Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S.

Policy

January 23, 2023

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47394
 SUMMARY

R47394
Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
January 23, 2023
Haiti, located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola and bordering the Dominican
Republic, is in the midst of interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. As of early Clare Ribando Seelke
2023, Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and mayors following the July 2021 Specialist in Latin
assassination of President Jovenel Moïse; the terms of the last ten elected senators expired in American Affairs
January 2023. A political standoff between de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s government
and rival political and civil society leaders, many of whom have backed a proposal (the
Karla I. Rios
“Montana Accord”) to form a transitional government, has prevented the country from
Analyst in Latin American
scheduling elections to replace officials whose terms have expired.
Affairs

The ongoing political impasse also has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security
and humanitarian crises caused by rampant gang violence, food and fuel shortages, a resurgence
of cholera, and an August 2021 earthquake that killed 2,000 people. In October 2022, Henry
asked for a foreign security force to help reestablish control and enable humanitarian aid deliveries; many Haitian civil
society groups oppose this request, and no country has offered to lead such a force. The Biden Administration and Congress
may look to assess potential policy options for addressing the compound crises in Haiti, which continue to fuel instability and
irregular U.S. bound-migration.

U.S. Policy
U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitians in their efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions
leading to free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. In FY2022, the Biden Administration allocated an
estimated $219.2 million in foreign assistance for Haiti to support those goals, including increased support for the Haitian
National Police. Haiti also receives significant U.S. humanitarian assistance, including at least $79.2 million in FY2022.

The Biden Administration’s approach toward Haiti has evolved from supporting the Henry government to working with the
United Nations (U.N.) and other international actors to push Henry, his rivals, and other stakeholders to reach an inclusive
political accord. Since October 2022, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned five current and
former Haitian officials and denied visas to dozens of additional individuals and their family members.

The Administration also has sought to facilitate a broader international response to the deteriorating security and
humanitarian situations in Haiti. In response to worsening conditions and Henry’s request for international assistance, the
United States and Mexico drafted a resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers; the U.N. Security
Council passed this resolution in October 2022. Separately, the United States and Mexico proposed, but did not yet draft, a
resolution to send a non-U.N.-led security assistance mission to Haiti. Since October 2022, the United States has supported
Canada’s sanctioning of additional politicians and business elites beyond those subject to U.S. sanctions, including former
President Michel Martelly (2011-2016).

Congressional Action
As in prior Congresses, the 117th Congress enacted legislation, appropriated and conditioned foreign assistance, and
conducted oversight of U.S. policy toward Haiti. Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional
Transparency Initiative (HAITI Act) as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division V).
The act withheld aid to the central government of Haiti, until certain conditions were met. It also required U.S. agencies to
measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and efforts to address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms
in Haiti. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2023 (P.L. 117-328, Division K), did not designate a total funding level
for Haiti but includes similar conditions on foreign assistance as enacted in the HAITI Act. The explanatory statement
accompanying P.L. 117-328 urged the Secretary of State to use “every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for dialogue”
among political leaders and to take “strong legal action” against those engaged in human rights abuses, corruption, and other
illicit activities. In addition, the 117th Congress held hearings on U.S. policy toward Haiti, U.S. treatment of Haitian migrants,
Haiti’s April 2022 selection as one of the priority countries of focus under the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), and
Haitian-led solutions to the country’s crises.

Moving forward, the 118th Congress may weigh in on U.S. foreign assistance, sanctions, and other policies aimed at
ameliorating the crises in Haiti. Congressional interest in Haiti also may be reflected in broader concerns about irregular
U.S.-bound migration.

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 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 2
Background ............................................................................................................................... 2
The Aftermath of President Moïse’s Assassination................................................................... 4
Security Crisis ................................................................................................................................. 5
Humanitarian Situation.................................................................................................................... 8
U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action ...................................................................................... 9
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress ............................................................................................... 11
Foreign Assistance .................................................................................................................. 12
Bilateral Assistance ........................................................................................................... 12
Humanitarian Assistance ................................................................................................... 13
Global Fragility Act Implementation ................................................................................ 14
Donor Coordination .......................................................................................................... 15
Trade Preferences .................................................................................................................... 15
Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral ............................................................................................. 16
Indictments .............................................................................................................................. 17
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 17
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Criminal Dynamics in Haiti ............................................................................................. 6

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2023 ..................................... 13

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 18

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 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy

Introduction
Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see
Figure 1), has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential
administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability
to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its
history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster
killed more than 200,000 people and set development back decades. Despite extensive
international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country
continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and
natural disasters, including an August 2021 earthquake that killed 2,000.
Haiti at a Glance The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after
Capital: Port-au-Prince the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in
Population: 12.2 million (2023, IMF est.) July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would
Languages: French (official), Creole (official) succeed him. Two days before the
Area: 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be
Massachusetts prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in.
GDP: $21.9 billion (2022, current prices, IMF est.) Since most legislators’ terms had expired at the
Real GDP Growth: -1.8% (2021); -1.2% (2022); time of the assassination, the Haitian legislature
0.5% (2023, forecast) (% change, constant prices, IMF) lacked the quorum needed to select a president
Per Capita GDP: $1,790 (2023, current prices, IMF to serve out the remainder of Moïse’s term, as
est.) outlined in the Haitian Constitution.
Life Expectancy: 60.4/66.1 years (male/female)
(UNDP, 2021)
As of early 2023, Haiti still lacks an elected
president, legislature, and local government. A
Maternal Mortality Ratio: 480/100,000 live births
(UNDP, 2022) political standoff between de facto Prime
Minister Henry’s government and opposition
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). political and civil society leaders regarding
how to form a transitional government to
stabilize the country and convene elections persists. The standoff continues amid a worsening
security crisis. Following a September 2022 announcement by Prime Minister Henry that fuel
subsidies would end, protests and gang-led violence erupted.3 After gangs took over the ports,
highways, and main fuel terminal, the economy ground to a halt and humanitarian agencies lost
access to some areas. In October, cholera resurfaced after a three-year hiatus. Henry requested
international intervention in Haiti in October 2022, but the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council has not yet voted on a resolution responding to that request.4
The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and
humanitarian crises in Haiti and the Henry government’s request for international intervention.
This report provides a brief overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date.

1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, Haiti: the Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe
Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History: From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation (New York, NY: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 2010).
2 International Crisis Group, Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007.

3 U.N. Security Council, “Letter Dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the

Security Council,” S/2022/747, October 10, 2022. Hereinafter, Security Council, S/2022/747.
4 For a description of the type of resolution the United States and Mexico had envisioned in response to Henry’s

request, see United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a
U.N. Security Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022.

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Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).

Political Situation
Background
Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the
Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long
periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural
disasters.5 After the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate
democratic rule have had limited success.6 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s
first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left Fanmi
Lavalas party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed
Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term

5 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France
of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about
the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al.,
“Haiti’s Lost Billions,” New York Times, May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915-
1934 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).
6 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the

regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the
leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, vol. V, document 309, at
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Mexico,
Cuba, and the Caribbean, vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1977-80v23/d253.

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after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections
favoring Fanmi Lavalas in May 2000. In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his
rule as well as U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.7
From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force
that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National
Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after the 2010 earthquake. The legacy of
MINUSTAH is complicated, as troops introduced cholera into the country and committed human
rights and sexual abuses. This experience has led many Haitians to oppose the type of foreign
military involvement requested by the Henry government.8
Haiti’s most recent presidents, Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel
Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), took office
after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.9 Under
Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, anti-government protests, and
gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians from across the political spectrum, Moïse allegedly
provided money and arms to gangs in exchange for favors, including suppressing anti-
government protests such as those that erupted in 2018 after announced fuel price hikes.10
Government instability increased in 2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the
country’s chief prosecutor alleging Moïse and other current and former officials had
misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in public funds.11
Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not
organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower
Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all
local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter,
Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021
or February 2022 (the State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13

7 Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005), pp.
83-90.
8 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of

a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” Conflict,
Security & Development, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced
recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in
Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022.
9 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” Global

Americans, December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner,
“Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November
21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug
Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” New York Times, December 12, 2021.
10 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,”

InSight Crime, November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests
occurred, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to

Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-C-

Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.
12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023.

13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and

International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf.

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On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au-
Prince. To this day, many details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has filed charges against three individuals for their role in a
plot to kidnap or kill Moïse.14 The FBI has also been supporting Haitian authorities’ investigation
of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities, turnover among the judges leading
the investigation, and break-ins at judges’ offices have occurred. By the end of 2022, Haitian
police had arrested, but not charged, at least 23 people accused of planning the plot, including 18
former Colombian soldiers, members of Moïse’s security team, a former rebel leader, a former
divisional police inspector, and a Haitian-American pastor with long-standing ties to Florida.15

The Aftermath of President Moïse’s Assassination

Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and
who would serve as prime minister.16 Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president
dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve
out the term.17 As Haiti lacked (and continues to lack) a functioning legislature at the time of the
assassination, the choice of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed
constitutional order.
Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph;
Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but
not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 8, the Haitian
government requested security and investigative assistance from the United States. In response to
that request, an inter-agency delegation traveled to Haiti on July 11. U.S. officials also met with
all three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who
would become prime minister and who would fill key cabinet positions, Joseph agreed that Henry
would be prime minister and he foreign minister on July 12.18 Lambert separately gave up his
quest to be prime minister; the U.S. government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July
17, the United States, United Nations, and other international donors issued a statement calling
for the formation of an “inclusive government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel
Henry to form such a government.19
In September 2021, Henry dismissed Haiti’s electoral council. He and his supporters then
proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to convene elections. They also
proposed that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected government takes
office. By early 2023, Henry has yet to appoint that council, and many civil society and political
actors within Haiti have opposed this proposal. Henry’s irregular path to his position and

14 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on the Assassination of Former President of Haiti Jovenel Moïse,
(Div. V, P.L. 117-103), November 10, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/.
15 Jacqueline Charles, “Made in Miami: How a South Florida Plot to Oust Haiti’s Jovenel Moïse Led to His Murder,”

Miami Herald, December 8, 2022; Jacqueline Charles, “Ex-Rebel Leader Known as ‘the Torturer’ Is Arrested in Haiti
President’s Assassination,” Miami Herald, December 21, 2022.
16 CRS Insight IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential Assassination, by Maureen Taft-Morales.

17 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en.
18 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023.

19 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.

