Report On Capacity Building
Report On Capacity Building
Report On Capacity Building
@
IAEA REPORT ON
CAPACITY BUILDING FOR
NUCLEAR SAFETY
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The
Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
IAEA REPORT ON
CAPACITY BUILDING FOR
NUCLEAR SAFETY
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© IAEA, 2015
FOREWORD
By Denis Flory
Deputy Director General
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Insights from the conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. LESSONS LEARNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Education and training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Human resource development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. Knowledge management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.5. Knowledge networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1
Declaration by the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna on
20 June 2011, INFCIRC/821, IAEA, Vienna (2011), para. 23.
2
Draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2011/59-GC(55)/14, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
3
Ibid., p. 6.
4
Ibid., p. 5.
1
Given that there has not been a specific International Experts Meeting (IEM)
on the subject of strengthening and maintaining capacity building, this report
considers the discussions and the outcomes of the conferences and meetings that
addressed this subject following the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The aim is to
share with Member States the most significant lessons learned to date regarding
strengthening and maintaining capacity building in the light of the Fukushima
Daiichi accident.
This report considers the discussions and the conclusions of the
International Conference on Human Resource Development for Nuclear Power
Programmes (the 2014 Conference), held on 12–16 May 2014, the insights
gained from IAEA peer review and support services relating to capacity building
for nuclear safety, and the discussions at relevant IEMs on this topic. The
report is expected to contribute to the ongoing efforts to assist Member States
in strengthening capacity building for nuclear safety and constitutes an integral
part of implementation of the Action Plan. The report is part of a series of IAEA
reports from IEMs that summarize the lessons learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi accident.
1.1. BACKGROUND
5
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal and
Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
2
The importance of human resources was highlighted by the International
Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG)6, which recognized that education in nuclear
science and technology needs to be stabilized in order to maintain sufficient human
resources in sciences and engineering relating to nuclear safety. In addition, the
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety are committed to taking
the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with
appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all safety related
activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.
INSAG also noted that for Member States embarking on a nuclear
power programme:
“The responsibility for safety requires that the new entrant operator establish
and maintain the necessary competencies of both staff and management
for safe operations. This entails providing adequate training and effective
knowledge management, establishing the culture and methodologies
to maintain safety under all conditions, and verifying that all activities and
processes are safe.”7
6
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP, Maintaining
Knowledge, Training and Infrastructure for Research and Development in Nuclear Safety,
INSAG-16, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
7
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY GROUP, Licensing the First Nuclear
Power Plant, INSAG-26, IAEA, Vienna (2012).
8
MALLICK, S., MOLLOY, B., “Capacity Building”, CN-215, paper presented at
IAEA Int. Conf. on Human Resour. Dev. for Nucl. Power Programmes Vienna, 2014.
3
FIG. 1. Capacity building, the umbrella approach.
1.2. OBJECTIVE
4
2. DISCUSSIONS AT
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
FOR NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES
2.1. BACKGROUND
9
The International Conference on Knowledge Management in Nuclear Facilities was
held from 18 to 21 June 2007 in Vienna.
10
The International Conference on Human Resource Development for Introducing and
Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes was held from 14 to 18 March 2010 in Abu Dhabi.
11
Human Resource Development for Introducing and Expanding Nuclear Power
Programmes (Proc. Int. Conf. Abu Dhabi, 2010), IAEA, Vienna (2012).
5
The Chairperson’s summary of the conference along with all conference
papers and presentations can be found in the Annexes to this report and on the
conference web site12 and on the attached CD-ROM.
The 2014 Conference recognized that there are many factors affecting
capacity building activities in Member States depending on the status or maturity
of the nuclear power programme. Those Member States embarking on new
nuclear power programmes need to establish and develop capacity. Member
States with expanding programmes need to respond to the need for additional
human resources, while Member States with mature programmes need to ensure
a stable capacity of human resources.
12
See http://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/46084/International-Conference-on-
Human-Resource-Development-for-Introducing-and-Expanding-Nuclear-Power-Programmes-
Building-and-Sustaining-Capacity.
6
The Conference participants emphasized that human resources are the
backbone of every nuclear power programme and require a significant variety
of skills and training. The conference highlighted the key role governments
have in integrating education and training programmes into an overall strategy
for building and maintaining capacity. Such an overall strategy needs to involve
all relevant stakeholders13 and cover the medium or long term to ensure
intergenerational knowledge transfer.
The results of national human resource requirements analysis contribute
to the effectiveness of strategies to develop and strengthen capacity building, and
are extremely useful for estimating education and training needs in the short and
medium term. A number of participants reported on the progress of systematic
analyses of human resource needs, which are being conducted for new and
mature nuclear programmes at the national and regional levels.
Several good examples of managing and improving education and training
systems were presented, including training needs analysis and the systematic
approach to training14. The systematic approach to training comprises five
interrelated phases including:
13
Stakeholders include governments, regulators, operators, research and development
design organizations and academia.
