
however.
uncertainty is inherent as the coupons are located topside, while the high-temperature end
may have a higher degradation rate.
A lesson learnt was that further confidence could be obtained if the integrity management
program had performed periodic coupon retrieval, thus allowing trending data and possibly
calibrating the calculation model at an earlier stage.
Armour Wire Condition
Annulus conditions for the flow-lines were thoroughly assessed. Based on:
• experiences with outer sheath damages during installation,
• risk of outer sheath burst if GRVs had failed in closed position
• risk of GRVs failing in open position
It was concluded that a flooded annulus should be assumed. Liquid filling in itself did not
present a problem; however any direct exposure of armour wires to surrounding fluids results
in requirement for verifying CP system condition.
Due to the fact that neither the protection potential nor anode mass could be inspected and
verified, general armour wire corrosion needed to be considered.
Calculating the acceptable armour wire corrosion based on a damage during installation and
malfunctioning CP system showed that within 22 years the maximum allowable utilization
during operation would be exceeded.

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure C2.6: Tensile armour wire stress level as function of thickness reduction
With the estimated thickness reduction over 22 years of operation a maximum pressure
of 95 bars was found. This was concluded unacceptable as the well shut-in pressure was
significantly higher.
Figure C2.7: Tensile armour utilization factor as function of bore pressure at determined
minimum wire thickness level
Conclusion
Based on the armour wire corrosion scenarios evaluated, it was found required to verify the
cathodic protection system condition. As the whole length of the flowline segments were
covered (due to requirements for impact- and trawling protection), this was not feasible. In
addition this would to entail intervention work of high risk for causing damage to the flexible
pipe as well as high cost.
Final conclusion was that the flexible pipe system should be decommissioned at the end of
current design life.
Lesson learnt is that to provide solutions for inspection and monitoring during the design
and development phase needs to be pursued. Inspection possibilities may have provided an
acceptance of lifetime assessment, thus allowing an extended service life. Integrity man-
agement within the design life would also have benefitted from such possibilities through
providing inspection data confirming the design integrity.

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
C2.5.3 Re-qualification example after outer sheath damage and annulus

flooding
Several older design premises only considered dry annulus as input to fatigue calculations.
Several of these systems have experienced outer sheath damages resulting in annulus flooding
with seawater.
Annulus testing indicated the presences of an outer sheath loss of integrity in the upper riser
section, i.e. above 30m water depth. Upon performing ROV inspections, the damage was
located and confirmed, see example in Figure C2.8.
Figure C2.8: Outer sheath damage due to interference with neighboring riser bundle
The time from the last annulus test provided a timeframe for the exposure time, i.e. 1.5
years. This timeframe is typically based on an annual inspection plan. General corrosion and
material loss for the maximum exposure time was not found to be critical, refer to Figure
C2.9 . Conservative assumptions applied for both corrosion rates and exposed area. Short-
term integrity was thus found to be acceptable, and repair work was successfully undertaken
to restore the outer sheath integrity as soon as possible to limit further exposure of the
armour wires.
Figure C2.9: General corrosion assessment in regards to remaining service life. Remaining
service life > 5 years from damage initiation
Establishing the long-term integrity and allowable service life was undertaken in parallel with
the repair work. The design premise was found to only consider dry annulus, thus the service
life was not documented in the current condition, where the possibility for accelerated fatigue
due to a more aggressive annulus environment was present.

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001
Fatigue calculations were performed according to a similar process and best practices as for
the design phase works. The key challenges identified were the following:
1. Accurately quantify accumulated fatigue damage up to the event of outer sheath in-
tegrity loss due to missing operational bore pressure data
2. Accurately quantify future fatigue damage due to unavailability of SN curves for the
current annulus environment
Challenge 1 resulted in the necessity to utilize bore pressure at the operational maximum
limit as a conservative approach. Actual bore pressure values were expected to be in the order
80% of this, which could have gained approximately doubling of the fatigue life, see Figure
C2.10. Reduction of available remaining service life is thus directly related to insufficient
monitoring data handling.
Challenge 2 resulted in the necessity to utilize SN curves for higher concentrations of corrosive
elements, i.e. SN curve #3 (see Figure C2.10), than actual expected values as shown in SN
curve #2. A reduction in the order of 1/4 of the more probable lifetime was experienced.
Developing accurate SN curves are both time consuming and costly, however this parameter
is perhaps the most single most significant input with very large impact on the new total
allowable service life.
Figure C2.10: Fatigue service life sensitivity for different input parameters. Fatigue capacity
is 1 if no damage (D) has been accumulated. At a value of 0 no remaining capacity exists,
i.e. end of service life. NOTE: Fatigue Life is Fatigue Service Life x SF = 10

Section C2.5
OC2017 A-001

Chapter C3
Repair Methods
Author: 4Subsea
467
Section C3.1
OC2017 A-001
C3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses repair methods for flexible pipe including end-fitting. Ancillary devices
to flexible pipes such as bend stiffeners, buoyancy modules and friction clamps are omitted.
Historical data of failure and damage to flexible pipes are described in Chapter A3 Failure
Modes.
A list of possible methods for inspection and integrity monitoring along with related industry
practice is presented in Chapter C1 Integrity Management. The feasibility and actual use of
the inspection methods are presented as part of Table C3.1.
The outline of this chapter is as follows:
Section C3.2 gives an overview of repair methods status for a wide range of known failure
modes.
Section C3.1 describes the process of planning for repair from detection of the damage to
continued operation of the pipe after repair.
Section C3.4 describes repair methods for outer sheath damages.
Section C3.5 describes repair methods to re-establish annulus vent for flexible pipes with
restricted annulus vent flow.
Section C3.6 presents an overview of re-termination of end-fitting as a repair method. This
repair method can be suitable for a variety of damages near the pipe ends. Re-termination
could also be applied to a segment along the pipe: by cutting the pipe, re-terminate both
ends and insert a short flexible jumper or spool piece connecting the two re-terminated ends.

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001
C3.2 Repair method status
C3.2.1 Overview of failure modes
This section presents a list of known failure modes for flexible risers based on tables 30-31
in [API 17B, 2008] and a report from PSA Norway on flexible pipes [Muren, 2008]. Related
methods known to 4Subsea for inspection and repair are listed for each failure mode where
applicable.
Table C3.1: Failure modes, inspection methods and repair methods for flexible risers -
[API 17B, 2008]. Column ’Defect ref.’ refers to relevant section in [API 17B, 2008].
Pipe Defect Defect Inspection Repair method Comment

layer ref. methods
Carcass 1.1 Hole, crevice, Internal visual None * Careful internal
pitting or inspection inspection over
thinning full pipe length
recommended
1.2 Unlocking Internal visual None * Acoustic methods
deformation inspection in pilot
Digital X-ray applications
offshore
1.3 Collapse or Collapse: Internal None * Collapse:
ovalization visual inspection, Replacement of
and digital X-ray riser
Ovalization:
Internal
measurements
and inspection
(intelligent or
gauge pigging)
1.4 Circumferential Internal visual None *
cracking / wear inspection
Carcass fatigue Internal visual None * Careful internal
cracks inspection inspection in all
dynamic areas
recommended
Carcass erosion Internal visual None Likely to be
inspection spread out over
riser length, most
significant in
curves / bends
High frequency Audible noise Components No experienced
vibrations due Vibration attached to carcass or riser
to vortex measurement connected pipe damages due to
shedding at Spectral analysis work may be vibrations
carcass cavities removed, or
(in gas pipes) strengthened
Internal 2.1 Crack or hole None (Internal None * Breach in the
pres- inspection in pressure sheath
sure smooth bore will eventually
sheat pipes) lead to leak.

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001

layer ref. methods
2.2 Rupture None (Internal None *
inspection in
smooth bore
pipes)
2.3 Collapse Internal visual None
inspection
2.4 Ageing Coupon sampling None * Re-termination of
embrittlement and analysis a riser with
(PA11, PVDF, pressure sheath
HDPE) ageing localized
to the end
successfully
performed
2.5 Excess creep None None
(extrusion) of
polymer into
metallic layer
2.6 Blistering None None
2.7 Rupture (due None None *
to fatigue)
2.8 Wear / nibbing None (Internal None *
inspection in
smooth bore
pipes)
Pressure 3.1 Individual or X-ray None Successfully
armour multiple wire used to detect
layer rupture (static wire fracture and
lines) unlocking.
Used onshore and
offshore above
waterline.
3.2 Unlocking X-ray None
3.3 Collapse or External None * Gross errors are
ovalization inspection possible to
Internal identify from
inspection (due external and/or
to interaction internal
with layers inside inspection
pressure armour)
3.4 Corrosion None None
3.5 Individual or See 3.1 See 3.1 See 3.1
multiple wire
rupture
(Dynamic
lines)
3.6 Longitudinal None None Should be
wire crack possible to detect
(hoop by X-ray
direction) tomography.
(Currently used
in laboratory, no
offshore
experience)

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001

layer ref. methods
Back- 4.1 Rupture (single X-ray None
up wire or all
pres- wires)
sure
armour
layer
4.2 Ovality External None * Gross errors are
inspection possible to
Internal identify from
inspection (due external and/or
to interaction internal
with layers inside inspection
pressure armour)
4.3 Clustering X-ray None
4.4 Corrosion None None
4.5 Individual or None None
multiple wire
crack
Tensile 5.1 Multiple-wire Eddy current, None Fractures
armour rupture (static Digital X-ray identified on
layers line) External outermost
inspection related armour layers.
to outer sheath Used in positions
rupture with identified
Torsion anomaly.
measurements Promising
Fiber optics development
measurement based on acoustic
methods
5.2 Bird-caging or Eddy current or None Successful X-ray
clustering X-ray for inspection
clustering performed
External
inspection for
bird-caging
5.3 Kinking X-ray None External

External inspection
inspection frequently
performed
5.4 Corrosion X-ray, eddy None X-ray successfully
current, used to detect
ultrasonic gross corrosion
inspection damage
5.5 Individual-wire See 5.1 See 5.1 See 5.1
rupture
(dynamic line)
Hydrogen For wire rupture
induced stress due to HIC see
cracking (HIC) 5.1
Wear between None None
steel armor
layers and
other layers

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001

layer ref. methods
Buckling of the External None Frequently used
pipe inspection for flow lines
permanent
buckling (e.g.
upheaval
buckling)
Annulus H2 S or CO2 Bore fluid Change H2 S-
diffusion: monitoring, H2 S- operational measurements
Acid annulus measurements in condition / bore performed on
annulus test, fluid annulus vent gas
annulus vent may be
monitoring inconclusive due
to absorption of
H2 S in steel and
volatile gas
Flooded Annulus volume Consider Annulus volume
annulus test injection of test is not able to
inhibitor all distinguish
dependent upon between oil,
cause for flooding condensed water
or minor leak to
sea. Liquid
pockets in low
points may
disturb inspection
accuracy
Re-assessment of
riser permissible
service life
required if not
considered in
design.
Anti- 6.1 Wear, cracking None None
wear
layer
6.2 Clustering None None
Insulation 7.1 Crushed layer External visual Retrofit Repair must
layer inspection additional consider
external clamp-on devices
insulation where relevant
Repair or replace
whole or part of
insulation layer
7.2 Flooded layer Monitoring of Not required Flooded layer
temperature shall be
(temperature considered during
drop) and bore design
condition. [API 17J, 2008]
Temperature
reading on
optical fibers

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001

layer ref. methods
7.3 Pipe clogging Flow monitoring Internal pigging Pigging and
(bore) (bore) Chemical chemical
Internal injection injection are
inspection Flushing frequently used
Retrofit Hydrate removal
additional may damage
external carcass
insulation
Repair or replace
whole or part of
insulation layer
Outer 8.1 Hole, tear, Annulus volume Repair methods
sheath rupture or test for outer sheath
crack External visual damage (see
inspection Section C3.4 )
Annulus vent
monitoring
8.2 Ingress of Annulus volume If hole in outer
seawater test sheath located
Ultrasonic near subsea end:
external tool Flushing of
annulus with
MEG and repair
of outer sheath
damage (see
Section C3.4
8.3 Wear, tear External visual Repair methods Repair or
inspection for outer sheath additional
damage (see protection may
Section C3.4 ) be adequate for
wear damages
Ageing and External visual None For local repair
degradation inspection see see Section
C3.4
End 9.1 Internal X-ray for pressure Re-termination May result in
fitting pressure sheath sheaths with failure of riser.
pull-out platinum markers
Annulus vent
monitoring
Major leak when
fully pulled out
9.2 Tensile-armour None, major leak None Expected to
pull-out (all when fully pulled result in failure of
wires) out riser.
9.3 Outer sheath Annulus vent Re-termination
pull-out monitoring or
annulus volume
test
Visual inspection

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001

layer ref. methods
9.4 Vent-valve Annulus volume Repair methods Restore annulus
blockage test / Annulus to re-establish vent. Test for
vent flow test annulus vent (see permanent
Annulus vent Section C3.6) damages to outer
monitoring sheath.
9.5 Vent-valve Subsea: Purge Replace valves Asses impact of
leakage gas or detectable (replacement of the leakage on
liquid through subsea vent plugs remaining service
annulus have been life.
Topside: Gas performed
leakage test successfully)
9.6 Individual None None
tensile-armour
pull-out
9.7 Failure of None None
sealing system
(sealing rings,
etc.)
9.8 Crack or None None
rupture of
pressure
armour or
back-up
pressure
armour
9.9 Crack or None None
rupture of
tensile armour
9.10 Structural None None Pipe burst /
failure of end catastrophic
fitting body or failure.
flange Replacement of
riser
9.11 Cracking of None None Pipe burst /
pressure sheath catastrophic
failure.
Replacement of
riser
* Note: Re-termination if defect is confirmed to be close to end only
C3.2.2 Market screening
In categorising proven repair techniques and commercial products for flexible pipes the market
has been screened for known designs and vendors. This included a dialog with different parties
involved in the flexible pipe market from flexible pipe manufacturers and offshore installation
companies to consultancy groups and inspection companies.
The market for commercial products associated to repair of flexible pipe is fairly narrow and
is more related to stand alone products designed for a specific project. Different solutions
exist at a development level still to be tested and are not at present commercially available.

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001
Hence, detailed description of these products is not presented.

The available and proven methods are grouped into three main categories:
• Repair methods covered by flexible pipe manufacturer
• Commercially available repair methods
• Stand-alone repair methods
Polymer welding of the outer sheath is the most common repair method covered by the pipe
supplier, a service most often provided during installation of the pipes.
A limited number of commercial products are identified which includes the products ’FlexGel’
and ’Armadillo’ both developed and supplied by Flexlife and ’Armawrap’ supplied by NICC.
Several special designed repair methods exist and have been used on various locations for
temporary or permanent use. Most common methods comprise sealing of outer sheath
rupture by soft or steel clamps and re–establishment of end–fitting vent system by installation
of annulus vent clamps.
The different repair methods are described in Section C3.4, Section C3.5 and Section C3.6.
C3.2.3 Evaluation of repair methods and general guidance on repair possi-

bilities
On the basis of the preceding sections, there are a limited number of failure defects which
are possible to detect, and even fewer which are possible and beneficial to repair.
The repair methods covered in this report are limited to failure modes which are both possible
to detect and possible to repair. Common for the identified repair methods is that both the
products available on the market and the stand alone designs used on specific projects all
relate to:
• Outer sheath damages
• Restricted or blocked annulus vent
4Subsea is aware of in total 4 re-terminations of flexible pipe end-fittings conducted offshore
by the pipemanufacturers; of these at least two have been described as unsuccessful. Note
also the separate hazard warning for re-termination in Section C3.6.2. Re-termination of
flexible pipe end fittings should always be performed in cooperation with the flexible pipe
manufacturer. This will be covered separately in Section C3.6.
From 4Subsea experience it is generally possible to repair damages limited to the outer sheath
or to restricted (blocked) annulus vent. Any structural damage needs careful consideration
and is never straight forward to repair.
C3.2.4 Qualification of new inspection methods and repair methods
New methods and technologies are continuously developed and there is a need for qualifi-
cation to ensure that the new technology meets the specified requirements. Qualification

Section C3.2
OC2017 A-001
of a repair method is a part of the complete process of planning for repair as described in
Section C3.3. For qualification of new inspection methods and new repair methods, guidance
may be found in standards and reference documents. Reference is here given to DNV’s rec-
ommended practice (RP) on Qualification of New Technology [DNV-RP-A203, 2012]. The
general methodology in the DNV RP is briefly described in the following.
The recommended practice is based on a system approach, in which an initial screening of the
system should be performed to identify novel elements.The failure mechanisms associated
with the use of thse novel elements will in turn be the main focus in the qualification process.
The elements which are not novel should be verified separately as for proven technologies.
The qualification is an iternative process to detect and correct for deviations on material,
components and assembly levels. Possible failure modes for the system should be identified
and the qualification must include appropriate margins for each failure mechanism associated
with the failure modes. Thus, larger uncertainties will require larger margins to meet the
requirements.

Section C3.3
OC2017 A-001
C3.3 Planning for repair
The process of planning and executing a repair is illustrated in a flow chart in Figure C3.1.
The flow chart covers the entire process from detection of damage to continued operation
of the pipe. For a damage which is possible to repair, there are 4 main steps in the process:
1. Damage assessment
2. Design and qualification of repair method
3. Execution of repair and verification of pipe integrity
4. Continued operation of the flexible pipe and update of the integrity management
program
These steps are described in the following with reference to Figure C3.1.
Figure C3.1: Flow Chart for the process of repair execution
C3.3.1 Damage assessment
The obvious starting point for a repair process is detection of the damage. This is followed
by an inspection of the damage in order to provide input for a technical assessment of the
damage. The inspection should address the following: pictures and extent of the damage,
type of damage and possibly the cause. If the current information from inspection proves
insufficient, there will be a loopback to perform additional inspections before continuing on
the technical assessment.

Section C3.3
OC2017 A-001
The technical assessment covers the following:

• structural integrity of the pipe
• risk level
• remaining service life
• feasibility for repair
• updated integrity management system
Additional or more detailed inspections may be necessary as part of the technical assessment.
The technical assessment should eventually result in a conclusive answer to the following
question: ’Is it required and possible to repair the damage?’ There are generally four alter-
native answers:
• Repair is not required: The pipe is ready for continued operation, update of integrity
management program may be required e.g. frequent inspections
• Repair is not possible: The pipe should be decommissioned
• Repair is possible and required: Continue the process of planning and executing a
repair
• Derate the pipe: This should be considered for pipes where repair initially is considered
not possible for the existing service/operational conditions. Derating the pipe will
change the input for the technical assessment and hence result in a loopback to a new
technical assessment.
C3.3.2 Design and qualification of repair method
There is a need for a broad range of input to establish functional requirements for the repair as
part of the repair concept selection. The list of necessary documentation and considerations
to this process includes:
• Key properties of the pipe
– Datasheet, structural composition
– Riser configuration lay-out
– Operating pressure, temperature, bore content and injection chemical history
– Possible deviations during manufacturing of the pipe
– Any previous repair history of the pipe
• Key features of the damage, including pictures
– Extent of damage
– Type of damage
– Cause of damage
• Location of damage
– Water depth

Section C3.3
OC2017 A-001
– Dynamics and curvature of the pipe at the location of the damage

– Interference with surrounding structures
– Access to the damage
• Requirements to the repair
– Structural integrity
– Durability
– Outer environment (sea water, hydrocarbons, riser dynamics, adjacent structures,
etc.)
– Material properties and degradation mechanisms (corrosion, ageing, creep, etc.)
• Installation scope
– Access to the damage, consider the feasibility for use of ROV, divers or rope
access
– Time
– Cost
• Known repair methods
– Review previous repairs for similar applications
The repair concept design and engineering includes description of concept, selection of ma-
terials, calculations, drawings, installation method, and maintenance issues.
The repair method is subject to a qualification run including verification testing to ensure
that the resulting repair method meets the specifications and fulfill its objective. The type
of test is to be agreed with the pipe owner. Qualification process includes FMECA of failure
modes and mechanisms associated with the loads determined for the specific application,
and identification of tests on material, components and assembly levels that have not been
previously performed or whose outcome cannot be confidently inferred by using predictive
tools validated with prior test data.
When a previously qualified repair method is applied to an equivalent damage, the design and
verification process may be simplified. However, it is emphasized that a previously qualified
repair method should undergo a new qualification when used in a different application.
C3.3.3 Execution of repair and verification of pipe integrity
The final repair solution is prepared, including procurement of the necessary components and
fabrication of the repair solution itself. A factory acceptance test (FAT) is usually performed
to verify the final repair solution and its accompanying components prior to installation.
Reference is given to the details on hydrostatic pressure test (leak test and structural integrity
test) provided in [API 17B, 2008]
Installation is usually performed by ROV or divers in subsea application. For outer sheath
damages located above sea level, access for installation may be obtained by rope access or
scaffolding. Direct access to the topside end-fitting (as for repair methods to re-establish
annulus vent) is often facilitated at the hang-off location. Further details on installation are

Section C3.3
OC2017 A-001
given for each repair method in the following Section C3.4, Section C3.5 and Section C3.6.
Documentation of the installation usually includes installation summary, as-built documen-

tation and test report.
The repair and pipe integrity is verified after repair; normally pipe integrity is verified as
follows:
• An annulus test is performed to confirm a successful repair after a repair of outer
sheath damage or re-establishment of annulus vent.
• A pressure test is performed to confirm structural integrity of the pipe and end fitting
after re-termination.
A successful repair is followed by continued operation of the pipe and update of the integrity
management program for the flexible pipe. Generally, there are also requirements for periodic
inspection and maintenance of the repair. Details on these requirements are presented for
each repair method in the following sections ( Section C3.4, Section C3.5 and Section C3.6
).

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
C3.4 Repair methods for outer sheath damages
Outer sheath damages include wear, tear, holes and breaches. Damages which are not
penetrating through the outer sheath shall not be cut through or be handled so as to cause
a hole. These damages should be reinforced if required with one of the methods described
in this section.
C3.4.1 Injection of inhibitor liquid in annulus
Objective and application
In the case of an outer sheath leakage, injection of a corrosion inhibitor may constitute a
mitigating action. The objective is to top-off riser annulus with the inhibitor in order to both
displace already ingressed seawater as well as limiting further ingress, thus avoiding seawater
containing oxygen from circulating the armour wires.
For the purpose of displacing seawater, the use of an inhibitor – such as Mono Ethylene
Glycol (MEG) – with density somewhat higher than seawater is beneficial. Injection of MEG,
combined with tracer dye, could additionally be used for leakage test to localize the outer
sheath damage. Injection of inhibitor is preferably used in combination with one of the other
repair methods for outer sheath damages described in the following sections in order to seal
off the damage from a corrosive environment.
The strategy of using an inhibitor fluid, e.g. Mono Ethylene Glycol (MEG), to limit fur-
ther corrosion has been performed by operators in the North Sea [Taylor et al., 2002],
[Picksley et al., 2002].The methodology is not standardized, but shown viable for the riser
in question. It should be ensured that no related material degradation effects are enhanced.
Description of the use and injection setup for an inhibitor liquid
An example of a MEG injection system assembly is schematically depicted in Figure C3.2.

An air driven pump injects MEG from a storage tank in to the riser annulus. The pump air
inlet pressure is controlled by a pressure regulator. Pressure safety valves (PSV) are used
as extra precaution to avoid pressure surges in the system. The applied feeding pressure
depends on the capacity of the outer sheath and the riser configuration for the actual flexible
pipe in question. Gravity feeding of the inhibitor fluid is an alternative for injecting the fluid
into riser annulus – though limited flow rates experienced shows this to be more viable for
topping–up than initial filling.
It is difficult to verify successful protection of the armour wires by this method. In this
context, the importance of having control of the injected volume, riser annulus volume,
applied feed pressure and riser configuration is emphasized. Prior to the injection, the annulus
volume should be estimated and used to establish criteria for the necessary injected volume.
Throughout the injection of the inhibitor, the injected volume and volume rate should be
continuously monitored to provide a basis for a subsequent evaluation of the repair. Dye
added to the injected inhibitor and simultaneous monitoring of the location of the outer
sheath damage may provide additional information on the flow of inhibitor and the effect of
the injected inhibitor.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.2: MEG injection setup
Subsequent inspection and maintenance
Subsequent to the injection of inhibitor, the outer sheath damage may be repaired by one
of the methods presented in the following sections or alternatively more MEG may be added
periodically to top off riser annulus and thereby prevent ingress of seawater. For a permanent
repair, periodically gas sampling is advised in order to monitor the annulus condition, in
particular with respect to possible corrosion processes.
Advantages and drawbacks, including aspects to consider before injection
One of the advantages of this method is that it does not require any direct access to the
repair area.
The injection of an inhibitor liquid in annulus is either used as a mitigating action until a
permanent repair is installed sealing off the outer sheath damage or to control corrosion in
a wet annulus. There are additional concerns and limitations related to this method:
• Requires acceptable flow rates through the vent parts and end-fitting
• The allowable feeding pressure is limited by the capacity of the outer sheath
• Dependent on the riser configuration, there may be local elevation differences along
the riser length, i.e. between sag and hog bends. A large elevation difference here may
cause entrapment of permeated gases in annulus resulting in a local pressure build up
and possibly burst of outer sheath. There are known examples of installing a vent

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
clamp with a relief valve at the hog bend to prevent the local pressure build up. Such
vent clamps may prevent the injection of inhibitor liquid.
• It is difficult to verify successful protection of the armour wires by this method. How-
ever, having ensured the ability to inject MEG along the full riser length, a single point
of leakage (a hole in the outer sheath or an open vent port) located near the subsea end
could ensure proper evacuation of seawater and thus improve control of the inhibitor’s
effect.
• Some concerns have been raised on the long term effect of MEG in regards to souring
and subsequent polymer and steel material degradation. The properties of the applied
inhibitor and its interaction with polymers, armor wires and annulus fluids should be
assessed before initiating this repair. The inhibitor’s exposure to temperature and
possible reactions with permeated gases from bore fluid should also be part of this
evaluation.
• The application of this method to displace seawater involves discharge of the inhibitor
liquid to sea. Local legislation and regulations concerning discharge of the inhibitor
liquid to sea should be considered upon choice of inhibitor.
C3.4.2 Soft repair clamp
The soft repair clamp is typically suitable for subsea areas of the flexible riser with minor
damages of the outer sheath, such as a hole or a tear. It is not suitable to repair structural
damages such as damages to the armor wires. The repair clamp can be specifically designed
to seal around small protruding parts of the outer sheath next to the damage.
The purpose of this repair clamp is to seal off the damage and thereby avoid seawater
containing oxygen from circulating the steel armour.
There are no known limitations to the structural dimensions of the flexible pipe to be repaired,
as the soft clamp is custom made for the repair area. Examples of successful repairs:
• Riser with OD 204 mm, damage with approximate dimensions: area 50 mm x 50 mm
• Dynamic umbilical with OD 204 mm, damage with approximate dimensions: area 80
mm x 40 mm and height of protruding part 40 mm
Description of the repair clamp and installation method
The damaged area and the surrounding area of the outer sheath are cleaned prior to clamp
installation. The clamp is illustrated in Figure C3.3 . The main component of the clamp is the
polyester strop which provides constant radial pressure on the damaged area through hoop
tension. The polyester band has slings at each side with a tension rod inside. One tension
rod is equipped with two bolts and the other is equipped with two nut receptacles. The
repair clamp is installed using a work–class ROV (WROV) and a hydraulic clamp installation
tool, illustrated in Figure C3.4. The WROV places the clamp over the damaged area and
closes the tool hydraulically around the riser. Then, the bolts are flipped over to enter the

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
receptacles and the bolts are tightened to the specified torque. A rubber pad mounted inside
of the repair clamp is designed to seal around the damage in the outer sheath.
The repair is verified by performing an annulus volume test in order to check that the clamp
is pressure tight as intended.
Figure C3.3: Soft clamp
Figure C3.4: Soft clamp: ROV installation tool and soft clamp
Dependent on the installed clamp and flexible pipe properties, retightening of bolts may be
required. Further, periodic annulus volume tests should be performed in order to verify outer
sheath integrity and annulus condition. Additionally, the repair clamp should periodically be
subject to visual inspection to check the condition of the clamp, e.g. check for interference
with neighboring structures, corrosion and general condition of the clamp and its components.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Table C3.2: Design issues for a soft repair clamp
Component Main Function Design issue

Polyester band Transfer bolt-tension Creep
to radial pressure onto
pipe body (load
bearing)
Tension rod, bolts, Tensioning of the Corrosion
nuts and nut clamp Thread damage (galling of threads)
receptacles
Tension rod, bolts, Tensioning of the Poor fit or buckling of the rubber liner
nuts and nut clamp Sealing
receptacles Durability
Marking of the as installed position on the riser should be made and the clamp should be
periodically verified to stay in position. The choice of inspection method, either general visual
inspection (GVI) or close visual inspection (CVI) is dependent on the purpose of inspection
and environmental conditions such as marine growth and visibility.
Advantages and drawbacks
An advantage is that this is a proven repair method with several successful repairs. The
clamps are considered as low-cost. The clamp is customized for a perfect fit with the
dimensions of the damage and the diameter of the flexible pipe. However, there are some
drawbacks for the subsea soft-clamp:
• Difficulties are experienced related to pressure sealing capabilities; the outer sheath
surface around the damage must be clean and smooth in order to get a tight seal.
• Protruding bolts from the clamp will be present after the installation. The risk of
interference and damage on neighboring structures must be considered. Mitigations
are for example proper orientation of clamp, cutting surplus protruding bolt length and
applying a soft protection.
• Small dynamic motions of the flexible pipe and WROV are required at the location of
the damage (may yield weather restrictions on installation)
• An experienced WROV pilot is required in order to install the clamp correctly at the
location of the damage
• Sufficient spacing to the neighboring risers must be present for the WROV to get
access.
Design aspects
The main components of the soft repair clamp are listed in Table C3.2 along with their main
function and particular issues which should be considered in design. In addition to these
particular design issues, there are general issues to consider as presented in Section C3.3.2.
The design issues listed in Table C3.2 are described in more detail below:

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
• Creep
Dependent on the applied pretension, creep in the strop may cause reduced radial
pressure and possibly poor sealing of the damage.
• Corrosion
Metallic parts may be fabricated in material resistant to corrosion.
• Thread damage
Coating may be used to ensure the nuts can be torqued to the set level without thread
damage occurring (galling of threads). Plastic spacer may be used between the nuts
and clamp body to control friction and surface damage.
• Poor fit or buckling of the rubber liner

