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ARTICLES 62.

ASPECTS OF THE 19TH CENTURY HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA

by Kof i Darkwah""

In recent years considerable research has been conducted

into various aspects of the history of Ethiopia particularly
for the 19th century. Consequently much more is now known
about the empire than before. The result of the researches
is, however, still largely in the form of theses or articles
in various learned journals. The present paper attempts to
bring together in the form of an outline, and only for the 19th
century, those aspects of the history of the empire into which
research has been made in the last few years, and to indicate
the new interpretations which have resulted.

The 19th century was an interesting and at the same

time a very important period in the long history of the empire
of Ethiopia. When the century began the prestige and authority
of the emperor, who was the embodiment of the central government
were at a low ebb, and the rulers of the provinces acted almost
like masters of independent entities. This unhappy situation
continued throughout the first half of the century. During the
second half of the century, however, the position of the emperor
improved gradually until by the end of the century the central
government commanded respect and obedience throughout the length
and breadth of the empire.

The decline of the imperial power dated back to the 18th

century and was the cumulated result of a combination of factors
which took their origin in the preceding centuries. In the
first half of the 16th century the last phase of a long series
of wars between the Christian empire and her Muslim neighbours
was fought. In this struggle the odds were so badly against
the Christian state that it was only through the intervention
of some four hundred well-armed Portuguese soldiers that she
was saved from a possible total extinction as a Christian state.
Nor did her Portuguese saviours have an easy job for their
combined efforts succeeded in defeating the Muslims only through
desparate fighting which cost the Portuguese more than three
quarters of their men including their leader Christopher da
Gama, the brother of the more famous naval explorer Vasco da

* Dr. Kofi Darkwah is a Research Fellow in.African History.

ARTICLES 63.

Gama. Secondly,, in the first decades of the 17th century,

there ensued fifteen years of religious civil strife. This
was the religious effect of the intervention of the Portuguese*
Roman Catholic by denominatIon8 in the war between Orthodox
Monophysite Christian Ethiopia and the Muslims, l.nthis reli-
gious civil strife the Roman Catholics won to their side the
support of the emperors of the time. Nevertheless, they were
finally defeated and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church came back
to Its own. The third factor which contributed to the decline
of the imperial authority was the migration of the people called
Gal la. At the time of their advance into Ethiopia in the 16th
and 17th centuries the Gal la were neither Christians nor muslims
but adherents of their own traditional religions. In their
advance they came to occupy the whole of the southern and parts
of the central Ethiopian plateau; in other words the Gal la occu-
pied at least half the traditional territory of the Christian
empire. The Imperial government was unable to stem the tide of
the Gal la onslaught.

The combined effect of these three factors was that by

the end of the 17th century the imperial authority had lost
much of the human and material resources to which it had had
access In former times. ft had also lost the respect and
confidence which it used to enjoy from its traditional sup-
porters - the Amhara and Tigrean nobility. Consequently these
traditional supporters became more separatist in their attitude
to the central Imperial government. This tendency was aggra-
vated by the marriage of Emperor lyasu II (1730-55) to the
daughter of a Yejju Gal la chief. The marriage, contracted on
the advice of the Emperor's mother, was probably intended to
gain, In the Gal la, useful allies for the imperial crown
against the separatist tendencies of the Tigrean/Amhara
nobility; but it had the effect of alienating these tradition-
al nobles all the more because they saw in the marriage a threat
to their traditional role In the government of the empire. This
fear was not unfounded for in course of time the newer element
In the society, the Galla, were brought into every level of the
governmental machinery until by the opening of the 19th century

1. The story of Portuguese role in the war is told in jThe

jPorjtLiguesejxpgdjtion
jjg__ j g j j jtoAbyss
_ inia
_ 2
in 15^2-[5^3;as nar-
ratedbyCastanJioso. Trans, and edt. R.S. Whiteway,
London, Hakluyt Society 1902.
ARTICLES 64,

the Gal la occupied Important positions not only in the pro-

vinces but also at the Imperial court.

It Is not difficult to see how this came about. When

lyasu II died the heir to the throne, lyoas, was half-Gal la;
he was also a minor and his Gal la mother acted as the regent.
As was to be expected the regent depended on her Gal la re-
latives for her government, appointing Gal la to posts both
in the provinces and at the court. From this time until the
rise of Emperor Tewodros In 1855 the politics of the empire
was dominated by the Gal la.

Right from the beginning of this development the

traditional nobility sought to resist the budding influence
of the Gal la in the empire. One way by which they hoped to
do this was to try and weaken, and If possible completely cut
off, their allegiance to the central or imperial government.
When the 19th century opened therefore there had been a long
standing struggle on the part of the Amhara/Tigrean nobles to
eliminate the Gal la Influence from the governing circles of
the empire. This struggle was championed by the northern pro-
vince of TIgre, and Tigre's assumption of this responsibility
dated back to the last quarter of the 18th century when Ras
Mlkael Sehul became governor of that province. Thus one of
the topics to consider in any serious discussion of the
history of Ethiopia in the 19th century Is the struggle bet-
ween the Tigrean/Amhara nobles on the one hand and the central
Imperial authority as represented by the Gal la dominated
imperial court. The Issue at stake, of course, was the proper
role of the traditional nobles In the government of the empire.
Although in the first half of the 19th century the traditional
nobles were unable to oust the Gal la from their positions of
influence they succeeded in keeping the effective power of the
imperial authority from most of the former provinces of the
empire and limited it only to the" capital, Gondar, and its
surrounding districts.
Another Important topic of the period Is the develop-
ment which took place within the provinces themselves. Within
the Individual provinces the 19th century saw serious efforts
by the provincial rulers to expand their territory, centralise
and consolidate their power over the expanding province. This
ARTICLES 65.

process also takes its origin from the 18th century in some
case and In others from the 17th century.