14
INTERNATIONALATOMIC ENERGYAGENCY, Experience in the Use of Systematic
Approach to Training (SAT) for Nuclear Power Plant Personnel, IAEA-TECDOC-1057, IAEA,
Vienna (1998).
7
of successful existing and new networks that work at the organizational, national
and international levels were presented during the conference.
The insights from a number of IAEA peer review and assessment services
that focused on capacity building or one of its components, such as education and
training, human resource development, knowledge management or knowledge
networks, are presented in the following.
The Education and Training Appraisal (EduTA) service was introduced
in 2005 to provide an assessment of the national legal and regulatory
infrastructure related to education and training in radiation protection and
the safety of radiation sources. To date, EduTA has been used in 17 missions
to 14 Member States. This service has shown that not all Member States have
a national strategy for education and training for radiation protection and safety.
The service highlighted the importance of involving all relevant stakeholders,
particularly the regulatory body, in establishing requirements for education
and training in radiation protection and safety. Criteria and procedures for the
recognition and designation of qualified experts and radiation protection officers
need to be clearly established by the regulatory body or other governmental
authorities. Information on national infrastructures and capabilities for education
and training in radiation protection and safety from EduTA missions need
to be disseminated for the benefit of all Member States to support their efforts
to develop and strengthen their education and training infrastructure.
The Education and Training Review Service (ETReS) was established
in 2012 to assist Member States in developing and maintaining a sustainable
and adequate education and training programme in nuclear safety. The ETReS
complements the EduTA service. To date, the ETReS has been used in three
Member States. Experience with this service has highlighted the importance
of systematic analyses of education and training needs for capacity building for
nuclear safety. The systematic approach to training is important to a number
of organizations, including operators, regulatory bodies, TSOs and research and
development organizations. The analysis of education and training gaps needs
to be comprehensive and needs to involve all relevant stakeholders in order
to minimize gaps in education and training programmes and in human resources.
To that end, a national integrated human resource development plan needs to be
developed, regularly evaluated and updated.
8
The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) is designed to strengthen
and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure of Member
States for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety and security.
The first IRRS missions were conducted in 2006 and more than 50 initial and
follow-up IRRS missions have been carried out worldwide to date. The service
has highlighted the importance of a national policy and strategy for nuclear safety
that includes provisions for ensuring that the necessary capacity is developed
and competence is maintained. The systematic approach to training needs
to be used for the development of regulatory body staff, and formal qualification
programmes should ideally be in place along with a regulatory inspector refresher
training programme. A systematic competence needs assessment, as supported
by the Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs (SARCoN),
is important in order to improve regulatory competence building programmes.
The SARCoN methodology15,16,17 has been used by Member States since
2005. To date, the IAEA Secretariat has provided SARCoN training seminars
in over 20 Member States, including more than ten embarking countries.
Strategies for capacity building need to be supported by adequate education and
training programmes as well as management systems and knowledge management
programmes. Such strategies need to be developed systematically based on the
identification of needs followed by the design, development, implementation and
final evaluation of activities. The self-assessment approach of SARCoN supports
capacity building, promotes ownership and facilitates follow-up actions, while
ensuring that national priorities are taken into account.
Other related IAEA services and reviews that have a component related
to capacity building for nuclear safety include the Operational Safety Review
Team (OSART) programme, and the Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV)
and the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) services.
The OSART programme was established to assist Member States
in enhancing safe operation of nuclear power plants18. More than 180 OSART
15
Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs for Regulatory
Bodies of Nuclear Facilities SARCoN Guidelines, available at:
http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/training/sarcon/sarcon_rev14_adec6.pdf.
16
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Managing Regulatory Body
Competence, Safety Reports Series No. 79, IAEA, Vienna (2013).
17
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Methodology for the Systematic
Assessment of the Regulatory Competence Needs (SARCoN) for Regulatory Bodies of Nuclear
Installations, IAEA-TECDOC-1757, IAEA, Vienna (2015).
18
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OSART Mission Highlights
2010–2012: Operational Safety Practices in Nuclear Power Plants, available at:
http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/s-reviews/osart/osart-mission-highlights%202010-2012.pdf.
9
missions to nuclear power plants and corporate organizations have been
performed to date. These missions have highlighted the need to systematically and
periodically evaluate the effectiveness of training programmes and the training
methods used for continuous improvement of the operational safety of nuclear
power plants. Nuclear power plant staff need to be given the opportunity for
refresher training, and nuclear power plant simulator facilities need to reflect the
current status of the specific plant in order to achieve the desired training results.
EPREV missions have been conducted in Member States since 1999
to review national emergency preparedness and response arrangements and
capabilities. The missions have shown that, to achieve globally harmonized
capabilities and responses to emergencies, there is a continuing need for greater
awareness of the international safety standards and compatibility requirements
for all Member States, both those with and without nuclear power programmes.
