Intervention - Bhaichung Bhutia

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. OF 2022

IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.30748-49 OF 2017
IN THE MATTER OF:
All India Football Federation …PETITIONER
Versus
Rahul Mehra & Others … RESPONDENTS
AND IN THE MATTER OF:
Bhaichung Bhutia … APPLICANT
I.A. NO. OF 2022 : Application for Intervention
PAPER BOOK
(FOR INDEX PLEASE SEE INSIDE)
ADVOCATE FOR THE APPLICANT: PURNIMA KRISHNA

INDEX
Sl. No. Particulars Page No.
1. Application seeking intervention along with 1-14

affidavit
2. Annexure A-1: 15-17

True copy of the Order dated 10.11.2017
passed by this Hon’ble Court


5. Annexure A-4: 38
True copy of FIFA’s Letter to AIFF dated
06.07.2022

25.07.2022
7. Annexure A-6: 44
05.08.2022
8. Annexure A-7: 45
True copy of Press Release by FIFA dated
16.08.2022
9. Annexure A-8: 46-182

True copy of the paper titled ‘Governance
Models Across Football Associations and
Leagues – A research mandate on behalf of
FIFA’ published by the International Centre
for Sports Studies
10. Annexure A-9: 183-184

True copy of FIFA’s Press Release dated
16.08.2022
11. Vakalatnama 185

1

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. OF 2022
IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.30748-49 OF 2017
IN THE MATTER OF:

All India Football Federation … Petitioner
Versus
Rahul Mehra & Ors. … Respondents
AND IN THE MATTER OF:

Bhaichung Bhutia … Applicant
Resident of Eagles Nest, Pangthang
Nursery, Nampong, East Sikkim,
Sikkim – 737 103.
APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION
TO
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA AND
HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
THE HUMBLE APPLICATION OF
THE ABOVE NAMED APPLICANT
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:-
1. The captioned Petition arises out of the interim order dated
31.10.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM

2
Nos. 46919/2016 and 19815/2012, whereby, the High Court
quashed the results of the elections of the All India Football
Federation (“AIFF”) that had been declared on 21.12.2016, and
appointed Dr. S.Y. Quraishi, former Chief Election Commissioner
of India as the Administrator-cum-Returning Office for conduct of
the elections afresh.
2. This Hon’ble Court vide Order dated 10.11.2017, was pleased to
constitute a Committee of Administrators (“COA”) to redraft
AIFF’s Constitution in consonance with the National Sports Code,
2011 (“NSC”) and the Model Guidelines and ensuring the
constitution of the Executive Committee (“EC”) and for holding
elections.
True copy of the Order dated 10.11.2017 passed by this Hon’ble
Court is annexed as ANNEXURE A-1. (Pg. 15 to 17)
3. Thereafter, by way of Order dated 18.05.2022, this Hon’ble Court
permitted the COA to circulate the draft Constitution prepared by
it amongst all the parties and to submit a tabulated statement of
their suggestions/objections, along with the inputs of the COA on
the proposed suggestions/objections. The said tabulated statement
along with the revised version of the draft Constitution, after

3
accepting/rejecting/modifying the proposed changes, was filed by
the COA before this Hon’ble Court on 15.07.2022 (“Draft
Constitution”).
4. The Applicant, for the reasons explained below, has preferred the
instant application seeking that the Draft Constitution finalized by
the COA be adopted as the new Constitution of the AIFF, as it
prioritizes and promotes the welfare and participation of current
and former players – who are the key stakeholders in any sport, in
the administration of Indian Football – over the vested interests
who have been in control of Indian Football for several decades.
5. Further, the Applicant most humbly prays that the Order dated
03.08.2022 passed by this Hon’ble Court directing that the General
Body (“GB”) of AIFF comprise the 36-member electoral college
of eminent players, be given its full effect. It is submitted that equal
representation of the players in the GB with voting rights will give
them not just a platform to voice their concerns but also take them
to a logical conclusion, instead of remaining subservient to the
interests of the non-player administrators. As rightly observed by

4
this Hon’ble Court “The administration of the affairs of football
will benefit from the experience, knowledge and concerns of the
players themselves,” and therefore, this change is paramount for
the development of Indian Football in a healthy manner.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICANT
6. Bhaichung Bhutia, the Applicant herein, was a professional
football player. He was a prolific striker and the captain of the
Indian national Football Team for more than 10 years. In 2011, he
retired from international football as one of the most decorated
Indian football players of all time.
7. In his 16-year international career, since 1995, the Applicant
scored 42 goals in 107 international appearances. Under the
Applicant’s captaincy, India won the South Asian Football
Federation (SAFF) Championships thrice in 1997, 1999, and 2005,
Nehru Cup titles twice in 2007 and 2009, and the 2008 AFC
Challenge Cup which gave India the right to play in the Asian Cup
in 2011, for the first time since 1984.

5
8. Apart from having won several individual and team honours at the
club level, the Applicant, most notably, also won the AIFF Player
of the Year awards twice in 1995 and 2008, the Arjuna Award in
1998, and the AFC Challenge Cup Most Valuable Player Award in
2008. The Applicant was awarded the prestigious Padma Shri in
2008 for his contribution to Indian Football.
9. Since 2018, the Applicant is the Manager of the Sikkim football
team, which represents Sikkim at the Santosh Trophy (Hero Senior
Men’s National Football Championship).
10. The Applicant has filed his nomination and is contesting for the
post of President of AIFF in the ongoing election process. The
Applicant believes and endorses the suggestion of the COA, as
accepted by this Hon’ble Court, to give adequate representation to
former football players in AIFF’s administration and functioning.
The Applicant has been concerned about the complete absence of
players’ voice in AIFF’s decision making processes which has
been captured by persons with vested interests. The Applicant is
passionate about improving the governance and administration of
Indian Football which have deteriorated sharply over the last

6
several years. Player reforms have stagnated and the administration
of AIFF has functioned only for serving vested interests.
II. FIFA STATUTES ONLY PROVIDE A BROAD FRAMEWORK AND

ARE NOT RIGID
11. The major concern of FIFA which emerges from its letters to AIFF
dated 06.07.2022, 25.07.2022, 05.08.2022 is that the inclusion of
36 eminent players in the electoral college of the GB, would alter
the membership structure of AIFF, thereby undermining the
existing members of the AIFF which would violate the FIFA
Statutes. Instead, keeping in mind that “the players’ voice needs to
be heard … and … the requirements of the Sports Code of India”,
FIFA in its letter dated 25.07.2022, recommended that the AIFF
“bring in a presence of above 25 percent of the Eminent Players in
the AIFF Executive Committee as Co-opted Members”.
True copy of FIFA’s Letter to AIFF dated 06.07.2022 is annexed
as ANNEXURE A-4. (Pg.38)
as ANNEXURE A-5. (Pg.39 to 43)
as ANNEXURE A-6. (Pg. 44)

7
True copy of Press Release issued by FIFA dated 16.08.2022 is
annexed as ANNEXURE A-7. (Pg. 45)
12. It is submitted that FIFA Statutes while they are mandatorily
required to be complied with by the Member Associations, only
provide a broad framework under which each Member Association
must govern football in its country. Different Member
Associations, however, are permitted to follow their own distinct
governance models, which are tailored as per the needs and
requirements of their domestic football structure. Specifically, in
respect of the structure, composition and voting powers of the GB,
this can be illustrated by the following examples:
a. In Ivory Coast, South Africa, Senegal, and Qatar, each first
division club holds three votes while second division clubs
have two votes in the GB. On the contrary, only one vote is
granted to other GB members.
True copy of the paper titled ‘Governance Models Across
Football Associations and Leagues – A research mandate on
behalf of FIFA’ published by the International Centre for
Sports Studies, is annexed as ANNEXURE A-8. (Pg. 46 to
182)
8
b. Ivory Coast’s Ligue Professionelle (68%) and Mexico’s Liga
MX (55%), have a majority voting power in the GB of their
respective National Football Associations.
c. Unlike the existing voting composition in AIFF under the old
Constitution which comprises only regional associations, the
GBs of the National Football Associations of England and the
USA, in addition to regional associations, also comprise lower
professional leagues, amateur football, national association’s
governing bodies representatives, and interest groups such as
players, referees, football doctors’ association, coaches’
associations, etc.
d. In the Italian Football Federation, interest groups comprising
the players, coaches and referees are represented in both, the
GB and the EC and in the Ivory Coast, at least one of the five
interest groups (referees, coaches, women football, football
doctors and former players) represented in the GB must also be
part of the EC.
13. Clearly, the structure and composition of the GB of Member
Associations and the voting powers of the stakeholders therein are
flexible, and not rigid as has sought to be portrayed by FIFA to the

9
COA or by the State Federations before this Hon’ble Court. This is
also evinced by FIFA’s own letter dated 25.07.2022 which has
permitted AIFF to have 25% eminent players’ representation in the
EC, even though there was no such provision in the old
Constitution.
14. However, as observed by this Hon’ble Court in the Order dated
03.08.2022, the use of the expression “say 25%” occurring in
Clause 3.20 of the NSC, “indicates that 25% is only an indicative
figure” and the NSC cannot be read in the manner of a statute,
which position has also been acknowledged by the Union of India.
15. As such, it is submitted that there is no reason why India ought not
to be given the option to move towards a more inclusive structure
such as those that are in place in the UK, USA, Italy, and Ivory
Coast, and which guarantee a more diverse representation of the
key stakeholders.
III. ILLEGALITIES CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED BY THREATS OF

SUSPENSION
16. While the Applicant empathizes with the young participants as
well as all the persons involved at the ground level in organizing
the U-17 Women’s World Cup, who have trained and worked
10
tirelessly towards making India proud and the international
competition a success, it is humbly submitted that if AIFF were to
carry out elections as per the pre-existing membership structure
under FIFA’s threat, then, it would be catastrophic for all of Indian
Football and its future, and the opportunity to bring about robust
reforms with emphasis on players’ welfare, which have been
neglected for decades, will be lost forever.
17. Therefore, at this juncture, when the ongoing electoral process has
already received imprimatur of this Hon’ble Court by its Order
dated 03.08.2022, neither FIFA, nor the State Federations, nor any
third party with vested interests, should be permitted to scuttle or
dictate terms that are contrary to the directions issued by this
Hon’ble Court. In fact, by suspending AIFF on the ground that
there has been “a serious violation of the FIFA Statutes” during the
ongoing election process, FIFA itself has attempted to delay the
timeline imposed by it on AIFF, as per which, elections were to
conclude by September 2022.
18. It is submitted that the specific concern raised by FIFA in its press
release dated 16.08.2022 that “[T]he suspension will be lifted once
an order to set up a committee of administrators to assume the

11
powers of the AIFF Executive Committee has been repealed and
the AIFF administration regains full control of the AIFF’s daily
affairs.”, will be duly taken care upon the completion of the
electoral process and declaration of results on 29.08.2022, after
which the EC of AIFF would regain the charge of managing
AIFF’s affairs from the COA.
True copy of FIFA’s Press Release dated 16.08.2022, is annexed
as ANNEXURE A-9. (Pg. 183 to 184)
19. The Applicant submits that this Hon’ble Court was conscious of
the fact that the existing electoral system was undemocratic,
exclusionary, and deficient. It was to this end that the Hon’ble
Court entrusted the COA to redraft AIFF’s Constitution in
consonance with requirements of the NSC. As such, all
stakeholders (including FIFA and State Federations) do not dispute
that the eminent players ought to be represented in the GB.
However, reverting to the pre-existing membership structure –
either under the threat of suspension or otherwise – is not only
undemocratic but it is also an attempt to perpetuate illegalities.
20. The Applicant submits that the much-needed reforms within AIFF,
and the Indian Football at large, cannot be held to ransom because

12
of FIFA’s suspension or any other threats. Reverting to existing
system would allow the vested interests to have a stranglehold on
AIFF for 4 more years and thereby damage the sport irreparably.
21. This application is being filed bona fide. No prejudice would be
caused to the other parties if the Applicant is allowed to intervene
and assist this Hon’ble Court.
PRAYER
It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may
graciously be pleased to:-
A. Allow the Applicant to intervene and assist this Hon’ble Court in
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 30748-49 of 2017; and
B. Pass any other order or direction as may be deemed fit and proper.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE APPLICANT AS IN DUTY

BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.
FILED BY:
(PURNIMA KRISHNA)
ADVOCATE FOR THE APPLICANT
New Delhi
21.08.2022
13
currently at Kolkata, do hereby solemnly
affirm and sincerely state as follows:

14
SLP(C) 30748-30749/2017 15
1 ANNEXURE A-1
ITEM NO.51 COURT NO.1 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal(C) Nos. 30748-30749/2017
(Arising out of impugned interim order dated 31-10-2017 in CM No.

46919/2016 and CM No. 19815 of 2012 in W.P. (C) No. 195 of 2010,
passed by the High Court Of Delhi At New Delhi)
ALL INDIA FOOTBALL FEDERATION Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
RAHUL MEHRA & ORS. Respondent(s)
(IA No.118219/2017-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT and IA No.118222/2017-PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS)
Date : 10-11-2017 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
For Petitioner(s)
Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Amarendra Sharan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Debmalya Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. Manish Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Kartik Bhatnagar, Adv.
Mr. Amit Bhandari, Adv.
Mr. Avival Kapoor, Adv.
Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Adv.
Ms. Yojna Goyal, Adv.
Ms. Saloni Aggarwal, Adv.
Mr. Premtosh Mishra, Adv.
Mr. Amit Anand Tiwari, Adv.
for M/s. Karanjawala & Co., AOR
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Rahul Mehra, respondent-in-person
SLP(C) 30748-30749/2017
2
16
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
We have heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi and

Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Rahul Mehra,
appearing in-person.
Considering the rival submissions, we are
inclined to stay the operation of the impugned
judgment and, in particular, the directions given by
the High Court in paragraph 22 of the impugned
judgment. We issue following interim directions:-
(i) Mr. S.Y. Qureshi, former Chief

Election Commissioner of India, who has
also served as Secretary in the Ministry
of Youth Affairs & Sports, Government of
India and Mr. Bhaskar Ganguly, former
Indian Captain and International Football
Player, 38, Nalta Mahajoti Road,
Kolkata–700028, are appointed as the
Committee of Administrators (Ombudsmen)
for formulation of Constitution of the
Federation which will be in consonance
with the National Sports Code and the
Model Guidelines for the conduct of its
business, constitution of the Executive
Committee and elections thereto, whilst
ensuring that the status and membership
of Petitioner Federation is not
undermined in any manner in the
International Body. They shall prepare
the draft Constitution and submit the
same within eight weeks along with their
report, in a sealed cover before this
Court.
SLP(C) 30748-30749/2017
3
17
(ii) While formulating the proposed

Constitution, the Committee of
Administrators (Ombudsmen) may take into
account the suggestions given by
Respondent No.1, if any.
(iii) After the report of the Committee of

Administrators, along with the proposed
Constitution, becomes available, further
directions as may be necessary can be
issued.
We place on record the stand taken by the

Petitioner before us that the present elected body
of the Petitioner-Federation is committed to extend
its full cooperation to the Committee of
Administrators for formulation of the proposed
Constitution of the Federation which will be
compliant in all respects and ensure transparency,
accountability and observance of democratic values
in the conduct of the business of the Federation.
As aforementioned, the directions issued in
paragraph 22 of the impugned judgment shall remain
in abeyance until further orders, subject to the
above directions.
List after ten weeks.
(Deepak Guglani) (H.S. Parasher)

Court Master Assistant Registrar
//TRUE COPY//
18
ANNEXURE A-2
Reportable
EXTRA-ORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS 30748-30749 OF 2017
All India Football Federation .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Rahul Mehra & Ors ....Respondent(s)
ORDER
1 Application for intervention1 is allowed.
2 By an interim order dated 10 November 2017, a Committee of Administrators 2
(also described as Ombudsmen), was constituted for (i) formulating the
Constitution of the All India Football Federation 3 in consonance with the National
Sports Code and the Model Guidelines; (ii) ensuring the constitution of the
Executive Committee and for holding elections.
3. The CoA has sought the permission of the Court to submit its report. Mr Samar
Bansal, counsel appearing on behalf of CoA submits that before the report was
finalized, the CoA circulated the draft report to the constituent units to elicit
responses. The report has been finalized after taking into consideration the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Sanjay Kumar
Date: 2022.05.20
responses which were received.
10:37:53 IST
Reason:
1 IA 52826 of 2022
2 “CoA”
3 “Federation”
19
2
4 The CoA, acting under the authority assigned to it by this Court in terms of the
above order has sought the permission to place the Constitution for further
consideration. The request of the CoA is allowed.
5 The proposed Constitution of the All India Football Federation which has been
directed to be presented to court in a sealed cover in the earlier interim order
shall be circulated to all the parties. Any objection or suggestion to the
Constitution, as proposed, shall be filed only before this Court on or before 30
June 2022. Any party desirous of obtaining a copy of the proposed Constitution
would be at liberty to email its request to Mr Samar Bansal, counsel appearing
on behalf of CoA. Mr Bansal will circulate the proposed Constitution to the
parties and to any other constituent unit. Thereafter, all objections and
suggestions shall also be emailed to Mr Bansal who shall collate the objections
for the purpose of rendering facilitative assistance to this Court. Counsel is
requested to prepare a tabulated statement of:
(i) The parties submitting suggestions/objections:
(ii) The nature of the suggestions/objections; and
(iii) The inputs of the CoA on the proposed suggestions/objections.
6 This exercise shall be carried out by the CoA on or before 15 July 2022 and a
tabulated statement shall be placed on the record. The tabulated statement
shall also be circulated to all the parties so as to apprise them of the position.
7 The elections of the Executive Committee which were held on 21 December
2016 were set aside by the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of
Delhi dated 31 October 2017. During the pendency of these proceedings, by the
20
3
interim order dated 10 November 2017, the operation of the judgment of the
High Court was stayed, including the directions which were issued in paragraph
22 of the judgment. The normal tenure of the elected body would, in any event,
have come to an end on 20 December 2020. The consequence of the order of
stay is that despite the expiry of its four year term, the Executive Committee
has continued to govern the affairs of the Federation. This state of affairs is not
in the interest of the proper governance of the Federation. Hence, the two
member CoA which was appointed by the order of this Court dated 10 November
2017 with a specific mandate to prepare the Constitution and hold elections to
the Executive Committee, is reconstituted to consist of the following members:
(i) Mr Justice Anil R Dave, former Judge of the Supreme Court;
(ii) Dr S Y Qureshi, former Chief Election Commissioner; and
(iii) Mr Bhaskar Ganguly, former captain of the Indian Football Team.
8 The CoA shall take charge of the affairs of the Federation and shall carry out the
following functions:
(i) The CoA shall assist this Court and provide its inputs in the course of the
present proceedings so as to facilitate the adoption of the Constitution
after the objections/suggestions are considered;
(ii) The CoA shall prepare the electoral roll/college for the purpose of
conducting the elections to the Executive Committee in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution, as proposed, subject to such further
directions as may be issued by this Court after hearing the parties;

21
4
(iii) The CoA shall carry out the day to day governance of the Federation;
(iv) In discharging its task in terms of (iii) above, the CoA would be at liberty
to take the assistance of the erstwhile Committee of the Federation which
has continued till the date of this order in order to facilitate decisions
being taken, inter alia, on the holding of tournaments, selection of players
and all other matters necessary for the proper governance of the
Federation;
(v) The erstwhile Committee which shall forthwith hand over the charge to the
CoA; and
(vi) The CoA would be at liberty to make all appropriate arrangements, for the
governance of the Federation, until elections are held.
9 The present direction is a temporary arrangement in order to facilitate the
holding of elections and the handing over of the affairs to a democratically
elected body in terms of the Constitution which will be adopted.
10 It is expected that the process of conducting the elections should be completed
expeditiously after the Constitution is finalized.
11 The CoA is requested to submit its report to this Court proposing the honorarium
payable to the three members, together with reimbursement of incidental
expenditure that may be incurred for the purpose of the functioning of the CoA.
The CoA would be at liberty to take the assistance of or to consult the erstwhile
Committee for such purposes as is necessary to ensure the smooth functioning
of the affairs of the Federation until elections are held. The erstwhile Committee
shall cooperate in all respects with the CoA. The CoA shall be at liberty to issue
22
5
appropriate directions in regard to the operation of accounts, funds and payment
of expenses incurred for the functioning of the Federation.
12 The petition shall be posted for hearing of objections on 21 July 2022.
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
[Surya Kant]
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha]
New Delhi;
May 18, 2022
-S-
23
6
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).30748-30749/2017
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 31-10-2017

in CM No. 19815/2012 and CM No. 46919/2016 passed by the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi)
VERSUS
(WITH IA No. 132863/2020 - APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING

TYPED DOCUMENTS, IA No. 136529/2020 - APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION,
IA No. 132356/2020 - APPLICATION FOR VACATION OF INTERIM ORDER, IA
No. 120057/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS, IA No. 52821/2022
- APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS, IA No. 25119/2020 –
CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION, IA No. 91992/2021 - EARLY HEARING
APPLICATION, IA No. 132355/2020 - EARLY HEARING APPLICATION, IA No.
118219/2017 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT,
IA No. 131744/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION, IA No. 52826/2022 -
INTERVENTION APPLICATION, IA No. 120713/2017 - MODIFICATION OF
COURT ORDER, IA No. 118222/2017 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)
Date : 18-05-2022 These petitions were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Anmol, Adv.
Mr. Nicholas Choudhary, Adv.
Mr. Shreesh Chadha, Adv.
Mr. Adith, Adv.
For M/S. Karanjawala & Co., AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Rahul Mehta (In-person)

Mr. Chaitanya Gosain, Adv.
24
7
Mr. Parshant Bhushan, Adv.

Mr. Kotla Harshavardhan, Adv.
Mr. Kshitij Maheshwari, Adv.
Mr. N. Sai Vinod, AOR
Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Adv.

Mr. Kanu Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Apoorv Kurup, Adv.
Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR
Mr. Hemant Phalpher, Adv.

Mr. Nar Hari Singh, AOR
Dr. Amaresh Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Shuvodeep Roy, AOR
Mr. Anshuman Amaresh, Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Nagarkatti Kartik Uday, AOR

O R D E R
1 Application for intervention (IA 52826 of 2022) is allowed.
2 In terms of the signed reportable order, the two member CoA which was
appointed by the order of this Court dated 10 November 2017 with a specific
mandate to prepare the Constitution and hold elections to the Executive
Committee, is reconstituted to consist of the following members:
(i) Mr Justice Anil R Dave, former Judge of the Supreme Court;
(ii) Dr S Y Qureshi, former Chief Election Commissioner; and
(iii) Mr Bhaskar Ganguly, former captain of the Indian Football Team.

25
8
3 The petition shall be posted for hearing of objections on 21 July 2022.
(SANJAY KUMAR-I) (RAM SUBHAG SINGH)

AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file)
//TRUE COPY//
26
ANNEXURE A-3
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
1
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.30748-30749/2017
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 31-10-2017

in CM No.19815/2012 31-10-2017 in CM No.46919/2016 passed by the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi)
VERSUS
(With IA No.132863/2020 - APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING

TYPED DOCUMENTS, IA No.136529/2020 - APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION,
IA No.132356/2020 - APPLICATION FOR VACATION OF INTERIM ORDER, IA
No. 120057/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS, IA No.52821/2022 -
APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS, IA No.25119/2020 –
CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION, IA No.91992/2021 - EARLY HEARING
APPLICATION, IA No.132355/2020 - EARLY HEARING APPLICATION, IA
No.118219/2017 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT, IA No.131744/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION, IA
No.98733/2022 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION, IA No.98631/2022 -
INTERVENTION APPLICATION, IA No.120713/2017 - MODIFICATION OF COURT
ORDER and IA No.118222/2017 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)
Date : 03-08-2022 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Chetan Kumar
Date: 2022.08.05
14:25:43 IST
Reason:
27
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
2
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Adv.

For CoA Mr. Samar Bansal, Adv.
Mr. Nagarkatti Kartik Uday, AOR
Mr. Siddharth Nath, Adv.
Mr. Madhav Gupta, Adv.
Ms. Jhanvi Dubey, Adv.
Ms. Khushboo Hora, Adv.

Mr. Rohan Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Anmol, Adv.
Mr. Nicholas Choudhury, Adv.
Mr. Shreesh Chadha, Adv.
M/s. Karanjawala & Co.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Rahul Mehra, Caveator-in-person

Mr. Chaitanya Gosain, Adv.
Mr. Amanpreet Singh, Adv.
Mr. Anand Thumbayil, Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Jain, ASG

Mr. Apoorv Kurup, Adv.
Mr. Arkaj Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Padmesh Mishra, Adv.
Ms. Tanya Aggarwal, Adv.
Mr. Nishank Tripathi, Adv.
Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Adv.
Mr. Kanu Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR
Mr. Nar Hari Singh, AOR

Mr. Hemant Phalphor, Adv.
Dr. Amaresh Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Anshuman Amaresh, Adv.
Mr. Shuvodeep Roy, AOR
Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Ritin Rai, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sanjeev Kapoor, Adv.
28
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
3
Mr. Sahil Naran, Adv.

Mr. Dhritiman Roy, Adv.
Mr. Madhavam Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Ayushman Kacker, Adv.
Ms. Samriddhi Shukla, Adv.
M/s. Khaitan & Co.
Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Prateek K Chadha, AOR
Mr. Yash S. Vijay, Adv.
Ms. Ayushi Rajput, Adv.
Mr. Utkarsh Pratap, Adv.
Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Adv.

Mr. Harsh Vardhan Kotla, Adv.
Mr. Kshitij Maneshwari, Adv.
Mr. N. Sai Vinod, AOR

O R D E R
1 On 10 November 2017, this Court while constituting a Committee of

Administrators1 observed that its remit would, among other things, be to (i)
formulate the Constitution of the All India Football Federation 2 in consonance
with the National Sports Code and the Model Guidelines; and (ii) conduct
elections and ensure the constitution of the Executive Committee.
Thereafter, by an order dated 18 May 2022, the constitution of the CoA was
modified.
2 The CoA consists of a former Judge of this Court; a former Chief Election
Commissioner who has held the post of Secretary in the Ministry of Youth
Affairs & Sports; and a former captain of the Indian football team. The order
of this Court empowered the CoA to provide its inputs to facilitate the
adoption of the Constitution of the AIFF under the directions of the Court
1“CoA”
2“AIFF”
29
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
4
after considering suggestions/objections. The CoA was also directed to

prepare the electoral college for the purpose of conducting elections to the
Executive Committee in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution as
proposed subject to further directions of this Court.
3 On 21 July 2022, this Court noted that the CoA had received nearly 215
comments from objectors, including the State Associations and FIFA-AFC. The
CoA accepted nearly 98% of the objections. The CoA has interacted with a
delegation of the FIFA which visited India.
4 On 11 October 2022, the FIFA Under-17 Women’s World Cup 2022 is due to
commence. India is to host the World Cup. FIFA has indicated to the CoA that
the inaugural of the Under-17 tournament should be carried out under the
auspices of a democratically elected body of AIFF. From this perspective and
bearing in mind the legitimate concerns of FIFA, it is necessary to expedite
the elections.
5 During the course of the previous hearing on 28 July 2022, there was a
general consensus that with this end in view the Court should issue specific
directions in regard to the holding of elections. The finalization of the
Constitution may take some more time since all the objectors would have to
be given an adequate opportunity of being heard. However, a need has been
expressed uniformly that the holding of the elections should not be delayed
any further.
6 There is a consensus that the elections should be conducted in a manner

which is in consonance with the National Sports Code and the draft
Constitution.
7 We have heard Mr Gopal Sankaranarayanan, senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the CoA, Mr Sanjay Jain, Additional Solicitor General representing
the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Mr Rahul Mehra, caveator in-person,
30
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
5
Dr Menaka Guruswamy, senior counsel representing 35 out of 36 State

Associations, Mr K V Vishwanathan, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
FSDL and Mr Prashant Bhushan and Dr Amaresh Kumar for the intervenors.
8 Dr Menaka Guruswamy, senior counsel has submitted before the Court that
the 35 State Associations whom she represents, in turn, represent the
interest of 7000 clubs, 700 district Associations and 5,00,000 football players
across the country.
9 Broadly speaking, the scheme which has been proposed by the CoA for
conducting the elections can now be analyzed. For the purpose of the
ensuing elections, the electoral college will comprise of (i) representatives of
State Federations; and (ii) representatives of eminent players. There are 36
State Federations, each of whom would select one representative to
represent the State Federation in the electoral college for AIFF. Each of them
would have one vote. Article 26 of the draft Constitution prescribes the term,
tenure, age limit and other conditions of eligibility. The CoA has proposed
that for the ensuing elections, a list of 36 eminent player representatives will
form a part of the electoral college. Initially, it was proposed that a national
players’ association can be constituted for selecting the representatives of
eminent football players, but at this stage, due to the exigencies of time, the
representatives of eminent players will be chosen on the basis of their
seniority, based on the number of international matches played while
representing India. Of the 36 players’ representatives, there will be 24 male
football players and 12 female players for the first election. The CoA
proposes to draw up a consolidated list of eminent players for this purpose
within ten days by taking the assistance of existing associations, clubs and
stakeholders so as to ensure that the list of eminent players is as
comprehensive as possible.
31
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
6
10 At this stage, it would be necessary for the Court to deal with the submission
urged by Dr Menaka Guruswamy appearing on behalf of the State
Associations. The submission is that in terms of the National Sports Code
2011, sports persons are entitled to voting only in the management of
national sports federations. In this context, senior counsel relied on clause
9.3(12). It has been submitted that clauses 3.9, 3.10 and 3.20 of the Model
Guidelines indicate that State Associations exclusively have the right to vote
in the elections to the Executive Committee. Moreover, it has been submitted
that the Model Election Guidelines contemplate that it is only the State
Associations who would be entitled to vote in the ensuing elections. Hence, it
has been urged that allowing eminent players to vote in the elections would
not be consistent with the National Sports Code.
11 In order to appreciate the submission, we have analyzed the provisions of the

