Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181986               December 4, 2013

ELIZALDE S. CO, Petitioner,
vs.
LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us this petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to set aside the decision2 dated
January 31, 2007 and resolution 3 dated March 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision 4 dated
February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in
Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and acquitted respondent Ludolfo P. Munoz,
Jr. (Munoz) of three counts of libel.

Factual Antecedents

The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner,
Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Munoz, a
contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was behind the filing of suit, Munoz made the following statements:

(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the
issuance of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;

(b) Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the

Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project, and;

(c) Co received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-
contract the project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with. 5

Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC.6
Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil action
arising from Muñoz’s libelous remarks against him.7

In his defense,8 Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding

as a call of public duty. In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman
involving the anomalous dredging project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the
cases, Muñoz claimed that the dismissal did not disprove the truth of his statements. He
further argued that Co is a public figure considering his participation in government
projects and his prominence in the business circles. He also emphasized that the
imputations dealt with matters of public interest and are, thus, privileged.

Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed to do.

In its decision, the RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that
the prosecution established the elements of libel. In contrast, Muñoz failed to show that
the imputations were true and published with good motives and for justifiable ends, as
required in Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 9

In light of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Muñoz’ charges against Co, the RTC also held
that Muñoz’ statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as
privileged communication.10

In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay ₱5,000,000.00 for each count of
libel as moral damages, ₱1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and
₱297,699.00 for litigation expense.11

Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest
and Muñoz’ statements were protected as privileged communication under the first
paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.12

It also declared that Co was a public figure based on the RTC’s findings that he was a
"well-known, highly-regarded and recognized in business circles." 13
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public
interest.14

Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel charges due
to the prosecution’s failure to establish the existence of actual malice.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal
aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz’ right against double
jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action. He avers that this principle applies in general
whether the civil action is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. 15

He also claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of
acquittal.16

Co further makes the following submissions:

First, the CA erred when it disregarded the presumption of malice under Article 354 17 of
the RPC. To overcome this presumption, Muñoz should have presented evidence on
good or justifiable motive for his statements. 18

On the contrary, the context of Muñoz’s radio interviews reflects his evident motive to
injure Co’s reputation instead of a sincere call of public duty. 19

Second, the CA erred in declaring Co as a public figure based on the RTC findings that
he is known in his community. He claims this as a relatively limited community
comprising of his business associates.20

The Respondent’s Arguments

Muñoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC because, as its
title suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil action separately from the
criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the right to separately institute the
civil action arising from the offense, the extinction of the criminal action extinguishes the
civil action.
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the
offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the present petition to
enforce the civil liability.21

Muñoz further posits that Co is not entitled to recover damages because there is no
wrongful act to speak of. Citing De la Rosa, et al. v. Maristela,22 he argues that if there is
no libel due to the privileged character of the communication and actual malice is not
proved, there should be no award of moral damages. 23

Lastly, Muñoz avers that Co is indirectly challenging the factual and legal issues which
the CA has already settled in acquitting him. Muñoz explains that this Court may no
longer overturn the CA’s findings as the doctrine of double jeopardy has set in. 24

The Issues

The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:

1. whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he

seeks to enforce the accused’s civil liability; and

2. whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks
despite his acquittal.

The Court's Ruling

We do not find the petition meritorious.

The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce
the accused’s civil liability.

The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111
of the ROC, which states:

“The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action.

However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is
a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.” (Emphasis ours)
Muñoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only if
the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it separately
was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muñoz’ acquittal of the crime of libel
did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muñoz’ utterance of the libelous
remarks remains undisputed. We reject Muñoz’ claim. The last paragraph of Section
2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from
the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately
from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs
situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the
criminal action; hence, its title "When separate civil action is suspended." Despite this
wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto.

