Constitutional Law Assignment

Made by-
Priyanshu Tawer
Ba llb 2nd year 3rd sem.
04116503819

Independence of Judiciary in India

Need for an Independent Judiciary

The basic need for the independence of the judiciary rest upon the following points:

1. To check the functioning of the organs: Judiciary acts as a watchdog by ensuring that all the
organs of the state function within their respective areas and according to the provisions of the
constitution. Judiciary acts as a guardian of the constitution and also aids in securing the doctrine
of separation of powers.
2. Interpreting the provisions of the constitution: It was well known to the framers of the consti-
tution that in future the ambiguity will arise with the provisions of the constitution so they en-
sured that the judiciary must be independent and self-competent to interpret the provision of the
constitution in such a way to clear the ambiguity but such an interpretation must be unbiased i.e.
free from any pressure from any organs like executive. If the judiciary is not independent, the
other organs may pressurize the judiciary to interpret the provision of the constitution according
to them. Judiciary is given the job to interpret the constitution according to the constitutional
philosophy and the constitutional norms.
3. Disputes referred to the judiciary: It is expected of the Judiciary to deliver judicial justice and
not partial or committed justice. By committed justice we mean to say that when a judge em-
phasizes on a particular aspect while giving justice and not considering all the aspects involved
in a particular situation. Similarly judiciary must act in an unbiased manner.

The Constitutional Provisions

Though in India there is no express provision in the constitution but the independence of judiciary is
imbibed in the letters of various provisions of the Constitution.

Independence of judiciary and rule of law are the basic features of the Constitution it cannot be abrog-
ated even by constitutional amendments.1
1
S.P. Gupta v Union of India : AIR 1982 SC 149

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 1. Security of Tenure an Appointment:

The power of appointment of judges of the Supreme Court is to be found in Clause (2) of Article 124
and his clause provides that every judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President after
consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the States as the Pres-
ident may deem necessary for the purpose, provide that in the case of appointment of Judge other than
the Chief Justice, the Chief justice of India shall always be consulted. It is obvious on a plain reading of
Clause (2) of Article 124 that it is the President, which in effect and substance means the Central Gov-
ernment, which is empowered by the Constitution to appoint Judges of the Supreme Court. So also Art-
icle 217, Clause (1) vests the power of appointment of the Judges of High Courts in the Central Govern-
ment, but such power is exercisable only “after consultation with Chief Justice of India, the Governor of
the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court.” It is clear on a plain reading of these two Articles that
the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court and such other Judges of the High court
and of the Supreme Court as the Central Government may deem it necessary to consult, are appoint-
ment resides solely in the sense that the Central Government cannot act arbitrarily without consulting
the constitutional functionaries specified in the two Articles but it can only after consulting them and the
consultation must be full and effective consultation.

Prof. Shibban La Saksen of the members of constituent assembly had suggested that the appointment of
Judges should be confirmed by 2/3rd majority of the parliament.2 This proposition was rejected by the
house because it would compromise he independence of judiciary and would leave the fate of the judge
in the hands of the executives and legislators.

This set the tone for Independence of Judiciary in our country.

The next question that arises for consideration is as to where be the power to appoint Judges of the High
Courts and the Supreme Court located? Who has the final voice in the appointment of Judges of High
Courts and the Supreme Court?

Every Judge of the Supreme Court Shall be appointed by the president by warrant under his hand and
seal after consultation with such of Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court in the States as
the President may deem necessary.

2
Constituent Assembly Debate On 24 May, 1949

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The bone of contention in this particular section is the word ‘consultation’, that whether ‘consultation’
means concurrence or merely communication.

In S.P. Gupta vs Union of India3 the Supreme Court held that ‘Consultation is a mere Suggestion not
concurrence and is not binding on the president.’ Their reasons were as follows:-

 They followed the judgement in Sankalchan Sheth.

 They said that Chief Justice of India is also a man with the flaws and failings of a common man,
hence making his view binding on the President and the executives may be dangerous idea.
 They referred the constitutional assembly debates where Dr. Ambedkar strongly opposed the
idea.