In order to prevent buckling of the rubber liner and to ensure constant radial tension,
the rubber liner should match the actual OD of the flexible pipe and fit the damaged
area. Further, the rubber surface may be lubricated in order to reduce friction between
the rubber liner and the outer sheath of the flexible pipe.
• Sealing
In order to improve the sealing capabilities of the rubber liner, sealing tape or mastic
may be filled into the rubber liner window and acting as a sealing putty.
• Durability
The material selection for the rubber liner should take into account ageing of the mate-
rials and the exposure to the environment; such as hydrocarbons, annulus compounds,
seawater, chemicals and sunlight.
C3.4.3 Rigid clamp
This method is applicable to outer sheath damages. The purpose of this repair is to restore
the outer sheath integrity and avoid exposure of steel armour wires to environmental expo-
sure. This clamp may also be modified to allow for future re-establishment of annulus vent
as described in Section C3.5.1. Numerous successful repairs are performed with clamps of
this kind. The clamp is not suitable to repair structural damages, e.g. broken armour wires.
Description of the rigid clamp and installation method
The clamp is manufactured in stainless or duplex steel of a desired quality and often made
up of two half shells. A typical clamp for illustrative purposes is shown in Figure C3.5
The damaged area and the surrounding area of the outer sheath are cleaned prior to clamp
installation. The clamp is then assembled onto the riser. The as-installed position is marked
onto the outer sheath for future reference. The repair integrity is verified by performing an
annulus volume test in order to check that the clamp is pressure sealing to set test pressure
level.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.5: Rigid clamp
Re-torqueing of bolts may be required due to cross-section and rubber liner creep. Further,
periodic annulus volume tests should be performed in order to verify outer sheath integrity
and annulus condition. The clamp should be verified to stay in position with no slippage.
Additionally, the repair clamp should periodically be subject to visual inspection to check
the condition of the clamp, e.g. check for interference with neighboring structures, corrosion
and general condition of the clamp and its components. The choice of inspection method,
either general visual inspection or close visual inspection, is dependent on the purpose of
inspection and environmental conditions such as marine growth and visibility.
Advantages and drawback
This method is proven successful in several repairs and the repair is relatively easy to perform.
The same limitations apply to this clamp as to the clamp modified for re-establishing annulus
vent (Section C3.5.1):
• The clamp should preferably be attached to a straight part of the pipe, away from the
splash zone and with no or limited dynamics
• Interference between the clamp and adjacent risers or structure is not permitted
• Availability for installation, inspection and bolt torqueing.
• The repair method requires direct access to the outer sheath. The location must be
without any guide tube or other structure surrounding the flexible pipe. For a riser
located in a guide tube with an outer sheath damage located close to the topside
end-fitting, then dependent on hang-off and topside layout, it may be possible to pull
up the riser and end-fitting a few meters to get access to the outer sheath and perform
the repair.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Table C3.3: Design issues for a rigid repair clamp

Metallic clamp Transfer bolt-tension to Corrosion
radial pressure onto pipe
body (load bearing)
Tension bolts, nuts and Tensioning of the clamp Corrosion
nut receptacles Thread damage (galling of threads)
Rubber liner Sealing of the damage Poor fit or buckling of the rubber liner
Durability
Design Aspects
The main components of the rigid repair clamp are listed in Table C3.3 along with their
main function and particular issues which should be considered in design. In addition to
these particular design issues, there are general issues to consider as presented in Section
C3.3.2
• Corrosion
Metallic parts may be fabricated in material resistant to corrosion or protected with
coating and anodes.
• Thread damage
the rubber liner should match the actual OD of the flexible pipe and fit the damaged
area.
• Durability
The material selection for the rubber liner should take into account ageing of the mate-
rials and the exposure to the environment; such as hydrocarbons, annulus compounds,
seawater, chemicals and sunlight.
C3.4.4 Structural repair clamp
This method is applicable to damages with a damaged outer sheath and a limited number
of broken armour wires. 4Subsea is only aware of one dynamic riser with broken wires that
has been repaired: The structural repair clamp was then applied to a 3” gas lift riser with
damaged outer sheath and where 1 or 2 armour wires appeared to be broken.
The purpose of the structural repair clamp is:
• Seal off the damage and thereby avoid seawater containing oxygen from circulating
the steel armour wires.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
• Immobilize the tensile armour wires in the damaged region and thereby provide a
structural repair.
Description of the structural repair clamp and installation method
For the one known repair, installation was performed by divers. The damaged part of the
outer sheath is cut away prior to installation of the repair clamp. The removed volume is
then replaced by rubber filler and covered with a thin sheet of adhesive rubber. Then the
clamp is closed over the repaired area to seal off the damage.
The clamp itself consists of two main parts: the inner clamp and the outer clamp, both
depicted in Figure C3.6. The inner clamp is a steel structure which clamp tightly in the
center of the clamp. The length of the inner clamp is sufficient to transfer the loads and
lock the dynamic stresses in the armour wires at the damage area.
An external plastic clamp with bellmouth shaped inside is mounted outside the central steel
clamp to ensure controlled bending near the inner steel clamp. The length of the external
clamp is sufficient to avoid local riser bending at the exit of the clamp.
The holding capacity of the clamp was tested as part of the design verification. Assembly
testing was done prior to shipment.
The structural repair clamp as installed is depicted in Figure C3.7. The outer sheath repair
integrity is verified by performing an annulus pressure test in order to check that the clamp
is pressure sealing to the set test pressure level.
Periodic annulus pressure and volume tests should be performed in order to verify outer
sheath integrity and annulus condition. Additionally, the repair clamp should periodically be
subject to visual inspection to check the condition of the clamp, e.g. check that the clamp
is in position, and check for interference with neighboring structures, corrosion and general
condition of the clamp and its components. The choice of inspection method, either general
visual inspection (GVA) or close visual inspection (CVA) is dependent on the purpose of
inspection and environmental conditions such as marine growth and visibility.
The main advantage of this clamp is that it provides repair method for combined outer sheath
damage and broken armour wires. However, there are several limitations and challenges to
be considered for this clamp:
• The dynamics, curvature and fatigue calculations for the flexible pipe at the location
of the clamp must be evaluated prior to repair.
• The possibility for interference between the clamp and adjacent risers or structure and
the associated consequences of interference should be evaluated prior to repair.
• Access for installation, inspection and bolt torqueing.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.6: Structural repair clamp: Upper picture: Inner clamp in open position. Bottom
picture: Outer clamp in closed position with inner clamp inside
without any guide tube or other structure surrounding the flexible pipe.
• The structural integrity of the repair cannot be directly verified after the repair. Hence,
this matter requires a proper qualification and test program prior to installation
Generally, for repair of a riser with one or more broken armour wires a lifetime assessment is
required prior to repair.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.7: Structural repair clamp as-installed
C3.4.5 Design aspects
The main components of the structural repair clamp are listed in Table C3.4 along with
their main function adn particular issues which should be considered in design. In addition
to these particular design issues, there are general issues to consider as presented in Section
C3.3.2.
Table C3.4: Design issues for a structural repair clamp

Rubber fill and sheet Sealing of the damage - Poor fit
- Durability
Inner clamp Transfer bolt-tension to - Structural capacity and sufficient radial
radial pressure onto pipe pressure to immobilize the tensile wires
body (load bearing)
immobilizing the tensile
wires
Tension bolts, nuts and Tensioning of the inner - Corrosion
nut receptacles clamp - Thread damage (galling of threads)
Outer clamp Limit bending of the riser - Structural capacity
- Durability
Tension bands Tensioning of the outer - Corrosion
clamp
• Poor fit of the rub ber fill and sheet.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
In order to obtain a good seal and to ensure constant radial tension, the damaged area
should be considered to be removed (cut away) and replaced by rubber fill. The surface
of the rubber fill and outer sheath should then be prepared and smoothened before
attaching the rubber sheet. The inner diameter of the inner clamp should match the
actual OD of the flexible pipe and fit the damaged area.
• Durability.
The material selection should take into account ageing of the materials and the exposue
to the environment, such as hydrocarbons, annulus compounds, seawater, chemicals
and sunlight.
• Structural capacity and sufficient radial pressure to immobilize the tensile wires.
The clamp geometry and stiffness, and the applied torque of tension bolts are of
importance to obtain sufficient radial support and to transfer the riser loadings across
the inner clamp. For this particular clamp, the purpose is to immobilize the tensile
wires. The structural capacity of the clamp must also be sufficient to limit bending of
the riser near the center of the inner clamp.
• Corrosion.
coating and anodes.
• Thread damage.
C3.4.6 Casting repair
This method is applicable to outer sheath damages located above sea level and where an
ordinary clamp is inadequate, such as for static sections where the pipe has a bend (large
curvature) or where the external sheath has a variation in its outer diameter. This repair
is applicable for repair in areas where hot-work permission is limited; e.g. polymer welding
(described in Section C3.4.7) is unacceptable.
The purpose of this repair is to restore the outer sheath integrity and avoid exposure of steel
armour wires to environmental exposure.
This repair method has been applied once: to a flexible riser with OD 109mm, and the
damage having the following approximate dimensions: 300mm x 150mm. However, the
repair was only partially successful as a not discovered blockage in the annulus vent system
caused a weak area and very small leakage path through the cast before the material could
fully cure. The cast repair is still considered to give a good degree of protection for the
armour layers from the surrounding corrosive environment.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Description of the casting repair and installation method
The damaged area and the surrounding area of the outer sheath to be covered by the cast
are cleaned and abraded in order to prepare the surface and increase bonding. A PVC mould
is mounted enclosing the damaged area. The mould can be fixed to the pipe by clamps at
both ends. This is illustrated in Figure C3.8. The cast itself is made from a polymer (e.g.
polyurethane) and the liquid casting material is poured into a fill port in the mold. The cast
is then allowed to cure before the mold and clamps are removed. The final cast repair is
depicted in Figure C3.9 .
The repair is verified by performing an annulus pressure test in order to check that the clamp
Figure C3.8: Cast repair: Schematic of repair. Top: general view. Bottom: detail of outer
clamp
Figure C3.9: Cast repair: Permanent solution

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Subsequent inspection and maintenance requirements
The need for further inspection and maintenance is dependent on the initial success of
the casting repair. If the casting repair initially is found not to be pressure tight, further
modifications may be required. A first attempt to improve a repair with a micro leakage may
be to set a new cast partially or fully covering the initial repair cast.
Further, periodic annulus pressure and volume tests should be performed in order to verify
outer sheath integrity and annulus condition. Additionally, the repair should periodically be
subject to visual inspection to check the condition of the cast, e.g. check for interference with
neighboring structures. The choice of inspection method, either general visual inspection
or close visual inspection, is dependent on the purpose of inspection and environmental
conditions such as marine growth and visibility.
Advantages and drawbacks, including design aspects
When successful, this repair method provides a solution to damages where an ordinary clamp
is inadequate as described in Section C3.4.6. The main drawback is the challenge in obtaining
a pressure tight repair with satisfactory bonding between the casting material and the outer
sheat.
The main components of the casting repair are listed in Table C3.5 along with the main
function and particular issues which should be considered in design. In addition to these
particular design issues, there are general issues to consider as presented in Section C3.3.2.
Table C3.5: Design issues for a casting repair

Mould and Encapsulate and support the casting - Sliding clamp / mould
clamp material while curing - Mould leakage
- Poor fit of mould
Casting Sealing the outer sheath: - Bonding to the outer sheath /
material - Keep internal annulus pressure leakage
- Prevent ingress of air, seawater or - Durability
moist
The design issues in Table C3.5 are described in more detail below:
• Sliding clamp/mould
The mould and clamp should be fixed at the intended location. Hence, the clamp and
mould should be properly connected and clamped to the pipe with sufficient radial
tension.
• Mould leakage
All ends and joints of the mould should be properly sealed and the opening where the
casting material is poured in should be located so that the potential for leakage is
minimized.
• Poor fit of mould
It could be challenging to make the mould fit a pipe with high curvature or irregular
outer sheath. Hence, careful preparation of the mould is recommended, and the mould

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
should preferably be made of a somewhat flexible material to allow for adjustments on

site.
• Bonding to the outer sheath / leakage
Dependent on the casting material and outer sheath material it has proven challenging
to obtain satisfactory bonding. Hence leakage in the cast and interface layer is an issue
to be addressed. Before applying the casting, it could be considered to temporarily
seal of the damage to avoid annulus fluids emerging into the casting material.
• Durability
The choice of casting material should be taken with due consideration of the cast’s
durability and its exposure to temperature, pH and annulus fluids. Water and moisture
present at the location for casting may cause a poor and porous cast.
C3.4.7 Polymer welding of outer sheath
This is a solution mainly applied for installation damages to the outer sheath. The purpose
is to restore an intact outer sheath. Successful repair require that the work is performed
under dry conditions and according to strict procedure.
Description of polymer welding of outer sheath
The successive steps in polymer welding are:

• Drying the outer sheath
• Welding
• Grinding the weld
Polymer welding will often require permit for hot work.
No additional inspection or maintenance is required for polymer welding of outer sheath.

However, when performing periodic visual inspection of the pipe, the location of the outer
sheath weld should be subject to close visual inspection, looking for possible defects and
corrosion products. Periodic annulus volume testing is also recommended.
A successful polymer welding will result in an intact outer sheath, and as stated above, no
particular inspection or maintenance is required subsequent to the repair.
However, problems of porosity and cracking are observed, resulting in unsuccessful repairs.
A qualified weld procedure is required. Performing a successful repair includes requirements

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
on the external environmental conditions, including dry condition, the ambient temperature
and sufficient time for the work. As a consequence, a habitat is often necessary.
Polymer welding on aged materials is often challenging and may involve conditioning of the
aged material and complex welding procedures to obtain reliable welds. The procedures will
be material dependent.
C3.4.8 Examples of commercially available products for outer sheath repair
Flexlife - FlexGel
FlexGel is a commercial product from Flexlife and is an example of an inhibition to mitigate

annulus corrosion. The description in this section is based on the data sheet for FlexGel
[Flexlife, 2012b] provided by Flexlife. The repair method is applicable to outer sheath dam-
ages in the splash zone for flexible pipes located within guide tubes. The purpose is to
mitigate the effect of splash zone environment and prevent ingress of seawater or air. The
gel is deployed into the guide tube, filling the area around the damage and displacing the
sea water. FlexGel is depicted in Figure C3.10.
Due to limited information about this product, the product cannot be properly evaluated.
Also, there is an unknown need for periodically inspection and maintenance subsequent to
installation.
Figure C3.10: FlexGel. Picture from FlexGel data sheet provided by Flexlife [Flexlife, 2012b]
Flexlife - Armadillo
Armadillo is a commercial product from Flexlife and an example of a casting / clamp repair.
The description in this section is based on the data sheet for Armadillo [Flexlife, 2012a]
provided by Flexlife. The purpose of the repair is to encapsulate and seal the outer sheath
damage in order to prevent ingress of seawater containing oxygen. The repair is applicable
to flexible pipes with OD of 2”-24” and is customized to fit the length of the damage and
to fit each pipe.
The Armadillo repair system is modular and consists of two half shells which are clamped
around the flexible pipe. The Armadillo is filled with a sealing fluid. The repair gel cures

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
during 24 hours to form an elastic solid which allows the flexible pipe to bend as normal and
simultaneously prevents ingress of seawater. The Armadillo is installed by ROV or by diver.
Armadillo is depicted in Figure C3.11.
Due to limited information about this product, the product cannot be properly evaluated.
Also, there is an unknown need for periodically inspection and maintenance subsequent to
installation.
Figure C3.11: Armadillo. Picture from Armadillo data sheet provided by Flexlife
[Flexlife, 2012a]
NICC - Armawrap
Armawrap is a commercial product from NICC. It is noted that Armawrap in principle is a

particular design of a soft clamp. Hence, this description of Armawrap is to be seen in the
context of Section C3.4.2 presenting the soft clamp in detail. The description in this sec-
tion is based on the product description, [NICC Systems, 2012b] and [NICC Systems, 2012a]
provided by NICC.
Objective and application The purpose of the repair is to encapsulate and seal the outer
sheath damage in order to prevent ingress of seawater containing oxygen. According to NICC,
Armawrap is applicable to damages located subsea, above water or in the splash zone.
Description of Armawrap and installation method Armawrap is made up of an elas-

tomer and is clamped around the flexible pipe. A gel and corrosion inhibitor is applied on
the inside of Armawrap in order to seal off the damage. According to NICC, the Armawrap
can easily be removed and replaced for inspection. Armawrap is depicted in Figure C3.12.
Installation of Armawrap can be performed by divers or by rope access, dependent on the
location of the damage.

Section C3.4
OC2017 A-001
Evaluating Armawrap Due to limited information about this product, the product cannot
be properly evaluated; neither can its advantages and drawbacks. Also, there is an unknown
need for periodically inspection and maintenance subsequent to installation.
According to NICC, Armawrap has been used for repair of outer sheath damages on several
flexible risers, including the following customers [Stewart, 2012]:
• GOT/Enquest
• Apache
• Addax Petroleum
• Shell
• Wellstream
Figure C3.12: Armawrap. Picture from NICC web page [NICC systems, 2012]

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
C3.5 Repair methods to re–establish annulus vent
C3.5.1 Installation of annulus vent clamp and drilling through outer sheath
Installation of annulus vent clamp and drilling through the outer sheath is the most common
known method to re-establish annulus vent for risers. This is performed if the vent flow
cannot be restored through the existing vent ports. 4Subsea has experience with numerous
successful repairs performed with installation of vent clamps. The installation of vent clamp
can be applied as a repair method for outer sheath as described in Section C3.4.3
Description of the vent clamp, drilling and installation method
The clamp is manufactured in stainless steel of a desired quality and often made up of two
half shell. A vent port is welded onto one of these half shells. In order to increase the
redundancy, an additional vent port can be added either above the first vent port (this will
increase the length of the clamp) or on the second half shell of the clamp. The clamp area
and the surrounding area of the outer sheath are cleaned prior to clamp installation. The
clamp is then assembled onto the riser. A typical annulus vent clamp is illustrated in Figure
C3.13.
Figure C3.13: Typical annulus vent clamp
In order to establish new vent ports, it is required to drill through the outer sheath. The
drilling is performed through the vent ports on the installed clamp. The drilling operation
must take into consideration that the annulus is pressurized with hydrocarbons and that the
drilling operation should not scratch or damage the outer tensile armor wires. Scratching
the tensile armor wires can possibly cause fatigue or high-stress hot-spots. To reduce the
probability of scratching the tensile armor wires, a drill with a soft material tip could be
considered. The hardness of the tip should be significantly lower than the hardness of the
armoring wires to minimize the risk of scratching the armour wires. Prior to performing the

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
repair, the applied drill(s) should be subject to thorough testing to ensure no scratching of
the tensile wires.
The drilling tool is designed to divert overpressure in the riser annulus, to ensure a safe and
controlled operation. In order to obtain good ventilation through the ventilation port, the
hole is wider than one tensile armor wires, such that ventilation is obtained through the gaps
/ space between three neighboring wires.
After drilling, the annulus is depressurized and annulus volume test is performed to verify the
repair. A permanent hose or piping is connected to the vent port(s) and the hose is secured
along the riser and finally connected at the location where the original vent piping is/was
connected. The annulus vent gas may be directed to the same vent system as originally
intended.
Dependent on the installed clamp, retightening of bolts may be required. Further, periodic
annulus volume tests should be performed in order to verify satisfactory vent flow. The
clamp should be verified to stay in position with no slippage. Additionally, the repair clamp
should periodically be subject to visual inspection to check the condition of the clamp, e.g.
check for interference with neighboring structures, corrosion and general condition of the
clamp and its components.
The vent port flow capability should be significantly larger than the design diffusion rate
of the pipe. Vent flow capability less than the design diffusion rate is not acceptable as
complete blocking of the vent ports then will be likely. Further actions are recommended to
increase the flow. Until the flow is re-established, annulus volume tests should be performed
more frequently to ensure pipe integrity.
This method is proven successful in several repairs and the vent clamp allows for direct
communication with annulus. Offshore field experience also include successful submerged
installations of vent clamps with ventilation topside. The following limitations should be
considered when the clamp location is chosen:
• The clamp should be located close to the topside end fitting.
• The clamp should preferably be attached to a part of the riser that is straight, away
from the splash zone and with no or limited dynamics.
• Interference between the clamp and adjacent risers or structure is not permitted.
• Access for installation, inspection and bolt torqueing.
without any guide tube or other structure surrounding the flexible pipe. For a riser
located in a guide tube, then dependent on hang-off and topside layout, it may be
possible to pull up the riser and end-fitting a few meters to get access to the outer
sheath and perform the repair.

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
Design aspects
The main components of the annulus vent clamp are listed in Table C3.6 along with their
main function and particular issues which should be considered in design. In addition to
these particular design issues, there are general issues to consider as presented in Section
C3.3.2.
Table C3.6: Design issues for annulus vent clamp and drilling through outer sheath

Drilling tools Drilling through the outer Appropriate for the outer sheat material
sheath and establish and the tensile wires
communication to annulus
Metallic clamp Provides constant radial Corrosion
pressure
Tension bolts, nuts and Tensioning of the clamp Corrosion
nut receptables
Rubber liner Sealing of the damage Poor fit or buckling of the rubber liner
Durability
Hose / piping Communication between Durability
annulus and platform vent
system
• Drilling tools appropriate for outer sheath material and tensile wires
The drilling tool should be tested for the relevant outer sheath material. The possibility
for unintentional rupture of the outer sheath should also be considered. The drill should
be designed to avoid damaging the tensile wires as scratches and dents in tensile wires
can initiate crack growth and provide hotspots for fatigue. The size of the hole should
also ensure satisfactory communication with annulus.
• Corrosion
coating and anodes.

the rubber liner should match the actual OD of the flexible pipe. Further, the rubber
surface may be lubricated in order to reduce friction between the rubber liner and the
outer sheath of the flexible pipe.
• Durability
The material selection for the hose / piping and for the rubber liner should take
into account ageing of the materials and the exposure to the environment; such as
hydrocarbons, annulus compounds, seawater, chemicals and sunlight.

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
C3.5.2 Establish new vent ports for a pipe located inside a guide tube
This is a method to re-establish annulus vent for risers with restricted vent flow and where
the vent flow cannot be restored through the existing vent ports. This method can be applied
where the more common method described in Section C3.5.1 is not possible, if access to
the outer sheath of the flexible pipe is prevented due to surrounding guide tubing. There
are restrictions to how small the outer diameter of the riser can be, but no known upper
limitation to the outer diameter of the riser. Naturally, the internal diameter of the guide
tube limits the outer diameter of the riser. 4Subsea has performed one successful repair with
this method of drilling new vent ports. That repair was performed on a flexible pipe with
OD 352mm.
Description of the drilling and installation method
In order to establish new vent ports, it is required to drill through the outer sheath. Access
to the outer sheath could preferably be obtained through an existing opening in the riser
guide tube such as nitrogen filling line or an inspection hatch. Where no such openings
exist, access to the riser outer sheath may be obtained by drilling through the guide tube
wall. Prior to the repair, the guide tube must be depressurized. A sketch of the resulting
arrangement with new vent port and new vent hose to flare is depicted in Figure C3.14.
The drilling operation must take into consideration that the annulus is pressurized with
hydrocarbons and that the drilling operation should not scratch or damage the outer tensile
armor wires. Scratching the tensile armor wires can possibly cause fatigue or high-stress
hot-spots. To reduce the probability of scratching the tensile armor wires, a drill with a soft
material tip could be considered. The hardness of the tip should be significantly lower than
the hardness of the armoring wires to minimize the risk of scratching the armour wires. Prior
to performing the repair, the applied drill(s) should be subject to thorough testing to ensure
no scratching of the tensile wires.
The drilling tool is designed to divert overpressure in the riser annulus, to ensure a safe and
controlled operation. In order to obtain good ventilation through the ventilation port, the
hole is wider than two tensile armor wires, such that ventilation is obtained through the
gaps/space between three neighboring wires.
A specifically designed fitting is attached to the drilled hole in the outer sheath after the
riser annulus is confirmed to be depressurized. A flexible hose is connected to the fitting in
order to permanently lead annulus vent gas back to the existing vent system.
The repair integrity is verified by performing an annulus volume test in order to check that
the clamp is pressure sealing to set test pressure level.
Periodic annulus volume tests should be performed in order to verify satisfactory vent flow.
As the repair is located inside the guide tube, periodical visual inspection is generally not
feasible. Hence, inspection of the repair itself is to be performed only when suspecting a

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.14: Establish new vent ports for a pipe located inside a guide tube
leakage or anomaly. The parts of the repair located outside the guide tube, should periodically
be subject to visual inspection to check the condition of vent piping and connections.
As the riser is located inside a guide tube pressurized with nitrogen, the pressure and nitrogen
consumption in the guide tube should be monitored in order to detect a possible increased
consumption caused by leakage from the guide tube through the vent system to flare.
The vent port flow capability should be significantly larger than the design diffusion rate of
the pipe. Vent flow capability less than the design diffusion rate are generally not acceptable
over longer periods of time. When the flow is this low complete blocking of the vent ports
are also likely. Further actions are recommended to increase the flow. Until the flow is
re-established, annulus volume tests should be performed more frequently to ensure pipe
integrity.
The main advantage of this repair method is that it provides annulus vent for flexible pipes
located inside guide tubes. Any uncertainties to the location and extent of the blockage

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
Table C3.7: Design issues for establishing new vent for a pipe located inside a guide tube

Drilling tools Drilling through the - Appropriate for the outer sheat
outer sheath and material and the tensile wire.
establish communication - Contain and divert annulus pressure in
to annulus a safe and controlled manner
Nipples Pressure tight - Corrosion
connection between - Holding capacity
annulus and hose
Hose Communication between - Durability
annulus and platform
vent system
within the end fitting are irrelevant, as the repair creates a vent flow path bypassing the
end-fitting. Having performed one repair, 4Subsea’s experience is that repair is durable and
holds tight for several years. This method is however more challenging than the method
described in Section C3.5.1 due to the following:
• Could be challenging to get access with tools inside the guide tube.
• Depressurizing of the guide tube is required.
• The guide tube opening must be modified to allow for the vent flow hose / tubing to
pass through.
• The repair requires the dynamic displacements of the flexible pipe inside the guide tube
to be relatively small.
Design aspects
The main components for establishing a new vent port are listed in Table C3.7 along with
their main function and particular issues which should be considered in design. In addition
to these particular design issues, there are general issues to consider as presented in Section
C3.3.2.
• Drilling tools appropriate for outer sheath material and tensile wires
The drilling tool should be tested for the relevant outer sheath material. A concern
when drilling in the outer sheath is that the shape of hole may not be as intended and
hence it may be difficult to attach the nipple. The possibility for rupture of the outer
sheath should also be considered.
The drill should be designed and tested to avoid damaging the tensile wires as scratches
and dents in tensile wires will initiate crack growth and provide hotspots for fatigue.
The size of the hole should also ensure satisfactory communication with annulus.
• Contain and divert annulus pressure in a safe and controlled manner
The drilling operation must take into consideration that the annulus is pressurized with
hydrocarbons. The drilling tool should be designed to contain and divert overpressure

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
in the riser annulus, to ensure a safe and controlled operation. The tool’s pressure
capacity should have appropriate margins to the potential annulus pressure
• Corrosion
Possibility for corrosion due to contact between nipple and tensile wires should be
considered and mitigated.
• Holding capacity
Threading and glue could be the method for fixation of the nipple. The holding capacity
is an important issue because this connection should also be leak tight. Threading after
drilling the hole must be considered for the relevant outer sheath material and should
be performed without risk of damaging the tensile wires. The properties of the glue and
its interaction with tensile wires, polymers and annulus compounds should be assessed.
• Durability
The material selection for the hose should take into account the exposure to the envi-
ronment; such as hydrocarbons, annulus compounds, seawater, chemicals and sunlight.
There are also risks to assess prior to depressurization of the guide tube. These risks are
related to the possibility of burst of outer sheath, release of hydrocarbons, suffocation from
N2-release and seawater being pushed up to the working area through the guide tube.
C3.5.3 Cyclic vacuum and nitrogen pressure
Objective and Application
The purpose of this method is to restore annulus vent through the existing vent ports.
However, some attempts with this method have proven limited success, as the driving force
from the limited overpressure is small (to avoid eventual damages on the riser).
Description of the repair method
The method is applied to one vent port at a time while the other vent ports are capped.
Cyclic vacuum and overpressure is applied through the vent ports. Vacuum can be applied
with a vacuum pump driven by compressed air available on site. The overpressure is applied
by feeding nitrogen into the vent port. As an alternative to cyclic pressure, a constant
overpressure could be applied for some time, e.g. 2–12 hours. The setup of the equipment is
sketched in Figure C3.15. The applied feeding pressure depends on the capacity of the outer
sheath for the actual flexible pipe. After completion of the repair, an annulus vent flow test
is performed to verify that the vent port is successfully opened.
the pipe. Vent flow capability less than the design diffusion rate is not acceptable. When
the flow is this low complete blocking of the vent ports are also likely. Further actions are
recommended to increase the flow. Until the flow is re-established, vent-port flow capacity
test should be performed more frequently to ensure pipe integrity.

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.15: Sketch of setup for nitrogen feeding
This method is a simple and less intrusive method than the repair methods described in
Section C3.5.1, Section C3.5.2 and Section C3.5.4. However, only limited success has been
achieved with this method.
C3.5.4 Hydraulic pressurization of vent port
The purpose of this method is to restore annulus vent through the existing vent ports using a
hydraulic pressure. The liquid has the benefit of being incompressible, and is hence regarded
safer to apply than an overpressure of nitrogen. The properties of the applied liquid and
its interaction with polymers (i.e. outer sheath) and armor wires should be assessed before
initiating this repair. This method can be applied subsequently to the repair method described
in Section C3.5.3.
Liquid is injected into one of the vent ports at a time while the other vent ports are capped.
The setup for injection of oil into the vent port is schematically sketched in Figure C3.16.The
setup of the system ensures that any gas evacuating from the annulus vent system is routed
to the external vent system.
Liquid is injected into the vent ports by the use of a hand pump and the pressure applied
is limited to a pre-determined level. The exact pressure depends on the capacity of the

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
Figure C3.16: Sketch of setup for injection of oil into vent port
outer sheath for the actual flexible pipe. If the flexible pipe is located in a pressurized guide
tube, this can allow for injection at a higher pressure. After applying the desired pressure,
a pressure drop is anticipated. Then, if subsequent attempts to build up pressure do not
succeed, the vent port is assumed to be open. However, if no immediate pressure drop
occurs, the vent port is sealed off to keep it pressurized for 2-12 hours. Finally, an annulus
vent flow test is performed to verify that the vent port is successfully opened.
recommended to increase the flow. Until the flow is re-established, annulus volume tests
should be performed more frequently to ensure pipe integrity.
The method described in the present section is simpler than the repair methods described in
Section C3.5.1 and Section C3.5.2 . However, no successful repairs are known.