A conspicuous feature of the process of expansion and

centralisation was the almost incessant warfare which went on
in the various parts of the Individual provinces. As a result
of these wars provincial frontiers kept shifting and provinces
of varying sizes and strength emerged in all parts of the empire.
The weaker ones were in course of time absorbed by their stronger
neighbours and In this way the number of provinces kept chang-
ing. In the first quarter of the century there must have been
at least ten provinces In the northern and central parts of the
empire, and there were at least as many In the southern parts.
By-the middle of the century the northern and central parts
were dominated by four large provinces: Tfgre, Begemder? Goj-
jam and Wallo. Shoa dominated the area Immediately to the
south of Wallo; to the south-west of Shoa five monarchies of
different sizes and degrees of cohesion had emerged, and to the
south and south-east of Shoa were the provinces of Gurage, Aru-
ssi and Harar. All these provinces continued to expand their
territory in the second half of the century with varying degrees
of success. By 1889 Shoa had achieved such successes in her
expansion that she had absorbed all the provinces to the south-
west, south and south-east. Tfgre, In the north had similarly
extended the frontiers of her effective influence although to
a lesser extent than was the case with Shoa, As for centrali-
sation and the development of strong provincial government Shoa
was probably the most successful.

An Important factor In the expansion of the provinces

was their importation of improved European firearms. Beginning
from the first decade of the century there was a steady influx
of firearms until by the 1880s Ethiopia was the best armed of
the black African countries. Owing to her geographical posi-
tion - her nearness to the coast - Tigre was by far the most
successful In the acquisition of firearms. As early as 1808
the ruler of Tigre, Ras Walda Sellassie and his subordinate
chiefs were reported to possess a total of 8,900 matchlocks,
and by 1831 the TIgrean rulers had acquired at least another
three thousand muskets, '

1. Richard Pankhurst: EconomicHIstoryofEthiopia 1800"1935.

Halle Sellassie I University Press, Addis Ababa, 1968,
p.579 and sources cited in Footnote 3 on page 611.
ARTICLES 66.

Next to Tigre Shoa was the best armed. The other pro-
vinces in the north and in the centre managed to obtain a few
firearms, probably not more than two thousand matchlocks bet-
ween them all by the 1830s'; but the southern provinces were
deprived of this advantage by the firm control that Shoa
exercised over Importation of firearms into those parts of
the empire.2 Acquisition of firearms, it should be emphasized,
continued throughout the 19th century. From the 1830s onwards
the rulers of Shoa, for example, sought ways and means by which
to increase their stock of firearms. Under Menilek (1865-1889)
a definite policy of acquisition was pursued as a result of
which thousands of firearms were imported from Italy and through
private French traders. Yet despite the expansion in Shoa's
armament position Tigre continued to be the best armed province
in the empire throughout the 1870s and the 1880s. The success
achieved by Tigre and Shoa In arms acquisition is one of the
factors which explain the success which attended their expan-
sionist and centralising activities.

In the early years of the 1850s a rebellion which

started from the district of Quara in the north-west of the
empire was to have profound effects on the subsequent history
of the empire as a whole. The rebellion was began by Kassa
of Quara, one of the minor officials of Ras All, Gal la govern-
or of Begemder, guardian of the imperial throne and the
effective ruler of what was left of the empire. By sheer
military prowess Kassa defeated one provincial governor after
another including Ras All himself* killing some and imprison-
ing others; by the end of February 1855 the rebel was In
control of the three great provinces of Tigres Begemder and
Gojjam. ignoring the existence of the puppet emperor of the
day Kassa got himself crowned as emperor and took the throne
name of Tewodros II. In 1855-56 he conquered the provinces
of Wallo and Shoa and brought them also under his control.
For the first time since the middle of the 18th century all
these provinces were brought under the control of the central
imperial government.

1. Ibid.
2. Archivlo Storico del la Societa Geografica Itailana.
Carton'! VIII D Traversl's letter dated Let-Marefia
10/V1888.
ARTICLES 67.

As emperor Tewodros set out to achieve three things.

First, to reorganise the political character of the empire
in such a way as to break the separatist and rebellious
tendencies of the nobility and subject them unequivocably
under the authority of the Imperial Authority, Secondly, to
bring about religious unity within his empire by converting
the pagans and muslims to the orthodox church of Ethiopia and
expelling those who would not adopt the Christian faith.
Thirdly, to reform the social and economic life of the empire
and eliminate the abuses of the preceding era. His ultimate
objective was to make the power of the emperor supreme within
the empire through reforms calculated to strengthen the imperial
authority morally, economically and militarily. In short his
objective was to revitalize and modernise his empire.

In his efforts to realize his objective Tewodros sought

to take advantage of modern technology; he also sought to make
use of European nationals who came to his country as an instru-
ment for developing sustained friendly relationship with the
states of Europe, It must, be noted that in his desire to make
his country profit by its relationship with Europe Tewodros
had good company in contemporary or near contemporary rulers
in other parts of 13th century Africa. Such well-known rulers
as Muhammad All and Khedive Ismail both of Egypt, Kabaka Hutesa
i of Bttganda, King Moshesh the founder of the BasuTo~/Xesotho 7
nation - to name only a few - all had the desire to use their
relationship with the states of Europe to the advantage of their
nat ive countr ies,

In those admirable objectives of revitalising the

central imperial authority and modernizing his empire Tewodros I
achieved only a transient success. Despite his Initial achieve-
ments he was unable to push his reforms successfully through
the second half of his reign. The habits of insubordination
separatism and autonomy which marked the political life in the
period before his rise to power had, In the words of a recent
writer, "become too firmly entrenched to eradicate as quickly
as Tewodros hoped to eradicate them".' In his efforts to eradi-
1, Donald Crummey: "Tewodros as a Reformer and a Modernizer"
S Vol.X No. 3, 1969,
For a biographical study of Tewodros see Sven Rubenson:
Eiblstsls.' Published by H.S.
University in association with O.U.P., Addis Ababa and
Nairobi, 1966
ARTICLES 68.

cate these abuses Tewodros did not receive from his subjects
that degree of cooperation which was necessary for the success
of his policies. This led to frustration on the part of the
emperor. The frustration revealed itself In high-handed,
cruel and inhuman acts. The resulting despotic behaviour of
Tewodros had the effect of uniting the country against him,
a unity which expressed itself in revolts all over the count-
ry. Thus Tewodros spent the second half of his reign trying,
almost always without success, to suppress revolt after re-
volt In different parts of his empire. The same element of
frustration led to a strain in his relations with the Europe-
an nationals in his empire and to his imprisoning the British
Consul and a number of Europeans.. The upshot of this action
was that In 1867 the British government despatched a military
expedition led by Sir Robert Napier into Ethiopia with the
sole aim of freeing the British Consul and the other Europe-
ans imprisoned by the Ethiopian emperor. Tewodros committed
suicide in April 1868 just as Napier's men were on the point
of entering his headquarters Maqdaia. His death brought to
an end the first serious attempt in the 19th century to
revive the power and the prestige of the imperial authority
and to reunite all the former provinces of the empire under
one effective central government.