But now in Supreme Court Advocates on Record vs Union of India4 the judgement in S.P. Gupta is now
reversed that the court has held that the opinion of the Chief Justice shall be binding on the President as
he is more Competent than other constitutional machineries to accrue the merit of a candidate.

The judges of Supreme Court and High Courts have been Given the security of the tenure. Once appoin-
ted, they continue to remain in office till they reach the age of retirement which is 65 years in the case of
Judges of Supreme Court (Art.124(2)) and 62 years in the case of Judges of High Courts (Art. 217(1)).

In the words of the bench in all India Judges Association vs Union of India5

“They are not employees of the State holding office during the pleasure of President/governor of the
state, as the case may be”

In words of Prof. K.T Shah in Constituent Assembly-

“ They Should not, in any way be exposed to any apprehension of being thrown out of their work by of-
ficial or executive displeasure. They should not be exposed to the risk of having to secure their liveli-
hood by either resuming their ordinary practice at the bar, or taking up some other occupation which
may not be compatible with a judicial mentality, or which may not be in tune with their perfect inde-
pendence and integrity.”

3
AIR 1982 SC 149
4
(1993) 4 SCC 441
5
AIR 1993 SC 2493

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They cannot be removed from the office except by an order of the President and that too on the ground
of proven misbehaviour and incapacity. A resolution has also to be accepted to that effect by a majority
of total membership of each House of Parliament and also by a majority of no less than two third of the
members of the house present and voting. Procedure is so complicated that there has been no case of the
removal of a Judge of Supreme Court or High Court under this provision.

In C Ramachandran Iyer v. A N Bhattacharjee

Pressure was put the local bar association on the judge to resign. In this case, the SC held that only the
Chief Justice of the SC can be the prime mover of the action against erring judges. Thus, after this case,
action against judges was allowed only through in-house procedures of the judiciary.

2. Salaries and Allowances:

“Those who control the purse strings will always have some capacity to influence the actions of those
who are dependent upon the content of the purse……. There can be no doubt that executive government
control over judicial salary fixation is always at least an incipient threat to judicial independence.”

The salaries and allowances of the judges is also a factor which makes the judges independent as their
salaries and allowances are fixed and are not subject to a vote of the legislature. They are charged on the
Consolidated Fund of India in case of Supreme Court judges and the Consolidated Fund of state in the
case of High Court judges. Their emoluments cannot be altered to their disadvantage (Art. 125(2)) ex-
cept in the event of grave financial emergency.

The conditions of service of judges while in office cannot be varied during the tenure nor can their salar-
ies be reduced. Until their salaries are determined by or under a law made by the parliament, their remu-
neration or allowances are as specified in II Schedule to Constitution of India 6. Selection to the Higher
Judicial Service in terms of Article 233 of the Constitution of India is also conducted by the High
Court.7

Article 112(3)(d)(i) of Constitution requires that budget shall contain a provision for payment of salaries
and allowances and pensions to Judges of Supreme Court and Article 202(3)(d) deals with the salaries
and allowances of High Court. Insofar as the Judiciary at gross root level is concerned, the budget is pre-
pared by various unit heads, consolidated at the State level and presented to the State Legislature.
6
Article 125 and 221 of the Constitution
7
State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447 : (1966) 1 SCR 771

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First All India Judges Case8, the Supreme Court said, “the efficient functioning of the

Rule of law under the aegis, of which our democratic society can thrive, requires an efficient, strong
and enlightened judiciary. And to have it that way, the nation has to pay a price.”

Though the Chief Justice India in the Case of Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of High Court have ab-
solute powers in the matter of conditions of service of officers and servants and the expenses of the
Courts. But, if any rules made by the Chief Justice relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they
require approval of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, under Article 146(2) and 229(2)
of Constitution of India respectively. These two are the provisions which clinching indicate that the fin-
ancial autonomy of India Judiciary is subject to executive control though in the preparation of budget to
meet the court expenses or in the establishment of new Courts, the Judiciary is consulted.

3. Transfer of Judges:-

This provision is there in the constitution to immune the judges from unnecessary transfers used by the
executives to harass public servants who are honest.

