1) An investigation was launched after NORM contamination above the acceptable limit was detected on equipment from well SR-149 during a workover. Monitoring of the internal joints, mandrels, and flowlines with multiple meters confirmed elevated NORM contamination from the producing formation.
2) Interviews with the rig manager revealed incorrect NORM monitoring and reporting was conducted during the workover. When properly monitored by the investigation team, all equipment showed contamination above limits.
3) The source of the NORM was determined to be the producing reservoir, not the gas lift line. Samples will be analyzed to identify specific radionuclides present in the scale.
1) An investigation was launched after NORM contamination above the acceptable limit was detected on equipment from well SR-149 during a workover. Monitoring of the internal joints, mandrels, and flowlines with multiple meters confirmed elevated NORM contamination from the producing formation.
2) Interviews with the rig manager revealed incorrect NORM monitoring and reporting was conducted during the workover. When properly monitored by the investigation team, all equipment showed contamination above limits.
3) The source of the NORM was determined to be the producing reservoir, not the gas lift line. Samples will be analyzed to identify specific radionuclides present in the scale.
1) An investigation was launched after NORM contamination above the acceptable limit was detected on equipment from well SR-149 during a workover. Monitoring of the internal joints, mandrels, and flowlines with multiple meters confirmed elevated NORM contamination from the producing formation.
2) Interviews with the rig manager revealed incorrect NORM monitoring and reporting was conducted during the workover. When properly monitored by the investigation team, all equipment showed contamination above limits.
3) The source of the NORM was determined to be the producing reservoir, not the gas lift line. Samples will be analyzed to identify specific radionuclides present in the scale.
1) An investigation was launched after NORM contamination above the acceptable limit was detected on equipment from well SR-149 during a workover. Monitoring of the internal joints, mandrels, and flowlines with multiple meters confirmed elevated NORM contamination from the producing formation.
2) Interviews with the rig manager revealed incorrect NORM monitoring and reporting was conducted during the workover. When properly monitored by the investigation team, all equipment showed contamination above limits.
3) The source of the NORM was determined to be the producing reservoir, not the gas lift line. Samples will be analyzed to identify specific radionuclides present in the scale.
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NORM Incident Report
REPORTING DEPARTMENT: UWN DATE OF INCIDENT : 21- 28 / 06 / 2010
TIME OF INCIDENT : INCIDENT LOCATION : Saih Rawl CONTROLLED BY : [ X ] PDO DSV on-site Well # SR-149 and SOS Inspection Yard Fahud [ X ] CONTRACTOR PDO INCIDENT SEVERITY (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5) : [ ] THIRD PARTY [ 1 ] REPUTATION [ 1 ] HARM TO PEOPLE [ 1 ] ENVIRONMENT [ 1 ] OVERALL Potential Risk Rating PER1E (Low) ACTIVITY AT TIME OF INCIDENT BROAD TYPE OF INCIDENT [X] Handling Hazardous Materials (NORM) [ X ] Unsafe Act/Condition PARTIES INVOLVED PDO DEPARTMENT / SECTION: UWN PDO CUSTODIAN : UWN2 CONTRACTOR 1 / CONTRACTOR 2: CONTRACT NUMBER: ?? 1: Shivani LLC 2. SOS TOTAL No. POTENTIALLY EXPOSED: 6 - 8
HOW THE INCIDENT OCCURRED
The Qarn Alam Asset requested a workover of SR-149 which utilises gas lift to aid oil production. This well has been in operation for over 8 years and according to EDM this was the first workover. The gas lift line and producing oil line were disconnected by the ODC contractor Galfar Engineering. The workover was performed by Shivani WPH21 who advised that NORM measurements were conducted as per the procedure and no NORM was detected above background. Consequently, all of the downhole equipment removed by the WPH was transported to the Special Oilfield Services (SOS) Inspection Yard in Fahud between 25 - 27 June for scrapping. On the 27 June SOS reported 56 of 83 joints delivered were NORM contaminated when monitored with a calibrated Mini 900/44A (Gamma & high energy beta) contamination meter. This was the last batch from the hoist and was delivered late Friday evening on 25 June 2010. NORM