Case Digest Envi 1

CASE SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Contents
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES.................................................................................................................................................... 2
Paje v. Casiño........................................................................................................................................................................ 2
Arigo v. Swift........................................................................................................................................................................... 5
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri BioTech Application (ISAAA) v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia.......................8
Segovia v. The Climate Change Commission....................................................................................................................... 11
LNL Archipelago Minerals Inc. V. Agham Partylist................................................................................................................ 12
Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait Protected Seascape v. Secretary Reyes..........................................................14
Boracay Foundation v. The Province of Aklan...................................................................................................................... 19
Republic v. Pagadian City Timber......................................................................................................................................... 21
WestTower Condominium v. First Philipine Industrial Corp.................................................................................................. 23
DENR v. Mayor Yap............................................................................................................................................................. 25
Torrecampo v. MWSS.......................................................................................................................................................... 27
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan....................................................................................................................................................... 28
Republic v. Ballocanag......................................................................................................................................................... 30
Osmeña v. Garganera.......................................................................................................................................................... 31
KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO.................................................................................................................................................. 32
TANADA v. ANGARA........................................................................................................................................................... 33
Momonga v. Omipon............................................................................................................................................................ 34
OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Paje v. Casiño
G.R. 207257, Feb. 3, 2015
Topic:
Coal-fired thermal power plant in Subic;
Writ of Kalikasan
Doctrine:
Writ of Kalikasan
 The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by
the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in
particular, the individual's right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
 Section 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
 Requisites:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
 Reliefs:
Section 15. Judgment. — Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners.
 To be entitled to the Writ of Kalikasan, there must be a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects or irregularities (in the issuance of an ECC) and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
 Environmental Impact System – (part of PD 1151, Philippine Environment Policy) - In every action, project or
undertaking, which significantly affects the quality of the environment, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms, and
entities were required to prepare, file and include a statement (i.e., Environmental Impact Statement or EIS) containing:

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with the maintenance
and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a finding must be made that such
use and commitment are warranted.
 Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS) - The PEISS is "a systems-oriented and integrated
approach to the EIS system to ensure a rational balance between socio-economic development and environmental
protection for the benefit of present and future generations." The ECC requirement is mandated under Section 4
thereof:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. — The President of
the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally
critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The PEISS consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, which is mandatory for private or public
projects that may significantly affect the quality of the environment. It involves evaluating and predicting the likely
impacts of the project on the environment, designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the community's welfare.
 Environmental Compliance Certificate v. Certificate of Non-Coverage - PD 1586 was implemented by DAO 2003-30
which, in turn, set up a system or procedure to determine when a project is required to secure an ECC and when it is
not. When an ECC is not required, the project proponent procures a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC). As part of the
EIA process, the project proponent is required to submit certain studies or reports (i.e., EIA document type) to the
DENR-EMB, which will be used in the review process in assessing the environmental impact of the project and the
adequacy of the corresponding environmental management plan or program to address such environmental impact.
This will then be part of the bases to grant or deny the application for an ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
Facts:
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable
and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP). Later TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated
July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
SBMA and RP Energy entered into another MOU, whereby RP Energy undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. It
identified the land at Sitio Naglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for the project and
another site of to be used as an ash pond.
On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-square
meter parcel of land to be used for building and operating the coal-fired power plant..
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-
fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the amended the ECC for 1 x 300-MW coal-fired power plant.

On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales and the Liga Ng Mga Barangay of Olongapo City issued
Resolutions opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales.
On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, et al filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon.
Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR.
The Court of Appeals denied the Writ of Kalikasan but invalited the ECC and Lease Development Agreement.
Thus, this appeal.
The Casiño Group argues that

 the construction and operation of the power plant will result water and air pollution which will
adversely affect the residents of the Provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
 the ECC was issued in violation of (1) the DENR rules on the issuance and amendment of an ECC,
particularly, DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-30 (Revised
Manual), (2) Section 59 of the IPRA Law, and (3) Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC. In addition, it
claims that the LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy violated Section 59 of the IPRA
Law.
The DENR argued that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a
Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.
RP Energy argued that since the CA denied that writ of Kalikasan, it has no power to grant the reliefs prayed for in the
Petition. And even if it does, the reliefs are limited to those enumerated in Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases and that the phrase "such other reliefs" in paragraph (e) should be limited only to those of the
same class or general nature as the four other reliefs enumerated.
Issues:
Whether the validity of ECC be challenge by a Writ of Kalikasan?
Whether the issuance of ECC in violation of other laws (IPRA and LGC) be subject to the Writ of Kalikasan?
Rulings:
Yes. The ECC can be challenged by a Writ of Kalikasan, subject to certain qualifications (the causal link of the defect to the
environmental damage).
As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not
only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection
between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed
outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC, which could conceivably warrant the granting of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there are serious and substantial misrepresentations or fraud in
the application for the ECC, which, if not immediately nullified, would cause actual negative environmental impacts of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules, because the government agencies and LGUs, with the final authority to implement the
project, may subsequently rely on such substantially defective or fraudulent ECC in approving the implementation of the project.
To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC, it is not sufficient to merely allege such defects or
irregularities, but to show a causal link or reasonable connection with the environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules. In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the

aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC. This
would have been sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of such issues in a writ of kalikasan case.
The Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. The evidence it presented is inadequate to
establish the factual bases of its claims.
NO. The issuance of the ECC which violated the IPRA Law and LGC and that the LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA Law, is not
within the coverage of the writ of kalikasan because, assuming there was non-compliance therewith, no reasonable connection
can be made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules.
To elaborate, the alleged lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians over the subject project would not lead to or is not
reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an affront to the local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the
alleged lack of a certificate precondition that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain would not result in or is
not reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the right of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains. These alleged violations could be the subject of
appropriate remedies before the proper administrative bodies (like the NCIP) or a separate action to compel compliance before
the courts, as the case may be. However, the writ of kalikasan would not be the appropriate remedy to address and resolve such
issues.
Arigo v. Swift
G.R. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014
Topic
Tubbataha reef
Doctrine:
 Concept of intergenerational responsibility – the locus standi of minors to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
(generations yet unborn).
 Writ of Kalikasan can be filed separately from criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law (Section 17, Rule 7 of Rules).
o The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization,
non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
o Reliefs from the judgment of the Writ of Kalikasan:
o SEC. 15. Judgment. — Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the
court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
o The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make
periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages
to individual petitioners.
 Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)|||

o A TEPO is an order which either directs or enjoins a person or government agency to perform or refrain from
a certain act, for the purpose of protecting, preserving, and/or rehabilitating the environment. The crucial
elements in its issuance are the presence of "extreme urgency" and "grave injustice and irreparable injury" to
the applicant.
o SEC. 8. Issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). — If it appears from the verified
complaint with a prayer for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) that the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of the
multiple-sala court before raffle or the presiding judge of a single-sala court as the case may be, may
issue ex parte a TEPO effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from date of the receipt of the TEPO by the
party or person enjoined. Within said period, the court where the case is assigned, shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the TEPO may be extended until the termination of the case.
o The court where the case is assigned, shall periodically monitor the existence of acts that are the subject
matter of the TEPO even if issued by the executive judge, and may lift the same at any time as
circumstances may warrant.
o The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for the issuance of a TEPO.
Facts:
Parties
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
V.
Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet et al. and "Philippine respondents." (AFP, Navy,
DENR, etc).
Incident
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US
Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of
the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty." On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief
stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls — the north atoll and the south atoll — and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a
smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are
considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.
 declared a National Marine Park in 1988 by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988.
 inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site in 1993,
 Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha
Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement. Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) on February, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del

Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." By March 30,
2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 17, 2013, ARIGO on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th
Fleet.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and
criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Petitioners prayed that

 immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of
Kalikasan xx order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the
Guardian grounding incident.
 Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and equitable under
the premises.
Issues:
Whether the PH can sue US for environmental damage which not a signatory of UNCLOS?
Whether the TEPO and Writ of Kalikasan should be granted to cease and desist over the Guardian grounding and for just and
equitable environmental rehabilitation measures?

Rulings:
YES. Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-
time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less
can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive
for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197.
 In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said
treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter's
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
NO. We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from
this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine
habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
 Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to
wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment. — Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and
discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is
closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of
rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the
following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute
resolution methods are encouraged by the court
Separate Opinion: Carpio, J.
A petition for a writ of kalikasan is a wrong remedy.
The writ of kalikasan is a remedy that covers environmental damages the magnitude of which transcends both political and
territorial boundaries. It specifically provides that the prejudice to life, health, or property caused by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official, public employee, or a private individual or entity must be felt in at least two cities or provinces. 61 The petition
for its issuance may be filed on behalf of those whose right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, provided that the
group or organization which seeks to represent is duly accredited.
Two things must be examined:

first, whether petitioners are qualified to bring this suit under the requirements of the provisions; and
second, whether there are actual injured parties being represented.
Petitioners satisfy the first requirement as they comprise both natural persons and groups duly recognized by the government. It
is doubtful, however, whether there are actual injured parties being represented. As discussed previously, a citizen's suit on an
environmental issue must be resorted to responsibly.
A petition for a writ of kalikasan is a wrong remedy.
A TEPO is an order which either directs or enjoins a person or government agency to perform or refrain from a
certain act, for the purpose of protecting, preserving, and/or rehabilitating the environment. 82 The crucial elements in its
issuance are the presence of "extreme urgency" and "grave injustice and irreparable injury" to the applicant. 83
Petitioners hinge the basis for this prayer on the salvage operations conducted immediately after the incident. The
remedy is no longer available considering that all activities to remove the grounded USS Guardian have been
concluded. 84 Furthermore, the Notice to Mariners No. 011-2013 issued by the Philippine Coast Guard on January 29, 2013
effectively set the metes and bounds of the damaged area. 85 This notice also prohibited "leisure trips to Tubbataha" and
advised "all watercrafts transitting the vicinity to take precautionary measures."
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri BioTech Application (ISAAA) v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia
G.R. 209271, July 26, 2016