Although Tewodros failed to achieve his objectives

his reign was not without significance. In the first place
his rise to power led to the elimination of the Gal la control
over the imperial crown which had lasted for more than a
century. From that time effective political power In the
empire reverted into the hands of the Amhara and Tigrean
nobility. Secondly the events of his reign brought the
central Imperial authority some vitality and self-confidence
and his attempt at reforms as well as his efforts to adopt
modern technology as a weapon for the development of his
empire constituted a worthy example which was emulated by
his successors.

On the death of Tewodros Wagshum Gobazie of Lasta

declared himself emperor with the throne name Tekla Glyorgis
and managed to keep himself In power for three to four years.
Throughout this period, however, his position was challenged
by other provincial leaders among whom was Godja Kassa of
ARTICLES 69.

TIgre. The desultary skirmishes which ensued ended with the

victory of Kassa over Tekla Giyorgis In July 18/1.' Kassa
then got himself crowned as emperor and took the throne name
of Yohannes IV.

The pol Icy that Yohannes pursued as emperor was s in

Its domestic as well as foreign aspects^ essentially a con-
tinuation of the noble aspirations that Tewodros had, with
such admirable vigour, sought to translate Into a real Ity.
In other words Yohannes sought to make the Imperial authority
supreme at home and to defend the unity, Integrity and Inde-
pendence of his empire against encroachment from foreign
powers.

Though Yohannes was anxious to make the Imperial

authority supreme at home the methods by which he hoped to
achieve this were different from those employed by his pre-
decessor. Tewodros had used armed warfare to try and reduce
all the provincial rulers to a position of complete, sub-
ordination to the central government and was not prepared to
concede even a shadowy Independence to any province. Yohannes
on the other hand was prepared to concede 1imited autonomy to
the provinces provided and for as long as they recognised him'
as their overlord and paid him regular tribute. This method
was clearly Ineffective for establishing the absolute supre-
macy of the imperial authority throughout the empire. The
ineffectiveness of Yohannes1 method has led one scholar to
remark that "rather than risking a series of civil wars, he
£ Yohannes J gave up Tewodros1 Idea of making Ethiopia a
centralized national state"; he concedes, however, that
"/*Yohannes J was certainly not prepared to accept a divided
Ethiopia".2 Such a remark fails to take fully into consi-
deration the circumstances of the time. It Is true that both
J^odrosandYohannesfacedex^ ' ty
1. M. Chaine: "Histoire du regne de Johannes rot d'EtMopie
1868-1889" Revue Semitlque 19139 p.180. The Chronicler
adds that Tekla Giyorgis was killed in the battle,

2. Sven Rubenson: "Some aspects on the survival of Ethio-

pian Independence In the period of the scramble for
Africa". |Li£££L!££L_i!l^!l£El££ljifill££» Salisbury* !962S
. p.259.
ARTICLES 70.

of their empire but the external threat which faced Yohannes

was certainly different in dimension and intensity from that
with which Tewodros had to deal. It was this essential
difference which determined the change in approach to domes-
tic issues. Yohannes1 methods should thus be seen and judged
in the light of the situation in which he found himself.
Yohannes was not prepared to accept a divided Ethiopia, yet
he adopted methods which seemed ineffective in achieving
national unity. He may have adopted those methods because
throughout his reign he was involved in a struggle with foreign
countries to safeguard the frontiers and preserve the terri-
torial integrity of his empire. For this reason he never
really had a free hand to deal more firmly with his recalcit-
rant provincial rulers. And while he was involved in a struggle
with foreign powers he must have thought it wise not to weaken
his resources in an armed conflict to assert his supremacy at
home, especially if this could be secured, if only temporarily,
by some other method. Thus Yohannes may well have adopted
these somewhat compromising methods as a stop gap measure
until such time that he would be free from entanglements with
foreign countries to deal more firmly with his provincial
rulers. His treatment of the King of Shoa and the ruler of
Gojjam supports this view. But as it turned out that time
never came.

The weakness in Yohannes method is revealed in the

relationship between the imperial authority and the ruler
of the Kingdom of Shoa who at this time was an astute and
ambitious man called Menilek.

In 1875 after he had secured himself in the north

Yohannes marched south to Shoa with the object of suppressing
the independence of that kingdom. Threatening Egyptian
attack on his northern frontier forced the emperor to change
his mind and instead of fighting he regulated his relations
with Menilek by an agreement by which Menilek acknowledged
Yohannes as his overlord and agreed to pay him tribute.'
1. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Paris): Correspon-
dence Pol itique des Consuls, Egypte, Massouah, Vol.4,
p.12. De Sarzec to Decarzes, 14/8/1875.
L.L. Lande: "Un voyageur francais dans L'Ethiopie
M/ridionale" Revue des Deux Mondes Vol.30, I878,
pp. 895-6,
ARTICLES