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allegations of his possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, however, have eroded his
credibility.20 Henry has fired officials who have sought to question him about the Moïse case.21
As an alternative to Henry’s proposal, numerous civil society organizations and political parties
have sought to form an interim government. After months of broad consultations, the Citizen
Conference for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (widely known as the Montana Group) came to an
agreement in August 2021.22 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led
by a president and prime minister, with oversight committees, to restore order, administer
elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human rights violations.
Although many civic leaders and political parties signed the accord, some did not (including
some business groups, churches, and the PHTK and allied parties). U.S. officials have
periodically criticized the Montana Group, including after it signed an agreement with the PEN
coalition, a group whose signatories include U.S.-sanctioned former Senator Lambert.23
As of January 2023, Henry and the Montana Group have been unable to reach a negotiated
solution. In October 2022, Henry and his advisers requested foreign intervention to address the
worsening security and humanitarian crises.24 Many Haitian political and civil society groups
opposed the request, and critics maintain that Henry wants an intervention to help him remain in
power and protect his and allied interests, much as past Haitian leaders did.25 Recent U.S. and
Canadian sanctions targeting Haitian politicians and business leaders, some of whom have
opposed negotiations or reportedly have benefitted from the unrest, could spur renewed efforts to
break the political impasse.26
Henry put forth a transition proposal in December 2022 named the “National Consensus for an
Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections.” His government published a decree establishing
a high transition council (HTC) to implement that transition plan in the state’s official newsletter
on January 17, 2023. It is yet unclear whether the plan will receive broad support.

Security Crisis
Since Moïse’s assassination, violent gangs have threatened to overwhelm the Haitian government
and businesses, many of which have long been the gangs’ primary benefactors. The symbiotic
relationship between the gangs in Haiti and the country’s political and economic elite is well
established. Many of Haiti’s past presidents and other prominent politicians have used and
received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as
campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and disruption (see
depiction in Figure 2).27 Former President Aristide relied on support from gangs known as

20 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill,
February 8, 2022.
21 As an example, see “Haiti’s PM Replaces The Prosecutor Who Wanted Him Charged In The President’s Slaying,”

Associated Press (AP), September 14, 2021.

22 Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022.

23 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023.

24 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022.

25 Jonathan M. Katz, “Haiti’s Elites Keep Calling for the U.S. Marines,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2022.

26 David C. Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions Against Haitian Politicians and Businessmen Accused of Ties

to Gangs,” UnivisionNews, December 19, 2022 (hereinafter Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”).
27 Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, Power, and an Escalating Crisis, October

2022. Hereinafter: Global Initiative, Gangs of Haiti.

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chimères, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in
financing gangs.28
The relationship between Haiti’s economic elite and gangs is less apparent but no less significant
than the ties between politicians and gangs. Business owners assert they have to support certain
gangs as a defensive measure to protect their businesses and enable them to move merchandise
throughout the country and abroad.29 In addition, some of Haiti’s top economic elites allegedly
finance gangs to bolster both licit and illicit businesses. In December 2022, the Canadian
government imposed sanctions on Gilbert Bigio, Reynold Deeb, and Sherif Abdallah, three elites
who reportedly provided “illicit financial and operational support to armed gangs.”30
Gangs have expanded their power in the wake of Moïse’s assassination. They have exerted
control over territory, highways, ports, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, challenging the
authority of the HNP and other state institutions. Gangs were responsible for an October 2021
kidnapping of U.S. missionaries and a blockade of the country’s primary fuel terminal from
September to early November 2022.31

Figure 2. Criminal Dynamics in Haiti

Source: CRS, based on a graphic from InSight Crime for the U.S. Agency for International Development,
November 2021, at https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00ZF3H.pdf.

28 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The Chimères, Their Activities and Their Geographic Presence;
the Treatment of the Chimères by the Authorities and the Presence of Group Members Within the Government and the
Police (2006-May 2008), June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President
Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022.
29 Alberto Arce and Rodrigo Abd, “In Haiti, the Difficult Relationship of Gangs and Business,” Associated Press,

October 21, 2021.

30 Government of Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022.

31 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), “Haitian Gang Leader Charged with Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking for

Kidnapping of 16 U.S. Missionaries in Fall 2021,” May 10, 2022; Henry Shuldiner, “From Negotiations to Sanctions, a
Busy Time for Crime in Haiti,” InSight Crime, November 11, 2022.

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As of late 2021, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) cited up to 200 gangs
in Haiti, which reportedly controlled some 60% of Port-au-Prince at that time.32 The G9 and
Family (G9) and the G-PEP are two of Haiti’s most powerful gang federations. From January to
August 2022, as gangs clashed, police recorded 25.5% more homicides than the same period in
2021. 33 Kidnappings reached a record level in May 2022 and remain elevated. A wave of gang-
related violence in Port-au-Prince in July 2022 resulted in more than 220 killings in one
neighborhood. According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-
based violence against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people.34
Although the State Department asserted that the HNP ranked among the “most trusted and
effective institutions in Haiti” after MINUSTAH left the country, the U.N. Secretary-General
described the police force in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons, equipment, and the
capacity to use them.35 Some studies also indicate the HNP has struggled with widespread
criminal cooptation and infiltration. For example, a July 2022 International Crisis Group study
estimated that 40% of the HNP has ties to gangs.36 A 2021 report by Harvard Law School’s
International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in attacks on
neighborhoods, which it termed “massacres,” in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to
2020.37
Even when police have sought to confront gangs and broader violence, the challenges have been
daunting. In November 2022, the director of the HNP’s training center was assassinated at that
facility.38 Also in November, the HNP temporarily lost control of a U.S.-delivered armored
vehicle during a firefight with gangs that resulted in two deaths.39
Furthermore, impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve
Moïse’s assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP
officer turned gang leader, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre of
71 people.40 Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022, and many of
the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons continue to hold

32 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Mapping Haiti’s Criminal Dynamics, November 2021; Global
Initiative, Gangs of Haiti.
33 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-General, October 13, 2022.