Topic:
Bio-engineered eggplants (Bt Talong); Precautionary principle
Doctrine:
 Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
 All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to undertake activities or
projects which will affect the quality of the environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.
 Precautionary Principle –
o Under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, in order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
o Section 1, Rule 20 – Applicability. — When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary
principle in resolving the case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
o Section 2, Rule 20 - Standards for application. — In applying the precautionary principle, the following
factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or
future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental
rights of those affected.
o For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last resort,
where application of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for the
environmental plaintiff — (a) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; (b) settings in which harm
might be irreversible and what is lost is irreplaceable; and (c) settings in which the harm that might result
would be serious. When these features — uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the
possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. When in
doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of the strongest fora in which the precautionary principle may
find applicability.
 The precautionary principle applies when the following conditions are met:
o there exist considerable scientific uncertainties;
o there exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are scientifically reasonable (that is based on
some scientifically plausible reasoning);
o uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without at the same time increasing ignorance of other
relevant factors by higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
o the potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for present or future generations or
otherwise morally unacceptable;
o there is a need to act now, since effective counteraction later will be made significantly more difficult or
costly at any later time.
Facts:
On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) was executed between UPLBFI, ISAAA and UP Mindanao
Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on eggplants that are resistant to
the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies involved in the project were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding,
Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II
(ABSPII) of USAID.
As indicated in the Field Trial Proposal submitted by the implementing institution (UPLB), the pest-resistant crop subject of the
field trial was described as a "bioengineered eggplant." The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
were incorporated into the eggplant (talong) genome to produce the protein Cry1Ac which is toxic to the target insect pests.
Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive
insect pest of eggplant.

Under the regulatory supervision of NCBP, a contained experiment was started in 2007 and officially completed on March 3,
2009. The NCBP thus issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment stating that "During the conduct of the
experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with and no untoward incident has occurred."
BPI issued Biosafety Permits to UPLB on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010. Thereafter, field testing of Bt talong commenced
on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur;
Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et al.) filed a petition for WRIT OF KALIKASAN
and WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS with prayer for the issuance of a TEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ORDER (TEPO).
They alleged that the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology. Greenpeace, et al.
further claimed that the Bt talong field test project did not comply with the required public consultation under Sections 26 & 27 of
the Local Government Code.
Greenpeace, et al. argued that this case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, the Bt talong field testing being a
classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health, environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient or
uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous
effects on human health and the environment.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)/BPI/Fertilizer
and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and UPLB.
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI and UPMFI filed their respective verified returns. They all argued that
 the issuance of writ of kalikasan is not proper because in the implementation of the Bt talong project, all environmental
laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected communities, to ensure that the people's right to
a balanced and healthful ecology was protected and respected.
 the precautionary principle is not applicable considering that the field testing is only a part of a continuing study being
done to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative impact on the environment. There is thus no
resulting environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or
Issues:
Whether the precautionary principle should be applied to bio-engineered eggplants?

Rulings:
Yes. The precautionary principle should be applied to bio-engineering eggplants.
Precautionary Principle –
 Under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
 Section 1, Rule 20 – Applicability. — When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit
of the doubt.
 Section 2, Rule 20 - Standards for application. — In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors,
among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations;
or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.

 For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last resort, where
application of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for the environmental plaintiff —
(a) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; (b) settings in which harm might be irreversible and what is
lost is irreplaceable; and (c) settings in which the harm that might result would be serious. When these features —
uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the
precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of the strongest fora in which the
precautionary principle may find applicability.
Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO research worldwide, the Court finds all the three
conditions present in this case — uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and the possibility of serious harm.
Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by small-scale farmers, majority of whom are poor and
marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies revealed
uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the environment associated with
use of GE technology in agriculture, and serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country
like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and
irreversible.
Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages of risk assessment and public
consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the EIS requirements to GMO field testing, are compelling reasons
for the application of the precautionary principle. There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once
the Bt eggplants are consumed as food. Adopting the precautionary approach, the Court rules that the principles of the NBF
need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned departments and agencies before allowing the
release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant. The more prudent course is to immediately enjoin the Bt talong
field trials and approval for its propagation or commercialization until the said government offices shall have performed their
respective mandates to implement the NBF.
Segovia v. The Climate Change Commission

G.R. 211010, March 7, 2017
Topic:
Writ of Kalikasan for Road Sharing Principle
Doctrine:
 WRIT OF KALIKASAN, requisites
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
 A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was
violated or would be violated.
 WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS –
o When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
o unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
 which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
 in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right
therein,
o or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right
o and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
o the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty,
attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or
regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts

until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
Facts:
This is a petition for the issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of the following
environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act);
Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO 254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2007 (AO 171). In gist,
petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued
degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the
government without due process of law. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assert that petitioners are not
entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission;
stating the environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause
environmental damage.
Issues:
Whether a Writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should be issued.

Rulings:
NO. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation
was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and
healthful ecology. Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot be issued.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the
official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking
to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk
and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or
executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the
continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the
exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is
best implemented. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
LNL Archipelago Minerals Inc. V. Agham Partylist

G.R. 209165, April 12, 2016
Topic
 Leveling of mountain in Zambales
 Illegal Cutting of trees (Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code_
 Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act
Doctrine:
 WRIT OF KALIKASAN – The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any

government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
o The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy,
covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available against an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or private individual or entity.
o The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises
from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the
actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
 Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:
o Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty,
be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
o There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705:
1. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
2. Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.
 Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act state:
o Section 57. Expenditure for Community Development and Science and Mining Technology – A contractor
shall assist in the development of its mining community, the promotion of the general welfare of its
inhabitants, and the development of science and mining technology.
o Section 69. Environmental Protection – Every contractor shall undertake an environmental protection and
enhancement program covering the period of the mineral agreement or permit. Such environmental program
shall be incorporated in the work program which the contractor or permittee shall submit as an accompanying
document to the application for a mineral agreement or permit. The work program shall include not only plans
relative to mining operations but also to rehabilitation, regeneration, revegetation and reforestation of
mineralized areas, slope stabilization of mined-out and tailings covered areas, aquaculture, watershed
development and water conservation; and socioeconomic development.
Facts:
LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. It embarked on a project
to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. It is about 25 kilometers away from the mine site.
In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, cited two laws which LAMI allegedly violated: (1) Section 68 of
the Revised Forestry Code, as amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act. It alleged the LAMI were
cutting trees without permits in violation of the Revised Forestry Code, and it was leveling the mountain to be used for

reclamation of their port in violation of the Philippine Mining Act. It further alleged that the acts of LAMI resulted environmental
damage to the inhabitants in Zambales and Pangasinan. Agham though failed to provide proof of the existence of the mountain
scrapped by LAMI.
LAMI argued that:

(1) LAMI had the necessary permits and authorization to cut trees in the port site; (2) LAMI had the necessary permits to
construct its port; (3) LAMI consulted with and obtained the support of the Sangguniang Barangay and residents of Barangay
Bolitoc; (4) LAMI’s port site is located on private and alienable land; (5) there is no mountain on the port site; (6) the Philippine
Mining Act is irrelevant and inapplicable to the present case; and (7) the other allegations of Agham that LAMI violated
environmental laws, rules or regulations are likewise baseless, irrelevant and false. LAMI stated further that there is no
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities and
provinces.
Agham Party-list filed a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition.
Issues:
 Whether LAMI violated the environmental laws: the Revised Forestry Code, and Philippine Mining Act;
 Whether LAMI flattened any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health,
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Rulings:
 No. LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by CENRO and passed the evaluation conducted after the issuance of the
permit so it clearly had the authority to cut trees and did not violate Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. The
Philippine Mining Act is not applicable to the case since LAMI is not conducting anything on the port site and it secured
all the necessary permits and licenses for the construction of a port and LAMI’s activity was limited to preparatory
works for the port’s construction. The Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining activities.
 No. The Respondent, in accusing LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any law allegedly violated by LAMI
in relation to this claim. It did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales and those of
the towns of Pangaisnan complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land formation which
may affect their lives, health, or properties. Neither was there any evidence showing a grave and real environmental
damage to the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.
The records of expert testimonies and government entities and offiicials also show that there is in fact no mountain
in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
The Supreme Court agreed with the CA in denying the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.
Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait Protected Seascape v. Secretary Reyes

G.R. 180771, April 21, 2015
Topic:
 Oil exploration in Tañon Strait;
 Agreement involving technical and financial assistance under Section 2, par.4 of Article XII, 1987 Constitution;
 National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992;
Doctrine:
 The Resident Marine Mammals have legal standing. Our Rules allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a
suit to enforce our environmental laws.
 Under NIPAS Act,

 Protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological
significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation.
 Protected Seascape is an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man
and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal
lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to
protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is
the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity
outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity
inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.
 Environmentally critical area is "an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant
environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located,
developed, or implemented in it"; thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment," is undertaken in it, such project must
undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment.
 The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It
prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project
or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project
(including cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also
includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to
protect the environment and the community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the project proponent
and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.
 While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in
said protected seascape.
Facts:
These two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-
46),which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage
of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks
to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987
Constitution and certain international and municipal laws.
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition, and
Mandamus,which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),Region VII in
connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide
petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration Project.
"Resident Marine Mammals" are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters
in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio)
as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine species.
***
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon

Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted
by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling
covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's underwater composition.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the
marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX
agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements.
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No.
2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended
the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150
meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions
both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for,
among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards aver that

 The Stewards contend there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they
have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait
and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the
environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
 SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because
JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.
 SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147 or the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, which
bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits.
o a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70
percent.

Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend
 that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition since only
natural or juridical person can be parties to an action and animals cannot be parties to an action;
 that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions;
 that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
 that public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to
SC-46; and
 that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further contend that the issues
raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated
by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008.
Issues:
Whether the Resident Marine Mammals (toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species) and Stewards have
no legal standing?
Whether offshore exploration in Tañon Strait under Service Contract 46 (by foreign company) is legally permissible under
Section 2 (par 4) of Article XII of the Constitution?
Whether SC-46 violates Section 27 of RA 9147 (Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act) which bans all marine
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits and NIPAS?

Rulings:
Yes. Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have locus standing.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases.
 In Oposa v. Factoran, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not
even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
 Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file
an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws.
o Citizen suit – it is based on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton:
o Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation . A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found
useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole — a creature of ecclesiastical law — is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person"
for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or
charitable causes.
o So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges,
groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology
and modern life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes —
fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including
man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff
speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation
to that body of water — whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger — must be
able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

NO. The Service Contract (SC 46) is null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
Agreements involving technical or financial assistance (Section 2, par. 4, Article XII of 1987 Constitution) are service contracts
with safeguards.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. xxx
xxx
xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them
per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service
contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the martial law regime.
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the
exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII.The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of
terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to
the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to
law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the
two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null
and void. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress. The doctrine of qualified
political agency does not apply because the Constitution requires that the President shall personally act it. As this Court has held
in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power
cannot be taken lightly.

Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the
requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
Yes. SC 46 violates the NIPAS Act.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected area in
1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the
purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt
from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment.— Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the
management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law
before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are
allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to
lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. — Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected
areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of
gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding
areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such
surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any
exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed
by Congress.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12;
instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected
areas.
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46,
which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no
such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait,
such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act.
Boracay Foundation v. The Province of Aklan

G.R. 196870, June 16, 2012
Topic:
 Reclamation of Caticlan port.
 Public consultation and approval of LGUs
Doctrine:
 The rule regarding Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is not a hard and fast rule . It is not applicable where, among
others, there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant case. The rule may
also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy or where the protestant has no
other recourse.