This arrangement was not satisfactory to either party; while

Yohannes expected Meniiek to behave like a vassal the latter
continued to act like an absolute master of an Independent
kingdom and even styled himself by the emperor's title.
Yohannes was of course determined to establish himself as
the supreme ruler of the whole of Ethiopia and could not
tolerate this pretence on the part of Menliek, In 1878
therefore when he was for a brief period free from engage-
ments with his foreign enemies Yohannes went south to Shoa
Intending to break once and for all the pretensions of the
ruler of that part of the empire. Again the prospect of
weakening his forces In a domestic war at a time when he
needed his full strength to protect his vulnerable frontiers
against external threats forced him to settle his differences
with Menliek In a "treaty" made on March 20 at Litche, The
most important "clauses11 of the "treaty" were as follows;
Meniiek renounced the Imperial title by which he styled him-
self and in return was officially recognised and crowned as
King of Shoa by Yohannes, Meniiek also reaffirmed his reco-
gnition of Yohannes as his overlord and promised to give him
tribute and military service. On his part Yohannes promised
to provide military help for Meniiek when the need arose.
On religious issues It was agreed that Meniiek should expel ,
from his Kingdom the European missionaries then working there.
The agreement was a set-back for the independence of Menilek-
so that by forcing him to accept It Yohannes had thereby
succeeded in establishing himself as the supreme ruler in
the empire,
The activities of Meniiek In the four years following
the I878 settlement caused the emperor considerable uneasiness.
By way of arbitrating between Menliek and Ras Adal, the govern-
or of Gojjam, who had gone to war in June 1882 Yohannes made
a new settlement with Menliek which was designed to ensure in
no uncertain manner the obedience and support of Menflek for
the emperor. This settlement confirmed the two previous
settlements. Men jlek j& control over those Galla lands to the

i. Antonio CecchI: 2
1886, Vol.1, p.41^ Massaja, G. 1 miei trertta-
1885 - 95 *
Vol.XI, p.10. Waldmeier, T.• Autobiography of Theophi1 us
Waldmeter, London 1886, p.133.
ARTICLES 72.

south of Gojjam disputed between himself and Ras Ada! was

recognised. With a view to strengthening the relationship
between the emperor Yohannes and his vassal Menilek a marriage
union was arranged between the emperor's son and heir, Ras
Areya Sellassie and Meneilek's daughter Waizero Zauditu. The
marriage actually took place in October 1882. Further the
settlement dealt with the question of succession to the imper-
ial throne on the death of Yohannes. But precisely what was
arranged is not known. Most writers think that Menilek was
recognised as the direct successor to Yohannes, This seems
very unlikely, In view of (a) the strength of regional senti-
ments at the time, (b) the fact that Yohannes had a son to
succeed him and could hardly be expected to overlook the
rights or claims of his own son in favour a vassal; and
(c) the purpose behind the marriage between Ras Areya Sellas-
sie and Waizero Zauditu. It is here being suggested, having
regard to all the circumstances of the time, that the success-
ion settlement agreed upon was likely to be something like this:
that the emperor's son and heir Ras Areya was to succeed him
and was himself to be succeeded by the children from his
marriage to Zauditu; and that in the event of Ras Areya dying
without an heir Menilek was to succeed him.

The concessions made to Menilek in the settlements

of I878 and 1882 would seem to have compromised the supremacy
of Yohannes 1 imperial position vis-a-vis Menilek and would
seem to suggest the failure of Yohannes to reduce Shoa and
its ruler to a position of undisputed subordination to the
imperial authority. This could only be achieved, it would
seem, by armed warfare but for other good reasons - explained
earlier in this paper^ - Yohannes was hesitant to adopt that
course of action. On his part Menilek appeared to be con-
tent with his method of exacting concessions from the emperor
through negotiations. He was careful not to provoke Yohannes
into armed conflict for he was painfully aware of the fact
that militarily the emperor was more powerful and that he
(Menilek) stood the chance of being defeated if it came to
armed warfare between them.

In 1888 Ras Areya Sellassie, the heir to Yohannes,

died without any children by Zauditu. A year later when

1 . Page 69-70 above.

ARTICLES 73-

Yohannes was killed In battle against the Sudanese Mahdists

the imperial crown passed Into the hands of Menilek of Shoa
who became emperor Menilek II.

Menilek 1 I was one of the greatest emperors that

Ethiopia has known In Its long history. in not only its
system of government but also In Its territorial extent and
problems Ethiopia of today was largely his creation. He
adopted and successfully executed the policy, first Initiated
by Tewodros li of uniting all the provinces of the empire
under one effective central government. In his relations with
foreign powers he continued the policy of ensuring the terri-
torial Integrity and Independence of his empire. The method
he adopted to achieve his domestic objective was a revolution.
In government by which hereditary rulers were gradually aboli-
shed and their place taken by officials appointed by and res~
ponslble to the crown. It is appropriate to remind ourselves
that this process by which hereditary officials were replaced
by appointed bureaucracy was not peculiar to 19th century
Ethiopia, It occurred In many other contemporary African
Kingdoms and empires; indeed It seems to be the usual method
by which monarchical centralization was effected.

It must be pointed out that the administrative methods

employed by Menilek had been tried out by him and his prede-
cessors as Kings of Shoa, Thus when Menilek became emperor
he had behind him at least twenty years of experience In the
art of government. This factor contributed in no small measure
to making his Imperial reign the success which It was.

Another Important development which took place In the

reign of Menilek was the expansion of the empire. Again this
dates back to the period when Menilek was just the King of Shoa.
From 1865 when he became the ruler of Shoa Menilek systematically
expanded the frontiers of his Inheritance on all sides. By 1889
when he became emperor he had more than doubled the size of his
Kingdom which now Included the five south-westerly monarchies
of Guma ? Ghera, Goma, Limmu-Enarga and Jimma Kaka* Gurage to
the south as well as ArussI and the city state of Harar to the
south-east of Shoa. On becoming emperor Menilek continued the
policy of territorial expansion and It was in this period that
the southernmost provinces of present day Ethiopia were conquered,
ARTICLES 74,

As has been mentioned earlier the success of Menllek s s expan-

sionist activities can be explained In terms of organization
and firearms. Menllek's opponents were in most cases dis-
united; to add to this disadvantage they also either possessed
no firearms at all as in the case of the southerly and the
south-westerly provinces, or they possessed very few as in
the case of Harar, Sn their campaigns of conquest therefore
Menilek's soldiers had a decisive advantage in their relative
organization and In their possession of firearms.

