1.

1. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103. August 31, 2005

Facts:

Lot 7035-A-8-B-5 is a subdivided portion of Lot 7035-A which was formerly part of a
homestead applied for in 1921 by Angel Madrid. The application was approved in 1935. The
Bureau of Lands found him to be in exclusive occupation of the lands subject of the homestead.
On 30 June 1987, petitioners filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages against
respondent for allegedly occupying two hundred (200) square meters, more or less, of Lot
without any legal right to do so, much less their consent or permission, and has failed and
refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands. They prayed that respondent be ordered
to vacate the land. respondent filed her answer with counterclaim alleging that the land being
claimed by petitioners is different from the land where her house is standing and that the land
was given or awarded to her by the Municipal Government of San Mateo, Isabela. She added that
she has been occupying the land since February 1946 and no one molested her in her actual
possession and use thereof except the claims of petitioners which she came to know only on 04
July 1987 when she received the summons.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is the registered owner of the subject lots.

Ruling:
No, respondent has no evidence of her ownership over the lot where her house is erected. The
Tax Declarations47 held by respondent but same are not proofs of ownership. A tax declaration
does not prove ownership. It is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, it is, at best, an
indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.
An examination of the tax declarations reveals that the property covered is not even specified
and described with particularity the exact location and borders were not mentioned. Thus, it is
clear that respondent, without any authority or right, is occupying petitioners’ land.
2.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO
ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, Respondents.
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado originally filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 but was substituted
by his heirs upon his death during the pendency of the petition. However, the RTC dismissed the
petition for want of evidence. It stated in its decision that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only
published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well
considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want
of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation.
Issue : WON the absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
Ruling: no, the lrc cannot validly confirm and register the title of private respondents
The Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. The Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette
and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The law used the term shall in
prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s
receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative
and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law.
Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered
because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. The reason for
the mandatory requirement is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that
the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.

3.
Director of Lands v. Rivas, G.R. No. L-61539. February 14, 1986
FACTS: The evidence shows that on March 14, 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court
of First Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory
information title for a tract of land, called Nottab
The conflicting evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation (Cavaco)
and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows that two persons, the brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and
Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of Pablo Guzman, played decisive roles in its disposition. The
evidence is conflicting because, according to Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis
Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion
was sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to
Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.
The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its area, is forestal and
grazing land, and consequently, was inalienable land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding
that land were void.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land registration case adjudicated to Cavaco 1,222
hectares of the Nottab land.
The trial court held that the said adjudication means that the respondent herein cannot use
anymore in this case the supposed 1873 informacion posesoria and the 1885 composicion
gratuita as bases of their application for registration. The reason is that said Spanish titles were
already used in the Cavaco case.
Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not exceed 1,000 hectares (Director of Lands vs,
Reves, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191 and other cases). It may be repeated
that Cavaco obtained more than 1,000 hectares by virtue of the said Spanish titles.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that Presidential Decree No. 892 since 1976 discontinued the
use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.
Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an application for the registration of two
parcels of land located at Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco.
The trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the applications of Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua and Cavaco.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted the application of Lope and
Vijandre.
ISSUE: W/N THE APPLICATION SHOULD BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
HELD: NO, THE APPLICATION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE
REPONDNTS.
The court held that the disputed land is inalienable public grazing land, being a part of the forest
reserve. It is part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile, Cagayan.
Said land is a part of the forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February
13, 1967. It is intended for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest uses.The
reservation was made prior to the instant 1968 application for registration.
Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10
distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private ownership.
4.

Evangelista vs Santiago

Facts:

Petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land in the Province of Rizal, by
virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez which
was part of a vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga" which was awarded to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Acting as
Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid", Ismael
Favila signed the deeds, assigning portions of the property to petitioners, in exchange for the
labor and work done on the property by petitioners and their predecessors.

Petitioners came to know that respondent was planning to evict them and it was revealed that
property was included in certificates of titles in the name of respondent.

Petitioners filed with the trial court, an action for declaration of nullity of respondent’s
certificates of title was fake and spurious. Respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal
capacity to file the complaint and thus, no cause of action.

Trial court held a preliminary hearing and thereafter, it issued the order dismissing petitioners’
complaint and denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration thus, petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court and denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration in its resolution.

Petitioners filed this petition for review and praying for the reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the order of dismissal of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of law stating that Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system holds of an
exception?

No, for Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system if filed after the deadline stated by law. 

The Fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:

WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation
of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership
unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . .

Therefore, as the law divests Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing
ownership over real property and such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated after
14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence
his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual
possession.