Regional and interregional education and training programmes are needed
on assessment and decision making during an emergency to promote a harmonized
and consistent global response. There is a need for better educational programmes
in both public and risk communications to adequately communicate health
risks during nuclear emergencies. There is also a need for knowledge networks
to provide a platform for emergency preparedness professionals to share their
knowledge and experience on capacity building.
The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) supports Member
States embarking on nuclear power programmes in the preparatory phase leading
to the introduction of a first nuclear power plant. The main objective of an INIR
mission is to assist the Member State in determining its infrastructure status and
to identify further development needs. By 2015, 15 INIR missions had been
conducted in 10 Member States.
The INIR missions have shown the importance of clearly specifying the
scope and timeline of a national nuclear power programme so that capacity
building programmes can be based on sound predictions of future needs. The roles
and responsibilities of the different organizations involved in capacity building
programmes need to be clearly identified, and effective national coordination
of capacity building activities is required to ensure that the necessary resources
are available when they are needed by the nuclear power programme.
INIR missions have also highlighted the need to clearly distinguish
education activities that are usually a governmental issue, such as a national
education plan, from human resource development, of which the latter builds
on an initial educational background and is provided by individual organizations
such as the nuclear energy programme implementing organization, the regulatory
body, or nuclear power plant owners or operators. Capacity building for the
regulatory body or TSOs can be a major challenge for embarking countries.
These organizations manage their own development either nationally or through
10
bilateral arrangements. Capacity building for the operating organization
is typically provided by the nuclear power plant vendor.
In 2005, the IAEA introduced assistance missions (‘assist missions’)
through Knowledge Management Assist Visits (KMAVs) for nuclear industry
operating organizations. These missions cover knowledge management policy,
strategy and culture, human resources, training and human performance,
document management and IT solutions as well as external collaboration. To date,
26 KMAV missions have been conducted to 17 Member States. Experience
from these missions has shown that nuclear safety knowledge management
needs to be included in an organization’s management system so that it is
consistently embedded in business processes across the organization. The KMAV
missions have also highlighted that nuclear safety related topics need to be
incorporated into the education and training curricula for nuclear engineers and
for other technical and non-technical disciplines of relevance to nuclear facilities
or activities. A sound understanding of topics related to nuclear safety needs to be
embedded in the whole nuclear workforce.
19
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Report on Strengthening
Nuclear Regulatory Effectiveness in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant, IAEA, Vienna (2013), available at:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/regeffectiveness0913.pdf.
11
Capacity building efforts to effectively meet the needs of recovery actions
that follow a nuclear or radiological accident,20 or to deal with nuclear legacy
facilities can be costly and take a long time. These efforts require the mobilization
of sufficient and competent personnel and resources for extended periods of time.
Member States making the transition to large scale decommissioning of nuclear
power plants face many challenges in maintaining a stable and skilled workforce.
Research and development21 activities are important for the identification
of gaps in scientific and technical capacity including knowledge, research,
expertise, and education and training. Research and development can be used
to identify the needs for infrastructure development and ongoing capacity building
activities at the national, regional or international levels.
All Member States would benefit from a programme of capacity building
in radiation protection. An accident similar in scale to the Fukushima Daiichi
accident would pose a significant challenge to the radiation protection capabilities
of many Member States, including States without a nuclear power plant.22
Consequently, well trained people and adequate equipment are needed to respond
to a nuclear or radiological accident and its aftermath. The decommissioning and
remediation activities following the Fukushima Daiichi accident will last several
decades, and radiation protection expertise is one of the key skills required for
the implementation of these activities.
The importance of training, particularly related to response capabilities,
was a common lesson learned that was highlighted at a number of IEMs.
The continuous training of staff in severe accident mitigation capabilities
is essential to improve the overall response capability of both staff at the nuclear
power plant and the experts in support centres.23
20
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Report on Decommissioning
and Remediation after a Nuclear Accident, IAEA, Vienna (2013), available at:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/decommissioning0913.pdf.
21
IAEA Report on Strengthening the Effectiveness of Research and Development in the
Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, IAEA, Vienna (2015).
22
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Report on the International
Experts Meeting on Radiation Protection after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Promoting
Confidence and Understanding, IAEA, Vienna (2014), available at:
http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/radprotection0914.pdf.
23
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Report on the International
Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, IAEA, Vienna (2012), available at:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/spentfuelsafety2012.pdf.
12
Human and organizational factors24 play a significant role in the
identification of specific training for nuclear power plant operating personnel.
The Fukushima Daiichi accident highlighted the need to better understand and
implement an integrated, or systemic, approach to safety so as to ensure proper
preparation and training of those who will be dealing with an unexpected nuclear
or radiological event. A review of major accidents yields insights into the human
and organizational factors involved in their occurrence. Some of these factors
relate to failures in training to deal with the unexpected.
Dedicated training is also essential for those responsible for communicating
with the public and the media in the event of a nuclear or radiological
emergency.25 Spokespeople, public information officers, executives and experts
must be included in the preparedness phase. In addition, the establishment of a
systematic, effective and regular training programme is necessary for all national
and local responders to an emergency (from national experts to security guards).
