G.R. No.

180282               April 11, 2011 In a resolution7 dated May 12, 2004, the RTC denied
respondent’s motion to dismiss and required the latter to
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, answer petitioners’ complaint.
and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, Petitioners, 
vs. In his Answer,8 respondent denied that he allowed
PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent. anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway. He stated
that petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to
DECISION expediency and not necessity. He also maintained
that there is an existing easement of right of way
available to petitioners granted by the Spouses
NACHURA, J.:
Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another
easement over respondent’s property.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
In an Order9 dated July 6, 2005, the RTC declared that
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated January 31, 2007
respondent’s answer failed to tender an issue, and opted
and Resolution2 dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV
to render judgment on the pleadings and thus deemed
No. 85471. The assailed Decision reversed and set
the case submitted for decision.
aside the July 15, 2005 decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No.
12581-14; while the assailed Resolution denied the On July 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision10 in
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners Crispin favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which
Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie reads, as follows:
Dichoso Pe Benito.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as hereby rendered, as follows:
follows:
1. granting plaintiffs a right of way over an area
On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for of 54 square meters more or less over Lot 01
Easement of Right of Way4 against respondent owned by defendant Patrocinio L. [Marcos]
Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners appearing in the Laoag City Assessor’s sketch
alleged that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the (Annex A) found on page 28 of the record of the
Cadastral Survey of Laoag City, covered by Transfer case;
Certificate of Title No. T-31219; while respondent is the
owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no access to a 2. ordering plaintiffs to pay defendant the
public road to and from their property, they claimed amount of ₱54,000.00 as proper indemnity; and
to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the
road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the 3. ordering the Register of Deeds of Laoag City
passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners to duly annotate this right of way on defendant’s
have been granted another passageway by the spouses title to the property.
Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners of
another adjacent lot, designated as Lot No. 21559-B, the SO ORDERED.11
former instituted the complaint before the RTC and
prayed that:
The RTC found that petitioners adequately
established the requisites to justify an easement of
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650
Court that judgment be rendered: of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise declared
petitioners in good faith as they expressed their
1. Granting the plaintiffs’ right of way over an willingness to pay proper indemnity.12
area of 54 square meters more or less of Lot 01
by paying the defendant the amount of On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
₱54,000.00, and that the right be annotated on decision and consequently dismissed petitioners’
defendant’s title; complaint. Considering that a right of way had
already been granted by the (other) servient estate,
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs designated as Lot No. 21559-B and owned by the
the sum of ₱30,000.00 as damages for Spouses Arce, the appellate court concluded that there
attorney’s fees and costs of suit; is no need to establish an easement over
respondent’s property. The CA explained that, while
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are the alternative route through the property of the
likewise sought.5 Spouses Arce is longer and circuitous, said access
road is adequate. It emphasized that the convenience
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent moved6 for the of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause grant of compulsory right of way. Thus, the opening
of action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate of another passageway is unjustified.13
of non-forum shopping.
Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court, raising
During the hearing on respondent’s motion to dismiss, the following issues:
the parties agreed that an ocular inspection of the
subject properties be conducted. After the inspection, I.
the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers. CAN PETITIONERS BE ENTITLED TO A
GRANT OF LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY FROM THEIR LANDLOCKED
PROPERTY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF
 PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH IS THE The conferment of a legal easement of right of way
SHORTEST ROUTE IN GOING TO AND FROM is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
THEIR PROPERTY TO THE PUBLIC STREET Code, quoted below for easy reference:16
AND WHERE THEY USED TO PASS?
Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a
II. real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
CAN RESPONDENT REFUSE TO GRANT A persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
RIGHT OF WAY ON THE DESIRED is entitled to demand a right of way through the
PASSAGEWAY WHICH HE CLOSED SINCE neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
THERE IS ANOTHER PASSAGEWAY WHICH indemnity.
IS MORE CIRCUITOUS AND BURDENSOME
AND IS BELATEDLY OFFERED UNTO Should this easement be established in such a manner
PETITIONERS? that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
III. indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate.
CAN PETITIONERS BE COMPELLED TO
AVAIL OF A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF ARCE In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
WHICH WAS BELATEDLY OFFERED BUT passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by
HAS BEEN FORECLOSED BY THE BANK AND others and for the gathering of its crops through the
WHEREIN THE LATTER IS NOT A PARTY TO servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity
THE CASE?14 shall consist in the payment of the damages caused by
such encumbrance.
The petition is without merit.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought before it from the CA by virtue of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be
errors of law. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
upon this Court. There are, however, recognized estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the
following requisites should be met:
(2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; 1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;

2. There is payment of proper indemnity;

(4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; and
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

4. The right of way claimed is at the point least

(6) when, in making its findings, the Court of
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or
consistent with this rule, where the distance from
its findings are contrary to the admissions of
the dominant estate to a public highway may be
both the appellant and the appellee;
the shortest.17
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
Petitioners may be correct in the theoretical reading of
trial court;
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, but they
nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to
(8) when the findings are conclusions without satisfy the above-enumerated requirements.18
citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when
considered with reference to the obligations imposed on
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, restriction on the property rights of the servient owner
are not disputed by the respondent; and and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the
servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing
the supposed absence of evidence and evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his
contradicted by the evidence on record.15 claim for easement of right of way may be
granted.19 Petitioners failed in this regard.
The present case falls under the 7th exception, as the
RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact and Admittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way
conclusions of law. through the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses
Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going
to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is the dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis
an existing outlet to and from the public road. for the easement.25

However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
circuitous, and they have to pass through other lots DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January
owned by different owners before they could get to the 31, 2007 and Resolution dated October 23, 2007 in CA-
highway. We find petitioners’ concept of what is G.R. CV No. 85471 are AFFIRMED.
"adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-
entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition SO ORDERED.
of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not
fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience
for the dominant estate is not what is required by
law as the basis of setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be
satisfied without imposing the easement, the same
should not be imposed.20

We quote with approval the CA’s observations in this

wise:

As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right of way

through the adjacent estate of Spouses Arce before the
complaint below was even filed. [Respondent] alleged
that this right of way is being used by the other estates
which are similarly situated as [petitioners]. [Petitioners]
do not dispute this fact. There is also a reason to believe
that this right of way is Spouses Arce’s outlet to a public
road since their property, as it appears from the Sketch
Map, is also surrounded by other estates. The fact that
Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of way through
respondent’s property, although an opening on the
latter’s property is undoubtedly the most direct and
shortest distance to P. Gomez St. from the former’s
property, bolsters our conviction that they have adequate
outlet to the highway which they are now likewise
making available to [petitioners].

The convenience of the dominant estate has never been

the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of
way.1âwphi1 To be sure, the true standard for the
grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when
there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case,
even when the said outlet, for one reason or another,
be inconvenient, the need to open up another
servitude is entirely unjustified.21

Thus, in Cristobal v. CA,22 the Court disallowed the

easement prayed for because an outlet already exists
which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners’
property and which is connected to a private road about
five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn,
leads to Ma. Elena Street, which is about 2.5 meters
wide, and finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was
determined by the Court to be sufficient for the needs of
the dominant estate.

Also in Floro v. Llenado,23 we refused to impose a right

of way over petitioner’s property although private
respondent’s alternative route was admittedly
inconvenient because he had to traverse several
ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different
persons, not to mention that said passage is impassable
during the rainy season.

And in Ramos v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,24 this Court

refused to grant the easement prayed for even if
petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other
owners, as temporary ingress and egress, which lots
were grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to
flood and mud because such grant would run counter to
the prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for
G.R. No. 152319               October 28, 2009 donees, except TCT No. 40044, which remained in his
name. These new TCTs were annotated at the back of
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE, namely: OCT No. 7036.5
CONCESA LIMENSE, Surviving Spouse; and
DANILO and JOSELITO, both surnamed Limense, TCT No. 40043, which covered Lot No. 12-C, was
children, Petitioners,  issued in the name of its co-owners Catalina Lozada,
vs. married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married to
RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESTITUTO RAMOS, Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco
VIRGILIO DIAZ, IRENEO RAMOS, BENJAMIN Ramos. It covered an area of 68.60 square meters, more
RAMOS, WALDYTRUDES RAMOS-BASILIO, or less, was bounded on the northeast by Lot No. 12-A,
TRINIDAD RAMOS-BRAVO, PAZ RAMOS-PASCUA, on the southwest by Calle Beata, and on the northwest
FELICISIMA RAMOS-REYES, and JACINTA by Lot No. 12-D of the subdivision plan. In 1932,
RAMOS, Respondents. respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their
residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No.
DECISION 12-C.

PERALTA, J., On May 16, 1969, TCT No. 968866 was issued in the

name of Joaquin Limense covering the very same area
of Lot No. 12-C.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, On October 1, 1981, Joaquin Limense secured a
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 affirming in toto the building permit for the construction of a hollow block
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid
15, dated September 21, 1990 in Civil Case No. 83- property and the adjacent parcel of land located at 2759
16128. Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila, designated as Lot No.
12-D, which was being occupied by respondents. The
fence, however, could not be constructed because a
The antecedent facts are as follows:
substantial portion of respondents' residential building in
Lot No. 12-D encroached upon portions of Joaquin
Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel Limense's property in Lot No. 12-C.
of land identified as Lot No. 12, Block No. 1074 of the
cadastral survey of the City of Manila covered by
Joaquin Limense demanded the removal of the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7036 issued at the
encroached area; however, respondent ignored both oral
City of Manila on June 14, 1927,3 containing an area of
and written demands. The parties failed to amicably
873.80 square meters, more or less, located in Beata
settle the differences between them despite referral to
Street, Pandacan, Manila. 
the barangay. Thus, on March 9, 1983, Joaquin
Limense, duly represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Dalmacio Lozada subdivided his property into five (5) Teofista L. Reyes, instituted a Complaint7 against
lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E. respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Through a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1932,4 he Manila, Branch 15, for removal of obstruction and
donated the subdivided lots to his daughters, namely: damages.
Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and Felicidad, all surnamed
Lozada. The Deed of Donation was registered with the
Joaquin Limense prayed that the RTC issue an order
office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on March 15,
directing respondents, jointly and severally, to remove
1932.
the portion which illegally encroached upon his property
on Lot No. 12-C and, likewise, prayed for the payment of
Under the said Deed of Donation, the lots were damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
adjudicated to Dalmacio's daughters in the following
manner: 
Respondents, on the other hand, averred in their
Answer8 that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco
a. Lot No. 12-A in favor of Isabel Lozada, Ramos,9who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud
married to Isaac Limense; Lozada, one of the daughters of Dalmacio Lozada, the
original owner of Lot No. 12. After subdividing the said
b. Lot No. 12-B in favor of Catalina Lozada, lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of
married to Sotero Natividad;  his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad;
Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to
c. Lot No. 12-C in favor of Catalina Lozada, Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco
married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No.
married to Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or
married to Francisco Ramos, in equal parts; common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since
1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not
d. Lot No. 12-D in favor of Salud Lozada, be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing
married to Francisco Ramos; and damage and prejudice to respondents.

e. Lot No. 12-E in favor of Isabel Lozada, After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a
married to Isaac Limense, and Felicidad Lozada, Decision10 dated September 21, 1990 dismissing the
married to Galicano Centeno.  complaint of Joaquin Limense. It ruled that an apparent
easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents.
Pertinent portions of the decision read as follows:
By virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Dalmacio
Lozada, OCT No. 7036, which was registered in his
name, was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer The Court finds that an apparent easement of right of
Certificates of Title (TCTs) bearing Nos. 40041, 40042, way exists in favor of the defendants under Article 624 of
40043, 40044, and 40045 were issued in favor of the the Civil Code. It cannot be denied that there is an alley
which shows its existence. It is admitted that this alley Respondents allege that it was possible that TCT No.
was established by the original owner of Lot 12 and that 96886, in the name of Joaquin Limense, was obtained
in dividing his property, the alley established by him thru fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of
continued to be used actively and passively as such. documents because the donees of said property could
Even when the division of the property occurred, the not possibly execute any valid transfer of title to Joaquin
non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the Limense, as they were already dead prior to the
corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in 1969. Respondents
alley made to disappear before the issuance of said further allege that petitioners failed to produce proof
titles. substantiating the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in the
name of Joaquin Limense. 
The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot
(12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot could Apparently, respondents are questioning the legality of
serve no other purpose than as an alley. That is why TCT No. 96886, an issue that this Court cannot pass
even after he acquired it in 1969, the lot continued to be upon in the present case. It is a rule that the validity of a
used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally.15 Section 48
lots as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 provides that:
of way was therefore known to plaintiff who must respect
the same in spite of the fact that his transfer certificate of [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
title does not mention the lot of defendants as among attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
those listed therein as entitled to such right of way. It is except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
an established principle that actual notice or knowledge
is as binding as registration.11 In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC
against respondents was an action for removal of
Aggrieved by said decision, Joaquin Limense filed a obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the
notice of appeal. The records of the case were defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been
transmitted to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial
pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin Limense proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the
died in 1999.12 nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

The CA, Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589, in Further, it has been held that a certificate of title, once
its Decision13 dated December 20, 2001 dismissed the registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered,
appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the
Frustrated by this turn of events, petitioners, as surviving reliance on registered titles would be lost. The title
heirs of Joaquin Limense, elevated the case to this Court became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse
via a Petition for Review on Certiorari14 raising the of one year from the time of its registration and issuance.
following issues: Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "upon the expiration
of said period of one year, the decree of registration and
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any
APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF case may pursue his remedy by action for damages
JURISDICTION, IN HOLDING, LIKE THE TRIAL against the applicant or other persons responsible for
COURT DID, THAT RESPONDENTS' LOT 12-D the fraud."16 It has, therefore, become an ancient rule
HAS AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it
OVER JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C? was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.17In the present
case, TCT No. 96886 was registered in 1969 and
2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF
respondents never instituted any direct proceeding or
APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF
action to assail Joaquin Limense's title. 
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, IN FAILING TO HOLD, LIKE
THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT THE Additionally, an examination of TCT No. 40043 would
PROTRUDING PORTIONS OF readily show that there is an annotation that it has
RESPONDENTS' HOUSE ON LOT 12-D been "CANCELLED."18  A reading of TCT No. 96886
EXTENDING INTO JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT would also reveal that said title is a transfer from TCT
12-C CONSTITUTE A NUISANCE AND, AS No. 4886619and not TCT 40043. Thus, it is possible that
SUCH, SHOULD BE REMOVED? there was a series of transfers effected from TCT No.
40043 prior to the issuance of TCT No. 96886. Hence,
respondents' position that the issuance of TCT No.
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that since Lot
96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense is impossible,
No. 12-C was covered by two TCT's, i.e., TCT Nos.
because the registered owners of TCT No. 40043 were
40043 and 96886, and there was no evidence on record
already dead prior to 1969 and could not have
to show how Joaquin Limense was able to secure
transferred the property to Joaquin Limense, cannot be
another title over an already titled property, then one of
taken as proof that TCT No. 96886 was obtained
these titles must be of dubious origin. According to the
through fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of
CA, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin
documents. 
Limense, was spurious because the Lozada sisters
never disposed of the said property covered by TCT No.
40043. The CA further ruled that a co-ownership existed Findings of fact of the CA, although generally deemed
over Lot No. 12-C between petitioners and respondents. conclusive, may admit review by this Court if the CA
Petitioners countered that TCT No. 96886, being the failed to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly
only and best legitimate proof of ownership over Lot No. considered, would justify a different conclusion, and if
12-C, must prevail over TCT No. 40043. the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts.20 As with the present case, the
CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious
origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have been Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes,
disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is testified that respondents and several other residents in
improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. the area have been using the alley to reach Beata Street
96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the since 1932. Thus:
best proof of Joaquin Limense’s ownership over Lot No.
12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that respondents and Atty. Manuel B. Tomacruz:
petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now
registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.  Q: Mrs. Witness, by virtue of that Deed of
Donation you claim that titles were issued to the
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered children of Dalmacio Lozada namely Salud
owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may Lozada, Catalina Lozada and Isabel Lozada, is
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of that right?
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted A: Yes, sir.
thereon.21
Q: And after the said property was adjudicated
However, although the owner of the property has the to his said children the latter constructed their
right to enclose or fence his property, he must respect houses on their lots.
servitudes constituted thereon. The question now is
whether respondents are entitled to an easement of right
of way. A: Yes, sir.

Petitioners contend that respondents are not entitled to Q: As a matter of fact, the herein defendants
an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, because have constructed their houses on the premises
their Lot No. 12-D is not duly annotated at the back of alloted to them since the year 1932?
TCT No. 96886 which would entitle them to enjoy the
easement, unlike Lot Nos. 12-A-1, 12-A-2, 12-A-3, 12-A- A: Yes, sir, they were able to construct their
4, 12-A-5, and 12-A-6. Respondents, on the other hand, house fronting Beata Street.
allege that they are entitled to an easement of right of
way over Lot No. 12-C, which has been continuously Q: And that house they have constructed on
used as an alley by the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada, the their lot in 1932 is still existing today?
residents in the area and the public in general from 1932
up to the present. Since petitioners are fully aware of the A: Yes, sir and they still used the alley in
long existence of the said alley or easement of right of question and they are supposed to use Beata
way, they are bound to respect the same. Street but they are not using Beata Street.

As defined, an easement is a real right on another's Q: They are using the alley?
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner
of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
A: Yes, sir, they are using the alley and they do
somebody else to do or something to be done on his
not pass through Beata Street.
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.22

Q: And they have been using the alley since

Easements may be continuous or discontinuous,
1932 up to the present?
apparent or non-apparent.

A: Yes, sir they have been using the alley since

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or
that time. That was their mistake and they
may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of
should be using Beata Street because they are
man. Discontinuous easements are those which are
fronting Beata Strret.
used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known
and are continually kept in view by external signs that Q: As a matter of fact, it is not only herein
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same. Non- defendants who have been using that alley since
apparent easements are those which show no external 1932 up to the present?
indication of their existence.23
A: Yes, sir they are using the alley up to now.
In the present case, the easement of right of way is
discontinuous and apparent. It is discontinuous, as the Q: As a matter of fact, in this picture marked as
use depends upon the acts of respondents and other Exh. "C-1" the alley is very apparent. This is the
persons passing through the property. Being an alley alley?
that shows a permanent path going to and from Beata
Street, the same is apparent. A: Yes, sir.

Being a discontinuous and apparent easement, the Q: And there are houses on either side of this
same can be acquired only by virtue of a title.24 alley?

In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of A: Yes, sir.
Joaquin Limense, does not contain any annotation that
Lot No. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over Q: As a matter of fact, all the residents on either
Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and his side of the alley are passing through this alley?
successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C
has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by
respondents and residents in the area for a long period A: Yes, sir, because the others have permit to
of time. use this alley and they are now allowed to use
 the alley but the Ramos's family are now [not] absence of malice and the absence of a design to
allowed to use this alley.25 defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An
individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own
In Mendoza v. Rosel,26 this Court held that: mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined
by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of
certificates of title do not mention any lien or
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s
encumbrance on their lots, they are purchasers in good
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
faith and for value, and as such have a right to demand
intention to overreach another. Applied to possession,
from respondents some payment for the use of the alley.
one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that
However, the Court of Appeals found, as a fact, that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
when respondents acquired the two lots which form the
which invalidates it.30
alley, they knew that said lots could serve no other
purpose than as an alley. The existence of the
easement of right of way was therefore known to Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
petitioners who must respect the same, in spite of alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the
the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not burden of proof.31 It is a matter of record that
mention any burden or easement. It is an respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their
established principle that actual notice or residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No.
knowledge is as binding as registration.  12-C, in 1932.32 Respondents' predecessor-in-interest
owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at the time the
property was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in
Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate
1932. The Deed of Donation executed by the late
of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same
Dalmacio Lozada, dated March 9, 1932, specifically
free of all encumbrances except those noted on said
provides that:
certificate. It has been held, however, that "where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest that was
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same I hereby grant, cede and donate in favor of Catalina
land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest Lozada married to Sotero Natividad, Isabel Lozada
has the effect of registration as to him."27 married to Isaac Simense and Salud Lozada married to
Francisco Ramos, all Filipinos, of legal age, the parcel of
land known as Lot No. 12-C, in equal parts.33
In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an
alley ever since it was donated by Dalmacio Lozada to
his heirs. It is undisputed that prior to and after the The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang,
registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length; the
as a right of way in favor of respondents and the public stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3
in general. We quote from the RTC's decision: share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada
and, hence, there was absence of a showing that
respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions
x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which
of their house on Lot No. 12-C.
shows its existence. It is admitted that this alley was
established by the original owner of Lot 12 and that in
dividing his property the alley established by him Using the above parameters, we are convinced that
continued to be used actively and passively as such. respondents' predecessors-in-interest acted in good faith
Even when the division of the property occurred, the when they built portions of their house on Lot 12-C.
non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the Respondents being builders in good faith, we shall now
corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the discuss the respective rights of the parties relative to the
alley made to disappear before the issuance of said portions encroaching upon respondents' house.
titles. 
Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code provide:
The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot
(12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot could Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
serve no other purpose than as an alley. That is why been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
lots as an alley. x x x28 Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
way over Lot No. 12-C, even though no registration of cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
the servitude has been made on TCT No. 96886. considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
However, respondents’ right to have access to the
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
property of petitioners does not include the right to
upon the terms of the lease and, in case of
continually encroach upon the latter’s property. It is not
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot No.
12-D encroach upon Lot No. 12-C. Geodetic Engineer
Jose Agres, Jr. testified on the encroachment of Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
respondents' house on Lot No. 12-C, which he possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
surveyed.29 In order to settle the rights of the parties retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. 
relative to the encroachment, We should determine
whether respondents were builders in good faith.

Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no

technical meaning or statutory definition; and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good
in good faith with the same right of retention, the person faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and
who has defeated him in the possession having the it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
paying the increase in value which the thing may have the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state
acquired by reason thereof. of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just
solution by giving the owner of the land the option to
In Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia,34 this provision was acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
applied to one whose house, despite having been built at indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the time he was still co-owner, overlapped with the land the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse
of another. In that case, this Court ruled:  to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who
is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.40]
Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or
sows on the land owned in common for then he did not
build, plant or sow upon the land that exclusively In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,41 this case must be
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The remanded to the trial court to determine matters
co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in
and the situation is governed by the rules of co- relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option
ownership. that petitioners would take and the amount of indemnity
that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate
the improvements on the lots. 
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is
terminated by the partition and it appears that the house
of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square Anent the second issue, although it may seem that the
meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the portions encroaching upon respondents' house can be
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the considered a nuisance, because it hinders petitioners'
provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should use of their property, it cannot simply be removed at
apply. x x x35 respondents' expense, as prayed for by petitioner. This
is because respondents built the subject encroachment
in good faith, and the law affords them certain rights as
In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by
discussed above.
a partition, and it appears that the house of an erstwhile
co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of
faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-
determine the respective rights of the parties. In this G.R. CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the
case, the co-ownership was terminated due to the following MODIFICATIONS:
transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of
Joaquin Limense. 1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C,
covered by TCT No. 96886, between petitioners
Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right and respondents.
to appropriate said portion of the house of respondents
upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided 2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further
may oblige respondents to pay the price of the land proceedings without further delay to determine
occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for the facts essential to the proper application of
is considerably much more than the value of the portion Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. 
of the house of respondents built thereon, then the latter
cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall SO ORDERED.
then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such
terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof.
Of course, respondents may demolish or remove the
said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they
so decide.36

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that

accords with the principle of accession that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around.37 Even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must
choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner
of the building to instead remove it from the land.38

The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is

that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he
can compel the landowner to make a choice between
two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the
indemnity required by law, or (2) to sell the land to the
builder.39

The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated,

thus:
 forest concessionaires, may reasonably require for
carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only.

G.R. No. 217051 Government officials charged with the prosecution of

these projects or their representatives are authorized to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the take immediate possession of the portion of the property
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND IDGHWAYS subject to the lien as soon as the need arises and after
(DPWH); ENGR. REBECCA J. ROCES, District due notice to the owners. It is however, understood that
Engineer, 2nd District Engineering Office of ownership over said properties shall immediately revert
Camarines Sur; and ENGR. VICTORINO M. DEL to the title holders should the airport be abandoned or
SOCORRO, JR., Project Engineer, DPWH, Baras, when the infrastructure projects are completed and
Canaman, Camarines Sur,Petitioners  buildings used by project engineers are abandoned or
vs. dismantled, but subject to the same lien for future
SPOUSES CORNELIO ALFORTE and SUSANA improvements.
ALFORTE, Respondents
Petitioners argued that this lien followed the property
DECISION even when respondents acquired the same from the
original grantee of the patent or the latter's successor-in-
DEL CASTILLO, J.: interest, pursuant to PD 1529, or the Property
Registration Decree, which provides, thus:
On pure questions of law, herein petitioners directly
come to this Court via this Petition for Review SECTION 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every
on Certiorari1 to nullify and set aside the July 28, 2014 registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
Decision (Partial)2 and March 3, 2015 Order3 of the pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 22 (Naga subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
RTC), in Civil Case No. RTC 2012-0013. certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted in said certificate and any of the following
Factual Antecedents
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
Respondents Cornelio and Susana Alforte were the
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the
registered owners of a 300-square meter parcel of
laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by
land (subject property) covered by Transfer Certificate of
law required to appear of record in the Registry of
Title No. 29597 (TCT 29597).4 The subject property,
Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent
which appears to be a vacant lot, was originally
purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
covered by a March 21, 1956 Free Patent and April 14,
1956 Original Certificate of Title No. 235,5 issued
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) or the xxxx
Public Land Act.
A writ of possession was issued in favor of petitioners.
A total of 127 square meters of the subject property
will be traversed by the Naga City-Milaor Bypass After proceedings in due course, the Naga RTC issued
Road construction project of the Department of the assailed Partial Decision, which contained the
Public Works and Highways (DPWH). For this reason, following pronouncement:
respondents filed a Complaint6 - docketed as Civil
Case No. RTC 2012-0013 - before the Naga RTC to DEFENDANTS raised the issue that Section 112, CA
compel petitioners to pay them just compensation No. 141 otherwise known as 'The Public Land Act' as
for the 127-square meter area that would have been amended by P.D. 653, imposes a 60-meter wide legal
lost to the road project, in the amount of ₱381,000.00, encumbrance on the property and thus, preclude[s]
with additional prayer for attorney's fees and litigation the SPS. ALFORTE from claiming just
expenses. compensation.