5.
6.
G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint against petitioner, represented by the Land Authority, for
the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots.
Petitioner alleged that he bought the subject property from Victor Gardiola and that Gardiola had
acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said
property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and
caused it to be surveyed, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands.
Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the subject property, that his
title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal
valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.

ISSUE:
W/N the informacion posesoria held by respondent had been converted into a record of
ownership?
RULING:
No, the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had not been converted into a record of
ownership because there is no showing in the case at bar of such thing, therefore, the subject
property remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession. Using this possessory
information, the respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
the Public Land Act, however, having failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this
avenue at this time. Respondent must also contend wiith the fact admitted by him and stated in
the decision of the Court a quo that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the land in
question since even before the outbreak of the war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of
possession.
Lastly, it is worthy to note the statement of the Solicitor General that the informacion posesoria
registered in the Office of the Register of Deed was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it
was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to the Register of Deeds by Dr.Feliciano,"
without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original was
lost since reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original.

7.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010
 
FACTS:
 
Respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana et al filed an application for registration of title over 2
pieces of land, professing themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by
succession from their predecessors-in-interest. Respondents also alleged that until the time of the
application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse,
exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they had
consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation. In support of
their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint, as well as copies of the
technical descriptions of each lot, certification from the geodetic engineer and the pertinent tax
declarations, together with the receipts of payment thereof.

Petitioner opposed the application and , advanced that that neither respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the tax declaration
submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide
acquisition in good faith or of prior possession in the concept of an owner.
 
ISSUE:
 
WON respondents have proven their occupation and possession of the property openly,
continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership.
 
Ruling
Yes.

Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree of 1978,
materially provides what documents and pieces of evidence to be filed with the application and
where to file it.

In the case at bar, the evidence presented , operates as substantial compliance with the legal
requirement of ascertaining the identity of 2 lots applied for registration. Verily, no error can be
attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that respondents were able to approximate
compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529.

In an original registration of title under Section 14(1) 42 P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for
registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have
exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier. He must prove that for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.

From the records, it is clear that respondents’ possession through their predecessor-in-interest
dates back to as early as 1937 when the subject property had already been declared for taxation
by Zenaida’s father. Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it
not been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the relevant
portions of the tax records on file with it had been burned when the assessor’s office was razed
by fire in 1997. Of equal relevance is the fact that with these tax assessments, there came tax
payments. Respondents receipts for tax expenditures are recorded with the predecessors in
interest being the named owners of the property . The unbroken chain of positive acts exercised
by respondents’ predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no other
conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to
the property. Not only do they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also, that
such claim is in all good faith.

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and realty tax
payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of
possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of
a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title
to the property, announces his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in
conflict with his interest and , it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to government
revenues. Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of
owner—open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the
government or from any private individual—itself makes their right thereto unquestionably
settled and, hence, deserving of protection under the law.

8.
SOUTH CITY HOMES VS REPUBLIC

facts:
The subject of this controversy is the elongated piece of land between lot 2386-A and lot 2381
acquired separately, the former by purchase and the latter by assignment by petitioner
corporation.

Petitioner contends that said land is originally a friar land, a patrimonial property of the state
which was omitted because of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral surveys. Moreover,
that it had acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupted possession thereof in
concept of owner, by itself and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.

However, the Republic argues that subject land used to be a canal which could not have been
appropriated by the purchasers of the adjacent lots or their successors-in-interest, being a land of
public domain. Neither could it be deemed included in the lots now owned by the petitioner
because their respective technical descriptions indicate otherwise. Prescription is also not
applicable because the petitioner has not established the requisite possession of the lot, as to
manner and length, to justify judicial confirmation of title in its name.

TOPIC: Evidence
Sec 17 of PD 1529

Issue #1
WON the petitioners validly established its entitlement to the disputed lot

Held:
No, the totality of the evidence falls short of establishing the title of the petitioner over the lot in
controversy, whatever its nature.

Firstly, the petitioner points to the original survey of the lands in 1906 which states that the two
lots adjoin each other, but it forgets that it has itself suggested that the old surveys were
inaccurate, which could explain the omission.
Secondly, the alleged dried canal should have been included in either of the two adjoining lots in
the cadastral survey, but it was not. Such mistake is not negligible as to come under what the
petitioner calls the allowable margin of error in the original survey. In Act 1120 or the Friar
Lands Act, the prohibition of purchase or lease to any canal is inapplicable in this case as the
subject canal is now without water and is therefore not a canal anymore contrary to the claim of
the Republic.