contamination between 20 -100 cps was detected on 56 joints whilst the 27 showed contamination below the PDO NORM limit. SOS notified the hoist and PDO representatives of the contamination which prompted this investigation. In total 300 joints, 5-6 gas lift mandrels and other associated equipment including the seal assembly were delivered to the SOS yard. The equipment were stockpiled in different locations within the yard awaiting monitoring and/or scrap. None of the joints or mandrels had end-caps/covers during the transport loading/unloading at the SOS yard as they were all scheduled for scrap. Once NORM was detected SOS staff end-capped and segregated confirmed joints with NORM tape. INVESTIGATION On Monday 28 June, PDO Snr Well Engineer Maarten Van Den Wildenberg UWN2, Field Superintendant Sean McGurk UWN19 and Industrial Hygienist Brett Young MSE32 visited the hoist and conducted an investigation with the Shivani Rig Manager (RM) George Runjan and PDO Drilling Supervisor (DSV) Ibrahim Al-Suleimani. During the interviews the RM advised he conducted monitoring of the Xmas tree, first five joints and every 5th joint to the assembly and did not detect NORM using either the Mini 900/44A or Mini 900/EP15 contamination meters. Monitoring at night was conducted by the NTP and there was some suggestion that the final 83 joints pulled at the night shift may not have been monitored by the NTP and the NORM was only present in the lower section of the well. This was subsequently found not to be true. The RM advised he did not monitor the internals of the flowlines and did not receive any indication of NORM from the ODC contractor who disconnected the flowlines or the Well handover Form provided and signed by the Asset. The PDO DSV advised he observed the RM take NORM measurements, but he did not take any measurements himself. The RM completed the NORM Survey Form Appendix A of SP1170 indicating internal and external results of 0.2 cps or background with both meters and NO NORM DETECTED. He arranged for the joints to be transported to the SOS yard for scrap. (Note: background with the Mini 900/44A is 2-3 cps) On-site, the RM was asked to demonstrate how he assesses the performance of the NORM meters and to describe how he performs the measurements. The meters were observed within calibration and appeared in good working condition. However the Mini 900/44A had two layers of polyethylene plastic to protect the aluminium window from damage during monitoring. During the interviews, the RM was able to correctly describe the definition of NORM, but could not describe how to measure background levels i.e. the inside of a clean joint of similar thickness. The RM advised he takes the cap off the Mini 900/EP15 (alpha / beta meter) which is mandatory as the cap will shield any particles giving false readings. The RM has undertaken NORM Awareness training with NTI and advised he received training on the WPH by the PDO trainer (Ibrahim Awad) in 2009. (Note: the RM, NTP, Driller and AD shall undertake NORM for Supervisors. All remaining crew shall undertake NORM Awareness as per SP1170 and SP1157 HSE Training requirements). The RM and investigation team utilised the WPH meters to monitor the internals of the flowlines. All other equipment had been removed to the SOS Yard. The oil line when monitored with the WPH Mini 900/44A and detected 15 cps with the heavy duty plastic on and 30 cps when removed. This immediately confirmed the presence of NORM above the PDO limits (5 cps above background). The oil line when monitored with the WPH Mini 900/EP15 (detects alpha/beta particles) read 30-50 cps, confirming the presence of NORM. In addition, the investigation team brought an alternate contamination meter - T201 (detects alpha/beta particles). This meter is comparable with the Mini 900/EP15 and it also confirmed the presence of NORM 30 cps which implies the hoists meters worked correctly. The background was 0.35 cps with the T201, similar to the Mini 900/EP15. Internal monitoring of the gas lift line using the WPH meters detected 2 cps with the Mini 900/44A and 0.5 cps with the Mini 900/EP15 which is equivalent to background. This indicated that the NORM contamination came from the producing reservoir. The change in detection from the Mini 900/44A with the thick plastic (15 cps) and no cover (30 cps) can be explained by the 2 layers of plastic shielding the high energy beta particles. The scale was very thin in the oil line, barely