34 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),

Sexual Violence in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022. Hereinafter BINUH
and OHCHR, Sexual Violence.
35 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “Haiti Summary,” at

https://2017-2021.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/haiti-
summary/index.html; Security Council, S/2022/747.
36 International Crisis Group, New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists, July 27, 2022.

37 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti,

April 2021, at http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Killing_With_Impunity-1.pdf.

38 Associated Press, “Head of Haiti’s Police Academy Killed at Training Facility,” November 25, 2022.

39 Evens Sanon and Megan Janetsky, “Haitian Police Briefly Lose Control of Armored Car,” Associated Press,

November 11, 2022.

40 Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph

Pierre Richard Duplan planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the government. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,”
December 10, 2020.

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inmates, 82% of whom were in pretrial detention in May 2021, in crowded conditions rife with
violence and disease. Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care.41
In addition, corruption and a lack of control over the country’s ports and borders have made Haiti
a hub for drug and arms trafficking. In August 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) office in Miami, FL, announced new initiatives to
counter reported spikes in arms and munitions trafficking to Haiti.42 In December 2022, the State
Department sanctioned Rommel Bell, former customs director in Haiti, for corruption after
Haiti’s anti-corruption unit launched an investigation in early 2022 into Bell’s alleged
participation in illegal arms trafficking.43

Humanitarian Situation
Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and
topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s
capacity to respond to such disasters is limited. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake,
inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane
Matthew, the 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019
[COVID-19]) have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.44
The Fund for Peace’s 2022 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 11th most fragile state in the
world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver
services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.45
In contrast to past humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, a political and security crisis is the
primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.46 According to U.N. officials, as of
December 2022, gang violence had displaced 155,000 people in Port-Au-Prince and trapped
19,000 in communities such as Cité Soleil.47 Gang blockades of highways have limited
humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to communities to the east
and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel terminal from mid-
September to early November 2022 combined with broad unrest, caused businesses and hospitals
to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang violence, sheltered in place
amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and food. The U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 5.2 million Haitians were in need of
humanitarian aid as of the end of 2022.48

41 BINUH and OHCHR, “N Ap Mouri”: Report on Conditions of Detention in Haiti, May 2021.
42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Announces Crackdown on
Firearms, Ammunition Smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean,” August 19, 2022.
43 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 2, 2022; Jacqueline

Charles, “U.S. Sanctions More Haitians, Including the Relatives of People Accused of Corruption,” Miami Herald,
December 11, 2022.
44 On recovery efforts, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left

Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); and Jacqueline Charles and José Antonio Iglesias, “Ten
Years After Haiti’s Earthquake: A Decade of Aftershocks and Unkept Promises,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2020. On
subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.”
45 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.

46 UNOCHA, “Seven Things to Know About the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022.

47 Reuters, “U.N. Expects Haiti Sanctions Regime to be Running by January,” December 8, 2022.

48 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Global Humanitarian Overview 2023,

December 2022.

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Some of the ongoing humanitarian concerns focus on food insecurity, health, protection, and
education. In October 2022, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that a
record 4.7 million Haitians, roughly 50% of the population, faced acute levels of hunger and
19,000 people were experiencing “catastrophic” (most urgent) levels of hunger.49 In October
2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti, causing 300 deaths by December.50 While cholera is
preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration, gangs have reportedly prevented
patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry to affected communities. Women
and children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to protection concerns. An October 2022 report by
the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights has described how gender-based violence by gangs against youth as young as 10 is
widespread and increasing.51 As of December 2022, due to increasing violence and cholera
outbreaks, hundreds of thousands of students, already years behind due to COVID-19-related
school closures, had not returned to school.52

U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action

The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 19 years, with strong support and
funding provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse of the
Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help restore
order and train the HNP.53 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded
MINUSTAH’s size and mission.
A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a
long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone; critics argue, however, that a
transitional government, not the U.N.-backed PHTK government, accomplished that goal.54 The
Security Council also praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing
the police, and improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived.
Haitian and international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in
introducing cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a
century) and for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.55 In 2016, then-Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in an outbreak that ultimately caused nearly
10,000 deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.56

49 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Catastrophic Hunger Levels Recorded for
the First Time in Haiti,” October 14, 2022.
50 USAID, “Haiti-Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2023, December 16, 2022.