 Writ of Continuing Mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper court when any
government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof “unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”
 Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of such
mandatory requirements will render the project’s implementation as illegal.
Facts:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of Aklan planned to expand the
port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay.
Thus, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito
Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore
area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation
area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources.
After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental
Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-
7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan
side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land use development of the
reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that the
Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public consultation meetings.
On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and petitioner
Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some 160 businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their
strong opposition to the reclamation project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.
Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to
commence with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for
Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition. The
Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:
a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;
b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC).
The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the
approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the Barangay Council
of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had “categorically
addressed all the issues” raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of
action due to the failure of BFI to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.
Issues:
 Whether the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case?
 Whether there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?
Rulings:

 No. The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies and to observe the
hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.
The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that the rule regarding exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable where, among others, there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy or where the protestant has no other recourse.
Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner under the
writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law” and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the
writ itself.”
The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper court when any government
agency or instrumentality or officer thereof “unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Such proper court may be the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court.
Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the
questions of unique national and local importance raised that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection.
Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the
submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision.”
 No. The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project.
The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological
balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval of local government units. In Province of Rizal v.
Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. The
absence of either of such mandatory requirements will render the project’s implementation as illegal.
Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the environmental and ecological balance
of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted that such national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those
that may cause pollution and bring about climate change, among others, such as the reclamation project in this case.
Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should “initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that
environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the
management plan”.
Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRA’s power to reclaim land in this case, to conduct prior
consultations and prior approval. However, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been
issued was insufficient to comply with the requirements under the LGC.
Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both
undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.

Republic v. Pagadian City Timber

G.R. 159308, September 16, 2008
Doctrine:
A license agreement is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right
of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to
develop, protect, and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement. License
Agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the non-impairment clause enshrined in the
Constitution.
Facts:
Petitioner, through the the DENR and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co. In. executed an Industrial Forest Management
(IFMA) No. R-9-040 whereby petitioner, represented by the then Regional Executive Director (RED) for Region IX, authorized
respondent to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest are covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod,
Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products
subject to a production-sharing scheme.
Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) which the DENR
approved. In response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding respondent’s alleged failure
to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the constant threats and harassment by armed
men employed by respondent, RED DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a regional team to
evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.
DENR sent a letter to respondent, giving notice of the evaluation and assessment to be conducted on the area the DENR
requested any representative of the company to appear at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, and bring with him documents and
maps concerning its IFMA operations. a DENR Evaluation Team went to the IFMA site. After a briefing conference between the
Evaluation Team and respondent’s Operations Manager, Inocencio Santiago, actual field evaluation and assessment followed.
an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and assessment of IFMA R-9-04 was held between DENR officials and IFMA
Representative and Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago at the CENRO, Pagadian. The evaluation team made
recommendations and submitted to the DENR a Memorandum regarding the performace evaluation of IFMA No. R-9-040.
RED Mendoza recommended to the DENR Secretary the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9- 040 for the FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT
THE APPROVED COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PLAN and for the FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT OR
ADOPT AGREEMENT WITH COMMUNITIES AND OTHER RELEVANT SECTORS. Respondent’s President, Filomena S. San
Juan, wrote DENR Secretary Cerilles that the company was surprised to receive the Order of the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-
040. She appealed for the reconsideration of the Order asking that a re-investigation be conducted to comply with due process.
Respondent appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
The OP affirmed the cancellation order based on the results of the actual evaluation and assessment of the DENR team. It ruled
that the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 was primarily and specifically governed by Section 26 of Department Administrative
Order (DAO) 97-04. Relative to respondent’s invocation of due process, the OP held that respondent was afforded the right to be
heard when it filed its motion for reconsideration and its subsequent appeal to the OP. The CA ruled in favor of respondents. In
striking down the rulings of the OP and the Order the CA declared that IFMA No. R-9-040 was a contract that could not be
unilaterally cancelled without infringing on the rights of respondent to due process and against impairment of contracts. The
appellate court agreed with respondent when the latter argued that it was entitled to the benefits of Sections 35 and 36 of IFMA
No. R-9-040 such that respondent should have been given 30 days, after due notice, to remedy any breach or default of the
provisions of the IFMA and/or that the dispute regarding the bases for the cancellation of the IFMA should have first been
submitted to arbitration.
Issues:
 Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that IFMA No. R9-040 is a contract and not a mere privilege granted by the
State to the respondent.

 Whether the CA seriously erred in ordaining that respondent can rightfully invoke prior resort to arbitration or the option
to mend it violations under IFMA No. R9-040.

Rulings:
 Yes. IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), the
law which is the very basis for its existence. Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a license agreement is defined
as “a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right of
possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding
obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said
agreement.” An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued
by the State to its grantees for the efficient management of the country’s dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has
been consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the
non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution.
 Yes. It is also futile for respondent to claim that it is entitled to an arbitration under Section 36 of IFMA No. R-9-040
before the license agreement may be canceled. A reading of the said Section shows that the dispute should be based
on the provisions of the IFMA to warrant a referral to arbitration of an irreconcilable conflict between the IFMA holder
and the DENR Secretary. In this case, the cancellation was grounded on Section 26 of DAO No. 97-04, particularly
respondent’s failure to implement the approved CDMP and its failure to implement or adopt agreements made with
communities and other relevant sectors. The contrary notwithstanding, what remains is that respondent never refuted
the findings of the Evaluation Team when given the opportunity to do so but waited until IFMA No. R-9-040 was
already cancelled before it made its vigorous objections as to the conduct of the evaluation, harping only on its alleged
right to due process. Indeed, respondent was given the opportunity to contest the findings that caused the cancellation
of its IFMA when it moved to reconsider the Order of cancellation and when it filed its appeal and motion for
reconsideration before the OP.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution dated July 24,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order dated June
7, 1999 of then DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles, and the Resolutions of the Office of the President dated January
12, 2000 and May 8, 2000 affirming the said Order, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.
WestTower Condominium v. First Philipine Industrial Corp.

