Māturīdī Theology A Bilingual Reader-1

Sapientia Islamica
Studies in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism
Edited by
Lejla Demiri (Tübingen)
Samuela Pagani (Lecce)
Sohaira Z. Siddiqui (Doha)
Editorial Board
Ahmed El Shamsy, Angelika Neuwirth, Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen,
Dan Madigan, Frank Griffel, Mohammad Hassan Khalil,
Olga Lizzini, Rotraud Hansberger, and Tim J. Winter
4
Māturīdī Theology
A Bilingual Reader
Edited by
Lejla Demiri, Philip Dorroll and Dale J. Correa
Mohr Siebeck
Lejla Demiri, born 1975; 2008 PhD, University of Cambridge; 2007−10 post-doctoral fellow-
ship, Trinity Hall, Cambridge; 2010−12 post-doctoral fellowship, Free University of Berlin;
since 2012 Professor of Islamic Doctrine at the Centre for Islamic Theology, University of
Tübingen.
Philip Dorroll, born 1985; 2013 PhD, Emory University; 2013−20 Assistant Professor of Reli-
gion at Wofford College in South Carolina, USA; since 2020 Associate Professor of Religion.
Dale J. Correa, born 1984; 2014 PhD, New York University; since 2014 Middle Eastern
Studies Librarian and since 2017 History Coordinator for The University of Texas Libraries;
currently Mellon Fellow for Diversity, Inclusion & Cultural Heritage with the Rare Book
School, Charlottesville.
ISBN 978-3-16-161097-4 / eISBN 978-3-16-161286-2

DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-161286-2
ISSN 2625-672X / eISSN 2625-6738 (Sapientia Islamica)
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In memoriam Josef van Ess
18 April 1934 – 20 November 2021
Table of Contents
Note on Transliteration and Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI
Introduction
1. An Overview of the Current Scholarship on Māturīdī Kalām
in Arabic, Persian and European Languages (Dale J. Correa) . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Māturīdī Studies in Turkish: Historical Outline and Main
Contributions (Philip Dorroll) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
3. Introducing the Volume (Lejla Demiri) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Part I: Epistemology and Ontology

Hureyre Kam
Dual Epistemology: Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), Kitāb al-Tawḥīd 33
Mürteza Bedir
Reason and Revelation: Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad
al-Samarqandī (c. 4th/10th century), Jumal uṣūl al-dīn and Muḥammad
ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī (c. 4th/10th century), Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn . . . . 47
Sümeyye Parıldar
Mental and Extra-Mental Existence: Ismail Gelenbevi (d. 1205/1791),
Risāla fī l-wujūd al-dhihnī . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Part II: Metaphysics

Angelika Brodersen
Divine Attributes: Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī (c. 5th/11th century),
al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
VIII Table of Contents
Lejla Demiri
God and Creation: ʿUbayd Allāh al-Samarqandī (d. 701/1301),
al-ʿAqīda al-rukniyya fī sharḥ lā ilāha ill Allāh Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh . . . 89
Part III: Prophethood

Hülya Alper
Proofs for Prophethood: Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115),
al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Harith Ramli
Prophethood and Divine Wisdom: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Khabbāzī
(d. 691/1292), al-Hādī fī uṣūl al-dīn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Part IV: Faith, Knowledge and Acts

Kayhan Özaykal
Human Nature and Knowledge of God: Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī
(d. 333/944), Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Dale J. Correa
The Intellect as Instrument of Knowledge: Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī
(d. 493/1100), Uṣūl al-dīn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Najah Nadi
The Nature of Faith: Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī
(d. 792/1390), Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Part V: Free Will, Predestination and the Problem of Evil

Racha el Omari
Divine Justice: Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931),
ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Philip Dorroll
Knowledge and Free Will: Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944),
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Table of Contents IX
Philipp Bruckmayr
Knowledge of Good and Evil: ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa
al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī (d. 747/1346), al-Tawḍīḥ fī ḥall
ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Tim Winter
Evil and Divine Wisdom: Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kamāl/
Kemalpaşazâde (d. 940/1534), Risāla fī bayān al-ḥikma li-ʿadam nisbat
al-sharr ilayhi taʿālā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Indices for Arabic Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Note on Transliteration and Dates
The transliteration of Arabic names follows that of The Encyclopaedia of Islam,

Three (EI3). Technical terms in Arabic are all italicised except for terms that
have become common in English (e. g. Hadith, Islam, imam, mufti, sufi, Sunni,
Shi’i). The tāʾ marbūṭa (‫ـة‬/‫ )ة‬is rendered as ‘a’ (e. g. sūra), or as ‘at’ when the
word is in the construct state (iḍāfa) (e. g. Sūrat al-Fātiḥa). Double dates are
used in reference to the Islamic (A. H.) and Common Era (C. E.) calendars (e. g.
716/1316).
Introduction
An Overview of the Current Scholarship
on Māturīdī Kalām in Arabic, Persian,
and European Languages
Dale J. Correa
Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī al-Samarq-

andī al-Ḥanafī (d. 333/944) was a theologian, a jurist, and an exegete hailing from
a village outside of Samarqand, known as Māturīt/Māturīd. He was extremely
influential in the formation of the Samarqandī/Transoxanian Ḥanafī theological
tradition, although the attribution of ‘a doctrinal school’ to his name did not
happen until generations after him.1 His principal teacher was Abū Naṣr Aḥmad
al-ʿIyāḍī (d. last third of the 3rd/9th century in skirmishes with Turks), through
whom al-Māturīdī can trace an intellectual lineage to Abū Bakr al-Jūzjānī (d.
250/864), Abū Sulaymān al-Jūzjānī (d. 200/816), and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī
(d. 189/805).2 Despite leaving behind only a few works for later generations to
study, al-Māturīdī has captured the scholarly imagination across the Muslim
and non-Muslim worlds – albeit to varying degrees. North American English-
language scholarship on al-Māturīdī and the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī school of thought
is just beginning to blossom, while the European and Middle Eastern scholarly
relationship with the scholar and those whom he influenced has a comparatively
longer history. Much of that history is entangled in the understanding of Ḥanafī
theologians as ‘Māturīdīs’, when in fact their identity was more complex than an
eponym.
1 Wilferd Madelung, “al-Māturīdī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. P. Bearman, et al.
⟨http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_5045⟩ (accessed 15 De-
cember 2020).
2 Ulrich Rudolph, “Abū Naṣr al-ʿIyāḍī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet,
et al. ⟨http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_23155⟩ (accessed
8 December 2020); ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīʾa, ed.
M. A. Ahmad, Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1989, vol. 1, p. 70.
4 Dale J. Correa
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī: Life and Works
The field of Islamic studies generally understands the Transoxanian Ḥanafīs as

‘Māturīdīs’, principally on the basis of the work of Wilferd Madelung.3 However,
they are more accurately understood as ‘Samarqandī Ḥanafīs’ in their formative
(1st/7th–4th/10th centuries) and early post-formative (5th/11th–6th/12th centuries)
periods because of the priority of their regional identification with Samarqand
and Mā warāʾ al-nahr, the area ‘beyond the [Oxus] river’ (in English, Trans-
oxania).4 The Ḥanafis of Transoxania defined themselves as part of – not sep-
arate from – the Ḥanafiyya through reference to Samarqand and to al-Māturīdī
in a constellation of theological issues. In their later period, these scholars would
formally self-identify (and be identified) as Māturīdīs.
Understanding the nature of Transoxanian intellectual networks beyond the
region, and the question of how Transoxanian scholars viewed their participa-
tion in an Islamicate intellectual tradition, presents unique challenges because
historiographic and prosopographic materials from before the Mongol invasion
are few and far between. A preliminary attempt to describe the intellectual net-
works of Transoxanian scholars of this period by Shahab Ahmed has indicated
that they benefited from the work of scholars in other regions, at the very least
through the latters’ texts, if not through personal study.5 However, this process of
influence, as shown by Ahmed, seems to dwindle by the 5th/11th century. Wilferd
Madelung and Muhammed Tancî have also specified which Ḥanafī works from
this region profess a thoroughly articulated Transoxanian theology that vigor-
ously distinguishes itself from that of other regions and schools of thought.6 Ap-
preciating Transoxanian Ḥanafī scholars’ emphasis on a regional specification
is integral not only to revisiting the characterisation of Transoxanian Ḥanafīs as
Māturīdīs but also to understanding their theological positions and the ways in
which they viewed their own intellectual tradition.
3 See Wilferd Madelung, “Māturīdiyya”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. P. Bearman,
et al. ⟨http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_5046⟩ (accessed
15 December 2020).
4 Dale J. Correa, “Taking a Theological Turn in Legal Theory. Regional Priority and
Theology in Transoxanian Ḥanafī Thought”, Locating the Sharīʿa. Legal Fluidity in Theory, His-
tory and Practice, ed. Sohaira Siddiqui and Nathan French, Leiden: Brill, 2019, pp. 111–26.
See also Ulrich Rudolph, “Ḥanafī Theological Tradition and Māturīdism”, The Oxford Hand-
book of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke, New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2016,
pp. 280–96.
5 Shahab Ahmed, “Mapping the World of a Scholar in Sixth/Twelfth Century Bukhāra.
Regional Tradition in Medieval Islamic Scholarship as Reflected in a Bibliography”, Journal of
the American Oriental Society, 120/1 (2000), pp. 24–43.
6 Wilferd Madelung, “The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks”, Actas do IV Congresso
de Estudos Árabes e Islâmicos, Coimbra-Lisboa 1968, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971, pp. 109–68;
Muhammed b. Tavît et-Tancî, “Abû Mansûr al-Mâturîdî”, Ankara Üniversitesi İlâhiyât Fakültesi
Dergisi, 1–2 (1955), pp. 3–12.
An Overview of the Current Scholarship on Māturīdī Kalām 5
The impression in the field that the Māturīdī school was eponymous in its
origins has been both buttressed and challenged by scholarship that focuses
on al-Māturīdī himself. Excellent studies of al-Māturīdī’s life and thought –
notably, by Ayyub Ali, Salim Daccache, Balqāsim al-Ghālī, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ
al-Maghribī, Sayyid Luṭfullāh Jalālī, Ulrich Rudolph, Mustafa Cerić, J. Meric
Pessagno, and most recently, Hureyre Kam and Kayhan Özaykal – provide rich
historical and intellectual background for the development of Ḥanafī thought
and the eventual formation of the Māturīdī identity. Ali’s ʿAqīdat al-Islām wa-l-
Imām al-Māturīdī was a foundational review of the history of Islamic theology
with a particular focus on locating Ḥanafī theology and al-Māturīdī within the
development of the discipline.7 This study is significant for its contemporary
academic contribution to understanding the relationship between al-Māturīdī,
Abū Ḥanīfa, and Islamic theology by establishing Ḥanafi theology as a thread of
Islamic theology. Imām ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī wa-
ārāʾuh al-kalāmiyya by al-Maghribī takes a deeper dive into the life and works of
al-Māturīdī.8 Like Ali and al-Ghālī below, al-Maghribī wrote his study following
the publication of Fathalla Kholeif ’s edition of al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd,
which paved the way for more focused study of al-Māturīdī’s theology. Al-Ma-
ghribī’s contribution reviews al-Māturīdī’s life and follows the main topics of the
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd to elucidate his theological views. It concludes with a study of
the theological differences between al-Māturīdī and Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d.
324/936), and al-Māturīdī and the Muʿtazila, as well as commentary on where
al-Māturīdī sits on the spectrum between the two.
In 1988, Daccache completed his doctoral thesis on al-Māturīdī’s theology of
creation, which was revised and published as a monograph in 2008.9 Daccache
situates al-Māturīdī’s work in its Samarqandī context, and focuses in particular
on al-Māturīdī’s theological epistemology and his understanding of God’s act
of creation, including its implications for metaphysics in general. In 1989, al-
Ghālī published his Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Ḥayātuh wa-ārāʾuh al-ʿaqdiyya.10
Al-Ghālī’s rich exploration contextualises al-Māturīdī’s education, profession,
and scholarship among near-contemporaries throughout Muslim society.
He focusses on al-Māturīdī’s views of God and humans, and the relationship
between the two, using al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd as a launching point. More
recently, Jalālī published Tārīkh va ʿaqāyid-i māturīdiyya, which takes a more
7 A. K. M. Ayyub Ali, ʿAqīdat al-Islām wa-l-Imām al-Māturīdī, Dhaka: al-Muʾassasa al-
Islāmīyya Banghlādīsh, 1983.
8 ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Maghribī, Imām ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa Abū Manṣur al-Māturīdī
wa-ārāʾuh al-kalāmiyya, Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1985.
9 Salim Daccache, Le problème de la création du monde et son contexte rationnel et his-
torique dans la doctrine d’Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (333/944), Beirut: Recherches de l’Université
Saint-Joseph, 2008.
10 Balqāsim al-Ghālī, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Ḥayātuh wa-ārāʾuh al-ʿaqdiyya, Tunis: Dār
al-Turkī li-l-Nashr, 1989.
6 Dale J. Correa
geographically-centred approach to al-Māturīdī’s biography and the study of his

theological ideas.11 Jalālī’s study also includes a comparison of Māturīdī, Ashʿarī,
Muʿtazilī, and Imāmī doctrines.
Rudolph’s Al-Maturidi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand was a
landmark study for advancing the understanding of Ḥanafī-Māturīdī theology
in Europe and North America.12 This essential study became all the more acces-
sible to English-speaking researchers after it was translated from the original
German into English by Rodrigo Adem in 2014.13 Rudolph takes great pains
to reconstruct the milieu in which al-Māturīdī studied, taught, and developed
his ideas and works. A remarkable observation from Rudolph’s work is that al-
Māturīdī – despite his invectives against the school – was deeply influenced by,
and owed much to, the Muʿtazila, and in particular, to Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/
al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931). In contrast, Cerić’s Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islām.
A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī takes a theologically sympa-
thetic approach by focusing on al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd in great detail.14
Cerić guides his reader through the logic of al-Māturīdī’s argumentation, con-
necting it to the broader ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa creed as well as to related (and
essential) works of theology, exegesis, Hadith, and law. Earlier Pessagno con-
tributed to the growing Western understanding of al-Māturīdī and his oeuvre
through scholarship about one of al-Māturīdī’s great influencers, Ibn al-Shabīb
(d. first half of 3rd/9th century), and al-Māturīdī’s approach to a number of key
concepts, including evil, acquisition (kasb), will (irāda), and power (qudra).15
Hureyre Kam, in recent years, has expanded the field’s understanding of al-
Māturīdī’s thought by focusing on his conceptualisation of evil.16 Intriguingly,
Kam argues that al-Māturīdī conceives of evil – or rather, theodicy – as a proof
of God’s very existence. Kayhan Özaykal has also shed light on al-Māturīdī’s
unique contributions to Islamic theology through the latter’s middle stance on
the ratiocentric-theocentric dichotomy.17 Özaykal finds that while al-Māturīdī’s
11 Sayyid Luṭfullāh Jalālī, Tārīkh va ʿaqāyid-i māturīdiyya, Qom: Markaz-i Muṭālaʿāt va
Taḥqīqāt-i Adyān va Madhāhib, 2007.
12 Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Maturidi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand, Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1996.
13 Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand,
trans. Rodrigo Adem, Leiden: Brill, 2014.
14 Mustafa Cerić, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islām. A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr
al-Māturīdī, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995.
15 J. Meric Pessagno, “Intellect and Religious Assent”, The Muslim World, 69/1 (1979),
pp. 18–27; “Irāda, Ikhtiyār, Qudra, Kasb. The View of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī”, Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 104/1 (1984), pp. 177–91; “The Reconstruction of the Thought of
Muḥammad Ibn Shabīb”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 104/3 (1984), pp. 445–53.
16 Hureyre Kam, Das Böse als Gottesbeweis. Die Theodizee al-Māturīdīs im Lichte seiner
Epistemologie, Kosmologie und Ontologie, Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2019.
17 Kayhan Özaykal, Theological-Ethics and Epistemology. The Euthyphro Dilemma and the
Metaethics of al-Māturīdī, PhD diss., Sakarya University, Sakarya, 2017.
theological-ethics views God as the paramount source of morality, he conceives

of reason as the foundation for the ordering of creation and as the primary con-
duit for human understanding of moral values. Zaid Khalid al-Zuriqat has also
focused on the interplay of reason and revelation in his article, “Dalīl maʿrifat
Allāh bi-l-ʿaql fī falsafat al-Māturīdī al-kalāmiyya”.18 Al-Zuriqat concludes that
reason is the spark for all pathways of knowledge to God for al-Māturīdī, from
the senses to testimony to contemplation of revelation.
Historical Studies
Recent scholarship has relied upon and revised that of the above scholars to
reveal more detail about Transoxania and Ḥanafī theology before, during, and
after the career of al-Māturīdī. In particular, Philip Dorroll’s contribution to our
understanding of al-Māturīdī’s metaphysics points to Anke von Kuegelgen and
Ashirbek Muminov’s work on epigraphic evidence from the Jakerdize cemetery
that elucidates the divisions among Ḥanafī scholars in Samarqand.19 Fur-
thermore, Dorroll explores the reception of al-Māturīdī’s metaphysical notion
of flux/taqallub (or lack thereof ) by Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) in
the latter’s Tabṣirat al-adilla, lending the field a crucial diachronic connection
between the opaque thought of the eponym and the mature, lucid writing of
later generations of Ḥanafī thinkers. Likewise, Philipp Bruckmayr’s “The Spread
and Persistence of Māturīdī Kalām and Underlying Dynamics” explores how
al-Māturīdī became an eponym for the Transoxanian Ḥanafī theological school,
and where and how al-Māturīdī’s ideas did and did not endure.20
M. Sait Özervarlı also connects al-Māturīdī’s thought to that of his intellectual
progeny in an effort to authenticate the unique manuscript of Kitāb al-Tawḥīd
held at Cambridge.21 Using Tabṣirat al-adilla, Özervalı is able to demonstrate
that the Cambridge manuscript is reflected either verbatim or by meaning in
al-Nasafī’s text. This article has helped dispel concerns in the field with trusting
a unique manuscript to represent a theological eponym’s master work. Özervarlı
has also contributed to the field’s understanding of the later Māturīdī school,
from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire and onwards.22 Qadrī Muḥammad
18 Zaid Khalid al-Zuriqat, “Dalīl maʿrifat Allāh bi-l-ʿaql fī falsafat al-Māturīdī al-kalāmiyya”,
Dirāsāt. Al-ʿUlūm al-insāniyya wa-l-ijtimāʿiyya, 46/3 (2019), pp. 493–501.
19 Philip Dorroll, “The Universe in Flux. Reconsidering Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s Meta-
physics and Epistemology”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 27/2 (2016), pp. 119–35.
20 Philipp Bruckmayr, “The Spread and Persistence of Māturīdī Kalām and Underlying
Dynamics”, Iran and the Caucasus, 13 (2009), pp. 59–92.
21 M. Sait Özervalı, “The Authenticity of the Manuscript of Māturīdī’s Kitāb al Tawḥīd.
A Re-examination”, İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi/Turkish Journal of Islamic Studies, 1 (1997),
pp. 19–29.
22 M. Sait Özervalı, “Attempts to Revitalize Kalām in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries
8 Dale J. Correa
al-Dīb likewise turns to works outside of the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd for some impres-
sion of what al-Māturīdī’s views may have been on issues not otherwise covered
in his main, extant theological treatise.23 Relying on al-Māturīdī’s Taʾwīlāt ahl al-
sunna, al-Dīb is able to parse out two major opinions by al-Māturīdī on the issue
of imāma: how the imām is selected, and the qualifications of the imām. Relat-
edly, Iranian scholars Shadi Nafisi and Somayeh Khalili Ashtiyani investigate the
place of ahl al-bayt in the narrations about imāma quoted in al-Māturīdī’s and
ʿUmar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī’s (d. 537/1142) works of Qur’anic exegesis.24 They
find that, although al-Māturīdī and al-Nasafī generally honour the ahl al-bayt,
the scholars do not rely on ahl al-bayt as sources for the interpretation of verses
related to the Prophet’s family and their leadership of the community.
Robert Wisnovsky notes a major shift in the intellectual history of Islamic
theology and philosophy through al-Māturīdī. In particular, he focuses on one
of al-Māturīdī’s most renowned followers, Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1099),
and the influence that Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) seemed to have on him.25 Wis-
novsky is able to demonstrate how the ‘philosophising’ of Islamic theology was
not a lone product of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) efforts; rather, it can
be traced to the lifetime of Ibn Sīnā and those he inspired, including al-Bazdawī.
Taking us into the present day, Ramon Harvey puts al-Māturīdī into conver-
sation with contemporary phenomenology and analytic theology in order to
show how a contemporary Muslim philosophical theology is possible in such
a space.26
Similarly tracing the dynamics between other Islamic sciences and Islamic
theology, Aron Zysow has demonstrated in both his monograph and notable
article, “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafī Legal Theory”, how theology
affects legal theory.27 Zysow carefully builds an intellectual history of the as-
(Islamic theology)”, The Muslim World, 89/1 (1999), pp. 90–105; M. Sait Özervalı, “Theology
in the Ottoman Lands”, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke, New
York NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 567–86.
23 Qadrī Muḥammad al-Dīb, “Manhajiyyat al-Imām al-Māturīdī fī muʿālajat ishkālāt fī
qaḍiyyat al-imāma,” al-Dirāya, 19/2 (2019), pp. 89–140.
24 Somayeh Khalili Ashtiyani and Shadi Nafisi, “A Critical Study of Matoridi and Nasafi’s
Views on Verses related to AhlulBayt (PBUT),” Taḥqīāt-i ʿUlūm-i Qurʾān va Ḥadīth, 12/1
(2015), pp. 145–76.
25 Robert Wisnovsky, “One Aspect of the Avicennan Turn in Sunni Theology”, Arabic
Sciences and Philosophy, 14 (2004), pp. 65–100. It is also worth consulting Madelung on the
relationship between Ḥanafī theology and Ashʿarī theology in the same time period; see his
“Abu l’Muʿin al-Nasafi and Ashʿari Theology”, Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth,
ed. Ian Richard Netton, Clifford Edmund Bosworth, and Carole Hillenbrand, Leiden: Brill,
2000, pp. 318–220.
26 Ramon Harvey, Transcendent God, Rational World. A Māturīdī Theology, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2021.
27 Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty. An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal
Theory, Atlanta GA: Lockwood Press, 2013; “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafī Legal
Theory”, Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss, Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp. 235–65.
sociation of key theological concepts with legal theoretical prescriptions in the

work of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144), showing how theology is the
essential foundation to the logic and structure of other disciplines for Ḥanafīs.
Dale J. Correa expands Zysow’s study to trace the development of the epis-
temological relationship between theology and legal theory in the Ḥanafī school
from al-Māturīdī’s generation to that of ʿUmar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī.28 Using
testimony as her lens, she finds that theology establishes and continues to re-es-
tablish the basis upon which legal theory is able to operate. Najah Nadi similarly
builds on Zysow’s findings in her study of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1390),
exploring how Islamic theology and Arabic logic were integrated into legal theo-
ry.29 Nadi focuses on theological principles, demonstrating how they play an
epistemological role in theology, logic, and legal theory, as they deal with the
objects and classification of knowledge, the character and typology of epistemic
indication, and the nature of theoretical investigation.
Critical Editions and Textual Studies
In the mid-20th century, the works of al-Māturīdī and key Ḥanafī theologians
came to the notice and intense focus of Western scholars. Manfred Götz intro-
duced the field to al-Māturīdī’s exegesis, Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, well before any
comprehensive edition would be completed.30 He also did so through the lens
of a later commentary by the still underappreciated ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī,
thus capturing two key and previously unfamiliar texts in one study. Walid
Saleh recently continued the effort to study al-Māturīdī’s immense exegesis by
using it as a lens for understanding the famous exegete Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī (d.
310/923).31 However, the most impactful edition of the 20th century was Fathalla
Kholeif ’s 1970 publication of al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, based on the Cam-
bridge manuscript.32 This edition and study opened the door for more scholars
to approach al-Māturīdī’s theology directly.
Angelika Brodersen has introduced to the field relatively unfamiliar scholars
who further our understanding of the Ḥanafī theological presence in Trans-
28 Dale J. Correa, Testifying Beyond Experience. Theories of Akhbār and the Boundaries of
Community in Transoxanian Islamic Thought, 10–12th Centuries CE, PhD diss., New York Uni-
versity, New York NY, 2014.
29 Najah Nadi, Theorising the Relationship between Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh. The Theo-
logical-Legal Epistemology of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), PhD diss., University of
Oxford, Oxford, 2018.
30 Manfred Götz,“Māturīdī und sein Kitab Taʾwilat al-Qurʾan”, Islam, 41 (1965), pp. 27–70.
31 Walid Saleh, “Rereading al-Ṭabarī through al-Māturīdī. New Light on the Third Century
Hijrī”, Journal of Qur’anic Studies, 18/2 (2016), pp. 180–209.
32 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, ed. Fathalla Kholeif, Beirut: Dar el-Machreq,
1970.
10 Dale J. Correa
oxania. Her edition of Abū Iṣḥāq al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī’s (d. 534/1139) Talkhīṣ
al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd, and the accompanying studies, elucidate the com-
plex intellectual networks between Bukhara and Samarqand in the premodern
period.33 Her edition of Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī’s (d. latter half of 5th/11th century)
Tamhīd fī bayan al-tawḥīd makes relevant and useful a long-overlooked work of
the Māturīdī school that persisted in its popularity through the 19th century.34
Likewise, Ayedh Aldosari has made it possible for the field to engage with
later Ḥanafī theology and its evolutionary trajectory in the form of ʿUmar ibn
Muḥammad al-Khabbāzī’s (d. 691/1292) Kitāb al-Hādī.35
Lastly, it is necessary to mention the editions of essential theological works
attributed to Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī, Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī (d. 482/1089),
ʿUmar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī, as well as to Abū l-Thanāʾ Maḥmūd al-Lāmishī
(d. early 6th/12th century). Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī’s theology has been made
more accessible through the work of Marie Bernand and Éric Chaumont, who
edited and composed a brief study of Kitāb Maʿrifat al-ḥujaj al-sharʿiyya.36 It is a
work of legal theory that gives evidence of many of the theological associations of
the discipline, aligning with what Fakhr al-Islām’s brother Abū l-Yusr reveals in
his Uṣūl al-dīn (edited by Hans Peter Linss and Aḥmad Ḥijāzī Aḥmad Saqqā).37
Although not an edition itself, but rather a descriptive study of a manuscript
ripe for editing, ʿImād Ḥasan Marzūq’s article on ʿUmar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī’s
Maṭlaʿ al-nujūm wa-majmaʿ al-ʿulūm makes for a crucial entry point for the study
of this encyclopedic tome of Islamic sciences, including theology.38 The Bazdawī
brothers and ʿUmar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī were contemporaries with one other
notable theologian, al-Lāmishī. His work of theology, Kitāb al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid
al-tawḥīd, would have remained in relative obscurity were it not for the critical
edition produced by ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī.39
33 Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥid, ed. Angelika Brodersen,
Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2011.
34 Angelika Brodersen, Zwischen Māturīdīya und Ašʿarīya. Abū Šakūr as-Sālimī und sein
Tamhīd fī bayān at-tauḥīd, Piscataway NJ: Gorgias Press, 2019.
35 Ayedh Aldosari, Ḥanafī Māturīdīsm. Trajectories of a Theological Legacy, with a Study
and Critical Edition of al-Khabbāzī’s Kitāb al-Hādī, Sheffield: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2020.
36 Marie Bernand and Éric Chaumont, Livre où repose la connaissance des preuves légales.
Kitāb fīhi Maʿrifat al-ḥujaj al-sharʿiyya, Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 2003.
37 ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Hans Peter Linss and Aḥmad Ḥijāzī
Aḥmad Saqqā, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2003.
38 ʿImād Ḥasan Marzūq, “Makhṭūṭ (Maṭlaʿ al-nujūm wa-majmaʿ al-ʿulūm) li-l-Imām Najm
al-Dīn Abī Ḥafṣ ʿUmar al-Nasafī. Dirāsa waṣfiyya taḥlīliyya”, Majallat Kulliyyat al-Ādāb Banhā,
46/1 (2016), pp. 1–50.
39 Abū l-Thanāʾ Maḥmūd ibn Zayd al-Lāmishī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd, ed.
ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī, Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1995.
Concluding Remarks
The study of al-Māturīdī and the Ḥanafī theological school that came to bear
his name is recently, and finally, an area of deep interest for Western academe.
Long a problem of access to sources, more of the central works of this school
have been edited and published in venues accessible to European and North
American scholars and libraries. Furthermore, the Māturīdī school is not so
easily dismissed now as too similar to the Ashʿarī school to not warrant intensive
investigation; rather, it has been identified as a significant, historically influential
thread of intellectual development that encourages Western academics to engage
with Muslim scholarship from South Asia and the Middle East. Philip Dorroll
introduces us to the rich and dominating Turkish academe and Turkish scholars’
foundational contributions to the study of Ḥanafī-Māturīdi theology in the
following section.
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Māturīdī Studies in Turkish
Historical Outline and Main Contributions
Philip Dorroll
By far the largest number and greatest diversity of modern academic studies
of Māturīdī theology have been done in Turkish. Modern Turkish scholars
and theologians, particularly in the last two decades, have fostered a genuine
renaissance in Māturīdī studies. Due to the historical importance and theo-
logical range of this tradition of scholarship, it will first be necessary to provide
a brief summary of its historical development, especially given the fact that the
achievements of this tradition of study have remained underappreciated (or
simply unknown) outside of Turkey. This tradition has experienced three stages
of development: (1) The rediscovery of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in
the early 20th century, (2) the earliest scholarly treatments of al-Māturīdī’s own
texts in the 1980s and 1990s, and (3) ‘The Māturīdī Renaissance’ of the 2000s to
the present day.
As is well-known, Ottoman-era Sunni kalām was methodologically syn-
cretistic and incorporated both Ashʿarī and Māturīdī texts and arguments (in
addition to mystical Sufi strains of theology and numerous other intellectual
traditions and influences).1 The first few decades of the Turkish Republic wit-
nessed a rediscovery of the importance of al-Māturīdī in particular, as some
intellectuals in this period saw the rationalistic elements of his theology as
conducive to the creative renewal of Sunni thought in the modern age.2 The
great Ottoman and Early Republican theologian Mehmed Şerefettin Yaltkaya
(1879–1947) included al-Māturīdī in his widely influential 1932 article3 on the
history of Islamic theology among Turkic peoples, thus laying the foundation for
al-Māturīdī’s importance in modern Turkish theology and scholarship. Two of
the first professors in the first theology faculty founded in the Turkish Republic
1 See M. Sait Özervarlı, “Theology in the Ottoman Lands”, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic
Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke, New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 567–86.
2 See Rıdvan Özdinç, Akıl, İrade, Hürriyet. Son Dönem Osmanlı Dini Düşüncesinde İrade
Meselesi, Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2013, pp. 108–9.
3 Mehmed Şerefettin Yaltkaya, “Türk Kelâmcıları”, Darülfünun İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası,
23 (1932), pp. 1–19.
16 Philip Dorroll
(at Ankara University), Yusuf Ziya Yörükan (1887–1954) and Muhammed et-
Tanci (1918–1974), produced short studies of Māturīdī theology in the 1950s.4
The first extensive scholarly studies of Māturīdī theology in Turkish were
produced in the 1980s and 1990s. These were significant for their careful analyt-
ical use of al-Māturīdī’s own extant works, his theological text Kitāb al-Tawḥīd
and his Qur’an commentary Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān. These studies include: Kemal
Işık, The Understanding of Faith, God, and Prophethood in Māturīdī’s Theological
System (1980);5 M. Saim Yeprem, Māturīdī and Free Will (1984);6 Hasan Şahin,
Religion According to Māturīdī (1987);7 M. Sait Yazıcıoğlu, The Conception of
Human Freedom according to Māturīdī and Nasafī (1992);8 Hanifi Özcan, The
Problem of Knowledge in Māturīdī (1993);9 Adil Bebek, The Problem of Sin in
Māturīdī (1998);10 and Hanifi Özcan, Religious Pluralism in Māturīdī (1999).11
M. Sait Özervarlı’s Pursuits of Renewal in Kalām. The End of the 19th to the Be-
ginning of the 20th Century (1998)12 is also worthy of note because it includes
consideration of the influence of Māturīdism in the history of modern Sunnī
kalām. The titles of these works provide a good sense of the future direction
Māturīdī studies would take in Turkey. Following the interest in al-Māturīdī in
the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, these first scholarly studies of al-
Māturīdī’s theology focused on themes crucial to understanding the importance
of Sunni theological heritage for approaching contemporary philosophical and
moral issues. These include the definition of religion and faith, problems in theo-
logical anthropology, and the extent to which al-Māturīdī’s work can be used to
inform contemporary debates concerning ethics and Islamic religious identity
in the modern period.
I term the current stage of Māturīdī studies in Turkey (the 2000s to the
present day) ‘The Māturīdī Renaissance’, because this period has seen the most
productive and theologically sophisticated florescence of Māturīdī thought in
4 Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, “İslâm Akaid Sisteminde Gelişmeler ve Ebu Mansur-i Matüridî”,
Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 2/2–3 (1953), pp. 127–42; Muhammed et-Tanci,
“Abû Mansûr el-Mâturîdî”, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 4/1–2 (1955), pp. 1–12.
5 Kemal Işık, Maturidi’nin Kelam Sisteminde İman, Allah ve Peygamberlik Anlayışı, Ankara:
Fütüvvet Yayınları, 1980.
6 M. Saim Yeprem, İrâde Hürriyeti ve İmâm Mâtürîdî, Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi
İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 1984.
7 Hasan Şahin, Mâturîdî’ye Göre Din, Kayseri: Yeni Matbaa, 1987.
8 M. Sait Yazıcıoğlu, Mâturîdî ve Nesefî’ye Göre İnsan Hürriyeti Kavramı, Istanbul: Milli
Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992.
9 Hanifi Özcan, Mâtürîdî’de Bilgi Problemi, Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakül-
tesi Vakfı Yayınları, 1993.
10 Adil Bebek, Matüridî’de Günah Problemi, Istanbul: Rağbet Yayınları, 1998.
11 Hanifi Özcan, Mâturîdî’de Dini Çoğulculuk, Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat
Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 1999.
12 M. Sait Özervarlı, Kelâm’da Yenilik Arayışları. 19. Sonu – 20. Yüzyıl Başı, Istanbul: İSAM
Yayınları, 1998.
Māturīdī Studies in Turkish 17
modern history. Over the past two decades, numerous scholarly books, articles,13
conferences, edited volumes, theses and dissertations,14 and popular works and
presentations have been produced in Turkish, in total running into many hun-
dreds of individual works. It is therefore impossible to enumerate them all here.
Instead, brief mention will be made of the three key areas of advancement in
this period: historical studies, critical editions and translations, and systematic
theological contributions.
Historical Studies
One of the influential works that set the stage for the current Māturīdī renais-
sance was Sönmez Kutlu’s edited volume, Māturīdī and Māturīdism. Historical
Background, Life, Works, Ideas, and the Māturīdī School (2003).15 This highly
useful collection of essays included Turkish translations of important articles
by non-Turkish scholars such as Philipp Bruckmayr, Keith Lewinstein, Wilferd
Madelung, Ulrich Rudolph, W. Montgomery Watt, and Ziyadov Yunusovich.16
This meant that many of the key findings of the latest global research on the his-
tory and context of Māturīdī theology in English, French, German, Russian, and
Uzbek sources were now available in Turkish. In addition, the volume included
studies of al-Māturīdī by the two leading figures of 20th century Turkish Islamic
theology, Bekir Topaloğlu and Hüseyin Atay. It also incorporated important
studies by leading contemporary Turkish scholars of al-Māturīdī, including by
Kutlu himself, Hanifi Özcan, Talip Özdeş, and Şükrü Özen. This volume also
included a key historical study (originally published in Uzbek) by Ashirbek
Muminov and Anke von Kügelgen17 that brought to light key biographical and
contextual details about al-Māturīdī that they discovered in previously unknown
manuscript sources in Istanbul. These sources revealed that al-Māturīdī was part
13 Article references and texts can be located in this database: http://ktp.isam.org.tr/?url=
makale/findrecords.php (accessed 4 December 2020).
14 Theses can be located in this database: http://ktp.isam.org.tr/?url=tezilh/findrecords.
php (accessed 4 December 2020).
15 Sönmez Kutlu (ed.), İmam Mâturîdî ve Maturidilik. Tarihi Arka Plan, Hayatı, Eserleri,
Fikirleri ve Maturidilik Mezhebi, Ankara: Kitabiyat, 2003.
16 P. Bruckmayr, “The Spread and Persistence of Māturīdī Kalām and Underlying Dynam-
ics” (2009); K. Lewinstein, “Notes on Eastern Hanafite Heresiography” (1994), W. Madelung,
“The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks” (1968), “The Westward Migration of Hanafi Schol-
ars From Central Asia in the 11th to 13th Centuries” (2002), U. Rudolph, “Das Entstehen der
Māturīdiya” (1997), W. M. Watt, “The Problem of al-Maturidi” (1974), Z. Ş. Yunusoviç, “Ebû
Mansûr El-Mâturîdî’ye Nispet Edilen Eserlerin Taşkent Yazmaları” [The Tashkent Manuscripts
of Works Related to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī and Some Studies of al-Māturīdī], trans. from
Uzbek by Sönmez Kutlu and Yuldus Musahanov and included in Kutlu’s İmam Mâturîdî ve
Maturidilik edited volume.
17 Ashirbek Muminov and Anke von Kügelgen, “Mâturîdî Döneminde Semerkand İlahi-
yatçıları”, İmam Mâturîdî ve Maturidilik, ed. Kutlu, pp. 279–91.
18 Philip Dorroll
of an ancient Ḥanafī intellectual centre in Samarqand (known as the Juzjāniyya)

known for its theological rationalism and its conflict with the theological
circles in the city associated with the ahl al-ḥadīth. Ahmet Ak’s historical study
“The Emergence of Māturīdism”, presented in 2009 and published in 2012,18
incorporated this manuscript evidence into the fullest picture yet described of
al-Māturīdī’s life and historical background.19 Ak’s study of al-Māturīdī’s life and
work (most recent edition published in 2017) remains the most up-to-date treat-
ment of al-Māturīdī’s historical background and biography.20
Recent edited volumes have made yet more scholarly studies on the history
of Māturīdism available in Turkish. These include numerous studies authored
by Central Asian scholars21 and included in the proceedings of the International
Symposium on Māturīdism (Past, Present, and Future) held in Kazakhstan in
2015, and key translated works by international scholars such as Marie Bernand,
Angelika Brodersen, Mustafa Cerić, Richard Frank, Daniel Gimaret, Manfred
Götz, J. Meric Pessagno, Joseph Schacht, and Josef van Ess.22 One recent collec-
tion focuses specifically on scholarship related to Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān.23 Finally,
it is important to mention that Ulrich Rudolph’s highly important monograph
on al-Māturīdī (Al-Maturidi und die Sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand, 1996)
has been translated into Turkish.24 In sum, the historical study of al-Māturīdī
18 Ahmet Ak, “Mâtürîdîliğin Ortaya Çıkışı”, Büyük Türk Bilgini İmâm Mâtürîdî ve Mâtü-
rîdîlik. Milletlerarası Tartışmalı İlmi Toplantı (22–24 Mayıs 2009, İstanbul), ed. İlyas Çelebi,
Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2012, pp. 435–51.
19 The main conclusions of von Kügelgen, Muminov, and Ak’s important studies are sum-
marised in English in the introductory section of Philip Dorroll, “The Universe in Flux. Recon-
sidering Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s Metaphysics and Epistemology”, Journal of Islamic Studies,
27/2 (2016), pp. 119–35.
20 Ahmet Ak, Büyük Türk Âlimi Mâturîdî ve Mâturîdîlik, Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2017.
21 International Symposium on Maturidism (Past, Present, and Future). Papers, ed. Sönmez
Kutlu, Ankara: Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi, 2018. It should be noted here that a significant lit-
erature on Māturīdism has recently developed in Central Asian languages. This material is
unfortunately linguistically inaccessible to the editors, but deserves significant attention in its
own right. Numerous important articles in these languages can be found in the edited collection
above, edited by Kutlu and published by Ahmet Yesevi University.
22 Included in the massive collection of texts related to Māturīdī and Māturīdism, Din Felsefe-
si Açısından Mâtürîdî Gelen-ek-i, ed. Recep Alpyağıl, Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2016: M. Bernand,
“La critique de la notion de nature (Ṭab‘) par le Kalām (1980); A. Brodersen, “Divine and Human
Acts in Māturīdī Kalām” (2014); selection from M. Ceric, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam.
A Study of the Theology of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī; R. Frank’s review of the Kholeif edition of
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd (1976); selection from D. Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain en théologie musul-
mane (1980); “M. Götz, “Māturīdī und sein Kitāb Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān” (1965), J. M. Pessagno,
“Intellect and Religious Assent: the View of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī” (1979), “The Uses of Evil
in Maturidian Thought” (1984); J. Schacht, “New Sources for the History of Muhammadan
Theology” (1953), J. van Ess’ review of the Kholeif edition of Kitāb al-Tawḥīd (1988).
23 Hatice K. Arpaguş, Mehmet Ümit, and Bilal Kır (eds.), İmâm Mâtürîdî ve Te’vîlâtü’l-
Kur’ân, Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2019.
24 Ulrich Rudolph, Semerkant’ta Ehl-i Sünnet Kelamı. Mâturîdî, trans. Özcan Taşçı, Is-
tanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2016.
and Māturīdism in contemporary Turkey incorporates the near entirety of glob-

al scholarly output on this topic, while at the same time contributing decisive
advancements of its own.
Critical Editions and Translations
The second area of decisive contributions made by the Turkish renaissance in

Māturīdī studies is the production of critical editions of al-Māturīdī’s extant
works. This monumental effort was led by the great Turkish theologian and
scholar Bekir Topaloğlu (1932–2016), whose extraordinary depth of theological
thought, scholarship, and mentorship is widely remembered and celebrated in
Turkey. Topaloğlu and Muhammed Aruçi produced the most recent and metic-
ulous critical edition of al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd in 2003,25 and Topaloğlu
led the production of the most recent and comprehensive critical edition of
the entirety of al-Māturīdī’s massive Qur’an commentary, Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān.26
Topaloğlu also produced a brilliantly lucid explanatory translation of Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd into Turkish in 2002,27 and initiated and led the Turkish translation of
Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān (some 9,000 pages in 18 volumes).28 It is difficult to overstate
the importance of these editions and translations, which have provided Turkish
scholars and readers with unparalleled access to al-Māturīdī’s theology.
Scholars in Turkey have also produced critical editions and translations of
important works from the Māturīdī school. These include: Topaloğlu’s edition
and translation of Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī’s (d. 580/1184) al-Bidāya fī uṣūl al-dīn
(1978);29 Ahmet Saim Kılavuz’s edition and translation of Abū Salama al-Sa-
marqandī’s (c. 4th/10th century) Jumal uṣūl al-dīn (1989);30 M. Sait Özervarlı’s
edition of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Usmandī’s (d. 552/1157) Lubāb al-kalām (2005);31
Mustafa Sinanoğlu’s edition of Abū Muḥammad al-Samarqandī’s (d. 701/1301)
al-ʿAqīda al-rukniyya (2008);32 Hülya Alper’s translation of Abū al-Muʿīn al-
25 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu and Muhammed Aruçi,
Ankara: İSAM, 2003.
26 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu et al., Istanbul: Mizan
Yayınevi, 2005–2011, 17 vols.
27 Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî, Kitâbü’t-Tevhîd. Açıklamalı Tercüme, trans. Bekir Topaloǧlu,
Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2002.
28 Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî, Tevîlâtü’l Kur’ân Tercümesi, trans. Bekir Topaloǧlu et al., Is-
tanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2019, 18 vols.
29 Nûreddin es-Sâbûnî, Mâtürîdiyye Akaidi, ed. and trans. Bekir Topaloğlu, Ankara:
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1978.
30 Ebû Seleme es-Semerkandî, Ebû Seleme Es-Semerkandî ve Akâid Risâlesi, ed. and trans.
Ahmet Saim Kılavuz, Istanbul: Emek Matbaacılık, 1989.
31 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Usmandī, Lubāb al-kalām, ed. M. Sait Özervarlı, Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları,
2005.
32 Abū Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, al-ʿAqīda al-ruknīyya, ed. Mustafa Sinanoğlu, Istanbul:
İSAM Yayınları, 2008.
20 Philip Dorroll
Nasafī’s (d. 508/1115) Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd (2010);33 Ömür

Türkmen’s edition of Abū Shukr al-Sālimī’s (d. after 460/1068) al-Tamhīd fī
bayān al-tawḥīd (2017),34 and Muhammed Aruçi’s edition of Nūr al-Dīn al-
Ṣābūnī’s al-Kifāya fī l-hidāya (2019).35
Systematic Theological Contributions
Of the three types of contributions produced by the Turkish renaissance in

Māturīdī studies, by far the most numerous have been books and articles
engaged in constructive theological projects and theological analysis based on
Māturīdī texts. These run into the many dozens, if not hundreds, of individu-
al works. In order to give a sense of the insights offered by this vast literature,
it is helpful to delineate two main methods of Turkish theological study of al-
Māturīdī. I term these the ‘constructive’ and the ‘analytical’ methods. The first
term denotes theological projects that explicitly utilise al-Māturīdī’s theology to
engage contemporary moral questions. These projects identify areas of potential
theological development in al-Māturīdī’s work, and then build creative theo-
logical arguments on the foundation of Māturīdī concepts. The second method
seeks to refine our precise understanding of al-Māturīdī’s theology in order to
more accurately situate it within the broader Sunni theological tradition, rather
than to utilise al-Māturīdī’s concepts as a way to engage contemporary moral
issues. It is important to note that these two methods are most often not mutually
exclusive in contemporary Turkish scholarship, and are found in various deg-
rees in almost all contemporary Turkish studies of al-Māturīdī.
The two contemporary Turkish theologians and scholars of al-Māturīdī,
Sönmez Kutlu and Hülya Alper, for instance, epitomise these two methods
or tendencies. Kutlu’s work has been dedicated to developing the theological
rationalism inherent in al-Māturīdī’s work in ways that contribute to the protec-
tion of both individual liberty and communal identity in contemporary Turkey.
The central insight in Kutlu’s vast body of theological work is that al-Māturīdī’s
understanding of human freedom and religious belief can be developed to foster
a genuinely Islamic understanding of both individual human rights and the
moral need to actualise our individual freedom in a given historical community,
such as the past and present historical tradition of Turkish Islam. For Kutlu, al-
Māturīdī’s theology of human freedom and human rationality have the potential
33 Ebü’l-Muîn en-Nesefî, Tevhidin Esasları. Kitâbü’t-temhîd li kavâidi’t-tevhîd, trans. Hülya

Alper, Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2010.
34 Abū Shukr al-Sālimī, al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd, ed. Ömür Türkmen, Istanbul: İSAM
Yayınları, 2017.
35 Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, al-Kifāya fī l-hidāya, ed. Muhammed Aruçi, Istanbul: İSAM
Yayınları, 2019.
to dignify and advance the Islamic moral obligation to establish individual lib-
erty and social justice in this life, in obedience to God’s ethical commands.36
Alper’s work also focuses on al-Māturīdī’s theological understanding of
human reason, but argues that al-Māturīdī’s specific analysis of human reason
provides its best insights through its connection with divine revelation and
divine wisdom, which of necessity transcend the historical particularity of
modernity. Alper’s work reveals the dialectic relationship between reason and
revelation, epitomised in her highly insightful phrase, ‘the priority of reason
and the necessity of revelation’ (aklın önceliği ve vahyin gerekliliği).37 Alper thus
uses al-Māturīdī’s work to sharpen the analysis of key theological dynamics in
Sunni tradition, such as the relationship between human reason and divine
revelation. According to Alper’s reading of al-Māturīdī, human reason is given
by God to allow human beings to freely approach God’s truth in revelation,
which is then both legitimised intellectually by human reason while at the same
time transforming human reason in its encounter with the ultimate truths of its
Creator.
Finally, it is important to note that in recent years, important thematic studies
of key features and issues in al-Māturīdī’s work have proliferated in Turkish.
These studies represent a stage of even further refinement in the modern Turk-
ish analysis and advancement of Māturīdī theology. Though far too numerous
to list here in their entirety, some notable examples can be mentioned here in
order to give a sense of the range of this current scholarship. These include Musa
Koçar’s The Relationship between God and the World in Māturīdī (2004);38
Emine Öğük’s The Relationship between Wisdom and Evil in Māturīdī’s System
of Thought (2010);39 Sami Şekeroğlu’s Morality in Māturīdī (2010);40 Harun
Işık’s Human Freedom in Māturīdī (2013);41 Kılıç Aslan Mavil’s Scriptural Her-
meneutics in Māturīdī Theology (2017);42 Hülya Terzioğlu’s The Perception of
36 See, for instance, his highly influential article, “Bilinen ve Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle İmam
Mâturîdî”, İmam Mâturîdî ve Maturidilik. Tarihi Arka Plan, Hayatı, Eserleri, Fikirleri ve
Maturidilik Mezhebi, ed. Sönmez Kutlu, Ankara: Kitabiyat, 2003, pp. 23–64; and his recent re-
flections on the state of Māturīdī studies in Turkey, “Türkiye’de Yapılan Mâturîdî ve Maturidilik
Araştırmaları Sorunları”, Mâtürîdî Araştırmaları. Sorunlar ve Öneriler, ed. Recep Tuzcu et al.,
Istanbul: Endülüs Yayınları, 2018, pp. 12–26.
37 Hülya Alper, İmam Mâtürîdî’de Akıl-Vahiy İlişkisi, Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2008, p. 157.
On her reflections on method in the study of Māturīdī, see her introduction to her edited
volume in honour of the memory of Bekir Topaloğlu, İmam Mâtürîdî ve Mâtürîdiyye Geleneği.
Tarih, Yöntem, Doktrin, Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2018,
pp. 7–9.
38 Musa Koçar, Mâtürîdî’de Allah-Alem İlişkisi, Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2004.
39 Emine Öğük, Mâtürîdî’nin Düşünce Sisteminde Şer-Hikmet İlişkisi, Ankara: TDV
Yayınları, 2010.
40 Sami Şekeroğlu, Mâtürîdî’de Ahlak. Felsefî bir Betimleme, Ankara: Ankara Okulu
Yayınları, 2010.
41 Harun Işık, Matüridi’de İnsan Özgürlüğü, Ankara: Araştırma Yayınları, 2013.
42 Kılıç Aslan Mavil, Mâtürîdî Kelâmında Tevil, Istabul: İSAM Yayınları, 2017.
22 Philip Dorroll
Women in Māturīdī (2018);43 and Osman Nuri Demir’s The Conception of the
Human Being in Māturīdī (2020).44
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Introducing the Volume
Lejla Demiri
The present volume is, to the best of our knowledge, the first Reader of Māturīdī
theology ever produced in a Western language. The choice of presenting and
explicating the rich and vibrant traditions of the Māturīdī school comes at a time
of propitious scholastic growth and interest in Islamic theology. The present
volume has thus been structured to mirror this variety and historical importance
and is divided into five parts, each mirroring classical compendia of kalām. As
such, the careful selection and presentation of the hitherto untranslated works
offer an exciting moment for the field of theology both within and outside Is-
lamic discourses.
Part One is dedicated to Epistemology and Ontology and opens with
Hureyre Kam’s contribution with a selection from Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s
(d. 333/944) Kitāb al-Tawḥīd (‘The Book of Unity’). The passages selected here
characterise al-Māturīdī’s theory of knowledge, the very foundation upon which
his systematic theology is built. Carefully analysing the two epistemological
frameworks promoted by al-Māturīdī, while at the same time bringing to our
attention the divergent readings of these challenging texts, Kam proposes a
novel way of interpreting al-Māturīdī’s methodology, which he identifies as ‘the
dual epistemology’. The first represents religious knowledge, while the other is
intended for knowledge in general, each having a distinct frame of reference.
The second chapter, by Mürteza Bedir, includes passages from two different
works, Jumal uṣūl al-dīn and Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn authored in the 4th/10th
century by two otherwise unknown scholars: Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn
Muḥāmmad al-Samarqandī and Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī, respec-
tively. Both works were written in a setting close to that of al-Māturīdī himself
and therefore serve as first-hand source information about his thought and
theology as perceived by his immediate circle of disciples and followers. The
two excerpts included here from the Jumal and its commentary deal with the
relationship between divine revelation and human reason. Discussing the epis-
temological value of reason vis-à-vis religious knowledge, both sources aim to
prove that in reality there can never be a real clash between reason and reve-
lation, for ultimately both reason and revelation are proofs of God, and as such
there is no room for inconsistency.
26 Lejla Demiri
This is followed by a chapter by Sümeyye Parıldar who presents an excerpt

from Risāla fī l-wujūd al-dhihnī (‘Treatise on Mental Existence’) authored by Is-
mail Gelenbevi (d. 1205/1791), a prominent 18th-century Ottoman scholar. The
selected text reflects post-Avicennan philosophical discussions on mental exis-
tence combined with theological discourses on divine knowledge, its universality,
and all-comprehensive nature. Acknowledging the obvious difficulties of Gelen-
bevi’s text, with her informative introduction and analysis, Parıldar facilitates the
reading by contextualising it within the larger framework of falsafa and kalām.
Part Two of the volume explores the Māturīdī school’s discourse on Meta-
physics, primarily dealing with the divine essence, attributes and actions. It
opens with a chapter by Angelika Brodersen, which offers a selection from a
certain Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī’s al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd (‘Introduction in
the Explication of the Unity’) stemming from 5th/11th-century Transoxiana. The
excerpt discusses a variety of arguments related to divine attributes, in support
of the Māturīdī (as well as the Ashʿarī) position of affirming the reality of God’s
attributes, in contrast to the Muʿtazilīs. Aiming to prove that ‘the attribute is
neither God nor other than Him’, al-Sālimī argues that the denial of the attrib-
utes would lead to the denial of the ‘attributed’, and to regard the divine essence
as completely identical with His attributes would lead to the conclusion that all
attributes are identical to each other. This is followed by a discussion on the at-
tributes of divine action, which he considers to be a single eternal attribute. This
is presented as an important feature that differentiates Māturīdī theology from
that of al-Ashʿarī who regards the attributes of action (understood as individual
acts) to be related to the divine attribute of power and as such created.
This is followed by Lejla Demiri’s chapter on Rukn al-Dīn ʿUbayd Allāh
al-Samarqandī’s (d. 701/1301) al-ʿAqīda al-rukniyya fī sharḥ lā ilāha ill Allāh
Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh (‘Rukn al-Dīn’s ʿAqīda: A Commentary on the
Shahāda’). Another Māturīdī scholar of Samarqandī provenance, and almost
unknown today, his theology merges kalām with taṣawwuf. He quotes from both
Ashʿarī and Māturīdī sources, blending them with those of sufis. The excerpt
here is a good summary of his theology which Demiri calls ‘the theology of
humility’, as it is founded on the axiom of the unknowability of God: ‘No one
knows God other than God’. Hence, human knowledge of God comes from Him.
Likewise, heavenly bliss is due to God’s mercy and favour, and not from human
beings earning their way to Heaven by acts of worship and righteous deeds. For,
al-Samarqandī emphatically writes, ‘complete thankfulness for the outward and
inward blessings of God is not possible, because every instance of thanks for
a new blessing requires further thanks unendingly. A blessing from God, even
if it be small, cannot be praised without incurring new blessings’. The divine
attributes of mercy, generosity and beauty feature frequently in al-Samarqandī’s
ʿAqīda, as can be observed in the excerpts presented in this volume, demon-
strating the extent of his merging kalām and taṣawwuf.
Introducing the Volume 27
Part Three of this volume, dealing with Prophethood, comprises two chap-
ters. The first, by Hülya Alper, introduces a very prominent Māturīdī scholar,
Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) and his al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd
(‘Introduction to the Principles of the Unity’), a book which summarises the
doctrine of the Māturīdiyya. In the excerpts translated and analysed here, Abū
l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, known for his systematisation of Māturīdī kalām, aims to
prove why prophethood is necessary, providing a number of rational arguments,
and finally presenting miracles as proofs for the truthfulness of prophethood.
Prophethood in itself is regarded as a tool of instruction and a means of attaining
wisdom and perfection, a true favour of the Wise and All-Knowing God, thanks
to His compassion and mercy towards His servants. Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī be-
lieves that since the intellect is able to know good and evil universally, though
not in individual instances, and since wisdom consists of knowing individual
instances, there is an inevitable need for divine guidance through prophets who
will make a necessary statement on each individual instance, i. e. deliver the
divine law. And even though the necessity of being grateful to the giver of a bless-
ing is embedded in the intellect, the divine law is needed to explain how to ap-
preciate the value of blessings and to know suitable ways to show one’s gratitude,
concludes al-Nasafī. He then continues to elaborate the ways by which miracles
are evidence for prophethood. The second text on prophethood is presented by
Harith Ramli in his chapter on another Central Asian Māturīdī scholar who set-
tled in Damascus, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Khabbāzī (d. 691/1292) and his work al-Hādī
fī uṣūl al-dīn (‘Guide to the Principles of Religion’). The excerpt here reflects al-
Khabbāzī’s effort in proving the need for prophethood. As Ramli clearly demon-
strates in his introduction, al-Khabbāzī follows the classical Māturīdī position
that the sending of prophets is due to divine wisdom. In al-Khabbāzī’s views,
‘humans are by design predisposed to receiving wisdom and knowledge, and
are ready to accept more when instructed by a wise teacher’. For, ‘the sending of
messengers to promise, warn, and to demonstrate to people what they require
for their benefit in both worlds, is an act of wisdom’. Yet al-Khabbāzī takes a
step further in his elucidations, as Ramli points out, ‘reflecting a need to address
not only older opponents (i. e. Muʿtazilites and the Barāhima, representing Indic
traditions in Central Asia such as Buddhism), but also new challenges in the
Ashʿarī-dominated milieu of Ayyubid Damascus’.
Part Four is dedicated to discussions on Faith, Knowledge and Acts, and
includes three chapters. Kayhan Özaykal’s chapter looks at al-Māturīdī’s com-
mentary on the Qur’an, Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān (‘Interpretations of the Quran’). The
selected passages here cover al-Māturīdī’s take on the Qur’anic story of Adam’s
creation and the dialogue between the Creator and the angels on this occasion
(Q 2:30–32). Al-Māturīdī places emphasis on the importance of knowledge and
God being the ultimate bestower of true knowledge: ‘Thus, God showed them
this to have them know that the path to recognising and knowing things is not
28 Lejla Demiri
(based on) natural qualities, but rather the kindness and grace of God’. In this
short text which reveals al-Māturīdī’s anthropology, he seems to be in line with
the position that regards this Qur’anic narrative as an indication of ‘the high
status and honour of humankind and the greatness of the knowledge granted
to them’. The Qur’anic verse which relates the angels’ response ‘Glory be to You,
we have no knowledge except that which You have taught us. Indeed, you are
the Knower, the Wise’ (Q 2:32) leads al-Māturīdī to discuss one of the earliest
theological themes, the relation between faith and deeds, and ultimately the
fate of a believer who has committed a major sin. The passages here exhibit, as
Özaykal points out, ‘al-Māturīdī’s wish to achieve the most reasonable and bal-
anced theological position in relation to the metaphysics of human action’. This
is followed by Dale J. Correa’s chapter on Uṣūl al-dīn (‘Roots of Religion’) of Abū
l-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100), an illustrious post-formative period Māturīdī
scholar from Bukhārā. The selected texts deal with the role of the intellect in
reference to faith. In his description of the intellect (ʿaql) as the tool (āla) for
attaining knowledge of things, al-Bazdawī regards the intellect’s seat to be the
brain, while its effect is in the heart: it is through the light of the intellect that
the heart perceives things. Al-Bazdawī then discusses whether the intellect on its
own is sufficient to attain knowledge of God. After evaluating in detail varying
views and scholarly positions, al-Bazdawī quite surprisingly comes to the con-
clusion that the intellect does not necessitate faith. In other words, human beings
are not responsible for having knowledge of God before the arrival of the Mes-
sengers. Then comes Najah Nadi’s chapter on Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-
Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) and his most original and latest theological work Sharḥ
al-Maqāṣid (‘Commentary on the Objectives’). A prominent scholar within both
Māturīdī and Ashʿarī theological circles, al-Taftāzānī’s works have attracted
global Muslim interest throughout the centuries, and yet his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid
has received little attention. As argued by Nadi, the originality of al-Taftāzānī’s
thought, ‘is best seen in his concern with critical verification of knowledge
(taḥqīq), spurning madhhab-affiliations’, and the excerpt in this volume is pres-
ented as an example of his method of taḥqīq. The selected passages discuss the
nature of īmān, bringing into dialogue al-Taftāzānī’s epistemology, ontology and
metaphysics. The passage provides a thorough discussion of the three statements
al-Taftāzānī mentions in the opening of the excerpt: ‘Firstly, īmān is the action of
the heart, not merely the action of the tongue. Secondly, it is assent (taṣdīq), not
merely knowledge (maʿrifa) or belief (iʿtiqād). Thirdly, actions are not intrinsic
to it [i. e. īmān] such that, were they to be absent, it would not be negated’.
Part Five on Free Will, Predestination and the Problem of Evil opens with
a chapter by Racha el Omari presenting a sample from Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/
al-Kaʿbī’s (d. 319/931) ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt, the only Muʿtazilī text
included in this volume. To better understand al-Māturīdī’s theological world,
and especially his views regarding human acts and divine justice, one has to
Introducing the Volume 29
closely examine his discussions with the Muʿtazilites and especially with his con-
temporary al-Kaʿbī, a prominent Muʿtazilī theologian, who often features in the
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. The selected passages here demonstrate al-Kaʿbī’s defence of
his belief that God must do the absolute best (aṣlaḥ) for His servants, a Muʿtazilī
view that al-Māturīdī and his followers vehemently rejected.
This is followed by Philip Dorroll’s presentation of select passages from
al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd reflecting his views concerning human acts. As
clearly expressed in the excerpt, according to al-Māturīdī’s theology, creation
owes its existence to divine omnipotence, wisdom, pre-existent knowledge, and
will, as he writes, ‘the entirety of His creation fluctuates within His gifts and His
goodness’. God has made human beings ‘capable of knowing and distinguishing
the praiseworthy from the blameworthy. He has made the blameworthy dis-
tasteful, and what is praiseworthy pleasing, to their intellects’. Human beings are
further obliged to obedience in accordance with the divine command. There-
fore, al-Māturīdī concludes, the Book of God ‘is truth from God’, and ‘whoever
adheres to it prospers and is saved, while whoever turns away from it is miserable
and fails’.
What follows is Philipp Bruckmayr’s introduction to ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd
Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī (d. 747/1346) and his al-Tawḍīḥ
fī ḥall ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh (‘The Clarification for Solving the Dif-
ficulties in The Revision in Legal Theory’). Although this is a work in legal theory,
the passages included here explore the nature of good and evil, a theme that is
relevant to both kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh. The excerpt, as Bruckmayr observes,
‘is of particular relevance because it represents the first sophisticated Māturīdī
engagement with the paradigm-shifting contributions of the Ashʿarī luminary
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) to the sciences of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh’. In
his discussion of good and evil, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī also reflects on its theo-
logical relevance to human free will and divine predestination. He particularly
rejects the Ashʿarī view that good and evil can only be known through revelation
and not through reason. He further aims to demonstrate the inconsistencies of
the Ashʿarī position, particularly challenging al-Rāzī’s argument.
The volume then concludes with a contribution by Tim Winter who provides
the full text, translation and analysis of Risāla fī bayān al-ḥikma li-ʿadam nisbat
al-sharr ilayhi taʿālā (‘A Treatise Expounding the Wisdom in Not Attributing
Evil to God the Exalted’), an outstanding theological treatise by the 16th-century
Ottoman Sheykhulislam Ibn Kamāl or Kemalpaşazâde (d. 940/1534). The text
focuses on the question of evil, exploring the difference between evil and good-
ness and the way they are attributed to God in scriptural texts. In Winter’s words,
Ibn Kamāl’s ‘central argument is transcendentalist and aporetic: God’s ḥikma
controls a universe of perfection (itqān), evident in the transcendent world
(malakūt) but which to those who inhabit the human material plane (mulk) is
only imperfectly perceived’. In addition to scriptural texts, the work also quotes
30 Lejla Demiri
from Persian poetry and takes its inspiration from Ibn ʿArabī’s cosmology and
metaphysics. As Winter aptly observes, Ibn Kamāl’s text ‘presents the complex
maturity of Ottoman metaphysics: by this period not only have the later Māturīdī
and Ashʿarī schools been brought into a nuanced conversation, but the very dif-
ferent ontology of Ibn ʿArabī has been seriously integrated as well’.
With its cross-regional character exploring the fecundity of theological ideas
throughout the centuries, the present volume offers a glimpse into the richness
of the Māturīdī tradition. Each text included in this volume comes with a short
introduction to the author, the work and the theme discussed in the selected
passages, followed by the Arabic original, and an annotated translation in Eng-
lish offered by each contributor. All chapters include passages from published
editions of the original material in Arabic (without the critical apparatus) except
for the second chapter (by Bedir) which is based on manuscripts. Instead of
simply reproducing the existing editions, we have introduced punctuation and
vocalisation wherever needed and have re-structured sentences and paragraphs
to facilitate the reading of these intricate texts. Typos or misreadings are tacitly
corrected unless there is a difference of reading, in which case these are indicated
in footnotes. Overall, the volume is intended to contribute to our knowledge of
Māturīdī theology and promote further research in the field. It will be particu-
larly useful for scholars and students of Islamic Studies, history of the Middle
East and Arabic language and philology.
Part I: Epistemology and Ontology
Dual Epistemology
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), Kitāb al-Tawḥīd
Hureyre Kam
It is well-known that al-Māturīdī, in his epistemological framework, draws on

three sources in his search for knowledge. These are: a) sense perception (ʿiyān/
ḥawāss), b) testimony/reports (samʿ/akhbār), and c) reason (ʿaql/naẓar). We
learn this from his introduction to the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd (‘The Book of Unity’),
where he lays out his epistemological system, which functions as a programmat-
ic framework for his arguments and the theological system put forward in his
book. This relatively short passage of approximately ten pages presented several
difficulties to the editors of the original manuscript, such that we have two di-
verging readings of this chapter in the two editions of Fathalla Kholeif 1 and Bekir
Topaloğlu – Muhammed Aruçi.2 The difficulties in reading and understanding
this short chapter understandably arose from the fact that al-Māturīdī seems to
take two distinct approaches to epistemology at the same time. After rejecting
taqlīd at the outset, he then goes on to clarify which sources of knowledge are
best suited to know the true religion, which are only two: al-samʿ and al-ʿaql.
After he discusses and defends his position in a very brief manner, he again asks
the question of which sources to consult to gain knowledge in general, and now
presents the reader with three different sources: al-ʿiyān, al-akhbār and al-naẓar.
This has led to much confusion among researchers attempting to describe al-
Māturīdī’s approach to epistemology.
While the majority of scholars hold the opinion that al-Māturīdī presents only
one epistemology for all questions, and they therefore interpret the differences
in his terminology for the different sources – ʿiyān/ḥawāss, samʿ/akhbār, ʿaql/
naẓar – as synonyms, I disagree. I hold the position that the usage of differing
terminologies refers to two distinct epistemological frameworks, in which he dif-
1 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, ed. Fathollah Kholeif, Beirut: Dar el-Machreq,
1970.
Istanbul/Beirut: Irshād/Dār Ṣādir, 2001. For an in-depth discussion of the differences between
the two editions with a special focus on the introduction, see Hureyre Kam, Das Böse als Gottes-
beweis Die Theodizee al-Māturīdīs im Lichte seiner Epistemologie, Kosmologie und Ontologie,
Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2019, pp. 38–50.
34 Hureyre Kam
ferentiates between the means to gain knowledge of the true religion (first part of
his introduction: two sources of knowledge) and the ways to gain knowledge in
general and in other scholarly disciplines (second part of his introduction: three
sources). I call this twofold approach of his ‘The dual epistemology’.3 Following
this new classification – which resulted from my observation that it is absurd
that al-Mātūrīdī would ask the question of knowledge two times successively
and answer differently both times – al-Mātūrīdī reserves a standalone epis-
temological framework for the quest of the true religion and excludes sensory
perception as a source for this kind of knowledge. This was necessary for him
because, according to traditional Sunni belief, there can be no prophet after the
Prophet Muḥammad, and prophets come with a proof of their prophecy, namely
miracles and wonders. Since miracles can only be perceived and recognised
through sense perception, he felt it necessary to deal with the questions of
religion in a framework different from that of scientific knowledge.
The problem that arises from this differentiation is, however, that the only
readily available source of knowledge that delivers necessary knowledge (ʿilm
ḍarūrī) – meaning, knowledge that is irrefutable and beyond any doubt – is
al-ʿiyān (sense perception). Since this source is excluded from the ‘religious epis-
temology’4 it would mean that there cannot be an indisputable knowledge of
God.5 The following translation of the introduction of the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd is to
be read with this system of dual epistemology in mind. The chapter headings
in the following excerpts of the original Arabic text of the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd are
structured according to my concept of his dual epistemology.6
3
Fur further elaboration, see Kam, Das Böse, pp. 21–81.
4
One could also name it fiqh in its original sense, meaning deep understanding of religion.
5 This makes it crucial for his system that he finds ways to strengthen the quality of
knowledge through samʿ/khabar. For a study on his approach to testimony, see Dale J. Correa,
“The Vehicle of Tawātur in al-Māturīdī’s Epistemology”, Büyük Türk Bilgini İmâm Mâtürîdî
ve Mâtürîdîlik. Milletlerarası Tartışmalı İlmî Toplantı (22–24 Mayıs 2009, Istanbul), ed. İlyas
Çelebi, Istanbul: IFAV, 2012, pp. 375–89.
6 The Arabic original is from the Topaloğlu-Aruçi Edition (TA), pp. 65–72. There are some
omitted passages, marked with […], to keep the focus on the main arguments. The content of
the omitted text is summarised in footnotes in the translation section. Words between curly
brackets in the Arabic indicate scribal additions to the text, while square brackets denote
redactions by the editors.
Dual Epistemology 35
[Selected text begins on the following page]