National Sports Code. Clause 9.3 envisages that in order to be eligible for
assistance from and for continuation of the recognition of government,
national sporting organizations must meet several criteria. Included among
them is sub-clause xii, which envisages the inclusion of sports persons (say
25%) with voting rights in the management of national sports federations.
Sub-clause xiii envisages that elections have to be held in terms of the Model
Election Guidelines. Clause 3.9 and 3.10 are extracted below:
“3.9 The membership of the Federation should be

confined to the corresponding State/UT and other special
units affiliated (like Sports Control Boards etc.) and where
Federation grant membership to individual clubs or individual
persons, such membership does not confer on such members
the right to vote in any of the Federation’s meetings.
3.10 At the National level, there will be only one

recognised federation for each discipline of sport. Only the
duly recognised National Sports Federation would be entitled
to financial grants as admissible. Only one State/UT
32
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
7
Association from each State/UT shall be admitted as a

member of the Federation, provided it has a minimum of 50%
of the District level Associations affiliated to it. Any
organisation of an all India standing and connected with the
Sport may be given the status as that of a State or that of a
U.T. and admitted as affiliated Member. Other categories of
membership may also be given but while each affiliated
State/UT Unit shall have a right to cast vote in the General
Body Meetings, no other class of Members shall have any
right to vote in the Federation’s meetings. While granting
recognition/affiliation to a State/UT Association, the National
Federation should take into consideration the representative
character of the State/UT Association so as to ensure that
only truly representative body of the game gets the
recognition/affiliation.”
12 Clause 3.9 envisages that membership of the Federation should be confined

to the corresponding States or as the case may be, Union Territories and to
other affiliated special units. Where a Federation grants membership to clubs
or persons, this would not confer a right to vote on them. Similarly, clause
3.10 envisages that apart from the State Associations other categories of
membership may also be given, but while each affiliated State/Union
Territory unit would have a right to vote in the General Body Meetings, no
other class of members would have a right to vote. These provisions would
have to however be read together with clause 3.20 which provides as
follows:
“3.20 Inclusion of prominent sports persons of outstanding

merit as members of the respective sports federations on a
tenure basis. The strength of such prominent sports persons
with voting rights should be a certain minimum percentage
(say 25%) of the total members representing the federation
and selection of such sports persons should be in
consultation with this Department.”
13 Clause 3.20 therefore envisages the inclusion of prominent sports persons as

members of sports federations on a tenured basis. Their voting rights should
33
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
8
be fixed at a certain minimum percentage, say 25% of the total members

representing the Federation. The selection of such sports persons should be
in consultation with the Department of Youth Affairs and Sports. In other
words, there are two specific provisions which contemplate the inclusion of
sports persons. There is on the one hand clause 9.3(12) which specifically
contemplates the inclusion of sports persons (say 25%) with voting rights in
the management of national sports federations. On the other hand, clause
3.20 also provides for the inclusion of prominent sports persons with a
certain minimum percentage of voting rights (say 25%) of the total members
representing the Federation. The use of the expression “say 25%” indicates
that 25% is only an indicative figure and the extent of the voting rights has
to be decided upon deliberation with the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.
14 Appearing for the Ministry, Mr Sanjay Jain, Additional Solicitor General

submitted that the Sports Code is an enabling document and not a restrictive
document. The Union Ministry has specifically endorsed the need for
including 36 eminent players who have represented India in at least one
international match.
15 The National Sports Code cannot be read in the manner of a statute. A

holistic understanding of its provisions has to be arrived at in order to
effectuate both its intent and purpose. In this backdrop, consistent with the
need for the healthy development of the sport of football in India, the
inclusion of eminent players who have represented the country would be of
immense benefit. The administration of the affairs of football will benefit
from the experience, knowledge and concerns of the players themselves.
They are vital stakeholders. Apart from the above analyses, we have also
taken note of the fact that the model statutes which are being notified by
FIFA do also contemplate due representation to sports players.
34
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
9
The CoA has proposed the following time schedule for conducting the
elections:
Date Days Event Applicable clause

from of Schedule III
Day 0
3rd August, 2022 Day 0 Order of this Hon’ble Court
12th August, 2022 Day 10 AIFF to prepare consolidated

list of Eminent Players and send
to the Returning Officer
State Associations to select their

representatives and send to the
Returning Officer
13th August, 2022 Day 11 Returning Officer shall issue the Article 3.4
Election Notice specifying the
Election Date as determined this
Hon’ble Court.
The Returning Officer shall Article 4.3

scrutinize and prepare the final
List of Voters (comprising State
Associations’ and Eminent
Players’ representatives as
indicated above) forming the
Electoral College in Form 1.
The Returning Officer will take
up objections raised, if any, and
decide on the same within 3
(three) days.
17th August, 2022 Day 15 Nomination Paper proposing Article 5.4

to 19th August, to Day and seconding a candidate for
35
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
10
2022 17 election as Office Bearer shall

be delivered to the Returning
Officer either by post or in
person by the candidate
himself/herself only in a period
between Day 15 and Day 17
between 11.00 AM and 1.00
PM.
20th August, 2022 Day 18 As soon as may be after 1:00 Article 5.7
P.M. on Day 18, the Returning
Officer shall prepare a list of all
nominations received by him,
post wise, in Form 3; and
publish the same in a
conspicuous place in his office
and also on the website of the
AIFF.
21st August, 2022 Day 19 At 11:00 A.M., the Returning Article 6.1
Officer shall scrutinize each
nomination paper, one by one,
received by him, and determine
its validity or otherwise.
22nd August, 2022 Day 20 Each candidate whose Article 7.1

to 24th August, to Day nomination has been found
2022 (until 22, 1:00 valid on scrutiny shall be
1:00PM) PM. entitled to withdraw his/her
candidature, from Day 20 until
1:00 P.M. on Day 22.
25th August, 2022 Day 23 As soon as may be after 11:00 Article 7.5
AM on Day 23, the Returning
Officer shall prepare the final
list of contesting candidates in
Form 6, display a copy of the
said list in a conspicuous place
in his office and on the AIFF
36
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
11
website. Returning Officer shall

also furnish a copy of the same
to each of the candidates / their
authorised representatives, if
they so demand.
Article 8.1
28th August, 2022 Day 26 Where the number of candidates
for any post is equal or lesser to
the number of posts they shall
be deemed to have been elected
unopposed.
On Day 26, the Poll for the Article 9.1

remaining posts shall be taken
post-wise, and shall commence
at a suitable time decided and
declared in advance by the
Returning Officer, in the
headquarters of the AIFF at
New Delhi.
28th / 29th August, Day 26 / The Returning Officer shall 10.1 (counting) &
2022 27 count the votes and declare the 11.1 (declaration)
results.
16 We approve the proposed time-lines.
17 For the above reasons, we order and direct that:
(i) The elections to the Executive Committee of AIFF should he held

expeditiously and shall be concluded in terms of the time schedule
which has been indicated in the tabulated statement set out above;
(ii) The elections shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the

provisions of Article 26 of the draft Constitution. The persons chosen as
representatives shall have to conform to Article 26.
37
SLP(C) 30748-49/2017
12
(iii) This would be an interim arrangement without prejudice to the rights

and contentions of the parties;
(iv) The interim Body would continue for a period of three months subject to
further orders of this Court till the Constitution is finalized;
(v) The interim Body shall not claim any equities on the basis of this order
and the present arrangement would be subject to further orders;
(vi) The CoA shall be apprised of the decisions of the elected Body; and
(vii) Each of the associations representing the State/UTs would nominate one
representative to the electoral college. The 36 member electoral college
of eminent football players shall consists of 24 male and 12 female
players. Each of them would be subject to the requirement of having
represented India in at least one international match and should have
retired from international football at least 2 years prior to the date of
the notification of the elections.
18 Since the above order is confined to the process of conducting the ensuing
elections, all other issues, including the interlocutory application which is
filed by FSDL, will be considered separately.
19 List the Special Leave Petitions on 20 September 2022.
(CHETAN KUMAR) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)

A.R.-cum-P.S. Court Master
//TRUE COPY//
7/27/22, 10:31 AM All India Football Federation Mail - Fwd: Comments/Suggestions to the Proposed Constitution of the AIFF
ANNEXURE A-4
52
Akshay Rajpurohit <akshay.rajpurohit@the-aiff.com>
38
Fwd: Comments/Suggestions to the Proposed Constitution of the AIFF
Sunando Dhar <sunandodhar@the-aiff.com> Tue, Jul 26, 2022 at 11:15 PM

To: Akshay Rajpurohit <akshay.rajpurohit@the-aiff.com>
---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Purushottam Kattel <purushottam.kattel@the-afc.com>
Date: Wed, Jul 6, 2022 at 10:06 AM

Subject: Re: FW: Comments/Suggestions to the Proposed Constitution of the AIFF
To: Gursimran Brar <gursimran.brar@the-aiff.com>
Cc: Tanner, Rolf (FIFA) <Rolf.Tanner@fifa.org>, Vahid Kardany <vahid.kardany@the-afc.com>, Jean-Marie, Kenny
(FIFA) <Kenny.Jean-Marie@fifa.org>, Akhalkatsi, Nodar (FIFA) <Nodar.Akhalkatsi@fifa.org>, Solemale, Sarah (FIFA)
<Sarah.Solemale@fifa.org>, Rufus, Prince (FIFA Development) <Prince.Rufus@fifa.org>, yogesh.desai@the-afc.com
<yogesh.desai@the-afc.com>, sunandodhar@the-aiff.com <sunandodhar@the-aiff.com>
Dear Gursimran
We thank you for this detail feedback that is submitted to the COA for further consideration.
We would like to highlight a point which we had put it in our comment but left out in the feedback.
For this amendment, the AFC and FIFA would like no change in the membership structure and we leave it to the
new AIFF Executive Committee and Congress on how to make the AIFF inclusive.
Therefore, it is very important that the current structure of the membership is not changed. The stakeholders can
consider the number of the members to be represented in the Executive Committee. However, a new member
should not be added in the current structure and this issue should be dealt by the new AIFF Executive Committee.
Likewise, we strongly believe that the Electoral College should be including the members of the States
Associations, not only the President and the General Secretary (72 people in total) which can be termed as a very
restrictive composition.
We hope these two messages are delivered to the COA while finalising the Statutes.
As you mentioned that the COA are planning to send the document to the Supreme Court for their review on 8
July 2022, we would like to reiterate, based on our discussion during the Mission, FIFA and the AFC would like to
see and approve the final version of the Statues before it goes to the Supreme Court for the approval.
Best Regards

P Kattel
Head of South Asia Unit
Development Department, MA
Governance Department and RA
Governance Department
MA Division
Asian Football Confederation

AFC House, Jalan 1/155B, Bukit Jalil, 57000 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Tel: +603 8994 3388 Fax: +603 8994 2689

Email: purushottam.kattel@the-afc.com
//TRUE COPY//

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=5deb9f79b6&view=pt&search=all&permmsgid=msg-f%3A1739438220133239893&simpl=msg-f%3A1739438… 1/2
7/27/22, 10:43 AM All India Football Federation Mail - Fwd: India (AIFF)
ANNEXURE A-5
69
Akshay Rajpurohit <akshay.rajpurohit@the-aiff.com>
39
Fwd: India (AIFF)
Sunando Dhar <sunandodhar@the-aiff.com> Tue, Jul 26, 2022 at 11:23 PM

To: Akshay Rajpurohit <akshay.rajpurohit@the-aiff.com>
---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Solemale, Sarah (FIFA) <Sarah.Solemale@fifa.org>
Date: Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 8:27 PM

Subject: India (AIFF)

To: sunandodhar@the-aiff.com <sunandodhar@the-aiff.com>
Cc: vahid.kardany@the-afc.com <vahid.kardany@the-afc.com>, purushottam.kattel@the-afc.com

<purushottam.kattel@the-afc.com>, Tanner, Rolf (FIFA) <Rolf.Tanner@fifa.org>, Akhalkatsi, Nodar (FIFA)
<Nodar.Akhalkatsi@fifa.org>, Balasingam, Sanjeevan (FIFA) <Sanjeevan.Balasingam@fifa.org>, Rufus, Prince (FIFA
Development) <Prince.Rufus@fifa.org>

Dear Sir,

We trust this email finds you well.

You may find attached hereto a joint letter from FIFA and AFC.

Greetings from Paris and best regards,

Sarah Solémalé
Senior Manager – Member Associations Governance
Member Associations Division

Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich, Switzerland
Mobile: +41(0)79 889 53 34
sarah.solemale@fifa.org
www.FIFA.com

DISCLAIMER

The information in this e-mail and any attachments are confidential and/or privileged and intended only for use by the
intended recipient(s). If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail and/or any attachments or if you have
received this e-mail and/or any attachments by mistake or accidentally, please notify the sender immediately, delete
this e-mail and any attachments from your system, and do not disclose, or make copies of, such information. Any
unauthorised use, copying, dissemination, distribution or disclosure of the information in this e-mail and any
attachments is strictly forbidden.

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=5deb9f79b6&view=pt&search=all&permmsgid=msg-f%3A1739438729233444469&dsqt=1&simpl=msg-f%3A… 1/2
7/27/22, 10:43 AM All India Football Federation Mail - Fwd: India (AIFF)
70
E-mails may be intercepted, altered or read by unauthorised persons. Accordingly, no (contractual) obligations may
be imposed on FIFA as a result of an undertaking contained in an e-mail. We further recommend that you use regular
mail, courier services or facsimile transmission for any information intended to be of a confidential nature. However,
40
please note that by sending us messages via e-mail, we will be given to understand that you authorise and instruct us
to correspond by e-mail in the relevant matter, unless the use of e-mails is not permitted according to FIFA
regulations.
.............................
https://www.the-aiff.com
https://www.facebook.com/TheIndianFootballTeam
https://www.twitter.com/IndianFootball
https://www.instagram.com/indianfootball
https://www.youtube.com/IndianFootball
.............................
Confidentiality: This communication and any attachments hereto are intended only for the intended recipient(s) and are confidential and
privileged, unless stated otherwise. If you are not the intended recipient. you are hereby notified that any review, re-transmission, duplication
in any manner, conversion to hard copy, copying, circulation or other usage/exploitation of this message and any attachment(s) contained
herein is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by return email and delete this
message and any attachments from your system.

Virus/Malware: Although the AIFF has taken reasonable precautions to ensure no virus/malware is present in this email, the AIFF shall not
be responsible for any loss or damage arising from the use of this email’s content or attachment(s).
Is it necessary to print this email? If you care about the environment like we do, please refrain from printing emails. It helps to keep the
environment forested and litter-free.
2022.07.25 FIFA-AFC Joint Letter to AIFF.pdf

138K
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=5deb9f79b6&view=pt&search=all&permmsgid=msg-f%3A1739438729233444469&dsqt=1&simpl=msg-f%3A… 2/2
71
41
25 July 2022
Mr. Sunando Dhar

Acting General Secretary
All India Football Federation (AIFF)
Dear Sir
FIFA-AFC Joint Comments on the AIFF Proposed Statutes
We would like to put on record that the joint FIFA-AFC feedback on the proposed AIFF
Statutes were sent to the AIFF on 29 June 2022 and on 14 July 2022.
We also acknowledge that many of the recommendations we initially made were

subsequently incorporated in the current version of the draft AIFF Statutes. In this context,
and with the aim of addressing some of the provisions that should, in our opinion, be
further clarified, we would like to bring to your kind attention the following items of the
draft Statutes.
1. Electoral Committee
FIFA and the AFC strongly believe that an independent Electoral Committee
appointed or elected by the AIFF Congress is the best solution to ensure democratic
elections in line with our requirements (i.e. art. 19 par. 2 of the FIFA Statutes and
art. 15 par. 1 of the AFC Statutes). We therefore strongly recommend the concerned
authorities to ensure that the body in charge of supervising the elections of the
AIFF comply with the aforementioned requirements.
2. Presence of Eminent Players (Article 1.18 and Article 20.2) in the General Body
(Congress) of the AIFF
As per the draft Statutes shared with us, there will be an additional 35 Eminent
Players in the AIFF Congress from the exiting 35 Member Associations. Although
we agree that the players’ voice needs to be heard, we are also of the view that the
importance of the existing members of the AIFF should not be undermined. To
bring in 50 percent of the members in the Congress structure which equals the
current membership structure is not prudent idea, and the AIFF should seek to be
more diverse in future. However, we understand the requirements of the Sports
Code of India and recommend AIFF to bring in a presence of above 25 percent of
the Eminent Players in the AIFF Executive Committee as Co-opted Members.
3. Article 25.3 b) and c)

b) In the event a person is elected as an Office-Bearer in the Executive
Committee of the AIFF and holds a position of an Office-Bearer in a Member
72
42
Association, he/she shall automatically be deemed to have vacated his/her
position in the Member Association.
c) Similarly, in the event that a person is elected as an Office-Bearer in a

Member Association and holds a position of an Office-Bearer in the
Executive Committee of the AIFF, he/she shall automatically be deemed to
have vacated his/her position in the Member Association.”
We are of the view that such a proposal would make it difficult for the Members
to get re-elected again at the respective Member Associations in the event that they
cannot serve their full term in the Executive Committee of AIFF for any reason.
4. Article 25.5
“If the President is permanently or temporarily prevented from performing his/her
official function, the Executive Committee shall decide a person to represent him
or her until the next AGM (Annual General Body Meeting) or SGM, whichever is
earlier.”
This article would undermine the importance of the elected officials by the AIFF
Congress as it would appear to grant the Executive Committee the power to bring
in a person to represent [the President] even from outside of the Executive
Committee. Therefore, FIFA and the AFC are of the view that the relevant provision
should specify that any person acting for or representing the President when the
latter is permanently or temporarily prevented from performing his/her official
function, should be chosen from amongst the existing AIFF Executive Committee
Members. Another option would be to create the position of Vice-President / Vice-
Presidents in the AIFF Executive Committee and provide in the AIFF Statutes that
such official(s) would step in, in the absence of the President.
5. Article 26
A provision stipulating that the term limits have no retroactive effect is missing in
Article 26. It is our opinion that such provision should be added to ensure any
previous term already fulfilled by any Executive Committee Members are not taken
into account in calculating the maximum number of terms.
Finally, we refer to recent feedback received from local football stakeholders which have
raised concerns that the Supreme Court may also establish in its decision that any future
amendments to the AIFF Statutes will have to be validated again by the Courts. In this
regard, we are of the opinion that the AIFF Congress, as the supreme and legislative body
of AIFF, should remain entitled in future to amend the AIFF Statutes without the need for
the Courts to validate the relevant changes. In this context, and for the sake of good order,
we would like to stress that any future changes to the AIFF Statutes should however be
fully in line with the requirements and principles of both FIFA and the AFC, in addition to
the national legal framework in place.
73
43
We extend our best wishes to AIFF and look forward to receiving an agreed Statutes by all
the stakeholders before 31 July 2022 to be readied for the endorsement by the AIFF
membership.
Yours sincerely,
FIFA AFC
KENNY JEAN-MARIE VAHID KARDANY

Chief Member Associations Officer Deputy General Secretary
//TRUE COPY//
38
ANNEXURE
ANNEXURE A-1A-6 44
BY E-MAIL
All India Football Federation
Mr Sunando Dhar
Acting General Secretary
sunandodhar@the-aiff.com
Zurich, 5 August 2022

kje/sba/nak/ssa
Situation of the All India Football Federation (AIFF)
Dear Sir,
We kindly refer you to our joint FIFA-AFC letter of 1 July 2022 which addressed the roadmap agreed upon by AIFF
and further participants to the meetings organised during a joint mission held on 21-23 June 2022. FIFA and the AFC
further reiterated our positions in our joint FIFA-AFC letter sent on 25 July 2022.
As per the said roadmap, the AIFF was to call for a special general assembly on the first week of August 2022 to
approve the new statutes worked upon with FIFA, the AFC and the Indian football community.
Unfortunately, we have been informed that the Supreme Court’s hearing held yesterday on the situation of the AIFF
allegedly resulted in deviations to the aforementioned roadmap. If this is considered to be true, it would irrefutably
jeopardise the mutual understanding which was displayed so far on the steps forward.
In this context, we would like to recall the AIFF’s statutory obligations applicable to all of FIFA and the AFC member
associations, including the obligation to manage its affairs independently and ensure that its own affairs are not
influenced by any third parties (cf. art. 14.1.(i) and art. 19.1 of FIFA Statutes in conjunction with art. 15.4 of the AFC
Statutes).
Bearing in mind the above, we kindly ask the AIFF to provide us without further delay with an official transcript of
the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 August 2022 by 17:00 hours Indian Standard Time on 9 August 2022. Upon receipt
of the said documentation and following its in-depth analysis, should there exist serious deviations to the aforesaid
roadmap, we would submit the matter to our relevant decision-making body for further considerations and possible
decisions based on FIFA Statutes, including the suspension of the AIFF and the withdrawal of the hosting rights for
the 2022 FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup in India.
We thank you for taking note of the above and look forward to receiving the AIFF’s response.
Yours sincerely,
FIFA AFC
Fatma Samoura Datuk Seri Windsor John

Secretary General General Secretary
//TRUE COPY//
TRUE COPY
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland T: +41 (0)43 222 7777 www.FIFA.com
45
ANNEXURE A-7
FIFA suspends All India Football

Federation
Tuesday, 16 August 2022 at 10:00 (local time)
The Bureau of the FIFA Council has unanimously decided to

suspend the All India Football Federation (AIFF) with immediate
effect due to undue influence from third parties, which
constitutes a serious violation of the FIFA Statutes. The
suspension will be lifted once an order to set up a committee of
administrators to assume the powers of the AIFF Executive
Committee has been repealed and the AIFF administration
regains full control of the AIFF’s daily affairs. The suspension
means that the FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup 2022™, scheduled
to take place in India on 11-30 October 2022, cannot currently be
held in India as planned. FIFA is assessing the next steps with
regard to the tournament and will refer the matter to the Bureau
of the Council if and when necessary. FIFA is in constant
constructive contact with the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
in India and is hopeful that a positive outcome to the case may
still be achieved.
//TRUE COPY//
Editions CIES
National associations and leagues share ANNEXURE A-8 46
C. Boillat & R. Poli - Governance models across football associations and leagues
the responsibility of organising football
competitions. However, governance models
vary greatly at worldwide level. This book
analyses the various existing models of
governance. It also studies the role of league
representatives and other stakeholders in
the decision-making processes of national
associations.
In order to give a representative insight of the
situation at a global level, the analysis includes
thirty-two national associations spread across
the six continental confederations. The
GOVERNANCE MODELS
authors also highlight that the relationship
between national associations and leagues ACROSS FOOTBALL
can be a difficult one. As a matter of fact,
each stakeholder requires the support of ASSOCIATIONS AND LEAGUES
the other, but at the same time neither party
wants the other to be too involved in the
governance of its own organisation.
Camille Boillat and Raffaele Poli are
geographers by training. Camille is a scientific
Camille Boillat & Raffaele Poli
collaborator at the International Centre for
Sport Studies (CIES), while Raffaele Poli is the
head of the CIES Football Observatory.
A research mandate
on behalf of
47
GOVERNANCE MODELS ACROSS
FOOTBALL ASSOCIATIONS AND LEAGUES
48
CENTRE
INTERNATIONAL
D’ÉTUDE DU SPORT
Réflexions sportives
Edited by Denis Oswald and Christophe Jaccoud
Vol. 4
The collection, Réflexions sportives, features conference proceedings organised or co-organised

by CIES, as well as ongoing studies undertaken by experienced and novice researchers. Its aim
is to promote CIES as a platform for academic debate, to produce work on topical subjects as
well as offer publication opportunities to talented researchers.
Editorial Board
Prof. Denis Oswald (Université de Neuchâtel and CIES Scientific Director), Prof.
Christophe Jaccoud (Université de Neuchâtel and CIES), Dr Raffaele Poli (Univer-
sité de Neuchâtel and CIES), Vincent Schatzmann (CIES General Secretary), Roger
Besson (Université de Neuchâtel and CIES), Thomas Busset (CIES) et Kevin Tallec
Marston (CIES)
49
GOVERNANCE MODELS
ACROSS FOOTBALL
ASSOCIATIONS AND LEAGUES

With the collaboration of David Rodrigues & Kevin Tallec Marston
Editions CIES - Collection Réflexions sportives - Neuchâtel 2014

50
Le Centre International d’Etude du Sport (CIES), institution scientifique crée en
1995 d’un partenariat entre la Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA), l’Université de Neuchâtel, la Ville et le Canton de Neuchâtel, a pour mis-
sion de développer, dans une perspective de type pluridisciplinaire (juridique, soci-
ologique, géographique, économique et historique), des activités de recherche, de
formation et de consulting au service de la communauté sportive. Le CIES a pour
vocation de servir de passerelle entre les mondes de la recherche, de l’enseignement
et la communauté sportive.
The International Centre for Sport Studies (CIES), a scientific institution created
in 1995 as a result of the joint venture between the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA), the University of Neuchâtel and the Town and State of
Neuchâtel, aims to develop, using a multi-disciplinary approach (legal, sociologic,
geographic, economic and historic), research, education and consulting activities to
provide to the sports world. The CIES’ purpose is to serve as bridge between the
research and education worlds and the sports world.
© Copyright
CIES - Centre International d’Etude du Sport
Avenue DuPeyrou 1
CH - 2000 Neuchâtel (Suisse)
Tél : +41 (0)32 718 39 00 Fax : +41 (0)32 718 39 01
Contact : secretariat.cies@unine.ch
www.cies.ch
ISBN 2-940241-24-4
51
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our gratitude to the following people who

provided us with relevant information:
Alex Miescher, Association Suisse de Football
Florence Etourneau, Fédération Française de Football
Frank Van Hattum, New Zealand Football
Ian Kemble, Jamaica Football Federation
Jo Setright, Football Federation Australia
Joko Driyono, Football Association of Indonesia/Liga Indonesia
Jonathan Hall, The Football Association (England)
Jürgen Paepke, Deutsche Fussball Liga
Kengo Arima, Japan Football Association
Łukasz Wachowski, Polish Football Association
Mark Aspden, New Zealand Football
Markus Stenger, Deutscher Fussball-Bund
Niccolò Donna, Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio
Nils Fisketjønn, Norwegian Football Association
Primo Corvaro, Fédération Internationale de Football Association
Raymond Grant, Jamaica Football Federation
Ridzal Saat, Football Association of Singapore/S. League
Robert Pongracz, Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Spain)
Victoriano Melero, Fédération Française de Football
Viktor Derdo, Football Federation of Ukraine
52
53
Table of contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Structural models, legal forms and agreements between national

associations and leagues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. League structural models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1.1. Legal form. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2. Association model: level of national association involvement
and financial relationships with the national association . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3. Separate entity model: level of national association involvement
and financial relationships with the national association . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4. Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5. Specific cases of league governance and financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. Documents governing the relationships between leagues
and national associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
II. The league in the national association structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. League membership in the national association and representation

in the general assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Power balance between stakeholders in the national association
general assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1. League representation and voting power in the national
association general assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2. Other stakeholders in the national association general assembly. . . 34
2.3. Election of league representatives to the national association
general assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3. Power balance between stakeholders in the national association
executive committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
VIII Governance models across associations and leagues 54
3.1. League representation in the national association executive
committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2. League representation and voting power in the national
association executive committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Other stakeholders in the national association executive committee. 48
3.4. Election of league representatives to the national association
executive committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4. Standing committees function, presence and members. . . . . . . . . . . 53
III. Division of labour between national associations and leagues. . . . 57
1. Organisation of competitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.1. National cup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.2. League cup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.3. Super cup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.4. Youth football and women’s football competitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2. Players’ status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3. Disciplinary proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4. Sport arbitration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5. Club licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
IV. League internal governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1. Internal governance: association model leagues with national

association management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2. Internal governance: association model leagues with
self-management and separate entity model leagues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.1. League executive committees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.2. League executive powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.3. League general assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.4. League members admittance and removal mechanisms. . . . . . . . . 93
Table of contents IX 55
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix 1: Legal form of leagues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Appendix 2: Documents governing the relationships between
leagues and national associations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Appendix 3: League representation in national association general
assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix 4: League representation in national association executive
committees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Appendix 5: Original texts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
56
57
List of figures
Figure n°1: Spanish football pyramid-shaped model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Figure n°2: League structural models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure n°3: Type of representation of leagues in national association general
assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure n°4: Frequency of interest groups representation in national
association general assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure n°5: Type of league representation in national association executive
committees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure n°6: Standard players’ status regulations model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure n°7: Standard disciplinary proceedings in football. . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Figure n°8: Stakeholders representation in league executive committees
(association model with self-management). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
List of tables
Table n°1: Associations included in the research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Table n°2: General information about leagues and competitions. . . . . . . . 6
Table n°3: Legal form of leagues surveyed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table n°4: Association model – leagues categorisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table n°5: Separate entity model – leagues categorisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table n°6: Selected leagues for further analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table n°7: Type of league membership in the national association. . . . . . 26
Table n°8: Number of members at national association general
assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
XII Governance models across associations and leagues 58
Table n°9: League voting power in national association general
assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table n°10: Stakeholders’ representation in national association general
assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Table n°11: Stakeholders representation per category in national association
general assemblies with league representation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table n°12: Interest groups representation in national association general
assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table n°13: Election of league representatives to national association
general assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table n°14: Number of members at national association general assemblies
and executive committees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table n°15: League voting power in national association executive
committees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table n°16: Election method(s) of national association executive committee
members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table n°17: Standing committees – FAZ example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table n°18: National cups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Table n°19: League cups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Table n°20: Super cups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Table n°21: Youth football competitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Table n°22: Entity governing players’ status issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Table n°23: Entity governing disciplinary proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table n°24: Entity governing arbitration proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Table n°25: Entity issuing club licences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Table n°26: League distribution according to chapter IV analyses. . . . . . 82
Table n°27: League governing entity in national association . . . . . . . . . . 83
Table n°28: Independent league structural models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Figures and tables XIII 59
Table n°29: Number of members at league executive committees
(association model with self-management). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Table n°30: Number of members at league executive committees (separate
entity model). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Table n°31: League general assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Table n°32: Promotion/relegation rules between top tier leagues and the
lower ones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Table n°33: Legal form of leagues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Table n°34: Documents governing the relationships between leagues and
national associations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table n°35: League representation in national association general
assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Table n°36: League representation in national association executive
committees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
60
61
Definitions
Championship or division: an annual football competition played by teams

usually coming from the same country. For example, Ligue 1 is the top tier
championship – or first division – in France.
Ex officio member: a person who is a member of a body (general assembly,
executive committee, etc.) by virtue of holding a position in another body.
For example, it is common that league presidents are ex officio member of
association executive committee.
League: organisation running one or several championships/divisions. For
example, the Swiss Football League is the organisation running the two top
tier championships – Super League and Challenge League – in Switzerland.
Youth football: competitions with age limit for participating players (usually
twenty years at most).
62
63
Acronyms
AFC Asian Football Confederation