So far we have dealt only with the domestic history

of Ethiopia, whatever references have been made to her rela-
tions with other powers have been incidental. We may now
look In detail at the relations which developed between her
and her neighbours of the Nile Valley - Egypt and the Sudan -
as well as with European powers which showed an interest in
the area s namely Britain, France and Italy,

Relations with Egypt were very important throughout the

19th century. As far as the Sudan was concerned, however, ft
was only from the 1880s that her influence on Ethiopian affairs
became important enough to attract the attention and reaction
from the central imperial government of Ethiopia, This was
because until the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan in 1882 that
country formed part of the Turkish possessions conquered and
governed by Egypt so that her relations with Ethiopia were
submerged in Egypt's relations with the Christian empire.

in the early years of the 19th century Muhammad All

came to power in Egypt and he at once embarked on a programme
of military social and economic reforms to transform and
strengthen Egypt. To obtain the manpower and the revenues
which were needed to carry through these reforms Muhammad
Ai i turned to the areas to the south of Egypt and conquered
the Independent states of Dongola s Shertd!,, Berber, Sennar and
Kordorfan In northern and central Sudan. The attraction of
these areas lay in the prospects they offered for slave hunt
and also In the legendary mineral wealth that was believed
to.be there.' in the 1830s Egypt got Involved In military
1. For Egyptian rule # ,In the Sudan see among others Mustafa
Sabri: i^Eni£|ire_Jay_£t ien sous Mehemet A l l , (Paris 1930).
Richard Hill; l a i £ t _ J ^ I ^ I ^ 3 M I j M ^ M l i > (1959).
P.M. Holt : iLJJ!2fi££fLJ^^
sultanate to thepresentday.
ARTICLES 75,

adventures in Syria and Greece and as a result her need for

more revenue and manpower Increased considerably. To meet
this Increased need Egyptian troops In the Sudan pushed
further afield establishing posts and raiding Into the borders
of the Ethiopian plateau. This was the area which was most
promising for minerals*trade and slave hunting. Naturally
the Ethiopians did not look on the activities of the Egyptians
with composure, and clashes ensued between the two neighbours
on their frontiers. On a number of occasions It looked as If
the Egypto-Sudanese soldiers would penetrate well into Ethiopia. 1

Since Ethiopia lacked effective-central government

.during t'ie first half of the 13th century it fell on the
rulers of the frontier districts Immediately threatened to
oppose the Egyptian incursions Into areas which they consider-'
ed to be part of their territory. In parts of the north and
in the north-west It was the rulers of Dembya who resisted the
Egyptians while the rulers of TIgre opposed them In parts of
the north and in north-east. Although serious clashes occurred
between the Egyptians and the Ethiopians In 1828-9, in the
1830s and 1840s, these vtdre relatively mild compared with what
was to happen In the second half of the century.

In the first half of the 19th century Egyptian objective

In Ethiopia was limited to establishing its authority in the
areas on the slopes of the Ethiopian plateau which were rich
,'.i I'su-rals and to controlling the caravan routes and the out-
V f . «>r the rich Ethiopian trade. In the, second half of the
>•'n ii', however, the Egyptians became overtly imperial in
o-r>tl- _-nbit ions as regards the Ethiopian regions, This was
,»3!-t ->i the larger plan pf the then ruler of Egypt, Khedive
Ismail, following the Imperial traditions of his great prede-
cessor Muhammad All, to build an Egyptian empire cover Ing'the
whole of north-east Africa, In 'pursuit of this plan Isiviail
bought the port of Massawa from his suzerain the sultan of
Turkey In IS65( and between 1870 and 1875 Egyptian troops
occupied ail the ports on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
coasts. In 1875 an Egyptian contingent pushed inland and

1, For details of this struggle in the first half of the 19th

century-see M. Ablr: 'The Origins of the Ethiopian-Egyptian
border f.roblem in the 19th century'. j^£uj|. Vol. VIII,
N o . 3 , 196"/, p p k k h S
ARTICLES 76.

occupied the Important southern city state of Harar. Already

by 1871 the Egyptian governor of Massawa, Werner Munzinger^ was
ready with plans for Egyptian annexation of Bogos, Halhal and
Marea, districts in northern Ethiopia regarded by the rulers
of Tigre as part of their territory. In 1872 Bogos and its
surrounding districts were in fact occupied by the Egyptians.2

These events took place at a time when the struggle for

succession to the imperial throne in Ethiopia following the
death of Tewodros was still unsettled, so that there was no
effective reaction to the Egyptian activities in the nor I
By 1875 Yohannes IV had emerged from the succession struggle
as the new emperor and had established himself as the strong
man in the empire. In that year when Egyptian troops pene-
trated into the northern province of Tigre they were crushingly
defeated at Gundet by the new emperor, Yohannes. In the follow-
ing year, in an attempt to avenge their defeat at Gundet, the
Egyptians projected an attack on Ethiopia from three different
points - the north, the east and Harar. Again they were complete-
ly wiped out by the Ethiopians.3 From this time until 1884 the
Egyptian threat of conquest paled into periodic border clashes
on Ethiopia's northern frontier. In 1884 through the efforts of
the British government a peace treaty was signed between Egypt
and Ethiopia which stipulated Egyptian withdrawal from the
Ethiopian regions and normalised relations between the two
countries.^ It was fortunate for Ethiopia that the period of
determined Egyptian imperial efforts coincided with the revival

1. Munzinger was a Swiss who came to the Red Sea region origin-
ally as an explorer and a businessman. He soon developed
ambitions for territorial possession in the region and in
his attempt to win support for his plans took service first
with Britain then with France as Vice-Consul at Massawa and
later with Egypt as governor of that port.
2. Sven Rubenson: "Some Aspects on the Survival of Ethiopian
Independence in the period of the scramble for Africa".
Op.cit., p.257.
3. For relations between Egypt and Ethiopia in the second half
of the century see G. Douin: Histo ire du regne du Khedive
Ismail, (Cairo 1938), Tome III Pts. 2 and 3. W. Mac. E. Dye:
Muslim Egypt and Christian Abyssinia, 1880.
4. This was the Hewett Treaty which was signed at Adowa on
June 3, 1884 after several months of negotiations.
ARTICLES 11.

of central government capable of offering effective resistance

to Egypt. It was probably this which saved Christian Ethiopia
from being dismembered by imperially minded muslim Egypt.