Section C3.5
OC2017 A-001
C3.5.5 Drilling a new vent port through the end-fitting
This method has been applied successfully where no access to the riser outer sheath is
possible due to a surrounding guide tube, and where an existing epoxy-filling port on the end
fitting made this convenient. A similar application would be to drill through the outer body
of the end fitting, if an epoxy filling port is not available.
Communication to riser annulus is established by drilling through the steel body of the riser
end-fitting, and in to the epoxy cast that is terminating the steel armour layers. The epoxy is
likely containing ’micro-cracks’ or small voids along the steel surfaces which becomes canals
for transporting annulus vent gas inside the end fitting to the new vent port consisting of
the old epoxy filling port.
recommended to increase the flow. Until the flow is re-established, annulus volume tests
should be performed more frequently to ensure pipe integrity.
The advantage of this method is that it allows for re-establishment of ventilation without
access to the riser outer sheath. There is however a large uncertainty to the presence of the
voids and micro-cracks in the internal epoxy, and its ability to transport gas from the riser
annulus through the internal of the end fitting and out to the newly drilled port. There is
also uncertainty related to if the micro-cracks in the epoxy can become blocked by the same
mechanism as the original vent ports in the end fitting.

Section C3.6
OC2017 A-001
C3.6 Re–termination of end–fitting as a repair method
C3.6.1 Objective and application
The repair involves cutting off the damaged section and terminate the new end. Re-
termination of end-fitting is applicable for repairs to a variety of damages on flexible pipes
located near one of the pipe ends. Re-termination could also be applied to a segment along
the pipe: by cutting the pipe, re-terminate both ends and insert a short flexible jumper or
steel spool piece connecting the two re-terminated ends. The relevant damages include:
• Outer sheath damages
• Polymer ageing (PA11) under bend stiffener
• Leakage in the end-fitting
• Carcass damages, e.g. carcass tear-off
• Restricted annulus vent
Carcass collapse could be an application for this repair. However, when identifying a collapse
it may prove difficult to inspect and assess the carcass below the collapse. Hence, it may be
uncertain whether a repair is beneficial or not. Re-termination is then likely to be discarded
for this type of failure.
There are also other applications to be considered. The outer sheath is often subject to wear
due to interaction with a bell mouth. Re-termination of the pipe will then change the wear
zone on the pipe.
The upper part of the flexible pipe is often most exposed/vulnerable to fatigue. Re–
termination of the pipe will alter the distribution of loading such that another part of the
pipe – which possibly has previously been less exposed – will be exposed to fatigue. In this
way, re–termination could possibly increase the ultimate fatigue life of the flexible pipe. It is
noted that this consideration perhaps is more of theoretical interest.
The applicability and feasibility of performing a re-termination should be assessed with due
consideration of the space required on board the installation, changes to the configuration
of the flexible pipe during the re-termination (e.g. pulled up, bent, suspended from a vessel)
and loadings imposed on the pipe (e.g. a free hanging flowline for static application subject
to dynamic motion of an installation vessel for 5 days).
C3.6.2 Re-termination
Re-termination of the subsea end requires an installation vessel to recover the subsea end
and to facilitate the re-termination aboard the vessel. Re-termination of the topside end
could be performed on the installation (platform) dependent on the available space and
layout on the installation. Hence, an installation vessel may be required also in this case. A
complete production stop on the installation is required when performing the re-termination
on the installation. The repair is performed by the manufacturer of the flexible pipe and
must be performed under controlled environmental conditions, i.e. a habitat. A pressure test
(structural-integrity test as described in [API 17B, 2008]) is performed to confirm pressure
tight end fitting after re-termination.

Section C3.6
OC2017 A-001
Hazard warning: Exposure to hydrocarbon gases, NORM, etc.
In general the flexible pipe suppliers have significant reservations on performing re-termination
on flexible risers which have been in operation due to risk level and HSE issues
Hydrocarbon gases: The method involves risk with reference to performing hot work (i.e.
welding) on a flexible pipe which has been used in operation where gas is trapped in annulus
or bore - with the potential of ignition of those gases. Preventive measures should be taken
to reduce the risk. Although having taken preventive measures, there is still considered to
be a high risk of hydrocarbon gases being present or migrating through the annulus or bore
to the work site at the pipe end.
NORM (Naturally occurring radioactive material): On a flexible pipe which has been used in
operation, scale containing NORM may be present in the pipe. These deposits of radioactive
material are usually low specific activity scale, meaning that the main hazard is related
to inhalation or swallowing - in particular being exposed to dust or small particles. Hence,
measurements for NORM should be performed both prior to and during the work. Preventive
measures should be taken.
Other compounds: The work involves the potential for exposure to other compounds and
elements in residuals of the bore flow such as injection chemicals and heavy metals (e.g.
mercury, lead).
C3.6.3 Subsequent inspection and maintenance
No additional inspection or maintenance is required for the new end-fitting after a successful
re-termination.
C3.6.4 Advantages and drawbacks
The repair provides a solution to a wide range of damages and provides a brand new end
fitting – although an end fitting made on site will never be as good as a factory made end
fitting fabricated at ideal conditions.
There are some limitations and drawbacks for this repair method:
• The repair is generally limited to damages located near the ends of the flexible pipe.
As the repair involves a shortening of the pipe length, the resulting total (dynamic)
length after the repair should be evaluated.
• The method is costly due to hire of an installation vessel and/or the required pro-
duction stop in addition to the costs of the end-fitting itself and the man hours for
re-termination.
• The method involves risk with reference to performing hot work (i.e. welding) on a
flexible pipe which has been used in operation where gas is trapped in annulus or bore.
• The method involves the potential of exposure to NORM and other compounds (details
are given above).
• The method is time consuming (in the order of 4 days).

Section C3.7
OC2017 A-001
C3.7 Summary
This chapter addresses repair methods for flexible pipes including end-fitting. Ancillary
devices to flexible pipes such as bend stiffeners, buoyancy modules and friction clamps are
omitted.
An overview of flexible pipe failure modes with evaluation of service experience, available
inspection methods and repair methods is presented. The overview shows that only a limited
number of the failure modes are possible to detect and repair. The failure statistics and
available inspection and repair methods advocate the importance of repair methods for the
failure modes reviewed in this chapter:
• Outer sheath damage
• Restricted annulus vent flow
Additionally, re-termination of end fitting is applicable as a repair method for damages

located near the pipe ends. Re-termination of flexible risers normally requires that flexible
manufacture provide new end-fittings and is responsible for the repair.
The chapter also presents a flowchart of the repair process from detection of damage to, if
proven viable, continued operation of the flexible pipe after repair.
The available repair methods for outer sheath damages are summarized in Table C3.8.
The available repair methods for restricted annulus vent flow are summarized in Table C3.9.
The following experienced flexible pipe body defects have no reported repair method:
• Carcass (collapse, fatigue, erosion, termination failure and tensile rupture have been
experienced)
• Pressure liner (collapse, fatigue, termination failure, polymer degradation have been
experienced)
• Pressure armour layers (fatigue and unlocking has been experienced)
• Tensile armour layers (fatigue and corrosion and severe handling induced damage have
been experienced). Structural repair clamp may be feasible for minor damages.
However, for damages near end-fittings re-termination has been used successfully for a limited
number of the above failures.

Section C3.7
OC2017 A-001
Table C3.8: Summary of repair methods for outer sheath damage
Repair method Application Track record Comment

Injection of inhibitor Subsea and above sea Several applications, Normally used to
liquid in annulus level usually combined with control corrosion.
Temporary action another repair for Limited by temperature
before a permanent outer sheath damage and annulus condition
repair
Soft repair clamp Subsea and above sea Numerous successful Only for outer sheath
level repairs damages
Rigid clamp Subsea and above sea Numerous successful Only for outer sheath
level repairs damages
Structural repair Subsea and above sea One known Require extensive
clamp level installation engineering including
Structural damages: post-repair service life
tensile wire assessment
Casting repair Above sea level. One known Only for outer sheath
Straight sections installation damages
Sections with
curvature and variable
OD
Polymer welding of Subsea (to be Well proven method Only for outer sheath
outer sheath performed above sea damages
e.g. on an installation Requires dry conditions
vessel) and above sea during welding.
Applies mainly during Strict weld procedure
installation or re-use of required to avoid
flexible pipes defects.

Section C3.7
OC2017 A-001
Table C3.9: Summary of repair methods for annulus vent
Repair method Extent of use Strengths Limitations

Annulus vent clamp Numerous Allows for direct Require direct access to
successful repairs communication with the outer sheath, most
annulus frequently used near
topside end-fitting.
Drilling new vent One known Allows for direct Require access to the
port for a pipe application. communication with flexible pipe
located inside a annulus
guide tube
Cyclic vacuum and Often tried as a first Easy to apply and the Limited success.
nitrogen pressure attempt to recover least intrusive repair Outer sheath burst
annulus vent method capacity must be
considered when
defining test pressure.
Hydraulic Tried as an initial Easy to apply and less No successful repairs
pressurization of attempt to recover intrusive than annulus known. Potential for
vent port annulus vent. vent clamp and drilling pressure build up in the
of new vent ports. annulus must be
considered when
defining test pressure.
Drilling new vent One known Applicable to a pipe Uncertainty of success:
port through the application with access to Dependent on annulus
end–fitting end–fitting and where vent through micro
the outer sheath is cracks in the internal
inaccessible (e.g. pipe epoxy in end-fitting.
located inside a .guide Often more complex
tube) than other alternatives

Section C3.7
OC2017 A-001
C3.7.1 Track record for repair methods
Table C3.10: Track record for repair methods
Repair method Track record

Repair methods for outer sheath dam-
ages
Injection of inhibitor liquid in annulus Several known applications, usually in com-
bination with one of the other repair meth-
ods for outer sheath damage
Soft repair clamp Numerous successful applications
Rigid clamp Numerous successful applications
Structural repair clamp One successful application (One known in-
stallation)
Casting repair One known installation
Flexlife – FlexGel Unknown
Flexlife – Armadillo Unknown
NICC – Armawrap Numerous successful applications, see Sec-
tion C3.4.8
Polymer welding of outer sheath Standard procedure work by flexible pipe
suppliers
Repair methods to re–establish annulus
vent
Installation of annulus vent clamp and Numerous successful applications
drilling new vent ports
Establish new vent ports for a pipe located One known installation
inside a guide tube
Cyclic vacuum and nitrogen pressure Often tried as a first attempt
Hydraulic pressurization of vent ports Tried as a first attempt. No successful re-
pairs are known
Drilling a new vent port through the end– One known installation
fitting
Re–termination of end–fitting as a repair Standard procedure work by flexible pipe
method suppliers – dependent on site layout and
conditions
The method involves the potential of exposure to NORM and other compounds (details are
given above).

Part D
Case Study
515
Chapter D1
Introduction
517
Section D1.2
OC2017 A-001
D1.1 Introduction
The Case Study is made to illustrate some steps to be taken and evaluations to be made
should certain damage occur during operation of a given riser for a given situation. The
damage described and the operational scenario selected is believed to be sufficiently typical
in order to serve as an illustrating example. Emphasis is made toward corrosion damaged
flexible pipes.
The purpose of the Case Study is also to highlight implementation of methods and method-
ologies described in the Handbook Chapters from A2 to C3.
The current Case Study will not fully meet the hopes of illustrating all sections of the
Handbook, but should serve as a good starting point for further extensions in a later edition.
The Case Study is generally based on the riser case ’North Sea Riser’. However, during the
JIP project some studies are performed by using the 4” (ID) riser from the Balmoral field as
a case: fatigue testing of armour wire in air, evaluation of corroded armour wire surfaces by
scanning and application of in-air SN-curve for reliability evaluation. Access to the riser data
is given by an agreement with the JIP - Riser End of Life, performed by Flexlife. The results
from the studies based on the Balmoral riser are included where relevant in supplementing
the results from the North Sea Riser.
After describing the riser structures, necessary aspects of operational life are defined - along
with selected alternative scenario, Chapter D2.
Chapter D3 describes the fatigue testing performed for the retrieved armour wire samples -
a mean to obtain important the remaining fatigue life of the armour wire.
The study of the corroded armour wire samples continue in Chapter D4 Chapter D4 by
investigating the corroded surfaces with the aim of obtaining yet more helpful data in un-
derstanding the effect of corrosion damage and how to measure the corrosion damage.
In Chapter D5 some structural aspects of tension armour wire failure due to corrosion is
studied. The described numerical analysis serves to illustrate a methodology in how to
account for wire failures in the integrity assessment analysis.
Integrity Management and Lifetime Assessment evaluations of the North Sea Riser are pre-
sented in Chapter D6 and Chapter D7, applying the Methodologies described in Chapters
C1 and C2.
In Chapter D8 probabilistic models and reliability analysis are illustrated for the Case along
with assessment of the remaining lifetime for different comparable scenario during operation.
D1.2 Case Description
D1.2.1 North Sea Riser
The riser section shown in Figure D1.1 has been used in the North Sea for 11 years connected
to a semisubmersible type of floater. The tension armour wires are subjected to fatigue
testing. However, the riser properties and operational information used in this Case Study
is only partially in agreement with this physical sample. The data basis for the Study is

Section D1.2
OC2017 A-001
gathered from different sources in a way which should be fairly representative for North Sea
conditions, but otherwise not true.
The armour wire samples are taken from the static part of the same riser, one section from
a corroded part and one non-corroded section serving as a reference.
A representative North Sea flexible riser configuration at a water depth of 300m is considered.
The riser pipe has an internal diameter of 6” and its build-up is illustrated in Figure D1.1
and Table D1.1.
Figure D1.1: A sample section of the North Sea flexible riser after 11 years of operation.
Table D1.1: North Sea Riser structure
No. Layer description Numerical model

1 INTERLOCKED CARCASS
2 PVD LAYER
3 PRESSURE ARMOUR
4 SPIRAL
5 POLYAMID ANTI-WEAR
TAPE
6 FIRST ARMOUR LAY
7 POLYAMID ANTI-WEAR
TAPE
8 SECOND ARMOUR LAY
9 OUTER SHEATH
The Case Study riser is intended for sweet service and conveys oil at an initial operating
pressure of around 300 bar, which is decreasing with time.
Due to confidentiality clauses, the specifications for the flexible pipe and the armour wire
cannot be released in full. Below are given some essential parameters.

Section D1.2
OC2017 A-001
Specifications of pipe:
Sweet service.
Design pressure 420 bar.
Design temperature 105°C.
Internal diameter of pipe 6 inches.
Specifications of armour wire:

Ultimate tensile strength 1400 MPa.
Cross section 3 x 12 mm2 .
The riser is connected to a floater of the semisubmersible type. Damage in the outer sheath
has caused the riser to be flooded, the exact period of time not known.
D1.2.2 Balmoral Riser
The 4” Gas lift riser, here denoted Balmoral riser, was replaced on the Balmoral FPV (owned
by Premier Oil) after 23 years of service.
The Balmoral riser is a 4” ID gas lift sweet service riser with a design pressure of 190 bar
(2700 psi). The armour wires of steel FI 41 have an ultimate tensile strength of 1400 MPa
and a cross-section of 3 x 6 mm2 . The Balmoral riser was used for 23 years before being
retrieved. The last part of service life the riser was subjected to wet annulus conditions (exact
time or gas/fluid content are not known). Also wire from a spare sample stored on-shore for
23 years was available.

Section D1.2
OC2017 A-001
(1) Balmoral riser - used (23 years) wire.
(2) Balmoral riser - stored on shore.
Figure D1.2: Sample sections of the Balmoral riser - both used and stored (courtesy Flexlife).

Section D1.2
OC2017 A-001

Chapter D2
Data Basis
523
Section D2.4
OC2017 A-001
D2.1 Introduction
The data basis for the Case Study includes data predominantly from the North Sea Riser,
but supplemented by data from the Balmoral riser. The operational data used for the
Case Study are partly real, partly fictitious or assumed.
D2.2 Temperature and pressure records (operation pressure)
The operating pressure is characterized by a decreasing trend. The average pressure during
the last 8 years in operation has been around 85 bar. In the following, it is assumed that the
operating pressure varies linearly from 300 to 85 bar during the first three years in operation.
Subsequently the operating pressure is assumed to be constant and equal to 85 bar.
The average temperature during the last six years in operation is around 70°C. It is assumed
that this value also applies to the first five years in operation.
D2.3 Annulus pressure tests
A sequence of annulus pressure tests are performed, starting during the second year in
operation. Based on the observed free volume in the riser, leakage of the outer sheath at the
upper part of the riser was suspected during the fifth year in operation. This was confirmed
by ROV inspection.
D2.3.1 Annulus gas sampling
Measurement of annulus gas composition is performed during the two last years that the
riser was in operation. In addition, a measurement was performed within one year after the
replacement riser was put in operation (i.e. after 11 years).
It is observed that the CO2 content in the annulus of the new riser is at the same level as was
observed for the decommissioned riser after the first year in operation. The same applies to
the hydrogen level in the annulus. This implies that the saturation of CO2 takes place quite
rapidly. This is also likely to hold for the associated CO2 -induced corrosion which leads to
an increase of the hydrogen level, indicating presence of permeated water in the annulus.
The H2 S level in the annulus was found to be negligible throughout the lifetime of the riser.
D2.4 Stress cycle distribution
Global dynamic analysis is performed to establish the long-term distribution of the cross-
section forces. These are applied in a local FEM analysis to calculate stress ranges for the
relevant pipe cross section by means of cycle-counting procedures. The long-term stress
cycle distribution forms the basis for computation of fatigue damage by application of the
relevant SN-curve. The effect of possible stress concentrations also needs to be taken into
account by proper magnification of the stress range.

Section D2.6
OC2017 A-001
By combining the damage contribution for all the cycle range classes based on the number of
cycles per class obtained from rainflow counting, the annual fatigue damage for the critical
cross-section is found.
The base case stress-range distribution for the relevant cross-section is shown in Figure D2.1.
Figure D2.1: Stress range distribution for relevant cross-section (Corrected for the effect of
mean-stress based on the Gerber approach).
D2.5 Sheath and corrosion damage
The sheath damage is located just below the guide tube at the top end of the riser. The
damage is very localized as shown for a similar type of damage in Figure D2.21 (left part).
After the damage the annulus is filled with sea-water. After the period of 1-year with sea-
water exposure, a limited amount of corrosion products are observed at the riser surface.
This indicates localized corrosion without any serious damage to single or multiple wires.
After 1 year the damage is repaired by a clamp which is indicated by a clamp of a similar type
in the right part of Figure D2.22. This seals the sheath and stops oxygen-driven corrosion.
An inhibitor fluid is also applied at the time of repair in order to prevent further corrosion.
A second scenario is also considered where the damage is located inside the guide tube such
that access is difficult and repair is not performed. This implies that the corrosion process
will be continuously on-going once the sheath damage has occurred.
(1) Type of sheath damage (2) Type of riser clamp
Figure D2.2: Type of sheath damage (left, [Muren, 2008]) and type of riser clamp (right)

Section D2.6
OC2017 A-001
D2.6 SN-curves
For the in-air condition, the SN-curve obtained from the tests of wires from the stored and
unused samples of the Balmoral riser, is applied (based on the results for the stored samples),
see Figure D2.3. The fatigue design curve is expressed on the following form:
1
Log10 N = Log10 a − mLog10 ∆S ⇒ Log10 ∆S = − (Log10 a − Log10 N ) (D2.1)
m
where ∆S is the stress range, N is the number of cycles to fatigue failure, m is the exponent
of the SN-relationship and a is the intercept along the horizontal axis.
The slope of the left part of the SN-curve is 1/m = 1/6, and the associated value of
Log10 (aDesign ) is around 20.5. A design fatigue limit is also applied. This limit is observed
to be just higher than the uppermost stress cycle (load effect) for the present riser, as given
in Figure D2.1 above. This implies that all the stress cycles fall below the fatigue limit.
However, in the present calculations the fatigue limit is removed such that an SN-curve with
a single slope is applied.
Figure D2.3: In-air fatigue design curve (red dashed line), obtained from
[Wang and Berge, 2012].
An issue in the calculations will be the relative effects on the SN-curve due to presence of
CO2 (in addition to condensed water or sea-water). The SN-curve in Figure D2.4 is obtained
from [Charlesworth et al., 2011]. The tests correspond to conditions with both CO2 (0.67
bara) and seawater(4%) / inhibitor(96%) being present. It is assumed in the following that
this curve applies for the phase before the outer sheath is broken, i.e. before the damage
occurs (even if no inhibitor and seawater in reality may be present for that case, but instead
CO2 and condensed water without inhibitor).
Based on the results from the annulus sampling, it seems reasonable to assume that the
transition from ’in-air’ conditions to the SN-curve with CO2 being present takes place within
the first year of operation.

Section D2.7
OC2017 A-001
Figure D2.4: SN-curve based on [Charlesworth et al., 2011]
Based on the dashed design curve in Figure D2.4, the m-exponent was estimated to be
around 4.1, and aDes around 16.8.
The effect of aerated sea-water being present (without any inhibitor) due to damage of the
outer sheath can be represented by increasing the slope of the SN-curve in Figure D2.4
slightly. The intersection point with the vertical axis is taken to be constant. This also
implies that the value of aDes is reduced somewhat.
After the clamp has been installed and the inhibitor fluid has been injected, the same design
SN-curve as that given in the Figure D2.4 is applied.
In order to mimic a situation without access to a sufficient amount of relevant test data,
the standard deviation associated with the fatigue test data is increased significantly while
keeping the design curve constant. This implies that the mean SN-curve is lifted. As part of
the reliability assessment, the mean curve and standard deviation represent the input to the
statistical modeling. As more test data becomes available, the variability reflected in terms
of the standard deviation is updated accordingly.
D2.7 Parameter variations
With respect to the internal pressure, the stress cycle distribution has been computed for
three different pressure levels as described above (i.e. 50 bar, 100 bar and 300 bar). The
normalized fatigue damage corresponding to the SN-curve given above is shown in Figure
D2.5 as a function of normalized pressure (with 100 bar applied as the normalization value).
The effect of moving the floater (semi-submersible) to a different position due to workover
at a particular well will be quantified in relation to the associated long-term cycle distribution
at the critical cross-section. The relative durations of the floater being located at the two
relevant positions (quantified as percentage of time) will be estimated.

Section D2.8
OC2017 A-001
Figure D2.5: Normalized fatigue damage versus pressure level. (Fatigue damage is normalized
by the value corresponding to 100 bar. Pressure is normalized by 100 bar)
Parameter studies will also be performed with respect to the following additional quantities:
• Drag coefficient
• Floater motion amplitudes
• Riser internal friction coefficients
The results of the parametric studies are given in terms of variation of the normalized fatigue
damage versus the normalized values of the parameters.
D2.8 Available floater motion and position data
Additional floater motion and position data will allow a more precise statistical modelling of
the input to the riser fatigue analysis.

Chapter D3
Testing
529
Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
D3.1 Introduction
Armour wire from two risers (Balmoral riser and North Sea riser) that had been in service
for several years, were available for investigation. Both risers had been subjected to wet
annulus conditions during the last part of their service life. The tensile armour wires were
visibly corroded, however, with no significant loss of cross section. Reference wire from non
corroded sections was also available for testing.
D3.2 Data provided by testing
Fatigue testing of corroded wire and reference wire (non corroded) was performed in air with
constant amplitude axial loading to obtain fatigue test data. The results were analysed to
evaluate the effect of the corrosion damage on the wires in terms of reduction of fatigue
strength and of fatigue life. The fatigue strength of the corroded wire was found to be
strongly degraded relative to the reference wire.
D3.3 Small scale testing in air
D3.3.1 Fatigue testing - general
The specimens were taken from the pipe sample and were straightened by hand rolling prior
to testing. The inside of the armour wire was marked on each specimen, to identify the
inside vs. the outside of the wires. The inside was subjected to tensile plastic strain during
the straightening process.
Two different geometries of the specimens were used in this study. The non-corroded (refer-
ence) wire was tested with dog-bone shaped specimens Figure D3.1, to avoid failures initiated
by the grips. The corroded specimens were tested both with dobgone and with full cross
section, Figure D3.2.
The dog-bone specimens of the reference wire had a test section of 90 mm. The machined
surfaces were polished with grit paper and the edges were rounded to a radius of approx-
imately 0.5 mm. The purpose of this treatment was to ensure that fatigue failures would
be initiated from the faces of the wires that had not been prepared in any way and thus
represented the original state of the wire.
The geometry of the full cross-section specimens of corroded wire is shown in Figure D3.2.
Specimens that failed from the grip area were not included in the analysis of test data
(non-valid).
Figure D3.1: Geometry of the dog-bone shaped specimen

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.2: Geometry of full cross-section specimens
It is generally recommended to have at least 12 specimens to establish a design SN curve

for one series (one material in one condition) [ASTM E 739, 2004]. Some tests turned out
to be invalid for various reasons. Specimens surviving 2 million cycles were considered run
outs.
D3.3.2 Test procedure
Testing was carried out in conformance with MARINTEK test procedures [Berge, 2012],
[Berge et al., 2003]. A state-of-art digital servo-hydraulic test frame was used, with capacity
100 kN. Axial load was applied by a servo-hydraulic actuator in load control. The test rig
and test set-up are shown in Figure D3.3. The loading was axial tension-tension with stress
ratio R = 0.1, sinusoidal with frequency 10 Hz.
Stress range was calculated from the load cell reading and the cross section of the specimens.
The load cell had a nominal accuracy of 0.5%. The cross section of each specimen was
measured with a digital caliper with resolution 0.01 mm.
Clamping of the specimens was provided by mechanical wedge grips, Figure D3.3. A common
problem in axial fatigue testing, in particular when testing high strength armour wire, is
fatigue failure initiated by fretting contact with the grips. For this reason the non-corroded
specimens were machined to a dog-bone shape, Figure D3.1.
Figure D3.3: Test rig for axial loading
Fatigue strength of non-notched components tends to be governed by the condition of the

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
surface. With the dog-bone specimens two types of surfaces were present on the test section,
the original surface of the armour wire, and the machined / polished surface. The purpose
of polishing was to create a surface with fatigue strength better than that of the original
surface. If this could be proved to be successful, the fatigue strength of a specimen would be
representative of the fatigue strength of the original armour wire. After testing all fracture
surfaces were inspected visually and the location of fatigue initiation was identified. Only
test specimens with failure initiating from the original surface (face) were considered to be
valid. Specimens with failures that were suspected to be influenced by the machining or by
the grips were discarded. The SN data are therefore assumed to be representative for the
fatigue strength of armour wire in the as-laid condition in a pipe.
Positions of fatigue initiation are indicated according to Figure D3.4.
Figure D3.4: Positions on the specimen cross section.
Specimens surviving 2 million cycles were considered as run outs.
D3.3.3 Armour wire from North Sea riser tested in air
Introduction
A flexible riser herein termed ’North Sea Riser’ was taken out of service after 11 years. It is
known that the annulus of the riser had been flooded by sea water for the last six years of
service. Tensile armour wire was taken from a section of the riser that had been subjected to
essentially static loads. The wires were visibly corroded, but with no significant loss of cross
section. Armour wire was also taken from a static section far from the point of water ingress,
believed not to have been affected by sea water. These wires were tested as reference. The
armour wire was a high strength sweet service grade with ultimate tensile strength 1400 MPa.
Wires from both samples were fatigue tested in air with constant amplitude axial loading.
For the reference wires dog-bone specimens were used, to avoid failures being initiated by
the grips. The corroded specimens were tested with the full cross section.
Wires from both samples were fatigue tested in air with constant amplitude axial loading.
The results were analyzed to evaluate the effect of the corrosion damage on the wires in
terms of reduction of fatigue strength and of fatigue life.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.5: Sample of North Sea risere reference armour wire. Wire is taken from a
non-corroded section of the riser.
Fatigue testing
Two samples of wire were tested. The reference sample was taken from a static section of
the pipe at a location far from the point of sea water ingress, where it is believed that no
sea water had been present during the service life of the pipe. The armour wire had a bright
appearance, with no sign of corrosion attack, see Figure D3.5. These specimens were tested
with the dog-bone geometry.
Discussion of the results from the reference specimens
The data are shown in Figure D3.6, with regression lines. The appearance of the SN plot
for these specimens is typical of SN data for new armour wire tested in air, with a narrow
scatter-band and a tendency for specimens surviving 1 million cycles to go to run-out. The
slope parameter coming out of the regression analysis mr = 25 is a very high value. Further
discussion on the slope parameter is given in [Berge, 2012].
Three specimens failed from the inside face of the wire (relative to pipe axis), four specimens
failed from the outside face. As described above, the helical wires coming off the pipe were
straightened by hand rolling prior to testing. The plastic deformation (tensile for the inside
face, compressive for the outside face) and corresponding residual stress thus had no apparent
effect on the fatigue strength.
Discussion of the results from corroded specimens
The corroded sample was also from a static section of the pipe, where sea water had been
present during the period of water ingress (6 years). The wire was visibly corroded with a
layer of rust and some shallow pitting, Figure D3.7 and Figure D3.8. However, the cross
section was not significantly reduced. These specimens were tested with full cross-section.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.6: North Sea riser SN data points and regression lines
Figure D3.7: Corroded North Sea armour wire prior to being dissected and cleaned before
testing takes place.
The test matrix and number of valid tests in the two series are shown in Table D3.1.
Table D3.1: Test series and sample numbers
Test series specimen type Number of valid specimens

Non-corroded (reference), dog-bone 12
Corroded, full cross-section 10
The data are shown in Figure D3.9, with regression lines.