Judges Transfer Case 1

In the case of S.P. Gupta vs Union of India, 1982 SC unanimously agreed with the meaning of the word
‘consultation’ as determined in the Sankalchand’s case. It further held that only ground on which the de-
cision of the govt. can be challenged is that it is based on mala fide and irrelevant consideration. In do-
ing so, it substantially reduced its own power in appointing the judges and gave control to the executive.

Judges Transfer Case 2

This matter was raised again in the case of SC Advocates on Record Association vs Union of India, AIR
1982. In this case, the SC overruled the decision of S.P. Gupta case and held that in the matter of ap -
pointment of judges of high courts and supreme court, the CJ should have the primacy and the appoint-
ment of the CJ should be based on seniority. It further held that the CJ must consult his two seniors most
judges and the recommendation must be made only if there is a consensus among them.

Judges Transfer Case 3

8
(1992) 1 SCC 109

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A controversy arose again when the CJ recommended the names for appointment without consulting
with other judges in 1999. The president sought advice from the SC (re Presidential Reference 1999)
and a 9 members bench held that an advice given by the CJ without proper consultation with other
judges is not binding on the govt.

As of now, due to the decision in judges Transfer Case 2, the appointment of the judges in SC and High
Courts are fairly free from executive control. This is an important factor that ensure the independence of
the judiciary.

4. The highly rigid process of impeachment-

Impeachment under Article 124(4) and (5). The same procedure applies to High Court Judges. Clause
(4) of Article 124 provides that a Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office ex-
pect by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a
majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
members of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House
present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the
ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The constitutional provision does not prescribe how this
investigation is to be carried on. It leaves it to Parliament to settle and lay down by law the detailed pro-
cedure according to which the address may be presented and the charge of misconduct or incapacity
against the Judge investigated and proved. In America, the Judges of Supreme Court hold office for life.
They can, however be removed by impeachment in cases of treason, bribery on other high crimes and
misdemeanour.

K. Veeraswami vs Union of India9 A five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that a Judge of the
Supreme Court and High Court can be prosecuted and convicted for criminal misconduct.

The word ‘proved’ in this provision indicates that the address can be presented by Parliament only after
the alleged charge of misbehaviour or incapacity against the Judge has been investigated, substantiated
and established by an impartial tribunal. The constitutional provision does not prescribe how this invest-
igation is to carried on.

In accordance with the above provision, Parliament has enacted the necessary law for the purpose. The
judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 now regulate the procedure for investigation and proof of misbehaviour or in-
9
(1991) 3 SCC 855: 1991 SCC (Cri) 734.

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capacity of a Supreme Court judge for presenting an address by the Houses of Parliament to the Presid-
ent for his removal.

5. Article 124(7) Prohibition on practicing before any court:

No person who has held office as a judge of the Supreme Court shall plead or act in any court or before
any authority within the territory of India.

This provision is there to ensure that there are no future allurements for the judgments considering
which their justice delivery is compromised.

6. Powers Jurisdiction of Supreme Court:

Parliament can only add to the power and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but cannot curtail them. In
the civil cases, Parliament may change the pecuniary limit for the appeals to the Supreme Court. Parlia-
ment may enhance the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It may confer the supplementary
powers on the Supreme Court to enable it work more effectively. It may confer power to issue direc-
tions, orders or writs for any purpose that those mentioned in Article 32 Powers of the Supreme Court
cannot be taken away. Making judiciary independent.

7. No discussion on conduct of judge in State Legislature / Parliament:

Article 211 provides that there shall be no discussion in the legislature of the state with respect to the
conduct of any judge of Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties. A similar pro -
vision is made in Article 121 which lays down that no discussion shall take place in Parliament with re-
spect to the discharge of his duties. A similar provision is made in Article 121 which lays down that no
discussion shall take place in Parliament with respect to the conduct of the judge of Supreme Court or
High Court in the discharge of his duties expect upon a motion for presenting an address to the President
praying for the removal of the judge. It is one of the safeguards to protect the independence of judiciary.