In the 1880s the Sudan, as distinct from Egypt, became

a factor which was taken seriously in the governing circles
of Ethiopia. This was because in 1882 the Sudan, under the
inspiring leadership of a religious figure, Muhammad Ahmad
bin Abdalla, popularly known as the Mahdi, revolted against
Egypt. A fairly strong muslim state was then established in
the Sudan whose attitude to her non-muslim neighbours was
militant and uncompromising. A jihad (holy war) was set in
motion aimed at converting the infidels to Islam, and Christ-
ian Ethiopia became an obvious target. From 1882 onwards,
therefore, Mahdist troops made periodic incursions Into the
western districts of Ethiopia and caused much uneasiness among
the frontier population. On at least two occasions' emperor
Yohannes approached the Mahdist authorities to agree to make
peace between them but on both occasions their response was
not encouraging.2 Early In 188/ Negus Tekla Haymanot the
Ethiopian governor of Gojjam attacked Gallabat and pillaged
the neighbourhood. Gallabat was an important market district
on Ethiopia's north-western frontier the possession of which
was disputed between the Ethiopia and the Sudan. In 1888 the
Mahdist soldiers penetrated well into Ethiopia and sacked
Gondar, its former capital. In the following year there was
an encounter between the opposing forces at Gallabat. It was
in his attempt to stem this tide from the Sudanese muslims

I. First In a letter to the Mahd I in March or April 1885

then In a letter to the Khalifa dated 25 December 1888.
See 6.N. Sanderson: "Sudanese Factors In the History
of Ethiopia In the Nineteenth Century" Paper read at
the International Conference on the theme Sudan in
Africa at Khartoum In February 1968, p.5 and footnote 27
on p.11 i.

2. G.N. Sandersons "Contributions from African Sources...

etc*.11 Historians In Tropical Africa, Salisbury 1962,
p.33 and footnote 3; p.23^ and footnote 1.
ARTICLES 78,

that emperor Yohannes received a mortal wound In an otherwise

successful Initial battle at Metemma In 1889. This Sudanese
threat to Ethiopia was one of the legacies that Menilek il
Inherited when he succeeded Yohannes as emperor. Shortly
after his accession Menilek made overtures to the Khalifa
for peaceful settlement of the issues at stake between them.'
During the reign of Menilek however there was a gradual
cessation of hostilities and a consequent improvement In
the relations between the two countries. From 1833 onwards
because of the increasing threat of European attack against
her, Sudan's attitude to Ethiopia softened. in 1895 Menilek
again made overtures to the Khalifa but it was not until
February 1897 that peace was concluded between them at Addis
Ababa,2 This new relationship did not have the time to reveal
its full effects because of the conquest of the Mahdlst state
In 1898 by Anglo-Egyptian troops.

We must now consider Ethiopia's relations with those

European powers which took an Interest In the Red Sea and
the Gulf of Aden areas. Throughout the first half of the
19th century British French, German and Italian nationals
visited the Ethiopian regions. They included explorers,
missionaries, naval officers, traders and adventurers.
A number of these visitors were favourably received and
sometimes patronised by one or the other of the Ethiopian
princes who, In doing so, hoped to use their visitors as a
channel through which they could enter into friendly rela-
tions with the different European countries from where they
came. Many of these attempts did not achieve anything con-
crete beyond enabling the Ethiopian princes to acquire some
firearms from Europe,

The contact which seemed to promise something solid

was that with the British, Desirous of winning undisputed
control over the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden route, which
was Important for uninterrupted communication with their

1, G.N. Sanderson: "Contributions from African Sources,.."

Oja^cjJ:., p.234 and footnote 2.

2. G.N. Sanderson: "The Foreign Policy of the Negus HenS

lek 896-98" No.! s
1964
ARTICLES 79.

possessions in India, the British were anxious to cultivate

the friendship of the African princes whose territory bordered
on the route,' In 1841 a British mission was sent to the King
of Shoa In southern Ethiopia to enter Into friendly and commer-
cial relations with the government of that Kingdom, The mis-
sion stayed untfi February 1843 and negotiated a commercial
treaty but the difficulties involved In implementing it made
the treaty remain a dead letter,2 In northern Ethiopia the
attempt by the British to win the friendship of the Ethiopian
princes was more promising than the case in the south. Here
In 1848 the first British Consul was appointed and stationed
at Massawa, The. man first appointed to the post, W.C. Plowden,
remained In the country until he was killed in !860 by rebels
against emperor Tewodros. it was his successor, Cameron, who
together with some European missionaries was imprisoned by
Tewodros in 1865.5 And It was for the purpose of liberating
those prisoners that the British Expedition led by Lord Napier
was sent into Ethiopia In 1867-68. After 1868 the British lost
Interest in Ethiopia and It was not until the 1890s that their
Interest In that country was revived.

Throughout the 13th century the French were interested

In Ethiopia and French missionaries and explorers were active
in the country. In the 1870s and '80s French merchants traded
actively In southern parts of the empire particularly in Shoa
and Harar, But throughout this period, despite several efforts
to that effect, their efforts were not given any serious official
backing and remained essentially on an individual level. It was
in the SomalI country that the French government intervened to
acquire first a sphere of influence and later a colony In the
1880s and 1890s.

1. Public Records Office: F.O. 1/1 folio 169, Henry Rud-

land to General Hewitt dated Mocha, 30/3/1809.

2. Correspondence on this mission is found In F.O. 1/3 and

in India Office Library, Bombey Secret Proceedings,
Lantern Gallery Nos. Ik5f 159* 184, 185, 189-206",

3» Abyssinia Original Correspondence Vols. 1-3.

ARTICLES 80.

Italy was the one European nation which exercised the

greatest influence on Ethiopian affairs in the 19th century.
In the second quarter of the century missionaries from Italy
were active in Tigre and in what is now Eritrea. When they
were expelled from the north some of them went to the Gal la
country to the south of Gojjam and into southern Shoa where
they remained until the late 1870s and early 1880s when
pressure from emperor Yohannes forced them to withdraw. It
was in Meniiek's Shoa however, that the Italians were most
active. From 1868 when the missionary Massaja arrived in
Shoa a steady stream of Italian nationals of all types -
traders, explorers, adventurers, doctors, artisans, engineers
- came into the kingdom. Some of them took service with the
king and a number of them accompanied him in his campaigns
of conquest. They travelled up and down the kingdom and
their reports constitute a valuable source of historical
information. Learned and commercial societies in Italy as
well as the Italian government showed an interest in the
activities of their nationals in Shoa and from 1882 the
government of Italy appointed an official representative in
Shoa. This ambassador, Pietro Antonelli, worked hard to
establish a commercial and a firm diplomatic relations be-
tween the two kingdoms.