‫ ‪36‬‬ ‫‪Hureyre Kam‬‬
‫ِالدلِيلِ ]‬
‫جوب معر َفة ال ّدين ب َّ‬
‫[ ُو ُ‬
‫مذاهب في‬ ‫حمه ال�له‪� }:‬أ ّما بعد‪َ ،‬ف إ�نَّا وجد َنا النَّاس مختلفي ا ْل َ‬
‫صور َر َ‬ ‫{قَالَ الشَّ ْيخ �أَ ُبو َم ْن ُ‬
‫اح َدة‪� :‬أَ ّن الذي هو عليه‬
‫النِّحل‪ ،‬في ال ّدين‪ ،‬متّفقين على اختالفهم في ال ّدين على كلمة و ِ‬
‫َ‬
‫ّ‬
‫كل منهم له سلف ُيقلد‪َ .‬ف َثبت‬ ‫اطل؛ على ات ّفاق جملتهم في �أَ ّن ّ‬ ‫حق والذي عليه غيره َب ِ‬
‫ّ‬
‫عدد؛‬ ‫َ‬
‫صاحبه لإ صابة مثله ض ّده‪ .‬على �أن ّه ليس فيه سوى كثرة ا ْل َ‬ ‫�أ ّن التقليد ليس م ّما ُي َ‬
‫عذر‬
‫ُ‬
‫[بها] صدقُه فيما ي ّدعي‪،‬‬ ‫حج ُة عقلٍ ُيع َل ُم َ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫اللّهم � ّإل �أن يكون لأحد م ّمن ينتهي القول � إليه‬
‫مرجعه في الدين بما يوجب تحقيقَ ه‬
‫ُ‬ ‫فمن � إليه‬ ‫وبرهان ُي ْق ِهم المنصفين على � إصابته ا ْل ّ‬
‫حق‪َ .‬‬ ‫ٌ‬
‫الحق فيما يدين هو به‪ ،‬ك�أ ّن الذي دان به‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ل واحد منهم معرفة‬
‫المحق؛ وعلى ك ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫عنه فهو‬
‫يضطر‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الحق له قد حصرهم‪ � ،‬إذ منتهى حجج ك ٍّل منهم َما‬
‫ّ‬ ‫هو مع �أدلّة صدقه وشهادة‬
‫ذكرت‪ .‬وال يجوز ظهور مثلها لض ّده‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫التسليم له لو ظفر بها؛ َوقد ظهرت لمن‬ ‫العقول � إلى ْ‬
‫تمويه �أسباب الشُّ به في‬
‫َ‬ ‫حججه َو�أظهر‬
‫ُ‬ ‫حجج العقل بعد ما غلبت‬
‫ُ‬ ‫فِي الدين‪ ،‬لما تتناقض‬
‫قوة � ّإل بالله العظيم‪.‬‬
‫غيره‪ .‬وال ّ‬
‫الدينية]‪7‬‬ ‫[القسم ال أ ّول‪ :‬مدارك العلم‬

‫ّ‬
‫عرف بهما الدين]‬
‫[كون السمع والعقل �أصلين ُي َ‬
‫ثم �أصل ما ُيعرف به الدين‪ � – ‬إذ ال ب ّد �أن يكون لهذا َ‬

‫الخلق دين يلزمهم االجتماع عليه‬ ‫َّ‬
‫و�أصل يلزمهم الفزع � إليه –وجهان؛ �أحدهما السمع‪ ،‬والآخر العقل‪.‬‬
‫‪7 This heading is due to my observation of the twofold epistemological approach, which has‬‬
‫‪been discussed above and is not part of the printed editions of the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd.‬‬
The necessity of knowing religion through proof (dalīl):
{The Master Abū Manṣūr, may God show him mercy, said:} Now, indeed we find
people divided into different denominations in their faiths and religions, in agree-
ment of their dissents regarding religion on one point: that they are right and the
others are wrong. They are all in agreement that they are following [the authority
of ] their predecessors. Therefore, it is clear that unquestioned following (taqlīd)
does not prevent the opinion holder from reaching the opposite [opinion] in the
same manner.8 There is not much to it other than the multiplicity in numbers
[of followers]. Nay, except that there is a rational proof for the one with authority
through which the truthfulness of his claim can be known, and demonstrative
evidence which would force the fair ones [to acknowledge] that he has reached
the truth. He who relies on this authority in religion, which requires a thorough
investigation, has reached the truth. So every one of them is obliged to know the
truth in the realms of the religion that he [i. e. the prophet] is on. The religion in
which he believes, with the proofs for his righteousness and the truth testifying
for him, encompasses them [every other religion], because the ultimate goal of
the proofs of all of them is to force reason into submitting to [the truth of their
claims] if they can achieve [a sustainable proof ]; but [those clear proofs] have
been shown by the one whom we mentioned [i. e. the prophet]. And it is not
possible that similarly [indisputable] proofs are brought up by someone who
is in opposition to [the prophet] in religion. Because [in this case] the proofs of
reason would fall into contradiction after his proofs [had already] unveiled the
doubtfulness [in the statements] of the others. There is no might and no power
except by God the Almighty.
[First Part: Religious Epistemology]9
[Testimony (samʿ) and reason (ʿaql) are the two sources with which the religion
is known]
There can be no doubt that the human race needs a religion in which they can
join together and principles upon which they can rely. The sources with which
to gain knowledge of the [true] religion are two: One is testimony and the other
is reason.
8 That is by following an opposing authority.

9 As mentioned above, this heading is not part of the original Arabic text.
‫�أ ّما السمع فم ّما ال يخلو بشر من انتحاله مذهباً يعتمد عليه ويدعو غيره � إليه‪ ،‬حتّى شاركهم‬
‫قر بوجود ْالأشياء وتحقيقها‪ ،‬على‬‫في ذلك �أصحاب الشكوك والتجاهل فضالً عن الذي ُي ّ‬
‫ل منهم [على] ما راموا تسوية �أمورهم عليه‬ ‫ذلك جرت سياسة ملوك الأرض من سيرة ك ّ‬
‫رعيتهم به؛ وكذلك �أمر الذين ا ّدعوا الرسالة والحكمة‪ ،‬ومن قام بتدبير‬ ‫وت�أ َ‬
‫ليف ما بين قلوب ّ‬
‫�أنْواع الصناعة‪ .‬وباللّه المعونة والنجاة‪.‬‬
‫ل ذي عقل‬ ‫خاصة ليس بحكمة‪ ،‬وخروج ك ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫و�أ ّما العقل فهو �أ ّن كون هذا العا َلم للفناء‬
‫بفعله عن طريق الحكمة قبيح عنه؛ فال يحتمل �أن يكون العا َلم الذي العقل منه جزءٌ‬
‫مؤسساً على غير الحكمة �أو مجعوالً عبثاً‪ .‬و � إذا ثبت ذلك ّ‬
‫دل �أ ّن � إنشاء العالم للبقاء ال‬ ‫ّ‬
‫وبخاصة الذي هو‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ثم كان العا َلم ب�أصله ّ‬
‫مبنياً على طبائع مختلفة ووجوه متضا ّدة‪،‬‬ ‫للفناء‪ّ .‬‬
‫عقل الذي يجمع بين ا ْلمجتمع ويفرق بين الذي حقّه التفريق؛ وهو‬
‫مقصود من حيث ا ْل ُ‬
‫الذي س ّمته الحكماء “العالم الصغير”‪ .‬فهو على �أهواء مختلفة وطبائع متشتّتة‪ ،‬وشهوات‬
‫جبلوا لتنازعوا في تجاذب المنافع و�أنواع ّ‬
‫العز والشرف‬ ‫ِّبت فيهم غالبة‪ ،‬لو تُركوا وما عليه ُ‬
‫ُرك ْ‬
‫التقاتل‪ ،‬وفي ذلك التفاني والفساد الذي‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ثم‬
‫في ْعقب ذلك التباغض ّ‬ ‫وا ْل ُملك والسلطان‪َ ،‬‬
‫جعل البشر وجميع الحيوان‬ ‫لو تعلّق �أمر كون العا َلم له لبطلت الحكمة في كونه‪ .‬مع ما ُ‬
‫جعلت لهم‪ .‬فلو لم ُي َر ْد‬ ‫غير محتمل للبقاء � ّإل بالأغذية وما به قوام �أبدانهم � إلى ُ‬
‫الم َدد التي ُ‬ ‫َ‬
‫بتكوينهم سوى فنائهم لم يحتمل � إنشاء ما به بقاؤهم‪ .‬و � إذ ثبت ذا ال ب ّد من �أصل يؤلّف‬
‫بينهم وي ُ‬
‫كفّهم عن التنازع والتباين الذي لديه الهالك والفناء‪.‬‬
As for testimony, it is (a source of knowledge) which nobody can neglect as a

basis of their faith and which they invite others to [acknowledge]. On this even
the sceptics10 and agnostics agree, let alone those who accept the existence and
reality of things. [Furthermore] the policy of all the kings on the earth relies on
this [source] in their approach to settle their affairs and to unite the hearts of
their subjects. The same applies to those who claim messengership and wisdom,
as well as to those who manage diverse crafts and handiworks. Support and
salvation are from God.
And as for reason, there would be no wisdom had this world been created only
to perish. Likewise, it is reprehensible for an intelligent being to do something
that lacks wisdom.11 Therefore, it is not possible that the world, of which reason
is a part, is not based on wisdom or that it is made in vain. This proves that the
world is created to persist, not to perish. Moreover, in its foundation, the world
consists of different natures and opposing aspects. This accounts especially for
that which is intended by reason12 – which brings together that which belongs
in composition and divides those which are meant to be divided13 – and this is
what the philosophers named the microcosm [i. e. the human]. For they have
different inclinations, diverse natures and desires dominant over them. If they
were to be left to their nature, they would inevitably come into conflict in an
effort to obtain different benefits such as honour, prestige, wealth, and rule. This
conflict would then lead to hating one another and fighting against one another,
in which lie mutual destruction and corruption. If the creation of the world was
based on this purpose, it would be devoid of wisdom. In addition to this, people
and all living beings in general can only survive with food and that with which
they preserve their bodies until their fixed term [comes to an end]. So if only
their ultimate destruction were intended with their creation, there would be no
sense in creating those things with which they ensure the continuation of their
existence. So since this is now established, undoubtedly there must be a principle
that would unite them and restrain them from conflict and difference that lead
to doom and decay.
10 Topaloğlu translates it as ‘sophists’ in Turkish: Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî, Kitâbüʾt-Tevhîd

Tercümesi, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu, Ankara: ISAM, 2005, p. 4.
11 In other words, departing from the path of wisdom by means of one’s own actions is
repugnant to anyone who possesses sound reason.
12 Meaning that which is intended to be recognised and acknowledged by reason.
13 He is highlighting the role and tasks of reasoning here, which is to analyse the object of
interest into its parts and synthesise again in order to gain insight. The reference to the micro-
cosm of the philosophers gives us a hint about the role of ʿaql in al-Māturīdī’s view. In taking
the ‘microcosm’ as a template, the ʿaql can gain insight to universal concepts and metaphysical
truths. But since the quality of the knowledge gained through reason is always in the mode of
muktasab, this knowledge cannot claim to be factual, but rather represents speculative insights
into the realms of metaphysical truths.
‫وقوف عليه‪]…[ .‬‬

‫َ‬ ‫يجمعهم عليه لغاية ما اح َتمل ُو ْس ُعهم ا ْل‬
‫ُ‬ ‫فلزم طلب �أصل‬
‫عام ًة]‪14‬‬ ‫[القسم الثاني‪ :‬مدارك العلم‬

‫ّ‬
‫المعرفة]‪15‬‬ ‫[�أسباب‬
‫والحق‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ثم اخ ُت ِلف في الأسباب التي بها ُيع َلم المصالح‬ ‫{قال �أبو منصور رحمه ال�له‪ّ }:‬‬
‫التمسك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫حسنه لزمه‬ ‫والمحاسن من �أضدادها‪ .‬فمنهم من يقول‪ :‬ما يقع في قلب ك ّ‬
‫ل منهم ُ‬
‫يتمسك بما �أ ُ ْل ِهم‪ ،‬لما يكون‬
‫ّ‬ ‫به‪ .‬ومنهم من يقول‪ :‬يعجز البشر عن الإ حاطة بالسبب‪ ،‬ولكن‬
‫ذلك م ّمن له تدبير العا َلم‪.‬‬
‫{قال الشيخ رحمه ال�له‪ }:‬وهما بعيدان من �أن يكونا من �أسباب ا ْلمعرفة‪ ،‬ل أ ّن وجوه التضا ّد‬
‫المحق‪ .‬ومحال �أن يكون سبب‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ل واحد منهم �أن ّه‬ ‫والتناقض في ْالأديان َب ِّي ٌن‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ثم عند ك ّ‬
‫الحق يعمل هذا العمل […]‪ .‬ولم يكن لواحد منهما دليل غير الذي لآخر في خطابه؛‬ ‫ّ‬
‫االختالف والتضا َّد َ‬
‫اللذين بهما التفاني‪]…[ .‬‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ع ما ال يدفع‬
‫وذلك نو ُ‬
‫ثم السبيل التي ُيوصل بها � إلى العلم بحقائق الأشياء‬

‫{قال الشيخ �أبو منصور رحمه ال�له‪ّ }:‬‬
‫ِ‬
‫العيان ْ‬
‫والأخبار والنظر‪.‬‬
‫‪14 This heading is due to my observation of the twofold epistemological approach, which‬‬
‫‪has been discussed above and is not part of the printed editions of the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd.‬‬
‫‪15 This heading is from TA (p. 69). I left out the first heading al-muqaddima at the same‬‬
‫‪place in TA. I did not include it because I consider it misleading at this place. If the muqaddima‬‬
‫‪or introduction begins at this point, what about the former sections regarding the rejection of‬‬
‫‪taqlīd etc.; are they to be considered outside the text? I assume TA were not able to find another‬‬
‫‪solution to categorise the text, because they did not see the dual epistemological approach put‬‬
‫‪forward in the text.‬‬
Therefore, it is necessary to look for a principle that unites them as far as they are
able to devote themselves to it. […]
[Second Part: General Epistemology]16
[The sources of knowledge]
{Abū Manṣūr, may God show him mercy, said:} Furthermore, there is dispute
regarding the ways to differentiate the useful, the true, and the good from their
counterparts. There are some who say: Good is that which appears in one’s heart
as such and which necessitates that they stick to it. And there are some who say:
It is beyond the powers of human beings to discern all the reasons for things.
Therefore, one has to stick to that which he receives as inspiration, because it
comes from the one who manages the universe.
{The Master, may God show him mercy, said:} And these two are far from being
sources of knowledge. Because it is evident that there are oppositions and con-
tradictions between the religions, while every one of them believes that they are
right. And it is impossible that a true source would lead to something like this,
confusing falsehood with truth. […] And none of them17 has a proof [for their
statement] other than the one which has already been delivered by the other
[i. e. the opposing party] in his speech. This is the kind of dispute which is not
capable of resolving differences and contradictions, thus bringing with it their
mutual destruction.18 […]
{The Master Abū Manṣūr, may God show him mercy, said:} The sources with
which to gain knowledge of the reality of things are the perception of the senses
(ʿiyān), reports (akhbār),19 and reasoning (naẓar)20.
16 As mentioned above, this heading is not part of the original Arabic text.
17 That is the parties relying on inspiration as a source.
18 Al-Māturīdī is trying here to find a solid basis for the means of a productive dialogue be-
tween opposing parties of religions. In the following sentences he also disqualifies the ‘method
of draws’, as in drawing lots and determining the winner of the argument by the length of the
straws. Furthermore, he disqualifies the consultation of seers and oracles. Note that oracles and
prophets are not synonymous in the view of al-Māturīdī, because oracles depend on inspiration
and visions, whereas prophets function as receivers and deliverers of messages from God.
19 Note that he used the term al-samʿ to refer to ‘testimony’ in his religious epistemology.
According to Josef van Ess the Qurʾan, Sunna and Consensus function as authoritative sources
and are subsumed under the term samʿ. See Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und
3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, Berlin: De
Gruyter, 1997, vol. 4, p. 660. This leads to the understanding that the term al-akhbār is wider in
its scope and is not restricted to the authoritative sources of religion.
20 Note that he used the term al-ʿaql to refer to ‘reason’ in his religious epistemology.
‫�أ‪[-‬العيان]‬
‫الحواس‪ ،‬وهو الأصل الذي لديه العلم الذي ال ض ّد له من الجهل‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫فالعيان ما يقع عليه‬
‫[…]‬
‫ب‪[-‬الأخبار]‬
‫{قال الشيخ رحمه ال�له‪ }:‬والأخبار نوعان؛ من �أنكر جملته َل ِ‬
‫حق بالفريق ال أ ّول‪ ،‬لأن ّه �أنكر‬
‫خبر‪ ،‬فيصير م ْنكراً عند � إنكارِه �إن َ‬
‫ْكاره‪]…[ .‬‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫� إنكاره‪ � ،‬إذ � إنكاره‬
[A. Sense Perception (ʿiyān)]
The ʿiyān indicates that which is perceived by the senses (ḥawāss).21 It is the
principle source that delivers the kind of knowledge to which there is no con-
trary other than ignorance. […]22
[B. Reports (al-akhbār)]
{The Master, may God show him mercy, said:} There are two classes of reports.23
He who denies them in principle joins the first group,24 for he is also denying
his own denial, because his denial is nothing but a report, so that he becomes a
denier of his own denial. […]25
21 Hanifi Özcan points out that according to other passages in al-Māturīdī’s exegetical work
the term al-ʿiyān is wider in its scope than al-ḥawāss, because it also includes inner senses like
instincts. See Özcan, Mâtüridî’de Bilgi Problemi, Istanbul: IFAV, 2012, p. 75.
22 In the following, al-Māturīdī uses the rhetorical example that if one were to cut off body
parts of those who neglect the senses as a source of knowledge, these deniers would of necessity
accept the validity of sensory knowledge due to the undeniable fact of physical pain. Thus, it is
unmistakable that the senses are a source of necessary knowledge (ʿilm al-ḍarūrī).
23 In a later passage he goes on to classify the reports according to the science of Hadith,
namely by distinguishing collective (al-khabar al-mutawātir) and single reports (al-khabar al-
wāḥid). Collective reports are more trustworthy than single reports, which have to be treated
with caution. Although the inclusion of reports into his epistemological framework is necessary
to legitimise the belief in prophets, the knowledge itself gained from reports is not to be seen as
necessary, but muktasab (acquired). The quality of the knowledge is subordinated to the quality
of the knowledge gained from sense perception, although sense perception cannot teach us
anything about God or the true religion.
24 Here al-Māturīdī refers to those who neglect sense perception as a source, meaning they
both have to be confronted with their denial and the absurdity of their claims.
25 Al-Māturīdī goes on to defend khabar as a legitimate source of knowledge by stating that
it gives us all the knowledge that we need to survive. This is because information about other
people and foreign places, as well as practical knowledge about living, is not etched into our
sensory perception or reason. This is the reason why we have to accept the akhbār on prophets.
Yet, in order to accept someone’s prophecy, he has to come with proofs (miracles) to back up the
legitimacy of his messages. Furthermore, although his elaboration on the necessity of akhbār
aims to validate the messages received from prophets, we can also see that he does not limit
akhbār to prophetic epiphanies. On the one hand he classifies ‘the reports’ according to hadith
methods, but on the other, this concept includes also reports in the sense of ‘news’. Therefore,
it has to be considered as a distinct source, rather than the very strict understanding of al-samʿ.
‫ج‪[-‬النظر]‬
‫الحس والخبر‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ثم الأصل في لزوم القول بعلم النظر وجوه‪� .‬أحدها‪ :‬االضطرار � إليه فِي علم‬
‫ّ‬
‫ع ما يحتمل الغلط‬ ‫طف‪ ،‬وفيما َيرِد من الخبر �أن ّه في نو ِ‬‫وذلك فيما �ي َ ْب ُعد من الحواس �أو َي ْل ُ‬
‫ّ‬
‫السحرة وغيرهم في التمييز بينها‪ ،‬وفي َت َع ُّرف الآيات بما‬ ‫َ‬ ‫وتمويهات‬ ‫ثم � ِ‬
‫آيات الرسل‬ ‫�أو ال‪ّ ،‬‬
‫الحق بنوره والباطل بظلمته‪]…[ .‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ُيت�أ ّمل فيها [من] قوى البشر و�أحوال ْالآتي َ‬
‫بها‪ ،‬ليظهر‬
[C. Reasoning (al-naẓar)]26
There are several aspects to the argument for knowledge through reason. One of
them is the necessity of [analysing the knowledge delivered by] sense perception
and testimonies/reports. This is the case for the senses, when [they seek to know
something, which is] out of reach for them, or too subtle [to be perceived by the
senses]. And this is the case for what is transmitted by testimonies and reports, in
that it seeks [to determine] if there is falsehood [in its information] or not, and
further to differentiate between the miracles of the messengers and the decep-
tions of the sorcerers and the like. And [it is needed] for recognising the verses/
miracles (al-āyāt)27 by reflecting on human capabilities and the conditions of
those who bring the (verses/miracles), so that the truth appears in its full glory
and the falsehood in its darkness.
26 In the case of al-Māturīdī naẓar (speculation) is not to be confused with istidlāl (infer-
ence), as performed by scholars. The naẓar is also not be degraded to a mere function of the ʿaql
in al-Māturīdī’s epistemology, although it might appear as such. Instead, it is a distinct source of
knowledge cooperating with ʿaql. While ʿaql functions as a tool of abstraction and seeks to grasp
transcendent truths, naẓar is a tool for analysing the information given to us by the senses and
testimonies/reports. The istidlāl is a tool of communication between different sources, which
are distinct, but not isolated from each other. For further elaboration, see Kam, Das Böse, pp.
65–72.
27 This term can mean ‘signs’ from the natural world as well as the specific verses of the
Qurʾan. As is so often the case with al-Māturīdī, it seems possible that he is deliberately referring
to both senses of the term at once.
46 Hureyre Kam
Bibliography
Primary Text
Istanbul/Beirut: Irshād/Dār Ṣādir, 2001, pp. 65–72.
Other Sources
Correa, Dale J., “The Vehicle of Tawātur in al-Māturīdī’s Epistemology. Constructing a
Theory of Knowledge from Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān”, Büyük Türk Bilgini İmâm Mâtürîdî ve
Mâtürîdîlik. Milletlerarası Tartışmalı İlmî Toplantı (22–24 Mayıs 2009, Istanbul), ed.
İlyas Çelebi, Istanbul: IFAV, 2012, pp. 375–89.
Ess, Josef van, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Ge-
schichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991–1997, 6 vols.
Kam, Hureyre, Das Böse als Gottesbeweis. Die Theodizee al-Māturīdīs im Lichte seiner
Mâtürîdî, Ebû Mansûr el-, Kitâbüʾt-Tevhîd Tercümesi, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu, Ankara:
ISAM, 2005.
Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr al-, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed. Fathalla Kholeif, Beirut: Dar el-Machreq,
1970.
Özcan, Hanifi, Mâtüridîʾde Bilgi Problemi, Istanbul: IFAV, 2012.
Reason and Revelation
Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī
(c. 4th/10th century), Jumal uṣūl al-dīn and Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā
al-Bushāghirī (c. 4th/10th century), Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn1
Mürteza Bedir
The following two works, an epistle and its commentary, are both works
written close to the milieu within which Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī lived and
worked. Although we have in our hands today some of the works of al-Māturīdī
himself, there are only a few extant sources that allow us to evaluate and con-
textualise his views and immediate world. One of the earliest sources is Jumal
uṣūl al-dīn by a certain Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī
(c. 4th/10th century), a younger contemporary of al-Māturīdī. The commentator,
Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī (c. 4th/10th century), about whom we know
little, seems to have lived immediately after al-Māturīdī’s generation. Hence, this
work reflects the immediate reception of views associated with al-Māturīdī and
his environment during the late fourth/tenth century, about which we have scant
knowledge. Given the fact that al-Bushāghirī, the author of the commentary
below, lived among the close circle of al-Māturīdī, this commentary is able to
provide almost contemporary information about the ideas associated with the
latter and his followers.
The following two excerpts from the epistle and its commentary are about
a perennial problem faced by monotheistic religions in general, and Islamic
theology and legal theory in particular. This is the problem of the tension
1 I would like to thank Şükrü Özen who in a private conversation on 11 April 2020, shared
with me his unpublished research on the identification of the author of Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-
dīn. According to him, the author is Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī, the author of Kashf
al-ghawāmiḍ fī aḥwāl al-anbiyāʾ. This latter work did not reach us but rather an abridgment
of it, titled al-Muntaqā by Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184).
Al-Bushāghirī, who lived in the 4th/10th century, was wrongly identified by Ismāʿīl Bāshā
al-Baghdādī as someone who lived in the 9th/15th century, see Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-Bābānī al-
Baghdādī, Īḍāḥ al-maknūn fī l-dhayl ʿalā Kashf al-ẓunūn, ed. Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat
Bilge, Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971, vol. 2, p. 363. Al-Muntaqā was published; see Abū
Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṣābūnī, al-Muntaqā min ʿiṣmat al-anbiyāʾ, ed. Mehmet
Bulut, 2nd ed., Istanbul: Nashriyyāt Riʾāsat al-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyya, 2019.
48 Mürteza Bedir
between revelation and human reasoning. Islamic legal theory discussed two
sub-problems with respect to this. One is the question of whether or not there
are original values to things and actions, independent of God’s revelation. The
second one is that of what the theoretical framework is of revealed laws vis-à-vis
human reasoning.
The first question was answered in four different ways. One answer is that
things are in principle permitted unless prohibitory evidence arrives. The second
view is its opposite, that things are originally prohibited unless the permissive
evidence arrives. The third view is that there is nothing original associated with
things, hence there is no verdict; the evaluative nature shall be determined by ev-
idence from God. The fourth view is the view of al-Māturīdī, who seems to have
downplayed the significance of this controversy due to the fact that – since the
first ever human being is a prophet – there is no need to search for the original
evaluation of the things and acts. After all, the evaluations of the things from
the first human being onward were taught by God Almighty. The values in this
world, therefore, all came from God’s communication to human beings through
His chosen messengers. In other words, all the values in this world were in fact
learned from God’s messengers.
The second question required a theoretical framework within which the
relationship of the human intellect with the revealed laws has been placed. The
earliest attempt to formulate such a framework was undertaken by the Ḥanafīs
(in particular al-Māturīdī and his Samarqandī associates), the Muʿtazila, as well
as some of the early Shāfiʿī jurists, all of whom argued that the human intellect is
able to grasp some truths independently of the revelation. Unlike in the previous
issue, where it is assumed that all the values known by humanity are taught by
God’s communication, here the scholars presumed a state in which the human
intellect stands alone, stripped of all the values extrinsic to it. The question is:
What can the intellect in this state know about values? According to al-Māturīdī,
his Samarqandī followers, the Muʿtazila and the fourth century Baghdadi
Ḥanafīs and some Shāfiʿīs of the same century, the human intellect alone can
grasp the truths or essences of some things, and hence the values associated with
them. They classified ‘things/acts’ in this respect into three types. The first type
is those acts whose evaluation is accepted by the human intellect as necessarily
obligatory. The second type is those that necessarily entail the prohibition of the
things/acts. These two were regarded as conclusive rational realities, in that even
revealed law could not overrule them. The third one is that of contingent things/
acts – that is, the acts whose values can be obligatory, prohibited or permitted
depending on the circumstances, hence they are contingent in terms of values.
In relation to the second problem, the authors also discuss the epistemological
value of reason as far as religious knowledge is concerned. They believed that
there is no real clash between reason and revelation simply due to the fact that
both reason and revelation are proofs of God, and thus they are not assumed to
Reason and Revelation 49
be inconsistent or incongruent. It is here in this respect that the above tripartite

division of the values correspond to the tripartite division of knowledge. Nec-
essary rational knowledge produces necessary obligations, impossible knowl-
edge produces necessary prohibitions, and finally, contingent knowledge relates
to contingent values. While revelation plays the major role in the latter realm, in
the former two realms reason and revelation are congruent.
‫ ‪50‬‬ ‫‪Mürteza Bedir‬‬
‫‪Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Jumal uṣūl al-dīn:2‬‬

‫وم ْم َت ِن ٌع‪ .‬فالواجب‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫نُور االعتقاد في الجملة �أن ّها على ثالثة �أقسام‪:‬‬
‫وم ْمك ٌن ُ‬
‫واجب في العقل ُ‬
‫ٌ‬
‫الم ْن ِعم والشكر له؛ والممتنع نحو الجهل بالنِّ َعم والكفر به؛ والممكن نحو‬ ‫نحو معرفة ُ‬
‫ثم الممكن لما لم يكن في العقل كفاية‬ ‫مقادير شرائع الدين كمقدار الصلوات والزكاة‪ّ .‬‬
‫يع َلم‬
‫رسول عن َمن ْ‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫ص ْرف الممكن � إلى الواجب �أو � إلى الممتنع �أ ْل َ‬
‫ج�أت الحاجة � إلى‬ ‫في َ‬
‫ِ‬
‫حقائق الأشياء ل ُي َب ِّين ذلك و َي ْ‬
‫الرسل‬‫ثم معلوم �أ ّن ُّ‬
‫حق من الواجب والممتنع‪ّ .‬‬ ‫ٍّ‬ ‫صرِفه � إلى‬
‫� إذا جاءت بالبراهين النَّ ِّيرة والآيات المعجزة التي دلّت على صدقهم وعصمتهم [جاؤوا]‬
‫وبيان ما في العقل � إمكانُه‪.‬‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫بت�أكيد ما في العقل � إيجا ُبه وتحقيقِ َن ْفي ما في العقل امتنا ُعه‬
‫ج ُدوا فِ ِ‬
‫يه‬ ‫َان ِم ْن ِع ْن ِد غَ ْي ِر ال� ل ِه َل َو َ‬ ‫جج اللّه ال تتناقض؛ وقد قال اللّه تعالى‪َ :‬‬
‫﴿و َل ْو ك َ‬ ‫ح َ‬‫ل أ ّن ُ‬
‫اخْ ِت َلفًا ك َِث ً‬
‫يرا﴾‪.3‬‬
‫ ‪2‬‬ ‫‪MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, Şehit Ali Paşa 1648, fol. 2a.‬‬
‫‪ 3‬سورة النساء ‪.82/٤‬‬
The light of belief in general has three divisions: rationally necessary, (ration-
ally) impossible and (rationally) contingent. The necessary is, for example,
knowledge of the Benefactor and gratefulness to Him. The impossible is, for ex-
ample, ignorance of the Benefactor and ungratefulness to Him. The contingent
is, for example, the specific measures of the religious rules, such as (deciding)
the number of prayers and the amounts of alms-giving. Since reason is not able
to transform the contingent into the necessary or into the impossible, there
emerges an obliging need for a messenger (sent) by the One who knows the
truths of things in order to explain this and turn him to the truth about what the
necessary and the impossible is. It is well known that when the messengers come
with splendid proofs and miraculous signs that illustrate their truthfulness and
infallibility, they confirm what is rationally necessary, verify the negation of what
is rationally impossible, and explain what is rationally contingent. For the proofs
of God do not contradict each other, as God the Exalted said: ‘If it had been from
other than God, they would have found therein much incongruity’ [Q 4:82].
‫‪Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī, Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn:4‬‬
‫قوله‪“ :‬نور االعتقاد في الجملة �أنها على ثالثة �أقسام”‬

‫[…]‬
‫[�أفعال العباد‪ ،‬منها ما هو] معصية‪ ،‬ومنها ما هو غفلة‪ ،‬ومنها ما هو عبادة‪ .‬فال ب ّد من معرفة‬
‫عرف به‪،‬‬‫في َ‬
‫بوحي ينطق ُ‬‫ٍ‬ ‫وعز‪ .‬وتعريفه � إ ّما‬
‫ل ّ‬ ‫هذه الأشياء والأعمال ومعرفتها بتعريف اللّه ج ّ‬
‫درك به � إلزا ُم اللّه عليه‪ .‬فما ُعرف بالعقل والسمع ُب ِدئ لموافقته �أن كان حظراً �أو‬
‫�أو بعقل ُي َ‬
‫العقل فيه فهو منتظر لورود السمع؛ ف إ�ن ورد السمع فقد خرج العقل عن‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫� إباح ًة‪ .‬وما َتوقّف‬
‫والعقل �آلة؛‬
‫َ‬ ‫السمع‪ .‬ولهذا نقول ب�أ ّن العلم �أفضل من العقل‪ ،‬ل أ ّن العلم حاجة‬
‫َ‬ ‫توقّفه فوافق‬
‫والآلة جعلت لأجل الحاجة ال الحاجة لأجل الآلة‪ .‬و � إن كان العلم ال يقوم للعبد � ّإل بالعقل‬
‫كالصالة ال يقوم للعبد � ّإل بالطهارة‪ ،‬لكنّهما � إذا حصلتا كان الصالة �أفضل من الطهارة‪.‬‬
‫وتكلّموا في مسئلة الحظر والإ باحة‪ .‬فبعضهم قالوا ب�أ ّن الأشياء كلَّها على الإ باحة حتّى يقوم‬
‫دليل الإ باحة‪ .‬وقال بعضهم‪ :‬هذا‬
‫ُ‬ ‫دليل الحظر‪ .‬وقال بعضهم‪ :‬هي على الحظر حتّى يقوم‬ ‫ُ‬
‫ِ‬
‫في الممكنات‪ ،‬ف�أ ّما في موجبات العقل وممتنعاته فال يحتاج � إلى هذا التقسيم والتفصيل‪.‬‬
‫وقال الشيخ �أبو منصور رحمه اللّه ب�أ ّن الخوض في هذه المسئلة خط�أٌ‪ ،‬ل أ ّن االستبداد بنفسه‬
‫ٍ‬
‫رسول لم يفتقر � إلى‬ ‫وقت عن‬
‫خل للمخاطبين ٌ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫رسول‪ ،‬فلما لم َي ُ‬ ‫زمان عن‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫كان يلزم �أن لو خال‬
‫خ ِبرهم‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫وقت حتّى كان ُي ْ‬ ‫القول ب�أحد هذه الأقاويل‪ ،‬لأن ّه كان يجب الفزع � إلى رسول ك ِّ‬
‫ل‬
‫عن المحظور وعن المباح‪� .‬أال ترى �أ ّن �أ ّول هذا الخلق كان رسوالً‪ ،‬فما معنى اشتغالنا بهذا‬
‫ٍ‬
‫رسول جاء � إلى الناس رسولٌ �آخر‪.‬‬ ‫آثار‬
‫التفصيل؟ و � إذا انطمست � ُ‬
‫ ‪4‬‬ ‫‪MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, Şehit Ali Paşa 1648, fols. 18a–21a.‬‬
His statement: ‘The light of belief in general has three divisions’

]…[
[Human deeds, some are acts of ] disobedience; some heedlessness; and some
others worship. Surely it is necessary to know these things and these deeds, which
can only be known through communication from God Almighty. His com-
munication is either by the revelation he [i. e. the messenger] conveys through
which these things can be known; or it [i. e. God’s communication] is by reason
through which God’s obligation on him [i. e. the human being] is recognised.
It begins with what is known by both reason and revelation for they concur on
either prohibition or permission. The thing on which reason suspends judgment
is subject to the arrival of revelation. When the revelation arrives, reason ends its
suspension of judgment and concurs with what revelation brings. It is because
of this that we consider knowledge to be superior to intellect. For knowledge is
a need, while intellect is an instrument. The instrument exists for the sake of the
need; the need does not exist for the sake of the instrument. A servant cannot
obtain knowledge without intellect, just as the prayer cannot be established
without purity. However, when they both exist, the prayer is superior to purity.
They [i. e. the scholars] conversed about the issue of prohibition and permis-
sion. Some of them said: Things are in principle permitted, unless there is an
indication of prohibition. Others said: They are [in principle] prohibited, un-
less there is an indication of permission. Some others said: This issue has to do
with contingent things; as to the necessary and the impossible things, there is no
need for this classification and division. The master Abū Manṣūr, may God have
mercy upon him, said that delving into this issue is an error, as one’s independ-
ent thinking would have required that there be a time devoid of a messenger.
Since for human beings there has been no period devoid of a messenger, there is
no need to adopt one of these opinions. At all times humans have been obliged
to seek aid from a messenger who will inform them of the prohibited and the
permitted. Consider that after all, the first ever human being was a messenger!
What is the meaning of engaging in this matter? When no trace of the messenger
remained, the next messenger came to (guide) people.
‫وسمعت الفقيه عبد الصمد بن �أحمد الأربنجي َيحكي‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫قال الشيخ الإ مام رضي اللّه عنه‪:‬‬
‫عن الشيخ �أبي منصور �أن ّه قال‪ّ � :‬إن العلماء في هذه ال أ ّمة لإ بانة الأحكام ومعالم الدين‬
‫كالأنبياء المتق ّدمين‪ .‬وكما كان � إذا انقرض رسولٌ ونُ ِفيت الأحكام وليس فيهم رسولٌ �آخر ولم‬
‫م جاءهم رسولٌ �آخر‪ ،‬كذلك في هذه ال أ ّمة � إذا انقرض الفقهاء والأئ ّمة في‬
‫ومعلِّ ٍ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بهاد ُ‬ ‫يبق لهم‬
‫َ‬
‫قرن �آخر �أو قيا َم الساعة‪ ،‬لأن ّه ال يجوز �أن َيترك اللّه تعالى‬
‫ظهور ٍ‬‫َ‬ ‫ل عص ٍر �أوجبت الضرور ُة‬‫ك ّ‬
‫وحكي هذه الحكاية يوم تُوفّي الشيخ �أبو بكر‬ ‫بي َن لل أحكام‪ُ .‬‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ي لهم وال ُم ِّ‬ ‫عباده ُسدى ال هاد َ‬
‫َ‬
‫العياضي رحمه اللّه‪.‬‬
‫وقوله “واجب في العقل”‬

‫�أي ساقط في العقل ثابت فيه‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الوجوب في اللغة هو السقوط؛ يقال‪“ :‬وجبت الشمس”‪،‬‬
‫دل �أن ّه هو المندوب‬
‫ور َسخ فيه والزمه ّ‬
‫شكر المنعم في العقل َ‬
‫ُ‬ ‫و“وجب الطائر”‪ .‬ف إ�ذا وجب‬
‫الرسل حيث جاؤوا بالواجب في العقل �إن ّما جاؤوا لمعنيين‪:‬‬‫� إليه والمرغوب فيه‪ّ � ،‬إل �أ ّن ُّ‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫الحجة بما في‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫الشك‪ ،‬والثاني لإ لزام‬ ‫شوائب‬
‫ُ‬ ‫لت�أكيد ما في العقل � إيجا ُبه فيزولَ عن تضاعيفه‬
‫عراض عنه‪ ،‬وكذلك في الممتنع‪ .‬ف�أ ّما في الممكن فلمعرفة‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫موجب العقل حتّى ال يمكنه الإ‬
‫كر له‬
‫وجوب المعرفة للمنعم والشُّ َ‬
‫َ‬ ‫كيفيّة الممكن ومقداره ووقته ومعناه‪ .‬لأن ّا � إن لم نجعل‬
‫موجباً فيه �أدلى م ِ‬
‫نكر في �أقطار الأرض الذي لم يبلغه الدعوة بالعذر‪ ،‬وال‬ ‫ضمناً في العقل َ‬
‫ُم َّ‬
‫ُ‬
‫عذر للقاصي والداني ولمن يبلغه الدعوة �أو لم تبلغه لسالمة العقل الذي �أعطاه اللّه َ‬
‫وركَّبه‬
‫عذر ب إ�ضاعته ف�أ ُ ِ‬
‫خلد في النار و ُع ِّذب‪ .‬وال كذلك‬ ‫فيه ليت�أ ّمل الواجب فيه والممتنع فيه‪ ،‬فلم ُي َ‬
‫الممكن‪ ،‬ل أ ّن من لم يبلغه دعوة السمع فهو معذور كالكافر يؤمن في دار الكفر وليس هناك‬
‫ل � إلى العلم بها حتّى مات لم يؤاخذ بها‪ .‬و�أ ّما المقيم في دار‬ ‫خبر عن الممكنات وال له سبي ٌ‬
‫ُم ٌ‬
‫الإ سالم فهو غير معذور بالجهل في الشرائع‪ ،‬ل أ ّن له سبيالً � إلى العلم بها‪.‬‬
‫‪ 5‬في الأصل‪ :‬في الواجب‪.‬‬

The great master, the imam – may God be pleased with him – said: I heard the
jurist ʿAbd al-Ṣamad ibn Aḥmad al-Arbanji who related from the master Abū
Manṣūr that he said: With respect to explaining the rules and the principles
of religion, the scholars of this community are in the status of the ancient pro-
phets [i. e. those of the previous communities]. Just as when a messenger died
the rules were forgotten and there was no guide, or teacher among them, there
came another messenger. Similarly, in this community when the jurists and the
masters die out in each generation, necessity entails the emergence of another
generation or the coming of the Last Hour. For it is impermissible to suppose
that God the Sublime would leave His servants aimless, that is, without a guide
and explainer of the rules. This story was related on the day the master Abū Bakr
al-ʿIyāḍī, may God have mercy on him, died.6
His statement: ‘Rationally necessary’

This means ‘what has fallen to reason and what is established in it’, for al-wujūb
linguistically means falling; for example, Arabs say ‘wajabat al-shams (the sun
fell)’ and ‘wajabat al-ṭāʾir (the bird fell)’. When gratefulness to the Benefactor
falls to reason, is firmly established in it and clings to it, this indicates that it is
recommendable and desirable. However, when the messengers brought what is
fallen to or engrained in reason they only did so for two reasons: (First) to con-
firm what is obligatory to reason so that its contents are cleared of the impurities
of doubts. The second one is to furnish proofs in support of what is necessitated
by the reason so that it becomes impossible] to turn a blind eye to it. The same is
true for the impossible. As to the contingent, it [i. e. the revelation] comes to pro-
vide information about the way the contingent is to be conducted, its amount, its
time and its implication. This is because if we do not assume that the obligation
of knowing the Benefactor and thanking Him are embedded in reason and
entailed by it, then any unbeliever in whatever part of the earth, whom the call
of the messengers may or may not reach, could allege an excuse. No excuse is
acceptable, neither from the distant one nor from the near one, due to soundness
of the reason given and fixed in him by God, so that he should reflect upon the
necessary and the impossible. No one shall be excused of wasting his reason,
which may lead to his staying in Hell and punishment forever. The contingent is
different, as the one whom the call of revelation does not reach is excused [from
fulfilling it], just as an unbeliever who becomes a believer7 in a non-Muslim
territory. Since there is no one to notify him of the contingent [duties] and no
other way to know them, he [then] continues as such until he dies, [and] he will
not be charged with [failing to fulfil] these [duties]. However, the one living in
the abode of Islam is not excused for ignorance of the laws of God, due to the fact
that he has a means of knowing them.
6 At the end of this work, the author gives the stories of Abū Bakr al-ʿIyāḍī, his brother and
his father.
7 i. e. converts to Islam.
‫وقوله‪“ :‬ثم لما لم يكن في العقل كفاية”‬

‫كيفية الممكن ومقاديره و�أوقاته‪ .‬ف�أ ّما قبول الممكن مع ّ‬
‫تميله في‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫يعني بالكفاية لمعرفة‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫العقل كفاية‪ ،‬ل أ ّن العقل في الجملة يقبل العبادة والطاعة وما به النجاة في الدنيا والآخرة‪،‬‬
‫وله الحذر من المعاصي والمضا ّر و � إن لم يكن له التمييز بين المنافع والمضا ّر والطاعات‬
‫لم ِ‬
‫مك ٍن منتظ ٍر لورود البيان‪.‬‬ ‫كنت في السمع والخبر‪ ،‬ف إ�ذاً العقل قاب ٌ‬ ‫والمعاصي التي تم ّ‬
‫ل لك ّ ُ‬
‫العقل‪ ،‬لأن ّه لم يكن فيه ر ُّده‪ .‬وباللّه التوفيق‪.‬‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ف إ�ن ورد البيان وافقه‬
‫وقوله “عن من يعلم حقائق الأشياء”‬

‫فالعالم بحقائق الأشياء بكلِّ ّيتها هو اللّه تعالى‪ ،‬وليس كما قالت الفالسفة � ّإن الفلسفة معرفة‬
‫ٌّ‬
‫حظ في الربوبيّة‪.‬‬ ‫الأشياء بكلِّيّتها بحقائقها‪ ،‬ل أ ّن هذه ربوبيّ ٌة‪ ،‬وليس للمخلوق‬
‫النيرة”‬
‫وقوله‪“ :‬بالبراهين ِّ‬
‫الرسل‪ ،‬ل أ ّن رسالة ُّ‬
‫الرسل‬ ‫قال الشيخ �أبو منصور‪ :‬البراهين والمعجزات ليست لإ ثبات رسالة ُّ‬
‫ثم المعجزة هي التي‬ ‫الحجة على الجاحدين‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫بالإ رسال فقط‪ ،‬لكن الآيات والبراهين لإ لزام‬
‫�أعجزت سائر الخلق عن الإ تيان بمثلها‪.‬‬
‫النيرة”‬
‫وقوله‪ِّ “ :‬‬
‫ح َرة فرعون ل ّما كانت لهم‬ ‫كس َ‬‫ما استنار في القلوب [لـ]ـمن لهم الحذاقة في �أضداد الآيات َ‬
‫حذاق ٌة في معرفة السحر واستنار لهم �آي ُة الرسالة لموسى صلوات اللّه عليه َع ِلموا �أن ال َش ْوب‬
‫ميز بين‬
‫علم في معرفة السحر لم ُي ِّ‬ ‫في الآية من السحر ف�آ َمنوا وص َّدقوا‪ ،‬و � إذا لم يكن لفرعون ٌ‬
‫ح َر﴾‪.9‬‬
‫الس ْ‬ ‫يرك ُُم الَّ ِذي َعلَّ َم ُ‬
‫ك ُم ِّ‬ ‫ظ ِلم‪ ،‬فقال‪�﴿ :‬إِنَّ ُه َل َ‬
‫ك ِب ُ‬ ‫الم ْ‬
‫الآيات ال َن ِّيرة والسحر ُ‬
‫‪ 8‬في الأصل‪ :‬القبول الممكن‪.‬‬

‫‪ 9‬سورة الشعراء ‪.٤9/2٦‬‬
His statement: ‘Since reason is not able to’

That is (reason is not) able to grasp fully the qualities of the contingent, or its
amounts and times. Despite the fact that reason vacillates, it is in principle an
adequate means of recognising the contingent in general. For in general reason
itself is capable of accepting worship, obedience and anything through which
salvation is achieved in this world and the hereafter; it is able to beware of sins
and harms, even though it cannot discern those benefits from harms, or obe-
dience from disobedience which are established by the authority of revelation
and tradition. So since reason is amenable to every contingent that expects an
explanation [i. e. revelation], then when that explanation occurs the reason ag-
rees with it, for there is nothing to object to. Success is from God!
His statement: ‘By the One who knows the truths of things’
The one who knows the truths of things in their totality is God the Sublime
alone. The claim of the philosophers that philosophy is the science of knowing
the complete truths of the things is wrong, as this implies divine lordship, where-
as the created being has no share in divine lordship.
His statement: ‘With splendid proofs’

The Master Abū Manṣūr said: The proofs and miracles are not to prove the
divine mission of the messengers, for the divine mission of the messengers is
[instituted] only by being sent (by God). On the contrary, the miracles and
proofs are to impose the proof on the deniers; then the miracle is that which
incapacitates other humans to produce the like.
His statement: ‘Splendid’
That which is illuminated in the hearts of those who are skilled in [recognising]
the opposites of the signs, such as the magicians of the Pharaoh, who, due to
their expertise in the magical craft, and since they were enlightened with the
sign of the divine mission of Moses – peace be upon him – they understood that
there is no mingling of magic in his proof, and hence believed and confirmed
[him]. Since Pharaoh had no knowledge of magical craft he could not discern
the splendid signs from the dark magic. And therefore he said: ‘Lo! He doubtless
is your chief who taught you magic!’ [Q 26:49].
‫جج ال�له ال تتناقض”‬ ‫وقوله‪“ :‬لأنّ ُ‬

‫ح َ‬
‫ل بعواقب الأشياء‪،‬‬
‫قصور في علمه �أو جه ٌ‬ ‫حجته من له �أمران‪:‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ج فيما ُي ِ‬
‫ناقض في‬ ‫� إذ المح َت ّ‬
‫ٌ‬
‫قصور في علمه وال‬
‫َ‬ ‫ل فال‬ ‫جه ربما‪ .‬ف�أ ّما اللّه ّ‬
‫عز وج ّ‬ ‫ج ُ‬
‫ح َ‬
‫وضعف في معناه‪ ،‬فتتناقض ُ‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫عجز‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫�أو‬
‫الحجة هو‬
‫ّ‬ ‫حججه‪ .‬ومعنى‬
‫ُ‬ ‫خفاء عليه بعواقب الأشياء‪ ،‬فال تتناقض‬ ‫َ‬ ‫بوبيته وال‬
‫ضعف في ُر ّ‬
‫َ‬
‫حجتان على العبد لمعرفة � إلزام اللّه‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الإ لزام‪ ،‬وفي العقل هذا الإ لزام كما في السمع‪ ،‬وكالهما‬
‫عليه فال تتناقضان‪.‬‬
‫يرا﴾‪”10‬‬ ‫اخ ِت َل ًفا َ ِ‬ ‫ج ُدوا فِ ِ‬

‫يه ْ‬ ‫َان ِم ْن ِع ْن ِد َغ ْي ِر ال� ل ِه َل َو َ‬
‫﴿و َل ْو ك َ‬
‫كث ً‬ ‫وقوله‪َ “ :‬‬
‫االختالف الكثير‪ ،‬ف إ�ذ َع ِلمتم القر�آن‬

‫ُ‬ ‫كن فيه‬ ‫يعني القر�آن لو كان من عند غير اللّه لكان يتم ّ‬
‫االختالف في بعض‬
‫َ‬ ‫اختالف فيه َلزِمكم �أن تُ ِق ّروا ب�أن ّه من عند اللّه‪ .‬ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬نرى فيه‬
‫َ‬ ‫وال‬
‫الحكم بعينه‪ ،‬ونرى فيه متشابهاً ومحكماً‬ ‫َ‬ ‫الآيات يوجب حكماً‪ ،‬وبعضها ينفي ذلك‬
‫النافي وال‬ ‫ناقض‬ ‫الموجب ال ُي ِ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫ومفسراً معموالً به ومجمالً موقوفاً على ورود بيانه‪ .‬قيل‪ :‬ب�أ ّن‬
‫َ‬ ‫َّ‬
‫ل واحد منهما في وقته‪ .‬ف إ�ذا وجب في بعض الآيات ّ‬
‫ثم انتفى‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫ب‪ ،‬بل ك ُّ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫الموج َ‬ ‫النافي يناقض‬
‫ٍ‬
‫وابتداء‬
‫ُ‬ ‫إتمامه‬
‫الموجب و � ُ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫في �آية �أخرى فليس له حكم المناقضة وال فيه اختالف‪ ،‬بل � ُ‬
‫إنهاء‬
‫المنتفي وبيانُه‪ .‬ولهذا نقول ب�أن النسخ بيان ُمنتهى ِ‬
‫وقت ما �أراد اللّه بالأمر ال أ ّول‪.‬‬
‫‪ 10‬سورة النساء ‪.82/٤‬‬

His statement: ‘The proofs of God do not contradict each other’

It is because a disputant whose proofs contradict each other is the one who
has two traits: [1] the lack of knowledge or unawareness of the consequences
of events, or [2] incompetence and weakness in nature, which would then
lead to the contradiction of the proofs. However, God Almighty has no lack in
knowledge, nor is He weak in His Lordship; neither are the consequences of
events concealed from Him. Therefore His proofs do not contradict each other.
The proof means an imposition; and this imposition is present in reason as well
as in revelation. Both are proofs] imposing on a human being the obligation
to know God. Therefore the two [i. e. reason and revelation] cannot contradict
each other.
His statement: ‘If it had been from other than God, they would have found
therein much incongruity’ [Q 4:82]
That is, if it had been from other than God, there would have been the possibility
of much incongruity. If you know the Qur’an, and that there is no contradiction
in it, it is imperative on you to admit that it is from God. If it is claimed: We
see in it inconsistencies in that while one verse is approving a ruling, another
one is negating the same rule. Similarly, we see the ambiguous, the unequivocal,
the construed that is to be implemented, and the concise that is dependent on
the arrival of the explication. The response is as follows: The approving does
not necessarily contradict the negating, nor does the negating contradict the
approving. On the contrary, each one is valid for its period of time. When [a
judgment] is approved in one verse, then it is negated in another verse, and this
is not to be regarded as contradiction or antinomy, but is to be construed as a
termination and completion of the approved and a beginning of the negating
and its explication. This is why we say that ‘abrogation is the articulation of the
expiry date of the previous injunction of God’.
60 Mürteza Bedir
Bibliography
Primary Text
Abū Salama, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Jumal uṣūl al-dīn, MS Istanbul,
Süleymaniye Library, Şehit Ali Paşa 1648, fol. 2a.
Bushāghirī, Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-, Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye
Library, Şehit Ali Paşa 1648, fols. 18a–21a.
Other Sources
Ṣābūnī, Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-, al-Muntaqā min ʿiṣmat al-anbiyāʾ, ed.
Mehmet Bulut, 2nd ed., Istanbul: Nashriyyāt Riʾāsat al-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyya, 2019 [an
abridgment of Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī’s Kashf al-ghawāmiḍ fī aḥwāl al-
anbiyāʾ].
Baghdādī, Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-Bābānī al-, Īḍāḥ al-maknūn fī l-dhayl ʿalā Kashf al-ẓunūn, ed.
Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge, Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971.
Mental and Extra-Mental Existence
Ismail Gelenbevi (d. 1205/1791), Risāla fī l-wujūd al-dhihnī
Sümeyye Parıldar
Ismail Gelenbevi (Ismāʿīl ibn Muṣṭafā ibn Maḥmūd Gelenbevī) (d. 1205/1791),
born in the village of Gelenbe (today in Manisa, Turkey), was a prominent scholar
of the eighteenth century. He wrote on a large variety of topics ranging from logic
and mathematics to theology. Important scholars and historians, such as Ahmed
Cevdet Pasha (d. 1312/1895) in his Tarih-i Cevdet and Muḥammad Zāhid al-
Kawtharī (d. 1371/1952), provide us with his biography and present him as a
leading figure in logic, theoretical and Islamic sciences as well as in engineering
and mathematics. This can be seen in Gelenbevi’s voluminous books, Ḥāshiya
ʿalā sharḥ al-Jalāl ʿalā l-ʿAḍudiyya (which is a gloss on Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī’s
[d. 908/1502] commentary on Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s [d.756/1355] ʿAqāʾid) and
Sharḥ ʿalā l-Tahdhīb (which is a gloss on Abū l-Fatḥ al-Mīrī’s Tahdhīb).
Avicenna talks about the processes of cognition through levels of abstraction
and he defines knowledge as the acquisition of form in the mind.1 Thus, he
draws a distinction between actualised things in the real world and their status
as being an object of knowledge. This allows later philosophers to talk about two
realms, the mental and the extra-mental. To give an example, the fire that gives
off light in its environment and can burn inflammables is extra-mental, while the
perceived fire is mental.
The question of mental existence is one of the most interesting developments
of post-Avicennan philosophical and theological discussions. The problem in its
formulation is mainly about the ontological status of the products of knowledge.
The problem combines previous theological literature on knowledge with
Avicennan metaphysics. Specific discussions on mental existence do not occur
before Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), though the structure of these discus-
sions can also be traced back to Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) separation of existence
and quiddity. Avicenna established that the knowledge process occurs by the
acquisition of form in the mind and at the higher levels of abstraction, where
1 Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ. al-Ṭabīʿīyāt. Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic text). Being the Psycholog-
ical Part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, ed. Fazlur Rahman, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, II.2,
pp. 58–61.
62 Sümeyye Parıldar
the quiddity of the thing is acquired. The definition and nature of knowledge
in the peripatetic framework requires some notion of existence different from
extra-mental existence. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī becomes the first person to discuss
the implications of such a notion through separate sections in his works titled
‘mental existence’, and he raises suspicions about a separate and established
realm of existence. Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), in defence of this dis-
tinction, replied that Rāzī’s understanding of Avicenna is wrong and that the
form acquired is a simile of, rather than identical to, the extra-mental form.
From Jurjānī on, the discussion took new turns and some notion of mental ex-
istence began to be accepted by theologians as well as by philosophers. Some
theologians, now affirming some notion of mental existence, still denied a sep-
arate reality to mental existence.2 Following this characterisation, new concepts
such as simile (muthul), estimated existence (mawjūd al-mawhūm) and realm
of the things themselves (nafs al-amr), were heavily discussed in later traditions.
Kemalpaşazâde (d. 940/1534), Taşköprüzâde (d. 968/1561) and Gelenbevi are
three of the most important figures of the Ottoman tradition who wrote separate
treatises on mental existence and the realm of the things themselves.
The following extract is chosen from Gelenbevi’s Risāla fī l-wujūd al-dhihnī
(‘Treatise on Mental Existence’).3 The selected text is a good example of these
later developments of the discussions around mental existence, where the realm
of the things themselves, estimated being, and discussions on non-existence
are combined with the discussions on divine knowledge, universality of divine
knowledge, and the all-comprehensive nature of divine knowledge. Gelenbevi’s
text is hard to follow in depth and he is also rather cursory in his transitions
between these wide-ranging topics.
Gelenbevi uses the issues of relation and verification of propositions as the
basis of his discussion. This follows under the four examples of a) the cases of
relations, such as the relation between the dawn and the (day)light; b) the truth
of a proposition that ‘the simile of this world is possible’; c) a leaf falling in a
dark night when there is no perceiver of the event; d) the proposition that the
existence of ‘(the mythical bird) Anqa is possible’ and e) the proposition that
‘Zayd is blind’.
2 For a history of mental existence and the various clusters of discussions that took place,
see Murat Kaş, “Mental Existence Debates in the Post-Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy.
Problems of the Category and Essence of Knowledge”, Nazariyat, 4/3 (2018), pp. 49–84.
3 The treatise was published in a compilation of popular scholarly treatises of the time,
under the title Resâil-i İmtihân (‘Treatises for the Exams’) (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire,
1262/1846, pp. 162–6). Recently a Turkish translation of the treatise was published by Ömer
Mahir Alper, relying on MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, Giresun 106, fol.151b–152b; and
MS Süleymaniye Library, Giresun 106, fol. 82a–83a. Alper presents a more complete version of
the treatise, including an introductory paragraph which offers two definitions of extra-mental
existence. See Ömer Mahir Alper (ed.), Varlık ve Zihin. İslâm Felsefesinde Zihnî Varlık Sorununa
Metinlerle bir Giriş, Istanbul: Klasik, 2021, pp. 469–73.
Mental and Extra-Mental Existence 63
Gelenbevi explores various options within the philosophical framework

where mental existence is accepted and similarly within the theological frame-
work where mental existence is denied. Both philosophers and theologians
accept that the relations are not extra-mentally existent. So the question is how
do theologians explain them without referring to mental existence? Gelenbevi
demonstrates how theologians realised and estimated extra-mental existence.
Although generally accepting mental existence appears to be the obvious
solution, philosophers face problems within their framework where the nature
of knower and known is closely connected. The third example, the case of the
knowledge about a leaf falling in a dark night, also epitomises the realm of things
themselves, as this category denotes those things that occur independently of
the knower’s cognition. Yet, Gelenbevi also uses this example to shift from a
discussion of mental existence (mind here, referring to human cognition), into
a wider consideration of divine knowledge. This progression in argumentation
makes sense because throughout the history of Islamic theology, theological dis-
cussions on knowledge most often take divine knowledge as the essential issue
and prioritised accounting for it.
Gelenbevi explains that the theologians first seek a principle of truth for each
part of a proposition, i. e. the subject and the predicate, in the extra-mental world.
But there are cases, similar to the above-mentioned examples, where the prin-
ciple of truth is difficult to find in this way. They then find the solution in turning
the proposition into a negative one. This is, following the largely accepted rule
that the existence of the subject is presupposed in the affirmative propositions
and the existence of the subject is not required for negative propositions.4
Gelenbevi’s presentation shows how theologians developed the concept of
conceptualised/estimated being in place of mental existence. Despite the apparent
favouring of the theological approach, his presentation additionally scrutinises
some generally accepted claims, such as the theologians’ argument that the realm
of extra-mental existence is equivalent to the realm of the things themselves.
His analysis of where the actualisation of a leaf ’s falling in a dark night takes
place points toward a larger discussion on the ontology of the realm of the things
themselves and his presentation here has a more neutral tone. According to the
philosophers, God knows universally and He and separate intellects do not pos-
sess knowledge of material and particular things. This is a universal knowledge
that includes all possible knowledge of the particulars. The actual knowledge
of material things and particulars require materiality on behalf of the knower.
Thus, knowledge of things in their particular manifestation can only occur in
lower beings. This argument apparently rules out the theologians’ conception,
4 Yusuf Daşdemir, “The Problem of Existential Import in Metathetic Propositions. Quṭb

al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī contra Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī”, Nazariyat, 5/2 (2019), pp. 81–118, at p. 89–91.
because according to this argument knowledge of specific and particular events,

such as a leaf ’s falling, cannot be part of the eternal divine knowledge.5
5 I have previously suggested that Gelenbevi’s treatise on mental existence can be eval-
uated in the context of commentaries on ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s (d. 756/1355) Mawāqif: Sümeyye
Parıldar, “Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi’s Thought through the Commentary
Tradition”, Osmanlı’da İlm-i Kelam, ed. Osman Demir, Veysel Kaya and Kadir Gömbeyaz, Is-
tanbul: İSAR Yayınları, 2015, pp. 165–88.

