IJPSS: Indonesian Journal of Peace and Security Studies e-ISSN: 2614-672X

Vol. 3 No. 1 Page 1-13, January - June 2021 p-ISSN: 2528-7559

Indonesia's Policy in Delaying the Ratification of Cooperation Agreement

on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP) 2006 – 2019

Achmad Ismail1
1
International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas
Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia
ismailachmad@rocketmail.com

ABSTRACT
Piracy and armed robbery are the real threat faced by each state, in particular, Indonesia as the
maritime (archipelagic) state. For facing Piracy and Armed Robbery, countries in Asia create
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
in Asia (ReCAAP). Unfortunately, Indonesia is not joining into that regional cooperation that
makes this phenomenon is very interesting to investigate. This article aims to identify systemic
factors, societal factors, governmental factors & idiosyncratic factors as factors of Indonesian
foreign policy to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional cooperation. The findings of this
article among others the existence of similar cooperation, the developing narrative in society,
the interaction and political dynamics between the government and the HoR, and the rational
choice of the president to determine Indonesia to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional
cooperation. This article uses a qualitative research method with a case study approach. Data
collection techniques in this article use literature study where is sourced from several kinds of
literature. This article concludes that the four factors above that influenced Indonesian policy did
not ratify the ReCAAP regional cooperation.

Keywords: Armed Robbery, Foreign Policy, Piracy, ReCAAP.

INTRODUCTION
Indonesian maritime security from piracy, illegal fishing, and armed robberies
are issues that must be considered by the Indonesian government because they
interfere with Indonesia's national interests. This is because Indonesia is a country with
a water area larger than the land area. In fact, according to the Indonesian Navy's
Hydrographic and Oceanographic Agency, Indonesia is a country that is located
between 2 continents (Asia and Australia), 2 oceans (Indian and Pacific), 17,504
islands, and an area of 7.9 million km², consisting of 1, 8 million km² of land area and
6.1 million km² of water area (EEZ area and territorial area), so about 77% of
Indonesia's territory is water territory (Dishodros TNI AL, 2004).
Indonesia's geographical condition is one of the absolute advantages to be
managed for Indonesia's interests, especially for trading activities. At least, according
to Pasoroan Herman Harianja (Chairman of the Indonesian Maritime Pilots
Association/INAMPA) that the country's economic potential from the maritime sector is
more than 1,300 trillion per year by looking at the potential of the area in the Malacca
Strait and 3 Arus Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI) and noting that there are 200 ships,
where crosses the strait every day with the breakdown of 15.2% of the world's oil
vessels (Pencawan & Kristianto, 2017). Countries in East Asia (Japan, South Korea,
China, and others) will always pass through the Malacca Strait or ALKI to trade with
countries in the African or Middle East region. This condition is very crucial for

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Indonesia in obtaining benefits so that its geographical conditions need to be utilized as