Petitioners filed their Answer7 praying for the dismissal The court is not persuaded by this argument.
on the ground, among others, of Jack of cause of
action - arguing that, since the property was It is not disputed that SPS. ALFORTE are the owners of
originally acquired by free patent, an easement in a parcel of land consisting of 300 square meters,
favor of the government of 60 meters existed without situated at Mabulo, Naga City and covered by TCT No.
need of payment of just compensation - except if 29597. The same parcel of land was originally covered
there were improvements, pursuant to Section 112 of CA by Original Certificate of Title No. 235, dated April 14,
141, as amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1956 pursuant to a Free Patent issued to Beatriz Santos
1361,8 which states thus: and Bienvenido Santos who later on transferred the
property to SPS. ALFORTE. Of the 300 square meters
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to aright-of- lot, 127 square meters thereof will be traversed by the
way not exceeding sixty (60) meters on width for public Naga City-Milaor By-pass Road. SPS. ALFORTE agreed
highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and Defendant DPWH assured them that [the latter]
telegraph and telephone lines, airport runways, including would pay the just compensation for the affected area. In
sites necessary for terminal buildings and other fact[,J in a letter dated July 13, 2010 then District
government structures needed for full operation of the Engineer Rolando Valdez xx x even made a formal offer
airport, as well as areas and sites for government to pay the affected area However, in a letter dated May
buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed 11, 2011 ENGR. VALDEZ informed SPS. ALFORTE that
in the prosecution of government-infrastructure projects, they [were] not entitled to the payment of just
and similar works as the Government or any public or compensation of the affected area, such that before the
quasi-public service or enterprise, including mining or
Court could fix the amount of just compensation, the its instance, without the latter depositing with the
issue on the entitlement of the SPS. ALFORTE to the authorized government depositary bank an amount
payment of just compensation [had] first to be resolved. equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to
SPS. ALFORTE argued that they [were] entitled to just the orders of the court as prescribed under Section 2,
compensation based on the Constitutional precept that Rule 67.
no private property should be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation. They claimed Under the Rules, the determination of just compensation
that[,] as the subject property [was] now a private is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
property, it [was] now beyond the coverage of CA No. than the commissioners. The order fixing the just
141 or the Public Land Act. On the other hand, compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
DEFENDANTS insisted that SPS. ALFORTE [were] not findings of, the commissioners would be final. It would
entitled to just compensation for the reason that the finally dispose of the second stage of the suit and leave
subject land was acquired by SPS. ALFORTE from nothing more to be done by the court regarding the
BEATRIZ SANTOS and BIENVENIDO SANTOS who issue. Since this stage was omitted after the
acquired the subject property by virtue of a Free Parent DEFENDANTS [were] placed in possession of the 127
under the Public Land Act. Section 112 of CA No. 141 or square meters portion of the property of the SPS.
the Public Land Act provides that lands acquired under ALFORTE and in order not to deny them due process,
said Act shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding there is compelling reason and need to re-open this case
60 meters in width for public highways. and appoint in accordance with Section 5 of Rule 67,
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
xxxx commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
The determination of just compensation by the trial
Settled is the rule that no person may be deprived of his
court with the aid of the commissioners is a
property without due process of law. The power of
substantial right that may not be done away with
eminent domain therefore, whether exercised by the
capriciously or for no reason at all.
State itself or by agencies to which it has delegated such
power, can be exercised only in accordance with the law
of the land. There must be appropriate expropriation All told, this Court finds the SPS. ALFORTE [have] a
proceedings and payment of indemnity. A statute cause of action against the DEFENDANTS and [are]
authorizing a corporation to exercise the power of therefore entitled to just compensation. Since the entire
eminent domain, being a derogation of general right and property of the SPS. ALFORTE consisting of 300
conferring upon it exceptional privileges with regard to square meters and almost half of it or a total of 127
the property of others, should be construed strictly in square meters was taken by the Government
favor of landowners whose property is affected by its through the DPWH, as the same was traversed by the
terms. Hence, before any right to take possession of Naga City-Milaor By-Pass Road, it will indeed result to
land under such statute can be fully exercised by the injustice if they will not be paid just compensation
corporation, the provisions of the statute must be fully for their property just because of the provisions of
and fairly complied with. CA No. 141.

The Court is convinced that as between the provisions WHEREFORE, premises considered, a Partial Decision
of CA No. 141 imposing [an] encumbrance in favor 1s hereby rendered:
of the government on the subject property up to 60-
meters in width as road right of way and the a) DECLARING the Plaintiffs Spouses Cornelio and
provisions of the Constitution particularly Article III, Susana Alforte entitled to the payment of just
Section 1 which provides that "no one should be compensation for the 127 square meters portion of their
deprived of life, liberty and property without due 300 square meters parcel of land covered by Transfer
process of law, m" and Section 9 which provides Certificate of Title No. 29597 of the Registry of Deeds for
that "Private property shall not be taken for public Naga City traversed and/or affected by the Naga City-
use without just compensation", it is the latter that Milaor By-Pass Road;
should prevail.
b) RECALLING the Order dated September 16, 2014
xxxx submitting this case for Decision and consequently, RE-
OPENING the same for the determination only of just
Thusly, the entitlement to just compensation of the SPS. compensation in accordance with Section 5, Rule 67 of
ALFORTE having been determined and resolved, the the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
Court can now proceed with the second stage in
expropriation, that is, the compulsory dete1mination of c) ORDERING the Defendants to deposit the amount of
just compensation by the Court with the assistance of Php 190,500, the assessed value of the property taken
not more than three (3) commissioners designated by and/or affected by the Naga City-Milaor By-Pass Road,
the court. Only upon completion of the two stages that with any authorized government depositary bank to be
expropriation is completed, and only upon payment of held by such bank until further orders from this Court
just compensation that title to the property passes to the within 15 days from receipt hereof in accordance with
Government. Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

In this case and pending determination by the Court of d) APPOINTING the following:
the issue on the entitlement of the SPS. ALFORTE to
just compensation of their property affected by the Naga 1. Alberto C. Villafuerte [III] - Local Assessment
City-Milaor By-Pass Road Project, it issued an Order of Operations Officer
Condemnation and/or granted the issuance of the writ of
possession on February 15, 2013 that authorized the III, City Assessor's Office, Naga City;
DEFENDANTS to take possession of the aforesaid
parcel of land which was implemented on July 1, 2013 at
2. Engr. Jose C. Ferro - No. 5 Jacod Ext., Liboton, Naga 60-meters. In the case of NIA vs. Manglapus cited by the
City; Defendants, the canal constructed by NIA was only
eleven (11) meters and was well within the 60-meter
3. Engr. Mar Basco - 383 Diamond St., Filoville Subd., right of way provided by law. This is not true in this case
Barangay Calauag, Naga City because the portion of the property of the Plaintiffs
occupied or traversed by the Naga City-Milaor By-Pass
Road is 127 square meters. Besides, this Court
as Commissioners to ascertain and report to this Court
maintains that other laws should be considered and
the just compensation of the 127 square meters parcel
interpreted in a manner consistent with our Constitution
of land taken and affected by the Naga City-Milaor By-
and that the issues raised in the motion had been
Pass Road.
passed upon and considered by this Court, thus no new
matters were raised which will warrant a reconsideration
ALBERTO C. VILLAFUERTE III, Local Assessment of the Partial Decision issued by this Court.
Officer III of the City Assessor's Office of Naga City and
a Licensed Real Estate Appraiser is hereby designated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for
as Chairman of the Board of Commissioners.
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, ALBERTO C. VILLAFUERTE III, ENGR.
SO ORDERED.10 (Citations omitted)
JOSE C. FERRO, and ENGR. MAR BASCO are hereby
directed to report to this Court on September 15, 2014 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning and signify their willingness Hence, this Petition.
to accept their appointment as Members of the Board of
Commissioners and to take their oath before the Branch Issues
Clerk of Court. Thereafter, the said Commissioners shall
meet in first session and their report must be filed with Petitioners submit the following issues for resolution:
this Court not later than October 31, 2014.
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS
e) ORDERING the plaintiffs to pay the fees of the ARE ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION DESPITE
Commissioners pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67. THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE LAND WAS
ORIGINALLY PUBLIC LAND AWARDED TO
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to notify RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST BY
the appointed Commissioners of their appointment. FREE PATENT, AND THUS A LEGAL EASEMENT OF
SIXTY-METER WIDE RIGHT-OFWA Y EXISTS IN
SO ORDERED.9 (Citations omitted) FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RESPONDENTS' LAND BEING ORIGINALLY
trial court denied through its March 3, 2015 Order, COVERED BY A FREE PA TENT, IT IS SUBJECT TO
stating- THE 60-METER WIDE PERPETUAL LEGAL
EASEMENT OF RIGHT-OF-WAY OR STATUTORY
LIEN FOR PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, ETC. AT NO COST TO
Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
THE GOVERNMNT, IMPOSED BY SECTION 112 OF
Partial Decision issued by this Court on July 28, 2014
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, THEREBY PRECLUDING
filed by the Defendants and the Comment/Opposition
RESPONDENTS FROM CLAIMING JUST
thereto filed by the Plaintiffs. The Motion for
COMPENSATION.
Reconsideration is anchored on the following grounds:

THE REPUBLIC'S ENFORCEMENT OF ITS RIGHT-OF-

1. [T]hat Plaintiffs' land being originally covered
WAY OR LEGAL EASEMENT UNDER SECTION 112
by Free Patent is subject to the 60-meter wide
OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT WAS UPHELD BY THIS
perpetual legal easement of right of way or
HONORABLE COURT IN NATIONAL IRRIGATION
statutory lien for public highway at no cost to the
ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 340
government, imposed by Section 112 of the
SCRA 661 (2000), AS WELL AS IN REPUBLIC VS.
Public Land Act, thereby precluding Plaintiffs
ANDAYA, 524 SCRA 671 (2007).
from claiming just compensation;

THE TRIAL COURT'S RATIOCINATION - THAT THE

2. That the Republic's enforcement of its right-of-
PUBLIC LAND ACT PROVIDES FOR A RIGHT OF
way or legal easement under Section 112 of the
WAY OF UP TO SIXTY (60) METERS, WHILE THE
Public Land Act was upheld by the Supreme
PORTION OF RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY
Court in the case of NIA vs. CA as well as in
TRAVERSED BY THE NAGA-MILAOR BY-PASS ROAD
Republic vs. Andaya;
IS 127 SQUARE METERS IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS. THE LAW SPEAKS OF WIDTH, NOT
3. Plaintiffs admittedly failed to exhaust AREA OF THE RIGHT OF WAY.
administrative remedies.
THE RTC, IN PRONOUNCING THAT "INJUSTICE"
In their comment/opposition the Plaintiffs alleged that the WILL RESULT "BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF
issues being raised have been exhaustively addressed CA NO. 141," VIOLATED THE PLAIN-MEANING RULE
and determined by this Court and in fine there is no OR VERBA LEGIS.
ground for reconsideration.
BESIDES, RESPONDENTS MANIFESTLY FAILED TO
After considering the allegations of both parties this EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.11
Court resolves to DENY the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners' Arguments
Granting arguendo that the Public Land Act will be
followed, the right of way provided therein is only up to
Praying that the assailed Naga RTC dispositions be set This Court finds that the RTC erroneously ruled that the
aside and that Civil Case No. RTC 2012-0013 be provisions of C.A. No. 141 are not applicable to the case
dismissed, petitioners contend in their Petition and at bar. On the contrary, this Court held that 'a legal
Reply12 that the trial court erred in declaring that easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the
respondents were entitled to just compensation, as CA Government over land that was originally a public land
141 specifically provides that every title to land obtained awarded by free patent even if the land is subsequently
under its provisions shall further be subject to a right-of- sold to another.' This Court has expounded that the
way easement not exceeding 60 meters on width, with 'ruling would be otherwise if the land was originally a
damages for the improvements only; that this lien private property, to which just compensation must be
followed the subject property even when respondents paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an
acquired the same from the original grantee of the patent easement of right-of-way.'
or the latter's successor-in-interest, pursuant to Section
44 of PD 1529; that these provisions of law were upheld It is undisputed that the subject property originated from
by the Court in several cases, particularly National and was a part of a 7,759-square-meter property
Irrigation Administration v. Court of covered by free patent registered under OCT No. 235.
Appeals13 and Republic v. Andaya;14 that the trial court Furthermore, the Spouses Regulto's transfer certificate
erred in stating essentially that government was only of title, which the RTC relied, contained the
entitled to 60 square meters, as opposed to 127 square reservation: 'subject to the provisions of the Property
meters that was being taken from respondents; and that Registration Decree and the Public Land Act, as well as
respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies to those of the Mining Law, if the land is mineral, and
by filing a case in court instead of filing a claim with the subject, further, to such conditions contained in the
Commission on Audit. original title as may be subsisting.'

Respondents' Arguments Jurisprudence settles that one of the reservations and

conditions under the Original Certificate of Title of land
In their Comment,15 respondents maintain that they were granted by free patent is that the said land is subject 'to
entitled to just compensation for the 127-square meter all conditions and public easements and servitudes
portion taken from their land for use by the government recognized and prescribed by law especially those
in its road project; that CA 141 cannot prevail over the mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114,
constitutional provision that no private property Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended'
shall be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation; that as the owners of the subject Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides
property, they have vested rights over the same which that lands granted by patent shall be subjected to a
must be protected; and that there was no need to right-of-way in favor of the Government, to wit:
exhaust administrative remedies because there was
nothing of an administrative nature involved in this case. Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-
way not exceeding sixty (60) meters on width for public
Our Ruling highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
telegraph and telephone lines, airport runways, including
The Petition is partially granted. sites necessary for terminal buildings and other
government structures needed for full operation of the
Petitioners are correct in their supposition that the only airport, as well as areas and sites for government
issue involved in this case is a purely substantive one - buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed
that is, an interpretation or reiteration of Section 112 of in the prosecution of government-infrastructure projects,
CA 141, as amended. The controversy concerns the and similar works as the Government or any public or
correct application of the said law, and does not call for quasi-public service or enterprise, including mining or
an examination of the probative value of the evidence forest concessionaires, may reasonably require for
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being carrying on their business, with damages for the
admitted. improvements only.

Neither were petitioners mistaken in coming directly to Government officials charged with the prosecution of
this Court; the controversy involves a major road project, these projects or their representatives are authorized to
the completion of which is of the utmostimportance. For take immediate possession of the portion of the property
the respondents, the case is no less urgent; their subject to the lien as soon as the need arises and after
property has been taken, which thus entitles them to due notice to the owners. It is however, understood that
reparation - "just compensation" as we call it in eminent ownership over said properties shall immediately revert
domain cases. to the title holders should the airport be abandoned or
when the infrastructure projects are completed and
buildings used by project engineers are abandoned or
Respondents' TCT 29597 specifically contains
dismantled, but subject to the same lien for future
a proviso stating that said title is "subject to the
improvements.
provisions of the xx x Property Registration Decree and
the Public Land Act, as well as to those of the Mining
Laws xx x."16 Their title is therefore necessarily subject In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject
to the easement provided in Section 112, as amended. to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for
Such a  proviso  exists in TCT 29597 since it was derived public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other
from a free patent issued on March 21, 1956. A legal similar works of the government or any public enterprise,
easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the free of charge, except only for the value of the
Government over land that was originally public land improvements existing thereon that may be affected.
awarded by free patent even if the land was
subsequently sold to another. This was the ruling xxxx
in Republic v. Spouses Regu1to,17 where the Court
made the following pronouncement: With the existence of the said easement of right-of-way
in favor of the Government, the petitioners may
appropriate the portion of the land necessary for the On the other hand, in Bartolata v. Repuhlic,20 the Court
construction of the bypass road without paying for it, held:
except for damages to the improvements. Consequently,
the petitioners are ordered to obtain the necessary To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the
quitclaim deed from the Spouses Regulto for the 162- property owner will be entitled to just compensation for
square-meter strip of land to be utilized in the bypass the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1)
road project.18 (Citations omitted) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of
right of way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right of
Respondents are therefore required to execute the way results in the practical destruction or material
corresponding quitclaim in favor of the State, with impairment of the value of the remaining property, or in
respect to the 127 square meters of respondents' land. the property owner being dispossessed or otherwise
deprived of the normal use of the said remainder.
Nonetheless, the Court observes that, while
respondents' land is only 300 square meters, the State This doctrine in Andaya was reiterated in the
requires 127 square meters thereof for its road project - recent Republic v. Regulto. We now apply the same
or nearly half of the whole property. This could affect the parameters for determining petitioner's entitlement to just
integrity of the whole property, and may materially impair compensation in the case at bar.
the land to such extent that it may be deemed a taking of
the same - which thus entitles respondents to just Recall that the subject property in this case is a 400
compensation for the remaining portion of their property. square meter parcel of land. The 223 square meter
In this regard, a thorough determination by the trial court portion of the subject property was traversed by
must be made. respondents' Metro Manila Skyway Project. And as
noted by the CA, the subdivision plan shows that the
In the Regulto case cited above, the State took 162 covered area corresponds to the widths of 13.92 meters
square meters of the landowners' 300-square meter and 13.99 meters, well within the 60-meter width
property, for which the Court declared that there was a threshold provide by law. Respondents are then not
taking of the whole property. It was held therein that- under any legal obligation to pay just compensation for
utilizing the 223 square meter portion pursuant to the
It is noted that the 162 square meters of the subject Republic's right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141, and in
property traversed by the bypass road project is well accordance with our ruling in Andaya.
within the limit provided by the law.1awp++i1 While this
Court concurs that the petitioners are not obliged to pay Anent the remaining 177 square meters of the 400
just compensation in theenforcement of its easement of square meter lot, suffice it to state that it was never
right-of-way to lands which originated from public lands proved that the said area was not subject to the statutory
granted by free patent, we, however, rule that petitioners lien. Neither was it established that despite not having
are not free from any liability as to the consequence of been utilized for the Metro Manila Skyway Project, the
enforcing the said right-of-way granted over the original enforcement of the easement resulted in the 'taking' of
7,759-square-meter property to the 300-square-meter the remaining property all the same. There is then no
property belonging to the Spouses Regulto. evidentiary basis for awarding petitioner just
compensation, as correctly ruled by the RTC and the
There is 'taking,' in the context of the State's inherent CA. However, petitioner remains the owner of the said
power of eminent domain, when the owner is actually 177 square meters and can fully exercise all the rights of
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is ownership over the same.
a practical destruction or material impairment of the
value of his property or when he is deprived of the Thus, there must be a thorough determination by the trial
ordinary use thereof. Using one of these standards, it is court if the utilization and taking of the 127-square meter
apparent that there is taking of the remaining area of the portion of respondents' land amounts to a taking of the
property of the Spouses Regulto. It is true that no burden whole property - as it amounts to the material
was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained impairment of the value of the remaining portion, or if the
title and possession of the property. The fact that more respondents are being dispossessed or otherwise
than half of the property shall be devoted to the bypass deprived of the normal use thereof
road will undoubtedly result in material impairment of the
value of the property. It reduced the subject property to Just compensation is defined as 'the full and fair
an area of 138 square meters. equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.' The word 'just' is used to qualify the
Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just compensation meaning of the word 'compensation' and to convey the
over the remaining area of the subject property, with idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to
interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On the
annum from the date of writ of possession or the actual other hand, the word 'compensation' means 'a full
taking until full payment is made. indemnity or remuneration for the loss or damage
sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for
xxxx public use.'21

Consequently, the case is remanded to the court of Thereafter, the amount of just compensation - if any -
origin for the purpose of determining the final just shall be determined and computed.
compensation for the remaining area of the subject
property. The RTC is thereby ordered to make the WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY
determination of just compensation payable to the GRANTED. The July 28, 2014 Decision (Partial) and
respondents Spouses Regulto with deliberate dispatch. March 3, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
The RTC is cautioned to make a determination based on City, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. RTC 2012-0013
the parameters set forth by law and jurisprudence are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, except for that
regarding just compensation.19 (Emphasis and italics in portion of the July 28, 2014 Decision (Partial) appointing
the original; citations omitted) commissioners, which becomes necessary in the event
that respondents are found to be entitled to payment of "Bounded on the North by Dry Creek; NW, by Lot 2759-
just compensation. C-l; SE., by Lot 2759-C-2-B; SW., by Lot 2759-C-2-B.
Area: 300 sq. meters more or less. Assessed at
The case is ORDERED REMANDED to the court of P1,260.00"4
origin for the conduct of further proceedings to resolve
the issue of whether there is a taking of the remaining On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot
portion; and if so, how much shall be paid to Nos. 2759-C-2-B-7, 2759-C-2-B-5 and 2759-C-2-B-6, all
respondents by way of just compensation. situated in the same area.5

SO ORDERED. On the southwest part of their lot lies Lot 2759-C-2-B-12,

covered by TCT No. T-7735 and measuring 262 square
meters, and is known as the "Foot Path." The foot path
lies between their lot and the three (3) lots owned by
petitioners. They and the owners of the neighboring lots
[ G.R. No. 248763, March 11, 2020 ]
use the foot path as an ingress to and egress from the
national highway.6
SPOUSES JESUS AND AIDA CASTRO,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES FELIMON AND LORNA
Sometime in May 1996, petitioners constructed an
ESPERANZA, RESPONDENTS.
interlinked wire fence and closed off the foot path,
thereby preventing them and their neighbors from using
DECISION the same. The closure of the foot path meant they could
no longer access the national highway and even their
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.: own property.7

The Case They demanded that petitioners desist from closing off
the road but were ignored. They filed a complaint with
This Petition for Review assails the Decision1 dated July the barangay captain, who, in turn, made verbal and
12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. written demands on petitioners to reopen the foot path.
05047-MIN entitled "Spouses Felimon and Lorna But petitioners ignored the barangay captain's
Esperanza v. Spouses Jesus and Aida demands.8
Castro," disposing, thus:
The closure of the foot path caused them irreparable
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is GRANTED. The injury, if not great inconvenience because they had to
Resolution dated 18 April 2018 of the Regional Trial wade through a creek to access the outside world. They
Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, is prayed for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit.9

Accordingly, judgment is rendered as follows: On the other hand, petitioners countered that
respondents' property was bounded on the east by a dry
1) Appellees Spouses Jesus and Aida Castro creek. Respondents had been using this dry creek as a
are DIRECTED to remove the concrete fence way in and out of their property for a long time now. The
and other structures they built on Lot No. 2759- western part of respondents' lot was bounded by Lot
C-2-B-12, Psd-09-013524, commonly known as Nos. 2759-C-2-B-5,2759-C-2-B-4, and 2759-C-2-B-12,
"Foot Path"; all of which are part of the foot path. Further, the foot
path lies among the five (5) lots that they also own: Lot
Nos. 2759-C-2-B-5, 2759-C-2-B-6, 2759-C-2-B-7, 2759-
2) Appellees Spouses Jesus and Aida Castro C-2-B-2 and2759-C-2-B-1.10
are permanently enjoined or restrained from
obstructing appellants and the other neighboring
lot owners from having access to and using the The foot path did not exist when respondents acquired
Foot Path, as their outlet to the national Lot No. 2759-C-2-A. They had to enclose their properties
highway; and with a fence to protect their interests. They also spent
P200,000.00 to convert Lot No. 2759-C-2-B-12 from a
deep swamp to a dry foot path by filling it with soil.
3) Appellees Spouses Jesus and Aida Castro Respondents never contributed a cent for the
are ORDERED to pay appellants Spouses construction of the foot path. Besides, respondents used
Felimon and Lorna Esperanza the amount of the dry creek to gain access to the national highway.11
Fifty-Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorney's fees.
Respondents acquired their property from a certain
Nestor Reluya through a deed of absolute sale. In that
SO ORDERED.2 document, it was emphasized that the dry creek was the
means to access the national highway. Even
Proceedings before the Trial Court respondent's very own TCT No. T-7060 bears an entry
to the effect that ingress and egress was through a dry
Respondents Spouses Felimon and Lorna Esperanza creek. Respondents never demanded from Nestor
filed their Petition3 dated January 20, 1997 for Reluya for a right of way to the national highway.12
mandatory injunction with damages against petitioners
Spouses Jesus and Aida Castro. Respondents Ruling of the Trial Court
essentially alleged:
After due proceedings, the trial court, by
They are absolute owners of Lot No. 2759-C-2-A, a Resolution13 dated April 18, 2018, dismissed the
residential lot covered by TCT No. T-7060 and Tax petition. It held that respondents failed to establish the
Declaration No. 002-1051 located in Minaog, Dipolog requisites of a right of way on petitioners' properties.
City. The lot is particularly described as follows:
Specifically, respondents failed to prove that there was the name of "Foot Path" and was not among the lots
no adequate outlet from their property to the national sold or transferred to third persons by Nestor Reluya
highway. Based on the trial court's ocular inspection, the who remained its owner. Even petitioner Jesus Castro
dry creek had already been converted to a gravel road testified that he was not the owner of the foot path.
that was wider than the foot path. The neighbors also Neither Nestor Reluya nor his heirs had relinquished
use the gravel road in going to the national highway. It their right thereto or changed its purpose, thus, the foot
would be prejudicial to petitioners, who had bought all path retained its nature as a passageway. Since
the surrounding lots, if they would be compelled to petitioners only owned the adjoining lots and not the foot
provide a foot path on their properties just to connect path itself, they had no exclusive, nay, absolute right to
respondents to their own lots. Besides, the foot path was close it.
a voluntary easement granted by Nestor Reluya to the
owners of Lot Nos. 2759-C-2-B-1 to 12 and to The Court of Appeals, thus, directed petitioners to
respondents' lot as well. In the deed of absolute sale remove the concrete fence and other structures they
between Nestor Reluya and respondents, there was no built on the foot path and permanently enjoined them
mention of a right of way granted to the latter. TCT No. from obstructing the ingress and egress of respondents
T-2575 issued to Nestor Reluya states that a right of way and the other neighbors. Petitioners were also ordered
was granted only to a certain Agosto Nazareth for Lot to pay respondents P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
1759-C-4-A for a consideration of P390.00. The trial
court further observed: The Present Petition