‫ ‪66‬‬ ‫‪Sümeyye Parıldar‬‬
‫اعلم �أ ّن المتكلّمين �أنكروا الوجود الذهني وحصروا بالوجود في الخارج وجعلوا وجود الأمور‬
‫االعتبارية في نفس الأمر كالمالزمة بين الطلوع ووجود النهار‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّها ليست معدومة صرفة‬
‫كالمالزمة بينه ووجود الليل وفاقاً بين الحكماء والمتكلّمين عبارة عن وجود مبد�أ انتزاع‬
‫العقل ايّاها في الخارج‪ .‬فالنور الموجودة بعد الطلوع مبد�أ انتزاع العقل �إيّاها في الخارج‪،‬‬
‫فالنور الموجودة بعد الطلوع مبد�أ النتزاع المالزمة بينه وبين وجود النهار ال بينه وبين وجود‬
‫والكم التي �أنكروا وجودها في الخارج‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الليل‪ .‬وكذا الكالم في جميع الأعراض النسبية‬
‫قضية صادقة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫لكن لقائل �أن يقول‪ :‬وما يقولون في قولهم �أمثال هذا العالم ممكن‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه‬
‫عندهم في نفس الأمر‪ .‬فال ب ّد من تحقّق نسبة في الخارج‪ � :‬إ ّما ب�أن يكون نفس تلك‬
‫النسبة من الأعيان‪ ،‬وهو باطل ل أ ّن جميع النسب من الأمور االعتبارية وفاقاً‪ ،‬و � إ ّما ب�أن‬
‫يكون منتزعة من وجود خارجي عيني وليس كذلك‪ � ،‬إذ ليس شيء من طرفي تلك النسبة‪،‬‬
‫يصح انتزاعها‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أعني الأمثال‪ ،‬ومعنى الإ مكان موجودان في الخارج لتنزع هي منه‪ ،‬وال‬
‫م ّما �أضيف � إليه الموضوع‪� ،‬أعني العالم الموجود‪ .‬و � ّإل لصدق قول المشرك‪“ :‬مثل الواجب‬
‫موجود”‪ ،‬وهو باطل‪.‬‬
‫بمجرد‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وال مخلص لهم � ّإل ب�أن يحملوا تلك القضيّة على السالبة وصدق السوالب‬
‫مطابقتها للنفي المحض‪ ،‬وال تتوقّف على تحقّق ذلك النفي في نفس الأمر ووجوده‬
‫متصور‪ ”6‬منتزعة من �أمر موجود في الخارج‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المحقّق‪ ،‬ويجعلوا النسبة قولنا‪“ :‬العالم‬
‫يتصورها‪ ،‬فعلى هذا كان نفس الأمر عندهم �أ ّ‬
‫عم من الوجود الخارجي والنفي‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫وهو من‬
‫المحض‪ .‬وال أ ّول مدار صدق الموجبات‪ ،‬والثاني مدار صدق السوالب‪� ،‬أعني بالمدار‬
‫القضية‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ما يقاس � إليه النسبة الذهنية‪ .‬ف إ�ن تطابقا ب�أن تكونا سلباً محضاً �أو وجوداً كانت‬
‫صادق ًة‪ ،‬و � ّإل كانت كاذب ًة‪.‬‬
‫‪ 6‬في الأصل‪ :‬متصورة‪.‬‬

Know that the theologians deny mental existence and they confine existence to
what exists in the extra-mental world. They establish the existence of relational
situations in the realm of things in themselves, such as the entailment between
dawn and the existence of the day. So that it is not ultimate nonexistence, such
as the entailment between it [i. e. dawn] and the existence of night. This is
commonly agreed upon by theologians and philosophers, that its existence is
based on the principle of its intellectual abstraction in the extra-mental world.
So the light that is existent after dawn is the principle for the abstraction of the
entailment between it and the existence of the day, but not between it and the
existence of night. And such is the case with all relational accidents and quantity,
the existence of which in the extra-mental world are denied.
However, one may say that when they say ‘the simile of this world is possible’,
this is a true proposition in the realm of the things themselves according to them.
It is inevitable that the actualisation of the relation is in the extra-mental world:
either a) through that very relation being from the extra-mental world [but
the relation is not extra-mental], and so this is invalid, because all relations are
regarded as relative entities by both (philosophers and theologians); or b) that it
is abstracted from an extra-mentally established existent; however, this is not the
case [so this is invalid]. This is because neither of the two parts of this relation,
meaning the simile and the meaning of ‘possible’, are existent in the extra-mental
world for them to be abstracted. And it is not correct to abstract it from that to
which the subject is attributed, meaning the existent world. If it were so [and the
simile of this world were to be derivable from the extra-mental world] then when
a person who believed that there is an equivalent to God said that ‘the simile to
the Necessary is existent’, then that too would be true. But it is invalid.
So, there is no way out for them other than predicating these propositions on
negation. And negations are accepted as true when they are only correspondent
with absolute negation. And so, the instantiation of this negation does not take
place in the realm of things themselves and this does not become an actual thing.
And they take the relation of our statement ‘the world is imagined’ as abstracted
from what is in the extra-mental world. And that is, who is imagining it. With
this, the realm of the things themselves, according to them, becomes more gen-
eral than extra-mental existents and absolute negation. The first one [i. e. extra-
mental existence] is the principle of truth for affirmatives and the second one
[i. e. absolute negation] is the principle of truth for negations. By ‘the principle’,
I mean that to which mental relation is compared. Being absolute-negative or
being existent, if both are correspondent, then the proposition is true. Other-
wise, the proposition is false.
‫عم من الوجود الخارجي المحقّق ومن الوجود‬ ‫والحق �أ ّن نفس الأمر عندهم �أ ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫و�أقول‪:‬‬
‫الخارجي الموهوم الذي توهم وجوده مركوز في طبع البشر‪ � ،‬إذ ال يسعهم � إنكار صدق قولنا‬
‫� إمكان �أمثال هذا العالم متحقّق في نفس الأمر‪ .‬فالقول ب�أ ّن الوجود في نفس الأمر عندهم‬
‫مسا ٍو للوجود الخارجي المحقّق باطل‪ ،‬بل هم جعلوا الوجود الموهوم الذي توهم مركوز في‬
‫طبع البشر بدل الوجود الذهني‪ ،‬كما ال يخفى على ذي فطرة‪.‬‬
‫و�أقول‪ :‬لنا على الحكماء‪ ،‬في تعميم الوجود في نفس الأمر من الوجود الذهني‪ ،‬بحث ّ‬
‫قوي‬
‫وهو �أ ّن نسبة السقوط � إلى الورقة الساقطة في ليلة ظلماء متحقّقة في نفس الأمر قطعاً‪ .‬ف إ�ن‬
‫المصحح لوجودها في نفس الأمر وجود طرفيها الذين تنتزع هي منهما في الخارج‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫كان‬
‫�أعني الورقة والحركة الموجودتين القابلتين للإ حساس‪ ،‬فذلك بعينه مذهب المتكلّمين‬
‫المصحح وجودها في ذهن من الأذهان‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المستغنين عن الوجود الذهني‪ .‬و � إن كان الوجود‬
‫ف إ� ّما في ذهن من الأذهان السافلة وهو باطل � إذ لم ترتسم في ذهن حيوان‪ ،‬و � إ ّما في ذهن‬
‫والمتغيرات غير‬
‫ّ‬ ‫جزئي وهو باطل عندهم � إذ الما ّديات‬
‫ّ‬ ‫من الأذهان العالية‪ � :‬إ ّما على وجه‬
‫مرتسمة عندهم في المبادي العالية على الوجه الجزئي‪ ،‬و � إ ّما على وجه كلّ ّي فحينئذ‬
‫نقول‪ :‬ذلك الوجود � إ ّما وقت السقوط ال قبله‪ ،‬فيلزم حدوث علم المبادي العالية وهو محال‬
‫السيما في علم الواجب‪ ،‬و � إ ّما �أزالً و�أبداً فيلزم تحقّق نسبة السقوط الحادثة في الأزل‬
‫ّ‬
‫وذلك سفسطة‪ .‬و�أيضاً ذلك الوجود هو بعينه هو وجودها الأزلي فما وجودها الحادث الغير‬
‫الأزلي‪.‬‬
I say: The truest position is that the realm of the things themselves, according to
them, is more general than the realised extra-mental existence and the estimated
extra-mental existence whose conceptualisation is firmly fixed in human nature.
Because they cannot deny the truthfulness of our statement that the possibility
of the similitude of this world is realised in the realm of the things themselves.
Thus, the claim that the existence in the realm of the things themselves, for
them, is equivalent to actualised in the extra-mental world is not valid. Instead,
they consider ‘the estimated existence whose conceptualisation is firmly fixed in
human nature’ to be in place of mental existence, as it is not hidden to the ones
with true primordial nature.
I say: Understanding existence in the realm of the things themselves as being
broader than mental existence provides us [i. e. theologians] a stronger position
against the philosophers. And it is that the fall of a leaf that has fallen in a dark
night is ultimately actualised in the realm of the things themselves.7 What verifies
its existence [i. e. the relation between the falling and the leaf ] in the realm of the
things themselves is the existence of both sides that is abstracted from the external,
meaning that the leaf and the movement are two existents, capable of perceivabil-
ity. And this is exactly the position of the theologians [because they claimed that
the relation was derived from the extra-mental world], whose theories do not need
a notion of mental existence. And8 if the existence (of the relation between the leaf
and falling) established its existence in a mind of minds, it is the case that a) it will
be in a mind among the lower minds and this is invalid, as such imagination is not
conceived in the mind of animals; or it is the case that b) it is in a mind among
the minds of higher beings. [There are two options]. It could be in a particular
manner, and this is invalid according to (the philosophers), because material and
changeable things are not imaginable, according to them, in higher principles
in a particular manner. Or it could be in a universal manner. In this case, we say
that the existence (of this relation) is either at the time of falling and not before,
and this necessitates temporality of the knowledge of higher principles, which is
impossible, especially with regard to the knowledge of the Necessary Being. Or
(another option is that the relation) would be eternal without a beginning and an
end, but then this requires that the actualisation of the relation of falling which is
temporal, is occurrent in eternity and this is nonsense. And again, this existence
itself is its eternal existence, and (then one cannot help but wonder) what is its
temporal existence which is different from its eternal existence?9
7 The realms of actualised beings, the mental beings and the things themselves have been also
discussed in terms of their comprehensiveness. You can follow the previous discussions before
Gelenbevi from Taşköprüzâde and Kemalpaşazâde’s texts: Mehmet Aktaş, Kemalpaşazâde’nin
Zihnî Varlık Risâlesi. Tahkik ve Değerlendirme, MA thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul, 2014;
Ömer Mahir Alper, “Taşköprîzâde. Zihni Varlığa Dair Tartışmalarda Özün ve Hakikatin Tesbiti”,
Osmanlı Felsefesi Seçme Metinler, ed. Ömer Mahir Alper, Istanbul: Klasik, 2015, pp. 235–302.
8 Here Gelenbevi will use this example to demonstrate how accepting mental existence, as
in the case of the philosophers, may lead to unsound possibilities.
9 One and the same thing cannot be temporal and eternal at the same time, since this is a
contradiction.
‫فالحق ما ذهب � إليه المتكلّمون من �أ ّن وجود تلك النسبة في نفس الأمر عبارة عن وجود‬
‫ّ‬
‫مبد�أ انتزعها في الخارج �أو تو ّهم وجود النسبة المنتزعة بعد السقوط مركوز في طبع البشر‪.‬‬
‫وال مخلص � ّإل ب�أ ّن يقال‪� :‬إن ّهم ال ينكرون كون وجود �أمثال تلك النسبة في نفس الأمر‬
‫عبارة عن وجود مبد�أ انتزعها في الخارج‪ ،‬ولكن يقولون � ّإن مبد�أ االنتزاع ال يكون موجوداً‬
‫خارجياً في جميع الموا ّد‪ ،‬بل يكون في بعضها موجوداً ذهنياً كما في قولهم العنقاء‬
‫ممكن‪ ،‬وحيث انقسم مبد�أ االنتزاع � إلى الموجود الخارجي والذهني‪ .‬فقد كان الوجود‬
‫في نفس الأمر �أ ّ‬
‫عم من الوجود الذهني‪ ،‬فتحقّق الثبوت الكلّ ّية وسائر المعقوالت الثانية‬
‫للإ نسان في نفس الأمر عبارة عن وجود الإ نسان في الذهن‪ � ،‬إذ الكلّ ّية ونسبتها � إليه كالهما‬
‫�أمران انتزاعيان انتزاعاً من الموجود الذهني ال من الموجود الخارجي‪ � ،‬إذ ال كلّ ّية وال نسبة‬
‫في الخارج‪.‬‬
And the truth is the argument of the theologians that the existence of these rela-
tions in the realm of the things themselves is solely the existence of the principle
of their abstraction in the extra-mental world or estimation of the existence of
the abstracted relation after the fall [of the leaf ], which is firmly fixed in human
nature. And there is no way out of this other than to say that (the philosophers) are
not denying the existence of similitudes being those relations in the realm of the
things in themselves, which exist solely as principles of abstraction in the extra-
mental world. However, (the philosophers) say that the principle of abstraction
is not extra-mentally existent in all matters. On the contrary, in some cases (the
principles of abstraction) exist as mental existence, such as their saying ‘Anqa is
possible’. In this way they divide the principle of abstraction into the categories
of extra-mental existent, and mental existent. And assuredly, existence in the
realm of things themselves is more general than mental existence. In the case of
establishment of universality and secondary universal for the human being,10
the establishment takes place in the realm of things themselves solely through
the human being as a mental existent.11 For the universal and its relation to it
[i. e. the concept of human being] are both abstracted situations, abstractions
from mental existence, not from extra-mental existence, because no universal
and no relation exists in the extra-mental world.12
10 That is when universality or a secondary universal is attributed to the human being.
11 In other words, the human being that is being connected with the universal is no longer
the human being in the extra-mental world, but rather a mental concept, the concept of human
being.
12 The reader will find the sentence clearer when considering the following example: the
human being is a species. Here, it would also be useful to remember how secondary intelligibles
are derived from the first level abstractions from the extra-mental objects. Thus, ‘tableness’, for
example, is a first level abstraction, in which relation to the extra-mental world still remains,
whereas universality is a further abstraction made from mental existents and first level ab-
stractions.
‫مصححاً للوجود في نفس الأمر � ّإل فيما كان مبد�أ‬

‫ّ‬ ‫وهم لم يرتضوا كون الوجود الموهوم‬
‫االنتزاع موجوداً في الخارج �أو في الذهن تحقيقاً كما في قولهم‪“ :‬زيد �أعمى” في الخارج‪،‬‬
‫ف إ� ّن العمي مفهوم عدمي سلبي ومجموع الذات‪ ،‬وذلك المفهوم معدوم في الخارج‬
‫تحقيقاً‪ ،‬ل أ ّن عدم الجزء يوجب عدم الك ّ‬
‫ل ومعنى حمله على زيد ات ّحاده في الوجود‬
‫الخارجي �أو الموهوم‪ � ،‬إذ وجود زيد محقّق ووجود الأعمى موهوم وال يتّحد المحقّق مع‬
‫ٍ‬
‫كاف في‬ ‫الموهوم‪ ،‬لكن ربما يتو ّهم �أ ّن وجود مفهوم الأعمى بعينه وجود زيد‪ ،‬وهذا القدر‬
‫صدق هذا الحمل‪ ،‬ل أ ّن ذلك االت ّحاد الموهوم منتزع من زيد والعمي الموجودين‪ ،‬ووجوده‬
‫في نفس الأمر � إ ّما عبارة عن وجود مبد�أ االنتزاع في الخارج‪ ،‬و � إ ّما عبارة عن وجوده الموهوم‬
‫المتفرع على وجود مبد�أ االنتزاع‪ .‬هكذا يجب �أن يحقّق مذهبهم‪ ،‬فاضبط هذا‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
They [i. e. the philosophers] are not content with estimated being as the verifier
of existence in the realm of the things themselves. The only exception to this is
when the principle of abstraction13 is existent in the extra-mental world or in
the mind, such as their saying ‘Zayd is blind’ in confirmation of what is in the
extra-mental world. In this case blindness is a negating non-existent concept.
The combination of the self [i. e. Zayd] and this concept is non-existent in the
extra-mental world in terms of its realisation.14 This is because non-existence
of the part necessitates non-existence of the whole.15 And the meaning of its
predication on Zayd is its unification in the extra-mental or estimated existence.
This is because the existence of Zayd is actualised and the existence of blindness
is estimated. And something realised does not unite with something estimated.
However, maybe it is possible to assume that existence of the notion of blind-
ness is nothing but the existence of Zayd. And this is enough for the truthful-
ness of this predication. Because this estimated unification is abstracted from
Zayd and blindness, which are two existents. And its existence16 in the realm of
things themselves is either solely the existence of the principle of abstraction in
the extra-mental world or it is solely the conceptualised existence built on the
existence of the principle of abstraction. This is how (the philosophers’) claim
should be verified, and so apprehend this.
13 That is the reality from which it is abstracted; the foundation/base that is the source of
its abstraction.
14 Meaning the combination itself is non-existent, as blindness is what one derives from
the actions, behavioural etc. implications of the actual existent human being, and it is not itself
existent, thus when someone is regarded as blind, it is not considered to be a combination of the
person and blindness. The combination is non-existent.
15 As the part (i. e. the blindness) is non-existent, so the whole (i. e. the combination of
Zayd and blindness) is also non-existent.
16 That is the unification of Zayd and blindness.
Bibliography
Primary Text
Gelenbevi, Ismail, Risāla fī l-wujūd al-dhihnī, in Resâil-i İmtihân, Istanbul: Matbaa-i
Âmire, 1262/1846, pp. 162–6, at pp. 162–4.
Other Sources
Aktaş, Mehmet, Kemalpaşazâde’nin Zihnî Varlık Risâlesi. Tahkik ve Değerlendirme, MA
thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul, 2014.
Alper, Ömer Mahir, “Taşköprîzâde. Zihni Varlığa Dair Tartışmalarda Özün ve Hakikatin
Tesbiti”, Osmanlı Felsefesi Seçme Metinler, ed. Ömer Mahir Alper, Istanbul: Klasik,
2015, pp. 35–302.
Alper, Ömer Mahir (ed.), Varlık ve Zihin. İslâm Felsefesinde Zihnî Varlık Sorununa Metin-
lerle bir Giriş, Istanbul: Klasik, 2021.
Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ. al-Ṭabīʿīyāt. Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic text). Being the Psychological
Part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, ed. Fazlur Rahman, London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Daşdemir, Yusuf, “The Problem of Existential Import in Metathetic Propositions. Quṭb
al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī contra Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī”, Nazariyat, 5/2 (2019), pp. 81–118.
Kaş, Murat, “Mental Existence Debates in the Post-Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy.
Problems of the Category and Essence of Knowledge”, Nazariyat, 4/3 (2018), pp. 49–84.
Parıldar, Sümeyye, “Tracing Mental Existence in al-Galanbawi’s Thought through the
Commentary Tradition”, Osmanlı’da İlm-i Kelam, ed. Osman Demir, Veysel Kaya and
Kadir Gömbeyaz, Istanbul: İSAR Yayınları, 2015, pp. 165–88.
Part II: Metaphysics
Divine Attributes
Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī (c. 5th/11th century),
al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd
Angelika Brodersen
Abū Shakūr Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Sayyid ibn Shuʿayb al-Sālimī al-Kashshī
flourished in the second half of the 5th/11th century in Transoxania. We know
next to nothing about his life, as the Ḥanafite biographical works do not mention
him. He gives a few details of his life and career himself. For example, he reports
an encounter with his teacher Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Khāṭib in
the 460s hijra (corresponding to the 1070s CE) in Samarqand,1 and mentions
his studies with Rukn al-Dīn wa-l-Islām Shams al-Aʾimma Abū Muḥammad al-
Ḥalawānī al-Bukhārī (d. 448/1056), a Ḥanafī jurist in Bukhārā.2 Thus, al-Sālimī
cannot easily be assigned to one of the main centres of Ḥanafite scholarship, but
he was active in a wider area. Concerning the year and place of his death, no
information is available.
According to the current state of research, Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī is the first
Māturīdite author who explicitly names Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935) and
his successors, and contrasts Ashʿarite theology with that of the Ahl al-sunna
wa-l-jamāʿa, in his view the Māturīdites. This exclusion of the Ashʿarites from
the Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa, which occurs in different passages in al-Sālimī’s
al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd (‘Introduction in the Explication of the Unity’),
reflects the theological-historical and religious-political situation in Transoxania
during the Seljuk period in the middle of the 5th/11th century until the middle of
the 6th/12th century. These rulers pursued a kind of persecution of the adherents
of Ashʿarism by assigning important political posts to Ḥanafites. Accordingly,
on the theological side, there is a tendency to observe that Ḥanafite theologians
were as opposed to their Ashʿarite competitors as they were to Muʿtazilism.
In this context, an important complex of arguments concerns the evaluation
of the divine attributes (Tamhīd, Chapter 4). In accord with the Ashʿarites, the
1 Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd, in Angelika Brodersen, Zwischen
Māturīdīya und Ašʿarīya. Abū Šakūr as-Sālimī und sein Tamhīd fī bayān at-tauḥīd, Piscataway
NJ: Gorgias Press, 2018, p. 331.
2 Ibid.
78 Angelika Brodersen
Māturīdites affirm the reality of God’s attributes, in contrast to the Muʿtazilites’

doctrine (Tamhīd, Chapter 4/1). Here, the Sunnis argue against the Muʿtazila as
follows: The denial of the attributes would also be the denial of the attributed, to
which then the opposites of the attributes would apply. That is impossible with
God. Moreover, God cannot know, see and hear things by His essence. If that
were the case, His essence would be identical with His knowledge, sight, hearing,
and so forth. Hence all attributes would be identical to each other. And because
the attributes are not different from God’s essence, there are no multiple eternal
entities.
A particularity of the Māturīdite doctrine, however, concerns the assessment
of the attributes of action, which the Māturīdiyya, as opposed to the Ashʿariyya,
regard as invariably eternal in the divine essence. Decisive here is the different
treatment of the divine action, which, according to the Māturīdite conception,
is a single, eternal attribute (Tamhīd, Chapter 4/3), while al-Ashʿarī has the
individual acts in mind (Tamhīd, Chapter 2/6). Against this background, the
following selection depicts the Māturīdites’ discussion of the divine attributes
dealing with the different opponents’ arguments.3
3 Ibid., pp. 115–9.
Divine Attributes 79

‫ ‪80‬‬ ‫‪Angelika Brodersen‬‬
‫الباب الرابع في إ�ثبات الصفات‬

‫القول ال أ ّول في الصفات‬
‫قال المهتدي �أبو شكور السالمي وفّقه اللّه تعالى‪ :‬اعلم ب�أ ّن ال�له تعالى موجود قديم موصوف‬
‫بصفاته‪ ،‬وال يجوز �أن يقال‪ :‬قديم مع صفاته‪ ،‬ل أ ّن كلمة مع للمقارنة بين شيئين والصفة‬
‫ليس هي شيئاً غير الموصوف حتّى نقول‪ّ � :‬إن الصفة والموصوف شيئان‪.‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قال �أحد ب�أ ّن الصفة ماذا‪ ،‬شيء �أو غير شيء؟ ولو قلنا‪ّ � :‬إن الصفة ليست بشيء‬
‫فالموصوف كيف يكون موصوفاً بال شيء؟ ولو قلنا‪ّ � :‬إن الصفة شيء فهذا الشيء يكون غير‬
‫الموصوف فال يجوز �أن يكون قديماً‪ .‬الجواب‪� :‬أن نقول ب�أ ّن هذا صفة الشيء‪ ،‬وال نقول‪:‬‬
‫شيء �أو غير شيء؛ ف إ�ن قيل ب�أ ّن الصفة قديمة �أو غير قديمة؟ نقول ب�أ ّن هذا صفة القديم‪،‬‬
‫ل أ ّن الذات موصوف قديم بصفاته‪.‬‬
‫وال يجوز �أن يقال‪ّ � :‬إن صفاته تقوم بذاته‪ ،‬ولكن نقول‪ :‬ذاته موصوف بصفاته‪.‬‬
‫وال جائز �أن يقال ب�أن ّه � ّإن صفاته تقوم بذاته موصوف بالوصف‪ ،‬بل نقول‪� :‬إن ّه موصوف‬
‫بالصفة‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الوصف صفة الواصف وهو كان موصوفاً قبل �أن يصفه �أحد‪.‬‬
‫وال جائز �أن يقال‪� :‬إن ّه قديم بجميع صفاته‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الجمع والفرق ال يجوز في صفاته‪ .‬فنقول‪:‬‬
‫قديم بصفاته‪.‬‬
‫وبعض الناس �أنكروا الصفات والنعوت �أصالً وقالوا‪ّ � :‬إن الصفة والنعت ليس هو ذات‬
‫البارئ‪ ،‬فال ب ّد من �أن يكون غيره‪ .‬و � إذا كان غيره ال يخلوا � إ ّما �أن يكون قديماً �أو حادثاً‬
‫محدثاً‪ .‬وال جائز �أن يكون حادثاً محدثاً‪ ،‬لأن ّه يوجب القول بحلول المحدث في القديم‪،‬‬
‫وهذا كفر‪ .‬وال جائز �أن يقال ب�أن ّه قديم‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الصفات لو كانت قديم ًة يوجب القول ب إ�ثبات‬
‫حي قادر عليم سميع‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫القديمين وثالثة و�كثر‪ ،‬وهذا محال‪ .‬وهو قول المعتزلة‪ ،‬وقالوا‪ّ � :‬إن الله ّ‬
‫بصير مريد بذاته‪� .‬أما ال‪ 4‬يجوز �أن تكون له حياة �أو قدرة �أو علم �أو سمع �أو بصر‪ ،‬ل أ ّن هذه‬
‫الأشياء تصير علّ ًة لصيرورته موصوفاً بهذه الصفة‪ ،‬وال جائز �أن تكون له علّة �أو لصفته علّة‪.‬‬
‫ثم الصفة ال تخلو � إ ّما �أن تكون هي الموصوف �أو غير الموصوف‪ ،‬وكالهما محال‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫‪ 4‬جميع النسخ هكذا‪.‬‬

Chapter 4: Affirmation of the Attributes

First Section: The Attributes
The guided Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī – may God give him success – said: Know
that God the Exalted is existent and qualified by His attributes in eternity. It
is not possible to say: eternal with His attributes. The expression with denotes
a proximity of two things. The attribute is not other than the qualified, so we
cannot say: The attribute and the qualified are two (distinct) things.
If someone asks: What is the attribute, a thing or nothing? If we say: The at-
tribute is nothing, how could the qualified be qualified as ‘nothing’? If we say:
The attribute is a thing, this thing is not identical with the qualified, and cannot
be eternal. The (correct) answer is that we say that this is the attribute of the
thing, and we do not say: a thing or nothing. To the question about whether the
attribute is eternal or not eternal, we say that this is the attribute of the eternal
because the essence is qualified as eternal in its attributes.
It is not possible to say: God’s attributes subsist in His essence. Instead, we say:
His essence is qualified by His attributes.
It is not possible to say that if God’s attributes subsist in His essence, He would
be qualified by the qualification. Rather, we say: God is qualified by the attribute,
because ‘qualification’ is the attribute of the qualifying subject, whereas God had
been qualified before anyone qualified Him.
It is not possible to say: God is eternal in all His attributes, for combination
and separation is not possible in His attributes. We say: [God is] eternal in His
attributes.
Some people denied the attributes and the qualities in principle, and said: The
attribute – or the quality – is not the essence of the Creator, thus it must be
other than Him. In this case, it has to be either eternal or contingent and cre-
ated. It is not possible that the attribute is contingent and created, because this
would result in the indwelling of the created in the Eternal. This is unbelief.
Nor is it possible to say that (the attribute) is eternal, because this would entail
the existence of two, three or more eternal entities. This is absurd. The latter is
the view of the Muʿtazila. They said: God is living, powerful, knowing, hearing,
seeing and willing by His essence. It is not possible for Him to have life, power,
knowledge, hearing or sight, because these things would be the cause for His
becoming qualified with the respective attribute. But, neither God nor any of His
attributes can have a cause. Thus, the attribute would be either the qualified or
other than the qualified. Both are absurd.
‫و�أ ّما �أهل الس�نّة والجماعة قالوا‪ّ � :‬إن اللّه تعالى لم يزل كان موصوفاً منعوتاً �أ ّ‬
‫زلياً وال يزال يكون‬
‫ل ال هي ذاته وال هي غير ذاته بل ذلك‬ ‫ثم نقول‪ّ � :‬إن صفات اللّه ّ‬
‫عز وج ّ‬ ‫موصوفاً منعوتاً �أبديّاً‪ّ .‬‬
‫صفاته‪ ،‬وبيانه �أ ّن الصفة � إذا كانت غير الموصوف ف إ�ن ّه يوجب �أن يقوم بذاته‪ .‬والشيء � إذا‬
‫ل ما جاز عليه التم ّ‬
‫كن‬ ‫قام بالشيء ف إ�ن ّه يقوم به بالتم ّ‬
‫كن والحلول كالعرض في الجوهر‪ ،‬وك ّ‬
‫دل �أ ّن الصفة ليست هي‬
‫والحلول جاز عليه النقل والنزول‪ ،‬وهذا من صفات المحدثات‪ّ .‬‬
‫غير الموصوف‪.‬‬
‫و �إن ّما قلنا‪ّ � :‬إن الصفات ليست هي الموصوف‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الصفات لو كانت هي الموصوف‬
‫يؤ ّدي � إلى � إثبات الصانعين وثالثة و�أكثر‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الموصوف صانع وهو موصوف بصفة العلم‬
‫وبصفة القدرة وبصفة الحياة وغيره‪ .‬ف إ�ذا كانت الصفة والموصوف واحداً فالصفة تكون‬
‫ل صفة على حدة تكون صانعاً‬
‫صانعاً فيكون العلم صانعاً والحياة صانعاً والقدرة صانعاً‪ ،‬وك ّ‬
‫فصح �أ ّن الصفات ليست هي الموصوف وال هي غير الموصوف‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫على حدة‪ ،‬وهذا محال‪.‬‬
‫فلهذا المعنى قلنا‪ّ � :‬إن الصفة ال هي هو وال هي غيره‪ .‬و�أ ّما ما قالت المعتزلة ب�أ ّن اللّه تعالى‬
‫ليست له صفة‪ ،‬قلنا‪ :‬نفي الصفة يوجب نفي الموصوف‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الصانع لو لم يكن عالماً‬
‫لكان ال يعلم الأشياء والأحوال‪ ،‬ومن �أحدث شيئاً وهو ال يدري ما الذي صنع وفعل‬
‫يصح ويجوز �أن‬
‫ّ‬ ‫فيوصف بالجهل فال يكون صانعاً‪ ،‬وهذا محال‪ .‬فلزم �أن يكون عالماً حتّى‬
‫ل جالله‪ .‬و � إذا ثبت �أن ّه عالم يقتضي �أن يعلم الأشياء كلّها والأحوال‬
‫يكون � إلهاً ربّاً صانعاً ج ّ‬
‫ب�أسرها في جميع �أوقاتها و�أماكنها‪ ،‬و � إذا علم الأشياء صارت الأشياء معلوم ًة له‪ ،‬وبدون‬
‫العلم ال يجوز �أن يكون الشيء معلوماً للعالم‪ ،‬ل أ ّن المعلوم يقتضي العلم ال محالة‪ .‬فثبت‬
‫�أ ّن الشيء بالعلم صار معلوماً له‪ ،‬فنفي العلم يوجب نفي العالم و � إثبات العلم يوجب � إثبات‬
‫فصح ما قلنا‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫العالم‪،‬‬
As for the people of the Sunna and the community, they said: God the Exalted
was qualified by His attributes in pre-eternity, and He will continue to be qual-
ified forever. Then we say: The attributes of God the Almighty are neither Him
nor other than Him, but they are His attributes. The explanation is that if the
attribute were other than the qualified [i. e. God], this would require it to subsist
in His essence. And if one thing subsists in another, this would be by location
and indwelling, as it is the case with the accident in the substance. Everything
subject to location and indwelling is subject to location and translocation, and
these are attributes of the created things. This proves that the attribute is not
other than the qualified.
We further said: The attributes are not identical with the qualified, for if the
attributes were identical with the qualified this would lead to the affirmation of
two, three and more creators, because the qualified is a creator, qualified by the
attribute of knowledge, the attribute of power, the attribute of life, and others. If
the attribute and the qualified were one, then the attribute would be a creator, so
that knowledge would be a creator, life would be a creator, and power would be a
creator, and each attribute will be a creator on its own. This is absurd. Therefore,
the correct solution is that the attributes are neither the qualified nor other than
the qualified.
Therefore, we said: The attribute is neither He [i. e. God] nor other than Him. As
for the Muʿtazila’s doctrine that God the Exalted does not have any attribute, we
said: The denial of the attribute necessitates the denial of the qualified. Because if
the Creator was not knowing, He would not know the things and the states, and
whoever brings a thing into existence and is unaware of what he has created and
done is qualified by ignorance, and cannot be a creator. This is impossible. It is
necessary that He knows, so that it is correct and possible for Him to be a God,
Lord and Creator, may His Majesty be Glorified. If it is proven that He knows,
this requires that He knows all things and states in their totality, in all times
and places, and if He knows all things, things become known to Him. Without
knowledge, it is not possible for a thing to be known to the knower, because what
is known necessarily requires knowledge. Therefore, it is proven that the thing
became known to him by knowledge. So the denial of knowledge requires the
denial of the knower and the proof of knowledge presupposes the knower. Thus,
our proposition is correct.
‫يؤكّده وهو �أ ّن العالم بوقوف العلم على المعلوم يصير المعلوم معلوماً له‪ ،‬و � إذا لم يكن له‬
‫ي شيء يقف على المعلوم؟ و � إذا لم يقف على المعلوم ف إ�ن ّه ال يعلم الأشياء‪ ،‬وهذا‬ ‫علم فب�أ ّ‬
‫ل يعلم الأشياء بالذات والمعلومات كلّها تكون معلوم ًة‬
‫عز وج ّ‬
‫محال‪ .‬ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬البارئ ّ‬
‫له بذاته‪ .‬فنقول‪� :‬إن ّه ذات عالم فنفي الصفات ال يوجب نفي الذات‪ .‬قلنا‪ :‬العالم لو علم‬
‫الأشياء بالذات والمعلوم معلوم له بذاته يكون ذاته علماً‪ .‬فيكون العلم هو الذات والذات‬
‫هو العلم‪ ،‬ل أ ّن المعلوم ال يكون معلوماً بدون الوقوف عليه وبدون العلم‪ ،‬فك ّ‬
‫ل ما يقف به‬
‫على المعلوم يكون عالماً‪.‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬لو قلنا ب�أن ّه موصوف بصفة يوجب القول ب إ�ثبات القديمين وثالثة و�أكثر‪ ،‬ل أ ّن‬
‫الصفة ال يجوز �أن يكون حادثاً محدثاً‪ ،‬ولو قلنا ب�أن ّه قديم يكون في هذا � إثبات القديمين‬
‫و�أكثر‪ .‬قلنا‪ :‬هذا ال يلزم‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الصفة ليست هي غير الموصوف‪ ،‬والصفة �إن ّما تكون غير‬
‫الموصوف � إذا كان عرضاً‪ ،‬فال يوجب القول بغيريّته عن الموصوف فال يكون فيه � إثبات‬
‫القديمين‪ .‬وقد يجوز �أن تكون الصفة صف ًة وال يكون عرضاً كما �أن ّه يجوز �أن يكون الذات‬
‫موجوداً وليس بجوهر‪ ،‬ف إ�ذا كان الذات ال يكون جوهراً فكذلك الصفة ال يكون عرضاً‪،‬‬
‫فال يلزم‪.‬‬
‫فصح بهذا الدليل �أ ّن الصفة ال هي هو وال هي غيره‪ ،‬و � إذا ثبت هذا المعنى في العلم يثبت‬
‫ّ‬
‫في جميع الصفات كالقدرة والحياة والسمع والبصر وغير ذلك‪.‬‬
‫القول الثاني في صفات الذات وصفات الفعل‬

‫قال �أبو الحسن الأشعري‪ّ � :‬إن صفات الذات قديمة وهي ثمانية‪ :‬الحياة والقدرة والعلم‬
‫والكالم والسمع والبصر والإ رادة والقدم‪ ،‬وما وراء ذلك من الصفات من مقتضيات القدرة‬
‫والعلم‪ ،‬وما يدخل تحت القدرة فهو من صفات الفعل كلّها محدثة‪.‬‬
This is confirmed by the fact that the knower knows the object of knowledge
when the knowledge encounters the known object. And if he has no knowledge,
how can he become aquainted with what is to be known’? If he is not aware of
what is to be known, then he does not know things, and this is impossible. If it
is said: The almighty Creator knows the things by His essence, and all known
things are known to Him by His essence. We say: He is a knowing essence, and
the denial of the attributes does not require the denial of the essence. We reply:
If the knower knew the things by his essence, and the object of knowledge is
known to him by his essence, his essence would be knowledge. Consequently,
the knowledge would be the essence, and the essence would be the knowledge,
because the known object is not known without encountering it. Everyone who
encounters the known object by his knowledge is a knowing subject.
If someone objects: If we say that He is qualified by an attribute, this would
require the affirmation of two, three, or more eternal entities. For the attribute
cannot be contingent and created. Moreover, if we say that the attribute is eter-
nal, this also requires the affirmation of two, or more, eternal entities. We reply:
This is not compulsory, because the attribute is not other than the qualified.
This would be the case if the attribute were an accident. Hence, discussing the
distinction between the attribute and the qualified is not required, and we do not
need to affirm two eternal entities. It is possible that the attribute is an attribute,
but not an accident; just as it is possible that the essence is an existent, but not a
substance. If the essence does not have to be a substance, likewise the attribute
does not have to be an accident, hence it is not compulsory.
This proof confirms that the attribute is neither Him nor other than Him. If this
meaning is proven for knowledge, it is proven for all attributes such as power,
life, hearing, seeing, and others.
Second Section: Attributes of the Essence and Attributes of Action

Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī taught: The attributes of the essence are eternal. These
are eight: life, power, knowledge, speech, hearing, seeing, will and eternity. The
other attributes belong to the requirements of power and knowledge, and what
belongs to power are the attributes of action. All of them are created.
‫امية‪ّ � :‬إن صفات الذات قديمة وهي خمسة‪ :‬الحياة والقدرة‬

‫الكر ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وقالت المتقشّ فة من‬
‫والعلم والسمع والبصر‪ ،‬وما وراء ذلك نعوت وليست بصفات كلّها محدثة‪ ،‬وقال بعضهم‪:‬‬
‫حادثة‪ .‬وهذا كلّه كفر محال‪ ،‬ل أ ّن اللّه تعالى قبل حدوث هذه الصفات من زعمهم يكون‬
‫ناقصاً وبعد حدوث هذه الصفات يصير كامالً ويزيد صفة‪ ،‬ومن اعتقد بمثل هذا ف إ�ن ّه‬
‫يصير كافراً‪ ،‬ول أ ّن الحدوث والإ حداث يوجب التغيير من صفة � إلى صفة ومن حال � إلى‬
‫حال‪ .‬فال يجوز التغيير على اللّه تعالى‪.‬‬
‫امية ببوزجان فقلت‬‫الكر ّ‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ناظرت حشويّاً من‬‫ُ‬ ‫قال المهتدي �أبو شكور السالمي وفّقه اللّه‪:‬‬
‫له‪ :‬ماذا تقولون في الصانع وصفاته من صفات الفعل؟ قال‪� :‬إن ّها حادثة محدثة‪ .‬فقلت‪ّ � :‬إن‬
‫الصانع قبل حدوث هذه الصفة يكون ناقص الصفة؟ وهذا محال‪ .‬قلت‪ :‬وماذا تقولون في‬
‫الأنبياء عليهم السالم قبل الوحي؟ قال ب�أ ّن النبي قبل الوحي ما كان ّ‬
‫نبياً وما كان معصوماً‬
‫ع ّما يوجب سقوط العدالة‪ .‬قلت‪ � :‬إذا فعل شيئاً يوجب سقوط العدالة يصير فاسقاً‪ .‬فلو �أ ّن‬
‫اللّه تعالى �أوحى � إليه في تلك الساعة يكون وحياً � إلى شخص فاسق فيكون الرسول فاسقاً‪.‬‬
‫قلت‪ :‬وماذا تقولون فيمن قال‪ :‬ال � إله � ّإل اللّه‪ ،‬واعتقد غير ذلك‪ ،‬نعوذ باللّه؟ قال ب�أن ّه مؤمن‪.‬‬
‫الرب ناقص والرسول فاسق والمؤمن منافق؟ واللّه ورسوله‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫قلت‪ :‬فما دينكم � ّإل �أن تقولوا ب�أ ّن‬
‫والحق يعلو وال‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الحق‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫فتحير وانقطع عن كالمه‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الباطل ال يقابل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫منزهان ع ّما قلتم‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫يعلى‪ ،‬واللّه الهادي � إلى الصواب‪.‬‬
A group within the Karrāmiyya,5 named the Mutaqashshifa,6 claimed: The at-
tributes of the essence are eternal. They are five: life, power, knowledge, hearing
and seeing. Beyond that are descriptions and not attributes. All of them are cre-
ated; some of them said: contingent. This is all disbelief and impossible, because
their view implies that God the Exalted had been deficient before the occurrence
of these attributes, and only after their occurrence He became complete and
gained an attribute. Whoever thinks this way becomes a disbeliever. Moreover,
occurrence and bringing (things) into existence necessitate changing from one
attribute to another, and from one condition to another. However change is not
applicable to God the Exalted.
The guided Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī – may God give him success – said: Once
I argued with a Ḥashwī, a member of the Karrāmiyya, in Būzjān. I asked him:
What is your opinion about the Creator and His attributes of action? He an-
swered: They are created and contingent. I asked: Thus, the Creator before the
occurrence of this attribute is lacking the attribute? This is impossible. I kept
on asking: What do you say concerning the Prophets – peace be upon them –
before the revelation? He replied that the Prophet before the revelation was
not a prophet and was not protected from losing his uprightness. I said: If he
does something that requires the fall of justice, he becomes an evildoer. If God
revealed to him at that time, this would be a revelation to an evildoer, and the
messenger would be an evildoer. Then I asked: What do you say about someone
who said: There is no deity but God, and thinks otherwise – God forbid? He
answered: He is a believer. I said: What is your religion, except that you say
that the Lord is deficient, and the Messenger is an evildoer, and the believer is a
hypocrite? God and His Messenger are beyond what you claim. Thereupon he
[i. e. my interlocutor] was baffled and at a loss for words, because no falsehood
compares to the truth, and the truth (always) prevails and is (never) defeated.
And God guides to the correct [path].
5 The Karrāmiyya, followers of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Karrām (d. 255/869), was
a sect which flourished in the central and eastern parts of the Muslim world, from the 3rd/9th
century until the Mongol invasions in the 7th/13th century. In some aspects, the doctrine of
the Karrāmiyya was similar to that of the Ḥanafiyya, but was rejected by the Sunnis due to the
exaggerated literalism and anthropomorphism.
6 Literally ‘the ascetics’. It is not entirely clear whether the author really means a specific
group within the Karrāmiyya as a whole, since ‘Mutaqashshifa’ was also used as a mock name
for the entire Karrāmiyya (see Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī
Theology in Samarqand, trans. Rodrigo Adem, Leiden: Brill, 2014, p. 77).
88 Angelika Brodersen
Bibliography
Primary text
Sālimī, Abū Shakūr al-, al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd, in Angelika Brodersen, Zwischen
Māturīdīya und Ašʿarīya. Abū Šakūr as-Sālimī und sein Tamhīd fī bayān at-tauḥīd,
Piscataway NJ: Gorgias Press, 2018, pp. 115–9.
Other Sources
Rudolph, Ulrich, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand,
God and Creation
ʿUbayd Allāh al-Samarqandī (d. 701/1301), al-ʿAqīda
al-rukniyya fī sharḥ lā ilāha ill Allāh Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh
Lejla Demiri
The selected passages are from al-ʿAqīda al-rukniyya fī sharḥ lā ilāha ill Allāh
Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh (‘Rukn al-Dīn’s ʿAqīda: A Commentary on the Shahāda’)
by Abū Muḥammad Rukn al-Dīn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
al-Samarqandī (d. 701/1301), a Māturīdī scholar originally from Samarqand.1
He studied in Baghdad and then moved to Damascus where he spent the last ten
years of his life. He taught in various mosques in Damascus as well as the famous
Ẓāhiriyya madrasa. He further had a teaching circle in the Umayyad Mosque,
and was later appointed as mudarris (lecturer) at the Nūriyya madrasa.2
Not much is known about ʿUbayd Allāh al-Samarqandī’s biography, though
he was considered one of the major figures of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī school at
the time. With his numerous works, al-Samarqandī contributed to systematic
theology (kalām), jurisprudence ( fiqh), Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr), Hadith and
Sufism (taṣawwuf ). Despite the rich textual material he left behind, he is almost
unknown in modern scholarship. Apart from his ʿaqīda3 and his lengthy work in
uṣūl al-fiqh comparing Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī principles of jurisprudence,4 none of
his writings have been published,5 and other than two very short encyclopedia
entries, one on his life and another on his ʿaqīda,6 to my knowledge, there exists
no other study about him or his scholarship.
1 Rukn al-Dīn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, al-ʿAqīda al-rukniyya fī sharḥ
lā ilāha ill Allāh Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh, ed. Mustafa Sinanoğlu, Istanbul: İSAM, 2008.
2 For his life and work, see Mustafa Sinanoğlu, “Semerkandî, Ubeydullah b. Muhammed”,
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009, vol. 36,
pp. 480–1.
3 See fn. 1.
4 Rukn al-Dīn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Jāmiʿ al-uṣūl fī bayān al-
qawāʿid al-ḥanafiyya wa-l-shāfiʿiyya fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. İsmet Garibullah Şimşek, Istanbul:
İSAM, 2020, 2 vols.
5 A critical edition of two of his treatises, one on ʿubūdiyya (servanthood) and one on tawba
(repentance) are currently being prepared by Lejla Demiri.
6 Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, “el-‘A kîdetü’z-Zekiyye” [sic], Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi,
Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989, vol. 2, pp. 260–1.
90 Lejla Demiri
Al-Samarqandī’s kalām is combined with his sufi ideas, learning and spirit-
uality. In his works, numerous kalām scholars are mentioned and quoted side by
side with various sufi authorities. He does not hesitate to cite from the scholarly
literature of different theological schools. He is happy to draw his inspiration
from both Ashʿarī and Māturīdī sources, blending them with those of sufis of
diverse mashrabs (spiritual dispositions).
The selection here provides a glimpse into his theology. The opening prayer
of his ʿaqīda reveals the type of theology he would put forward7: a theology of
humility. The entire created realm is an indication, a sign (āya) leading to Him, a
manifestation of His names and attributes, a mirror reflecting His perfection8. Yet
God is bāṭin (hidden), for only He can truly know Himself 9. Maʿrifa is ultimately
a gift from God10. He is the One Who in the first place facilitates this knowledge
for human beings and subsequently rewards them for having chosen His path;
this is a double blessing – the blessing of īmān and the blessing of the reward11.
Not only is the maʿrifa from God, but also the possibility of serving Him and of
finally receiving His reward in the hereafter is entirely dependent upon His will
and mercy12. All is a divine blessing, a gift from the Creator.
In addition to God’s mercy and generosity, al-Samarqandī also draws our
attention to divine beauty. Following the Māturīdī (as well as the Ashʿarī)
position on the beatific vision (ruʿyat Allāh), he considers it to be permissible by
reason, and promised by revelation without ascribing any ‘modality, direction or
image’. But he does not limit his exposition to scriptural texts alone, as he further
develops a supportive argument established on the beauty of God. Since God
is beautiful, and everyone who is beautiful requires to be seen by others, and
since Heaven is the abode of favours and not the abode of trials, al-Samarqandī
concludes that ‘the believer is worthy of seeing Him, loving Him and longing for
Him due to God’s honouring him with this’13. This is a clear example of how his
theology is enriched with sufi principles and explications.
7 Al-Samarqandī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 39.

8 Ibid., p. 47.
9 Ibid., p. 86.
10 Ibid., p. 87.
11 Ibid., p. 93.
12 Ibid., p. 147.
13 Ibid., p. 84.
God and Creation 91

‫ ‪92‬‬ ‫‪Lejla Demiri‬‬
‫ِ‬
‫معرفته بالشواهد من‬ ‫ُّ‬
‫لتعذ ِر‬ ‫الباطن كن ُه هويّته‬
‫ِ‬ ‫الحمد للّه الظاه ِر وجو ُده بشهادة الكائنات‪،‬‬
‫ِ‬
‫النبوات‪ .‬فال أ ُ‬
‫نبياء الكرام والمالئك ُة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫مصابيحها من مشكاة‬
‫ُ‬ ‫الظاهرة‬ ‫والسمعيات‬
‫ّ‬ ‫العقول‬
‫العلى‪ ،‬وحقائقِ �أسمائِه الحسنى‪.‬‬ ‫كنه صفاتِه ُ‬‫كنه ذاتِه و ِ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫العظام كلُّهم حيارى في معرفة‬
‫ُ‬ ‫الم ْع َتر ِ‬
‫المفَ َّ‬
‫ض ُل على‬ ‫بعجزِه حتّى قال‪“ :‬ال �أحصي عليك ً‬
‫ثناء”‪ ،‬وهو ُ‬ ‫ِف ْ‬ ‫نبيه ُ‬
‫والصالة على ّ‬
‫البسيطة الغبراء‪ ،‬مح ّم ٍد خاتم النبيّين‪ ،‬وعلى �آله و�أصحابه‬
‫ِ‬ ‫وقاطن‬
‫ِ‬ ‫الم ِظلَّة الخضراء‬ ‫س ّ‬
‫كان َ‬
‫نجو ِم السماء � إلى يوم الدين‪]…[ .‬‬
‫وسفلياتها‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫خلق اللّ ُه تعالى من العوالم‪ُ ،‬عل ِويّاتها‬
‫َ‬ ‫نعتقد �أ ّن ما‬
‫َ‬ ‫يمان به �أن‬
‫ُ‬ ‫وم ّما يجب الإ‬
‫ريه ْم �آ َياتِ َنا فِي‬
‫﴿س ُن ِ‬‫مظهر لوجود اللّه وكماالته‪ .‬قال اللّه تعالى‪َ :‬‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫وملكوتياتها‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وملكياتها‬
‫ّ‬
‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ح ُّق﴾‪]…[ .14‬‬ ‫ْ‬
‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ه‬‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�‬ ‫م‬‫ه‬ ‫َ‬
‫ل‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ب‬‫�ت‬
‫ْ َ َّ َ َ َ َّ َ ُ ْ َّ ُ َ‬‫ي‬ ‫�‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ت‬‫ح‬ ‫م‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫س‬ ‫ْفُ‬‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ْالآف َ‬
‫و‬ ‫ِ‬
‫َاق‬
‫خالق‬
‫ُ‬ ‫قديم‪،‬‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫واجب الوجود‪،‬‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫قال �أهل الس�نّة‪� :‬أ ّول الفرض على العقالء معرف ُة اللّه ب�أن ّه‬
‫غيره‪ ،‬وما سوى‬ ‫للخلق � إل ٌه ُ‬‫ليها‪ ،‬ملكيّها وملكوتيّها‪ ،‬وليس َ‬ ‫وس ْف ِّ‬ ‫بر َّمتها‪ُ ،‬ع ْلويِّها ُ‬ ‫الكائنات ُ‬
‫بدي بال نهاية‪َ .‬‬ ‫خر ال أ ُّ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫﴿ل‬ ‫والمعيد‪ ،‬وال أ ّول الفر ُد بال بداية‪ ،‬والآ ُ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫المبدئ‬ ‫ث‪ ،‬وهو ُ‬ ‫حاد ٌ‬ ‫اللّه‬
‫َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ل وال مثالٌ ‪ ،‬وال‬ ‫فكار‪ ،‬وليس للّه مث ٌ‬
‫ُ‬ ‫حقُ ه أال‬ ‫ار﴾ ‪ ،‬وال َت ْل َ‬ ‫ص َ‬ ‫ار َو ُه َو ُي ْدرِكُ ْال أ ْب َ‬
‫ص ُ‬ ‫ك ُه ْال أ ْب َ‬ ‫تُ ْد ِر ُ‬
‫‪15‬‬
‫يصح �أن يقال‪� :‬إن ّه‬

‫ّ‬ ‫كيف وال � إحساسٍ ‪ ،‬فال‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫س‪ ،‬و �إن ّه مرئ ِ ٌّي بال‬ ‫ح ُّ‬
‫يتخيل وال يتو ّهم‪ ،‬وال ُي َ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫محسوس‪ � ،‬إذ الإ حساس يقتضي النهاي َة والإ دراكَ ‪ .‬وال ُيعرف ذاتُه وال صف ٌة من صفاته‬ ‫ٌ‬
‫منز ٌه عن الض ِّد والن ّد‪ .‬و �إن ّه الظاهر بحسب الآيات‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّه‬ ‫ن‬‫إ‬ ‫�‬ ‫و‬ ‫‪،‬‬ ‫التشبيه‬
‫َ‬ ‫يقتضي‬ ‫ّه‬ ‫ن‬‫أ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫بالقياس‪،‬‬
‫جزئيا كان �أو كلّ ًّيا‪،‬‬
‫ًّ‬ ‫عليم‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫حادث‬ ‫ل‬ ‫الباطن لأن ّه ال ُي َ‬
‫دركُ كن ُه ذاته‪ .‬وهو بك ّ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫والدالئل‪ ،‬و �إن ّه‬
‫والواجب الوجود‬‫ُ‬ ‫والمحاالت لذاتها‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ل الممكنات موجوداتِها ومعدوماتِها‪.‬‬ ‫قادر على ك ّ‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫و �إن ّه‬
‫يوصف اللّ ُه‬ ‫لذاته ال يدخالن تحت القدرة‪ ،‬لعدم المحلّية للقدرة‪ ،‬ال لعجز اللّه تعالى‪ .‬فال َ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫واحدة وغيرِها‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بجهة‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫واحد‬ ‫بالقدرة على خلق مثله‪ ،‬وال على الجمع بين الض ّدين في مح ٍّل‬
‫من المحاالت‪ .‬وذاتُه وصفاتُه ليستا بمقدورتين‪ � ،‬إذ وجوب الوجود لذاته تُنافي المقدور�يّة‪.‬‬
‫[…]‬
‫الفصلت ‪.٥٣/٤١‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫‪ 14‬سورة‬
‫‪ 15‬سورة الأنعام ‪.١٠٣/٦‬‬
God and Creation 93
Praise be to God, Whose existence is apparent through the testimony of the

existent beings, and Whose very essence is hidden due to its unknowability
through rational proofs or transmitted information derived from the clear light
of the prophetic lamp. The noble Prophets and the great angels are all perplexed
in knowing the very nature of His essence, the core of His exalted attributes and
the real nature of His most beautiful names. Prayers be upon His Prophet who
acknowledged his own incapacity, to the extent that he said: ‘I cannot fully praise
You’,16 although he was made to excel all the inhabitants beneath the continual
shade of heaven and the dwellers upon the spacious earth, Muḥammad the Seal
of the Prophets, and prayers be upon his family and upon his companions, the
stars of heaven, until the Day of Judgment.17 […]
Among the things we are required to believe is that all the worlds that God the
Exalted has created, be they high or low, visible or invisible, all are the locus of
manifestation of the existence of God and His perfections. As God the Exalted
says: ‘We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and within themselves until
it becomes clear to them that it is the Truth’ [Q 41:53].18 […]
The People of the Sunna affirm that the first duty upon intelligent beings is to
acknowledge that God is the Necessary Being, Pre-Eternal, the Creator of all the
existent things, be they high or low, visible or invisible, and that the creation has
no god other than Him; everything except for God has a beginning, and He is
the Originator and the Restorer; the First and the Unique without a beginning;
the Last, and the Everlasting without an end. ‘Vision comprehends Him not, but
He comprehends all vision’ [Q 6:103]; no cognition can perceive Him; God has
neither likeness nor equal; no imagination or surmise can comprehend Him;
neither can He be sensed; He is visible, but without (speculating upon) ‘how’ and
without being perceived through the senses; it is not right to say: He is perceptible
through the senses, since perception through the senses requires limitation and
grasping. Neither His essence nor any of His attributes can be known by analogy,
for this would lead to anthropomorphism, whereas He is free from (having) an
opposite or an equal. He is the Manifest through signs and proofs, and He is the
Hidden, for the true nature of His essence cannot be perceived. He knows every-
thing that happens, be it particular or general, and has power (to give) contingent
things existence or non-existence. Things that are impossible in themselves, or
the Necessary Being Whose existence is due to Himself, do not fall under the
domain of this capacity, because there is no object for the capacity to relate to,
and not because of any incapacity on the part of God the Exalted. God cannot be
ascribed with the power to create His equal, to bring together two opposites in a
single place from one single perspective, or to do any other impossible things. His
essence and His attributes are not objects of power, for being the Necessary Being
Whose existence is from Himself excludes being an object of power.19 […]
16 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, “Ṣalāt”, 42.
18 Ibid., p. 47.
19 Ibid., pp. 62–3.
‫ح ُ‬
‫ك ُم َما‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫قديمة بذاته �أزالً و�أبداً‪ ،‬قال اللّه تعالى‪ �﴿ :‬إ َِّن ال� ل َه َي ْ‬ ‫اللّه مري ٌد �أزالً و�أبداً ب إ� ٍ‬
‫رادة‬
‫ض ٍّر﴾‪ ،21‬آالية‪ .‬ومن حيث العقل نقول‪ّ � :‬إن اللّه خلق‬ ‫ِيد﴾‪ ،20‬وقال‪ �﴿ :‬إ ِْن �أَ َر َ‬
‫ادنِ َي ال� ل ُه بِ ُ‬ ‫ُير ُ‬
‫ذات اللّه تعالى وكماالتِه؛ واللّه �أمرنا‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ِف العقولُ وترى بمر�آة العالم‬ ‫العالم ُمظهراً ومر�آ ًة ل َتعر َ‬
‫َ‬
‫ِ‬
‫كماالت اللّه‬ ‫والفاق ‪ ،‬ل َن َ‬
‫عرف‬ ‫‪23‬‬ ‫كر في خلق السماوات والأرض ‪ ،‬و�آيات أالنفس آ‬
‫‪22‬‬ ‫بالتف ّ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫شجرة هو من �آيات الآفاق‪،‬‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫تعالى ونُ ِق َّر بها‬
‫ونصفَ ه بها‪ .‬فنقول‪ :‬حدوث َ‬
‫الو ْرد مثالً من‬
‫ح �أحد طرف َِي الممكن من العدم‬ ‫نطق بلسان الحال �أ ّن له ُم ِ‬
‫حدثاً �أحدثه‪ � ،‬إذ ُّ‬
‫ترج ُ‬ ‫يدلّنا و َي ِ‬
‫وحسن صورتِه ورائحته‬ ‫العقول‪.‬‬
‫ث‪ ،‬قد ُعرِف ذلك ببداءة ُ‬ ‫� إلى الوجود ال يكون بدون ُم ِ‬
‫حد ٍ‬
‫ُ‬
‫اللطيفة يدلّنا على ِسعة جوده ورحمته‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الورد ليس من ضرورات حاجات الإ نسان‪،‬‬
‫ٍ‬
‫وجه في الك ّميّة والكيفيّة في وقت‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بوجه دون‬ ‫وهو المقصود ِمن خلق العالم‪ .‬واختصاصه‬
‫ٍ‬
‫بوجه‬ ‫تخصيص المفعوالت‬ ‫الربيع يدلّنا على �أ ّن اللّه تعالى مري ٌد‪ � ،‬إذ الإ رادة صفة تقتضي‬
‫َ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫واحد على‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫وقت‬ ‫المفعوالت كلُّها في‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫وقت‪ � ،‬إذ لوال الإ راد ُة لوقعت‬ ‫ووقت دون‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫وجه‬ ‫دون‬
‫ٍ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫هيئة واحدة‪]…[ .‬‬
‫سماء الحس َنى بال نهاية‪ ،‬وال تع ُّد َد في‬

‫ُ‬ ‫حصى‪ ،‬وله ال أ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بصفات ال تُ َع ُّد وال تُ َ‬ ‫موصوف‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫اللّه‬
‫واحد‪ .‬وكذلك‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫ل اسم‪ .‬فاللّه َع ِلم ما كان وما يكون وما لم يكن بعل ٍ‬
‫م‬ ‫ل صفة وال في ك ّ‬
‫ك ّ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫واحدة‪ .‬وكذا الكالم والمشيئة‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه متكلّ ٌم من الأزل � إلى‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بقدرة‬ ‫ل الممكنات‬
‫يقدر على ك ّ‬
‫وجميع الكتب السماوية دال ّ ٌة على ذلك الكالم الحقيقي القائم بذات‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫واحد‪،‬‬ ‫الأبد بكال ٍم‬
‫ل الكائنات الماضية والواقعة في‬ ‫كتب ما َن ِفدت كلماتُه‪ .‬وك ُّ‬
‫ٍ‬ ‫اللّه‪ ،‬ولو �أُنزِل �ألوف �ألوف من‬
‫ل صفة من صفاته‪ ،‬ل أ ّن التع ُّدد‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫واحد‪ .‬وكذا في ك ّ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫إيجاد‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫واحدة و �‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بمشيئة‬ ‫الحال والمستقبلة‬
‫عراض ناقص ٌة‪]…[ .‬‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫حق الخلق‪ ،‬ل أ ّن صفات الخلق �أ‬
‫والنقصان كما في ّ‬
‫َ‬ ‫العجز‬
‫َ‬ ‫يستلزم‬
‫‪ 20‬سورة المائدة ‪.١/٥‬‬

‫‪ 21‬سورة الزمر ‪.٣٨/٣٩‬‬
‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫يات ل ألي ْال أ ْل َب ِ‬
‫اب﴾‪.‬‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ات َو ْال أ ْرضِ َواخْ ِت َلف اللَّ ْيلِ َوالنَّ َها ِر َلآ ٍ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫او ِ‬ ‫ سورة �آل عمران ‪ �﴿ :١٩٠/٣‬إ َِّن في خَ ْلقِ َّ‬
‫الس َم َ‬
‫‪22‬‬
‫ح ُّق﴾‪.‬‬‫حتَّى �يَ�ت َ َب َّي َن َل ُه ْم �أَنَّ ُه ا ْل َ‬ ‫َاق َوفِي �أَنْفُ ِ‬