Continuous education and training, including the involvement of stakeholders,
are essential to creating and maintaining emergency preparedness and awareness.
The lessons learned presented below are summarized within the framework
of the four pillars of capacity building and are preceded by some general
cross-cutting lessons.
5.1. GENERAL
Human resource capability and knowledge are essential for a safe, secure
and sustainable nuclear power programme and require dedicated programmes
at the global, national and organizational levels.
24
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Report on the International
Experts Meeting on Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety in the Light of the
Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, IAEA, Vienna (2014), available at:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/humanfactors0914.pdf.
25
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Report on the International
Experts Meeting on Enhancing Transparency and Communication Effectiveness in the Event of
a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA, Vienna (2012), available at:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/enhancetransparency180612.pdf.
13
Nuclear safety requirements underscore the importance of capacity
building, as the abilities of all nuclear operators, regulators and other relevant
organizations require sufficient numbers of competent staff. The safety
requirements established in Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework
for Safety (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1)26 require that
at the national level, “[t]he government shall make provision for building and
maintaining the competence of all parties having responsibilities in relation to the
safety of facilities and activities.” GSR Part 1 also requires that “[a]s an essential
element of the national policy and strategy for safety, the necessary professional
training for maintaining the competence of a sufficient number of suitably
qualified and experienced staff shall be made available.”
In addition, the operating organization is to ensure that all activities that
may affect safety are performed by suitably qualified and competent persons, and
a regulatory body is to be established and maintained with the competence and
the resources necessary to fulfil its statutory obligations.27
To meet these needs, capacity building for nuclear safety needs to be
promoted through activities at the individual, organizational, national and global
levels. Activities need to be designed to take advantage of the strengths of each
of these levels. Each of the four pillars of capacity building requires a targeted
programme that addresses nuclear safety needs.
The life cycle of a nuclear power plant usually spans more than one
generation and government support is essential to develop a nationally coordinated
strategy for capacity building that encompasses all relevant stakeholders.
Capacity building for nuclear safety needs to be supported by governments
and through a national strategy to ensure that all stakeholders are involved during
the full life cycle of a nuclear power programme. National strategies can help
to identify the gaps in capacity building efforts at the national level, and can
also help to contribute to higher level objectives, such as a strong safety culture,
safety leadership and transparency.
26
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal and
Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
27
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants: Commissioning and Operation, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/2, IAEA,
Vienna (2011). INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal
and Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
14
The IAEA peer review services and their associated self-assessments, such
as SARCoN or ETReS, allow for the identification of capacity building needs
and provide a means of monitoring progress in building and sustaining capacity
in nuclear safety.
Peer review services are an important mechanism for exchanging
information and experience to strengthen nuclear safety in a harmonized and
transparent manner, both at the organizational and national levels. There is a
need for enhanced sharing of peer review mission findings for the benefit of all
Member States as a means to provide an improved knowledge base for capacity
building efforts.
The self-assessments that are associated with IAEA peer reviews are
important tools as they increase ownership and facilitate follow-up actions, while
ensuring that national priorities are taken into account.
Member States need to consider hosting peer reviews or conducting
self-assessments, sharing results in a transparent manner and ensuring that
appropriate follow-up actions are implemented.
28
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants: Commissioning and Operation, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/2, IAEA,
Vienna (2011).
15
The systematic approach to training needs to be embedded in the
organization’s management system, which allows for continuous improvement
and the ability to address issues such as quality management, staff development
and lifelong learning. While some qualifications included in the systematic
approach to training need to be formalized and codified, others, such as team
cooperation and gender or cultural awareness, need to be promoted as soft skills.
In both cases, regulatory oversight of the development and implementation of the
systematic approach to training is important.
Technical experts may have specific needs in terms of continuous learning,
and require a tailored systematic approach to training programmes. These needs
can be met through specific skills development plans, drills and exercises,
particularly for areas where prompt decision making is needed to implement
emergency response actions and accident mitigation measures.
A harmonized understanding of nuclear safety education and training, skills,
and competence standards is instrumental to building a sustainable and strong
safety culture, to which experts from a wide range of disciplines, both technical
and non-technical, can make important contributions. This understanding can also
facilitate the transfer of staff and knowledge between organizations or Member
States. This can contribute to individual career development based on established
qualification schemes, and contributes to nuclear safety worldwide.
Systematically conducted human resource needs analyses are useful
to identify capacity building needs in the short and medium term as well as to
assess and evaluate the effectiveness of current efforts.
Safety issues need to be incorporated into the training not only for nuclear
engineering, but also for other related technical and non-technical disciplines
so that the nuclear workforce, as a whole, has a sound understanding of safety
issues. Experts from non-technical disciplines, such as the behavioural sciences,
can significantly contribute to understanding the interaction of human,
organizational and technical factors and how they contribute to nuclear safety.
16
Increased emphasis needs to be placed on medium and long term planning
of capacity building and human resource development, particularly for those
Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme.