The Foot Path is not a compulsory legal easement which Petitioners now invoke this Court's discretionary
cannot be disturbed or recalled. Being a voluntary appellate jurisdiction to reverse and set aside the Court
easement the control still belongs to the owner of the of Appeals' decision. They essentially reiterate their
same, Nestor Reluya who had long died, and whose argument that although the foot path has a separate title,
other properties, including those who bought from him, it is intended for their benefit and not for the benefit of
had also been sold to Respondents. Practically the said respondents who already had the dry creek as their
Foot Path is now under the control of the new owner, the means to access the national highway. Being a voluntary
Respondents having bought the surrounding lots. Said easement, control over the foot path remained with
Foot Path serves no one anymore, since the whole lot Nestor Reluya, and after his death, control over the foot
area is now practically owned by Respondents. The path had been transferred to them as his successors-in-
purpose of its birth had become mooted by the interest. Since the whole area practically belonged to
disappearance of its other users. After all it came about them already, the foot path no longer has any use to
only for the use of the Lot B owners (i.e. B-11 to B-11, third persons, including respondents. Besides,
with the further note that B-10 is a Road Lot which respondents failed to prove the four (4) requisites for the
serves the purpose already of a compulsory servitude, establishment of a compulsory easement.16
while Lot B-12, the Foot Path itself, to the mind of the
(sic) this court was intended only for the Lot B
subdivision owners and not for the petitioners who have In their Comment17 dated December 16, 2019,
an adequate outlet via the dried creek). respondents riposte that petitioners are not the owners
of the foot path. Further, the foot path is the only
legitimate ingress to and egress from their property. By
Granting that said Foot Path is demandable as a Letter dated March 22, 2004, the City Building Officer of
compulsory or given and existing servitude, still Dipolog informed petitioners that the construction of the
Petitioners under the requisites of servitude cannot have fence was illegal for failing to secure the necessary
it. It is too burdensome on the Respondents, and the rule permit. The foot path was already existing when
is that convenience is not the gauge but adequacy and petitioners bought their lots.
not artificial necessity. Besides, he never paid any
indemnity for it.14
Issue
Consequently, the trial court decreed:
Do respondents have the right to use the foot path as
ingress and egress and the requisite standing as well to
WHEREFORE, premises considered it not being clear pray that petitioners remove the fence they constructed
by preponderance of evidence that a road right of way to close off the foot path?
was given to Petitioners, or that the existing Foot Path
was for their benefit, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Ruling
Petitioner instead shall use the adequate outlet (the
dried creek) towards the Road Lot, for his ingress and We affirm.
egress to the national highway.
An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this
SO ORDERED.15 country. It is a suit which has for its purpose the
enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a
particular time, from the commission or continuance of a
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals specific act, or the defendant's compulsion to continue
performance of a particular act. It has an independent
On respondents' appeal, they faulted the trial court for: existence. It is similar to the special civil action of
a) failing to consider petitioners were not the owners of prohibition under Rule 65, except that the latter, in
the foot path and therefore had no right to bar anyone common with other special civil actions, deals with
from gaining access to it; b) holding that they had not special matters requiring a special procedure, i.e., it is
proven the four (4) requisites to establish a right of way; concerned with public officers or entities performing
and c) not awarding them damages. public duties: tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, whereas the
By its assailed Decision dated July 12, 2019, the Court former, an ordinary suit, generally involves acts and
of Appeals reversed. It found that the foot path had its transactions of private individuals. The action for
own separate title, specifically TCT No. T-7735, bearing injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as Verily, the respondents had the right and legal standing
part or an incident of an independent action or to seek a writ of mandatory injunction against petitioners,
proceeding. And, of course, in an action of injunction, the who had no authority to close off the foot path from
auxiliary remedy of a preliminary injunction, prohibitory general use. Too, as early as 1914, Resolme v.
or mandatory, may issue.18 An injunction may either be: Lazo25 had already decreed that a complaint for
(1) a prohibitory injunction, which commands a party to injunction is the proper remedy to ensure that a right-of-
refrain from doing a particular act; or (2) a mandatory way is respected thus:
injunction, which commands the performance of some
positive act to correct a wrong in the past.19 We are of opinion that the trial judge correctly held that
the record sustains the plaintiffs' claim of a right of way
Here, respondents prayed for a writ of mandatory as indicated by the arrows marked number 1 on the plan
injunction and "render its decision to perpetually restrain of the land submitted by the commissioner and filed with
respondents closing the FOOT PATH, and mandatory the record. We think however that the form of the
injunction be made permanent."20 A mandatory judgment entered by him must be modified. He directed
injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere merely that this road "be opened for the public use" and
prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of by inference imposed upon the defendant the duty of so
preserving the status quo between the parties, it also doing. But there is nothing in the record which would
commands the performance of an act. Accordingly, the justify a finding that the defendant is charged with a duty
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is justified only to maintain or construct a road across his land. So far as
in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the the record discloses his only obligation in regard to this
complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he or she right of way over his land is a negative one, that is to
does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the say, not to obstruct or hinder the free passage over it of
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is improper. any persons entitled to make use of it. While the prayer
While it is not required that the right claimed by of the complaint does not clearly indicate the relief
applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive relief, be sought by the plaintiffs, we think that it may fairly be
conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at construed as a prayer for a permanent injunction, and as
least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated that is the relief to which the plaintiffs are entitled upon
by any substantial challenge or contradiction.21 the facts alleged and proven, the trial court should have
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant
Here, respondents hinge their claim to remove the from obstructing, by the maintenance offences or
fence enclosure of the foot path on the voluntary otherwise, the plaintiffs' passage over the ancient right of
easement made by Nestor Reluya thereon and the way, which the trial court found to be in a direct line as
fact that the same is covered by its own title, TCT indicated by the arrows marked No. 1 on the
No. T-7735. As defined, an easement is a real right on commissioner's plan. (Emphasis supplied)
another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby
the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or So must it be.
allowing somebody else to do or something to be done
on his property, for the benefit of another person or As for the award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, the
tenement. Easements are established either by law or by Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]his Court, however,
the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the finds the propriety of granting an award of attorney's fees
latter, voluntary easements.22 in favor of appellants since they were apparently
compelled to litigate their cause and incurred the
Generally, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or necessary expenses to protect their rights."26 Yet, this
compulsory right of way only after he or she has justification is not enough. Even if a party is compelled to
established the existence of these four (4) requisites: (a) litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is his or her rights, attorney's fees will not be awarded if no
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a
payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was case. To award attorney's fees, the court must have
not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (d) the right of factual, legal, and equitable justification. The court must
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient state the award's basis in its decision. These rules are
estate.23 based on the policy that no premium should be placed
on the right to litigate.27 Here, there is no clear showing
Notably, the opening of an adequate outlet to a that petitioners, in persistently asserting their exclusive
highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory right over the foot path, acted in bad faith, thus, they
easements, not voluntary easements.1âшphi1 The cannot be held liable for attorney's fees.
fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified
as an easement of necessity does not detract from its ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
permanency as a property right, which survives the Decision dated July 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in
termination of the necessity.24 CA-G.R. CV No. 05047-MIN is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION deleting the award of attorney's fees.
The foot path was a voluntary easement constituted
by Nestor Reluya and this fact was confirmed by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. Further, the Court of
Appeals noted that the separate title to the foot path
was retained by Nestor Reluya and later on passed
on to his heirs after his death. Also, there is no
showing that the Heirs of Nestor Reluya had
withdrawn the right-of-way. Hence, although the dry
creek had been turned into a gravel road that gives
access to the national highway, the foot path has not
lost its nature as a voluntary easement which
benefits respondents and third persons. Surely,
petitioners cannot claim the foot path as their own
and exclude third persons from using it.
 otherwise reserved by law x x x. And in the present
case, what is expressly reserved is what is written in
TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter strip of the
lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is
SO ORDERED. reserved for public easement purposes. (From OCT
1873/A-50) and to the limitations imposed by Republic
G.R. No. 194336               March 11, 2013 Act No. 440. x x x"8

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, The trial court opined that respondents have a better
vs. right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in
RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO an area reserved for public easement purposes and
NAVARRO, JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS that only the local government of Las Piñas City
SANTOS, ARMANDO TRILLOS, FELICISIMO could institute an action for recovery of possession
TRILLOS, ARCANGEL FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN, or ownership.
PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO CAGUYONG, GINA
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA, JOCELYN
same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO
August 21, 2007.9 Consequently, petitioner elevated
VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA,
the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on March
SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG
5, 2010, sustained the dismissal of the case.
DE GUZMAN, ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA DELA
RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON, Referring to Section 210 of Administrative Order (A.O.)
RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO MARTINEZ, and PRECY No. 99-21 of the Department of Environment and Natural
LOPEZ, Respondents. Resources (DENR), the appellate court ruled that the
3-meter area being disputed is located along the
DECISION
creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore,
PERALTA, J.: belonging to the public dominion. It said that
petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact,
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are the March 5, indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the
2010 Decision1 and October 29, 2010 Resolution2 of the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming ownership and
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court,
affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision3 of the Las Piñas however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled
Regional Trial Court, Branch 197 (trial court) dismissing to seek recovery of possession of the contested
the complaint filed by petitioner. portion is not the City of Las Piñas, but the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for
General (OSG), pursuant to Section 10111 of
accion publiciana with damages against
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 (otherwise known as
respondents for allegedly building their shanties,
The Public Land Act).
without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-
square-meter property located at Daisy Road, Phase V, The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las Piñas City. It denied by the CA per Resolution dated October 29,
claims that said parcel of land, which is duly 2010, hence, this petition.
registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Anchoring its pleadings on Article 63012 of the Code,
Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject
of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter
recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision strip reserved for public easement, it still retains
residents.5 In their Answer with ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of
Counterclaim,6 respondents denied the material the public dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel
allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the
it is the local government, not petitioner, which has proper party to file an action for recovery of possession
jurisdiction and authority over them. against respondents conformably with Articles 42813 and
53914 of Code.
Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective
witnesses and the trial court additionally conducted an We deny.
ocular inspection of the subject property.
An easement or servitude is a real right on another's
On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner
petitioner’s complaint, finding that the land being of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping somebody else to do or something to be done on his or
area going down and leading towards the Mahabang her property, for the benefit of another person or
Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter legal tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the
easement; thus, considered as public property and estate to which it actively or passively belongs,
part of public dominion under Article 5027 of the New indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right,
Civil Code (Code), which could not be owned by unless extinguished by causes provided by law.15 The
petitioner. The court held: Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
x x x The land title of [petitioner] only proves that it is the belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a
owner in fee simple of the respective real properties community, or of one or more persons to whom the
described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances, encumbered estate does not belong.16 There are two
except such as may be expressly noted thereon or kinds of easement according to source: by law or by will
of the owners – the former are called legal and the latter within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty
voluntary easement.17 A legal easement or compulsory (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
law has for its object either public use or the interest of easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
private persons.18 navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person
shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is
While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Underscoring
ownership of the portion on which the easement is supplied)
established, and may use the same in such a manner as
not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 Thus, the above prove that petitioner’s right of
thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning ownership and possession has been limited by law
easements established for public or communal use shall with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the
be governed by the special laws and regulations relating banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the
thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of Court cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, as
this Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes." to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents
have a better right to possess the subject portion of
In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99- the land because they are occupying an area
21 dated June 11, 1999, which superseded DENR A.O. reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to
No. 97-0519 dated March 6, 1997 and prescribed the petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it
revised guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent precisely because it is public land. Likewise, we
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory
Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot rights over the land intruded upon.22 The length of
be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the time that they may have physically occupied the
government’s program of biodiversity preservation. land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered
Aside from Section 2.1 above-quoted, Section 2.3 of the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their
which further mandates: possession is presumed to have retained the same
2.3 Survey of Titled Lands: character throughout their occupancy.23

2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands: As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to
institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone,
The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed We find and so hold that both the Republic of the
as the above. However, when these lands are to be Philippines, through the OSG and the local
subdivided, consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the government of Las Piñas City, may file an action
strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban areas depending on the purpose sought to be achieved.
shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for The former shall be responsible in case of action for
easement and bank protection. reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring
an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the
Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban
technical description and annotated in the title.
Development and Housing Act of 1992).24 Under R.A.
xxxx 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in
the poorer sections of the communities in urban areas
2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious
Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or problem of squatting in the metropolis,25 all local
Industrial Purposes: government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and
demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3)
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams
playgrounds.26 Moreover, under pain of administrative
shall be observed and be made part of the open space
and criminal liability in case of non-compliance,27 it
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.
obliges LGUs to strictly observe the following:
The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to
Section 29. Resettlement. - Within two (2) years from the
subsequent subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)
effectivity of this Act, the local government units, in
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall
allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a implement the relocation and resettlement of persons
stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
required and shall be considered as forming part of the garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated in other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks
October 14, 1977.20 Said law is explicit: open spaces are and playgrounds. The local government unit, in
"for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall
of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic
playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable services and facilities and access to employment and
public lands, and non-buildable." livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic
needs of the affected families.1âwphi1
Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code
of the Philippines21 which provides: Section 30. Prohibition Against New Illegal Structures. -
It shall be unlawful for any person to construct any
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores structure in areas mentioned in the preceding section.
of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and After the effectivity of this Act, the barangay, municipal
or city government units shall prevent the construction of
any kind or illegal dwelling units or structures within their
respective localities. The head of any local government
unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise tolerates
the construction of any structure in violation of this
section shall be liable to administrative sanctions under
existing laws and to penal sanctions provided for in this
Act.

Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an

action for mandamus to compel the local government of
Las Piñas City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the
eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and
any other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh
to one of the avowed policies of R.A. 7279, which is to
reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly those that
adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology.28

Indeed, as one of the basic human needs, housing is a

matter of state concern as it directly and significantly
affects the general welfare.29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 5,

2010 Decision and October 29, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which
affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Las Piñas
RTC, Branch 197, dismissing petitioner's complaint, is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Petitioner insisted that her property was not isolated
because of her own acts.14 When her mother gave the
property to her as part of her inheritance, there was no
intention for the property to have no outlet.15

G.R. No. 194488               February 11, 2015 According to petitioner, her and respondents’ lots were
previously owned by her mother. Respondents’ lot was
ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, given to Dominador Ramos (Dominador) who allegedly
vs. was respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. Dominador
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. VALENTIN and ANATALIA was also her mother’s brother and caretaker of
RAMOS, Respondents. properties.16
DECISION Only 500 square meters were given to Dominador. Part
of the 1,500 square meters was intended as a right of
LEONEN, J.:
way. Dominador was tasked to prepare the documents.
This is a Rule 45 Petition1 of the Court of Appeals But, instead of limiting the conveyance to himself to 500
Decision2 dated August 12, 2010 and of the Court of square meters of the property, he conveyed the whole
Appeals Resolution3 dated October 28, 2010. 1,500 square meters, including that which was supposed
to be the access to the barangay road.17 Petitioner’s
On March 28, 2006, petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through mother only learned about what Dominador did when a
Dolores B. Cinco,4 filed a Complaint5 before the Regional meeting was called in 1989 regarding the
Trial Court of Maloles, Bulacan, for easement of right implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
ofway against respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Program.18 She did not cause the recovery of her title
Valentin and Anatalia Ramos.6 because at that time, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
was razed by fire, causing the destruction of the
In her Complaint before the Regional Trial Court,
documents covering the subject properties. Dominador
petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a
was also her brother, whom she presumed would give
450-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Malibong
her a right of way to the main road. Instead of giving
Bata, Pandi, Bulacan, designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and
way, however, he closed the passage, causing
covered by TCT No. T-343642-(M).7 The property used
petitioner’s property’s isolation.19 Despite demands and
to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B8 and was surrounded by
willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to
estates belonging to other persons.9 Petitioner also
accede to petitioner’s claims.20
alleged that respondents’ 1,500-square-meter property
surrounded her property, and that it was the only In their Answer,21 respondents contended that the
adequate outlet from her property to the highway.10 A isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s
113-square-meter portion of respondents’ property was own act of subdividing the property among her children
also the "point least prejudicial to the without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case
[respondents]."11 The easement sought was the vacant between her and her tenants.22 The property chosen by
portion near the boundary of respondents’ other lot.12 petitioner as easement was also the most burdensome
for respondents.23 Respondents pointed to an open
space that connected petitioner’s property to another
public road.24

Upon agreement by the parties, the Branch Clerk of

Court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises in
February 2007, in the presence of the parties.25

After an Ocular Inspection Report26 was submitted on

March 2, 2007, the case was considered submitted for
decision.27

On April 11, 2007, the trial court issued its

Decision,28 dismissing the Complaint for easement of
right of way, thus:29

WHEREFORE, finding the prayer for a grant of

compulsory easement of right of way on a 113 square
meter portion of defendants’ property to be devoid of
merit, the same is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the
case is ordered DISMISSED with no pronouncements as
to damages and costs.30

The trial court found that petitioner’s proposed right of

way was not the least onerous to the servient estate of
Figure 1. Drawing13 showing the location of petitioner’s respondents.31 It noted that the proposed right of way
and respondents’ properties in relation to the proposed would passthrough improvements, such as respondents’
easement. Petitioner’s property is located on the leftmost garage, garden, and grotto.32 The trial court also noted
part of the drawing. Respondents’ property and the the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to
proposed 113-square-meter easement are located on the public road.33 However, the trial court pointed out
the drawing’s right side that contains petitioner’s that"[o]ther than the existing irrigation canal, no
property. Barangay Malibong Bata Road can be seen on permanent improvements/structures can be seen
the rightmost part of the drawing. standing on the subject rice land."34 Moreover, the
nearby landowner was able to construct a bridge to Petitioner points out that respondents’ property was
connect a property to the public road.35 Hence, "[t]he previously owned by her mother. She alleged that her
way through the irrigation canal would . . . appear to be uncle who was her mother’s caretaker of property
the shortest and easiest way to reach the barangay fraudulently caused the titling of the whole 1,500-square-
road."36 meter property instead of just the 500-square-meter
portion under his name.57
Petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court’s
Decision.37 These allegations are relevant only if we are determining
the issue of the property’s ownership. However, this is
On August 12, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied not an issue in this case. Petitioner does not question
petitioner’s appeal and affirmed in toto the Regional Trial the ownership or the registration of respondents’ title
Court’s Decision.38 It found no reversible error in the trial over the property. We are limited to the issue of
court’s decision to dismiss petitioner’s petitioner’s easement rights. On that matter, petitioner’s
complaint.39 Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of act of filing a Complaint for easement of right of way is
proving the existence of the requisites for the grant of an acknowledgement that the property is owned by
easement.40 The Court of Appeals also found that respondents. It is tantamount to a waiver of whatever
petitioner’s property had an adequate outlet to the public right or claim of ownership petitioner had over the
road.41 property.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated September II
8, 2010 was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution promulgated on October 28, 2010.42 Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil
Code requirements for the grant of
Petitioner filed this Petition on December 22, 201043 to easement rights
assail the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.44 The acts of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest
necessarily affect petitioner’s rights over the property.
We are asked to determine whether petitioner has the One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of
compulsory easement of right of way over respondents’ right of way is that the isolation of the property is not due
property.1âwphi1 to the acts of the dominant estate’s owners.
Petitioner argued that the Regional Trial Court and the As shown in the pleadings submitted to the trial court,
Court of Appeals failed to consider that it was not her petitioner and respondents had conflicting claims on this
property that was adjacent to the irrigation canal but her issue. Petitioner alleged that it was her uncle,
sister’s. Her property was surrounded by other estates Dominador, who caused the isolation of her property
belonging to other persons. Hence, she had to pass through his act of appropriating for himself the whole
through other properties before reaching the irrigation property entrusted to him by her mother. Moreover, he
canal.45 closed the passage from petitioner’s property to the
Moreover, even if she traversed the other properties, she public road.
would only end up on the bank of the irrigation canal On the other hand, respondents alleged that the isolation
without means to cross over.46 The fact that she had to was due to the acts of petitioner’s predecessor-in-
construct a bridge over the irrigation canal supported her interest. She allegedly subdivided the property in favor of
position that there was indeed no adequate outlet from her children, including petitioner, without regard to the
her property to the public road.47 In any case, a bridge pending dispute over the property. If the latter is true,
will necessarily be an obstruction on the public road.48 petitioner could not claim any right to compulsory
Petitioner further argued, citing Quimen v. Court of easement even if it was not she who caused the
Appeals,49 that "[t]he owner of the dominant estate can property’s isolation. Petitioner is bound by her
demand a right of way through the servient estate predecessor-in-interest’s act of causing the isolation of
provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the her property.
beneficial use of his property."50 Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not
In their Comment  on the Petition, respondents argued
51 cause the isolation of petitioner’s property, petitioner still
that this case is already barred by prior cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the
judgment.52 Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest and her proposed portion of respondents’ property. This is
children had already previously filed an action for because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an
easement of right of way against respondents.53 That easement of right of way under the Civil Code.
case had already been dismissed in favor of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the
respondents.54 The reason for the dismissal of the case requisites of an easement of right of way: ART. 649. The
was the possibility of constructing a bridge over the owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
irrigation canal.55 Respondents further argued that the cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
easement must be real and not fictitious.56 other immovables pertaining to other persons and
The petition has no merit. without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to
demand a right of way through the neighboring estates,
I after payment of the proper indemnity.
The issue of ownership is irrelevant
to the case; filing of a complaint for
easement is a recognition of the
servient property owner’s rights
Should this easement be established in such a manner Also in Floro v. Llenado, we refused to impose a right of
that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the way over petitioner’s property although private
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the respondent’s alternative route was admittedly
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied inconvenient because he had to traverse several
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different
estate. persons, not to mention that said passage is impassable
during the rainy season.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by And in Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., this Court
others and for the gathering of its crops through the refused to grant the easement prayed for even if
servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other
shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by owners, as temporary ingress and egress, which lots
such encumbrance. were grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to
flood and mud because such grant would run counter to
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the the prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for
immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts. the dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis
ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be for the easement.63 (Citations omitted) Access to the
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient public highway can be satisfied without imposing an
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where easement on respondents’ property.
the distance from the dominant estate to a public The Ocular Inspection Report reads, in part:
highway may be the shortest.
Upon reaching the said place, pictures were taken in the
Based on these provisions, the following requisites need presence of both parties and their respective counsel.
to be established before a person becomes entitled to The undersigned observed that fronting the lot where the
demand the compulsory easement of right of way:58 house of the defendant is erected, is Brgy. Malibong
1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables Bata public road. The property of the plaintiff is located
belonging to other persons, and is without adequate at the back of defendant’s lot. Plaintiff, through her
outlet to a public highway; counsel, requested that the side portion of defendants’
lot where the latter’s garage and a grotto are erected or
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the a portion of defendants’ newly acquired adjacent lot be
surrounded immovable; the right of way. This was objected to by Atty. Batalla
arguing that to grant the same is more prejudicial to the
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its
defendants considering that the improvements thereon
owner’s acts; and
will be affected and that there is another existing public
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established road which is nearer to the plaintiff’s property. Atty. Sali
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and admitted that there is another existing public road but the
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of right of way cannot be done as there is more or less
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the four-meter wide irrigation before reaching the said public
shortest. road.

An easement of right of way is a real right. When an In order to confirm if there is indeed another existing
easement of right of way is granted to another person, public road which is nearer to plaintiff’s property, the
the rights of the property’s owner are limited.59 An owner undersigned together with the above-mentioned court
may not exercise some of his or her property rights for personnel and the parties and their respective counsel,
the benefit of the person who was granted the easement proceeded to the said place. True enough, there is a
of right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the public road also named Brgy. Malibong Bata public road,
existence of the above conditions is imposed on the fronting plaintiff’s property. However, there is more or
person who seeks the easement of right of way.60 less four-meter wide irrigation before reaching the said
public road. It was also confirmed that the two properties
We agree with the Regional Trial Court’s and the Court of the plaintiff are between the public road which is
of Appeals’ findings that petitioner failed to establish that adjacent to the irrigation. Atty. Sali manifested that they
there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and already requested before the officers of the National
that the proposed easement was the least prejudicial to Irrigation Administration (NIA) for the grant of the right of
respondents’ estate. way but the same was disapproved. Atty. Batalla pointed
out that there are already some concrete bridges nearby
There is an adequate exit to a public highway.
the properties of the plaintiff.64
This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos61 that the
Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner’s
convenience of the dominant estate’s owner is not the
property had another outlet to the highway. In between
basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially
her property and the highway or road, however, is an
if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing
irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a
the easement.62 Thus:
bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is nearby properties.
required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory
There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents’
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be
property to serve petitioner’s needs. Another adequate
satisfied without imposing the easement, the same
exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the
should not be imposed.
public roads.
....
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report
may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner
because she will have to traverse other properties and Imposing an easement on the part of respondents’
construct a bridge over the irrigation canal before she property for petitioner’s benefit would cost respondents
can reach the road. However, these reasons will not not only the value of the property but also the value of
justify the imposition of an easement on respondents’ respondents’ opportunity to use the property as a garage
property because her convenience is not the gauge in or a garden with a grotto.
determining whether to impose an easement of right of
way over another’s property.65 Petitioner also failed to Petitioner may use another outlet, which may provide
satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the longer access from her property to the public highway,
servient estate." but is free from obstructions. The four-meter wide
irrigation canal may be traversed upon construction of a
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining bridge. As noted by the trial court:
the existence of an easement of right of way, the
requirement of "least prejudic[e] to the servient estate" A neighboring land owner was able to construct a short
trumps "distance [between] the dominant estate [and concrete bridge wide enough even for vehicles to pass
the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only through the irrigation canal from his property to the
insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least barangay road. The Court sees no reason why plaintiff
prejudice." could not do the same and why it would not be allowed if
carried in accordance with the requirements set by
This court had already affirmed the preferred status of NIA.70
the requirement of "least prejudice" over distance of the
dominant estate to the public highway.66 Thus, in Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, a reading of the
Quimen, this court granted the longer right of way over August 17, 2005 National Irrigation Administration Letter-
therein respondent’s property because the shorter route Response71 to petitioner’s query regarding the possibility
required that a structure of strong materials needed to of constructing a concrete bridge over the irrigation canal
be demolished.67 This court said: shows that petitioner was not really disallowed from
constructing a bridge. She was merely given certain
[T]he court is not bound to establish what is the shortest conditions, thus:
distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to
the servient estate, such as when there are Wherefore, this office could not negate such
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round decision.72 However, request for grant of right of way for
about way, or to secure the interest of the dominant the construction of bridge over an irrigation canal could
owner, such as when the shortest distance would place be granted subject to the following conditions[:] (1) that
the way on a dangerous decline. the landowner will shoulder the cost of construction
subject to the design and specifications approved by this
.... office[;] (2) construction schedule must be informed for
inspection[;] (3) subject construction will not impede the
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate free flow of irrigation water[;] (4) distance between
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance bridges will not hamper our mechanical equipment to
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While move freely within the area during clearing schedule; (5)
shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it active participation of the landowner in the clearing and
is not always so as when there are permanent structures maintenance of the canal for continuous water flow; (6)
obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other any violation of the above conditions will mean
hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions revocation of the permit and any damage to the canal
and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In structures will mean restoration of the landowner at his
other words, where the easement may be established on own cost.73
any of several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause It is true that an easement of right of way may be
the least damage should be chosen. However, as granted even if the construction of the bridge was
elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not allowed. However, in determining if there is an adequate
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause outlet or if the choice of easement location is least
the least damage should be used, even if it will not be prejudicial to the servient estate, this court cannot
the shortest.68 (Citation omitted) Petitioner would have disregard the possibility of constructing a bridge over the
permanent structures — such as the garage, garden, four-meter-wide canal. This court must consider all the
and grotto already installed on respondent’s property — circumstances of the case in determining whether
destroyed to accommodate her preferred location for the petitioner was able to show the existence of all the
right of way. conditions for the easement of right of way.