‫س ِه ْم َ‬ ‫ِيه ْم �آ َياتِ َنا فِي ْالآف ِ‬
‫الفصلت ‪َ ﴿ :٥٣/٤١‬س ُنر ِ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫‪ 23‬سورة‬
God and Creation 95
God is the One Who Wills from pre-eternity to eternity with an infinitely pre-ex-
istent will [subsistent] with His essence from pre-eternity to eternity, as God the
Exalted says: ‘God ordains what He wills’ [Q 5:1] and ‘If God willed some hurt
for me’ [to the end of ] the verse [Q 39:38]. With respect to the intellect, we say:
God created the universe as a reflector24 and mirror, so that the intellects may
know and see through the mirror of the universe the essence of God the Exalted
and His perfections. God commanded us to reflect on the creation of the heavens
and the earth25 and on the signs within ourselves and on the horizons,26 so that
we may know the perfections of God the Exalted, affirm them and describe Him
through them. We further state that, for instance, the coming into existence of a
rose from a rosebush is one of the signs on the horizons; it stands as a proof to
us and pronounces with the tongue of its whole being that it has a Creator Who
brought it into existence, for choosing existence over non-existence from the two
possible opposing options cannot happen without a Creator. This is known by
basic intelligence. The beauty of its form and its subtle fragrance further indicate
to us the abundance of His generosity and His mercy, for the rose is not one of
the necessary needs of a human being, who is the purpose behind the creation
of the universe. Its being in one particular way rather than another, in terms of
quantity as well as quality, during springtime, further shows us that God the
Exalted is the One Who Wills, for the will is an attribute which requires the acts
to be particularised in a certain way and at a certain time. If there were no will,
all acts would happen at the same time and in the same form.27 […]
God is described by innumerable and countless attributes, and to Him belong
the most beautiful names without any limitations. There is no multiplicity with-
in any attribute or name. So God knows what has happened, what will happen
and what will never happen with one and the same knowledge. Likewise He
has power over all contingent things with one and the same power. And so it is
with speech, as well as with will; He is a speaker from pre-eternity to eternity
with one and the same speech; and all the sacred scriptures indicate that real
speech which subsists in the essence of God; and if thousands and thousands of
scriptures were to be sent down, still there would be no end to His words. All the
existent beings of the past, present and future are (brought into existence) with
one and the same will, as well as one and the same creation. Likewise with every
one of His attributes. For multiplicity necessitates inability and deficiency, as is
the case with the nature of created beings, because the attributes of creation are
[merely] deficient accidents.28 […]
24 Following the reading of muẓhir in the current publication, whereas a more common
usage would be maẓhar, or locus of divine manifestation.
25 See the Qur’anic verse (Q 3:190): ‘Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth,
and in the alternation of night and day, there are indeed signs for those with understanding’.
26 See the Qur’anic verse (Q 41:53): ‘We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and
within themselves until it will become clear to them that it is the Truth’.
27 Al-Samarqandī, al-ʿAqīda, pp. 72–3.
28 Ibid., p. 83.
‫رؤية اللّه بالبصر الظاهر تجوز لعبيده عقالً في الدنيا والآخرة‪ ،‬وموعو ٌد تحقّقُ ها في الج�نّة في‬
‫الآخرة بال كيف وال جهة وال صورة‪ .‬والدليل على الجواز مطلقاً سؤالُ موسى عليه السالم‬
‫جو ٌه‬ ‫﴿و ُ‬
‫لخرة قوله تعالى‪ُ :‬‬ ‫ك﴾‪ ،29‬والدليل على التحقّق في ا آ‬ ‫ِني �أَ ْن ُ‬
‫ظ ْر � إِ َل ْي َ‬ ‫بقوله‪﴿ :‬ر َ‬
‫ب �أر ِ‬
‫َ ِّ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫َي ْو َم ِئ ٍذ َن ِ‬
‫لوهية‪ ،‬ويجب‬ ‫ل جماالً يليق بالأ ّ‬ ‫اض َر ٌة ۞ � إِ َلى َربِّ َها َناظ َرةٌ﴾ ‪ ،‬ولأ ّن اللّه جمي ٌ‬
‫‪30‬‬
‫يب‬ ‫الم ِع ِ‬
‫غيره بخالف َ‬ ‫ل جميل يجب �أ ْن يراه ُ‬ ‫الثناء ويجب مح�بّة عباده له وشوقهم � إليه‪ ،‬وك ّ‬
‫ومحبته وشوقه � إليه‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ل لرؤيته‬ ‫الناقصِ ‪ ،‬والج�نّة دار الكرامات ال دار االبتالءات‪ ،‬والمؤمن �أه ٌ‬
‫يمان‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ويكون الإ‬
‫َ‬ ‫يرتفع االبتالء‬
‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫لعباده كيال‬ ‫لإ كرامه اللّه بذلك‪ ،‬وفي الدنيا �إن ّما لم ُي ِر ذا َته‬
‫غيباً ال ضروريّاً‪.‬‬
‫كنهها‬
‫َ‬ ‫رؤية اللّه من �أقسام المتشابهات التي تعرف العقولُ �أص َلها بالدالئل وال تعرف‬
‫ٍ‬
‫صراط �أح ّد من السيف و�أدقّ من الشَّ ْعر‪،‬‬ ‫وحقيق َتها‪ ،‬كوزن الأعمال وكمرور الناس على‬
‫اء‬
‫ج َ‬ ‫﴿و َ‬
‫طت ِ ‪31‬‬
‫ان﴾ ‪ ،‬وقوله‪َ :‬‬ ‫وكاليد والمجيء المذكور ْين في قول ال�له تعالى‪َ ﴿ :‬ب ْل َي َدا ُه َم ْب ُسو َ َ‬
‫نشتغل بكيفيتها ود ْر ِك ِ‬
‫كنه‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ك﴾‪ ،32‬وما جرى مجراها‪ .‬فالجواب علينا �أن نؤمن بها وال‬ ‫َربُّ َ‬
‫ّ‬
‫الحق والرؤي َة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والمجيء بظهور‬ ‫اليد بالقدرة �أو الجود‬ ‫ل و�أ ّولوا َ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫حقيقتها‪ .‬فالمعتزلة �أنكروا الك َّ‬
‫َ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫صورة‪ .‬ودين اللّه‬ ‫جسمانياً ورؤي َة‬ ‫جسماني ًة ومجيئاً‬ ‫والمشبه ُة اعتقدوا يداً‬ ‫برؤية الآيات‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫الغلو والتقصير‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫بين‬
‫‪ 29‬سورة الأعراف ‪.١٤٣/٧‬‬

‫‪ 30‬سورة القيامة ‪.٢٣–٢٢/٧٥‬‬
‫‪ 31‬سورة المائدة ‪.٦٤/٥‬‬
‫‪ 32‬سورة الفجر ‪.٢٢/٨٩‬‬
God and Creation 97
Seeing God with outward vision by His servants in this world and the hereafter is
permissible by reason, and its realisation in Heaven in the hereafter is promised
(by revelation) without (ascribing any) modality, direction or image. The proof
for the absolute permissibility is Moses’ request, peace be upon him, (as indi-
cated) in his words: ‘My Lord, show me (Yourself ), that I may gaze upon You’
[Q 7:143], while the proof for the realisation in the hereafter is His statement,
may He be Exalted: ‘On that Day there will be radiant faces, looking towards
their Lord’ [Q 75:22–23]. Also because God is beautiful with a beauty becoming
of divinity, and it is necessary for His servants to praise Him, love Him and
long for Him, for everyone who is beautiful requires to be seen by others, unlike
the flawed, deficient one. Heaven is the abode of favours and not the abode of
trials; the believer is worthy of seeing Him, loving Him and longing for Him
due to God’s honouring him with this, while in this world He does not show His
essence to His servants, lest the trial be eliminated and faith be [of that which is]
unseen, rather than self-evident [knowledge].33
The vision of God is one of the class of ambiguous things whose basis may be
known by intellects through indications, but whose very essence or true nature
cannot be known – such as the weighing of deeds;34 the passing of people over
the Bridge sharper than a sword and thinner than a hair;35 the ‘hand’ and the
‘coming’ mentioned in the words of God the Exalted: ‘Truly, His hands are open
wide’ [Q 5:64], and ‘Your Lord shall come’ [Q 89:22], and other similar cases.
Our response should be to believe in them without delving into their modalities
or trying to grasp the inner essence of their natures. The Muʿtazila deny them all
and interpret the ‘hand’ metaphorically as ‘power’ or ‘generosity’, the ‘coming’ as
the ‘manifestation of the truth’, and the ‘vision’ as the ‘vision of the signs’, where-
as the Mushabbiha (Anthropomorphists) believe in a physical hand, physical
arrival and the vision of an image. However, the religion of God is between
excessiveness and deficiency.36

34 The weighing of good and bad deeds on the Day of Judgment, as indicated in the Qur’anic
verses: ‘We will set up scales of justice for the Day of Resurrection so that no soul is wronged in
the least. Though it be of the weight of a grain of mustard seed, We shall bring it out. And We
suffice for reckoners’ [Q 21:47]. ‘The weighing on that day is the true (weighing). As for those
whose scale is heavy, they are the successful. And as for those whose scale is light: those are they
who lose their souls because they used to wrong Our revelations’ [Q 7:8–9].
35 This is the eschatological bridge, described in prophetic tradition, as stretching over
the Fire and leading to the Garden, laid for humanity to cross on the Day of Judgment. The
righteous would successfully traverse, reaching their blissful abode, while the wicked would fall
into the hellfire.
‫كنه حقيقة ذات اللّه ال يمكن معرف ُته لجميع الخالئق � إلى �أبد الآبدين‪ .‬ولهذا قال الجنيد‪:‬‬
‫“العجز عن درك الإ دراك‬
‫ُ‬ ‫يق رضي اللّه عنه‪:‬‬ ‫عرف اللّ َه � ّإل اللّه”‪ .‬وقال �أبو بكر الص ّد ُ‬
‫“ال َي ُ‬
‫ح ْمقَ ى”‪ ،‬وقال النبي صلّى‬‫�إدراكٌ ”‪ .‬وقال النبي صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم‪“ :‬كلُّكم في ذات اللّه َ‬
‫ُ‬
‫ثناء عليك‪� ،‬أنت كما �أ َ‬
‫ثنيت‬ ‫النبيين والعارفين‪“ :‬ال �أحصي ً‬ ‫سيد ّ‬ ‫اللّه عليه وسلّم مع �أن ّه كان ّ‬
‫عرفت اللّه على الحقيقة‪ ،‬ولم يطاوع لساني ثناء‪ ،‬بل مراده‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫يرد به �أن ّي‬
‫على نفسك”‪ .‬لم ْ‬
‫قدر عليه‪ .‬و�أ ّما قولُ �أبي حنيفة رحمه اللّه في‬
‫ظمتك‪ ،‬وال �أ ُ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫وع َ‬‫ثناء يليق بجاللك َ‬ ‫ال �أعلم ً‬
‫حق عبادتِه”‪ ،‬فالمرا ُد ّ‬
‫حق المعرفة التي‬ ‫ِ‬
‫معرفته وما عبدناه َّ‬ ‫“عر ْفنا اللّ َه َّ‬
‫حق‬ ‫َ‬ ‫الفقه الأكبر‪:‬‬
‫كلِّ ْفنا بها‪.‬‬
‫ُ‬
‫تصور للعباد على ثالثة �أقسام‪ )١( :‬معرف ٌة فطر�يّة‪ ،‬و � إشارة الأنبياء عليهم‬ ‫معرفة اللّه َ‬
‫قدر ما ُي َّ‬
‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫السالم � إليها بقولهم‪�﴿ :‬أَفِي ال� ل ِه َش ٌّ‬
‫ات َو ْال أ ْرضِ ﴾ ‪ ،‬وقال ّ‬
‫نبينا صلّى اللّه‬ ‫او ِ‬ ‫ك فَاط ِر َّ‬
‫‪37‬‬
‫مولود يولد على الفطرة”‪ )٢( .‬ومعرفة داخلة تحت التكليف بعد المعرفة‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫عليه وسلّم‪“ :‬ك ُّ‬
‫ل‬
‫والنقلية من الأنبياء عليهم السالم‪ )٣( .‬ومعرف ٌة َموهو بِ ّية‬
‫ّ‬ ‫العقلية‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الفطر�يّة بواسطة الحجج‬
‫خواص عباد اللّه تعالى بالكشوف وبتصفية مر�آة الروح والقلب‪]…[ .‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫لبعض‬
‫‪ 37‬سورة � إبراهيم ‪.١٠/١٤‬‬

God and Creation 99
The true reality of God’s essence can categorically never be known by any of
the creatures. Thus Junayd [al-Baghdādī d. 297/909] said: ‘No one knows God
other than God’,38 and Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, may God be pleased with him, said:
‘The inability to attain perception is itself perception’.39 The Prophet, may God
bless him and grant him peace, said: ‘With regard to the essence of God, you
are all simpletons’.40 The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, fur-
ther said, although he was the master of the Prophets and the knowers of God:
‘I cannot fully praise You; You are as You have praised Yourself ’.41 He did not
say: ‘I truly know God, but my tongue is unable to praise Him’. Rather what
he intended (by this statement) is that: ‘I neither know a praise that befits Your
majesty or Your sublimity, nor am I capable of it’.42 As for the saying by Abū
Ḥanīfa, may God show mercy to him, in al-Fiqh al-akbar: ‘We know God truly,
but we do not worship Him in the way He deserves to be worshipped’,43 the
intended meaning is ‘the true knowledge which has been entrusted to us’.44
The knowledge of God, according to what is conceivable to the servants, is of
three kinds: (1) A natural disposition to know God, which is signified in the
statement by the Prophets, may God bless them all: ‘Can there be doubt con-
cerning God, the Creator of the heavens and earth?’ [Q 14:10]. And our Prophet,
may God bless him and grant him peace, said: ‘Every newborn is born upon
fiṭra’.45 (2) Knowledge of God as required by religious obligation, following the
maʿrifa fiṭriyya, through the means of rational proofs and scriptural evidence
(brought) by the Prophets, peace be upon them. (3) Knowledge granted to some
special servants of God, the Exalted, through unveilings and through the pu-
rification of the mirror of the soul and the heart.46 […]
38 Junayd’s words are quoted by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) in his The Ninety-
Nine Beautiful Names of God. al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā, trans. David
Burrell and Nazih Daher, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2004, pp. 35–6.
39 Abū Bakr’s statement is also mentioned by Ghazālī, a few pages after the above-mention-
ed quote from Junayd. See ibid., p. 42.
40 A similar narration is attributed to the Prophet’s companion Abū l-Dardāʾ: ‘We are all
simpletons, with regard to the essence of God’ (Kullunā aḥmaq fī dhāt Allāh). See Abū l-Faraj
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Jawzī, Akhbār al-ḥamqā wa-l-mughaffalīn, ed. ʿAbd al-Amīr Mahannā,
Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1410/1990, p. 26.
41 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, “Ṣalāt”, 42.
42 Ghazālī also mentions this hadith and offers the same interpretation, immediately after
his quote from Abū Bakr which was mentioned above. See Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beau-
tiful Names of God, p. 42. It is very likely that Samarqandī was relying on Ghazālī’s work here.
43 ‘We know God the Exalted truly, as God has described Himself in His Book with all His
attributes, but we are unable to worship Him truly the way He deserves to be worshipped.’ Abū
Ḥanīfa, al-Fiqh al-akbar, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Cairo, 1368/1949, reprinted in
Mustafa Öz, İmâm-ı Â’zamın Beş Eseri, Istanbul: İFAV, 2002, pp. 69–77, at p. 75.
44 Al-Samarqandī, al-ʿAqīda, p. 86–7.
45 Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, “Janāʾiz”, 92.
‫ٍ‬
‫جديدة‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫نعمة‬ ‫ل شك ِر‬ ‫والباطنة على الكمال ال يمكن‪ ،‬ل أ ّن ك َّ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫الظاهرة‬ ‫م اللّ ِه‬
‫شكر نِ َع ِ‬
‫ُ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫م جديدة من‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ت � إل بنع ٍ‬ ‫حم ُد نعم ٌة من اللّه و � إن قلَّ ْ‬
‫شكره � إلى ما يتناهي‪ .‬وال تُ َ‬ ‫يستوجب‬
‫َ‬
‫القوة والعصمة والزمان والمكان وغيرها‪ .‬والج�ن ّ ُة والنجا ُة من العذاب برحمته تعالى وفضله‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫ال باستحقاق �أعمالنا‪]…[ .‬‬
‫ِ‬
‫والدخول في الج�نّة‪ ،‬والمعاصي‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بموجبة للسعادة‬ ‫وغيرها من الخيرات ليست‬ ‫العبادات‬
‫ُ‬
‫ُ‬
‫ِ‬
‫والدخول في النار؛ و �إن ّما السعادة والدخول في الج�نّة والشقاوة‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بموجبة للشقاوة‬ ‫ليست‬
‫ح ْس َنى‬ ‫ت َل ُه ْم ِمنَّا ا ْل ُ‬
‫ين َس َبقَ ْ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫والدخول في النار برحمة اللّه وعدله‪ .‬قال اللّه تعالى‪ �﴿ :‬إ َِّن الَّذ َ‬
‫كائن � إلى يوم‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫القلم بما هو‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ف‬‫“ج َّ‬ ‫النبي عليه السالم‪َ :‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ون﴾‪ ،47‬وقال‬ ‫ك َع ْن َها ُم ْب َع ُد َ‬ ‫�أُو َل ِئ َ‬
‫القيامة”‪ .‬وقد حكم اللّه تعالى بسعادة بعضٍ وبشقاوة بعضٍ في الأزل ال لعلّ ٍة؛ والسعاد ُة‬
‫خ ِل َق له؛ قال اللّه‪َ ﴿ :‬ف�أَ َّما َم ْن‬ ‫ميس ٌر لِما ُ‬ ‫ل َّ‬ ‫زلي‪ ،‬وك ٌّ‬ ‫أ‬
‫بالسعادة الزليّة والشقاوة بالإ شقاء ال ّ‬
‫أ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ص َّد َق بِا ْل ُ‬ ‫�أَ ْع َ‬
‫اس َتغْ َنى ۞‬ ‫ح ْس َنى ۞ ف ََس ُن َي ِّس ُر ُه ل ْل ُي ْس َرى ۞ َو�أ َّما َم ْن َبخ َل َو ْ‬ ‫طى َواتَّقَ ى ۞ َو َ‬
‫ح ْس َنى ۞ ف ََس ُن َي ِّس ُر ُه ل ِ ْل ُع ْس َرى﴾‪.48‬‬ ‫َوك ََّذ َ‬
‫ب بِا ْل ُ‬
‫‪ 47‬سورة الأنبياء ‪.١٠١/٢١‬‬

‫‪ 48‬سورة الليل ‪.١٠–٥/٩٢‬‬
God and Creation 101
Complete thankfulness for the outward and inward blessings of God is not pos-
sible, because every instance of thanks for a new blessing requires further thanks
unendingly. A blessing from God, even if it be small, cannot be praised without
incurring new blessings such as power, protection, time, space and so forth. The
attainment of Heaven and salvation from punishment are only possible due to
His mercy and His favour, not because we deserve them by our deeds.49 […]
Acts of worship and other good deeds do not necessarily bring about happiness
[i. e. salvation] and entry into Heaven. Neither do sinful acts necessarily bring
about wretchedness [i. e. damnation] and entry into Hell. Happiness and en-
tering Heaven, as well as wretchedness and entering Hell, are only due to the
mercy of God and His justice. God the Exalted said: ‘Surely those to whom kind-
ness has gone forth before from Us, they will be far removed from it [i. e. Hell]’
[Q 21:101]. And the Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ‘The pen dried up with
what would be until the Day of Judgment’.50 In pre-eternity God the Exalted
passed judgment [with His will] on who would be happy and who would be
wretched, not due to a cause [that would necessitate this]. Thus happiness is due
to pre-eternal happiness and wretchedness is due to pre-eternal wretchedness.
Everyone is enabled to do what they are created for. God said: ‘A s for him who
gives and is mindful (of God), and believes in goodness, surely We will ease his
way to the state of ease. But as for him who is miserly and deems himself self-
sufficient, and disbelieves in goodness, surely We will ease his way to hardship’
[Q 92:5–10].51

50 For the hadith, see Abū l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad al-Ṭabarānī, al-Muʿjam al-kabīr,
ed. Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Salafī, Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1404/1983, vol. 10, p. 303;
vol. 11, pp. 123, 178 and 223.
102 Lejla Demiri
Bibliography
Primary Text
Samarqandī, Rukn al-Dīn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-, al-ʿAqīda al-rukniyya fī sharḥ
lā ilāha ill Allāh Muḥammad Rasūl Allāh, ed. Mustafa Sinanoğlu, Istanbul: İSAM,
2008.
Other Sources
Abū Ḥanīfa, al-Fiqh al-akbar, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Cairo: (s. n.),
1368/1949, reprinted in Mustafa Öz, İmâm-ı Â’zamın Beş Eseri, Istanbul: İFAV, 2002,
pp. 69–77.
Bukhārī, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-, al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vaduz: Thesaurus Islamicus Foun-
dation, 2000.
Ghazālī, Al-, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God. al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmāʾ
Allāh al-ḥusnā, trans. David Burrell and Nazih Daher, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts
Society, 2004.
Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Akhbār al-ḥamqā wa-l-mughaffalīn, ed. ʿAbd
al-Amīr Mahannā, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1410/1990.
Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, al-Jāmiʾ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vaduz: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, 2000.
Samarqandī, Rukn al-Dīn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-, Jāmiʿ al-uṣūl fī bayān al-
qawāʿid al-ḥanafiyya wa-l-shāfiʿiyya fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. İsmet Garibullah Şimşek, Is-
tanbul: İSAM, 2020, 2 vols.
Sinanoğlu, Mustafa, “Semerkandî, Ubeydullah b. Muhammed”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
İslâm Ansiklopedisi, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009, vol. 36, pp. 480–1.
Ṭabarānī, Abū l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad al-, al-Muʿjam al-kabīr, ed. Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-
Majīd al-Salafī, Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1404/1983.
Yavuz, Yusuf Şevki, “el-‘A kîdetü’z-Zekiyye” [sic], Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklope-
disi, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989, vol. 2, pp. 260–1.
Part III: Prophethood
Proofs for Prophethood
Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115),
al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd
Hülya Alper
Abū l-Muʿīn Maymūn ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Muʿtamid al-Nasafī
is considered as one of the most important theologians of the Māturīdiyya after
its founder. He was born in 408/1047 in Nasaf, an important cultural centre of
Mā warāʾ al-nahr (Transoxiana) in Central Asia at the time. Not much is known
about his life apart from the fact that his father and grandfather were also scholars
of the Ḥanafī school. Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī is known for his systematic devel-
opment of Māturīdī kalām, transmitting it to subsequent generations through
numerous students he taught. For example, Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142)
and ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144) are among the famous scholars who
studied with him. Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī died on 25 Dhū l-Ḥijja 508 (22 May
1115), most probably in Bukhara.
Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s high position in the school of Māturīdiyya is often
compared to the position of al-Bāqillānī and al-Ghazālī in the Ashʿarī school
of theology. His most voluminous kalām work Tabṣirat al-adilla fī uṣūl al-dīn
(‘Exposition of the Proofs in the Foundations of Religion’) is one of the most
important works of the Māturīdiyya theological school thanks to its systematic
handling and rich content. It is widely regarded as the second most influential
text in the Māturīdī kalām tradition after Māturīdī’s masterpiece Kitāb al-Tawḥīd.
Any serious study of al-Māturīdī or the Māturīdī school therefore requires an
examination of al-Nasafī’s works. Tabṣirat al-adilla is especially important as a
guide for interpreting the most difficult and obscure parts of Kitāb al-Tawḥīd.
Due to these reasons and most especially his contribution to the systematisation
of Māturīdī kalām, Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī should be regarded as the second
founder of the Māturīdī school of theology.
In addition to his role in theology, al-Nasafī contributed to tafsīr (Qur’anic
exegesis) and fiqh (Islamic law and jurisprudence). Sharḥ Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān
(‘Commentary on the Interpretations of the Qur’an’), which is attributed to ʿAlā
106 Hülya Alper
al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, actually consists of statements by al-Nasafī.1 This fact

is revealed at the beginning of the commentary, as ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Samarqandī
explains that he collected his teacher’s statements in a book in order to prevent
them from being lost and forgotten.
Baḥr al-kalām fī ʿaqāʾid ahl al-Islām (‘Ocean of Words on the Doctrines of
the People of Islam’) is a concise theoretical work written by al-Nasafī during his
youth, while his al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd (‘Introduction to the Principles
of the Unity’) may be considered an abridgment of his Tabṣirat al-adilla. In the
Tamhīd al-Nasafī often refers to the Tabṣirat al-adilla, indicating that detailed
explanations are to be found there.2 The Tamhīd summarises the beliefs of the
Māturīdiyya.
A selection from the section on prophethood from the Tamhīd is translated
here.3 In this selection, al-Nasafī first aims to prove why prophethood is nec-
essary, providing some rational proofs to this effect, and then explains miracles
as specific evidence for the truthfulness of prophethood.
1 ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, Sharḥ Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library,

Hamidiye 176, fol. 1b.
2 Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Qābil, Cairo: Dār
al-Thaqāfa, 1987, pp. 50, 52, 109, 113.
3 Ibid., pp. 41–7.
Proofs for Prophethood 107

‫ ‪108‬‬ ‫‪Hülya Alper‬‬
‫فصل في إ�ثبات الرسالة‬

‫ولما ثبت �أ ّن للعالم صانعاً حكيماً عليماً‪ ،‬وك ّ‬
‫ل جزء من �أجزاء العالم مل ُ‬
‫كه‪ ،‬ال شريك‬
‫مر من دالئل وحدانيّته تعالى‪ ،‬فنقول‪ّ � :‬إن ورود التكليف بالإ يجاب والحظر‬ ‫له فيه‪ ،‬لما ّ‬
‫العقل �أو يحكم بامتناعه‪ � ،‬إذ‬
‫ُ‬ ‫الملك في مماليكه ليس م ّما ي�أباه‬
‫ُ‬ ‫والإ طالق والمنع م ّمن له‬
‫التصرف في مملوكه بقدر ما له من الملك‪ .‬وللّه تعالى في ك ّ‬
‫ل جزء من‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫مالك والية‬ ‫ل‬
‫لك ّ‬
‫ُ‬
‫ملك التخليق‪ � ،‬إذ هو الموجد له من العدم والمخترع له ال‬ ‫�أجزاء العالم و�أشخاص بني �آدم‬
‫ثم‬
‫التصرف‪ّ .‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ل من ذلك على �أ ّ‬
‫ي وجه شاء من وجوه‬ ‫يتصرف في ك ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫عن �أصل‪ ،‬فكان له �أن‬
‫ي طريق شاء‪ � :‬إن شاء فعل ذلك بتخليق العلم لهم بذلك‪ ،‬و � إن شاء فعل‬ ‫يعلّمهم ذلك ب�أ ّ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫رسول � إلى المكلّف من جنسه �أو من خالف جنسه‪.‬‬ ‫ذلك ب إ�رسال‬
‫ٌ‬
‫غ درجة الكمال عند � إفادة‬ ‫مهي�أ لقبول الحكمة والعلم مع ٌّد للزيادة وبلو ِ‬‫ّ‬ ‫على �أ ّن البشر‬
‫الجهل وال يمتنع عليه قبولُ العلم بالتعليم‪.‬‬
‫ُ‬ ‫الحكيم المرشد �إيّاه‪ � ،‬إذ هو م ّمن يجوز عليه‬
‫ثم � ّإن صانع العالم هو الحكيم الذي ال يسفه‪ ،‬العليم الذي ال يجهل‪ ،‬وهو الموصوف‬ ‫ّ‬
‫بالر�أفة والرحمة على عباده‪ ،‬فال يمتنع منه � إمداد المجبولين على النقيصة بما يوجب زوالها‬
‫ويورث لهم الكمال وبلوغ الدرجة العالية في الحكمة والعلم‪.‬‬
‫وبالوقوف على هذه الجملة يعرف �أ ّن � إرسال الرسل � إلى الخلق مبشّ رين ومنذرين ّ‬
‫ليبينوا‬
‫للناس ما يحتاجون � إليه من مصالح داريهم ويفيدوهم من �أنواع الحكم ما يبلغون به درجة‬
‫الكمال في حيز الإ مكان دون االمتناع‪.‬‬
‫يحقّقه �أ ّن الأوامر الواردة من الصانع الحكيم على �ألسنة سفرائه من رسله و�أنبيائه عليهم‬
‫السالم كلّها م ّما ينتفع بما �أمر به الم�أمورون ويندفع الضرر باالمتناع ع ّما نهى عنه‬
‫ثم � ّإن من �أمر �أعمى بسلوك الطريق الجا ّدة الموصلة له � إلى مقصده الذي ينتفع‬
‫المنهيون‪ّ .‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫تم انتفاع ونهاه �أن يحيد عنه يمنة �أو يسرة لما �أ ّن في الحيد عنه � إلى ذلك‬
‫ببلوغه � إليه �أ ّ‬
‫وقوعه في المهاوى والمهالك‪ ،‬ع ّد ذلك منه حكمة بل ر�أفة ورحمة‪ ،‬فمن ع َّده ممتنعاً فهو‬
‫الجاهل باالمتناع والإ مكان‪.‬‬
Chapter on Proving Prophethood

As mentioned among the proofs of the unity of God, the Exalted, it is proven that
the universe has a Wise and All-Knowing Creator and that every single part of
the universe belongs to Him; He has no partner. Thus, we say: the intellect does
not reject or deem impossible for the one who has absolute sovereignty of his
domain to impose obligations in the forms of orders, prohibitions, permissions,
and preventions. For every owner has absolute authority to act freely over his
property to the extent of his domain. God possesses the authority of creation
in every part of the universe and over each member of humankind. For He is
the one who has originated them from non-existence and created them without
basing His creation on any origin. Therefore, He has the authority to act freely
over each of them, exercised in any form He wishes. After that, He allows them
to attain the knowledge of it4 through any way He wishes: He can create in them
(directly) the knowledge of it, if He wishes, or He can do this by sending to the
obligated ones a messenger from their kind or other than their kind (to provide
them with the knowledge).
In fact, human beings are created with the ability to attain wisdom and knowl-
edge, as well as with the capability to increase in knowledge and reach the degree
of perfection when the wise teacher explains all of this to them. Yet, it is possible
for them to stay in ignorance, as well as to attain knowledge through teaching.
Moreover, the Creator of the universe is the Wise who is never foolish, the
All-Knowing who is never ignorant, and He is attributed with compassion and
mercy towards His servants. Therefore, He is not restrained from extending His
help to His servants in order to remove their shortcomings, to mature them to
perfection, and to enhance them in wisdom and knowledge.
Hence, by comprehending this argument it becomes known that it is not impos-
sible but rather plausible for God to send His messengers to creation as bearers
of good tidings and warners, so that they explain to the people what they need
for their good in both worlds and teach them various types of wisdom which
would lead them to perfection.
What further affirms (prophethood) is that all the commandments of the Wise
Creator conveyed through the tongues of His emissaries from among His mes-
sengers and His prophets, are for the benefit of those who fulfil His command-
ments and protect from harm those who avoid violating His prohibitions. For
example, the behaviour of a person who orders a blind man to follow a straight
path that leads to gaining the perfect benefits and forbids him to turn right and
left in order to protect him from falling into pits and dangers is accepted as wis-
dom, and even as compassion and mercy. Whoever regards this as impossible is
ignorant about impossibility and possibility.
4 ‘It’ indicates here all kinds of obligations.

‫شك �أ ّن فيما خلق اللّه تعالى من جواهر العالم ما‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ثم بعد ثبوت � إمكانه في العقول نقول‪ :‬ال‬
‫ّ‬
‫يتعلّق به مصلحة �أبدان الخلق من الأغذية التي ال ب ّد لقوام مهجتهم منها‪ ،‬والأدوية التي‬
‫الصحة الثابتة و � إزالة العلل العارضة‪ ،‬وما يحصل بتناوله التلف والهالك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫بها يحصل حفظ‬
‫ب�أسرع م ّدة وهو السموم القاتلة‪ .‬وليس في قوى العقول الوقوف على طبائعها واالطالع على‬
‫ما فيها من المصالح والمفاسد‪ .‬فلو لم يرد البيان م ّمن هو العالم بحقائقها لننتفع بما فيه‬
‫ل جوهر من ذلك على ما خلقه عليه‬
‫المضرة‪ ،‬لم يكن لخلق ك ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المنفعة ونجتنب ع ّما فيه‬
‫والمضرة حكمة‪ ،‬ولما �أمكن للخلق الوصول � إلى ما هو المخلوق سبباً لبقائهم‬
‫ّ‬ ‫من المنفعة‬
‫والتمييز بينه وبين ما في الإ قدام على تناوله َع َ‬
‫ط َبهم وهالكَهم‪ ،‬والعقل ال يطلق التجربة‬
‫بنفسه مع ما فيه من خطر الهالك‪ ،‬فال ب ّد من بيان يرد م ّمن له العلم بذلك ّ‬
‫لئل يؤ ّدي‬
‫االمتناع عن البيان � إلى فناء �أبدان الممتحنين من غير تعلّق عاقبة حميدة بتخليقهم لما‬
‫قضية الحكمة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫خاصة‪ ،‬وهو خارج عن‬
‫ّ‬ ‫فيه من تخليق الخلق للفناء‬
‫ل منهم جبل‬ ‫يحقّقه �أ ّن البشر لو �أمكنهم الوصول � إلى ذلك بما لهم من العقول‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ثم ك ّ‬
‫حب البقاء وطلب ما يحصل له به من الدوام‪ ،‬فلو لم يشرع الحكيم شرعاً ولم يضع‬‫ّ‬ ‫على‬
‫مختصاً بما لها من الأحكام وينقطع عن الأعيان طمع من لم‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المختص بها‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أسباباً يكون‬
‫يفز باالختصاص بسبب تملّكه لتسارع ك ّ‬
‫ل � إلى ما يميل � إليه طبعه ويعرف فيه بقاؤه ويرجو‬
‫االستمتاع به‪ .‬وفي ذلك وقوع المنازعة والعداوة‪ ،‬وذلك سبب تولّد الضغائن والأحقاد‪،‬‬
‫ل ذلك م ّما يحمل على التقاتل والتفاني‪ ،‬وفيه فناء الخلق وانقطاع نسل البشر وارتفاع‬
‫وك ّ‬
‫خاصة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫جنسهم‪ ،‬وهم المقصودون بتخليق العالم‪ ،‬وفيه �أيضاً تخليق الخلق للفناء‬
Now that the possibility of it [i. e. prophethood] is established by reason, we fur-

ther say: there is no doubt that among the substances of the universe that God
the Exalted created, there are those which are beneficial to the bodies of created
beings. The food which is necessary for them to live a healthy life, and the med-
ication which is put to use in order to both keep their health and cure diseases
belong to this category. Also, there are other substances (which affect the body),
such as poisonous ones that cause the immediate death and destruction of the
body when eaten. In terms of the contents of this category, it is not possible for
human beings to recognise their nature by intellect and to be fully aware of their
benefits or harms. If there were no explanations about the nature of these sub-
stances by the person who knows the real nature of these substances, so that we
can benefit from their use and avoid their harm, there would have been no wis-
dom behind creating any benefit or harm in them whatsoever, and there would
have been no possibility for human beings to reach that which is created for
their survival and to distinguish between these (beneficial substances) and those
which cause their perdition and destruction. The intellect itself never uses trial
and error as a method when there is a risk of death. Accordingly, a clarification
by someone who has the knowledge of the matter is indispensable. This is be-
cause abstaining from explanation means that the bodies of the obliged ones [i. e.
human beings] are created just for nothingness without having a praiseworthy
end for their creation. And to create creation for only nothingness is against the
reality of wisdom.
This clearly proves (the reality of prophethood): if people could attain this
(necessary knowledge)5 with their intellect (still the existence of prophethood
is necessary). The nature of human beings is created with the desire to survive
and with the need to perpetuate. If the Wise did not establish a law and did not
specify the legal reasons that made the authorised person authorised; and if the
greed of the person who does not have the legal authority to have the ownership
of the commodity is not obstructed (by the enforcement of the law); then every
individual would follow his natural inclination, and that which he thinks is bene-
ficial for maintaining his survival, and hopes to be useful. And these circum-
stances would pave the way for the rise of conflict and antagonism culminating
in animosity and hatred. All of this leads to war and mutual destruction which
would bring the end of life, the extinction of human beings, and the end of their
species, though they [i. e. humankind] are the purpose of the creation of the uni-
verse. Hence, this situation leads to the conclusion that humanity is created for
nothingness alone.
5 The knowledge of what is beneficial for the wellbeing of their bodies and what is harmful.
‫ودفع‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫وفي � إرسال الرسل عليهم السالم ووضع الشرائع حصولُ العاقبة الحميدة للتخليق‬
‫لأسباب العبث والفساد فيما بين العباد‪ .‬فمن �أنكر الشرع و�أبطل الأمر والنهي فقد سعى في‬
‫ل فتنة في العالم وفساد في الدنيا‪ ،‬وباللّه العصمة عن ك ّ‬
‫ل ضاللة‪.‬‬ ‫� إثارة ك ّ‬
‫يحقّقه �أ ّن في قوى العقول الوقوف على جمل المحاسن والمساوئ دون �أعيانها‪ ،‬والشرف‬
‫والحكمة في الوقوف على الأعيان دون الجمل‪ .‬فال ب ّد من ورود البيان م ّمن له العلم‬
‫ل فرد من �أفراد تلك الجمل‪� ،‬أن ّه من جملة المحاسن �أو من جملة القبائح‪،‬‬
‫بحقيقة ك ّ‬
‫ليحمل العقل بميالنه � إلى المحاسن صاحبه على مباشرته وبنفاره عن القبائح على االنتهاء‬
‫عنه‪ .‬لوال ذلك لم يحصل لتخليق العقل مائالً � إلى المحاسن ونافراً عن القبائح عاقبة‬
‫حميدة‪ ،‬وذلك ليس بحكمة‪ .‬يؤيّده �أ ّن العقول لما دعته � إلى المحاسن ونفرته عن القبائح‪،‬‬
‫وال وقوف لها على �أعيان الجنسين‪ ،‬لكان فيه الأمر بما ال وصول له � إلى مباشرته والنهي‬
‫ل‬
‫حق ك ّ‬
‫ع ّما ال وجه له � إلى االنتهاء عنه‪ ،‬وذلك ليس بحكمة‪ .‬فال ب ّد من البيان الوارد في ّ‬
‫عين‪ ،‬وليس ذلك � ّإل الشرع‪ ،‬واللّه الموفّق‪.‬‬
‫والذي يؤيّد هذا كلّه �أ ّن وجوب شكر المنعم مودع في العقول لما فيه من الحسن‪ ،‬وحظر‬
‫الكفران كذلك‪ ،‬وليس في قوى العقول الوقوف على قدر النعم وما يوازيها من الشكر‪ ،‬فال‬
‫كن العاقل من �أداء ما كلّف ب�أدائه واالمتناع ع ّما منع‬
‫ب ّد من الشرع الوارد ببيان ذلك ليتم ّ‬
‫من تعاطيه‪ ،‬واللّه الموفّق‪.‬‬
Therefore, the purpose of sending messengers – may peace be upon them – and
establishing religious laws is to bring a praiseworthy result for the creation and
to eliminate the circumstances which would cause futility and corruption among
people. He who denies the religious law and abolishes the divine command-
ments and prohibitions strives to stir up all forms of disorder in the universe and
corruption in the world. God’s protection is the shield against all kinds of error.
It is likewise affirmed that the intellect is able to know what is good and what is
bad universally, but not in individual instances. However nobleness and wisdom
consist of knowing individual instances, not knowing (good and evil) univer-
sally. Therefore, there is a need for a statement to be made by someone who
knows the nature of each particular instance of those universals, whether it be-
longs to the universal good or the universal evil, so that the intellect would lead
one to do good deeds because of its inclination towards good and to avoid bad
deeds because of its hate of evil. Otherwise, there is no praiseworthy outcome
for making the intellect be inclined towards good and dislike evil. That is not
wisdom. So since the intellect leads man to fulfil the good and avoid the evil
universally, and is unable to know about individual instances, there would be an
order about fulfilling what is impossible to be fulfilled and a prohibition of what
is impossible to be avoided. That is not wisdom. Therefore, it is necessary that a
statement be made in each individual instance, and that is nothing but the divine
law. Success comes only from God.
This is all justified by the fact that the necessity of being grateful to the giver
of a blessing is embedded in the intellect; and so is the proscription of being
ungrateful. Yet, the intellect is not capable of appreciating the value of blessings
and knowing suitable ways to show its gratitude. Accordingly, there must be a
divine law to explain so that those who have intellect may be able to fulfil what
they are obliged to do and to avoid what they are forbidden from doing. Success
comes only from God.
‫بصحة الرسالة‪ ،‬ذكرناها في كتابنا‬

‫ّ‬ ‫يتبين بالوقوف عليها القول‬
‫ووراء ذلك وجوه كثيرة ّ‬
‫المترجم بتبصرة الأدلّة‪ .‬وفي هذا القدر الذي ذكرناه في هذا الكتاب كفاي ٌة لمن عقل‬
‫ثم الرسالة و � إن كانت عند كثير من المتكلّمين في حيز الممكنات‪ ،‬وعند‬
‫و�أنصف‪ّ .‬‬
‫�أصحابنا المحققّين هي من مقتضيات الحكمة على ما ّ‬
‫قررناه‪ ،‬ف إ�ذا جاء واحد وا ّدعى‬
‫نبينا المصطفى مح ّمد صلّى اللّه‬
‫الرسالة في زمان جواز ورود الرسل‪ ،‬وهو قبل مبعث ّ‬
‫بالنص الوارد انختام الرسالة وانسداد بابها‪ ،‬وا ّدعى هذا الجائي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫عليه وسلّم‪ � ،‬إذ لم يثبت‬
‫�أن ّه رسول اللّه كان يجب الت�أ ّمل في دعواه‪ ،‬ف إ�ن كانت دعواه ممتنعة كدعوى زرادشت‬
‫لصانعين عاجزين �أو دعوى ماني ب�أصلين قديمين النور والظلمة‪ ،‬مع ما في العقول من‬
‫تقرير استحالتهما كان يجب الر ّد ب�أ ّول ما قرعت الدعوى السماع ال االشتغال بطلب‬
‫البرهان‪ � ،‬إذ ال داللة تقوم على تصحيح الممتنع � ّإل � إذا �أريد بذلك ت�أكيد في � إظهار كذبه‪،‬‬
‫ٍ‬
‫حينئذ ستره‬ ‫� إذ من المعلوم الذي ال ريب فيه �أن ّه ال يتم ّ‬
‫كن من � إقامة الدليل‪ ،‬فينهتك‬
‫ويفتضح في دعواه‪.‬‬
Besides these points, there are plenty of aspects that, when comprehended, dem-
onstrate the truthfulness of prophethood, which we explained in our book titled
Tabṣirat al-adilla (‘Exposition of the Proofs’). What we have explained here in
this book is enough for those who have intellect and fair judgment. Although
prophethood is considered by numerous systematic theologians to be within the
category of the possible, it is considered by our companions, the verifiers, to be
one of the requirements of wisdom, as we explained earlier. In the times when it
was permitted to expect a messenger to arise – that is, before the sending of our
Prophet, the Chosen, Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, i. e.
before establishing by scriptural text that prophethood had ended and its door
was shut – it was required to consider the words of individuals who had laid
claim to prophethood. If their claims were impossible, considered by intellect as
absurd claims – such as Zarathustra’s claim of the existence of two weak gods or
Mani’s claim of two eternal [divine] principles: light and darkness – then these
claims were required immediately to be rejected without bothering to ask for a
demonstration. It is because there is no proof to affirm the impossible,6 other
than when the aim is to clearly prove the invalidity of their claims. For, it is
known without any doubt, that it is impossible for him to provide any proof.
Then he would be exposed7 and disgraced in his claim.
6 i. e. these kinds of claims are considered by the intellect as impossible claims, and there is
no way to prove the validity of the ‘impossible’.
7 Literally ‘his cover will be torn’, indicating that his lie will be uncovered.
‫و � إن كانت دعواه ممكن ًة ال يجب قبول قوله بدون � إقامة الدليل‪ ،‬بخالف ما يقوله الإ باضية‬
‫من الخوارج من وجوب قبول قول م ّدعي الرسالة بدون � إقامة الداللة‪ ،‬لما �أ ّن ّ‬
‫تعين هذا‬
‫تعينه فبقي في حيز‬‫الم ّدعي للرسالة ليس في حيز الواجبات النعدام داللة العقل على ّ‬
‫الممكنات‪ ،‬وربما يكون كاذباً في دعواه فكان القول بوجوب قبول قوله قوالً بوجوب قبول‬
‫قول من يكون قبول قوله كفراً‪ ،‬وهذا خلف من القول‪ .‬و � إذا لم يجب قبول قوله بدون الدليل‬
‫يطالب بالدليل‪ ،‬وهو المعجزة‪ .‬وح ّدها على طريقة المتكلّمين �أن ّها ظهور �أمر بخالف‬
‫النبوة مع نكول من يتح ّدى به عن معارضته‬
‫ّ‬ ‫العادة في دار التكليف لإ ظهار صدق م ّدعي‬
‫قيد بدار التكليف‪ ،‬ل أ ّن ما يظهر من الناقض للعادة في دار الآخرة ال يكون‬
‫بمثله‪ .‬و �إن ّما ّ‬
‫النبوة ليقع االحتراز به ع ّما يظهر على يدي‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫معجزة‪ .‬و �إن ّما قلنا‪ :‬لإ ظهار صدق م ّدعي‬
‫لوهية‪ � ،‬إذ ظهور ذلك على يده جائز عندنا‪ ،‬وفيه �أيضاً احتراز ع ّما يظهر على‬ ‫م ّدعي ال أ ّ‬
‫يدي الولي‪ � ،‬إذ ظهور ذلك كرامة للولي جائز عندنا‪ .‬و �إن ّما قلنا‪ :‬لإ ظهار صدقه‪ ،‬ل أ ّن ذلك لو‬
‫نبوتي �أ ّن هذا الحجر يشهد لي به‪ ،‬ف�أنطق‬
‫صحة ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ظهر لإ ظهار كذبه ب�أن قال‪ :‬الدليل على‬
‫اللّه تعالى الحجر بتكذيبه‪ ،‬ال يكون ذلك معجز ًة له وال دليالً على صدقه‪ ،‬بل يكون دليالً‬
‫على كذبه في دعواه‪ .‬و �إن ّما قلنا‪ :‬مع نكول من يتح ّدى به عن معارضته بمثله‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الناقض‬
‫ثم ظهر على يدي المتح ّدى به مثله لخرج ما ظهر على يده عند‬
‫للعادة لو ظهر على يده ّ‬
‫ّ‬
‫يكذبه‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬
‫يكذبه يكون دليل صدق من‬ ‫المعارضة عن الداللة‪ � ،‬إذ مثله ظهر على يدي من‬
‫فيكون دليل كذبه‪ ،‬فيتعارض الدليالن فيسقطان‪ ،‬واللّه الموفّق‪.‬‬
Even if his claim of prophethood were contingent, it is not required to accept

his words unless he has presented proofs. This argument is contrary to the view
of the Ibadis from among the Kharijites, who assert that it is required to accept
claims of prophethood without given proofs. It is because, without the presence
of rational proofs confirming him as the prophet,8 it is not imperative to accept
him as a prophet. (As it is not imperative,) it remains within the possible. Maybe
he has lied about his claim of being a prophet. Stating that it is imperative to
accept his claim is identical with stating that it is imperative to accept the blas-
phemy of accepting his claim. That is self-contradictory. Therefore, as it is not
imperative to accept his words without proofs, he would be asked for proofs,
and these are miracles. The definition of miracle, according to the view of the
theologians, is ‘the happening of an action or event, in this world of obligations,9
that is in contrast to the ordinary laws of nature, in order to prove the truthful-
ness of the one who claims to be a prophet, making the opponents unable to
challenge him with a similar one’. It is restricted to ‘this world of obligations’,
because contradicting ordinary laws of nature in the hereafter cannot be defined
as miracle. Our statement ‘in order to prove the truthfulness of the one who
claims to be a prophet’ is meant to exclude such acts occuring at the hands of
claimants of deity. Because, according to our view, it is possible for such acts
to happen at the hands of the claimants of deity. (Our statement) also excludes
such acts occurring at the hands of the saints. Because, according to our view,
this is possible for the saints as their karāma (the miracles of saints). We further
said: ‘in order to prove his truthfulness’, for if such an incident happens in a
way to prove his lie – for instance, if he said ‘the proof of the truthfulness of my
prophethood is that this rock will testify to it’, and then God made the rock speak
of his being a liar – this would be neither a miracle for him nor the proof of his
truthfulness. On the contrary, this would be the proof confirming that he had
lied about his claim. We also said: ‘making the opponents unable to challenge
him with a similar one’, because if an event contradicting the custom [i. e. natural
order of things] occurred at his hands and then it occurred at the hands of his
challengers it would fail to be a proof. Since the same happened at the hands of
(his opponent) who considered the claimant (of the prophethood) to be a liar,
it would be the proof of the truthfulness of the opponent and the proof of the
claimant’s lie. Then, the proofs of both sides would contradict each other, and
they would cease to be proof. Success comes only from God.
8 i. e. reason is unable to prove that this or that individual in particular is a true prophet.
9 The author is implying this world that human beings live in, and not the hereafter.
‫النبوة كانت دالل ًة على‬

‫ّ‬ ‫بينّا على يدي م ّدعي‬ ‫ثم � إذا ظهرت المعجزة على الح ّد الذي ّ‬
‫ّ‬
‫تقرر في عقولنا‪� :‬أ ّن اللّه تعالى سامع دعوى هذا الم ّدعي‪،‬‬
‫صدق الم ّدعي‪ .‬ووجه الداللة ما ّ‬
‫و�أ ّن ما ظهر على يده خارج عن مقدور البشر بل عن مقدور جميع الخالئق‪ ،‬وال قدرة عليه‬
‫� ّإل للّه تعالى‪ .‬ف إ�ذا ا ّدعى الرسالة ّ‬
‫ثم قال‪� :‬آية صدق دعواي �أ ّن اللّه تعالى �أرسلني �أن يفعل‬
‫كذا ففعل اللّه تعالى ذلك كان ذلك من اللّه تعالى تصديقاً له فيما ي ّدعي من الرسالة بما‬
‫فعل اللّه تعالى من نقض العادة‪ ،‬فيكون ذلك كقوله له عقيب دعواه هذه‪ :‬صدقت‪ ،‬وهذا‬
‫ظاهر في المتعارف‪ ،‬واللّه الموفّق‪.‬‬
‫سم‪ ،‬مع‬‫ثم قد ثبت بوقوف الناس على طبائع الجواهر وما هو غذاء منها وما هو دواء �أو ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫حواسهم � إمكان الوقوف على ذلك‪� ،‬أن ّهم وقفوا على ذلك‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�أن ّه ليس في قوى عقولهم �أو‬
‫باعالم خالقها على لسان من �أرسله � إليهم باعالم ذلك‪ .‬فثبت به �أ ّن فيما مضى من الأزمنة‬
‫كانت الرسالة ثابت ًة في الجملة‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ثم على طريق التعيين‪ ،‬والذي ثبت بالتواتر الموجب للعلم‬
‫قطعاً ويقيناً �أن ّه ظهرت على �أيديهم المعجزات الناقضات للعادات كقلب العصا حيّة‬
‫واليد بيضاء وانفالق البحر و � إبراء عيسى الأكمه والأبرص و � إحياء الموتى و � إخراج الناقة من‬
‫الجن والشياطين والطيور وغير ذلك‪ .‬ثبتت ّ‬
‫نبوتهم بما اقترن بدعاويهم من‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫الحجر وتسخير‬
‫ِ‬
‫حيل المحتالين‪ ،‬المجاوزة قوى المخرقين‪،‬‬
‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫هذه الآيات الخارجة عن طوق البشر‪ ،‬المباينة‬
‫صحة ووكادة مخالفة في ذلك الحيل والتمويهات التي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫التفحص والت�أ ّمل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الزائدة عند ش ّدة‬
‫ثم � ّإن من كان مساوياً لهم في الدعوى والبرهان‬
‫تظهر عند البحث عنها وجوه بطالنها‪ّ .‬‬
‫صحة الدعوى‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ووجه داللة البرهان كان مساوياً لهم في‬
When the miracle happens, in accordance with the definition that we have ex-
plained, at the hands of the one who has claimed his prophethood, it proves
the truthfulness of the claimant. What indicates its being a proof is our rational
conclusion that God the Exalted heard the claim of this claimant and that what
appeared at the hands (of the claimant) is beyond the capability of human beings
and even beyond the capability of any created being. No one is able to do such a
thing other than God the Exalted. And so when he claimed his prophethood and
said: ‘as a sign of the truthfulness of my claim that God the Exalted has sent me
as a messenger, He shall let a certain incident happen’, and then if God the Exalt-
ed let this certain incident happen, this would mean that God had confirmed his
truthfulness in his claim of prophethood, through making that certain incident,
which contradicts the customary laws of nature, occur. It is as if God verbally
confirmed his claim, saying: ‘you speak the truth’. This is a commonly accepted
fact among people. Success comes only from God.
It is established that people know the nature of substances, which one is nutri-
tious, which one is curative or poisonous. However, it is beyond the capability of
their intellect and of their senses to know these. Accordingly, people know these
because the Creator has informed them through the tongues of the messengers
whom He had sent to them to provide this knowledge. Therefore, this further
establishes that prophethood existed in the past generally and later appointed
individually. What is passed on through tawātur10 (recurrent transmission),
which necessarily brings forth definite and certain knowledge, is that miracles,
contradicting the customary laws of nature, occurred at the hands of the pro-
phets, such as the turning of the staff into a snake, the emergence of the hand
pure white, the parting of the sea,11 Jesus curing the blind and leper, and reviving
the dead,12 the bringing forth the camel from a solid rock,13 the subjugation of
the jinn, devils and birds,14 and so forth. The authenticity of their prophethood
was confirmed by the occurrence of these miracles that are beyond the capability
of human beings; these differ the tricks of fraudsters and surpass the powers of
tricksters. Upon a thorough examination and contemplation, the miracles be-
come more certain and clearly valid, whereas the tricks and deceptions become
invalid. The more similar one is to them [i. e. prophets] in terms of the claim, the
demonstration, and the way of proving the demonstration, the more similar he is
to them in terms of the truthfulness of the claim.
10 Tawātur as a term indicates that an account is reported numerously by different narrators
and through various chains of transmission, in a way that substantiates its authenticity. Such a
report is called mutawātir.
11 These are the miracles attributed to the Prophet Moses in the Qur’an. See Q 2:50.
12 These are the miracles of the Prophet Jesus. See Q 3:49.
13 This is the miracle of the Prophet of Ṣāliḥ. See Q 7:73.
14 These are the miracles of the Prophet Sulaymān (Solomon). See Q 27:17.
120 Hülya Alper
Bibliography
Primary Text
Nasafī, Abū l-Muʿīn al-, al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Qābil, Cairo: Dār
al-Thaqāfa, 1987, pp. 41–7.
Other Sources
Samarqandī, ʿAlā al-Dīn al-, Sharḥ Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library,
Hamidiye 176, fols. 1–879.
Prophethood and Divine Wisdom
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Khabbāzī (d. 691/1292),
al-Hādī fī uṣūl al-dīn
Harith Ramli
Jalāl al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Khabbāzī (sometimes referred
to as al-Khujandī) was born in 629/1231–2 in Khujand (in present day Tajikis-
tan), around the time of the Mongol invasions of this region. He began his studies
in Khwarezm, but then moved westwards to Baghdad, then Damascus, where
he lived for the remainder of his life. In Damascus, he taught in a number of
madrasas, but was mainly associated with the Khatuniyya, an institution which
made it a requirement that all teachers were to be the highest ranking of Ḥanafī
scholars. Al-Khabbāzī is mainly known for his works on Ḥanafī law, including a
gloss on the al-Hidāya of al-Marghinānī and a work of his own on jurisprudence,
al-Mughnī fī uṣūl al-fiqh. He himself is described in the biographical sources as
‘a pious jurist’ ( faqīh mutaʿabbid), and when he died in 691/1292 aged 72, he
was buried in the sufi cemetery of Damascus.1
As al-Khabbāzī states in his introduction, al-Hādī fī uṣūl al-dīn (‘Guide to
the Principles of Religion’) was written as an accessible theological work for
students, neither too short and dense, nor too lengthy. Historically, it is located
at the threshold of two interesting turning points in the history of Māturīdism:
its transmission westwards beyond Central Asia due to the Mongol invasion,
and just before the heavy systematising impact of Avicennan philosophy on the
kalām schools. While some reference is made to the Falāsifa, like any classical
kalām text, the main focus is addressing the threat of Muʿtazilite theology.
The section on prophecy translated here presents an interesting example of
old and new challenges coming together.2 Al-Khabbāzī sides largely with the
Central Asian position that the sending of prophets can justifiably be said to be a
1 For his biography, see Ibn Quṭlubughā, Tāj al-tarājim fī ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya, ed.
Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf, Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1992, pp. 220–1; Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-
Bābānī al-Baghdādī, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn asmāʾ al-muʾallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn, ed. Kilisli
Rifat Bilge and İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1951, vol. 1,
p. 787.
2 Jalāl al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al- Khabbāzī, al-Hādī fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Adil Bebek,
Istanbul: Marmara İlahiyat Yayınları Vakfı, 2006, pp. 205–9.
122 Harith Ramli
necessary requisite of divine wisdom, and uses similar arguments to those made
by his contemporary Abū l-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310)3 and also to those
of Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) translated in the preceding chapter of
this Reader. However, al-Khabbāzī goes to greater lengths to also bring forward
scriptural as well as rational proofs, reflecting a need to address not only older
opponents (i. e. Muʿtazilites and the Barāhima, representing Indic traditions in
Central Asia such as Buddhism), but also new challenges in the Ashʿarī-domi-
nated milieu of Ayyubid Damascus.
3 See Abū l-Barakāt al-Nasafī, Sharḥ al-ʿumda fī ʿaqāʾid ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa, ed. ʿAbd
Allāh Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Ismāʿīl, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2012.
Prophethood and Divine Wisdom 123

‫ ‪124‬‬ ‫‪Harith Ramli‬‬
‫الكالم في إ�ثبات الرسالة‬
‫قال عا ّمة المتكلّمين بعثة الأنبياء جائزة‪ .‬وعند المحقّقين من �أصحابنا �أن ّها واجبة‪ ،‬وال‬
‫يعنون بكونها واجبة �أن ّها يجب على اللّه ب إ�يجاب �أحد �أو ب إ�يجابه على نفسه‪ ،‬بل يعنون �أن ّها‬
‫مت�أكّدة الوجود لأن ّها من مقتضيات الحكمة‪ ،‬فيكون عدمه من باب السفه‪ ،‬وهو محال‬
‫واجب الوجود ل ّما �أ ّن انعدامه يوجب‬
‫َ‬ ‫وجوده يكون‬
‫َ‬ ‫على القديم‪ .‬هذا كما �أ ّن ما علم اللّ ُه‬
‫الجهل‪ ،‬وهو محال على الحكيم‪ .‬وقالت البراهمة �أن ّها محال‪.‬‬
‫ودليل الجواز �أ ّن ورود التكليف بالإ يجاب والحظر والإ طالق والمنع م ّمن له الملك في‬
‫ل شخص من‬ ‫يتصرف في ك ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫مماليكه ليس م ّما ي�أباه العقل �أو يدفعه الدالئل‪ ،‬فله �أن‬
‫التصرف منعاً كان �أو � إطالقاً حظراً كان �أو‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أشخاص بني �آدم ب�أ ّ‬
‫ي شيء شاء من وجوه‬
‫ثم يعلّمهم ذلك � إ ّما بتخليق العلم لهم به �أو بتخصيص بعض عباده بالعلم من‬ ‫� إيجاباً‪ّ ،‬‬
‫جنسهم �أو من خالف جنسهم ب إ�فهام صحيح �أو بوحي صريح‪ُ .‬يؤيِّده �أ ّن البشر َّ‬
‫مهيئ‬
‫ثم �أ ّن صانع العلم‬
‫لقبول الحكمة والعلم مع ّد للزيادة عند � إفادة الحكيم المرشد �إيّاه ‪ّ .‬‬
‫‪4‬‬
‫حكيم ال يسفه‪ ،‬عليم ال يجهل‪ ،‬ال يمتنع منه � إمداد المجبول على النقيصة بما يوجب‬
‫زوالها‪.‬‬
‫‪ 4‬في الأصل‪ّ � :‬أن البشر مهيّئاً لقبول الحكمة‪ ،‬والعلم مع ّد للزيادة عند � إفادة الحكيم المرشد �إيّاه‪.‬‬
Discussion concerning the establishment of the truth of messengers (from

God)
Generally, the mutakallimūn state that the sending of prophets is among the
possible things.5 According to those who have verified the truth from among
our fellows,6 it is necessary. But they do not mean by this that it is a necessity
made incumbent upon God by another or by Himself, but that its existence is
a rational certainty. This is because it is among the requisites of wisdom, while
its non-existence would be a type of foolishness, which is impossible for the
Eternal One. This is similar to stating that when God knows the existence of
something, it follows that its existence is necessary, as its non-existence would
imply ignorance, which would be impossible for the All-Wise. And the Barāhima
say that it [i. e. prophethood] is impossible.7
The proof of its possibility is that for one who has dominion in his domains, the
sending of obligations containing commandment, prohibition, permission and
proscription is not something which is rejected by reason or refuted by proofs.
It is therefore conceivable for Him [i. e. God] to dispose of the affairs of anyone
from among the children of Adam in any way He wishes, be that in the form
of a proscription, a permission to act, a prohibition or a commandment. Thus,
He informs them of this either in the form of creating knowledge of it within
them, or by specially apportioning this knowledge for some among His servants,
either from the human species or not, through true insight or clear revelation.
This is supported by the fact that humans are by design predisposed to receiving
wisdom and knowledge, and are ready to accept more when instructed by a wise
teacher.8 It is also supported by the fact that the Creator of the world is All-
Wise – never foolish; All-Knowing – never ignorant, and it is not impossible
for Him to provide support for a being who has been created (firstly) with a
deficiency, (providing him) with what is necessary to remove it.
5 That is known to human reason.

