[ ] In his essay, F.G.

Bailey, a British social anthropologist, discusses India's

parapolitical systems. The term "para political" was coined by David Easton, who
believes that everything occurs in local communities such as villages, universities, or
international organisations is "para political." He wishes to examine the parapolitical
situation in India, focusing on various types of conflicts in the village of Bisipara in the
state of Orissa. On a local level, he wants to examine three types of conflict: factions,
cast climbing, and conflict between castes active in bisipsara.

Dolo is an Oriya term that means flock, herd, or political group, while the phrase
doladoli means "conflict of functions." Bisipara was created by two renowned
warrior caste men in the village of Dolo. The warriors were mostly from the same
agnatic / familial heritage. Some belonged to the lowest castes, and some turned
traitors to their own brother's descendants for financial gain. Man contributed more
money to make up the costs of weddings, burials, and mourning for those in his own
faction. The leader's role was to safeguard his faction from outside threats, which
was referred to as the 'brokerage task.' During a panchayat confrontation, verbal
attacks and defences for honour were commonplace. Typically, leaders relied on an
orator.

The majority of the attacks against village leaders were motivated by simple
misappropriation of community finances and failure to contribute to local chores.
Because the punishment was based on consensus, the Panchayat never came to a
decision, and disagreements typically resulted in rumours, gossip, and backbiting. It
was only an ancestor of leader one replacing the ancestor of leader two from the
headman ship, and the events of indecisive combat kept going one after another
with barely any significant fights performed. Dola Doli had several regulations, such
as shaking hands but not meeting, and being polite if they did. They did not destroy
the materials of others who held political power. The village was united in its
debates, and the conflicts were resolved in the village rather than being carried to a
higher political authority, indicating that the community was united and the issues
were not taken to higher authorities.

Dolo conflict group, which consisted of two or three relationship rules, namely,
leader, follower, and dependent, with the dependent having the ability to switch
sides but the follower not. The followers' collectivity was considered as a core, while
the dependents' collectivity was seen as a support. Confrontations and encounters
were the messages about one's own power, approaches of interaction between
competitors and assertion or claims to entitlement to value role, dangers, and to
determine opponent a series of challenges that resulted in one side withdrawing or
in one of the battles with victory of one side and defeat of the other.
This is a public statement that demonstrates both of their strength and constitutes
an encounter. Communication is based on both parties using similar language,
agreeing on symbol actions, and employing permitted strategies. Instability emerges
when the two sides are unable to communicate effectively and cannot agree on
suitable tactics.

Political or economic activity brings with it some advantages that are not available to
everyone in the village. The advantages are regarded as being limited in a cultural
sense. Because power and honour are gained by demeaning others, the political
structure is made up of a set of norms that govern the competition and keep it in
check. Other general rules apply to political actors, such as having a family and
worshipping, and their behaviour is also governed by non-social factors such as
demography, the physical environment, and so on. All of these factors combine to
form the environment of a political structure. According to Easton, structure and
environment go through a constitutional process of mutual adjustment. In its
environment, the political structure provides both resources and restraints.

Caste climbing is the second situation. Due to the government's prohibition on

distilling at home, the distiller's caste in Bisipara becomes extremely wealthy. They
ascended the caste ladder by spending on prestige, sanskritizing their practises,
purchasing land, and excluding their women from working in the fields. Due to
economic stability, the distilleries of Bisipara that were on the verge of being
polluted ascended up the caste ladder.

Bailey is interested in learning more about the process of distiller caste climbing,
which aided a low-caste man's elevation in society. The desire to rise in caste
suggests that caste plays a significant role in politics. According to Bailey, caste
climbing is predicated on enhancing prestige and honour. Honor is symbolised in two
ways: the first is through differentiated services from village specialists, which are
paid for in two ways: cash or through the Jajmani system. Jajmani has a higher rank
of implication than cash, and there are also sophisticated food laws, such as the
quality of the meal and whether it is accepted or denied based on the giver's
inferiority.

Distiller can break into monopoly in four stages: first, he can make specialists
materially attached to him through loans, threats, and violence. Second, by expecting
the specialist's services in exchange for money, then converting the services into a
jajmani arrangement, and last, by creating the same connection with the specialist as
a dominant caste warrior or brahman.