The cost of having to destroy these structures, coupled The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals also
with the fact that there is an available outlet that can be considered the aspect of necessity for an easement in
utilized for the right of way, negates a claim that determining petitioner’s rights.
respondents’ property is the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. The trial court found that there is still no necessity for an
easement of right of way because petitioner’s property is
An easement is a limitation on the owner’s right to use among the lots that are presently being tenanted by
his or her property for the benefit of another. By Dominador and Filomena Ramos’ children.74 Petitioner is
imposing an easement on a property, its owner will have yet to use her property. The Complaint for easement
to forego using it for whatever purpose he or she deems was found to have been filed merely "for future
most beneficial. Least prejudice, therefore, is about the purposes."75 Thus, according to the Court of Appeals,
suffering of the servient estate. Its value is not "[a]dmittedly, there is no immediate and imperative need
determined solely by the price of the property, but also for the construction of a right of way as the dominant
by the value of the owner’s foregone opportunity for use, estate and its surrounding properties remain as
resulting from the limitations imposed by the easement.69 agricultural lands under tenancy."76
The aspect of necessity may not be specifically included to the issue of the existence of petitioner's easement
in the requisites for the grant of compulsory easement rights. This determination needs proper reception and
under the Civil Code. However, this goes into the assessment of evidence, which is not the province of this
question of "least prejudice." An easement of right of court. That issue should be threshed out in a separate
way imposes a burden on a property and limits the case directly attacking petitioner's certificate of title.
property owner’s use of that property. The limitation
imposed on a property owner’s rights is aggravated by WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision
an apparent lack of necessity for which his or her promulgated on August 12, 2010 and its Resolution
property will be burdened. promulgated on October 28, 2010 are AFFIRMED.

III SO ORDERED.

The case is not barred by prior

judgment

Respondents argued in their Comment that the case

was already barred by prior judgment because
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest and her siblings had
already filed an action for easement against respondents
in 2004. This case, according to respondents, had
already been dismissed because of the existence of
another public road or highway, which can be accessed
after the construction of a bridge over the irrigation
canal.77

Respondents alleged that petitioner’s predecessor-in-

interest not only subdivided her property among her
children, which included petitioner. Petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest also converted her property from
farmland to home lots. This, respondents argued, is
prohibited under Section 73(c) and 73(e), and Section 74
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.78 Hence,
the conversion was illegal, and this case still involves the
predecessor-in-interest’s property prior to its
subdivision.79

In her Reply,80 petitioner argued that the property was

not barred by prior judgment because she was already
the registered owner of her property before the
complaint for easement was filed by her mother and her
siblings.

She was not a party to that case.81

Dismissal of a case on the ground of res judicata

requires that a final judgment must have been rendered
between the same parties over the same subject matter
and cause of action.82

Even if it is true that this and the alleged previous case

involve the same issue, there can be no res judicata if
there is no identity of parties and/or subject matter. For
purposes of determining if there is identity of parties, two
different persons may be considered as one identity if
they represent the same interest or cause.83

Based on the records, petitioner's certificate of title was

issued in her name on April 12, 1999.84 If as admitted by
respondents, the previous case for easement was filed
in 2004 and petitioner was not represented in the case,
then there could have been no identity of the parties and
subject matter. Petitioner's interest could not have been
represented by her predecessor-in-interest or by her
siblings because none of them were the owners of
petitioner's property in 2004.

Respondents' insistence that the cases involve the same

interests because the alleged conversion of petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest's property from farmland to home
lots was illegal involves the determination of whether
there was such conversion. The determination of
whether there was conversion may be relevant to the
issue of the validity of petitioner's title but is not relevant
 deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported
the matter to the barangay for mediation and
conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the
conferences scheduled by the barangay, however,
drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or more than six
years after the execution of the deed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages3 against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando City, La Union.

G.R. No. 175510               July 28, 2008 In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they
purchased the subject property on the strength of
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, respondents’ assurance of providing them a road right of
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO way. They thus prayed that respondents be ordered to
VALDEZ, Petitioners, provide the subject property with a 2½-meter wide
vs. easement and to remove the concrete wall blocking the
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD same.4
TABISULA, Respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory
DECISION Counterclaim (for damages and attorney’s
fees),5 averred that the 2 ½-meter easement should be
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
taken from the western portion of the subject property
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased and not from theirs;6 and petitioners and their family are
via a January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale1 (the also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject
deed) from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and property, which adjoining properties have access to two
Caridad Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.) portion public roads or highways – the bigger one which adjoins
(the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one which
located in San Fernando, La Union, which 380 sq.m. abuts an existing barangay road on the north.7
parcel of land is more particularly described in the deed
Respondents further averred that they could not have
as follows:
agreed to providing petitioners an easement "on the
A parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on western side of their lot" as there exists a two-storey
the North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, concrete house on their lot where the supposed
251, on the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot easement is to be located, which was erected long
No. 223-A, declared under Tax Decl. No. 52820, with an before the subject property was sold to petitioners.8 In
area of 380 square meters, more or less, and assessed support of this claim, respondents submitted a February
at ₱ 17100.00 for the current year. It is not registered 20, 2003 letter from the City Engineer’s Office.9
under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law.
Branch 26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
petitioners’ complaint and granted respondents’
The pertinent portions of the deed read: Counterclaim by Decision10 of March 18, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing,
That for and in consideration of the sum of SEVENTY judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants as
THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currencyp against the plaintiffs and hereby orders the Complaint
[sic] paid to us at our entire satisfaction by spouses dismissed for being unmeritorious and plaintiffs are
VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ, both of legal hereby ordered to pay the defendants, the following:
age, Filipinos and residents of 148 P. Burgos St., San
Fernando, La Union, receipt of which is hereby 1) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
acknowledged, do hereby SELL, CONVEY and
2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
TRANSFER by way of absolute sale unto the said
spouses Victor and Joecelyn Valdez, their heirs and 3) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
assigns, the TWO HUNDRED (200) SQUARE METERS,
EASTERN PORTION of the parcel of land above- 4) P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
described, free from all liens and encumbrances.
5) To pay the costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.11 (Underscoring supplied)
That now and hereinafter, said VENDEE-SPOUSES
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by
VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ shall be the
Decision of May 29, 2006,12 affirmed that of the trial
absolute owners of the said 200 sq. meters, eastern
court, it holding that the deed only conveyed ownership
portion and that we shall warrant and forever defend
of the subject property to petitioners, and that the
their ownership of the same against the claims of all
reference therein to an easement in favor of petitioners
persons whomsoever; they shall be provided a 2 1/2
is not a definite grant-basis of a voluntary easement of
meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western side
right of way.13
of their lot but which is not included in this sale.
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are
x x x.x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the right of way as they failed to present circumstances
western side of the subject property.2 Believing that that justifying their entitlement to it under Article 649 of the
side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the Civil Code.14
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration15 having been Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over
denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution of immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
November 15, 2006, they filed the present petition for annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice
review on certiorari faulting the trial [sic] court third persons.

I. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory
PART OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE DATED easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind
JANUARY 11, 1993; of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
II. . . . IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF THE
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE GRANTING A RIGHT OF Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a
WAY IS VAGUE AND OBSCURE; real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
III. . . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY persons, and without adequate outlet to a public
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS.16 (Underscoring highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
supplied) neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on indemnity.
another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue xxxx
of which the owner of the same has to abstain from
doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
property for the benefit of another thing or person."17 The immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil (Underscoring supplied)
Code which reads:
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
immovable belonging to a different owner. the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way
subject thereto, the servient estate. under Article 649, the following requisites must be
complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other
There are two kinds of easements according to source – immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
by law or by the will of the owners. So Article 619 of the highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the
Civil Code provides: isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the
the will of the owners. The former are called legal and point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to
the latter voluntary easements. the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
From the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is clear may be the shortest.21 The onus of proving the existence
that what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
deed by respondents of an easement reading: "they estate,22 herein petitioners.
shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on
the western side of their lot but which is not included in As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported
this sale." by the Sketch23 (Exhibit "B"; Exhibit "1") of the location of
the lots of the parties and those adjoining them,
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any a common evidence of the parties, petitioners and their
transaction involving the sale or disposition of real family are also the owners of two
property must be in writing.18 The stipulation harped properties adjoining the subject property which have
upon by petitioners that they "shall be provided a 2 ½ access to two public roads or highways.24
meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of
their lot but which is not included in this sale" is not a Since petitioners then have more than adequate
disposition of real property. The proviso that the passage to two public roads, they have no right to
intended grant of right of way is "not included in this demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the
sale" could only mean that the parties would have to "western side of [respondents’] lot."
enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the It may not be amiss to note at this juncture that at the
purpose.19 The use of the word "shall," which is time the deed was executed in 1993, the barangay road-
imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, Exhibit "1-G," by which petitioners could access Burgos
should be construed as merely permissive where, as in Street-Exhibit "1-F," was not yet in existence; and that
the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires the Interior Street-Exhibit "1-H," which petitioners via this
it to be given an imperative meaning.20 case seek access to with a right of way, was still a
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement creek,25 as reflected in the earlier-quoted particular
must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not description of respondents’ parcel of land from which the
to prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the subject property originally formed part.
Civil Code call for, viz: Respecting the grant of damages in favor of respondents
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the by the trial court which was affirmed by the appellate
inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to court, the Court finds the same baseless.1avvphi1
the ownership and other rights over immovable property. To merit an award of moral damages, there must be
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the
like. It is not enough that one suffers sleepless nights,
mental anguish, serious anxiety as a result of the
actuation of the other party.26 Invariably, such actuation
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence27 to
have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill-motive.

In respondents’ case, they predicated their Counterclaim

for damages on general allegations of sickness,
humiliation and embarrassment, without establishing bad
faith, fraud or ill-motive on petitioners’ part.28

More importantly, respondents are precluded from filing

any counterclaim in light of Article 199 of Rule XXVI of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 reading:

xxxx

ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any

Party or Witness to Appear before the Lupon or Pangkat.
— Refusal or willful failure of any party or witness to
appear before the lupon or pangkat in compliance with
summons issued pursuant to this Rule may be punished
by the city or municipal court as for indirect contempt of
court upon application filed therewith by the lupon
chairman, the pangkat chairman, or by any of the
contending parties. Such refusal or willful failure to
appear shall be reflected in the records of the lupon
secretary or in the minutes of the pangkat secretary and
shall bar the complainant who fails to appear, from
seeking judicial recourse for the same course of
action, and the respondent who refuses to appear, from
filing any counterclaim arising out of, or necessarily
connected with the complaint.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While respondent Caridad Tabisula claimed that she

always appeared, when summoned, before the
barangay lupon,29 the following Certificate to File
Action30 belies the claim.

xxxx

This is to certify that respondents failed to appear for (2)

Mediation Proceeding before our Punong Barangay
thus the corresponding complaint may now be filed in
court.

Issued this 24th day of November 1998 at the Multi

Purpose Hall, Barangay 1 City of San Fernando (LU).

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

The award for moral damages being thus baseless, that

for exemplary damages must too be baseless.

As for the award of attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation, respondents have not shown their entitlement
thereto in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision and

November 15, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of
respondents, Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad
Tabisula, is reversed and set aside. In all other respects,
the challenged decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 the isolation of the dominant estate was Zerda's fault;
and that his requested right of way would cause great
damage and prejudice to them.7

The RTC Ruling

In its September 11, 2006 Decision, the RTC ruled in

favor of Spouses Williams. It found that the isolation of
Zerda's lot was due to his own acts because when he
bought the said property, he was aware that Spouses
Williams had already started introducing improvements
G.R. No. 207146
on their own property. It stated that Spouses Williams
SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA were able to prove that while they were in negotiation
WILLIAMS, Petitioners with Sierra for the purchase of the dominant estate,
vs Zerda intervened and bought the land himself, knowing
RAINERO A. ZERDA, Respondent full well that the land was surrounded by other
immovables.8
DECISION
The RTC also noted that the right of way requested by
MENDOZA, J.: Zerda was not the shortest distance from the dominant
estate to the public highway. It observed that the
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
shortest distance began "from the northeastern corner of
November 28, 2012 Decision1 and the April 16, 2013
Lot 1177-B, the dominant estate, following the northern
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R. CV
boundary of Lot 1201-A, the servient estate, and running
No. 01115-MIN, which reversed and set aside the
across the southeastern portion of Lot 1177-C straight
September 11, 2006 Decision3 and the February 8, 2007
up to the public highway."9
Order4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Surigao
City, (RTC) in Civil Case No. 6285, a case for easement Finally, the RTC granted the claim of Spouses Williams
of right of way. for moral damages and exemplary damages.
The fallo  reads:
The Facts
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the herein
Respondent Rainero A. Zerda (Zerda)  was the owner of
complaint be DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
a parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1177-B (dominant
costs. However, on the compulsory counterclaim,
estate) of the Surigao Cadastre, situated in Barangay
plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendants moral
Lipata, Surigao City, with an area of 16,160 square
damages in the sum of ₱30,000.00 and exemplary
meters (sq. m.), and covered by Transfer Certificate of
damages of ₱20,000.00.
Title (TCT)  No. T- 18074. Immediately behind the
dominant estate was Lot No. 7298, a swampy mangrove SO ORDERED.10
area owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On both
sides were Lot No. 1177-C, registered under the name Zerda filed a motion for reconsideration. In its February
of Woodridge Properties, Inc. and Lot No. 1206, in the 8, 2007 Order,11 the RTC partially granted the motion by
name of Luis G. Dilag. In front was Lot No. 1201-A deleting the award of moral damages.
owned by petitioner-spouses Larry and Rosarita
Aggrieved, Zerda appealed before the CA.
Williams (Spouses Williams),  where the national
highway ran along.5 The CA Ruling
On July 28, 2004, Zerda filed a complaint against In its assailed November 28, 2012 Decision, the
Spouses Williams for easement of right of way. The CA reversed  and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It
complaint alleged that Zerda's lot was without adequate explained that the isolation of Zerda's property was not
outlet to a public highway, that it could not be accessed due to his own acts, and to deny the right of way to a
except by passing through Spouses Williams' property; purchaser of an enclosed estate simply because of his
that the isolation of Zerda's property was not due to his prior knowledge that the same was surrounded by
own acts, as it was the natural consequence of its immovables would render the law on easements
location; that the right of way he was claiming was at a nugatory. "In effect, the purchaser would only be filling
point least prejudicial to Spouses Williams' property; and into the shoe[s] of the previous owner of the isolated
that on January 27, 2004, Zerda wrote to Spouses property in the exercise of his right to demand an
Williams formally asking them to provide him with right of easement of right of way. The new owner did not do
way, for which he was willing to pay its reasonable value anything that would have caused the deliberate isolation
or to swap a portion of his property, but Spouses of the property."12
Williams refused.6
Further, the CA declared that Zerda was not in bad faith
Spouses Williams countered that the complaint should when he intervened in the negotiation for the sale of the
be dismissed for lack of cause of action because Zerda dominant estate between Sierra, the previous owner and
failed to establish the requisites for the existence of right Spouses Williams. It noted that Sierra himself denied
of way. They claimed that sometime in May 2003, they knowing Larry Williams, thereby negating the spouses'
were in negotiation with Agripina Sierra (Sierra),  the claim of a negotiation. The CA added that even if there
former owner of the dominant estate, for its sale to them was a prior negotiation, Sierra could not be deprived of
but the sale did not materialize due to the intervention of his right to sell his property to a buyer of his own
Zerda. Spouses Williams further averred that they choosing.13
undertook visible development projects on their property
as early as May 2003 amounting to ₱6,619,678.00; that The CA also found that the right of way, proposed by
Zerda, was the shortest distance to the national highway
and the least prejudicial to the servient estate. It laid In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
emphasis on Spouses Williams' admission that they had passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by
no intention to build houses in the area sought and that others and for the gathering of its crops through the
the 705.20 sq. m. long pathway would only affect a small servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity
portion of their lot which had a total area of 12,200 sq. shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by
m. The dispositive portion of the CA ruling reads: such encumbrance.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
September 11, 2006 Decision and February 8, 2007 immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Surigao
City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
We hereby order (a) appellees to allow the right of estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
passage by the appellant thru their Lot 1201-A; and (b) the distance from the dominant estate to a public
appellant to pay private respondent the indemnity highway may be the shortest.
therefor to be determined by the trial court. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the In summary, an entitlement to the easement of right of
determination of the proper amount of indemnity for the way requires that the following requisites must be met.
easement of right of way under Article 649. 1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
SO ORDERED.14 immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
Spouses Williams moved for reconsideration, but their
motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, 2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par.
dated April 16, 2013. 1);

Hence, this petition. 3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
ISSUE
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least
WHETHER RESPONDENT ZERDA IS ENTITLED TO prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY. consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
Spouses Williams argue that the respondent caused the (Art. 650).15
isolation of his property because he bought the lot with
notice that it had no access to the national highway and All the above requisites are present in this case.
was surrounded by other immovables; that the
respondent was in bad faith because he was aware that As regards the first requisite, there is no dispute that the
they were negotiating with Sierra over the purchase of respondent's property was surrounded by other
the dominant estate when he intervened and bought the immovables owned by different individuals, including
property himself; that the shortest distance from the Spouses Williams. The isolation was further shown in
dominant estate to the public highway began from the the Sketch Plan16 prepared by Honorato R. Bisnar, the
northeastern corner of Lot No. 1177-B (the dominant geodetic engineer deputized by the parties. Moreover,
estate) following the northern boundary of Lot No. 1201- contrary to Spouses Williams' claim that there was a
A, then passing through the southeastern portion of Lot barangay road closest to the dominant estate, the R TC,
No. 1171-C; and that the right of way requested by the during the ocular inspection, observed that "there was no
respondent was not the least prejudicial in view of the existing barangay road xxx."17
developments introduced by them thereon. The second requisite of payment of indemnity was also
Zerda was ordered by the Court to file his comment on complied with by the respondent when he wrote
the petition of Spouses Williams. Despite several Spouses Williams on January 27, 2004, formally asking
opportunities granted to him, he failed to file his them to provide him with a right of way, for which he was
comment.1avvphi1 Thus, his right to file a comment on willing to pay a reasonable value or to swap a portion of
the petition for review was deemed waived. his property.18

The Court's Ruling Anent the third requisite, the isolation of the dominant
estate was not due to the respondent's own acts. The
The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is property he purchased was already surrounded by other
governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code: immovables leaving him no adequate ingress or egress
to a public highway. Spouses Williams refused to grant a
ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a right of way and averred that the isolation of the
real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is dominant estate was attributable to the respondent's
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other own acts. They pointed out that when the respondent
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, purchased the dominant estate, he knew that Sierra was
is entitled to demand a right of way through the in negotiation with them for the sale of the dominant
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper estate, thus, he was in bad faith. Nonetheless, it cannot
indemnity. be used to defeat the respondent's claim for a right of
Should this easement be established in such a manner way. Sierra had every right to sell his property to
that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the anybody. Further, when the respondent bought the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the dominant estate there could have been no existing
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied contract of sale yet considering that Spouses Williams
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient and Sierra were still in negotiation.
estate.
Hence, consent, one of the essential requisites for a bank of any river or stream shall be preserved as
valid contract, was lacking. permanent timberland.6

As to the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the right of On October 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for
way sought by the respondent is at the point least reduction of legal easement docketed as SP. Proc. No.
prejudicial to the servient estate and it is the shortest 10746-CEB before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
distance to the national highway. This is evident in the Branch 12. Petitioner alleged that the property is
Sketch Plan19 showing that the requested right of way residential as shown by the tax declaration7 and the
was alongside the perimeter of Spouses Williams' Certification8 of the Office of the City Assessor. Thus, the
property. Moreover, during the ocular inspection, the applicable legal easement is only three meters pursuant
RTC observed that the right of way, which the to Department of Environment and Natural Resources
respondent was seeking was alongside a (DENR) Administrative Order No. 99-21,9 and not forty
precipice.20 Spouses Williams insisted that they intended meters, which applies to timberlands and forest lands.
to build structures on the portion claimed by the Petitioner also alleged that enforcing the forty-meter
respondent, but at a safe distance from the precipice, legal easement would virtually deprive her of the use
not immediately beside it. In addition, the 705.20 sq. m and enjoyment of the property since it consists only of
long pathway would only affect a small portion of the 1,000 square meters.
12,200 sq. m. property of Spouses Williams, and for
which the respondent expressed willingness to pay. The DENR countered that the property is inalienable. It
also claimed that the applicant agreed on the forty-meter
Even assuming that the right of way being claimed by legal easement when the free patent was applied for.
the respondent is not the shortest distance from the
dominant estate to the public highway, it is well-settled The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. It said that
that "[t]he criterion of least prejudice to the servient there is no longer any reason for the forty-meter legal
estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest easement because the property had been transformed
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. into residential land and the area where it is located has
xxx In other words, where the easement may be been reclassified as urban. Applying DENR A.O. No. 99-
established on any of several tenements surrounding the 21, the applicable legal easement is only three meters.
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest  and The decision’s decretal portion states:
will cause the least damage  should be chosen. If having WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single ordered that the legal encumbrance of forty (40) meters
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage for river bank protection annotated on Petitioner’s
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest."21 As Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5455 be reduced to the
previously discussed, the right of way claimed by the applicable legal easement of three (3) meters in
respondent is at a point least prejudicial to the servient accordance with law.
estate.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Cebu City is
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The November hereby directed to cancel the above legal encumbrance
28, 2012 Decision and the April 16, 2013 Resolution of of forty (40) meters annotated on Petitioner’s Transfer
the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 01115-MIN, Certificate of Title No. 5455 and in lieu thereof, annotate
are AFFIRMED in toto. the applicable legal encumbrance of three (3) meters for
G.R. No. 163118             April 27, 2007 river bank protection.

DORIS CHIONGBIAN-OLIVA, Petitioner, SO ORDERED.10

vs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE court’s decision. It upheld the DENR’s claim that the
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL property was inalienable. Accordingly, a positive act of
RESOURCES AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF the government was necessary to declassify it from
CEBU CITY, Respondents. forest land to alienable land. Declaration of the property
DECISION as residential in the tax declaration and reclassification
of the area where it is located as urban were insufficient
QUISUMBING, J.: bases to reclassify the property. The fallo of the
appellate court’s decision reads:
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the Decision1 dated
August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
No. 74409, reversing the Decision2 dated December 13, December 13, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 12 Judicial Region, Branch 12, Cebu City, in SP. PROC.
in SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB, and (2) the NO. 10746-CEB, is hereby REVERSED and SET
Resolution3 dated March 17, 2004, denying the motion ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.11
The following facts are undisputed.
The appellate court later denied petitioner’s motion for
Petitioner Doris Chiongbian-Oliva is the registered owner reconsideration.
of a parcel of land in Talamban, Cebu City, as evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 5455.4 This title Petitioner now raises the following issues:
originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. I.
1066 from a free patent granted on September 11, 1969
under Commonwealth Act No. 141,5 as amended. The WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S LOT COVERED
free patent, OCT No. 1066, and TCT No. 5455 contained BY THE LEGAL ENCUMBRANCE IS A PUBLIC
the condition that a forty-meter legal easement from the LAND/LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (AND THUS,
CANNOT BE RECLASSIFIED EXCEPT BY THE surveys. Pertinent to this case are the following
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT) OF THE GOVERNMENT, provisions:
OR A PRIVATE LAND.
2.1 Original Surveys:
II.
2.1.a Public Lands:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT IS CORRECT
IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT All alienable and disposable (A and D) lands of the
PETITIONER’S LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. 5455 IS public domain shall be surveyed pursuant to Section 1
SITUATED IN AN URBAN AREA AND NOT IN A Par. (1) of R.A. 1273 [C.A. No. 141, Section 90(i)]
FOREST AREA, AND IN THUS CONCLUDING THAT whereby a strip of forty (40) meters wide starting from
THE LEGAL EASEMENT APPLICABLE FOR RIVER the banks on each side of any river or stream that may
BANK PROTECTION IS THREE (3) METERS AND NOT be found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved
FORTY (40) METERS. as permanent timberland.

III. Likewise, to be demarcated are public lands along the

banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 90(i) OF C.A. NO. 141 and lakes throughout their entire length and within a
WHICH PROVIDES FOR A UNIFORM EASEMENT OF zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
FORTY (40) METERS FROM THE BANK ON EACH meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
SIDE OF ANY RIVER, AND WHICH PRESERVES THE forest area, along their margins which are subject to the
SAID 40-METER PORTION AS PERMANENT easement for public use in the interest of recreation,
TIMBERLAND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
SITUATED IN A FOREST AREA OR AN URBAN AREA,
IS STILL APPLICABLE TO LOTS SITUATED IN AN xxxx
URBAN AREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS 2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:
OF SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 51 OF P.D. NO. 1067.12 2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Is the property public The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed
or private land? and (2) Is the applicable legal easement as the above. However, when these lands are to be
forty or three meters? subdivided, consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the
strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban areas
On the first issue, C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for
that lands of the public domain may be classified by the easement and bank protection.
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, into: (1) alienable The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the
or disposable; (2) timber; and (3) mineral technical description and annotated in the title.
lands.13 However, only alienable or disposable lands
xxxx
may be disposed of through any of the forms of
concession enumerated in the law.14 A free patent is one Running in parallel vein is the Water Code of the
of such concessions15 and once it is registered and the Philippines17 which provides:
corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered
by them ceases to be part of the public domain and Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores
becomes private property.16 of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and
within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty
Verily, by the issuance of a free patent on September (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
11, 1969, and the subsequent issuance of OCT No. forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
1066 and TCT No. 5455, the property in this case had easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
become private land. It is inconsistent for an alienable navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person
land of the public domain to be covered by a free patent shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is
and at the same time retain its character as public land. necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.
On the second issue, Section 90(i) of C.A. No. 141
requires that a forty-meter legal easement from the bank Since the property in this case was originally alienable
of any river or stream shall be preserved as permanent land of the public domain, the application for free patent
timberland. More specifically, it provides: contained the condition that a forty-meter legal
easement from the banks on each side of any river or
(i) That the applicant agrees that a strip forty meters
stream found on the land shall be demarcated and
wide starting from the bank on each side of any river or
preserved as permanent timberland. However, after the
stream that may be found on the land applied for, shall
property was administratively titled, it underwent several
be demarcated and preserved as permanent timberland
surveys for purposes of subdivision, consolidation, or
to be planted exclusively to trees of known economic
consolidation-subdivision as evidenced by TCT No.
value, and that he shall not make any clearing thereon or
5455. This title provides that it is a transfer from TCT
utilize the same for ordinary farming purposes even after
Nos. 3975 and 436018 and describes the property as Lot
patent shall have been issued to him or a contract of
2 of the consolidation-subdivision plan Pcs-07-002121,
lease shall have been executed in his favor. (Emphasis
being a portion of Lot 6 and 7 Pcs-07-000974.19 Thus,
supplied.)
presently only three meters is required to be demarcated
To implement this, the DENR promulgated A.O. No. 99- and preserved as permanent timberland.
21 which provides the guidelines in the processing,
In this case, the trial court properly took judicial notice
verification, and approval of isolated and cadastral
that Talamban, Cebu City is an urban area. Judicial
notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.20 A municipal jurisdiction, whether
designated as chartered city or provincial capital, is
considered as urban in its entirety if it has a population
density of at least 1,000 persons per square
kilometer.21 The City of Cebu was created on October
20, 1934 under Commonwealth Act No. 58.22 It is a
highly urbanized city classified as entirely urban.23 Thus,
all its barangays, including Talamban, are considered
urban.