AIA Associazione Italiana Arbitri
AIFF All India Football Federation
ANFP Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Chile)
ASF/SFV Association Suisse de Football, Associazione Svizzera di
Football / Schweizerischer Fussballverband
CAF Confédération Africaine de Football
CAS Court of Arbitration for Sport
CBF Confederação Brasileira de Futebol
CONCACAF Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean
Association Football
CONI Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano
CONMEBOL Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol
DFB Deutscher Fußball-Bund
DFL Deutsche Fußball Liga
EPFL European Professional Football Leagues
EU European Union
FAS Football Association of Singapore
FAZ Football Association of Zambia
FCF Federação Caboverdiana de Futebol
FECAFOOT Fédération Camerounaise de Football
FENAFUTH Federación Nacional Autónoma de Fútbol de Honduras
FFA Football Federation Australia
XVIII Governance models across associations and leagues 64
FFC Federación de Fútbol de Chile
FFF Fédération Française de Football
FFU Football Federation of Ukraine
FIF Fédération Ivoirienne de Football
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIGC Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio
FKF Football Kenya Federation
FMF Federación Mexicana de Fútbol
FSF Fédération Sénégalaise de Football
FTF Fédération Tunisienne de Football
FVF Federación Venezolana de Fútbol
IPL Indonesian Premier League
ISL Indonesia Super League
JFA Japan Football Association
JFF Jamaica Football Federation
KPL Kenyan Premier League
LFA Ligue de Football Amateur (France)
LFP Ligue de Football Professionnel (France)
LFPC Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun
LND Lega Nazionale Dilettanti (Italy)
LNFA Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado (Spain)
LNFP Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Spain and Honduras)
LNFP Ligue Nationale du Football Professionel (Tunisia)
MLS Major League Soccer (USA)
N/A Not Applicable/Not Available/No Answer
NAIA National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (USA)
Acronyms XIX 65
NASL North American Soccer League (USA)
NCAA National Collegiate Athletic Association (USA)
NFF Norges Fotballforbund
NSL National Soccer League (South Africa)
NWSL National Women's Soccer League (USA)
NZF New Zealand Football
OFC Oceania Football Confederation
PFAJ Professional Football Association of Jamaica
PLCA Premier League Clubs Association (Jamaica)
PNGFA Papua New Guinea Football Association
PSSI Persatuan Sepakbola Seluruh Indonesia
PZPN Polski Związek Piłki Nożnej
QFA Qatar Football Association
QSL Qatar Stars League
QSLM Qatar Stars League Management
RAZ Referees Association of Zambia
RFEF Real Federación Española de Fútbol
SAFA South African Football Association
SEFPSA Sociedad Española de Fútbol Profesional, S.A.
SFL Swiss Football League
The FA The Football Association (England)
UEFA Union of European Football Associations
USASA United States Adult Soccer Association
USL United Soccer Leagues (USA)
USSF United States Soccer Federation
WPSL Women's Premier Soccer League (USA)
66
67
Introduction
This publication derives from a research mandate carried out by the authors
on behalf of FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association). In
present-day football, question of the relationships across national football
associations and professional leagues is paramount. It raises crucial govern-
ance issues such as income distribution, representation and political power.
Ultimately, the ways in which these relationships are governed heavily impact
football development throughout the world. This study aims to describe a
number of situations observed in a sample of associations in all confedera-
tions. For national associations or leagues interested in developing their ac-
tivities and the sport in general, this report may offer valuable insights into
the ways in which many other national associations and leagues manage their
relationships and governance models. It is divided into four chapters:
–– Relationships between associations and leagues
–– League representation in association structures
–– Labour division between leagues, associations and other stakeholders
–– Internal governance of leagues
Each chapter includes a variable number of sections and subsections provid-
ing a description of the current situation. Throughout this publication, sum-
mary tables and examples are displayed in order to allow the reader to have a
clear overview of the various mechanisms and strategies encountered around
the world.
The research project covered all the regional areas in each confederation.
For that purpose, thirty-two FIFA member associations – representing vari-
ous levels of football development – have been studied (tab. 1).
Table n°1: Associations included in the research

UEFA (9) England, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Switzerland,Ukraine
CAF (8) Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia
AFC (6) Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Qatar, Singapor
CONCACAF (5) Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, USA
CONMEBOL (3) Brazil, Chile, Venezuela
OFC (2) New Zealand, Papua New Guinea
2 Governance models across associations and leagues 68
Within a country, football is usually governed according to a pyramid-shaped
model. The top tier league(s) take(s) place at national level, while teams of
lower level generally play against each other within championships governed by
regional associations. The lower the level, the more numerous the teams tend to
be. In this research, the analysis includes all leagues managed at national level
for each association surveyed. For example, in Spain, both top tier champion-
ships (Primera and Segunda División) take place at a national level and are man-
aged by the same entity (LNFP – Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Spanish
top tier league). The two lower level championships – Segunda División B and
Tercera División – are divided into regional groups. However, they are still
managed at a national level by the LNFA (Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado)
and are thus also covered by the study (fig. 1). In summary, the terms ‘division’
or ‘championship’ refer here to the competition itself, while ‘league’ refers to the
organisation running one or more divisions or championships.
Figure n°1: Spanish football pyramid-shaped model
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional*

[2 championships, 42 teams]
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado*

[2 championships, 440 teams]
Regional associations
[19 associations, dozens of championships, thousands of teams]
* The two highest level leagues are studied in the present research
The methodology for this project consisted of collecting information avail-

able from reports (FIFA Member Associations Marketing Surveys, UEFA Sur-
vey on Professional League Organisations 2009/10, EPFL Report on European
Professional Football Leagues Organization, Structure and Governance Season
2009/10, academic literature, etc.), official documents (FIFA, associations
and leagues statutes and regulations) and online sources (associations’ and
leagues’ official websites, etc.). This information has then been complement-
ed on a case by case basis through emails and phone interviews.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks to all people who accepted to
participate in this research and who provided very valuable insights. We wish
Introduction 3 69
also to thank James Johnson who managed the research on behalf of FIFA.
His vast knowledge and contacts were also of key importance in the comple-
tion of the study.
70
71
I. Structural models, legal forms and agreements
between national associations and leagues
This chapter examines the relationships between the association and the
league(s) organised at national level and taking place within its jurisdiction.
It is divided into two sections. The first one deals with the structural model of
leagues. It consists of an analysis of the leagues’ legal form, the degree of asso-
ciation implication in leagues organisation and the financial relationships be-
tween leagues and associations. This information is useful in understanding
the degree of autonomy of each league, particularly regarding management
and administration issues. These areas of interest will be analysed throughout
the report.
The second section concerns the nature of the documents governing the
relationships between a league and the association. Additional information
about existing agreements between associations and leagues is also provided.
The table below (tab. 2) presents the leagues surveyed according to their
name, status (amateur/professional), number of division(s) and name of the
championship(s). The reader may note that some leagues are in fact semi-
professional in that players and officials often receive some form of remunera-
tion. For the purposes of this study, however, we define ‘professional’ as the
status of the club as an institution and not the fact that some players may be
semi-professional or even earn their entire living as a footballer.
Table n°2: General information about leagues and competitions
Association Structure Pro. Div. Name of championships
England Premier League Yes 1 Premier League
The Football League Yes 3 Championship; League 1; League 2
Football Conference Semi 2 Conference National; Conf. South/North

France Ligue de Football Prof. Yes 2 Ligue 1; Ligue 2
Ligue du Football Am. No 3 National; CFA; CFA2

Germany Ligaverband Yes 2 Bundesliga; 2. Bundesliga
3. Liga Yes 1 3. Liga

Italy Lega Nazionale Prof. Serie A Yes 1 Serie A
Lega Nazionale Prof. Serie B Yes 1 Serie B
Lega Pro Yes 2 1a divisione; 2a divisione
Lega Nazionale Dilettanti No All the rest

Norway Norsk Toppfotball Yes 2 Elite League; 1st Division;
Divisjonforeningen Semi 1 2. Divisjon

Poland Ekstraklasa Yes 1 Ekstraklasa
Polish Football Association Yes 2 I Liga; II Liga

Spain Liga Nacional de Fútbol Prof. Yes 2 Primera División; Segunda División
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado No All the rest

Switzerland Swiss Football League Yes 2 Super League, Challenge League
Erste Liga No 2 1. Liga Promotion; 1. Liga Classic
Amateur Liga No 1 2.Liga Interregional

Ukraine Ukrainian Premier League Yes 1 Ukrainian Premier League
Prof. Football League of Ukraine Yes 2 Ukrainian 1st League; Ukrainian 2nd League
Cameroon Ligue de Football Prof. du Cameroun Yes 2 Elite One; Elite Two
Cape Verde Campeonato Nacional Yes 1 Campeonato Nacional
Ivory Coast Ligue Prof. Yes 2 Ligue I; Ligue II
Ligue Am. No 2 Division 3; Championnat Régional

Kenya Kenyan Premier League Yes 1 Kenyan Premier League
FKF Division One No 1 Division 1

Senegal Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Prof. Yes 2 Ligue 1; Ligue 2
Ligue du Football Am. No 2 Nationale 1; Nationale 2

South Africa National Soccer League Yes 2 Premier Division; 1rst Division
SAFA Second Division No 1 SAFA 2nd Division
SAFA Regional League No 2 SAFA Regional League

Structural models, legal forms and agreements 7 73
Association Structure Pro. Div. Name of championships
Tunisia Ligue National du Football Prof. Yes 2 Ligue I; Ligue II
Ligue National du Football Am. No 3 Ligue III

Zambia Premier League Yes 1 Premier League
Division One No 1 Division One South/North

Australia A-League Yes 1 A-League
India I-League Yes 2 I-League; 2nd Division
Indonesia Indonesia Super League Yes 2 Super League; Premier Division
Liga Indonesia No All the rest

Japan J. League Yes 2 J. League Division 1; J. League Division 2
Japan Football League No 1 Japan Football League

Qatar Qatar Stars League Yes 1 Qatar Stars League
Second Division League Yes 1 2nd Division League

Singapore S. League Yes 1 S. League
National Football League No All the rest

Honduras Liga Nacional de Fútbol Prof. Yes 1 1ra division
Liga Nacional de Ascenso Yes 1 Liga Nacional de Ascenso

Jamaica Prof. Football Association of Jamaica Semi 1 National Premier League
Mexico Liga MX Yes 1 Liga MX
Ascenso MX Yes 1 Ascenso MX
Segunda División Yes 2 Liga Premier; Liga de Nuevos Talentos
Tercera División Yes 1 3ra División

USA Major League Soccer Yes 1 Major League Soccer
North American Soccer League Yes 1 North American Soccer League
United Soccer Leagues Yes 1 USL Pro
US Adult Soccer Association No More than 100

Brazil Campeonato Brasileiro Yes 4 Série A; Série B; Série C; Série D
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Prof. Yes 3 Campeonato Nacional; 1ra B; 2da División
Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Am. No All the rest

Venezuela Federación Venezolana de Fútbol Both 4 1ra División; 2da Div. A; 2da Div. B; 3ra Div.
New Zealand National League No 1 Premiership
Papua New National Soccer League Semi 1 National Soccer League
Guinea
Club Championship No 1 Club Championship
1. League structural models
In this study, the concept of structural model refers to the legal form of the
league, the level of association involvement from a management perspective
and the nature of the financial relationships between the league and the as-
sociation. From this perspective, two models with different variants may be
distinguished as illustrated in the diagram below (fig. 2).
Figure n°2: League structural models
Legal form
Association Separate
model entity model
National
association National With Without
involvement Self-
association shareholding shareholding
management
management interest interest
Financial
relationships
Financially Financially Majority Minority
dependent independent stake stake
1.1. Legal form
The legal form of a league consists of its legal designation. Each state having
its own legal system, various legal forms can be found. However, with respect
to football leagues, these legal forms are often similar. Generally speaking,
two categories may be distinguished: the association model and the separate
entity model (tab. 3).
In the association model, leagues have the same legal form as the national
federation to which they belong. In legal terms, an association is the grouping
of persons or other entities (for example football clubs) with a common pur-
pose. With regard to football leagues or associations, associations regularly
require membership, written rules and statutes, and the yearly organisation of
a general assembly to which all entitled members may participate and vote1.
Any association can also be affiliated to another association. In such a
case, the affiliated association must follow the rules of the parent association.
Furthermore, in football, most organisations are non-profit associations. This
does not mean that they have no economic activity, but rather that they
must reinvest their profits in the association as they cannot pay dividends to
members.
As a concrete example, the Swiss Football League (SFL) is an association
grouping twenty Swiss top tier football clubs (ten Super League clubs and ten
Challenge League clubs). These clubs are members of the SFL and therefore
must follow the rules of the SFL. At the highest level, the SFL is affiliated
to the ASF/SFV (Swiss association) and must in turn follow the rules of the
ASF/SFV. The SFL is then a fully-fledged association but still has to observe
the rules and the decisions of the ASF/SFV as mentioned in SFL statutes.
The second category, the separate entity model, refers to leagues for which
the legal form is that of a company with an independent ownership structure.
The decision making power belongs to the shareholders. Consequently, in the
separate entity model, the association is usually less involved in the running
of the league. Most of the time, clubs are the main shareholders of the league.
However, the association can also be one of them, if not the only one. The
association can thus maintain strong influence in decision-making.
Beyond the ownership structure, leagues and associations in the separate
entity model still maintain close relationships with regard to some specific
competences usually managed by the associations such as the appointment of
referees, disciplinary processes and the rules of the game.
The leagues in the separate entity model can have different legal forms
depending on their business activities, but also according to the legal system
of the country in which they are located. Yet, most of the leagues organised
as a business owned by shareholders are limited liability companies. These
companies usually have nominative shareholders and only specific entities
(for example clubs competing in the league) can own shares.
1 Most national associations have the legal form of an association. However, in some cases
(like the FA – English association – and the FFA – Australian association), the national
association has the legal form of limited liability company.
Table n°3: Legal form of leagues surveyed
France (2) Ligue de Football Professionnel, Ligue du Football Amateur
Association model (54)
Germany (2) Ligaverband, 3. Liga

Italy (4) Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A, Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie B, Lega
Pro, Lega Nazionale Dilettanti
Norway (2) Norsk Toppfotbal, Divisjonforeningen
Poland (1) Polish Football Association
Spain (2) Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado
Switzerland (3) Swiss Football League, Erste Liga, Amateur Liga
Ukraine (2) Ukrainian Premier League, Professional Football League of Ukraine
Cameroon (1) Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun
Cape Verde (1) Campeonato Nacional
Ivory Coast (2) Ligue Professionnelle, Ligue Amateur
Kenya (1) FKF Division One
Senegal (2) Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel, Ligue du Football Amateur
South Africa (2) SAFA Second Division, SAFA Regional League
Tunisia (2) Ligue Nationale du Football Professionnel, Ligue Nationale du Football Amateur
Zambia (2) Premier League, Division One
Australia (1) A-League
India (1) I-League
Indonesia (1) Liga Indonesia
Japan (2) J. League, Japan Football League
Qatar (2) Qatar Stars League, Second Division League
Singapore (2) S. League, National Football League
Honduras (2) Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Liga Nacional de Ascenso
Mexico (4) Liga MX, Ascenso MX, Segunda División, Tercera División
USA (1) United States Adult Soccer Association
Brazil (1) Campeonato Brasileiro
Chile (2) Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Amateur
Venezuela (1) Federación Venezolana de Fútbol
New Zealand (1) National League
Papua New Guinea (2) National Soccer League, Club Championship
England (3) Premier League, The Football League, Football Conference
Separate entity model (11)
Poland (1) Ekstraklasa

Kenya (1) Kenyan Premier League
South Africa (1) National Soccer League
Indonesia (1) Indonesia Super League
Jamaica (1) Professional Football Association of Jamaica
USA (3) Major League Soccer, North American Soccer League, United Soccer Leagues
1.2. Association model: level of national association involvement and financial
relationships with the national association
The second key criterion to describe the structural model of leagues is the
level of association involvement from a management perspective. In the as-
sociation model, two major distinctions can be made (tab. 4):
i. Association model with national association management

An association model with national association management means that the
league is entirely managed by the national football association. The league
does not have its own statutes, it is not governed by a specific board or ex-
ecutive committee and usually does not have a specific administration. In
this case, the league is not a distinct legal entity and generally does not have
specific statutes. The management of the league is handled by a standing
committee (competition committee, league committee, professional football
committee, etc.) or an office within the national association structure and
without a separated administrative delegation.
For example, this is the case in Zambia, where the Premier League and
Organizing Committee of the FAZ (Zambian association) is in charge of the
organisation of the Premier League, the top tier league in Zambia as men-
tioned in FAZ statutes.
In the Ivory Coast, an office (Bureau de la Ligue Professionnelle) is re-
sponsible for organising the professional competitions within the FIF (Ivo-
rian association). The members of the Bureau de la Ligue Professionnelle are
chosen by FIF executive committee. Being an integral part of the FIF, this
Bureau does not have any legal personality and does not have its own statutes.
However, contrary to other leagues in the association model with national
association management, it has its own administration.
This research focuses primarily on men’s top tier football because all wom-
en’s top tier football competitions in the countries surveyed are association
model leagues with national association management. However, in the USA,
management of women’s football is unique. Top tier women’s football league
– the National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL) – is administered by the
USSF (American association), but financed by three associations: Mexico,
USA and Canada. On the other hand, women’s football lower leagues in the
USA (W-League, Women’s Premier Soccer League, USASA – United States
Adult Soccer Association – women’s football leagues) are separate entity mod-
el leagues.
ii. Association model with self-management
An association model with self-management means that the national associa-
tion delegates the management of the league to an affiliated association. This
association has its own governing bodies (board/executive committee), stat-
utes and administration. The association model with self-management can be
further separated into two sub-categories according to the level of financial
independence vis-à-vis the national association to which they belong:
(a) A league classified in the association model with self-management is
financially dependent if the national association delegates the administration
and the management of the league to an affiliated association, but still pre-
dominantly funds the league in order to help organise competitions or even
its own self-managed administration. This situation can be explained by the
fact that, in some countries, league revenues are not sufficient for the league
to run the competitions. In these cases, the league depends on the subsidies
provided by the national association.
Cameroon’s Ligue de Football Professionnel is, for example, self-managed
and has its own statutes and regulations. However, the league is financially
dependent on the subsidies granted by the FECAFOOT (Cameroonian as-
sociation). Consequently, the financial autonomy guaranteed in the league’s
statutes rather means that the association representing the league decides on
the league budget. The league has then financial autonomy as mentioned in
its statutes, but not financial independence.
(b) A league under the association model with self-management is finan-
cially independent when the league not only has its own statutes, regulations,
administration, but is also able to generate substantial incomes which allows
the organisation to stand on its own financially. Here the league is still affili-
ated to the national association – and is thus fully subject to the statutes, rules
and decisions of the national association – but is not dependent on the na-
tional association subsidies in order to finance its operations and organise its
competitions. The league obtains its revenues independently of the national
association, particularly from sponsoring and broadcasting rights.
In France, for example, the FFF (French association) has delegated the
management of all the aspects of the professional divisions (Ligue 1 and
Ligue 2) to the LFP (Ligue de Football Professionnel). However, as an affili-
ated entity, the LFP remains under the supervision of the FFF as mentioned
in both LFP and FFF statutes.
Table n°4: Association model – leagues categorisation
France (1) Ligue du Football Amateur
National association management (28)
Germany (1) 3. Liga

Norway (2) Norsk Toppfotball, Divisjonforeningen
Poland (1) Polish Football Association
Spain (1) Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado
Cape Verde (1) Campeonato Nacional
Ivory Coast (2) Ligue Professionnelle, Ligue Amateur
Kenya (1) FKF Division One
Senegal (1) Ligue de Football Amateur
South Africa SAFA Second Division, SAFA Regional League
Tunisia (2) Ligue National du Football Professionnel, Ligue National du Football
Amateur
Zambia (2) Premier League, Division One
Australia (1) A-League
India (1) I-League
Indonesia (1) Liga Indonesia
Qatar (1) Second Division League
Singapore (2) S. League, National Football League
Brazil (1) Campeonato Brasileiro
Venezuela (1) Federación Venezolana de Fútbol
New Zealand (1) National League
Papua New Guinea (2) National Soccer League, Club Championship
Cameroon (1) Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun
Self-management (26)
Financially
dependent
(4)
Senegal (1) Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel

Mexico (2) Segunda División, Tercera División
France (1) Ligue de Football Professionnel
Financially independent (22)
Germany (1) Deutsche Fussball Liga

Italy (4) Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A, Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie
B, Lega Pro, Lega Nazionale Dilettanti
Spain (1) Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional
Switzerland (3) Swiss Football League, Erste Liga, Amateur Liga
Ukraine (2) Ukrainian Premier League, Professional Football League of Ukraine
Japan (2) J. League, Japan Football League
Qatar (1) Qatar Stars League
Honduras (2) Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Liga Nacional de Ascenso
Mexico (2) Liga MX, Ascenso MX
USA (1) United States Adult Soccer Association
Chile (2) Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional, Asociación Nacional de
Fútbol Amateur
1.3. Separate entity model: level of national association involvement and
financial relationships with the national association
In the separate entity model, two major distinctions concerning national

association involvement in league management can be highlighted (tab. 5):
i. Separate entity model with national association shareholding interest

As previously explained, in the separate entity model, the company managing
the league(s) can be partly owned by the national association. This is the case
of the separate entity with national association shareholding interest category.
According to the percentage of shares held, the national association can have
more or less decision making power on league activities. Two scenarios are
possible:
(a) Majority stake: the national association owns the majority of league
shares. In this situation, the national association has a strong decision making
power upon the league activities.
In Jamaica for example, the Professional Football Association of Jamai-
ca (PFAJ, Jamaican top tier league) is a joint venture company owned by
the JFF (Jamaican association) and the Premier League Clubs Association
(PLCA). The JFF holds 51% of the shares while the PLCA holds the remain-
ing 49%2.
(b) Minority stake: the national association owns a minority of league
shares. From this perspective, the national association does not have a strong
decisional power in league activities. However, through these shares, the
league can obtain for example the right to be informed and consulted as well
as a decisional power over specific issues or even a veto power.
In England for example, the Premier League is a private company limited
by shares. The FA owns only 1% of the shares of the Premier League, while
the other shares are distributed among the twenty Premier League clubs. This
1% share, known as the ‘Special Share’, is only issued to the FA. Through this
‘Special Share’, the FA ‘has the ability to exercise a vote on certain specific
issues, but has no role in the day-to-day running of the Premier League’3.
Moreover, this share provides the FA – as a shareholder – the right to be
informed and consulted. As mentioned in the Premier League Handbook, the
2 Interview with Raymond Grant, JFF General Secretary, 13th December 2013
3 http://www.premierleague.com/content/premierleague/en-gb/about/formal-relations.
html (last consultation: 9th of August 2013)
FA and the Premier League work together on some matters such as the rules
of the game, refereeing, youth development, etc4.
Similar situations exist in Indonesia and Poland. In Indonesia, Super
League clubs own 99% of the shares of PT Liga Indonesia, the league operator
company, while the PSSI (Indonesian association) owns the remaining 1%5.
In Poland, each Ekstraklasa club owns 5.8% of the Ekstraklasa joint-stock
company (there are sixteen Ekstraklasa clubs – the clubs own then 92.8% of
the shares), while the PZPN (Polish association) owns the remaining 7.2%6.
ii. Separate entity model without national association shareholding interest

The second configuration of the separate entity model is that in which the na-
tional association holds no shareholding interest of the company running the
league. In this case the national association usually has no power at all over
the management of the league. However, some agreements can be drawn up
between the league managing company and the national association covering
disciplinary processes, rules of the game or financial issues (revenue distribu-
tion – TV rights) as further developed.
For example, the FA does not own any shares in the Football League and
in the Football Conference (English second and third tier leagues). However,
as the FA governs football at the national level in England, the rules and
regulations of these leagues must be approved by the FA7.
Table n°5: Separate entity model – leagues categorisation

National Majority stake (1) Jamaica (1) Professional Football Association of Jamaica
association
with Minority stake (4) England (1) Premier League
shareholding
interest (5) Poland (1) Ekstraklasa
Kenya (1) Kenyan Premier League
Indonesia (1) Indonesia Super League
National association without England (2) The Football League, Football Conference
shareholding interest (6)
South Africa (1) National Soccer League
USA (3) Major League Soccer, North American Soccer League,
United Soccer League
4 http://www.premierleague.com/content/dam/premierleague/site-content/News/publications/
handbooks/premier-league-handbook-2012-2013.pdf (last consultation: 18th of June 2014)
5 Interview with Joko Driyono, PSSI General Secretary, 10th October 2013
6 E-mail communication with Łukasz Wachowski, PZPN Domestic Competition Depart-
ment Director, 22nd October 2013
7 Interview with Jonathan Hall, The FA Director of Football Services, 16th October 2013
1.4. Observations
Our analysis shows that the vast majority of leagues maintain strong connec-
tions with their respective national associations. The model within which the
most surveyed leagues are represented is clearly the association model. No
fewer than fifty-four leagues belong to this model, while only eleven leagues
fall under the separate entity model. Within the association model, a lot of
leagues are entirely managed by the relevant national association (twenty-
eight out of fifty-four). This finding suggests that national associations still
have very strong power over the leagues in many countries.
The leagues belonging to the association model with self-management are
also particularly numerous: twenty-six, of which twenty-two are financially
independent. Our analysis clearly shows that self-management goes hand in
hand with the ability to generate sufficient income to finance the administra-
tive structure needed to properly run competitions.
Within this general framework, there is the question of the role of the
state. In countries where there is a high level of state intervention, it may
result in a league that is not fully separate from the national association re-
gardless of its financial independence. For example, ‘in terms of sport, France
is the most interventionist [of ] Western European states’ (Amara & al. 2005:
200). National laws and regulations define, from the first law concerning
sport in 1901, many aspects of the football management in the country such
as ‘safety in stadia, the financial control of professional clubs, and the fight
against doping and spectator violence’ (idem: 202). Even the professional
football governing structure – LFP – is under state authority since the com-
position and duties of the LFP’s statutory bodies must be approved by the
French sport minister (article 2, Convention entre la FFF et la LFP).
The examination of the elements presented above allows us to highlight a
historical distribution of the different models. In countries where football is
already a well-established sport – mostly European countries and some Latin
American ones (Chile, Mexico, Honduras) – the top tier leagues tend to be
governed by an entity which is, at least partly, outside the national association
jurisdiction (association with self-management and financial independence
or separate entity models).
Conversely, in countries where the practice of football is in expansion
– Asian and Oceanic countries for example – the leagues are usually more
strongly attached to the national association (association with national associ-
ation management or with self-management but no financial independence).
It can also be noted that the lower tier of well-established football countries
tend also to be organised according to these two latter models (Germany’s 3.
Liga, Spain’s LNFA, France’s LFA – Ligue de football amateur, etc.).
1.5. Specific cases of league governance and financing
As underlined in the previous subsection, in most of the traditional football

countries top tier leagues and national associations have separate manage-
ment and administration bodies. Conversely, leagues in expanding football
countries and lower tier leagues of traditional football countries are generally
managed by their respective national associations. Of course, there are a few
exceptions. Most of the time, this can be explained by the historical context
in the country. This subsection details specific cases of league governance and
financing in countries such as the United States, New Zealand and Norway
among others.
In the USA, where football has had recent success, Major League Soc-
cer followed the model of the major American sports (American football,
baseball, basketball and ice hockey) by using a closed-league system. Within
the context of the organisation of the World Cup in 1994 one of the hosting
conditions placed on the USSF was the creation of a national professional
league which ultimately gave birth to MLS (American top tier league) in
1996 (Green 2009). The league was formed as a limited liability company.
Furthermore, MLS is qualified, in legal terms, as a ‘hybrid’ single-entity com-
pany, to the extent that ‘MLS and its operator/investors comprise a hybrid
arrangement, somewhere between a single company […] and a cooperative
arrangement between existing competitors’8. Since it has some features of
a single-entity company, MLS and the teams competing in it constitute a
unique entity:
In a single entity model, there are no individual team owners. Investors may be assigned a
particular team, but ultimate authority for player movement, marketing strategies, televi-
sion contracts, and sponsoring acquisition and retention lies with the league office (South-
all & Nagel 2007: 371).
8 Fraser v. Major League Soccer: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-1st-circuit/1441684.html