At the time when the Italians were in Shoa they

were also established in parts of the Somali coast. In
1885, on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from the
Red Sea port of Massawa, the Italians occupied it and
began to push gradually inland towards the frontiers of
Tigre. The fact was that from 1882 the Italians were
determined to acquire a colony in the Ethiopian region.
It is quite possible that the activities of the Italian
nationals in Shoa and in the Gal la regions to the south
of Shoa had the ulterior motive of finding out the prospects
of Italy acquiring a colony somewhere in southern Ethiopia.
And missions which were sent to Gojjam and northern Ethio-
pia in the 1870s and 1880s appear to have had such a motive.
The region to the north of Tigre as well as the northern
districts of Tigre itself must have appeared to the Italians
1. Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Rome): A.S.M.A.I. 36/1-4
Memorandum by the Societa Geografica Itaiiana to the
President of the Council of Ministers dated 8/VI878.
ARTICLES

to be an area where they could acquire a colony hence their

occupation of Massawa in I885 and their gradual penetration
inland towards Tigre. On a number of occasions both emperor
Yohannes and _neg_u£ (King) Menllek of Shoa, who was a friend
of the Italians, asked the latter to clarify their intentions
with regards to the northern areas of Tigre; on each occasion
the Italians protested their pacific intentions. Notwith-
standing thefr protestations they continued pushing gradually
Inland, This brought them into hostilities with Yohannes who
acted not only as the emperor of the whole of Ethiopia but
also as ruler of Tigre for Tigre was the emperor's native
province. In a skirmish which took place In January I887 at
Dogaii the Ethiopians massacred an Italian force. This halted
the Italian advance but only temporarily and by the time of
the death of emperor Yohannes the Italian threat to the terri-
torial Integrity of the empire was still very great.

Not long after Menilek had succeeded Yohannes as

emperor in March 1889 he came to terms with the Ital ians in
a treaty signed on May 2 at WIchale. By this treaty Menilek
allowed the Italians to keep the area which they had already
occupied, that is Massawa and the lowlands between the coast
and the highlands. Clause seventeen of this treaty was inter-
preted by the Italians to mean that they had acquired protect-
orate rights over the whole of Ethiopia,' The misunderstand-
ing which arose between the two parties over this clause
coupled with the continued penetration of the Italians beyond
the limits set by other clauses of the treaty of Wichale led,
after the failure of the many attempts at peaceful settlement,
to a series of skirmishes which culminated in a battle fought
near Adowa on 1st March I896 in which the Italians were routed

1. For details of this see Sven Rubenson: Wichale XVI Sf The

Attempt toestablish a Protectorate over Ethiopia. Addis
Ababa 1964. Carlo Giglo: L'ArtlcoloXVM del trattato di
Lj£cJ_aJ_n_, Casa Edltrice PIetro CaTroTT7 Como 1 967-
These two publications are expanded versions of articles
publIshed by the two scholars on the treaty of Wichale in
tne
jj£E?lniLL_.?JL-A.f,r,lcTgn.. Jlls..!-ffD. VoI-v N o . 2 , 1964 and Vol.VI
NQ.27~T955T SeT^Tio~RLibenson: "Professor Glglio, Anto-
neili and Article XVII of the treaty of Wichale", in same
Journal Vol.VI I No.3, 1966.
 ARTICLES 82.

by the Ethiopians, A new basis for !talo-Ethfopian relations

was establ ished by the treaty of Addis Ababa (October, 1896)
which ended the state of war existing at the time.

The battle of Adowa was a severe setback for the

colonial ambitions of Italy In northern Ethiopia, The
victory won by the Ethiopians had important consequences.
It saved the empire from conquest not only by Italy but by
any other power with colonial ambition in Africa, The Ethio-
pian victory forced the European powers to change their at-
titude to that Christian empire as a protectorate of Italy
and to recognise her as a sovereign independent nation whose
ruler must be dealt with as an independent sovereign and whose
views must be taken into account on any negotiations concerning
North-East Africa. Menliek was thus able to make diplomatic
use of his victory over the Italians to sign frontier treaties
with Britain, France and Italy vihose colonies bordered on Ethio-
pia in the East, South and West by which the boundaries between
Ethiopia and those colonies were demarcated. These boundary
treaties were made between I896 and 1907. Except with slight
alterations the present day frontiers of Ethiopia reflect
those negotiated between Menilek and the European colonial
powers during the closing years of the 13th century.

Internally the victory at Adowa strengthened the

position and power of Menilek. Before the war the loyalty
of the nobles of Tigre, particularly Ras Mangasha, to Meni-
lek as emperor had been In some doubt. Now, with the defeat
of the Italians the chances of those chiefs securing the
support of the Italians in Eritrea to make trouble for Meni-
lek became extremely slim and they were thus forced to re-
cognise Menilek as the supreme authority In the empire. From
this time, notwithstanding Ras Mangasha's rebellion of 1898
the country could be said to have acquired a sense of unity
probably greater than what was known at the time of Yohannes.
After I836* as a result of the new sense of security which
Menilek gained both internally and externally with his
victory over the Italians, he was able to turn his attention
more seriously to pushing through a programme for the modern-
ization of his empire. Although Meni?ek's career as an
innovator and a modernizer began with his return to Shoa
•from Maqdaia in 1865 and continued throughout the 1870s and
ARTICLES 83.

1880s some of his most ambitious innovations were carried out,

or at least attempted, In the period after the battle of Adowa.
It was probably In the field of modernization that Menllek
made the greatest use of Europeans and of modern technology.