51 BINUH and OHCHR, October 2022.

52 U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “UNICEF Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report: July-November 2022,” December

16, 2022.
53 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April

2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability,
promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and
protect human rights.
54 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April

2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis
after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’:
Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021.
55 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by

Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

56 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help

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In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) took MINUSTAH’s place,
focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the HNP’s
professionalization, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence-
reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the
number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files
processed on the day of their reception.57 However, Haitians continued to report increased sexual
violence and widespread cholera cases.58
In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti
(BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s
mandate, which currently runs through July 2023,59 is to advise the Haitian government on how to
establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so
elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting
human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing
reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.60 BINUH coordinates
with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the
World Food Program to a new U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime office in Haiti.
On October 6, 2022, Acting Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment of
an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian
aid to flow. On October 8, 2022, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the
Security Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request. Such approaches
included deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to
support the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational anti-gang
force, expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and
combating arms trafficking.61 On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed
resolution by the United States and Mexico, which would reportedly authorize the deployment of
a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.62 Few countries have publicly offered to send their forces
to Haiti.63 Nevertheless, at the January 2023 North American Leaders Summit, Canadian Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau said that Canada, Mexico, the United States, and Caribbean leaders have
been in contact to “ensure that if the situation starts to deteriorate once again, we will have
options.”64
On October 17, 2022, the Security Council also discussed a resolution sponsored by the United
States and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those

Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the
pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021 Annual Report.
57 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive

Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019.

58 International Justice Resource Center, “U.N. Transitions from Peacekeeping to Governance, Amid Crisis in Haiti,”

October 17, 2019.

59 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate.

60 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence.

61 Security Council, S/2022/747.

62 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security

Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. Security Council Report, “Haiti: Briefing,” in What’s in Blue (blog),
December 21, 2022 (hereinafter Security Council Report, “Haiti”).
63 International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect of Foreign Intervention, December 14, 2022.

64 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Trudeau, and President López Obrador in Joint

Press Conference,” January 10, 2023.

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who finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution
(Resolution 2653) on October 21, 2022, and met on December 21, 2022, to follow up on
implementation of that resolution.65

U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress

U.S. policy goals in Haiti under the Biden Administration include supporting Haitian-led efforts
to confront gangs and insecurity; resolving the political and constitutional crisis; reviving the
economy; and addressing poverty and a lack of basic services (including health care and
education), which have fueled irregular migration.66 Diplomatically, the Biden Administration’s
approach to Haiti has evolved from supporting the Henry government to encouraging Henry, the
Montana Group, and others to engage in dialogue to reach an inclusive political accord while
addressing deteriorating conditions in the country.67 Biden Administration officials traveled to
Haiti in October 2022 to discuss how to respond to Henry’s request for international assistance
and to urge political actors to “rise above their differences” and chart a path to “improved
security” and “democratic order.”68 Secretary of State Antony Blinken also announced additional
assistance to address cholera, security assistance for the HNP, and new sanctions to hold Haitians
accountable for “instigating violence and unrest.”69
Since Moïse’s assassination, U.S. Canada, U.N. officials and others, criticized for past
interventions in the country, have emphasized their support for Haitian-led solutions to the
country’s political and security challenges. As those solutions have yet to emerge and conditions
in Haiti have deteriorated, U.S. officials reportedly have pursued several courses of action. The
U.S. government has sanctioned corrupt officials and encouraged other countries to do so;
supported back-channel negotiations between Henry and other key stakeholders; and assessed
whether a partner country would be willing to lead a non-U.N. “multinational force” funded by
voluntary contributions to help stabilize the country.70 President Biden and Prime Minister
Trudeau discussed Haiti during the North American Leaders Summit, during which they stressed
sanctions and other efforts to improve the situation in the country, but also potential other options.
Rather than focusing on organizing some type of intervention, many Haitian human rights experts
and civil society groups have asked U.S. officials to push Henry to reach a political agreement,
likely with the Montana Group, before considering intervention proposals.71
On many U.S. policy issues, Congress has had a direct role in shaping policy or conducting
oversight of policy development and implementation. Those policy issues include, but are not
limited to, foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration.

65 Security Council, “Resolution 2653 (2022), October 21, 2022; Security Council Report, “Haiti.”
66 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Haiti, approved March 18, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ICS_WHA_Haiti_Public.pdf (hereinafter State Department, Integrated Country Strategy).
67 Brian A. Nichols, “U.S., Other Nations Can Redouble Efforts for a Democratic Haiti,” Miami Herald, July 6, 2022.

68 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Media Note: Assistant Secretary Brian A. Nichols to Visit

Haiti,” October 12, 2022.

69 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Steps to Address the Humanitarian and Security

Situation in Haiti,” October 12, 2022.

70 Adams, “U.S. and Canada Turn to Sanctions”; International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the

Prospect for Foreign Intervention, briefing no. 48, December 14, 2022.
71 Pierre Espérance, “As Haiti’s Last 10 Lawmakers’ Terms Expire, Political Transition Must Take Priority over

Military Intervention,” Just Security, December 15, 2022.