visible. If the scale had been thicker, the beta particles would have been self absorbed by the scale and only gamma photons would have been detected by the 44A probe. However as the scale was so thin, beta particles were able to escape and were detected by the 44A meter with the cover off. In the case of thin scales a more accurate measurement can be detected by removing the protective cap or plastic off or by using only thin plastic to protect the probe during monitoring. What can be certain is that the WPH RM, NTP or others who performed NORM measurements did not do so correctly. The erroneous results recorded on the NORM Report Form indicating 0.2 cps indicates that the RM and NTP do not know how to correctly monitor for NORM and how to interpret results. The observed monitoring technique of the RM to monitor the internals of the flowlines was poor. The RM did not orientate the probe towards the scale and was observed placing it straight in which may underreport contamination. Whilst the DSV advises he witnessed some NORM measurements taken, he too was not competent to verify if the monitoring was performed correctly. SOS YARD INVESTIGATION On 28 June UWN19 and MSE32 visited the SOS yard. NORM measurements were conducted on the interior of the joints removed from SR-149 using both the Mini 900/44A and T201 as SOS does not have an equivalent Mini 900/EP15. From the final 83 joints delivered by the hoist were monitored by SOS, it was reported that only 56 were contaminated above the PDO Limit i.e. 5 cps above background. Monitoring conducted in the presence of the investigation team showed all joints were contaminated approve 20 – 100 cps. The SOS staff were taking the readings to casually and were not orientating the probe window towards the scale. When monitored with the T201, the joints measured 30 cps confirming NORM contamination. SOS were requested to collect the gas lift mandrels and other supporting down hole equipment including the seal assembly. The equipment was monitored internally with the Mini 900/44A and T201 and all showed elevated NORM contamination above the PDO acceptable limits. Internal measurements of the mandrels showed 40-90 cps with the T201 and background externally. This further supported that the gas flowing down the annulus, into mandrels to lift the oil was not NORM contaminated. If this was the case, the gas flowline and exterior of the joints and mandrels would have tested positive for lead-210 with the T201. What was observe was that some joints had thin black scale which was broken in to approx 1 cm flakes whilst the mandrels had a thicker observable scale. Photos were taken of scale and samples will be collected once the joints reach the Bahja NORM yard for analysis to confirm the Radium- 226, Radium-228 and Lead-210 activity. There was some suspicion or concerns raised that when the joints are wet as during a workover, the readings are not as accurate owing to shielding of the water/oil giving false negative results. Dirty water was splashed over 3 joints. The readings with both the Mini 90044A and T201 both showed NORM contamination indicting that wet pipes or joints if NORM contaminated will still be detected by these meters as the gammas will penetrate the water. The Beta particles should be shielded from thick scales and any detection would be predominately gamma, however when wetted on thin scales, both meters detected contamination comparable to dry scales dispelling the above concerns. ODC CONTRACTOR GALFAR ENGINEERING The ODC contractor did not perform NORM monitoring of the gas lift and production flowlines (externally and internally) when disconnecting them from the Xmas tree. Had monitoring been performed the ODC Contractor would have detected NORM in the oil producing line (30-50 cps) which would have classified the well as NORM contaminated. Exposure to NORM scales through inhalation/ingestion would have been minimal as the scale was very thin and fixed to the spools. Monitoring on site on the 29 June showed the oil line from the Xmas tree to the choke and ESD line as contaminated. The gas line did not indicate NORM contamination. SP1170 requires monitoring for NORM of all equipment that has conveyed or stored production fluids and if potential for inhalation of ingestion exists, workers shall wear NORM PPE. CONCLUSIONS The ODC Contractor did not take into consideration any NORM precautions. The WPH RM and NTP did not monitor the well in accordance