(last consultation: 18th of June 2014)
In this context,
the league is owned by two types of independent investors: investor-operators and passive
investors. The investors-operators are those investors who have signed operating agree-
ments giving them the right to take control of a specific MLS team. Passive investors,
meanwhile, contribute capital to the league, but do not have operating rights to any teams
(Green 2009: 82).
In practice, the league gathers and then redistributes benefits and losses across
all of the teams.
Nowadays, this system has evolved and, while some revenues and costs are
still centralised – such as national broadcasting rights, players’ contracts and
salaries or league intellectual property – others are under the investors-oper-
ators’ responsibility – for example the portion of designated players’ salaries
that are above the cap, regional broadcasting rights, hospitality or stadium
management9. While, until 2004, only three investors-operators owned all
the MLS teams, the league now encourages each franchise to have its own
owner (Primault & al. 2012: 27) and as of the 2014 season only one club is
controlled by the league (Chivas USA).
A second interesting use of the closed-league model is in New Zealand
where the NZF (New Zealand association) manages its own league (National
League). The teams participating are franchises. They must apply for a licence,
pay an ‘entrance/participation fee’ and satisfy criteria established by the NZF.
As in MLS, there is no promotion, nor relegation. This league is the only one
governed by the NZF and it is played in the summer. In winter, it is the re-
gional associations that manage the leagues. They have their own regulations
but, as they are affiliated to NZF, they must adhere to the basic NZF rules10.
In Switzerland, all leagues are financially autonomous from the national
association. While the Swiss top tier league (SFL), enjoys commercial income
from many sources (TV rights, sponsoring, etc.) the two lower leagues (Erste
Liga and Amateur Liga) are mainly financed by club registration fees. How-
ever, the Swiss national association helps financing the leagues by giving them
some of the revenues generated through national team activities. Further-
more, the national association provides the leagues with some free services
(referees’ and high level coaches’ training for example)11.
9 A designated player is a player having a higher salary than the salary cap. MLS teams can
hire up to three designated players.
10 Interview with Frank Van Hattum, NZF President, 7th October 2013
11 Interview with Alex Miescher, ASF/SFV Secretary General, 26th September 2013
Similar to Switzerland, all Italian leagues are financially autonomous.
However, the FIGC (Italian association) provides grants to some of the affili-
ated leagues. For example, Lega Serie B and Lega Pro (second and third top
tier leagues) receive subsidies in order to support their youth development
programmes, while the LND (Italian amateur league) obtains financial help
for the management of the players’ registration system on a regional basis
through the Regional Committees12.
Norway has a rather unique governance system among these specific cases
surveyed. The league follows the association model with national association
management. However, clubs taking part in the two first divisions (Norsk
Toppfotball) are represented by an interest lobby, called Norsk Toppfotball
as well. This organisation is recognised by the NFF (Norwegian association),
but is not a member of the latter. Norsk Toppfotball acts as an informal inter-
mediate between the clubs and the national association. It regulates the day
to day cooperation between them, shares information and split the revenue
from media rights (nowadays, the clubs receive 68% of the TV rights and
the national association 32%). The board of Norsk Toppfotball is composed
of three representatives of the Norwegian MA and three representatives of
the clubs. The chairman at Norsk Toppfotball is shared: for two years, the
position of chairman is a representative from the national association and the
following two years it is a representative from the clubs13.
Other examples show that tailor-made solutions exist in many countries
to govern the relationships between national associations and top tier leagues.
In Qatar, for example, the Qatar Stars League and the national association are
separate entities, but have in fact the same managing team. This is partially
related to the point system set up by the AFC (Asian Football Confederation)
that favours clubs from national associations with the separate entity model
to access continental competitions.
In Ukraine, while the Ukrainian Premier League is an association under
the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian association, a separate company was created
to run the commercial activities of the league, which makes the national law
preventing sports associations from making a profit inapplicable.
In Spain, the LNFP association also created a company, SEFPSA (Socie-
dad Española de Fútbol Profesional, S.A.), through which they manage the
financial, marketing and business activities of the league – apart from the TV
12 Interview with Niccoló Donna, FIGC Development Department, 24th September 2013
13 Interview with Nils Fisketjønn, Competitions Director of the NFF (Norwegian associa-
tion), 24th September 2013
rights, which are negotiated directly by the clubs. SEFPSA is entirely owned
by the LNFP14.
In Germany, Ligaverband (German top tier league) is an association com-
posed of the thirty-six clubs of the two top tier divisions (Bundesliga and 2.
Bundesliga). Ligaverband owns a subsidiary called Deutsche Fussball Liga
(DFL). The DFL is a GmbH (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung), a kind of
limited liability company that can be found in Germany, Austria, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein. The DFL is responsible for the ‘strategic actions of the
German League’ (EPFL 2011: 13) and has created its own subsidiaries: ‘DFL
Sports Entreprises (responsible for the commercial side of the competition)
and Sportcast (responsible for the production and distribution of the signal
of the Bundesliga matches, and other media developments)’ (ibid.).
All these examples show that beyond the general framework illustrated in
the previous subsections, the structural models of leagues vary and regularly
utilise innovative solutions based on the local context.
2. Documents governing the relationships between leagues

and national associations
This section focuses on the documents governing the relationships between

leagues and national associations. Within association models with national
association management, there is no need for any document to define the
relationships between the league and the national association because the
league, being entirely managed by the national association, is governed by the
national association statutes and regulations. Conversely, when the governing
body of a league is not part of the national association, both organisations
have to provide the frameworks for the relationship generally outlined in one
or several documents15.
In most cases, the constitution/statutes and regulations of both organisa-
tions define these relationships. This is, for example, the case in Switzerland,
Mexico and Honduras. However, in addition to the documents cited before,
14 Interview with Robert Pongracz, Head Executive Office of the LNFP President, 24th
October 2013
15 For a complete overview of the leagues legal forms and documents governing the relation-
ships between leagues and national associations, see appendices from page 105.
there are some specific agreements or a convention that govern these relation-
ships. This is often the case when the league’s governing body is a separate
entity or an association with self-management and financial independence.
For example, the DFB-Liga Grundlagenvertrag is the document governing
the relationships between the Ligaverband (German top tier league) and the
DFB (German association).
Beyond a specific agreement between the national association and the
league, in some countries, a national sports law can also govern, for any sport,
the relationship between the league and the national association.
The following two cases of league governing structures using the associa-
tion model with self-management and financial independence illustrate this
issue: France’s LFP and Spain’s LNFP. These are good examples in order to
show the variety of documents that can be drafted to govern the relationships
between the league and the national association.
First of all, in both countries, there are national sport laws (France’s Code
du Sport and Spain’s Ley del Deporte) which define the establishment of
professional leagues and the basic relationships between a league and the
national association. Then, like in most situations, the league and national
association statutes and regulations describe the basic relationships between
the two specific entities. Finally, agreements are drawn up in order to outline
extraordinary resolutions or labour divisions – Convention entre la Fédé-
ration Française de Football et la Ligue de Football Professionnel (France),
Convenio de Coordinación RFEF-LFP (Spain) – or even financial issues –
Protocole d’accord financier entre la Fédération Française de Football et la
Ligue de Football Professionnel (France).
In Italy, the relationships between the leagues and the FIGC are regulated
both by the Guidelines issued by the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI)
as well as a national legislation. These Guidelines must be adhered to in the
statutes and regulations of the leagues. As a matter of fact, league statutes and
regulations must be approved by the Executive Committee of the FIGC. It is
this body which judges if the league rules comply with the guidelines laid down
by the Italian Olympic Committee and by the Federation itself in its statutes.
Furthermore, a specific national law (the Melandri Law) governs the distribu-
tion of TV-rights generated by the Lega Serie A (Italian top tier league). This
law defines a solidarity system according to which 10% of the total amount
must be distributed to the lower leagues (Lega Serie B, Lega Pro and LND) 16.
16 Interview with Niccoló Donna, FIGC Development Department, 24th September 2013
Southeast Asia provides an example of how the management of sporting
and commercial issues can be divided. The sporting aspects in the regulations
of the Indonesia Super League (ISL) must be approved by PSSI. However,
as PT Liga Indonesia (the company managing ISL competitions) is an inde-
pendent structure, the PSSI has no say in the management of its commercial
revenues17.
The analysis in this first chapter allowed us to determine the structural
and legal aspects governing the relationships across associations and leagues.
The following chapters are more focused on how the relationships between
leagues and national associations play out in practice. First of all, the next
chapter presents the involvement of the league in the national association’s
decision making processes. The remaining chapters will tackle the issues of
division of labour between associations and leagues, as well as league internal
governance.
89
II. The league in the national association structure
This chapter analyses the manner in which leagues are represented in nation-
al associations. The study of league membership, representation and voting
power in the national association structure is of particular importance to fur-
ther understand the relationships between these institutions. The chapter also
deals with the representation of other football stakeholders such as regional
associations and interest groups (referees, coaches, players, etc.).
The chapter focuses on how the league is represented in the national asso-
ciation general assembly, executive committee and standing committees. It is
divided into four sections: the league membership in the national association,
the power balance between stakeholders in the national association general
assembly as well as on the national association executive committee, and fi-
nally the composition of major national association standing committees.
From this chapter on, only top tier leagues taking place in the selected
national associations’ jurisdiction have been examined (tab. 6).
Table n°6: Selected leagues for further analysis
Confederation National Association Structure
UEFA England Premier League
France Ligue de Football Professionnel
Germany Ligaverband
Italy Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A
Norway Norsk Toppfotball
Poland Ekstraklasa
Spain Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional
Switzerland Swiss Football League
Ukraine Ukrainian Premier League
CAF Cameroon Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun
Cape Verde Campeonato Nacional
Ivory Coast Ligue Professionnelle
Kenya Kenyan Premier League
Senegal Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel
South Africa National Soccer League
Tunisia Ligue National du Football Professionnel
Zambia Premier League
AFC Australia A-League
India I-League
Indonesia Indonesia Super League
Japan J. League
Qatar Qatar Stars League
Singapore S. League
CONCACAF Honduras Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional
Jamaica Professional Football Association of Jamaica
Mexico Liga MX
USA Major League Soccer
CONMEBOL Brazil Campeonato Brasileiro
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional
Venezuela Primera División
OFC New Zealand National League
Papua New Guinea National Soccer League
The league in the national association structure 25 91
1. League membership in the national association and
representation in the general assembly
As discussed in the previous chapter, almost all national associations have

the legal form of an association and require membership. Being a member
of a national association allows participation in competitions organised by
the latter. It also provides benefits to the services provided by the national
association (refereeing, youth development, disciplinary processes, etc.). In
return, a member has to adhere to the statutes and regulations of the national
association.
In this section, the statutes of the national associations surveyed are exam-
ined in order to determine if the league governing structures are a member of
the national association.
After investigation, four major cases have been identified (tab. 7):
–– The league is a direct member of the national association. For example,
in Germany, the Ligaverband – the association constituted by the clubs of
the top two German divisions – is a direct member of the DFB.
–– The league is represented by the clubs, which are members of the na-
tional association (for example, in Kenya, only the Premier League clubs
are members of the national association, not the league itself ).
–– In some countries (Italy, Cameroon, Singapore, Japan, Qatar, Hondu-
ras, Venezuela), both the league and the clubs are members of the national
association.
–– In other cases, neither the league nor the clubs are members of the
national association. In these cases (Cape Verde, India, Jamaica, New Zea-
land, Papua New Guinea), the regional associations form the membership
of the national association (for example, the members of the Jamaican
association are the Parish Associations, Jamaica being divided into admin-
istrative regions called ‘Parishes’).
Generally speaking, leagues categorised in the previous chapter as an associa-
tion with self-management or separate entity tend to be either direct, indirect
(through their clubs) or both direct and indirect members of the association.
On the other hand, for leagues in the association model with national as-
sociation management, regional associations tend to be the only members of
the national association.
Table n°7: Type of league membership in the national association
Structure National National association's membership
association
Direct Indirect Double None
(clubs) (direct + (regional
clubs) associations)
Ekstraklasa Poland X
Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A Italy X
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Spain X
Ligaverband Germany X
Ligue de Football Professionnel France X
Norsk Toppfotball Norway X
Premier League England X
Swiss Football League Switzerland X
Ukrainian Premier League Ukraine X
Campeonato Nacional Cape Verde X
Kenyan Premier League Kenya X
Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun Cameroon X
Ligue National du Football Professionnel Tunisia X
Ligue Professionnelle Ivory Coast X
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel Senegal X
National Soccer League South Africa X
Premier League Zambia X
A-League Australia X
I-League India X
Indonesia Super League Indonesia X
J. League Japan X
Qatar Stars League Qatar X
S. League Singapore X
Liga MX Mexico X
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Honduras X
Major League Soccer USA X
Professional Football Association of Jamaica Jamaica X
Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Chile X
Campeonato Brasileiro Brazil X
Primera División Venezuela X
National League New Zealand X
National Soccer League Papua New Guinea X
Statutorily speaking, there is a link between the form of league membership
and the form of league representation in the national association general as-
sembly. For example, when a league is a direct member of the national as-
sociation, it is directly represented – in this case by members of the league’s
governing bodies – in the national association general assembly. However,
the form of the actual representation differs from the prescribed statutory
form of the membership in the national association general assembly in nine
cases (Italy, England, Switzerland, Cameroon, Singapore, Japan, Australia,
Honduras, and Venezuela).
Concerning the representation of the leagues in the national association
general assembly, the most common situation is that of indirect membership.
In fourteen cases out of thirty-two, the league is represented by the clubs
competing in it. The indirect membership of the league through clubs in the
national association General Assembly occurs in all league structural models.
For example, clubs of the Campeonato Brasileiro (Brazilian top tier league,
categorised as an association model with national association management in
the previous chapter), Ligue de Football Professionnelle (France, association
model with self-management) and Ekstraklasa (Poland, separate entity model)
are all part of the general assembly of their respective national associations.
The second most common situation – in nine cases – concerns the di-
rect representation of the league in the national association general assembly.
In this category there are no leagues with national association management
which seems logical since the league is directly managed by the national as-
sociation through a specific national association governing body (league com-
mittee, league office, etc.).
In the third situation (six leagues), there are no league (direct or indirect)
representatives at the national association general assembly. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, four of these leagues (Cape Verde, India, New Zealand, Papua New
Guinea) belong to the association model with national association manage-
ment. The two exceptions here are the J. League – Japanese top tier league, an
association model league with self-management – and the PFAJ – a separate
entity model league – neither of which is represented in their respective na-
tional association general assembly.
The last situation – the double (both direct and indirect) representation –
concerns only three national associations. In the DFB, the QFA (Qatari asso-
ciation) and the FAS (Singaporean association), the league has both indirect
representatives (through the clubs) and direct representatives at the general
assembly. In Germany, for example, the Ligaverband is represented by the
clubs. However, the Ligaverband and the DFL (a Ligaverband subsidiary) are
also directly represented. Indeed, they both have representatives in the DFB
President’s Bureau and in the DFB Executive Committee, whose members
are ex officio members of the DFB General Assembly18.
The graph below (fig. 3) shows the representation of the leagues in na-
tional association general assemblies.
Figure n°3: Type of representation of leagues in national association general assemblies
No representation
19%
Direct
28%
Double 9%
(direct+clubs)
44%
Indirect (clubs)
It is interesting to note that professional leagues are represented in the vast

majority of association general assemblies (81%). However, direct representa-
tion is still quite limited (37% of all cases). This finding reflects the fact that
legally and/or economically autonomous leagues only exist in a minority of
associations surveyed.
2. Power balance between stakeholders in the national

association general assembly
Representation in an association’s general assembly is important but it is not

the whole story. This section analyses in more detail the power balance be-
tween the different stakeholders, with specific emphasis direct and indirect
(via clubs) league representation.
An association is usually headed by two main governing bodies: the gen-
eral assembly (or council, congress, etc.) and the executive committee (or
board of directors).
18 E-mail communication with Jürgen Paepke, DFB Legal Director, 24th January 2014
The general assembly is the supreme and legislative authority of a national
association. It is the meeting of the representatives of all members of the
association. For example, duties of FAS Council, as presented in FAS stat-
utes, include: ‘to make, adopt or amend the FAS Constitution’, ‘to approve
financial statements’, ‘to approve annual budget’, ‘to admit, suspend, expel or
revoke a Member’, and so on. In addition, general assemblies usually elect the
members of the executive committee. The general assembly takes place once
a year, but extraordinary assemblies can be organised upon special request.
As a national association governs, at least in theory, all football activities
of a country, its general assembly usually gathers a large number of members
since the bodies represented are numerous (leagues, clubs, regional associa-
tions, interest groups, etc.) (tab. 8). Furthermore, each body may have a large
number of representatives in the national association’s general assembly. For
example, the PZPN General Assembly has 118 members: sixty representa-
tives from the regional associations, thirty-two representatives from the Ek-
straklasa (Polish top tier league) clubs (two representatives for each of the
sixteen clubs), eighteen representatives from the I Liga (second tier league)
clubs, four coach representatives, two from women’s football and two from
futsal. However, some general assemblies have a smaller number of members.
The FFA General Assembly has for example only ten members: nine rep-
resentatives from the regional associations and one representative from the
A-League (Australian top tier league) clubs.
Table n°8: Number of members at national association general assemblies
National association Number of members at the general assembly
England (FA) 100-110
France (FFF) 254
Germany (DFB) 259
Italy (FIGC) 288
Norway (NFF) 350
Poland (PZPN) 118
Spain (RFEF) 180
Switzerland (ASF/SFV) 101
Ukraine (FFU) 147
Cameroon (FECAFOOT) 111
Cape Verde (FCF) N/A
Ivory Coast (FIF) 162
Kenya (FKF) 78
Senegal (FSF) N/A
South Africa (SAFA) 189
Tunisia (FTF) N/A
Zambia (FAZ) N/A
Australia (FFA) 10
India (AIFF) N/A
Indonesia (PSSI) 108
Japan (JFA) 48
Qatar (QFA) N/A
Singapore (FAS) 23
Honduras (FENAFUTH) 26
Jamaica (JFF) N/A
Mexico (FMF) 15
USA (USSF) N/A
Brazil (CBF) 47
Chile (FFC) 21
Venezuela (FVF) 80
New Zealand (NZF) 7
Papua New Guinea (PNGFA) N/A
In this section, we study four indicators in order to analyse the involvement
of leagues and other stakeholders in national association general assemblies:
(a) Number of direct (league) and indirect (clubs) representatives, if any,
in the national association general assembly compared to the whole number
of members.
(b) Percentage of votes granted to direct and indirect representatives of
the leagues.
(c)Representation of other stakeholders attending the national association
general assembly. We have identified five major categories of stakeholders:
–– Regional association representatives.
–– Lower professional league representatives.
–– Amateur football representatives: this category is made up of repre-
sentatives of amateur leagues, amateur league clubs or amateur football
governing structures.
–– Other national association governing body members: in some cases,
members of other national association governing bodies (standing com-
mittees, secretarial office, etc.) attend the general assembly. Most of the
time, they do not have the right to vote. National association life mem-
bers are also included in this category.
–– Interest groups: representatives of specific interests related to football
(players, referees, coaches, women football, futsal, etc.).
(d) Modes of election of league representatives.
The results obtained are presented in the subsections below19.
2.1. League representation and voting power in the national association general
assembly
Most of the time, there is a correlation between league representation (num-

ber of league representatives compared to the total number of national as-
sociation general assembly members) and league voting power (percentage of
votes granted to the representatives of the leagues). In general, each member
of the general assembly has one vote. This is, for example, the case in ASF/
SFV General Assembly. Each representative has one vote (Swiss Football
League: twenty-eight representatives; Erste Liga: twenty-six representatives;
Amateur Liga: forty-seven representatives).
19 For a complete overview of the league representation and voting power in the national
association general assembly, see appendices from page 109.
However, league representation and voting power are variable according
to country (tab. 9). Consequently, no specific categorisation can be defined.
Some specific cases may nonetheless be highlighted:
(a) First, as explained previously, it is worth noting that some leagues (four
leagues with national association management, as well as Japan’s J. League
and Jamaica’s PFAJ) do not have any representatives and voting power in the
national association general assembly because they are not represented at all.
(b) Ivory Coast’s Ligue Professionelle is also an interesting example as
it illustrates how representation and voting power may differ: out of a pos-
sible 162 the league has seventy-six representatives at the national association
General Assembly (two representatives for each of the fourteen first division
clubs and twenty-four second division clubs). While the league representa-
tion is less than a half of the whole number of representatives, the league has a
voting power of 68%. Indeed, each first division club holds three votes while
second division clubs have two votes. Conversely, only one vote is granted to
other General Assembly members (the thirty-eight third division clubs and
five interest groups with two representatives each). Similar situations exist in
South Africa, Senegal and Qatar.
(c) The difference between representation and voting power may also be
due to the fact that some members of the general assembly are allowed to
attend it without the right to vote. This is the case at FAS, FENAFUTH
(Honduran association), FFC (Chilean association) and FVF (Venezuelan
association) General Assemblies. In all these cases, representatives from the
national association governing bodies (members of the executive committee
or the general secretary for example) attend without a voting right. At the
FAS General Assembly, neither FAS General Secretary nor S. League (Singa-
porean top tier league) CEO (Chief Executive Officer) has the right to vote.
(d) Indonesian football governance is currently in a transitional phaseps-
si20. The representation of the league in PSSI Congress is of particular inter-
est. Actually, two leagues are currently running in Indonesia: Indonesia Su-
per League and Indonesia Premier League (IPL). According to PSSI statutes,
eighteen top tier clubs and sixteen second tier clubs must be represented in
the Congress. In the current situation the representation of these clubs was
divided between the two leagues. From the top tier divisions, fourteen ISL
20 Indonesian Football: Reform. (http://pssi.or.id/dev/izCFiles/uploads/File/20130126 Foot-

ball Reform INA - Timeline ENG Version.pdf, last consultation: 11th of September 2013,
no longer active)
Table n°9: League voting power in national association general assemblies
Structure National association League voting power
Ekstraklasa Poland 27%
Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A Italy 12%
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Spain 17%
Ligaverband Germany 35%
Ligue de Football Professionnel France 37%
Norsk Toppfotball Norway 18%
Premier League England 8-9%
Swiss Football League Switzerland 28%
Ukrainian Premier League Ukraine 2%
Campeonato Nacional Cape Verde 0%
Kenyan Premier League Kenya 20%
Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun Cameroon 4%
Ligue National du Football Professionnel Tunisia N/A
Ligue Professionnelle Ivory Coast 68%
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel Senegal N/A
National Soccer League South Africa 5%
Premier League Zambia N/A
A-League Australia 10%
I-League India 0%
Indonesia Super League Indonesia 37%
J. League Japan 0%
Qatar Stars League Qatar N/A
S. League Singapore 10%
Liga MX Mexico 55%
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Honduras 31%
Major League Soccer USA N/A
Professional Football Association of Jamaica Jamaica 0%
Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Chile 47%
Campeonato Brasileiro Brazil 42%
Primera División Venezuela 26%
National League New Zealand 0%
National Soccer League Papua New Guinea 0%
34 100
Governance models across associations and leagues
clubs and four IPL clubs are represented. As for the second tier divisions, ten
ISL clubs and six IPL club representatives take part in the PSSI Congress21.
(e) Finally, it is important to highlight that only two leagues have a major-
ity voting power in the national association general assembly: Ivory Coast’s
Ligue Professionelle (68%) and Mexico’s Liga MX (55%). Across all leagues
surveyed, the average percentage of league votes in national association gen-
eral assemblies reaches 20%.
2.2. Other stakeholders in the national association general assembly
The representation of stakeholders other than the top tier leagues or clubs in
national association general assemblies also greatly varies according to coun-
try (tab. 10). For example, while only the regional associations are part of
the FCF (Cape Verdean association) General Assembly , the SAFA (South
African association) includes three main types of stakeholders: the National
Soccer League (NSL, South African top tier league), fifty-three regional as-
sociations and twelve interest groups (football doctors’ association, coaches’
associations, school football, university football, army football, veteran foot-
ball, corporative football, deaf football, intellectually impaired football, fut-
sal, supporters’ association, players’ associations).
With regard to the ‘other’ stakeholders category as presented previously
(regional associations, lower professional leagues, amateur football, national
association governing bodies and interest groups), we can note that only the
FA Council and the USSF National Council gather all five categories. On
the other hand, six national association general assemblies are made up of a
single category of stakeholders: FCF, AIFF (India), JFA (Japan), JFF, NZF
and PNGFA (Papua New Guinea). In all these cases, the regional associations
are the only stakeholders in the national association general assembly. All the
top tier leagues taking place in the aforementioned countries are association
model leagues with national association management, with the exception of
Japan’s J. League. CBF (Brazilian association) and FFA are specific cases be-
cause their general assemblies are only composed of regional association and
first division club representatives (in Australia, there is one representative for
all ten A-League clubs).
Table n°10: Stakeholders’ representation in national association general assembly
National association Regional Lower Amateur National Interest
association professional football association's groups
leagues governing
bodies
representatives
England X X X X X
France X
Germany X X
Italy X X X
Norway X
Poland X X X
Spain X X X X
Switzerland X
Ukraine X X X X
Cameroon X X
Cape Verde X
Ivory Coast X X
Kenya X X X
Senegal X X
South Africa X X
Tunisia X X
Zambia X X X X
Australia X
India X
Indonesia X X X
Japan X
Qatar X
Singapore X X
Honduras X X X
Jamaica X
Mexico X X
USA X X X X X
Brazil X
Chile X X
Venezuela X X X
New Zealand X
Papua New Guinea X
Two other cases deserve to be highlighted insofar as their national associa-
tion general assembly is formed by only one stakeholder category besides top
tier leagues. FFF and ASF/SFV General Assemblies include only the top tier
league representatives and representatives from amateur football (respectively
LFP clubs and delegates of the SFL).
If we consider the overall situation, regional associations and the amateur
football categories are the most represented in national association general as-
semblies. Only six national association general assemblies include representa-
tives of lower professional leagues: Lega Serie B and Lega Pro in the FIGC,
The Football League and Football Conference in the FA, I Liga in the PZPN,
Professional Football League of Ukraine in the FFU (Ukrainian association)
and Ascenso MX, Segunda División and Tercera División in the FMF (Mexi-
can association), NASL (North American Soccer League) and USL (United
Soccer League) in the USSF22.
This situation can be explained by the fact that it is particularly unusual to
encounter several professional leagues within the same country: professional
divisions most often belong to the same league (such as Ligue 1 and Ligue 2
belonging to the LFP in France for example). In the six aforementioned cases
the top tier league falls under either an association model league with self-
management (Italy, Ukraine, Mexico) or a separate entity league (England,
Poland, USA).
Some other correlations between the representation of stakeholders in na-
tional association general assemblies and the league structural models can
also be highlighted:
–– Regional associations are more represented in general assemblies of na-
tional associations with association model leagues with national associa-
tion management (eight cases out of twelve) than in national associations
with other structural models (twelve cases out of twenty). This suggests
that the development of professional football tends to go hand in hand
with a decline in the power of regional associations at national association
level.
–– On the other hand, amateur football and interest groups categories
are generally more represented in general assemblies of national associa-
tions with association model leagues with self-management and separate
entity leagues (respectively fifteen and twelve cases out of twenty) than in
general assemblies of national associations with association model leagues
22 In the USA, the women’s professional football league, the NWSL, is also represented in
the USSF general assembly.
The league in the national association structure 103
37
with national association management (four cases out of twelve for both
categories).
More than the league structural model, the representation of other stakehold-
ers is usually related to the representation of the top tier league in the national
association general assembly (tab. 11):
–– When the league is not represented in the general assembly (six cases:
Cape Verde, India, Japan, Jamaica, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea)
regional associations are the only stakeholders.
–– Conversely, in general assemblies in which the league is represented,
the distribution of stakeholders is more diverse than in the cases with-
out league representation. Amateur football representatives are the most
frequent stakeholders, while regional associations and interest groups are
present in over the half of the cases.
Table n°11: Stakeholders representation per category in national association general assemblies
with league representation23
Stakeholders All general assemblies General assemblies General assemblies
representatives (32) without league with league
representation (6) representation (26)
Regional associations 63% 100% 54%
Lower professional 19% - 23%
leagues
Amateur football 59% - 73%
National associations 28% - 35%
governing bodies
Interest groups 50% - 62%
The graph below (fig. 4) analyses the representation of interest groups in

national association general assemblies. Only the sixteen general assemblies
which include interest groups are mentioned here. The most represented in-
terest groups are players, coaches and referees, who are members of ten na-
tional association general assemblies each. At the opposite end of the table
(‘others’ category), eight national association general assemblies (England,
Ukraine, Ivory Coast, South Africa, Senegal, Singapore, USA and Venezuela)
either include interest groups only represented in one national general as-
sembly or non-specified interest groups (‘others members’ in Senegalese and
23 Twenty-six national associations concerned: national association general assemblies with

no league representation (Cape Verde, India, Japan, Jamaica, New Zealand and Papua
New Guinea – regional associations being the only stakeholders) are not considered here.
Singaporean association statutes) (tab. 12). For example, in England, the na-
tional association General Assembly includes race equality representatives.
In Ukraine, street football league and public association ‘Play for Ukraine
together’ are represented in the national association General Assembly. In
South Africa, there are deaf football and university football representatives
and in the Ivory Coast, former players’ ones. Interestingly, agents are never
represented.
Figure n°4: Frequency of interest groups representation in national association general

assemblies
70%
63% 63% 63%
60%
50% 50%
50%
40% 38%
30% 25%
20% 19% 19% 19% 19%
13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
10%
0%
The general assembly with the highest number of interest group delegations
is that of FFU, with nineteen different interest groups represented. SAFA
General Assembly includes twelve interest groups, FECAFOOT has ten
and seven at the FA. In the other general assemblies, the number of interest
groups (if any) fluctuates between three and five.
Table n°12: Interest groups representation in national association general assemblies
National association
South Africa
Ivory Coast
Cameroon
Venezuela
Singapore
Indonesia
England
Ukraine
Zambia
Senegal
Tunisia
Poland
Kenya
Spain
USA
Italy
Interest groups
Players X X X X X X X X X X
Referees X X X X X X X X X X
Coaches X X X X X X X X X X
Futsal X X X X X X X X
Women’s football X X X X X X
Disabled football X X X X
Beach soccer X X X
Youth football X X X
School football X X X
Over 35 years old football X X X
Football doctors X X
Army football X X
Corporative football X X
Supporters X X
National government X X
Interest groups appearing in one X X X X X X X
general assembly only
Not specified interest groups X X
2.3. Election of league representatives to the national association general

assembly
The election of league representatives taking part in the national association

general assembly is usually linked to whether league is represented directly or
indirectly:
1) When the league is directly represented, the representatives are elected
from the league.
2) When the representation of the league is indirect, each club president
(or someone designated by them) represents his own club – and thus, indi-
rectly, the league – in the general assembly.
3) When the league is both directly and indirectly represented, both di-
rect representatives of the league and representatives of the clubs attend the
general assembly.
4) The league is not represented.
The following table (tab. 13) presents the mode of election of the league
to the national association general assembly. The numbers in the third col-
umn correspond to the four point typology described above. However, two
specific cases are worth noting:
–– The Spanish LNFP is a specific case because not all the clubs com-
peting in it are represented in the RFEF (Spanish association) General
Assembly: only seventeen clubs of the twenty from the Primera División
clubs have representatives and thirteen of the twenty-two clubs from the
Segunda División attend the national association general assembly.
–– At the FFA General Assembly, there is one person who represents the
ten A-League clubs. This representative must be elected by at least 75%
of the clubs24.
Our analysis highlights that top tier leagues usually have little voting power
at the associations’ general assemblies. Actually, few of them have a voting
power higher than 30% (eight leagues out of twenty-seven with available
information). This is due to the important place given to grassroots and ama-
teur football representatives (throughout amateur football representatives,
but also representatives from regional associations and interest groups) in the
assemblies.
24 Interview with Jo Setright, FFA Head of Legal, Business Affairs and Integrity, 4th Novem-
ber 2013
Table n°13: Election of league representatives to national association general assemblies
League National association Mode of election
Ekstraklasa Poland 1
Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A Italy 2
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Spain 1
Ligaverband Germany 3
Ligue de Football Professionnel France 2
Norsk Toppfotball Norway 2
Premier League England 1
Swiss Football League Switzerland 1
Ukrainian Premier League Ukraine 1
Campeonato Nacional Cape Verde 4
Kenyan Premier League Kenya 2
Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun Cameroon 1
Ligue National du Football Professionnel Tunisia 2
Ligue Professionnelle Ivory Coast 2
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel Senegal 2
National Soccer League South Africa 1
Premier League Zambia 2
A-League Australia 2
I-League India 4
Indonesia Super League Indonesia 2
J. League Japan 4
Qatar Stars League Qatar N/A
S. League Singapore 3
Liga MX Mexico 1
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Honduras N/A
Professional Football Association of Jamaica Jamaica 4
Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Chile 1
Campeonato Brasileiro Brazil 1
Primera División Venezuela 1
National League New Zealand 4
National Soccer League Papua New Guinea 4
3. Power balance between stakeholders in the national
association executive committee
This section reproduces the same analysis as in the previous one but now ap-
plied now to executive committee membership. This allows us to produce a
broader picture of the situation regarding the power balance between stake-
holders in the association structure.
While the general assembly can sometimes bring together more than a
hundred people (180 for RFEF General Assembly for example), the members
of the Executive Committee are usually far less numerous (seventeen mem-
bers for FIF Executive Committee for example) (tab. 14). However, there are
some exceptions to this general rule. For example, both NZF Congress and
Board consist of seven members. NZF Congress members are the representa-
tives of the seven regional associations. Board members are elected either by
the regional associations (three members) or by an ‘independent commission’
(four members) including NZF President, regional association representa-
tives and local sport government representatives25.
Table n°14: Number of members at national association general assemblies and executive
committees26
National association Number of members at the Number of members at the
general assembly executive committee
England (FA) 100-110 16
France (FFF) 254 21
Germany (DFB) 259 12
Italy (FIGC) 288 56
Norway (NFF) 350 12
Poland (PZPN) 118 11
Spain (RFEF) 180 18
25 Interview with Frank Van Hattum, NZF President, 7th October 2013
26 In Spain, the RFEF has two executive bodies: the Comisión Delegada and the Junta
Directiva. The Comisión Delegada is an ordinary executive committee. Its role includes
budget approval, modifications of the regulations, etc. The Junta Directiva has sixty
members, all chosen by the president. Its role is to assist the president in his/her governing
activities. In this study, only the Comisión Delegada, as an ordinary executive committee,
will be taken into account (interview with Robert Pongracz, Head Executive Office of the
LNFP President, 24th October 2013).
The league in the national association structure 109
43
National association Number of members at the Number of members at the

general assembly executive committee
Switzerland (ASF/SFV) 101 15
Ukraine (FFU) 147 8
Cameroon (FECAFOOT) 111 17
Cape Verde (FCF) N/A 18
Ivory Coast (FIF) 162 7
Kenya (FKF) 78 40
Senegal (FSF) N/A 11
South Africa (SAFA) 189 23
Tunisia (FTF) N/A 27
Zambia (FAZ) N/A 12
Australia (FFA) 10 17
India (AIFF) N/A 15
Indonesia (PSSI) 108 6
Japan (JFA) 48 27
Qatar (QFA) N/A 5-9
Singapore (FAS) 23 5-9
Honduras (FENAFUTH) 26 5
Jamaica (JFF) N/A N/A
Mexico (FMF) 15 N/A
USA (USSF) N/A 34
Brazil (CBF) 47 6
Chile (FFC) 21 7
Venezuela (FVF) 80 11
New Zealand (NZF) 7 7
Papua New Guinea (PNGFA) N/A 7
3.1. League representation in the national association executive committee
League representation in the national association executive committees (fig.