Lastly, As to acquisitive prescription, the witness testimonies are essentially hearsay and
inherently inadequate for beng self-serving apart from the fact that the possession of the subject
lot was not and could not have been transferred to the petitioner when it acquired Lots Nos. 2381
and 2386-A for the simple reason that these two lots did not include the third lot. Moreover,
tacking of possession is allowed only when there is a privity of contract or relationship between
the previous and present possessors. In the absence of such privity, the possession of the new
occupant should be counted only from the time it actually began and cannot be lengthened by
connecting it with the possession of the former possessors, although the grantee enters into
possession of the land not described and uses it in connection with that conveyed.

Art 1135 of the civil code states that in case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area
greater, or less, than that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession of
the successor-in-interest. In the case of the herein petitioner, it should begin from 1981 when it
acquired the two adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of the
other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in the name of the petitioner was
filed in 1983, the applicant had been in possession of the property for less than three years. This
was far too short of the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property.

9.
Tottoc v. IAC, G.R. No. 69969. December 20, 1989
Facts:

petitioner applied for the lease of a pasture land before the Bureau of Forestry, Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. By virtue of said application, petitioner was granted
Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps- 993 after a survey of the area involved. Thereafter, petitioner
occupied said 78.6 hectares of pasture land and fenced the same, without anybody disturbing his
possession thereof. Private respondent, being a neighbor of petitioner, was aware of such
occupation of the land by petitioner since 1949. Meanwhile, private respondent, upon
verification from the Bureau of Forestry supposedly before 1963 that the pasture land in question
was reportedly untouched and outside the pasture land of petitioner, filed his
application for a homestead with the Bureau of Lands and entered the northern portion of the
land, clearing and cultivating an area of less than 4 hectares in 1963. private respondent secured
a certification from Assistant Chief Maximo A. Abuan of the Bureau of Forestrycertifying to the
fact that the land in question is alienable and disposable. petitioner caused the relocation survey
of his pasture land in the presence of Bureau of Lands Inspector and private respondent. It was
found in said survey that a portion of the land subject of private respondent's application was
within the pasture land of petitioner and within the so- called Forest Zone. Petitioner maintains
that respondent court should not have relied on the certification issued by District Forester
Abuan, it being hearsay evidence by reason of Abuan's failure to testify thereon.

Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute is alienable by relying on the certification issued by District
Forester Abuan and in disregarding the contrary testimonies and certifications.

Ruling:
No, the subject land is not alianable. The question as to whether a particular portion of land is
forestal or any other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. Thus, the mere classification or certification made by the Bureau of forestry that a part of
the public domain is timberland is not controlling in all cases. While we admit an exception to
the rule that the Bureau of Forestry has the power to set aside for forestry or mineral purposes a
particular land in question, 14 and that is when there was prior intervention of private interests,
said exception cannot find application in private respondent's favor since petitioner's interests
commenced and vested very much earlier than any claim
thereon by the former.

10.
OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and SUSANA BRAULIO,
RODOLFO, LOURDES and BEATRIZ all surnamed ALBA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA, Respondents.
Jose Lachica filed an application for title to land purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from,
from one Eulalio Raz together with technical description, surveyor’s certificate, certification by
the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277. The initial hearing was
scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the Official Gazette was
issued on September 23, 1958. The certification of posting of the notice of initial hearing was
issued on October 13, 1958. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio, Octabela Vda. de Raz,
Jose Rago as attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco filed their different opposition to the
application, claiming as owners of different portions of the subject land. However, the oppositors
failed to present any substantial evidence or failed to appear in the hearing.
Issue: WON private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in fee
simple for the parcel of land he applied for.
Ruling: the Supreme court ruled that only the 620 square meter portion on which private
respondent Jose N. Lachica’s house is situated can be registered and confirmed in the name of
private respondent.
Under the law, an applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his
title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein
referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all.
If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove
that the property sought to be registered is included in that title.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership. Tax declarations for a
certain number of years, although constituting proof of claim of title to land, is not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported by other effective proof.
Private respondent/applicant has not adduced evidence to show how and when he was able to
acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters further reduced to 620 square meters on account
of 220 square meters appropriated for the market road, the bigger area of 3,755 square meters
from anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia Regado.

11.
Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594. November 28, 1975
FACTS: Melecio Padilla acquired 16,800 hectares, of land situated at the municipality of Laur,
Nueva Ecija in 1895 by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime.
Upon his death in1990, ownership and possession of the subject land was transmitted to his
daughter and sole heir Maria Padilla until her death in 1940.
Applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late
Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title. Applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for
substitution of parties, requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation
be considered as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests,
ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed
the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under
Proclamation No. 237.
During the trial blueprints of two survey plans were presented, the first blueprint copy of a plan
of landas surveyed for Maria Padilla, was not formally offered in evidence, and the second plan
of the land, as surveyed for Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation was submitted
by the said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the Director of Lands. The lower court
rendered decision ordering the land to be registered in favor of (a) ParañaqueInvestment and
Development Corporation, two-thirds (2/3) portion, and (b) Roman C. Tamayo,Filipino
citizen, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property. The oppositors Director of Lands, Director of
Fo
restry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to
the Supreme Court. Hence, the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS BLUEPRINTS OF THE SURVEY PLAN IS
VALID TO CLAIM OWNERSHIP.
HELD: NO, BLUEPRINTS OF THE SURVEY PLAY IS NOT A VALID CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP.
The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved by the Director of
Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. It is not the function of the LRC to check the
original survey plan as it has no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the
original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same
therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done. The applicant is not relieved of
his duty of submitting the original tracing cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved by
the Director of Lands.