Some account must now be given of the condition of the

Ethiopian Orthodox Church In the 19th century. Like the
institution of the monarchy the Church was, and has remained
to this day, one of the pillars of the unity and civilization
of Ethiopia. Church leaders exercised considerable influence
on political leaders; the Abun^ as well as the JEichetje^, the
two top officials of the church had their seats in the imperial
capital and their relations with the political leaders reflected
the relations between the church and the state.3

Until the 16th century the relations between church

and state were by and large smooth, and were in line with
the settlement of 1269 by which the church had in effect
been subordinated to the state. Yet the state respected the
church's authority in its spiritual domain and both the church
and the state co-operated in the terrItorial, moral' and religious
expansion that the empire witnessed In the 14th, 15th and 16th
centur ies.

in the 17th century the smooth relationship between

church and the monarchy or the Imperial authority passed
through a period of strain which grew progressively worse
until by the opening of the 19th century it was almost at a
breaking point. Thus one of the Issues that one has to
consider In respect of the church in the period under review
was the unsettled nature of its relationship with the state.

1. For a study of Menllek as a modernIzer see Chapter V of

my forthcoming monograph* Mej]eJJ_k_of__£tM_£p_[a» Heinemann,
(in the press).

2. The Abun (abuna when followed by a name) was the metro-

poi Itan of the Church; the jxhejje was the head of all
the monks.
3. The main source for this account of the state of the
church is Ignazio Guldl: "La Chiesa Abissina" Oriente
Moderno, Anno 11 (1922-1923), pp. 123-128, 186-190, 252-256.
ARTICLES 84,

During the first three quarters of the century

sporadic efforts were made to settle the differences between
church and monarchy; but whatever success attended these
efforts was short lived and In general the strained rela-
tions remained until the 1870s when a new and happier phase
In church-state relations opened.

The deterioration In the relations between church

and state in the 17th century was the result of the parti-
cipation of the monarchy in the dispute which ensued between
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Jesuit missionaries
who attempted to convert Ethiopia to Roman Catholicism,
During this dispute the emperors of the time sided with the
Jesuits, allowed themselves to be converted and proceeded
by means of royal edicts to abolish the age old practices of
the local orthodox church and substituted for them the pra-
ctices of the Roman Catholic Church. This threat to the
existence of the Orthodox Church was the cause of the reli-
gious civil war of the 17th century of which mention has
already been made earlier In these article. Although in the
end the monarchy gave In to the church and restored the tra-
ditional practices of the church, the role which the monarchy
had played had the effect of weakening the respect and the
confidence of the church for the monarchy and thereby strained
the otherwise smooth relations that had existed between those
two pillars of Ethiopian civilization.

The situation was aggravated in the 18th century

when the Gal la of the central plateau entered the court
and began to wield Influence over the policy of the emperors.
As was said earlier the Gal la were either pagan or muslfm;
in either case they did not,care a straw for those things
which the Ethiopian Church held dear. Or, at best they were
nominal Christians, In which case they were lukewarm in their
attachment to the orthodox church. In such a situation It
was only to be expected that conflict would develop between
the leaders of the church and those of the state not only on
purely religious matters but also on some Issues of a secular
nature. Moreover, by tradition the church expected political
leaders not merely to be members but even more Important to
be champions of the orthodox faith and to shape their actions
*and lives along lines that would meet the approval of the
ARTICLES 85.

church. From the 18th century onwards therefore these two

groups of leaders in the empire were, as It were, at each
other's throat with each group seeking to take advantage
of the difficulties of the other to further Its own course.
The Gal la guardians of the Imperial court df1ly-dalI led each
time the post of Abun fell vacant and a new Abun had to be
obtained from Egypt. And when after a long lapse an Abun
was obtained, usually through the Instrumentality of one or
the other of the Tigrean/Amhara provincial governors, the
imperial court treated the cleric in such a way as to make
it extremely difficult for him to carry out successfully the
functions of his office. The Abuns on their part naturally
sided with the Tigrean/Amhara governors in their efforts to
weaken and overthrow Gal la influence over Imperial policy.'

Another subject that needs to be considered relates

to the church itself and was centred on its domestic issues.
Such was the organization of the church that there was no
religious institution or body at the national level which had
the responsibility over doctrine. The highest ecclesiastical
figure in the country was the Abun, who was at this time
always a foreigner from Egypt, His rights and privileges
were considerable but his duties, especially the purely reli-
gious ones were circumscribed and limited to consecrating
bishops and crowning a new emperor. The organization of the
church was centred on the monasteries of which the most
important were those of Debra Libanos in Shoa (whose head
v/as always chosen as the ec_heqe) and Ewostethewos in Gojjam.
The teachings of the church were interpreted by the monks
in each of the monasteries; differences as regards inter-
pretation and emphasis could therefore easily arise as be-
tween two monasteries. The only institution which had the
power to resolve any such differences and re-establish or
enforce orthodoxy was the emperor and his court. But by
the middle of the 18th century the court was hardly In a
position to discharge this function; yet this was the time
when there were serious doctrinal differences between the
various monastic orders within the church, for the two
principal monastic parties had by this time s both fallen

1. M. Abir: Ethiopia: Era of the Princes, Longmans,

1968, pp.
ARTICLES 86.

away from the doctrine of Alexandria which was considered

orthodox in Ethiopia,

The doctrinal controversies dated back to the reli-

gious troubles of the early 17th century. By the opening of
the 19th century these controversies had crystallized around
two major issues - the number of births that Christ had and
the relationship between the three persons of the Trinity,
With the decline of the imperial authority, and against the
background of the conflict firstly between the church and the
monarchy, secondly between the various monastic parties as to
the orthodoxy of their own doctrines, and thirdly between the
various provincial chiefs for territorial as well as political
aggrandizement, the provincial chiefs took up the doctrine of
the principal monasteries in their domains and made it the
official doctrine in the territories under their control. The
result was that the church came to be divided against Itself
and as a unified national institution it simply ceased to
exist. Thus the decline of the state was paralleled by a
corresponding decline of the church.

In the iBkQs and again during the first half of the

reign of emperor Tewodros efforts were made to resolve the
doctrinal differences in the church and to establish a uniform
orthodox doctrine.' These efforts achieved very little success,
It was not until May J878 that the revitalized imperial
authority now in the hands of Yohannes IV was able to exercise
Its traditional powers in respect of the church and summoned
a council which resolved the doctrinal differences which had
plagued the church for more than two hundred years. There-
after the church was able to regain its unity, its spiritual
leadership and moral influence within the empire. As was the •••I
case with the state the church also witnessed a period of
decline and revival during the 19th century.

{, Ignazio Guidi, Art, eft.