6 Meaning the Māturīdīs.
7 Barāhima is a term frequently found in Islamic theological texts to denote a religious
tradition that accepts the existence of God but generally rejects the authority of prophets. There
is disagreement in the classical sources over the degree to which prophets are rejected, with
earlier texts acknowledging that they believed in the prophethood of Adam and even Abraham
(and thus, also providing an explanation for the term itself, coming from Ibrāhīmiyya). Later
texts go so far as to present them as deniers of prophecy altogether. The degree to which the term
might have been inspired by the Vedic Brahminist traditions of India is unclear, and scholars
continue to dispute the origins of this term. See Binyamin Abrahamov, “The Barāhima’s Enig-
ma. A Search for a New Solution”, Die Welt des Orients, 87 (1987), pp. 72–91; Norman Calder,
“The Barāhima. Literary Construct and Historical Reality”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies, 57/1 (1994), pp. 40–51. Calder concludes his study by pointing out that in
the later period, the Barāhima simply became ‘a peg for the denial of prophecy’ (pp. 49–50). We
can see this most clearly in the way the Barāhima are being used in this text simply as a general
umbrella term for ‘deniers of prophecy’.
8 In the edition there is a comma after al-ḥikma, which we have decided to omit in our
reading. With the comma the sentence would mean: ‘predisposed to receiving wisdom, and
knowledge can be increased when instructed by a wise teacher’.
‫مضرة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬ورود التكليف منه سفه‪ � ،‬إذ فيه �أمر بما ال منفعة للآمر ونهي ع ّما ال‬
‫للناهي‪ ،‬وذلك سفه اعتباراً بالشاهد‪ .‬قلنا‪ :‬التسوية بين الشاهد والغائب هنا ممتنعة‪� .‬أليس‬
‫شياء ال‬
‫ً‬ ‫�أ ّن في الشاهد من فعل فعالً ال منفعة فيه وال لغيره فهو سفيه‪ ،‬واللّه تعالى خلق �أ‬
‫ينتفع بها �أح ٌد الب�تّة كالأجزاء الكامنة في تخوم الأرض والجبال؟ ف إ�ذا افترق الحال بين‬
‫الشاهد والغائب في الفعل فكذا في الأمر والنهي‪.‬‬
‫ثم في بعثة الأنبياء عليهم السالم فوائد كثيرة نذكرها على التفصيل‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫�أحدها �أ ّن فيها ت�أكيد دليل العقل بدليل النقل وقطع عذر المكلّف على ما قال تعالى‪:‬‬
‫اب ِم ْن ق َْب ِل ِه‬
‫اه ْم بِ َع َذ ٍ‬ ‫﴿و َل ْو �أَنَّا �أَ ْه َل ْ‬
‫ك َن ُ‬ ‫‪9‬‬
‫ج ٌة َب ْع َد ُّ‬
‫الر ُسلِ ﴾ ‪ .‬وقال‪َ :‬‬ ‫ون لِلنَّاسِ َع َلى ال� ل ِه ُ‬
‫ح َّ‬ ‫ك َ‬ ‫﴿ل ِ َئ َّل َي ُ‬
‫ول﴾‪.10‬‬ ‫َلقَ الُوا َل ْو َل �أَ ْر َس ْل َ‬
‫ت � إِ َل ْي َنا َر ُس ً‬
‫الثاني‪� :‬أ ّن اللّه تعالى خلق الخلق محتاجين � إلى الغذاء في البقاء و � إلى الدواء للشفاء‬
‫صحة و � إزالة العلّة العارضة وخلق من جنسها السموم القاتلة‪ ،‬والعقل ال يقف‬‫ّ‬ ‫ولحفظ‬
‫عليها‪ ،‬والتجربة ال يكفي لمعرفتها � ّإل بعد الأدوار ومع ذلك فيها خطر‪ ،‬وفي بعثة الأنبياء‬
‫معرفة طبائعها من غير خطر‪.‬‬
‫ثم �أخذوا‬
‫خاص ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الثالث‪� :‬أن ّه لو فرض كيفية العبادة � إلى الخلق ربما �أتى ك ّ‬
‫ل طائفة بوضع‬
‫يتعصبون لها فيفضى � إلى الفتن‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫الرابع‪� :‬أ ّن الذي يفعله الإ نسان بمقتضى عقله كالفعل المعتاد والعادة ال يكون عبادة‪ .‬ف�أ ّما‬
‫االئتمار لمن كان معظماً في قلبه على الئمته‪ 11‬كان � إتيانه به لمحض العبادة‪ ،‬ولذلك ورد‬
‫الحج متفاوتة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الأمر بالأفعال الغريبة في‬
‫‪ 9‬سورة النساء ‪.١٦٥/٤‬‬

‫‪ 10‬سورة طه ‪.١٣٤/٢٠‬‬
‫‪ 11‬في الأصل‪ :‬لميته‪.‬‬
If it is said: The sending of obligations from Him is foolish, since contained

within them are commandments to perform actions which do not benefit the
one who commands, or prohibitions from performing actions which do not
harm the one who prohibits. And this is clear foolishness by analogy with the
seen world. We say that drawing comparisons between the seen12 and unseen
world13 here is not acceptable. Is it not the case that there is no one in the seen
world that acts in a way that does not benefit him or others? However, God has
created things which do not benefit anyone at all, such as parts hidden beneath
the surface of the Earth and mountains. Therefore, if the situation between the
seen and unseen world can differ in the case of actions, then it can also differ in
the case of commandments and prohibitions.
In the sending of prophets – peace be upon them –, there are many benefits,
which we shall now mention in detail.
The first: Through it there is a confirmation of rational proof with the proof of
revelation which conclusively nullifies any excuse made by the one who comes
under ethical-religious obligations. This is in accordance with the statement of
the Exalted ‘so that there will not be for humankind a claim against God after the
(sending) of messengers’ [Q 4:165]. And He has also stated: ‘If We had destroyed
them with a punishment before him [i. e. the messenger], then they would have
said, “Why did You not send us a messenger?”’ [Q 20:134].
The second: God the Exalted created humans needing food for survival and
medicine for healing, maintaining good health and removing sickness, and also
created from the same genus other things that contain deadly poison. Human
reason cannot intuitively know what these are, nor can accumulated experience
bring about this knowledge except after lengthy periods – and notwithstanding
this [i. e. the knowledge obtained] there is still danger in it. Whereas in the send-
ing of prophets, knowledge of their different natures can be obtained, without
any danger involved.
The third: If deciding the mode of worship was an obligation left to humans,
then each group might come up with its own distinct religious practice and
would begin to become fanatical about this, and this would lead to dissension.
The fourth: Human actions which are based on reason alone, such as habitual
actions or habits, do not constitute worship. But when a person carries out the
command of one whom the heart glorifies – in spite of (reason’s) rebuking of
it – then this is pure worship.14 For this reason, instructions have been sent down
for the performance of various strange acts in the Hajj (pilgrimage).
12 The mundane world.
13 The divine.
14 Or, alternatively: ‘But carrying out the command of someone who is greatly honoured
in one’s heart [i. e. the Prophet], notwithstanding his illiteracy (ummiyyatihi), is pure worship’.
In either reading, the idea conveyed is that worship purely based on rational reasons alone
diminishes the aim of worship, which is obedience.
‫لهية عزيزة‪ ،‬فال ب ّد من بعثة الأنبياء و � إنزال الكتب‬

‫[الخامس]‪ :‬والكامل نادر والأسرار الإ ّ‬
‫ل مساعد � إلى منتهى كماله الممكن له‪.‬‬ ‫عليهم � إيصاالً لك ّ‬
‫السادس‪� :‬أ ّن الحاجة ّ‬

‫ماسة � إلى الصناعات النافعة كالنسج والخياطة والبناء وصنعة النجر‬
‫والزرع‪ ،‬كما قال ال�ه تعالى‪﴿ :‬وعلَّمناه صنع َة َلبوسٍ َل ُ ‪15‬‬
‫اص َن ِع‬ ‫ك ْم﴾ ‪ ،‬وقال تعالى‪َ :‬‬
‫﴿و ْ‬ ‫ََ َْ ُ َ َْ ُ‬ ‫ل‬
‫ك﴾‪ ،16‬فوجب بعثة الأنبياء لتعليمها‪.‬‬
‫ا ْلفُ ْل َ‬
‫قبيح في العقل‪ ،‬والعقول قاصرة عن معرفة ك ّمية‬

‫ٌ‬ ‫حسن وكفرانه‬
‫ٌ‬ ‫الثامن‪� :‬أ ّن شكر المنعم‬
‫سمعي يرد بذلك كلّه‪ � ،‬إذ الشكر‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫بيان‬ ‫كيفيته وجنس الشكر ووقته‪ ،‬فال ب ّد من‬
‫الشكر و ّ‬
‫ٍّ‬
‫واجب‪ ،‬ولوال البيان لكان ذلك تكليف ما ليس في الوسع‪ ،‬و �إن ّه ال يجوز‪.‬‬
‫ومبينين للناس ما يحتاجون � إليه من‬‫ّ‬ ‫فثبت بهذه الوجوه �أ ّن � إرسال الرسل مبشّ رين ومنذرين‬
‫مصالح داريهم حكمة‪ .‬وبهذا يبطل �أيضاً قول البراهمة القائلين بوقوع الغنية بالعقل‪ ،‬ل أ ّن‬
‫بالعقل � إن كان يمكن الوقوف على الواجب والممتنع ولكن ال يمكن الوقوف به على‬
‫الممكن على �أن ّه � إن كان ممكناً‪ ،‬لكن ال يكون ذلك � ّإل ب إ�داب الفكرة والنظر الدائم‬
‫والبحث الكامل‪ ،‬وفيه مشقّة عظيمة‪.‬‬
‫تحقّقه‪� :‬أ ّن � إعطاء ما زاد على الكفاية يع ّد � إكراماً و � إفضاالً و � إنعاماً‪ ،‬فال يبعد ذلك من ذي‬
‫الفضل العظيم والمنعم الكريم‪� .‬أال ترى �أ ّن اللّه تعالى خلق للخلق عينين ويدين و�أذنين و � إن‬
‫كان المقصود يحصل بواحد؟‬
‫‪ 15‬سورة الأنبياء ‪.٨٠/٢١‬‬

‫‪ 16‬سورة هود ‪.٣٧/١١‬‬
[The fifth]: [The existence of ] the perfect person is rare17 and the divine secrets
are precious. Therefore, prophets and revealed scriptures must be sent in order
to give everyone what will assist them to attain the extent of perfection possible
for them.
The sixth: (Human) need requires the existence of useful crafts such as weaving,
tailoring, building, carpentry and agriculture, as in the statement of God the
Exalted: ‘And We taught him the craft of making garments (of mail) for you’ [Q
21:80]. And the Exalted also said: ‘Build a ship’ [Q 11:37]. Thus, the sending of
prophets is necessary to teach (humankind) about this.
[The seventh benefit is missing from the text]
The eighth: Human reason intuitively knows that expressing gratitude to the
Benefactor is good, and that ingratitude to Him is repugnant. Human intellects
are not capable of knowing how much gratitude is needed, how to express grati-
tude, what type of gratitude should be expressed, and when gratitude should be
expressed. Therefore, clear verbal guidance that details all of this is necessary,
as gratitude is obligatory. If there was no such guidance, then this would be the
imposing of a religious obligation that the person is not capable of fulfilling, and
this is not acceptable [for God].
Based on these considerations, it has been established that the sending of mes-
sengers to promise, warn, and to demonstrate to people what they require for
their benefit in both worlds, is an act of wisdom. And with this, the arguments
of the Barāhima who say human intellect alone is sufficient are dismissed. This
is because the intellect can only know conclusively what is logically necessary or
impossible, not what is possible. Even if we were to grant that this was possible,
it would not be achieved except after the lengthy deliberation, constant med-
itation, and complete investigation, which is extremely difficult.
The truth of the matter is that the granting of something beyond what is suffi-
cient is an act of honour, generosity and bounty, and therefore this is not incon-
ceivable for the Possessor of Great Generosity and the Most Noble Provider. Do
you not see that God the Exalted has created humans with two eyes, two hands,
and two ears, when one of each would have been sufficient for what they were
intended for?
17 In other words, nobody is perfect, when left to their own human resources.
‫و � إذا ثبت �أ ّن بعثة الأنبياء جائزة ف إ�ذا جاء واحد وا ّدعى الرسالة في زمان جواز ورود الرسول‪،‬‬
‫نبينا عليه السالم‪ ،‬ال يجب قبول قوله بدون المعجزة‪ ،‬لأن ّه خبر الواحد‬ ‫وهو قبل مبعث ّ‬
‫و�أن ّه يحتمل الصدق والكذب‪ ،‬ول أ ّن وجوب قبول قوله يؤ ّدي � إلى قبول قول من يكون قبول‬
‫قوله كفراً‪.‬‬
‫وح ّدها على طريقة المتكلّمين �أن ّها �أمر يظهر بخالف العادة في دار التكليف لإ ظهار‬
‫النبوة مع نكول من يتح ّدى به عن معارضته بمثله‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫صدق م ّدعي‬
‫قيد بدار التكليف‪ ،‬ل أ ّن ما كان في الآخرة من خالف العادة ال يكون معجزةً‪.‬‬ ‫و �إن ّما ّ‬
‫الولي والمت�ألّه � إذ ظهور خالف العادة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫النبوة احترازاً ع ّما ظهر على يد‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وب إ�ظهار صدق م ّدعي‬
‫المتنبي يوجب انسداد معرفة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫المتنبي‪ .‬والفرق �أ ّن ظهور على يد‬
‫ّ‬ ‫على يد المت�ألّه جائز دون‬
‫النبي عليه السالم‪ .‬ف�أ ّما ظهوره على يد المت�ألّه ال يوجب انسداد باب معرفة الإ له‪ ،‬ل أ ّن ك ّ‬
‫ل‬
‫عاقل يعرف �أ ّن الآدمي المشتمل على دالالت الحدوث وسمات القصور ال يكون � إلهاً‬
‫و � إن رؤي �ألف خارق العادة‪ .‬وب إ�ظهار صدقه‪ ،‬لأن ّه لو ظهر على � إظهار كذبه ال يكون معجز ًة‬
‫المتنبي �أ ّن معجزتي نطق هذه الشجرة ف�أنطقها اللّه بتكذيبه ال يكون معجزةً‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫كما لو ا ّدعى‬
‫وبنكول من يتح ّدى به عن معارضته‪ ،‬لأن ّها يخرج عند المعارضة عن الداللة‪.‬‬
Since it is established that the sending of prophets is a possibility, then if a claim-

ant to prophethood came at the time in which it is possible for messengers to be
sent, which is before the appearance of our Prophet – peace be upon him – then
it would not have been necessary to accept his claim without (the manifestation
of ) a miracle. This is because it is a single person’s claim which could be either
true or false. Therefore, if it were necessary to accept such a claim, then it would
be tantamount to making it necessary to accept a person’s claim the acceptance
of which could be kufr.18
The definition of a ‘miracle’, according to the method of the mutakallimūn, is
that it is an occurrence which occurs outside of normal occurrences in the realm
of religious obligation19 in order to manifest the truth of one who claims pro-
phethood together with the inability of the one who contests it to bring forth
something comparable.
This definition restricts it to ‘the realm of religious obligation’, because disrup-
tions of normal occurrences in the Hereafter are not miracles. It is defined as
‘the truth claim of a claimant to prophethood’ in order to distinguish it from
(disruptions of normal occurrences) that occur at the hands of saints and those
who claim divinity. This is because disruptions of the norm in the hands of those
who claim divinity – unlike those who falsely claim prophethood – are (also)
possible. The difference between the two being that their manifestation at the
hands of a false claimant of prophethood entails necessarily that the path to
knowing whether a person is a true prophet – peace be upon him – is blocked.
However, in the case of the manifestation (of a disruption of normal occurrence)
at the hands of a claimant to divinity, the path to knowing divinity is not blocked
for human intuition, as any person with intellect will know that a human with all
the signs of contingency and characteristics of deficiency cannot be a god, even
if a thousand disruptions of normal occurrence were shown. It is defined by ‘to
manifest the truth (of one who claims prophethood)’, because if it were the case
that the disruption of normal occurrence were to manifest the prophet’s false-
hood, then it could not be a miracle. For example, if a claimant to prophethood
were to say: ‘My miracle would be that this tree would talk’, but then God made
the tree speak of his falsehood, then it would not be a miracle. It is defined by
‘the inability of the one who contests it (to bring forth something comparable)’,
because this makes the challenge void of proof.20
18 In other words, the evidence for belief in a claim to prophecy would be insufficient with-
out additional supporting evidence. The term used here (khabar wāḥid) is a term deriving from
the field of Hadith, and refers to a narration with only a single chain of narrators to support it.
Most theological schools reject the idea that a matter of belief (as opposed to a matter of law and
practice) could be based on such narrations.
19 That is in this world.
20 In other words, because the miracle dispossesses him – when he is unable to bring for-
ward a comparable event – of a proof.
‫ووجه داللة المعجزة على صدق الآتي بها �أن ّا نعلم يقيناً �أ ّن اللّه تعالى سامع لدعواه و�أ ّن ما‬
‫ثم قال‪ �“ :‬إلهي � إن كنت‬
‫ظهر على يده خارج عن مقدور جميع البشر‪ .‬ف إ�ذا ا ّدعى الرسالة ّ‬
‫فسود عقيب سؤاله علمنا بضرورة �أن ّه‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وجه القمر” مثالً‪،‬‬
‫َ‬ ‫فسود‬
‫ِّ‬ ‫صادقاً في دعوى الرسالة‬
‫ص ّدقه في دعواه‪.‬‬
‫المتنبي � إضالالً للخلق ويجوز منه خلق‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬لم ال يجوز � إظهار المعجزة على يد‬
‫الضالل فيهم وترك �أصلحهم عندكم؟ قلنا‪ :‬لوجوه‪.‬‬
‫�أحدها‪� :‬أ ّن اللّه تعالى قادر على التفرقة بين الصادق والكاذب بطريق الداللة كما هو قادر‬
‫عليها بطريق الضرورة‪ .‬فلو ظهرت على يد الكاذب النس ّد طريق معرفة الرسول بطريق‬
‫الداللة‪ ،‬وفيه تعجيز اللّه تعالى‪.‬‬
‫والثاني‪� :‬أن ّه لو ظهرت على يد الكاذب لكان تكليف الخلق بتصديق الأنبياء تكليف ما ال‬
‫بالنص �أو الإ جماع‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫يطاق‪ ،‬و �إن ّه غير جائز �أو غير ثابت‬
‫والثالث‪ :‬ال نسلم ب�أ ّن ذلك مقدور‪ .‬ف إ� ّن المعجزة ع َلم صدق الآتي بها فيستحيل وجودها‬
‫مع الكاذب‪ ،‬وهذا ل أ ّن المعجزة المقرونة بالتحدي نازل منزلة قوله‪“ :‬صدقت �أنت رسولي”‪.‬‬
‫وعالمة الكاذب �أن ّه ما قيل له ذلك واستحال الجمع بين التصديق وعدمه‪ .‬نعم‪ ،‬خلق خرق‬
‫العادة مقدور على حياله‪ ،‬ف�أ ّما عند تض ّمنه بطالن داللته على صدق الصادق فال‪ .‬وهذا‬
‫كخلق السواد في مح ٍّل مقدو ٍر على انفراده‪ ،‬ف�أ ّما على تض ّمنه الجمع بين الض ّدين فال‪.‬‬
The way in which the prophetic miracle can prove the truth of the one bringing
it21 is this: that we know with certainty that God the Exalted can hear his call,
and that what manifests at his hands is beyond the power of all humans. Thus,
when he makes the claim to prophethood, he would say, for example: ‘My God,
if I am true in my claim to prophethood, then darken the face of the moon’. And
when the moon is immediately darkened in response to his call, we then know
necessarily that (God) has verified his claim.
If it was said: Why is it not possible, according to your view, that a false claimant
to prophethood performs miracles and leads the people to error, while it is pos-
sible that error is created by God within them and that that which is best for
them is abandoned?
We say: For many reasons, one among them being that it is possible for God the
Exalted to create a means to distinguish between a true prophet and a false pro-
phet through the method of evidenced reasoning, just as it is possible for Him
to create one through intuitive knowledge. But if the miracle were to manifest
at the hands of a false prophet, then the path to knowing the prophet through
evidenced reasoning would be closed. This would be tantamount to saying that
the capability of God the Exalted is limited.
Secondly, if miracles were to be manifested at the hands of a false claimant to
prophethood, then the obligation on humans to testify to the truth of prophets
would be an obligation beyond capacity.22 This is not possible by reason, nor is
it established by scriptural text or communal consensus.
Thirdly, we do not accept that this is conceivable, as the prophetic miracle is the
mark of the truth of the one who performs it, and therefore, its concurrent ex-
istence at the hands of the liar is logically impossible. This is because a prophetic
miracle that poses a challenge23 is equivalent to (God) saying: ‘You have spoken
the truth. You are My messenger’, whereas this is not said to a liar, and the coexis-
tence of the verification of a statement and the absence of such verification is log-
ically impossible. Yes, (the false prophet is able to) create a ‘disruption of habit’
by means of his tricks, but this does not mean that his false evidence should be
included in the same category as the truth of a true prophet. This is comparable
to the creation of blackness in a place, in which case its removal is logically pos-
sible, but not the coexistence of the two opposites (blackness and its absence).
21 That is the prophet.

22 An obligation which they did not have the means to fulfil.
23 To the denier of the claim.
‫والرابع‪ :‬لو سلم �أن ّه مقدور لكنّه غير واقع بمنزلة خالف معلوم اللّه تعالى كيال يؤ ّدي � إلى‬
‫وخلو بعثة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الحجة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الحق بالباطل و � إبطال الأدلّة وتعجيز الباري تعالى عن � إلزام‬
‫ّ‬ ‫التباس‬
‫الأنبياء عن الفائدة‪.‬‬
‫حجة وحكمة عند اختيار المكلّف‪ ،‬ذلك‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ونسبة الإ ضالل � إلى اللّه تعالى على وجه يكون‬
‫جائز دون ما يكون عبثاً وسفهاً‪.‬‬
‫واللّه الهادي‪.‬‬
Fourthly, if we were to accept this as possible, it would still not occur, as this
would conflict with the knowledge of God the Exalted, leading to a confusion
between truth and falsehood; the nullification of the proofs (of prophethood);
the suggestion that the Creator the Exalted is limited in His ability to make proof
conclusive; the removal of any benefit from the sending of prophets.
The attribution of misguidance to God the Exalted insofar as it leads to a proof24
or wise benefit for a morally responsible person confronted with a moral choice,
this is permissible. But anything beyond this23 would be pointless and foolish.
And God is the Guide.
24 A proof against someone, ḥujja.

25 Or misguidance for any other purpose.
136 Harith Ramli
Bibliography
Primary Text
Khabbāzī, Jalāl al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-, al-Hādī fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Adil Bebek,
Istanbul: Marmara İlahiyat Yayınları Vakfı, 2006, pp. 205–9.
Other Sources
Abrahamov, Binyamin, “The Barāhima’s Enigma. A Search for a New Solution”, Die Welt
des Orients, 87 (1987), pp. 72–91.
Baghdādī, Ismāʿīl Bāshā al-Bābānī al-, Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn asmāʾ al-muʾallifīn wa-āthār al-
muṣannifīn, ed. Kilisli Rifat Bilge and İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Istanbul: Milli
Eğitim Basımevi, 1951, vol. 1, p. 787.
Calder, Norman, “The Barāhima. Literary Construct and Historical Reality”, Bulletin of
the School of Oriental and African Studies, 57/1 (1994), pp. 40–51.
Ibn Quṭlubughā, Tāj al-tarājim fī ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya, ed. Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān
Yūsuf, Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1992, pp. 220–1.
Nasafī, Abū l-Barakāt al-, Sharḥ al-ʿumda fī ʿaqāʾid ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa, ed. ʿAbd Allāh
Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Ismāʿīl, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2012.
Part IV: Faith, Knowledge and Acts
Human Nature and Knowledge of God
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān
Kayhan Özaykal
The following is a translation of selected passages from al-Māturīdī’s Qur’anic

commentary, Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān (‘Interpretations of the Qurʾan’).1 These pas-
sages cover verses 30–32 of Sūrat al-Baqara, which recount the story of Adam’s
creation and the remarkable response from the angels that this event provoked.
Here, al-Māturīdī’s commentary (tafsīr) articulates the importance of knowl-
edge to the stations of prophethood and humanity, both represented by the first
human. A contrast drawn between the essences of light, fire and earth – from
which the angels, jinn and humans are respectively created – concerning the
attainment of knowledge reveals God as the ultimate bestower of true under-
standing. The commentary then addresses a subject of great controversy in the
early period of Islam: deferment of judgement regarding the fate of a believer
who committed a major sin. The passages here exhibit al-Māturīdī’s wish to
achieve the most reasonable and balanced theological position in relation to the
metaphysics of human action.
1 This translation is based on Ahmet Vanlıoğlu and Bekir Topaloğlu’s edition of al-
Māturīdī’s Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, Istanbul: Dār al-Mīzān, 2005, vol. 1, pp. 71–82. Other editions
of his commentary are Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Aẓīm. Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna, ed. Fāṭima Yūsuf al-
Khiyamī [or al-Khīmī], Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla Nāshirūn, 1425/2004 (5 vols.), and Taʾwīlāt
Ahl al-Sunna. Tafsīr al-Māturīdī, ed. Majdī Bāsalūm, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2005 (10
vols.). To translate the following passages, Topaloğlu’s Turkish translation was also consulted
(Te’vîlâtü’l-Kur’ân Tercümesi, ed. Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, Istanbul: Ensar, 2015, vol. 1).
‫ ‪140‬‬ ‫‪Kayhan Özaykal‬‬
‫س ُد فِ َ‬
‫يها‬ ‫يها َمن ُي ْف ِ‬ ‫ل فِ َ‬ ‫ج َع ُ‬ ‫ل فِي ْال أ َ ْرضِ َخ ِل َ‬
‫يف ًة قَا ُلوا أ�َ َت ْ‬ ‫ج ِ‬
‫اع ٌ‬ ‫ك ل ِ ْل َم َلئِك َِة إ�ِنِّي َ‬‫َو إ�ِ ْذ قَالَ َر ُّب َ‬
‫ون [سورة‬ ‫ك قَالَ إ�ِنِّي أ�َعْ َل ُم‪َ ‬ما َل َت ْع َل ُم َ‬ ‫س َل َ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫حب َ ِ‬
‫ِح ْمدكَ َونُق ِّد ُ‬ ‫ن نُ َس ِّب ُ‬ ‫اء َو َن ْ‬
‫ح ُ‬ ‫الد َم َ‬
‫ك ِّ‬ ‫َو َي ْس ِف ُ‬
‫البقرة ‪]٣٠/٢‬‬
‫قصة �آدم عليه‬
‫يتوجه � إليه [الكالم] م ّما تض ّمن ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫{قال الشيخ رضي اللّه عنه‪ 2}:‬القول فيما‬
‫السالم من سورة البقرة والكشف ع ّما قال فيها �أهل التفسير [هو ما يقال فيه] من غير شهادة‬
‫لأحد منّا لإ صابة جميع ما فيه من الحكمة �أو القطع على تحقيق شيء‪ ،‬و [من غير الحكم‬
‫وجهوا � إليه بالإ حاطة‪ .‬ولكن الغالب م ّما يحتمله تدبير البشر‪ ،‬ويبلغه مبلغ علمنا م ّما‬
‫بما] ّ‬
‫يجوز �أن يوصف به �أهل المحنة‪]…[ .‬‬
‫{قال}‪ :‬ومعنى قوله‪ ﴿ :‬إ�ِنِّي أ�َعْ َل ُم‪َ ‬ما َل َت ْع َل ُم َ‬

‫ون﴾‪� ،‬أ ّن اللّه قد كان �أخبرهم عن الذين يفسدون‪،‬‬
‫ولم يكن �أعلمهم ما فيهم من الرسل والأخيار‪ ،‬فهو يعلم ما ال يعلمون من الأخيار فيهم‪،‬‬
‫ولذلك ذكرهم عند سؤال الإ نباء بما �أعلمهم من عظيم امتنانه على �آدم �أن جعله بمعنى‬
‫نبي � إلى المالئكة بما علّمه الأسماء‪ .‬ولم يكن بلغ تو ّهمهم �أ ّن في البشر ما يحتاج [� إليه]‬
‫ّ‬
‫ثم يحتاجون‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫به‪،‬‬ ‫شياء‬‫أ‬ ‫ل‬‫ا‬ ‫وجالء‬ ‫شياء‬‫أ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫عن‬ ‫ستار‬‫أ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ا‬ ‫رفع‬ ‫سبب‬ ‫هو‬ ‫الذي‬ ‫النور‬ ‫من‬ ‫المخلوقون‬
‫أ‬
‫في اقتباس العلم � إلى من هو من جوهر التراب والماء الذي هو �أصل الستر والظلمة‪ .‬ف�راهم‬
‫اللّه بذلك ليعلموا �أ ّن ليس طريق المعرفة والعلم بالأشياء الخلقة‪ ،‬ولكن لطف اللّه وامتنانه‪.‬‬
‫قوة � ّإل باللّه‪]…[ .‬‬
‫وال ّ‬
‫ثم تكلّموا في معنى ذلك‪ .‬فمنهم من يقول‪ :‬ظنّوا �أن ّهم �أكرم الخلق على اللّه‪ ،‬و�أن ّه ال ّ‬
‫يفضل‬ ‫ّ‬
‫�أحداً عليهم‪ .‬ومنهم من يقول‪ :‬ظنّوا �أن ّهم �أعلم من جميع من يخلق من جوهر النار �أو التراب‪،‬‬
‫الجن والأنس عصاة‪.‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫من حيث ذكرت من جوهرهم‪� ،‬أو لعظم عبادتهم للّه‪ ،‬وعلمهم ب�أ ّن في‬
‫علو البشر وشرفه وعظم ما �أكرموا [به] من العلم‪.‬‬ ‫ثم بالسجود لإ ظهار ّ‬ ‫فلهذا امتحنهم بالعلم ّ‬
‫ِ‬
‫ك﴾‪]…[ .‬‬ ‫س َل َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ِح ْمدكَ َونُق ِّد ُ‬ ‫ن نُ َس ِّب ُ‬
‫حب َ‬ ‫ومنهم من قال بقوله‪َ :‬‬
‫﴿و َن ْ‬
‫ح ُ‬
‫)‪2 Words between curly brackets in the Vanlıoğlu-Topaloğlu edition of Taʾwīlāt (vol. 1‬‬

‫‪indicate scribal additions to the text, rather than the words or thoughts of al-Māturīdī. The same‬‬
‫‪applies in the English translation below. Square brackets in the Arabic denote redactions by‬‬
‫‪editors Vanlıoğlu and Topaloğlu and, in the case of ellipses, passages omitted by the translator.‬‬
Human Nature and Knowledge of God 141
And when your Lord said to the angels, ‘I will make a successor on the earth’.
They said, ‘Will You make one who will cause corruption there and shed
blood, when we glorify You with praise and proclaim Your holiness?’ God
said, ‘I know that which you do not know’ [Q 2:30].
{The Shaykh [al-Māturīdī], may God be pleased with him, said:} [In regard to]3
forging an opinion about this [divine discourse], which includes the story of
Adam, peace be upon him, in Sūrat al-Baqara, and unveiling what the Qur’anic
commentators have said about it; none of us can testify that all the wisdom [con-
tained here has been attained] accurately, or that a particular thing has been ver-
ified with certainty [by us]. Also, none of us can decide that [the scholars] have
understood and interpreted it with full comprehension. Rather, the most the
human can comprehend and the furthest we can reach is limited to the amount
of knowledge that can be attributed to those who are tested [by God] […]
{[The Shaykh] said:} The meaning of His statement, ‘I know that which you
do not know’, is that God had already informed them [i. e. the angels] about
those who will cause corruption, but had not yet notified them of the messengers
and virtuous among them [i. e. humanity]. Indeed, God knew things they did
not know about the virtuous ones among them. For this reason, when He asked
[the angels] to report [the names] to Him; He made them aware of the great
blessings bestowed on Adam, to whom He taught the names, transferring him
in a sense to the status of a prophet to the angels. [The angels] had not imagined
that those created from light, which is a cause of lifting away the veils from things
and illuminating them, could be in need of something in humans. And yet, in
order to acquire knowledge, [the angels] were in need of one made from the sub-
stance of earth and water, which is the source of veiling and darkness. Thus, God
showed them this to have them know that the path to recognising and knowing
things is not (based on) natural qualities, but rather the kindness and grace of
God. And there is no power except with God. […]
[The scholars] speculated on the meaning of this.4 Some of them said: They
[i. e. the angels] supposed they were the noblest of creation to God, and that
He would favour none over them. And some of the [scholars] said: [The angels
objected because they] supposed they were more learned than all those created
from the substance of fire or earth, in view of what has been mentioned above
about their respective substances; or due to the greatness of their worship of
God, and their knowledge that among the jinn and humans were rebellious ones.
For this reason, [God] tested them [i. e. the angels], first with knowledge, and
then with prostration [to Adam], so as to disclose the high status and honour of
humankind and the greatness of the knowledge granted to them. Finally, some
of the scholars explained this [objection] with God’s statement [quoting the
angels]: ‘When we glorify You with praise and proclaim Your holiness?’ […]
3 Words between square brackets in the English translation are explanatory additions by
the translator not found in the Arabic original.
4 That is, the objection of the angels toward the creation of Adam.
‫اء هَ ٰ ؤ َُل ِء إ�ِنْ كُ�نْ ُت ْم‬

‫ض ُه ْم َع َلى ا ْل َم َلئِك َِة َف َقالَ أ�َ ْن ِب ُئونِي ِب أ�َ ْس َم ِ‬ ‫َ‬
‫كلَّ َها ثُ َّم َع َر َ‬ ‫َو َعلَّ َم � َآد َم ْال أ ْس َم َ‬
‫اء ُ‬
‫ين [سورة البقرة ‪]٣١/٢‬‬ ‫ص ِِ‬
‫ادق َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ض ُه ْم َع َلى ا ْل َم َلئِك َِة﴾ يحتمل �أن يكون َعلَّ َم‪:‬‬ ‫َ‬
‫كلَّ َها ثُ َّم َع َر َ‬ ‫﴿و َعلَّ َم � َآد َم ْال أ ْس َم َ‬
‫اء ُ‬ ‫وقوله‪َ :‬‬
‫�ألهم‪ .‬ويحتمل �أن يكون َعلَّ َم ب إ�رسال ملك من غير الذين امتحنوا به‪ .‬وفي ذلك تثبيت �أحد‬
‫وجهين‪ � :‬إ ّما �أن يكون العلم ب�أشياء حقيقة ضرورة‪ ،‬يقع عند النظر في الأسباب التي هي �أدلّة‬
‫وقوعه عند الت�أ ّمل فيها‪ ،‬نحو وقوع الدرك بالبصر عند النظر وفتح العين؛ و � إ ّما �أن كان اللّه‬
‫تعالى خلق فعل التعلّم الذي يعلم المرء فيما يضاف فيه � إلى اللّه تعالى �أنه علّم‪ .‬وكذا قوله‪:‬‬
‫سباب‬
‫َ‬ ‫﴿و َما َعلَّ ْم َنا ُه الشِّ ْع َر َو َما َي َنب ِغي َل ُه﴾‪ .6‬وال يحتمل هذه ال أ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫﴿علَّ َم ُه ا ْل َب َي َ‬
‫ان﴾ ‪ ،‬وكذا قوله‪َ :‬‬ ‫َ‬
‫﴿ل ِع ْل َم َل َنا � إ َِّل‬
‫لما كانت له كلّها‪ ،‬ولم يكن تعلم حقيقة ليؤذنها‪ ،‬وكذلك قول المالئكة‪َ :‬‬
‫َما َعلَّ ْم�ت َ َنا﴾‪ .4‬واللّه الموفّق‪.‬‬
‫اء هَ ٰ ؤ َُل ِء﴾‪ ،‬ظاهره �أمر‪ ،‬ولكنّه يحتمل التو ّعد والمعاتبة على ما‬
‫وقوله‪ ﴿ :‬أ�َ ْن ِب ُئونِي ِب أ�َ ْس َم ِ‬
‫بينّا‪ ،‬وذلك في القر�آن كثير‪ .‬و � إن كان في الحقيقة �أمراً ففيه داللة جواز الأمر فيما ال يعلمه‬ ‫ّ‬
‫الم�أمور‪ � ،‬إذا كان بحيث يحتمل العلم به � إلى ذي العلم‪ ،‬يتبيّن له � إذا طلب واستوجب رتبة‬
‫التعلّم والبحث‪ .‬ويحتمل �أن يكونوا ّ‬
‫نبهوا حتّى ال يسبق � إليهم‪ – ‬عند � إعالم �آدم‪� – ‬أ ّن ذلك‬
‫ّ‬
‫تدل على ّ‬
‫نبوته‪ ،‬ذكرهم عجزهم‬ ‫من حيث يدركونه لو تكلّفوا‪� ،‬أو �أراد �أن يريهم �آي ًة عجيب ًة‬
‫ل‪:‬‬ ‫عن ذلك‪ ،‬و�ألزمهم الخضوع لآدم عليه السالم في � إفادة ذلك العلم به‪ ،‬كما قال ّ‬
‫عز وج ّ‬
‫وس ٰى﴾‪ ،7‬ذكره �أ ّوالً حاله وحال عصاه‪ ،‬ليعلم [�أ ّن] ما �أراه م ّما في يده‬ ‫ك بِ َي ِم ِ‬
‫ين َ‬ ‫﴿و َما تِ ْل َ‬
‫ك َيا ُم َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫نبينا وعليه السالم‪.‬‬
‫نبوته‪ ،‬على ّ‬ ‫من �آية ّ‬
‫‪ 5‬سورة يس ‪.٦٩/٣٦‬‬

‫‪ 6‬سورة البقرة ‪.٣٢/٢‬‬
‫‪ 7‬سورة طه ‪.١٧/٢٠‬‬
And He taught Adam all the names, then showed them to the angels, and asked
them: Tell me the names of these, if you are truthful [Q 2:31].8
As for His statement, ‘And He taught Adam all the names, then showed them to
the angels’, it is possible that the word ‘He taught’ here means ‘He inspired’. And
it is also possible that ‘He taught’ by sending an angel from other than those who
were tested with this. Here, one of two possible forms [of knowledge] is established:
[firstly] either the knowledge of things is real and necessary, taking place through
the causes [of knowledge], which are proofs for the occurrence of knowledge when
they are pondered, as in the occurrence of comprehension by sight when the eye
is open and observing; or [secondly, the knowledge occurred] by God the Exalted
creating the act of learning, so the person knows that it is He who is the One that
is teaching, where the teaching belongs to God.9 Such is the case in His statement:
‘[The Merciful] taught him the way of communication’ [Q 55:4]; and His state-
ment: ‘We did not teach [Muḥammad] poetry; he had no need for that’ [Q 36:69].
This type of teaching does not require the causes of knowledge, since these [causes]
are all with God; and it is not a reality that was announced to them [i. e. the angels].
Such is the meaning of the angels’ statement: ‘We have no knowledge except that
which You have taught us’ [Q 2:32]. And God is the Granter of Success.
His statement, ‘Tell me the names of these’, appears literally to be a command. Yet
there is the possibility that it is a threat or a reprimand, as we have explained. This
occurs in the Qur’an often. If the statement is actually a command, it is an indi-
cation of the permissibility for a command to be given to an individual regarding
what he does not know about, [though only] when the [required] knowledge is
tied to one who knows it, and this knowledge would be clear to him10 upon his
asking and requesting it from the learned, so that he too can achieve the level of
knowledge and learning. It is also possible that the (angels) were warned [with
this divine statement] – when Adam informed them [of the names of things] –
so they would not fall into the suspicion that the knowledge was of a type they
could find, were they to make an effort to do so. Alternatively, [God] wanted to
show them a miraculous sign as proof of his [i. e. Adam’s] prophecy. [God] thus
reminded them of their inability to do this [i. e. state the names of things], and
obligated them to submit to Adam, peace be upon him, in recognition of his
knowledge, just as He, the Mighty and Sublime, said: ‘What is that in your right
hand, O Moses?’ [Q 20:17].11 Here, God first reminded him [i. e. Moses] of his
own condition and the condition of his staff, until Moses learned that what (God)
showed him in his hand was a sign of his prophecy. Peace and blessings be upon
our Prophet [Muḥammad] and upon him [i. e. Moses].
8 The last clause of this verse is also more idiomatically translatable as ‘if you truly [think
you can]’: M. A. S. Abdel Haleem (trans.), The Qur’an, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
9 Khiyamī’s edition, Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna, records the final ‫ علّم‬as ‫ ِع ْلم‬, which changes the
ٌ
last clause to ‘where the knowledge belongs to God’.
10 That is, the one addressed with the command.
11 Succeeding verses Q 20:18–23 are required here to make sense of the meaning: [Moses
‫ُكرت‪� ،‬أو � إن كنتم‪ – ‬من خلقتكم‪ – ‬موصوفين‬

‫ين﴾ في المعاني التي ذ ْ‬ ‫ص ِِ‬‫وقوله‪ ﴿ :‬إ�ِنْ كُ�نْ ُت ْم َ‬
‫ادق َ‬
‫َ‬
‫واحذروا القول بالجهل‪ .‬وفي‬ ‫واصدقوا‬
‫ُ‬ ‫بالصدق‪� ،‬أو على تحذير القول بال علم‪ ،‬وك�أن ّه قال‪:‬‬
‫ذلك �أن ّهم لم يتكلّفوا بالقول في شيء‪ ،‬ولم يعلّمهم اللّه تعالى‪]…[ .‬‬
‫يم [سورة البقرة ‪]٣٢/٢‬‬

‫حك ُ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ك أ�َ ْن َ‬
‫ت ا ْل َع ِليم ا ْل َ ِ‬ ‫ك ال َ ِع ْل َم َلنَا إ� َِّل َما َعلَّ ْم�تَنَا إ�ِن َّ َ‬ ‫قَا ُلو ْا ُس ْب َ‬
‫حا َن َ‬
‫يم﴾ يشبه‬
‫حك ُ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ك أ�َ ْن َ‬
‫ت ا ْل َع ِليم ا ْل َ ِ‬ ‫ك ال َ ِع ْل َم َلنَا إ� َِّل َما َعلَّ ْم�تَنَا إ�ِن َّ َ‬ ‫وقول المالئكة‪﴿ :‬قَا ُلو ْا ُس ْب َ‬
‫حا َن َ‬
‫�أن يكون السابق � إلى وهمهم معنى �أو خطر فعل م ّما كان باللّه خرج من �أن يعقلوا حكمته‬
‫� إ ّما بما لم يبلغهم العلم بها‪� ،‬أو يخطر ببالهم �أن ّه تعالى كيف ي�أمرهم وهو يعلم �أن ّهم ال يعلمون‬
‫بها‪� ،‬أو خطر ببالهم من غير تحقيق ذلك‪ ،‬ولكن على ما يبلى به الأخيار‪ ،‬كقوله‪َ :‬‬
‫﴿و َما‬
‫�أَ ْر َس ْل َنا ِمن ق َْب ِل َ‬
‫ك ِم ْن َر ُس ٍ‬
‫ول َو َل َن ِب ٍّي � إ َِّل �إِذَا َت َمنَّى﴾‪ 12،‬الآية؛ �أو كما ال يخلو به الممتحن من‬
‫الخواطر التى تبلغ المحنة بهم المجاهدة بها في دفعها‪ ،‬و � إن لم يكن لهم بما يخطر ببالهم‬
‫نزهوه ع ّما خطر ببالهم وسبق � إلى وهمهم‪ ،‬ووصفوه ب�أن ّه عليم ال‬
‫صنع‪ .‬فقالوا‪ :‬سبحانك‪ّ ،‬‬
‫يخفى عليه شيء‪ ،‬حكيم ال يخطئ في شيء‪ ،‬وال يخرج فعله عن الحكمة‪ .‬وباللّه التوفيق‬
‫والعصمة‪.‬‬
‫‪ 12‬سورة الحج ‪.٥٢/٢٢‬‬

And His statement, ‘If you are truthful’, refers to the issues mentioned [above],
or [it means] that ‘if you are – by virtue of your nature13 – endowed with truthful-
ness’; or it further indicates a warning about speaking without knowledge. It is as
if He said: Be truthful and beware of ignorant speech. There is also an indication
that they [i. e. the angels] were not responsible for saying anything, and God the
Exalted had not taught them knowledge [in the matter concerned]. […]
They said: Glory be to You, we have no knowledge except that which You have
taught us. Indeed, You are the Knower, the Wise [Q 2:32].
The statement of the angels, ‘Glory be to You, we have no knowledge except
that which You have taught us. Indeed, You are the Knower, the Wise’, seems
to mean that their minds had been driven by suspicion or there preyed on their
minds an act belonging to God,14 the wisdom of which went beyond their
understanding, either because no knowledge of it had reached them, or because
they questioned how He the Exalted could command them [to do something]
when He knew they had no knowledge of [how to do] it. Or [the suspicion] came
to their minds [like a delusion] without any verification. Yet it was a test for the
virtuous, as in His statement: ‘We have not sent any messenger or prophet before
you, but that when he wished… [Q 22:52]’.15 It may also mean that those who are
tested [by God] are not without evil thoughts, which bring [the tested one] such
a trial that it requires great effort to dispel them, even though they have no power
over what comes to their minds. So they [i. e. the angels] stated: ‘We glorify You’.
They professed God to be above all [the inappropriate attributes] that had come
to their minds and that they had suspected groundlessly; and they described
Him as Knowing, nothing is hidden to Him; and Wise, nothing He does is mis-
taken, and no action of His is unwise. Success and protection are by God.
said] ‘It is my staff, upon which I lean; by which I bring down leaves for my sheep; and for
which I also have other uses’. God said, ‘Throw it down, O Moses’. So he threw it down, and
suddenly it was a fast-moving snake. He said, ‘Pick it up, and do not be scared: We shall return
it to its previous form. And now place your hand on your side; it will come out white with no
harm – another sign. We do this so as to show you [some] of Our great signs’.
13 Emphasis added.
14 This sentence appears to offer two different possibilities concerning the angels’ thoughts;
that they were either plagued with suspicion or merely puzzled by some divine act (due to their
lack of knowledge or understanding). However, an alternative reading instead makes the ‘or’
refer to two possibilities regarding the divine mind. Thus, the angels’ statement “intimates they
had first suspected there was in God some idea or intention to do something”.
15 It appears al-Māturīdī here expects the reader to know the full verse: ‘We have not sent
any messenger or prophet before you, except that when he wished, Satan threw [in something
opposed] to what he wished for. But God cancels what Satan throws in, and then confirms His
message. God is the Knowing, the Wise.’
‫وفي الآية منع التكلّم في الشيء � ّإل بعد العلم به‪ ،‬والفزع � إلى اللّه عن القول به � ّإل بعلم‪ ،‬وهذا‬
‫﴿والَ‬ ‫ل من عرف اللّه‪ .‬وبه �أمر تعالى ّ‬
‫نبيه عليه الصالة والسالم‪ ،‬فقال‪َ :‬‬ ‫الحق الذي يلزم ك ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫هو‬
‫ك بِ ِه ِع ْل ٌم﴾‪ ،16‬الآية‪ .‬وسئل �أبو حنيفة رضي اللّه عنه عن الإ رجاء ما بدؤه؟‬
‫س َل َ‬
‫ف َما َل ْي َ‬
‫َت ْق ُ‬
‫فقال‪ :‬فعل المالئكة‪ � ،‬إذ سئلوا عن �أمر لم يعلموا [فـ]ـف ّـوضوا ذلك � إلى اللّه تعالى‪.‬‬
‫ومعنى الإ رجاء نوعان‪� .‬أحدهما محمود‪ ،‬وهو � إرجاء �أصحاب الكبائر ليحكم اللّه تعالى فيهم‬
‫ك‬ ‫بما يشاء‪ ،‬وال ُينزلهم ناراً وال ج�ن ّ ًة‪ ،‬لقوله تعالى‪﴿ :‬الَ َيغْ ِف ُر �أَن ُي ْش َركَ بِ ِه َو َيغْ ِف ُر َما ُد َ‬
‫ون ذَل ِ َ‬
‫رجئ الأفعال � إلى اللّه‪ ،‬ال يجعل للعبد‬ ‫اء﴾‪ .17‬والإ رجاء المذموم هو الجبر‪[ ،‬وهو] �أن ُي ِ‬ ‫ش ُ‬‫ل ِ َمن َي َ‬
‫فيه فعالً وال تدبير شيء من ذلك‪.‬‬
‫‪ 16‬سورة الإ سراء ‪.٣٦/١٧‬‬

‫‪ 17‬سورة النساء ‪.٤٨/٤‬‬
In this verse is an interdiction of discussing anything except after having knowl-

edge of it, and [also expressed is] a need to seek refuge in God from speech about
anything except with knowledge. This is the truth that applies to everyone who
is cognizant of God, and God the Exalted in this way commanded His prophet,
peace and blessings be upon him, as He said: ‘Do not follow that of which you
have no knowledge’ [Q 17:36].18 Abū Ḥanīfa,19 may God be pleased with him,
was asked about the source of [the doctrine of ] deferment. He said: It is the act
of the angels. When they were asked about a matter of which they did not know,
they entrusted that matter to God the Exalted.20
Deferment is one of two types. One of them is praiseworthy, and it is deferment
as regards [the fate of ] the committers of major sins to the judgement of God
the Exalted according to His will, so they are neither designated [as belonging]
to hell nor paradise, as per the statement of the Exalted: ‘God does not forgive
the association of partners to Him, and forgives whatever is devoid of this to
whomever He wills’ [Q 4:48]. The blameworthy deferment is determinism. It is
to defer [human] acts to God, without attributing any role to the servant; neither
the performance nor the arrangement of the act.21
18 The full verse reads: ‘Do not follow that which you have no knowledge of; the ears, the
eyes and the heart – all of them will be asked about.’
19 Eponymous founder of one the four main schools of Sunni law, early scholar of Islamic
theology, and the main authority of whom al-Māturīdī considers himself a follower.
20 Māturīdī scholar ʿAlā al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144?), author of the single known
commentary on the Taʾwīlāt, explains that Abū Ḥanīfa conceived the fate of those who died with
major sins within the context of deferment (yarjaʾ amr al-ṣāḥib al-kabāʾir), understood as the
suspension of judgment in expectation of God’s will (mashīʾat Allāh). Abū Ḥanīfa is reported
to have said that God can, if He wills, forgive major sinners and enter them into heaven with-
out any punishment, or alternatively punish them to the amount of their sins (ʿadhdhabahum
bi-qadri dhunūbihim) prior to leading them to heaven. Al-Samarqandī then reports that Abū
Ḥanīfa was asked about the origin of this idea and that he gave the above response (ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn
al-Samarqandī, Sharḥ Taʾwīlāt al-Māturīdī, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, Hamidiye 176,
fol. 21a [undated]).
21 The term tadbīr, here translated as ‘arrangement’, has the meaning of pre-ordainment
when used in reference to God, in the sense of realisation as part of the divine plan. It appears
in the Qur’an in verb form four times (10:3; 10:31; 13:2; 32:5) with the same meaning. When
used by al-Māturīdī in reference to humans, however, the term most likely denotes intention.
‫المروي حيث قال‪“ :‬صنفان من �أ ّمتي ال ينالهم شفاعتي‪ :‬القدر�يّة والمرجئة”‪.‬‬

‫ّ‬ ‫وعلى ذلك‬
‫والقدر�يّة هي التي لم تر للّه في فعل الخلق تدبيراً‪ ،‬وال له عليه قدرة التقدير‪ .‬والمرجئة هي‬
‫التي لم تر للعبد فيما ينسب � إليه من الطاعة والمعصية فعالً الب�تّة‪ ،‬ف�أبطلت الشفاعة لهما‬
‫وجعلتها للمذهب الأوسط بينهما‪ ،‬وهو الذي يحقّق للعبد فعالً وللّه تقديراً‪ ،‬ومن العبد‬
‫والحق‪� ،‬إن ّه‬
‫ّ‬ ‫شر ومن اللّه خلق ًة‪ ،‬وذلك على المعقول م ّما عليه طريق العدل‬
‫تحركاً بخير �أو ٍّ‬
‫ّ‬
‫بين الإ فراط والتقصير‪ .‬وكذلك قال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم‪“ :‬خير الأمور �أوساطها”‪.‬‬
‫قوة � ّإل باللّه‪.‬‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫﴿وك ََذل ِ َ‬
‫ج َع ْل َناك ُْم �أ َّم ًة َو َسطاً﴾ ‪ ،‬الآية‪ .‬وال ّ‬
‫ك َ‬ ‫وكذلك قال اللّه تعالى‪َ :‬‬
‫‪22‬‬
‫‪ 22‬سورة البقرة ‪.١٤٣/٢‬‬

It is on this [matter] that the [prophetic] narration23 states: ‘Two groups from my
community will not be granted intercession: The Qadariyya and the Murjiʾa’.24
The Qadariyya are those who regard God as neither arranging human acts nor
exercising a power to realise them. The Murjiʾa are those who do not consider
the servant as acting in whatever obedience or rebellion is ascribed to them.
So the intercession was made invalid to both (groups) and permissible for the
school positioned between them,25 which recognises that the performance of
the act belongs to the servant and the realisation of it belongs to God. From the
servant comes the move to either (do) good or evil, and from God comes the
creation [of the act].26 This is what reason understands from the path of justice
and fairness; it is between excessiveness and deficiency. In this sense, the Mes-
senger of God, may God grant him blessings and peace, said: ‘The best of affairs
is the moderate one’.27 And in the same manner, God the Exalted, said: ‘We have
made you a moderate nation’ [Q 2:143]. And there is no power except with God.
23 The following hadith is narrated by Jūzaqānī from Anas ibn Mālik. It continues with an
alternative description of the two groups to the one al-Māturīdī provides (below). Shawkānī
deems the hadith to be mawḍūʿ (fabricated) (Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al- Shawkānī, al-Fawāʾid al-
majmuʿa fī l-aḥādīth al-mawḍūʿa, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Yaḥyā al-Yamanī, Cairo: Maktabat
al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya, 1960, pp. 452–3). In al-Samarqandī’s Sharḥ, the second group is
alternatively named the Jabriyya, that is, the determinists (see fn. 24).
24 The Qadariyya arose approximately in the late seventh century as one of the first sects in
Islam. They claimed that human actions originated from a free will belonging to the individual
person and their name was often used pejoratively for the later Muʿtazila theological school
which assumed their libertarian views. The Murjiʾa arose contemporarily with the Qadariyya.
Their name, derived from irjāʾ, is a collective term that refers to the early Islamic groups who
deferred judgment to God on the eschatological fate of major sinners and refrained from mak-
ing declarations about their spiritual status. Here, however, al-Māturīdī is attributing to them
the deferment of all acts to God, by which he means determinism (al-jabr). This is confirmed in
al-Samarqandī’s Sharḥ, where ‘the innovating Murjiʾa’ (al-murjiʾa al-mubtadiʿa) are identified
as determinists (jabriyya) (fol. 21a) for believing that God’s servants are merely ‘like the tree
moving in the wind’ (kamā l-shajara tataharrak bi-l-rīḥ) (fol. 21b).
25 Here, al-Māturīdī is referring to the Ahl al-Sunna as the middle school. See Topaloğlu,
Te’vîlâtü’l-Kur’ân Tercümesi, p. 112.
26 These lines contain a group of metaphysical terms that have intricate differences in mean-
ing. Tadbīr (see fn. 21), is contrasted in this passage with taqdīr, which is translated as ‘realise’, in
the sense of to make real or concrete. Taqdīr is also often translated as ‘divine decree’, though that
reading has not been preferred here. The term fiʿl (act) is related to haraka (movement), and as
such it appears al-Māturīdī means action of the heart or, in other words, intention. Also in this pas-
sage, taqdīr is associated with khalaqa (create), and this association is one reason for the preferred
translation of ‘realise’ for the former. Al-Samarqandī phrases the matter slightly differently from
the Taʾwīlāt. He writes the correct school is the one which ‘recognises that performance of the
acquired act ( fʿilan kasban) belongs to the servant, and that the creation and decree (khalqan wa
taqdīran) belongs to God’ (Sharḥ, fol. 21b). The ‘acquirement’ mentioned might refer to either the
act made real for the individual by God or the moral significance and responsibility attached to it.
27 This hadith, as cited in Bayḥaqī’s al-Sunnan al-kubrā, “Kitāb ṣalāt al-khawf ”, reads: An
affair between two affairs, and the best of affairs is the moderate one (‫�أَ ْم ًرا َب ْي َن �أَ ْم َر ْي ِن َوخَ ْي ُر ال أ ُ ُمو ِر‬
ُ ‫( )�أَ ْو َسا‬Abū Bakr al-Bayḥaqī, al-Sunnan al-kubrā, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādīr ʿAṭā, Beirut:
‫ط َها‬
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003, vol. 3, p. 387), and is classed munqaṭiʿ (i. e. missing a single
narrator in its chain of transmission). It also is included in Shawkānī’s collection of mawḍūʿ
hadith (al-Fawāʾid, p. 251), as narrated by Bayḥaqī, and judged to be muʿḍal (i. e. missing one
or two narrators). Al-Samarqandī too cites in further support the Qurʾanic verse, ‘And thus We
made you a moderate nation’ (ummatan wasaṭan) (Q 2:143).
150 Kayhan Özaykal
Bibliography
Primary Text
Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr al-, Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, ed. Ahmet Vanlıoğlu and Bekir Topaloğlu,
Istanbul: Dār al-Mīzān, 2005, vol. 1, pp. 71–82.
Other Sources
Abdel Haleem, M. A. S. (trans.), The Qur’an, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Bayḥaqī, Abū Bakr al-, al-Sunnan al-kubrā, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādīr ʿAṭā, Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003, vol. 3.
Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr al-, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-Aẓīm. Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna, ed. Fāṭima
Yūsuf al-Khiyamī [or al-Khīmī], Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla Nāshirūn, 1425/2004 (5
vols.).
Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr al-, Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna. Tafsīr al-Māturīdī, ed. Majdī Bāsalūm,
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2005 (10 vols.).
Mâtürîdî, Ebû Mansûr el-, Te’vîlâtü’l-Kur’ân Tercümesi, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu, ed. Yusuf
Şevki Yavuz, Istanbul: Ensar, 2015, vol. 1.
Samarqandī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-, Sharḥ Taʾwīlāt al-Māturīdī, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Li-
brary, Hamidiye 176 [undated].
Shawkānī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-, al-Fawāʾid al-majmuʿa fī l-aḥādīth al-mawḍūʿa, ed.
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Yaḥyā al-Yamanī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya,
1960.
The Intellect as Instrument of Knowledge
Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100), Uṣūl al-dīn
Dale J. Correa
Ṣadr al-Islām Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn
ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) – better known as al-Qāḍī Abū l-Yusr
al-Pazdawī – is the brother of Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī, and hails from the
village of Bazda (Pazdah) near Nasaf (Nakhshab). Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad
al-Bazdawī was apparently so well known for his straightforward, clear writing
that he was given the name Abū l-Yusr (literally, the Father of Ease), whereas his
brother was known as the opposite: Abū l-ʿUsr (the Father of Hardship). Abū
l-Yusr was a teacher of law and Hadith in Bukhara, and eventually became the
qāḍī of Samarqand.1
Abū l-Yusr’s Uṣūl al-dīn (‘Roots of Religion’), a theological treatise, is one
of two known works attributed to the scholar. The other is Maʿrifat al-ḥujaj al-
sharʿiyya, a work of legal theory. Abū l-Yusr situates the Uṣūl al-dīn within the
Ḥanafī theological lineage of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), although
he notes that al-Māturīdī’s own works were quite difficult for him to understand
and utilise. Abū l-Yusr’s theological contribution can be understood as a clearly-
articulated explication of the Ḥanafī theological school in its post-formative
period.2
In the selected excerpt,3 Abū l-Yusr takes on the intellect (al-ʿaql) in a
theological context. In the first section, he deals with the intellect as a subtle,
physical instrument (āla) for attaining knowledge of things. He compares it to
the nose, eyes, ears, hand, and mouth as an instrument for acquiring knowledge.
Abū l-Yusr describes how the brain is the ‘seat’ of the intellect, but its effect
carries through to the heart. He goes so far as to cite a qudsī hadith in which
1 ʿAbd Allāh Kiyānī Farīd, “Bazdawī, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abū l-Yusr”, Dānish-
nāma-yi Jihān-i Islām/Encyclopaedia Islamica, Tehran: Bunyad-i Dayirah-yi al-Maʿāraf-I
Islāmī, 1993, vol. 3, available at: https://rch.ac.ir/article/Details/6657?‫ابوالیسر‬-‫محمد‬-‫بن‬-‫محمد‬-‫بزدوی‬
(accessed 11 October 2020).
2 Muhammed Aruçi, “Pezdevi, Ebü’l-Yüsr”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi,
3 ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Hans Peter Linss and Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-
Saqqā, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li l-Turāth, 2003, pp. 212–7.
152 Dale J. Correa
God declares that He will be worshipped, He will reward, and He will punish
through the intellect. This section sets the intellect apart as a distinctive human
anatomical and rational trait, created by God for the purpose of discernment of
the necessity to worship Him and be thankful to Him. The second section on the
necessity of the intellect goes into more detail as to whether or not God entails
faith through the intellect. Abū l-Yusr makes a point of highlighting the varying
scholarly opinions on this question within the Ḥanafī theological universe. After
some creative argumentative gymnastics, Abū l-Yusr manages to recover Abū
Ḥanīfa’s (d. 150/767) opinion through Abū l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/951) to
support the view he wishes to put forth: that humans are not required to have
knowledge of God’s existence before the coming of the Messengers, even with
their great intellect.
The Intellect as Instrument of Knowledge 153

‫ ‪154‬‬ ‫‪Dale J. Correa‬‬
‫مس أ�لة {‪ :}٧٤‬العقل �آلة لمعرفة الأشياء‪.‬‬

‫بالمرئيات‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أجمع �أهل القبلة �أ ّن العقل �آلة وقوع العلم بالأشياء‪ ،‬كالعين �آلة وقوع العلم‬
‫والأذن �آلة وقوع العلم بالمسموعات‪ ،‬والأنف �آلة وقوع العلم َ‬
‫بالم ْش ُمومات‪ ،‬والفم �آلة وقوع‬
‫العلم بالمذوقات واليد �آلة وقوع العلم بالملموسات‪ ،‬ل أ ّن اللّه تعالى �أجرى العادة �أ ّن العبد‬
‫�إن ّما يصير فاعالً بالآالت‪ ،‬و � إن لم تكن الآلة شرط وجود الفعل‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن اللّه تعالى فاعل بال‬
‫حق العباد‪ ،‬وهو جسم لطيف‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫�آلة‪ .‬واللّه تعالى خلق العقل وجعله �آل ًة لمعرفة الأشياء في‬
‫ُمضيء محلُّ ُه الر�أس عند عا ّمة �أهل الس�نّة والجماعة‪ .‬و�أثره يقع على القلب فيصير القلب‬
‫ك ًة بنور الشمس وبنور السراج الأشياء‪ .‬ف إ�ذا ق ّ‬
‫ل‬ ‫ُمد ِركاً بنور العقل الأشياء كالعين تصير ُمد ِر َ‬
‫النور �أو ضعف‪ ،‬ق ّ‬
‫ل الإ دراك وضعف‪ .‬و � إذا انعدم النور‪ ،‬انعدم الإ دراك‪ .‬وعند بعض المعتزلة‪:‬‬
‫العقل عرض‪ .‬وعند بعض الأشعرية‪ :‬العقل نوع علم‪.‬‬
‫ون﴾‪� ،4‬أي ال‬ ‫﴿ل َي ْع ِق ُل َ‬

‫ون َش ْيئاً َو َل َي ْه َت ُد َ‬ ‫وجه قول من يقول �إن ّه نوع علم‪� :‬أ ّن اللّه تعالى قال‪َ :‬‬
‫يعلمون‪ .‬وكذا الناس يقولون‪ :‬فالن ال يعقل شيئاً‪.‬‬
‫وجه قول من يقول � ّإن العقل عرض‪� :‬أن ّه يقال‪ :‬فالن عاقل من العقل‪ ،‬كما يقال عالم من‬
‫العلم وجالس من الجلوس‪ ،‬وهذا كلّه عرض‪ ،‬كذا هذا‪ .‬فعند هؤالء العقل كالصفاء للعين‬
‫في � إدراك الأشياء‪ ،‬وهو صفاء القلب‪.‬‬
‫وجه قول عا ّمة �أهل الس�نّة والجماعة‪ :‬حديث سمعناه من �أئ ّمتنا ب�أسانيد متّصلة �أ ّن النبي‬
‫فقلت‬
‫ُ‬ ‫خلقت شيئاً �أحسن من العقل‪،‬‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال خبراً عن اللّه �أن ّه قال‪“ :‬ما‬
‫فقلت‪ :‬بك �أ ُ ْع َب ُد وبك �أثيب وبك �أعاقب”‪ ،‬فدلّنا‬
‫ُ‬ ‫فقلت له‪ :‬ت�أخّ ر فت�أخّ ر‪،‬‬
‫ُ‬ ‫له‪ :‬تق ّدم فتق ّدم‪،‬‬
‫درك به الأشياء‪.‬‬‫نوراني تُ َ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫هذا الحديث على �أن ّه جسم لطيف‬
‫‪ 4‬سورة البقرة ‪.١٧٠/٢‬‬

Issue [74]: The Intellect is an Instrument for Knowing Things.