Article 121 appears with a general heading ‘Procedure Generally’. Article 124 (4) and (5) appear in
chapter IV and it is obvious that Article 121 is a general rule designed to prevent discussion in Parlia-
ment about the conduct of a judge of SC or HC.10

8. Power to punish for contempt:

10
Sub-Committee on Judicial v. Union of India And Ors 1991 AIR 1598

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Both the Supreme Court and the High Court have the power to punish any person for their contempt.
Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to punish for contempt of itself. Like-
wise, Article 215 lays down that every High court have the power to punish for contempt of itself.

Article 129 enables Supreme Court to be Court of Record:

The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the
power to punish for contempt of itself.

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs State of Maharashtra 11 Supreme Court has asserted that in the absence
of any express provision in the Constitution the Apex Court being a court of record has jurisdiction in
every matter and if there be any doubts, the court has power to determine its jurisdiction.

Om Prakash Jaiswal vs D.K. Mittal12 Availability of an independent judiciary and an atmosphere

wherein Judges may act independently and fearlessly in the source of existence of civilization in society
the writ issued by the court must be obeyed. It is the binding efficacy attaching with the commands of
the court and the respect for the orders of the court which deter the aggrieved persons from taking the
law in their own hands because they are assured of an efficacious civilized method of settlement of dis-
pute.

Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs State of Gujarat13

The Supreme Court has held that its power to contempt in article 129 is not confined to its own con-
tempt. It extends to all courts and tribunals subordinate to it in the country.

9. Separation of Judiciary from the Executive:

Article 50 contains one of the Directive Principles of the State Policy and lays down that the state shall
take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the state. The object be-
hind the Directive Principle is to secure the independence of the judiciary from the executive. Article 50
says that there shall be a separate judicial service free from executive control.

The separation of powers, also known as trias politica. The Doctrine of Separation of Power is the fore-
runner to all the constitutions of the world which came into existence since the days of the “Magna
Carta”. Though Montesquieu was under the erroneous impression that the foundations of the British
11
AIR 1967 SC 001
12
AIR 2000 SC 1136
13
AIR 1991 SC 2176

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Constitution lay in the principle of Separation of Power, it found its genesis in the American Constitu-
tion. Montesquieu had a feeling that it would be a panacea to good governance but it had its own draw-
backs. A complete Separation of Power without adequate chicks and balances would have nullified any
constitution. It was only with this in mind the founding fathers of various constitutions have accepted
this theory with modifications to make it relevant to the changing times.

I.C. Golak Nath vs State of Punjab it was opined that

“The constitution brings into existence different constitutional entitles, namely the unions, the state and
the union territories. It creates three major instruments of power and expects them to exercise their re-
spective power without overstepping their limits. They should function with the spheres allotted to them
to assure independence of all three wings”

Other Statutory Provisions in CrPc for Independence of Judiciary:

Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs State of Gujarat14

A Magistrate, Judge or any other Judicial Officer is liable to criminal Prosecution for an offence like any
other citizen but in view of the paramount necessity of preserving the independence of judiciary and at
the same time ensuring that infractions of law are properly investigated, we think that the following
guidelines should be followed:

(A) If a Judicial Officer is to be arrested for some offense , it should be done under intimation to the
District Judge or High Court as the case may be.
(B) If the facts and circumstances necessitate the immediate arrest of a Judicial Official of subordin-
ate judiciary, a technical or formal arrest may be affected.
(C) The fact of such arrest should be immediately communicated to the District and Sessions Judge
of the concerned District and the Chief Justice of the High Court.
(D) The Judicial officer so arrested shall not be taken to a police station, without the prior order or
direction of the District and Sessions Judge of the concerned District, if available.
(E) Immediate facilities shall be provided to the judicial officer for communication with his family
members, legal advisers and judicial officers, including the District and Sessions Judge.

14
AIR 1991 SC 2176

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 (F) No statement of a Judicial Officer who is under arrest be recorded nor any panchnama be drawn
up nor any medical tests be conducted except in the presence of the Legal Adviser of the Judicial
Officer of equal or higher rank, if available.
(G) There should be no handcuffing of a Judicial Officer. If however, violent resistance to arrest is
offered or there is imminent need to effect physical arrest in order to avert danger to life and
limb, the person resisting arrest may be overpowered and handcuffed. In such case, immediate
report shall be made to the District and Sessions Judge concerned and also to the Chief Justice of
the High Court. But the burden would be on the Police to establish the necessity for effecting
physical arrest and handcuffing the Judicial Officer and if it be established that the physical ar-
rest and handcuffing of the Judicial Officer was unjustified, the Police Officers causing or re-
sponsible for such arrest and handcuffing would be guilty of misconduct and would also be per-
sonally liable for compensation and/ or damages as may be summarily determined by the High
Court.