well as possible.
If we observe the geographical conditions and the great economic potential for
Indonesia, the geographical security of Indonesian waters is very important to fulfill its
national interests. In line with this, Connie Rahakundini Bakrie also explains that one of
the threats to the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia at the regional security level
is piracy (Bakrie, 2007). In 2009, the International Maritime Organization/IMO (2009)
received reports that there were 409 related reports about piracy & Armed Robbery at
sea, which in the previous year (in 2008) there was an increase of 106 incidents or
24.6 percent (IMO, 2009). In line with IMO, James Kraska explained that there was
also an increase recorded by the International Maritime Bureau/IMB, explaining that
there were almost 3,000 attempts from pirate attacks during 2000-2009 (Kraska, 2011).
In response to this challenge, in 2006, countries in the Asian region
collaborated to handle piracy and armed robbery called the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
An effort to eradicate this activity is considered important by observing that Asian
countries' export-import trade activities are highly dependent on increasingly significant
sea routes (ReCAAP, n.d.-a).
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was the first regional intergovernmental
cooperation to collaborate to promote increased resistance to piracy and armed
robbery of ships in Asia (ReCAAP, n.d.-b). There were at least 16 countries that signed
the text of this regional agreement. ReCAAP became the first treaty that specifically
aimed at eradicating piracy and armed robbery. Until April 2017, 20 countries have
joined the ReCAAP regional cooperation (ReCAAP, n.d.-b).
The role and activities of ReCAAP in the ReCAAP Agreement such as, firstly as
an information-sharing center (ISC) to promote close cooperation between the parties
in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery of ships, secondly increasing
the capacity of the parties to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery of ships,
thirdly promoting cooperation with other regional and international organizations
(government organizations and shipping associations) to share information and best
practices to enhance their networks to handle the piracy and armed robbery collectively
(ReCAAP, n.d.-b). After ReCAAP was officially formed, on December 4, 2006,
Indonesia's policy firmly postponed the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation
because it was against the sovereignty principle of 3 coastal states that secured the
Malacca Strait (Purwanto, 2006). Indonesia often participates in several seminars and
discussions organized by ReCAAP. However, after all this time, the discourse for
Indonesia to ratify the ReCAAP regional cooperation again emerged in 2016 from the
statement of Commission I member of the House of Representative (HoR), Charles
Honoris (Siregar, 2016). Until now, this discourse is still being rolled out by some
parties.
Based on these data, several assumptions are underlying the author's thoughts
that Indonesia should be included in ReCAAP membership, but Indonesia does not
participate in ReCAAP membership. First, Indonesia is an archipelago country
(Archipelagic State) where crime act (especially Piracy & Armed Robbery) in water
areas must be a major concern. Second, strategic values (both economic and security)

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should be used wisely for Indonesia's national interests. Therefore, the research
question raised by the author in this article is, "why Indonesia did not participate in
ReCAAP membership?"

LITERATURE REVIEW
Since 2000, which was the peak of piracy activity, ReCAAP has effectively and
significantly managed to overcome the number of attacks in the Southeast Asia region
(Aprilia, 2017; Hribernik, 2013). This can be seen from the problem-solving capacity,
increased collaborative cooperation, changes in member behavior, and optimal
technical achievements. The existence of ReCAAP can also be an ideal opportunity for
European countries to increase their influence in Southeast Asia and gain a foothold as
a security actor in the region (Hribernik, 2013).
Several articles discuss the reasons for Indonesia not actively participating or
delaying joining ReCAAP regional cooperation. There are non-material factors (history,
values, and norms) that cause Indonesia to participate in ReCAAP (Swastika, 2018). In
addition, the values and norms brought by ReCAAP were not in line with Indonesia, so
Indonesia decided to cooperate with the existing ones. For example, ReCAAP carries
the values of transparency, openness and so on which are contrary to the non-
intervention values espoused by Indonesia (Swastika, 2018).
Furthermore, ReCAAP regional cooperation has the potential to violate
Indonesia's sovereignty with various factors of consideration. For example, Indonesia
must permit ReCAAP member countries to use and pass through Indonesian waters for
the benefit of ReCAAP (A. R. Putra, 2017). Indonesia, which is not part of ReCAAP,
stands on the argument that there will be interference from other countries, especially
having to report data to other ReCAAP member countries. Of course, this makes
relations between countries complex, especially in the ASEAN region (Andyva &
Burhanuddin, 2018).
Arifin & Damanik explained that there were 3 reasons for Indonesia not to
participate in the ReCAAP collaboration. First, the condition of the Malacca Strait does
not require new cooperation, because there are already MALSINDO and EiS who will
coordinate sea patrols and air surveillance. Second, the representative of the
Indonesian Foreign Minister reasoned on his experience, in which Indonesia had
experienced a misinterpretation of data where there had been a piracy attack on the
IMB list in Malaysian territory belonging to Indonesia since the IMB reporting center
was in Malaysia. Third, the postponement of the ratification of the ReCAAP agreement
related to issues of sovereignty following Japan's growing intention to internationalize
the Malacca Strait (Arifin & Damanik, 2020).
The articles above explain several reasons for Indonesia's postpone ReCAAP
regional cooperation from various perspectives. However, there has been no article
addressing this issue through James Rosenau's concept of foreign policy.