Conformably with the foregoing considerations, the

reduction of the legal easement of forty meters on
petitioner’s property covered by TCT No. 5455 to three
meters now is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated August 7, 2003 and Resolution
dated March 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 74409 are REVERSED, and the Decision
dated December 13, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 12 in SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 and the respondent has no access to any existing public
road; second,  that the respondent has offered to
compensate the petitioners for the establishment of the
right-of-way through the latter’s property; third, that the
isolation of the subject lot was not caused by the
G.R. No. 198594 respondent as he purchased the lot without any
adequate ingress or egress to a public highway;
HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and
and, fourth and last,  given the available options for the
LIBY P. CALIMOSO, Petitioners,
right-of-way, the route that passes through the
vs.
petitioners’ lot requires the shortest distance to a
AXEL D. ROULLO, Respondent.
public road and can be established at a point least
DECISION prejudicial to the petitioners’ property.

BRION, J.: The petitioners moved to reconsider the CA’s decision

arguing that, while the establishment of the easement
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing through their lot provided for the shortest route, the
the December 15, 2010 decision2 and the August 23, adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage not
2011 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu only to the nipa  hut situated at the corner of the
City, in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 00834. The CA affirmed petitioners’ lot, but also to the bedroom portion of the
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),  Branch other concrete house that stood on the property. The
29, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. CEB-23858 that ordered CA, however, did not consider the petitioners’ arguments
the establishment of an "easement of right of way" in on the ground that the matters alleged were not raised or
favor of respondent Axel D. Roullo. proven before the trial court, thus, it denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Facts of the Case
The petitioners filed the present petition for review
In his Complaint4 for Easement of Right of Way, the
on certiorari  raising the issues of: (a) whether the
respondent mainly alleged: that he is the owner of Lot
respondent has met all the requisites for the
1462-C-15 situated in Brgy. Sambag, Jaro, Iloilo City;
establishment of a legal easement of right-of-way on
that his lot is isolated by several surrounding estates,
Lot 1454-B-25 owned by the petitioners, (b) whether
including Lot 1454-B-256 owned by petitioners Helen,
the establishment of the right-of-way on the
Marilyn, and Liby, all surnamed Calimoso; that he needs
petitioners’ lot is at the point least prejudicial to the
a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road;
servient estate, and (c) whether a right-of-way can
and that the shortest and most convenient access to the
be established through other lots surrounding the
nearest public road, i.e.,  Fajardo Subdivision Road,
respondent’s property other than through the
passes through the petitioners’ lot.
petitioners’ property.
The petitioners objected to the establishment of the
OUR RULING
easement because it would cause substantial damage to
the two (2) houses already standing on their property. We disagree with the CA finding that all the
They alleged that the respondent has other right-of-way requisites for the valid establishment of an
alternatives, such as the existing wooden bridge easement of right-of-way are present in this case.
over Sipac Creek bounding the respondent’s lot on the
northeast; that the bridge, if made concrete, could To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the
provide ingress or egress to the Fajardo Subdivision following requisites should be met:
Road.
"1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
Due to the respondent’s allegedly malicious and immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
groundless suit, the petitioners claimed entitlement to highway;
the following awards: P100,000.00 as moral damages,
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, P1,000.00 as appearance fee, and 3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of
P15,000.00 as litigation expenses. the dominant estate; and
In a decision dated September 29, 2003, the RTC 4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least
granted the respondent’s complaint and ordered the prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
right-of-way "measuring 14 meters in length and 3 dominant estate to a public highway may be the
meters in width (42 square meters, more or less) over shortest."7
Lot 1454-B-25, specifically at the portion adjoining the
bank of Sipac Creek." Accordingly, the RTC ordered the The immovable in whose favor the easement is
respondent to pay the petitioners proper indemnity in the established is called the dominant estate, and the
amount of "Php1,500.00 per square meter of the portion property subject to the easement is called the servient
of the lot subject of the easement." The petitioners estate.8 Here, the respondent’s lot is the dominant estate
appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA. and the petitioners’ lot is the servient estate.

The CA, in its assailed December 15, 2010 decision, That the respondent’s lot is surrounded by several
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision and held that all the estates and has no access to a public road are
requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory undisputed.1âwphi1 The only question before this Court
easement of right-of-way were present in the is whether the right-of- way passing through the
respondent’s case: first,  that the subject lot is indeed petitioners’ lot satisfies the fourth requirement of
surrounded by estates owned by different individuals
being established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.

Three options were then available to the respondent for

the demanded right-of-way: the first option is to
traverse directly through the petitioners’ property, which
route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14)
meters from the respondent’s lot to the Fajardo
Subdivision Road; the second option is to pass through
two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-1 and 1461-B-2) located on
the southwest of the respondent’s lot, which route has
an approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to
another public highway, the Diversion Road; and
the third option is to construct a concrete bridge
over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the
property of a certain Mr. Basa in order to reach the
Fajardo Subdivision Road.

Among the right-of-way alternatives, the CA adopted the

first option, i.e.,  passing through the petitioner’s lot,
because it offered the shortest distance  (from the
respondent’s lot) to the Fajardo Subdivision Road and
the right-of-way would only affect the "nipa hut" standing
on the petitioners’ property. The CA held that the
establishment of the easement through the petitioners’
lot was more practical, economical, and less
burdensome to the parties.

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement

of right-of-way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the
right-of-way must be established on the tenement where
the distance to the public road or highway is
shortest and where the least damage would be caused.
If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage)
do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the
past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail
over the shortest distance criterion.9

In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through

the petitioners’ lot would cause the destruction of the
wire fence and a house on the petitioners’
property.10 Although this right-of-way has the shortest
distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial
considering the destruction pointed out, and that an
option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any
damage, albeit longer, is available.

We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant

estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement;"11 that "a longer way
may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate,
such as when there are constructions or walls which can
be avoided by a round-about way."12

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition

for review on certiorari and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the decision dated December 15, 2010, and
resolution dated August 23, 2011, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 00834. The complaint
for the easement of right- of-way is DISMISSED without
prejudice to another complaint that the respondent may
file against the proper party or parties based on the
terms of this Decision.

Costs against respondent Axel D. Roullo.

SO ORDERED.
 and on the West, along line 4-1 by Lot 5808-F-1, Psd-
07-01-004579. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan
being S. 50 deg. 59'W., 411.55 m. from BM No. 44,
Cebu Cadastre; thence N. 60 deg. 34' E., 4.99 m. to
point 2; thence S. 20 deg. 33' E., 17.95 m. to point 3;
thence S. 60 deg. 34' W., 4.99 m. to point 4; thence N.
20 deg. 33' W., 17.94 m. to point of beginning;
G.R. No. 163157
containing an area of EIGHTY NINE (89) SQUARE
SPOUSES BERNABE MERCADER, JR. and LORNA METERS, more or less. x x x (Emphasis Supplied)
JURADO-MERCADER, OLIVER MERCADER,
Lot No. 5808-F-2-B, situated behind Lot No. 5808-F-2-A,
GERALDINE MERCADER and ESRAMAY
contained 249 square meters, and was covered by TCT
MERCADER, Petitioners,
No. 107915 in the names of "spouses LETECIA GABUY
vs.
A BARDILAS and JESUS BARDILAS, of legal age,
SPOUSES JESUS BARDILAS and LETECIA GABUYA
Filipinos."5 It was particularly described as follows:
BARDILAS, Respondents.
A parcel of land (Lot 5808-F-2-B, Psd-07-018600, being
DECISION
a portion of Lot 5808-F-2, Psd-07-01-004579). Situated
BERSAMIN, J.: in the Barrio of Punta Princesa, City of Cebu, Province of
Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the SW., along line 1-
The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the 2 by Lot 5808-F-1, Psd-07-01-004579; on the West
portion on which the easement is established, and may along line 2-3 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cad.; on the North
use the same in such manner as not to affect the along line 3-4-5 by Lot 5725, Cebu Cadastre; on the
exercise of the easement.1 East, along line 5-6 by Lot 5808-F-3, Psd-07-01-004579;
on the South along line 6-7 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cad. and
The Case
on the West, along line 7-8-1 by Lot 5808-F-2-A of the
This appeal seeks to undo and reverse the decision subdivision plan; with a Road Right of Way (3.00
promulgated on March 18, 2003 "only insofar as Civil meters wide). Beginning at a point marked "1 "on plan
Case No. CEB-12783 is concerned," whereby the Court being S. 50 deg., 59'W., 411.55 m. from BM No. 44,
of Appeals (CA) partly affirmed the judgment rendered Cebu Cadastre; thence S. 64 deg .. 87'W., 16.02 m. to
on October 10, 1995 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) point 2; thence N. 22 deg. 23'W., 3.01 m. to point 3;
in Civil Case No. CEB-12783 and Civil Case No. CEB- thence N. 64 deg. 10'E., 16.12 m. to point 4; thence N.
13384. In so doing, the CA recognized the right of the 64 deg. 10'E., 14.00 m. to point 5; thence S. 21 deg.
respondents as the owners of the servient estate to the 20'E., 20.01 m. to point 6; thence S. 60 deg. 34' W., 9.40
road right of way. m. to point 7; thence N. 20 deg. 33'W., 17.95 m. to point
8; thence S. 60 deg. 34'W., 4.99 m. to the point of the
Antecedents beginning. Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED
FORTY NINE (249) SQUARE METERS, more or less. x
The issue concerns the right of way between the
x x (Emphasis supplied)
owners of three parcels of land denominated as Lot
No. 5808-F-l, Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and Lot 5808-F-2-B. The right of way mentioned in the TCT No. 107915 of
The lots were portions of Lot No. 5808-F, situated in the Spouses Bardilas (Lot No. 5808-F-2-B) exited into
Barangay Punta Princesa in Cebu City with an area of the Clarita Subdivision and was roughly 300 lineal
2,530 square meters, and registered under Transfer meters from Buhisan Road, a national road.
Certificate of Title No. 78424 of the Registry of Deeds in
Cebu City in the name of "Arsenia Fernandez, of legal Behind Lot No. 5808-F-2-B was Lot No. 5808-F-3,
age, married to Simeon Cortes, both Filipinos."2 Another registered under TCT No. 88158 in the name
subdivision lot derived from Lot No. 5808-F was Lot No. of"LETECIA GABUYA BARDILAS, married to JESUS
5808-F-3 BARDILAS, both of legal age and Filipinos,"6 particularly
described as follows:
Lot No. 5808-F-l, which fronted a side street within the
Clarita Village, contained 289 square meters, and was A parcel of land (Lot 5808-F-3, Psd-07-07-004579,
registered under TCT No. 88156 in the names "OLIVER, bearing a portion of 5808-F, psd-07-07-003019); situated
14 yrs. old, GERALDINE, 12 yrs. old, ESRAMA Y, 10 in the District of Punta Princesa, Ciky (sic) of Cebu,
yrs. old, all surnamed MERCADER, Filipino, minors, and Island of Cebu. Bounded on the Ne. and NW. along lines
single."3 Such registered owners were the children of 1-2-3- by lot 5808-F-4; on the NW., along line 3-4 by lot
petitioner Bernabe Mercader, Jr. by his first wife, 5808-F-5; along line 4-5 by lot 5808-F-6, all of the
Rebecca Gabuya Mercader, who had died in 1975. subdivision plan; on the NW., along line 5-6 by Lot 5725,
Cebu Cadatre; on the East and SE., along lines 7-8-9 by
Lot No. 5808-F-2-A, situated behind Lot No. 5808-F-l, lot 5808-B; on the SE., along line 9-1 by lot 5808-C;
had an area of 89 square meters. It was covered by TCT along 10-11-12 bylot (sic) 5808-D; along line 12-13-14
No. 107914 in the names of "spouses BERNABE by Lot 5808-E., all psd-0701003019; on the SE., along
MERCADER AND LORNA JURADO, of legal age, line 14-45 by lot 5726, Cebu Cadastre; on the SW.,
Filipinos," 4 and was particularly described as follows: along line 15-16 by Lot 5808-F-2 of the subdivision plan;
and on the NW, along line 16-1 by lot 5725, Cebu
A parcel of land (Lot 5808-F-2-A, Psd-07-018600, being
Cadastre. x x x
a portion of Lot 5808-F-2, Psd-07-01-004579). Situated
in the Barrio of Punta Princesa, City of Cebu, Province of In relation to Lot No. 5808-F-3, there is another right of
Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the North and East way about 40 lineal meters away from Buhisan Road.7
along lines 1-2-3 by Lot 5808-F-2-B, with existing Right
of Way (3.00 meters wide); of the subdivision plan; on On May 11, 1992, the Clarita Village Association erected
the South along line 3-4 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cadastre; a concrete perimeter fence to close the exit point of the
right of way of the Spouses Bardilas from Lot No. 5808- By letter dated August 14, 1992, 10 the Spouses
F-2-B to the existing road within Clarita Village. The Bardilas, through Atty.
closure forced the Spouses Bardilas to use the second
exit to Buhisan Road, which is from their Lot No. 5808-F- Alfredo J. Sipalay, informed the Spouses Mercader of
3. the encroachment by about 14 square meters of the
latter's residential house and fence on the right of way.
At the instance of the Clarita Village Association, and the Hence, they wrote that they were giving the latter two
Spouses Bardilas, Engr. Edgar T. Batiquin of the Office alternatives, namely:
of the Building Official of Cebu City, conducted his
verification/investigation of the vicinity of the disputed 1. Pay THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) for
right of way. Engr. Batiquin later on reported to the the 14 square meters which your house and wall fence
Building Official the following findings in his letter dated have encroached (the amount represents ₱2,000.00 per
June 15, 1992,8 to wit: square meter, which is the fair market value of the
property plus P2,000.00 for the expenses the Spouses
Per verification/investigation conducted in connection Bardilas have incurred as a result of the encroachment
with the above subject the findings are to wit: of your property); or

1. That the fence constructed by the association should 2. Demolish the wall fence and the portion of your house
have the which encroached my clients' property.

necessary permit; On August 19, 1992, the Spouses Mercader, through

Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro, responded by insisting that as
2. Said fence encroached a small portion of the road the owners of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A they were equally
right-of-way of Ms. Bardilas (please see attached sketch entitled to the right of way; and that they were proposing
plan, color red); to buy the equivalent portion of the right of way to which
3. That a fence and portion of the redidential house they were entitled at a reasonable price, viz.:  11
owned by Mr. Bernabe Mercader have also encroached Dear Compañero:
the road right-of-way (please see attached sketch plan,
color green); Your letter dated August 14, 1992 addressed to Mr.
Bernabe Mercader has been referred to me for
4. Total area encroached on the right-of-way is 14.00 appropriate response.
square meters.
In this connection, please be informed that my said client
Subsequently, on July 1, 1992, Barangay Chairman is equally entitled to the use of the road-right-of-way
Jose F. Navarro of Punta Princesa, Cebu City convened subject of your letter having bought Lot No. 5808-F-2-A
a meeting among the interested parties at the Chinese which is one of the two dominant estates entitled thereto.
Temple inside the Clarita Village. In attendance were The other estate is Lot No. 5808-F-2-B owned by your
officers of the Clarita Village Association, including clients. Incidentally, this road-right-of-way has not been
petitioner Bernabe Mercader, Jr., and barangay officials. used for its purpose as the exit to Clarita Village has
The Clarita Village Association explained that its closure been closed. Attached herewith is copy of TCT No.
of the right of way had been for the purpose of 107914 for Lot No. 5808-F-2-A as Annex "A".
preventing individuals of "questionable character" from
using the right of way to enter the area to steal from the However, if your client is willing, my client proposes to
residents of the Clarita Village. The meeting resulted in buy the equivalent portion of the road-right-of-way to
the discussion and agreement of the following matters, which they are entitled to at a reasonable price.
to wit:9
Please feel free to communicate with me on this matter.
1) The villagers/Clarita Village Association WILL HAVE
NO OBJECTION for the spouses: Jesus and Letecia In their reply of August 24, 1992, 12 the Spouses Bardilas
Bardilas (on their own expense) (sic) demolish a portion rejected the claim of the Spouses Mercader that they
of the wall fence erected on a portion of Clarita Village were entitled to the use of the right of way, and
side street blocking the said spouses' right of way; - and reiterated their demand for ₱30,000.00 as the fair market
replace with IRON GATE so that they can use it anytime. value of the property, stating:
Buying cost of the iron gate - as well as labor cost in Dear Atty. Navarro:
replacing the knocked out portion of the said wall fence
with iron gate will be shouldered by spouses: Jesus and This is in reply to your letter dated August 19, 1992
Letecia Bardilas. which our office received on August 20, 1992.

2) KEYS TO THE IRON GATE. - One (1) key will be My clients, Spouses Jesus and Letecia Bardilas,
given to the spouses MR. & MRS. BERNABE disagree with Mr. Bernabe Mercader's claim that he is
MERCADER so that at anytime they can open the gate entitled to the use of their road right of way. Attached as
in going thru their residence. ONE (1) key will be kept by Annex "A" is a photocopy of my clients' TCT No. 107915
spouses: Jesus and Letecia Bardilas for their usage in of the property in question which clearly states that my
opening the iron gate anytime they may open it. clients' property is subject to three (3) meters wide right
of way. Mr. Mercader's TCT No 107914, which was
3) All parties present were in accord that the contents of issued on the same day and time as my clients' TCT on
items 1 to 3 STAND as their agreement in solving this March 30, 1989 at 10:10 a.m., don't (sic) have the same
instant case, and also in accord to implement the provision regarding the use of a right of way. This is
agreement as soon as possible. THEY ALSO AGREE because Mr. Mercader's property is fronting the street
THAT IN VIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT, - THEY ALL while my clients' property is situated at the back of Mr.
CONSIDER THIS CASE AMICABLY SETTLED. Mercader's property; hence, the provision regarding the
right of way on my clients' TCT.
It is true that my clients' road right of way has been encroachment on the portion of their property being used
closed since June, 1992 due to a wall constructed by the as right of way only from the survey conducted by Engr.
Clarita Village Association resulting in much Batiquin of the Office of the Building Official in June
inconvenience to my clients since they have to pass 1992;20 and that they then referred the matter to their
through a circuitous and muddy road. However, in a lawyer for appropriate action.
meeting with their Barangay Captain, the officers of the
Clarita Village Association already agreed to let my The Spouses Bardilas stated as affirmative defense that
clients pass through the wall provided they will put up a although the property of the Spouses Mercaders had a
gate between the walls. My clients already have a three gate fronting the side street within the Clarita Village,
(3) meter wide gate ready to be put up only to discover they had allowed the latter to use the right of way only
that it won't fit because Mr. Mercader has encroached because Bernabe Mercader, Jr. was the husband of the
their road right of way. Hence, my letter to Mr. Mercader elder sister of Letecia Gabuya Bardilas; that the
on August 14, 1992, informing him to pay ₱30,000.00 to Spouses Mercader abused the favor by using the right of
my clients or to demolished (sic) his wall fence and way as their garage; that they requested the Spouses
portions of his house which encroached my clients' road Mercader to move their vehicles out but they got angry
right of way. and instigated the closure of the right of way by the
Clarita Village Association, where he was a ranking
Since Mr. Mercader opts to pay my clients, we reiterate officer at the start of the dispute; that the Spouses
our demand for ₱30,000.00 which is the fair market Mercader were wrongly claiming the extinguishment of
value of my clients' property. the right of way; and that the Spouses Mercader had no
cause of action against them, and should be held liable
We hope we could settle this matter within this week. for damages in their favor.
Civil Case No. CEB-12783 During the pre-trial on September 29, 1993, the trial
Finding the demand for payment of ₱30,000.00 by the court required the Spouses Mercader to amend their
Spouses Bardilas to be unlawful, unwarranted and petition to include the children of Bernabe Mercader, Jr.
unfounded, the Spouses Mercader commenced on by his first wife, Rebecca Gabuya Mercader, due to their
September 8, 1992 their action for declaratory relief, being the registered owners of Lot No. 5808-F-1. The
injunction and damages against the Spouses Bardilas in amended petition, dated October 25, 1993, was filed on
the RTC in Cebu City (Civil Case No. CEB-12783). The November 4, 1993.21
case was assigned to Branch 20. Civil Case No. CEB-13384
The Spouses Mercader alleged that they were the lawful In view of the encroachment by the Spouses Mercader
and registered owners of adjoining lots, to wit: Lot No. on a portion of the road right of way, the Spouses
5808-F-1 and Lot No. 5808-F-2-A where their residential Bardilas could not fit their 3-meter wide iron gate.
house stood; 13 and that their Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and Another meeting with the officers of the Clarita Village
the Spouses Bardilas' Lot No. 5805-F-2-B were portions Association was held on November 11, 1992.22 When
of Lot No. 5808-F-2 that had been subdivided and sold the efforts of the parties to amicably settle the issue
separately to each of them; 14 that Lot No. 5808-F-2-A failed, the Spouses Bardilas brought on December 24,
was bounded on the North and the East by Lot No. 1992 their own suit for specific performance with
5808-F-2-B; that in 1989, they had used a negligible preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction against
portion 8f the easement to build their fence and a portion the Clarita Village Association and the Spouses
of their residential house, without impairing the use for Mercader (Civil Case No. CEB-13384) in the RTC in
which it was established and without any objection, Cebu City. The case was raffled to Branch 10 of the
protest or complaint from the respondents; that they RTC.
retained the ownership of the portion of the property on
which the easement was established pursuant to Article On October 5, 1993, the Spouses Bardilas moved for the
630 of the Civil Code;  that the non-user of the easement consolidation of Civil Case No. CEB-13384 with Civil
had extinguished it pursuant to Article 631, paragraph 3, Case No. CEB-12783. The RTC (Branch 10) granted the
of the Civil Code; that the rights of the dominant and motion for consolidation.23
servient estates had merged in them; and that there was
a need to declare their rights to that portion of their Judgment of the RTC
property on which the easement of right of way had been On October 10, 1995, the RTC rendered its consolidated
established vis-a-vis the unlawful demands of the decision in Civil Case No. CEB 12783 and Civil Case
Spouses Bardilas. No. CEB-13384, disposing:24
The Spouses Mercader prayed that they be declared as WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises,
having retained the ownership of the 63.33 square judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner
meters where the easement of right of way had been Mercader's (sic) as against spouses Bardilas in Civil
established; that the merger of the rights of the servient Case No. 12783:
estate owner and dominant estate owner be declared
their favor; 15 and that the Spouses Bardilas be made to (a) DECLARING the EXTINGUISHMENT of the
pay damages. easement of road right of way passing through the real
properties of petitioners spouses Mercader's (sic) and
In their answer, 16 the Spouses Bardilas averred that Lot Bernabe Mercader, Jr. and his children and the
No. 5808-F-2-A and Lot No. 5808-F-2-B used to be parts cancellation of the annotation of said easement from
of Lot No. 5808-F-2; that the right of way in question was TCT No. 107914 and TCT No. 88156;
a part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B that they owned as borne
out by the technical descriptions of Lot No. 5808-F-2- (b) DECLARING petitioner Mercader's (sic) as owners of
A17 and Lot No. 5808-F-2-B 18 as well as the subdivision said extinguished easement of right of way;
plan of the properties; 19 that they learned of the
(c) GRANTING to petitioner Mercader's (sic) the right to I. That the Mercaders are the owners of the easement of
use and occupy the extinguised easement which adjoins right of way in question.
the Mercader's properties;
II. That the easement of right of way in question has
(d) ORDERING respondents spouses, Jesus and been extinguished.
Letecia Bardilas to pay petitioners the following
amounts: III. In granting the Mercaders the right to use and occupy
the extinguished easement which adjoins the Mercaders'
a) The sum of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; properties.

b) The sum of ₱35,000.00 as attorney's fees; and IV. In awarding moral damages, attorney's fees and
costs of suit to the Mercaders in Civil Case No. CEB-
c) The sum of ₱20,000.00 as costs of suit; 12783.
and in Civil Case No.13384: V. In dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-13384 and in
(a) DISMISSING the amended complaint filed by declaring the closure of the road right of way in question
plaintiffs spouses Bardilas; by Clarita Village as lawful and valid.