The SN data for the corroded specimens are significantly different from the data from the
reference wire. The fatigue strength is much lower. Inspection of specimens shows that 50%
of the specimens failed from the edge/corner, cf. Figure D3.4. This could indicate that the
corrosion damage had no preference with respect to position on the wires.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.8: Corroded North Sea armour wire prior to testing.
Comparison of SN data from reference and from corroded wire
As discussed in [Berge, 2012] regression analysis of small samples of SN data, in particular

if the data samples cover only a narrow range of fatigue lives, could give very misleading
results, in particular regarding the slope parameter m. In [Berge, 2012] it is argued that in-air
fatigue data for tensile armour should be analysed with a fixed slope parameter, and m = 6
is adviced unless there is evidence to assume some other value. For corroded specimens it is
not possible to give general recommendations on a slope parameter, because of a different
initiation mechanism due to corrosion damage.
For illustration, the two samples were analysed with a fixed slope parameter m = 6, as shown
in Figure D3.9. As shown, the corroded specimens had a significantly lower fatigue strength
compared to the reference wire. The reduction in strength (mean life curves) was 30 %, and
the residual life of the corroded specimens (assuming m = 6) was 10 %.
On the basis of the assumed design SN curves the reduction in strength/life is even larger.
However, due to the small size of the samples and relatively large scatter a comparison of
the design SN curves becomes very uncertain.
Summary and conclusions for North Sea riser
Armour wire taken from a used flexible riser was fatigue tested in air. Two samples of wire
were tested, both were taken from static parts of the riser. One sample was from a section
of the pipe that had been flooded by sea water for approximately six years. The wire was
visibly corroded, but with no significant loss of cross section. The other sample was taken
from a section far from the point of sea water ingress, and was believed to have not been
subjected to sea water corrosion. The pipe had been in operation for a total of 11 years.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.9: SN data from North Sea riser, both reference tensile wire and corroded tensile
armour. Regression analysis with fixed slope paremeter ms = 6.
The reference wires had no visible corrosion damage. The SN data are believed to be
representative of new (unused) wire.
Wires from the flooded section of the riser had visible corrosion damage in the form of a layer
of rust and shallow pits. The reduction in cross section area was not significant. The fatigue
strength was significantly lower than that of the reference wire. The reduction in fatigue
strength (mean life curves with forced slope parameter m = 6) relative to the reference wire
was approximately 30 %. The remaining fatigue life was approximately 10 %.
The data samples are very small, and the conclusions are indicative only.
D3.3.4 Armour Wire from Balmoral riser tested in air
Introduction
Flexlife has obtained sections of two risers from the same production with the same specifi-
cations. One riser has been stored for 23 years. The conditions of the storage are not known.
The other one has been in service for the full period, subjected to wet annulus conditions
for the last part of the service life. An exact period for wet conditions is not known, neither
gas mixture nor fluids in the annulus for the wet condition. The wires from this riser had
general corrosion damage in the form of shallow pits. However, the cross section was not
significantly reduced.
Fatigue testing
The tested armour wire was grade FI 41 material, with a nominal ultimate tensile strength
of 1400 MPa.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Three series of samples were tested in the current project. The first series samples are from
wires taken out of service (used) with the test section machined to a dog-bone shape. The
second series are from the stored riser (stored) with a machined (dog bone) test section.
The third series samples are from the used wires with full cross-section.
The test matrix and specimen numbers in each of the three series are provided in Table D3.2.
Table D3.2: Test series and sample numbers, Balmoral riser
Test series / specimen type Number of specimens

Used and machined test section (dog bone) 16
Stored and machined test section (dog bone) 19
Used and full cross-section 13
Discussion of the test results from reference wire, dog bone shaped specimens
The data are shown in Figure D3.10. Two specimens failed outside of the 90 mm test section,
with initiation from the edge. The initiation was not caused by the clamping. For these two
specimens the stress range was calculated on the basis of the original cross section, i.e. the
cross section at the location of the failure. By inspection these two specimens were found
to be significantly corroded, and the fatigue failures had been initiated from the corroded
section, Figure D3.11. As stated above, no information was available on the condition of the
storage of this pipe. Apparently some corrosion had taken place in parts of the pipe, Figure
D3.11.
The remaining specimens had no significant corrosion damage, judged from visual inspection.
The appearance of the SN plot for these specimens is typical of SN data for new armour wire
tested in air, with a narrow scatter-band and a tendency for specimens surviving 1 million
cycles to go to run-out.
Based on these observations the data sample, excluding specimens 3 and 19, were taken as
representative of unused armour wire, Figure D3.12.
Regression analysis of the data sample will give a very uncertain estimate (large confidence
interval) of the slope parameter m. MARINTEK has adopted a standard slope m = 6 for
armour wires in air (fixed slope regression analysis), with a fatigue limit at N = 106 .
Assuming the same slope for the SN curve (m = 6) a regression analysis was carried out.
The resulting mean life and design life SN curves are shown in Figure D3.12. The curves are
shown for demonstration only, due to the very small sample size.
Discussion of the test results for corroded, dog bone shaped specimens
The data are shown in Figure D3.10. The resulting mean life and design life SN curves are
shown in Figure D3.12.
The SN data for used (dog bone) specimens are very different from the data for the stored
(dog bone) specimens, with much lower fatigue strength. Two specimens had failed from
fatigue initiation outside of the test section, and not being affected by the grips. For these
two specimens the stress range was calculated on the basis of the original cross section, i.e.
the cross section at the location of the failure.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.10: SN data points for Balmoral riser tested in air
Figure D3.11: Photo of stored dog bone specimens that failed from corroded area outside
of test section.
The appearance of the data may lead to a conclusion that the SN curve for used wire is very
steep, with a low value of the slope parameter m. However, this is most probably fortuitous,
due to the random choice of stress range for each specimen, in this case leading by chance to
an apparent systematic behaviour. The appearance of the SN data is most probably linked
to the random nature of corrosion damage, as discussed in Section D3.3.4.
Discussion for the corroded full cross-section specimens
The data are shown in Figure D3.10. For regression analysis (Figure D3.12) the two dog bone
specimens of the used wire that had failed in the full cross section, were included the same

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.12: Valid SN data points and regression lines with assumed fatigue limit for
Balmoral riser testen in air.
sample. The resulting mean life and design life SN curves are shown in Figure D3.12. It can
be seen that the mean life SN curve of these data is significantly lower than for the used, dog
bone specimens, and that the two scatterbands (based on two standard deviations) are hardly
overlapping. This indicates that the two samples (dog bone and unmachined specimens) are
statistically different.
It is observed that for this test series 11 out of 15 specimens failed from the corner or edge,
i.e. from the part that was machined off for the dog bone specimens. This could indicate that
the corrosion damage had some preference for the corner/edge, and the dog bone specimens
in this case giving unconservative results.
Fatigue of tensile armour is a weakest link process, starting from the location on the surface
where the combination of microstructure, residual stress, surface condition and in this case
corrosion damage is most severe. Comparing the used and the stored samples, and assuming
that corrosion exposure is the main difference, it is apparent that the corrosion damage has
a significant effect on the fatigue strength of used wire. In each test 90 mm section of
wire is tested, and the probability of testing a ’lower bound’ defect is relatively small. In the
dynamically loaded section of a flexible pipe several 10’s of meters are fatigue loaded. Hence,
the design must be based on ’lower bound’ data, conventionally taken to be the mean life
curve minus two standard deviations. Assuming that the full cross section specimens give
the most realistic data for used wire, the reduction in strength (mean life curve) in relation
to stored wire is approximately 40 %. The remaining fatigue life is approximately 5%.
Due to the small size of the samples and relatively large scatter a comparison of the design
SN curves becomes very uncertain.

Section D3.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D3.13: The fractured used, full cross-section specimens, Balmoral riser
Summary and conclusions for Balmoral riser
Armour wires taken from two flexible risers were fatigue tested in air. The two rises were
from the same production, with identical specifications. One riser has been stored for 23
years. The other one has been in service for the same period.
Totally three series of the wires were tested. One series were wires for the used riser with
machined test section (dog bone shaped). Another series were wires from the stored riser
with machined test section (dog bone shaped). The last series were wires from the used riser
with full cross-section.
Wires from the stored pipe showed some corrosion damage which is related to storage con-
ditions. Samples from these corroded sections were excluded from the analysis of this test
series. The main part of the sample that was tested showed fatigue strength characteristics
typical of new wire.
Wires from the used pipe had significant corrosion damage in the form of shallow pits on
the surfaces. The reduction in cross section area was not significant. The fatigue strength
was significantly lower than that of stored wire. Comparison of data from dog bone shaped
specimens with the edges machined off in the test section, and specimens that were tested
with full cross section, showed a significant difference in fatigue strength. The full cross
section specimens had lower fatigue strength. By inspection it was found that nearly all full
cross section specimens failed from the unmachined corner or edge, indicating preferential
corrosion damage at these locations.
Based on the data from the full cross section specimens the reduction in fatigue strength
(mean life curves) relative to wire from tha stored pipe was approximately 40%. The re-

Section D3.4
OC2017 A-001
maining fatigue life was approximately 5%.

The data samples are very small, and the conclusions are indicative only.
Further use of test results for Balmoral riser
The SN curves for the stored (unused) armour wire are also presented in Section D2.6 for
the in-air conditions. The fatigue limit is removed such that an SN curve with a single slope
is applied in the calculations presented in Chapter D8.
D3.4 Concluding remarks
The following observations and concluding remarks are based on the data presented for the
testing of the North Sea riser:
• Testing in air of non-corroded wire gave results that are typical of high strength armour
wire, a very flat SN-curve that is essentially a fatigue limit.
• Testing in air of wire taken from a corroded section of the same riser gave results
indicating a significant fatigue notch. The reduction in fatigue strength was a factor
of approximately (1/1.4). The reduction in fatigue life (assuming a slope parameter
m = 6) was a factor 1/10.
• The corrosion damage was superficial, with no significant loss of cross section.

Section D3.4
OC2017 A-001

Chapter D4
Evaluation of specimen surface of

tension armour samples from two
different risers
543
Section D4.1
OC2017 A-001
D4.1 Introduction
Sections from two risers (the Balmoral and North Sea risers) that had been in service for
several years, were available for investigation. Both risers had been subjected to wet annulus
conditions during the last part of their service life. The tensile armour wires were visibly
corroded, however, with no significant loss of cross section.
Tensile armour wires from both risers were tested with cyclic axial loading in air conditions as
described in Section D3.3. The fatigue strength was found to be strongly degraded relative
to reference wire. The degradation of fatigue strength appeared to be related to the corrosion
damage of the surface of the wires.
D4.1.1 Balmoral riser
The Balmoral riser had been in service for 23 years, subjected to wet annulus conditions for
the last part of the service life. An exact period for wet conditions is not known, neither gas
mixture nor fluids in the annulus for the wet condition. The grade of wire was FI 41, a high
strength wire for sweet service with dimensions 6 x 3 (mm).
The wires from this riser had general corrosion damage in the form of shallow pits, [ASTM G 46, 2005].
However, the cross section was not significantly reduced. A photo of a typical sample is shown
in Figure D4.1.
Figure D4.1: Photo of tensile armour wire from Balmoral riser, after 23 years of service.
Period of flooded condition is not known.
D4.1.2 North Sea riser
The North Sea riser had been taken out of service after 11 years. It is known that the annulus
of the riser had been flooded by sea water for the last six years of service. The tensile wire
was high strength wire for sweet service with ultimate tensile strength 1400 MPa.

Section D4.1
OC2017 A-001
Tensile armour wire was taken from sections of the riser that had been subjected to essentially
static loads. The wires were visibly corroded, but apparently to a lesser extent compared to
the Balmoral riser. The degradation of fatigue strength was also less as described in Section
D3.3. There was no significant loss of cross section. A photo of a typical sample is shown
in Figure D4.2.
Figure D4.2: Photo of tensile armour wire from North Sea Riser after 11 years of service, six
years in flooded condition.
D4.1.3 Material samples
The samples were taken from specimens that had undergone fatigue testing. The specimens
were cleaned according to [ASTM G 1, 2005]. The cleaning solution was 500 ml of concen-
trated HCl and 3.5 g hexamethylene mixed to 1000 ml with distilled water. The specimens
were soaked in this solution for 10 min. at room temperature, then rinsed carefully with tap
water, washed in ethanol and dried.
Positions on the respective specimens are identified as shown in Figure D4.3.
Figure D4.3: Positions on specimens.

Section D4.2
OC2017 A-001
D4.2 Surface characterization of fatigue specimens
Surface characterization of the wires using an optical microscopy technique termed optical
3D surface metrology is performed for both the North Sea and Balmoral risers. Surface
profiles of selected samples were obtained, and cross-sectional dimensions of corrosion pits
were measured. Examples of the work are presented in this section.
D4.2.1 Microscopy
The microscopy was carried out by SINTEF Tribology Group. The microscope utilizes a
technique termed infinite focus for optical 3D surface metrology. Its operating principle
combines the small depth of focus of an optical system with vertical scanning to provide
topographical and color information from the variation of focus. Vertical resolution can be
as low as 10 nm making the instrument ideal for surface study of both homogeneous and
compound materials.
The microscope is able to sample only a small area for each scan. Fatigue is a weakest link
process, a fatigue crack will initiate at the surface defect producing the largest notch effect.
In this case it was not possible to scan the defect that actually had caused the fatigue failure
in the respective specimens. The strategy was thus to select an area on the specimen surface
that could represent a worst case with regard to corrosion damage.
D4.2.2 Procedure for investigation
The procedure for the investigation was as follows:

• Area for scanning on each specimen was selected based on visual inspection. The
intention was to investigate an area which appeared to have the most severe corrosion
damage.
• Images and measurements were taken in the following sequence:
– x2.5 objective, 45x magnification:
∗ Optical image
∗ Colour image
∗ Line profile of surface
– x20 objective, 355x magnification
∗ Optical image
∗ Colour image
∗ Line profile of surface
∗ Measurements of surface roughness parameters
The most meaningful information was provided by the colour image and the surface profile
at 25x magnification, enabling measurement of cross section of the deepest pit within the
sample length. Selected results for the North Sea riser is presented in Section D4.2.3.

Section D4.2
OC2017 A-001
D4.2.3 North Sea Riser
The following specimens for the North Sea Riser with the respective fatigue test parameters
were investigated:
Table D4.1: Specimens from the North Sea Riser.
Specimen ID ∆S (MPa) N(cycles) Comments

3 NC-O-42-5 490 137 863 Failure from face corner
4 NC-O-46-2 480 140 990 Failure from edge corner
5 NC-O-43-7 470 123 320 Failure from face
6 NC-0-4-4 460 164 189 Failure from edge
From visual inspection the corrosion damage on the North Sea Riser material was much less
and of a different nature compared to the Balmoral riser. The pitting was more uniform, and
with shallower pits.
North Sea Riser Specimen 3
A microscope colour image of specimen 3 is shown in Figure D4.4.

A line profile for the line indicated in Figure D4.4 is shown in Figure D4.5.
Figure D4.4: Colour image of Specimen 3. The size of the area is 5.6 x 4.3 mm. The range
of depth scale is 0µm (light green) to -40µmm (deep purple).

Section D4.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D4.5: Line profile from Figure D4.4. Dimension of deepest pit (approximately) 25
µm depth, 500 µm widt

of depth scale is 0 µm (light green) to -70µm (deep purple).

Section D4.2
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Figure D4.7: Line profile from Figure D4.6. The deepest pit has dimensions (approximately)
60µm depth and 500 µm width.

of depth scale is 0 µm (light green) to -80µm (deep purple).

Section D4.2
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Figure D4.9: Line profile from Figure D4.8. The deepest pit has dimensions (approximately)
60µm depth and 700 µm width.
North Sea Riser Specimen 6a and 6b
Specimen 6 showed very different corrosion patterns on the respective faces. On face 6a
relatively wide and isolated pits were found. On face 6b a pattern of corrosion stripes was
observed, possibly from anti-wear tape. Both sides were scanned.
Colour image of Specimen 6a is shown in Figure D4.10.
Figure D4.10: Colour image of Specimen 6a. The size of the area is 20.0 x 4.3 mm. The
range of depth scale is 0 µm (light green) to -140 µm (deep purple).
Figure D4.11: Line profile from Figure D4.11. The deepest pit has dimensions (approxi-
mately) 110 µm depth and 3 mm width.
Colour image of Specimen 6b is shown in Figure D4.12.


Section D4.2
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Figure D4.12: Colour image of Specimen 6b. A pattern possibly due to the tape is apparent.
The size of the area is 5.6 x 4.3 mm. The range of depth scale is 0 µm (light green) to -90
µm (deep purple).
Figure D4.13: Line profile from Figure D4.12. The deepest pit has dimensions (approxi-
mately) 65 µm depth and 500 µm width.
D4.2.4 Discussion and summary
The line profile with x2.5 objective (35x magnification) gave the most useful results in terms
of surface properties related to fatigue strength. In Table D4.2 the cross sectional dimensions
of the largest pits for each specimen are summarized.
The aspect ratio is defined as the ratio Depth/Width of the pits. The aspect ratio is a
measure of the acuity of a pit in terms of stress concentration factor. Measurements of pit

Section D4.3
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dimensions for both North Sea Riseer and Balmoral riser are presented in Table D4.2.
Table D4.2: Summary of the measurements of pit dimensions.
Riser Specimen Depth(µm) Width(µm) Aspect ratio

21 200 2000 0.10
22 150 300 0.50
Balmoral 26 200 1300 0.15
26 150 1500 0.10
Mean 175 1275 0.21
3 25 500 0.05
4 60 500 0.12
5 60 700 0.09
North Sea
6a 110 3000 0.04
6b 65 500 0.13
Mean 64 1040 0.09
Observations:
Armour wire material was taken from two risers that had been subjected to flooded annulus
conditions. Specimens that had been fatigue tested to failure were investigated for pitting
corrosion damage. What appeared to be worst case pits from visual investigation of each
specimen were scanned. The following observations were made:
• The depth of the pitting on the Balmoral wire was significantly larger than on the
North Sea Riser.
• With one exeption, the aspect ratio was in the range < 0.15 for pits on both samples
of wire.
• One pit on Balmoral wire had an aspect ratio of 0.5.
• The overall results are in agreement with the fatigue strength data.
D4.3 Scanning electron microscopy of fatigue fracture surfaces

of tensile armour
D4.3.1 Microscopy
The investigation was carried out at the Metallurgical Laboratory of SINTEF. The defects
were characterized using the nomenclature of [ASTM G 46, 2005].
D4.3.2 Specimen description
Specimens from both North Sea and Balmoral risers were investigated.
An overview of the North Sea riser specimens with the respective fatigue test parameters is
presented in Table D4.3.

Section D4.3
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Table D4.3: Specimens from the North Sea Riser.
Specimen ID ∆S (MPa) N(cycles) Comments

3 NC-O-42-5 490 137 863 Failure from face corner
4 NC-O-46-2 480 140 990 Failure from edge corner
5 NC-O-43-7 470 123 320 Failure from face
6 NC-0-4-4 460 164 189 Failure from edge
7 NC-O-2-3 450 176 951 Failure form corner
13 NC-O-31-13 440 310 848 Failure from edge
Example - North Sea Riser specimen No.3
Fatigue initiation location and initial defect are shown in Figure D4.14 and Figure D4.15.
Figure D4.14: Fatigue initiation from upper right hand corner, North Sea riser specimen no.
3.
Figure D4.15: Initial defect, specimen no. 3: Wide, shallow pit. Dimensions 110 µm (depth)
x 730 µm (width).

Section D4.3
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D4.3.3 Discussion and summary
Summary of the measurements of pit dimensions.

In the below the cross sectional dimensions of the pits for each specimen are summarized.
The aspect ratio is defined as the ratio Depth/Width of the pits. In this case the dimensions
of the respective pits are measured in the crack plane. The cross-sectional dimension in the
direction of the principal stress is not known. Thus, there is no information on the acuity of
the defects in terms of stress concentration factor.
Table D4.4: Summary of the measurements of pit dimensions.
Riser Specimen Depth Width Aspect Comment

(µm) (µm) ratio
21 170 475 0.36
22 115 320 0.36
Balmoral 25 250 NA NA
26 90 900 0.10
27 250 640 0.39
80 200 0.40
31
150 500 0.30 Not an initiation site
3 110 730 0.15
4 120 500 0.24
5 130 800 0.16
North Sea
85 375 0.23
6
40 450 0.09 Not an initiation site
65 800 0.08
7
50 240 0.21 Not an initiation site,
possibly a fabrication defect
13 85 470 0.18
For fatigue crack initiation the depth dimension is the most important. The average of
initiation defects (not counting the defects that were judged not to have initiated fatigue
cracks) is presented in Table D4.5.
Table D4.5: Average depth of initiation defects.
Average depth (µm) Average width (µm) Average aspect ratio

Riser
Balmoral 159 507 0.32
North Sea 99 612 0.17
The initial defects on the Balmoral wire were significantly larger than the defects on the
North Sea wire. This is consistent with the findings from optical surface scanning of the
respective wires. It is also consistent with the finding that the Balmoral wire was more
affected by corrosion damage than the North Sea wire in terms of fatigue strength reduction.
The aspect ratio of the pits appears to be significantly different for the two armour materials.
The aspect ratio of the pits on the Balmoral wire is nearly twice as large as the aspect ratio
of the pits on the North Sea riser. This could indicate a somewhat different corrosion
mechanism in the two cases, pitting corrosion on the Balmoral being more localized. It could
also be an indirect result of the fact that on the Balmoral wires the corrosion had reached a
more advanced stage. The average width of the pits is nearly the same for the two cases. If

Section D4.3
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it may be assumed that further pitting corrosion on the North Sea riser takes place primarily
in the depth direction, the pit shapes would end up like in the Balmoral case.
Observations: Armour wire material was taken from two risers that had been subjected to
flooded annulus conditions. The fracture surfaces of specimens that had been fatigue tested
to failure were investigated by scanning electron microscopy. The following observations
were made:
• In all the cases fatigue cracks had been initiated at corrosion pits.
• The initial defects (pits) on the Balmoral wire were significantly larger than the defects
on the North Sea wire.
• The aspect ratio of the pits was significantly different for the two types of material.
The interpretation of this observation is unclear.
• The overall results are in agreement with the fatigue strength data.

Section D4.3
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Chapter D5
Numerical evaluation of some

integrity problems for flexible pipe
cross-sections
557
Section D5.2
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D5.1 Introduction
Two integrity problems are addressed in this section of the Case Study:
• Integrity assessment of damaged flexible pipe cross-section
• Lateral buckling analysis of tension armour wire of a flexible riser
The first problem addresses consequences for the flexible pipe cross-section when tensile
wires fails, specifically when 2, 4 or 6 neighbouring wires of the inner tensile layer fails. The
cross-section of the North Sea riser is applied for the study.
The second problem addresses the development of rational procedures for evaluating long
term armour buckling behaviour in flexible pipes. The study objects are a 6" riser, a 14"
jumper and a 8" riser cross-sections. None of the study objects are related to the North Sea
riser since the numerical estimates are compared towards laboratory tests performed by Nils
Højen Østergaard (PhD thesis, [Østergaard, 2012a] )
D5.2 Integrity assessment of damaged flexible pipe cross-sections
D5.2.1 Introduction
The main axial load-carrying layer of the flexible pipe is the tensile armour layer(s). The
failure of the tensile armour layer to carry the tensile loads will cause pipe failure. The tensile
armour layer consists of a significant number of tensile armour wires, and for a layer failure to
occur a certain number of wires need to fail. The failure of individual wires may happen due
to exceeding the ultimate or fatigue capacity excessive loads or reduced resistance (f.inst.
corrosion)
A FE analysis of a section of the North Sea Riser is applied as a basis for an integrity
assessment of a damaged flexible pipe cross-section. The studied scenario is the integrity of
the cross-section when either 2, 4 or 6 neighbouring inner tensile armour wires fails.
Most of the results presented here are based on the scenario of 6 broken wires. However, in
tabulated analysis results, the cases of 2 and 4 broken wires are included as well.
D5.2.2 Stresses and stress component
For the tensile armor wire the stresses are related to the governing force resultants defined
in Figure D5.12 and the load scenario, which can be divided into:
• Axisymmetric loads that only change the length and diameter of the straight pipe
cylinder and with small relative deformations between wires. This includes tension,
torsion, internal and external pressure loads, the latter assuming that no local buckling
or collapse effects occur.
• Bending loads where the straight pipe cylinder is bent into a torus and where significant
relative deformations will occur between the wires.
The significant stress components are shown in Figure D5.13 which includes components
from axial force (basis for strength calculation), torsion moment and bidirectional bending.

Section D5.2
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(1) Initial torsion and curvature quantities
(2) Wire force resultants
(3) Stress components in armour wires
Figure D5.1: Definition of wire coordinate axes and mechanical quantities

Section D5.2
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A flexible riser hanging from a floater will be exposed to cyclic loads from top motions and
hydrodynamic effects resulting in cyclic riser motions and global responses in terms of tension
and curvature variations.
The static reference stress level in the tensile armor is given by the mean static effective
tension and associated internal and external pressures. This gives a mean axial stress and
associated contact pressures that govern the friction moment. In a flexible riser the tension
and external pressure will vary along its length, hence the friction moment will also change
along the riser. Because of the differences in contact pressure between layers, the response in
terms of dynamic stresses due to bending (induced by floater motion and hydrodynamic loads)
will be different between layers. Hence, the nature of dynamic stresses will be characterized
by variations both between layers and along the length of a flexible riser.
The dynamic stresses will consist of an axial friction stress associated to the slip between
layers, axial stresses from dynamic tension, local torsion and bending stresses resulting from
the components of global curvature along each wire. This results in dynamic longitudinal
and shear stresses in the tensile armor where the longitudinal stress represents the most
important contribution with respect to fatigue. The longitudinal stress and associated mean
stress being input to the fatigue calculation consist of different contributions. For the tensile
armour these are:
Q1 ,T Q1 ,F M2 M3
∆σ11 = ∆σ11 + ∆σ11 + ∆σ11 + ∆σ11 (D5.1)
Where
• ∆σ11 = the tensile armour longitudinal stress range
Q1 ,T
• ∆σ11 = the stress range from dynamic tension variation,
Q1 ,F
• ∆σ11 = the dynamic stress range from friction effects,
M2
• ∆σ11 = the dynamic stress from bending about the wire weak axis
M3
• ∆σ11 =the stress range from bending about the wire strong axis.
Considering one load cycle, the stress response at one point in the wire cross-section exposed
to curvature cycle at constant tension and pressure will typically look like the one in Figure
D5.2. The steep part of the curve is primarily governed by the stick regime where the armor
behaves as a stiff pipe until the layer friction is exceeded and the stress increase from that
point will be governed by local bending of the wire. Since the rate of stress increase in the
stick regime is much higher than for local elastic bending of the wire, small curvature ranges
often governs the fatigue life. This is especially the case for corrosion fatigue calculations
where no cut-off is applied in the fatigue curve (all stress ranges counts in the Miner sum).
D5.2.3 FE analysis procedure
The methodology applied to perform an integrity assessment of damaged flexible pipe cross-
sections is described as follows:
• Establish a lower bound estimate for the SN curve and perform fatigue analysis in the
traditional way. Obtain stress distribution based on intact pipe properties and updated
parameters based on operational history

Section D5.2
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Figure D5.2: Typical stress history and fatigue calculation procedure
• Perform robustness checks using FE analysis to find how many tensile armor wires can
fail
• In order to possibly obtain an estimate for the number of wire failures, evaluate:
– if it is possible to use the numerical model to monitor multiple tensile armor
failures before the pressure spiral fails?
– if sufficient robustness of the riser can be verified by applying elevated pressure?
• If the answer to the two questions above is yes, then establish Stress Concentration
Factors (SCFs) for the stress components in the armor wires (due to failure of some
tensile armor wires) with respect to Mean stress and Dynamic stress:
1. Establish FE model
2. Apply tension and operating internal pressure
3. Increase pressure to design pressure
4. Vary the number of tensile wire failures (inner layer) and measure:
– Rotation per length
– Stress distribution in tensile and pressure armor
– Static SCF
5. Apply dynamic curvature and measure dynamic SCF
• The stress concentration factor (SCF) in this case is defined as the ratio of corre-
sponding mean and dynamic stresses between the analyses of intact and damaged
(wire failure) model conditions
• Apply the SCF’s in analytical formulas:
– for longitudinal mean stress:
un-damaged cross-section:

Section D5.2
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Q1 M2 M3
σ11 = A + W2 + W3 = σ11−Q1 + σ11−M 2 + σ11−M 3
damaged cross-section:
∗ = SCF
σ11 11−Q1 · σ11−Q1 + SCF11−M 2 · σ11−M 2 + SCF11−M 3 · σ11−M 3
– for dynamic stress, longitudinal direction:

damaged cross-section:
∗ = ∆SCF
∆σ11 11−Q1 · ∆σ11−Q1 + ∆SCF11−M 2 · ∆σ11−M 2 + ∆SCF11−M 3 ·
∆σ11−M 3
• Perform fatigue analysis with mean and dynamic stress accounting for SCF’s along
with sensitivity analysis with respect to number of failed wires.

Section D5.2
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D5.2.4 FE analysis of North Sea Riser section
The following is a summary of the model applied and the results obtained for a finite element
analysis of a section of the North Sea Riser. The general finite element code MARC© is used
for the analysis.
Flexible Pipe Model Data, 6” Pipe
Pipe and model layers are illustrated in Table D5.1. The FE model with applied tension is
shown in Figure D5.3
Table D5.1: North Sea Riser structure
No. Layer description
1 INTERLOCKED CARCASS
2 PVD LAYER
3 PRESSURE ARMOUR
4 SPIRAL
5 POLYAMID ANTI-WEAR TAPE
6 FIRST ARMOUR LAY
7 POLYAMID ANTI-WEAR TAPE
8 SECOND ARMOUR LAY
9 OUTER SHEATH
Figure D5.3: FE model for a section of the North Sea Riser
The individual layers shown in Table D5.1 are modelled separately and combined into the
final model, Figure D5.3. Layer models are described in the following.