Case Elucidations-

Independence of judiciary and rule of law are the basic features of the Constitution it cannot be abrog-
ated even by constitutional amendments.15

There are many instances when the independence of Judiciary was compromised, some of the cases are
as follows:-

i. ADM Jabalpur vs Shivkant Shukla16

In this case the Supreme Court was practically coerced by the government at that time to pass a favour-
able judgment. Justice H. R Khanna was the one who dissented from the majority but had to pay the
price, when Justice Beg was made the CJ despite Justice Khanna was senior.

Justice Bhagwati who negated the issue raised had recently admitted that negating the issue raised in the
instant case was the biggest mistake he ever made.

“He confesses that the Supreme Court decision in ADM Jabalpur was wrong and he pleads guilty for the
same. The reason attributed for him joining the majority (Justices A. N. Ray, Y. V. Chandrachud, and
M.H. Beg) in the case was that he was persuaded by his colleagues and he admits it was an act of weak-
15
S.P. Gupta v Union of India : AIR 1982 SC 149
16
AIR 1976 SC 1207

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ness on his part.“He also says that it was against my conscience...That judgment is not Justice Bhag-
wati’s”

ii. Indira Gandhi Nehru v. Raj Narain17

Where the dispute regarding P.M. election was pending before the Supreme Court, opined that adjudica-
tion of a specific dispute is a judicial function which parliament, even under constitutional amending
power, cannot exercise i.e. the parliament does not have the jurisdiction to perform a function which the
other organ is responsible for otherwise there will be chaos as there will be overlapping of the jurisdic-
tions of the three organs of the state.

An attack on Independence of Judiciary: Judicial Standards and Accountability bill?

The above-mentioned bill is one of the vaguest bills in recent times and prima facie is an attack by the
executives on Judiciary to clip their wings. Some of the vague provisions are also seconded by the stand-
ing committee are:-

 Clause 3(2)(b) No judge shall have close association with individual members of the Bar, partic-
ularly those who practice in the same court in which he is a judge.
 The Committee expressed its opinion that the phrase, close association' is vague, and recommen-
ded it be replaced by the phrase 'close social interactions
 The Committee is of the view that the expression ‘close association’ is very vague in nature and
it may invite varying interpretations. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the said
words may be replaced by the expression ‘close social interactions’ to avoid unwarranted ambi-
guity.
 While deliberating upon the Bill, the Committee felt that that the proviso (i) of the clause 3(2)(f)
needs to bring out more clearly and distinctly what is meant by the term “individual capacity” as
the line of distinction between a judge’s official capacity and individual capacity is quite thin.
Likewise, the Members were of the view that the expressions ‘private forum’ and ‘academic
forum’ may be defined to bring more clarity in the meaning implied in these expressions.
 The Committee, accordingly, recommends amendment of clause 18 of the Bill so as to enable the
Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to nominate, respectively, one

17
1975 supp SCC

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 Member of Parliament from each House, having legal expertise and high standing in the legal
arena to the Oversight Committee.
 Clause 56 of the Bill provides that appeal from a person convicted on a trial held under the
clause 53(1) shall be directly to the Supreme Court. The Committee while discussing this clause
felt that the existing provisions of the Bill were curtailing the right of challenge of the complain-
ant to one only. The Committee feels that the complainant’s normal right of judicial review on
jurisdictional grounds both under article 226 of the Indian Constitution and under the apex Court
judgement in Chandra Kumar vs Union of India and others is not intended to be circumscribed or
eliminated, as indeed it cannot be by a mere Act of Parliament. Hence, while maintaining appel-
late recourse to the apex Court as already provided, a small Explanations may suitably clarify the
availability of judicial review on jurisdictional grounds apart from the apex Court appeal

Is the Judiciary actually free?

