only to questions of law as the Court is not a trier of facts.

37 This rule,
however, allows for exceptions such as when the findings of fact of the trial
court, or in this case of the quasi-judicial agencies concerned, are conflicting or
contradictory with those of the CA.38

The main issue in this case is whether petitioner was validly dismissed from
employment.

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that
the employee's dismissal was for a valid cause.39 A valid dismissal requires
compliance with both substantive and procedural due process40 - that is, the
dismissal must be for any of the just or authorized causes enumerated in Article
297 282 and Article 298 283, respectively, of the Labor Code, and only after notice
and hearing.41

The records of the case show that petitioner was charged with two infractions,
i.e., (1) insubordination for her failure to sign the Notice to Transfer and (2)
habitual neglect for her absences without leave from March 22 to March 26, 2014, as
shown by the two memoranda served on her.

In the Memorandum dated March 10, 2014, GRRI charged petitioner with
insubordination for her refusal to sign the Notice of Transfer which amounts to a
non-compliance with procedure, viz.:

Please explain within 24 hours why you should not be penalized with insubordination
by not accepting in writing your memorandum of reassignment.

You have been re-assigned by the Executive Committee to function in a much needed
area where your knowledge is expected to be shared with the need and growth of the
company. However, you refused to comply with its procedure by not signing and
affirming your new work assignment. Further, it has been noticed that you are
reporting and unofficially functioning on your new given assignment when in fact
you have not complied with the procedure.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the following

requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
attitude"; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.43 Both requirements are not present in this case.

As stated by petitioner in her handwritten explanation,44 she withheld her

signature on the Notice to Transfer because she was awaiting answers to the
questions she raised to the management via e-mail. She cannot be forced to affix
her signature thereon if she does not really fully understand the reasons behind
and the consequences of her transfer.45 While her action is willful and
intentional, it is nonetheless far from being "wrongful and perverse." In addition,
respondents failed to prove that there is indeed an order or company procedure
requiring a transferee's written conformity prior to the implementation of the
transfer, and that such order or procedure was made known to petitioner.

Given the foregoing, there is no basis to dismiss petitioner on the ground of

insubordination for her mere failure to sign the Notice to Transfer.

Relevantly, there is also no basis to impose a penalty of three-month suspension

without pay on petitioner for her delay in assuming her new role at the Storage
Department considering that she was not even cited by GRRI for said act. GRRI is
already deemed to have waived its right to terminate or discipline petitioner on
such ground. The case of Exocet Security and Allied Services Corp. v. Serrano46 is
instructive on this matter, viz.:

Thus, it is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere

lapse of the six-month period of floating status as a case of constructive
dismissal, without looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the
security guard's failure to assume another post. This is especially true in the
present case where the security guard's own refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was
the reason that he was not given an assignment within the six-month period. The
security agency, Exocet, should not then be held liable.

Indeed, from the facts presented, Serrano was guilty of willful disobedience to a
lawful order of his employer in connection with his work, which is a just cause for
his termination under Art. 288 (previously Art. 282) of the Labor Code.
Nonetheless, Exocet did not take Serrano's willful disobedience against him. Hence,
Exocet is considered to have waived its right to terminate Serrano on such
ground.47 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, the CA erred in imposing a three-month suspension without pay on petitioner.

Anent the charge of habitual neglect for petitioner's absences without leave,
jurisprudence provides that in order to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, the
neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual.48 Gross negligence has been
defined as "the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence,
or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them."49 On the other hand, habitual neglect
"imparts repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending
on the circumstances."50 A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute
a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.51

Petitioner's four-day absence without leave is not gross nor habitual. Even so,
petitioner's absences are still not justified. Petitioner alleged that she did not
report back to work after serving her preventive suspension because the management
did not reply to her query as to when she needed to report.52 This reasoning does
not justify her absences. The Notice of Preventive Suspension served on her clearly
stated that the period of her preventive suspension was from March 14 to March 21,
2014. Thus, she was expected to report back to work on her next working day. Yet,
she reported only on March 26, 2014. Therefore, while there may be no basis to
dismiss her on the ground of gross and habitual neglect, petitioner is still guilty
of having committed a violation. It is here that totality of infractions may be
considered to determine the imposable sanction for her current infraction. In Merin
v. National Labor Relations Commission,53 the Court explained the principle of
"totality of infractions" in this wise:

The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period
of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an
erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken singly
and separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into
tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and
independent of each other. While it may be true that petitioner was penalized for
his previous infractions, this does not and should not mean that his employment
record would be wiped clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an
employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be
meted out since an employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken
together in determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed
upon petitioner, he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable behavior
on board. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving
employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has the right
to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-protection.54 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.)
To be sure, the totality of an employee's infractions is considered and weighed in
determining the imposable sanction for the current infraction.55 It presupposes
that the employee is already found guilty of the new violation, as in this case.
Apropos, it is also worth mentioning that GRRI had already previously warned
petitioner that the penalty for her next infraction would be elevated to dismissal.
Thus, the dismissal of petitioner, on the basis of the principle of totality of
infractions, is justified.

However, the Court notes that petitioner's dismissal is tainted with numerous
procedural lapses.