RESEARCH METHOD
The research method in this article uses a qualitative research method with a
case study approach. Neuman states that case study research intensively investigates
one or a small group of cases, focusing on many details in each case and context

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(Neuman, 2014). In this article, the author focuses on the case of Indonesian policies
that postpone the ratification of the ReCAAP agreement, especially in 2006 – 2019.
In the first phase of this article, the authors collected some secondary literature
related to Indonesia's policy towards ReCAAP from books, scientific journals,
documents, and articles from related online media. The data obtained will be forward
through processing, the data classification process until it continues into the
triangulation process. Triangulation is one source of data collection techniques for
compiling data from different factors using the same technique (Sugiyono, 2012). This
process aims to ensure the validity and reliability of the data, which leads to in-depth
analysis.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To answer the reason why Indonesia has postponed the ratification of ReCAAP
regional cooperation is foreign policy. By definition, foreign policy is a strategy that can
be taken by governments in determining their actions in the international world
(Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2014). This article draws on James Rosenau's concept of
foreign policy. James Rosenau explained in more detail also divided it into 4 major
input factors that became influences, such as (Rosenau, 1976):
First, First, systemic factors are a factor from the external environment of a
country, such as the structure of relations between developed countries, patterns of
alliances formed between countries, and situational factors. On the other hand,
international values and norms, opinions of other actors are also important to be
notified (Setiawan & Yani, 2019). In this context, if a country already has cooperation in
certain fields, it will be a consideration when that country undertakes similar
cooperation with other parties.
Second, societal factors, which are a factor that come from the internal
environment, including cultural and historical factors, economic development, and
social structures also public opinion. For societal factor focuses more on the narratives
that are built-in society (public opinion). Of course, this can be started from some
statements from experts who understand the issue.
Third, governmental factors are a factor that describes politics and structures in
government. In terms of governmental factors, the dynamics between the government
and the HoR on an issue. When the two agree, it will be easy to achieve it, and vice
versa when they agree, there will be political lobbies that must be carried out.
Fourth, idiosyncratic factors are an internal factor of a policymaker/political elite
by looking at experience, education, personality, and other factors in the life of political
elites. No less important when looking at the idiosyncratic factor of a president. It can
be seen when his education, experience, personality, and even the rational choice of
the president is also determined. Therefore, this article analyzes the reasons why
Indonesia, as a unit of analysis, postponed the ratification of ReCAAP regional
cooperation using the 4 factors described above as an analytical tool.

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RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This section of the article will be divided into 4 sub-discussions, of which the 4
sub-discussions are the 4 factors that determine foreign policy according to James
Rosenau. First, systemic factor: similar cooperation. The existence of similar
cooperation which has been ratified by Indonesia makes it overlap so that the
cooperation is ineffective. Second, societal factor: community participation. The
narratives that develop in society so that the government is careful in deciding to
postpone or ratify ReCAAP regional cooperation are the determining factors for foreign
policy. Third, governmental factor: participation of government and HoR. Describe the
interactions or dynamics developed between the government and the HoR to postpone
the ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation. Fourth, idiosyncratic factor: The
Rational Choice of the President. Educational background, family, experience, and
personal political tendencies will determine the policy to postpone the ratification of
ReCAAP regional cooperation.

SYSTEMIC FACTOR: INDONESIA’S SIMILAR COOPERATION

The international/regional (external) environment is one of the important
elements in a foreign policy process. Rosenau said this is a systemic source, in brief, is
the external/international environmental condition. Webber and Smith also analyze that
the international domain is a challenge or an advantage to produce a more profitable
foreign policy (Webber & Smith, 2002).
If examined more deeply, the systemic factor explains that Indonesia has
ratified similar cooperation related to securing the territorial waters of piracy and armed
robbery which causes the cooperation to overlap and be ineffective. For example, the
International Maritime Organization and International Maritime Bureau & Littoral State
cooperation. It is in line with the statement of the Minister of Defense, Juwono
Sudarsono, who stated that Indonesia could still share information with the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in Kuala Lumpur and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in London if many agencies or parties participated, it would add
complexity at the end, it needs to negotiate again so that it becomes ineffective and
inefficient (Purwanto, 2006). This is one of the reasons Indonesia’s foreign policy has
not ratified the ReCAAP regional cooperation. This condition is similar to the opinion of
James Fearon who argues that countries must be rational in seeking their goals and
consider what other countries are doing (or will do) concern for their international
environment (systemic/international environment) (Fearon, 1998). Therefore, one of the
considerations in taking a foreign policy is the international constellation faced by a
country.
As an effort to find the right answer, the existence and cooperation that carried
out by Indonesia against IMO are already in advance. The International Maritime
Organization (IMO) was established with its initial name as the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) in 1958. On its official website, there are
several work programs in various fields, including maritime safety, marine environment,
human elements, technical cooperation, maritime security, legal affairs, facilitation,
conference, communication & outreach, member state audit scheme & implementation
support (IMO, n.d.-a).