In doladoli, if a distiller is a head of the Group, it is called- leader one, it is usual that
the leftovers distillers will gain advantage, a team is not an individual but a caste-
group as per the rule of caste climbing. The leader one's support element is village
specialist whose services he is attempting to gain will be placed in the support
category because his support can be subverted anytime. Except for those who lose
because of leader one's achievement, identifying the opponent leader is difficult.
Leader will attempt to gain the services of specialists (washerman, herdman, barber,
etc.). Leader two will only be exposed if he takes some action for members of his
caste and higher who oppose distiller.

They keep things simple by obtaining specialist services, which is the goal of the
competition between the two leaders' honors, which is a commodity or instrument
that incorporates which side has the capacity to have the most resources by along
with the freedom of who has the most political maneuvering.

The four measures proposed by Bailey for leader one are materially beholding the
specialist, diverting services from them in cash & changing the same services into the
jajmani system, and extracting forms of commensal esteem from specialists, similar
to warriors and brahmans. The first two aspects use non-political dependent roles to
support gain, whereas the other two use pragmatic roles that are different from the
normative structure. It can be seen that normative rules of the village political
structure always impose a claim to honour and purity. If leader two intends to enter
the arena, he can do so by acquiring the specialist out of leader one's debt or by
harassing leader one straight.

Leader two will also get rid of specialist services because the former has previously
provided services to leader one, causing leader two to cancel services because he
would dump the old specialist as useless and select a new specialist. They maintain
the game's rules, including the meaning of honor symbols and prizes, and do not
destabilize the monopolistic deference system. The majority of dola doli techniques
are normatively justified, and the most important preliminary maneuver or
subversion is dictated by how to succeed without cheating. There are no prescriptive
norms for caste climbing, and there are no norms that can be used overtly to justify
such actions. There is no oriya term for caste-climbing as this term doladoli exists. It
implies that the caste system is not a normatively political structure, and that rivalry
between castes can only be organized by pragmatic rules.

Both leaders agree on the connotation of honour symbols, as well as the practical
laws and regulations governing what environmental resources may or may not be
used during the competition. It also demonstrates why distillers cannot speed up the
process by directly subverting the Brahman, because according to the rules, if a
distiller wanted to subvert a poor brahmin, he will need a huge amount of money,
and the higher caste Brahmin will most likely outcaste the poor brahmin, and it costs
nothing more to buy the loans of a poor Brahmin than it does to buy the loans of a
poor washerman. The entire situation demonstrates that all of the political value that
a particular Brahman had for the distiller will be removed, with no rewards for him.
On a normative and pragmatic level, Dola Doli forbids the usage of caste climbing
roles.

The context of the caste system can assist in the evaluation of this caste climbing
process in general, as it can be applied to any political structure in which there is a
chase for rank, power, and prestige. Bailey discusses Barths' research in Swat Valley,
where he looks at the changing leadership in the 'cosa nostra gangs,' and how a man
named Valachi was interrogated by the United States Senate. That exposed the same
broad pattern of resource build-up that defines political standing and allows him to
claim normative symbols of political status.

The third problem, caste conflict, has no Oriya equivalent. Harijan affair, or the affair
of the defiled caste:pans, is the name given to the conflict in Bisipara (praja, who is
dependent on warriors). Following Gandhi's anti-untouchability campaign and the
temple entry act, the pans tried to enter the village temple as if they were of the
clean caste, and the people of the clean caste obstructed their way. The pans
requested police assistance and legal protection for their rights. After that, they
created similar deity in their street and decided to quit scavenging as a typical
profession, vowed to be teetotal, and changed their position from pan to Gandhi's
"Harijan." People of the clean caste shunned pans as village musicians, instead hiring
a different set of untouchables.

When their petition was denied, the pans would seek assistance from a higher
official or the government. Fearing a civil complaint from pans, clean caste countered
by hiring a lawyer. The pans were able to manage the sources of power since the
Harijan campaign was still proceeding out, and they had other Congress assistance
because they now had affluent landowners, schoolmasters, a political party agent,
and ex-police officers from their own caste.