G.R. 194239, June 10, 2015
Topic:
 leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati City
Doctrine:
 The award of damages to individual petitioners in environmental cases is prohibited (under Section 15 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases).
 Under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose
of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
Facts:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz.: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-
kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and
(b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in
Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the
provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety allowance against leakage,
considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than twice the current operating pressure and are
buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium
(West Tower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises
led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, West Tower's
management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city's Bureau of Fire
Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their respective units on
July 23, 2010 and the condo's power was shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of West Tower shouldered the expenses of
hauling the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant in the area to separate
fuel from the waste water.
On October 28, 2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of
Makati invited to determine the source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower.
A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was already
closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities on the roads surrounding West
Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit
because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.
Petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or failure to timely replace its pipelines and to observe extraordinary diligence
caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the now 47-year old pipeline
would not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and property of those who live or sojourn in all the
municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn to live in a
balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns. The
TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural
integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any
untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt
thereof.
On January 25, 2013, FPIC filed its Compliance (Re: Department of Energy Certification on the Black Oil Pipeline) and submitted
the required DOE Certification.
Issues:
 Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to
desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment, despite issuance of
DOE Certification?
 Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies?

Rulings:
No. The TEPO may be lifted in light of the DOE Certification of the White Oil Pipeline System (WOPL) commercial viability.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the activities
and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the
resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of
the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate
reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the
other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its
condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may
be ordered.
However, Respondent FPIC is DIRECTED to undertake and continue the remediation, rehabilitation and restoration of
the affected Barangay Bangkal environment until full restoration of the affected area to its condition prior to the leakage
is achieved. For this purpose, respondent FPIC must strictly comply with the measures, directives and permits issued
by the DENR for its remediation activities in Barangay Bangkal, including but not limited to, the Wastewater Discharge
Permit and Permit to Operate.
No. The special trust fund is denied for future contingencies. It tantamounts to damages which is prohibited by the Rules.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose
of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
Furthermore, Sec. 15 (e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of
damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. — Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
xxx xxx xxx

individual petitioners.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a
trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably
already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but
a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of
the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.
DENR v. Mayor Yap

G.R. 167707, October 8, 2008
Doctrine:
 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
 All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State .
 A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
 It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to
private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation
of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.
 There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 ; and (2)
the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
 Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership
or possessory rights.
Facts:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since
time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48
(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in
their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. The OSG maintained that respondents-

claimants' reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
Issues:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands
alienable.
Whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a
right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Rulings:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to
private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation
of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails,
which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
No. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have
vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law.
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2)
the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Private claimants' bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land.
Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and
applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. Where the land is not
alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
Torrecampo v. MWSS
G.R. 188296, May 30, 2011
Doctrine:
Political question
Facts:
DPWH personnel and its heavy equipment entered a portion of Barangay Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road
Extension Project over Lot Nos. 42-A-4, 42-A-6 and 42-A-4 to connect the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) to the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX). Three (3) aqueducts of the MWSS which supply water to eight million Metro Manila residents runs
underneath the proposed C-5 Road Extension Project within Barangay Matandang Balara.
These three (3) sub-terrain aqueducts connect raw water from the La Mesa Dam to the Balara Filtration Plant located in
Barangay Matandang Balara, Diliman, Quezon City. Portions of these aqueducts are located underneath Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City, and are buried in varying depths because of the uneven surface of Quezon City's landscape.
Bgy Captain Torrecampo filed a petition for injunction with TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injuction that the project would result to
grave injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner and the eight million residents of Metro Manila considering that the impending
DPWH road project includes the portion known as "Tandang Sora Section" located within petitioner's barangay, underneath
which are the aqueducts supplying water to eight million residents of Metro Manila, which aqueducts might be damaged and thus
imperil and disrupt water supply to all Metro Manila residents.
That the MWSS and the DPWH violate fundamental rights should they choose to proceed with the C-5 Road Extension Project
using MWSS' properties instead of the RIPADA area:
 Right to health (Sec. 15, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution)

 Right to balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution)
 Use of property bears a Social Function (Section 6, Article XII of the Constitution)
Torrecampo insisted that the RIPADA area, consisting of Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and Pook Dagohoy, located in Barangay
University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, Quezon City, is a better alternative to subject lots.
Issues:
Whether it is within the power of the Court to decide the proper route to take for the C-5 project?