Section D5.2
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Carcass model, Figure D5.4:

• Modeled in a simplified manner using 8-node brick elements, 1 element across the
thickness.
• An orthotropic material model was used to give the correct stiffness in the radial,
circumferential and longitudinal direction.
• Example: The Young’s modulus in the longitudinal direction is set to be a very small
value as the axial stiffness of the carcass is negligible
Figure D5.4: Carcass model
PVD layer model, Figure D5.5:

• Modeled using 8-node brick elements, 1 element across the thickness.
• The Young’s modulus was reduced from 350 Mpa to 210 MPa to ensure correct bending
stiffness of the pipe
Figure D5.5: PVD layer model
Pressure armor model, Figure D5.6:

• Modeled in a simplified manner using 8-node brick elements (1 element across the
thickness), but adding a rebar element model in order to obtain the same stiffness
properties (w.r.t. local bending of cross-section and pressure) as for the physical
pressure armour
• Orthotropic material model with tuned material properties for correct stiffness
• Two types of elements are used in the analysis

Section D5.2
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– 8 node solid element

– Special element (rebar), only takes membrane forces, located in neutral axis
Figure D5.6: Pressure armour model
Spiral model, Figure D5.7:

• Modeled in a simplified manner using 8-node brick elements, 1 element across the
thickness
• An orthotropic material model was used to give the correct stiffness in the radial,
circumferential and longitudinal direction.
• Example: The Young’s modulus in the longitudinal direction is set to be a very small
value as the axial stiffness of the spiral is negligible
Figure D5.7: Spiral model

Section D5.2
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Anti-wear tape model, Figure D5.8:

• Insignificant structural stiffness contribution
• Included for improved convergence with respect to contact and friction
Figure D5.8: Anti-wear tape model
Tensile armor layers model, Figure D5.9:

• Rectangular steel wires of dimension 3 mm x 9mm
• Modeled using 8 node solid element
– one element across the thickness
– one element in width
• One contact body, including self contact (the deformation of wire may cause contact
between different wire locations of the same wire) and friction
Figure D5.9: Tensile armour layer model. For the inner tensile armour layer: yellow pairs of
elements modelled such that separation is obtained for the scenario of broken wires.
Modelling and numbering of theinnter tensile armour layer, including the elements for simu-
lating armour failure, are shown in Figure D5.10

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
(1) Pairs of glued elements for the simulation of wire failures
(2) Model numbering of a selected section of the inner tensile armour layer
Figure D5.10: Numbering and modeling of the first (inner) tensile armour layer
Outer sheath model, Figure D5.11

• Modeled using 8-node brick elements
• Isotropic material properties
• The Young’s modulus was reduced to 132 MPa to ensure correct bending stiffness of
the pipe
Figure D5.11: Outer sheat model

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
Boundary conditions, Figure D5.12

• Boundary conditions applied to each end
– Constraints assuming plane sections to remaining plane
– Bending (i.e. enforced rotation) Dynamic curvature (± 2°) applied, see Figure
D5.13.
Figure D5.12: Bending of model 2°(enforced rotation)
Load cases
Definition of Loads:
• Case A (no bending)
– Fix all translations and rotations at the ends
– Step 1: gradually increase tension to design tension
– Step 2:
∗ External pressure: increase to 1 MPa
∗ Internal pressure: increase to operating pressure
∗ Tension: increase to 375 kN, also accounting for end cap
– Step 3:
∗ Internal pressure: increase to design pressure
∗ Tension: increase to 986 kN, also accounting for end cap
• Case B (bending)
– Fix all translations and 2 out of 3 rotations at the ends
– Step 1 and 2 as for Case A
– Step 3:
∗ Internal pressure: keep at operating pressure
∗ Tension: keep tension at 375 kN
∗ Rotation of ends: gradually apply bending to ±2°at each end while keeping
tension constant
Model variation to account for wire failures in the inner tension armour layer:
A total of 4 models were analyzed, see also Figure D5.13:
• Model 1: All wires intact (no failures)

Section D5.2
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• Model 2: 2 broken wires (in the inner tension armour layer)

Figure D5.13: FE models applied for the study

Section D5.2
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D5.2.5 FE analysis results
Response values
6 SCF’s are of interest for each model:

• Mean stress:
SCF11−Q1 , SCF11−M 2 , SCF11−M 3
• Dynamic stress:
∆SCF11−Q1 , ∆SCF11−M 2 , ∆SCF11−M 3
The mean stress SCF’s were found by comparing analysis results from Model 2, 3 and 4
to Model 1 (intact) for Case A (no bending)
The dynamic SCF’s were found by comparing analysis results from Model 2, 3 and 4 to
Model 1 (intact) for Case B (bending)
Responses evaluated for both the inner (first) tension armour layer and for the pressure
armour layer. The tensile armour layers also represent added resistance for the pressure
armour to withstand the internal pressure. A reduction of the tensile armour resistance due
to wire failures will influence the resulting stresses in the pressure armour. A quantification
of this influence is valuable for the evaluation of a possible failure of the pressure spiral prior
to a loss of function of the tensile armour layers.
The notations used for stress in the results are shown in Table D5.2. The definition of stress
concentration factor for inner tensile armour wires are described in Table D5.3.
Note: Superscript indexes t, b, d denotes

• t tension; combined tension and pressure loading
• b bending; combined tension, pressure and bending
• d damaged; wire failures in inner tensile armour layer
Table D5.2: Stress notation used, see also Figure D5.1 for definitions.
Condition Intact Damaged

t,d b,d
Total longitudinal stress t
σ11 b
σ11 σ11 σ11
t,d b,d
Axial stress t
σ11−Q1 b
σ11−Q1 σ11−Q1 σ11−Q1
Stress com- t,d b,d
ponent Bending stress about y-axis t
σ11−M 2
b
σ11−M 2 σ11−M 2 σ11−M 2
t,d b,d
Bending stress about z-axis t
σ11−M 3
b
σ11−M 3 σ11−M 3 σ11−M 3
Table D5.3: The definition of stress concentration factor (SCF) for inner tensile armour wires
Stress Stress concentration factor (SCF)

t,d
Mean stress SCF11−Q1 σ11−Q1 / σ11−Q1
t
b,d t,d
∆SCF11−Q1 (σ11−Q1 - σ11−Q1 ) / (σ11−Q1
b
- σ11−Q1
t
)
Dynamic stress ∆SCF11−M 2 b,d

(σ11−M t,d
2 - σ11−M 2 ) / (σ11−M 2 - σ11−M 2 )
b t
b,d t,d
∆SCF11−M 3 (σ11−M 3 - σ11−M 3 ) / (σ11−M 3 - σ11−M
b t
3)

Section D5.2
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Results Case A; SCF of mean longitudinal stress for inner tensile armour layer
The load case is defined by:

Tension and pressure only (no bending). The resulting SCFs for mean stress are shown in
Table D5.4, and response patterns for the 4 different models are shown in Figure D5.14.
Table D5.4: SCFs for inner tensile armour due to wire failures in inner tensile armour layer,
applied tension and pressure only.
Model Response (inner tensile armour layer)

SCF11−Q1 (mean stress) SCF11−M 2 SCF11−M 3
2 wire failures 1.15 Not relevant (NR),
4 wire failures 1.29 see discussion below
6 wire failures 1.43
Figure D5.14: Indicated response patterns for the 4 different models during load case A
(tension and pressure only)
The axial stresses σ11−Q1

t and the total longitudinal stresses σ11
t (σ t = σ t
11
t
11−Q1 + σ11−M 2 +
3 ) in the inner tensile armour layer are shown in Figure D5.15 for the intact model.
t
σ11−M
For this load condition the bending stress σ11−M
t
2 is insignificant and the bending stress
σ11−M 3 is zero.
t
t,d t,d t,d t,d t,d t,d

The corresponding stresses σ11−Q1 and σ11 (σ11 = σ11−Q1 + σ11−M 2 + σ11−M 3 ) for the
damaged condition with six broken tensile wires are shown in Figure D5.16. The maximum
t,d t,d
value of σ11−Q1 and σ11 is about 188.5MPa and 193.9 MPa, as indicated by Figure D5.16.

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
There is only a small difference in the maximum values, which means that the stress compo-
t,d t,d
nent σ11−M 2 and σ11−M 3 from introduced bending moments due to wire failure, is small and
insignificant for this load condition. The dominant effect of wire failures on the mean stress
t,d
is seen for the axial stress σ11−Q1 . The SCFs for σ11−M 2 and σ11−M 3 are then considered
irrelevant.
t,d
The ratio of axial stress between σ11−Q1 (damaged condition) and σ11−Q1
t (intact condition),
are presented in Figure D5.17 - Figure D5.19. In Figure D5.17 the axial stress ratio is shown
for the broken wires only, and in Figure D5.18 and Figure D5.19 the ratio is shown for the
ten wires adjacent on either side of the broken wires. A reduction in SCF from 1.43 to 1.03
is noticed for the wire furthest away (wire no.15 and 39) from the broken tensile wires.
Figure D5.15: Axial stress σ11−Q1

t and total longitudinal stress σ11
t in inner tensile armour
layer (intact condition)
The SCF for the longitudinal axial stress σ11−Q1 for the inner tensile armor wires is presented
in Figure D5.20 and Table D5.4. The analysis results show that the SCF increase linearly
with increasing number of failed wires, see Figure D5.20. A SCF of 1.36 is noticed for five
broken inner tensile armour wires.
[De Sousa et al., 2011] performed a test of a 6” riser to measure strain concentration factors
between damaged (five tensile armour wires broken in outer layer) and intact condition under
pure tension load. Strain concentration factors of 1.64 and 1.32 were found for the outer and
inner tensile wires, respectively. The broken inner tensile armour wires are still constrained
by the outer tensile armour wires. It is then reasonable that the SCF is smaller for the broken
inner tensile wire layer than for the layer outside. A good correspondence is seen between
the results from De Sousa and the results obtained in the North Sea riser analysis.

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
t,d t,d
Figure D5.16: Axial stress σ11−Q1 and total longitudinal stress σ11 in the inner tensile armor
layer (damaged condition, 6 broken wires)
t,d
Figure D5.17: Axial stress ratio σ11−Q1 t
σ11−Q1 for 6 broken wires in the inner tensile armour
layer.

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
t,d
Figure D5.18: Axial stress ratio σ11−Q1 /σ11−Q1
t in wire number 6 to 15
t,d
Figure D5.19: Axial stress ratio σ11−Q1 / σ11−Q1
t in wire number 39 to 48.

Section D5.2
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Figure D5.20: SCF for σ11−Q1 with 2, 4 and 6 broken inner tensile armour wires

Section D5.2
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Results Case B (bending); SCF of dynamic stress for inner tensile armor layer
The load case is defined by: Tension and pressure applied, followed by bending.
The SCF of dynamic stress for the inner tensile armour wire is presented in Table D5.4, and
response patterns for the 4 different models are shown in Figure D5.23
The longitudinal axial stresses σ11−Q1
b and the total longitudinal stress σ11
b in the inner tensile
armor layer for the intact condition with combined tension, pressure and bending loads are
b,d b,d
shown in Figure D5.22. The stresses σ11−Q1 and σ11 for the damaged condition with six
broken tensile wires are shown in Figure D5.23
Table D5.5: SCFs for inner tensile armour layer under applied tension, pressure and bending
and due to 2, 4 and 6 wire failures in the inner tensile armour layer.
Model Response (inner tensile armour layer)

∆SCF11−Q1 (mean stress) ∆SCF11−M 2 ∆SCF11−M 3
2 wire failures 1.12 Not relevant (NR),
4 wire failures 1.18 see discussion below
6 wire failures 1.20
Figure D5.21: Indicated response patterns for the 4 different models during load case B
(tension, pressure and bending)

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.22: Axial stress in the inner tensile armour layer (intact condition)
Figure D5.23: Axial stress in the inner tensile armour layer (damaged condition; 6 broken
wires)
The effect of bending on the longitudinal axial stress σ11−Q1 along tensile wire no.48 and
47 is shown in Figure D5.24 for the intact and damaged conditions with 6 broken wires.
Wire no.49 has failed along with the five adjacent ones (wires no.1-5), see Figure D5.10.
b,d t,d
It is observed (dotted lines) that the increase in longitudinal axial stress ( σ11−Q1 - σ11−Q1 )
for wire no.48 (next to the damages wires) in damaged condition is less than the increase

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
in longitudinal axial stress (σ11−Q1

b -σ11−Q1
t ) in intact condition. At the same time for wire
no.47 there is a larger increase in axial stress for the damaged condition than for the intact
condition. The SCF is calculated at the location with the maximum longitudinal axial stress
b,d
σ11−Q1 for the damaged condition.
The maximum bending stress about local X2 axis occurs at 12 o’clock location when the
global bending moment is applied about Y axis (see Figure D5.25). The 12 o’clock location
is approximately the location where the wires failed. The concentration factor about the X2
axis (∆SCF11−M 2 ) is evaluated at this location. Due to the small wire thickness and the
30.0°lay angle of the inner tensile armour wire, the increase of the stress component induced
b,d t,d
by the bending about X2 axis (σ11−M 2 - σ11−M 2 and σ11−M 2 - σ11−M 2 ) at this location is
b t
in the range of 2-3 MPa. The contribution to the increase of longitudinal stress range for
the fatigue analysis is insignificant and ∆SCF11−M 2 is then neglected (not relevant) for the
current case.
The minimum bending stress about local X3 axis occurs at 12 o’clock location when the
global bending moment is applied about Y axis (see Figure D5.25). The contribution to the
increase of longitudinal stress range for the fatigue analysis is insignificant and ∆SCF11−M 3
is thus not relevant for the current case.
Results; SCF of mean circumferential stress of pressure armor
The circumferential stresses in the spiral layer for intact and damaged condition with com-
bined tension and pressure loads are shown in Figure D5.26. The SCF of mean circumferential
stress for pressure armor layer is presented in Table D5.6.
For the pressure armor layer, cylindrical coordinates are adopted in the analysis. SCF of
circumferential stress are evaluated by comparing between corresponding analysis steps of
the damaged and the intact conditions.
Bending responses in pressure armour are ’not applicable’ (NA) due to using an orthotropic
material model which is not suitable for describing the stress concentrations sufficiently.
Table D5.6: SCF of pressure armor layer
Model SCF of mean

circumferential
stress
2 broken wires 1.05
4 broken wires 1.10
6 broken wires 1.13
Influence of broken inner tensile wire on the curvature of the riser
The curvatures along the length of the riser model under bending load of ±2 °at each end
for intact and damaged conditions are shown in Figure D5.27. The curvature will increase
slightly when the number of broken inner tensile wires is increasing. The curvature increases
from 0.02595 to 0.02631 when the 6 inner tensile wires are broken.

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
(1) Tensile wire nr. 48
(2) Tensile wire nr. 47
Figure D5.24: The axial stress σ11−Q1 and the increase of the axial stress ∆σ11−Q1 in inner
tensile armour layer due to bending (6 broken wires)

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.25: The circumferential stress at spiral layer.
Figure D5.26: The circumferential stress at spiral layer.
Summary of results from FE analysis of North Sea riser section
A summary table of the obtained stress concentration factor between a damaged 6” riser
cross-section by a selected number of armour wire failures and an intact cross-section is
shown in Table D5.7.

Section D5.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.27: The curvature of riser under bending load of ±2 °at each end.
Table D5.7: Summary of results from FE analysis of North Sea riser Case Study
No. of Response
wire layer SCF11−Q1 SCF11−M 2 SCF11−M 3 ∆SCF11−Q1 ∆SCF11−M 2 ∆SCF11−M 3
failures in
Tensile 1
layer
2 Tensile 1 1.15 NR NR 1.12 NR NR
Pressure 1.05 NA NA NA NA NA
NR - not relevant due to small values

NA - not applicable for the pressure armour layer due to the material modelling

Section D5.2
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Discussion of results:
Stress increase by 6 failed wires; effect on fatigue life:
a) Mean stress:
An increase in mean stress by a factor (SCF) of 1.43 will affect (increase) the stress range
applied for the fatigue calculation according to the mean stress correction predicted by
Goodman or Gerber.
As an example, assuming:
σm = 300 MPa assumed mean stress level
σu = 1200 MPa assumed ultimate stress
∆σ0 = constant = stress range at zero mean stress
∆σ = increase in stress range
(∆σ0 )
Goodman: ∆σ =
(σm · SCF )
(1 − ( )
σu )
For intact condition (SCF = 1) : ∆σ = 1.33 · ∆σ0

For damaged condition (6 failed wires, SCF = 1.43): ∆σ = 1.56 · ∆σ0
Increase in stress range: ∆σSCF = 1.56/1.33 = 1.17
An increase in stress range will (as an estimate) reduce the fatigue life by a factor of:
(∆σSCF )3 = (1.17)3 = 1.6
b) Dynamic stress:
An increase in dynamic stress (stress range) by a factor (SCF) of 1.2
An increase in stress range will (as an estimate) reduce the fatigue life by a factor of:
(SCF )3 = (1.2)3 = 1.73
Estimated total factor of fatigue life reduction: 1.6 · 1.73 = 2.76
Hole in the outer seal scenario:

A common cause for corrosion damage of tensile armour wires is a penetration of the outer
seal allowing seawater to fill the annulus. Normally the outer tensile armour layer will be
damaged first. Based on this scenario a numerical model with failures in the outer tensile
armour layer will be more realistic.
Numerical analysis and selection of wire failure in the inner tensile armour layer:
By selecting wire failures to occur in the inner tensile armour layer, the influence on the
pressure armour layer inside may be studied. The inner tensile armour layer offer support to
the pressure armour layer. Failures in inner tensile wires reduces the support to the pressure
armour and more load needs to be carried by the pressure armour. This increases the stresses
in these wires, which eventually may cause failure of the pressure armour layer.
The outer tension armour layer offers support to the inner layer and will thus limit the increase
in stress in the inner layer for increasing number of wire failures.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
D5.3 Lateral buckling analysis of flexible riser tensile armour

wire
D5.3.1 Background
During deep water flexible pipe installation, the pipe is normally free hanging from the
installation vessel to the seabed in empty condition. This will introduce large hydrostatic
forces to the pipe causing true wall compression. In addition, the pipe will be exposed to cyclic
bending caused by waves and vessel motion. The combination of true wall axial compression
and cyclic bending may lead to tensile armor instability in both lateral and radial directions.
If the anti-buckling tape is assumed to be strong enough, the inner tensile armor will loose
its lateral stability first due to the gap that may occur between the inner tensile armor and
the pipe core, hence restricting the available friction restraint forces. These may further be
reduced by cyclic motions that act to create slip between the layers, hence introducing lateral
buckling of the tensile armor, with associated severe global torsion deformation of the pipe,
ultimately causing the pipe to lose its integrity.
The anti-buckling tape is designed to prevent the radial buckling behavior, however, its effect
on lateral buckling has not yet been documented in available literature. In the following, the
effect of the winding direction of the anti-buckling tape on the twist of the cross section is
studied, including comparisons with available test data from literature.
D5.3.2 Introduction
The tensile armor is a key strength component of flexible pipes providing resistance to
pressure, gravity loads and cyclic bending caused by environmental loads. It normally consists
of an even number of layers which are cross wound by a number of flat rectangular wires
with a lay angle of 30 to 55 degrees. For deep water applications, the coupled effect from
cyclic bending and external pressure may lead to lateral and radial instability of tensile armors
during pipe installation and operation.
Any failure of the tensile armor wires may cause loss of pipe integrity and such failures
are therefore not permitted by design standards. Ultimate and fatigue strength have been
extensively studied in recent years, while quite little effort has been devoted to address the
mechanism of the lateral and radial buckling of the tensile armor wires. Figure D5.28 and
Figure D5.29 illustrates two types of tensile armor instability scenarios: the radial buckling
and lateral buckling. It can be seen that the integrity of the flexible pipe may be completely
destroyed once these failure modes occur.
The anti-buckling tape is usually used to prevent radial instability of the tensile armor, how-
ever it will also influence the lateral buckling process. Lateral buckling was first introduced
and described by [Braga and Kaleff, ] based on experimental results. Further experiments
to study the lateral buckling behavior were carried out by Secher, Bectare and Felix-Henry
[Secher et al., 2011], studying flexible pipe behavior at 3000m water depth, however, details
were not given.
Lateral buckling under net annulus condition due to the cyclic bending was studied by
Østergaard, Lyckegaard and Andreasen [Østergaard, 2012b]. The work included both ex-
perimental tests and formulation of a theoretical model under the assumption of no friction

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
[Østergaard et al., 2011], [Østergaard, 2012a] and [Østergaard et al., 2012]. The experi-
ments were carried out in 2012 for three risers with different size and material under same
load conditions and is used as a benchmark in the work reported here [Østergaard, 2012a].
An analytical model for evaluating the tensile armour buckling capacity was presented in
[Sævik and Ji, 2014] based on formulating the linearized differential equation describing the
transverse stability of a thin curved wire under no friction. This was followed by a numer-
ical study based on FE analyses to evaluate the extra capacity from friction during cyclic
bending behavior, applying first yield of the wires as failure criteria. The results were then
compared to the test data by Østergaard, and a design criteria for transverse tensile armour
buckling proposed. Excellent correlation with test data was found with respect to failure /
no failure. However, the study did not include the effect of the anti-buckling tape in terms
of torque coupling. In the present work, which is partly based on [Zhou et al., 2015], both
the tape torque and friction effects are included, yielding slightly more conservative results
than obtained in [Sævik and Ji, 2014].
Figure D5.28: Radial buckling failure mode
Figure D5.29: Lateral buckling failure mode

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
D5.3.3 Theoretical background
Theoretical model
The axial stress from axisymmetric loads, including tension, torsion, internal and external
pressure loads, is the primary stress component in the tensile armor. In addition secondary
stresses will occur due to local bending and friction due to bending.
The basis for the modelling applied here was partly presented by Sævik and Thorsen[Sævik et al., 2012]
including tensile armor and core contact elements (HSHEAR353 and HCONT453). How-
ever, since then two more elements have been developed for application in the present study,
[Sævik, 2015], revised as per 2015 and [Zhou et al., 2015]. These are:
• The HSHEAR363 element that enables to model the tape, pressure spiral and sheath
layers
• The HCONT463 element that enables to model contact between the tensile armor and
the tape, sheath and pressure spiral layers.
HSHEAR363 is a 13 degree of freedom (DOF) beam element which includes the standard 12
beam DOF’s plus one extra to capture radial motion, see Figure D5.30. The element applies
thin shell theory for the sheath, whereas the longitudinal helix strain is used for the armor
wire. In both cases, the strain is expressed in terms of the radial DOF and the beam axial
strain and torsion quantities. It is noted that this represents a simplification that excludes
considering the full 3D stress state (neglecting stress in the thickness direction), however,
this is justified by axial membrane action being the primary variable in this case.
The HCONT463 element describes contact and friction between a supporting cylindrical
layer and the tensile armor as shown in Figure D5.31.
Figure D5.30: HSHEAR363 ELEMENT

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.31: HCONT463 ELEMENT
Failure Mechanism
The process of lateral buckling is initiated from the end cap force, where the two tensile
layers will be squeezed against the anti-buckling tape. Under wet annulus conditions, as
assumed here, a gap will develop between the inner tensile armor layer and the pressure
armor. By assuming that the anti-buckling tape is strong enough, the tensile layer will only
be able to slide in the lateral direction. The inner tensile armor layer will have the smallest
friction resistance and begin to loose its capacity first. In order to keep the torsion balance
in the cross-section, a loss in axial compression is necessary for the outer layer, associated
with pipe twist in its helix direction.
Then the pipe will rotate and follow the lay angle direction of the outer tensile layer. If the
pipe is exposed to cycle bending, a certain rotation will take place during each cycle until
the torsion failure of the cross-section is reached.
The mechanism can be understood by looking at the expected buckling behaviour of each
wire. Considering the tensile wire restrained by friction, bent to a certain curvature and then
exposed to a gradually increasing axial load, the expected force displacement characteristic
is visualised in Figure D5.32. The capacty is limited by the asymptoses of the Euler buckling
force, PE , and the yield force, σy A. Due to the restraint from friction, the capacity is larger
than the theoretical Euler buckling load even if the imperfection introduced by curvature
is large, leading to snap buckling. However, when exposed to cyclic curvature, every cycle
will lead to a reduction of the lateral transverse friction resistance, thus reducing the lateral

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
buckling capacity of each wire until the capacity reaches the Euler buckling load.
Figure D5.32: Axial force versus axial displacement for a wire restrained by friction
Analytical Method
Under the assumption of no friction, a conservative estimate of the axial buckling force
contribution from each wire can be achieved from the curve beam differential equation
[Sævik and Ji, 2014] as:
π 2 EI3
P = cos α[ + GI1 (κ22 − κt κ2 ) + 4EI2 κ21 + EI3 κ21 ] (D5.2)
l2
where l is the unknown buckling length, E is the Young’s modulus and G is the shear
modulus. κ1 is the initial torsion, κ2 is the initial normal curvature and κt is the cylinder
curvature in the tendon lateral transverse direction being expressed as:
sin α cos α
κ1 = (D5.3)
R
sin2 α
κ2 = (D5.4)
R
cos2 α
κt = (D5.5)
R
where α is the lay angle and R is the helix radius. The inertial moments corresponding to
the three wire axes are listed below, where b is the width and t is the thickness of the tendon
cross-section.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
1
I1 ' bt3 (D5.6)
3
1 3
I2 = bt (D5.7)
12
1 3
I3 = tb (D5.8)
12
As the buckling length increases towards infinite, the first term of Eq. D5.2 will be very small
and can be neglected. Then the axial force capacity contribution from each wire specializes
into the following lower bound estimate:
P = cos α[GI1 (κ22 − κt κ2 + 4EI2 κ21 + EI3 κ21 ] (D5.9)
D5.3.4 Analysis tools
The analyses were performed by the finite element software BFLEX, which is developed by
SINTEF Ocean, [Sævik, 2015]. BFLEX is based on the principle of virtual displacement, and
a co-rotational formulation is applied to solve the non-linear equilibrium equations. The first
release of the software was made in 1990s for stress and fatigue analysis of tensile armor
wire in the flexible risers. It has been under continuous development since then by adding
new functionalities, see [Sævik, 2015].
D5.3.5 Model description
The model set-up applied in the laboratory test tests reported by [Østergaard, 2012a] and
used to benchmark the present model, is shown in Figure D5.33. Each test pipe was equipped
with a smaller pipe on the inside which was pretensioned to obtain the desired true wall
compression level. Then the test specimen was exposed to one sided cyclig bending (zero
curvature - maximum curvature - zero curvature) until failure occured.
Figure D5.33: Buckling model
The flexible pipes studied are the same as reported by Østergaard in 2012 [Østergaard, 2012a].
Tests were carried out for three flexible risers with the inner diameter of 6 inch, 8 inch and
14 inch. The details are listed in Table D5.8 [Østergaard, 2012a].

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Table D5.8: Pipes design and material properties
Pipe layer / pipe design 6" Riser 8" Riser *2) 14" Jumper
*1) *2)
Outer diameter (m) 0.201 0.276 0.442
Inner layer of Pitch length, Lpitch (m) 1.263 1.474 2.247
tensile armour wires Pitch angle, Φhel (deg) 26.2 30 31.5
Wire size, (height x width) (mm) 3x10 5x12.5 4x15
Number of wires 52 54 70
Outer diameter (m) 0.209 0.289 0.452
Outer layer of Pitch length, Lpitch (m) 1.318 1.525 2.345
tensile armour wires Pitch angle, Φhel (deg) -26.2 -30.3 -31.0
Wire size, (height x width) (mm) 3x10 5x12.5 4x15
Number of wires 54 56 72
Yield strength (MPa) 650 1350 1350
High strength Pitch length, Lpitch (m) 0.075 0.025 0.140
anti-birdcaging tape Pitch angle, Φhel (deg) 83.5 88.4 -84.4
*3)
Tape size, (height x width) (mm) 1x60 1.8x1.3 1x60
Number of windings 1 8 2
Outer diameter (m) 0.225 0.314 0.477
Outer sheath *4)
Thickness (mm) 6.0 10.0 10.0
Number of inner layer pitches in 3.96 3.39 3.34
Pipe sample
pipe sample (including end
fittings)
*1) A basic grade steel used for wires with yield strength of approximately 650 Map,
elastic modulus 210 GPa, Poison’s ratio 0.3
*2) A high strength grade steel used for wires with yield strength of approximately 1350MPa,
elastic modulus 210GPa, Poison’s ratio 0.3
*3) Tape material properties chosen are: elastic modulus 27GPa. Poison’s ratio 0.4
*4) Sheath material properties chosen are: elastic modulus 400MPa, Poison’s ratio 0.4
The full model shown in Figure D5.35 includes two cores, two tensile layers, one structural
tape layer between the two tensile layers, one anti-buckling layer and one sheath layer. One
core was modelled by elastic pipe elements to introduce true wall compression by pretension
as applied in the test. The other core was used to support the inner tensile layer and was
modelled by HSHEAR363 elements. The inner and outer tensile layers were modelled by
helix element HSHEAR353. Each tensile layer was represented by four helix tendons. The
structural tape, anti-buckling tape and the sheath were all modeled by HELIX363 elements.
The friction between layers was included by means of the HCONT363 contact element. Since
the contact between the anti-buckling tape and the sheath will not influence a lot, the two
element groups shared the same radial node, which means that there were only four contact
layers. The cross section is shown in Figure D5.36. The friction coefficient between layers
was set to 0.15 and the pipe length applied in the analyses corresponded to approximately
five pitches of the inner tensile armour layer.
There were two loading conditions: cyclic bending and compression. The analysis of the first
10 seconds was by static analysis and included prescribing a tensile axial strain to the inner
core to obtain the desired true wall compression in the tensile armour. Then the next 2460
seconds included cyclic bending by prescribed end rotations. Each bending cycle lasted 20
seconds and the applied time increment was 0.005s. Dynamic analysis was applied in this
sequence to ensure numerical stability.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.34: Model in BFLEX
Figure D5.35: Model cross section

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
D5.3.6 Analysis and results
Case Overview
Twelve cases were carried out to study the lateral buckling behavior due to cyclic bend-
ing, consistent with the experimental input data sheet shown in Table D5.8. The loading
conditions for the 12 cases are shown in Table D5.9.
Table D5.9: Test loading conditions
Pipe ID Case Number Applied Bending

compression (kN) radius (m)
2 265 11
3 80 11
6 inch riser, L = 5 m 4 210 11
5 160 11
6 265 8
7 277 21
8 269 8
14 inch jumper, L = 7.5 m
9 411 10
10 950 12
11 300 12
8 inch riser, L = 5 m 12 400 12
13 700 12
Analysis Process
The applied failure criterion was when the outer fibre of the steel wire reached the yield
stress. If there were no failures, the torsion and rotation will be small and increase slowly.
Case 2 is studied as an example of a test leading to failure as shown in Figure D5.36. To
avoid the influence of the boundary conditions, the middle part of the pipe was chosen. The
red part of the tendon indicates the section of the pipe where the wire stress exceeded the
yield stress.
Having identified yield stress exceedance during the applied cycles, the corresponding end
rotation was found as shown in Figure D5.37. Since the inner tensile layer fails first, in order
to keep the torsion balance, the outer tensile layer rotates following the direction of outer
layer lay angle which results in torsion rotation of the whole pipe. For the test pipes, the lay
angle is negative, so the end rotation will be negative as well.
Figure D5.38 demonstrates the longitudinal stress as a function of time for one critical
element. The yield stress of 650MPa is exceeded after approximately 34 cycles.
Case 3 is studied as an example of a no failure case as shown in Figure D5.39. The rotation is
very small and buckling will not occur. The element with the maximum longitudinal stress is
shown in Figure D5.40. The longitudinal stress does not exceed the yield stress of 650MPa,
which means there is no failure in the tensile layer.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.36: Example of failure - Case 2- identification of failure location
Figure D5.37: Example of failure - Case 2 - end rotation as a function of time

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.38: Longitudinal stress σxx history during failure - Case 2
Figure D5.39: Example of no failure - Case 3

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.40: Longitudinal stress σxx for Case 3

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Results in terms of failure and end rotation
The comparison of end rotation and failure/no failure between BFLEX simulation and mea-
sured values are shown in Table D5.10
Table D5.10: Results of pipe failure due to cyclic bending
Pipe Case Applied Bending Results in Pipe twist Results in Bflex