An integrated national human resource development plan needs to be
developed and regularly updated. The national government plays an important
role in initiating or leading the development of such a national plan. The plan
needs to include the current and expected human resource demand for the
different qualification levels and technical areas and be based on the overall plan
for the national nuclear power programme.
For Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme, a clear
understanding of the programme timeline and the implications for human resource
needs is essential. This understanding will allow the provision of sufficient
qualified and competent staff at the right time. In addition, greater attention needs
to be directed to the capacity building needs of regulatory bodies and TSOs.
It is important to clearly define and distinguish the roles of the government
and other relevant organizations for human resource development and
education and training. While education is primarily a national governmental
responsibility, individual organizations maintain human resource development
plans and recruitment programmes, which, in turn, are fed by the national human
resource pool.
The migration of the workforce between Member States has increased
and needs to be taken into account in any national or organizational planning.
Monitoring national workforce migration and organizational staff recruitment
trends, and consolidating the findings at the national level can contribute
to appropriately address these increases in migration.
17
Medium and long term knowledge management planning is needed
to effectively manage knowledge transfer to future generations. The life cycle
of a nuclear power plant can span several decades and many generations;
consequently, knowledge transfer to future generations is needed from normal
operation through to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Intergenerational
transfer of knowledge, experience and skills is important to inform the education
and training programmes for subsequent generations.
In addition, the activities undertaken to recover from a nuclear power
plant accident, as well as to deal with nuclear legacy situations, will also require
knowledge management and knowledge transfer over a period of decades. These
activities need the mobilization of knowledgeable and experienced national and
international personnel for extended periods of time. Sustaining these efforts
for decades is a challenge that requires medium and long term knowledge
management planning.
Nuclear safety knowledge needs to be managed proactively through
programmes at the national and organizational levels, particularly programmes
for regulatory bodies and TSOs.
At the national level, knowledge management requires the inclusion of all
relevant stakeholders. The processes for the creation, preservation and sharing
of knowledge need to be aligned with the nuclear power programme timelines
to ensure the right knowledge is available at the right time. These processes need
to be sustainable and need to take into consideration any anticipated technological
and societal changes.
At the organizational level, the availability of nuclear safety knowledge
is crucial for both operating organizations and regulatory bodies. Nuclear
safety knowledge needs to be managed by every relevant organization,
and the knowledge management process needs to be embedded into the
management system.
Although the responsibility for safety rests primarily with the operating
organization, governments and regulatory bodies also have an important
responsibility to establish standards and the regulatory framework to protect
people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.
Knowledge management is essential for regulatory bodies to effectively fulfil
their functions. IAEA safety standards require that a process be established
to develop and maintain the necessary competence and skills of staff of the
regulatory body, as an element of knowledge management.29
29
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal and
Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1, IAEA,
Vienna (2010).
18
5.5. KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS
30
A complete overview of the GNSSN is available at:
http://gnssn.iaea.org/More/Home.aspx.
19
Dissemination of nuclear safety knowledge is important in order to improve
and enhance public information and outreach, and can be facilitated through
nuclear safety knowledge and education networks.
Knowledge networks are useful mechanisms for reaching out to society and
building bridges between the nuclear sector and the public. Capacity building
programmes need to include public outreach and interaction with the community
so that basic nuclear knowledge becomes available to, and is shared by, a broader
societal group. This can also help to reduce boundaries between nuclear and
non-nuclear professions and to build a stable scientific and technical human
resource reservoir for nuclear professions.
Public perception and confidence depend on the availability and
communication of information. The regulator is often considered the main trusted
source of information. Regulatory bodies need to enhance communication,
transparency and sharing of regulatory knowledge and experience with interested
parties such as industry and the general public.
Existing regional nuclear safety knowledge networks, such as the Asian
Nuclear Safety Network, the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear
Regulatory Agencies, the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators and the Forum
of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa, can be used as models of efficient and
effective nuclear safety knowledge management mechanisms to share nuclear
safety information, good practices and practical experience. They can also
provide for a capacity building framework and enhance sustainable national
and regional nuclear safety infrastructures. Existing regional nuclear education
networks, such as the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology,
the Latin American Network for Education in Nuclear Technology and the
AFRA Network for Education Science and Technology are equally important
mechanisms in this context.
20
Both nuclear power plant operating organizations and regulatory bodies
require suitably qualified and experienced staff. The life cycle of nuclear facilities
usually spans more than one generation, and an overarching lesson is that human
resource capacity and knowledge management are essential for nuclear safety
and require ongoing programmes at the organizational, national and global
levels over the long term. National governments play a key role in supporting
the development of a nationally coordinated strategy for capacity building that
encompasses all relevant stakeholders.
National strategies can also help promote higher level objectives, such
as strong safety culture, safety leadership and transparency. The national
government is to make provisions for building and maintaining the competence
of human resources. National governments can be instrumental in developing
a harmonized understanding of nuclear safety education and training to which
experts from a wide range of disciplines, both technical and non-technical, can
make important contributions.