The features of doladoli about the roles that comprise honour and the tactics that
competitors may use are normatively stated, but in caste climbing, the rules that
specify the prize are normatively stated, and the main tactic for turning an economic
role into a political role is a pragmatic rule. Thus, in order to obtain political power,
one must switch wealth into purity. Furthermore, caste can be a criterion for political
status, and an economic role can be converted into a political role. The pans did not
attempt to make a pragmatic transition to their economic roles since their purity or
honour rating is originally so low in untouchability that any successful attempt to
submit a village servant would result in them being dismissed by others.

Clean castes refuse to acknowledge that the use of external political rule has
pragmatic legitimacy in the village political order, whereas wealth is a resource that
can be converted into caste status, and closer ties with the government for the
Congress party cannot be turned, at least not in Bisipara. Doladoli is a set of rules
that regulate competition by agreeing on prizes and tactically permissible tactics to
be used in obtaining those prices. This is also valid for caste climbing, but there is
normative agreement on prices however no agreement on permissible tactics in
caste conflict.

Normatively, village structure defines honour, but structure B specifies that honour is
determined by election to office. It further highlights that while caste is a
prerequisite for admission into the competition, all citizens, regardless of caste, are
eligible for honour under structure B of government, which is an explicit normative
rule that external political rules may not be applied in village politics. It is shown that
in order to gain the village's status according to structure A, the pans enlist the
assistance of structure B, which is government/legal assistance. They try to gain their
rights as citizens of India in relation to structure B in order to obtain the prizes
offered by the village structure A.

A similar change is occurring in the clean caste, as they are unable to prevent the
pans from obtaining government assistance. They are obliged for using legal rules as
a counter-attack in order to maintain their monopoly on prizes defined by caste or
village normative rules. They are prompted to present their case to magistrates and
police in terms that are acceptable under the law.

When a pragmatic rule is brought that enables distillers using an economic role as a
qualification for political status, it is a way for them to relieve pressure on the
normative rules. However, the use of citizenship roles in caste conflict is not like this;
these are not pragmatic exceptions that can be accommodated within the normative
rules; instead, they corroborate the pertinent normative rule that caste is a political
qualification, and their increasing volume of use builds up like a head of water is the
normative dam and eventually it gives way.

In terms of the model's constraints, actions such as corruption, nepotism, and

casteism are condemned in a legal context, but they are normatively correct in a
village or caste framework. Such laws can be used to local factional politics, as seen
in Northern India, where the Jat and Rajput employ the external roles of courts,
police, and high-ranking associates for personal advantage.
Finally, he demonstrated the conceptual clarity of the three categories of conflict in
Bisipara: first, a political structure with norms such as prizes and personal norms that
qualify a man to obtain services from others; next, tactics or procedures such as
subversion confrontation and encounter. The normative are values that can be
publicly expressed as a rationale for action at the second level, while pragmatic rules
are technical directives that are ethically neutral and fill in the gaps left by the
generalities of normative expression. They're the technical rules for breaking the
normative rules without getting caught. The village's patterns and episodes, which
precede one situation after another and accumulate within the normative
framework, are the subject of the third set. Forth goes on to say that there is a
difference between a political framework and the environment.

Politics are ordered competition for certain sort of value. It defines political structure
as critically detached from the environment, which includes social structures, non-
social structures, and non-political (like democracy) structures. The relationship
between political structure and its environment could be seen in terms of both
positive and negative feedback. It can also be altered to allow for environmental
pressure and to establish regularities, which are statements that link variables in a
political system to environmental variables.

Untouchability's predominance, as well as the discriminatory and exploitative

processes associated with it, have been attempted to be eroded by the state. The
Temple Entry Act, for example, was a direct intrusion by the state in the personal
lives and relationships of the people of Bisipara. Bailey seems to note that those who
were financially independent of the village were the ones who were least tied by its
laws, traditions, and consequences. By complying to official and legal requirements,
many former untouchable households were able to break their caste habits. The
previous untouchables who stayed in Bisipara were active participants in the
panchayat's politics as well as the village's ritual life. It is self-evident that political
gains can be obtained through economic advantages, which aid in caste elevation. A
political arena or government could provide as a means for a lower caste to compete
with a higher caste simply by virtue of being a legal citizen of the state.