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The maritime security field is one of the fields in which it regulates piracy and
armed robbery against ships. That action started in 2002 when the incidence of piracy
and armed robbery were increased. IMO is also doing cooperation with regional
cooperation in related fields, namely ReCAAP. IMO also issued several resolutions as
a guide in decreasing piracy and armed robbery, one of which is by establishing IMO's
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), which aims to highlight adequate self-protection as
the most appropriate prevention for acts or attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery
(IMO, n.d.-c). To provide effectiveness in eradicating piracy and armed robbery, IMO
MSC issued investigative guidelines that listed in MSC.1/Circ.1404 and resolution
A.1025 which regulate the existence of coastal state legislation, investigator training,
investigative strategies, protection from crime, and so on (IMO, n.d.-b).
Not only IMO, but also Indonesia has cooperated with the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) for a long time. IMB, which is a special division of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has the objective to act as a focal point in fighting all
types of crimes and maritime malpractice. IMO resolution A 504 aims to urge the
government, all interests, and organizations to cooperate and exchange information
with each other and the IMB to maintain and develop coordinated action in combating
maritime fraud (IMB, n.d.-b). Therefore, the organization that was founded in 1981 can
be said to have the main task of IMB is to protect the integrity of international trade by
looking for fraud and malpractice. One of the IMB's main areas of expertise is in
suppressing piracy. Concerned with the development of this alarming phenomenon,
this led to the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Center in 1992 (IMB, n.d.-b). This
information center is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It organizes travel on world
shipping lanes, reports pirate attacks to local law enforcement and issues alerts about
piracy hotspots.
In 1992, the IMB Piracy Reporting Center (IMB PRC) in work 24 hours as the
main contact for ships attacked by piracy and armed robberies which were collected
and followed up on patrol boats, even providing a danger signal pattern for colleagues,
besides, information received is also disseminated to IMO, government, IGOs and
related law enforcement agencies, as well as the funding made by IMB, is in the form
of donations which is a reflection of trust in the work of IMB (IMB, n.d.-a). As the result,
the patrol cooperation between the IMB and the Indonesian marine police has shown
positive results by maximizing data sources and providing the best protection to ships.
The IMB report for the year (2017) lists several incidents in a row, at least 79 incidents
in 2013, 29 incidents in 2014, 56 incidents in 2015, and 26 incidents in 2016.
Besides IMO and IMB, Indonesia also has cooperation, namely Littoral State
(Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia). Indonesia still respects the sovereignty of the 3
coastal countries where Indonesia believes that the cooperation of the 3 coastal states
is still capable and responsible for securing the territorial waters of the 3 countries,
especially the Malacca Strait. As a statement from the Director-General of Defense
Strategy of the Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. Dadi Susanto, who argued that, if the
ISC (Information Sharing Center) ReCAAP was intended only to secure the Malacca
Strait under Japanese control, it would also disrespect the sovereignty of the three
coastal nations, especially if the patrols were already underway maximum, so there is
no need for control from countries outside the 3 coastal countries (Priyambodo, 2006).
Therefore, it is worried in which this ReCAAP regional cooperation will be more