(b) DECLARING the road network of the Clarita Village On March 18, 2003, the CA promulgated the now
still as private properties and not public; assailed decision,33 modifying the judgment of the RTC
and disposing as follows:
(c) DECLARING that the closure of OUTLET NO. 1 of
said easement of right of way by the Clartita Village as WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY
lawful and valid; GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 20 in Civil Case Nos. CEB-
SO ORDERED. 12783 and CEB-13384 is hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:
On October 19, 1995, the Spouses Bardilas moved for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises,
evidence,25 representing that they had obtained the judgment is hereby rendered in favor of respondents
certification dated August 24, 1995 by Antonio V. Spouses Jesus and Letecia Bardilas as against the
Osmeña, the developer of the Clarita Village and the petitioners Spouses Bernabe and Lorna Mercader,
attorney-in-fact of Carmen and Elena Siguenza, the Oliver Mercader, Geraldine Mercader and Esramay
owners of the Clarita Village,26 to the effect that the road Mercader in Civil Case No. 12783:
network of the Clarita Village had been donated to Cebu
City. "hey appended to the motion the Deed of Donation 1) DECLARING respondents Jesus and Letecia Bardilas
of Road Lots27and the certification dated July 5, as owners of the three (3) square meter wide road in
1995 28 by Antonio B. Sanchez, Department Head III of question;
the Office of the City Engineer, Department of 2) GRANTING to respondents Jesus and Letecia
Engineering and Public Works of Cebu City, stating that Bardilas the right to use and occupy the said three (3)
the road network within the Clarita Village "has been square meter wide road; and
used as part of the road network of the City of Cebu and
as such was asphalted by the city thru F.T. Sanchez 3) ORDERING petitioners to pay the respondents the
Construction in 1980." These documents, according to sum of ₱20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
the Spouses Bardilas, were newly discovered evidence
that they "could not, with reasonable diligence, have 4) ORDERING the petitioners to pay the costs of suit;
discovered and produced at the trial."29 and in Civil Case No. 13384:
On November 13, 1995, 30 the RTC denied the motion 1) DISMISSING the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs
for new trial because: (a) the Deed of Donation of Road Spouses Jesus and Letecia Bardilas; and
Lots  had been in the possession of the movants'
counsel, and had been in fact shown to the court, but 2) DECLARING the road network of the Clarita Village
had neither been offered nor marked as evidence during still as private properties and not public.
the trial; (b) the certifications (Annexes A and C of the
SO ORDERED.
motion for new trial) had derived their existence from
the Deed of Donation of Road Lots, and could not be On April 28, 2003, the Spouses Mercader sought the
considered as newly discovered evidence; (c) the Deed reconsideration of the decision,34 stating that the CA had
of Donation of Road Lots  did not bear the signature of "erred in awarding the 3 meter road right of way to the
then Acting City Mayor Eulogio Borres as the [Spouses Bardilas] and in ordering the respondent
representative of the donee; and (d) the Deed of Mercader spouses, et al. to pay attorney's fees."35 They
Donation of Road Lots had not been notarized. It noted argued that because Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and Lot
that the failure to comply with the legal requirements for No.5808-F-2-B used to be one lot denominated as Lot
donations under the Civil Code rendered the donation No. 5808-F-2 that had the same right of way leading to
void and invalid, and could not alter the result of the the Clarita Village, they "are also legally entitled to the
litigation. other half of the right of way" as owners of one of the
subdivided lots;36 that, as shown in their Exhibit H,37 Lot
With the denial of their motion for new trial, the Spouses
No. 5808-F-3 of the Spouses Bardilas "has another 3
Bardilas appealed to the CA.31
meter road right of way towards another point of Buhisan
Decision of the CA Road which is only about 40 lineal meters"38 from their
property; and that the award of attorney's fees was "not
In their appeals, the Spouses Bardilas insisted that the proper there being no legal basis to grant the award. "39
RTC committed reversible errors in declaring:32
On March 16, 2004, 40 however, the CA denied Spouses 5808-F-2-B,47 which was one of the boundaries defining
Mercader's motion for reconsideration. Lot F-2-A. Moreover, under the Torrens system of
land registration, the certificate of title attests "to the
Hence, this appeal only insofar as Civil Case No. CEB- fact that the person named in the certificate is the
12783 was concemed.41 owner of the property therein described, subject to
Issues such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to
The Spouses Mercaders raise the same issues aired in obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the
their motion for reconsideration in the CA.1âwphi1 They right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and
contend that the technical description of their property to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring
contained the phrase "with existing Right of Way (3.00 further. The Torrens system gives the registered
meters wide)," which signified that they were equally owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will
"entitled to the road-right-of-way being conferred upon be secured in his ownership as long as he has not
them by TITLE pursuant to Article 622 of the New Civil voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered
Code." They submit that: land."48 The Torrens certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title in the particular property
Hence,
described therein.49
they too should equally share in its retention for uses
What really defines a piece of land is not the area
other than the easement after its non-user brought about
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries
by the closure of the exit point by Clarita Village
therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
Association. As borne out by the evidence, the
indicating its limits.50 As shown in the subdivision plan
respective properties of petitioners Sps. Bernabe and
of Lot No. 5808-F-2,51 and based on the technical
Lorna Mercader, on one hand, and Sps. Jesus and
description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B as appearing in TCT
Letecia Bardilas, on the other hand, used to be a whole
No. 107915,52 the right of way in dispute, which is
Lot 5808-F-2 with an area of 338 square meters before
"(B)ounded on the SW., along line 1-2 by Lot 5808-F-J,
the same was subdivided into Lot 5808-F-2-A with an
Psd-07-01-004579; on the West along line 2-3 by Lot
area of 89 square meters for the petitioner spouses and
5726, Cebu Cad.; on the North along line 3-4-5 by Lot
Lot 5808-F-2-B with an area of 249 square meters for
5725, Cebu Cadastre" was part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of
the respondents. Before the subdivision, there was
the Spouses Bardilas.
already a 3-meter wide road right of way leading towards
Clarita Village. Thus, after the subdivision, the subject It is noteworthy that an encumbrance "subject to 3
easement was annotated in both certificates of title as meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No.
earlier stated. Very clearly, petitioners Bernabe and 107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the
Lorna Mercader, and respondents Jesus and Letecia Spouses Bardilas.53 As the owners of the servient estate,
Bardilas, should equally share in the area of the the Spouses Bardilas retained ownership of the road
easement. Consequently, the petitioners cannot be right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was
ordered to return the portion of easement on which part for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Spouses
of petitioners' house and fence stand. 42 Mercader. The latter could not claim to own even a
portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of
Ruling of the Court
the Civil Code  expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the
We cannot sustain the petitioners' claim that they servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which
acquired their right to the road right of way by title. the easement is established, and may use the same in
such manner as not to affect the exercise of the
Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. easement."
Tabisula,43is "a real right constituted on another's
property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the
the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to owners of the burdened property, the Spouses Bardilas
allow somebody else to do something on his property for remained entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes
the benefit of another thing or person." "It exists only of ownership under the Civil Code, specifically: jus
when the servient and dominant estates belong to two utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, jus disponendi and jus
different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an vindicandi. Article 428 of the Civil Code  recognizes that
incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement without other limitations than those established by
is an admission that the property belongs to another. "44 law. 54 In that regard, the CA cogently pointed out:55

It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous Moreover, as owners of the three (3) square meter wide
apparent easement45 in the context of Article 622 of road in dispute, the appellants (referring to the Bardilas
the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non- spouses) may rightfully compel the petitioners-appellees
apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether to pay to them the value of the land upon which a portion
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. of their (petitioners-appellees) house encroaches, and in
But the phrase with existing Right of Way  in the TCT case the petitioners-appellees fail to pay, the appellants
is not one of the modes of acquisition of the may remove or demolish the encroaching portion of the
easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of petitioners-appellees' house. xxxx
title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the
The second issue concerns the award of attorney's fees.
juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as
Relying on Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, (Special Sixth
law, donation, contract, and will of the testator."46
Division),56the petitioners argue that the CA erred "in
A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F- awarding attorney's fees to the appellants after
2-A indicates that the phrase with existing Right of Way eliminating or refusing to award moral and exemplary
(3.00 meters wide)  referred to or described Lot No. damages;"57 that the CA did not make any finding to the
effect "that the appellants were compelled to litigate with In Benedicto v. Villaflores, we explained the reason
third persons or to incur expenses to protect their behind the need for the courts to arrive upon an actual
interest;"58 and that, consequently, the grant of attorneys' finding to serve as basis for a grant of attorney's fees,
fees to the Spouses Bardillas lacked legal basis. considering the dual concept of these fees as ordinary
and extraordinary:
The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is
governed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code,  to wit: It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the
exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, because of the policy that no premium should be placed
cannot be recovered, except: on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of
(1) When exemplary damages is awarded; damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount
paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense,
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he
expenses to protect his interest; has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary
concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
for damages to be paid by the losing party to the
plaintiff;
prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil case or awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of
proceeding against the plaintiff; the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to
make findings of fact and law that would bring the case
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be
and demandable claim; reasonable.
(6) In actions for legal support; We can glean from the above ruling that attorney's fees
are not awarded as a matter of course every time a party
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
wins. We do not put a premium on the right to litigate.
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
On occasions that those fees are awarded, the basis for
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's the grant must be clearly expressed in the decision of
compensation and employer's liability laws; the court.

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability In awarding attorney's fees, the CA relied on Article 2208
arising from a crime; (11) of the Civil Code.  The exercise of the discretion to
allow attorney's fees must likewise be justified.
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.  v. Margarine-Verkaufs-
Union,  60 the Court said:
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation Insofar as the present case is concerned, the lower court
should be recovered. made no finding that it falls within any of the exceptions
that would justify the award of attorney's fees, such as
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy a plainly
litigation must be reasonable.
valid, just and demandable claim. Even under the broad
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC eleventh exception of the cited article which allows the
Marketing Corporation,59 the Court opined that whenever imposition of attorney's fees "in any other case where
attorney's fees are granted, the basis for the grant must the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
be clearly expressed in the judgment of the court. It and expenses in litigation should be recovered," the
expounded on why this is so: Court stressed in Buan, supra, that "the conclusion must
be borne out by findings of facts and law. What is just
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, this Court had and equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of
the occasion to expound on the policy behind the grant feeling but of demonstration . . . . Hence, the exercise of
of attorney's fees as actual or compensatory damages: judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under
(T)he law is clear the in the absence of stipulation, Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code demands a factual,
attorney's fees may be recovered as actual or legal or equitable justification upon the basis of which
compensatory damages under any of the circumstance the court exercises its discretion. Without such
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise,
its basis being improperly left to speculation and
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be conjecture." The summary award of counsel's fees made
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that in the appealed judgment must therefore be set aside.
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a Considering that the decision of the CA does not
suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees express any justification other than stating that attorney's
under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable fees were being awarded to the respondents "pursuant
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to to paragraph 11 of Article 2208 of the New Civil
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect Code," the award by the CA must be set aside;
his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where otherwise, attorney's fees would be turned into a
no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a premium on the right to litigate, which is prohibited.
party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous Moreover, attorney's fees, being in the nature of actual
conviction of the righteousness of his cause. damages, should be based on the facts on record and
the Court must delineate the legal reason for such
award.61

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment

promulgated on March 18, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
53153 with respect to Civil Case No. CEB-12783 subject
to the MODIFICATION that the portion "ordering
petitioners to pay the respondents the sum of
₱20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees"
is DELETED; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Branch 31, ordered respondents, their agents and
representatives to cease and desist from placing
barricades on the disputed road.9

In their Answer,10 respondents denied having entered

into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the
construction and the use of the disputed road. They
[G.R. NO. 172077 : October 9, 2009] alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their
knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS
on their properties and has since then intermittently and
COOPERATIVE, INC.
discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling
(BAPCI), Petitioner, v. EDMUNDO O. OBIAS,
sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents
PERFECTO O. OBIAS, VICTOR BAGASINA, ELENA
claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction
BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES, ROGELIO
and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a
MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI,
government-owned and controlled corporation, and the
PILAR GALON, ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO
entire country was then under Martial Law. Respondents
BENOSA, JR., MARIA VILLAMER and ROBERTO
likewise denied that the road has become a public road,
PADUA, Respondent.
since no public funds were used for its construction and
DECISION maintenance. Moreover, respondents alleged that with
the exception of Edmundo and Perfecto Obias, they are
PERALTA, J.: actual tillers of the ricelands, having acquired their rights
over said lands under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
27). Edmundo and Perfecto Obias are the owners of the
on Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
eastern portion of the property on which a portion of the
seeking to set aside the August 24, 2005 Decision2 and
road going to BISUDECO was constructed.
March 28, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Respondents denied that they barricaded the road.11
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59016.
Jaime Manubay and Manolito Maralit, for themselves
The facts of the case:
and in representation of other sugarcane planters, filed
Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development the first complaint-in-intervention.12
Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at Himaao,
Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint13 and with leave
Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO
of court a Re-Amended Complaint,14 where it averred, as
constructed a road ("the disputed road") - measuring
an alternative cause of action in the event the lower
approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long.
court does not find merit in its causes of action, that it
The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling
will avail of the benefits provided for under Article
and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site
64915 of the New Civil Code. Petitioner thus demanded
(Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its
from respondents a right of way over the disputed road
sugar milling operations.4
for its use.16
On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial
Respondents filed an Answer17 to refute petitioner's
Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of
alternative cause of action. Respondents claimed that
BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a
the road from the sugarmill to the Maharlika Highway at
Complaint5 against respondents Edmundo Obias,
Barangay Romero, Bula, Camarines Sur, which exits at
Perfecto Obias, Victor Bagasina, Elena Benosa, Melchor
the Rural Bank of Bula site, had a distance of only about
Brandes, Rogelio Montero, Pedro Montero, Claudio
15 kilometers; hence, respondents asserted that said
Resari, Pilar Galon, Antonio Buison, Prudencio Benosa,
road was shorter and was a more appropriate right of
Jr., Victor Bagasina Jr., Maria Villamer, and Roberto
way than the disputed road.18
Padua, alleging that on March 27, 1993 and April 3,
1993, respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed On July 21, 1993, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary
road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones Injunction19 ordering the respondents to desist from
across it, preventing petitioner's and the other sugar constructing barricades across the road.
planter's vehicles from passing through the disputed
road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to On June 28, 1994, nine other cooperatives20 filed their
petitioner.6 Complaint-in-Intervention.21

Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the On June 25, 1997 the RTC rendered a Decision,22 the
disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners dispositive portion of which reads:
of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is
provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and
hereby rendered declaring the Writ of Preliminary
relatives of the landowners in exchange for the
Injunction issued against all the herein defendants, their
construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner
agents, representatives and such other persons acting in
contends that through prolonged and continuous use of
their behalf, permanent and perpetual BUT the plaintiff
the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way
Bicol Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc., (BAPCI) is
over the properties of the landowners, which right of way
hereby ordered to pay the owners of the lots affected by
in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO's
the road, viz: Pedro Montero - P299,040.00; Pedro
assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be
Galon - P52,920.00; Clara Padua - P46,410.00; Antonio
permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the
Buizon - P35,070.00; Rogelio Montero - P41,160.00;
disputed road and from obstructing its free passage.7
Maria Villamer - P41,580.00; Melchor Brandes
In an Order8 dated April 19, 1993, the Regional Trial - P76,440.00; Prudencio Benosa - P41, 650.00; Elena
Court of Pili (RTC), Camarines Sur, 5th Judicial Region, Benosa - P39,550.00; Victor Bagasina, Jr. - P39,410.00;
and Claudio Resari - P40,950.00. Upon full payment and the latter was not a party to the proceedings
thereof, the plaintiff shall be declared the absolute owner below.33
of the road in question. Legal rate if interest is hereby
imposed upon the plaintiff from the finality of this Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
decision until fully payment hereof. No costs. alleging among others that the CA Decision failed to rule
on the issue of estoppel and laches. Moreover, Benosa
SO ORDERED.23 and Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing
the portion of the CA Decision deleting the award of
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any indemnity to them. On March 28, 2006, the CA issued a
concrete evidence to prove that there was an agreement Resolution denying the same.
between BISUDECO and respondents for the
construction of the disputed road.24 Moreover, it held that Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the
petitioner did not acquire the same by prescription.25 The following assignment of errors, to wit:
RTC, however, also held that petitioner was entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way as provided for I.
under Article 649 of the New Civil Code upon payment of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
proper indemnity to respondents.26 SERIOUSLY IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS
Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration of the FORGED AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BISUDECO
RTC Decision. Petitioner contended that: (1) the value of MANAGEMENT AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
the land is excessive; (2) the evidence is insufficient to FOR THE CONTRUCTION OF THE ROAD IN
justify the award; (3) the decision is contrary to law and QUESTION.
jurisprudence. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged II.
that: (1) the trial court erred in declaring the persons
mentioned in the decision's dispositive portion to be THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF
entitled to indemnity for the construction and the use of APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
the disputed road; (2) BAPCI should not be declared the PRINCIPLES OF PRESCRIPTION, LACHES AND
absolute owner of the disputed road upon full payment of ESTOPPEL IN THE CASE AT BAR.
the indemnity due to the defendants; and (3) the
III.
decision failed to award damages.27
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
On September 24, 1997, the RTC denied both motions
COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE
for reconsideration.28 The parties then appealed to the
CLASSIFICATION OF THE ROAD IN QUESTION AS
CA.
BARANGAY ROAD.
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision, the
IV.
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION, THE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
CONSIDERING THE VALUATION OF THE LANDS
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Pili, Camarines Sur, in
AFFECTED BY THE ROAD IN 1994, AND NOT IN
Civil Case No. P-1899 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1974, WHEN SAID ROAD WAS CONSTRUCTED.
the awards of Php46,410.00 to Clara Padua and
Php41,650.00 to Prudencio Benosa are hereby V.
DELETED, and the declaration that the plaintiff BAPCI
shall become the absolute owner of the disputed road THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED
upon full payment of indemnity is REVERSED and SET SERIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED ALSO TO CONSIDER
ASIDE. Accordingly, the owners of the servient estate in THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRIGHTMENT
the easement of right of way recognized in this Decision AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER.34
shall retain ownership of the lands affected by the
At the outset, this Court shall address some procedural
easement in accordance with Art. 630 of the Civil Code.
matters. Quite noticeably, herein petition is denominated
We hereby AFFIRM the appeal in all other respects.
as one filed under Rule 6535 of the Rules of Court
SO ORDERED.29 notwithstanding that it seeks to assail the Decision and
Resolution of the CA. Clearly, petitioner had availed of
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was the improper remedy as the appeal from a final
no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence disposition of the CA is a Petition for Review under Rule
of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
regarding the construction of the disputed Rules of Court.36
road.30 Moreover, the CA also declared that an
easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such In Active Realty and Development Corporation v.
cannot be acquired by prescription.31 The CA likewise Fernandez,37 this Court discussed the difference
affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was between petitions filed under Rule 65 and Rule 45, viz:
entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way upon
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper to
payment of proper indemnity to respondents. The CA,
correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower
however, declared that ownership over the disputed road
court, or grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount
should remain with respondents, despite the grant of a
to lack of jurisdiction. This remedy can be availed of
compulsory easement.32 Lastly, the CA deleted the
when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
awards to Prudencio Benosa (Benosa) and Clara Padua
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
(Padua), since the former never claimed ownership of
any portion of the lands affected by the disputed road Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
on the other hand, is a mode of appeal available to a
party desiring to raise only questions of law from a Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of the disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it was
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by
other courts whenever authorized by law. an agreement with the owners of the lands that said road
traversed.
x x x The general rule is that the remedy to obtain
reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the
appeal. Thus, the proper remedy for the petitioner alleged agreement, petitioner posits that they presented
should have been a Petition for Review circumstantial evidence which, if taken collectively,
on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court since would prove its existence.41 Specifically, petitioner cites
the decision sought to be reversed is that of the CA. The the following circumstances, to wit:
existence and availability of the right of appeal
proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the A. The agreement was of public knowledge.42 Allegedly
requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that BISUDECO and respondents entered into an agreement
"there should be no appeal. The remedy of appeal under for the construction of the road provided that the latter,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was still available to the their children or relatives were employed with
petitioner.38 BISUDECO.

Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions b. The road was continuously used by BISUDECO and
of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the public in general.43
the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be c. There was no protest or complaint from respondents
appealed to this Court by filing a Petition for Review, for almost a period of two decades.44
which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case.39 Moreover, it is basic d. The portions of the land formerly belonging to
that one cannot avail of the remedy provided for under respondents affected by the road were already
Rule 65 when an appeal is still available. Hence, segregated and surveyed from the main lots.45
petitioner should have filed its petition under Rule 45.
e. The road in dispute is already a barangay road.
The procedural infirmity notwithstanding and in the
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only
interest of substantial justice, this Court shall consider
questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a
herein petition as one filed under Rule 45 especially
Petition for Review on Certiorari . This rule, however, is
since it was filed well within the reglementary period
not iron-clad and admits certain exceptions, such as
proscribed under the said Rule. The Court also takes
when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
notice that the assignment of errors raised by petitioner
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
does not allege grave abuse of discretion or lack of
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse
jurisdiction on the part of the CA.
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
On the Existence of an Agreement between misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
BISUDECO and Respondents conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of
Anent the first error raised, petitioner argues that the CA absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
erred in not finding that BISUDECO and respondents evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of
forged an agreement for the construction of the road in Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
dispute. Petitioner thus asserts its entitlement to an Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
easement of right of way over the properties of and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
respondents by virtue of said agreement. justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
An easement of right of way was succinctly explained by Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
the CA in the following manner, to wit: (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.46
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds
belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement no justification to warrant the application of any
is established either by law (in which case it is a legal exception to the general rule.
easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary Crucial to the petitioner's cause was its burden of
easement). In terms of use, easement may either be proving the existence of the alleged agreement between
continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the
way ' the privilege of persons or a particular class of road. In this regard, the RTC found that petitioner failed
persons to pass over another's land, usually through to prove its existence, to wit:
one particular path or linen - is characterized as
a discontinuous easement because its use is in It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete
intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of evidence to prove that there was such an agreement
this character, an easement of a right of way may between BISUDECO and defendants. Hereunder quoted
only be acquired by virtue of a title.40 are the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses regarding the
alleged agreement.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in
the case at bar, viz: Romeo Deveterbo, Transportation Superintendent of
BISUDECO testified'
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be Cross Examination by Atty. Pejo
acquired only by virtue of a title.
Q: You also mentioned that there was an agreement COURT: You mean Himaao Millsite road?cralawred
between Senator Cea, Mr. Obias and some of the
tenants?cralawred A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes. Atty. Carandang:

Q: You mentioned that this was not in writing, am I right? Q: What arrangement is that supposedly filed to you?
cralawred cralawred

A: Yes. A: She told me in exchange for the use of the road, the
relatives or owners or tenants of the land will be hired by
Q: How did you know about it that it was not in writing, the sugar Central?cralawred
who told you, Senator Cea?cralawred
COURT:
A: It was commonly known to all original employees of
the BISUDECO. Q: So, only the tenants not the owners?cralawred

Q: You know it from the management?cralawred A: The tenant's children the road belongs.

A: From co-employees. xxx

Q: You learned about that agreement from you co- Finally, intervenor Antonio Austria, in trying to show you
employees?cralawred that there was consent and approval on the part of the
defendant Edmundo Obias to give the right of way to
A: Yes. BISUDECO at the time to be used in hauling the
sugarcane of the planters to the Central, averred the
Q: In other words, therefore, that is why you said you are following uncertain statements:
confused between Edmundo Cea and Perfecto Obias
because you just learned it from other employees and A: Well, he has (sic) having a case against PENSUNIL,
you were never present when they talked about it, am I regarding the property I think the right of way going to
right?cralawred PENSUMIL right now we discuss it and he said he is
allowing it anymore but then I reminded him wayback in
A: Yes. x x x 1974 to 1980 he was one of the biggest planters in the
To this effect also is the testimony of Angel Lobo, head part of Partido so he consented to the late I think
of the agricultural Department of BAPCI, to wit: Edmundo Cea, the owner of BISUDECO at that time to
pass his property since he is also milling a lot of things at
A: Yes, your Honor?cralawred that time and many other things one of the concession
mill was I think some of the tenants there in Himaao will
COURT: From where did you learn?cralawred
be employed in the mill.
A: From people whom I talked with at that time and it is a
xxx
public common knowledge at that time.
These aforequoted testimonies of the plaintiff's
xxx
witnesses failed to satisfactorily establish the plaintiff's
Atty. Carandang: I repeat my question, Your Honor. contention that there was such an agreement. Likewise,
the list of the Employees of Defendants' relatives,
You said you acquired it from or because of common son/daughter employed by the BISUDECO (Exhibit H)
knowledge and you mentioned some people. Who are does not in any manner prove the alleged agreement.47
those people you are referring to whom you acquired
that knowledge?cralawred For its part, the CA also ruled that petitioner failed to
prove the existence of the said agreement, to wit:
A: Most of all, the late Benjamin Bagasina, Barangay
Captain at that time who was our employee in Like the lower court, we found no conclusive proof to
consideration of this agreement, then we have also a sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement
Civil Engineering Head, Civil Engineering Department between BISUDECO and the defendants-appellants
who is responsible for the maintenance of this road. I regarding the construction and the use of the disputed
learned from him that this arrangement established the road. The lower court correctly disbelieved the plaintiffs-
fact why this road was constructed. appellants' contention that an agreement existed
because there is simply no direct evidence to support
Q: Who is the head of the Engineering Dept? this allegation. BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial
evidence that are not sufficiently adequate as basis for
xxx
the inference than an agreement existed. By
COURT: May answer. themselves, the circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants
cited - i.e., the employment of sixteen (16) relatives of
A: Engineer Pablo Tordilla who was then the head of our the defendants-appellants; the defendants-appellants'
Civil Engineering Dept. unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of the
agreement is known to everyone, etc. - are events
But this Engineer Pablo Tordilla, Lobo's alleged source
susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not
of the information, was never presented in Court. And,
necessarily lead to BAPCI's desired conclusion.
according to the Chief Accountant of BAPCI, David
Additionally, the testimonies that the plaintiffs-appellants
Severo:
presented are mainly hearsay, as not one among the
A: When I was interviewing Mrs. Alma Montero Penaflor witnesses had personal knowledge of the agreement by
she filed to me a certain arrangement related to the used reason of direct participation in the agreement or
of the land to Himaao as road going to the central. because the witness was present when the agreement
was concluded by the parties. Thus, given the for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of
defendants-appellants' categorical denial that an right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because
agreement existed, we sustain the lower's conclusion the right is exercised only if and when a train operated
that no agreement existed between BISUDECO and the by a person passes over another's property. In other
defendants-appellants.48 words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon
the act or intervention of man which is the very essence
Based on the foregoing, the inability of petitioner to of discontinuous easements.
prove the existence of an agreement militates its
allegations in herein petition. On this score, both the The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks
RTC and the CA are one in ruling that petitioner had does not, in any way, convert the nature of an easement
failed to prove the existence of the agreement between of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the
BISUDECO and the respondents for the construction of presence of apparent signs or physical
the road. Also, well-established is the rule that "factual indications showing the existence of an easement, but
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes
parties and carry even more weight when the said court such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The
affirms the factual findings of the trial court."49 Hence, presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
this Court finds no reason to reverse such findings. easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road
(which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
On Acquisition by Prescription evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
Petitioner would have this Court re-examine Costabella easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
Corporation v. Court of Appeals50 (Costabella) where the certain height is non-apparent.
Court held that, "It is already well-established that a right In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of
of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be a permanent railway does not make the right of way a
acquired by prescription."51 Petitioner contends that continuous one; it is only apparent. Therefore, it cannot
some recognized authorities52 share its view that an be acquired by prescription. In Louisiana, it has also
easement of right of way may be acquired by been held that a right of passage over another's land
prescription. cannot be claimed by prescription because this
Be that as it may, this Court finds no reason to re- easement is discontinuous and can be established only
examine Costabella. This Court is guided by Bogo- by title.
Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals53 (Bogo- In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the
Medellin), involving the construction of a railroad track to passage of petitioner's trains denotes the existence of an
a sugar mill. In Bogo-Medellin, this Court discussed the apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
discontinuous nature of an easement of right of way and And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
the rule that the same cannot be acquired by easements, whether apparent or not, may be
prescription, to wit: acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right
by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. of way whether by law, donation, testamentary
succession or contract. Its use of the right of way,
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the
view for the reason that the railroad right of way was, easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous
according to them, continuous and apparent  in nature. easement of a railroad right of way can only be
The more or less permanent railroad tracks were acquired by title and not by prescription.54
visually apparent and they continuously  occupied the
subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the
granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). conclusion is inevitable that the road in dispute is a
Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period in discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same
1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the easement of may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are either
right of way over the subject land. continuous or discontinuous according to the manner
they are exercised, not according to the presence of
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of
use of vehicles or the passage of persons is such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has
permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of been improved and maintained over a number of years,
way over it becomes continuous in nature. The it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply
reasoning is erroneous. make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the
New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements,
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue
either continuous or discontinuous according to the
of a title.
manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the On Laches and Estoppel
existence of such easements. Thus, easement is
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the Petitioner argues that estoppel and laches bar
intervention of any act of man, like the easement of respondents from exercising ownership rights over the
drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals properties traversed by the road in dispute. In support of
and depends on the act of man, like the easement of said argument, petitioner posits that BISUDECO had
right of way. been peacefully and continuously using the road without
any complaint or opposition on the part of the
The easement of right of way is considered respondents for almost twenty years. Respondents, on
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person the other hand, claim that they merely tolerated the use
passes or sets foot on somebody else's land. Like a road of their land as BISUDECO was a government-owned
and controlled corporation and considering that the did not present any evidence that would show an
disputed road was constructed during the time of Martial admission, representation or conduct by respondents
Law. that will give rise to estoppel.59

There is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is Classification of the Road in Dispute as a Barangay
a rule of equity and applied not to penalize neglect or Road
sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing
a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it disregarded
situation. The question of laches is addressed to the the classification of the road in question as a barangay
sound discretion of the court and each case must be road. In support of said argument, petitioner presented
decided according to its particular circumstances.55 It is Exhibit Q, a Tax Declaration or Field Appraisal and
the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, Assessment Sheet60 (1991 FAAS) with Survey Number
should not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of 1688-40 and PIN No. 026-01-009-08-037, dated April
limitations or the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice 30, 1991, which they claim proves that the road in
will result.56 dispute is already a barangay road.