5) follows a different general trend to that in general assemblies discussed
above. Rather than representation that is indirect (via clubs for example),
leagues are generally directly represented on executive committees. Concern-
ing leagues that have direct representation in national association executive
committees, three different cases can be identified:
–– The league president is an ex officio member and the only representa-
tive of the league: Ligue de Football Professionnelle (France), Norsk
Toppfotball (Norway), Ligue Nationale du Football Professionnel (Tuni-
sia) and Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun (Cameroon).
–– The league president is an ex officio member, but other league repre-
sentatives are also part of the national association executive committee (in
parentheses, the number of league representatives other than the league
president): Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A (2) (Italy), Ligaverband
(15) (Germany), Premier League (1) (England), Swiss Football League (2)
(Switzerland), National Soccer League (3) (South Africa), J. League (2)
(Japan) and Qatar Stars League (1) (Qatar).
–– League representatives are part of the national association Executive
Committee: Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (2) (Spain), Ekstraklasa
(1) (Poland), Premier League (1) (Ukraine), Premier League (1) (Kenya),
Liga MX (1) (Mexico), Professional Football Association of Jamaica (4)
(Jamaica) and Associación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (4) (Chile).
Exceptions to this direct representation has been observed in only three coun-
tries. Two of these cases consist of club representatives. In the Ivory Coast, at
least five Ligue Professionnelle club representatives must be members of the
Executive Committee. In Senegal, top tier league representation is both di-
rect and indirect. Clubs of Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel (Sen-
egalese top tier league) have five representatives besides the league President,
who is an ex officio member of the national association Executive Commit-
tee. USA’s Major League Soccer is represented by members of the Professional
Council, the USSF governing body of professional football.
In the remaining cases, the league is either not represented (five cases:
India, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia27, New Zealand) or the information
27 In Australia, the top tier league is not represented. However, it holds 10% of the votes in
the election of the national association executive committee members.
concerning its membership is not stipulated in the national association stat-
utes (five cases: Cape Verde, Zambia, Honduras, Brazil, Venezuela, Papua
New Guinea).
Figure n°5: Type of league representation in national association executive committees28
Direct
League president and
67% league representatives
26%
League president 15%

22%
No only 26%
representation
7% League representatives
4%
Double Indirect (clubs)
(direct+clubs)
3.2. League representation and voting power in the national association

executive committee
National association executive committees generally include fewer people

than general assemblies. Consequently, in many cases the number of league
representatives does not exceed two. The highest number of league repre-
sentatives observed in an national association executive committee is six in
Senegal (out of twenty-three members).
As in the case of general assemblies, league representation and voting
power are usually proportional, since one vote is granted to each member.
There are only five cases in which the number of representatives differs sig-
nificantly from voting power:
–– In the five-member FMF Executive Committee, Liga MX has one rep-
resentative, but this representative has five votes out of ten, equating to
50% of all votes.
–– In DFB Executive Committee, Ligaverband representatives have two
votes each, while other Executive Committee members can have between
one and three votes.
28 Twenty-six national associations concerned: information about league representation in

national association Executive Committee was not available for Cape Verde, Zambia,
Honduras, Brazil, Venezuela and Papua New Guinea.
–– In the FTF Executive Committee, league voting power (7%, one vote
out of a possible fourteen) is proportionally higher than league representa-
tion (one representative out of seventeen). This is because the national as-
sociation General Secretary, Referee Commission President and National
Technical Director attend the Executive Committee without having the
right to vote.
–– The same situation exists in Spain. League voting power (15%, two
votes out of thirteen) is higher than league representation (two representa-
tives out of sixteen) because RFEF General Secretary, General Adminis-
trator and Juridical Department Director attend the Comisión Delegada
without voting29.
–– The situation is also similar in the ASF/SFV. Here league voting power
(29%, two votes out of seven) is proportionally slightly higher than league
representation (three representatives out of eleven). The national associa-
tion General Secretary, Communication Director, Technical Director and
the Head of A and U21 national teams, who is a representative of the
league, are all part of the Executive Committee without voting rights.
In national association executive committees, only two leagues have a vot-
ing power equivalent to or higher than 50%: Mexico’s Liga MX (50%) and
Chile’s Associación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (57%). This percentage
never exceeds 30% in the other national associations surveyed. In Senegal,
for example, the league holds 26% of votes with six representatives out of
twenty-three members with voting rights. Conversely, in Cameroon, the rep-
resentation of the twenty-four regional associations in the Executive Com-
mittee does not allow the league representative to have a strong decisional
power (4%, one representative out of twenty-seven members). Moreover,
some leagues do not have any representation and voting power in the na-
tional association executive committee at all (India, New Zealand, etc.) (tab.
15). Across all leagues, the average percentage of league votes in national as-
sociation executive committee reaches 15%30.
29 Interview with Robert Pongracz, Head Executive Office of the LNFP President, 24th
October 2013
30 For a complete overview of the league representation and voting power in the national
association executive committee, see appendices from page 111.
Table n°15: League voting power in national association executive committees
Structure National association League voting power
Ekstraklasa Poland 17%
Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A Italy 14%
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Spain 15%
Ligaverband Germany N/A
Ligue de Football Professionnel France 8%
Norsk Toppfotball Norway 12%
Premier League England 17%
Swiss Football League Switzerland 29%
Ukrainian Premier League Ukraine 7%
Campeonato Nacional Cape Verde N/A
Kenyan Premier League Kenya 8%
Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun Cameroon 4%
Ligue National du Football Professionnel Tunisia 7%
Ligue Professionnelle Ivory Coast 28%
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel Senegal 26%
National Soccer League South Africa 10%
Premier League Zambia N/A
A-League Australia 0%
I-League India 0%
Indonesia Super League Indonesia 0%
J. League Japan 11%
Qatar Stars League Qatar 22%
S. League Singapore 0%
Liga MX Mexico 50%
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Honduras N/A
Professional Football Association of Jamaica Jamaica 12%
Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional Chile 57%
Campeonato Brasileiro Brazil N/A
Primera División Venezuela N/A
National League New Zealand 0%
National Soccer League Papua New Guinea N/A
3.3 Other stakeholders in the national association executive committee
It is rather difficult to give a clear overview of stakeholders’ representation in

national association executive committees because in many cases committee
composition depends on elections taking place at national association general
assemblies. Four examples illustrate the variety of scenarios: 1) non-specified
stakeholder representation, 2) mixed stakeholders, 3) part of elected presi-
dent’s campaign, 4) not elected by the general assembly.
Most of the time, it is not specified in the national association statutes if
the persons elected have to belong to a specific organisation or if they must
hold a specific position. As such, it is difficult to know if these elected indi-
viduals represent a league, regional association or interest group.
For example, PSSI Executive Committee members are elected by the PSSI
Congress. This Congress elects the president, two vice-presidents and twelve
other members. However, it is not specified in PSSI statutes which organisa-
tion these persons must represent.
However, in many cases, the composition of the national association ex-
ecutive committee is defined according to a mixed model. The president is
elected by the general assembly, without mention to potential affiliations to
an interest organisation. The election of the other executive committee mem-
bers is conducted via separate elections by the general assembly which choos-
es individuals representing predefined football governing structures. General
assembly members vote for individuals who must belong to a clearly-defined
entity. Sometimes, the constitution of the executive committee is completed
with ex officio members.
For instance, FSF (Senegalese association) Executive Committee is com-
posed of twenty-three members. Among these members, the president is
elected by the General Assembly. The six Vice-Presidents are ex officio mem-
bers (President of the Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel, amateur
football President, etc.). The last sixteen members are also elected by the gen-
eral assembly, but they must belong to specific interest organisations (three
members are representatives of the first division clubs, four members repre-
sents the regional leagues, one represents women’s football, etc.).
In the third scenario, the composition of the executive committee can also
depend on the presidential election. In some cases, the presidential candidate
has to propose an electoral roll to the general assembly and, if he is chosen,
the persons cited on this roll will become members of the executive commit-
tee. The composition of the list may be also partially predefined.
In the Ivory Coast, for example, the national association statutes stipulate
that some specific representatives must be included in the presidential candi-
date’s electoral roll. The President must propose an electoral roll containing
seventeen members to be elected alongside him. This roll must include at
least three Ligue 1 representatives, two Ligue 2 representatives, two Division
3 representatives and a representative of one of the interest groups attending
the national association General Assembly.
In France, the composition of the national association Executive Com-
mittee is defined according to a mixed model combining the presidential
candidate’s electoral roll and ex officio members. The elected President has
to propose a roll comprising future members of the Executive Committee,
though the rules do not specify if these persons must belong to specific inter-
est organisations. Furthermore, some ex officio members are automatically
added to the committee. Concretely, FFF Executive Committee is composed
of twelve members. Among these members, the President and nine other
members are elected by the General Assembly. The two remaining members
are LFP and LFA Presidents. The latter are not elected by the General Assem-
bly, but are ex officio members.
Finally, the last case concerns national association executive committees
for which members are not elected by the general assembly. The composition
of the committee is here defined in the national association statutes and each
member must belong to a specific football entity. An internal election decides
who the representative of each entity would be. In FMF Executive Commit-
tee, for example, the five members are the four representatives of the four
Mexican professional leagues (Liga MX, Ascenso MX, Segunda División and
Tercera División) and the representative for amateur football. Leagues and
amateur football governing structures appoint representatives themselves in
the Executive Committee.
When the composition of the executive committee is known, the most
common stakeholder – besides the top tier league representative – is the ama-
teur football representative. Regional associations also are sometimes repre-
sented, mostly when neither professional nor amateur football are part of the
executive committee.
Concerning interest groups, they are rarely represented on the executive
committee. Actually, only nine national association executive committees
(Spain, Italy, England, Cameroon, Senegal, Ivory Coast, India, Japan and
USA) include interest group representatives. The detailed view of their rep-
resentation cannot be discussed here because the statutes of some national
associations stipulate that an interest group must be represented, without ac-
tually stating which one. The choice of the represented interest group usually
depends on a vote by the general assembly. It may be noted that, while the
most common interest groups found in general assemblies (players, referees,
coaches, etc.) can also be found in executive committees, other less common
groups (corporative football, school football, supporters, etc.) have no repre-
sentation on executive committees.
In the Italian association, for example, players, coaches and referees are
represented in both the General Assembly and the Executive Committee. On
the other hand, in the Ivory Coast, the FIF statutes stipulate that at least one
of the five interest groups (referees, coaches, women football, football doctors
and former players) represented in the General Assembly must be also part of
the Executive Committee.
However, in a few cases, some interest groups are represented directly on
the executive committee but nowhere else. For example, in Senegalese as-
sociation Executive Committee, the national team players are represented.
Similarly, in Indian association Executive Committee, one of the two follow-
ing interest groups must be represented: ‘Services Sports Control Board’ and
‘Railway Sports Promotion Board’.
It is also interesting to study the modes of election of league representa-
tives to an association’s executive committee. Modes of election are also a
good indication of how power is actually managed in organisations.
3.4. Election of league representatives to the national association executive

committee
League representatives who sit on national association executive committees

are appointed according to different procedures, which are described below:
1) Elections by the general assembly without predefined distribution. This
means that the executive committee members who are elected by the national
association general assembly do not have to belong to any specific affiliated
structure or hold a specific function. For instance, PSSI statutes stipulate that
the congress elects the executive committee members, but does not specify
their affiliation or function.
2) Elections by the general assembly with predefined distribution.
In this case, the national association general assembly elects the league
representative(s) to the executive committee. In Senegal, for example, FSF
General Assembly must elect five Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel
club representatives to the Executive Committee.
3) Ex officio members. Here the league representative(s) to the committee
is a predefined member of the league governing structure – usually the league
president. The President of the Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun
is the only league representative on FECAFOOT Executive Committee.
4) Internal elections. In this last scenario, the league’s representation on
the committee is predefined and the league representative(s) is (are) chosen
among members of the league governing structure. For example, Kenyan Pre-
mier League (KPL) representative on FKF (Kenyan association) Executive
Committee is chosen by, and among, the league members.
In some cases, it is possible that several procedures are used simultaneous-
ly in order to determine league representatives in the executive committee.
The table (tab. 16) below shows the league election procedure(s) for top
tier league representative(s) who sit on national association executive com-
mittees. The numbers in the third column correspond to the four point typol-
ogy described above. The procedures are presented here as they are described
in the national association statutes. However, it is possible that an informal
agreement is made between the national association members in order to de-
fine the distribution of the executive committee members, particularly when
it comes to elections by the general assembly.
In Norway, for example, the statutes stipulate that the members must be
elected by the General Assembly. However, there is an informal predefined
distribution with seats granted to Norsk Toppfotball (interest organisation
representing top tier football clubs) Chairman, a referee representative, rep-
resentatives of the major regional areas, etc.31
31 Interview with Nils Fisktejønn, Director of Competitions at the NFF (Norwegian as-
sociation), 24th September 2013
Table n°16: Election method(s) of national association executive committee members
National association Election method(s)
England (FA) 4
France (FFF) 3
Germany (DFB) 2 and 3
Italy (FIGC) 4
Norway (NFF) 2
Poland (PZPN) 2
Spain (RFEF) 4
Switzerland (ASF/SFV) 2 and 3
Ukraine (FFU) 1
Cameroon (FECAFOOT) 3
Cape Verde (FCF) N/A
Ivory Coast (FIF) 2
Kenya (FKF) 4
Senegal (FSF) 2 and 3
South Africa (SAFA) 3 and 4
Tunisia (FTF) 3
Zambia (FAZ) N/A
Australia (FFA) No league representative
India (AIFF) No league representative
Indonesia (PSSI) No league representative
Japan (JFA) N/A
Qatar (QFA) 1
Singapore (FAS) No league representative
Honduras (FENAFUTH) N/A
Jamaica (JFF) N/A
Mexico (FMF) 4
USA (USSF) N/A
Brazil (CBF) N/A
Chile (FFC) 3 and 4
Venezuela (FVF) N/A
New Zealand (NZF) No league representative
Papua New Guinea (PNGFA) N/A
4. Standing committees function, presence and members
Beyond general assemblies and executive committees, standing committees

also play a crucial role in the governance of associations. Standing commit-
tees are committees formed in order to fulfil specific tasks. The number and
the duties of standing committees in an national association structure may
vary highly. For example, FAZ includes fourteen standing committees within
its governing structure (tab. 17):
Table n°17: Standing committees – FAZ example

FAZ standing committees
Premier League and Organizing Committee Players Status and Transfers Committee
Finance and Investment Committee Medical Committe
Technical Committee Publicity, Promotions and Fair Play Committee
Referees Committee Youth Football Committee
Associations Committee Women's Football Committe
Legal Committee Futsal Committee
Audit Committee Marketing and Television Advisory Committee
For this research, we have chosen to study three specific standing committees:
the referees’ committee, players’ status committee and disciplinary commit-
tee. We opted for these three standing committees because they are among the
most important and commonly found in national association organisations.
The referees’ committee is usually responsible for all issues concerning ref-
ereeing and referees. Illustrating some of the duties is a list taken from SAFA
National Referees Committee, as mentioned in SAFA Constitution:
46. The National Referees Committee shall consist of a chairperson, a deputy chairper-
son and no more than ten (10) members and shall:
46.1 supervise and monitor the implementation of the Laws of the Game;
46.2 make decisions and interpretations regarding the Application of the Laws of
the Game;
46.3 propose to the National Executive Committee any amendments to the Laws
of the Game for submission to the FIFA Executive Committee;
46.5 compile a list of referees qualified to supervise international matches for sub-
mission to FIFA and CAF;
46.6 appoint the referees for all matches under the jurisdiction of SAFA and its
affiliates;
46.7 establish uniformity in methods of refereeing and implementation of the
Laws for nationwide use;
46.8 establish uniform criteria for the inspection of referees for use by all SAFA
members;
46.9 organize courses for referees and referee instructors;
46.10 draw up a list of instructors and lecturers capable of conducting courses for
referees;
46.11 prepare and produce useful didactic material on refereeing;
We have found a referee committee in almost all statutes of the selected na-
tional associations. However, four national associations have specific organi-
sation concerning referees. The FIGC is a specific case because it does not
have any referee committee in its organisation. However, Italian referees have
their own association – AIA, Associazione Italiana Arbitri – which is affili-
ated to the FIGC. The AIA is then responsible, under the supervision of the
FIGC, for all issues concerning refereeing and referees. The situation is similar
in England and in the USA with, respectively, the Professional Game Match
Officials Limited and the Professional Referee Organization. In Australia,
issues concerning referees and refereeing are managed by a ‘referee leader-
ship group’. It is a consultative and strategic group comprised of referees and
directed by the FFA32.
Generally, the national association executive committee (or in a few cases
the general assembly) designates the members of the committee. Sometimes,
it is specified in the national association statutes that a member of the execu-
tive committee must be the chairperson of the committee. In these cases, it is
not possible to know if league representatives are members of the committee.
Yet, some national associations have specific election methods. In Spain, for
example, the RFEF has a specific referee committee for issues concerning the
professional league (LNFP). This committee includes three members: one is
chosen by the national association, another by the league and the last one by
common consent.
ber 2013
The players’ status committee is responsible for issues concerning the sta-
tus of the players and sometimes transfers. Here are the duties of PSSI Play-
ers’ Status Committee, as mentioned in the statutes:
(1) The Players’ Status Committee shall be responsible for preparing and supervising all
matters relating to regulations regarding players’ status, change of status, and transfer in
accordance with FIFA Regulations: Status and Transfer of Players, and determining the
players’ status in various levels of PSSI competitions.
(2) The Executive Committee may draw up regulations governing the Players’ Status
Committee’s powers of jurisdiction.
(3) The Players’ Status Committee shall report to the Executive Committee, in cases of
disputes involving members, players, match and player agents and officials of matches to
be brought up to the Arbitration level as provided in the FIFA Statutes.
Of the three standing committees studied in this research, the players’ status
committee is the least commonly found. Fourteen national associations do
not explicitly mention the existence of a players’ status committee in their
statutes. However, it is possible that issues concerning players’ status are
treated in another committee. In England, for example, FA Sanctions and
Regulations Committee is responsible for players’ status issues. Similar cases
have also been found in Switzerland, Poland and Tunisia.
Members of the players’ status committee are usually elected by the ex-
ecutive committee or the general assembly, as described above for the referee
committee.
The disciplinary committee is responsible for judging offences committed
by its members and imposing sanctions on them. For example, the duties of
FAZ Disciplinary Committee are presented as follows in the statutes:
i. The function of the Disciplinary Committee shall be governed by the FAZ Discipli-
nary Code. The Committee shall pass decisions when at least three (3) members including
the Chairman or vice chairman are present. In certain cases, the chairman shall rule alone
in accordance with Article 14 of the FAZ Disciplinary Code.
ii. The Committee may pronounce the sanctions described in this Constitution and
the FAZ Disciplinary Code on Member Associations, Member Clubs, Officials, Players,
Match and Players’ Agents.
iii. These provisions are subject to the disciplinary powers of the FAZ Council and the
Executive Committee with regard to the suspension and expulsion of Members.
Disciplinary committees exist in all national associations. Members of the

disciplinary committee are – as the two previously analysed standing com-
mittees – most of the time chosen by the executive committee or the general
56 122
assembly. For this reason, it is difficult to know who the members of the
disciplinary committees are and whose interests they represent.
Only five national associations (Germany, England, Switzerland, Norway
and Japan) have explicitly reported league representation in their disciplinary
committee. For example, ASF/SFV Disciplinary Committee is composed of
twelve members. All three sections of the ASF/SFV (Swiss Football League,
Erste Liga and Amateur Liga) put forward potential candidates and the Gen-
eral Assembly elects four members per section.
In a few national associations the statutes specify that disciplinary com-
mittee members must be independent and must have legal qualifications.
This is the case in Spain, Italy, Ukraine, Australia and Qatar. The FIGC stat-
utes explain, for example, that the members of the disciplinary committee
must be either university professors, researchers, or doctors in business eco-
nomics. One example of the ways in which national association seek to en-
sure the independence of disciplinary committee members is the Reglamento
de funcionamiento interno y administración de órganos disciplinarios de la
RFEF. This document stipulates for example that the members of the disci-
plinary committee must not accept invitations to attend a football match in
the VIP area.
We can also note that many leagues (apart from leagues belonging to
the association model with national association management) have their own
standing committees. Therefore, the specific interests of leagues are often
not explicitly represented in the national association standing committees
presented above. Generally speaking, all issues concerning referees tend to
remain in the hands of national associations. The following chapter explores
in more detail the issue of the labour division between leagues and national
associations.
123
III. Division of labour between national associations
and leagues
This chapter explores the distribution of activities between national associa-

tions and leagues with regard to five key areas of football governance:
–– Organisation of competitions
–– Players’ status
–– Disciplinary proceedings
–– Sport arbitration
–– Club licensing
Here we study how national associations and leagues share responsibilities
in the management of each of the above areas. This will also provide a clear
overview of the level of importance of each area in the governance of football
at national level.
1. Organisation of competitions
The organisational structure of five of the most common national competi-

tions at worldwide level analysed in this research include33:
–– National cup
–– League cup
–– Super cup
–– Youth football competitions
–– Women football competitions
33 The organisation of men’s national leagues has not been taken into account as this has
already been analysed in section I.
1.1. National cup
The national cup is usually a knock-out competition played by teams of the

same country belonging to different levels of the football pyramid. The inter-
est generated by the national cup lies in the fact that amateur teams have the
possibility to play against professional teams. This can often make for unbal-
anced games, at least on paper, but also allows for the proverbial meeting of
‘David vs. Goliath’.
As shown in the table below (tab. 18), all but three countries hold an an-
nual national cup: Papua New Guinea, Honduras and Australia. However,
concerning Australia, the FFA is expected to organise a national cup for the
upcoming season (2014)34.
Table n°18: National cups35

Country National Organiser Participating teams
cup
England Yes National association 737 teams: all Premier and Football League teams
and qualified teams from levels 1 to 6 of non-league
football structure
France Yes National association 7420 teams: all teams from top tier (Ligue 1) to fifth
tier (CFA 2) and qualified amateur teams
Germany Yes National association 64 teams: all Ligaverband teams, 4 top teams of the
3. Liga previous season, winners of the 21 regional
associations cups and 3 regional associations teams
Italy Yes Top league (Lega 78 teams: all Serie A and B teams, 27 Lega Pro teams
Nazionale Professionisti and 9 LND teams
Serie A)
Norway Yes National association 128 teams: 80 Norsk Toppfotball and
Divisjonforeningen teams and 48 qualified teams
Poland Yes National association 48 teams: all Ekstraklasa and I Liga teams and 14
qualified amateur teams
Spain Yes National association 84 teams: all LNFP teams, qualified Segunda B teams
and Tercera division groups champions
Switzerland Yes National association 64 teams: 20 SFL teams, 18 Erste Liga teams and 26
qualified teams from Liga Amateur
ber 2013
35 In England, ‘non-league’ football concerns all football championship competitions below
the Premier League and the Football League. In India, ‘Services’ teams are governmental
institutions teams (army, police, etc.). In Mexico, as in many Latin American football
competitions, Copa MX is divided between two annual tournaments: the apertura (open-
ing, from July to December) and the clausura (closing, from January to May). In Brazil,
the CBF establishes clubs and states rankings (Ranking Nacional de Clubes and Rank-
ing Nacional de Federações) in order to determine which clubs will enter a competition
(Copa do Brasil, Copa Libertadores, etc.).
Division of labour between national associations and leagues 59 125
Country National Organiser Participating teams
cup
Ukarine Yes National association and 55 teams (2012-2013 edition): 16 Premier League, 17
top leagues (Premier 1st League, 22 2nd League teams and the teams which
League/Professional played the Amateur cup final
Football League)
Cameroon Yes National association 64 teams: all Elite One and Two teams and 36
qualified teams
Cape Verde Yes National association N/A
Ivory Coast Yes National association N/A
Kenya Yes National association N/A
Senegal Yes National association N/A
South Africa Yes National association 32 teams: all Premier Division teams and 16 qualified
(early stages)/top league teams
(National Soccer League)
Tunisia Yes National association 32 teams: all Ligue 1 teams and 16 qualified amateur
teams
Zambia Yes National association 8 teams: 6 top Premier League teams and top team of
each Division One groups
Australia No - -
India Yes Independent company 22 teams: 12 qualified teams, 4 I-League teams, 4
I-League 2nd division teams and two ‘services’ teams
Indonesia Yes N/A N/A
Japan Yes National association 88 teams: all J. League teams, JFL top team and 47
regional associations cup winner
Qatar Yes National association 18 teams: all QSL teams and 4 2nd division teams
Singapore Yes National association 16 teams: all S. League teams and 4 invited teams
Honduras No - -
Jamaica Yes Top league (Professional 16 teams: National Premier League teams and regional
Football Association of championships winners
Jamaica)
Mexico Yes Top leagues (Liga MX/ Copa MX Apertura: all Liga MX teams apart from
Ascenso MX) those playing the CONCACAF Champions League
(14 teams) and 14 Ascenso MX teams (28 total)
Copa MX Clausura: all Liga MX teams apart from
those playing the CONCACAF Champions League
and Copa Libertadores (11 teams) and 13 best teams
of the Ascenso MX Apertura championship (24 total)
USA Yes National association 68 teams: 16 MLS, 6 NASL, 12 USL PRO and 34
amateur teams
Brazil Yes National association 86 teams: 6 teams qualified for Copa Libertadores, 70
best teams from regional leagues (number of teams/
state depending on the ranking of the state) and the
10 best teams from the CBF team ranking (apart from
teams already qualified thanks to the two first factors)
Chile Yes Top league (Associación 32 teams: all Primera División and Primera B teams
Nacional de Fútbol
Profesional)
Venezuela Yes National association 38 teams: all Primera División and Segunda División
teams
New Zealand Yes National association 128 teams: qualified teams from every division (apart
from Premiership clubs)
Papua New Guinea No - -
Where a national cup exists, the national association is, in most cases, respon-
sible for its organisation. Two factors can explain the predominance of the
national association as the national cup organiser36:
–– Nine cases (Norway, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Zambia, Sin-
gapore, Brazil, Venezuela and New Zealand) concern countries in which
top tier leagues are entirely managed by the national association (associa-
tion model with national association management). This means that the
national association is the only governing football structure at national
level in these countries and that, consequently, all national competitions
are organised by the national association.
–– In ten cases (Spain, France, Germany, England, Switzerland, Poland,
Cameroon, Japan, Qatar and USA) the organising national association
falls under either the association model with self-management or the sepa-
rate entity model. However, as the national cup gathers teams coming
from different tiers of the football pyramid, the national association takes
over the organisation of the cup because it is the supreme football author-
ity in the country and then includes all leagues (through affiliation or
shareholding) under its administrative umbrella.
–– In four cases, the national cup is organised by the top tier league. All
these cases are leagues under the association model with self-management
(Italy, Mexico and Chile) or separate entity leagues (Jamaica). Two of
these national cups (Chile and Mexico) are actually played only by teams
belonging to the league which organises the competition and, as a result,
do not include any amateur teams. In Jamaica, National Premier League
(top tier championship) teams and the winners of regional championships
compete for the national cup, which is organised by the top tier league
(PFAJ). Italy is a unique case here because, while the teams competing in
the national cup come from different leagues, it is the top tier league (Lega
Nazionale Professionisti Serie A) which is in charge of the organisation of
the competition, and not the national association.
A few other cups are organised in a different manner including a hybrid na-
tional association -league joint model. The situation in Ukraine is such that
the national cup is jointly organised by the second top tier league (Profes-
sional Football League, which organises first and second round of the com-
petition), the top tier league (Premier League, third round) and the national
36 The cases of Senegal, Kenya and Indonesia national cups cannot be explained because
information concerning the competition format is not available.
association (FFU, final). Teams belonging to the Premier League and Profes-
sional Football League are joined by the two national amateur cup finalists37.
In South Africa, the tournament is organised jointly by the national as-
sociation (SAFA) and the top tier league (NSL). The SAFA is in charge of the
early stages of the competition, which only features teams not belonging to
the NSL. As soon as NSL teams enter the competition, the NSL takes over
the organisation of the cup.
In India, the national cup (Durand Cup) is organised by an independent
company, the Durand Football Tournament Society. However, the competi-
tion is ‘conducted under the aegis of All India Football Federation’38.
It should also be noted that in some countries, additional national cups
are organised for amateur or lower level teams. For example, the FA organ-
ises the FA Trophy for teams from the fifth to the eighth tier of the English
football pyramid. In Italy, Lega Pro (Italian third tier league) organises the
Coppa Italia Lega Pro, involving teams belonging to that league. In Ukraine,
a national amateur cup is organised for amateur clubs.
1.2. League cup
In contrast to a national cup competition which draws teams together from

different levels of the footballing pyramid, a league cup refers to a competi-
tion reserved for teams belonging to the same league. The organisation of this
kind of cup is thus dependent on the existence of a particular league entity.
Usually league cups are only played in countries where the league follows
the association model with self-management or the separate entity model.
Moreover, as the league cup is only played by teams belonging to the league
in question, the latter is responsible for the organisation of the competition.
The league cups in Singapore and India are exceptions. As the S. League
(Singaporean top tier league) and the I-League (Indian top tier league) are
entirely managed by the national association – they are association model
leagues with national association management – the league cup is then organ-
ised by the national association as well.
37 E-mail communication with Victor Derdo, FFU Professional Football Committee, 25th
November 2013
38 http://www.durandfootball.com/about_us.html (last consultation: 6th of November 2013)
Of the thirty-two countries surveyed, only eight league cups were identi-
fied (tab. 19). Thus, apart from a minority, this type of competition is not
common at worldwide level.
Table n°19: League cups