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Foreign Assistance

Bilateral Assistance
Congress has appropriated foreign assistance to support Haiti’s recovery from recurrent natural
disasters and foster long-term stability, with a particular spike in assistance in the aftermath of a
massive 2010 earthquake. Congress shapes U.S. policy toward Haiti through appropriations,
conditions on appropriations, and reporting requirements linked to the disbursement of U.S.
assistance.
Congress enacted the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative
(HAITI Act; H.R. 2471/S. 1104) as part of the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L.
117-103). P.L. 117-103 did not designate an appropriations level for Haiti. The act required the
State Department to withhold any funding for the central government of Haiti until a new
president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or the Secretary of
State has determined a transitional government representative of Haitian society is in place and it
is in the U.S. interest to provide assistance. Notwithstanding those requirements, the act allowed
U.S. agencies to provide assistance to support elections, anti-gang police and justice
administration, public health, food security, water and sanitation, education, disaster relief and
recovery, and other programs to meet basic human needs. The act prohibited U.S. funding for the
Haitian army.
The HAITI Act also required U.S. agencies to measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and
efforts to address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The State
Department submitted the reports required in P.L. 117-103 and made them public on November
10, 2022.72
Over the last five years, U.S. bilateral assistance to Haiti has ranged from a low of $180.3 million
in FY2020 to an estimated $219.2 million provided in FY2022 (see Table 1). In March 2022, the
State Department and USAID adopted a two-year Integrated Country Strategy to guide U.S.
foreign assistance to Haiti for FY2022-FY2024.73 The Administration requested $274.8 million in
assistance for Haiti in FY2023, up from the estimated FY2022 allocation. Most of the FY2022
allocation funded health and other development activities, but it also increased support for the
HNP (see Table 1). In the FY2023 budget proposal, the Administration requested funding to help
Haiti recover from external shocks by making investments in the HNP, combating corruption,
strengthening civil society, and providing services for marginalized people.74
The FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328), enacted in December 2022, does
not specify a comprehensive appropriations level for Haiti. The accompanying explanatory
statement designates $8.5 million for reforestation efforts and “not less than” $5.0 million to help
meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act requires the State
Department to withhold any aid to support the Haitian government until the Secretary of State
certifies that a new president and parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or
that a broadly representative transitional government is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to
provide such assistance. The withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support
free and fair elections; anti-gang police and justice administration; disaster relief and recovery;

72 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Haiti: Reports,” November 10, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/haiti-reports/.
73 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy.

74 White House, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2023, p. 91.

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and education, public health, food security, and other basic human needs. As in prior years, the
act prohibits assistance for the armed forces of Haiti.
The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-328 also urges the Secretary of State to use
“every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for dialogue” among political leaders and key
stakeholders. In addition, it urges the Secretary of State to take “strong legal action” against those
engaged in human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities.75

Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2023

(appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2022 FY2023
Account FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 (Estimate) (Request)

DA 32,000 51,000 51,000 52,000 56,000 111,000

ESF 8,500 — — 14,800a 5,500 —
FFP 3,244 11,719 7,996 3,110 — —
GHP (State) 99,386 103,011 78,765 99,822 103,081 100,000
GHP (USAID) 24,200 24,500 24,500 24,500 24,500 34,500
INCLE 12,000 15,000 18,000 13,000 30,000 29,000
IMET 233 241 96 255 107 255
FMF 5,000 — — — — —
Total 184,563 205,471 180,357 207,487 219,188 274,755

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Supplementary Tables-Foreign

Operations, FY2020-FY2023; and U.S. Department of State, FY2022 Estimate Data, August 16, 2022.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FFP = Food for Peace; GHP = Global
Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military
Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing. Additional FY2021 funding provided by the American
Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2).

Humanitarian Assistance
The United States generally provides various forms of humanitarian assistance to Haiti. USAID’s
Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) provided more than $92.1 million in humanitarian
assistance to Haiti in FY2021 and at least $79.2 million in FY2022 through July 8, 2022.76 Of the
total amount of humanitarian assistance provided over the past two fiscal years, $152.8 million
represented emergency funding, much of which responded to humanitarian needs (i.e., concerns
about food; health; water, sanitation, and hygiene; and protection) exacerbated by an August 2021
earthquake that killed some 2,250 people and damaged 115,000 homes and other structures. BHA

75 “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R.
2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 198—book II (December 20,
2022), p. S9299.
76 USAID, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, “Haiti Assistance Overview,” August 2022.

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also provided $18.6 million in early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience programming.77 The
Department of Defense (DOD) worked with USAID to deliver some 600,000 relief supplies.78
As the humanitarian situation in Haiti worsened, USAID sent a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) team to the country in October 2022. The DART is coordinating the delivery of
relief supplies to a portion of the estimated 5.2 million Haitians in need of humanitarian
assistance.79 Since October, USAID/BHA has helped transport 278 metric tons of relief supplies
to Port-Au-Prince.
U.S. agencies also are helping Haiti respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and other health needs.
Through June 2022, USAID and the State Department had provided at least $49 million in aid to
help Haiti address the health and humanitarian impacts of COVID-19.80 The United States has
donated nearly 1.1 million COVID-19 vaccines to Haiti; 2.1% of Haitians had completed the
recommended COVID-19 vaccination schedule as of December 2022.81 In December 2022, DOD
deployed the U.S. Naval Ship Comfort to deliver medical care to Haitians for several days as part
of a multi-country deployment.82