In herein petition, the CA denied petitioner's argument in The same is again a question of fact which cannot be
the wise: the proper subject of herein petition. Petitioner cannot
have this Court re-examine the evidentiary value of the
As previously explained in our Decision, the applicable documents it presented before the RTC as the same is
law is Article 622 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, not a function of this Court. In any case, after a closer
which provides: scrutiny of the 1991 FAAS, this Court holds that the
same is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim.
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be Respondents, in their Comment,61 argue against the
acquired only by virtue of a title. classification of the road in dispute as a barangay road
in the wise:
The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino,
opines that this provision seeks to prevent the imposition Petitioner also stated that the Honorable Court of
of a burden on a tenement based purely on the Appeals fails to consider the fact that the owner of the
generosity, tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of the road in question is the Municipality of Pili in the Province
owners thereof. of Camarines Sur and as proof of such claim they
presented and marked as Exhibit Q, tax declaration no.
We applied the cited provision to the case in ruling that 009-756 or Annex D of their Petition. However, private
no easement of right of way was acquired; based on the respondents wish to call the attention of this Honorable
evidence presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed to Court to the following:
satisfactorily prove the existence of an agreement
evidencing any right or title to use the disputed road. We A. Tax Declaration No. 009-828 attached as Annex C-6
additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellant's position that of the Verified Petition declared in the name of Edmundo
it had acquired the easement of right of way through Obias (one of the private respondents);
acquisitive prescription, as settled jurisprudence states
that an easement of right of way cannot be acquired by b. Actual Use portion of said Annex C-6 marked as Exh.
prescription. No. N-6-a-1 which states "Road Lot (BISUDECO Road)";
andcralawlibrary
We hold the same view on the issue of acquisition of an
easement of right of way by laches. To our mind, settled c. The Memoranda portion in the second page of Annex
jurisprudence on the application of the principle of C-6 which states: "Revised to declare the property in
estoppel by laches militates against the acquisition of an The name of the rightful owner, Edmundo Obias based
easement of right of way by laches. from the approved subdivision plan, Bsd-05-000055
(OLT) & technical descriptions. Likewise area was made
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are to conform with the said subdivision plan from 4,773
basically courts of law and not courts of equity; equity, sq.m. to 11,209 sq.m.
which has been aptly described as "justice outside
legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and Obviously, the alleged Exhibit Q of the Petitioner is an
never against, statutory law; Aeguetas nunguam erroneous tax declaration, thus, negates the claim of the
contravenit legis. Based on this principle, we find that the Petitioner that the same is owned by the Municipality of
positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code - the Pili and has been declared a barangay road. Private
statutory provision requiring title as basis for the respondents cannot understand why the herein
acquisition of an easement of a right of way - precludes Petitioner alleged this matter and used it as a proof to
the application of the equitable principle of laches.57 support their claim when they are already in possession
of a tax declaration correcting the same and even
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is attached the same as part of their Petition.62
categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be
acquired by prescription militates against petitioner's In its Reply,63 petitioner counters:
claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can II. While Petitioners claim that the road belongs to the
only be acquired by title. More importantly, whether or Municipal Government of Pili, yet what they attached to
not the elements of laches are present is a question the Petition as Annex "C-7" is a tax declaration of
involving a factual determination by the trial Edmundo Obias. Petitioners have the following
court.58 Hence, the same being a question of fact, it observations:
cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. On the
other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court xxx
likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that petitioner
(b) That land of Edmundo Obias covered by Annex "C-6"
to the Petition is not included or involved in this case at
bar. His name does not appear to be awarded in the
Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals and also in
the list of beneficiaries to receive monetary
considerations made by Mr. Angel Lobo.64

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court is

more inclined to believe the claim of respondents. The
claim of petitioner to the effect that the land of Edmundo
Obias is not included in the case at bar is misleading. It
may be true that Edmundo was not awarded indemnity
by the lower courts, however, the same does not mean
that his lands do not form part of the subject matter of
herein petition.

It bears to stress that Edmundo claimed in the CA that

he was the owner of the affected ricelands and that
respondents were merely his tenants-beneficiaries under
PD 27, otherwise known as the Tenant Emancipation
Decree.65 The CA, however, dismissed said claim
because it was raised for the first time on appeal. It also
held that the averments in the documents submitted by
Edmundo in the RTC described respondents as
"owners" of the land they till; hence, the same
constituted binding judicial admissions.66

Based on the foregoing, petitioner's attempt to refute the

contents of the 1995 FAAS by claiming that the lands of
Edmundo are not involved in the case at bar must fail. It
is clear that respondents are the tenant-beneficiaries of
the lands of Edmundo under PD 27; hence, contrary to
the claim of petitioner, the lands of Edmundo are the
subject matter of herein petition.

In addition, it is curious that petitioner relies on the 1991

FAAS yet finds exception to the contents of the 1995
FAAS. After a closer scrutiny of both documents, it
appears to this Court that the land described in the 1991
FAAS is also the same land described in the 1995
FAAS. Both FAAS involve land measuring 4,773 square
meters. Likewise, both FAAS have the same PIN
Number (026-01-009-08-037) and Survey Number
(1688-40). Accordingly, the annotation contained in the
1995 FAAS, to the effect that a "BISUDECO road" does
not belong to the Municipality of Pili, serves to weaken
petitioner's claim.???
 1. The dominant estate is a property enclosed with a
concrete fence with no less than three (3) doors in it,
opening to an alley belonging to the servient estate
owned by the petitioner. The alley is leading to Matienza
St.;

2. The dominant estate has a house built thereon and

said house has a very wide door accessible to Matienza
St. without any obstruction. Said street is perpendicular
G.R. No. 173252               July 17, 2009
to J.P. Laurel St.
UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
It is therefore found that the dominant estate has an
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
egress to Matienza St. and does not have to use the
vs.
servient estate.10
JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO
CHUNG, Respondents. In their Answer,11 respondents countered that the
extinguishment of the easement will be of great
DECISION
prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of
QUISUMBING, J.: laches since it took petitioner 15 years from acquisition
of the property to file the petition.
The instant petition assails the Decision1 dated October
27, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated June 19, 2006 of the In a Decision dated August 19, 2002, the trial court
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76213. The ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of
appellate court had reversed and set aside the voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the
Decision3 dated August 19, 2002 of the Regional Trial dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the
Court of Manila, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. 00-97526. dominant estate has no more use for the easement
since it has another adequate outlet to a public road
The antecedent facts are as follows: which is Matienza Street. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development
Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. orders the cancellation of the Memorandum of
1762534 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title Encumbrance annotated in TCT No. 176253 which
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary granted a right of way in favor of the person named
easement which has been carried over from the Original therein and, upon the finality of this decision, the
Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The Register of Deeds of the City of Manila is hereby
certified English translation5 of the annotation reads: directed to cancel said encumbrance.
By order dated 08 October 1924 of the Court of First With respect to the other prayers in the petition,
Instance of Manila, Chamber IV (AP-7571/T-23046), it is considering that the same are mere incidents to the
declared that Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico has the right exercise by the owners of right of their ownership which
to open doors in the course of his lot described as Lot they could well do without the Court’s intervention, this
No. 2, Block 2650 of the map that has been exhibited, Court sees no need to specifically rule thereon. The
towards the left of the Callejon that is used as a passage Court cannot award plaintiff’s claims for damages and
and that appears as adjacent to the said Lot 2 and to attorney’s fees for lack of sufficient bases therefor.
pass through the land of Encarnacion Sandico y
Santana, until the bank of the estero that goes to the SO ORDERED.12
Pasig River, and towards the right of the other Callejon
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
that is situated between the said Lot 2 and Lot 4 of the
October 27, 2005, the appellate court reversed the
same Block N.6
decision of the trial court and dismissed the petition to
As Sandico’s property was transferred to several cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right
owners, the memorandum of encumbrance of a of way.
voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was
The appellate court ruled that when petitioner’s petition
consistently annotated at the back of every title covering
was initially dismissed by the executive judge, the copy
Sandico’s property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in
of the petition and the summons had not yet been
petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property
served on respondents. Thus, when petitioner moved to
was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph
reconsider the order of dismissal, there was no need for
Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No.
a notice of hearing and proof of service upon
121488.7
respondents since the trial court has not yet acquired
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the jurisdiction over them. The trial court acquired
Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of jurisdiction over the case and over respondents only
Way8 on the ground that the dominant estate has an after the summons was served upon them and they were
adequate access to a public road which is Matienza later given ample opportunity to present their evidence.
Street. The trial court dismissed the petition on the
The appellate court also held that the trial court erred in
ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner
canceling the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court
right of way. The appellate court ruled that Article
conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an
631(3)13 of the Civil Code, which was cited by the trial
Order9 dated November 24, 2000, the trial court granted
court, is inapplicable since the presence of an adequate
the motion and made the following observations:
outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal or
compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like
in the instant case. There having been an agreement the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter,
between the original parties for the provision of an voluntary easements.17
easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate,
the same can be extinguished only by mutual agreement In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary
or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. easement of right of way exists in favor of
respondents.1avvphi1 In its petition to cancel the
The decretal portion of the decision reads: encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way,
petitioner alleged that "[t]he easement is personal. It was
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco
hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision is Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition Lot No. 2, Block 2650."18 It further stated that "the
to cancel the encumbrance of right of way is dismissed voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of
for lack of merit. Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by
No costs. will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory
easement and definitely not an easement created by
SO ORDERED.14 such court order because ‘[the] Court merely declares
the existence of an easement created by the
Before us, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals
parties."19 In its Memorandum20 dated September 27,
erred in:
2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that
I. "[t]he annotation found at the back of the TCT of
Unisource is a voluntary easement."21
… BRUSHING ASIDE PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
THAT THE EASEMENT IS PERSONAL SINCE THE Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now
ANNOTATION DID NOT PROVIDE THAT IT IS claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the
BINDING ON THE HEIRS OR ASSIGNS OF SANDICO. same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is
not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to
II. a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street.22 As we
have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a
… NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EASEMENT IS
highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
PERSONAL SINCE NO COMPENSATION WAS GIVEN
easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at
TO PETITIONER.
bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also
III. qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract
from its permanency as a property right, which survives
… DISREGARDING THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION ON the termination of the necessity.23 A voluntary easement
UNJUST ENRICHMENT. of right of way, like any other contract, could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
IV.
renunciation of the owner of the dominant
… TREATING THE EASEMENT AS PREDIAL.15 estate.241avvphi1

Petitioner contends that the fact that Sandico and Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is
Hidalgo resorted to judicial intervention only shows that personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely
they contested the existence of the requisite factors mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding
establishing a legal easement. Besides, the annotation their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the
itself provides that the easement is exclusively confined parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not
to the parties mentioned therein, i.e., Sandico and mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary
Hidalgo. It was not meant to bind their heirs or assigns; easement of right of way is like any other contract. As
otherwise, they would have expressly provided for it. such, it is generally effective between the parties, their
Petitioner adds that it would be an unjust enrichment on heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and
respondents’ part to continue enjoying the easement obligations arising from the contract are not
without adequate compensation to petitioner. Petitioner transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
also avers that to say that the easement has attached to provision of law.25 Petitioner cites City of Manila v.
Hidalgo’s property is erroneous since such property no Entote26 in justifying that the easement should bind only
longer exists after it has been subdivided and registered the parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so
in respondents’ respective names.16 Petitioner further mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable since the
argues that even if it is bound by the easement, the issue therein was whether the easement was intended
same can be cancelled or revoked since the dominant not only for the benefit of the owners of the dominant
estate has an adequate outlet without having to pass estate but of the community and the public at large.27 In
through the servient estate. interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that the
clause "any and all other persons whomsoever" in the
Respondents adopted the disquisition of the appellate easement embraces only "those who are privy to the
court as their counter-arguments. owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-
The petition lacks merit. 2672" and excludes "the indiscriminate public from the
enjoyment of the right-of-way easement."28
As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner We also hold that although the easement does not
of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing appear in respondents’ title over the dominant estate,
somebody else to do or something to be done on his the same subsists. It is settled that the registration of the
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. dominant estate under the Torrens system without the
Easements are established either by law or by the will of annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does
not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the
registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without
the annotation of the voluntary easement, which
extinguishes the easement.29

Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the

property does not extinguish the easement. Article
618 30 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant
estate is divided between two or more persons, each of
them may use the easement in its entirety, without
changing the place of its use, or making it more
burdensome in any other way.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated October 27, 2005 and the Resolution
dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 prior to the construction on Lot 1, they received enough
bright and natural light from their windows. The
construction allegedly rendered the Sps. Garcia's house
dark such that they are unable to do their normal
undertakings in the bedroom, living room and other
areas of the house without switching on their lights. The
Sps. Garcia likewise alleged that the said structure
constructed on Lot 1 is at a distance of less than three
G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019 meters away from the boundary line, in alleged violation
of their easement. Furthermore, the Sps. Santos
SPS. TEDY GARCIA AND PILAR GARCIA, allegedly m de excavations on Lot 1 without providing
PETITIONERS, v. LORETA T. SANTOS, WINSTON sufficient lateral support to the concrete perimeter fence
SANTOS AND CONCHITA TAN, RESPONDENTS. of the Sps. Garcia.
DECISION Hence, in their Complaint, aside from asking for
damages, the Sps. Garcia prayed that: the RTC declare
CAGUIOA, J.:
them as having acquired the easement of light, air, and
Before the Court is a Petition for Review view against Lot 1; the respondents be prohibited from
on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule, 45 of the Rules of constructing any structure on Lot 1 taller than the Sps.
Court filed by petitioners Tedy Garcia (Tedy) and Pilar Garcia's one-storey residential house; the respondents
Garcia (Pilar) (collectively the Sps. Garcia), assailing the be prohibited from building any structure on Lot 1 at a
Decision2 dated June 30, 2016 (assailed Decision) and distance of less than three meters from the boundary
Resolution3 dated October 5, 2016 (assailed Resolution) line; and the respondents be prohibited from making
of the Court of Appeals,4 (CA, Special 18th Division) in excavations on Lot 1 that deprive sufficient lateral
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 05701. support to the fence located on the subject property.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings On February 19, 2009, the RTC issued an
Order8 granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
As narrated by the CA in its assailed Decision and as enjoining the Sps. Santos from further undertaking
culled from the records of the instant case, the essential further construction work on Lot 1. The TRO was
facts and antecedent proceedings of the case are as eventually lifted on March 20, 2009.9
follows:cralawred
In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim10 dated
The instant case stems from a Complaint5 for February 27, 2009, the respondents asserted that Tan
"[easements of light, air and view, lateral support, and was incorrectly impleaded, denying that Tan is involved
intermediate distances and damages with prayer for writ whatsoever in the matter at hand, with the latter not
of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of temporary being the registered owner of Lot 1.
restraining order]" (Complaint) filed on February 18,
2009 by the Sps. Garcia against the respondents Further, the respondents argued that the Sps. Garcia
Spouses Loreta and Winston Santos (the Sps. Santos) failed to allege how they acquired the easement of light
and respondent Conchita Tan (Tan) before the Regional and view either by prescription or title. The respondents
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31 (RTC). The case was maintained that the mere presence of windows on the
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-30023. one-storey house of the Sps. Garcia in itself does not
give rise to an easement by title, stressing that there was
As alleged in the Complaint, the Sps. Garcia are the no tenement standing on Lot 1 at the time of the
registered owners of Lot 2, Blk. 1, San Jose Street, construction of the one-storey house standing on the
Southville Subdivision, Molo, Iloilo City (subject subject property. The respondents also argued that the
property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Sps. Garcia also failed to acquire an easement by
No. T- 130666.6 prescription because they never alleged that they made
a formal prohibition of the construction of a taller
The subject property, which has been occupied by the
structure on Lot 1.
Sps. Garcia for about eleven (11) years, has a one-
storey residential house erected thereon and was With respect to the Sps. Garcia's claims on easement of
purchased by them from the Sps. Santos in October lateral and subjacent support, the respondents
1998. At the time of the purchase of the subject property maintained that such claims are baseless because the
from the Sps. Santos, the one-storey house was already excavation works were all made within Lot 1 and were
constructed. Also, at the time of the acquisition of the not deep enough to deprive the Sps. Garcia subjacent
subject property, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which is owned and lateral support. Moreover, these excavations were
by the Sps. Santos, was an idle land without any already finished without causing any damage to the Sps.
improvements. Lot 1 is covered by TCT No. T- Garcia's house.
114137,7 registered under the name of the Sps. Santos.
Lot 1 remained empty until the Sps. Santos started the The trial then ensued, with the Sps. Garcia presenting
construction of a two-storey residential house therein on their testimonial and documentary evidence.
January 24, 2009. Upon inquiry from the construction
workers, Tedy was erroneously informed that Tan was The Sps. Santos' Demurrer to Evidence (CA-G.R. SP
the new owner of Lot 1. No. 06176)

As further alleged in the Complaint, the building After the Sps. Garcia rested their case, the Sps. Santos
constructed on Lot 1 is taller than the Sps. Garcia's one- filed a Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Demurrer to
storey residential house. As such, the Sps. Santos' Evidence)11 which the RTC denied in its Order12 dated
building allegedly obstructed the Sps. Garcia's right to April 28, 2011.
light, air, and view. The Sps. Garcia bemoaned how,
The Sps. Santos then assailed the RTC's denial of their the Sps. Garcia responded with their Reply24 dated
demurrer to evidence by filing a petition November 9, 2017.
for certiorari13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA. The petition was raffled to the Twentieth Division Issues
and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06176. Stripped to its core, the instant Petition presents two
In its Decision  dated May 20, 2013, the CA, Twentieth
14 main issues for the Court's disposition: (1) whether, in
Division denied the certiorari petition of the Sps. Santos view of the CA, Twentieth Division's final and executory
for failing to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse Decision dated May 20, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 06176,
of discretion in denying the respondents' demurrer to the doctrine of the law of the case finds application; and
evidence. (2) whether the Sps. Garcia have acquired an
easement of light and view with respect to Lot 1
The respondents filed a Motion for owned by the Sps. Santos.
Reconsideration15 dated June 17, 2013, which was
denied by the CA, Special Former Twentieth Division in The Court's Ruling
its Resolution16 dated February 22, 2016. On March 31, In deciding the merits of the instant Petition, the Court
2016, the Decision dated May 20, 2013 rendered by the shall resolve the issues in  seriatim.
CA, Twentieth Division became final and executory.17
I. The doctrine of the law of the case not
Afterwards, the trial ensued before the RTC, with the
applicable in the instant case
Sps. Santos presenting their evidence.