ID Num- compres- radius experi- before Bflex twist
ber sion (m) ment unloading before
(kN) (deg) failure
(deg)
2 265 11 Failure 45 Failure 10 (in-
(increasing) creasing)
6 inch 3 80 11 No failure <1 (stable) No failure 3 (slowly
increasing)
4 210 11 Failure 45 Failure 11 (slowly
(increasing) increasing)
5 160 11 No failure 3 (slowly Failure 3(
increasing) increasing)
6 265 9 Failure 45(slowly Failure 10 (in-
increasing) creasing)
7 277 21 No failure <1 (stable) No failure 5 (slowly
increasing)
14 inch
8 269 8 No failure 6.5 Failure 17 (in-
(increasing) creasing)
9 411 10 Failure 27 Failure 27 (rapidly
increasing)
10 950 12 Failure 10 (rapidly Failure 11 (rapidly
increasing) increasing)
11 700 12 Failure 27 (slowly Failure 21 (in-
8 inch increasing) creasing)
12 300 12 No failure 1 No failure 2.8 (slowly
increasing)
13 400 12 No failure 15 (slowly Failure 18 (in-
increasing) creasing)
For the 6 inch riser, BFLEX predicts failure for Case 5 whereas no failure was observed
in the test. However, for case 4 with 50 kN more compression, failure was obtained both
numerically and experimentally.
For the 14 inch jumper, the torsion end rotations of the failure cases agree quite well with
the experimental results. However, the collapse for Case 8 was not obtained in the test,
whereas the model predicted failure.
For the 8 inch riser, the result from Cases 11 (failure) and 12 (no failure) fit well with the
experimental results. However, for Case 13, BFLEX predicts failure whereas no failure was
observed in the test.
Hence, for the cases investigated the proposed model demonstrates some conservatism when
applying the proposed first yield as failure criterion. The study reported in [Sævik and Ji, 2014]
concluded with exact correlation in terms of failure or no failure for the same experimental
tests and by application of same failure criterion. However, the model was based on exclud-
ing the effect of the antibuckling tape torque which may lead to small differences in contact
pressure and friction. This may explain the differences seen by applying the two modelling
approaches.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
The advantage of including the anti-buckling tape as in the procedure reported here is that
the strengthening effect from the anti-buckling tape can be documented as ellaborated on
in the following.
D5.3.7 Effect of anti-buckling tape
The effect of the anti-buckling tape on the lateral buckling behavior of the tensile armor
was studied including sensitivity analysis of the effect of the lay direction, lay angle of anti-
buckling tape and the friction coefficient between layers.
Influence of anti-buckling tape
The effect of anti-buckling tape was studied by comparing a case without anti-buckling tape
with the same case including the anti-buckling tape. The results are shown in Figure D5.41,
which reveals clearly the effect of anti-buckling tape on the lateral buckling behavior. It
indicates that the anti-buckling tape can slow down the buckling process significantly. By
simply linearizing the curves in the figure, the end rotation rate of the pipe without anti-
buckling tape is almost 20 times higher than for the case with anti-buckling tape.
Figure D5.41: Comparison between the riser with and without anti-buckling tape
Influence of Lay Direction of Anti-buckling Tape
The anti-buckling tape is helically wound, often with a steep angle close to 90 degrees. Its
lay angle may influence the buckling behavior of the tensile armors. A sensitivity study based
on Case 8 was performed to study this effect. The direction of the lay angle of anti-buckling
tape in Case 8 was changed from -84.4 to +84.4.
Figure D5.42 and Figure D5.43 show the effect of lay direction on the end rotation of the
cross section. Since the lay angle of the outer tensile layer is negative, the negative anti-
buckling tape lay angle means that it is in the same direction as the outer tensile layer. A
positive lay angle means that it is in the opposite direction. It is seen that the negative lay
angle direction will slow down the buckling process. In addition, for the negative lay angle

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
case, the pipe have a stronger tendency of twisting in the opposite direction after failure,
contributing to limit the end rotation.
Figure D5.42: Influence of lay direction of anti-buckling tape
Figure D5.43: Influence of lay direction of anti-buckling tape 2
The longitudinal stress in the anti-buckling tape is shown as a function of time in Figure
D5.44 for both cases. When the anti-buckling tape has the same lay direction as the outer
tensile layer, the tape will slow down the torsion end rotation process by mobilising more
stress as the process goes on. For the opposite case, the rotation of the outer layer will
give a corresponding reduction in the stress mobilised in the tape layer. This means reduced
capability of reducing the end rotation.
Influence of the Lay Angle applied for the Anti-buckling Tape
The lay angle applied for the anti-buckling tape may also influence the lateral buckling
capacity. The lay angle was therefore changed between -76 to -88 degree and the results in

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
(1) Same lay direction as outer tensile layer (2) Opposite lay direction as outer tensile layer
Figure D5.44: Longitudial stress in anti-buckling tape comparison by changing lay directions
terms of end rotation are shown in Figure D5.45.
Figure D5.45: Influence of lay angle of anti-buckling tape
The anti-buckling tape with smaller lay angle will have a better capability to prevent the
end rotation. The compontent of longitudinal stress on the global x-axis direction is larger
due to the smaller lay angle, which will provide more resistance when the tape is squeezed
towards the pipe centre due to the end rotation behavior.
Influence of friction coefficient
In order to study the effect of the friction coefficient on the end rotation during cyclic
bending, the friction coefficient between all the layers was changed from 0.15 to 0.2. The
results are shown in Figure D5.46.
A larger coefficient will provide more friction resistance between layers and reduce the slip
between layers during the lateral buckling process, which results in a smaller end rotation.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D5.46: influence of friction coefficient
D5.3.8 Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the study:

• True wall compression due to external pressure in combination with cyclic bending
during pipe installation and operation may lead to lateral buckling failure of the armour
wires. This is particularly the case under wet annulus conditions.
• Pipe failure can be observed as severe torsion deformation of the cross-section. In
laboratory tests this can be observed as severe end rotation.
• End rotation predicted by BFLEX agrees well with most of the measured values from
laboratory tests.
• In all cases studied the proposed failure criterion based on exceeding the yield stress
demonstrated conservatism with regard to the tests
• Anti-buckling tape will have a great influence on the lateral buckling process.
• The same lay direction between the outer tensile layer and anti-buckling tape will
perform better than the opposite lay direction. The effect is to resist end rotation.
• Smaller lay angle of the antibuckling tape will have better performance than higher lay
angle. However, it is important to notice that the end rotation phenomenon studied
here is based on the assumption that the anti-buckling tape is strong enough, and
that the tensile layer will fail by lateral buckling, i.e radial buckling is assumed to not
occur. A smaller lay angle of anti-buckling tape will provide more resistance to lateral
buckling, however, the radial buckling capacity will be reduced. So it is necessary to
consider both effects for an optimized design.
• Larger friction coefficient between layers will result in smaller end rotation, i.e. in-
creasing the capacity against lateral wire buckling.
• The elastic buckling value provides a conservative estimate. For all cases the axial
compressive load observed in the tests was a factor 1.6-1.9 above the elastic buckling
load found from analytical theory.

Section D5.3
OC2017 A-001

Chapter D6
Integrity Management of North Sea

Riser
601
Section D6.2
OC2017 A-001
D6.1 Introduction
The basis for the integrity management (IM) planning is the Handbook Chapters B2 Risk
Analysis Methodology, A3 Failure Modes and C1 Integrity Management. This case study
section suggests a working methodology to transform the presented information tools into
an actual integrity management plan for the case study riser, ’North Sea riser’. The method
can be graphically represented by the below figure:
Figure D6.1: Integrity Management Plan Development
For a field development it will normally be distinctive ’families’ of flexible pipes, based on
the pipe design, physical location, operational function or operational parameters. Being
aware of both the similarities and dissimilarities are important to ensure that the final risk
level in fact reflects the actual situation. Oil production risers may be effective to plan as a
group, however important differences arise if one riser for instance is a high pressure, high
temperature service while others may be at the other end of the scale.
Planning an integrity management program requires good and updated knowledge on flexible
pipe failure modes, layer failure mechanisms and the many, interconnected pathways possible
from initiation to ultimate pipe failure. Reviewing the Chapter A3 Failure Modes is highly
recommended in advance of reading the case study presented below.
D6.2 Methodology
Initially the pipeline design for the given operational conditions assumed in the design premise
is reviewed for all presently known failure modes as presented in Chapter A3 Failure Modes,
Section A3.3. In sequence the review is performed according to the following outline:
• Step 1: Determine if failure mode is applicable for the system being reviewed (materials,
structural layout, global configuration etc.)
• Step 2: Assess relevant field experience: essentially determine if failure mode is theo-
retical, experienced previously or a frequent occurrence
• Step 3: Identify if conditions promoting degradation are present for system being
reviewed
• Step 4: Identify for which operational or environmental conditions the ultimate loss of
layer function is expected to occur
• Step 5: Identify if the layer failure may trigger other failure modes
• Step 6: Identify if layer failure may trigger ultimate pipe failure and identify the time
scale for progression of failure

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
• Step 7: Assess risk level: probability, consequence and risk without any mitigations
implemented and if control mechanisms are required
• Step 8: Identify relevant risk reducing control mechanisms: preventive, monitoring,
inspection or testing.
• Step 9: Re-assess risk level considering successful implementation of suggested control
mechanisms
D6.3 Review of Selected Failure Modes
For a limited number of failure modes, the below sections contains a review according to
methodology presented in Chapter D6. The review is an illustrative text presenting how to
utilize the information from Chapter A3 Failure Modes with the actual conditions assumed for
the North Sea riser. The text is not exhaustive and is only to be considered for information.
D6.3.1 Carcass Collapse
Step 1: Applicability of Failure Mode
Failure mechanism related to gas absorption and release in polymer is not applicable for
single layer pressure sheath designs. It is only valid for extremely rapid depressurisations
which are not considered realistic in an oil production riser.
Severe bending of pipe may occur due to accidental damage during installation or in extreme
environmental conditions more severe than design premise.
Hydrate melting is considered as not applicable due to low gas content of transported fluid,
i.e. factors enabling hydrate formation is not present.
Step 2: Field Experience
Field experience is that failure mode is only experienced in testing for single layer pressure
sheath pipes. Failure mode is thus not to be considered as a risk factor for the subject riser.
Step 3: Degradation Promoters
High operational bore pressures (300 bar) in early service life (condition based).
Extended time with sand production and high flow rates (condition based).
Step 4: Occurrence of Layer Failure
At event of severe bending significantly below MBR; highest probability expected during
installation/intervention (event based).
Subsequent to outer sheath loss of layer function allowing hydrostatic pressure to act directly
onto carcass through pressure sheath (event based, time based).

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
Step 5: Trigger for other failure modes
Carcass collapse can trigger pressure sheath layer failure.
Step 6: Ultimate Pipe Failure and Time Scale
Partial or complete or partial bore obstruction occurs immediately after carcass collapse.
The time scale to loss of containment is medium to long term after triggering pressure
sheath layer failure and subsequently outer sheath layer failure. Failure mechanism: cyclic
deformations of pressure sheath lacking internal support.
Step 7: Risk Level (Un-Mitigated)
Probability (Failure Mode): Very Low.
Probability (Ultimate Pipe Failure): Very Low.
Consequence:
1. Safety: No or superficial injuries (loss of containment expected only due to high hy-
drostatic pressure (seabed)).
2. Environment: Massive effect, large damage area, > 100 barrel oil (BBL) (loss of
containment).
3. Cost: > 10 mill. (EUR) - replacement riser.
Risk: Medium.
Requirement for IM actions: No.
Step 8: Control Mechanisms
Installation phase is considered as main risk driver. Through performing post-installation

gauge pigging it is verified that no deformations are present.
Residual probability of occurrence exists due to possibility for extreme environmental condi-
tions resulting in severe dynamic motions. Post-event verification of global motion compared
to design basis may be performed to validate design integrity if anomalies are identified.
Combination of time- and event based factors may increase probability of occurrence in late
service life. Reduction of the initial carcass collapse capacity due to material loss (erosion,
corrosion) combined with outer sheath damage. Periodic review of monitoring data, bore
fluid data and annulus test data provide information and is considered satisfactory.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
Table D6.1
Control Mechanism Periodic Event based

Gauge Pigging X
Pressure Monitoring X
Status assessment X
Annulus Free Volume X
Measurement
Procedures
Anomaly reporting from post-event extreme weather conditions outside design premises.
Monitoring:
Operational data review to assess differential pressure topside / subsea versus flow rates and
experienced bore depressurization rates.
Inspection:
Internal inspection: gauge pigging post-installation.
Testing:
Verification of outer sheath integrity through annulus free volume testing.
Step 9: Risk Level (Mitigated) Ultimate pipe failure is expected to be controlled through
selected IM activities. Remaining consequence are economic due to loss of operational
integrity.
Probability (Ultimate Pipe Failure): Very Low .
Consequence:
1. Safety: No or superficial injuries.
2. Environment: Slight effect on the environment, <1 BBL due to failure occurring before
operation.
3. Cost: > 10 mill. EUR - replacement riser.
Risk: Medium.
D6.3.2 Carcass Axial Overloading
Pipe Blockage and large differential pressure across blockage through either of the below
occurrences:
a Wax plug - not applicable based on fluid properties; flow assurance calculations.
b Hydrate plug - not applicable based on fluid properties; flow assurance calculations.
c Slug - not applicable based on fluid properties; flow assurance calculations.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
d Pig - applicable; gauge pigging after installation.

From flow assurance calculations and produced fluid properties, wax and hydrate plugging
and slugging is considered to be not applicable. Remaining initiator is if pig becomes stuck
and attempts to release through increasing differential pressure.
Loss of radial contact between the inner layers is considered not applicable for single layer
pressure sheath of polyamide material.
Failure mechanism a, b and d of Step 1 are experienced.
Main degradation promoters relate to manufacturing anomalies, i.e.

1. fully extended carcass: checked and verified during Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) -
not applicable.
2. insufficient anchoring of the carcass in the end-fitting: design integrity.
Loss of radial contact in cross section is considered not applicable, refer to Step 1.
On the assumption of only pigging can trigger layer failure, occurrence is related pre-operation
commissioning operations.
Occurrence of failure mode triggers ’Carcass Collapse’ failure mode through loss of radial
support of pressure sheath.
If failure mode is triggered there are two scenarios, both resulting in loss of containment:
1. Worst case; pull-out of pressure sheath and pressure armour. Occurs immediately.
2. Best Case: through indirect mechanism, i.e. damage to pressure sheath developing
finally through thickness. Expected to be long-term as polyamide pressure sheath is
less notch- and fatigue sensitive than PVDF.

Consequence:

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
1. Safety: No or superficial injuries

2. Environment: Slight effect on the environment, <1 BBL due to failure occurring before
operation.
Risk: Medium.
Requirement for preventive actions: Yes.
Requirement for IM actions: No.
Step 8: Control Mechanisms, see Table D6.2
Table D6.2

Anomaly Reporting X
Preventive
Avoid failure mode through commissioning procedure; control and verification of differential
pressure across pig during execution. Ensure compliance to pipe supplier recommendations
to pig specification.
Upon entering operations phase it is assumed that failure mode is negligible.
Procedures
None
Monitoring:
None
Inspection:
None
Testing:
None
Step 9: Risk Level (Mitigated)
Ultimate pipe failure is expected to be controlled through selected IM activities. Remaining

consequence relates to economic due to loss of operational integrity.
Consequence:
• Safety: No or superficial injuries.
• Environment: Slight effect on the environment, <1 BBL due to failure occurring before
operation.
• Cost: > 10 mill. EUR - replacement riser.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
Risk: Medium.
D6.3.3 Pressure Sheath Embrittlement (Ageing of Polyamides)
Brittle rupture or crack growth through thickness.
Several reported failures believed to be due to methanol batch treatment or high Total Acid
Number (TAN).
Uncertainty in prediction model; both less and more severe degradation due to factors not
presently in the ageing models.
1. High temperature.
2. High concentration of acidic species / alkalinity of the produced water.
3. Oxygen (from chemical treatment or leakages).
Direct: Cool-down / cold conditions due to reduction of ductility with temperature. If

simultaneous handling (e.g. bending) is experienced this may initiate layer failure.
Indirect: None.
Direct: loss of containment: fluids leaking to annulus.

Indirect: outer sheath burst, fluids leaking to environment.
Ultimate failure: loss of containment.
Time frame for ultimate failure after layer failure is very short.
Probability (Failure Mode): Medium.

Probability (Ultimate Pipe Failure): Medium.
Consequence:

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
1. Safety: Multiple fatalities.

2. Environment: Massive effect, large damage area, > 100 BBL (loss of containment).
Risk: Very High.
Requirement for IM actions: Yes.
Table D6.3
Control Mechanism Periodic Event

based
Status assessment X
Temperature Monitoring X
Annulus Vent Flow Monitoring X
Sampling of Bore Fluid X
Pressure Barrier Coupon X
Sampling
Preventive
Minimize batch methanol treatment.
Temperature minimisation cannot be performed - reservoir characteristics are fixed. Flow
restrictions are not desired, i.e. lowered production rates.
Procedures
None.
Monitoring:
Monitoring data for temperature and shut-downs.
Annulus vent monitoring for detection of ultimate pipe failure (may be installed upon accu-
mulating critical levels for ageing end-of-life).
Inspection:
None.
Testing:
Polymer coupons exposed to flow environment: not possible to install subsea (hot end).

Consequence:

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
1. Safety: Multiple fatalities.

Risk: Medium.
D6.3.4 Tensile Armour Wire Fatigue
Failure mode is applicable for any dynamic service flexible pipe through two degradation
mechanisms:
1. Corrosion fatigue (corrosive environment in annulus).
2. Fatigue (dry annulus).
Experienced - i.e. failure mode had led to accidents.
High internal pressure; this is valid as riser is expected to operate at 300 bar in initial phase.
This is however accounted for in design calculations. Continued higher internal pressures
than accounted for in design premise may invalidate fatigue calculations, i.e. condition
based degradation.
Increased bending: global dynamics controlled through design. Events with extreme environ-
mental conditions are short-term and not expected to contribute to gross fatigue damage.
Wear of the anti-wear tape: cannot be inspected, however only a concern in late phase of
life cycle, i.e. time based degradation.
Unfavourable local design of bending stiffener or bellmouth: riser is supported by bellmouth,
limiting riser curvature at bellmouth exit, i.e. curvature is controlled through design.
Corrosion: annulus condition if hole in outer sheath and/or H2 S or CO2 in produced bore
fluids and/or condensed water. Outer sheath damage may occur during whole life cycle, i.e.
event based degradation. Riser is designed for sweet service, thus any change of bore fluid
composition may invalidate design assumptions, i.e. condition based.
Inner tensile wires more susceptible to fatigue. If outer sheath damages local corrosion may
result in outer wires becoming dominant failure area.
Torsional imbalance and twisting of the pipe.
Loss of support for pressure armour resulting in unfavorable loading and possible fatigue/overloading.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
Full pipe rupture.
Pressure sheath extrusion.

Pressure armour fatigue and unlocking.
Leakage from pressure sheath, possible outer sheath failure. Loss of containment; either
partial or worst case full pipe rupture.

Probability (Ultimate Pipe Failure): Low.
Consequence:
• Safety: Multiple fatalities. Service life predictions estimate highest fatigue in upper
part of riser near manned installation, thus loss of containment with ignition imposes
significant safety consequences.
• Environment: Massive effect, large damage area, > 100 BBL (loss of containment).
Risk: High.
Requirement for IM actions: Yes
Table D6.4

Anomaly Reporting X
Status assessment X
Annulus Free Volume Measurement X
Sampling of Bore Fluid X
Annulus Gas Sampling X
Preventive
Design robustness and safety factors for fatigue calculations provide margin against failure.
Procedures
Monitoring:
Pressure monitoring to enable review of operational data.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
Inspection:
None.
Testing:
Bore fluid sampling to verify produced fluid composition.
Example of reliability considerations for tensile wire fatigue may be found in Chapter D8
Consequence:
• Safety: Multiple fatalities. Service life predictions estimate highest fatigue in upper
part of riser near manned installation, thus loss of containment with ignition imposes
significant safety consequences.
Risk: Medium.
D6.3.5 Outer Sheath: hole in the outer sheath
Applicable to any riser system due to several initiators; accidental impacts, blocked annulus,
abrasion, handling/installation or manufacturing defects, i.e. mainly event based but also
time based.
Applicable to all outer sheath materials.
Frequent failure mode; detection and repair possible. Critical if layer failure is located in
splash zone or in sections of significant dynamic loading.
Events:
a falling objects - applicable.
b impact from fishing equipment/lines - not applicable due to exclusion zone.
c broken mooring lines - applicable, will be detected.
d installation - procedures should avoid layer failure to occur, however not possible to
exclude.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
e improper operation of annulus vent system, i.e. shut-in.

Time:
f restricted annulus vent - applicable based on experience; diffusion rate and annulus
free volume determines time scale for layer failure to occur.
g abrasion from attachments to neighbouring structures, guide-tube, seabed etc. - ap-
plicable, however clashing between riser/structure not identified in design. Abrasion
from guide-tube or seabed possible.
Mainly related to events, i.e. randomly during both installation and through life.
Some time-based degradation promoters; thus increased probability for occurring in late life
phase (abrasion, restricted annulus vent).
Corrosion of steel armours in annulus (pressure armour, tensile armour).

Tensile armour fatigue.
Pressure armour fatigue.
Gradual loss of pressure- and tensile armour capacity in terms of strength and fatigue life. If
reaching critical level full pipe rupture is possible.
Time scale dependent on location of damage, utilization rate of armours, design fatigue
life and design service condition (sweet). Indication of failure in a few years, i.e. short- to
medium term.
Probability (Failure Mode): High.

Probability (Ultimate Pipe Failure): High.
Consequence:
1. Safety: Multiple fatalities. Service life predictions estimate highest utilization (fatigue,
strength) in upper part of riser near manned installation, thus loss of containment with
ignition imposes significant safety consequences.

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
Risk: Very High

Requirement for IM actions: Yes.
Table D6.5

Anomaly Reporting X
Status assessment X
Dropped Object Reporting and Survey X
Annulus Free Volume Measurement X X
Annulus Flow Measurement X
Topside GVI X X
Subsea GVI X X
Preventive
Accidental event prevention through procedures.
Procedures
Annulus vent system operation.
Monitoring:
None.
Inspection:
Topside General Visual Inspection (GVI) (gross anomalies, improper operation of vent-
system).
Subsea GVI (gross anomalies, dropped objects, trawl board impacts etc.).
Testing:
Annulus Free Volume Measurement.
Annulus Flow Measurement (confirm vent capacity).
Testing is to be performed both periodic and post-events presenting increased probability for
outer sheath damage. This could be for instance installation work on neighbouring systems
or other intervention works, detection of clashing towards mooring lines or similar.
Probability (Failure Mode): High (event driven, no significant probability reduction).

Consequence:

Section D6.3
OC2017 A-001
• Safety: Multiple fatalities. Service life predictions estimate highest utilization (fatigue,
strength) in upper part of riser near manned installation, thus loss of containment with
ignition imposes significant safety consequences.
Risk: Medium.

Section D6.4
OC2017 A-001
D6.4 Summary
A summary of the integrity management plan for the North Sea riser is presented in the
following sections.
D6.4.1 Failure Event Tree
Failure modes and their applicable failure causes and following events or mechanisms lead-
ing to ultimate pipe failure can be analysed through a failure event tree to identify the
relationships and interactions, see Figure D6.2.
The failure causes are shown in blue, the resulting failure mode in green and subsequent
pathway to ultimate pipe failure in purple. Ultimate pipe failure is shown in red.
The failure event tree can be used as a tool; e.g. detection of outer sheath damage often
leads to a review and assessment of corrosion and fatigue issues. However, as can be seen in
the below chart, also the carcass collapse failure mode may be triggered, which may lead to
ultimate pipe failure directly or through pressure sheath failure. The result should be that
also this failure mode is taken into account when assessing the new risk level subsequent to
the outer sheath damage.
Carcass Axial
Pigging Overload
(Tear-Off)
Pressure Sheath
Impact Damage
(Trawl board, mooring (Scratching, tearing, collapse)
line, dropped object) Blockage
Carcass Collapse
(Ultimate Pipe
Extreme Failure)
Environmental
Conditions
Blocked Vent Ports

(Improper operation,
degradation) Corrosion of
Armour Wires Loss of
Abrasion Outer Sheath (Tensile, Pressure) Contaiment
Breakage of Pressure
(Riser towards guide- Damage (Ultimate Pipe
Fatigue / wires Sheath Failure
tube) (Through Sheath) Failure)
Corrosion Fatigue
(Tensile, Presure)
Impact
(Trawl board, mooring
line, dropped object)
Service Conditions
Pressure Sheath
(Temperature, batch
Embrittlement
methanol treatment)
Figure D6.2: Failure Event Tree for Selected Failure Modes

Section D6.4
OC2017 A-001
D6.4.2 Unmitigated Risk Level
Risk level associated with no implemented control mechanisms are shown in Table D6.6 -
i.e. summary of above sections.
Table D6.6: Risk Level - Unmitigated
Failure ProbabilityProbability Safety Environment Cost Risk

Mode (Failure (Ultimate (mil- Level
Mode) Pipe lion
Failure) EUR)
Carcass Very low Very Low No or Massive effect, Large >10 M
Collapse superfi- damage area, >100
cial BBL
injuries
Carcass Very low Very Low No or Slight effect on the >10 M
Axial superfi- environment, <1 BBL,
Overload cial
injuries
Pressure Medium Medium Multiple Massive effect, Large >10 VH
Sheath fatalities damage area, >100
Embrittle- BBL
ment
Tensile Medium Low Multiple Massive effect, Large >10 H
Armour fatalities damage area, >100
Wire BBL
Fatigue
Outer High High Multiple Massive effect, Large >10 VH
Sheath fatalities damage area, >100
Damage BBL
Three failure modes are presenting unacceptable high risk level due to probability for ultimate
pipe failure to occur. It is required to implement control mechanisms - as suggested in
previous sections.

Section D6.4
OC2017 A-001
D6.4.3 Mitigated Risk Level
The mitigated risk level is shown in Table D6.7; note that the probability for the failure mode
to occur is static. The probability for ultimate pipe failure is however reduced due to the
implementation of control mechanisms.
Table D6.7: Risk Level - Mitigated
Failure Probability Probabil- Safety Environment Cost Risk

Mode (Failure ity (mil- Level
Mode) (Ultimate lion
Pipe EUR)
Failure)
Carcass Very low Very low No or Slight effect on the >10 M
Collapse superfi- environment, <1 BBL,
cial
injuries
Carcass Very low Very low No or Slight effect on the >10 M
Axial superfi- environment, <1 BBL,
Overload cial
injuries
Pressure Medium Very Low Multiple Massive effect, large >10 M
Sheath fatalities damage area, > 100
Embrittle- BBL (loss of
ment containment)
Tensile Medium Very Low Multiple Massive effect, large >10 M
Armour fatalities damage area, > 100
Wire BBL (loss of
Fatigue containment)
Outer High Very Low Multiple Massive effect, large >10 M
Sheath fatalities damage area, > 100
Damage BBL (loss of
containment)
An important note is that the risk level is no less than Medium. The fact that cost of
replacement is high drives the risk level. Cost effectiveness is therefore driven by avoiding
premature replacement of riser system, to be further improved through an optimization in
regards to cost of control mechanism implementation.
D6.4.4 Control Mechanisms
Table D6.8 summarizes the identified control mechanisms to be implemented based on the
performed review. There are separate tables for periodic activities and event-based activities.

Section D6.4
OC2017 A-001
Table D6.8: Integrity Management Plan - Event Based Control Mechanisms
Control Mechanism / Carcass Carcass Pressure Tensile Outer

Failure Mode Reference Collapse Axial Sheath Armour Sheath
Overload Embrittle- Wire Damage
ment Fatigue
Annulus Vent Flow X
Monitoring
Annulus Free Volume X X
Measurement
Anomaly Reporting X X X
Dropped Object Reporting X
and Survey
Gauge Pigging X
The installation phase is critical towards elevated failure probability. However the methods
implemented are assumed to be able to detect critical and initiated defects - mainly through
verification of an intact outer sheath and through the gauge pigging. The main safeguard is
in any event installation procedures and the strict adherence to those.
Following any events that may impact the riser system integrity, an important safeguard is
anomaly reporting. This is to ensure that any anomaly is properly assessed and addressed.
This is valid for both installation-, commissioning- and operation phase of the system service
life.
Annulus vent flow monitoring is not an initially required control mechanism, however may
be utilized if damages are suspected or if high-risk degradation levels of the pressure sheath
are reached.
The periodic control mechanisms are implemented both to have a solid data foundation and
to detect those event, condition or time-based degradation modes not immediately discovered
in day to day operation. Status assessments provide an important safeguard by ensuring that
there is an active follow-up of the riser system, both detection of new anomalies, proper follow
up of existing ones and tracking of historical data and events.
Table D6.9: Integrity Management Plan - Periodic Control Mechanisms
Control Mechanism / Failure Mode Carcass Pressure Tensile Outer

Reference Collapse Sheath Armour Sheath
Embrit- Wire Damage
tlement Fatigue
Annulus Flow Measurement X
Annulus Free Volume Measurement X X
Annulus Gas Sampling X
Pressure Barrier Coupon Sampling X
Sampling of Bore Fluid X X
Status assessment X X
Status assessment X X
Subsea GVI X
Temperature Monitoring X
Topside GVI X

Section D6.4
OC2017 A-001
D6.4.5 Implementation
Periodic activities are to be performed according to planned intervals. The time scale is
dependent on the period of time from initial layer failure to ultimate loss of pipe function and
also on practical considerations. None of the reviewed failure modes relevant for operation,
are expected to progress immediately from initial damage to loss of containment.
Necessary time for being added to detect progressing degradation or non-reported events
dictates typically semi-annual or annual reviews, testing and inspection in the initial life phase
of the life cycle. This is to ensure that the design premises are valid based on operational
experience.
In the mid-life phase a decrease in control mechanism scope or increased intervals may be
justified based on the provided historical data, e.g. bore fluid composition, coupon sampling,
if it can be verified that design premises are conservative.
In the late-life phase typically the risk level will increase due to higher uncertainty in the
actual pipe condition compared to design predictions. Additional control mechanisms or
detail studies, related to time based degradation modes, may be introduced to ensure that
the risk level remains acceptable. Typically this would be a fatigue re-analysis with actual
operational parameters (internal pressure, environmental conditions).

Chapter D7
Lifetime Assessment of North Sea

Riser
621
Section D7.1
OC2017 A-001
D7.1 Introduction
The basis for case study lifetime assessment is the handbook Chapters C2 Lifetime As-
sessment and A3 Failure Modes. This case study section presents a worked example of a
lifetime assessment for the North Sea riser according to the workflow presented in referenced
chapters.
The basis for the lifetime assessment is an anomaly reported by the Integrity Management
(IM) system after being in operation for 5 years. The anomaly relates to suspected outer
sheath breach, detected by annulus free volume testing. This triggered a subsea General
Visual Inspection (GVI) inspection, confirming outer sheath damage located just below guide-
tube exit.
The fundamental basis for performing the lifetime assessment is the below flowchart in Figure
D7.1, also presented in Chapter C2 Lifetime Assessment.
Figure D7.1: Flowchart for lifetime assessment (LTA) process
The review will consider the main steps, (from Figure D7.1), in sequence to verify if the riser
can be safely kept in service for the required service life, essentially conclude on the following
two questions:
1. Is the current integrity level above acceptance limit?
2. Is the predicted integrity level at end of specified service life, above acceptance limit?