Global Fragility Act Implementation

The 116th Congress enacted the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (GFA; P.L. 116-94, Division J, Title
V), which directed the executive branch to develop a 10-year strategy to prevent conflict globally
and stabilize conflict-affected areas. It also directed the executive branch to select priority
countries or regions to execute such efforts through 10-year plans. In April 2022, the Biden
Administration announced one region and four priority countries for GFA implementation; Haiti
was among them. The GFA also authorized three distinct funds: the Prevention and Stabilization
Fund, the Complex Crisis Fund, and the Multi-Donor Global Fragility Fund. These funds support
the updated prologue of the Global Fragility Strategy put forth by the Biden Administration and
country implementation plans, which were due to Congress in December 2022.
Development experts have urged U.S. agencies to focus GFA efforts in Haiti on bolstering a
Haitian-led solution that ensures citizen security, addresses Haiti’s escalating impunity, and
provides humanitarian and economic support for those affected by the country’s interrelated
political, economic, and security crises.83
Some Members of Congress have debated whether Haiti should receive some types of GFA-
related funding. This debate may reflect, in part, the absence of viable government entities with
whom to execute the GFA country plan (§505(a)). Although it did not appear in the FY2023
Omnibus Appropriations Act, the FY2023 Senate-introduced version of the FY2023 State and

77 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/

#covid_map_link; Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” at
https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp.
78 U.S. Southern Command, “USNS Comfort Arrives in Haiti,” December 13, 2022.

79 USAID, “Haiti-Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #1, FY2023, October 21, 2022; USAID, “Haiti-Complex

Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2, FY2023, December 16, 2022.

80 USAID, “COVID-19: Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #5, FY2022, June 30, 2022.

81 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution,” at https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/haiti/

#covid_map_link; and Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” at
https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp.
82 U.S. Southern Command, “USNS Comfort Arrives in Haiti,” December 13, 2022.

83 Roger Mitchell, “Why the Global Fragility Act Matters for Haiti,” Modern Diplomacy, August 25, 2022.

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Foreign Operations Appropriations measure, S. 4662, would not have made Prevention and
Stabilization funds available to Haiti.

Donor Coordination
The United States is the leading bilateral donor in Haiti, and Congress has encouraged U.S.
executive agencies to coordinate foreign assistance priorities with key countries and international
organizations represented in Haiti. Active since 2004, the “Core Group” has shaped international
responses to key events in Haiti, as when it called on Henry to form a “consensual and inclusive
government” in July 2021.84 In addition to the U.S. Ambassador, the Core Group comprises the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; the Ambassadors of Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU); and the Special Representative of the
Organization of American States.
Many members of the Core Group (including the EU, Spain, and France) have expressed interest
in contributing to a multi-donor basket fund on security that aims to support the long-term
development of the HNP; Canada and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) administer the
fund. UNDP estimates the fund needs at least $28 million over two years to achieve its aims.
Thus far, the U.S. government has donated $3 million and Canada has donated 10 million
Canadian dollars in support of the fund.85
In October 2022, the U.S. and Canadian governments sped up the delivery of armored vehicles
and other tactical equipment purchased by the Haitian government for the HNP.86 Canada
delivered additional armored vehicles in January 2023.

Trade Preferences
Congress has extended unilateral trade preferences to Haiti through several trade preferences
programs enacted since 1975. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67,
subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of
selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to
uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. The current Haiti-specific preference
program, which expires in 2025, provides unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector.87
In 2021, $751.3 million (67.9%) of total U.S. imports from Haiti entered under the Haiti-specific
preference program and $260.4 million (23.6%) entered under P.L. 98-67.88
During the 117th Congress, measures that would have extended duty-free treatment from 2025 to
2035 with respect to imports from Haiti under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act were
introduced as the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2021 (S. 3279 in November
2021; H.R. 6136 in December 2021 and H.R. 9461 in December 2022).

84 BINUH, “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021.

85 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Canada Joint Statement on Support for the Haiti Security Basket
Fund,” September 23, 2022.
86 Reuters, “U.S., Canada Deliver Armored Vehicles to Haitian Police to Fight Gangs,” October 15, 2022.

87 For a description of how the Haiti-specific preference programs have evolved and have affected Haitian exports and

Haitian workers, see U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Haiti Trade: Impact of U.S. Preference Programs on
Haiti’s Economy and Workers, December 2022.
88 Ibid.

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Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral

In 2020, as part of its policy toward Haiti, the U.S. government began to impose sanctions against
those responsible for significant human rights abuses, corruption, and drug trafficking. In
December 2020, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which built upon and expanded the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328), U.S. Department of the
Treasury imposed asset blocking and visa restrictions on Chérizier (the gang leader and former
HNP officer) and two former Moïse Administration officials for involvement in the La Saline
massacre.89 In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions pursuant
to E.O. 14059 on Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian senate, and former Senator Youri
Latortue for involvement in drug trafficking.90 Treasury imposed the same sanctions on Senator
Rony Celestin and former Senator Richard Lenine in December 2022.91 Pursuant to Section
7031(c) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on Senator
Lambert for corruption and involvement in a gross violation of human rights.92 The State
Department also imposed visa restrictions on former Haitian Customs Director Rommel Bell and
Senator Celestin for corruption.93 Those subject to recent public sanctions represent a range of
political parties. Dozens of officials and their families have privately had their visas revoked.
The United States has encouraged other international partners and the U.N. to sanction the
financial backers of Haitian gangs, recognizing that targeted sanctions imposed in a multilateral
manner may have a better chance of affecting change than unilateral sanctions.94 U.S. sanctions
have been closely coordinated with those announced by the Government of Canada, which also
imposed sanctions on former President Martelly for drug trafficking—a move U.S. officials have
“welcomed” but not yet replicated.95 In October 2022, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
approved Resolution 2653 imposing sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier for “engaging in acts that
threaten the peace, security, and stability of Haiti.”96 It also mandated the creation of a panel of
experts to recommend further individuals and entities to be subject to travel bans, asset seizures,
and an arms embargo.
Toward the end of the 117th Congress, similar legislative measures, the Haiti Criminal Collusion
Transparency Act of 2022 (H.R. 9147/S. 5083), were introduced in both chambers. The bills
would have required the presidential administration to produce and release publicly an annual list