The challenges of capacity building differ depending on whether a Member
State is embarking, maintaining or expanding a nuclear power programme
or undertaking decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
The IAEA peer review services and associated self-assessments provide
a good means of monitoring progress and identifying gaps and areas for further
work and improvements in capacity building. Member States should consider
hosting such peer reviews or conducting self-assessments, sharing results in a
transparent manner and ensuring appropriate follow-up on recommendations.
A systematic approach to training needs to be integrated into the
management systems of all organizations relevant to nuclear safety. Safety issues
need to be incorporated into the curricula of higher education and training, not
only for nuclear engineering, but also for related technical and non-technical
subjects. In addition, expertise from non-nuclear disciplines can provide valuable
insights into the interaction of human, organizational and technical factors and
how they can contribute to nuclear safety.
Nuclear safety knowledge needs to be managed through programmes
at both the national and the organizational levels, including regulatory bodies
and TSOs. Nuclear regulators need to maintain the necessary nuclear safety
knowledge to carry out their legal function as regulator, both in terms of having
independent knowledge themselves and making informed decisions regarding
the appropriate knowledge of operators.
Knowledge networks are an effective mechanism to share knowledge,
to pool resources and to develop a harmonized understanding of nuclear safety
culture and leadership. One important objective of future work needs to be the
connection of all networks and initiatives under one single umbrella, such as the
21
GNSSN. Knowledge networks are also useful mechanisms that can help reach
out to society and build bridges between the nuclear sector and the public.
22
Annex A
CHAIRPERSON’S SUMMARY1
Thank you for participating in this conference and remaining until the
end. I would like to begin my closing remarks by looking back four years.
The 2010 Conference on Human Resource Development for Introducing and
Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes highlighted the importance of human
resources, the need to broaden nuclear curricula, emphasized governmental and
societal support, requested more cooperation in building human resources and
proposed a follow-up conference to be held to monitor progress.
In response, the IAEA organized this conference we are about to conclude.
It has focused on capacity building, human resource development, attracting
the next generation, education and training, nuclear knowledge management
and knowledge networks. I am pleased to say that the conference was very
successful. It was attended by more than 300 participants from 65 Member States
and 5 international organizations, a very good turnout, and an increase from
the 2010 Conference. Participation was also very broad and covered all types
of countries: newcomers, countries with expanding nuclear power programmes
and ‘mature’ countries. It also covered all types of institutions: from industry
to regulators to academia. This is clear evidence that capacity building and human
resource development continues to be of high interest to many Member States.
Let us now review the work we have done in the course of the last five days.
The first insight is that the drivers for capacity building are manifold:
countries with new programmes need to build up new capacity, countries with
expanding programmes need to recruit additional workforce and countries with
mature programmes need to ensure stable capacity and turnover. In addition,
nuclear safety and security requirements provide strong drivers, and the
importance of capacity building was rightly underlined in the IAEA Action Plan
on Nuclear Safety.
1
The opinions expressed in this Summary — and any recommendations made — are
those of the Chairperson and do not necessarily represent the views of the IAEA, its Member
States or other cooperating organizations.
23
A second insight is that in terms of nuclear activities, the world has
changed since the 2010 Conference. New nuclear power programmes have
started in several countries, we see a continuing globalization in nuclear power,
we expect the decommissioning of additional plants in countries with phase-out
policies and the Fukushima accident has led to additional safety enhancement.
I am pleased that an impressive number of activities in Member States
that address these challenges were presented, and that the IAEA has responded
to these developments as well with a host of activities. In all areas we heard about
this week — nuclear energy, nuclear safety and nuclear security — the IAEA
has active programmes that support capacity building in Member States. New
IAEA services and guidance have been developed, for example, the Capacity
Building Self-Assessment Methodology. New networks have been established
for nuclear education and training and nuclear safety and security. Other IAEA
services continue to play an important role, for example, the expanding catalogue
of training and e-learning courses. The IAEA’s technical cooperation programme
will remain essential in this area.
Against this background, and while we will continue to need to learn from
each other, we are now in a phase of implementing capacity building programmes
based on proven mechanisms.
A third important insight is that capacity building programmes need to cover
the full scope of the nuclear programme. They should encompass fuel, power
and waste facilities; consider government, regulators, industry, academia and
research; include all academic subjects needed; and cover nuclear programme
management and outreach into society at large.
As a fourth insight, we heard this week that capacity building is a real need
and is being addressed on many levels, all of which need to be considered:
24
—— On the global level, the globalization of the nuclear industry is mirrored
by an increased internationalization of university programmes, recruitment
and professional careers. A growing number of international cooperative
programmes, for example, in the area of networks in nuclear education,
safety and security, were presented.
25
—— Strategic outreach plans are crucial for workforce development,
commitment of the next generation and for building acceptance of nuclear
energy. Organizations should maintain and further develop pathways ‘from
education to employment’ and be ready to inspire, develop and encourage
the next generation. There is also a need to engage better with the public
so that dialogue with prospective future nuclear professionals becomes
more attractive.