The people of the qibla have agreed that the intellect is an instrument for the
occurrence of knowledge of things, just as the eye is an instrument for the oc-
currence of knowledge of the visible, the ear is an instrument for the occurrence
of auditory knowledge, the nose is an instrument for the occurrence of olfactory
knowledge, the mouth is the instrument for the occurrence of gustatory knowl-
edge, and the hand is the instrument for the occurrence of tactile knowledge.
For God the Exalted has made it the norm that the servant only becomes a doer
through instruments, even if the instrument is not a condition for the existence
of the action. God the Exalted is an actor without any instrument. God the
Exalted created the intellect and made it an instrument for knowing things for
the servants. It [i. e. the intellect] is a subtle and illuminating body, its seat is
the head – in the opinion of the majority of ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa.5 Its effect
occurs on the heart, so the heart is able to perceive things through the light of
the intellect, just as the eye is able to perceive things through the light of the sun
and the light of the lamp. If the light lessens or is weak, so too does perception
lessen and weaken. If the light disappears, so too does perception. In the opinion
of some of the Muʿtazila, the intellect is an accident. In the opinion of some of the
Ashʿariyya, the intellect is a type of knowledge.
The argument of those who say that [the intellect] is a type of knowledge: that
God the Exalted said, ‘they did not use their reason at all, nor were they guided’
[Q 2:170]. That is: they did not know. Likewise, people say: so-and-so does not
know (yaʿqil) a thing.
The meaning of the statement of those who say that the intellect is an accident:
that it is said, so-and-so is intelligent from the ‘intellect’, just as it is said [so-
and-so] is knowledgeable [as derived lexicographically] from ‘knowledge’ and
[so-and-so] is sitting [as derived lexicographically] from ‘sitting’. All of that is an
accident, and so likewise this. In the opinion of these [people], the intellect is like
clarity for the eye in perceiving things, and it is the clarity of the heart.
The meaning of the statement of the totality of ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa: a hadith
which we have heard from our imams through connected chains of transmission
that the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, gave a report from
God that He said: ‘I have not created anything better than the intellect. I told it
to advance, it advanced. I told it to go back, it went back. So I told it, through you
I will be worshipped; through you I will reward; and through you I will punish.’6
We have evinced this hadith to [show] that [the intellect] is a subtle, illuminating
body through which things are perceived.
5 Al-Bazdawī intends by ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa his Sunnī, primarily (though not ex-
clusively) Ḥanafī colleagues.
6 For the hadith, see Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-
Wafāʾ, 1983, vol. 1, pp. 96–7.
‫القلب الأشياء‪ ،‬و � إليه �أشار‬

‫ُ‬ ‫وقال �أكثر العلماء‪ّ � :‬إن محلّه الدماغ و�أثره في القلب‪ ،‬بنوره ُيدرِك‬
‫س غيره زال عقله‪ .‬فجعلوا العقل في الر�أس‪ .‬وبهذا‬ ‫�أصحابنا ف إ�ن ّهم قالوا‪ � :‬إذا ضرب � إنسان ر�أ َ‬
‫الحديث يبطل ما قالوا‪ ،‬ولكن يقال عقل � إذا علم كما يقال �أبصر � إذا علم ل أ ّن بالعقل يعلم‪،‬‬
‫ويقال فالن عاقل �أي عالم ل أ ّن العقل ُيذكَر ويراد به العلم‪ ،‬ويقال عاقل �أي ذو عقل كما‬
‫يقال تامر والبن‪� ،‬أي ذو تمر وذو لبن‪.‬‬
‫مس أ�لة {‪ :}٧٥‬هل العقل موجب؟ والقول في الإ يمان باللّه تعالى وبما يجب‪.‬‬
‫ٍ‬
‫شيء ما � ّإل بالخطاب من اللّه‬ ‫قال عا ّمة �أهل الس�نّة والجماعة‪ :‬ال يجب على العاقل �أداء‬
‫تعالى على لسان واحد من عباده‪ ،‬وكذا ال يجب عليه االمتناع عن شيء ما � ّإل به‪ .‬وبه‬
‫قال الأشعري‪.‬‬
‫وعند المعتزلة‪ :‬يجب الإ يمان باللّه تعالى والشكر له قبل بلوغ الخطاب‪ .‬وهل يجب عندهم‬
‫الإ قرار بالرسل؟ عند بعضهم يجب الإ قرار بجملة الرسل ال بالأعيان‪ ،‬وعند بعضهم ال‬
‫يجب‪.‬‬
‫وقال الشيخ �أبو منصور الماتريدي بمثل ما قالت المعتزلة‪ ،‬وهو قول عا ّمة علماء سمرقند‬
‫وبعض علمائنا من �أهل العراق‪ .‬وقد ذكر الكرخي في مختصره عن �أبي حنيفة �أن ّه قال‪ :‬ال‬
‫حد في معرفة الخالق لِما َي َرى في العا َلم من �آيات الحدوث‪ ،‬و�أئ ّمة ُبخارى الذين‬
‫ُعذر ل أ ٍ‬
‫ب؟ عند الفريق‬
‫وج ٌ‬ ‫شاهدناهم كانوا على القول ال أ ّول‪ ،‬والمس�ألة تُعرف ب�أ ّن العقل هل هو ُم ِ‬
‫وجب‪ .‬وهذا مجاز من الكالم‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن العقل ال يكون‬ ‫موجب‪ .‬وعند الفريق الثاني ُم ِ‬‫ال أ ّول غير ِ‬
‫موجباً‪.‬‬
‫فاللّه تعالى هو الموجب لكن بسبب العقل‪ ،‬فيكون العقل عندهم سبباً للوجوب‪ .‬وفائدة‬
‫االختالف‪� :‬أ ّن َمن لم تبلغه الدعوة من رسول ما وال دعوة رسول من رسله ولم يؤمن‪ ،‬هل‬
‫يخلّد في النار؟ […]‬
Most of the scholars have said: [the intellect’s] seat is the brain, and its effect is
in the heart; through its light, the heart perceives things. Our colleagues have
[also] pointed to this, for they have said: if a person hits the head of another, his
intellect is erased. So they have set the intellect in the head. With this hadith,
what they have said is invalidated. However, it is said that one reasons when
one knows, just as it is said that one perceives when one knows; because one
knows through the intellect. It is also said, so-and-so is an intelligent individu-
al – that is, knowing, because the intellect is mentioned and what is meant by it
is knowledge. [Additionally,] it is said [one is] an intelligent individual – that is,
one has intelligence, just as it is said tāmir and lābin – that is, one who has dates,
and one who has milk.
Issue [75]: Is the Intellect Necessitating? And the Doctrine on Faith in God the
Exalted and by What It Is Necessitated.
The majority of ahl al-sunna waʾl-jamāʿa have said: it is not necessary for the
intelligent person to discharge any [duty] except by address from God the
Exalted through the tongue of one of His servants. Likewise, it is not necessary
for [the intelligent person] to refrain from performing [any acts] except by (His
address). This is the opinion of al-Ashʿarī.
In the opinion of the Muʿtazila, faith in God the Exalted is necessary, as well
as gratitude to Him, before [God’s] address has reached [a people]. Is it their
opinion that stated belief in the Messengers is necessary? In the opinion of
some of them, it is necessary to affirm the Messengers as a whole though not as
individuals; while for some others of them [i. e. the Muʿtazila], it is not necessary.
Shaykh Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī said the same as the Muʿtazila said, and it is
the opinion of the majority of the [Ḥanafī] scholars of Samarqand and some of
our [Ḥanafī] scholars from Iraq. Al-Karkhī has mentioned in his abridgment
of [a work by] Abū Ḥanīfa that [the latter] said: there is no excuse for anyone
in knowing the Creator, based on what one sees in the world of signs of [the
world’s] creation. The imams of Bukhārā that we have met held the first opinion.
The issue is known to be: [whether or not] the intellect can necessitate [belief in
God]? The first group holds that [the intellect] cannot necessitate it. The second
group holds that [the intellect] can necessitate it, and this is metaphorically ex-
pressed in speech; [in reality] the intellect does not necessitate [faith].
It is God the Exalted who makes it necessary, but through the cause of the
intellect. Thus, the intellect, in their opinion, is a cause of necessitation. The
result of this difference of opinion is [the question]: is the one to whom no Mes-
senger’s call to faith has arrived, nor the call to faith of any messenger [preaching
on behalf of ] the Messengers of God, and who does not believe, condemned to
the Fire for eternity? […]
‫ف إ�ن قالوا‪ :‬يستحيل �أن تكون معرفة اللّه تعالى غير واجباً عليه‪.‬‬
‫ثم نقول‪ :‬ال يستحيل‪ ،‬ل أ ّن وجوب شيء من اللّه تعالى هو �أن ي�أمره‬ ‫فنقول‪ :‬لم يستح ِيل؟ ّ‬
‫اللّه تعالى بتحصيله‪ ،‬وال يستحيل �أن ال ي�أمر اللّه تعالى عباده بمعرفته‪ ،‬ول أ ّن الواجب ما‬
‫مدح على تحصيله و ُيالم على تركه‪ ،‬وال يستحيل �أن ال يمدح اللّه تعالى � إنساناً بمعرفته‬
‫ُي َ‬
‫وال يذ ّم بترك معرفته‪.‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قالوا‪ :‬الكفر مسخوط اللّه تعالى‪ ،‬فيجب تركه‪ ،‬وتركه ال يتحقّق � ّإل بالإ يمان‪.‬‬
‫فنقول‪ :‬ما الذي �أردتم بالمسخوط؟‬

‫ف إ�ن قالوا‪ :‬نريد به‪ :‬غير مرضي‪.‬‬
‫فنقول‪ � :‬إن كان غير مرضي لماذا يجب تركه؟ ف إ� ّن الواجب ما ُيمدح على تحصيله و ُيالم‬
‫على تركه ويعاقب‪ ،‬وال يستحيل �أن ال يعاقب اللّه � إنساناً على الكفر‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه ال يعاقب في‬
‫الدنيا‪ ،‬وكذا ال ُيليم عليه كما في الدنيا‪.‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قالوا‪ :‬ما روى الكرخي عن �أبي حنيفة يدلُّ على �أ ّن الإ يمان واجب دون بعث الرسل‪،‬‬
‫وهكذا روى الحاكم الجليل في المنتقى عن �أبي حنيفة‪ .‬و � إذا كان المذهب عن �أبي‬
‫التمسك به على من يعتقد مذهب �أبي حنيفة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫حنيفة هكذا‪ ،‬يجب‬
‫فنقول‪ :‬يحتمل �أن ّه �أراد به بعد مجيء الرسل‪ ،‬على �أ ّن الصحيح �أن ّه �أراد به هكذا‪ ،‬ل أ ّن‬
‫الإ نسان ال يقدر �أن ينظر في الآيات الشتغاله باللهو وب�أعمال الدنيا � ّإل بعد ٍ‬
‫داع يدعوه � إلى‬
‫ل � إنسان الت�أ ّمل‬
‫الحواس؛ ال يقدر ك ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الت�أ ُّمل والنظر في الآيات‪ ،‬كما في جميع ما غاب عن‬
‫داع يدعوه � إلى الت�أ ّمل في الدالئل‪ .‬فيكون المراد منه بعد بعث الرسل‪ ،‬لأن ّه ال‬
‫ٍ‬ ‫فيه � ّإل بعد‬
‫يقدر على الت�أ ّمل قبل ذلك غالباً‪ ،‬وهكذا الجواب عن احتجاجهم بالنصوص‪.‬‬
If they say: It is impossible that knowledge of God the Exalted is not necessary
for [a human being].
Then we say: Why is it impossible? We [follow this by] saying: It is not impos-
sible because the necessitation of something from God the Exalted, is that God
the Exalted commands its attainment. It is not impossible that God the Exalted
did not command His servants to have knowledge of Him, because the ‘necessa-
ry’ is that which one is praised for attaining and reproached for abandoning. It
is not impossible that God the Exalted would not honour a person for knowing
Him and not criticise for abandoning knowledge of Him.
If they say: Disbelief is loathed by God the Exalted, so its abandonment is nec-
essary, and its abandonment is not realised except through faith.
Then we say: What do you mean by ‘loathed by’?
Then if they say: We mean by it, ‘not pleasing to’.
Thus, we say: If He were not pleased with it, then why is its abandonment nec-
essary? Surely what is required is what is praiseworthy in its attainment, and
reproachful for its abandonment and punishable. It is not impossible that God
not punish a person for disbelief. He does not punish in this world, and likewise
He does not reproach like He would in this world.
If they say: What al-Karkhī related from Abū Ḥanīfa indicates that faith is nec-
essary [even] without the sending of the Messengers. Al-Ḥākim al-Jalīl7 related
likewise from Abū Ḥanīfa in al-Muntaqā. If the madhhab of Abū Ḥanīfa puts it
this way, then one who professes adherence to the madhhab of Abū Ḥanīfa must
hold to that opinion.
We say: It is possible that he meant by this ‘after the arrival of the Messengers’.
The correct [interpretation] is that he meant something similar, because the
human being is not capable of investigating the signs [of God] due to their pre-
occupation with trivial matters and the work of this world except after a caller [to
faith] calls them to contemplate and investigate the signs [of God] – just as with
all that is absent from the senses. No human being can contemplate this except
after a caller [to faith] calls them to contemplation of the indicators. Thus, what
is meant by this is after the sending of the Messengers, because one is generally
incapable of contemplating before that, in most cases, and this is also the re-
sponse to their argumentation based on scriptural texts.
7 Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd ibn
Ismāʿīl ibn al-Ḥākim, known as al-Ḥākim al-Marwazī (d. 334/945).
160 Dale J. Correa
Bibliography
Primary Text
Bazdawī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-, Uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Hans Peter Linss and Aḥmad Ḥijāzī
al-Saqqā, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li l-Turāth, 2003, pp. 212–7.
Other Sources
Aruçi, Muhammed, “Pezdevi, Ebü’l-Yüsr”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi,
Farīd, ʿAbd Allāh Kiyānī, “Bazdawī, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abū l-Yusr”, Dānish-
nāma-yi Jihān-i Islām/Encyclopaedia Islamica, Tehran: Bunyad-i Dayirah-yi al-
Maʿāraf-I Islāmī, 1993, vol. 3, available at: https://rch.ac.ir/article/Details/6657? -‫بزدوی‬
‫ابوالیسر‬-‫محمد‬-‫بن‬-‫( محمد‬accessed 11 October 2020).
Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir al-, Biḥār al-anwār, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Wafāʾ, 1983, vol. 1.
The Nature of Faith
Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390),
Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid
Najah Nadi
The linguist-cum-theologian Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī (d.

792/1390) is a prominent scholarly figure within the Māturīdī and Ashʿarī
theological traditions. Whether he himself maintained an affiliation with the
Ashʿarīs or Māturīdīs is a contested idea. It is perhaps the most famous contro-
versy concerning al-Taftāzānī in historical and contemporary accounts on his
life and scholarship. We lack any self-pronouncements from al-Taftāzānī’s side
concerning his legal or theological madhhab-affiliations, and his writings dis-
play clear advocacy of both Maturīdī and Ashʿarī doctrines. Nonetheless, due to
the widespread acclaim of his commentary on the famous Māturīdī theological
manual, al-ʿAqāʾid al-nasafiyya, and his appointment as the grand judge (qāḍī
l-quḍāh) at the Ḥanafī court in Sarakhs, al-Taftāzānī has been mostly associated
with the Māturīdī tradition. The originality of al-Taftāzānī’s thought, as I argued
elsewhere,1 is best seen in his concern with critical verification of knowledge
(taḥqīq), spurning madhhab-affiliations.
The subjects of al-Taftāzānī’s writings cover the breadth of religious and lit-
erary topics from theology, theoretical jurisprudence, practical jurisprudence,
and Arabic logic to Hadith, Qur’anic exegesis, Arabic rhetoric, morphology, and
Sufism. Al-Taftāzānī’s works on theology, morphology, and rhetoric enjoyed an
almost universal interest in the various pre-modern and modern Islamic centres
of education – from Egypt’s al-Azhar, the Ottoman courts, and Safavid madrasas
to the madrasas in the Indian subcontinent. Yet, al-Taftāzānī’s most original
theological work, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, a commentary on his own Maqāṣid al-
ṭālibīn, received little attention in pre-modern and modern studies. Authored in
Samarqand in 784/1383, it was his last theological work. The passage presented
in this contribution is from this magnum opus and is an example of al-Taftāzānī’s
method of taḥqīq.
1 Najah Nadi, Theorising the Relationship between Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh, PhD Diss., Ox-
ford University, 2018.
162 Najah Nadi
The passage is an excerpt from the sixth section (maqṣid) on matters known
through revelation (samʿiyyāt), discussing the nature of īmān (commonly trans-
lated as faith or belief ).2 In the introduction to his book, al-Taftāzānī states that
the epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical maqṣids or objectives of the
book are geared toward serving the establishment of al-samʿiyyāt. This passage is
a good example of how al-Taftāzānī actually uses his epistemology and ontology
sections to support creedal matters. It also shows the interconnectivity between
the three spheres in understanding the essential concept of īmān. Al-Taftāzānī
argues that assent (taṣdīq) in the normative definition of īmān as (the acceptance
of the heart – taṣdīq al-qalb) is identical to the logical conception of assent (taṣdīq)
as understood by Muslim logicians.3 Further, al-Taftāzānī brings an ontological
depth to his discussion by arguing that religious commands (awāmir) are not
restricted, in their existence, to the category of action; they can also pertain to
the category of quality.4 Hence, the essence of īmān, as a religious command,
2 Translating īmān in the Islamic context as faith or belief are both problematic. Faith, in the
Christian sense, for example, is a non-evidentiary state of certitude; while in Islamic theology,
īmān is a state of certitude and acceptance that is either based on knowledge of the proofs
themselves or knowledge of a trusted person’s knowledge of those proofs, namely, imitation.
As for the term belief, it is better suited to the Arabic term iʿtiqād, which mostly refers to such
acceptance with no regard to the existence or non-existence of proofs. I have thus chosen to
keep the Arabic term, īmān, untranslated.
3 In his seminal work, Knowledge Triumphant, Franz Rosenthal explains that although
the equation of īmān and taṣdīq came about around 800, it was the Ashʿarīs who significantly
injected this notion into their theological discussions. He adds that this practice might have
been influenced by the newly introduced discussions on Greek philosophy. See Franz Rosen-
thal, Knowledge Triumphant. The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1970,
pp. 100–2. Wilfred Smith has also used, among other texts, parts of al-Taftāzānī’s statements
used here to conclude that taṣdīq indeed denotes an intellectual process. See Wilfred C. Smith
“Faith as Taṣdīq”, Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge, Albany NY: SUNY
Press, 1979, pp. 96–119. Also see Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology.
A Semantic Analysis of Imān and Islām, Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies,
1965.
4 The Aristotelian Categories is a system of classifying existing beings into ten categories, or
high genii, (substance, quality, quantity, relatives, being in time, place, position, having, acting,
and being acted upon). It is part of his Organon and it provides the framework for his philo-
sophical thinking. This system has been adopted and appropriated by Muslim logicians in what
is termed (al-maʿqūlāt al-ʿashr), starting as a section in works of kalām and falsafa and slowly
becoming an independent genre of writing in post-classical works. Most Muslim theologians
only accept three or four out of the ten categories, including the category of quality as it partly
provides the framework for their sections on epistemology. Al-Taftāzānī classifies the category
of quality into four types: a) sensory qualities, the five senses, b) qualities inhering in the soul,
such as all types of apprehension (idrāk), c) qualities specific to quantities, such as dimensional
qualities, and d) potential qualities, such as the potentiality of being or not being sick, broken,
etc. The category of action or acting (an yaf ʿal), however, is mainly concerned, al-Taftāzānī
explains, with effecting the occurrence of something (taʾthīr al-shayʾ fī ghayrihi). The section
on this category is usually combined with its sister category, being acted upon (an yanfaʿil).
Both are theorising the requirements for the occurrence of an action in the external world,
and the effective relationship between this action, and the actor, in the state of acting, and the
acted upon, in such a state. Al-Taftāzānī, citing al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), explains that there is one
The Nature of Faith 163
he concludes, is the quality of the intellect rather than the actions of limbs, as
argued by those who claim commands must be within the category of action to
conclude that the essence of īmān is actions. The deficiency of their argument is
extensively discussed in the sections following the section presented here.
comprehensive example of these two categories, that is, the changing and moving in the case of
an yafʿal, and being changed and moved, in the case of an yanfaʿil. All forms of acting, such as
building, making, burning, etc, fall under this example of changing and moving. Al-Taftāzānī,
citing Ibn Sīnā (d. 427/1037), explains that after the occurrence of the action in the external
world, it moves from the realm of these two categories to either the category of quantity or the
category of quality, depending on the action. Hence, the name acting (an yafʿal) is preferred
over the name action ( fiʿl). This is also why many theologians, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.
606/1209), claim that these two categories are only mentally existent and should not be amongst
the categories. Understanding the limitation of the category of acting and its non-subsisting
nature, al-Taftāzānī builds his understanding of īmān as a subsisting quality rather than the state
of ‘acting’ upon the command to believe. He is not denying that some commands, such as the
command to pray, would validly be placed under the category of acting as the person praying is
engaged in this ‘acting’ from the beginning to the end of the prayer. This is not the case of īmān
which is understood as subsistent thing, as we will see in the section below. For the Aristotelian
system of Categories, see Paul Studtmann, “Aristotle’s Categories”, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2018/entries/aristotle-categories/ (accessed 16 June 2020). For al-Taftāzānī’s discussion of
these categories, see Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, Istanbul:
Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥājj Muḥarram al-Busnawī, 1305/1887, vol. 1, pp. 200, 222, 229, 254, 285–6.
‫ ‪164‬‬ ‫‪Najah Nadi‬‬
‫مجرد فعل اللسان‪ ،‬الثاني‪� :‬أن ّه‬

‫ّ‬ ‫قال‪ :‬لنا مقامات‪ ،‬ال أ ّول‪� :‬أ ّن الإ يمان فعل القلب دون‬
‫التصديق دون المعرفة واالعتقاد‪ ،‬والثالث‪� :‬أ ّن الأعمال ليست داخلة فيه بحيث ينتفي هو‬
‫بانتفائها‪]…[ 5.‬‬
‫شك �أ ّن التصديق المعتبر في الإ يمان هو ما يعبّر عنه في الفارسيّة بـ“كرويدن‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ونحن نقول‪ :‬ال‬
‫وباوركردن وراست كوى داشتن” � إذا �أضيف � إلى الحاكم‪ ،‬و“راست داشتن وحق داشتن”‬
‫مجرد العلم والمعرفة الخالي عن هذا المعنى‪ .‬لكن ههنا‬
‫ّ‬ ‫� إذا �أضيف � إلى الحكم‪ .‬وال يكفي‬
‫مواضع نظر‪ ،‬ومطارح فكر ال ب ّد من التنبيه عليها‪ ،‬وال غنى من الإ شارة � إليها‪.‬‬
‫‪5 Al-Taftāzānī,‬‬ ‫‪Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 2, p. 249.‬‬

He [Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī in his Maqāṣid al-ṭālibīn upon which this is com-
mentary] said: We have (a few) assertions: Firstly, īmān is the action of the heart,
not merely the action of the tongue. Secondly, it is assent (taṣdīq), not merely
knowledge (maʿrifa)6 or belief (iʿtiqād). Thirdly, actions are not intrinsic to it [i. e.
īmān] such that, were they to be absent, it would not be negated. […]
We say [concerning the second assertion]: there is no doubt that assent (taṣdīq)
considered as [part of the definition of] īmān7 is that which is expressed in the
Persian language by [the terms] ‘to accept, to believe, and to hold something as
truthful’8 when connected to the one making a judgment, and ‘to be true and
right’9 when connected to the judgment itself. Mere knowledge or cognisance
which lacks this meaning does not suffice [as īmān].10 Yet, there are, in this issue,
areas of investigation and further thinking to which we must alert you, as there
is no escaping their mention.
6 It should be noted that the Arabic terms, ʿilm and maʿrifa, each have more than one sense.
In one sense, they are synonyms. In another sense, they are defined in opposition to each other.
In our author’s usage, when he uses them together, he intends to bring out their opposition
(e. g. the last paragraph of this text), but when he uses them separately (e. g. this passage), he
merely intends the general meaning of ‘knowledge’, thus using them as synonyms. My trans-
lation follows this usage.
7 That is the normative definition which states that īmān is the acceptance of the heart
(taṣdīq al-qalb). For the linguistic usage of īmān and taṣdīq as synonyms, see Azharī (d.
369/980), al-Tahdhīb, “alif-mīm-nūn” and “ṣād-dāl-qāf”; Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004), Maqāyīs, “alif-
mīm-nūn”; and Ibn Manẓūr (630–711/1233-ca.1312), Lisān al-ʿArab, “alif-mīm-nūn”, which
states: ‘the people of knowledge, linguists and others, agree that īmān means taṣdīq’.
8 Geravīdan va bāvar kardan va rast kavá dashtan.
9 Rāst dāshtan va ḥaqq dāshtan.
10 The original paragraph contains both Arabic and Persian and is somewhat obscure.
However, the point being made here, though it is a semantic point, will be relevant to the
arguments unfolding in the next passage.
‫ ‪166‬‬ ‫‪Najah Nadi‬‬
‫ال أ ّول‪� :‬أن ّه ليس معنى كون الم�أمور به مقدوراً واختياريّاً �أن ّه يلزم �أن يكون الب�تّة من مقولة الفعل‬
‫يصح تعلّق‬
‫ّ‬ ‫العقلية‪ ،‬بل �أن‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الخارجية‪ ،‬دون االعتبارات‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫التي ربما ينازع في كونها من الأعيان‬
‫قدرته به‪ ،‬وحصوله بكسبه واختياره‪ ،‬سواء كان في نفسه من الأوضاع والهيئات‪ ،‬كالقيام‬
‫َاع َل ْم �أَنَّ ُه َل � إِ َل َه � إ َِّل ُه َو﴾‪﴿ ،11‬قُلِ ا ْن ُ‬
‫ظ ُروا َماذَا فِي‬ ‫الكيفيات‪ ،‬كالعلم والنظر‪﴿ ،‬ف ْ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والقعود‪� ،‬أو‬
‫َ‬
‫ات َو ْال أ ْرضِ ﴾‪� ،12‬أو االنفعاالت‪ ،‬كالتسخّ ن‬ ‫او ِ‬
‫والتبرد‪ ،‬والحركات والسكنات‪ ،‬وغير‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫الس َم َ‬
‫َّ‬
‫ذلك‪ ،‬كالصالة‪� ،‬أو التروك‪ ،‬كالصوم‪ � ،‬إلى غير ذلك‪ .‬ومع هذا فالواجب المقدور المثاب‬
‫مجرد � إيقاعها؛ فكون الإ يمان م�أموراً به‬
‫ّ‬ ‫عليه بحكم الشرع يكون نفس تلك الأمور‪ ،‬ال‬
‫نفسانية يكتسبها المكلّف بقدرته واختياره‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫كيفية‬
‫ّ‬ ‫اختياريّاً مقدوراً مثاباً عليه ال ينافي كونه‬
‫بتوفيق اللّه تعالى وهدايته‪ .‬على �أن ّه لو لزم كون الم�أمور به هو الفعل بمعنى الت�أثير جاز �أن‬
‫يكون معنى الأمر بالإ يمان الأمر ب إ�يقاعه واكتسابه وتحصيله‪ ،‬كما في سائر الواجبات‪.‬‬
‫‪ 11‬سورة محمد ‪.١٩/٤٧‬‬

‫‪ 12‬سورة يونس ‪.١٠١/١٠‬‬
Firstly, it is not necessary for a command to be from the category of action in

order that it be possible to fulfil it and for one to have choice [regarding fulfilling
it] – in spite of the fact that one may argue that it is an external entity, not a [mere]
rational consideration. Rather, it means that [the commanded thing] must be
such that it is valid for the power, choice, and acquisition of [the one being com-
manded] to attach to it. This would equally include [A] that which, in and of itself,
is a type of posture or position, such as standing and sitting; or [B] a quality,13
such as knowledge and speculation, [just as referred to in the following verses:]
‘Know that there is no God but’ He [Q 47:19], ‘Say: Behold what is in the heavens
and the earth’ [Q 10:101]; or [C] instances of being acted upon,14 such as becom-
ing hot or cold, movement and stillness; and [D] other than that, such as prayer
[which is an action], or abstentions, such as fasting, and so on. In spite of this,
obligatory matters that are both possible and rewardable due to a religious ruling
are the [above mentioned] matters themselves, not merely their occurrence. Ac-
cordingly, īmān being commanded, possible, and subject to choice and reward,
does not contradict its being a quality inhering in the soul that the responsible
person acquires by means of their own power and choice, through the support
and guidance of God the Exalted. Even were it necessary for a matter that is
commanded to be an action, in the sense of bringing about an effect, it would be
possible that the meaning of the command to have īmān is a command to bring
it about, acquire it, or attain it, just as is the case regarding all other obligations.
13 That is the category of quality (maqūlat al-kayf ).

14 That is the category of being acted upon (maqūlat al-infiʿāl).
‫ ‪168‬‬ ‫‪Najah Nadi‬‬
‫فن المنطق‪ ،‬والثقة في تفسير �ألفاظه‪ ،‬وشرح معانيه‪،‬‬ ‫الثاني‪� :‬أ ّن ابن سينا وهو القدوة في ّ‬
‫المعبر عنه‬
‫َّ‬ ‫التصور هو بعينه اللغوي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫صرح ب�أ ّن التصديق المنطقي الذي قسم العلم � إليه و � إلى‬
‫ّ‬
‫في الفارسيّة بـ“كرويدن” المقابل للتكذيب‪ ،‬قال في كتابه المس ّمى بــدانش نامه عالئي‪:‬‬
‫“دانش دوكونه است يكي دربافتن ودررسيدن و�آنرا بتازى تصور خوانند ودوم كرويدن و�آنرا‬
‫بتازى تصديق خوانند”‪ .‬وهذا صريح ب�أ ّن ثاني قسمي العلم هو المعنى الذي يوضع ب إ�زائه‬
‫ونفي لما عسى يذهب � إليه‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫لفظ التصديق في لغة العرب‪ ،‬و“كرويدن” في لغة الفرس‪،‬‬
‫معاند من �أ ّن “كرويدن” في المنطق غيره في اللغة‪ .‬وقال في الشفاء‪“ :‬التصديق في قولك‬
‫البياض عرض هو �أن يحصل في الذهن نسبة صورة هذا الت�أليف � إلى الأشياء �أنفسها �أن ّها‬
‫مطابقة لها‪ ،‬والتكذيب يخالف ذلك”‪ .‬فلم يجعل التصديق حصول النسبة التا ّمة في‬
‫الذهن على ما يفهمه البعض‪ ،‬بل حصول �أن ينسب الذهن الثبوت �أو االنتفاء الذي بين‬
‫طرفي المؤلَّف � إلى ما في نفس الأمر بالمطابقة‪ ،‬ومعناه نسبة الحكم � إلى الصدق‪� ،‬أعني‪:‬‬
‫وبينه ب�أن ّه ض ّد التكذيب الذي معناه النسبة � إلى الكذب‪� ،‬أعني‪:‬‬
‫“صادق داشتن وكرويدن”‪ّ .‬‬
‫“كاذب داشتن”‪.‬‬
Secondly, Ibn Sīnā – who is the model in the art of logic, the trustworthy one
in interpreting its expressions and explaining its meanings – states that logical
taṣdīq, into which knowledge is divided alongside taṣawwur, is exactly the lin-
guistic meaning expressed in Persian as geravīdan and contrasted with denying
(takdhīb), as he says in his book, Dānish-nāmeh ʿAlāʾī :15 ‘Knowledge is two
types: the first is simple apprehension and grasping, which is called taṣawwur in
Arabic. The second is geravīdan, which they call taṣdīq in Arabic’. This is explicit
that the second of the two sub-divisions of knowledge is the meaning to which
the expression taṣdīq is assigned in the language of Arabs, and geravīdan in the
language of Persians. This also refutes what might be claimed by an intransigent
person, that geravīdan in logic is different than it is in language. He [i. e. Ibn Sīnā]
said in al-Shifā’: ‘The assent [which occurs] in your statement, “Whiteness is an
accident”, is that there obtain in the mind the relation between the form of this
[verbal] composition and the things themselves – that it is adequate to them –
whereas denial is opposed to this’. Thus, he did not make assent the occurrence
of the predication in the mind, as understood by some. Rather, [it is] the occur-
rence that the mind attributes the affirmation or negation that is between the two
terms of the [verbal] composition16 being adequate to things in themselves.17 The
meaning of the [latter understanding] is to relate the judgment to truthfulness,
I mean holding it to be truthful or accepting it. He [i. e. Ibn Sīnā] has clarified
[this meaning by stating that] its opposite is denial, which means judge some-
thing to be untruthful, by which I mean what is called [in Persian] ‘to be false’.18
15 Dānish-nāmeh ʿAlāʾī was partly translated from the original Persian to English by Farhang
Zabeeh, see Farhang Zabeeh (ed. and trans.), Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic. Part one of Danesh-
nama Alai. A Concise Philosophical Encyclopaedia and Autobiography, The Hague: Nijhoff,
1971. The book is used by al-Taftāzānī as an authority of what the logical terms taṣawwur and
taṣdīq mean according to a logician. Ibn Sina classifies knowledge, in Persian, and uses their
equivalent Arabic terms to show the similarity between Arabic and Persian terms in logic. The
significance of the Persian terms is not as clear as al-Taftāzānī makes it seem. However, his
argument that the use of taṣdīq in logic and theology is the same stands clear.
16 That is the subject and predicate of a proposition.
17 The difference between the two understandings of taṣdīq is that the first is concerned
with the truthfulness of the proposition while the second is concerned with the role of the
intellect in arriving at and accepting such a truthfulness. This second understanding allows
for taṣdīq being within religious commands and under the category of quality while the first
restricts it to the realm of ‘actions.’
18 kādhib dashtan.
‫ ‪170‬‬ ‫‪Najah Nadi‬‬
‫اختياري هو الإ يقاع �أو االنتزاع‪ ،‬فكيف يكون نفس‬

‫ّ‬ ‫وبهذا يندفع ما يقال � إن الحكم فعل‬
‫ِ‬
‫التصديق �أو جزؤه والتصديق قسم من العلم الذي هو من مقولة الكيف �أو االنفعال؟ ونعم‬
‫ما قال َمن قال‪ :‬الإ سناد والإ يقاع ونحو ذلك �ألفاظ وعبارات‪ .‬والتحقيق �أنه ليس للنفس‬
‫ههنا ت�أثير وفعل‪ ،‬بل � إذعان وقبول‪ ،‬و � إدراك �أن النسبة واقعة �أو ليست بواقعة‪ .‬نعم‪ ،‬حصول‬
‫هذا التصديق قد يكون بالكسب‪� ،‬أي‪ :‬مباشرة الأسباب باالختيار‪ ،‬ك إ�لقاء الذهن‪ ،‬وصرف‬
‫كمن وقع عليه الضوء فعلم �أ ّن‬
‫الحواس‪ ،‬وما �أشبه ذلك‪ ،‬وقد يكون بدونه‪َ ،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫النظر‪ ،‬وتوجيه‬
‫الشمس طالعة‪ .‬والم�أمور به يجب �أن يكون من ال أ ّول‪.‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬فاليقين الحاصل بدون الإ ذعان والقبول بل مع الجحود واالستكبار‪ ،‬كما‬
‫التصور دون التصديق‪ ،‬وهو ظاهر البطالن‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫للسوفسطائي ولبعض الكفّار‪ ،‬يكون من قبيل‬
‫قلنا‪ :‬نحن ال ن ّدعي � ّإل كون التصديق المنطقي –على ما ّ‬
‫يفسره رئيسهم ال على ما يفهمه‬
‫المعبر عنه بـ“كرويدن”‪،‬‬
‫َّ‬ ‫وحلج‪ – ‬هو التصديق اللغوي المقابل للتكذيب‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫نساج‬
‫ل ّ‬ ‫ك ّ‬
‫بت القول و � إطباق القوم على �أ ّن المعتبر في الإ يمان هو اللغوي دون‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫حينئذ ّ‬ ‫يصح‬
‫ّ‬ ‫و�أن ّه ال‬
‫المنطقي‪ ،‬بل غايته �أن ّه يجب اشتراط �أمور‪ ،‬كاالختيار وترك الجحود واالستكبار‪ .‬و�أ ّما �أن ّه‬
‫تصوراً �أو خارجاً‬
‫ّ‬ ‫يلزم على قصد تقسيمه وتفسيره كون اليقين الخالي عن الإ ذعان والقبول‬
‫التصور والتصديق‪ ،‬فذلك بحث �آخر‪ ،‬لكن الكالم في � إمكان الإ يقان بدون الإ ذعان‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫عن‬
‫[…]‬
Through the above, [we] refute what has been claimed that [since] a judgment
is an act of choice which is the performance or abstaining from performance [of
an action], how could it be identical to an assent or a part of an assent, while an
assent is a type of knowledge that falls under the category of quality or being
acted upon? How truly the one spoke who said: ‘predication and occurrence
are [mere] expressions and phrases’. The verified opinion is that the soul has
no action and causal efficacy in this matter [i. e. īmān,] but only to submit19,
accept, and apprehend, that a propositional relation has or has not occurred.
Indeed, this assent could be achieved through acquisition – i. e. taking the means
by choice, such as releasing the intellect, leading the investigation, and directing
the senses [to the evidences], and the like – and it could also happen without any
of these, such as a person upon whom rays of light have fallen, so they know that
the sun has risen. The commands must be from the first type.
If it is argued that were certitude to exist separate from submission and ac-
ceptance – but rather with denial and arrogance, such as occurs with sophists
and some unbelievers – it would be a type of conception, rather than an assent;
which is clearly invalid. We respond: we are claiming nothing except that the log-
ical taṣdīq, as interpreted by their master [i. e. the logicians’], not as understood
by any weaver or wool-carder, is the linguistic taṣdīq that contrasts denying
(takdhīb), which is expressed [in Persian] as geravīdan. It is not then valid for
people to fixate on, nor agree on, the claim that what is considered sufficient
regarding īmān is the linguistic [meaning], not the logical. Indeed, the most that
can be argued is that there must be conditions of matters like choice, absence of
denial and arrogance [for īmān to be valid]. As for the issue that this categorisa-
tion and interpretation (of taṣdīq) entails that certitude lacking submission and
acceptance is a conception, or neither a conception nor an assent, is a different
point of research. The present debate regards the possibility of the existence of
certitude without submission.20 […]
19 The term idhʿān used here to explain taṣdīq is difficult to translate. Its lexical root, dh-ʿ-n
denotes meanings of following, acceptance, and as such it is very similar to the term qubūl
(acceptance) conjoined with idhʿān here. See Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004), Maqāyīs, “dhāl-ʿayn-nūn”.
20 Al-Taftāzānī is arguing you cannot have a valid certitude without submission, but if it
does exist, there is a debate on whether such a state is considered a conception or an assent.
Some later logicians, such as Mīr Zāhid al-Harawī (d. 1101/1689–90), have discussed this debate
and concluded that such a state would be considered a conception not an assent.
‫ ‪172‬‬ ‫‪Najah Nadi‬‬
‫الثالث‪� :‬أن ّا ال نفهم من نسبة التصديق � إلى المتكلّم بالقلب سوى � إذعانه وقبوله و � إدراكه‬
‫يتصور هناك فعل وت�أثير من القلب‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫لهذا المعنى‪� ،‬أعني‪ :‬كون المتكلّم صادقاً من غير �أن‬
‫ونقطع ب�أ ّن هذا كيفيّة للنفس قد تحصل بالكسب واالختيار ومباشرة الأسباب‪ ،‬وقد‬
‫تحصل بدونها‪ .‬فغاية الأمر �أن يشترط فيما اعتبر في الإ يمان �أن يكون تحصيله باالختيار‪،‬‬
‫على ما هو قاعدة الم�أمور به‪ .‬و�أ ّما �أ ّن هذا فعل وت�أثير من النفس ال كيفيّة لها‪ ،‬و�أ ّن االختيار‬
‫معتبر في مفهوم التصديق اللغوي فممنوع‪ ،‬بل معلوم االنتفاء قطعاً‪ ،‬ولو كان الإ يمان‬
‫صح االت ّصاف به حقيقة � ّإل حال المباشرة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والتصديق من مقولة الفعل دون الكيف َل َما‬
‫والتحصيل‪ ،‬كما ال يخفى على من يعرف معنى هذه المقولة‪.‬‬
‫الرابع‪� :‬أن ّه وقع في كالم كثير من عظماء الملّة وعلماء ال أ ّمة مكان لفظ “التصديق”‬
‫المعبر‬
‫ّ‬ ‫لفظ “المعرفة” و“العلم” و“االعتقاد”‪ ،‬فينبغي �أن ُيحمل على العلم التصديقي‬
‫عنه بـ“كرويدن”‪ ،‬ويقطع ب�أ ّن التصديق من جنس العلوم واالعتقادات‪ ،‬لكنّه في الإ يمان‬
‫ّ‬
‫ويدل على‬ ‫مشروط بقيود وخصوصيات‪ ،‬كالتحصيل واالختيار وترك الجحود واالستكبار‪.‬‬
‫كرم اللّه وجهه �أ ّن الإ يمان معرفة‪ ،‬والمعرفة تسليم‪،‬‬
‫علي ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ذلك ما ذكره �أمير المؤمنين‬
‫والتسليم تصديق‪.‬‬
Thirdly, attributing taṣdīq of the heart to a speaker leads us to understand

nothing but their submission, acceptance, and his/her apprehension of such a
meaning – I mean, the speaker’s affirmation – without any conception of the
heart (making an) action or (having a) causal efficacy [in the external world]. We
are also certain that this is a psychological quality which may occur by means
of acquisition, choice, and following the causes [of its achievement], and it may
also occur without [these matters]. The upshot of the matter here is that we
make a condition in what is considered īmān that it is acquired by means of
choice, in accordance with the rule concerning [religious] commands [i. e. they
must be performed with choice, not coercion]. [However, the claim] that this
[taṣdīq] must be an action and an effect caused by the soul, not a quality of it, and
that choice must be considered part of the linguistic conception of belief is an
invalid [claim]. In fact, its invalidity is conclusively known. Further, if īmān and
assent are of the category of action, not quality, it would have not been valid for
anything to be characterised by it except in the instant that one is engaged in it
and the moment of its occurrence.21
Fourthly, the use of the expressions ‘cognisance’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘belief ’, has
occurred in the speech of many luminaries of the religion [of Islam] and scholars
of the Umma in place of taṣdīq [in their definition of īmān]. This must be inter-
preted as referring to knowledge characterised by assent which is expressed [in
Persian] as geravīdan. It must also be emphasised that although taṣdīq falls under
the genus of knowledge and belief, it is conditioned, in īmān, upon qualifications
and special qualities, such as [the believer] bringing it about, [having] choice, and
abstaining from denial and arrogance. This is indicated by what was mentioned
by the Commander of the Believers, Imām ʿAlī, may God ennoble his face, that
īmān is knowledge; knowledge is submission; submission is assent.
21 Review fn. 4 in the introduction, explaining this point from al-Taftāzānī’s section on
categories.
‫ ‪174‬‬ ‫‪Najah Nadi‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قيل‪ :‬قد ذكر � إمام الحرمين والإ مام الرازي وغيرهما �أ ّن التصديق من جنس كالم النفس‪،‬‬
‫بمتعين �أن يكون علماً �أو � إرادةً‪ ،‬بل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وكالم النفس غير العلم والإ رادة‪ .‬قلنا‪ :‬معناه �أن ّه ليس‬
‫يدل عليه بعبارة �أو كتابة �أو � إشارة فهو كالم النفس‪،‬‬‫ّ‬ ‫ل ما يحصل في النفس من حيث‬ ‫ك ّ‬
‫سواء كان علماً �أو � إراد ًة �أو طلباً �أو � إخباراً �أو استخبار ًا‪� ،‬أو غير ذلك‪ ،‬وليس كالم النفس‬
‫نوعاً من المعاني مغايراً لما هو حاصل في النفس بات ّفاق ِ‬
‫الف َرق‪ ،‬و � ّإل لكان � إنكاره � إنكاراً‬
‫للتصديق والطلب والإ خبار واالستخبار‪ ،‬وسائر ما يحصل في القلب‪ ،‬وليس كذلك‪،‬‬
‫بل � إنكاره عائد � إلى �أ ّن الكالم هو المسموع فقط دون هذه المعاني‪ .‬فالقول ب�أ ّن الإ يمان‬
‫ي نوع من �أنواع الأعراض‪،‬‬ ‫التقصي عن مطالبته �أن ّه من �أ ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫كالم النفس ال يكفي في‬
‫و�أ�يّة مقولة من المقوالت‪ .‬وال محيص سوى تسليم �أن ّه من الكيفيّات النفسيّة الحاصلة‬
‫باالختيار الخالية عن الجحود واالستكبار‪ .‬وليت شعري �أن ّه � إذا لم يكن [الإ يمان] من‬
‫جنس العلوم واالعتقادات فما معنى تحصيله بالدليل �أو التقليد؟ وهل ُيعقل �أن يكون ثمرة‬
‫واالعتقاد؟‪22‬‬ ‫النظر واالستدالل غير العلم‬
‫‪22 Al-Taftāzānī,‬‬ ‫‪Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 2, pp. 251–3.‬‬

If it is argued that Imām al-Ḥaramayn [al-Juwaynī, d. 478/1085] and al-Imām

al-Rāzī [Fakhr al-Dīn, d. 606/1209] as well as others stated that an assent falls
under the genus of speech inside the soul (kalām al-nafs), and speech inside
the soul is different from knowledge and will. We respond: what this means
is that [speech] does not have to be knowledge or will; rather, everything that
occurs in the soul in so far as it can be indicated by [external] speech, writing, or
signifying is considered speech inside the soul. This can equally be knowledge,
will, request, predication, or questioning, and so forth. Further, speech in the
soul is not a different type of meaning than [other] matters which occur in the
soul, by agreement of the theological schools. Otherwise, rejecting it [i. e. speech
of the soul] would entail rejecting taṣdīq, requests, predications, and questioning,
as well as everything that occurs in the heart, none of which is true. Rejecting it
then [i. e. speech of the soul], goes back to the idea that speech is only that which
is heard, not these [above] meanings. The view which argues that īmān is speech
of the soul does not suffice as a thorough investigation regarding which type of
accident it is and to which of the categories it belongs. There is no escape from
accepting that (īmān) is one of the qualities of the soul, occurring by means
of choice, and lacking denial and arrogance. I wish I knew, if (īmān) does not
share in being of the [same] type [of thing] as knowledge and beliefs, then what
is the meaning of acquiring it through [rational] proofs or conformed following?
Is it even rationally possible that the outcome of scholarly investigation and
referential reasoning be anything other than knowledge or belief ?
176 Najah Nadi
Bibliography
Primary text
Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥājj
Muḥarram al-Busnawī, 1305/1887, vol. 2, pp. 249, 251–3.
Other Sources
Azharī, Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-, Tahdhīb al-lugha, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām
Muḥammad Hārūn et al., Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-l-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama. 1966,
15 vols.
Ibn Fāris, Abū l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad, Muʿjam maqāyīs al-lugha, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Hārūn,
Beirut: al-Dār al-Islāmiyya, 1410/1990, 6 vols.
Ibn Manẓūr, Abū al-Faḍl Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mukarram. Lisān al-ʿArab, Beirut:
Dār Ṣādir, [1968], 15 vols.
Izutsu, Toshihiko, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology. A Semantic Analysis of Imān
and Islām, Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1965.
Nadi, Najah, Theorising the Relationship between Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh, PhD diss., Ox-
ford University, Oxford, 2018.
Rosenthal, Franz, Knowledge Triumphant. The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam,
Leiden: Brill, 1970.
Smith, Wilfred C., “Faith as Taṣdīq”, Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge,
Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1979.
Studtmann, Paul, “Aristotle’s Categories”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/
entries/aristotle-categories/ (accessed 16 June 2020).
Zabeeh, Farhang (ed. and trans.), Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic. Part one of Danesh-name
Alai. A Concise Philosophical Encyclopaedia and Autobiography, The Hague: Nijhoff,
1971.
Part IV: Free Will, Predestination
and the Problem of Evil
Divine Justice
Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931),
ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt
Racha el Omari
Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931)1 was a leading Muʿtazilī theologian

and contemporary of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). Al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb
al-Tawḥīd2 documents his debates with al-Kaʿbī, debates which, in turn, in-
formed al-Māturīdī’s innovative theological choices, including his conception of
divine justice.3 Like the Sunnī theologian Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935–6),
al-Māturīdī postulated God as a free omnipotent agent, but unlike al-Ashʿarī, al-
Māturīdī understood that God chooses to make the quality of His acts intelligible
to human reason separately from revelation. Thus, al-Māturīdī was opposed to
the Muʿtazilī axiom that God must do what is just for His servants, and to al-
Kaʿbī’s notion that God must do the absolute best (aṣlaḥ) for His servants when
He creates them.
Although al-Kaʿbī’s ‘doctrine of the optimum’ is extensively noted in the works
of his opponents, its original full content has long remained unknown, as none
of his theological works survive. This has changed with a recent publication of
al-Kaʿbī’s ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt, a work in which he tackles a variety of
theological topics. The following translated passages are selected from a chapter
titled al-Taʿdīl wa-l-tajwīr (‘On establishing [God’s] justice and refuting [claims
of His] injustice’),4 in which al-Kaʿbī responds to the challenge of opponents he
labels ‘godless’ (mulḥidūn)5 by marshalling various arguments for his doctrine
1 For a study of al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī’s theology on the basis of a critical account of his doc-
trines as extant in the testimonies of his opponents, see Racha el Omari, The Theology of Abū
l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931), Leiden: Brill, 2016.
2 Ulrich Rudolph, al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand,
trans. Rodrigo Adem, Leiden: Brill, 2015, p. 227.
3 Ibid., pp. 297–300.
4 Ḥusayn Khanṣū, Rājiḥ Kurdī, and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Kurdī (eds.), Kitāb al-Maqālāt wa-
maʿahu ʿuyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt lī Abī l-Qāsim ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-
Balkhī, Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2018, pp. 646–7; 651–2.
5 On the identities and late antique backgrounds of these opponents, see Patricia Crone,
“Excursus II. Ungodly Cosmologies”, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine
Schmidtke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 103–29.
180 Racha el Omari
of the optimum. These opponents claim that there is an inherent contradiction

in the monotheists’ belief in a wise and just God who creates beings with the
burden of moral responsibility when He knows that they will be unbelievers.
Al-Kaʿbī’s response involves a central argument: just as reason is best for human-
kind, though in some cases it can lead to suffering and misfortune, so God’s
creation of humankind as morally responsible beings is also best for them,
though He knows that some of them will be unbelievers.
Divine Justice 181

‫ ‪182‬‬ ‫‪Racha el Omari‬‬
‫في التعديل والتجوير‬

‫مس�ألة‪ :‬قال الملحدون كيف يجوز �أن يكون الصانع تثبتونه حكيماً رحيماً جواداً وقد خلق‬
‫خلقاً وهو يعلم �أن ّهم يعصون فيصيرون � إلى النار ويبقون فيها �أبداً ال يخفَّف‪ 6‬عنهم وهو لو‬
‫لم يخلقهم �أو �إن ّه حين خلقهم لم يكلّفهم ما كفروا وال استحقّوا به النار؟‬
‫الموحدون �أوجب [الملحدون] �أ ْن يكون الخلق والتبليغ والتكليف قبيحاً‬

‫ّ‬
‫الجواب‪[ :‬قال]‪7‬‬
‫استحق �أحد العقاب والخلود في النار‪ .‬و[لو‬

‫َّ‬ ‫وال يكون حكمة‪ ،‬ل أ َّن ذلك لو لم يكن ما‬
‫ضر من العقل‪،‬‬ ‫خس وال �أ ّ‬
‫وجب] تسليم الجميع من العقاب واللوم لكان ال شيء �أوضع و�أ ّ‬
‫ل أ َّن الإ نسان منّا ما لم يكن عاقالً لم يلحقه لوم في شيء م ّما يكون منه ولم يلزمه عتاب وال‬
‫موحدوها وملحدوها [مجمعون]‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أدب‪ .‬ومن كان عاقالً لحقه ذلك �أجمع واستحقّه‪ .‬والأمم‬
‫على شرف منزلة العقل وفضله وسقوط ض ّده‪.‬‬
‫ف إ�ن قالوا‪ّ � :‬إن العقل ليس يدعو � إلى شيء من ذلك م ّما يوجب اللّوم وال يحمل عليه وال‬
‫يدخل فيه‪ ،‬بل هو ٍ‬
‫ناه ذلك زاجر عنه‪ .‬ولو شاء العاقل لم يرتكب شيئاً من الموهوم القبيح‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫اللذة‪ .‬قيل لهم‪:‬‬ ‫عز العلم وشرف المعرفة و[�أ]عظم موقع‬
‫وبعد ف إ� َّن في العقل منافع وهو ّ‬
‫الشر‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫[…]‪ 8‬ف إ�ن ّه لو زال لم يلحق اللّوم العذاب ولم يهتد ‪9‬الإ نسان لكثير من‬
‫ ‪6‬‬ ‫‪ is referencing the Q 2:86, 2:162, 3:88, 16:85 and 35:36.‬ال يخفَّف عنهم ‪The phrase‬‬
‫ ‪7‬‬ ‫‪All additions to the edited text or emendations of it are marked between square brackets.‬‬
‫‪8 The Arabic text here is corrupt.‬‬
‫‪ is anomalous and departs from Qur’anic usage (for example,‬يهتدي ‪9 This usage of the verb‬‬
‫‪Q 2:53).‬‬
Divine Justice 183
On establishing (God’s) justice and refuting (claims of His) injustice

A Question:10 The godless opponents said: How is it possible that you maintain
that the Maker is wise, compassionate and generous, when He created human-
kind knowing that they will disobey and end up in hellfire and remain in it for
eternity, without alleviation for their suffering. [How do you maintain this belief
about the Maker] when, if He had not created them, or if He had not made
them morally responsible when He created them, then they would not have dis-
believed and would not have deserved hellfire because of it [i. e. their disbelief]?
The Answer: The monotheists said: [The opponents] postulated that creation,
sending revelation through a messenger, and the imposition of moral obligation
are evil and not acts of wisdom because if these acts had not been [created], no
one would have deserved punishment and eternity in hellfire. [Indeed if it were
obligatory] that all human beings be spared from punishment and blame, then
nothing would have been more inferior, base, or harmful than reason. For if a
human being among us were not rational, he would not be afflicted by the blame
caused by something that he did and neither rebuke nor discipline would have
been his [end]. Whoever is endowed with reason would be afflicted with that,
all of it, and would deserve it. However, [the monotheists added], humankind –
monotheists and godless alike – are in agreement about the nobility of the rank
of reason, the merit of reason, and the ignobility of its contrary.
If [the opponents] say that reason does not call for anything that necessitates
blame, nor does it incite it, nor is it comprised of it; rather [they say], reason
forbids these acts and prohibits them; [and] that should the rational person wish
it, he would not commit anything erroneous that is evil, and there are benefits to
reason, and it is the glory of science, the elevation of knowledge, and the great-
est occasion for delight, then they are told: [But] if reason were removed, then
suffering would not follow blame, and a human being would not be led to many
[acts of] wrongdoing?
10 Khanṣū, Kurdī and Kurdī (eds.), Kitāb al-Maqālāt, pp. 646–7.

‫ف إ�ذا قالو‪ :‬بلى وال ب َّد من ذلك‪ .‬قيل لهم‪ :‬ف إ�ذا كان العقل شريفاً فاضالً ال عيب فيه للعلّة‬
‫يستحق النار � ّإل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫التي ذكرتم فكذلك التبليغ والتكليف‪ ،‬لأن ّه و � إن كان الإ نسان ال يكفر وال‬
‫مع وجودهما ف إ�ن ّهما لم يدخال في الكفر والمعصية ولم يحمال عليهما بل فيهما �أش ّد الزجر‬
‫واستحق الخلود في النعيم كما استحقّه غيره‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والنهي عن ذلك‪ .‬ولو شاء المكلّف لأطاع‬
‫م ّمن هو في مثل حاله‪ ،‬ال فرق بينه وبينه في القدرة والتمكين‪ ،‬وفيهما مع ذلك الوصول‬
‫� إلى المعرفة والعقل لأن ّهما ال يكونان � ّإل مع التبليغ وفي تكليف الرئاسة في الدنيا والوصول‬
‫� إلى النعيم في الآخرة‪.‬‬
‫مس�ألة‪ :‬ف إ�ن قالوا ّ‬

‫فهل خلق اللّه هؤالء الذين علم �أن ّهم يطيعون ويؤمنون ولم يخلق �أولئك‬
‫الذين علم �أن ّهم يعصون ويكفرون‪ .‬وكيف جاز �أن يخلقهم وقد علم ذلك منهم؟‬
‫الجواب‪ :‬قلنا لأمور‪� .‬أحدها �أ َّن خلقه �إيّاهم ّ‬

‫ثم تبليغه لهم و � إن كان يعلم �أن ّهم يكفرون‬
‫بجنايتهم على �أنفسهم وسوء اختيارهم لها ليس ب إ�ساءة � إليهم وال ضرر عليهم بوجه من‬
‫وتفضل وحسن نظر وتعريض للخير والنعيم المقيم والثواب الذي ال‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الوجوه بل هو � إحسان‬
‫شيء �أعلى و�أفضل منه‪ .‬وليس على من �أحسن من سبيل وال […]‪ 11‬بل الذي يجب له‬
‫[…]‪12‬‬ ‫الشكر والخنوع بالطاعة‬
‫ف إ�ن قالوا‪ :‬ف إ� ّن اللّه لم يكن يريد هذا الإ حسان الذي �أعقبه المكروه و�أ ّداه � إلى الغفلة‪ ،‬ولو‬
‫خ ِّير لم يختر ذلك لنفسه‪.‬‬
‫ُ‬
‫ ‪11‬‬ ‫‪There is a break in the edited text (ibid., p. 652).‬‬

‫ ‪12‬‬ ‫‪In many cases, such as this, the text is impossible to reconstruct (ibid., p. 34).‬‬
Divine Justice 185
If they say: Surely what we stated must be true, then they are told: But if reason
is noble, excellent, [and] without any defect, according to the explanation you
mentioned, then the revelation of God’s message and the imposition of moral
obligation are also [noble, excellent, and without any defect]. For although a
human being does not profess unbelief and deserve hellfire except with their
[i. e. the revelation of God’s message and the imposition of moral obligation] ex-
istence, they do not cause unbelief, disobedience, and incite [someone to commit
these acts]. Rather, both of them [i. e. the revelation of God’s message and the
imposition of moral obligation] strictly prohibit and forbid unbelief. If a morally
obligated person wished it, he could obey and deserve eternal life in bliss, just
as anyone [else] in a state similar to his would deserve it. There is no difference
between the two in their capacity for action and power. It is through revelation
and moral obligation that knowledge and reason are attained. For knowledge
and reason exist only with revelation and with the imposition of leadership in
this world and the attainment of bliss in the hereafter.
A Question:13 If they say: Why did not God create only those whom He knows
will obey and believe in Him, and not create those whom He knows will disobey
[Him] and not believe? How is it right for Him to create them when He already
knows this about them?
The Answer: We say that this is the case for many reasons. One is that God’s
creation of them and His sending a revelation through a messenger – though He
knows that they will not believe because of the wrongs they perpetuated against
themselves and the bad choices [they made] for themselves – is not harm He in-
flicted upon them, nor is it detrimental to them in any possible way. Rather, they
[i. e. His creation of them and His sending a revelation through a prophet] are
grants of beneficence, favour, good discernment, and exposure [to the possibility
of attaining] good and lasting felicity and reward that is superior and the best of
all. Moreover, there is no constraint on whoever grants beneficence […],14 rather
gratitude and submission are due to Him through obedience […]15
If they say: God did not will this beneficence which occasioned, as its con-
sequence, what is reprehensible to [a human being] and what led him to heed-
lessness, and [if they say]; indeed, if [a human being] were to choose, he would
have not chosen that beneficence for himself.
13 Ibid.,pp. 651–2.
14 Ibid.,p. 652. There is a break in the edited text.
15 In many cases, such as this, the text is impossible to reconstruct.
‫قلنا‪ :‬لو كان هذا الإ حسان �أعقبه المكروه و�أوقعه فيه �أو �أ ّداه � إليه لكان لعمري يجب �أن‬
‫ال [يؤ ّديه]‪ ،16‬بل الواجب �أن ال يكون � إحساناً في الحقيقة‪ .‬ف�أ ّما � إذا لم يكن كذلك فليس‬
‫تصير فيه � إرادته وال كراهيته‪ ،‬ل أ َّن المريض قد يكره الدواء وهو خير له‪ ،‬والمذنب لو ُ‬
‫خ ِّير‬
‫�أيضاً لم يختر العقاب على ذنبه بقدر استحقاقه وقد يكون مع ذلك �أصلح له في عاجله‬
‫و�آجله‪ ،‬الصواب الذي ال يجوز غيره‪.‬‬
‫تقي‬ ‫أ‬ ‫والوجه الثاني �أن ّه قد يجوز �أ َّن ال�له يعلم �أنَّه يخرج من صلب ك ّ‬
‫ل كافر �لف مؤمن ومائة ّ‬
‫وداع � إلى هدى وسائس للعباد وحافظ للبالد‪ .‬ولو �أنَّه ابتد�أ خلقهم‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫و � إمام وقائد � إلى الخير‬
‫ولم يخرجهم من �أصالب �آباء وبطون �أ ّمهات لم يصيروا � إلى ذلك‪.‬‬
‫ ‪16‬‬ ‫‪.‬ير َّده ‪The edited text reads‬‬

Divine Justice 187
Then we reply: If this beneficence were to cause [a human being] to commit a

reprehensible act, or were to plunge him into it, or lead him to it, then, by my life,
God must not have caused it. Rather, it cannot, truly, be beneficence. But if that
is not the case [i. e. if it is indeed beneficence], then [a human being’s] volition
or aversion has no role in its occurrence. For a sick person may hate medicine
when it is good for him. Equally, if a disobedient person were given a choice, he
would not choose to be punished for his sin, as he deserves it, even though this
punishment may be more beneficial for him in the short and long term, [even
though] it is the right thing, and nothing other than it is permissible.
A second manner of responding to the question is to state that it is possible that
God knows that from the loin of every unbeliever there will originate a thousand
believers, a hundred devout people, guides, leaders to good, callers to guidance,
rulers of subjects, and guardians of communities. Had He started their creation
without having them originate from the loins of fathers and bellies of mothers,
they would not have ended up as they did.
188 Racha el Omari
Bibliography
Primary Text
Kaʿbī, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-, ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt, in Ḥusayn Khanṣū, Rājiḥ
Kurdī, and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Kurdī (eds.), Kitāb al-Maqālāt wa-maʿahu ʿuyūn al-masāʾil
wa-l-jawābāt lī Abī l-Qāsim ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Balkhī, Amman:
Dār al-Fatḥ, 2018, pp. 646–7; 651–2.
Other Sources
Crone, Patricia, “Excursus II. Ungodly Cosmologies”, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic
Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 103–29.
El Omari, Racha, The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931), Leiden:
Brill, 2016.
Rudolph, Ulrich, al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunnī Theology in Samarqand,
Knowledge and Free Will
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), Kitāb al-Tawḥīd
Philip Dorroll
Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) was the founder of one of the greatest
traditions of Sunni dogmatic theology and is considered to be one of the most
widely influential thinkers in the history of Sunni Islam. He was born in Māturīd,
in or near the cosmopolitan urban center of Samarqand, the city where he spent
his life. His was a disciple of Abū Naṣr al-ʿIyāḍī (d. ca. 275/888), placing him in
a long institutional tradition of Ḥanafī learning founded in that region by Abū
Sulaymān al-Juzjānī (d. 200/816), himself a student of Abū Ḥanīfa’s famous dis-
ciple Abū Yūsuf.
Māturīdī became a prominent member of the learned elite in Samarqand in
his own right. Well-known for his defence of rational investigation in theology
and his strong critique of blind traditionalism, he argued in defence of human
free will and the ability of the human intellect to rationally analyse and prove
the doctrines of religion. At the same time, he critiqued the rationalism of the
Muʿtazila on the grounds that it compromised God’s omnipotence and un-
knowable wisdom. Māturīdī held it necessary to affirm at one and the same time
the efficacy of human freedom and the ultimate reality of divine omnipotence,
as well as the efficacy of human reason and the ultimate reality of divine wisdom.
His work can be seen as a systematic investigation of the logical relationship
between these theological affirmations.
Māturīdī’s extant writings include his extensive theological treatise Kitāb
al-Tawḥīd and his voluminous Qur’anic commentary, Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān.1 This
enormous work is notable for its extraordinary nuance and range of conceptual
commentary, including extended theological arguments that deepen or clarify
questions also discussed in Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. A number of other works that have
been reliably attributed to him are not extant. These include a comparative
work on differing Muslim theological schools, numerous theological refutations
1 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu et al., Istanbul: Mizan
190 Philip Dorroll
(most of which are aimed at the Muʿtazila and the Muʿtazilī theologian al-Kaʿbī,
d. 319/931), and several works on uṣūl al-fiqh.2
This selection provides an overview of Māturīdī’s entire theological vision,
including his metaphysics, theological anthropology, and epistemology.3 The
truth of things is rooted in the contrast between the nature of God and the nature
of creation. God is single and unchanging, but creation is manifold and sub-
ject to constant change under the direction of God’s wisdom. God has endowed
human beings with the capacity for knowledge, the basis of which is direct
sensory perception (ʿiyān) and the use of the intellect or reason (ʿaql), so that
they can ascertain and choose good over evil. Humans err in their interpretation
of the world and of God’s revelation when they confuse the whims of their cre-
ated natures with the clear perception of the truth provided by the intellect when
it reflects on God’s wise ordering of the universe.
2 For thorough overviews of his life and work, see Ahmet Ak, Büyuk Türk Alimi Maturidi
ve Maturidilik, Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2017; and Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Māturīdī and the Devel-
opment of Sunni Theology in Samarqand, trans. Rodrigo Adem, Leiden: Brill, 2014.
3 From Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu and Muhammed
Aruçi, Ankara: İSAM, 2003, pp. 351–6.
Knowledge and Free Will 191

‫ ‪192‬‬ ‫‪Philip Dorroll‬‬
‫مس أ�لة في �أفعال الخلق و إ�ثباتها‬

‫والملك‬
‫والربوبية‪ ،‬ذي البرهان المنير ُ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المتفرد بالدوام‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المتوحد بالقدم والإ ّ‬
‫لهية‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫الحمد للّه‬
‫وصرفهم بحكمته على سابق علمه ومشيئته‪ ،‬وتقلّب ك ُّ‬
‫ل‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫الكبير؛ الذي فطر الخلق بقدرته‪،‬‬
‫ون﴾ ‪،‬‬
‫‪4‬‬ ‫َ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫بريّته في مواهبه و � إحسانه‪� .‬أنش�أ الأشياء كيف شاء‪َ ،‬‬
‫﴿ل ُي ْس�ألُ َع َّما َي ْف َع ُل َو ُه ْم ُي ْس�ألُ َ‬
‫ثم بالجزاء عن السفه‪ ،‬ويرغبوا في‬ ‫جروا بالسؤال ّ‬ ‫كن منهم السفه والحكم ُة‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ليز ّ‬ ‫لِما يتم ّ‬
‫ينور قلوبنا بالتوحيد‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه‬
‫التسديد‪ ،‬و ّ‬
‫َ‬ ‫عزمنا‬ ‫الحكمة‪ .‬ونس�أله �أن يكرمنا بالتوفيق‪ ،‬و َي ُ‬
‫جدر ُ‬
‫حميد مجيد‪.‬‬
‫�أ ّما بعد‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن اللّه تعالى لما خلق البشر للمحنة بما جعلهم �أهل تمييز وعل ٍ‬
‫م بالمحمود‬
‫حسناً‪ ،‬وعظّم في‬
‫من الأمور والمذموم‪ ،‬وجعل ما يذ ّم منها قبيحاً في عقولهم‪ ،‬وما ُيحمد َ‬
‫الح َسن والرغب َة فيما ُيذ ّم على ما ُيحمد‪ ،‬دعاهم‪ – ‬على ما عليه‬
‫�أذهانهم � إيثار القبيح على َ‬
‫ُركِّبوا وما به �أ ُ ْ‬
‫كرِموا‪ � – ‬إلى � إيثار �أمر على �أمر‪ ،‬وقبّح في عقولهم احتمال �أمثالهم [غيره]‪.‬‬
‫ونفع ُيرغَ ب فيه‪ ،‬ليكون ذلك لهم ع ْلماً‬

‫ٍ‬ ‫جعل اللّه جميع ما لهم فيه متقلَّ ٌ‬
‫ب بين ضر ٍر �يُتّقى‬
‫للموعود م ّما به الترغيب والترهيب‪ .‬و�أنش�أهم على طبائع تنفر عن �أشياء وتميل � إلى �أشياء‪،‬‬
‫و�أراهم في عقولهم ُ‬
‫ح ْس َن بعض ما تنفر عنه الطباع بحمد العواقب‪ ،‬وق ُْب َح بعض ما تميل‬
‫� إليه بذ ّم العواقب‪ .‬فصيّرهم بحيث يحتملون المكروه على الطباع بلذيذ العاقبة‪ ،‬ويقهرونه‬
‫بشهي النهاية‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ع ّما يدعوهم � إليه‬
‫‪ 4‬سورة الأنبياء ‪.٢٣/٢١‬‬

A Question Regarding Human Acts and their Demonstration

Praise be to God, the only one distinguished by pre-eternity and divinity, unique
in continuity and lordship, possessor of radiant proof and great dominion; He
who brought forth creation through His omnipotence and continually alters
their affairs through His wisdom, in accordance with His pre-existent knowledge
and will. The entirety of His creation fluctuates within His gifts and His good-
ness. He establishes things as He wills: ‘He shall not be questioned about what
He does; but they shall be questioned’ [Q 21:23].1 Wherefore human beings may
act according to either foolishness or wisdom, on account of the fact that they
will be questioned [and then recompensed for their deeds], they are driven back
from foolishness and made to desire wisdom. We ask Him to ennoble us with His
success, that He render our resolve fit for His guidance, and that He enlighten
our hearts with divine unity; for He is the Praiseworthy, the Glorious.
Now then: God Most High has created human beings for trial, in that He has
made them capable of knowing and distinguishing the praiseworthy from the
blameworthy. He has made the blameworthy distasteful, and what is praisewor-
thy pleasing, to their intellects. He has also made grievous (or distressing) in their
minds the preference for evil over good, and the desire for what is blameworthy
over what is praiseworthy. He calls them – in accordance with the original con-
stitution and nobility of their nature – to prefer one over another; thus, He has
made undertaking the one over the other repugnant to their intellects.
God has made all of what pertains to human beings fluctuate between a harm
that is feared and a benefit that is desired, so that it would constitute for them
knowledge of the promised outcome that is either to be desired or to be feared.
And He has created human beings according to natures that avoid some things
and incline toward others, and He has made them perceive in their intellects
the good in some of what their nature avoids on account of those things’ good
outcomes, and the evil in some things toward which their nature inclines on
account of those things’ blameworthy outcomes. He has shaped human beings
such that they will endure what is detestable to their natures for the sake of a
pleasant outcome; and likewise, that they may resist that to which they are at-
tracted on account of a bad end.
1 All Qur’an translations are taken from The Study Quran, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr et al.,
New York NY: HarperOne, 2015.
‫ثم امتحنهم � إذ �أبت عقولُهم احتمال �أمثالها‪ ،‬ور ّغب في محاسن الأعمال ومكارم الأخالق‬
‫ّ‬
‫ح ُسن من الأعمال واجتناب ما قبح من ذلك‪ّ .‬‬
‫ثم جعل ما فيه محنهم �أمرين‪:‬‬ ‫باختيار ما َ‬
‫العسير واليسير‪ ،‬والسهل والصعب؛ � إذ هم بال محنة يتعاطون الأمرين جمعياً‪ ،‬لما � إليه‬
‫التوصل لهم � إلى الأصل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ج َعل الأسباب التي بها‬
‫مرجع ما �أقدموا عليه وامتنعوا‪ .‬وعلى ذلك َ‬
‫البين‬
‫ل فضيلة‪ .‬وهو العلم على وجهين‪ :‬على الظاهر ّ‬
‫ل درجة و ُينال ك ّ‬
‫الذي به ُيرتقى � إلى ك ّ‬
‫والخفي المستور‪ ،‬ليتفاضل بذلك �أولوا العقل على قدر تفاضلهم في االجتهاد واحتمال‬
‫ّ‬
‫ما كرهته الطباع ونفرت عنه النفس‪.‬‬
‫خص الأسباب‪ ،‬وهو الذي‬

‫ّ‬ ‫وعلى ذلك جعل سبيله قسمين‪� .‬أحدهما‪ :‬العيان الذي هو �أ‬
‫ليس معه جهل‪ ،‬ليكون �أصالً لما خفي منه‪ .‬والثاني‪ :‬السمع الذي عن داللة الأعيان‬
‫ومفسر ومبهم‪ ،‬ليبيّن منتهى‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ثم جعل السمع قسمين‪ :‬محكم ومتشابه‬ ‫يعرف صدقه وكذبه‪ّ .‬‬
‫المفسر‬ ‫ِ‬
‫الكف فيما يجب ذلك والإ قدا ِم فيما يلزمه‪ .‬ومن حمل المبهم على‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المعارف من‬
‫ّ‬
‫ولزوم المحكم وعرضِ المتشابه عليه ما �أمكن �أن يكون ما فيه‪ :‬م ّما يلزم ّ‬
‫تعرفه وم ّما � إليه‬
‫حاجة ب�أهل المحنة‪� ،‬أو تركُ الخوض في ذلك فيما �أمكن الغَناء عن ّ‬
‫تعرف حقيقة ما فيه‪،‬‬
‫فيكون محنة الوقوف؛ � إذ للّه تعالى �أن يمتحن بوجهين‪ :‬بالتسليم ّ‬
‫مر ًة وبالطلب ثانياً‪ ،‬و �إن ّما‬
‫على العبد الطاعة في قدر الأمر‪.‬‬
Thus has He tested human beings whereby their intellects scorn undertaking
such affairs [i. e. that which is detestable to their natures], and He has awakened
the desire for good works and noble character traits through the choosing of
what is good, and the avoiding of that which is evil, from among possible acts. He
has made that through which they are tested of two types: the burdensome and
the easy, and the simple and the difficult. Human beings frequently encounter
both of these types without any trial, because what is being referred to here are
all those things which human beings readily engage in, and those which they
naturally try to avoid. Accordingly, God has established the means by which they
arrive at the principle by which one is raised to every degree and is granted every
virtue. This (principle) is knowledge, which occurs in two aspects: the clearly
manifest, and the hidden concealed. In this way the excellence of those who
make use of their intellect occurs to the extent of their excellence in expending
effort, and their enduring what is hateful to their nature and what is despised by
their own selves.
Furthermore, God has made the way to knowledge of two types: the first being
direct sensory perception, which is the most specific of the sources of knowledge
and the one which cannot admit of ignorance, such that it forms a basis for the
knowledge of even the things that remain hidden from it. The second is reported
knowledge, whose truth or falsehood is known through the evidence of the
senses. He has made reported knowledge to be of two types: the decisive2 and the
ambiguous, the elucidated and the obscure. This distinction exists to elucidate
the limits of knowing with respect to those matters which require avoidance
of investigation, and those which require further pursuit. This distinction also
pertains to the application of the obscure [verses] according to the elucidated
ones, and the overriding exigency of the decisive [verses], which necessitates
the examination of the ambiguous verses in light of the decisive ones. (This dis-
tinction also pertains) to both: that which is necessary to know, and which all the
people of trial feel a need to know; and that which necessitates refraining from
further investigation, and which one does not feel a need to know the actual
reality; the act of refraining from such investigation is itself a kind of test. Thus,
the test of God the Most High may occur in two respects: through unquestioning
acceptance [without knowledge of its reality on the one hand], and the effort to
pursue [knowledge of the reality on the other]. Obedience is thus incumbent
upon the human being in accordance with the [divine] command.
2 Verses of the Qur’an.