89 E.O. 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” December
20, 2017; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International
Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020.
90 E.O. 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade,” December 15, 2021;

U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Haitian Politicians for Narcotics Trafficking,”
November 4, 2022.
91 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Sanctions Additional Corrupt Haitian Politicians for Drug Trafficking,”

December 2, 2022.
92 U.S. Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Designation of Haitian Senate President, Joseph

Lambert, for Involvement in Significant Corruption and a Gross Violation of Human Rights,” December 4, 2022.
93 U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses,” December 9, 2022.

94 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, October 2021.

95 Government of Canada, “Sanctions: Grave Breach of International Peace and Security in Haiti,” updated December

19, 2022, at https://www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; Jacqueline

Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime
Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022.
96 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 2653 (2022) Concerning

Haiti,” at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653.

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of Haitian political and economic elites tied to gangs. They also would have required the
Secretary of State to identify which of those individuals may be subject to visa restrictions and
sanctions pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations legislation and Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act. Congress did not take further action on either bill. Similar legislation
could be introduced and considered during the 118th Congress.

Indictments
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has assisted Haitian officials investigating the Moïse
assassination and selected cases involving those complicit in arms trafficking, gang violence, and
drug trafficking in and through Haiti. DOJ has secured the extradition of two individuals
allegedly complicit in Moïse’s assassination, as well as a gang leader responsible for the 2021
kidnapping of U.S. missionaries. In November 2022, DOJ indicted seven leaders of five Haitian
gangs, including additional individuals involved in the 2021 missionary kidnappings.97

Migration Issues
Migration issues continue to be a high priority for U.S. policy and Congress. U.S. government
apprehensions of Haitian migrants have risen notably, both at sea and on the U.S. Southwest
border. In FY2022, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encountered roughly 53,910
Haitians on the Southwest border, up from 47,255 encountered in FY2021.98 Many of those
Haitians had resided in third countries (particularly Brazil and Chile) since the 2010 earthquake
and had few ties to Haiti.99 CBP placed a majority of those individuals (77%) into Title 8 removal
proceedings under immigration code, and many were released into the United States to await their
immigration court proceedings. CBP expelled the other 22% of Haitians from the United States
under Title 42 of the U.S. Code. In FY2022, the Coast Guard interdicted more than 7,175 Haitian
migrants, compared with 1,527 Haitian migrants in FY2021.100 Through September 2022, the
International Organization for Migration assisted more than 21,215 Haitians repatriated to Haiti
(69% of which were from the United States), many with few ties to the country.101
On January 5, 2023, the Department of Homeland Security announced the expansion of a set of
new immigration policies to Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, which started in October 2022
for Venezuelans.102 After January 5, 2023, Haitians who have a U.S. sponsor can apply for
immigration parole and fly directly into the United States after U.S. vetting. In contrast, Haitians
apprehended between ports of entry are now subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy,
which allows DHS to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of

97 U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens,”
November 7, 2020.
98 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Nationwide Encounters,” calculated by CRS using data available at

https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters. Nearly 46% of migrants were encountered at ports of

entry and 53% between ports of entry.
99 Caitlyn Yates, Haitian Migration Through the Americas: A Decade in the Making, Migration Information Source,

September 30, 2021.

100 Skyler Shepard, “Coast Guard Repatriates 180 People to Haiti, 46 Children,” CBS12, November 25, 2022.

101 International Organization for Migration, “Migrant Returns and Reception Assistance in Haiti: Air & Sea,

September 2022.
102 DHS, “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans and Eliminates Cap for

Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.

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Mexico). Mexico has agreed to receive up to a total of 30,000 migrants from those three countries
per month.103
The United States also has taken steps to provide legal migration and protection pathways for
some Haitians. Some 155,000 Haitians may be eligible for relief from removal under the
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation announced in May 2021, and additional Haitians
are eligible under the extension announced in December 2022.104 In July 2022, the Biden
Administration said it would resume the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program, allowing
certain U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents to seek parole for family members in Haiti.

Outlook
The 118th Congress is likely to maintain a keen interest in developments in Haiti, as deteriorating
security and humanitarian conditions in Haiti intersect with a broad range of U.S. interests and
policy responses. As noted earlier, Congress has directly engaged with U.S. policy approaches
toward Haiti in relation to foreign assistance, trade preferences, sanctions policy, and migration.
Should the current crisis in Haiti continue, Congress may choose to consider and assess new
policy approaches to address the situation in Haiti, including the potential for U.S.-backed
international intervention, or other new engagements in Haiti.

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke Karla I. Rios

Specialist in Latin American Affairs Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report draws from the past work of Maureen Taft-Morales, Specialist in Latin American Affairs.

103 Government of Mexico, “Mexico Welcomes the Announcement of new US Actions to Achieve Orderly, Safe,
Regular and Humane Migration,” January 5, 2023.
104 See CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson.

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Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service R47394 · VERSION 2 · NEW 19