The Court delineated the requirements of procedural due process in King of Kings
Transport, Inc. v. Mamac,56 viz.:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the
specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to
prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at
least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an
opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or
lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently
prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed
narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge
against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice.
Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are
violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the
employees.57 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

The records show that GRRI failed to observe the foregoing requirements.

First, while the Termination Notice cited four grounds for petitioner's dismissal,
the Memorandum dated March 10, 2014 only charged petitioner with insubordination
for her refusal to sign the Notice to Transfer. Second, petitioner was only given
24 hours to submit an explanation. Third, no administrative hearing was held, or
even scheduled. Lastly, the Termination Notice already cited petitioner's absences
without leave as ground for her dismissal even before she was even given any
opportunity to be heard.

Considering that a valid cause for petitioner's dismissal exists but the
requirements of procedural due process were not observed, the award of nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is in order.58

With respect to petitioner's claim for SILP, the Court finds that the same is in
order. In RTG Construction, Inc. v. Facto,59 the Court awarded money claims,
particularly SILP, despite the validity of the employee's dismissal. The first
paragraph of Article 95 of the Labor Code provides that every employee who has
rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly incentive leave
of five days with pay. In the present case, petitioner had been in the employ of
GRRI since 2002, or for 12 years, hence she is entitled to SILP. Considering that
petitioner is claiming non payment, the burden also rests on GRRI, as the employer,
to prove payment.60 Since, GRRI has not shown any proof that it has paid petitioner
SILP or that it is exempted from paying the same, the CA erred in deleting the
award of SILP. However, the computation of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC, must be
modified conformably with Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista.61
The LA's computation of SILP due to petitioner is limited only to three years,
citing Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides for the three-year prescriptive
period for money claims. However, in Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista,
the Court held that the three-year prescriptive period commences not at the end of
the year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service
incentive leave, but only from the time the employee becomes entitled to the
commutation of his service incentive leave, i.e., from the time he demands its
commutation or upon termination of his employment, as the case may be.62 This
pronouncement has also been affirmed by the Court in Rodriguez v. Park N Ride,
Inc.63 Thus, the computation of petitioner's SILP should cover the period from the
beginning of her employment until its termination, as follows:

P10,000.00 (12) / 365 (5 days) (12 years) = P19,726.02

Finally, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the total
monetary award from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTLY

GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 23, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 143474
is AFFIRMED but subject to MODIFICATION.

Respondent Ganco Resort and Recreation, Inc. is ordered to pay petitioner Neren
Villanueva Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as nominal damages, and Nineteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-Six and 2/100 Pesos (P19,726.02) as service incentive
leave pay. The total monetary award shall be subject to interest rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo,* J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Lopez, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

* Designated additional Member per Raffle dated December 11, 2019.

1 Rollo, pp. 10-33.

2 Id. at 35-48. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in
by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.

3 Id. at 50-51.

4 Id. at 70-82.

5 Id. at 85-89.

6 Id. at 71, 154.

7 Id. at 36-37, 71, 154-155.

8 Id. at 37.

9 Id.

10 Id.
11 Id. at 37-38.

12 Id. at 38, 72, 155.

13 Id. at 38.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 38, 72-73.

17 Id. at 38.

18 Id. at 39.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 39, 73.

22 Id. at 39.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 154-163.

25 Id. at 163.

26 Supra note 4.

27 Rollo, pp. 81-82.

28 Supra note 5.

29 Supra note 2.

30 Id. at 47-48.

31 See id. at 18-22.

32 See id. at 22-24.

33 Id. at 24-26.

34 Id. at 26-27.

35 Id. at 278-292.

36 Id. at 324-335.

37 Galan v. Vinarao, G.R. No. 205912, October 18, 2017, 842 SCRA 602, 609.

38 Janssen Pharmaceutica v. Silayro, 570 Phil. 215, 226-227 (2008).

39 Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., 760 Phil. 779, 789 (2015).

40 Dagasdas v. Grand Placement and General Services Corporation, 803 Phil. 463, 478
(2017).

41 San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 225 Phil. 302 (1989).

42 Rollo, p. 122.

43 Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (Inport) v. NLRC, 267 Phil. 863, 872
(1990).

44 Rollo, pp. 96-98.

45 See Notice to Transfer, id. at 92-93, where it is stated that employees who
affixed their signature "understood that the lateral transfer did not in any way
affect or violated [their] rights as an employee [and that they] agree and accept
[the] responsibilities [of their new assignment]."

46 744 Phil. 403 (2014).

47 Id. at 420-421.

48 National Bookstore, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 235, 246 (2002).

49 Id. at 245.

50 Cavite Apparel, Inc. v. Marquez, 703 Phil. 46, 55 (2013).

51 National Bookstore, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48 at 246.

52 Rollo, p. 130.

53 590 Phil. 596 (2008).

54 Id. at 602-603.

55 Aplicador v. Moriroku Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 233133, October 17, 2018
(Unsigned Resolution); Sy v. Banana Peel, G.R. No. 213748, November 27, 2017, 846
SCRA 612, 630-631.

56 553 Phil. 108 (2007).

57 Id. at 117.

58 Licap Marketing Corp. v. Baquial, 737 Phil. 349, 361 (2014) and Better
Buildings, Inc. v. NLRC, 347 Phil. 521, 531 (1997).

59 623 Phil. 511 (2009).

60 Id. at 520-521.

61 497 Phil. 863 (2005).

62 Id. at 877.

63 807 Phil. 747 (2017).