‫قروا بالكتاب �أن ّه ّ‬

‫حق من عند‬ ‫ل ثناؤه كتابه على الأمرين َت َّ‬
‫عرف الناس الذين �أ ّ‬ ‫ول ّما جمع ج ّ‬
‫ل‬ ‫اللّه ال يسع العدول عنه‪ ،‬و�أ ّن من لزمه �أفلح ونجا‪ ،‬ومن مال عنه شقى وخسر‪ .‬حتّى ّ‬
‫ظن ك ّ‬
‫فريق �أن ّه قد �أصاب المحكم من ذلك ولزمه‪ ،‬و�أ ّن عليه فيما ذهب � إليه خصومه �أن يقف‬
‫ف‬
‫تعر َ‬
‫كل ّ‬ ‫تقرر عنده فيما اعتقده‪ .‬ف�ألزم ّ‬
‫تفرقُهم [في] الحاجة ّ‬ ‫في ذلك �أو يحمله على ما ّ‬
‫المحكم منه‪.‬‬
‫َ‬ ‫المحكم من المتشابه [و] لزو َم العلم بالمتشابه‪ ،‬لأن ال يناقض‬
‫َان ِم ْن ِع ْن ِد غَ ْي ِر‬ ‫صف اللّه �أن ّه َ‬

‫﴿و َل ْو ك َ‬ ‫ثم معلوم �أن ّه ال يحتمل القر�آن االختالف‪ ،‬وبه َو ْ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫يرا﴾ ‪ .‬وفي العقل �أ ّن تناقض �أدلّة من له الأدلّة هو دليل سفهه‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ال�له َل َو َ‬
‫ج ُدوا فيه اخْ ت َلفًا كَث ً‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫تفرقوا ليس من حيث القر�آن‪ ،‬وال لِما ليس فيه بيان؛ بل‬
‫وجهله؛ فثبت بذلك �أ ّن الذي له ّ‬
‫دل تكليف الر ّد � إلى القر�آن ولزوم ات ّباعه على �أ ّن فيه بيان ذلك‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫و �إن ّما خفي المحكم على من لم يبلغه لمعان‪ � )١ :‬إ ّما لميل طبيعة الجوهر � إلى [ما] ّ‬
‫يتلذذ‬
‫به؛ ‪� )٢‬أو لإ لف بعض ما اعتاده؛ ‪� )٣‬أو لتقليد من وثق به؛ ‪� )٤‬أو لتقصير في الطلب؛ ‪)٥‬‬
‫الربوبية دون �أن �أتبع عق َله ما �أُلقي في سمعه‬
‫ّ‬ ‫يسوى عليه حكم َة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أو لثقة منه بعقله �أ َّ‬
‫حب �أن‬
‫فصار به المحكم عنده متشابهاً؛ ‪� )٦‬أو لتقصير في البحث‪ � .‬إذ [هذه] الوجوه هي وجوه‬
‫قوة � ّإل باللّه‪.‬‬
‫الشبهة على الذين عدلوا عن التوحيد على شهادة كلّ ّية الأشياء له بذلك‪ .‬وال ّ‬
‫‪ 5‬سورة النساء ‪.٨٢/٤‬‬

As God the Most Praised made His Book contain the two matters, it became
known to those people who acknowledge the Book: that it is truth from God,
there being no possibility of deviation from it; and that whoever adheres to it
prospers and is saved, while whoever turns away from it is miserable and fails.
Even so, each particular school of thought supposes that they have hit on the
decisive meaning of the text and adhered to it, and that their opponent either
hesitates in accepting the (decisive) meaning of the text, or bases their particular
interpretation of the text merely on their own assumptions. Thus, the disagree-
ment of the various schools of thought requires that they all distinguish the
decisive (verses) from the ambiguous ones, and the necessity of knowledge con-
cerning the ambiguous ones, so that they do not contradict decisive (verses) of it.
It is well-known that the Qur’an cannot contradict itself, as God Himself has
indicated: ‘Had it [i. e. the Qur’an] been from other than God, they would surely
have found much discrepancy therein’ [Q 4:82]. According to reason, contradic-
tion of proofs for those (who claim to have) the proofs is evidence merely of their
own foolishness and ignorance. It is therefore established that the disagreement
of the various schools is neither due to the Qur’an itself, nor because it does not
contain any clear explanation; rather, this indicates the obligation to refer to the
Qur’an and adhere to its authority on account of the clear explanations therein.
The unambiguous verses may be concealed from the one who is unable to reach
them for a number of reasons: (1) one’s natural inclination toward what one
finds pleasing, (2) becoming habituated to that to which one is accustomed, (3)
the blind imitation of a trusted person, (4) inability to inquire, (5) finding the
conclusions of one’s own intellect more dear than reconciling it with God’s wis-
dom, without subordinating one’s intellect to what is encountered in revelation;
thus making the unambiguous verses seem to be ambiguous, or (6) inability to
investigate. These are the causes of the doubt of those who deviate from the [true
doctrine of God’s] oneness, despite the manifest witness of all (existence) to this
[truth]. And there is no power but God’s.
‫و�أصل ذلك �أ ّن اللّه تعالى خلق البشر على طبائع تميل � إلى المال ّذ الحاضرة‪ ،‬وتدعو‬
‫صاحبها � إليها‪ ،‬وتزيّنها في عينه‪ ،‬بما ركّب فيه من الشهوات � إلى ما � إليه ميل طبعه‪ ،‬وهي‬
‫تنفر ع ّما فيه �ألمه وتعبه‪ ،‬فيصير طبعه �أحد �أعداء عقله في التحسين والتقبيح‪ .‬و � إن كان ما‬
‫حسنته الطبيع ُة ّ‬
‫وقبحته‬ ‫تغير من حال � إلى حال‪ ،‬وما ّ‬
‫وقبحه ليس له زوال وال ّ‬
‫العقل ّ‬
‫ُ‬ ‫حسنه‬
‫ّ‬
‫بالكف ع ّما‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والتغير عن حال � إلى حال بالرياضة والقيام على ذلك‬
‫ّ‬ ‫هو في ح ّد االنقالب‬
‫�ألِفَ ه‪ ،‬والصرف � إلى ما ينفر عنه بحسن القيام عليه على ما يحتمل الطبع قبوله‪ ،‬نحو‬
‫المعروف من �أمر الطيور والبهائم‪� :‬إن ّها بطبعها تنفر ع ّما �أريد بها من �أنواع منافع البشر‪ّ ،‬‬
‫ثم‬
‫بحسن قيام �أهل البصر بذلك يصير م ّما طبع عليه بالميل � إليه كالمستوحش‪ ،‬وم ّما طبع‬
‫على النفار عنه كالمطبوع عليه‪ .‬وعلى ذلك �أمر نفار الطبع عن القتل والذبح في البشر‪،‬‬
‫ثم سهولة ذلك عليه‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫وما يدرك حسنه بالعقل �أو قبحه‪ ،‬فال يزال يزداد على ما فيه � إدراكه ببديهة الأحوال‪ .‬ولذلك‬
‫حج ًة‪ ،‬ال ميل الطباع؛ � إذ �أجرى قلمه على �أهلها‪ ،‬و � إن شاركوا في الطباع‬
‫ّ‬ ‫جعل اللّه العقول‬
‫العقل حس َنه و � إن كان‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ّباع ما �أراهم‬
‫غيرهم م ّمن ليست لهم عقول سليمة‪ ،‬و�ألزم �أهلها ات َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫قبحه و � إن كان في طبيعة الجوهر قبوله‪ � ،‬إذ العقل‬
‫ُ‬ ‫العقل‬ ‫في‬ ‫ما‬ ‫واجتناب‬
‫َ‬ ‫‪،‬‬‫النفار‬
‫ُ‬ ‫الطبع‬ ‫في‬
‫صاحبه على حقيقة ما عليه الشيء‪ ،‬والطبع – �أعني طبع الجوهر – ال ّ‬
‫يوضح ذلك‪.‬‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ُيرِي‬
The root of this issue is that God Most High has created humankind according
to natures that incline to immediate delights, call their possessors to these (de-
lights), and make these (pleasures) seem beautiful in their sight; He has thus
fixed within human beings the passions toward which their disposition inclines.
Moreover, these natures are averse to that which constitutes pain and exertion
(on the part of human beings), and thus human beings’ own nature becomes one
of the enemies of their use of their own intellect in ascertaining the goodness and
evilness of things. For that which the intellect ascertains to be good or evil never
ceases to be so, and does not change from state to state. However, that which
human nature ascertains to be good or evil is liable to alteration and change
from one state to the next through practice and training, such as abstaining from
that to which one is accustomed, or turning toward that to which one is averse,
because one has effectively trained oneself to do this such that one’s nature can
bear it. Such is known to be the case with birds and beasts: they are by their very
nature averse to the ways in which humans might wish to use them for their
own benefit. But given certain training and experience, even actions that we
find ourselves naturally averse to and repelled by may come to be experienced as
natural by some people. For example, human beings are naturally averse to kill-
ing [one another] and to the slaughter [of animals], but (by habituation) these
actions may become easy for them to commit.3
By contrast, the intellectual perception of what is good and what is evil increases
in accuracy via insight into the various conditions of the perceptible world. For
this reason, God has made the intellect a sure proof, rather than natural inclina-
tions. He has therefore channelled His pen upon the people of intellect,4 even
though they share the same human nature as those who do not possess sound
intellects, and He enjoins those people to adhere to that which the intellect
shows them to be good, even if there were a natural aversion to it; and to avoid
what is evil according to the intellect, even if there were a natural attraction to
it. For the intellect causes its possessor to perceive the truth of the thing as it is,
while the nature – and by this, I mean the natural disposition of a thing – does
not make this clear.
3 In other words, one of the reasons that human beings’ inclinations are poor guides to
objective morality is the fact that even good inclinations can be forcibly changed: human beings
can habituate themselves to committing objectively harmful acts, such as taking a life.
4 The phrase ‘people of intellect’ here refers to people of sound mind and rationality,
meaning people who are considered morally and religiously responsible for their actions.
‫غير الحاضر‪ ،‬والعقل يدرك به ما حضر وغاب‪ ،‬وبه‬

‫بصر به وال ُي َمثَّل ُ‬
‫� ّإن طبع الجوهر ال ُي َ‬
‫ّ‬
‫ويتلذذ به‪ ،‬وعنده تسهل‬ ‫َيحضر على الطبع ما غاب‪ ،‬حتّى يصير له كالشاهد م ّما يكرهه‬
‫وتخف ُم َؤن الذي يكرهه الطبع‪ .‬وعلى ذلك تقدير الكالم والعبارات‪� :‬إن ّها و � إن‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المحنة‬
‫تتغير‪ .‬ويجوز‬ ‫كانت تختلف في الحسن والقبح على الأسماع ف إ�ن ّها ال ّ‬
‫تغير الحقوق � إذ هي ّ‬
‫الحق‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أن تُ َؤ َّدى عبارة واحدة بلسانين يكون �أحدهما �أحلى من الآخر‪ .‬والحسن لنفسه �أو‬
‫المعبرين‪ .‬فلهذا لم يق ّدر حسن الأشياء بطبع الخلقة وال بحسن‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ال يختلف الختالف‬
‫الحسن قبيحاً‪ .‬وهو الأصل الذي َيلزم تسوي ُة ك ّ‬
‫ل‬ ‫َ‬ ‫العبارة‪ ،‬و �إن ّما ق ّدر بالعقل الذي ال يرى‬
‫التغير‪ ،‬وال يناقضه جهل‪ ،‬فيكون‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أمر من الأمور عليه‪ .‬وذلك كعلم العيان الذي ال يحتمل‬
‫ل �أمر مطبوع‪.‬‬ ‫خفي مستورٍ‪ ،‬وكذلك �أمر العقل وما �أراه �أص ٌ‬
‫ل لك ّ‬ ‫ٍّ‬ ‫هو �أصالً لك ّ‬
‫ل‬
‫بينّا من مخالفة الطبائع في التز�يين العقولَ وفي التقبيح تعذر على كثير من الخلق‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ولما ّ‬
‫المحكم عندهم في صورة المتشابه‪ ،‬والمتشابه‬
‫ُ‬ ‫� إدراك ما �أراهم العقل والطبع‪ ،‬فصار بذلك‬
‫ل شيء بغير سبيله‪ .‬فنس�أل اللّه �أن يعصمنا عن‬ ‫في صورة المحكم‪ ،‬وهكذا �أريد َد ْرك ك ّ‬
‫قوي مدبّر قدير‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والحق بصورة الباطل‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه‬
‫ِّ‬ ‫الحق‪،‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫رؤية الباطل بصورة‬
Nothing is perceived or represented by the natural disposition of a thing ex-

cept that which is immediately apparent. However, both the apparent and
the hidden can be perceived by means of the intellect, by means of which the
hidden becomes apparent to a thing’s natural disposition, in the same way that
someone directly perceives what is hateful or pleasing to them. For the intellect,
trial is easy and the burdens that are hateful to the disposition are easily borne.
Speech and expressions are evaluated in the same way: though these may exhibit
variance to the ears when referring to good and evil, good and evil do not change
in their essences simply because expressions for them change. For though it is
perfectly possible that one expression may be conveyed more sweetly in one
language than in another, goodness itself or its essential nature does not differ
due to the variance in how it may be expressed. It is for this reason that the
goodness of things is ascertained neither by means of the natural dispositions
of created beings, nor by beauty of expression. Instead, it is ascertained by the
intellect, which never perceives goodness as evil. This is a general principle that
must be applied to any issue. In this way the intellect is similar to direct sensory
perception, which does not admit of change and which ignorance cannot con-
tradict, for it forms a basis for the knowledge of even the things that remain
hidden and concealed from it. In exactly the same way, the intellect perceives the
essential principle of that which is experienced as natural.
We have thus explained the disparity between natures and intellects in the as-
certainment of good and evil that renders it impossible for a great many people
to distinguish between what their intellect and their natural disposition presents
to them. In this way the unambiguous appears to them in the guise of the ambig-
uous, and the ambiguous in the guise of the unambiguous, and thus the attempt
is made to perceive things in ways unbefitting to them. We ask God to protect us
from seeing the false in the guise of the true, and the true in the guise of the false,
for indeed He is mighty, arranger and determiner of [affairs].
202 Philip Dorroll
Bibliography
Primary Text
Ankara: İSAM, 2003, pp. 351–6.
Other Sources
Ak, Ahmet, Büyuk Türk Alimi Maturidi ve Maturidilik, Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2017.
Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr al-, Tāʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu et al., Istanbul: Mizan
Yayınevi, 2005–2011. 17 volumes.
Rudolph, Ulrich, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of Sunni Theology in Samarqand,
The Study Quran, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr et al., New York NY: HarperOne, 2015.
Knowledge of Good and Evil
ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī
al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī (d. 747/1346), al-Tawḍīḥ
fī ḥall ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh
Philipp Bruckmayr
ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī

(d. 747/1346) was the foremost Māturīdī theologian of his time and, arguably,
the school’s last major representative from its native region, Transoxania. Inter-
estingly, however, he authored no kalām work proper. Instead, his own highly
original contributions to Māturīdī thought are hidden in his encyclopedia of the
sciences, Taʿdīl al-ʿulūm, as well as in his major work on legal theory, al-Tawḍīḥ,
which is a commentary on his al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. The section below is a
prime example of the convergence of specific questions of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh
in Ḥanafī-Māturīdī works on legal theory. Devoted to the question of the nature
of good and evil, and its implications for legal theory, the following extract is
of particular relevance because it represents the first sophisticated Māturīdī
engagement with the paradigm-shifting contributions of the Ashʿarī luminary
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) to the sciences of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh.
In the selected text from al-Tawḍīḥ fī ḥall ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh
(‘The Clarification for Solving the Difficulties in The Revision in Legal Theory’)1
Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī first discusses the relevance of the question of the nature
of good and evil for legal theory, and its intimate connection to the question of
free will and predestination. After introducing different scholarly definitions of
good and evil, including Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī approaches, he focuses specifically
on the Ashʿarī claim that good and evil can only be known through revelation
and not through reason, a view which is disputed by the Māturīdiyya. He thus
sets out to present the two bases of the Ashʿarī view, namely that human acts
are not intrinsically good or evil, and that humans are not acting by exercising
their free choice (ikhtiyār), both of which he rejects. Whereas he swiftly refutes
the first of these premises, his discussion of the second is highly elaborate and
1 ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī, al-Tawḍīḥ fī ḥall
ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, in the margin of Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī,
Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ ʿalā al-Tawḍīḥ, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, (s. d.), pp. 172–6.
204 Philipp Bruckmayr
unprecedented among the Māturīdiyya. Indeed, the Ashʿarī rejection of free

will as he presents it, is none other than the famous preponderator (murajjiḥ)2
argument introduced by al-Rāzī, according to which the preponderator needed
by a human to act rather than not to act, or to choose between two possible
actions, can only be derived from God and not from human free will.
Thus, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī endeavours to illustrate the inconsistencies
in al-Rāzī’s argument in a highly philosophical discussion, which has become
widely known and commented upon as a kind of separate work, entitled al-Muq-
addimāt al-arbaʿa (‘The Four Premises’). In the first of these four prolegomena,
which appears at the very end of this extract, the author additionally links the
discussions of good and evil and human volition to two other debates with
the Ashʿariyya, i. e. those about the divine attribute of bringing-into-existence
(takwīn) and about the distinction between the latter and the thing brought into
existence (mukawwan).
2 The preponderator (murajjiḥ) is the outweighing element of any decision between acting
or non-acting, or between two possible actions. In addition, in cosmological terms, a murajjiḥ is
needed to tip the scale between being and non-being for a thing to become existent.
Knowledge of Good and Evil 205

‫ ‪206‬‬ ‫‪Philipp Bruckmayr‬‬
‫“فصل ال ب ّد للم أ�مور به من الحسن”‬

‫هذه المسئلة من �أ ّمهات مسائل الأصول ومه ّمات مباحث المعقول والمنقول‪ ،‬ومع ذلك‬
‫هي مبنيّة على مسئلة الجبر والقدر الذي زلّت في بواديها �أقدام الراسخين وضلّت في‬
‫الحق فيها �أعني‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المتبحرين‪ ،‬وحقيقة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫كرين وغرقت في بحارها عقول‬ ‫مباديها �أفهام المتف ّ‬
‫خواص‬
‫ّ‬ ‫سر من �أسرار اللّه تعالى التي ال يطلع عليها � ّإل‬
‫� إلحاق بين طرفي الإ فراط والتفريط ّ‬
‫عباده‪ ،‬وها �أنا بمعزل عن ذلك لكن �أوردت مع العجز عن درك الإ دراك قدرما وقفت عليه‬
‫ووف ِّْق ُ‬
‫ت لإ يراده‪.‬‬ ‫ُ‬
‫اعلم �أ ّن العلماء قد ذكروا �أ ّن الحسن والقبح يطلقان على ثالثة معان‪ .‬ال أ ّول‪ :‬كون الشيء‬
‫ٍ‬
‫نقصان‪ .‬والثالث‪ :‬كون‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫كمال وكونه صف َة‬ ‫مالئماً للطبع ومنافراً له‪ .‬والثانى‪ :‬كونه صف َة‬
‫الشيء متعلّ َق المدح عاجالً والثواب �آجالً وكونه متعلّ َق الذ ّم عاجالً والعقاب �آجالً‪.‬‬
‫فالحسن والقبح بالمعنيين ال أ ّولين يثبتان بالعقل ات ّفاقاً‪� ،‬أ ّما بالمعنى الثالث فقد اختلفوا فيه‬
‫فعند الأشعري ال يثبتان بالعقل بل بالشرع فقط‪ .‬وهذا بناء على �أمرين‪� .‬أحدهما‪� :‬أن ّهما ليسا‬
‫لذات الفعل‪ ،‬وليس للفعل صفة يحسن الفعل �أو يقبح لأجلها عند الأشعري‪ .‬وثانيهما‪:‬‬
‫جوز كونه متعلّق‬
‫�أ ّن فعل العبد ليس باختياره عنده فال يوصف بالحسن والقبح‪ ،‬ومع ذلك ّ‬
‫الثواب والعقاب بالشرع بناء على �أ ّن عنده ال يقبح من اللّه تعالى �أن يثيب العبد �أو يعاقبه‬
‫على ما ليس باختياره‪ ،‬ل أ ّن الحسن والقبح ال ينسبان � إلى �أفعال اللّه تعالى عنده‪.‬‬
Section: What has been commanded is necessarily good

This issue pertains to the major problems of legal theory and the important
investigation into what is known through reason and what is known through
transmission.3 As such, it is based on the question of compulsion and predestina-
tion, in whose territory [even] the feet of those firmly rooted [in knowledge] slip,
and regarding the principles of which the minds of the thinkers go astray, and
in whose oceans the intellects of those deeply immersed drown. The essential
truth therein, i. e. the balance between the two extremes of excess4 and neglect,5
is one of the secrets of God the Exalted, which are not divulged except to His
selected servants. Behold, even though I am far from it [i. e. from being among
this group of His elect], and despite my inability to attain [a full] perception,
I am presenting this topic as far as I have understood it and have been enabled
to expound upon it.
Know that the scholars have referred to good and evil in three different senses:
firstly, the property of the thing in relation to what is either agreeable to [human]
nature or incompatible with it; secondly, its property as either an attribute of
completeness or deficiency; thirdly, the property of the thing in relation to
immediate [i. e. this-worldly] praise and later reward [i. e. in the hereafter] or in
relation to immediate reprimand and later punishment.
In the first two senses good and evil are unanimously established through
reason. In the third sense, however, there is disagreement over it. According
to the Ashʿarīs,6 they cannot be established through reason but only through
revelation. This is based on two claims. According to the first of these, neither
of the two [i. e. good and evil] is intrinsic to the act, and for the Ashʿarīs the act
therefore does not have an [inherent] quality rendering it either good or evil.
Secondly, the act of the human being is – according to them – not by his free
choice and thus not [a priori] characterised as either good or evil. Therefore,
they hold it to be possible that its property depends on reward and punishment
[as specified] by revelation. This rests on their assumption that it is not evil for
God the Exalted to either reward or punish the servant for what he has not done
by his own free choice, because – according to them – [the categories of ] good
and evil do not apply to the actions of God the Exalted.
3 i. e. revelation.
4 i. e. the doctrine of human compulsion.
5 i. e. the doctrine that humans themselves are the creators of their acts.
6 The author uses al-Ashʿarī, which could be understood either as a reference to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) or to one of his followers (i. e. a given Ashʿarī). As most of the author’s
discussion in this section is engaged with the thought of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, it should be taken
as a generic reference to the Ashʿariyya rather than one specifically to Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī.
‫ومنهياً‬
‫ّ‬ ‫بمجرد كون الفعل م�أموراً به‬
‫ّ‬ ‫فالحسن والقبيح بالمعنى الثالث يكونان عند الأشعري‬
‫عنه‪ .‬فلهذا قال‪“ :‬فالحسن عند الأشعري ما �أمر به” سواء كان الأمر للإ يجاب �أو الإ باحة‬
‫�أو الندب‪“ ،‬والقبيح ما نهي عنه” سواء كان النهي للتحريم �أو للكراهة‪“ .‬وعند المعتزلة ما‬
‫يحمد على فعله” سواء كان يحمد عليه شرعاً �أو عقالً‪ ،‬وهذا تفسير الحسن‪“ ،‬وما يذ ّم‬
‫على فعله” هذا تفسير القبيح‪“ .‬وبتفسير الآخر‪ :‬ما يكون للقادر العالم بحاله �أن يفعله”‬
‫المضطر والمجنون‪ ،‬وهذا تفسير �آخر للحسن‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫احترز بالقيدين عن فعل‬
‫يختص بالوجوب‬
‫ّ‬ ‫فسروا الحسن والقبيح بتفسيرين‪ ،‬فالحسن بالتفسير ال أ ّول‬
‫ف إ� ّن المعتزلة ّ‬
‫والمندوب‪ ،‬بالتفسير الثاني يتناول المباح �أيضاً‪“ .‬وما ليس له ذلك” �أي القبيح ما ليس‬
‫للقادر العالم بحاله �أن يفعله‪ .‬فكال تفسيري القبيح متساويان ال يتناوالن � ّإل الحرام‬
‫والمكروه‪ .‬فعلى التفسير ال أ ّول للحسن المباح واسطة بين الحسن والقبيح‪ ،‬وعلى الثاني‬
‫ال واسطة بينهما‪.‬‬
‫“فعند الأشعري ال يثبتان � ّإل بالأمر والنهي” لما ذكرت �أ ّن هذا الحكم مبني عنده على‬
‫�أصلين �أوردت على مذهبه دليلين لإ ثبات الأصلين‪� .‬أ ّما ال أ ّول فقوله‪“ :‬لأن ّهما ليسا لذات‬
‫الفعل �أو لصفة له و � ّإل يلزم قيام العرض وضعفه ظاهر” �أي ضعف هذا الدليل ظاهر‪ ،‬لأن ّه‬
‫� إن عني بقيام العرض بالعرض ات ّصافه به فال نسلم امتناعه‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه واقع كقولنا‪ :‬هذه الحركة‬
‫سريعة �أو بطيئة‪ ،‬على �أ ّن قيام العرض بالعرض بهذا المعنى الزم‪ ،‬على تقدير كونهما‬
‫شرعيين �أيضاً نحو هذا الفعل حسن شرعاً �أو قبيح شرعاً‪]…[ .‬‬
In the third sense, good and evil are, for the Ashʿarīs, solely based on whether
one has been either commanded to perform a given act or has been prohibited
from it. It is in this regard, that I have said: ‘The good for the Ashʿarīs is what has
been commanded’,7 no matter whether in the form of command, permission, or
recommendation. And ‘the bad is what has been forbidden’, whether through
prohibition or disapproval. And further: ‘Among the Muʿtazila it constitutes
those acts for which one is praised’, whether praised by revelation or reason. This
is their interpretation of the good, just as ‘those acts for which one is reproached’
is their interpretation of the bad. ‘Or, following another interpretation, [only]
that which one performs, while being capable of it and knowledgeable about its
status [as good or bad]’, to the exclusion of acts of compulsion or insanity. This is
thus another definition of the good.8
Indeed, the Muʿtazila interprets the good and the bad in a twofold manner.
According to the first interpretation, the good concerns the obligatory and the
recommended. Following the second, it also includes the permissible. ‘And what
is not encompassed by it, [is the other]’, i. e. the bad, which one, while being
capable of it and knowledgeable about its status, would never perform [as it
would be unreasonable]. Both interpretations of the bad are alike as they include
only the forbidden and the reprehensible. Thus, according to the first definition
of the good, the permissible lies in the middle between the good and the bad,
while according to the second, there is no such middle ground between them
[i. e. it includes the permissible].
‘According to the Ashʿarīs, the two can only be known through command and
prohibition’. As I have noted, they base this rule on two principles and I have
put forward two proofs against their view regarding the conclusiveness of these
principles. Regarding the first one, we said: ‘because [they hold that] the two [i. e.
good and evil] are not intrinsic to the act nor to any of its attributes, or else they
would necessarily subsist in an accident, and its weakness is evident’. That is, the
weakness of this proof is obvious, because if they mean by that the subsistence
of the accident in another accident characterising it [as good or evil], then we
do not agree that this is impossible. Actually, it happens, as in our saying: ‘This
movement is fast or slow’, given the subsistence of the accident [i. e. the quality
of being fast or slow] in the [other] accident [i. e. movement]. In this sense, it is
also inseparable from the stipulation of their property through revelation, that is,
that the given act is [characterised as] either good or bad through revelation. […]
7 Passages in quotation marks represent parts of his original work al-Tanqīḥ, on which the
author here comments, speaking of himself (as the author) in the third person.
8 That an act is only considered good if one is capable of effecting it voluntarily and
knowledgeable about its implications.
‫كن‬‫اضطراري‪ ،‬و � إن تم ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫و�أ ّما الثاني فقوله‪“ :‬ول أ ّن فاعل القبيح � إن لم يتم ّ‬
‫كن من تركه ففعله‬
‫مرجحاً‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّفاقياً‪ ،‬و � إن توقّف يجب عنده‪ ،‬لأن ّا فرضناه‬
‫مرجح كان ات ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ف إ�ن لم يتوقّف على‬
‫المرجح باختياره ّ‬
‫لئل يتسلسل فيكون اضطراريّاً‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫يترجح المرجوح وال يكون‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫ولئل‬ ‫تا ّماً‬
‫ّفاقي ال يوصفان بهما ات ّفاقاً”‪]…[ .‬‬
‫واالضطراري واالت ّ‬
‫ّ‬
‫واعلم �أ ّن كثيراً من العلماء اعتقدوا هذا الدليل يقينيّاً‪ ،‬والبعض الذي ال يعتقدونه يقينيّاً لم‬
‫ل الفريقين مواقع‬‫يوردوا على مق ّدماته منعاً يمكن �أن يقال �إن ّه شيء‪ ،‬وقد خفي على ك ّ‬
‫الغلط فيه‪ .‬و�أنا �أسمعك ما سنح لخاطري‪ ،‬وهذا مبني على �أربع مق ّدمات‪.‬‬
‫المق ّدمة الأولى‪� :‬أ ّن الفعل يراد به المعنى الذي وضع المصدر ب إ�زائه ويمكن �أن يراد به‬
‫تحرك زيد فقد قامت الحركة بزيد‪ ،‬ف إ�ن �أريد بالحركة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المعنى الحاصل بالمصدر‪ ،‬ف إ�ن ّه � إذا‬
‫ي جزء يفرض من �أجزاء المسافة فهي المعنى الثاني‪،‬‬ ‫للمتحرك في �أ ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الحالة التي تكون‬
‫و � إن �أريد بها � إيقاع تلك الحالة فهي المعنى ال أ ّول‪ ،‬والمعنى الثاني موجود في الخارج‪� ،‬أ ّما‬
‫ال أ ّول ف�أمر يعتبره العقل وال وجود له في الخارج‪ � ،‬إذ لو كان لكان له موقع ّ‬
‫ثم � إيقاع ذلك‬
‫الإ يقاع يكون واقعاً � إلى ما ال يتناهى فيلزم التسلسل في طرف المبد�أ في الأمور الواقعة في‬
‫الخارج وهو محال‪ ،‬ولأن ّه يلزم �أن ّه � إذا �أوقع الفاعل شيئاً واحداً �أوجد �أموراً غير متناهية وهذا‬
‫بديهي االستحالة على �أ ّن كون الإ يقاع �أمراً غير موجود في الخارج �أظهر على مذهب‬
‫الأشعري‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن التكوين عنده �أمر غير موجود في الخارج‪.‬‬
As far as the second principle is concerned, they say: ‘because if the committer
of an evil had not been able to desist from it, then his act was compulsory. If he
would, however, have been able to, and it was not based on a preponderator,
then it must have been mere coincidence. And if it had been dependent upon
one, then it must have happened necessarily, because we are assuming a com-
plete preponderator, and it would be impossible for the non-preponderant to
prevail. This preponderator cannot be derived from [human] free choice, as
this would lead to an infinite regress [as a human act as preponderator would
necessitate another preponderator to bring it about]. Thus, the act must have
been compulsory [i. e. with the preponderator emanating from God]. Yet, it is
unanimously agreed that neither the compulsory nor the coincidental can be
characterised accordingly [as either good or bad]’. […]
Know that many scholars hold this proof to be certain. The few who do not con-
sider it to be certain have not responded to its premises with anything to speak
of, as the erroneous positions in it have been unknown among both groups [i. e.
Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs]. I will now let you know what has come to my mind in
this regard, and this will be based on four premises.
First premise: ‘Act’ can be used in the sense of the root-principle [or verbal
noun] expressed by it, or in the sense of the product of the root-principle [i. e.
the coming into existence of a given act]. If Zayd moves, this movement has
been effected in him. But if we mean by ‘movement’ the state of the person who
moves along any assumed part of a distance, then this is the second meaning.
If we, however, mean the production of this state with it, then this is the first
meaning. In the second sense it exists in the physical world, but in the former
the thing is [merely] of a conceptual nature and is thus inexistent in the physical
world. If it were to be manifest [in the physical world], then we would have to
assume a [prior] production of this production and so forth without ending.
This would necessarily lead to an infinite regress on the level of the actual things
of the physical world. This is absurd, because it would necessitate that an endless
number of things had to be produced for the actor to produce just one single
thing. This is a priori an impossibility, given that the fact of the production of an
[hitherto] inexistent thing in the physical world is known in the Ashʿarī school,
whereas the [divine attribute of ] bringing into existence is for them inexistent in
the physical world.9
9 This distinction within the act between its production and its state is related to two other
major points of contention between the schools, namely the Māturīdī doctrine of the eternal
divine attribute of takwīn (bringing into existence) and the related distinction between takwīn
and mukawwan, both of which Ashʿarism rejects.
212 Philipp Bruckmayr
[The remaining three premises upon which Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī builds his
refutation of late Ashʿarī doctrine, can be summarised as follows:
Second premise: The existence of any logically possible thing or act (kull
mumkin) necessarily depends on a cause (ʿilla) through which this thing or act
necessarily exists. Thus, the existence of such a cause, or more precisely the ex-
istence of the totality of elements on which the existence of the possible thing or
act depends, renders its existence not a possibility but a necessity. In the case of
the inexistence of such a totality, the existence of the possible thing or act is an
impossibility.
Third premise: In accordance with the distinction between the two components
of any act outlined in the first premise (i. e. the state of movement, which exists
in the physical world, and the production of the state, which does not), this
totality of elements, on which the existence of an act depends, necessarily in-
cludes elements of a merely conceptual nature (al-umūr al-iḍāfiyya). The latter
are, accordingly, neither existent nor inexistent, and include, among others, the
production or existentiation of the act (īqāʿ) and human choice (ikhtiyār).
Fourth premise: Whereas nothing can exist without its necessary cause, the pro-
duction of an act, which – as was outlined in the preceding premise – represents
a conceptual element that is neither existent nor inexistent, can occur without
such a cause rendering its existence a necessity. Thus, a decision may not always
depend on a preponderator (murajjiḥ), as, for instance, in a decision between
two undetermined (i. e. equal) options, neither of which is preponderant nor
non-preponderant. Conversely, decisions between an ultimately preponderant
and a non-preponderant option, do necessitate a preponderator, which, howev-
er, is derived from human volition and not divine decree.]
Bibliography
Primary text
Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī, ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd, al-Tawḍīḥ fī
ḥall ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, in the margin of Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar
al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥ ʿalā al-Tawḍīḥ, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, (s. d.),
pp. 172–6.
Evil and Divine Wisdom
Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kamāl/Kemalpaşazâde (d. 940/1534),
Risāla fī bayān al-ḥikma li-ʿadam nisbat al-sharr ilayhi taʿālā
Tim Winter
The author of this treatise, here translated in its entirety,1 was the Ottoman chief
jurist (şeyhülislam, shaykh al-Islām) Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kamāl (Kemal-
paşazâde) (d. 940/1534). A former cavalryman, this active and versatile Ottoman
judge and professor composed some two hundred books in Arabic, Persian and
Turkish, including works of history, poetry, Islamic law and several influential
texts on the Arabic and Persian languages.2 His primary interest, however, seems
to have been metaphysics, a field in which the Ottoman intelligentsia found it-
self challenged by alternative ontologies. Heirs to a Māturīdī-Ḥanafī tradition
to which our author himself claims allegiance,3 the Ottoman thinkers seldom
hesitated to adopt or at least commend many later Ashʿarī positions; indeed,
their favourite theology textbook was Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī’s (d. 792/1390)
(Ashʿarī) commentary on Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī’s (d. 537/1142) (Māturīdī)
Kitāb al-ʿAqāʾid, a summa to which they frequently added Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī’s
493/1100) Uṣūl al-Dīn, a broadly Māturīdī text which showed considerable re-
spect for Ashʿarī approaches. Ottoman thinkers were fond of assembling lists of
disputes or commonalities between the two schools, and were usually very com-
fortable with a culture of theological borrowing and syncretism;4 Kemalpaşazâde
himself penned a work in this comparative genre.5
A crux of the dispute between early Ḥanafī and Qadarī dogmatists had been
the enigma of free will and the compatibility of God’s justice with His power and
1 Shams al-Dīn ibn Kamāl, Risāla fī bayān al-ḥikma li-ʿadam nisbat al-sharr ilayhi taʿālā, in
Rasāʾil Ibn Kamāl, Istanbul: Iqdām, 1316 AH (1898), vol. 1, pp. 125–30.
2 (Nihal) Atsız, “Kemalpaşa-oğlu’nun Eserleri”, Şarkiyat Mecmuası, 6 (1966), pp. 71–112,
and 7 (1972), pp. 83–135.
3 Shams al-Dīn ibn Kamāl, Risāla al-Munīra, Istanbul: Ṣaḥḥāf Aḥmad Efendi, 1296 AH
(1879), pp. 13, 18.
4 ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUthmān Mestçizâde, al-Masālik fī l-khilāfiyyāt, ed. Seyit Bahçıvan, Is-
tanbul: Irshād, 1428/2007, pp. 188–93.
5 Shams al-Dīn ibn al-Kamāl, Masāʾil al-ikhtilāf bayn al-Ashāʿira wa-l-Māturīdiyya, ed.
Saʿīd Fawda, Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 1430/2009.
216 Tim Winter
foreknowledge. On this the Māturīdīs are often seen as closer to Muʿtazilī ideas
than their Ashʿarī rivals, but simple assertions of a Māturīdī ‘rationalism’ ignore
the diversity of Māturīdism and the rigour of natural theology in later Ashʿarī
thought. Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) had himself devoted much of his
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd to the problem of free will and the related issues of theodicy.
God cannot be guilty of jabr, he believed, of simply creating actions for which
He then condemns humans; but neither is He ignorant of the future, or partially
able. God’s will (mashīʿa) can be wisely other than His command (amr), as when
He commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, knowing the outcome in advance,6
for God always acts according to a wisdom (ḥikma) which humans may not
discern.
Kemalpaşazâde’s treatise is broadly in line with this Māturīdī assumption
that God’s justice is real and intrinsic. His main treatment of human freedom
appears elsewhere,7 but in the present text he focuses on the sub-argument
which pointedly asks why in many scriptural texts evil (sharr) is not attributed to
the omnipotent God in the way goodness is. Māturīdī had himself begun his own
long wrestling with the free will paradox by raising the puzzle of the creation of
sinners and disbelievers which had figured prominently in early debates with
Muʿtazilism.8 Characteristic of this Māturīdī tradition is Kemalpaşazâde’s em-
phasis on Divine free choice (ikhtiyār) and wisdom (ḥikma), both of which are
real, although obscure; there is no statement of a divine command theory. The
Māturīdī argument which holds that the non-attribution of evil to God is es-
sentially out of courtesy to Him9 does not appear, however; and the compatibil-
ist Māturīdī and Ashʿarī idea of kasb, the human ‘acquisition’ of actions created
by God, is barely cited.
The author’s central argument is transcendentalist and aporetic: God’s ḥikma
controls a universe of perfection (itqān), evident in the transcendent world
(malakūt) but which to those who inhabit the human material plane (mulk)
is only imperfectly perceived. As Māturīdī had said, God’s ḥikma has placed
everything in its due place,10 and this must include misguidance and suffering.
This transcendentalism, which insists on the inadequacy of human perception
and judgement, is strongly supported in the Persian poetic tradition, which Ke-
malpaşazâde knows well. Even more noticeably the author borrows extensively
from Ibn ʿArabī’s metaphysics, not to supplant kalām, but to offer a further per-
spective. For Ibn ʿArabī, the world lies between existence and nonexistence, and
Ankara: İSAM, 2005, p. 485.
7 For instance in his Risāla fī l-jabr wa-l-qadar (Rasāʾil Ibn Kamāl, vol. 1, pp. 158–85).
8 Māturīdī, Tawḥīd, pp. 486–514.
9 Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna, ed. Fāṭima al-Khīmī, Beirut: Muʾassasat
al-Risāla, 1425/2004, vol. 1, pp. 458–9.
10 Māturīdī, Tawḥīd, p. 170.
Evil and Divine Wisdom 217
sharr is a synonym for the latter; it is no more than perspectival, which is why in
a certain sense it is not ascribed ‘to Him’. Manifestation obliges differentiation,
and the differentia (taʿayyunāt) are qualified by Divine names, which reduce
to Mercy (raḥma) but express the fullness of possibility in establishing Rigour
(jalāl) as well as Beauty (jamāl) in entities whose receptivity (istiʿdād) is defined
in relation to them. Evil is, thus, an intrinsic aspect of entities’ apparent distance
from the Real. One of Ibn ʿArabī’s major discussions of this significantly takes its
cue from the same hadith with which Kemalpaşazâde begins his treatise.11
The text thus presents the complex maturity of Ottoman metaphysics: by this
period not only have the later Māturīdī and Ashʿarī schools been brought into
a nuanced conversation, but the very different ontology of Ibn ʿArabī has been
seriously integrated as well.
11 ‘[…] and evil is not [ascribed] to You’, Muḥyī l-Dīn ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya,
Cairo: (s. n.), 1329/1911, vol. 3, p. 528.
‫ ‪218‬‬ ‫‪Tim Winter‬‬
‫الشر إ�ليه تعالى‬

‫ّ‬ ‫رسالة في بيان الحكمة لعدم نسبة‬
‫بسم ال�له الرحمن الرحيم‬

‫ل شيء‪ ،‬والصالة على مح ّمد‬ ‫الحمد للّه الذي �أحسن خلق مصنوع و�أتقن صنع ك ّ‬
‫حي‪.‬‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ‬
‫ل ّ‬ ‫حي المنعوت بالفضل على ك ّ‬
‫المبعوث من �شرف قبيلة و�فضل ّ‬
‫الشر � إلى اللّه تعالى‪ .‬فنقول‪ ،‬ومن اللّه‬

‫ّ‬ ‫�أ ّما بعد فهذه رسالة معمولة في بيان ّ‬
‫سر عدم نسبة‬
‫التوفيق وبيده �أزمة التحقيق‪ ،‬ثبت في صحيح مسلم �أ ّن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم‬
‫والشر ليس � إليك”‬
‫ّ‬ ‫كان يقول في دعاء االستفتاح‪“ :‬لبّيك وسعديك‪ ،‬والخير في يديك‪،‬‬
‫المتصرفة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫القوة‬
‫تجاوز عن ّ‬
‫التصرف‬
‫ّ‬ ‫تنوع‬
‫راسخ في علم البيان‪ ،‬وتثنيتها باعتبار ّ‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫التجوز على من له قد ٌم‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وال يخفى وجه‬
‫كوت‪.‬‬ ‫الم ْلك وعالم الغيب المس ّمى بعالم المل ُ‬ ‫في العالمين‪ :‬عالم الشهادة المس ّمى بعالم ُ‬
‫ي﴾ على قراءة‬ ‫ت بِ َي َد َّ‬
‫خ َل ْق ُ‬ ‫ك �أَ ْن َت ْس ُ‬
‫ج َد ل ِ َما َ‬ ‫﴿ما َم َن َع َ‬‫ومن ههنا ات ّضح وجه قوله تعالى‪َ :‬‬
‫‪12‬‬
‫حظ من عالمي الملك والملكوت‪ ،‬وفيه � إشارة � إلى جهة فضل �آدم‬ ‫التشديد �أي لما خلقته ذا ٍّ‬
‫حظ لهم من �أحد العالمين المذكورين‪.‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫عليه السالم على الم�أمورين بالسجود له م ّمن ال‬
‫والشر ليس منك‪ ،‬ل أ ّن وجوده منه ضرورة �أن ّه ال‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫“والشر ليس � إليك” ولم يقل‪:‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫و �إن ّما قال‪:‬‬
‫شراً بالنسبة � إليه تعالى‪ ،‬و �إن ّما ذلك بالنسبة � إلى غيره‪ ،‬والإ ضافة‬ ‫يوجد � ّإل هو‪ّ � ،‬إل �أن ّه ليس ّ‬
‫ير﴾‪ 13‬حيث‬ ‫ٍ ِ‬ ‫َّك َع َلى ُ‬ ‫� إلى ما سواه‪ ،‬وعلى هذا ورد قوله تعالى‪﴿ :‬بِ َي ِدكَ ا ْل َ‬
‫خ ْي ُر �إِن َ‬
‫ل َش ْيء قَد ٌ‬ ‫ك ِّ‬
‫خص الخير بالذكر في مقام النسبة � إليه تعالى‪ ،‬وذكر الشيء‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫والشر بل‬
‫ّ‬ ‫لم يقل بيدك الخير‬
‫صالحية المقدور�يّة‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫للشر �أيضاً في بيان مقام تناول قدرته لما له‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫العا ّم‬
‫‪ 12‬سورة ص ‪.٣٨/٧٥‬‬

‫‪ 13‬سورة �آل عمران ‪.٣/٢٦‬‬
A Treatise Expounding the Wisdom in Not Attributing Evil to God the Exalted
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God, Who excellently made creation and perfected the fashioning
of all things. May blessings rest upon Muḥammad, he who was sent from the
noblest tribe and the best of clans, and is characterised by a merit superior to that
of every other living thing.
To proceed. This is a treatise written to expound the secret reason for the non-
attribution of evil to God the Exalted. We say – and success is from Him and in
His hand lie the reins of true ascertaining – that it is established in the Ṣaḥīḥ of
Muslim that God’s Messenger, may God bless him and grant him peace, used
to say in the prayer with which he began his worship: ‘At Your service, at Your
felicitous command; the good is in Your two hands, and evil is not [ascribed] to
You,’14 [implying] a disregarding of agency.
Now, the modality of this disregarding is not hidden from anyone who has a
sturdy foothold in the discipline of rhetoric: the dual number in the expres-
sion is there to take into account the heterogeneity of Divine agency in the two
worlds, which are the World of Witnessing, which is also known as the ‘World
of Sovereignty’ (mulk), and the World of the Unseen, which is called the ‘World
of the Kingdom’ (malakūt). Thus is the sense of His word the Exalted, ‘What
prevents you [the Devil] from prostrating to that [Adam] which I created with
My two hands?’ [Q 38:75], if we follow the variant reading which doubles the
final consonant,15 which is to say, ‘that which I created to be in possession of a
share of the two worlds, of Sovereignty and of the Kingdom.’ This contains an
indication of the merit of Adam, upon him be peace, over those [angels] who are
being commanded to prostrate to him, who have no share in either of the two
aforementioned worlds.
[The Prophet] said ‘Evil is not [ascribed] to You’ rather than ‘Evil is not from You’
only because its being is necessarily from Him, given that He alone has being;
however it is not evil in relation to Him the Exalted but only in relation to others,
being referenced to what is not Him. This is why God the Exalted says: ‘In Your
hand is the good; verily You are Powerful over everything’ [Q 3:26] instead of ‘In
Your hand is the good and the evil’; in fact, He singled out the good for mention
in that it exists in relation to Him, and mentioned a general ‘everything’ when
referring to evil, in explaining the extent of His power’s reach, as He [alone]
possesses the capacity which subjects things to His decree.
14 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, “Musāfirīn”, 201.

15 Reading yadayy, ‘My two hands’, instead of yadī, ‘My hand’. The author’s interpretation
here reflects that of Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, vol. 2, pp. 3–4.
‫ ‪220‬‬ ‫‪Tim Winter‬‬
‫ل َش ْي ٍء﴾‪ ،16‬فهو الخالق للعباد وما صدر‬ ‫﴿خال ِ ُق ُ‬

‫ك ِّ‬ ‫وتحقيق هذا الكالم �أ ّن اللّه تعالى َ‬
‫الشر‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المنهي عنه كان قد فعل‬
‫َّ‬ ‫عنهم وظهر منهم من الأفعال والأقوال‪ .‬والعبد � إذا فعل القبيح‬
‫والرب تعالى هو الذي جعله فاعالً لذلك‪ ،‬وهذا الجعل منه تعالى عدل وحكمة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫والسوء‪،‬‬
‫شر وقبيح‪ ،‬فهو سبحانه بهذا الجعل قد وضع‬
‫وصواب‪ ،‬فجعله فاعالً خير وحسن والمفعول ّ‬
‫الشيء موضعه لما له في ذلك من الحكمة البالغة التي يحمد عليها‪ ،‬فهو خير وحكمة‬
‫وشراً‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ومصلحة و � إن كان وقوعه من العبد عيباً ونقصاً‬
‫وهذا �أمر معقول في الشاهد‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن الصانع الخبير � إذا �أخذ الخشبة العوجاء والحجر المكسور‬
‫واللبنة الناقصة فوضع ذلك في موضع يليق به ويناسبه كان ذلك منه عدالً وصواباً يمدح‬
‫ل‪ .‬ومن وضع الخبائث في‬ ‫ل عوج ونقص وعيب نذ ّم به المح ّ‬ ‫به‪ ،‬و � إن كان في المح ّ‬
‫موضعها ومحلّها الالئق بها كان ذلك حكم ًة وعدالً وصواباً‪ .‬و �إن ّما السفه والظلم �أن يضعها‬
‫في غير محلّها الالئق بها‪ ،‬فمن وضع العمامة على الر�أس والنعل في الرجل والكحل في‬
‫العين والزبالة في الكناسة فقد وضع الشيء في موضعه ولم يظلم النعل والزبالة � إذ بهذا‬
‫محلّها‪.‬‬
‫وبهذا التفصيل انكشف الحجاب عن وجه الجواب الذي ذكرناه في تفسير قوله تعالى‪:‬‬
‫ك﴾‪ 17‬حيث قلنا‪ :‬ف إ�ن‬ ‫ك ِمن سي�ئ َ ٍة ف َِمن َن ْف ِ‬
‫س َ‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫ح َس�ن َ ٍة ف َِم َن ال� ل ِه َو َما �أَ َ‬
‫صا َب َ ْ َ ِّ‬ ‫ك ِم ْن َ‬ ‫﴿ما �أَ َ‬
‫صا َب َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ً‬ ‫ً‬
‫قلت السيّئة من الله تعالى خلقا كالحسنة والحسنة من العبد كسبا كالسيّئة فما وجه‬ ‫ّ‬
‫سيئة ال نسبة لها � إلى اللّه تعالى‪ .‬وقد ورد في‬
‫السيئة من حيث �أن ّها ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الفرق بينهما‪ ،‬قلت � ّإن‬
‫الخبر �أ ّن � إدريس عليه السالم قال‪“ :‬اللّه هو المحمود في جميع فعاله‪ ،‬حاشاك حاشاك‪،‬‬
‫يا روحي فداك‪ ،‬من فعل قبيح ينافي وجهك الحسناء”‪.‬‬
‫‪ 16‬سورة الزمر ‪.٦٢/٣٩‬‬

‫‪ 17‬سورة النساء ‪.٧٩/٤‬‬
The truth of this statement is ascertained by the fact that God the Exalted is
‘Creator of every thing’ [Q 39:62], and is thus the Creator of His servants and
the words and deeds which proceed and appear from them. The servant, when
he performs an ugly and forbidden action, has done something evil and wicked,
and it is indeed the Lord Who made him the agent of that act; but this ‘making’
by Him the Exalted is just, wise and correct; so that His making him the agent
is good and beautiful even though the action itself remains evil and ugly. By
this ‘making’ He the Sublime has set affairs in their due place, insofar as in this
there is an utmost wisdom which is praiseworthy; and (His ‘making’) is thus
good, wise, and useful, even though the action’s proceeding from the servant
comprises a fault, a defect, and a wickedness.
This is something which may be understood from observation. When a skilled
craftsman takes a crooked length of wood, a broken rock, and a deficient piece of
brick, and places these things in a fitting and appropriate position, this comprises
a just, right, and praiseworthy action, even if the site still contains a crookedness,
inadequacy, and flaw by which we condemn it. So too he who places ordure in
its due and suitable place has acted wisely, justly, and correctly. Foolishness and
injustice would obtain only were he to put them in a place which was wrong
for them. In this way someone who places a turban on his head, sandals on his
feet, and antimony in his eyes, and puts rubbish on the refuse-pile, has placed
everything in its due place, and has committed no wrong against the sandal and
the rubbish, since they have gone to their rightful locations.
By detailing the matter in this way the veil is lifted from the face of the answer,
which we have discussed [elsewhere] in our commentary on His saying, ‘What-
ever good touches you is from God, and whatever misfortune touches you is
from yourself ’ [Q4:79] where we wrote: ‘Should you say: “The misfortune is
God’s, the Exalted, as a creation, just like the good, and the good is the human’s,
as an acquisition (kasb), just like the misfortune; so in what way are they to be
differentiated?” I would reply: “The misfortune, qua misfortune, has no relation
to God the Exalted.”’18 It has been narrated in a report that Idrīs, upon him be
peace, said: ‘God is praiseworthy in all His actions. Far be it from You, far be
it from You, may my soul be Your ransom, that You should do something ugly
which would contradict the beauty of Your face!’
18 The author may be referring to his Qur’anic commentary, where the same point about
kasb is made but expressed differently. See Shams al-Dīn ibn Kamāl, Tafsīr Ibn Kamāl Bāshā,
ed. Māhir Habbūsh, Istanbul: al-Irshād, 1439/2018, vol. 3, p. 125.
‫ ‪222‬‬ ‫‪Tim Winter‬‬
‫سر دقيق ينتبه‬ ‫شر ال نسبة � إليه تعالى فقد وقفت على ّ‬ ‫الشر من حيث �أن ّه ٌ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫و � إذا عرفت �أ ّن‬
‫﴿و�أَنَّا َل َن ْدرِي �أَ َش ٌّر �أُر َ‬
‫ِيد بِ َم ْن فِي‬ ‫الجن‪َ :‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫المفسرون في قوله تعالى حكاي ًة عن نفر من‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫له‬
‫َ‬
‫الشر بصيغة المجهول صارفاً‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ْال أ ْرضِ �أَ ْم �أَ َر َ‬
‫اد بِ ِه ْم َربُّ ُه ْم َر َش ًدا﴾‪ 19‬حيث �أتى عند ذكر � إرادة‬
‫مصرحاً نسبتها � إليه تعالى‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫نسبتها عن اللّه تعالى‪ ،‬وعند ذكر � إرادة الخير بصيغة المعلوم‬
‫واعلم �أ ّن خلق الكافر ليس بقبيح و � إن كان الكافر قبيحاً‪ ،‬كما �أ ّن تصوير الصور القبيحة‬
‫المصور وغاية مهارته في صنعته‪ .‬وتحقيق هذا‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫يدل على كمال حذاقة‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ليس قبيحاً بل‬
‫المعنى �أ ّن الحكمة كما �أ ّن موجبها � إتقان الصنع‪ ،‬ل أ ّن � إتقان الخلق على ما ّ‬
‫نبه � إليه في‬
‫ل َش ْي ٍء﴾‪� 20‬أي �أحكم صنعه‪ .‬ف إ� ّن بقاء صورة الجبال‬ ‫﴿ص ْن َع ال� ل ِه الَّ ِذي �أَتْقَ َن ُ‬
‫ك َّ‬ ‫قوله تعالى‪ُ :‬‬
‫بعد ما تخلخلت وصارت كالعهن المنفوش‪ ،‬كما هو المذكور في سباق الكالم ّ‬
‫دل على‬
‫كمال الإ تقان من جهة الصنع‪ ،‬وهو تركيب الصورة في الما ّدة‪ .‬وبهذا الإ تقان ينتظم ك ّ‬
‫ل‬
‫شيء قويّاً كان تركيبه كالنخل �أو ضعيفاً كالنحل‪.‬‬
‫موجهاً � إحسان‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ولم يتنبه له من قال في تفسيره �أحكم خلقه وسواه على ما ينبغي كذلك‬
‫خ َلقَ ُه﴾‪� 21‬أي لم يقتصر‬ ‫ل َش ْي ٍء َ‬
‫ك َّ‬ ‫الخلق ال � إحسان المخلوق‪ ،‬ولهذا قال تعالى‪�﴿ :‬أَ ْ‬
‫ح َس َن ُ‬
‫ل شيء بل زاد عليه قوله خلقه‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن في زيادته صرف الحسن من‬ ‫على قوله �أحسن ك ّ‬
‫حمـ ٰ ِن‬ ‫خ ْلقِ َّ‬
‫الر ْ‬ ‫﴿ما َت َرى فِي َ‬
‫المخلوق � إلى الخلق وله �أيضاً نفي التفاوت عن خلقه في قوله‪َ :‬‬
‫او ٍ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫ت﴾‪ 22‬ال عن مخلوقه‪ .‬وقصور الصانع �إن ّما يلزم من القصور في الصنع ال من‬ ‫م ْن َتفَ ُ‬
‫القصور في المصنوع‪ ،‬لأن ّه قد يكون دليالً على كماله‪.‬‬
‫الجن ‪.١٠/٧٢‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫‪ 19‬سورة‬
‫‪ 20‬سورة النمل ‪.٨٨/٢٧‬‬
‫‪ 21‬سورة السجدة ‪.٧/٣٢‬‬
‫‪ 22‬سورة الملك ‪.٣/٦٧‬‬
Since you have now recognised that evil, qua evil, is unrelated to Him the Exalt-
ed, you will have appreciated a subtle secret which the Qur’anic exegetes have
noticed when considering His word the Exalted, where He quotes a group of
jinn : ‘We know not whether evil is intended for those on earth, or whether their
Lord wishes for them good guidance’ [Q 72:10]. In this verse He uses the passive
voice in describing the will to evil in order to deflect its attribution to God the
Exalted, but uses the active voice when speaking of the will to good and explicitly
attributes it to Him the Exalted.
Know, too, that it is not ugly for God to have created the unbeliever, even though
the unbeliever is in himself ugly, just as drawing ugly pictures is not in itself an
ugly thing but in fact points up the artist’s skill and extreme perspicuity in his
craft. To verify this idea further [we would say that] wisdom is necessarily linked
to perfect making, since the perfect creation indicated in His word the Exalted,
‘The making of God Who perfected all things’ [Q 27:88] means that He created
everything perfectly, and just as the ongoing appearance of mountains after they
endure tremors and become like ‘carded wool’,23 as is mentioned earlier in the
text,24 indicates the perfect excellence with which they had been made, namely
the composition of their forms out of matter. And it is by this same perfecting
that everything is arranged, whether it be strong in its composition, such as the
palm-tree, or frail, like the honeybee.
This has gone unnoticed by the author who wrote in his commentary: ‘He cre-
ated it firmly and distributed it equally over everything appropriate’,25 similarly
indicating the beneficence of creating, not of the created entity itself. For this
reason (God) the Exalted says that ‘He excellently made everything which He
created’ [Q 32:7], not limiting Himself to saying ‘He excellently made everything’
but adding ‘which He created’, for it is in this addition that He attributes excel-
lence not to the creature but to the creation itself. God also denies the existence
of any incongruity in His creation, although it may exist in His creatures, where
He says: ‘You shall see no incongruity in the All-Merciful’s creation’ [Q 67:3]. For
a craftsman’s deficiency inheres only in the way he makes things, not in what he
has made, although that [too] can be a proof of his perfection.
23 See Q 101:5.
24 Theverse begins, ‘You behold the mountains, and you think them to be firm, but they
pass away as do the clouds.’
25 Abū Saʿīd al-Bayḍāwī, Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-taʾwīl, Istanbul: al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿUthmāniyya, 1329/1911, p. 509.
‫ ‪224‬‬ ‫‪Tim Winter‬‬
‫ولقد �أشار � إلى هذا الشيخ المحقّق محي الدين ابن العربي ق ّدس اللّه ّ‬
‫سره العزيز‪:‬‬
‫ال تنكروا الباطل في طرزه ف إ�ن ّه بعض كماالته‬
‫وقال بعض العارفين على اللسان الفارسي‪ :‬قصور صانع در بدي صنع است نه در صنع‬
‫بدي‬
‫زشتىء خط زشتئ نقاش نيست بلكه ازوى زشت هم بنمود نيست‬
‫قوة نقاش باشد �آن كه او هم تواند زشت كردن هم نكو‬