Country Organiser Participating teams
England The Football League 92 teams: all Premier and Football Leagues teams
France Ligue de Football 43 teams: all Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 teams and professional
Professionnel teams from National (third top tier division)
Senegal Ligue Sénégalaise de N/A
Football Professionnel
South Africa National Soccer League 16 Premier Soccer League teams
India National association 20 teams: 14 I-League teams and 6 qualified teams from
I-League 2nd Division
Japan J. League 18 J1 teams
Qatar Qatar Stars League 12 QSL teams
Singapore National associaton 12 S. League teams and 4 qualified National Football
League teams
1.3. Super cup
Beyond national leagues and cups which are played throughout the season,
a super cup usually refers to a single match competition played between the
winner of the country’s top division and the winner of the national cup. It is
usually played as a ‘season opener’ – that is to say, just before the beginning
of the top division championship.
The table below (tab. 20) shows that a super cup takes place in the ma-
jority of the countries surveyed (twenty out thrity-two). Two different super
cups are organised in Kenya – one with the basic super cup format (top
league winner vs. national cup winner) and the other under the form of a
tournament between the top eight teams of the previous year’s top tier league
championship. Apart from the Kenyan case, only two super cups are played
under a format different from the more traditional model: South Africa’s and
Qatar’s super cups.
Division of labour between national associations and leagues 129
63
Table n°20: Super cups

Country Super cup Organiser Competition format
Spain Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Italy Yes Top league Top division winner vs. national cup winner
France Yes Top League Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Germany Yes Top league Top division winner vs. national cup winner
England Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Switzerland No - -
Poland Yes Top league Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Ukraine Yes Top league Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Norway No - -
Tunisia Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Ivory Coast Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Cape Verde Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
South Africa Yes Top league Previous season's top 8 Premier Division teams
Zambia Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Senegal Yes N/A N/A
Cameroon No - -
Kenya Yes N/A Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Kenya Yes Top league Previous season's top 8 KPL teams
India No - -
Indonesia Yes N/A Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Singapore Yes National association Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Japan Yes Top league Top division winner vs. national cup winner
Australia No - -
Qatar Yes Top league Previous season's top 4 QSL teams
Mexico Yes Top league Top division winner vs. national cup winner
USA No - -
Honduras No - -
Jamaica No - -
Brazil No - -
Chile No - -
Venezuela No - -
New Zealand Yes National association Regular season winner vs. playoffs winner
Papua New Guinea No - -
For the eighteen national associations organising a super cup for which in-
formation was available, eight super cups are organised by the national as-
sociation while ten are run by the top tier league. For countries in which the
top tier league follows the association model with self-management or the
separate entity model, the super cup is most often organised by the league
(eleven cases – Italy, France, Germany, Ukraine, Poland, South Africa, Kenya,
Singapore, Japan, Qatar and Mexico) while the Spanish and English super
cups are organised by the national association.
1.4. Youth football and women’s football competitions
The final area of competition addressed here covers youth and women’s foot-
ball. In the thirty-two countries surveyed, two models of youth football com-
petition organisation were identified:
–– In the first model, the national association is in charge organising all
youth football competitions at national level.
–– In the second example, the top tier league organises the elite youth
competition, while the national association (or another entity) organises
other national youth competitions.
The most common model (in twenty-four of the thirty-two countries sur-
veyed) is the first system, in which the national association organises all youth
football competitions. The other cases are presented in the table below (tab.
21):
Table n°21: Youth football competitions

Country Organiser
England Premier League organises elite youth football competitions (U-21 and U-18)
Italy Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A organises elite youth football competitions (U-19)
Ukraine Premier League organises elite youth football competitions (U-21 and U-19)
Indonesia Indonesia Super League organises elite youth football competitions (U-21)
Japan J. League organises elite youth football competitions (U-18, U-16, U-15, U-14 and U-13)
Mexico Liga MX organises elite youth football competitions (U-20 and U-17)
USA USSF has its own Development Academy but USSF affiliated organisations and college/
university associations also organise youth football competitions
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional organises elite youth football competitions
(from U-8 to U-19)
When a league organises its own youth competitions, it is generally at an
elite level. This only occurs if leagues follow either the association model with
self-management or the separate entity model. Lower levels of youth football
competitions are almost exclusively organised by the national association.
However, lower leagues also sometimes organise their own youth football
competitions. The Football League, English second tier league, for exam-
ple, organises its own U-18 football competition called ‘The Football League
Youth Alliance’. However, the national youth cup is organised by the FA.
The USA is a unique case. While the USSF organises elite youth football
competitions (Academy leagues for U-13/14, U-15/16 and U-17/18), other
USSF affiliated associations (US Youth Soccer, American Youth Soccer Or-
ganization, US Club Soccer, etc.) also organise youth football competitions.
Furthermore, similar to every major sport in the USA, football is also played
by colleges and universities. As such, specific and university sport associations
(NCAA, NAIA, etc.) also organise youth football competitions throughout
the country.
All women’s football competitions in the countries surveyed are organised
by the national association 39. However, in Italy, the amateur league organises
national women’s football through its Women’s Football Department. Further-
more, as mentioned in the first chapter of the study, in the USA, the top tier
league (NWSL) is managed by the national association, but is also financed by
the Mexican and Canadian associations. However, lower tier championships
are managed by separate entity leagues. For example, the W-League is managed
by the USL, the Women’s Premier Soccer League is managed by the WPSL and
the USASA women’s football championships are managed by USASA.
2. Players’ status
Having discussed competition organisation, we now move to the second of

the five key areas of football governance: players’ status. For each national
association surveyed, in order to understand which entity – national associa-
tion or league – deals with players’ status issues, we studied, where available,
the regulations concerning the following points (non-exhaustive list):
39 Information concerning women’s football competitions in Mexico was not available.

–– Status of the players (amateur or professional)
–– Registration of players (eligibility – conditions and requirements;
transfer; player’s registration)
–– Contract stability (termination of contract)
–– Protection of minors
–– Training compensation and solidarity mechanisms
–– Wages
–– Quotas and limits (local players, academy players, rosters, etc.)
This section only provides an overview of these issues rather than a full point-
by-point discussion. These issues are primarily governed by FIFA through
its standard regulations referring to players’ status. The national association
must then set up players’ status regulations in compliance with FIFA’s Regu-
lations on the Status and Transfer of Players40. The related national associa-
tion regulations must include some compulsory articles from the aforemen-
tioned FIFA rules and must be approved by the world governing body. In
some instances, the league will draft specific regulations concerning players’
status issues. These must match both with those of FIFA and the national
association (fig. 6). Generally, league regulations have to be approved by the
national association before implementation.
Figure n°6: Standard players’ status regulations model
Regulation topics
Hierarchical status/primacy (from the more general to the more specific)
FIFA’s
regulations
National
association’s
regulations
League’s
regulations
(do not concern all cases)
According to our findings, two national association models govern players’

status issues at national level:
–– In the national association model, regulations about players’ status are
exclusively issued by the national association, in compliance with FIFA
regulations.
40 http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/officialdocuments/doclists/laws.html#tranferts (last con-

sultation: 8th November 2013)
67
–– In the mixed national association-league model, the league adds spe-

cific players’ status regulations to those of the national association.
The table below (tab. 22) categorises national associations according to these
two models:
Table n°22: Entity governing players’ status issues

National association National association-league Other
Italy Australia England Japan France
Norway India Germany Honduras
Poland Indonesia Spain Mexico
Cameroon Qatar Switzerland USA
Cape Verde Singapore Ukraine Chile
Ivory Coast Jamaica South Africa
Kenya Brazil
Senegal Venezuela
Tunisia New Zealand
Zambia Papua New Guinea
As briefly stated previously, the national association model refers to a country

in which all regulations and rules concerning players’ status issues are ad-
ministered by the national association. For example, in New Zealand, NZF
regulations 5 (‘Status of Players’) and 10 (‘National League Regulations’) give
instructions about players’ status issues. Regulation 5 deals particularly with:
–– Registration
–– Registration periods
–– Player passport
–– Player transfers
–– Unregistered players
–– Enforcement of disciplinary suspensions
–– Transfer fees
–– Training compensation
–– Release of players for National Association representative matches
–– Guest players
In regulation 10, the NZF outlines some control mechanisms such as quo-
tas and limits for National League rosters, as demonstrated in the following
article:
8.1 In each National League season, each franchise club shall name and contract (in
accordance with 8.11) a squad consisting of a maximum of twenty five (25) players
(‘Franchise Club Players’) of which five (5) must be Academy players as defined in
8.2. Further, each franchise must include on the team list for each match a mini-
mum of two (2) Academy players.
In New Zealand – as in many other countries – the national association re-

produces FIFA’s players’ status regulations and adds some further specific
rules. Some national associations (Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Zambia, Papua
New Guinea) simply refer to FIFA regulations without adding additional
points. For example, article 7 of FIF statutes states:
1. Players’ status and transfer forms are governed by the FIF Executive Committee in
conformity with the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players41.
The national association model concerning players’ status regulations is used

in every country in which the league is an association model league with
national association management. This is logical as the national associations
in those countries are responsible for every aspect of league management. In
addition, some leagues with self-management (categorised either in the as-
sociation model with self-management or in the separate entity model) also
have players’ status issues regulated only by the national association. This is
the case in Italy, Senegal, Cameroon, Qatar (all of these being association
models with self-management) and in Poland, Kenya and Indonesia (separate
entity model leagues).
The second major model is the national association-league mixed model.
Here, the league establishes players’ status regulations in order to bring ad-
ditional clarification or restrictions to existing national association and FIFA
regulations. This model is only encountered in countries in which the league
follows the association model with self-management or the separate entity
model. For example, in South Africa, NSL Rules comprise an entire chapter
dedicated to ‘the Status, Registration and Transfer of Players’. At the begin-
ning of the chapter, it is stipulated that:
23.1 These rules deal with the status and eligibility of players, as well as the rules appli-
cable whenever players move between clubs within the League’s jurisdiction and be-
tween such clubs and other clubs within the jurisdiction of SAFA or other national
associations.
41 Translation, see appendices for original text.

23.2 These rules are designed to give effect to the general principles of the FIFA regula-
tions within the constraints imposed by the constitution of the Republic of South
Africa and other relevant provisions of South African law.
Furthermore, SAFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players state

that:
1.1. These regulations deal with the status and eligibility of players, as well as the rules
applicable whenever players move between clubs within SAFA’s jurisdiction and be-
tween such clubs and clubs within the jurisdiction of other national associations.
This example shows that a league can issue its own regulations regarding the
status of players. However, as the league is under national association and
FIFA jurisdiction, regulations issued by the former must not contradict those
of the national or world governing bodies.
Honduras is a specific example of the national association-league model
as all issues concerning players’ status, apart from training compensation,
are regulated by the league (Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional). Questions
pertaining to training compensation are regulated by the Tribunal Nacion-
al de Arbitraje de Fútbol, which is an independent court managed by FE-
NAFUTH.
Players’ status issues are implemented in a very specific way in France. As
in many cases of the national association-league mixed model, the LFP has its
own regulations. However, standard national rules are not established by the
national association, but are specified in the Charte du football profession-
nel (professional football charter). This document is a collective agreement
developed by the governing authorities of French football:
–– Fédération Française de Football (French association)
–– Ligue de Football Professionnel (top tier league)
–– Union des Clubs Professionnels de Football (professional football
clubs union)
–– Union Nationale des Footballeurs Professionnels (professional football
players national union)
–– Union Nationale des Entraîneurs (coaches national union)
–– Cadres Techniques Professionnels du Football (football professional
technical managers)
This charter explains all conditions of employment relative to professional
football and, therefore, players’ status.
State laws can also have an impact on football governance. In the situation
concerning the eligibility of a player with regards to nationality, some state
laws must be taken into consideration. For example, in countries applying
European Union laws, following the Bosman ruling, it is impossible for a
national association or a league to impose nationality quotas on players in a
team. However, some national associations and leagues have introduced spe-
cific regulations in order to protect domestically trained players.
In Switzerland, SFL’s Règlement sur la Qualification des Joueurs de la SFL
stipulates that, of the maximum twenty-five players that a club can register,
a maximum of seventeen players can be non-locally trained players. A locally
trained player is a player who has been registered with an ASF/SFV club for
at least three seasons or thirty-six months between his fifteenth and twenty-
first birthdays.
In Italy, the presence of non-EU (European Union) players is regulated
by immigration law at State level. This sets a maximum number of profes-
sional athletes who can be registered each year. CONI is then responsible for
establishing quotas per sports organisation, including the FIGC. The latter
also sets rules defining quotas for football clubs.
3. Disciplinary proceedings
The third key area discussed here is the role of disciplinary proceedings. Dis-
ciplinary cases in professional football are usually managed according to a
universal model. First instance decisions are taken by a disciplinary commit-
tee, while second instance decisions are taken by an appeals committee. In a
few cases, a tribunal of the third instance settles the dispute. If necessary, the
case is then heard by an arbitration court (fig. 7).
Figure n°7: Standard disciplinary proceedings in football
First instance
Disciplinary committee
Second instance
Appeals committee
Third instance
(occasional)
Arbitration
In this section we have researched which football governing entity – national

association or league – is responsible for internal disciplinary proceedings,
from the first to the second stage and through to an eventual third instance in
the process. Similar to players’ status, we find both national association and
national association-league models as well as a third system, organised by the
league. The majority of leagues fit into one of these three categories (tab. 23):
–– In the national association model, the national association organises
each step of the disciplinary proceedings.
–– In the league model, the league organises all steps of the disciplinary
proceedings.
–– In the mixed model, the league has its own disciplinary committee but
the appeal committee is administered by the national association.
Table n°23: Entity governing disciplinary proceedings

National association League Mixed Other
England Indonesia Switzerland France Germany
Norway Qatar Cameroon Italy Spain
Ukraine Singapore USA Poland Japan
Cape Verde Honduras Chile Kenya Brazil
Ivory Coast Jamaica Senegal
Tunisia Mexico South Africa
Zambia Venezuela
Australia New Zealand
India Papua New Guinea
72 138
In the national association model, the basic disciplinary system is to have, as

mentioned before, a disciplinary committee as first instance which is then
followed by an appeals committee. This is the situation in Zambia, for exam-
ple. Article 45 on judicial bodies of FAZ statutes stipulates that:
1. The Judicial Bodies of FAZ are:
i. Disciplinary Committee
ii. FAZ Council Appeal Committee
iii. Arbitration Tribunal
In some cases, disciplinary proceedings are divided into several entities, with
each having a specific jurisdiction. For example, in Jamaica, JFF rules and
regulations concerning the top tier championship stipulates that the Compe-
titions’ Committee can act as a first instance body and impose penalties (sus-
pension, fines, etc.) if the issue does not concern the other JFF first instance
body, the Complaints and Disciplinary Committee. Appeals are treated ex-
clusively by JFF Appeal Committee.
National associations following this kind of disciplinary procedure are
mostly located in countries in which the top tier league structure has been cat-
egorised as an association model league with national association management
described in the first chapter of this study. However, other league structures
are also represented such as the models used in Germany, Ukraine, Qatar,
Mexico and Honduras (association model league with self-management), as
well as in England and Indonesia (separate entity model leagues). In England,
the national association reviews most disciplinary cases. However, it is possible
for some ‘off-field’ issues not to be covered by the national association rules
and regulations. These cases are treated by the league (Premier League).
Shifting focus to the second model of countries where the league manages
the process, the procedure can be either traditional – single first and second
instances – or divided into specific jurisdictions. In Cameroon, for example,
the Ligue de Football Professionel has a traditional disciplinary system, with
the first instance Commission d’Homologation et de Discipline and the sec-
ond instance Commission d’Appel. Alternatively, the Swiss Football League
has six first instance judicial bodies (licences commission, disciplinary order
judges, disciplinary committee president adjucating as single judge, disci-
plinary committee, players’ qualification committee and transfers commit-
tee) and two second instance panels (licences appeal committee and appeal
court), as explained in article 16 of the SFL statutes.
Within the league model, two countries have specific characteristics:
–– MLS has a disciplinary committee but no second instance body. The
MLS Commissioner acts as the second instance body and provides a final
decision if necessary.
–– In Chile, the ANFP (Chilean top tier league) has three first instance
entities: Tribunal de Disciplina de l’ANFP, Tribunal de Assuntos Patrimo-
niales and Tribunal de Honor. However, we could not find any second
instance body in the ANFP or FFC documents.
The third model discussed here is the league-national association mixed mod-
el. In this scenario the league often administers the first instance stage of
the process, while the national association is responsible for appeal decisions
concerning professional football. In South Africa, for example, first instance
decisions concerning the National Soccer League belong to NSL Disciplinary
Committee or to NSL Dispute Resolution Chamber. However, if the deci-
sion is contested, the appeal judgment is rendered by SAFA Appeal Commit-
tee. In Italy, ‘on-field’ issues are treated according to the league-national asso-
ciation mixed model but more ‘severe’ cases are heard on a case-by-case basis.
All national associations with league and national association-league
models from a disciplinary perspective have association model leagues with
self-management or separate entity leagues.
There are several countries whose disciplinary structure does not match
with one of the three previously explained models. In Germany and Japan,
jurisdiction concerning disciplinary proceedings is shared between the na-
tional association and the league. In Germany, the national association is
responsible for disciplinary proceedings related to issues occurring during
matches. The league administrates procedures concerning violations of li-
censing regulations. In Japan, the top tier league usually handles day-to-day
issues (suspensions, sanctions, etc.) while the national association runs proce-
dures in so-called ‘severe’ cases (corruption, match-fixing, etc.). The extent of
each entity’s duties is usually described in their respective statutes.
Finally, two countries have specific disciplinary proceedings:
–– In Spain, both first and second instance bodies are part of the top tier
league (LNFP) organisation, as in the basic league model. However, there
is a third instance body, the Comité Español de Disciplina Deportiva,
which is administered by the Spanish government.
–– In Brazil, all disciplinary decisions are taken by Brazilian state judicial
bodies responsible for sport justice.
We now move to the question of sport arbitration, the fourth key area identified.
4. Sport arbitration
In sport, when a dispute cannot be resolved by the first or second (or poten-
tially third) instance judicial body, the parties usually resort to an arbitra-
tion tribunal. The Switzerland-based CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sport)
is the supreme arbitration tribunal for sport disputes. It is possible however
that sport governing bodies in some countries can have access to their own
national level arbitration court, which can be used before resorting to CAS.
FIFA statutes42 stipulate that football governing bodies – national associa-
tions and leagues – must recognise CAS as the ultimate arbitration court.
Article 68 of FIFA statutes stipulates that national associations must insert a
provision for arbitration in their own statutes. Here, we studied which foot-
ball governing body – national association, league or other – is responsible
for the administration of the arbitration tribunal when the dispute concerns
top tier football stakeholders. Our research has revealed four main categories
of entities administering the arbitration court (tab. 24):
–– National association
–– Top tier league
–– Sport-related body: National Olympic Committee or National Sport
Justice
–– CAS (national associations in this category directly refer to CAS when
an arbitration procedure is necessary)
Table n°24: Entity governing arbitration proceedings

National association League Sport-related body CAS Other
England Zambia Spain France Switzerland Germany
Norway Australia Italy Ukraine Japan
Poland India Tunisia Venezuela Singapore
Cameroon Indonesia Brazil Mexico
Cape Verde Qatar USA
Ivory Coast Honduras New Zealand
Kenya Jamaica
Senegal Chile
South Africa Papua New Guinea
42 http://fr.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/statutes.html (last consultation: 3rd December

2013)
In the first category, the national association creates and sets up its own ar-
bitration court. Six national associations (Poland, Norway, Ivory Coast, Sen-
egal, Australia and Honduras) have a permanent arbitration court. Concern-
ing the other national associations, their statutes stipulate that they ‘shall
create’ an arbitration court when deemed necessary. For example, article 50
of PNGFA statutes which concerns dispute arbitration states the following:
Papua New Guinea Football (Soccer) Association shall create an Arbitration Tribunal,
which shall deal with all internal national disputes between PNGFA, its Members, Players,
Officials and match and players’ agents that do not fall under the jurisdiction of its judicial
bodies. The Executive Committee shall draw up special regulations regarding the composi-
tion, jurisdiction and procedural rules of this Arbitration Tribunal.
Similar cases have been encountered in Cape Verde, South Africa, Cameroon,
Kenya, Zambia, India, Indonesia, Qatar, Jamaica and Chile.
Under the league model, the Spanish LNFP is the only league surveyed
which has created its own arbitration court, the Tribunal Arbitral del Fútbol.
Regarding the third category (sport-related bodies), in Italy and Tunisia,
the arbitration proceedings are set up by their respective National Olympic
Committee. In contrast, if the CBF retains the prerogative to create an arbi-
tration court for very specific issues, most of the professional football-related
issues are arbitrated by the National Sport Justice, as explained in article 73
of CBF statutes:
CBF shall create an arbitration court to settle internal disputes […] if these latter do not
concern the constitutional authority assigned to Sport Justice43.
The fourth category pertains to countries that have no intermediate arbitra-

tion court at national level which is the case in Switzerland, Ukraine and Ven-
ezuela. If a dispute must be heard by an arbitration court, the case is taken
directly to the CAS, as explained in article 51 of the FFU statutes:
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (Lausanne, Switzerland) has the exclusive com-
petence to adjudicate all disputes within the limits of FIFA and UEFA activities as well as
appeals from the decisions of the FFU Appeals Committee as the final instance organ. The
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) does not accept appeals from the decisions concern-
ing suspensions for four matches or for the term of up to three months.

Beyond the four categories mentioned some leagues and national associa-
tions refer in their statutes and regulations to an arbitration tribunal without
specifying which entity creates and sets up the actual tribunal. This is the case
in Germany, Singapore and New Zealand. Further research would be needed
to determine precisely how arbitration proceedings are managed in Japan,
Mexico and USA.
5. Club licensing
Having addressed the first four keys areas – competitions, players’ status, dis-
ciplinary and arbitration – this section discusses the final area: club licensing.
The purpose of club licensing regulations is to define minimum requirements
for a club to participate in a competition. The licence is usually issued by the
governing body organising the competition in question – league, national as-
sociation or continental confederation. In order to obtain the licence, a club
must fulfill a wide range of criteria. These criteria can be of sporting, legal,
financial, infrastructure and/or administrative nature. Here we studied which
entity – league, national association or other – is responsible for defining and
issuing club licences in each of the countries surveyed.
FIFA issues standard regulations concerning club licensing that must be
incorporated in domestic (national association or league) regulations44. FIFA
club licensing regulations are general but with mandatory conditions. na-
tional associations and leagues generally add specific features to them. Conti-
nental confederation club licensing regulations are also important since clubs
wishing to compete for continental competitions must fulfill them. As a re-
sult of this, football governing entities – national association or league – tend
to integrate some features of continental confederation club licensing in their
own regulations.
Considering the information presented above, the countries surveyed
have been categorised in the following way (tab. 25):
44 http://fr.fifa.com/aboutfifa/officialdocuments/doclists/laws.html#tranferts (last consulta-

tion: 27th November 2013)
Table n°25: Entity issuing club licences
National association League Other
Italy Zambia England South Africa
Norway Australia France Tunisia
Poland India Germany Honduras
Ukraine Indonesia Spain Brazil
Cameroon Singapore Switzerland Venezuela
Cape Verde Jamaica Japan
Ivory Coast Mexico Qatar
Kenya New Zealand USA
Senegal Papua New Guinea Chile
In the first category, the national association is responsible for club licensing.
For instance, in Mexico, article 6 of FMF’s Reglamento de Afiliación, Nom-
bre y Sede determines the requirements to be fulfilled by professional clubs in
order to compete in the Liga MX (Mexican top tier league):
Affiliation to FMF is validated thanks to the Certificate of Affiliation, delivered by the