[ ] Emma Tarlo's article attempts to construct a narrative of the emergency by

focusing on a section of Delhi that is not in the heart of the city, but rather the area
where people who had previously lived in the inner city slums were later relocated to
the resettlement colony. She was less concerned with slum clearance and more
concerned with the reality that many people were able to achieve their housing
rights through family planning.

The Welcome colony in east Delhi was a place where slum dwellers were relocated
(one wave in the 1960s and second in 1976). She went to the welcome colony since it
allows her to see things from a different angle. She goes to the MCD's slum and
Jhuggi Jhompri department because this is where all of the compiled file work for the
resettlements is maintained. The files gave her access to the official emergency
memory, which had been hushed during the crisis. She received file interpretation
aid from the clerks, which was critical in providing information about what was in the
file as well as material that was not officially documented in the files. By looking
through the files, she was able to deduce that not every slum was eligible for
resettlement.

When a plot of land or a built-up tenement is assigned to a family whose home has
been demolished, usually as a consequence of a slum clearance policy, but rarely due
to flood or fire, a slum department file is created. Because the papers relate to
allotments rather than demolitions, it's impossible to tell how many of the displaced
were unable to find a plot or tenement based on them. In 1960, a squatter census
was conducted to distinguish between two groups of squatters: those who had
settled in Delhi before July 1960 and those who had settled in Delhi after that date.
The goal was to relocate eligible squatters to resettlement colonies, where they
would be required to pay lease payments and small rentals. Ineligible squatters were
to be evicted from the city entirely, preventing future migrants from claiming they
could dwell in the capital. Due to the difficulty in identifying the eligible from the
ineligible, this difference was later dropped.

Many people sold their plots and moved back to jhuggis, sometimes even settling for
the second time. To put an end to this practise, the MCD lowered the size of
allotments from 50 to 25 square yards, lowering their value and making them less
enticing to developers. All of this occurred as a result of the jhuggi jhompri
eradication strategy, which was implemented in 1958 when the slum 'problem'
became recognised as a significant one. As a result, 'paper truths' served as
intermediaries between the officials' requirements and the demands of the
occupants. The demolition slips revealed that while most pre-emergency allotments
were from jhuggis, many came from ancient neighbourhoods of old Delhi, implying
that they were not recent migrants but long-term residents.
 [ ] In his essay, F.G. Bailey, a British social anthropologist, discusses India's
parapolitical systems. The term "para political" was coined by David Easton, who
believes that everything occurs in local communities such as villages, universities, or
international organisations is "para political." He wishes to examine the parapolitical
situation in India, focusing on various types of conflicts in the village of Bisipara in the
state of Orissa. On a local level, he wants to examine three types of conflict: factions,
cast climbing, and conflict between castes active in bisipsara.

Dolo is an Oriya term that means flock, herd, or political group, while the phrase
doladoli means "conflict of functions." Bisipara was created by two renowned
warrior caste men in the village of Dolo. The warriors were mostly from the same
agnatic / familial heritage. Some belonged to the lowest castes, and some turned
traitors to their own brother's descendants for financial gain. Man contributed more
money to make up the costs of weddings, burials, and mourning for those in his own
faction. The leader's role was to safeguard his faction from outside threats, which
was referred to as the 'brokerage task.' During a panchayat confrontation, verbal
attacks and defences for honour were commonplace. Typically, leaders relied on an
orator.

The majority of the attacks against village leaders were motivated by simple
misappropriation of community finances and failure to contribute to local chores.
Because the punishment was based on consensus, the Panchayat never came to a
decision, and disagreements typically resulted in rumours, gossip, and backbiting. It
was only an ancestor of leader one replacing the ancestor of leader two from the
headman ship, and the events of indecisive combat kept going one after another
with barely any significant fights performed. Dola Doli had several regulations, such
as shaking hands but not meeting, and being polite if they did. They did not destroy
the materials of others who held political power. The village was united in its
debates, and the conflicts were resolved in the village rather than being carried to a
higher political authority, indicating that the community was united and the issues
were not taken to higher authorities.

Dolo conflict group, which consisted of two or three relationship rules, namely,
leader, follower, and dependent, with the dependent having the ability to switch
sides but the follower not. The followers' collectivity was considered as a core, while
the dependents' collectivity was seen as a support. Confrontations and encounters
were the messages about one's own power, approaches of interaction between
competitors and assertion or claims to entitlement to value role, dangers, and to
determine opponent a series of challenges that resulted in one side withdrawing or
in one of the battles with victory of one side and defeat of the other.