—— Education and training programmes should be integrated into an overall
strategy for building and maintaining capacity, supported by governments.
For regulators, management of competencies is of particular importance,
and the Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs was
presented as a useful tool in that regard.
—— Networks have become a proven and key mechanism to support knowledge
sharing and capacity building and to foster harmonization and cooperation.
A large number of successful existing and new networks working
at corporate, national and international levels were presented this week.
—— Nuclear programmes are large scale and long term. The knowledge
required for the safe, reliable and efficient operation of nuclear facilities
is an asset that should be properly managed. Knowledge management
should address each area of a nuclear programme from design through
construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure
of nuclear facilities. Proper knowledge management contributes to meeting
a company’s strategic and business objectives. It is vital not only for
operating, design and construction companies, but also for regulatory
bodies, technical support organizations and for countries with mature
nuclear programmes as well as for newcomer countries.
26
There have been significant, practical developments since the
2010 Conference and we all look forward to the next occasion to continue our
discussions, possibly at another follow-up conference four or five years from now.
My thanks go in particular to all speakers, session chairs and co-chairs and
to the conference rapporteur. I also thank all participants for their valuable time,
attendance and contributions.
It was your participation that made this conference a success. Thank you.
Marta Ziakova
16 May 2014
27
Annex B
In the area of capacity building for nuclear safety, the IAEA is implementing
a number of activities, which were reported on at the 2014 conference. The
following chapter provides a brief summary of these activities.
1
Draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2011/59-GC(SS)/14, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
2
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Managing Regulatory Body
Competence, Safety Reports Series No. 79, IAEA, Vienna (2013).
28
The approach to education and training outlined here complements the
Strategic Approach to Education and Training in Radiation, Transport and
Waste Safety until 2020 that was established by the IAEA, which calls upon
Member States to develop national strategies for education and training in this
area. The related Education and Training Appraisal service has been hosted
by 14 Member States.
The IAEA has also invested efforts in strengthening capacity building
in the area of emergency preparedness and response, particularly in the light
of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. A recent achievement is linked to the IAEA
Response and Assistance Network (RANET) and the designation of the IAEA
RANET Capacity Building Centre in Fukushima Prefecture. This project
commenced in December 2012, following the signing of the Practical
Arrangements between the IAEA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
under the Memorandum of Cooperation between the IAEA and the Fukushima
Prefecture. Since then, a number of workshops related to nuclear and radiological
emergency preparedness and response have been conducted in this centre.
3
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Educational Programme in
Nuclear Security, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 12, IAEA, Vienna (2010).
29
programmes or courses in nuclear security using the materials developed
by INSEN experts and institutions, including a consortium of European
universities offering a pilot Master of Science programme which was
inaugurated by the Director General in 2014. Non-European universities
are following this lead.
—— The establishment of the international network of Nuclear Security Training
and Support Centres (NSSC), which helps to ensure sustainable nuclear
security by acting as a resource base to facilitate national training. This
network also provides technical support services for life cycle equipment
management and scientific support services for the detection of and
response to nuclear security events. Some 50 States have established such
centres or have plans to do so. The IAEA coordinates the activities of the
NSSC network with a view to strengthening nuclear security training and
support services as a cornerstone of national, regional and international
capacity building activities.
The value of this work and the importance of capacity building for nuclear
security was recognized in the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the International
Conference on Nuclear Security, which was organized by the IAEA and held
in Vienna in 2013, as well as by IAEA Member States through IAEA General
Conference resolutions and other international fora such as the 2014 Nuclear
Security Summit in The Hague4.
One of the main functions of the IAEA under its Statute is to “foster
the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses
of atomic energy”. Therefore, the IAEA is committed to facilitating the exchange
of information, experience and knowledge among its Member States.
While international cooperation has increased in recent years, nuclear
safety and security knowledge remains scattered all over the globe. Different
experiences, competencies and needs at the individual, organizational and
national levels continue to exist. In addition, countries with limited technical
infrastructure are embarking on nuclear power programmes. In this complex
environment, the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Framework (GNSSF)
represents a good and proven instrument for achieving a high level of nuclear
safety and security worldwide. The Global Nuclear Safety and Security
4
See http://www.nss2014.com/en.
30
Network (GNSSN), in this context, constitutes the heart of the GNSSF, and
brings together international legal instruments with the national nuclear safety
and security infrastructure. Moreover, the GNSSN supports the IAEA’s nuclear
safety and security programme. In line with the Action Plan, the GNSSN, as a
knowledge network, supports capacity building in Member States and contributes
to enhancing international cooperation and dialogue in the field of nuclear safety
and security.
Over the past few years, the GNSSN has become a worldwide gateway
to sharing nuclear safety and security knowledge and services to facilitate
capacity building among IAEA Member States. The IAEA has brought together
existing and new knowledge networks in nuclear safety and security under the
GNSSN. These networks include global networks such as the International
Regulatory Network, the Technical and Scientific Support Organization Forum
and the Global Safety Assessment Network. The GNSSN includes regional
networks such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, the Arab Network
of Nuclear Regulators, the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa and
the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies.