‫يها﴾‪� 26‬أي ما تهتدي به � إلى طريق النجاة‬‫ل َن ْفسٍ ُه َد َ‬
‫ك َّ‬‫﴿و َل ْو ِش�ئْ َنا َلآ َت ْي َنا ُ‬
‫قال اللّه تعالى‪َ :‬‬
‫ح َّق ا ْلقَ ْولُ ِمنِّي﴾‪� 27‬أي ثبت قضائي على مقتضى الحكمة‬ ‫ك ْن َ‬ ‫من النار في دار القرار‪﴿ ،‬و َل ِ‬
‫َ‬
‫ِ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫الإ لهية‪َ َ ،‬‬
‫ّن جهنّم مرتبة من مراتب‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ين﴾ ‪،‬‬‫ج َمع َ‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ْ‬
‫ج َهنَّ َم م َن الج�نَّة َوالنَّاسِ � ْ‬ ‫﴿ل أ ْم َل أَ َّن َ‬ ‫ّ‬
‫‪28‬‬
‫والحق الذي يلوح �أنواره من‬

‫ّ‬ ‫الوجود فال يجوز في الحكمة تعطيلها و � إبقاؤها في كتم العدم‪.‬‬
‫بقوة التوفيق �أ ّن فيض الوجود من منبع الجود فائض على الماهيّات الممكنة‬
‫كوة التحقيق ّ‬
‫ّ‬
‫المعذب فيهما‬ ‫حسب ما تستع ّد وتقبله‪ .‬وكما �أ ّن المنعم في النش�أتين ممكن فكذلك‬
‫ممكن‪ ،‬والمنعم في � إحديهما دون الأخرى ممكن‪ ،‬وعطاؤه تعالى غير مقطوع وال ممنوع‪،‬‬
‫ف إ� ّن يده ملآن بالخير والكمال وخزانته مملوءة بنفائس الجود والإ فضال‪ ،‬فال ب ّد �أن يوجد‬
‫جميع الأقسام الممكنة‪.‬‬
‫و�أصل هذا �أ ّن الصفات الإ لهيّة ب�أسرها تقتضي الظهور في مظاهر الأكوان والبروز في‬
‫الجمالية تقتضي البروز وت�أبى االستتار فكذلك الأسماء‬
‫ّ‬ ‫مجالي الأعيان‪ .‬وكما �أ ّن الأسماء‬
‫المعز يتجلّى في مجلي‬
‫ّ‬ ‫الجالليّة تستدعي الظهور و � إظهار الآثار‪ .‬فكما �أ ّن اسم الهادي‬
‫والمذل يظهر في مظاهر نش�أة المشركين‬
‫ّ‬ ‫نش�أة المؤمنين والأبرار كذلك اسم المض ّ‬
‫ل‬
‫والكفّار‪ .‬واعتبر هذا في سائر الأسماء والصفات ينكشف عندك لمعة من لمعات �أنوار‬
‫الحقيقة وتستنشق ش ّمة من نفحات الأسرار الدقيقة‪.‬‬
‫‪ 26‬سورة السجدة ‪.١٣/٣٢‬‬

‫‪ 27‬سورة السجدة ‪.١٣/٣٢‬‬
‫‪ 28‬سورة السجدة ‪.١٣/٣٢‬‬
This has been referred to by the right-thinking Shaykh Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī,
may God sanctify his noble secret, who wrote: ‘Do not deny what is false in what
He has woven, for it is part of His perfections,’29 while one of the Sufi knowers
of God has said in the Persian tongue: ‘The craftsman’s shortcoming lies in the
defect of the artifact, not in the making of the defect’.
The ugliness of the script is not the ugliness of the artist; nay ‘tis an exhibition
of the ugly by him.
The power (skill) of the artist is that he can make both the ugly and the beautiful.30
God the Exalted has said: ‘Had We wished We would have given every soul its
guidance’ [Q 32:13], which is to say, that which it needed to guide it to the path
of salvation from Fire in the eternal abode, ‘but the True Word came from Me’
[Q 32:13], in other words, My decree in accordance with divine wisdom was
established, and ‘I shall fill Hell with jinn and men altogether’ [Q 32:13]. For
hell is one of the degrees of being, which the Divine wisdom may not abolish
and keep in the concealment of nonexistence. The reality, whose lights by the
strength of Providence shine forth from the window of discerning the truth, is
that the emanation of being from the Wellspring of generosity flows out upon the
possible quiddities in accordance with what they are prepared for and are able
to accept. Just as the individual who receives blessings in this world and the next
is a possible being, so too is the one who receives punishment in both; possible
also is the one who receives blessing only in one and not the other. And God’s
giving is uninterrupted and unstinting, for His hands are filled with goodness
and perfection and His treasury is full of precious generosity and grace. It is
inescapably the case, therefore, that all possible categories exist.
This is based on the fact that the Divine attributes all need to be manifested
in the theophanies of existent entities and to appear in the showings of sub-
stances. Just as the Names of Beauty must appear and refuse any concealment,
so too the Names of Rigour invite manifestation and the appearance of their
effects. So just as the names The Guide (al-Hādī) and The Ennobler (al-Muʿizz)
manifest themselves in the theophanies of the lives of believers and saints, so too
do the names The Misguider (al-Muḍill) and The Abaser (al-Mudhill) appear
in the theophanies of the lives of idolators and unbelievers. Consider this as it
applies also to the remaining Divine names and attributes and one of the gleams
of Truth’s Light will be disclosed to you, and you will breathe a fragrance that
comes from the exhalations of the subtle mysteries.
29 A more usual version appears in Ibn Kamāl’s Sharḥ (referenced note 35 below, p. 32):
lā tunkirū al-bāṭila fī ṭawrihi, fa-innahu baʿḍu ẓuhūrātihi, attributed to Abū Madyan in Ṣāʾin
al-Dīn ibn Turka’s (d. 835/1432) commentary on Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ : Ṣāʾin al-Dīn ibn Turka,
Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Moḥsen Bīdārpūr, Tehran: Enteshārāt-i Bīdār, 1378 sh (1999), vol. 1,
pp. 361, 516; vol. 2, p. 915.
30 Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, The Mathnawí of Jalálu ’ddín Rúmí, ed. and trans. Reynold Alleyne
Nicholson, London: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1926–40, vol. 3, p. 77.
‫ ‪226‬‬ ‫‪Tim Winter‬‬
‫والسؤال ب�أ ّن هذا ل ِ َم صار مظهراً لهذا االسم وذلك لذلك االسم مضمح ّ‬
‫ل عند التحقيق‪،‬‬
‫السر الدقيق‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬ ‫ف إ�ن ّه لو كان هذا مظهراً لذلك االسم لكان هذا ذلك‪ ،‬فافهم هذا‬
‫و � إذا عرفت هذا فقد انكشف لديك وجه ما ورد في الحديث الصحيح الإ ّ‬
‫لهي من قوله عليه‬
‫يلومن � ّإل نفسه”‪ ،‬ووقفت‬
‫ّ‬ ‫السالم‪“ :‬فمن وجد خيراً فليحمد اللّه‪ ،‬ومن وجد غير ذلك فال‬
‫ون﴾‪.31‬‬ ‫ك َّن النَّاس �أَنْفُ َس ُه ْم َي ْ‬
‫ظ ِل ُم َ‬ ‫ظ ِلم النَّاس َشي ًئا و َل ِ‬
‫َ ْ َ‬ ‫على معنى قوله تعالى‪ �﴿ :‬إ َِّن ال� ل َه َل َي ْ ُ‬
‫َ‬
‫يدلن على عدم استعداد الإ دراك �أشعر‬ ‫وذلك �أن ّه تعالى لما ذكر الصمم والعمي اللذين ّ‬
‫الكالم بوقوع الظلم لوجود االستعداد لبعض وعدمه لبعض‪ ،‬فسلب الظلم عن ذاته‪ ،‬ل أ ّن‬
‫عدم االستعداد في الأصل ليس ظلماً لعدم � إمكان ما هو �أجود منه بالنسبة � إلى خصوصيّة‬
‫ذلك العين وهويّته‪ ،‬فكان عينه مقتضياً له في رتبة من مراتب الإ مكان‪ ،‬كما ال يمكن‬
‫للحمار مع حماريّته استعداد الإ دراك الإ نساني وكان عينه مستدعياً لما هو عليه من‬
‫االستعداد الحماري‪ ،‬وال يطلب منه ما وراء ما في استعداده‪ ،‬فال ظلم هذا � إذا لم يكن‬
‫في الأصل‪.‬‬
‫ثم بطل برسوخ الهيئات المظلمة فال كالم فيه وكالهما ظالم لنفسه‪� .‬أ ّما‬
‫و�أ ّما � إذا كان فيه ّ‬
‫الثاني فظاهر‪ ،‬و�أ ّما ال أ ّول فلقصوره في درجات الإ مكان ونقصانه بالإ ضافة � إلى ما فوقه‬
‫لقصور الحمار مثالً عن الإ نسان ونقصانه بالنسبة � إليه ال في نفسه‪ .‬ف إ�ن ّه في ح ّد نفسه ليس‬
‫بقاصر وال ناقص على ما �أشار � إليه بعض الكاملين في النظم الفارسي‪:‬‬
‫�پير ما گفت خطا بر قلم صنع نرفت �آفرين بر نظر پاك خطا پوشش باد‬
‫‪ 31‬سورة يونس ‪.٤٤/١٠‬‬

The question as to why such-and-such an event is a manifestation of the former

name, while such-and-such an event is a manifestation of the latter, vanishes
when rightly investigated. For were the former (event) to be a manifestation of
the latter (name), the former (event) would in fact be the latter. You are to under-
stand this nuanced mystery.
If you have indeed understood this then you will have uncovered the sense of the
sound divine hadith in which [the Prophet] says, upon him be peace: ‘Whoever
finds good, let him praise God, and whoever finds something else, let him
certainly blame none but himself.’32 You will also have understood His word the
Exalted, ‘God does not wrong people in anything, but people wrong themselves’
[Q 10:44]. This is because He the Exalted, when He mentions deafness and blind-
ness, qualities which indicate an incapacity of perception, in this verse, conveys
the impression that an injustice has taken place because of the existence of this
capacity in some people and not in others,33 but He dissociates Himself from
injustice, because a lack of receptivity (istiʿdād) in the basis of a thing does not
itself comprise an injustice, since it is impossible that anything more excellent
than it could have existed in relation to the specific nature and identity of that
phenomenon, which required it in the light of one of the degrees of possibility,
just as a donkey, in its donkey-ness, cannot acquire the capacity of human
perception, and cannot be asked for what lies beyond its capacity. So there is no
injustice here, as it refers to the case where it is not present intrinsically.
However if it was present and then ended due to the settling of dark dispositions,
there is nothing to be said: both have ‘wronged themselves.’ The second case
is self-evident; as for the first, it is because of its falling short in the degrees of
possibility and its inadequacy in relation to what is above it, not because of its
intrinsic nature, due to, for example, the donkey’s inferiority and inadequacy in
relation to a human being, not to what is intrinsic to the donkey, for in itself it is
neither inferior nor inadequate. This is what is alluded to in the Persian verse of
one of the perfect sages:
Our spiritual master said: No mistake was made by Creation’s pen.
Bravo, to his pure error-hiding sight!34
32 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, “Birr”, 55.

33
The previous two verses having mentioned issues relating to the perception of the deaf
and the blind.
34 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ, Dīwān-i Ḥāfiẓ, ed. Parvīz Nātil Khānlarī, Tehran:
Enteshārāt-i Khwārazmī, 1359 sh (1980), p. 218.
‫ ‪228‬‬ ‫‪Tim Winter‬‬
‫ثم �أشار باالستتار � إلى‬

‫مر بيانه و�أثبته في المصنوع‪ّ ،‬‬
‫نفى الخطاء عن الصنع و�أصاب على ما ّ‬
‫وجه انتفائه عنه تعالى �أيضاً بنوع من االعتبار‪ .‬ولنا في شرح البيت المذكور رسالة مفردة‬
‫�أوردنا فيها تفصيل الوجه المزبور‪.‬‬
‫و�أ ّما الذي ذهب � إليه �أساطين الحكمة وسالطين المعرفة من �أ ّن الخير يصدر عنه تعالى‬
‫لوح � إلى هذا‬
‫والشر العرض لما بينهما من االرتباط كما بين الجوهر والعرض‪ .‬وقد ّ‬
‫ّ‬ ‫بالذات‬
‫المقال من قال‪ :‬الغيث ال يخلو عن العيث‪ ،‬يعني ما ينزل في وقته من قطار الأمطار مع ما‬
‫فيه من قضاء الأوطار ال يخلو عن الأخطار في بعض الأقطار‪.‬‬
‫لشر جزئي وضرر‬

‫ّ‬ ‫ومعنى الكالم الخير الكلّي والنفع العا ّم المقصودان بالذات ال يتركان‬
‫خاص ال ب ّد �أن يفعال بالعرض‪ ،‬ف إ� ّن في قوام العالم بالنظام المحكم ال ب ّد من ظهور الشرور‬
‫ّ‬
‫السم في � إزالة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫وصدور الآالم‪ .‬وهذا ال ينافي الحكمة ف إ� ّن الطبيب الحاذق قد يستعمل‬
‫المرض‪ .‬قال موالنا ق ّدس اللّه ّ‬
‫سره العزيز‪:‬‬
‫شركه سر زد از ميان كائنات بر مثال چوپ دان اندر نبات‬
‫فله �أيضاً وجه معقول � ّإل �أ ّن ما ق ّدمناه �أدقّ وبالقبول �أ ّ‬

‫حق ولش�أنه تعالى ومقتضى حكمته‬
‫والتعصب‬
‫ّ‬ ‫التعسف‬
‫ّ‬ ‫�أليق و�أوفق‪ ،‬كما ال يخفى على من ت�أ ّمل و�أنصف وبالتجنّب عن‬
‫ات ّصف‪ .‬واللّه تعالى �أعلم و�أحكم‪.‬‬
The poet thus denies any error in the making and affirms its rightness, as has
been explained and proven above with regard to created entities. Then with ‘con-
cealment’ he uses a form of expression which points to a means of not attributing
it to (God) the Exalted. I have written a separate treatise commenting on this line
of verse, in which I elaborate the aspect I have mentioned here.35
Let us now turn to the position favoured by the champions of wisdom and the
sultans of knowledge, who hold that goodness proceeds from Him the Exalted as
essence, while evil is an accident, due to the connection which links them, which
is as that which links a substance and an accident. This is a doctrine indicated by
the person who said, ‘There is no rain which brings no corruption,’ which means
that the rain which comes to the land in due time satisfies some wants, but in
some places is not devoid of risky consequences.
What this means is that the reality of universal good and general utility which
are intended in themselves is not negated by the existence of a partial evil and
a particular harm which must necessarily be enacted upon accidents, for in the
upholding of the world in its firm system, evils and pains must necessarily occur.
This is not in conflict with (Divine) wisdom, for a clever physician may utilise
poison in removing some illnesses. As Rūmī says, may God sanctify his noble
secret:
The evil which emerged from the bosom of the Universe,
Know [that it is] like the wood in the plant.36
Although this also has a formal theological aspect, the account which we have
given above is subtler and more worthy of acceptance, and, as will be evident to
those who reflect fair-mindedly and avoid arbitrary or fanatical thinking, is also
more fitting to the Divine nature and wisdom. And God, Exalted is He, is more
Knowing and Wise.
35 This is his Sharḥ-i yek bayt-i Ḥāfiẓ, ed. Kadir Turgut, in “Kemalpaşazâde’nin Hâfız’a
Ait Bir Beytin Şerhini İçeren Farsça Risalesi”, Doğu Araştırmaları, 11/1 (2013), pp. 25–48; a
text, perhaps written following a discussion of theodicy with Selim I, of a similar length to the
one presented here, and taking the same theological line, albeit with more Persian proof-texts
and fewer scriptural citations and aiming at a more elevated literary style. The bayt was also
the subject of a commentary by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library,
Esad Efendi 3685/5), and later Ottoman commentaries on Ḥāfiẓ paid it particular attention in
what became a minor but celebrated crux for Ottoman thinkers reflecting on theodicy (Turgut,
28–9). It triggers the longest of the footnotes to a masterful recent translation into English: Peter
Avery, The Collected Lyrics of Háfiz of Shíráz, Bartlow [Essex]: Archetype, 2007, pp. 144–5, who
notes the overlap of Ashʿarite conceptions of kasb with Sufi ideas.
36 Unidentified, even though the author cites it again as Rūmī’s in his Sharḥ-i yek bayt.
Perhaps he is referring to Mathnawī, I, l.1998: ‘And if there be one fault together with a hundred
advantages (excellences), it resembles the wood (woody stalk) in the sugarcane’ (trans. Nichol
son, vol. 1, p. 108).
230 Tim Winter
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Mestçizâde, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUthmān, al-Masālik fī l-khilāfiyyāt, ed. Seyit Bahçıvan, Is-
tanbul: Irshād, 1428/2007.
Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vaduz: Thesaurus Islamicus, 2000.
Rūmī, Jalāl al-Dīn, The Mathnawí of Jalálu ’ddín Rúmí, ed. and trans. Reynold Alleyne
Nicholson, London: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1926–40.
Contributors
Hülya Alper is Head of the Department of Kalam at the Faculty of Theology,

Marmara University in Istanbul. She completed her undergraduate and gradu-
ate studies in Kalam at Marmara University, where she has been teaching since
1993. She was a visiting scholar at Dar al-Ulum Faculty, Cairo University (2002)
and at SOAS, University of London (2011). Her research is focused on Islamic
theology, especially on the Māturīdī school of theology. Her publications include
İmanın Psikolojik Yapısı (2002), Tevhidin Esasları (al-Nasafī, Kitab al-Tamhīd li
qawaʿid al-tawḥīd, translation from Arabic to Turkish, 2007), İmam Mâtürîdî’ye
Göre Akıl-Vahiy İlişkisi (2008), İmam Mâtürîdî ve Mâtürîdiyye Geleneği Tarih,
Yöntem, Doktrin Prof. Dr. Bekir Topaloğlu Anısına (Editor, 2018).
Mürteza Bedir received his PhD from the University of Manchester, Depart-
ment of Middle Eastern Studies, in 1999. He worked as a lecturer (both Assis-
tant and Associate professors) in the University of Sakarya, Faculty of Theology
(2000–10). In January 2011, he was appointed professor of Islamic Law in the
Faculty of Theology, Istanbul University. He is the author of several books
including the Fıkıh, Mezhep ve Sünnet: Hanefi Fıkıh Teorisinde Peygamber’in
Otoritesi (2004), and Buhara Hukuk Okulu. 10.–13. Yüzyıllar Orta Asya Vakıf
Hukuku Bağlamında Bir İnceleme (2014). His research interests cover, inter alia,
Islamic legal theory, especially the Hanafi School of law, reason and revelation in
Islamic legal theory, historiography of law in the Muslim world, fatwa literature,
the law of religious endowments (awqāf ) and bioethics. He is currently working
on the formation of ‘Ottoman law’ through the Şeyhülislam fatwas and risāla
literature of the 16th century.
Angelika Brodersen studied Protestant theology, German and Islamic studies
at the University of Göttingen. Since her doctorate with Tilman Nagel with a
thesis on the mystic ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī and his interpretation of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s
doctrines, she has published studies on details of the theology of Abū Manṣūr
al-Māturīdī and his successors, as well as editions of important Māturīdī sources.
After several years as an independent lecturer for German as a foreign language,
she has been working as a research assistant at the Department of Oriental and
Islamic Studies at the Ruhr University Bochum since 2010.
232 Contributors
Philipp Bruckmayr studied Arabic and Islamic Studies, Turkish Studies and
History at the University of Vienna, where he received his PhD in Arabic and
Islamic Studies in 2014. He has published on Islam in Southeast Asia, Arab and
Islamic communities in the Americas, post-classical Islamic theology, Catholic
scholarly engagement with Islam, and on religion and politics in Syria. Currently
a lecturer at the University of Vienna in Arabic and Islamic Studies, he has held
fellowships and lectureships at the International Research Center Cultural
Studies (Vienna), Passau University, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and the
University of Exeter. He was awarded the Dissertation Prize of the German
Association of Middle Eastern Studies (DAVO) in 2015 and the Dr. Hermann
Stieglecker-Scholarship for Christian-Islamic Studies of the Forum of World
Religions (FWR) in 2017. He is a member of the scientific advisory board of the
German Association of Middle Eastern Studies (DAVO).
Dale J. Correa, PhD, MS/LIS, is the Middle Eastern Studies Librarian and
History Coordinator at the University of Texas at Austin. She specialises in Is-
lamic legal theory, theology, and philosophy, with a particular interest in the
intellectual tradition of the eastern regions of the Islamicate empire (namely,
Transoxania). Her forthcoming monograph examines the development and
flourishing of the Transoxanian approach to testimony, or communication—that
is, the transmission of knowledge of a past event by agents over time and space.
She is also concerned with the representation and use of Islamicate materials in
the digital realm, particularly for the purposes of digital Islamic humanities. She
has served on the executive board of the Middle East Librarians Association, as
well as in a senior advisory capacity for digital Islamic humanities projects. Her
published work can be found across an array of disciplines, from Islamic Studies
to information and library science.
Lejla Demiri is Professor of Islamic Doctrine at the Centre for Islamic Theol-
ogy, University of Tübingen. She received her PhD from the University of Cam-
bridge (2008), and held post-doctoral fellowships at Trinity Hall, Cambridge
(2007–10) and the Free University of Berlin (2010–12). Her research explores
systematic theology, the intellectual history of Islam and Muslim-Christian
theological encounters, and she publishes extensively on theological and inter-
faith matters. She is the author of Muslim Exegesis of the Bible in Medieval Cairo
(Brill, 2013), and co-editor of The Future of Interfaith Dialogue (with Yazid
Said; Cambridge University Press, 2018) and Early Modern Trends in Islamic
Theology (with Samuela Pagani; Mohr Siebeck, 2019). She also serves as Section
Editor for Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History (1500–1900)
(Brill, 2012–present), and Senior Editor (Islam) of St Andrews Encyclopaedia of
Theology (2019–present).
Contributors 233
Philip Dorroll holds a PhD in Religion from Emory University in Atlanta.

He is Associate Professor of Religion at Wofford College in Spartanburg, SC. His
work focuses on Sunni Islamic theology in classical Arabic and modern Turkish,
Orthodox Christian theology in Arabic, and the historical relationship between
Orthodox Christians and Muslims. His publications include the book Islamic
Theology in the Turkish Republic (Edinburgh University Press, 2021); articles
in Journal of Islamic Studies, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Con-
temporary Islam, Review of Middle East Studies, and others; in addition to public
writing and commentary on Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations.
Racha el Omari is Associate Professor in the Department of Religious Studies
at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She works on the history of the
Muʿtazila and her publications include The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/
al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) (Brill, 2016) and “Accommodation and Resistance. Classi-
cal Muʿtazilites on Ḥadīth” in the Journal of Near Eastern Studies (71/2 [2012],
pp. 231–56). She is currently working on an annotated translation of Abū l-Qāsim
al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī’s ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt. Her current research also in-
cludes investigating the role of early kalām in the formation of Sunnī doctrines.
Hureyre Kam is currently Visiting Professor (Vertretungsprofessor) at the
Academy of World Religions, University of Hamburg and a Post-Doc fellow at
the Goethe-University Frankfurt. He studied Philosophy and Islamic Studies
in Berlin and obtained his PhD at the Goethe-University Frankfurt. He then
worked as a lecturer at the Swiss Institute for Islam and Society at the Univer-
sity of Fribourg, where he led many workshops on Islamic Spiritual Care. His
research focuses on theodicy and epistemology. His PhD Thesis Das Böse als
Gottesbeweis, dealing with al-Māturīdī’s approach to the problem of evil, was
published in 2019. Currently he is working on the epistemology of Ibn Rushd in
order to present a systematic framework for integrating Muslim theology in the
philosophical and scientific discourse of modern times.
Najah Nadi has a D.Phil. from the University of Oxford and is the Aziz Foun-
dation Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the Cambridge Muslim College. Her doc-
toral thesis is titled Theorising the Relationship between Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh.
The Legal–Theological Hermeneutics of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390)
and she is currently in the process of publishing it as a monograph. She holds
an MA in Religious Studies from Boston University and a BA in Islamic Studies
from al-Azhar University in Cairo. She is also a Fellow in Peace and Reconcili-
ation at Virginia Theological Seminary (USA) and a junior fellow at the Holberg
Seminar on Islamic History at Princeton University.
Kayhan Özaykal is Assistant Professor in the philosophy of religion at Istanbul
University. He was educated at SOAS, University of London, in religious studies
234 Contributors
and social anthropology and thereafter in philosophy at Birkbeck, University

of London. He obtained his PhD from Sakarya University in 2017 with a dis-
sertation on al-Māturīdī’s metaethical thought. His interests lie at the crossroads
between the Islamic tradition and analytic and continental philosophy. Among
his principal research areas are theistic ethics, Islamic theology and philosophy,
and the connections between epistemology and metaphysics. His current
projects include a study of artificial intelligence and transhumanism in relation
to Islamic thought and a modern philosophical commentary on Islamic creed.
Sümeyye Parıldar is a lecturer in Islamic philosophy at Istanbul Univer-
sity. She was born in Ankara in 1980 and graduated from Marmara University
Faculty of Theology in 2004. She studied Mulla Sadra’s ontology in her first MA
at Marmara University in 2008 and Kripke’s Wittgenstein in her second MA in
Philosophy at Birmingham University in 2009. In 2014, she completed her PhD
thesis titled: Intentionality in Mulla Sadra. This work was published in 2020. She
joined Istanbul University as a lecturer in 2015. She has published articles and
book chapters on medieval psychology and metaphysics. She is also interested in
contemporary discussions in metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
Harith Ramli is Lecturer in Theology and World Religions at Edge Hill Uni-
versity. He was awarded a DPhil from the University of Oxford in 2012 for his
thesis on fourth/tenth century Sufism and its relationship with wider trends in
Islamic thought. Following this he has held teaching posts at SOAS (University
of London), University of Nottingham, the London Muslim College and the
Cambridge Muslim College. He works primarily on the history of early Islamic
thought, and has published on the formation of Sufism, Islamic theology and
law, with a focus on the evolution of Sunni traditions. He also works in the field
of curriculum development for Islamic Studies in secondary education.
Tim Winter is Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Divinity, Uni-
versity of Cambridge, and is Dean of the Cambridge Muslim College. He has
translated several sections of the Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī
(d. 505/1111), authored numerous academic articles on Islamic thought, history
and interfaith. He is also known for his works dealing with contemporary issues
of Islamic culture, identity and spirituality. Winter is editor of the Cambridge
Companion to Classical Islamic Theology (CUP, 2008) and together with Richard
Harries and Norman Solomon, is co-editor of Abraham’s Children. Jews, Chris-
tians and Muslims in Conversation (T&T Clark, 2006). His most recent book is
Travelling Home. Essays on Islam in Europe (Quilliam Press, 2020). Recognised
as a leading figure in Muslim interfaith relations, Winter was a major signatory
of A Common Word (2007). He is a regular contributor to the British press and
BBC Radio.
Index
Abū Yūsuf 189 Buddhism 27, 122
agnostic 39 Bukhara 10, 28, 77, 105, 151, 157
ahl al-ḥadīth/people of ḥadīth 18, Bukhārī, ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd Ṣadr
ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa/The people of al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī al- 29,
the Sunna and the community 5, 6, 203
77, 155 Bushāghirī, Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al- 25,
āla/tool 27, 28, 45, 151 47, 52
amr/command 21, 29, 95, 109, 113, 125, Būzjān 87
127, 143, 145, 147, 159, 162, 167, 171,
173, 195, 207, 209, 216, 219 Central Asia 18, 27, 105, 121, 122
angel 27, 28, 93, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, coexistence 133
219 cosmology 30
anthropology 16, 28, 190 Creator 21, 27, 81, 83, 85, 87, 90, 93, 95,
anthropomorphism 87, 93 99, 109, 119, 125, 135, 157, 221
ʿaqīda/creed 5, 6, 19, 26, 89, 90, 162
ʿaql/reason/intellect/human rationality 7, dalīl/proof 6, 25, 27, 34, 37, 41, 43fn25,
20, 21, 25, 27–29, 33, 37, 39, 41, 43fn25, 48, 85, 93, 95, 97, 105, 106, 109, 115,
45, 48, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 63, 90, 95, 117, 119, 122, 125, 127, 131, 143,
97, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117fn8, 119, 125, 162fn2, 175, 197, 209, 211, 223
127, 129, 131, 133, 149, 151, 152, 155, Damascus 27, 89, 121, 122
157, 163, 169fn17, 179, 180, 183, 185, Day of Judgement 93, 97fn34, 101
189, 190, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, dialectic 21
207, 209 divine attributes 26, 77, 78, 204, 211, 225
Ashʿarī, Abū l-Ḥasan al- 5, 26, 77, 78, 85, divine essence 26, 78
157, 179, 207fn6 divine law 27, 113
aṣlaḥ/best 29, 133, 179 divine wisdom 21, 27, 122, 189, 225, 229
Avicenna/Ibn Sīnā 8, 61, 62, 121, 163fn4, doctrine of human compulsion/jabr 207,
169 216
awāmir/religious commands 21, 162, 163,
169fn17, 173 epistemology/epistemological 5, 9, 25, 28,
āya/sign 45, 51, 57, 90, 93, 95, 97, 119, 33, 34, 36fn7, 37, 40fn14, 40fn15, 41,
143, 145fn12, 157, 159 43fn22, 45fn26, 48, 162, 190, 233, 234
Ayyubid 27, 122 eschatology/eschatological 97fn35,
149fn24
Balkhī, Abū l-Qāsim al- 6, 28, 179 ethics 7, 16
Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad al- 105 extra-mental world 61–63, 67, 69, 71, 73
Barāhima 27, 122, 125, 129
bāṭin/hidden 90, 93 falāsifa/philosophers 39, 57, 61–63, 67,
Bazdawī, Abū l-Yusr al- 8, 10, 28, 151, 69, 71, 73, 121
155fn5, 215 falsafa/philosophy 8, 26, 57, 121, 162fn4
236 Index
Fārābī, Abū Naṣr al- 162fn4 ʿiyān, ḥawāss/sense/perception 33, 34, 41,
fiqh/jurisprudence 34fn4, 89, 105, 121, 43, 45, 93, 119, 159, 171, 190, 195
190, 161, 203
fiṭraʾ/original disposition 99 Jesus 119
free will 29, 149fn24, 189, 203, 204, 215, jinn 119, 139, 141, 223, 225
216 Jurjānī, al- 62
Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al- 175
Gelenbe 61
Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid al- 8, 99fn38, 99fn39, kalām/Systematic Theology 7, 15, 16,
99fn42, 105 17, 25, 26, 27, 29, 89, 90, 105, 115, 121,
162fn4, 203, 216
Hadith 6, 43fn23, 89, 131fn18, 151, 161 kalām/speech 85, 95, 157, 175, 201
hajj/pilgrimage 127 karāma/miracles of saints 117
Ḥanafī 3–11, 18, 48, 77, 89, 105, 121, 151, Karrāmiyya 87
152, 155fn5, 157, 161, 189, 203, 215 kasb/acquisition 6, 149fn26, 167, 171, 173,
Ḥashwī 87 216, 221, 229fn35
hell 55, 97, 101, 147, 183, 185, 225 Kemalpaşazâde 29, 62, 69fn7, 215–217
ḥikma/wisdom 21, 27, 29, 39, 109, 111, 113, Khabbāzī, Jalāl al-Dīn al- 10, 27, 121,
115, 122, 125, 129, 141, 145, 183, 189, 122
190, 193, 197, 216, 221, 223, 225, 229 Khujand 121
humility 26, 90 knowledge 7, 9, 25–30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 41,
43, 45, 47–49, 51, 53, 57, 59, 61–64, 69,
Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥyī l-Dīn 30, 216, 217, 78, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 90, 95, 97, 99, 109,
219fn15, 225 111, 119, 125, 127, 133, 135, 139, 141,
Ibn Kamāl, Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad 29, 30, 143, 145, 147, 151, 152, 155, 157, 159,
215 161, 162fn2, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173,
ikhtiyār/free choice/human freedom 20, 175, 183, 185, 190, 193, 195, 197, 201,
21, 189, 203, 207, 211, 212, 216 207, 229
ʿilla/cause 212 kufr/unbelief 81, 131, 185
ʿilm ḍarūrī/necessary knowledge 34,
43fn22, 53, 83, 111, 195 Mā-warāʾ-al-nahr/Transoxania 3, 4, 7, 26,
īmān/faith 28, 90, 97, 157, 159, 162, 163, 77, 105, 203
165, 167, 171, 173, 175 madhhab/school of law 9, 105, 147fn19,
intellect 27–29, 48, 53, 63, 95, 97, 109, 149, 151, 159, 161
111,113, 115, 129, 131, 151, 152, 155, major sin 28, 139, 147, 147fn20, 149fn24
157, 163, 169fn17, 171, 189, 190, 193, masjid/mosque 89
195, 197, 199, 201, 207 mashīʾat Allāh / 147fn20, 193, 216
Iraq 157 mashrab/spiritual disposition 90
Islamic Theology 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 17, 25, 47, Māturīdī Kalām/Māturīdī School/
63, 147fn19, 162fn2 Māturīdī Studies /Māturīdī Theology/
ʿiṣma/infallibility 51 Māturīdism 3–7, 10, 11, 15–17, 19–21,
Ismail Gelenbevi 26, 61–63, 64fn5, 69fn7, 25–30, 77, 78, 89, 90, 105, 106, 121,
69fn8, 125fn6, 147fn20, 161, 203, 204, 211,
istidlāl/inference 45fn26 215–217
istiʿdād/receptivity 217, 227 Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr al- 3–9, 11, 15–21,
itqān/perfection 29, 216 25, 27–29, 33, 39fn13, 41fn18, 43fn21,
iʿtiqād/belief 28, 34, 51, 53, 162fn2, 165, 43fn22, 43fn24, 43fn25, 45fn26, 45fn27,
173, 175 47, 48, 105, 139, 140fn2, 141, 145fn15,
Index 237
147fn19, 147fn21, 149fn23–26, 151, predestination 29, 203, 207
157, 179, 189, 190, 216 problem of Evil 28
mawjūd al-mawhūm/estimated existence prophet 8, 27, 34, 37, 41fn18, 43fn23,
62, 63, 69, 73 43fn25, 48, 87, 93, 97fn35, 99, 101, 109,
maʿrifa/knowledge/gnosis 28, 53, 57, 90, 115, 117, 119, 121, 125, 127, 129, 131,
99, 127, 159, 165 133, 135, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 155,
mental existence 26, 61–63, 64fn5, 67, 69, 185, 219, 227
71, 163fn4 prophethood 27, 106, 109, 111, 115, 117,
Messenger of God 27, 39, 45, 48, 51, 53, 119, 125, 131, 133, 135, 139
55, 57, 87, 109, 113, 115, 119, 125, 127,
131, 133, 141, 145, 152, 157, 159, 183, Qadariyya 149
185, 219 qibla/direction towards Kaaba 155
metaphysics 5, 7, 28, 30, 61, 139, 190, Qur’an 8, 16, 19, 27, 28, 59, 89, 95fn25,
215–217 95fn26, 97fn34, 105, 119fn11, 139, 141,
microcosm 39 143, 147fn21, 161, 182fn9, 189, 193fn1,
Middle East 3, 11, 30 195fn2, 197, 221fn18, 223
miracles 27, 34, 43fn25, 45, 57, 106, 117,
119, 131, 133 raḥma/mercy 26, 27, 37, 41, 43, 53, 55, 90,
modern history 17 95, 99, 101, 109, 217
monotheistism /monotheistic 47, 180, 183 rationalism 18, 20, 189, 216
moral 7, 16, 20, 21, 135, 149fn26, 180, Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn al- 29, 61, 62, 163fn4,
183, 185, 199fn3 175, 203, 204, 207fn6
morphology 161 religious belief 20
Moses 57, 97, 119fn11, 143, 145fn12 Renaissance 15, 16, 19, 20
muktasab/acquired 39fn13, 43fn23 revelation 7, 21, 25, 29, 48, 49, 53, 55, 57,
Murjiʾa 149 59, 87, 90, 97, 125, 127, 162, 179, 183,
Mushabbiha 97 185, 190, 197, 203, 207, 209
mutakallimūn 125, 131 Rūmī, Jalāl al-Dīn al- 229
mutaqashshifa 87 ruʿyat Allāh/beatific vision 90, 97
Muʿtazila 5, 6, 26–29, 48, 77, 78, 81, 83,
97, 121, 122, 149fn24, 155, 157, 179, Safavid 161
189, 190, 203, 209, 216 saint 117, 131, 225
mystical 15 Ṣāliḥ/a prophet 119fn13
Sālimī, Abū Shakūr al- 10, 20, 26, 77, 81,
Nasaf 105, 151 87
Nasafī, Abū l-Muʿīn al- 7, 20, 27, 105, 106, Samarqand 3–5, 7, 10, 18, 26, 48, 77, 89,
122 151, 157, 161, 189
Nūriyya madrasa 89 Samarqandī, Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn
Muḥammad al- 25, 47, 50
Omnipotent/omnipotence 29, 179, 189, Samarqandī, ʿAlā al-Dīn al- 9, 105, 106,
193, 216 147fn20, 149fn23, 149fn24, 149fn26,
ontology 28, 30, 63, 162, 217 149fn27
Ottoman-era 7, 15, 16, 26, 29, 30, 62, 161, Samarqandī, ʿUbayd Allāh al- 26, 89, 90,
215, 217, 229fn35 99fn42
samʿ/akhbār/testimony/reports 7, 9, 33,
paradise 147 34fn5, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 155, 195, 221
Pharaoh 57 Sarakhs 161
post-Avicennan 26, 61 Satan 145fn15
238 Index
sceptics 39 taṣawwur/apprehension/grasping/
Schacht, Joseph 18 imagination 169
Seljuk period 77 taṣdīq/assent/acceptance of the heart 28,
Shāfiʿī 48, 89 162, 165, 169, 171, 173, 175
sharr/evil 6, 149, 193, 216, 217, 219, 221, tawātur/recurrent transmission 119
223, 229 Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān 9, 16, 18, 19, 27, 105,
social justice 21 139, 149fn26, 189
sufi/mystic 15, 26, 89, 90, 121, 161, 225, Theophany 225
234 tradition 4, 15, 20, 21, 25, 27, 30, 34, 57,
Sulaymān/Solomon 119fn14 62, 97fn35, 105, 122, 125fn7, 161, 189,
Sunni/Sunni kalam/Sunni thought 15, 16, 215, 216
20, 21, 34, 78, 87fn5, 147fn19, 155fn5, Turkey 15, 16, 19, 20, 21fn36, 61
179, 189 Ṭūsī, Nasīr al-Dīn al- 62
tafsīr/Qurʾanic exegesis 6, 8, 9, 43fn21, 89, Umayyad Mosque 89

105, 139, 161, 223 uṣūl al-dīn/principles of faith 10, 19, 25,
Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar 27, 28, 47, 50, 52, 105, 121, 151, 215
al- 9, 28, 161, 162, 163fn4, 165,
169fn15, 171fn20, 173fn21, 203fn1, 215 Van Ess, Josef 18, 41fn19
taḥqīq/verification 28, 62, 145, 161
Tajikistan 121 wisdom 21, 27, 29, 39, 109, 111, 113, 115,
takwīn/bringing-into-existence 204, 122, 125, 129, 141, 145, 183, 189, 190,
211fn9 193, 216, 219, 221, 223, 225, 229,
taqlīd/unquestioned following 33, 37,
40fn15 Ẓāhiriyya madrasa 89
taṣawwuf/Sufism 26, 89, 161 Zarathustra 115
‫الكشّ افات‬
‫– كشّ اف الآيات القرآنيّة‬

‫– كشّ اف الأحاديث‬
‫– كشّ اف الأعالم‬
‫– كشّ اف الأماكن‬
‫كشّ اف الآيات القرا ّ‬
‫ٓنية‬
‫رقم‬ ‫رقم السورة‬
‫الصفحة‬ ‫والآية‬ ‫الآية‬
‫‪222‬‬ ‫)‪(٧:٣٢‬‬ ‫ل َش ْي ٍء خَ لَقَ ُه﴾‬

‫ك َّ‬ ‫﴿�أَ ْ‬
‫ح َس َن ُ‬
‫‪98‬‬ ‫)‪(١٠:١٤‬‬ ‫ات َو ْال أَ ْرضِ ﴾‬

‫او ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫﴿�أَفِي الل َّ ِه َش ٌّ‬
‫ك فَاط ِر َّ‬
‫‪94‬‬ ‫)‪(٣٨:٣٩‬‬ ‫ض ٍّر﴾‬ ‫﴿� إ ِْن �أَ َر َ‬
‫ادنِ َي الل َّ ُه بِ ُ‬
‫‪100‬‬ ‫)‪(١٠١:٢١‬‬ ‫ون﴾‬ ‫ح ْس َنى �أُو َل ِئ َ‬

‫ك َع ْن َها ُم ْب َع ُد َ‬ ‫ت َل ُه ْم ِمنَّا ا ْل ُ‬
‫ين َس َبقَ ْ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫﴿� إ َِّن الَّذ َ‬
‫)‪(٤٤:١٠‬‬ ‫ون﴾‬ ‫ك َّن النَّاس �أَنْفُ َس ُه ْم َي ْ‬
‫ظ ِل ُم َ‬ ‫ظ ِلم النَّاس َشي ًئا و َل ِ‬
‫َ ْ َ‬ ‫﴿� إ َِّن الل َّ َه َل َي ْ ُ‬
‫‪226‬‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪94‬‬ ‫)‪(١:٥‬‬ ‫ِيد﴾‬ ‫ح ُ‬
‫ك ُم َما ُير ُ‬ ‫﴿� إ َِّن الل َّ َه َي ْ‬
‫‪94‬‬ ‫يات ِلأُلِي ْال أَ ْل َب ِ‬

‫اب﴾ )‪(١٩٠:٣‬‬ ‫ات َو ْال أَ ْرضِ َواخْ ِت َل ِ‬
‫ف اللَّ ْيلِ َوالنَّ َها ِر َلآ ٍ‬ ‫او ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫﴿� إ َِّن في خَ ْلقِ َّ‬
‫‪96‬‬ ‫)‪(٦٤:٥‬‬ ‫ان﴾‬ ‫﴿ َب ْل َي َدا ُه َم ْب ُسو َ‬
‫ط َت ِ‬
‫ير﴾‬ ‫ٍ ِ‬ ‫َّك َع َلى ُ‬ ‫﴿بِ َي ِدكَ ا ْل َ‬

‫خ ْي ُر �إِن َ‬
‫‪218‬‬ ‫)‪(٢٦:٣‬‬ ‫ل َش ْيء قَد ٌ‬
‫ك ِّ‬
‫‪220‬‬ ‫)‪(٦٢:٣٩‬‬ ‫ل َش ْي ٍء﴾‬ ‫﴿خَ ال ِ ُق ُ‬

‫ك ِّ‬
‫‪96‬‬ ‫)‪(١٤٣:٧‬‬ ‫ب �أَرِنِي �أَ ْن ُ‬

‫ظ ْر � إِ َل ْي َ‬
‫ك﴾‬ ‫﴿ر ِّ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪92‬‬ ‫)‪(٥٣:٤١‬‬ ‫حتَّى �يَ�ت َ َب َّي َن َل ُه ْم �أَنَّ ُه ا ْل َ‬
‫ح ُّق﴾‬ ‫َاق َوفِي �أَنْفُ ِ‬
‫س ِه ْم َ‬ ‫ِيه ْم �آ َياتِ َنا فِي ْالآف ِ‬
‫﴿س ُنر ِ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪222‬‬ ‫)‪(٨٨:٢٧‬‬ ‫ل َش ْي ٍء﴾‬ ‫﴿ص ْن َع الل َّ ِه الَّ ِذي �أَتْقَ َن ُ‬
‫ك َّ‬ ‫ُ‬
‫‪142‬‬ ‫)‪(٤:٥٥‬‬ ‫﴿علَّ َم ُه ا ْل َب َي َ‬

‫ان﴾‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪166‬‬ ‫)‪(١٩:٤٧‬‬ ‫َاع َل ْم �أَنَّ ُه َل � إِ َل َه � إ َِّل ُه َو﴾‬

‫﴿ف ْ‬
‫‪100‬‬ ‫ح ْس َنى ۞ ف ََس ُن َي ِّس ُر ُه ل ِ ْل ُي ْس َرى ۞ َو�أَ َّما َم ْن )‪(١٠-٥:٩٢‬‬ ‫ص َّد َق بِا ْل ُ‬ ‫طى َواتَّقَ ى ۞ َو َ‬ ‫﴿ َف�أَ َّما َم ْن �أَ ْع َ‬
‫ح ْس َنى ۞ ف ََس ُن َي ِّس ُر ُه ل ِ ْل ُع ْس َرى﴾‬ ‫ب بِا ْل ُ‬‫اس َتغْ َنى ۞ َوك ََّذ َ‬ ‫َبخ َل َو ْ‬
‫ِ‬
‫ْت ا ْلع ِليم ا ْل َ ِ‬ ‫َك الَ ِع ْلم َل َنا �إِال َّ ما َعلَّ ْم�ت َ َنا �إِن َ َ‬ ‫﴿قَالُو ْا ُس ْب َ‬
‫‪144‬‬ ‫)‪(٣٢:٢‬‬ ‫يم﴾‬‫حك ُ‬ ‫َّك �أن َ َ ُ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫حان َ‬
‫‪166‬‬ ‫)‪(١٠١:١٠‬‬ ‫ات َو ْال أَ ْرضِ ﴾‬ ‫او ِ‬ ‫الس َم َ‬

‫ِ‬
‫ظ ُروا َماذَا في َّ‬ ‫﴿قُلِ ا ْن ُ‬
‫َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪92‬‬ ‫)‪(١٠٣:٦‬‬ ‫ار﴾‬ ‫ص َ‬ ‫ار َو ُه َو ُي ْدرِكُ ْال أ ْب َ‬
‫ص ُ‬ ‫ك ُه ْال أ ْب َ‬‫﴿ل ت ُْد ِر ُ‬‫َ‬
‫ ‪242‬‬ ‫تافاّ شكلا‬

‫‪144‬‬ ‫)‪(٣٢:٢‬‬ ‫﴿ل ِع ْل َم َل َنا � إ َِّل َما َعلَّ ْم�ت َ َنا﴾‬

‫َ‬
‫‪192‬‬ ‫)‪(٢٣:٢١‬‬ ‫﴿ل ُي ْس�أَلُ َع َّما َيفْ َع ُل َو ُه ْم ُي ْس�أَلُ َ‬

‫ون﴾‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪154‬‬ ‫)‪(١٧٠:٢‬‬ ‫ون﴾‬ ‫﴿ل َي ْع ِق ُل َ‬

‫ون َش ْيئاً َو َل َي ْه َت ُد َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪146‬‬ ‫)‪(٤٨:٤‬‬ ‫اء﴾‬

‫ش ُ‬‫ك ل ِ َمن َي َ‬ ‫﴿الَ َيغْ ِف ُر �أَن ُي ْش َركَ بِ ِه َو َيغْ ِف ُر َما ُد َ‬
‫ون ذَل ِ َ‬
‫ج�ن َّ ِة َوالنَّاسِ �أَ ْ ِ‬
‫ج َهنَّ َم ِم َن ا ْل ِ‬ ‫َ َ‬
‫‪224‬‬ ‫)‪(١٣:٣٢‬‬ ‫ين﴾‬
‫ج َمع َ‬ ‫﴿ل أ ْم َل أَ َّن َ‬
‫‪126‬‬ ‫)‪(١٦٥:٤‬‬ ‫ج ٌة َب ْع َد ُّ‬

‫الر ُسلِ ﴾‬ ‫ون لِلنَّاسِ َع َلى الل َّ ِه ُ‬
‫ح َّ‬ ‫ك َ‬‫﴿ل ِ َئ َّل َي ُ‬
‫‪220‬‬ ‫)‪(٧٩:٤‬‬ ‫ك﴾‬ ‫ك ِمن سي�ئ َ ٍة ف َِمن َنفْ ِ‬

‫س َ‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫ح َس�ن َ ٍة ف َِم َن الل َّ ِه َو َما �أَ َ‬
‫صا َب َ ْ َ ِّ‬ ‫ك ِم ْن َ‬ ‫﴿ما �أَ َ‬
‫صا َب َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫او ٍ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫‪222‬‬ ‫)‪(٣:٦٧‬‬ ‫ت﴾‬ ‫ح َم ِن م ْن َتفَ ُ‬ ‫﴿ما ت ََرى في خَ ْلقِ َّ‬
‫الر ْ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪218‬‬ ‫)‪(٧٥:٣٨‬‬ ‫ت بِ َي َد َّ‬

‫ي﴾‬ ‫ك �أَ ْن ت َْس ُ‬
‫ج َد ل ِ َما خَ لَقْ ُ‬ ‫﴿ما َم َن َع َ‬
‫َ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪140‬‬ ‫)‪(٣٠:٢‬‬ ‫يها َمن‬ ‫ل فِي ْال أ ْرضِ خَ ِليفَ ًة قَالُوا �أَت ْ‬
‫َج َع ُل فِ َ‬ ‫ج ِ‬
‫اع ٌ‬ ‫ك ِة �إِنِّي َ‬‫ك ل ِ ْل َم َلئ ِ َ‬‫﴿و � إ ِْذ قَالَ َربُّ َ‬
‫َ‬
‫َ‬ ‫ك‪ ‬قَالَ �إِنِّي �أَ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫‪ ‬ما‬‫م‬
‫ُ َ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ع‬
‫ْ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫س‬ ‫د‬
‫َ ِّ ُ‬ ‫قَ‬‫ُ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫و‬ ‫كَ‬‫د‬ ‫م‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ب‬‫ُس‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫َح‬
‫ن‬ ‫و‬
‫ِّ َ َ َ ْ ُ َ ِّ ُ َ ْ‬ ‫اء‬ ‫م‬ ‫د‬ ‫ال‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ُيفْ ُ َ َ َ ْ‬
‫س‬ ‫ي‬ ‫و‬ ‫ا‬‫يه‬ ‫ف‬ ‫د‬ ‫س‬
‫ون﴾‬ ‫َل ت َْع َل ُم َ‬
‫‪128‬‬ ‫)‪(٣٧:١١‬‬ ‫اص َن ِع ا ْلفُ ْل َ‬

‫ك﴾‬ ‫﴿و ْ‬
‫َ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪222‬‬ ‫)‪(١٠:٧٢‬‬ ‫ِيد بِ َم ْن فِي ْال أ ْرضِ �أَ ْم �أَ َر َ‬
‫اد بِ ِه ْم َربُّ ُه ْم َر َش ًدا﴾‬ ‫﴿و�أَنَّا َل ن َْدرِي �أَ َش ٌّر �أُر َ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪96‬‬ ‫)‪(٢٢:٨٩‬‬ ‫اء َربُّ َ‬
‫ك﴾‬ ‫ج َ‬‫﴿و َ‬
‫َ‬
‫َاضر ٌة ۞ � إِ َلى ربِّ َها ن ِ‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫)‪96 (٢٢:٧٥-٢٣‬‬ ‫َاظ َرةٌ﴾‬ ‫َ‬ ‫جو ٌه َي ْو َم ِئذ ن ِ َ‬
‫﴿و ُ‬
‫ُ‬
‫ك ِة فَقَ الَ �أَ ْن ِب ُئونِي بِ�أَس َم ِ‬
‫اء َ ٰه ُؤ َل ِء‬ ‫ض ُه ْم َع َلى ا ْل َم َلئ ِ َ‬ ‫ْ َ‬
‫‪142‬‬ ‫)‪(٣١:٢‬‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫كلَّ َها ث َُّم َع َر َ‬ ‫﴿و َعلَّ َم � َآد َم ال أ ْس َم َ‬
‫اء ُ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ين﴾‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ِ‬
‫صادق َ‬ ‫ك�نْ ُت ْم َ‬ ‫� إ ِْن ُ‬
‫‪128‬‬ ‫)‪(٨٠:٢١‬‬ ‫ص ْن َع َة َل ُبوسٍ َل ُ‬

‫ك ْم﴾‬ ‫﴿و َعلَّ ْم َنا ُه َ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪148‬‬ ‫)‪(١٤٣:٢‬‬ ‫ج َع ْل َناك ُْم �أ ُ َّم ًة َو َسطاً﴾‬ ‫﴿وك ََذل ِ َ‬
‫ك َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪146‬‬ ‫)‪(٣٦:١٧‬‬ ‫ك بِ ِه ِع ْل ٌم﴾‬
‫س َل َ‬ ‫﴿والَ َتقْ ُ‬
‫ف َما َل ْي َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪224‬‬ ‫)‪(١٣:٣٢‬‬ ‫ح َّق ا ْلقَ ْولُ ِمنِّي﴾‬ ‫﴿و َل ِ‬
‫ك ْن َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪126‬‬ ‫)‪(١٣٤:٢٠‬‬ ‫ول﴾‬ ‫اب ِم ْن ق َْب ِل ِه َلقَ الُوا َل ْو َل �أَ ْر َس ْل َ‬
‫ت � إِ َل ْي َنا َر ُس ً‬ ‫اه ْم بِ َع َذ ٍ‬ ‫﴿و َل ْو �أَنَّا �أَ ْه َل ْ‬
‫ك َن ُ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪224‬‬ ‫)‪(١٣:٣٢‬‬ ‫ل َنفْ سٍ ُه َد َ‬
‫يها﴾‬ ‫﴿و َل ْو ِش�ئْ َنا َلآت َْي َنا ُ‬
‫ك َّ‬ ‫َ‬
‫ ‬ ‫ةّينٓارقلا تايآلا فاّشك‬ ‫‪243‬‬

‫ِ ِ‬ ‫َان ِم ْن ِع ْن ِد غَ ْي ِر الل َّ ِه َل َو َ‬
‫‪50, 58,‬‬ ‫)‪(٨٢:٤‬‬ ‫ج ُدوا فيه اخْ ِت َلفًا ك َِث ً‬
‫يرا﴾‬ ‫﴿و َل ْو ك َ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪196‬‬
‫‪144‬‬ ‫)‪(٥٢:٢٢‬‬ ‫﴿و َما �أَ ْر َس ْل َنا ِمن ق َْب ِل َ‬

‫ك ِم ْن َر ُس ٍ‬
‫ول َو َل َن ِب ٍّي � إ َِّل �إِذَا ت ََمنَّى﴾‬ ‫َ‬
‫وس ٰى﴾‬ ‫ك بِ َي ِم ِ‬
‫ين َ‬ ‫﴿و َما تِ ْل َ‬
‫‪142‬‬ ‫)‪(١٧:٢٠‬‬ ‫ك َيا ُم َ‬ ‫َ‬
‫‪142‬‬ ‫)‪(٦٩:٣٦‬‬ ‫﴿و َما َعلَّ ْم َنا ُه الشِّ ْع َر َو َما َي َنب ِغي َل ُه﴾‬
‫َ‬
‫كشّ اف الأحاديث‬
‫رقم‬
‫الصفحة‬ ‫الراوي‬ ‫متن الحديث‬
‫‪154‬‬ ‫مح ّمد باقر المجلسي‪،‬‬ ‫خلقت‬

‫ُ‬ ‫النبي صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال خبراً عن اللّه �أن ّه قال‪« :‬ما‬
‫بحار الأنوار‬ ‫فقلت له‪ :‬ت�أخّ ر‬
‫ُ‬ ‫فقلت له‪ :‬تق ّدم فتق ّدم‪،‬‬
‫ُ‬ ‫شيئاً �أحسن من العقل‪،‬‬
‫فقلت‪ :‬بك �أ ُ ْع َب ُد وبك �أثيب وبك �أعاقب»‬
‫ُ‬ ‫فت�أخّ ر‪،‬‬
‫‪100‬‬ ‫سليمان بن �أحمد‬ ‫كائن � إلى يوم القيامة»‬

‫ٌ‬ ‫القلم بما هو‬
‫ُ‬ ‫ف‬
‫«ج َّ‬
‫َ‬
‫الطبراني‪،‬‬
‫المعجم الكبير‬
‫‪98‬‬ ‫ابن الحوزي‪� ،‬أخبار‬ ‫«كلُّكم في ذات اللّه َ‬

‫ح ْمقَ ى»‬
‫والمغفَّلين‬
‫الح ْمقى ُ‬
‫َ‬
‫‪98‬‬ ‫صحيح البخاري‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫مولود يولد على الفطرة»‬ ‫ل‬
‫«ك ُّ‬
‫‪226‬‬ ‫صحيح مسلم‬ ‫يلومن � ّإل‬

‫ّ‬ ‫«فمن وجد خيراً فليحمد اللّه‪ ،‬ومن وجد غير ذلك فال‬
‫نفسه»‬
‫ثناء عليك‪� ،‬أنت كما �أ َ‬ ‫ُ‬

‫‪98‬‬ ‫صحيح مسلم‬ ‫ثنيت على نفسك»‬ ‫«ال �أحصي ً‬
‫‪218‬‬ ‫صحيح مسلم‬ ‫والشر ليس � إليك»‬
‫ّ‬ ‫«لبّيك وسعديك‪ ،‬والخير في يديك‪،‬‬
‫ ‬ ‫لعألا فاّشك ‬ ‫‪245‬‬
‫كشّ اف الأعالم‬
‫ابن سينا‪168 :‬‬ ‫علي‪172 :‬‬

‫ّ‬
‫�أبو الحسن الأشعري‪84 :‬‬ ‫عيسى‪118 :‬‬
‫�أبو بكر الص ّديق‪98 :‬‬ ‫فرعون‪56 :‬‬
‫�أبو بكر العياضي‪54 :‬‬ ‫القدر�يّة‪82, 84, 92, 184 :‬‬
‫�أبو حنيفة‪146 :‬‬ ‫الكراميّة‪86 :‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫�أبو شكور السالمي‪80, 86 :‬‬ ‫الكرخي‪156, 158 :‬‬
‫�أبو َم ْن ُ‬
‫صور‪36, 40, 52, 56, 156 :‬‬ ‫الخوارج‪116 :‬‬
‫� إدريس‪220 :‬‬ ‫المتقشّ فة‪86 :‬‬
‫�آدم‪108, 124, 130, 140, 142, 218 :‬‬ ‫المتكلّمين‪66, 68, 114, 116, 124, 130 :‬‬
‫الأشعرية‪154 :‬‬ ‫مح ّمد رسول ال�له ‪ /‬النبي ‪ /‬الرسول‪50, 52, 54, 86 :‬‬
‫� إمام الحرمين‪174 :‬‬ ‫ ‪92, 98, 100, 108, 114, 126, 130, 132, 144,‬‬
‫� إمام الرازي‪174 :‬‬ ‫ ‪148, 154, 156, 218‬‬
‫�أهل الس�نّة والجماعة‪82, 92, 154, 156 :‬‬ ‫محي الدين ابن العربي‪224 :‬‬
‫البراهمة‪124, 128 :‬‬ ‫المرجئة‪148 :‬‬
‫الجنيد‪98 :‬‬ ‫المعتزلة‪80, 82, 96, 154, 156, 208 :‬‬
‫زرادشت‪114 :‬‬ ‫موسى‪56, 96, 142 :‬‬
‫عبد الصمد بن �أحمد الأربنجي‪54 :‬‬
‫كشّ اف الأماكن‬
‫ُبخارى‪156 :‬‬
‫بوزجان‪86 :‬‬
‫سمرقند‪156 :‬‬
‫العراق‪156 :‬‬

Māturīdī Theology A Bilingual Reader-1

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Sapientia Islamica

Studies in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism

ISBN 978-3-16-161097-4 / eISBN 978-3-16-161286-2

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie;

© 2022 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen. www.mohrsiebeck.com

Note on Transliteration and Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

Part I: Epistemology and Ontology

Part II: Metaphysics

Part III: Prophethood

Part IV: Faith, Knowledge and Acts

Part V: Free Will, Predestination and the Problem of Evil

The transliteration of Arabic names follows that of The Encyclopaedia of Islam,

Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī al-Samarq-

Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī: Life and Works

The field of Islamic studies generally understands the Transoxanian Ḥanafīs as

geographically-centred approach to al-Māturīdī’s biography and the study of his

theological-ethics views God as the paramount source of morality, he conceives

sociation of key theological concepts with legal theoretical prescriptions in the

Critical Editions and Textual Studies

Ahmed, Shahab, “Mapping the World of a Scholar in Sixth/Twelfth Century Bukhāra.

of an ancient Ḥanafī intellectual centre in Samarqand (known as the Juzjāniyya)

and Māturīdism in contemporary Turkey incorporates the near entirety of glob-

Critical Editions and Translations

The second area of decisive contributions made by the Turkish renaissance in

Nasafī’s (d. 508/1115) Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd (2010);33 Ömür

Systematic Theological Contributions

Of the three types of contributions produced by the Turkish renaissance in

33 Ebü’l-Muîn en-Nesefî, Tevhidin Esasları. Kitâbü’t-temhîd li kavâidi’t-tevhîd, trans. Hülya

Terzioğlu, Hülya, Mâtürîdî’de Kadın Algısı. Te’vîlâtü’l-Kur’an Bağlamında bir İnceleme,

This is followed by a chapter by Sümeyye Parıldar who presents an excerpt

It is well-known that al-Māturīdī, in his epistemological framework, draws on

[Selected text begins on the following page]

‫الدينية]‪7‬‬ ‫[القسم ال أ ّول‪ :‬مدارك العلم‬

‫ثم �أصل ما ُيعرف به الدين‪ � – ‬إذ ال ب ّد �أن يكون لهذا َ‬

The necessity of knowing religion through proof (dalīl):

[First Part: Religious Epistemology]9

8 That is by following an opposing authority.

As for testimony, it is (a source of knowledge) which nobody can neglect as a

10 Topaloğlu translates it as ‘sophists’ in Turkish: Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî, Kitâbüʾt-Tevhîd

‫وقوف عليه‪]…[ .‬‬

‫عام ًة]‪14‬‬ ‫[القسم الثاني‪ :‬مدارك العلم‬

‫ثم السبيل التي ُيوصل بها � إلى العلم بحقائق الأشياء‬

[Second Part: General Epistemology]16

[The sources of knowledge]

[A. Sense Perception (ʿiyān)]

be inconsistent or incongruent. It is here in this respect that the above tripartite

‫‪Abū Salama Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Jumal uṣūl al-dīn:2‬‬

‫‪Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Bushāghirī, Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn:4‬‬

‫قوله‪“ :‬نور االعتقاد في الجملة �أنها على ثالثة �أقسام”‬

His statement: ‘The light of belief in general has three divisions’

‫وقوله “واجب في العقل”‬

‫الحجة بما في‬

‫‪ 5‬في الأصل‪ :‬في الواجب‪.‬‬

His statement: ‘Rationally necessary’

‫وقوله‪“ :‬ثم لما لم يكن في العقل كفاية”‬

‫وقوله “عن من يعلم حقائق الأشياء”‬

‫‪ 8‬في الأصل‪ :‬القبول الممكن‪.‬‬

Note on Transliteration and Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

[A. Sense Perception (ʿiyān)]

Chapter 4: Affirmation of the Attributes