This is a public statement that demonstrates both of their strength and constitutes
an encounter. Communication is based on both parties using similar language,
agreeing on symbol actions, and employing permitted strategies. Instability emerges
when the two sides are unable to communicate effectively and cannot agree on
suitable tactics.

Political or economic activity brings with it some advantages that are not available to
everyone in the village. The advantages are regarded as being limited in a cultural
sense. Because power and honour are gained by demeaning others, the political
structure is made up of a set of norms that govern the competition and keep it in
check. Other general rules apply to political actors, such as having a family and
worshipping, and their behaviour is also governed by non-social factors such as
demography, the physical environment, and so on. All of these factors combine to
form the environment of a political structure. According to Easton, structure and
environment go through a constitutional process of mutual adjustment. In its
environment, the political structure provides both resources and restraints.

Caste climbing is the second situation. Due to the government's prohibition on

distilling at home, the distiller's caste in Bisipara becomes extremely wealthy. They
ascended the caste ladder by spending on prestige, sanskritizing their practises,
purchasing land, and excluding their women from working in the fields. Due to
economic stability, the distilleries of Bisipara that were on the verge of being
polluted ascended up the caste ladder.

Bailey is interested in learning more about the process of distiller caste climbing,
which aided a low-caste man's elevation in society. The desire to rise in caste
suggests that caste plays a significant role in politics. According to Bailey, caste
climbing is predicated on enhancing prestige and honour. Honor is symbolised in two
ways: the first is through differentiated services from village specialists, which are
paid for in two ways: cash or through the Jajmani system. Jajmani has a higher rank
of implication than cash, and there are also sophisticated food laws, such as the
quality of the meal and whether it is accepted or denied based on the giver's
inferiority.

Distiller can break into monopoly in four stages: first, he can make specialists
materially attached to him through loans, threats, and violence. Second, by expecting
the specialist's services in exchange for money, then converting the services into a
jajmani arrangement, and last, by creating the same connection with the specialist as
a dominant caste warrior or brahman.

In doladoli, if a distiller is a head of the Group, it is called- leader one, it is usual that
the leftovers distillers will gain advantage, a team is not an individual but a caste-
group as per the rule of caste climbing. The leader one's support element is village
specialist whose services he is attempting to gain will be placed in the support
category because his support can be subverted anytime. Except for those who lose
because of leader one's achievement, identifying the opponent leader is difficult.
Leader will attempt to gain the services of specialists (washerman, herdman, barber,
etc.). Leader two will only be exposed if he takes some action for members of his
caste and higher who oppose distiller.

They keep things simple by obtaining specialist services, which is the goal of the
competition between the two leaders' honors, which is a commodity or instrument
that incorporates which side has the capacity to have the most resources by along
with the freedom of who has the most political maneuvering.

The four measures proposed by Bailey for leader one are materially beholding the
specialist, diverting services from them in cash & changing the same services into the
jajmani system, and extracting forms of commensal esteem from specialists, similar
to warriors and brahmans. The first two aspects use non-political dependent roles to
support gain, whereas the other two use pragmatic roles that are different from the
normative structure. It can be seen that normative rules of the village political
structure always impose a claim to honour and purity. If leader two intends to enter
the arena, he can do so by acquiring the specialist out of leader one's debt or by
harassing leader one straight.

Leader two will also get rid of specialist services because the former has previously
provided services to leader one, causing leader two to cancel services because he
would dump the old specialist as useless and select a new specialist. They maintain
the game's rules, including the meaning of honor symbols and prizes, and do not
destabilize the monopolistic deference system. The majority of dola doli techniques
are normatively justified, and the most important preliminary maneuver or
subversion is dictated by how to succeed without cheating. There are no prescriptive
norms for caste climbing, and there are no norms that can be used overtly to justify
such actions. There is no oriya term for caste-climbing as this term doladoli exists. It
implies that the caste system is not a normatively political structure, and that rivalry
between castes can only be organized by pragmatic rules.