FMF to Professional Clubs and State Associations from the Amateur Sector, after having
satisfied the conditions stipulated in the Social Statutes, the present Regulations and the
practical measures from the latter.
The Certificate of Affiliation is an untransferable qualification which is not subject to
joint ownership and cannot be transferred to another body or legal transaction held by
the owner45.
While, in some countries (Italy, Poland, Norway, Cameroon, Senegal, Zam-

bia, India, Mexico and New Zealand), club licensing by the national asso-
ciation is already in effect, the process is still in preparation in others (Ivory
Coast, Cape Verde, Kenya, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, Jamaica and
Papua New Guinea). In these cases, the statutes stipulate that the national
association ‘shall operate’ club licensing regulations, as illustrated by article
38a of FFA statutes:
¹ FFA shall operate a club licensing system in accordance with the principles of the club
licensing regulations of AFC and FIFA.
² The objective of the club licensing system is to safeguard the credibility and integrity
of club competitions, to improve the level of professionalism of clubs in Australia, to

promote sporting values in accordance with the principles of fair play as well as safe and
secure match environments and to promote transparency in the finances, ownership and
control of clubs.
³ FFA shall issue club licensing regulations governing the club licensing system, as shown
at Annexure K of these FFA Statutes. Inter alia, the club licensing regulations shall stipu-
late to which clubs the system applies. As a minimum, the club licensing system must be
implemented in respect of top-division clubs which qualify for AFC club competitions
on sporting merit. The club licensing bodies shall consist of the first-instance body and
the appeals body. The members of these club licensing bodies shall be appointed by the
executive committee.
In cases where the national association operates club licensing, all league
structural models are represented – association model with national associa-
tion management (Norway, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Zambia, India, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand), association model with self-management (Italy,
Cameroon, Senegal and Mexico) and separate entity model (Poland, Kenya,
Indonesia and Jamaica).
A second entity responsible for club licensing is the league. All the nation-
al associations where leagues manage club licensing have association model
leagues with self-management (Spain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Japan,
Qatar and Chile) or separate entity leagues (England and USA). In Qatar
for example, QSLM (Qatar Stars League Management) is responsible for the
club licensing process, as explained in article 2.1. of the QSL Club Licensing
Regulations:
2.1.1. QSLM shall be responsible for the QSLM Club Licensing System and shall appoint
the relevant administrative and decision-making bodies.
2.1.2. The process shall be comprised of self-certification on part of the Clubs, together
with an audit conducted by the QSLM.
In Qatar, as in many Asian and European countries, the continental confed-

eration (here, AFC) club licensing criteria have been taken into account in
order to define domestic regulations, as specified in article 1.1. of the QSL
Club Licensing Regulations:
These Regulations govern the rights, duties and responsibilities of all parties involved in
the QSLM Club Licensing System and define, in particular:
[…]
c) The minimum sporting, infrastructure, personnel and administrative, legal and
financial criteria to be fulfilled by a Club in order to be granted a License by the
Licensor for entering the QSL and AFC Club Competitions.
In some countries in this category, club licensing proceedings are shared be-
tween the national association and the league. In England, for example, the
FA oversees UEFA (Union of European Football Association) club licensing
regulations and any additional rules stipulated within FA documents46. It
should be noted, however, that some aspects of club licensing (finance, club
ownership, infrastructure, etc.) are managed by the Premier League.
The last category of club licensing management models includes a variety
of scenarios:
–– In Venezuela, club licensing is partly regulated by a national law, the
Ley Orgânica de Deporte, Actividad Física y Educación Física. The FVF
also issues club licensing regulations (Normas Reguladoras de Categoria
Nacional) through its Comisión de Torneos Nacionales.
–– In Brazil, we did not find any national club licensing system. However,
regional associations (twenty-seven state federations) have their own club
licensing regulations.
–– In South Africa, SAFA Constitution stipulates that ‘SAFA shall oper-
ate a Club licensing system in accordance with the principles of the Club
licensing regulations of FIFA and CAF’ (art. 79), similar to some other
countries where club licensing is managed by the national association. Yet
the NSL defines some features which allow clubs to enter its competi-
tions, such as regulations concerning club ownership and infrastructure
inspections.
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the league can only rarely act in-
dependently on the legislative aspects at a national level. In the cases where
leagues do act independently, it applies to rather ‘strong’ leagues (financial-
ly independent leagues in the association model and separate entity model
leagues). These ‘strong’ leagues, even though they do not always succeed in
acting independently, often manage to reach a consensus with the national
associations and this gives birth to a ‘mixed’ decision-making process.
The role of the national associations in these legislative areas still remains
very important because they are the highest football governing bodies at na-
tional level. Despite the growing role of leagues and their member clubs at
46 E-mail communication with Jonathan Hall, The FA Director of Football Services, 27th
November 2013
international level, the national associations remain the principal direct in-
terlocutors with the continental confederations, which make decisions on ac-
cess and participation rights to the lucrative continental competitions (UEFA
Champions League, CONMEBOL Copa Libertadores, AFC Champions
League, etc.)47.
47 For example, following years of pressure by the G-14 (an organisation representing some
of the most important European clubs), European clubs have obtained a vote at UEFA’s
Professional Football Strategy Council which decides on a number of issues for continen-
tal competitions.
147
IV. League internal governance
The previous chapters have focused on the relationships between associations

and leagues, as well as on the representation of the latter in the former. To
complete the picture, the last chapter provides a description of the stake-
holders who are represented in the internal governing bodies of the league.
This allows us to highlight governance mechanisms in league structures. This
chapter is divided into two main sections.
Section one considers leagues entirely managed by the national associa-
tion (association model with national association management). The type of
entity in the national association organisation – standing committees, offices,
etc. – and the relevant affiliations of their members to other football interest
groups are described.
The second section concerns leagues not managed by the national asso-
ciation (association model with self-management and separate entity model)
and reveals the composition of their executive committee and general assem-
bly. In addition, executive committees, the election/appointment processes,
terms of mandate and chairman/CEO/executive committee prerogatives are
studied. Furthermore, the admittance/removal mechanisms for clubs to/from
the league and their consequences on the management of the league are also
discussed.
The table below (tab. 26) displays the distribution of leagues according
to their structural models and the section from chapter 4 in which they are
studied.
Table n°26: League distribution according to chapter IV analyses
League with national association management League with independent managing structure
(association model with national association (association model with self-management/separate
management) entity model)
(studied in 4.1.) (studied in 4.2.)
Norsk Toppfotball (Norway) Ekstraklasa (Poland)
Campeonato Nacional (Cape Verde) Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A (Italy)
Ligue National du Football Professionnal (Tunisia) Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Spain)
Ligue Professionnelle (Ivory Coast) Ligaverband (Germany)
Premier League (Zambia) Ligue de Football Professionnel (France)
A-League (Australia) Premier League (England)
I-League (India) Swiss Football League (Switzerland)
S. League (Singapore) Ukrainian Premier League (Ukraine)
Campeonato Brasileiro (Brazil) Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun (Cameroon)
Primera División (Venezuela) Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel (Senegal)
National League (New Zealand) National Soccer League (South Africa)
National Soccer League (Papua New Guinea) Premier League (Kenya)
Indonesia Super League (Indonesia)
J. League (Japan)
Qatar Stars League (Qatar)
Liga MX (Mexico)
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Honduras)
Major League Soccer (USA)
Professional Football Association of Jamaica (Jamaica)
Associación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Chile)
1. Internal governance: association model leagues with

national association management
Within the association model with national association management, leagues

are entirely managed by the national association. Therefore, they are not usu-
ally governed by an executive committee and a general assembly but rather by
a specific structure which is part of the national association organisation (tab.
27). For example, this structure can be a standing committee directly linked
to the national association executive committee or a specific office, which
sometimes has its own administration.
League internal governance 83 149
Table n°27: League governing entity in national association48
League Governing body Number of Election/appointment process
members
Norsk Toppfotball Competitions Head of the department appointed by NFF
N/A
(Norway) Department General Secretary
Campeonato Nacional FCF Organizing N/A Appointed by FCF Executive Committee
(Cape Verde) Committee
Ligue National de Football Bureau de la LNFP 4 appointed by FTF Executive Committee
12
Professionnel (Tunisia) and 8 by the clubs
Ligue Professionnelle Bureau de la Ligue Appointed by FIF Executive Committee
15
(Ivory Coast) Professionnelle
Premier League (Zambia) FAZ Premier League and 11 appointed by FAZ Executive Committee
12
Organizing Committee and one by the Referees Association
A-League (Australia) FFA A-League Head of the department appointed by FFA
N/A
department CEO
I-League (India) AIFF I-League Appointed by AIFF Executive Committee
N/A
Committee
S. League (Singapore) S. League CEO 1 Appointed by FAS Executive Committee
Campeonato Brasileiro CBF Diretoria de N/A
N/A
(Brazil) Competições
Primera División FVF Comisión de 6 appointed by FVF Executive Committee
12
(Venezuela) Torneos Nacionales and 6 club representatives
National League (New NZF Competitions and Appointed by NZF CEO/General Secretary
1
Zealand) Events Manager
National soccer League PNGFA National Soccer PNGFA President and General Secretary
(Papua New Guinea) League Committee N/A are ex officio members, other members are
appointed by PNGFA Executive Committee
Five of these top tier leagues are managed and organised by a standing com-
mittee belonging to the national association structure (Cape Verde, Zambia,
India, Venezuela and Papua New Guinea):
–– FCF Organizing Committee members are appointed by FCF Execu-
tive Committee.
–– FAZ Premier League and Organizing Committee comprises twelve
members, including a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, a Treasurer and eight
other members, all appointed by FAZ Executive Committee. The remain-
ing member is appointed by RAZ, the Referees Association of Zambia.
–– I-League (Indian top tier league) Committee is constituted by AIFF
Executive Committee. The I-League Committee shall create sub-commit-
48 In Norway and Australia, the national association department responsible for the man-
agement of the league is composed by national association employees. They do not repre-
sent any other football interest groups and their number and their appointment processes
are not taken into account in this study. Only the department head’s appointment process
is analysed.
84 Governance models across associations and leagues150
tees (Emergency Committee, Referees Committee, etc.) in consultation
with the AIFF. Concerning the day-to-day management of the league, the
AIFF appoints a CEO, two managers and two assistants.
–– FVF Comisión de Torneos Nacionales comprises twelve members: six
are appointed by the FVF while the six others are club representatives
(four from Primera División and two from Segunda División clubs). This
committee does not only organise and manage the top tier league but all
leagues taking place at national level.
–– Members of PNGFA National Soccer League Committee are appoint-
ed by PNGFA Executive Committee. PNGFA President and General Sec-
retary are ex officio members of the committee. A Business Development
Manager, a Competition Manager and an Assistant Competition Man-
ager are responsible for the day-to-day management of the league.
The remaining leagues all possess a variety of organisational structures rang-
ing from a CEO, national association department or a bureau which man-
ages day-to-day affairs. In New Zealand, a manager appointed by the NZF
is responsible for the organisation and management of the league. In Brazil,
CBF Diretoria de Competições has equivalent functions.
In Norway and Australia, the national association department manages
and organises the league. The A-League (Australian top tier league) depart-
ment, supported by other specialists in the national association, is responsible
for various aspects of the league management (operations, events, ticketing
and football services, marketing, finance, regulations and disciplinary, media
and referees). Similarly, NFF Competitions Department comprises five chap-
ters (club licensing, laws and regulations, transfer and insurance, referees and
delegates, competitions calendar and fixtures). In Australia, the national asso-
ciation CEO appoints the head of department, who is also the league CEO,
appointment which must be approved by the national association Board. In
Norway, he is appointed by the national association General Secretary.
In Singapore, the S. League is managed by a CEO, appointed by the
national association Executive Committee. The CEO runs the day-to-day
activities of the league and reports to the national association Executive Com-
mittee. Executive decisions such as admittance/removal of S. League clubs,
for example, are decided by FAS Executive Committee or Council.
In Tunisia and the Ivory Coast, the national association entrusts the man-
agement of the league to an entity with its own administration. This en-
tity is entirely part of the national association. For example, Tunisia’s Ligue
Nationale du Football Professionnel has its own President, Vice-Presidents
and Treasurer. It manages and organises professional football in Tunisia but
remains under the control of the Bureau Fédéral, FTF Executive Committee.
FTF’s Bureau de la Ligue is composed of twelve independent members49.
Four members are appointed by FTF Executive Committee, upon recom-
mendation by the Tunisian Sports Minister, while the eight remaining mem-
bers are elected by the Ligue National de Football Professionnel General As-
sembly, which is the official gathering for all professional clubs. The Bureau
de la Ligue can create some standing committees in order to assist the Gen-
eral Assembly in the management and organisation of the league.
In the Ivory Coast, the Bureau de la Ligue Professionnelle is composed
of fifteen members and assisted by six Counsellors and one Administrative
Secretary. It is under the control of the FIF and its composition is determined
by FIF Executive Committee.
Thus, the organisational structure of leagues run by national associations
is varied even if five operate under a standing committee. We turn now to
leagues not managed by their national association.
2. Internal governance: association model leagues with self-

management and separate entity model leagues
This section explores four aspects of the league internal governance:

–– the composition of the executive committee
–– the powers of the executive committee
–– the composition of the general assembly
–– the league members admittance and removal mechanisms
Leagues following the association model with self-management or the sepa-
rate entity model both have governing bodies which are independent from
the national association. However, according to their structural model, the
usual internal governance for each case is different.
49 Throughout this fourth chapter, we refer to ‘independent members’ as people who are
not affiliated to any football interest groups (national associations, leagues, clubs, regional
associations, players/referees/coaches associations, etc.). These people can be, for example,
businessmen, lawyers, researchers, auditors, doctors and so on.
An association model league with self-management will, for most of the
time, have the usual governing system of an association, with a general assem-
bly including club representatives who elect an executive committee. A sepa-
rate entity league will have the governing system of a company. The general
assembly here is the general meeting of the shareholders, while the executive
committee is the board of directors. While the executive committee of an
association model league with self-management can include club representa-
tives, the board of directors is mostly composed of independent people with
no function inside league clubs.
As explained above, association model leagues with self-management and
separate entity leagues have different governing systems. Therefore, for each
of the four areas, they will be analysed separately beginning with leagues with
self-management (tab. 28).
Table n°28: Independent league structural models

Association model with self-management Separate entity model
Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A (Italy) Ekstraklasa (Poland)
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Spain) Premier League (England)
Ligaverband (Germany) National Soccer League (South Africa)
Ligue de Football Professionnel (France) Premier League (Kenya)
Swiss Football League (Switzerland) Indonesia Soccer League (Indonesia)
Ukrainian Premier League (Ukraine) Major League Soccer (USA)
Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun (Cameroon) Professional Football Association of Jamaica (Jamaica)
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel (Senegal)
J. League (Japan)
Qatar Stars League (Qatar)
Liga MX (Mexico)
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Honduras)
Associación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Chile)
2.1. League executive committees
Concerning association model leagues with self-management, the number of

members in the executive committee varies from seven to twenty-five (tab.
29).
League internal governance 153
87
Table n°29: Number of members at league executive committees (association model with self-
management)
League Number of members
Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A (Italy) 11 (+ other members without vote)
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Spain) 17 (+ other members without vote)
Ligaverband (Germany) 9
Ligue de Football Professionnel (France) 25 (+ other members without vote)
Swiss Football League (Switzerland) 9
Ukrainian Premier League (Ukraine) Determined by the General Assembly
Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun (Cameroon) 13
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Professionnel (Senegal) N/A
J. League (Japan) 21
Qatar Stars League (Qatar) 5
Liga MX (Mexico) 15
Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Honduras) 10
Associación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Chile) 7
Among these members, the basic rule is to have a president, elected by the
general assembly, and other members who are club representatives, chosen by
their peers. This distribution is strictly followed by four leagues out of eleven
(Spain, Italy, Honduras and Chile). In Switzerland, SFL Executive Commit-
tee members are not direct club representatives but must be proposed by
clubs. In Germany, Ligaverband (top tier league) Executive Committee is
composed of club representatives and two members of DFL (a Ligaverband
subsidiary) Management Board, who are ex officio members.
In other cases, the distribution is completed by national association and
interest groups representatives (France, Cameroon and Japan). In these exam-
ples, national association representatives’ voting power is 8% in France, 15%
in Cameroon and 14% in Japan (fig. 8).
The interest groups represented are:
–– Players, educators, clubs directors, referees, clubs doctors, administrative
staff representatives and independent members (businessmen, lawyers and a
member of the Fondation du Football) in LFP Executive Committee
–– Players, coaches and referees in the LFPC (Cameroonian top tier
league)
–– Independent members (businessmen, researchers and auditors) in the
J. League (Japanese top tier league)
In two cases, Chile and Qatar, the appointment process is different from the
previous examples in that many of the roles across the league and national
association are shared by the same individual. In Chile, the Associación Na-
cional de Fútbol Profesional Executive Committee members are ex officio
members of the FFC Executive Committee. Indeed, the ANFP President is
automatically appointed FFC President, in the same process with the ANFP
General Secretary, while two ANFP Executive Committee members are ap-
pointed national association Executive Committee members. In Qatar, QSL
(Qatari top tier league) Chairman is also QFA President. Furthermore, two
members of QSL Executive Committee are also members of QFA Board.
In Ukraine, Executive Committee members are elected by the General
Assembly. The Ukrainian Premier League statutes do not stipulate if they
must be affiliated to any other football interest group.
Three league executive committees (Spain, Italy and France) include
members without voting rights. These members are either internal league
governing body members (Spain and Italy) or national association and inter-
est group representatives (France).
Figure n°8: Stakeholders representation in league executive committees (association model

with self-management)
100% 91%
80%
64%
60%
40% 36%
27% 27% 27%
20%
0%
League direct Clubs MA Interest groups Members Representation
representatives representatives representatives without vote not or only
(President, partly available
Chairman,
General
Secretary, etc.)
Moving to the second group, separate entity model leagues also have execu-
tive committees – also known as Board of Directors in most of these com-
panies – but these bodies generally include fewer members than association
model leagues (tab. 30). Furthermore, the shareholders of the company usu-
ally appoint a chairman/president and a CEO, who are responsible for the
day-to-day management of the league who are joined, in some cases, by other
89
members such as clubs chairmen/presidents (South Africa and Jamaica) or

national association direct members (Jamaica).
In Poland and England, the Ekstraklasa and Premier League Boards are each
composed of only two independent members with business backgrounds. In
South Africa, eight club representatives are included – the President of the league
and seven other members – and one independent member who acts as CEO.
Jamaica’s PFAJ is a specific case. As it is a joint venture company owned by
the Premier League Clubs Association and the JFF, the members of the board
are representatives from both organisations. Three members of the PLCA and
four members of the JFF constitute the PFAJ Board. The PFAJ President is a
PLCA representative.
Table n°30: Number of members at league executive committees (separate entity model)
League Number of members
Ekstraklasa (Poland) 2
Premier League (England) 2
Kenyan Premier League (Kenya) N/A
National Soccer League (South Africa) 9
Indonesia Super League (Indonesia) N/A
Major League Soccer (USA) N/A
Professional Football Association of Jamaica (Jamaica) 7
Only three categories of stakeholder are represented on the board of directors

for separate entity leagues: independent members (three cases), club repre-
sentatives (two cases) and national association representatives (one case).
Concerning both association and separate entity model leagues, the ex-
ecutive committee members’ terms of mandate usually vary from two to four
years. These mandates are normally renewable.
2.2. League executive powers
In separate entity model leagues, the board is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the league, as explained in English Premier League Articles
of Association:
47. Subject to the Memorandum and the Articles the affairs of the Company shall be
managed by the Board subject always to any directions from time to time given and
any policy resolved upon by the Members in General Meeting.
48. The Board shall:
48.1 manage the affairs of the Company including the operation of the League and
the operation and implementation of the Rules;
48.2 exercise all powers of the Company but subject always to such powers of su-
pervision and policy direction as the Members in General Meeting may from time
to time exercise or give;
48.3 take such executive steps as it considers necessary to give effect to any policy
resolved upon by the Members in General Meeting;
48.4 make such recommendations to the Members on such matters of importance
to the Company as it considers appropriate; and
48.5 subject to the provisions of the Articles and the Act, determine any and all mat-
ters of procedure to be followed by the Company.
49. The Board shall not in relation to any dealings relating to television, broadcast-
ing, sponsorship or like transactions or other matters materially affecting the com-
mercial interests of the Members enter into any contract or agreement or conduct
themselves in any way as would bind the Company to any contract or agreement
without the prior authority or approval by Resolution of the Members.
50. No alteration of the Memorandum or the Articles nor any direction of the Mem-
bers shall invalidate any prior act of the Board which would have been valid if that
alteration had not been made or that direction had not been given.
These articles, and particularly articles 47 and 49, demonstrate that board
decisions must not go against the interests of the members of the league.
In many separate entity structural models, the management of the league,
or at least a part of it, can be delegated to the league CEO. This is, for exam-
ple, the situation for NSL management, as shown in article 8.2. of the NSL
Constitution:
The Executive Committee will delegate some of its operational functions and powers to
the Chief Executive Officer.
In association model leagues with self-management, Executive Committees

have similar responsibilities to separate entity model leagues’ board. How-
ever, while the executive committee takes executive decisions relative to the
league, the execution of these decisions is in most cases entrusted to a single
person, often known as general director. Article 12.1. of the Lega Serie A
(Italian top tier league) presents some examples of the duties of the league
general director:
The General Director is the executive representative of the administrative and manage-
ment body of the Lega Serie A; he executes the legal outcomes of the superior Bodies of
the Lega Serie A, in accordance with his competences; he governs and administrates the
Offices of the Lega Serie A of which he is the hierarchical superior; he makes sure, from
the date of his appointment, to regulate the contractual relationships of the employees of
the Lega Serie A50.
Finally, in some instances, a governing body is created in order to respond

to urgent affairs in lieu of the executive committee. The members of this
body are less numerous than the Executive Committee members. This is for
example the case, with LFP Bureau, as explained in article 34 of LFP statutes:
Between Management Board meetings, the Bureau gets together at the request of the
President in order to adress urgent affairs, to run current affairs and study, if necessary, all
questions which must be submitted to the decision of the Management Board51.
Similar to national associations, a second crucial governing body for the

league is its general assembly. The next subsection describes who is repre-
sented in leagues’ general assemblies and their respective voting power.
2.3. League general assemblies
Concerning association model leagues with self-management, the general

assembly is usually composed of representatives from clubs belonging to
the league, as shown in the table below (tab. 31). In separate entity model
leagues, the general assembly is a meeting of the shareholders of the league.
It will then gather club representatives from the league and, in some cases,
a representative of the national association if the latter holds shares in the
league company.

Table n°31: League general assemblies
League Number of club representatives Other members
(and voting power)
Ekstraklasa (Poland) 16 clubs (1 vote each) National association representative (1 vote) and
Executive Committee members (without vote)
Lega Nazionale Professionisti 20 clubs (1 vote each) - League President and Vice-President,
Serie A (Italy) Executive Committee members, Collegio dei
Revisori Serie A and Consiglieri Federali eletti
in rappresentanza della Lega Serie A members
(all without vote);
- Future or past league clubs can take part in
the assembly but can only vote on matters
concerning their time as future or past
members of the league
Liga Nacional de Fútbol 20 Primera División clubs (1,1 League President (1 vote), General Secretary,
Profesional (Spain) vote each) and 22 Segunda General Director, national association President
División clubs (1 vote each) and league President’s guest (all without vote)
Ligaverband (Germany) 18 Bundesliga clubs and 18 2. None
Bundesliga clubs
Ligue de Football Professionnel 20 Ligue 1 clubs (3 votes each) Independent and honorary members (all
(France) and 20 Ligue 2 clubs (2 votes without vote)
each)
Premier League (England) 20 clubs (1 vote each) - League Chairman and CEO
- National association representative (without
vote)
Swiss Football League 10 Super League clubs and 10 League honorary members and Presidents,
(Switzerland) Challenge League clubs (1 vote Executive Committee members and senior
each) executives (all without vote)
Ukrainian Premier League 16 clubs (votes: N/A) League President (vote: N/A)
(Ukraine)
Kenyan Premier League (Kenya) 16 clubs (votes: N/A) National association President (votes: N/A)
Ligue de Football Professionnel 14 Elite One clubs (2 votes League President, national association President
du Cameroun (Cameroon) each) and 14 Elite Two clubs (1 and 3 national association representatives, 2
vote each) representatives of the players association, 2 of
the referees one and 2 of the coaches one (all
with 1 vote)
Ligue Sénégalaise de Football N/A N/A
Professionnel (Senegal)
National Soccer League (South 16 Premier Division clubs (10 Executive Committee members (1 vote each)
Africa) votes each) and 16 First Division
clubs (2 votes each)
Indonesia Super League N/A N/A
(Indonesia)
J. League (Japan) 18 Division 1 and 22 Division 2 None
clubs (votes: N/A)
Qatar Stars League (Qatar) N/A N/A
Liga MX (Mexico) N/A N/A
Liga Nacional de Fútbol 10 clubs (2 representatives with None
Profesional (Honduras) 1 vote each)
Major League Soccer (USA) N/A N/A
Professional Football 12 clubs (votes: N/A) None
Association of Jamaica (Jamaica)
Associación Nacional de Fútbol 18 Primera División clubs (2 None
Profesional (Chile) votes each) and 14 Primera B
clubs (1 vote each)
Among the fourteen general assemblies for which information was complete,
only the Ligaverband, J. League, LNFP (Spain), PFAJ and ANFP General
Assemblies include club representatives. On the other hand, ten have addi-
tional members. In nine cases, these members come from other league gov-
erning bodies or are league internal members (members of the league execu-
tive committee, president, general secretary, etc.). Generally, these members
do not have voting rights.
In three countries (Poland, Cameroon and Kenya), the national associa-
tion is represented in the league General Assembly. The representation of the
Polish and Kenyan association in their respective top tier league General As-
sembly is not surprising as they hold shares in the league company. In Spain,
the national association President can take part in the league General Assem-
bly but he is not entitled to vote. In England, the FA can attend the Premier
League General Assembly but does not have the right to vote as a result of
only holding a 1% ‘Special Share’ in the league. This is described in articles
7.3. of the Premier League Articles of Association:
The Special Shareholder shall have all the rights of a Member in relation to receiving notice
of, and attending and speaking at General Meetings and to receiving minutes of General
Meetings. The Special Shareholder shall have no right to vote at General Meetings.
In Jamaica, the national association is the majority shareholder of the league

company in the Executive Committee (four national association representa-
tives out of seven members) but not in the General Assembly, as the only
members are club representatives.
Finally, only the Ligue de Football Professionnel du Cameroun General
Assembly includes interest group representatives, with members of players,
referees and coaching associations permitted to attend.
2.4. League members admittance and removal mechanisms
Another very important criterion to be considered when it comes to analysing

internal league governance issues are the mechanisms regulating admittance
and removal. The admittance or removal of a league member can depend on
sporting or non-sporting criteria.
Concerning sporting criteria, football national championships usually use
the promotion/relegation system to select teams competing for each champi-
onship. In this system, the lower ranked clubs from a particular champion-
ship at the end of a season are relegated to the lower tier championship. In
order to replace them, the best teams from the lower level are promoted. The
number of relegated/promoted teams differs from one league to another.
Relegation or promotion from a championship to another does not neces-
sarily lead to a league membership change, as some leagues manage several di-
visions. For example, a French club being relegated from Ligue 1 (French top
tier championship) to Ligue 2 (French second tier championship) remains a
member of the LFP, as the LFP manages both championships. Nevertheless,
a club relegated from Ligue 2 to National (French third tier championship)
loses its membership to the LFP and becomes a member of the LFA, which is
entirely managed by French association.
The table below (tab. 32) shows, for each country surveyed, the highest
level at which promotion/relegation results in a league membership change.
Table n°32: Promotion/relegation rules between top tier leagues and the lower ones52
National Promoted to/ Promoted from/ Number Processes
association relegated from relegated to of clubs
rel./
prom.
England Premier League Football League - Premier League 3 bottom clubs relegated
Championship - Football League Championship 2 top clubs
3
(The Football promoted and a play-off between clubs placed
League) 3rd to 6th
France Ligue 2 (LFP) National (LFA-FFF) - Ligue 2 3 bottom clubs relegated
3 - National 3 top clubs promoted
Germany 2. Bundesliga 3. Liga (DFB) - Bundesliga 2 bottom teams relegated
(Ligaverband) - 3. Liga 2 top clubs promoted
2-3 - Play-offs between 2. Bundesliga 3rd from bottom
club and 3. Liga 3rd top club
Italy Lega Nazionale Lega Nazionale - Serie A 3 bottom clubs relegated
Professionisti Professionisti Serie B 3 - Serie B 2 top clubs promoted, play-offs between
Serie A clubs placed 3rd to 6th
Poland Ekstraklasa I Liga (PZPN) - Ekstraklasa 2 bottom clubs relegated
2 - I Liga 2 top clubs promoted
Spain Segunda Segunda División B - Segunda División bottom 4 clubs relegated
División (LNFA-RFEF) 4 - Play-offs between the 4 best clubs of each 4
(LNFP) Segunda División B groups (16 clubs in total)
Switzerland Challenge 1. Liga Promotion - Challenge League bottom club relegated
1
League (SFL) (Erste Liga) - 1. Liga Promotion top club promoted
Ukraine Ukrainian Ukrainian First - Ukrainian Premier League 2 bottom clubs
Premier League League (PFL) 2 relegated
- Ukrainian First League 2 top clubs promoted
Cameroon Elite two Regional - Elite two 3 bottom clubs relegated
(LFPC) championships 3 - Play-offs between the best regional
(FECAFOOT) championships clubs
52 Leagues with national association management are not included in the table as promo-
tion/relegation does not lead to a change of membership for the clubs.In brackets, the
name of the league managing the championship, as far as the league and the champion-
ship names differ.
National Promoted to/ Promoted from/ Number Processes
association relegated from relegated to of clubs
rel./
prom.
Kenya Kenyan FKF Division One - Kenyan Premier League 2 bottom clubs
Premier League (FKF) relegated
2 - Champion of each of the 2 FKF Division One
groups promoted
Senegal Ligue 2 (LFSP) National 1 - Bottom club of the 2 Ligue 2 groups relegated
(LFA-FSF) 2 - Play-offs between the 6 National 1 groups
champions, 2 best clubs promoted
South Africa National First SAFA Second - National First Division 2 bottom clubs relegated
Division (NSL) Division (SAFA) 2 - Play-offs between the 9 SAFA Second Division
groups champions, 2 best clubs promoted
Indonesia Premier Liga Indonesia First N/A
N/A
Division (ISL) Division (PSSI)
Japan J. League Japan Football - J. League Division 2 bottom club relegated
Division 2 League - Top Japan football League club promoted
1-2 - Play-offs between J. League Division 2 2nd from
bottom club and JFL 2nd top club
Qatar Qatar Stars Second Division - Qatar Stars League bottom club relegated
1
League League (QFA) - Second Division League top club promoted
Honduras Liga Nacional Liga Nacional de - Club with the poorest results over Liga Nacional
de Fútbol Ascenso de Fútbol Profesional Apertura and Clausura
Profesional 1 tournaments relegated
- Play-offs between Liga Nacional de Ascenso
Apertura and Clausura champions
Jamaica National Regional leagues - National Premier league 2 bottom clubs
Premier League (JFF) relegated
2
(PFAJ) - Play-offs between 4 regional leagues champions,
2 best clubs promoted
Mexico Liga MX Ascenso MX - Club with the poorest results over the Liga MX
six last tournaments relegated
1 - Play-offs between Ascenso MX Apertura and
Clausura champions, winner promoted
USA No promotion/relegation system
Chile Segunda Tercera División - Segunda División bottom club relegated
División (ANFA) 1 - Play-offs between the 2 top clubs of the 2
(ANFP) Tercera División groups, best club promoted
Promotion or relegation is the sporting reason for league membership to

change. Promotion or relegation can also have administrative, infrastructure,
legal and/or financial consequences for a club. For example, article 55 of the
Spanish LNFP statutes includes fifteen points on the non-sporting require-
ments to be fulfilled in order to become a member of the league. The first five
requirements are listed below:
1.- To complete the registration form, on the model established by the LIGA.
2.- To present the certificate sent by the Real Federación Española de Fútbol, which con-
firms that the team applying for the competition has achived the necessary sporting merits.
3.- To pay the registration fee and, regarding clubs promoted from the Segunda División
‘B’, the amount corresponding to the fixed fee established by the LIGA. The amount to
be paid will correspond to the set amount of each club or SAD in the assets of the LIGA.
4.- To satisfy the conditions concerning the sports infrastructures and services which have
been established by la LIGA in order to take part in the professional competitions, in
compliance with the Sports Law and the development dispositions.
5.- To present the accreditation certificate ensuring the ability to pay the tax and Social
Security obligations53.
If the club succeeds in fulfilling the requirements of the league, it obtains a

licence54. Article 9 of the Swiss Football League statutes stipulate that admit-
tance or removal of a member depends on the acquisition of the licence by
the latter:
1) Member status is acquired upon obtaining a licence.

2) It terminates with the relegation in an ASF section other than the SFL one, with the
definitive refusal of the licence or with its withdrawal for the end of a season55.
This article also shows that the loss of membership is not restricted to relega-
tion. A club can be removed from a league if it does not obtain a licence, even
if it fulfills all sporting requirements.
Other ways to be removed from a league for non-sporting reason include
a breach of league regulations, a lack of financial resources or following the
withdrawal of league membership. These reasons, and a few others, are exem-
plified in article 26 of the Hondurian LNFP statutes:
The affiliated clubs constituting the Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional shall lose their
affiliation for any of the following reasons:
a) On withdrawal of the affiliated club.
b) Upon dissolution of the affiliated club.
c) For not taking part to or withdrawing from an official competition for reasons not
attributable to the Liga.
d) On expulsion decreed by a Committee of the Liga due to severe fault against morals,
discipline, ethics and acceptable behaviour; and ratified by the Federation Congress.
e) For not fulfilling the obligations stipulated to the clubs in the Liga statutes.
f ) For economic insolvency duly confirmed by the Liga.