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dominated by the presence of Japan as an initiator or it can be called an extension of

the Japanese power, even resulting in concerns that Indonesia will be dictated by
Japan if Indonesia joins ReCAAP. Besides, efforts to cooperate in regional maritime
security in Southeast Asia, especially the Strait of Malacca, should be initiated by
Southeast Asian countries, not by other countries (A. R. Putra, 2017).
Starting from the ministerial-level meeting in October and November 1971,
produced a joint statement explaining that the responsibility for the security of the
Malacca Strait and its surroundings is the responsibility of the three coastal states. This
also strengthened by the cooperation of the Indo-Sin Coordinated Patrol (ISCP),
Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol (IMCP), and the ratification of the Terms of
Reference of The Malacca Straits Patrol Joint Coordinating Committee (TOR MSP
JCC) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Malacca Strait security operations
in 2006 in Batam. Several steps of patrol cooperation are carried out effectively and
regularly, including, Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol, Indonesia-Singapore
Coordinated Patrol, Indonesia-Thailand Coordinated Patrol, Indonesia-India
Coordinated Patrol, Malindo Optima Coordinated Patrol, Joint Maritime Air Patrol
Operation Eye in The Sky (EiS), and the Malacca Straits Patrol Intelligence Exchange
Group (MSP-IEG) also build a cooperative mechanism between the littoral state and
the user state for cooperative cooperation and participate in maintaining and improving
navigation safety and the security of the Malacca Strait and its surroundings.
Several parties from overseas are still waiting for Indonesia's participation in the
regional cooperation for ReCAAP. Sean Moon, the assistant secretary's senior adviser
to the US Department of Homeland Security's border, immigration and trade policy
office, said that if Indonesia joined ReCAAP and coordinated with this multilateral
agreement and the IMB, it would have greater coordinated patrols and gained better
assets, better awareness, better targeting capacity and that would drive the piracy rate
down (Yosephine, 2016). However, with the presence of IMO, IMB, and littoral state
cooperation as systemic factors that have existed before ReCAAP with the same focus,
namely overcoming piracy and armed robbery, it is one of the considerations for the
Indonesian government not to ratify ReCAAP itself.
Another reason, Bradford (2004) and Sato (2007) igive attention to the
importance of calculating aggregate costs and benefits in informing Indonesian non-
cooperation in ReCAAP and They claim that Indonesia did not join ReCAAP because
of the low benefits perceived and high costs of cooperation (Febrica, 2014). Indonesia
does not cooperate on ReCAAP because the aggregate incentives to cooperate are
low. This is similar to Rosenau's statement, which states that, for systemic variables,
this includes non-human aspects of the external environment of society or actions that
occur abroad that influence the choices made by officials (Rosenau, 2006).
Geographical realities and external dynamics (such as similar maritime cooperation,
such as IMB, IMO, littoral state, ASEAN Maritime Forum, and so on) are clear
examples of systemic variables that can shape decisions and actions of Indonesian
foreign policy officials not to ratify ReCAAP.

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SOCIETAL FACTOR: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