Section D7.2
OC2017 A-001
D7.2 Lifetime Assessment - North Sea Riser Case Study
D7.2.1 Lifetime Assessment Initiator
The initiator is an anomaly confirmed by subsea GVI. The riser has been annulus tested
regularly as required by the IM program, however last test did detect an abnormal changes
in annulus free volume.
Figure D7.2: North Sea Riser - Annulus Test history (Riser #2 included for illustration
purposes - i.e. normal trend data)
The initial test, Year 2, showed approximately 50% free volume compared to theoretical
volume. The following year, annulus free volume was found significantly higher at 80%. In
the fourth year, annulus pressure could not stabilize during test, i.e. suspected loss of outer
sheath integrity - subsequent confirmed by subsea GVI.
This implies that at time of test in Year 3, the outer sheath was intact, while at test in Year
4 it was breached. This information is important for the estimation of a timeframe between
damaging event and time for detection. In this example, the period of time between the
tests was 401 days or 1.1 years - slightly above the annual period.
Damage details are further investigated by subsea GVI. The damage is characterized by the
following:
1. Type: linear, narrow cut damage at 45°towards pipe main axis.
2. Exposure size: minor breach, no directly exposed wires. Approximately 10cm length.
3. Failure Causes: assumed accidental damage by external object.
D7.2.2 Lifetime Assessment Premise
The assessment premise for the current riser in simplest form consist of the following infor-
mation:
1. Background Information.
2. Objective Statement.

Section D7.2
OC2017 A-001
3. Requirements Statement.
4. Detail Information.
(a) Annulus Test reports (all years).
(b) Subsea GVI report.
(c) Sketch of system / damage location / relevant features.
Background information is essentially the compilation of contents in Section D7.2.1
Objective statement could for this case be:

1. Verify if riser system is safe to operate within the required service life of 15 years from
year 5.
2. Identify any mitigating actions or modifications to allow operation within required
service life.
Requirements Statement should include reference to applicable design standard, company
guidelines and reporting format. For the current case, normally the original design standard
would be utilized. Reporting format is company specific, however should as a minimum
include the information required to update risk- and failure event tree charts and IM program.
Detail Information is not further included here. This type of information should be available
through the IM information management systems.
D7.2.3 Lifetime Assessment
Initially, the determination of possible failure modes and their relationship is required to
proceed with both the diagnostic and prognostic assessment. To ensure that the full line
system is analysed, the questioners from Chapter C2, Lifetime Assessment, Section C2.4 are
reviewed. Objective is to identify deviations from the original design basis and assumptions,
other possible threats to the riser integrity. Given that there is a specific initiator for the
assessment, the questions are used as screening tools as compared to what would be the
case for a full lifetime extension type assessment.
Layer Assessment - Outer Sheath
From Chapter C2, Section C2.4.4 ’Outer Sheath’ it is evident that layer function is lost, i.e.
not providing a barrier towards external environment. This presents a change compared to
design assumptions.
Q11.1 presents the following guidance note: ’For any loss of outer sheath integrity, refer
to failure description Impact, wear and pressure induced rupture creating hole in the outer
sheath (Chapter A3 - Failure Modes)’
Q11.2 ’Are there any findings from inspections showing local damages, continuous abra-
sion or interference with other structures/components’ relates to determining the cause of
the outer sheath damage to avoid further degradation. By the Remote Operating Vessel
(ROV) inspection performed, no interfacing objects, sharp edges or protruding objects were
identified. It is thus assumed that the initial assessment of accidental damage from either
installation that has progressed into through sheath thickness.

Section D7.2
OC2017 A-001
Action: verify requirement for restoring layer function by repairing outer sheath. Note that
this is normally a general requirement from flexible pipe vendors in case of outer sheath
damages.
Layer Assessment - Insulation Material

Through questions Q10.1 ’Is the measured temperature loss between upstream and down-
stream end of the flexible pipe system in accordance with design calculations’ and Q10.2 ’Is
arrival temperature sufficient to meet flow assurance requirements ’it is verified using tem-
perature monitoring data that there has been no significant change to temperature drop from
subsea to topside interface points, and that arrival temperature still meets the requirements.
Essentially no impact to existing design assumptions.
Layer Assessment - Anti-Buckling Protection

The anti-buckling protection is vital if the riser can experience compression. However in
the damage area, even if the anti-buckling protection tape was damaged, the riser is only
experiencing tension. Essentially no impact to existing design assumptions based on the
questionnaire.
Layer Assessment - Anti-Wear Protection

No remark for the anti-wear protection layers.
Layer Assessment - Tensile Armour

Q 7.1 ’Is annulus environment checked and verified against design assumptions’ is negative;
the current annulus environment is outside the design specification being flooded. Implica-
tions of this needs to be considered and applicable reports updated.
Q 7.2 ’Is general corrosion material loss calculation valid based on current/predicted annulus
environment’: the design premises stated that with dry annulus, any corrosion processes
were negligible. With the introduction of liquid filled annulus, re-calculations needs to be
performed taking into account sweet corrosion. Sour corrosion is not valid given the negligible
amounts of H2 S reported from both bore fluid sampling and annulus gas sampling.
Q 7.3 ’Are there known outer sheath damage(s) with loss of external barrier and possibility of
localized corrosion’is detailed in Section D7.2.3 in regards to localized corrosion and possible
reduction of cross section capacity.
Q 7.4 ’Is utilization ratio at current and end of required service life within limits in [API 17J, 2008]
for all design load cases’: this needs to be verified as current design premise is invalid.
Q 7.5 ’Is accumulated fatigue calculations valid’and Q 7.6 ’Is predicted remaining fatigue
life sufficient for required service life’: this needs to be verified as current design premise is
invalid.
Remaining questions are possible to close out as they are either not applicable or can be
ruled out.
Layer Assessment - Pressure Armour

Similar considerations as for the tensile armour wire is applicable.
Action: Corrosion and material loss calculations. See Section D7.2.3 and Section D7.2.3
Layer Assessment - Pressure Barrier

Questions can be closed out as not applicable.

Section D7.2
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Layer Assessment - Carcass

Q 3.1 ’Is flow rate below design assumption’and Q 3.2 ’Is any sand production recorded’
needs to be considered due to possible reduction in carcass collapse capacity due to erosion.
Q 3.4 ’Are there any internal inspection and/or pigging runs performed’ presents the option
of performing a pigging run to verify no deformation of the carcass. This must be seen in
relationship with most probable damage cause, and thus not selected in this case as pressure
monitoring data provides no signals of significant blockage.
Failure Event Tree
Finally, reviewing the failure event tree from Section D6.4.1, it can be seen that there are
additional triggered failure modes due to an initial outer sheath failure, see Figure D7.3.
Carcass Axial
Pigging Overload
(Tear-Off)
Pressure Sheath
Damage
Impact (Scratching, tearing,
(Trawl board, mooring collapse)
line, dropped object) Blockage
Carcass Collapse
(Ultimate Pipe
Extreme
Failure)
Environmental
Conditions
Blocked Vent Ports

(Improper operation,
degradation) Corrosion of
Armour Wires Loss of
Abrasion Outer Sheath (Tensile, Pressure) Contaiment
Breakage of Pressure
(Riser towards guide- Damage (Ultimate Pipe
Fatigue / Corrosion wires Sheath Failure
tube) (Through Sheath) Failure)
Fatigue
(Tensile, Presure)
Impact
(Trawl board, mooring
line, dropped object)
Service Conditions Pressure

(Temperature, batch Sheath
methanol treatment) Embrittlement
Figure D7.3: Failure Event Tree after outer sheath damage: Red-line indicates pathways to-
and from experienced failure causes- and modes (full black outline)
These failure modes, in addition to the outer sheath damage failure mode, needs to be
considered and reviewed additionally.
Summary Actions
1. Verify requirement outer sheath repair

2. Utilization ratios of steel armours due to corrosion (sweet, oxygen)
3. Fatigue service life
4. Review based on failure modes from Chapter A3 Failure Modes
(a) Carcass collapse (Verify no reduction in carcass collapse capacity)
(b) Corrosion of armour wires
(c) Corrosion fatigue / fatigue of armour wires

Section D7.2
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Diagnostic
Carcass Collapse: Utilizing the monitoring strategies for this failure mode, reviewing data
for differential pressures between topside- and subsea sensors versus flow rates/choke settings
is performed. There are no identified anomalies, i.e. changes from initial operation phase.
The probability for a collapse to have occurred can be considered negligible.
Corrosion of armour wires: Corrosion rates depends on several parameters. A key issue for
this event is if the cathodic protection system can be considered effective, thus preventing
corrosion. Reviewing previous subsea GVI inspection reports provide information on anode
status and protection potential - and for the subject riser there are no findings indicating
that the CP system is rendered ineffective.
Conservative data may be used to determine consequence of an ineffective CP system for
comparison. Corrosion rates are available in several published papers, ranging from near 0.5
mm/year to more generally accepted level of approximately 0.1 mm/year [Clements, 2003].
Using the latter, the current exposure of 1.1 years provide a total corrosion of 0.11 mm from
any surface. To perform a calculation of current increase in stress levels the following is
assumed:
1. Armour wires only adjacent to damage is corroding - i.e. maximum of 1/4 of total
wires.
2. Armour wires subject to corrosion have material loss on both sides, but not at the
edges.
Assumption 2 is considered sufficiently conservative when determining reduction of load
bearing area, seeFigure D7.4.
Figure D7.4: Tensile Armour Wire - Corrosion Scenarios to assess conservatism in calculation
Figure D7.5 shows results from an axi-symmetric model; design stress levels can thus be
compared with worst-case current stress levels:
Only a modest increase in stress level from design state to year 1.1 occurs: a 9 MPa increase.
The conclusion is that at current time being, the conservative corrosion scenario does not

Section D7.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D7.5: North Sea riser: Stress Levels and Utilization Rate versus time. 0.1mm/year
corrosion for 1/4 of the tensile armour wires in outermost layer.
impose any threats to the riser cross section, even at design pressures. As the current oper-
ational pressure is significantly lower, approximately 85 bar compared to design pressure of
420 bar, the margin towards unacceptable utilization rates is significant - using 0.5 mm/year
corrosion rate it is evident that only after year #5 one is nearing the limiting utilization ratio
of 0.67.
Note that this is only considerations based on static stress values to assess the criticality of
current exposure time. The conclusion is that the outer sheath damage does not impose an
immediate risk to continued operation, given the surplus capacity of the cross section.
Corrosion fatigue / fatigue of armour wires: Corrosion fatigue or pure fatigue damage
accumulation is a time-based degradation mode. The failure mode is always present for
dynamic risers. For a riser where the original fatigue service life was calculated based on a dry
annulus environment, the presence of an outer sheath breach, with subsequent both annulus
flooding and possible direct oxygen corrosion, accelerates the fatigue damage accumulation
due to a more severe SN-curves that needs to be considered.
The original design fatigue calculations showed a considerable surplus fatigue life capacity.
Figure D7.6 can be used to assess the criticality of the new annulus conditions.
From Figure D7.6, it is evident that if the CP system is ineffective, only 7 years of fatigue
life is available. Taking into consideration that standards prescribe a safety factor of 10 as

Section D7.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D7.6: North Sea riser: Fatigue damage accumulation versus time. NOTE: Fatigue
Life is Fatigue Service Life x SF=10
the steel armours are not inspectable, only 0.7 years of service life would be available.
Given that the CP system is shown to be functioning, it is evident that a significant gain is
to be expected. Given the damage type, the uncertainty of CP system effectiveness some
distance away from the actual damage, using the anaerobic seawater curve is the selected
curve. This conservative assumption shows expectations of close to 17 years of fatigue service
life.
A gain in service life is expected by the fact that the riser has been operating at a significantly
lower pressure than assumed in design premises. Combined, the conclusion is that the outer
sheath breach does not impose an immediate threat to the riser integrity given the short
exposure time.
Prognostic
Carcass collapse: There is no identified change to risk level over the whole service life due
to
1. Design integrity provides margin between hydrostatic pressure and collapse resistance
of carcass.
2. There is no recorded active time dependent degradation promoters, i.e. sand produc-
tion resulting in erosion or other corrosive processes, which both could be reducing the
load capacity of the carcass layer.
As such the failure mode is considered to have no impact on the service life of the riser -
based on no change from current operational parameters, refer to Section D6.3.1. I.e. the
failure mode is considered negligible also for the future service lifetime of the riser.
Corrosion of armour wires: From Figure D7.5 it is evident that repair will be necessary to
avoid reaching limiting utilization ratios due to general corrosion. There is time to perform

Section D7.2
OC2017 A-001
the repair within the indicated timeframe of 1 year from discovery, without any significant
further accumulation of damage. The increase in stress level is 17 MPa or a corresponding
increase in utilization ratio of 0.01.
From the layer assessment there is an additional requirement to verify if other corrosion
processes, considered negligible in the design due to dry annulus, now will present a future
integrity risk. Performing material loss calculations based on public domain or vendor specific
methodology should be performed. For the current riser this relates to sweet corrosion pro-
cesses due to CO2 present in bore gas, permeating into annulus. Sour corrosion is considered
negligible. Through this analysis it is found that sweet corrosion is acceptable, if current
design levels of CO2 in transported oil remains stable.
Corrosion fatigue / fatigue of armour wires: Provided that a repair is performed, the
fatigue life chart in Figure D7.6 shows that approximately 17 years of service life may be
available. To properly verify the remaining service life, fatigue re-analysis might be required
to be performed. This can take into account actual historic operating pressures, time with
annulus in dry condition, exposed to seawater due to outer sheath breach and flooded annulus
but with outer sheath integrity restored and expected future service conditions, i.e. operating
pressure.
For the current riser, increased stress levels due to material loss (sweet corrosion) is expected,
requiring a re-analysis. This is discussed in Chapter D8 of this Case Study. It is assumed a
successful outcome - providing the minimum required additional 15 years of service life.
D7.2.4 Lifetime Assessment Conclusion
The lifetime assessment conclusion is that:

1. The current integrity level is acceptable, allowing continued operation while repair is
performed
2. The end-of life integrity level is acceptable, without need for major modifications or
repair
This is only valid if performing the outer sheath repair to restore the outer sheath integrity.
The option of postponing or avoiding repair may be interpreted as possible based on the
above chapters. However, considering that there are possibilities for severe local corrosion
and armour wire pitting, with subsequent introduction of higher SCFs, the option is not
viable given the lack of accurate inspection tools.
Documentation of the lifetime assessment should include a final report, based on Chapter
C2 - Lifetime Assessment, Section C2.2.7.
This would, for this limited assessment:

1. Anomaly close-out report.
(a) Description of assessment initiator and assessment premise.
(b) Conclusions on lifetime assessment:
i. Acceptable integrity level at current time and for required service life.
(c) Recommendations to Integrity Management program.

Section D7.2
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i. Repair of outer sheath within 1 year from damage occurrence.

ii. Include new control mechanism: sampling of annulus gas.
iii. Update of information management system.
A. Integrity Management Plan (risk assessments, failure event tree).
B. References to reports provided by the lifetime assessment (below).
2. Updated riser service life report(s).
(a) utilization rate calculations for steel armours due to material loss.
(b) fatigue service life of steel armours for flooded annulus condition.

Section D7.2
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Chapter D8
Reliability
633
Section D8.1
OC2017 A-001
In the following, the basis for reliability analyses related to fatigue lifetime of specific flexible
riser configurations is elaborated. Initial reliability calculations are also performed. Focus is
on the tensile helix. The fatigue damage due to the combination of wave action and dynamic
floater motion is considered.
An ’imaginary case’ without repair being performed is also considered for the purpose of
comparison. The applied failure criterion corresponds to fatigue failure of a single wire in
the tensile helix.
D8.1 Probabilistic Models and Reliability analysis
D8.1.1 Introduction
In general, design criteria related to the different types of limit states need to be considered.
These apply to the Serviceability, Ultimate, Fatigue and Accidental Limit States.
In the following, the possibility of fatigue failure for the tensile armour is focused upon since
this is critical in relation to assessment of remaining lifetime.
D8.1.2 Relevant failure functions
The failure function corresponding to fatigue accumulation for constant annulus conditions
is first considered. The effect of experiencing changing conditions after a certain time in
operation (e.g. stepwise change of corrosive environment) will subsequently be addressed.
Designating the randomized Miner sum at failure by X1 = XF ail and the accumulated
damage at time T by D(T ; X2 , X3 ...XN ), the failure function g(X1 , X2 , .....XN ) is expressed
as:
g(T ; X1 , X2 ...XN ) = g(T ; X) = X1 − D(T ; X2 , X3 · · · XN ) (D8.1)
Failure occurs if this function becomes negative, i.e. when the accumulated damage is larger
than the Miner sum which corresponds to failure.
The probability of failure for a specified time in operation is then obtained as the probability
that the failure function becomes negative, i.e.:
pf (T ) = P (g(T ; X1 , X2 ...XN ) < 0) = P [{X1 − D(T ; X2 , X3 · · · XN )} < 0] (D8.2)
This probability can then be computed for a sequence of increasing values of the time in
operation, i.e Top = T = k·∆T where k is a positive integer and ∆T is a specified time
increment.
In the case that a change of the annulus conditions occur (e.g. due to fluid diffusion, sheath
damage or clamp repair), the cumulative probability distribution of the accumulated damage
at the given point in time when the change occurs (e.g. tc,0 ) needs to be found. This can
be obtained by application of the following expression:

Section D8.1
OC2017 A-001
FD (d; tc,0 ) = P (D(tc,0 ; X1 , X2 ...XN ) < d) = P [{D(tc,0 ; X2 , X3 · · · XN ) − d} < 0]

(D8.3)
The corresponding density function fD (d; tc,0 ) is then obtained by differentiation.
For the time period following tc,0 , the failure probability can be obtained by conditioning on
the probability for a specific value of the damage at tc,0 to be present, and by subsequently
integrating over all possible such values:
pf (T) =RP(g (T; X1 , X2 ...XN ) < 0)

= P ([{X1 − D (T; X2 , X3 · · · XN )} < 0]|D(tc,0 ) = v) · fD (v;tc,0 )dv
0≤v=D(tc,0 )≤1
(D8.4)
For the case with a damaged sheath followed by repair with a clamp, this expression needs
to be applied twice: First for the time interval after damage up to the repair is performed,
and secondly for the time period after the clamp is installed.
D8.1.3 Random variables and probabilistic models
Initially, only the variability related to the Miner sum and the relevant SN-curve is considered.
The former variability is modeled by representing the Miner sum as a Lognormal variable with
a mean value of 1.0 and a coefficient of variation equal to 0.3. The SN-capacity is given on
the form N (∆S)m = C where N is the number of cycles until failure; m and C are material
constants and ∆S is the stress range. On logarithmic form this relationship can be written
as follows:
1
Log10 ∆S = − (Log10 N − Log10 C) (D8.5)
m
The SN-curve uncertainty is modeled by representing the SN-curve intercept (i.e. Log10 C)
as a Gaussian random variable. The mean value of the intercept corresponds to the mean
SN-curve. The design curve (which corresponds to the case that C = ā as given above) is
hence obtained by applying the mean value minus two standard deviations (i.e. a parallel
shift of the SN-curve in Log-Log-scale).
The randomness associated with the CO2 condition is somewhat increased as compared to
that implied by Figure D2.4. This is modelled by keeping the design curve constant and
’lifting’ the mean curve. The reason for this increase of variability is to be more aligned with
the ’in-air’ uncertainty representation.
For both annulus conditions, three different levels of randomness (SN-curve ’uncertainty’)
are applied. The term ’Base Case’ refers to the middle level of variability. The ’high level’
corresponds to an increase of the standard deviation (i.e. which is associated with the
intercept as just explained) for the Base Case by a factor of 2.0. The ’low level’ corresponds
to a decrease of the standard deviation by applying a factor of 0.5.

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.1.4 Analysis method
The probability of failure is computed by application of the so-called First Order Reliability
Method (FORM). This approach consists of two main steps: (i) Transformation of the basic
variables and the failure function into standard Gaussian variables (ii) Computation of the
minimum distance from the origin to the failure surface (i.e. the surface corresponding to the
failure function being equal to zero). This distance is then directly applied for estimation of
the failure probability. Further details of this procedure are given e.g. in [Madsen et al., 1986]
and [Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982] .
D8.1.5 Acceptance criteria
Relevant target reliability levels for metallic risers are given e.g. in [DNV-OS-F201, 2010].
It is reasonable to apply the same target values also for flexible risers if a single type of
potential failure mode dominates for a given cross-section. Regarding the target failure
probability levels, these can be determined by means of a risk assessment approach. The
requirements related to the target probability level in the above-mentioned document depend
on the applicable Safety Class which varies from ’Low’ through ’Normal’ to ’High’. The
categorization into class is made based on the type of fluid which is conveyed by the riser
and assessment of consequences. The probabilities are given as ’probability of failure per
year per riser’. For the three Safety Classes the values are 10−3 , 10−4 and 10−5 . Here, these
values are assumed to correspond to the failure probability per year for the most critical
location and the most critical layer, which presently is the tensile armour. For the upper part
of the present riser it appears that Safety Class High is relevant due to the conveyed fluid
being gas under high-pressure.
D8.2 Assessment of remaining SN-lifetime
D8.2.1 Introduction
Different scenarios are now considered in relation to estimation of fatigue lifetime for the
present riser. These correspond to the following cases:
Table D8.1: Summary of scenarios for estimation of fatigue lifetime of tensile armour.
Scenario Variables Annulus Average pressure

condition
A Undamaged, benign SN-Curve* In-air Operation pressure 300 bar
conditions
B Undamaged, SN-Curve Corrosive with Operation pressure 300 bar
corrosive CO2
C Undamaged, SN-Curve Corrosive with Recorded pressure, avrg = 115
monitored pressure CO2 bar
D Damaged, repaired SN-Curve Seawater w/ Recorded pressure = 85 bar (at
inhibitor time of damage)
E Damaged, SN-Curve Corrosive with Recorded pressure = 85 bar (at
un-repaired seawater time of damage)
F Undamaged, Multiple** Corrosive with Recorded pressure, avrg = 115
monitored pressure CO2 bar

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
Scenario Variables Annulus Average pressure

condition
G Damaged, repaired Multiple Seawater w/ Recorded pressure = 85 bar (at
inhibitor time of damage)
H Damaged, Multiple Corrosive with Recorded pressure = 85 bar (at
un-repaired seawater time of damage)
* SN-Curve variables correspond to Miner sum uncertainty and intercept of SN-curve vari-
ability
** The applied variables are given for the different cases in the relevant sections below
For each of the scenarios the effect of increasing and decreasing the variability associated
with the applied SN-curve is also considered.
D8.2.2 Scenario A: Initial assessment: In-air one-slope SN-curve
The case of the in-air curve without any fatigue limit (i.e. the one-slope curve with m = 6)
is first considered. This is SN curve for the Balmoral riser, as presented in Section D3.3.4,
also described in Section D2.6. The cumulative probability of failure versus time in operation
is shown in Figure D8.1, where the middle curve corresponds to the base case. Note that
presently only SN-related sources of variability are included. (Incremental probability per
year is not shown since this value is very low throughout the considered time period)
Figure D8.1: Failure probability versus time based on one-slope in-air SN-curve without
fatigue limit. Only SN-related variability is included. Middle curve is base case, rightmost
curve corresponds to reduced SN-variability, leftmost curve corresponds to increased SN-
variability (Operation pressure is 300bar)
The effect of reducing the uncertainty related to the applied SN-curve (e.g. due to testing of a
large number of homogeneous test samples) is next investigated by increasing the associated

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
standard deviation. The mean SN-curve is kept constant while the standard deviation is half
of the base case value. This implies that the design curve moves significantly upwards. The
corresponding probability of failure versus time is shown as the rightmost curve in Figure
D8.1.
The effect of increasing the uncertainty related to the SN-curve is also investigated. The
mean SN-curve is still the same, while the standard deviation is now twice the base case
value. The resulting probability of failure versus time is shown as the leftmost curve in Figure
D8.1.
A summary of the results is given in Table D8.2 for the three different levels of variability
associated with the SN-data. (The ’engineering design’ procedure for the present base case
SN design curve gives a estimated fatigue life of 461 years without any safety factor included.)
Table D8.2: Summary of time in operation until transition between different safety levels
occurs corresponding to results in Figure D8.1
Years in operation
SN-data From 10−5 to 10−4 From 10−4 to 10−3
Half variability 340 450
Base case 75 180
Double variability 12 30

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.3 Scenario B: Initial assessment: SN-curve for corrosive environment

with full operation pressure
It is next assumed that the SN-curve which corresponds to presence of CO2 applies (i.e. the
curve which was shown in Section D2.6, Figure D2.4). The failure probability as a function
of time is shown in Figure D8.2 . Also for this case only SN-related variability is included.
Transition from safety class high to safety class normal occurs at around 70 years. Safety
class low is predicted to occur at around 100 years for the present basis of analysis.
Figure D8.2: Failure probability versus time based on SN-curve for CO2 -corrosive environ-
ment. Only SN-related variability is included. Middle curve is base case, rightmost curve
is reduced SN-variability, leftmost curve is increased SN-variability (Operation pressure is
300bar)
The effect of both increasing and reducing the variability related to the applied SN-curve is
investigated also for this case by increasing/decreasing the standard deviation. The results
are given in Figure D8.2 corresponding to the leftmost and rightmost curves, respectively.
associated with the SN-data. (The ’engineering design’ procedure for the present base
case SN design curve gives an estimated fatigue life of 210 years without any safety factor
included.)
occurs corresponding to results in Figure D8.2
Years in operation
Base case 70 100

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.4 Scenario C: Lifetime estimation based on monitored data (i.e.pressure

reduction)
As described above, the variation of the operation pressure and the annulus gas content with
time has been measured. The average operation pressure is computed as 115 bar based on
the available information. This implies that the stress cycle distribution and SN-curve can
be updated accordingly. The resulting probability of failure versus time in operation is shown
in Figure D8.3 .
Figure D8.3: Failure probability versus time based on SN-curve for CO2 -corrosive environ-
ment. Only SN-related variability is included. Middle curve is base case, rightmost curve
corresponds to reduced SN-variability, leftmost curve corresponds to increased SN-variability
(Average operation pressure is 115 bar)
The effect of both increasing and reducing the uncertainty related to the applied SN-curve
is again investigated. The results are given in Figure D8.3 in terms of the leftmost and
rightmost curves, respectively. The results are summarized in Table D8.4 for the three
different levels of variability of SN-data. (The ’engineering design’ procedure for the present
base case SN design curve gives a estimated fatigue life of 440 years without any safety
factor included.)
occurs corresponding to results in Figure D8.3. (CO2 environment, pressure reduction is
accounted for)
Years in operation
Base case 145 208

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.5 Comparison of results for cases without sheath damage - Scenario

A-C
A summary of the results for the three cases which correspond to an intact sheath is provided
by Table D8.5. It is observed that the case with CO2 conditions and pressure reduction gives
the highest estimated values of the time in operation. The in-air condition (with full operation
pressure of 300 bar) gives intermediate values for the same cases, while the CO2 condition
with full operation pressure of 300 bar gives the lowest values.
Table D8.5: Summary of time in operation until transition between different safety levels for
different conditions (without sheath damage).
Years in operation
From 10-5 to 10-4 From 10-4 to 10-3
SN-data In air CO2 P-rd/CO2 In air CO2 P-rd/CO2
Half variability 340 132 277 450 167 350
Base case 75 70 145 180 100 208
Double variability 12 12y 31 30 27 56
It should be noted that the results for the In-air and CO2 conditions are not directly com-
parable as the inherent scatter of the SN-curves are different. If the scatter associated with
the In-air condition is instead taken to be the same as for the CO2 condition, the following
comparison will result for the Base case (by keeping the mean curve for the In-air condition
constant and hence modifying the design curve accordingly):
(i) Transition from 10-5 to 10-4 occurs at 240 years for In-air versus 70 years for CO2
conditions (i.e. the latter value is the same as before)
(ii) Transition from 10-4 to 10-3 occurs at 340 years for In-air versus 100 years for CO2
conditions (i.e. the latter value is the same as before).

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.6 Scenario D: Sheath damage with repair
The contribution to accumulated damage due to the one year period where seawater is
present will dominate at the time when the clamp is installed. The expected damage after
this one-year period with sea-water (i.e. at t = 6 years) is computed as 0.25. The probability
of failure as a function of the time elapsed after the clamp repair has been performed can
be computed by application of the expressions given above.
The results are shown in Figure D8.4. The middle curve corresponds to the base case value
of the SN-curve scatter, while the leftmost and rightmost curves correspond to increased
and decreased values of this scatter, respectively.
Figure D8.4: Failure probability versus time. Sheath damage occurs at t = 5 years followed
by a clamp repair at t = 6 years.

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.7 Scenario E: Sheath damage without repair
For the case without repair, the expected value of the initial damage at t = 5 years is
computed as 0.01 (corresponding to the Base case with CO2 being present and pressure
reduction taken into account) which is negligible. Subsequently, there is a transition to the
new SN-curve which reflects that seawater is present. Note that at present the direct effect
of corrosion in terms of possible increase of stress concentration is neglected.
The resulting failure probability versus time is shown in Figure D8.5. Corresponding results
for the cases with increased and decreased scatter associated with the available SN-data are
also shown.
Figure D8.5: Sheath damage at t=5 years without any repair.
of SN-data. It is observed that for the case without clamp repair, the anticipated residual
lifetime is significantly reduced.
different conditions (with and without repair after sheath damage at t = 5 years).
Years in operation
From 10-5 to 10-4 From 10-4 to 10-3
SN-data With rep. Without rep. With rep. Without rep.
Half variability 97 7.65 170 8.35
Base case 75 6.40 126 6.95
Double variability 26 5.30 45 5.55

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.8 Comparison of base case results for all scenarios A - E.
A comparison of the curves which show the variation of the failure probability versus time
for the different scenarios is provided by Figure D8.6 for the case with solely SN-related
variability included. As observed,the scatter of the predicted lifetime increases for increasing
probability levels.
Figure D8.6: Comparison of failure probability as a function of time for the various base case
conditions.