This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that "[e]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one
criminal and one civil. Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes
by which civil liability ex delicto  may be enforced:

(1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action;25

(2) through a civil action that is filed separately, either before the criminal action
or after, upon reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action. 26

The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action. 27

This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect its nature, as may be
apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC,
which states:

Section 2. Contents of the judgment. – x x x In case the judgment is of acquittal,

it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.(Emphasis ours)

If, as Muñoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of
the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2, Rule 120 of
the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no need for the judgment of
the acquittal to determine whether "the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist." The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare if there remains
a basis to hold the accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may
avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex delicto.

In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,28 the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a
party – whether the accused or the offended party – may avail with respect to the
judgment:

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment
on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.

From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended
party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did
he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action because the
latter would only add to our clogged dockets.29

To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when,
notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto:

(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of

evidence is required;
 (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and

(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted.

We thus now proceed to determine if Co’s claim falls under any of these three
situations.

The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.

The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged

communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the
crime.30

The law presumes that every imputation is malicious; 31 this is referred to as malice in
law.

The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations
were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the
imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive. 32

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article
354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:

(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance

of any legal, moral or social duty;33 and

(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.34

Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v.

CA,35 we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of
the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. In Guingguing
v. CA,36 we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are likewise
privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the
prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made or published with
actual malice or malice in fact – the knowledge that the statement is false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.37

In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged communication
has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and
consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.

In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of
the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Munoz’ statements were
fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has
the burden of providing that Munoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the
prosecution failed in this respect.

Co assails the CA’s ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the
CA’s factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present petition,
review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to
factual matters, and without violating Munoz’ right against double jeopardy given that
the acquittal is essentially anchored on question of fact.

In light of the privilege nature of Munoz’ statements and the failure of the prosecution to
prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Munoz. Without the
crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the
present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355 dated January 31, 2007 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division’s Chairperson
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court; rollo pp. 50-93.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marelene Gonzales-Sison; id. at 97-
110.
3
 Id. at 46-48.
4
 Penned by Judge Pedro R. Soriano; id. at 435-446.
5
 Id. at 101, 106, 244, 374.
6
 Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, which were consolidated in view of
the identity of parties and issues; RTC decision; id. at 435-446.
7
 Id. at 561.
8
 Id. at 372-383.
9
 Article 361. Proof of the truth. - In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth
may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as
libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a

crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made
against Government employees with respect to facts related to the
discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by
him, he shall be acquitted. (Emphasis ours)
10
 Rollo, p. 444.
11
 Id. at 446.
12
 Id. at 108; Article 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions. (Emphasis ours)
13
 See rollo, pp. 444-445, wherein the RTC stated: "Mr. Elizalde Co is a
respected person in the community. He is well-known – a big-time businessman
– his name a by-word in the business circles – with his construction company
conferred with the highest Triple AAA category rating to engage in the
construction business – with membership in several private and public
associations. The church recognized his charitable work bestowing him with a
recognition award as a distinguished alumnus. He carries the unsullied good
reputation of his family untarnished by any scandal in the past. x x x "
14
 Id. at 108.
15
 Id. at 592.
16
 Citing Bautista v. CA, G.R. No. 46025, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 231; id.
at 593.
17
 Article 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, x x x (Emphasis ours)
18
 Rollo, pp. 654-656.
19
 Id. at 87.
20
 Id. at 80.
21
 Id. at 560-561, citing People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748 (1955).
22
 (CA) 50 O.G. 254.
23
 Pages 10-12, Memorandum for the Respondent.
24
 Page 14, Memorandum for the Respondent.
25
 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Section 1.
26
 Id.
27
 Id.
28
 G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 316, 353.
29
 Padilla v. CA, 214 Phil. 492 (1984).
30
 In Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 61,
67, this Court held that there is libel only if the following elements exist: (a)
imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
31
 Article 354 of the RPC.
32
 First paragraph, Art. 354, Revised Penal Code.
33
 Art. 354(1), Revised Penal Code.
34
 Art. 354(2), Revised Penal Code.
35
 361 Phil. 1 (1999).
36
 508 Phil. 193 (2005).
37
 Supra note 35 and 36.