This section will explain the existence of narratives that have developed in the
community to be careful about ratifying any cooperation, including delaying the
ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation. It is feared that this will be detrimental
to Indonesia's interests because of overlapping cooperation so that it becomes
ineffective and inefficient.
This variable generally consists of the non-governmental aspects of a society
that influence its external behavior, for example, the main value orientation of a society,
the level of national unity is just a few of the societal variables that can contribute to a
country's foreign policy and aspirations (Rosenau, 2006). Until then, all discussions that
develop in society transform into bigger and bigger public opinion. The expectations of
the public and academics as input for the Indonesian government about foreign policy
have not ratified the ReCAAP collaboration.
Several suggestions or criticisms were voice so that Indonesia would not ratify
any kind of cooperation, including ReCAAP. Mardjono Reksodiputro, Professor of the
Law University of Indonesia, reminded the government to be careful in adopting
international/regional cooperation or provision. He was also worried that the ratification
not considered first, would harm the interests of the state (Razak, 2008). In line with
Mardjono, another professor of law focusing on international law, Hikmahanto Juwana,
said that, in declaring its participation in regional cooperation, international
conventions, and so on for ratification, Indonesia must be careful but not too afraid and
remain to open the dynamics of international law. He also added that there are at least
four requirements that must be taken into consideration in carrying out ratification, first,
whether the international instrument can be adopted by national law, second, it must be
measured the government's commitment if the ratification is signing (especially
regarding financial support), third, it must be measured whether the Indonesian law
enforcement system has been running well or not, fourth, what is the next
implementation (particularly regarding reporting and monitoring), without these four
requirements, the ratification will be ineffective (Ali, 2014). This is what the Indonesian
government hopes as an important source to create a foreign policy in terms of
ratification of international agreements or cooperation, particularly ReCAAP and others.
Many existing factors were spreading into the public sphere to form public
opinion rapidly. Many opinions that develop in society in looking at an issue cannot be
separate from a thing that can be the source, especially history, experience, culture,
and other factors. If you look at its history, Indonesia has often ratified international
agreements or cooperation. Former Indonesian diplomat as well as international law
expertise, Harry P. Haryono, stated that Indonesia has indeed ratified too many
international conventions also he is aware that this habit has started since the era of
President BJ Habibie (Ali, 2014). This has become consistent with the fact that every
decision-making mind is a microcosm from the diversity that may occur in a society, he
also adds that culture, history, geography, economy, political institutions, ideology,
demography, and countless other factors forming societal context/sources where
decision-makers operate (Hudson, 2005).
So that, the societal factor that develops in the community becomes another
important source. It is also a reminder for the Indonesian government to issue a policy
of postponing the ReCAAP regional cooperation with the consideration that the

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government should be careful in the signing of international agreements/cooperation.

Other than that, the government must examine the challenges and benefits for
Indonesia's national interest and not harmful to Indonesia's national interests.

GOVERNMENTAL FACTOR: PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT AND HoR

There will always be mechanisms (especially politics/government) which a
policy is to publish (through a statement/legal product). In this context, the existence of
political dynamics & political interactions through meetings to become a legal product
between the executive and legislative in Indonesia is a step that must be a pass as one
of the factors of foreign policy. This shows that not only are the international
constellations the source but also domestic dynamics are an important source as well,
as James Fearon argues that IR experts have been thinking about whether and how to
integrate domestic and international (or systemic) analysis (Fearon, 1998).
Furthermore, in a meeting between Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono and
Commission I HoR RI, it was discussed about regional cooperation with ReCAAP and
Indonesia did not join. After the meeting, Juwono Sudarsono said that Indonesia had
not insisted on taking part in this cooperation, because currently there were
coordinated patrols between Indonesia and Malaysia (Detiknews, 2006). Furthermore,
that Indonesia had previously joined IMO and IMB.
The existence of overlapping with the principle of the sovereignty of the three
coastal states that secure the Malacca Strait has made Indonesia not yet join in
ReCAAP regional cooperation. In line with Juwono Sudarsono, Director General of
Defense Strategy of the Ministry of Defense (Dirjen Strahan Dephan), Maj. Gen. TNI
Dadi Susanto added that if regional cooperation aims to secure Asian seas from piracy
and armed robbery, why should an Information Sharing Center (ISC) be placed in
Singapore, which is also fully sovereign to secure its territory in the Malacca Strait
(Priyambodo, 2006). This is interesting because when ISC was in Singapore, all data
related to Indonesian territorial waters would be used by Singapore for its benefit.
Furthermore, ReCAAP does not have the ability or resources to ensure the accuracy of
the reports received by ISC. This is due to ReCAAP only accepts reports from ships
that are victims of piracy & armed robbery without checking the situation directly, thus
leading to errors in information/data. On the other hand, indirectly, Singapore also gets
benefits from the establishment of ISC in its territory for Singapore’s national interest
with direct access while Indonesia gives its “data sovereignty” to other parties.
On the other hand, there are internal Indonesian parties who want Indonesia to
join ReCAAP. Member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Commission I,
Charles Honoris, argues that Indonesia needs to ratify international conventions in
handling armed piracy to create a joint commitment to prevent, deter, arrest and punish
perpetrators of piracy crimes and establish a joint information center (L. M. Putra,
2016). However, this was not strong enough to become the basis for Indonesia to join
ReCAAP. There are large costs incurred by Indonesia when joining ReCAAP, as stated
by Bradford and Sato Indonesia did not join ReCAAP because of the low benefits and
the high cost of cooperation. In addition, regarding information sharing, Minister
Juwono Sudarsono assumed that referring to the exchange of information between the
three coastal countries and eleven ReCAAP member countries, he considered that it
would cause overlapping information due to the large number of parties involved.