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
D8.2.9 Scenario F: Carbon dioxide with reduced pressure: Multiple sources

of variability.
The effect of including additional sources of variability in the calculations is next considered.
This is performed for the following three cases which were considered above:
• CO2 conditions with reduced pressure
• Sheath damage with repair
• Sheath damage without repair
For all of these three conditions, an identical set of additional random variables are included.
These are summarized in Table D8.7.
Table D8.7: Summary of additional random variables for reliability assessment of Case Study.
Variable Distribution Base Mean St.dev.

case value
Drag coefficient Lognormal 1.0 1.0 0.20
Surface floater surge amplitude, Xs Lognormal 1.0 1.0 0.05
Surface floater pitch amplitude, Xp Lognormal 1.0 1.0 0.05
Friction coefficient Lognormal 1.0 1.0 0.10
Internal pressure Lognormal 1.0 1.0 0.05
Three-dimensional effects load and Normal 1.0 1.0 0.05
response effects, X3D**
Analysis method, global analysis Normal 1.0 1.0 0.05
Analysis method, local analysis Normal 1.0 0.9 0.15
Environmental description**1 Lognormal 1.0 1.0 0.05
A further description of the methods which are applied for reliability analysis is found in
Chapters B2 and B3 of the Handbook. For the five first variables in Table D8.7, parametric
variations are first performed such that the fatigue damage is computed for several ’levels’
of the relevant quantity (e.g. drag coefficient and surge amplitude). Response surface poly-
nomials are subsequently established based on the computed values of the fatigue damage.
These are polynomials are next given as input to the reliability analysis. The four last vari-
ables in Table D8.7 are applied in a more direct manner as model uncertainty factors which
are multiplied with the computed fatigue damage.
The computed failure probability versus time with these additional variables being included
is compared to the base case (i.e. for the case that solely variables which are related to
the fatigue capacity parameters are taken into account). This comparison is provided by the
leftmost and middle curve in Figure D8.7 . It is seen that the transition between the high
and normal safety classes now occur at around 92 years (versus 145 years for the base case).
The transition between safety class normal and safety class low occurs for 142 years with the
additional variables being included (versus 208 years for the base case).
The effect of introducing a certain degree of reserve margin in the description of the external
loading is next considered (which leads to more optimistic predictions of remaining lifetime).
It has been observed that so-called 3D effects (i.e. lack of colinearity and homogeneity of the
physical processes which correspond to the current, wave, wind and floater motion). These
1
**The variables representing uncertainty related to analysis methodand environmental description are
assumed to apply for the stress range rather than the fatigue damage. This variable is hence elevated to a
power equal to the m-exponent of the SN-curve in the reliability calculations

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
effects are not captured by the numerical calculation models due to simplifications, and will
typically lead to over-estimation of the external loading and the associated riser response.
This is taken into account by decreasing the mean value of the computed stresses (i.e. by
introducing a bias factor with a value of 0.80 instead of 1.0).
The resulting failure probability versus time is shown by the rightmost curve in Figure D8.7.
The transition between safety class high and normal now takes place at around 225 years,
and the transition between safety class normal and low occurs at around 345 years.
Figure D8.7: CO2 environment with reduced operation pressure. Results for multiple ran-
dom variables as compared to solely SN-curve uncertainty (base case). Effect of possible
conservatism inherent in global computation model is shown by rightmost curve.
The relative influence of the various random variables on the computed failure probability
is measured by the so-called Importance Factors which sum up to a total value of 1.0
(or 100%). For the leftmost curve (and failure probability levels of 10-3 ), the SN-curve
uncertainty variable contributes by 48 % and the Miner sum uncertainty by 19 %. The
environmental description and the 3D load and response effects each contributes by 9 %.
The remaining variables accordingly together contribute by a total of 15%.
For the case with the bias factor of 0.80, the relative importance of the variables is slightly
shifted. The SN-curve uncertainty variable now contributes by 46% and the Miner sum
uncertainty by 19%. The environmental description contributes by 9% and the 3D load and
response effects by 13%. The remaining variables sum up to a contribution of 14%.
The estimated transition times for the three cases shown in Figure D8.7 are summarized in
Table D8.8 below.

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
different conditions (for the case with CO2 environment and monitored pressure level).
Years in operation
Additional variability 92 142
Base case 145 208
Global model conserv. 225 345
D8.2.10 Scenario G: Sheath damage with repair: Multiple sources of vari-

ability
A corresponding analysis is performed by introducing the additional sources of variability for

the case where the sheath has been damaged and with a subsequent clamp repair (with the
repair being assumed to have no flaws or defects). The resulting probability of failure versus
time is shown by the leftmost curve in Figure D8.8, where also the base case curve is included
as the middle curve. Transition from safety class high to safety class normal takes place at
around 19 years. Further transition from safety class normal to safety class low occurs at 46
years (The base case values are respectively 36 years and 58 years).
The rightmost curve in Figure D8.8 represents the case where possible conservatism associ-
ated with the global calculation model is taken into account. The transition between safety
class high and normal is observed at around 63 years, and the transition between safety class
normal and low at around 103 years.
Figure D8.8: Sheath damage with repair. Results for multiple random variables as compared
to solely SN-curve uncertainty (base case). Effect of possible conservatism inherent in global
computation model is shown by rightmost curve.
The relative importance of the variables is a little modified compared to the previous case
(i.e. for a probability level of 10-3 ). The SN-curve uncertainty variable contributes by 35%
and the Miner sum variability now accounts for 41%. The environmental description amounts

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
to 7% and 3D load and response effects to 6%. Hence, the remaining variables give a total
of 11%.
For the case with the bias factor of 0.80, the SN-curve uncertainty variable now contributes
by 32% and the Miner sum uncertainty by 41%. The environmental description variability
amounts to 6% and the 3D load and response effects to 9%. This implies that the remaining
variables sum up to a contribution of 12%.
The results for the three cases presented in Figure D8.8 are summarized in Table D8.9 below.
different cases (for the case with sheath damage followed by clamp repair).
Years in operation
Additional variability 60 98
Base case 75 126
Global model conserv. 129 230
D8.2.11 Scenario H: Sheath damage without repair: Multiple sources of

variability
The effect of including the additional random variables is next studied for the case without
repair of the external sheath, i.e. with sea-water corrosion. The resulting failure probability
versus time is shown by the leftmost curve in Figure D8.9 . Corresponding results for the
base case (i.e. by including solely variables associated with the SN-uncertainty) are shown
by the middle curve in the figure. The rightmost curve also now provides results when taking
into account possible conservatism associated with the global analysis model.
The resulting transition times between the different safety classes are summarized in Table
D8.10 for the different cases. It is observed that the values span the range from around 5.9
to around 7.9 years.
The relative ranking of the random variables also now gives results along the same lines as
for the previous cases. The SN-curve variability represents % of the total, and the Miner
sum contributes by %.

Section D8.2
OC2017 A-001
Figure D8.9: Sheath damage at t=5 years without any repair. Results for multiple random
variables as compared to SN-curve uncertainty (base case). Effect of possible conservatism
inherent in global computation model is shown by rightmost curve.
for different cases (for the case with sheath damage followed by clamp repair).
Years in operation
Additional variability 5.9 6.4
Base case 6.4 7
Global model conserv. 6.9 7.9

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
D8.3 Consideration of successive wire failures
D8.3.1 General
If the external sheath which is damaged after 5 years in operation remains unrepaired, the
consequence will be a sequence of individual wire failures until failure of the whole cross-
section occurs. It is hence highly relevant to estimate the time from seawater ingress until
failure of a specific number of wires which corresponds to cross-section failure.
The following analysis is based on application of the results which were obtained from the
numerical analysis of a damaged pipe. These results are found in Appendix D9 Section ??.
From the analysis it is observed that after failure of the sixth wire, the load-carrying capacity
of the cross-section is mainly lost. Accordingly, this is considered to be the failure criterion
in the present assessment.
As a result of the successive wire failures, there will be an increase of the stress levels in
the remaining wires. This is presently modeled by introducing a stress concentration factor
which increases after each wire failure. Based on the numerical study referred to above, a
linear increase is presently applied. Following the first wire failure, the stress concentration
factor is set to 1.075. Following the second failure, the value is 1.15. After that, the values
are 1.225, 1.3 and 1.375, respectively.
D8.3.2 Correlation properties between pairs of failure events
For analysis of multiple wire failures, the pairwise correlation between the different failure
events will play an important role. This correlation depends on variability associated with the
load effect versus that of the resistance. This is first demonstrated based on fairly general
considerations.
Schematically, the safety margin with respect to fatigue failure for each wire (indicated by
the subscript i) can be written on the following form:
Mi = DRi − DSi (D8.6)
where the first term is a function of the fatigue capacity variables and the second term is a
function of the variables related to the load effect. The safety margin will generally decrease
with time, and failure occurs as soon as this margin transits from positive to negative values
(i.e. when it becomes zero). If the two terms on the right-hand side are assumed to be
independent from each other, the variance of the safety margin is obtained as
V ar[Mi ] = V ar[DRi ] + V ar[DSi ] (D8.7)
since the expected value of the cross term, i.e. E[{DRi − E[DRi ]} · {DSi − E[DSi ]}] , is
zero due to independence. Introducing a safety margin of the same type for a second wire
with subscript j, we similarly obtain
V ar[Mj ] = V ar[DRj ] + V ar[DSi ] (D8.8)

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
The covariance between the two safety margins is next obtained as (by still assuming inde-
pendence between the resistance and load effect terms):
Covar[Mi , Mj ] = Covar[DRi , DRj ] + Covar[DSi , DSj ] (D8.9)
The correlation coefficient between the two safety margins is next expressed as
Covar[Mi , Mj ] Covar[DRi , DRj ] + Covar[DSi , DSj ]

ρMi Mj = q = q (D8.10)
V ar[Mi ]V ar[Mj ] V ar[Mi ]V ar[Mj ]
For the case that the load effect dominates a high value of the correlation coefficient between
failure events will be observed since the stress levels in the different wires will be highly
correlated (i.e. the first term in the numerator will be large). For the case that the resistance
term dominates a low value of the correlation coefficient will result. This is based on the
assumption that the resistances of the different wires are uncorrelated and accordingly both
terms in the numerator will be small relative to variances in the denominator.
For the present case with a damaged external sheath a quite localized corrosion process is
likely to occur. The relevant wires which are most likely to fail due to strength reduction will
hence be located in the vicinity of the sheath damage. The corrosion process which takes
place in each individual wire is further assumed to be very differentiated. This implies that
there will be a low correlation between the remaining strength properties of the different
wires.
D8.3.3 Consideration of possible failure sequences
In the general case, after failure of each wire, there will be a number of wires which are
candidates for being the next one to fail. The likelihood for each of the candidates to be
the one that really breaks depends on a number of factors such as the initial value of the
accumulated damage when the previous wire failed, the future stress level in the particular
wire being considered, possible cross-section reduction of the wire and fatigue resistance. A
fairly general illustration of the sequence of possible failure events is shown in the Figure
D8.10.
Figure D8.10: Illustration of sequence of individual wire failures.
A simplified failure sequence will result if there is only one possible candidate for the next
wire failure after each wire failure event. This is illustrated in Figure D8.11. Accordingly, it
is assumed that there is a corrosion process which is progressing from one wire to the next
(somewhat depending on the extension of the damage to the outer sheath). For this case, it

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
is also assumed that the initial magnitude of the accumulated damage (due to cyclic stresses)
in the other unbroken wires at the time of failure of one specific wire is of somewhat limited
magnitude. Such a sequence is more relevant for the present case where there is a localized
damage to the outer sheath of the flexible pipe.
Figure D8.11: Simplified failure sequence with only one potential candidate at each step.
D8.3.4 Failure of first wire
By application of the design SN-curve which corresponds to seawater conditions, the time
elapsed from seawater ingress until failure of the first wire (which is not necessarily the one
with highest stresses) is computed as 4.3 years.
By representing the SN-curve intercept parameter as a random variable instead of as a fixed

’design value’, the time until breakage of the first wire also becomes a random variable. The
corresponding cumulative distribution is shown in Figure D8.12, where also the Miner sum
uncertainty has been included (see Section D8.1.3).
Figure D8.12: Probability distribution of (total elapsed) time until breakage of first wire.
Solely SN-curve variability (base case) and Miner sum uncertainty are included. Cumulative
distribution is well fitted by lognormal model with mean value of 17 years and standard
deviation of 6 years.

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
From the distribution function it is seen that there is a probabliity of only around 5% for
the time until wire breakage to be less than (5 + 4.3) years = 9.3 years. In order for
this probability to reach 50%, it is seen that the corresponding elapsed time needs to be
(5+11)years = 16years. It is found that the distribution function is quite well approximated
by a lognormal model with a mean value of 17 years and a standard deviation of 6 years.
Clearly, by including additional relevant sources of uncertainty (which are related e.g. to the
calculation of stresses in the wires) the probability distribution function for the time period
will typically be ’wider’ than that shown in Figure D8.12.
D8.3.5 Failure of second wire
By application of the same design SN-curve as before but now combined with a stress
concentration factor of 1.075, the time until failure of the second wire (as measured from
the time of failure e of first wire) is computed as 2.2 years. It is noted that this estimate is
based on the assumption that the initial accumulated fatigue damage in the second wire at
the time of failure of the first wire is equal to zero.
Given that the first wire has failed, the cumulative distribution function for the time until
the second wire fails can be computed in a similar manner as for the first wire. However,
for the present analysis an initial damage is assumed for the second wire at the time of
breakage of the first wire. The defect-driven scenario as discussed above is considered
where the correlation between the accumulated damage in the different wires is very low.
As a representative example, a value of DInit = 0.3 is applied. The resulting cumulative
distribution function is shown in Figure D8.13. It is found that for the present case the
distribution function is quite well approximated by a lognormal model with a mean value of
4.5 years and a standard deviation of 2.5 years.
Figure D8.13: Probability distribution of time from breakage of first wire until breakage of
second wire, solely SN-curve variability (i.e. the base case level) and Miner sum uncertainty
are included.
A cumulative probability of 0.5 is now reached after an elapsed time (with t=0 at the time

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
of breakage for the first wire) equal to 3.9 years.

The total time (counted from start of operation) until failure of the second wire is found by
means of the following expression:
P ((Tb2 = T1 + T2 ) < tb2 ) = FT b2 (tb2 )

X
= P (T2 ≤ tb2 − t1 |T1 = t1 ) · P (T1 = t1 )
All t1
Z tb2 (D8.11)
= P (T2 ≤ tb2 − t1 |T1 = t1 ) · fT1 (T1 = t1 )dt1
0
Z tb2
= FT2 (tb2 − t1 |T1 = t1 ) · fT1 (T1 = t1 )dt1
0
where t1 designates (a specific value of ) the time at failure of the first wire and t2 refers
to (a specific value of) the additional time elapsed until breakage of the second wire (i.e.
corresponding to the cumulative distribution function in Figure D8.13).
The resulting cumulative distribution function is shown in Figure D8.14. It is seen that the
’width’ of the distribution function is somewhat larger than for the distribution functions
both in Figure D8.12 and in Figure D8.13. The new mean value and standard deviation of
the fitted lognormal distribution are equal to 21.5 years and 6.5 years, respectively.
Figure D8.14: Probability distribution of (total elapsed) time until breakage of second wire.
Solely SN-curve variability (base case) and Miner sum uncertainty are included. Initial dam-
age in second wire at time of failure of first wire is 0.3. Cumulative distribution is well fitted
by lognormal model with mean value of 21.5 years and standard deviation of 6.5 years.
D8.3.6 Failure of third wire
By application of the design SN-curve for seawater conditions but now combined with a
stress concentration factor of 1.15, the time until failure of the third wire (as measured from
the time of failure of the secondt wire) is computed as 1.8 years. This estimate is also based

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
on the assumption that the initial accumulated fatigue damage in the third wire at the time
of failure of the second wire is equal to zero.
By introducing the same random variables and the same initial damage (i.e. 0.3) as for the
second wire, the resulting cumulative distribution function which is shown in Figure D8.15
is obtained. It is found that for the present case the distribution function is quite well
approximated by a lognormal model with a mean value of 3.7 years and a standard deviation
of 2.5 years.
Figure D8.15: Probability distribution of time until failure of third wire, given failure of
second wire (assuming that the initial damage in third wire at the time of failure in second
wire is 0.3). This distribution is well fitted by a lognormal model with mean value of 3.7
years and standard deviation of 2.5 years.
The cumulative distribution function for the total elapsed time until failure of the third wire
(See Figure D8.16 ) is given by an expression of the same type as before:
P ((Tb3 = T1 + T2 + T3 ) < tb3 ) = FT b3 (tb3 )

X
= P (T3 ≤ tb3 − tb2 |Tb2 = tb2 ) · P (Tb2 = tb2 )
All tb2
Z tb3 (D8.12)
= P (T3 ≤ tb3 − tb2 |Tb2 = tb2 ) · fTb2 (Tb2 = tb2 )dtb2
0
Z tb3
= FT3 (tb3 − tb2 |Tb2 = tb2 ) · fTb2 (Tb2 = tb2 )dtb2
0
where the second factor is the probability density function for the time until failure of the
second wire (which can be obtained by differentiation of the cumulative distribution function
that is shown in Figure D8.14).
D8.3.7 Failure of fourth wire
The stress concentration factor is now increased to 1.225 and the corresponding time until
failure of the fourth wire (as measured from the time of failure of the third wire) is computed

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D8.16: Resulting cumulative distribution for time until failure of third wire. Cumu-
lative distribution is well approximated by lognormal model with mean value 25.2 years and
standard deviation 7.0 years.
as 1.5 years. This estimate is still based on the assumption that the initial accumulated
fatigue damage in the third wire at the time of failure of the second wire is equal to zero.
The same random variables as before are next introduced, while the initial damage is increased
to 0.4 (i.e. the damage in the fourth wire at time of failure of the third wire). The resulting
cumulative distribution function is shown in Figure D8.17. It is found that for the present
case the distribution function is quite well approximated by a lognormal model with a mean
value of 2.8 years and a standard deviation of 2.1 years.
Figure D8.17: Probability distribution of time until breakage of fourth wire, given breakage
of third wire. Cumulative distribution function is well fitted by lognormal model with mean
value of 2.8 years and standard deviation of 2.1 years.

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
The cumulative distribution for the total elapsed time until failure is obtained in the same
way as before by application of the probability density function for the time until failure of
the third wire. Considering the expression for the cumulative distribution of the time until
failure of the third wire, all the relevant indices are just incremented by 1 (e.g b2 to b3 and
b3 to b4).
The resulting distribution function is shown in Figure D8.18. It is found to be well fitted by
a lognormal model with a mean value of 28 years and a standard deviation of 7.3 years.
Figure D8.18: Resulting cumulative distribution for time until failure of fourth wire. Cumu-
lative distribution is well approximated by lognormal model with a mean value of 28.0 years
and a standard deviation of 7.3 years.
D8.3.8 Failure of fifth wire
The stress concentration factor is next increased to 1.3 and the corresponding time until
failure of the fifth wire (as measured from the time of failure of the fourth wire) is computed
as 1.2 years (based on the assumption that the initial accumulated fatigue damage in the
fifth wire at the time of failure of the fourth wire is equal to zero).
The same random variables as before are next introduced, while the initial damage is also
now equal to 0.4 as for the fourth wire (i.e. the damage in the fifth wire at time of failure
of the fourth wire). The resulting cumulative distribution function is shown in Figure D8.19.
It is found that for the present case the distribution function is quite well approximated by
a lognormal model with a mean value of 2.4 years and a standard deviation of 1.8 years.
The cumulative distribution for the total time until failure is obtained in the same way as
before by application of the probability density function for the time until failure of the fourth
wire in combination with the cumulative distribution function in Figure D8.19 .
The resulting distribution function is shown in Figure D8.20. This distribution is found to be
well fitted by a lognormal model with a mean value of 30.4 years and a standard deviation
of 7.5 years.

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
Figure D8.19: Probability distribution of time until failure of fifth wire after failure of fourth
wire. Cumulative distribution is quite well fitted by a lognormal model with a mean value of
2.4 years and a standard deviation of 1.8 years.
Figure D8.20: Resulting cumulative distribution for time until failure of fifth wire. Cumulative
distribution is well approximated by lognormal model with a mean value of 30.4 years and a
standard deviation of 7.5 years.
D8.3.9 Failure of sixth wire
The stress concentration factor is next increased to 1.375 and the corresponding time until
failure of the sixth wire (as measured from the time of failure of the fifth wire) is found to be
1.05 years (based on an initial accumulated fatigue damage in the sixth wire equal to zero
at the time of failure of the fifth wire).
The same random variables as before are next introduced combined with an initial damage
of 0.4 as for the fifth wire. The resulting cumulative distribution function is shown in Figure

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
D8.21. The distribution function is now quite well approximated by a lognormal model with
a mean value of 2.0 years and a standard deviation of 1.7 years.
Figure D8.21: Probability distribution of time until failure of sixth wire, given failure of fifth
wire. Distribution function is well fitted by lognormal model with mean value of 2.0 years
and standard deviation of 1.7 years. (Initial damage in sixth wire at time of failure of fifth
wire is assumed to be 0.4)
The cumulative distribution for the total time until failure is obtained in the same way as
before by application of the probability density function for the time until failure of the fifth
wire in combination with the cumulative distribution function in Figure D8.21.
The resulting distribution function is shown in Figure D8.22. This distribution is found to be
well fitted by a lognormal model with a mean value of 30.4 years and a standard deviation
of 7.7 years.
Figure D8.22: Resulting cumulative distribution for time until failure of sixth wire. Cumu-
lative distribution is well approximated by lognormal model with a mean value of 32.4 years
and a standard deviation of 7.7 years.

Section D8.3
OC2017 A-001
D8.3.10 Summary of results for sequential wire failure
A summary of the properties of the sequence of cumulative distribution functions for the time
until the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth wire failures are given in Table D8.11
below.
Table D8.11: Properties of cumulative distribution functions for total time until sequence of
wire failures
Failure in wire number Mean value Standard deviation

[years] [years]
1 17.0 6.0
2 21.5 6.5
3 25.2 7.0
4 28.0 7.3
5 30.4 7.5
6 32.4 7.7
It is furthermore worthwhile to consider the time until the three probability levels which
correspond to safety class high, normal and low are reached for the sequence of wire failures
(i.e. 10-5 , 10-4 and 10-3 ). These values can be directly identified from the sequence of
cumulative distribution functions for Tb1 , Tb2 , Tb3 and up to Tb6 . The results are given
in Table D8.12 below. For the purpose of comparison, the corresponding accumulated
values based on application of the design SN-curve (also assuming the initial damage in the
individual wires to be identical to zero) are also shown in the rightmost column of the table.
The resulting factored values which are obtained by application of a safety factor of 10 is
also shown in the same column.
An estimate of the time until failure of the sixth wire based on application of the design SN-
curve and the given stress distribution (including successively increasing stress concentration
factors) is accordingly obtained as (4.3+2.2+1.8+1.5+1.2+1.05) years = 12.15 years. This
exceeds the estimated time until failure for the first wire (i.e. 4.3 years) by almost a factor
of 3 (Note: These values do not include the time until sea water ingress occurs, i.e. 5 years).
It is noted that this estimate is based on the assumption of complete independence between
the failure events (i.e. breakage) for the individual wires. Accordingly this estimate is based
on one conservative assumption (the design SN-curve which represents a lower fractile) and
one assumption which is likely to be unconservative (i.e. related to independent failure
events). It is further observed that dividing the estimated fatigue lifetimes by a factor of 10
gives a negligible design value of the corresponding residual lifetime of 1.2 years.

Section D8.4
OC2017 A-001
Table D8.12: Time until safety levels are reached versus design values
Wire Safety Safety Safety Design SN-curve

num- level high level level low Factored/unfactored(Note that the
ber transition normal transition common starting point for all time
[years] transition [years] values is at t=5 years)
[years]
1 5.8 6.4 7.0 [(5+0.43)=5.4]/[(5+4.3)=9.3]
2 6.0 6.8 8.3 [(5+0.65)=5.7]/[(5+6.5)=11.5]
3 7.6 9.0 10.5 [(5+0.83)=5.8]/[(5+8.3)=13.3]
4 9.2 10.5 12.2 [(5+0.98)=6.0]/[(5+9.8)=14.8]
5 10.5 12.0 14.0 [(5+1.1)=6.1]/[(5+11.0))=16.0]
6 11.6 13.2 15.5 [(5+1.2)=6.2]/[(5+12.1)=17.1]
D8.4 Concluding remarks
For the Case Study riser configuration reliability analyses are performed for the two cases
corresponding to conditions with an intact outer sheath versus a damaged one. In the latter
case sea-water is present in the annulus, and conditions corresponding to clamp repair as
well as no repair are analysed.
Three different SN-curves which correspond to environments with different corrosive prop-
erties are considered. These correspond respectively to in-air conditions, CO2 conditions
without sea-water and subsequently with seawater being present. For the case with CO2
being present in the annulus, the effect of applying the monitored operation pressure instead
of the initial pressure is quantified. This is found to have a strong influence on the predicted
remaining lifetime of the riser.
Statistical scatter associated solely with available SN-data is first taken into account. The
effect of including additional sources of uncertainty is subsequently investigated. The time
until transition between the different safety levels is found to decrease significantly, although
the variability related to SN-related uncertainty still dominates the picture.
An assessment of the probabilistic characteristics for the time from seawater ingress until
possible cross-section failure is performed based on consideration of a sequence of multiple
wire failures. For the case that there is low correlation between the individual wire failures
(e.g. due to a defect-driven failure process) it is found that there is a significant effect related
to single versus multiple wire failure events.
Statistical scatter associated solely with available SN-data is first taken into account. The
effect of including additional sources of uncertainty is subsequently investigated. The time
until transition between the different safety levels is found to decrease significantly, although
the variability related to SN-related uncertainty still dominates.

Section D8.4
OC2017 A-001

Part E
Abbrevations, Units and Constants
663
Chapter E1
Abbreviations
Author: 4Subsea, SINTEF Ocean, NTNU
665
Section E1.0
OC2017 A-001
Abbreviations
Table E1.1: Abbreviations
AISI 304 Stainless steel grade

AISI 316 Stainless steel grade
API American Petroleum Institute
APL Advanced Production and Loading, the company is now part of Na-
tional Oilwell Varco
A&R Abandon and Recover
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AUV Autonomous underwater vehicle
CALM Catenary Anchor Leg Mooring
CAPEX Capital Expenditures
CIV Corrected Inherent Viscosity
CoF Consequence of failure
CoG Centre of gravity
CP Cathodic Protection
CRA Corrosion Resistant Alloy
CVI Close visual inspection
DEH Direct Electrical Heating
DFI Design, Fabrication and Installation
DNV Det Norske Veitas
EPIC Engineering Procurement Installation and Commissioning
ESC Environmental Stress Cracking
ESV Emergency shutdown valve
EV Emergency valve
FAT Factory Acceptance Test
FE FEM Final Element Method (computational analysis type)
FPSO Floating Production Storage and Offloading
GI Gas injection
GRP Glass Reinforced Polyester
GRV Gas Relieve Valve
GVI General visual inspection
HDPE High Density PolyEthylene
Hs Significant Wave Height
ID Inner Diameter
IM Integrity Management
IMR Inspection Maintenance and Repair
IMS Integrity Management System
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IPB Integrated Production Bundle
ISU Integrated Service Umbilical
ITR Inspection, Test and Repair
JIP Joint Industry Project
Kp Kilometer position
LPP Length between perpendiculars (vessel length measurement)

Section E1.0
OC2017 A-001
LTA Lifetime Assessment

LTE Life Time Extension
MBR Minimum Bending Radius
MEG Mono Ethylene glycol
MWA Mid Water Arch
NACE National Association of Corrosive Engineers
NORSOK Norwegian Standards for the Oil Industry
OD Outer Diameter
OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
OOS Out-Of Straightness
OP Oil production
OPEX Operational Expenditure
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Process and Instrumentation
Diagram
PA Polyamide
PA 11 Polyamide 11
PE PolyEthylene
PLEM PipeLine End Manifold
PLET PipeLine End Termination
PMV Production Master Valve (subsea production trees/manifolds)
PoF Probability of failure
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
PU PolyUrethane
PVDF Polyvinylidene fluoride
PWV Production Wing Valve (subsea production trees/manifolds)
QA Quality assurance
RAO Response Amplitude Operator
RFO Ready For Operation
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
RP Recommend Practice (used by DNV)
SBM Single Buoy Mooring, company
SN Stress range versus number of cycles to failure
SSIV Subsea Isolation Valve
TAN Total acid number
TDP Touchdown Point
TFL Through Flow Line
TLP Tension Leg Platform
UHB Upheaval Buckling
UV Ultraviolet (radiation)
VDF Vinylidene Fluoride
WI Water injection
WL Water level
WROV Work- ROV
XLPE Cross linked Polyethylene
γ UR Utilisation related to Upheaval Buckling based on displacement
needed to mobilise peak upward resistance
γ UF Utilisation related to force required to initiate Upheaval Buckling

Section E1.0
OC2017 A-001

Chapter E2
Units and Constants
Author: 4Subsea, SINTEF Ocean, NTNU
669
OC2017 A-001
Units and Constants
SI units are used for calculations and reporting. However, for the purpose of clarity some
imperial units may be used. If not noted otherwise, all units are SI or units derived thereof.
Table E2.1: Units and Constants
Units used
Length meter [m]
Force Newton [N]
Pressure bar (105x[N/m2 ] or 0.1 [Pa])
Mass kilogram [kg]
Stress Pascal [Pa] and [MPa] (106x[Pa])
Temperature [°C]
Viscosity [mPa· s] (= 1 centipoise [cp])
Constants
Acceleration due to 9.81 [m/s2 ]
gravity
Density of seawater 1025 [kg/m3 ], unless otherwise specified.
Density of steel 7850 [kg/m3 ]
Steel modulus of 2.06x105 [MPa], unless otherwise specified.
elasticity
Poisson’s ratio 0.3 [-]

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Handbook on

Design and operation

NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean ii 2017 edition

Editors: Dag Fergestad SINTEF Ocean

This HANDBOOK is sponsored by: ConocoPhillips

©2017: NTNU / 4Subsea / SINTEF Ocean

Telephone: +47 464 15 000

Cover photo: ©4Subsea AS

2017 edition iii NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

STF70 A92006 - 07.02.1992

MT2014 A-001 15.04.2014

OC2017 A-001 06.06.2017

OC2017 A-001 12.12.2017

• corrected typing error in equation B1.61

NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean iv 2017 edition

2017 edition v NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

• Reliability methods for integrity assessment of flexible pipes.

NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean vi 2017 edition

2017 edition vii NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean

NTNU, 4Subsea and SINTEF Ocean viii 2017 edition

• Highlight the implementation of methodologies described in the Handbook sections

PART A: FLEXIBLE SYSTEMS

Chapter A1 "Flexible Pipe Systems"

The primary objectives of the chapter are to present:

• State of the art overview of flexible pipe systems in use today

• Flexible pipe design aspects

• Flexible riser system experience and guidance

• Flexible flowline experience and guidance

• Installation considerations and experience

Chapter A2 "Flexible Pipe Properties and Materials"

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Chapter A3 "Failure Modes"

PART B: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS TOOLS

Chapter B1 "Design Analysis"

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Chapter B2, "Risk Analysis Methodology"

Chapter B3, "Reliability Analysis"

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Chapter B4 "Annulus Environment and Corrosion"

The purposes of this chapter are to:

• Define the span of possible conditions in flexible pipe annuli

– Detection of damage of outer sheath

– Susceptibility for corrosion as a function of the location of cover damage

– Risk assessment and possible mitigation

The industry needs:

• Solutions for monitoring, detection and predictions

• Guidance for how to deal with damage or other incidents

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Chapter B5 "Test Methods"

Chapter C1 "Integrity Management"

Chapter C2 "Lifetime Assessment"

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Chapter C3 "Repair Methods"

PART D: CASE STUDY

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of corrosion damage and how to measure the corrosion damage.

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A1 Flexible Pipe Systems 3