Rulings:
No. Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction.
Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Court's jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to
show that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Court's extraordinary
certiorari power.
The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the province of
this Court. Such determination belongs to the Executive branch. Moreover, in this case the DPWH still has to conduct the proper
study to determine whether a road can be safely constructed on land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the
MWSS, which owns the land, cannot decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent such DPWH study and
MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction can be alleged against or attributed to
respondents warranting the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power.
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. 186739, April 17, 2013

Doctrine:
Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (
1) the implementation of community-based forestry products;
(2) management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and
(3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects. It also referred to DENR Administrative Order
No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions, programs and projects of the DENR
which had been devolved to the LGUs, as follows:
Section 3.1 Forest Management

a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations, except at least one project per province that
shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and those areas located in protected areas and
critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to policies and procedures prescribed by the
DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other
guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000)
hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into
community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as
identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as
defined in Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of
flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other implements used in the commission of offenses
penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the
DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not included in the above enumeration
of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR and, thus, cannot be exercised
by the LGUs.
Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of
regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those
present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr.
and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of
TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in
Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of
the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to
various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178)

were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar. On June
2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to
0259.
It was noted in this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only
government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol
usurped the official functions that properly belong to the DENR.
Issues:
 Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Mayor Ruzol Are Valid
 Whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR,
and no one else.

Rulings:
 No. The Permits to Transport issued by Mayor Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage and control communal forests" under
Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control
of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, we reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in
accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from
the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national
policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
 No. the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the
transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also
exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement
and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the
subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR.
The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits
could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every
one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is
not only a responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest
denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and
share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which
was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the
concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, we consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes
automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended
to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused."
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime
when the criminal mind is wanting." Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind"
when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and
monitor salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that
to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the
standing advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and conservation of
our natural resources.

Republic v. Ballocanag
G.R. 163794, November 28, 2008
Doctrine:
 Forest land
Doctrine:
 Public forest are non-alienable public lands.
 It is not being capable of registration their inclusion in a certification of ownership or confer title on the registrant.
 Accession of public forests, on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private property.
 In case, it is no longer feasible to permit the planter or sower in good faith to remove the trees he planted. The only
equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay the planter or sower the value of the improvements
introduced on the property in order to avoid damage to the land.
Facts:
Sometime in 1970, Danilo Reyes bought the subject 182,941-square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
[subject land] from one Regina Castillo with Title issued pursuant to Free Patent. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced
improvements and planted the land with fruit trees, including about a thousand mango[es], more than a hundred Mandarin citrus,
and more than a hundred guyabanos. He also had the title transferred in his name.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it turned out that about 162,500 square meters of this
land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro and, therefore, cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under any
existing law, and is not registrable. The same land has been leased by the State to Atty. Augusto Marte under an Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement. Hence, the controversy.
Thus, the OSG filed a Complaint for "Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion" as represented by the Bureau of Forest
Development (or BFD). It was explained that the source of the Title issued pursuant to Free Patent is spurious, fictitious and
irregularly issued.
Judgment was issued cancelling the Title and reverting the land to the State. It said that
 the said areas are not being capable of registration their inclusion in a certification of ownership or confer title on the
registrant.
 It is also a matter of principle that public forest are non-alienable public lands.
 Accession of public forests, on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private property.
Hence, this petition to the Court that Reyes be declared the planter and sower in good faith and be entitled the reimbursement
for the improvements.
Issues:
Whether planter or sower of forest land be considered planter and sower in good faith and be entitled to reimbursement for the
improvements?

Rulings:
Yes. Reyes is entitled to the payment of just compensation by the State.
Indubitably, to order the reversion of the subject land without payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the rights of
Reyes over the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced therein, would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as
well.
To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject land, even if he is legally entitled to do so, would
be risking substantial damage to the land. It would negate the policy consideration underlying the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement (of Atty. Marte) — to protect and preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any damage to the
land. Further, it would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal thing, the possessor in good
faith may remove them unless the person who recovers the possession exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the
preceding article.
In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code have been restricted. It is no
longer feasible to permit him to remove the trees he planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay
Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair because, after all, by the terms of the
AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent
improvements on the land shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify the lessee.
Osmeña v. Garganera
G.R. 231164, March 20, 2018
Doctrine:
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9003 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ECOLOGICAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM, CREATING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES, DECLARING
CERTAIN ACTS PROHIBITED AND PROVIDING PENALTIES, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Sec. 52 Par C - Any public officer who willfully or grossly neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty by
this Act or its implementing rules and regulations; or abuses his authority in the performance of his duty; or, in any manner,
improperly performs his duties under this Act or its implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that no suit can be
filed until after thirty-day (30) notice has been given to the public officer and the alleged violator concerned and no appropriate
action has been taken thereon.
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8749 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Sec. 41 Par C - Any public officer who willfully or grossly neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty by
this Act or its implementing rules and regulations; or abuses his authority in the performance of his duty; or, in any manner,
improperly performs his duties under this Act or its implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that no suit can be
filed until thirty-day (30) notice has been taken thereon.
 Section 3, Rule 7 of RPEC allows direct resort to this Court or with any of the stations of the CA, which states:
Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Inawayan landfill served as the garbage disposal area of Cebu City as approved by DENR in 1993. In 2011, former Mayor Rama
ordered the closure of the said landfill and subsequent SP resolutions were approved for the closure and rehabilitation of the
landfill. As a result, the Inayawan landfill was partially closed and all wastes from Cebu City were disposed in a privately-
operated landfill in Consolacion and formally closed in 2015. In 2016, under the administration of Mayor Osmeña, they sought
with DENR regarding the temporary opening of the landfill, which the DENR did not oppose. But, after the DOH inspection, it
recommends the immediate closure of the landfill due to the lack of sanitary requirements, environmental, health and community
safety issues. On September 23, 2016, Joel Capili Garganera for and on his behalf, and in representation of the People of the
Cities of Cebu and Talisay and the future generations, including the unborn (respondent) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) before the CA. That Inayawan landfill causes
serious environmental damage which threatens and violates their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and has already
outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-suited for its purpose. Respondent further asserted that its reopening and continued
operation violates several environmental laws and government regulations. The CA, granted a writ of kalikasan, required
petitioner to file a verified return and a summary hearing was set for the application of TEPO. But Mayor Osmeña averred that
respondent failed to comply with the condition precedent which requires 30-day notice to the public officer concerned prior to the
filing of a citizens suit under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. However, CA still granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan which