It also includes thematic networks such as the Regulatory Cooperation Forum,
the Forum for Senior Regulators of CANDU Reactors, the WWER Regulators’
Forum and the Control of Sources Network. Under the GNSSN, the IAEA
Incident and Emergency Centre launched the Emergency Preparedness Network
(EPnet) in September 2014. This serves as a collaborative network for emergency
preparedness and management professionals at all levels to share knowledge,
identify common issues and exchange solutions.
The GNSSN is an inclusive concept that links, complements and brings
together all existing networks and initiatives and is recognized as instrumental
in harmonizing approaches and adopting best practices to achieve sustainable
nuclear safety and security infrastructures. It is considered as the means to sustain
the implementation of the international legal framework and focuses on assisting
Member States in meeting their national responsibilities as well as their
international obligations. Since 2011, over 350 capacity building regional and
national activities were implemented under the GNSSN framework, gathering
together more than 3500 experts from 120 Member States.
31
Annex C
OPENING SESSION
Opening Remarks
D. Flory
Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and
Security, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Opening Remarks
A. Bychkov
Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Capacity Building
S. Mallick and B. Molloy
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
32
PRESENTATIONS
The Nuclear Power Institute Programs for Human Resource Development for the
Nuclear Industry
K.L. Peddicord
Texas A&M University, USA
Japan Nuclear Safety Institute’s Activities for Reflecting Lessons Learned from
the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
A. Kugo
Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI), JAPAN
33
Challenges in Building Capacity for a Nuclear Programme in the Philippines
E.M. Bacarra
Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology, Research
and Development, Department of Science and Technology (PCIEERD-DOST),
PHILIPPINES
Sudan Country Profile — Human Resource Development (HRD) for the First
Nuclear Power Programme
E.H. Elneel Yousif
Ministry of Science and Technology, SUDAN
Design and Safety Assessment Review Service (DSARS): The Safety Assessment
Advisory Programme (SAAP)
P. Hughes
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
34
Session 1C (Tuesday): Human Resources and Capacity Building
35
European Master in Innovation in Nuclear Energy (EMINE), Developed in the
Framework of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology,
KICINNOENERGY
J. Dies, et al.
Technical University of Catalonia (UPC), SPAIN
36
Human Resources Development in Tajikistan
U. Mirsaidov
Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency (NRSA), TAJIKISTAN
The Value of the Junior Professional Officer Program to the IAEA and its
Member States
S.E. Pepper
Brookhaven National Laboratory, USA
37
Educational Network Environment: Models and Implementation
H. Zhivitskaya
Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics, BELARUS
Education and Training Networks as a Tool for Nuclear Security Human Resource
Development and Capacity Building
D. Nikonov, A. Durczok and I.Y. Suh
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Nuclear Education and Training for Building and Sustaining Capacity from
Korean Experience
Youngmi Nam
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), REPUBLIC OF KOREA
38
EDF Skills Management for Operations
C. Poizat
Electricité de France (EDF), FRANCE
39
Nuclear Training Excellence Project in Slovenské elektrárne
A. Kvočková, M. Tonkovičová and M. Baláž
Slovenské elektrárne, SLOVAKIA
40
The Role of Computer-based Educational Laboratories in Nuclear Engineering
University Programmes
S.A. Korolev, A.N. Kosilov, E.V. Chernov and S.B. Vygovskiy
National Research Nuclear University MEPhI, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
41
Policy, Development and Delivery of Education and Training Programmes
in Radiation Protection: A Crucial Contribution to the Safe Use of Ionising
Radiation
M. Coeck
SCK•CEN Academy, BELGIUM
Country Presentation
N. Kone
Malian Radiation Protection Agency (AMARAP), MALI
42
Knowledge Management at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
J. Hudson
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), USA
How Knowledge Mapping is Being Used to Integrate Plans for Safe and Reliable
Operations
J. Day
Sellafield Ltd, UK
43
Session 4C (Thursday): Knowledge Management
44
Knowledge Management Course for Master Program in Nuclear Engineering
N.I. Geraskin, A.N. Kosilov and E.G. Kulikov
National Research Nuclear University MEPhI, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
45
The Storer System: A Tool for Traceability and Radioactive Wastes Record
Preservation
C.L. Vetere, P.R. Gomiz and M.B. Lavalle
National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), ARGENTINA
46
Nuclear Education, Training and Outreach in Latin America and the Caribbean
Region
A.T. Chavez Flores, R.O. Barrachina, J.L. François and M. Sbaffoni
National Atomic Energy Commission, ARGENTINA
CLOSING SESSION
47
Closing Remarks for the International Conference on Human Resource
Development for Nuclear Power Programmes: Building and Sustaining Capacity
A. Bychkov
Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
15-22481
48
IAEA Report on