The Ruling of the RTC In the instant Petition, the Sps. Garcia make the
argument that the doctrine of the law of the case applies
In its Decision18 dated May 28, 2015, the RTC ruled in in the instant case, considering that the CA, Twentieth
favor of the Sps. Santos and dismissed the Complaint. Division's final and executory Decision dated May 20,
The dispositive portion of the aforesaid Decision 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 06176 expressly and
reads:cralawred categorically found that ''[t]here is an acquired easement
WHEREFORE, EVERYTHING CONSIDERED, the of light, air and view in favor of [the Sps.
herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED, the Garcia]"25 based on Article 624 of the Civil Code26 and
counterclaims are likewise dismissed. the decided cases of Amor v.
Florentino27 and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon,28 and that "the
Costs de oficio. contention of [the respondents] that the mere opening of
windows and doors does not constitute an easement is
SO ORDERED.19 therefore refuted."29
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary The argument is unmeritorious.
In sum, the RTC held that the Sps. Garcia never The doctrine of the law of the case states that whatever
acquired any easement of light and view either by title or has once been irrevocably established as the controlling
by prescription. legal rule of decision between the same parties in the
Hence, the Sps. Garcia appealed the RTC's Decision same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
before the CA, Special 18th Division.20 The appeal was correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts
docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 05701. on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.30
The Ruling of the CA, Special 18th Division
Citing Mercury Group of Co., Inc. v. Home Dev't Mutual
In its assailed Decision, the CA, Special 18th Division Fund,31 the CA, Special 18th Division was correct in
denied the appeal for lack of merit, the dispositive explaining that the aforesaid doctrine applies only when
portion of which reads:cralawred there has been a prior decision on the
merits:cralawred
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 28 May
2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, "Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion
Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 09-30023 is AFFIRMED. delivered on a former appeal. . . . It is a rule of general
application that the decision of an appellate court in
SO ORDERED.21 a case is the law to the case on the points presented
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the
case in both the trial and appellate courts and no
Agreeing  in toto  with the RTC, the CA held that the Sps. question necessarily involved and decided on that
Garcia never acquired an easement of light and view appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of
under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are
substantially the same as those on which the first
The Sps. Garcia filed a Motion for
question rested and, according to some authorities,
Reconsideration22 dated August 4, 2016, which was
provided the decision is on the merits. x x x32
denied by the CA, Former Special 18th Division in its
assailed Resolution. chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed The CA, Twentieth Division's final and executory
by the Sps. Garcia under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Decision dated May 20, 2013 relied upon by the Sps.
Garcia was not a final and executory decision on the
The respondents filed their Comment (To the Petition
merits of the case as it dealt solely on the issue of
dated October 28, 2016)23 dated June 20, 2017, to which
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the respondents' demurrer to evidence.
In fact, the CA, Twentieth Division was unequivocal in The easement of light and view has two components.
explaining that it discussed "the issue on easement of The easement of light or jus luminum has the purpose of
light, air and view not so much to address the merit of admitting light and a little air, as in the case of small
the petition but to illustrate the extent by which [the Sps. windows, not more than 30 centimeters square, at the
Garcia] have relentlessly pursued their claim."33 height of the ceiling joists or immediately under the
ceiling.39 On the other hand, the easement of view
Hence, the first issue posed by the Sps. Garcia is or servidumbre prospectus40 has the principal purpose of
denied. affording view, as in the case of full or regular windows
overlooking the adjoining estate.41
II. The easement of light and view imposed on
Lot 1 acquired by the Sps. Garcia Explained otherwise, the easement of light is the right to
make openings under certain conditions in order to
Having disposed of the first issue, the Court shall now receive light from another's tenement while the
decide whether the Sps. Garcia have indeed acquired an easement of view is the right to make openings or
easement of light and view, imposing a burden on Lot 1 windows, to enjoy the view through the estate of another
not to obstruct the subject property's free access to light and the power to prevent all constructions or works
and view. The Court notes that the issues surrounding which would obstruct such view or make the same
the alleged easement of lateral and subjacent support difficult.42 The easement of view is broader than the
were no longer pursued by the Sps. Garcia in the instant easement of light because the latter is always included
Petition. Hence, the Court's Decision shall focus in the former.43
exclusively on the easement of light and view
purportedly acquired by the Sps. Garcia as against the As held by jurisprudence, the easement of light and view
Sps. Santos' Lot 1. is intrinsically intertwined with the easement of the
servient estate not to build higher or altius non tollendi.
Considering that the jurisprudence on the concept of These two necessarily go together "because an
easements of light and view is not in abundance, this is easement of light and view requires that the owner of the
an opportune time for the Court to explain clearly and servient estate shall not build to a height that will
resolutely the rules regarding the acquisition of an obstruct the window."44
easement of light and view vis-a-vis several parcels of
land owned by separate owners that were previously In the instant case, the Sps. Garcia assert that since
owned by a single owner, and the distances that must be they have acquired by title an easement of light and
observed in relation thereto. view, the owner of the adjacent servient estate, i.e., the
Sps. Santos, is proscribed from building a structure that
The Concept of Easements and the Easement of Light obstructs the window of their one-storey house.
and View
Classification of Easements as Positive and Negative
According to Article 613 of the Civil Code, an easement Easements
or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable Article 616 of the Civil Code states that easements may
belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor be classified into positive and negative easements. A
of which the easement is established is called the positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner
dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the of the servient estate the obligation of allowing
servient estate. something to be done or of doing it himself. On the other
hand, a negative easement is that which prohibits the
As defined by jurisprudence, an easement is "a real right owner of the servient estate from doing something which
on another's property, corporeal and immovable, he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist.
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing
or allowing somebody else to do or something to be What is the significance of determining whether an
done on his property, for the benefit of another person or easement is positive or negative? Such determination is
tenement. Easements are established either by law or by consequential in determining how an easement is
the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the acquired.
latter, voluntary easements."34 An easement has been According to Article 621 of the Civil Code, in order to
described as "a real right which burdens a thing with a acquire easements by prescription in positive
prestation consisting of determinate servitudes for the easements, the prescriptive period shall commence from
exclusive enjoyment of a person who is not its owner or the day on which the owner of the dominant estate, or
of a tenement belonging to another."35 the person who may have made use of the easement,
Legal easements are ones imposed by law, and which commenced to exercise it upon the servient estate.
have, for their object, either public use or interest of With respect to negative easements, the prescriptive
private persons,36 as opposed to voluntary easements period shall commence from the day on which the owner
that are established by the agreements of the parties. of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument
The different legal easements are: (a) easement relating acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the
to waters; (b) right of way; (c) party wall; (d) light and servient estate, from executing an act which would be
view; (e) drainage; (f) intermediate distances; (g) lawful without the easement.
easement against nuisance; and (h) lateral and
subjacent support.37 Easement of Light and View as a Positive and Negative
Easement
The legal easement called easement of light and view
refers to an easement whereby the dominant estate How then is an easement of light and view classified? Is
enjoys the right to have free access to light, a little air, it a positive or a negative easement?
and a view overlooking the adjoining estate, i.e., the
servient estate.38
The answer is it may be both; an easement of light and necessarily mean a document. Instead, it refers to a
view may either be positive or negative. juridical act or law sufficient to create the
encumbrance.52 One such legal proviso which grants title
As a general rule, an easement of light and view is to an easement is found in Article 624 of the Civil
a positive one if the window or opening is situated in Code.
a party wall, while it is a negative one if the window or
opening is thru one's own wall, i.e., thru a wall of the Article 624 of the Civil Code reads:cralawred
dominant estate.45 However, "[e]ven if the window is on
one's own wall, still the easement would be positive if the x x x. The existence of an apparent sign of easement
window is on a balcony or projection extending over into between two estates, established or maintained by the
the adjoining land."46 owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them
be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the windows continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the
and other openings, which are allegedly now prevented ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
from receiving light and view due to the structure built by should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
the Sps. Santos on Lot 1, are made in the wall of Sps. them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before
Garcia's one-storey-house. There is no party wall the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply
alleged to be co-owned by the parties. in case of the division of a thing owned in common by
two or more persons.
In the very early case of Cortes v. Yu-Tibo,47 the Court
held that the easement of light and view in the case The aforesaid article is based on Article 541 of the
of windows opened in one's own wall is negative. As Spanish Civil Code, which reads:cralawred
such easement is a negative one, it cannot be acquired
by prescription except where sufficient time of x x x. The existence of an apparent sign of an easement
possession has elapsed after the owner of the dominant between two estates established by the owner of both
estate, by a formal act, has prohibited the owner of the shall be considered, should one of them be alienated, as
servient estate from doing something which would be a title for the active and passive continuation of the
lawful but for the easement.48 easement, unless, at the time of the division of the
ownership of the two properties, the contrary should be
The phrase "formal act" would require not merely any expressed in the deed of conveyance of either of them,
writing, but one executed in due form and/or with or the sign is obliterated before the execution of the
solemnity.49 This is expressly stated in Article 668 of the instrument.
Civil Code which states that the period of prescription for
the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be The mode of acquiring an easement under Article 624 is
counted: (1) from the time of the opening of the window, a "legal presumption or apparent sign."53 Article 624
if it is through a party wall; or (2) from the time of the finds application in situations wherein two or more
formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the estates were previously owned by a singular owner, or
adjoining land or tenement, if the window is through even a single estate but with two or more portions being
a wall on the dominant estate. owned by a singular owner.54 Originally, there is no true
easement that exists as there is only one owner. Hence,
It is from these legal premises that the RTC and CA, at the outset, no other owner is imposed with a
Special 18th Division based their holdings that the Sps. burden.55 Subsequently, one estate or a portion of the
Garcia "never acquired an easement of light and view estate is alienated in favor of another person, wherein, in
under Article 668 of the Civil Code for failure to serve a that estate or portion of the estate, an apparent visible
notarial prohibition."50 It is not disputed that the Sps. sign of an easement exists. According to Article 624,
Garcia never sent the Sps. Santos any formal notice or there arises a title to an easement of light and view,
notarial prohibition enjoining the latter from constructing even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by
any building of higher height on Lot 1. Hence, the RTC the owner of the dominant estate, if this apparent
and CA, Special 18th Division made the conclusion that visible sign, such as the existence of a door and
the Sps. Garcia failed to acquire an easement of light windows, continues to remain and subsist, unless, at
and view in relation to the adjacent Lot 1. the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, ( 1)
the contrary should be provided in the title of
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the aforesaid holding conveyance of either of them, or (2) the sign aforesaid
of the RTC and CA, Special 18th Division is incorrect in should be removed before the execution of the deed..
view of Article 624 of the Civil Code.
This is precisely the situation that has occurred in the
Article 624 - The Existence of an Apparent Sign of instant case. Prior to the purchase of the subject
Easement between Two Estates formerly owned by a property by the Sps. Garcia in 1998, the subject property
Single Owner considered a Title to Easement of Light and its adjoining lot, i.e., Lot 1, were both owned by
and View singular owners,  i.e., the Sps. Santos. On the subject
property, a one-storey house laden with several windows
While it is a general rule that a window or opening and openings was built and the windows and openings
situated on the wall of the dominant estate involves a remained open. Then on October 1998, the subject
negative easement, and, thus, may only be acquired by property, together with the one-storey structure, was
prescription, tacked from the time of the formal alienated in favor of the Sps. Garcia, while the Sps.
prohibition upon the proprietor of the servient estate, it is Santos retained the adjoining Lot 1.
not true that all windows or openings situated on the wall
of the dominant estate may only be acquired through Jurisprudence has recognized that Article 624 is an
prescription. exception carved out by the Civil Code that must be
taken out of the coverage of the general rule that an
Aside from prescription, easements may likewise be easement of light and view in the case of windows
acquired through title.51 The term "title" does not opened in one's own wall is a negative easement that
may only be acquired by prescription, tacked from a owner of the two houses, by which he imposed upon
formal prohibition relayed to the owner of the servient one of them an easement for the benefit of the
estate. other. It is well known that easements are established,
among other cases, by the will of the owners. (Article
As explained in Amor v. Florentino, the very decision 536 of the Code) It was an act which was, in fact,
in  Cortes v. YuTibo, while holding that the easement of respected and acquiesced in by the new owner of the
light and view in situations involving openings situated servient estate, since he purchased it without making
on the wall of the dominant estate is a negative any stipulation against the easement existing thereon,
easement that may only be acquired by prescription but, on the contrary, acquiesced in the continuance of
tacked from formal prohibition, "distinguishes that case the apparent sign thereof. As is stated in the decision
from the situation foreseen in article 541 [now Article itself, "It is a principle of law that upon a division of a
624 of the Civil Code]."56 tenement among various persons—in the absence of
In Cortes v. Yu-Tibo, there were two different owners of any mention in the contract of a mode of enjoyment
two separate houses from the beginning, which is a different from that to which the former owner was
situation different from that presented under Article 624 accustomed—such easements as may be necessary for
where there is only one original owner of the two the continuation of such enjoyment are understood to
structures. Cortes v. Yu-Tibo itself explicitly differentiates subsist." It will be seen, then, that the phrase "active
the situation presented therein and the special situation enjoyment" involves an idea directly opposed to the
contemplated under then Article 541 of the Spanish Civil enjoyment which is the result of a mere tolerance on the
Code, which is now Article 624 of the Civil Code, part of the adjacent owner, and which, as it is not based
wherein no formal act is needed to acquire easement of upon an absolute, enforceable right, may be considered
light and view:cralawred as of a merely passive character. Therefore, the
decision in question is not in conflict with the former
x x x It is true that the supreme court of Spain, in its rulings of the supreme court of Spain upon the
decisions of February 7 and May 5, 1896, has classified subject, inasmuch as it deals with an easement of
as positive easements of lights which were the object of light established by the owner of the servient estate,
the suits in which these decisions were rendered in and which continued in force after the estate was
cassation, and from these it might be believed at first sold, in accordance with the special provisions of
glance[,] that the former holdings of the supreme court article 541 of the Civil Code.57
upon this subject had been overruled. But this is not so,
as a matter of fact, inasmuch as there is no conflict chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
between these decisions and the former decisions above
cited. Application of the Court's Decisions in Amor v.
Florentino, and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon to the Instant
In the first of the suits referred to, the question Case
turned upon two houses which had formerly
belonged to the same owner, who established a The rulings of the Court in  Amor v.
service of light on one of them for the benefit of the Florentino and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon, which involve
other. These properties were subsequently conveyed to situations that are almost completely analogous to the
two different persons, but at the time of the separation of instant case, are enlightening.
the property nothing was said as to the discontinuance
of the easement, nor were the windows which In these cases, like the case at hand, several properties
constituted the visible sign thereof removed. The new were once owned by a single owner, wherein in one of
owner of the house subject to the easement endeavored the properties, a structure with windows and other
to free it from the incumbrance, notwithstanding the fact openings was put up. Subsequently, the adjacent
that the easement had been in existence for thirty-five property was transferred to a different owner, wherein a
years, and alleged that the owner of the dominant estate structure was built thereon obstructing the windows and
had not performed any act of opposition which might other openings found on the adjacent lot.
serve as a starting point for the acquisition of a In Amor v. Florentino, one Maria Florentino (Maria)
prescriptive title. The supreme court, in deciding this owned a house and a camarin or warehouse located in
case, on the 7th of February, 1896, held that the Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had, on the north side,
easement in this particular case was positive, three windows on the upper storey, and a fourth one on
because it consisted in the active enjoyment of the the ground floor. Through these windows, the house
light. This doctrine is doubtless based upon article received light and air from the adjacent lot where
541 of the Code, which is of the following tenor: "The the camarin stood.
existence of apparent sign of an easement between two
tenements, established by the owner of both of them, On September 6, 1885, Maria made a will, devising the
shall be considered, should one be sold, as a title for the house and the land on which it was situated to Gabriel
active and passive continuance of the easement, unless, Florentino, one of the respondents therein, and to Jose
at the time of the division of the ownership of both Florentino, father of the other respondents therein. In
tenements, the contrary should be expressed in the said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and
deed of conveyance of either of them, or such sign is the lot where it was situated to Maria Encarnacion
taken away before the execution of such deed." Florentino (Maria Encarnacion). Upon the death of the
testatrix in 1892, nothing was said or done by the
The word "active" used in the decision quoted in devisees in regard to the windows in question. On July
classifying the particular enjoyment of light referred 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion sold her lot and the
to therein, presupposes on the part of the owner of warehouse thereon to the petitioner therein, Severo
the dominant estate a right to such enjoyment Amor (Amor). In January 1938, therein Amor destroyed
arising, in the particular case passed upon by that the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-
decision, from the voluntary act of the original storey house.
In deciding the case, the Court first explained that Subsequently, in 1960, the Court rendered its Decision
easements may be acquired either through title or in the case of Gargantos v. Tan Yanon.
prescription and enumerated the different acts by which
an easement may be acquired by virtue of title, namely: In the said case, the late Francisco Sanz (Sanz) was the
(1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient former owner of a parcel of land with the buildings and
estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion of
between two estates, established by the owner of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three (3) and then
both, referring to Article 541 (now Article 624) of the sold each portion to different persons. One portion was
Civil Code. Citing decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold
Spain, the Court explained that "under article 541 [now it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of
Article 624] of the Civil Code, the visible and strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan
permanent sign of an easement 'is the title that Yanon, the respondent therein. This house had on its
characterizes its existence' ('es el titulo caracteristico northeastern side, doors and windows overlooking the
de su existencia.')"58 third portion, which, together with the camarin and small
building thereon, after passing through several hands,
Applying Article 541 (now Article 624) of the Civil Code, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos (Gargantos), the
the Court held that the existence of the four windows petitioner therein. In 1955, Gargantos tore down the roof
constructed on the subject house was an apparent of the camarin and constructed a combined residential
sign of an easement of light and view, the house and warehouse on his lot.
subsistence of which after the lots were segregated to
different owners created an easement of light and view The Court held that Article 538 (now Article 621) of the
by title without the need of any formal notice to the Civil Code and the doctrine in Cortes v. Yu-Tibo that the
servient estate. The Court explained that the moment of easement of light and view in situations involving
the constitution of the easement of light and view, openings situated on the wall of the dominant estate is a
together with that of altius non tollendi, was the time negative easement that may only be acquired by
of the transfer of the other property adjacent to the prescription tacked from formal prohibition "[is] not
lot where the windows were located, which, in that applicable herein because the two estates, that now
case, was the death of the original owner of both owned by petitioner, and that owned by respondent,
properties:cralawred were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco
Sanz."60
It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence
of the apparent sign in the instant case, to wit, the The Court further explained that the existence of the
four windows under consideration, had for all legal doors and windows on the northeastern side of the
purposes the same character and effect as a title of house was equivalent to a title, for the visible and
acquisition of the easement of light and view by the permanent sign of an easement was the title that
respondents upon the death of the original characterized its existence:cralawred
owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the establishment of that x x x It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both
easement of light and view, the concomitant and properties. On that portion presently belonging to
concurrent easement of  altius non tollendi  was also respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that
constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot, Maria the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of
Encarnacion Florentino, not having objected to the the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner.
existence of the windows. The theory of article 541, of On said northeastern side of the house, there are
making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to windows and doors which serve as passages for light
a title, when nothing to the contrary is said or done by and view. These windows and doors were in existence
the two owners, is sound and correct, because as it when respondent purchased the house and lot from
happens in this case, there is an implied contract Sanz. The deed of sale did not provide that the
between them that the easements in question should easement of light and view would not be
be constituted. established. This then is precisely the case covered
Analyzing article 541 further, it seems that its wording is by Article 541, O.C.C. (now Article 624, N.C.C.) which
not quite felicitous when it says that the easement provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
should continue. Sound juridical thinking rejects such an easement between two estates, established by the
idea because, properly speaking, the easement is not proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of
created till the division of the property, inasmuch as a them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will
predial or real easement is one of the rights in another's continue actively and passively, unless at the time
property, or jura in re aliena and nobody can have an the ownership of the two estates is divided, the
easement over his own property, nemini sua res servit. contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either
In the instant case, therefore, when the original owner, of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the
Maria Florentino, opened the windows which received instrument is executed. The existence of the doors
light and air from another lot belonging to her, she was and windows on the northeastern side of the
merely exercising her right of dominion. Consequently, aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the
the moment of the constitution of the easement of light visible and permanent sign of an easement is the
and view, together with that of  altius non tollendi, was title that characterizes its existence (Amor vs.
the time of the death of the original owner of both Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be noted, however,
properties. At that point, the requisite that there must be that while the law declares that the easement is to
two proprietors — one of the dominant estate and "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time
another of the servient estate was — fulfilled.59 only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before
that time there is no easement to speak of, there being
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary but one owner of both estates (Article 530, O.C.C., now
Article 613, N.C.C.).61
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary once owned by one owner, regardless of the existence
of improvements in the (future) servient estate. What law
From Amor v. Florentino and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon, requires is that, at the time the ownership of the estates
read together with Cortes v. Yu-Tibo, it has been is divided, there must be an apparent sign of easement
jurisprudentially established that, in a situation wherein that exists, such as a window, door, or other opening, in
Article 624 of the Civil Code applies, there arises an the dominant estate.
easement if an apparent sign of the existence of an
easement,  i.e., the existence of windows and openings As exhaustively explained by recognized Civil Law
on the dominant estate, continues to remain even Commentator, former CA Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa,
after the transfer of the property to the new the existence of an easement of light and view under
owner, unless such apparent sign is removed or if Article 624 is established as long as (1) there exists an
there is an agreement to the contrary.62 apparent sign of servitude between two estates; (2) the
sign of the easement must be established by the owner
To reiterate, such is exactly the situation attendant in the of both tenements; (3) either or both of the estates are
instant case. Lot 1 and the subject property were once alienated by the owner; and (4) at the time of the
owned by one owner, i.e., the Sps. Santos. On the alienation nothing is stated in the document of alienation
subject property, a one-storey house with windows and contrary to the easement nor is the sign of the easement
other openings that accept light and view from Lot 1, removed before the execution of the
which was idle at that time, was built. Subsequently, in document:cralawred
1998, the subject property was alienated in favor of the
Sps. Garcia. It is undisputed that the windows and other x x x In this case[,] the owner of two estates has
openings on the one-storey house subsisted and established an apparent sign of the easement between
remained open. It is also not disputed that there was no two estates. It is apparent inasmuch as since it is the
agreement made by the parties whatsoever to the effect owner establishing it in his own property in favor of an
that the windows and openings of the Sps. Garcia's estate belonging to himself there is no easement but
house should be closed or removed. merely an exercise of the right of ownership. Should,
however, one or both of the estates be alienated or after
Hence, in accordance with Article 624 of the Civil Code, partition in case of a property owned in common, then
from the time the Sps. Santos transferred the subject that sign established by the owner will constitute a title
property to the Sps. Garcia, there arose by title an for the establishment of the easement, both actively or
easement of light and view, placing a burden on the passively, except in case the contrary should be
servient estate,  i.e., Lot 1, to allow the Sps. Garcia's provided in the document of conveyance of either estate
residence unobstructed access to light and view, subject or in case before the alienation is made the sign is
to certain limitations as will be discussed hereunder. removed by the owner. Hence, in order that this article
The core of the RTC and CA, Special 18th Division's will apply[,] the following are the requisites: (1) That
Decisions dismissing the Sps. Garcia's Complaint there exist an apparent sign of servitude between
centers on the argument that the cases of Amor v. two estates; (2) That the sign of the easement be
Florentino, and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon  are not established by the owner of both tenements because
applicable to the instant case because in the latter, "the the article will not apply when the easement is
previous owner only made improvements on the [subject established by a person different from the owner; (3)
property] of [the Sps. Garcia] at the time of the transfer That either or both of the estates are alienated by the
of the alleged dominant estate to [the Sps. Garcia.] This owner; and (4) That at the time of the alienation
takes the instant case out of the factual milieu nothing is stated in the document of alienation
of Amor and Gargantos."63 According to the CA, Special contrary to the easement nor is the sign of the
18th Division, "[t]he rulings easement removed before the execution of the
in Amor and Gargantos appear to be premised on the document.66
fact that the previous owner made improvements on chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
both properties prior to the transfer of one of these
properties."64 It is evident that the prior existence of another structure
or building in the other estate, in addition to the apparent
After a close reading of Amor v. sign of easement existing on the dominant estate, is not
Florentino and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon, the Court holds a requirement for the application of Article 624. What is
that the RTC and CA, Special 18th Division were clear from the foregoing is that the hallmark of an
mistaken in not applying the aforesaid cases to the easement of light and view established by an apparent
instant case. sign of easement under Article 624 is the existence of an
First and foremost, the subject Civil Code provision dealt apparent sign of servitude between two estates, such as
with by these two cases, i.e., Article 624 (formerly Article a window, door, or any other opening, that was
541) of the Civil Code, merely states that what is established by the common owner of both estates prior
involved in this particular situation is "an apparent sign of to the division of ownership of these estates.
easement between two estates."65 Second, upon close reading of Amor v.
There is nothing in the aforesaid provision that requires Florentino and Gargantos v. Tan Yanon, there is no
the presence or establishment of structures or holding whatsoever by the Court that the application of
improvements on both estates at the time the ownership Article 624 (formerly Article 541) is restricted to
of the two estates is divided. The conclusion of the CA, situations wherein the servient estate previously
Special 18th Division that Article 624 applies only when contained improvements or structures. The RTC and
the (future) servient estate has an improvement thereon CA, Special 18th Division failed to explain the rationale
at the time of the transfer of the ownership of either or for making a differentiation as to situations wherein the
both of the estates finds no textual support. What the law servient estate was idle at the time of the division of the
merely states is that there must be two estates that were ownership of the two estates. Instead, the RTC and CA,
Special 18th Division merely nitpicked this singular views — those openings which are made on a wall
factual difference and concluded, without sufficient parallel or almost parallel to the line that divides the
explanation, that the factual milieu of the instant case estates, in such a way that the neighboring tenement
differs from those of Amor v. Florentino and Gargantos can be seen without putting out or turning the head,
v. Tan Yanon. or oblique views — those openings in a wall which form
an angle to the boundary line, and therefore of necessity
It must be stressed that the presence of a minor factual requires in order to see the neighboring tenement to
difference does not preclude the application of judicial thrust the head out of the opening and look to the right or
precedent. It must be explained how the factual left.74 In the case at hand, the openings found on the
difference in a case makes the doctrine established in property of the Sps. Garcia offer a direct view of the
the decided case inapplicable therein. In the instant property of the respondents Sps. Santos.
case, the cases of Amor v. Florentino and Gargantos v.
Tan Yanon clearly and plainly explain that there arises In relation to direct view windows or openings, the Civil
an easement if an apparent sign of the existence of an Code provides two distance rules or distances that must
easement,  i.e., the existence of windows and openings be observed before they can be made or established.
on the dominant estate, continues to remain even after
the transfer of the property to the new owner, without Firstly, there is the two-meter distance rule under Article
making any holding whatsoever that there should have 670 of the Civil Code, which provides: "[n]o windows,
been a prior structure that was put up on the servient apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which
estate. The fact that the existence of windows, doors, afford a direct view upon or towards an adjoining land or
and other openings on the dominant estate is the tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two
apparent sign of an existing easement is not hinged meters between the wall in which they are made and
whatsoever on the presence of structures on the such contiguous property." This Article is to be read in
adjacent servient estate. In short, the fact in the conjunction with Article 671 as the latter provides the
aforesaid cases that the servient estates therein had mechanism by which the two-meter distance is to be
existing structures prior to the division of ownership is measured, to wit: "[t]he distances x x x shall be
not a significant fact that is determinative of the holdings measured in cases of direct views from the outer line of
of the Court. the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer
line of the latter when they do, and in cases of oblique
In fact, the Court notes that in Amor v. Florentino, the views from the dividing line between the two properties."
improvement originally constructed on the servient
estate,  i.e., the warehouse, was actually totally Hence, under Article 670, which is the general rule,
demolished and that, after the transfer of ownership of when a window or any similar opening affords a direct
the dominant estate, a new two-storey house was view of an adjoining land, the distance between the wall
thereafter built in its stead. This does not differ in which such opening is made and the border of the
substantially from a situation wherein new constructions adjoining land should be at least two meters.
are done in the servient estate that was previously Similarly, Republic Act No. 6541 as revised by
completely empty. Presidential Decree No. 1096 or the National Building
Further, in Gargantos v. Tan Yanon, the Court, in Code of the Philippines provides the same two-meter
applying Article 624 of the Civil Code, held that "[b]y distance requirement pursuant to Section 708(a), which
reason of this easement, petitioner cannot construct on provides that: "[t]he dwelling shall occupy not more than
his land any building."67 The Court did not say that the ninety percent of a comer lot and eighty percent of an
petitioner therein was barred only from adding or inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement of
increasing the height of existing structures or Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall
improvements. be at least 2 meters from the property line."

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Secondly, the three-meter distance rule is embodied in
RTC and CA, Special 18th Division committed an Article 673 of the Civil Code, which states that whenever
error in holding that the Sps. Garcia failed to acquire by any title a right has been acquired to have direct
an easement of light and view in the instant case. By views, balconies or belvederes overlooking an adjoining
virtue of Article 624 of the Civil Code and applicable property, the owner of the servient estate cannot
jurisprudence, the Court holds that the Sps. Garcia build thereon at less than a distance of three meters,
have acquired an easement of light and view by title not two meters, from the property line, to be
despite the lack of any formal notice or prohibition measured in the manner provided in Article 671.
made upon the owner of the servient estate. Article 673 of the Civil Code reads:cralawred

The Three-Meter Distance Rule ART. 673. Whenever by any title a right has been
acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
Now that the existence of an easement of light and view overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the
has been established in favor of the Sps. Garcia, the servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a
Court shall now delve on whether to grant Sps. Garcia's distance of three meters to be measured in the manner
prayer that "respondents should therefore remove from provided in Article 671. Any stipulation permitting
Lot 1 their building or structure which blocks or impedes distances less than those prescribed in Article 670 is
petitioners' air, light and view."68 void.

The Court answers the question with a qualified yes. Article 673 is the exception to the general rule. In a
situation wherein an easement is established or
Based on Articles 66969 and 670 of the Civil Code, there recognized by title or prescription, affording the dominant
are two kinds of windows: (1) regular or full70 or direct estate the right to have a direct view overlooking the
view71 windows, and (2) restricted,72 or oblique or side adjoining property, i.e., the servient estate, which is the
view73 windows. As for openings, they may be direct exact situation in the instant case, the two-meter
requirement under Article 670 is not applicable. Instead,
Article 673 is the applicable rule as it contemplates the
exact circumstance attendant in the instant case, i.e.,
wherein an easement of view is created by virtue of law.

This provision has already been previously applied to

easements of light and view acquired under Article 624.
In Gargantos v. Tan Yanon, the Court held that since
"[therein] respondent Tan Yanon's property has an
easement of light and view against petitioner's property[,
b]y reason of this easement [under Article 624], [therein
Gargantos] cannot construct on his land any building
unless he erects it at a distance of not less than
three meters from the boundary line separating the
two estates."75

To reiterate, as Article 673 states a special rule covering

a situation wherein a dominant estate has acquired a
right "to have direct views, balconies or belvederes,
overlooking the adjoining property, the owner of the
servient estate may not build on his own property except
at a distance of at least three meters from the boundary
line,"76 the two-meter distance as provided in Article 670
is not enough. The distance between the structures
erected on the servient estate and the boundary line of
the adjoining estate must be at least three meters.

In the instant case, the records show that Roberto

Planton Baradas (Baradas), the construction project
engineer who supervised the construction of the Sps.
Santos' house located on Lot 1, testified that "[t]here is a
distance of two meters between [the Sps. Garcia's]
fence and the wall of [the respondents] spouses
Santos."77 Simply stated, the distance between the
structure erected by the Sps. Santos on Lot 1 and the
boundary line is only two meters, which is less than the
three-meter distance required under Article 673.

Therefore, considering that the Sps. Garcia have

acquired by title an easement of light and view in
accordance with Article 624 of the Civil Code, the Sps.
Santos should necessarily demolish or renovate
portions of their residential building so that the
three-meter distance rule as mandated under Article
673 of the Civil Code is observed.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.

The Decision dated June 30, 2016 and Resolution dated
October 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CV No. 05701 are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Necessarily, the Decision dated May 28, 2015
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 31 is likewise REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

The Court declares the EXISTENCE OF AN

EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW in favor of the
petitioners Sps. Tedy and Pilar Garcia. The respondents
Sps. Loreta and Winston Santos are hereby ordered
to REMOVE from Lot 1 such portions of their building or
structure in order to comply with the three-meter rule as
mandated under Article 673 of the Civil Code.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.