Having pondered upon various ways in which our founding fathers and other legislators have tried to in-
sulate the judiciary from external executive influence, now the question which remains is Judiciary actu-
ally free? Or is it bound by many internal factors as opposed to external ones.

1. Post retirement Executive Offices:

As we know Judges are offered many post retirement offices like the chairmanship of National Human
Rights Commission and Press Council of India and others. It would not take rocket science to assume
that these are allurements even if some are honorary in nature.

Other example is the office of the interstate river dispute Commission which extends to 3-5 years and is
considered as a paid holiday for judges. Judges are humans with weaknesses and if such opportunities
are up for grabs, it won’t be impossible for few to compromise of their morals.

Prof. K.T Shah in the constitutional assembly debates had made the following observation-

“Whether during his tenure of office, or in the ordinary course of judgeship or even on retirement, I
would suggest that there should be a constitutional prohibition against his employment in any executive
office, so that no temptation should be available to a judge for greater emoluments, or greater prestige
which would in any way affect his independence as a judge”

M.C. Setalvad, the Chairman of the First Law Commission wrote in his autobiography:

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"The Commission had, after careful consideration expressed the unanimous view that the practice of
Judges looking forward to or accepting employment under the Government after retirement was un-
desirable as it could affect the independence of the Judiciary. We therefore recommended that a consti-
tutional bar should be imposed on Judges accepting office under the Union or State Governments sim-
ilar to the bar in the case of the Auditor and Comptroller-General and members of Public Service Com-
missions.

2. Lobbying:

Every Coin has two sides to it, when we support that CJI and CJ of SC and HC respectively should have
the final call for selecting judges, it also has a negative side to it, the phenomenon of Lobbying of
‘Uncle Judges’ phenomenon.

Since now the selection after the 3rd Judge transfer case has been completely internalized, therefore
there is high profile lobbying for seat birth in HC and SC.

In its 230th report, the Law Commission has made the following observations:-

“As a matter of practice, a person, who has worked as a District Judge or has practised in the High
Court in a State, is appointed as a Judge of the High Court in the same State. Often we hear complaints
about ‘Uncle Judges’. If a person has practised in a High Court, say, for 20-25 years and is appointed a
Judge in the same High Court, overnight change is not possible. He has his colleague advocates – both
senior and junior - as well as his kith and kin, had been practising with him. Even wards of some Dis -
trict Judges, elevated to a High Court, are in practice in the same High Court. There are occasions,
when advocate judges either settle their scores with the advocates, who have practised with them, or
have soft corner for them. In any case, this affects their impartiality and justice is the loser. The equity
demands that the justice shall not only be done but should also appear to have been done.”

What is the solution then, in the words of an eminent Professor of Law, Dr.H.C. Hajare, ‘I think the cre-
ation of a judicial commission is the only solution to the various controversies in the appointment of
Judges?

CONCLUSION

Judges have the ultimate responsibility for decisions regarding freedoms, rights and duties of natural and
legal persons within their jurisdiction. The independence of each individual judge safeguards every per-

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son’s right to have their case decided solely on the basis of the law, the evidence and facts, without any
improper influence. A well-functioning, efficient and independent judiciary is an essential requirement
for a fair, consistent and neutral administration of justice. Consequently, judicial independence is an in-
dispensable element of the right to due process, the rule of law and democracy.

The independence of the judiciary as is clear from the above discussion hold a prominent position as far
as the institution of judiciary is concerned. It is clear from the historical overview that judicial independ-
ence has faced many obstacles in the past specially in relation to the appointment and the transfer of
judges. Courts have always tried to uphold the independence of judiciary and have always said that the
independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution.

Courts have said so because the independence of judiciary is the pre-requisite for the smooth functioning
of the Constitution and for a realization of a democratic society based on the rule of law. The interpreta-
tion in the Judges Case giving primacy to the executive, as we have discussed has led to the appointment
of at least some Judges against the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The decision of the Judges Case
was could never have been intended by the framers of the Constitution as they always set the task of
keeping judiciary free from executive and making it self-competent. The decision of the Second Judges
Case and the Third Judges Case is a praiseworthy step by the Court in this regard.

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