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IDIOSYNCRATIC FACTOR: RATIONAL CHOICE OF PRESIDENT

The president's educational background, family, experience, and political
tendencies make the president determine his rational choice for the national interest.
John Lovell adds that individual decision-makers conceptualize the foreign policy
situation as influenced by many factors, including the surrounding culture, the role of
policy-making actors, and in some time concentrated on the influence of personality in
individual behavior (Lovell, 1970). In addition, Umar Suryadi Bakry states that foreign
policy decision-makers are often influenced by personal experience, mental and
physical health, and so on (Bakry, 2016).
Sourced from Lovell that the surrounding culture, especially family is one of
idiosyncratic, so it is in line with the cultural background of President SBY who was
educated in a disciplined manner by his father, a soldier. Even SBY thinks his father
(Sekotjo) is his idol, his father is a soldier, so in his simple household, he thinks his
father is a hero (Maeswara, 2009). SBY also has a strong personality, responsibility,
and intellect he acquired during his military education. This is also similar to the
statement of Jerrold Post, where the admiration of a leader at a role mentor takes a
very large part and there is a tendency for similarities in the form of policies taken with
his role mentor (Post, 2006). Biographical notes are a clearer and more complete
separate source because what is written is a description of a person's life and more
complex, there is more in-depth research in the biography. The firmness, wisdom, and
good calculation of SBY that comes from his family, especially his father, has made
SBY firmly take several foreign policies. It is felt that there have been several similar
collaborations, huge costs, and several other considerations for not joining ReCAAP
regional cooperation.
The next president is Joko Widodo. The conditions of Jokowi's family at that
time forced Jokowi to be simple, diligent, hard-working, and firm, which is reflected in
his personality until now. This was proved when Jokowi was firm with Malaysia
regarding the Ambalat issue by maintaining sovereignty and not being compromised
(Armenia, 2015). In this context, Jerrold M. Post says these are core attitudes, which
are an explanation of the basic behavior of a leader in responding to political events
into a political decision or policy, where the basic behavior can come from
psychological conditions that are influenced by nature, habits and environmental
conditions that have been formed since childhood, they can also be influenced by the
inherited nature of the family tree, then influenced by patterns of upbringing and
parental ambition for one's future (Post, 2006).
Especially in this context the policy not to ratify ReCAAP, even though there are
some parties to persuade Indonesia to join ReCAAP regional cooperation. Its high
nationalist spirit has made Indonesia does not ratify ReCAAP because other national
interests are bigger with the assumption that if joining ReCAAP costs a lot, there is
information that overlaps with other similar cooperations.

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CONCLUSION
This article answers that there are several reasons for Indonesia's postpone to
ratify in the regional cooperation of ReCAAP. The ratification of the IMO, IMB and
littoral state cooperation has made Indonesia postpone the ratification of the RECAAP
regional cooperation because it has the same goal. It is feared that there will be
overlapping of information and it will become ineffective and inefficient, one of which is
in terms of cost, which becomes a systemic factor. Some narratives in the community
argue that the government has to postpone the ratification of ReCAAP regional
cooperation because it makes this cooperation ineffective, inefficient, and sacrifices
national interests to become a societal factor. However, the government also need not
be afraid to ratify other collaborations.
In addition, the dynamics and political interactions that occur between the
government and the HoR through meetings must be passed before ratifying the
cooperation which results in delaying the ratification of the ReCAAP regional
cooperation because there have been several similar collaborations. These political
dynamics and interactions become governmental factors. Idiosyncratic factors, namely
educational background, family, experiences, etc. President SBY and Jokowi instilled a
high sense of nationalism since childhood. This convinced them to postpone the
ratification of the ReCAAP regional cooperation seeing that the losses received
outweighed the benefits for Indonesia.

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