54 See section 3.5. for more details about club licences.
g) For severely breaching the statutes, regulations or decisions of the FENAFUTH,
CONCACAF, UNCAF and FIFA.
h) For relegation56.
If a club ceases to be a member of a league for non-sporting reasons, it is

replaced by the best ranked relegated club or by the highest ranked non-pro-
moted club from the lower level championship. In these cases, the promoted
club (for non-sporting reasons) must still fulfil all non-sporting requirements
to become a member of the league.
The admittance and removal of members can have the following conse-
quences on the organisation of the league:
–– A promoted club becomes a new member of the league if it fulfills all
sporting and non-sporting requirements. Furthermore, club representa-
tives gain the right to enter the league general assembly and, in some
cases, the national association’s. In some instances, they can also become
eligible to join league and national association executive committees.
–– A relegated club for sporting or non-sporting reasons loses its mem-
bership to the league. Therefore, the club is no longer represented in the
league governing bodies and, in some cases, in the national association’s.
However, this depends upon the composition of the national association
governing bodies (for example, all Norwegian clubs can attend the na-
tional association General Assembly while in Brazil only Série A clubs
may attend).
Moreover, if a club is relegated from a professional league to an amateur level
league, the club loses its professional status, as stipulated in article 102 of the
LFP regulations:
The clubs shall have professional status.

Only clubs with professional status are allowed to employ professional players.
[…]
When a club is sportively or administratively relegated to the Championnat National, it
loses its professional status57.
Usually, in this type of situation, professional clubs will have a transitory pe-
riod in order to adapt their statutes and functioning to the amateur level (for
example, two years in France and four in Switzerland).

Additionally, in separate entity model leagues, the admittance and remov-
al of members will have consequences for the distribution of shares, as clubs
are shareholders of the company managing the league. The transfer of shares
is regulated in article B.4. and B.5. of the English Premier League rules:
B.4. At the end of each Season the Board shall require each of the Clubs relegated in ac-
cordance with Rule C.11 to execute an instrument transferring its ordinary share in
the League to such of the 3 clubs promoted to the League from the Football League
as the Board directs.
B.5. Upon such share transfers being registered in accordance with the Articles each of
the promoted Clubs will become a member of the League.
The admittance and removal mechanisms for league members differ in closed
leagues. Unlike open leagues, closed leagues do not use the promotion/relega-
tion system. Among the thrity-two top tier leagues surveyed, only five were
found to be closed (Indian I-League, Singaporean S. League, Australian A-
League, USA’s MLS and New Zealand Premiership). Four (India, Singapore,
Australia and New Zealand) of these five cases are association model leagues
with national association management. This means that the admittance or
removal of members is a decision made by the national association. In the
USA, the decision concerning the admittance or removal of a club belongs
entirely to the league (MLS).
Clubs wishing to join a closed league must fulfill requirements similar to
those of an open league. However, concerning closed leagues, sporting cri-
teria are only of minor importance, as most newly admitted clubs are newly
founded. Even if the new league member is an already existing club, its pre-
vious sporting performances will not be the main criteria for entering the
league. For example, Montreal Impact joined MLS in 2012 after finishing
the previous NASL (USA second tier league) championship in seventh place
(out of eight teams). According to the MLS commissioner, the main criteria
for entering the league were as follows58:
–– Committed and engaged ownership
–– A comprehensive stadium plan
–– Demonstrated fan support for professional soccer in the market
–– Support from sponsors, television partners and other constituents
–– Geographic location
58 ‘MLS aims to add four teams by 2020’, http://m.goal.com, 31st of July 2013 (last con-
sultation: 8th of January 2014)
–– A strategic business plan for the launch and successful operation of
the club
Clubs can be removed from closed leagues due to financial or disciplinary
reasons, as seen with Gold Coast United and North Queensland Fury59 in the
Australian top tier A-League.
59 ‘A-League revokes Gold Coast licence’, http://www.heraldsun.com.au, 29th of February

2012, and ‘North Queensland Fury dropped from A-League after being found “too big
of a financial risk”’, http://www.foxsports.com.au, 1st of March 2011 (last consultation:
8th of January 2014)
166
167
Conclusion
This publication has presented a comparative account of the ways in which

the relationships between leagues and national associations are governed in
32 countries at global level. This analysis allowed us to illustrate, on one
hand, the diversity of the existing situations according to national context,
and on the other hand, to highlight emerging trends in football governance
throughout the world.
First of all, we classified the leagues surveyed according to three criteria:
their legal form, the level of the national association’s involvement in the
league management and the financial relationships with respect to the rel-
evant national association. This analysis shows that a standard governance
model does not exist. While some leagues present several similarities in these
three areas, no league governance model looks exactly like another one.
Some leagues which are enjoying sporting and economic success, such
as the English ones for example, tend to be taken as models by emerging
football territories. While still a minority, the separate entity model with a
higher degree of power and independence of leagues with respect to national
associations is thus gaining momentum. However, the distinctive features
encountered from one country to another show that leagues and national as-
sociations use ingenuity to find the most tailor-made way to govern football
in a country. This publication may help them to acquire a greater knowledge
of the type of solutions applied in other contexts and thus further develop
creativity in the area of governance for the good of the game.
It is also important to note that many leagues surveyed are entirely or at
least partially managed by their national association. This finding shows that
national associations are still very powerful in most of the countries surveyed.
The league and the national association are in fact never totally independent
one from the other. Even when the league looks very independent, particu-
larly in financial terms, the national association still has a word to say in some
of the decisions made by the league.
The report has also focused on the representation and voting power of
the league in the main governing bodies of the national association. This
analysis highlighted that the league often has only limited decisional power,
since its voting power does not exceed 30% in most of the national asso-
102 168
ciation’s governing bodies surveyed. Actually, amateur football – through its

own representatives, but also through regional associations and interest group
representatives – often has a voting power largely superior to the one of pro-
fessional football.
On the one hand, this seems logical since the large majority of football
players come from the amateur world. Demographically then, professional
football is largely outweighed by the amateur game. However, this does not
reflect the huge economic power of professional leagues in countries in which
football is a well-established sport commercially. Hence, it is not surprising
that the most developed leagues from a business perspective tend to intensify
their lobbying in order to make their voices better heard at national and in-
ternational level.
In regards to representation and voting power in the league’s governing
bodies, national associations – which represent the whole of the sport – are
marginalised at best. When the national association does not entirely man-
age the league, it is not often represented in the league’s internal governing
bodies. Furthermore, in many cases, the national association does not have
any voting power in the decision-making procedures concerning the govern-
ance of a top tier league. The question of representation and voting power
in both institutions is a complicated one and if not balanced properly may
constitute a problem for the management of the sport. Why? For the simple
reason that the different entities – national associations and leagues – may
not always share the same goals. Also in terms of perception, there can be
conflicts between one organisation – the national association – whose goal is
to develop the sport as a whole and another organisation – the league – whose
main objective is to manage the business and commercially grow the game.
Without an appropriate institutional framework and a good power balance
between national associations and leagues, such diverging views may bring
problems and, in the long term, prove to be very detrimental for the smooth
development of the game in a given country.
Finally, when observing many situations in which the national associa-
tions do not entirely govern football at national level, we can note that the
relationship between the national association and the league is a love-hate
one. They need each other for some matters, but at the same neither one not
wants the other to be too involved in the governance of its own organisation.
The balance is a delicate one indeed.
169
Bibliography
In addition to the various national association or league statutes and regula-

tions, the following documents were used to elaborate this report:
Amara, M., Henry, I., Liang, J. and Uchiumi, K., 2005: ‘The Governance of
Professional Soccer: five Case Studies – Algeria, China, England, France
and Japan’, European Journal of Sport Science, 5, 4: 189-206.
EPFL-Association of European Professional Football Leagues, 2011: EPFL
Report on European Professional Football Leagues Organization, Structure
and Governance Season 2009/10, Nyon: EPFL-Association of European
Professional Football Leagues.
FIFA, 2012: FIFA Member Associations Marketing Surveys, Zurich: FIFA.
Green, B. A., 2009: ‘Can Major League Soccer Survive another Antitrust
Challenge?’, Sweet & Maxwell’s International Sports Law Review, 9: 79-91.
Primault, D., Prouty, D. M., Ross, S. and Zimbalist, A., 2012: ‘Major League
Soccer: un nouveau modèle?’, Jurisport, 199: 27.
Southall, R. M. and Nagel, M. S., 2007: ‘Marketing Professional Soccer in
the United States: the Successes and Failures of the MLS and the WUSA’,
In Desbordes, M. (ed), Marketing and Football, an International Perspec-
tive, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 366-394.
UEFA, 2010: UEFA Survey on Professional League Organisations 2009/10,
Nyon: UEFA.
170
171
Appendices
Appendix 1: Legal form of leagues
Table n°33: Legal form of leagues

National Structure Association model Separate entity model
association
shreholding interest
national association
Without national
Self-management
Self-management
without financial
independence
independence
management
and financial
Minority of
Majority of
association
England Premier League X
England The Football League X
England Football Conference X
France Ligue de Football Professionnel X
France Ligue du Football Amateur X
Germany Ligaverband X
Germany 3. Liga X
Italy Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A X
Italy Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie B X
Italy Lega Pro X
Italy Lega Nazionale Dilettanti X
Norway Norsk Toppfotball X
Norway Divisjonforeningen X
Poland Ekstraklasa X
Poland Polish Football Association X
Spain Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional X
Spain Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado X
Switzerland Swiss Football League X
Switzerland Erste Liga X
Switzerland Amateur Liga X
Ukraine Ukrainian Premier League X
Ukraine Professional Football League of Ukraine X
Cameroon Ligue de Football Pro. du Cameroun X
Cape Verde Campeonato Nacional X
Ivory Coast Ligue Professionnelle X
Ivory Coast Ligue Amateur X
Kenya Kenyan Premier League X
National Structure Association model Separate entity model
association
Without national
Self-management
Self-management
without financial
independence
independence
management
and financial
Minority of
Majority of
association
Kenya FKF Division One X
Senegal Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Prof. X
Senegal Ligue de Football Amateur X
South Africa National Soccer League X
South Africa SAFA Second Division X
South Africa SAFA Regional League X
Tunisia Ligue National du Football Professionnel X
Tunisia Ligue National du Football Amateur X
Zambia Premier League X
Zambia Division One X
Australia A-League X
India I-League X
Indonesia Indonesia Super League X
Indonesia Liga Indonesia X
Japan J. League X
Japan Japan Football League X
Qatar Qatar Stars League X
Qatar Second Division League X
Singapore S. League X
Singapore National Football League X
Honduras Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional X
Honduras Liga Nacional de Ascenso X
Jamaica Prof. Football Association of Jamaica X
Mexico Liga MX X
Mexico Ascenso MX X
Mexico Segunda División X
Mexico Tercera División X
USA Major League Soccer X
USA North American Soccer League X
USA United Soccer Leagues X
USA United States Adult Soccer Association X
Brazil Campeonato Brasileiro X
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Pro. X
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Amateur X
Venezuela Federación Venezolana de Fútbol X
New Zealand National League X
Papua New Guinea National Soccer League X
Papua New Guinea Club Championship X
Appendices 107 173
Appendix 2: Documents governing the relationships between
leagues and national associations
Table n°34: Documents governing the relationships between leagues and national associations
National Structure
association statutes,
National sports law

Special agreements
association
constitution, etc.
constitution, etc.
League statutes,
No document
management)
regulations,
regulations,
association
(national
National
England Premier League X X X
England The Football League X X
England Football Conference X X
France Ligue de Football Professionnel X X X X
France Ligue du Football Amateur X
Germany Ligaverband X X X
Germany 3. Liga X
Italy Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A X X X X
Italy Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie B X X X X
Italy Lega Pro X X X X
Italy Lega Nazionale Dilettanti X X X X
Norway Norsk Toppfotball X
Norway Divisjonforeningen X
Poland Ekstraklasa X X X
Poland Polish Football Association X
Spain Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional X X X X
Spain Liga Nacional de Fútbol Aficionado X
Switzerland Swiss Football League X X X
Switzerland Erste Liga X X X
Switzerland Amateur Liga X X X
Ukraine Ukrainian Premier League X X X
Ukraine Professional Football League of Ukraine X X X
Cameroon Ligue de Football Pro. du Cameroun X X
Cape Verde Campeonato Nacional X
Ivory Coast Ligue Professionnelle X
Ivory Coast Ligue Amateur X
Kenya Kenyan Premier League X X
Kenya FKF Division One X
Senegal Ligue Sénégalaise de Football Pro.f. X X X
Senegal Ligue de Football Amateur X
South Africa National Soccer League X X
South Africa SAFA Second Division X
South Africa SAFA Regional League X
National Structure
association statutes,
National sports law

Special agreements
association
constitution, etc.
constitution, etc.
League statutes,
No document
management)
regulations,
regulations,
association
(national
National
Tunisia Ligue National du Football Professionnel X
Tunisia Ligue National du Football Amateur X
Zambia Premier League X
Zambia Division One X
Australia A-League X
India I-League X
Indonesia Indonesia Super League X X X
Indonesia Liga Indonesia X
Japan J. League X X
Japan Japan Football League X X
Qatar Qatar Stars League X X
Qatar Second Division League X
Singapore S. League X
Singapore National Football League X
Honduras Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional X X
Honduras Liga Nacional de Ascenso X X
Jamaica Prof. Football Association of Jamaica X X X
Mexico Liga MX X X
Mexico Ascenso MX X X
Mexico Segunda División X X
Mexico Tercera División X X
USA Major League Soccer X X
USA North American Soccer League X X
USA United Soccer Leagues X X
USA United States Adult Soccer Association X X
Brazil Campeonato Brasileiro X
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Pro. X X
Chile Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Amateur X X
Venezuela Federación Venezolana de Fútbol X
New Zealand National League X
Papua New Guinea National Soccer League X
Papua New Guinea Club Championship X
Appendices 109 175
Appendix 3: League representation in national association
general assemblies
Table n°35: League representation in national association general assemblies

National Structure Representation Voting Other stakeholders
association power
Chairman, Vice-chairman, Vice-presidents, divisions,
regional associations, The Football League (lower professional
8-9% league), other leagues (semi-professional and amateur),
England Premier League 8/100-110 interest groups (referees, league managers, professional
players, race equality, disability, supporters), independent
non-executive directors, General Secretary
Ligue de Football
France 43/254 37% Amateur delegation
Professionnel
Germany Ligaverband 90/259 35% Regional associations, national association internal members
Lega Nazionale
12% Other professional leagues (Serie B, Lega Pro), amateur
Italy Professionisti 20/288 delegation, interest groups (players, coaches, referees)
Serie A
Norway Norsk Toppfotball 32/300-400 18% Other clubs
27% Regional associations, I Liga clubs (second division), interest

Poland Ekstraklasa 32/118 groups (coaches, women's football, futsal)
President, regional associations, amateur clubs, interest
Liga Nacional de
Spain 30/180 17% groups (professional and non-professional players, referees,
Fútbol Profesional coaches, futsal)
Switzerland Swiss Football 28/101 27% Amateur delegation

League
Ukrainian Premier
Ukraine 3/147 2% Other national association members (N/A)
League
Ligue de Football Regional leagues, interest groups (youth football, women's
Cameroon Professionnel du 5/111 4% football, veteran and corporative football, futsal and beach
Cameroun soccer, players, coaches, referees, government delegates)
Cape Verde Campeonato 0/N/A 0% Regional associations

Nacional
Ivory Coast Ligue 68% Third division clubs, interest groups (former players, players,
76/162
Professionnelle coaches and technical staff, sport doctors, referees)
Kenyan Premier 20% FKF Division One (second division), regional associations,
Kenya 16/78
League interest groups (referees, players, coaches, women's football)
Ligue Sénégalaise Amateur clubs, regional leagues, ONCAV (Organisme
Senegal de Football 32/N/A N/A National de Coordination des Activités de Vacances), other
Professionnel members (N/A)
Regional associations, interest groups (football doctors,
coaches, school football, university football, army football,
South National Soccer 6/189 5% veteran football, corporative football, deaf football,
Africa League intellectually impaired football, futsal, supporters, players
associations)
Ligue National
Tunisia du Football 36/N/A N/A Amateur football, interest groups (beach soccer, futsal,
women's football)
Professionnel
Other clubs, regional associations, interest groups (players,
Zambia Premier League 16/N/A N/A referees, coaches, school football), Executive Committee
members, ex officio members (N/A)
Australia A-League 1/10 10% Regional associations
association power
India I-League 0/34 0% Regional associations
Top Premier Division clubs, top First Division clubs, top
Indonesia Super
Indonesia 18/108 17% Second Division clubs, top Third Division clubs, regional
League associations, interest groups (futsal, referees, players, coaches)
Japan J. League 0/47 0% Regional associations
Qatar Qatar Stars League N/A N/A Clubs, others (N/A)
10% Executive Committee members, ex officio members (General

Singapore S. League 3/23 Secretary, S. League CEO)
Regional associations, Liga Nacional de Ascenso (second
Liga Nacional de
Honduras 8/26 31% division), Executive Committee members and General
Fútbol Profesional Secretary
Prof. Football
Jamaica Association of 0/N/A 0% Regional associations
Jamaica
55% Other professional leagues (Ascenso MX, Segunda división,

Mexico Liga MX 5/15 Tercera división), amateur delegation
States associations, national associations, other professional
Major League N/A leagues, members of the board, past Presidents, life members,
USA N/A
Soccer national members, affiliates, interest groups (players, futsal,
disabled football), members of Adult and Youth Councils
Campeonato
Brazil 20/47 42% Regional associations
Brasileiro
Asociación
Chile Nacional de 9/21 47% President, amateur delegation, Director, General Secretary
Fútbol Profesional
Regional associations, Atletas integrantes de las Selecciones
26% Estadales y Nacionales, interest groups (profesionnal players,
Venezuela Primera División 18/69 referees, coaches), Executive Committee and standing
committees members
New National League 0/7 0% Regional associations
Zealand
Papua New National Soccer 0/N/A 0% Regional associations
Guinea League
Appendices 111 177
Appendix 4: League representation in national association
executive committees
Table n°36: League representation in national association executive committees

association power
The Football League (lower professional league), amateur
England Premier League 2/12 17% delegation, independent non-executive directors, Chairman,
General Secretary
President, Vice-president, Treasurer, General Secretary,
Ligue de Football
France 1/12 8% amateur football, other members elected by the General
Professionnel Assembly
Germany Ligaverband 16/56 N/A Regional associations, President, Board members
Lega Nazionale
14% Other leagues (Serie B, Lega Pro, LND), interest groups
Italy Professionisti 3/21 (players, coaches, referees), President
Serie A
Norway Norsk Toppfotball 1/8 12,5% Other members elected by the General Assembly
Poland Ekstraklasa 1/6 17% President, Vice-presidents
Amateur clubs, President, General Secretary, General
Liga Nacional de 15% Administrator, Juridical Department Director, regional
Spain 2/16
Fútbol Profesional associations, interest groups (professional and amateur
players, referees, coaches)
President, other leagues (Erste and Amateur Liga), General
Switzerland Swiss Football 2/7 29% Secretary, Communication Director, Technical Director,
League Head of A and U21 national teams
Ukrainian Premier
Ukraine 1/15 7% Other members elected by the General Assembly
League
Ligue de Football President, regional associations, players association
Cameroon Professionnel du 1/27 4% representative
Cameroun
Cape Verde Campeonato N/A/7 N/A N/A

Nacional
President, Vice-presidents, other members elected by the
Ivory Coast Ligue N/A/18 28% General Assembly (must include third division clubs and
Professionnelle interest groups)
Kenyan Premier Chairman, Vice-chairman, FKF Division One (second
Kenya 1/12 8%
League division), regional associations
President, Vice-presidents (representing amateur football,
regional leagues, Organisme National de Coordination
Ligue Sénégalaise
26% des Activités de Vacances, amateur clubs and international
Senegal de Football 6/23 players) amateur clubs, regional leagues, interest groups
Professionnel (women's football, beach soccer and futsal, referees, sport
doctors)
South National Soccer 10% President, Vice-presidents, regional associations and other
4/40
Africa League members elected by the General Assembly
Ligue National President, Vice-president, amateur football, General
Tunisia du Football 1/17 7% Secretary, Referee Commission President, National Technical
Professionnel Director and other members (N/A)
Zambia Premier League N/A/11 N/A N/A
Other members elected by the General Assembly and
Australia A-League 0/6-9 0% appointed by the national association Director
association power
President, Treasurer, regional associations, interest groups
India I-League 0/19 0% (‘Services Sports Control Board’ or ‘Railway Sports
Promotion Board’, by rotation, women's football)
Indonesia Super
Indonesia 0/15 0% President, Vice-presidents and other members (N/A)
League
President, Vice-presidents, General Secretary, regional
11% associations, interest groups (referees, coaches, women's
Japan J. League 3/27 football), other members (university professors, cultural
figures, lawyers, etc.)
Qatar Qatar Stars League 2/N/A N/A N/A
Singapore S. League 0/8 0% President, Vice-presidents, Treasurer, General Secretary
Liga Nacional de
Honduras N/A N/A N/A
Fútbol Profesional
Prof. Football
12% President, Vice-presidents, Treasurer, Executive Officer,
Jamaica Association of 4/34 regional associations, standing committees Chairmen
Jamaica
50% Other professional leagues (Ascenso MX, Segunda división,

Mexico Liga MX 1/5 Tercera división), amateur delegation
President, Vice-president, Past President, General Secretary,
Major League N/A Adult and Youth Councils, independent directors, players,
USA 2/N/A
Soccer ‘at large’ representatives (disabled football, futsal, national
affiliates, national associations, national members, others)
Campeonato
Brazil N/A/6 N/A N/A
Brasileiro
Asociación
Chile Nacional de 4/7 57% Amateur delegation
Fútbol Profesional
President, Vice-president, General Secretary, interest groups
Venezuela Primera División N/A/11 N/A (players, referees, coaches) and other members elected by the
General Assembly
New Members elected by the General Assembly and members
National League 0/7 0%
Zealand chosen by an independent body
Papua New National Soccer N/A President, Senior Vice-president, Junior Vice-president, other
N/A/7
Guinea League members elected by the General Assembly
Appendices 113 179
Appendix 5: Original texts
Page 68:
1. Le statut des joueurs et les modalités de leurs transferts sont régis par le Comité
Exécutif de la FIF conformément au Règlement du Statut et du Transfert des Joueurs
de la FIFA.
Page 75:
La CBF creará un tribunal arbitral para dirimir los litigios nacionales internas […] en las
materias que estén fuera de la competencia constitucionalmente atribuida a la Justicia
Deportiva.
Page 77:
La afiliación a la FMF se acreditará a través del Certificado de Afiliación, título que con-
cede la FMF a los Clubes Profesionales y a las Asociaciones Estatales del Sector Amateur,
una vez cumplidos los requisitos de afiliación marcados por el Estatuto Social, el presente
Reglamento y las disposiciones que resulten aplicables.
El Certificado de Afiliación, es un título intransferible, que no está sujeto a cotitularidad
o copropiedad, y el mismo no puede ser traspasado a otro bajo ninguna figura o negocio
jurídico celebrado por el titular.
Page 91:
Il Direttore Generale costituisce il vertice esecutivo dell’apparato amministrativo e gestion-

ale della Lega Serie A; porta in esecuzione le deliberazioni dei superiori Organi della Lega
Serie A, nel rispetto delle relative competenze; dirige e amministra gli Uffici della Lega
Serie A, verso i quali è in posizione di superiorità gerarchica;provvede, sin dall’assunzione,
a regolare contrattualmente i rapporticon i dipendenti della Lega Serie A.
Page 91:
Entre les réunions du Conseil d’administration, le Bureau se réunit sur convocation du

Président pour traiter des affaires urgentes, gérer les affaires courantes et étudier si néces-
saire, toutes questions qui devront être soumises à la décision du Conseil d’administration.
Pages 95 and 96:
1.- Formular solicitud de inscripción, conforme el modelo que a tal efecto tenga estable-
cido la LIGA.
2.- Presentar certificación expedida por la Real Federación Española de Fútbol, de ostentar
el equipo que pretenda inscribir en la competición profesional méritos deportivos para
poder acceder a la misma.
3.- Abonar la cuota de inscripción y para los clubes ascendidos de la Segunda División
‘B’ el importe correspondiente a la participación contable que tenga establecida la LIGA.
El importe a satisfacer ascenderá a la participación contable de cada club o SAD en el
patrimonio de la LIGA.
4.- Reunir los requisitos de instalaciones deportivas y servicios que reglamentariamente
tenga establecidos la LIGA para la participación en competiciones profesionales, en
cumplimiento de la Ley del Deporte y disposiciones de desarrollo.
5.- Presentar certificación acreditativa de estar al corriente de pago de sus obligaciones
fiscales y con la Seguridad Social.
Page 96:
1) La qualité de membre s’acquiert par l’obtention de la licence.

2) Elle prend fin par la relégation dans une autre section de l’ASF que la SFL, par le refus
définitif de la licence ou la renonciation à celle-ci pour la fin d’une saison.
Pages 96 and 97:
Los clubes afiliados que forman la Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional perderán su afil-
iación por cualquiera de las siguientes causas:
a) Por renuncia expresa del afiliado.
b) Por disolución del Club afiliado.
c) Por no participar o retirarse de una competencia oficial por razones no imputables a la
Liga.
d) Por expulsión decretada por una Asamblea de la Liga por faltas graves contra la moral,
disciplina, ética y buenas costumbres; y ratificado por el Congreso de la Federación.
e) Por dejar de cumplir con las obligaciones que señalen a los clubes los Estatutos de la
Liga.
f ) Por insolvencia económica debidamente comprobada por la Liga.
g) Violar gravemente los estatutos, reglamentos o las decisiones de la FENAFUTH,
CONCACAF, UNCAF y FIFA.
h) Por descenso.
Appendices 115 181
Page 97:
Les clubs doivent disposer du statut professionnel.

Seuls les clubs disposant du statut professionnel sont autorisés à employer des joueurs
professionnels.
[…]
Lorsqu’un club est relégué sportivement ou administrativement en Championnat Nation-
al, il perd le statut professionnel.
Editions CIES
National associations and leagues share 182
C. Boillat & R. Poli - Governance models across football associations and leagues
the responsibility of organising football
competitions. However, governance models
vary greatly at worldwide level. This book
analyses the various existing models of
governance. It also studies the role of league
representatives and other stakeholders in
the decision-making processes of national
associations.
In order to give a representative insight of the
situation at a global level, the analysis includes
thirty-two national associations spread across
the six continental confederations. The
GOVERNANCE MODELS
authors also highlight that the relationship
between national associations and leagues ACROSS FOOTBALL
can be a difficult one. As a matter of fact,
each stakeholder requires the support of ASSOCIATIONS AND LEAGUES
the other, but at the same time neither party
wants the other to be too involved in the
governance of its own organisation.
Camille Boillat and Raffaele Poli are
geographers by training. Camille is a scientific
collaborator at the International Centre for
Sport Studies (CIES), while Raffaele Poli is the
head of the CIES Football Observatory.
//TRUE COPY//
A research mandate
on behalf of
ANNEXURE A-9
183
MEDIA RELEASE

FIFA Strasse 20, P.O Box 8044 Zurich, Switzerland, +41 (0) 43 222 7777
FIFA suspends All India Football

Federation
English - Other languages (4)
184
Tuesday, 16 August 2022 at 10:00 (local time)
The Bureau of the FIFA Council has unanimously decided to suspend the All India
Football Federation (AIFF) with immediate effect due to undue influence from third
parties, which constitutes a serious violation of the FIFA Statutes.
The suspension will be lifted once an order to set up a committee of administrators

to assume the powers of the AIFF Executive Committee has been repealed and the
AIFF administration regains full control of the AIFF’s daily affairs.
The suspension means that the FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup 2022™, scheduled to
take place in India on 11-30 October 2022, cannot currently be held in India as
planned. FIFA is assessing the next steps with regard to the tournament and will refer
the matter to the Bureau of the Council if and when necessary. FIFA is in constant
constructive contact with the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports in India and is
hopeful that a positive outcome to the case may still be achieved.
FIFA PARTNERS
//TRUE COPY//
185
20th
20th August

Intervention - Bhaichung Bhutia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Intervention - Bhaichung Bhutia

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Intervention - Bhaichung Bhutia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. NO. OF 2022

IN THE MATTER OF:

All India Football Federation …PETITIONER

Rahul Mehra & Others … RESPONDENTS

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

Bhaichung Bhutia … APPLICANT

I.A. NO. OF 2022 : Application for Intervention

ADVOCATE FOR THE APPLICANT: PURNIMA KRISHNA

Sl. No. Particulars Page No.

1. Application seeking intervention along with 1-14

2. Annexure A-1: 15-17

3. Annexure A-2: 18-25

4. Annexure A-3: 26-37

6. Annexure A-5: 39-43

9. Annexure A-8: 46-182

10. Annexure A-9: 183-184

11. Vakalatnama 185

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

IN THE MATTER OF:

Rahul Mehra & Ors. … Respondents

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:-

1. The captioned Petition arises out of the interim order dated

31.10.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CM

Nos. 46919/2016 and 19815/2012, whereby, the High Court

quashed the results of the elections of the All India Football

Federation (“AIFF”) that had been declared on 21.12.2016, and

appointed Dr. S.Y. Quraishi, former Chief Election Commissioner

of India as the Administrator-cum-Returning Office for conduct of

the elections afresh.

2. This Hon’ble Court vide Order dated 10.11.2017, was pleased to

constitute a Committee of Administrators (“COA”) to redraft

AIFF’s Constitution in consonance with the National Sports Code,

2011 (“NSC”) and the Model Guidelines and ensuring the

constitution of the Executive Committee (“EC”) and for holding

True copy of the Order dated 10.11.2017 passed by this Hon’ble

Court is annexed as ANNEXURE A-1. (Pg. 15 to 17)

3. Thereafter, by way of Order dated 18.05.2022, this Hon’ble Court

permitted the COA to circulate the draft Constitution prepared by

it amongst all the parties and to submit a tabulated statement of

their suggestions/objections, along with the inputs of the COA on

the proposed suggestions/objections. The said tabulated statement

along with the revised version of the draft Constitution, after

accepting/rejecting/modifying the proposed changes, was filed by

the COA before this Hon’ble Court on 15.07.2022 (“Draft

True copy of the Order dated 18.05.2022 passed by this Hon’ble

Court is annexed as ANNEXURE A-2. (Pg. 18 to 25)

instant application seeking that the Draft Constitution finalized by

the COA be adopted as the new Constitution of the AIFF, as it

prioritizes and promotes the welfare and participation of current

the administration of Indian Football – over the vested interests

who have been in control of Indian Football for several decades.

03.08.2022 passed by this Hon’ble Court directing that the General

Body (“GB”) of AIFF comprise the 36-member electoral college

of eminent players, be given its full effect. It is submitted that equal

representation of the players in the GB with voting rights will give