Both leaders agree on the connotation of honour symbols, as well as the practical
laws and regulations governing what environmental resources may or may not be
used during the competition. It also demonstrates why distillers cannot speed up the
process by directly subverting the Brahman, because according to the rules, if a
distiller wanted to subvert a poor brahmin, he will need a huge amount of money,
and the higher caste Brahmin will most likely outcaste the poor brahmin, and it costs
nothing more to buy the loans of a poor Brahmin than it does to buy the loans of a
poor washerman. The entire situation demonstrates that all of the political value that
a particular Brahman had for the distiller will be removed, with no rewards for him.
On a normative and pragmatic level, Dola Doli forbids the usage of caste climbing
roles.

The context of the caste system can assist in the evaluation of this caste climbing
process in general, as it can be applied to any political structure in which there is a
chase for rank, power, and prestige. Bailey discusses Barths' research in Swat Valley,
where he looks at the changing leadership in the 'cosa nostra gangs,' and how a man
named Valachi was interrogated by the United States Senate. That exposed the same
broad pattern of resource build-up that defines political standing and allows him to
claim normative symbols of political status.

The third problem, caste conflict, has no Oriya equivalent. Harijan affair, or the affair
of the defiled caste:pans, is the name given to the conflict in Bisipara (praja, who is
dependent on warriors). Following Gandhi's anti-untouchability campaign and the
temple entry act, the pans tried to enter the village temple as if they were of the
clean caste, and the people of the clean caste obstructed their way. The pans
requested police assistance and legal protection for their rights. After that, they
created similar deity in their street and decided to quit scavenging as a typical
profession, vowed to be teetotal, and changed their position from pan to Gandhi's
"Harijan." People of the clean caste shunned pans as village musicians, instead hiring
a different set of untouchables.

When their petition was denied, the pans would seek assistance from a higher
official or the government. Fearing a civil complaint from pans, clean caste countered
by hiring a lawyer. The pans were able to manage the sources of power since the
Harijan campaign was still proceeding out, and they had other Congress assistance
because they now had affluent landowners, schoolmasters, a political party agent,
and ex-police officers from their own caste.

The features of doladoli about the roles that comprise honour and the tactics that
competitors may use are normatively stated, but in caste climbing, the rules that
specify the prize are normatively stated, and the main tactic for turning an economic
role into a political role is a pragmatic rule. Thus, in order to obtain political power,
one must switch wealth into purity. Furthermore, caste can be a criterion for political
status, and an economic role can be converted into a political role. The pans did not
attempt to make a pragmatic transition to their economic roles since their purity or
honour rating is originally so low in untouchability that any successful attempt to
submit a village servant would result in them being dismissed by others.

Clean castes refuse to acknowledge that the use of external political rule has
pragmatic legitimacy in the village political order, whereas wealth is a resource that
can be converted into caste status, and closer ties with the government for the
Congress party cannot be turned, at least not in Bisipara. Doladoli is a set of rules
that regulate competition by agreeing on prizes and tactically permissible tactics to
be used in obtaining those prices. This is also valid for caste climbing, but there is
normative agreement on prices however no agreement on permissible tactics in
caste conflict.

Normatively, village structure defines honour, but structure B specifies that honour is
determined by election to office. It further highlights that while caste is a
prerequisite for admission into the competition, all citizens, regardless of caste, are
eligible for honour under structure B of government, which is an explicit normative
rule that external political rules may not be applied in village politics. It is shown that
in order to gain the village's status according to structure A, the pans enlist the
assistance of structure B, which is government/legal assistance. They try to gain their
rights as citizens of India in relation to structure B in order to obtain the prizes
offered by the village structure A.

A similar change is occurring in the clean caste, as they are unable to prevent the
pans from obtaining government assistance. They are obliged for using legal rules as
a counter-attack in order to maintain their monopoly on prizes defined by caste or
village normative rules. They are prompted to present their case to magistrates and
police in terms that are acceptable under the law.

When a pragmatic rule is brought that enables distillers using an economic role as a
qualification for political status, it is a way for them to relieve pressure on the
normative rules. However, the use of citizenship roles in caste conflict is not like this;
these are not pragmatic exceptions that can be accommodated within the normative
rules; instead, they corroborate the pertinent normative rule that caste is a political
qualification, and their increasing volume of use builds up like a head of water is the
normative dam and eventually it gives way.