with SP1170 or the NORM Guideline MSE.24 Precautions for Well Re-Entry. The NORM meters provided by the hoist were in calibration date and in working condition. Placing the two layers of thick plastic over the 44A probe shielded some beta particles but not to background levels as reported by the WPH. Had the EP15 probe been used correctly it would also have detected the presence of NORM. OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVEMENTS PDO 1. The Asset Production Supervisor (Responsible Supervisor) did not thoroughly review the ODC Contractor Job HSE Plan and identify the need to perform external and internal NORM measurements of the flowlines. Recommendations: 1a. The ODC Contractor, Galfar Engineering shall be informed by the Contract Holder that NORM precautions including measurements shall be included during all flowlines to Xmas tree disconnections. The CH and ODC Contractor shall develop a plan to include NORM training of Galfar ODC staff, providing NORM meters, or PDO providing in the interim, provision of PPE and providing NORM monitoring results to the Asset. Note: Likewise if the WPH removes the flowlines, it shall monitor them for NORM as this represents the first opportunity to detect NORM. 1b. All Production Supervisors shall undergo the NORM Supervisors Course to recognise where NORM may occur and the precautions to follow in the PtW. 2. The Asset prior to handing over the well to the Hoist Contractor did not identify NORM in the Well Handover Form. This was left blank. The Asset is responsible for advising/reporting all HSE risks associated with a well including high pressure, H2S, NORM etc. As this was the first workover of this well, no prior NORM results exists, however the Asset has not identified if similar wells in the same reservoir which underwent a recent workover were NORM contaminated. This may have given a pre-warning to the WPH and DSV to be more vigilant. Recommendations: 2a. The Asset (Production Supervisor/Operator) shall obtain the NORM results from the ODC contractor once the flowline(s) have been disconnected. In addition, NORM results from previous workovers or interventions shall be used to predict if NORM is likely to occur in the well prior to being worked over. The PT can include this data in the well proposal. The NORM results shall be entered in the Well Handover Form by the Asset Production Supervisor/Responsible Authority prior to handover to the WPH or other service provider. 2b. The Asset shall place NORM contaminated labels on well SR-149 and flowlines. The highest NORM readings shall be entered into EDM and the Assets NORM Spreadsheets shall be updated. 3. The Drilling Report requires the Hoist to monitor for NORM. The Drilling Report is explicit about what to monitor and advises to monitor the Xmas tree, hanger, first 5 joints and every 5 joints from then on unless NORM is detected. However, it does not advise to monitor the internals of the flowline(s) which would have indicated NORM at the outset. If the RM, NTP and DSV had referred to the Flow Diagram in MSE.24 Radiological Safety Precautions for Well Re-Entry in the NORM Manual, it mandates this requirement. Recommendations: 3a. Senior Well Engineers to include a line in the Drilling Report for the hoist to refer to the ODC contractors NORM result and to conduct their own NORM readings of the internals of the flowlines. The DSV shall verify NORM readings are conducted of the internals of the flowlines in accordance with SP1170 and NORM Guideline MSE.24. WPH Recommendations: 4. The hoist can place a thin layer of plastic over the meter to protect the Mini 900/44A probe and shall not use two layers of thick plastic. No cover or cap shall be placed on the Mini 900/EP15. 5. Shivani shall develop a plan to train their staff for NORM as per SP1170 and SP1157 i.e. including NORM Awareness (Crew), NORM for Supervisors (RM NTP, A, AD) and NORM Meter Users (RM NTP, A, AD). SOS Recommendations: 6. Nominated NORM Meter users shall undergo the new NORM Meter training course when available through NTI. 7. SOS shall be provided both the 2 x Mini 900/44A and 2x Mini 900/EP15 meters 8. All the NORM joints from SR-149 shall be end capped. The Mandrels shall have 200um plastic taped over the open ends. All the equipment shall be itemised, recorded in Appendix B of SP1170 and transported to the Bahja NORM Yard for decontamination.
COST INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT (US$) : < 10,000