ordered Mayor Osmeña and/or his representatives to permanently cease and desist from dumping or disposing of garbage or
solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same. Mayor Osmeña's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied, hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently
established.

Rulings:
Yes. Here, the present petition for writ of kalikasan under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC) is a separate
and distinct action from R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage
of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for
a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a
speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology
that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological
threats.
Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct action to this Court and the CA where it is
dictated by public welfare, this Court is of the view that the prior 30-day notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and
R.A. 8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it.
Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is
an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual
or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for
the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on
a case-to-case basis. The Court is convinced from the evidence on record that the respondent has sufficiently established the
aforementioned requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. The record discloses that the City
Government's resumption of the garbage dumping operations at the Inayawan landfill has raised serious environmental
concerns.
KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910, 16th Nov 1995
Mendoza, J:
Doctrine
· Non self-executory provisions do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for
legislative or executive action.
· Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds.
Facts
Originally, Kilosbayan (petitioner) filed a petition questioning the legality of the equipment lease agreements entered between
Philippine Charity Sweepstake Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming Management Corp (PGMC). The first petition was based
on the grounds that the ELA had been made in the violation of the charter for the PCSO and law on public bidding. The Court
dismissed the petition due to lack of legal standing the petitioner (not real-party in interest) and for lack of genuine issues of the
constitutionality of the case.
Subsequently, PCSO and PGMC entered into a contract of lease conforming to the requirement on the first judgement.
The same petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration now assailing the morality of the contract entered into by PCSO and
PGMC, said to be in violation of the Constitution. They said that they had legal standing to sue because the Constitution, by
guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, § 16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds:

Section 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
Issue:
W/N Kilosbayan has legal standing to sue as taxpayer or as people’s independent organization based on rights conferred under
Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution?
Rulings:
No. The petitioner has no legal standing. The cited provision is not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be
enforced in the courts.
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but
they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the
validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This
case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.In the case at bar, there is no allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation
of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art. II, §16 a right-conferring provision which can be
enforced in the courts. That provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis supplied.)
In contrast, the policies and principle invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such categorization.
TANADA v. ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295, 2nd May 1997
Panganiban, J:
Doctrine
Theory of Auto-limitation
Facts
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and
for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith. Petitioners viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives
foreign trading intervention.
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits,
restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this
means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation
will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and
money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . .
Issue
W/N the GATT is unconstitutional since it restrict the Philippine sovereignty?

Ruling
No. GATT is not unconstitutional.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda
— international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact .
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory,
the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations,
the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism
is over. The age of interdependence is here."
Momonga v. Omipon
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 (Resolution), [March 14, 1995], 312 PHIL 395-405
Doctrine
Facts
At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended
Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded. A complaint
was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge
Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the
owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources filed the instant complaint
against the respondent Judge alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products
violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A 1 and Administrative Order No.
59, Series of 1990. 2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the
non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that Golpe, the owner
of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks. On his way home after
delivering hollow blocks in Barangay Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced lumber and deliver
the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the construction of a barangay high school building. They were
apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. After changing the tire, both the lumber and the truck were ordered deposited at the
police station of Hinunangan.
Issues

Whether the respondent Judge was correct in releasing the truck used in the crime of transporting the truck?
Rulings
Yes. The Judge was correct because the truck was owned by a third person not committing the crime.
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not
subject to any disciplinary sanction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this
cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense." In this
case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein
be convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no justification for
respondent Judge not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR
Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and
all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. However,
as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied
himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59. The
release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings
under Adm. Order No. 59 6 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty
imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for
reinvestigation and motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before
the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed against the owner
thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."
||| (Momongan v. Omipon, A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 (Resolution), [March 14, 1995], 312 PHIL 395-405)

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CASE SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Thus, this appeal.

The Casiño Group argues that

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Petitioners prayed that

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Separate Opinion: Carpio, J.

A petition for a writ of kalikasan is a wrong remedy.

Two things must be examined:

A petition for a writ of kalikasan is a wrong remedy.

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Yes. The precautionary principle should be applied to bio-engineering eggplants.

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Segovia v. The Climate Change Commission

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

LNL Archipelago Minerals Inc. V. Agham Partylist

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

 Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:

 Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act state:

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

LAMI argued that:

Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait Protected Seascape v. Secretary Reyes

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend

Yes. Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have locus standing.

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Yes. SC 46 violates the NIPAS Act.

Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:

Boracay Foundation v. The Province of Aklan

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Republic v. Pagadian City Timber

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

WestTower Condominium v. First Philipine Industrial Corp.

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

xxx xxx xxx

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

DENR v. Mayor Yap

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

 Right to health (Sec. 15, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution)

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

Section 3.1 Forest Management

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]

OMPAD, ENOYA, DELA FUENTE, DOSDOS [USJR]