In terms of the model's constraints, actions such as corruption, nepotism, and

casteism are condemned in a legal context, but they are normatively correct in a
village or caste framework. Such laws can be used to local factional politics, as seen
in Northern India, where the Jat and Rajput employ the external roles of courts,
police, and high-ranking associates for personal advantage.

Finally, he demonstrated the conceptual clarity of the three categories of conflict in

Bisipara: first, a political structure with norms such as prizes and personal norms that
qualify a man to obtain services from others; next, tactics or procedures such as
subversion confrontation and encounter. The normative are values that can be
publicly expressed as a rationale for action at the second level, while pragmatic rules
are technical directives that are ethically neutral and fill in the gaps left by the
generalities of normative expression. They're the technical rules for breaking the
normative rules without getting caught. The village's patterns and episodes, which
precede one situation after another and accumulate within the normative
framework, are the subject of the third set. Forth goes on to say that there is a
difference between a political framework and the environment.

Politics are ordered competition for certain sort of value. It defines political structure
as critically detached from the environment, which includes social structures, non-
social structures, and non-political (like democracy) structures. The relationship
between political structure and its environment could be seen in terms of both
positive and negative feedback. It can also be altered to allow for environmental
pressure and to establish regularities, which are statements that link variables in a
political system to environmental variables.

Untouchability's predominance, as well as the discriminatory and exploitative

processes associated with it, have been attempted to be eroded by the state. The
Temple Entry Act, for example, was a direct intrusion by the state in the personal
lives and relationships of the people of Bisipara. Bailey seems to note that those who
were financially independent of the village were the ones who were least tied by its
laws, traditions, and consequences. By complying to official and legal requirements,
many former untouchable households were able to break their caste habits. The
previous untouchables who stayed in Bisipara were active participants in the
panchayat's politics as well as the village's ritual life. It is self-evident that political
gains can be obtained through economic advantages, which aid in caste elevation. A
political arena or government could provide as a means for a lower caste to compete
with a higher caste simply by virtue of being a legal citizen of the state.

[ ] Emma Tarlo's article attempts to construct a narrative of the emergency by

focusing on a section of Delhi that is not in the heart of the city, but rather the area
where people who had previously lived in the inner city slums were later relocated to
the resettlement colony. She was less concerned with slum clearance and more
concerned with the reality that many people were able to achieve their housing
rights through family planning.

The Welcome colony in east Delhi was a place where slum dwellers were relocated
(one wave in the 1960s and second in 1976). She went to the welcome colony since it
allows her to see things from a different angle. She goes to the MCD's slum and
Jhuggi Jhompri department because this is where all of the compiled file work for the
resettlements is maintained. The files gave her access to the official emergency
memory, which had been hushed during the crisis. She received file interpretation
aid from the clerks, which was critical in providing information about what was in the
file as well as material that was not officially documented in the files. By looking
through the files, she was able to deduce that not every slum was eligible for
resettlement.

When a plot of land or a built-up tenement is assigned to a family whose home has
been demolished, usually as a consequence of a slum clearance policy, but rarely due
to flood or fire, a slum department file is created. Because the papers relate to
allotments rather than demolitions, it's impossible to tell how many of the displaced
were unable to find a plot or tenement based on them. In 1960, a squatter census
was conducted to distinguish between two groups of squatters: those who had
settled in Delhi before July 1960 and those who had settled in Delhi after that date.
The goal was to relocate eligible squatters to resettlement colonies, where they
would be required to pay lease payments and small rentals. Ineligible squatters were
to be evicted from the city entirely, preventing future migrants from claiming they
could dwell in the capital. Due to the difficulty in identifying the eligible from the
ineligible, this difference was later dropped.

Many people sold their plots and moved back to jhuggis, sometimes even settling for
the second time. To put an end to this practise, the MCD lowered the size of
allotments from 50 to 25 square yards, lowering their value and making them less
enticing to developers. All of this occurred as a result of the jhuggi jhompri
eradication strategy, which was implemented in 1958 when the slum 'problem'
became recognised as a significant one. As a result, 'paper truths' served as
intermediaries between the officials' requirements and the demands of the
occupants. The demolition slips revealed that while most pre-emergency allotments
were from jhuggis, many came from ancient neighbourhoods of old Delhi, implying
that they were not recent migrants but long-term residents.