12.

Director of Lands vs Tesalona

Facts:

The controversy arose from an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land on the basis
of an alleged possessory information title. The application was opposed by the government on
the ground that the parcels of land are part of the inalienable land of the public domain.

The trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants and
declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as owned by the government.

The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court decision but modified declaring the
confirmation of the title of applicants-appellants over Lots 1 and 2.
ISSUE: Whether or not application for registration over said lots was correctly granted by the
Courts?

No, in light of their failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, original of the
possessory information title to the courts and submission of an unclear, illegible copy of a
Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896.

Jurisprudence provides that if the original tracing plan was forwarded to the LRC, "the
applicants may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence." 

It has been held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission
of secondary evidence of alleged possessory information titles considering the number of fake
titles that have been discovered following their supposed reconstitution after the last World
War.  

As submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for is mandatory, said
requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly and due to anomalies that prompted
the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 892 which outlawed all Spanish titles, including
possessory information titles, unless they were authenticated in appropriate registration
proceedings before August 16, 1976 thus these evidence must be presented for application to be
granted which the lower courts did not do so thus application must be denied.  

13.
14.
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,
substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO

FACTS:
Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over a land
under Presidential Decree No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and when died, his heirs m, represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court dismissed the petition, however, it found that the applicants through
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of
the subject land since 1938, so the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition of petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of respondents,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation?
RULING:
No, the land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title of respondents,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation because this is impelled by the
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement..
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as
by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated
as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein
may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be
owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting. Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law, thus, respondents cannot register yet the title in their names.

15.

G.R. No. L-35787 April 11, 1980

FAUSTA FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA
FRANCISCO, respondents.

Facts:

In 1964, petitioner had the land in question surveyed and discovered her land is already titled in
the name of the respondent Alejandro F. Santos. Petitioner and her siblings who are the adjacent
registered owners of the land in question, were not notified of any alleged survey of this land nor
of the present application for registration as actual occupant and possession of the land in
question. Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in The Official Gazzette but
petitioner does not read it.

Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona
Francisco obtained through fraud Decree No. N-99332; In their application dated October 29,
1963, they claimed to be the owners of this parcel of land by possession. This is not true.
Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco have never been in possession of the parcel of land
in question.

Petitioner maintains that she is the absolute owner in fee simple of that parcel of land in
question; that she has been in possession of said land, together with her father who is her
predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully, adversely and continuously since time immemorial .
Since 1918, Diego Francisco, father of petitioner, had occupied and introduced improvements on
the parcel of land in question and In 1940, Diego Francisco, was able to obtain a title on a
portion of this big parcel of land, now embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, in the
names of petitioner Fausta Francisco and her sister and brother. The petitioner's father died in the
year 1941. The testimony of former Mayor of Teresa, Rizal, who is an adjacent owner across the
Santol Creek, said that Alejandro F. Santos was never in possession of this land in question and
that it was Diego Francisco who was the one in possession of this parcel of land during his
lifetime and after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open possession
of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute
owner of this parcel of land.

Private respondents opposed the above petition for review on the grounds that petitioner's
petition is not sufficient in form and substance and failed to state in said petition how she became
the owner thereof and under what color of title does she claim to be owner of the land; neither
did petitioner attached any instrument supporting her claim other than a supposed affidavit of
merit signed by her alone containing allegations amounting to the existence of intrinsic fraud
only; that the essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and review of a decree
under Sec. 38 of Act 496 is that it be made only by a person who has been deprived of land or of
any interest therein by virtue of the decree sought to be reconsidered. A mere claim of ownership
is not sufficient and the petition of any person whose interest in the land is short of absolute
ownership, lacks the essential requisite, and for that reason should not be considered.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332 and

(b) Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.

Ruling:

Yes There was fraud in the securing of Decree No. N-99332 and Petitioners are the true owners
of the lot in question. It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of the land in
question was not notified of the alleged survey. it was made to appear by applicants-respondents
on The Surveyor's Certificate that Jose P. Cruz, and Diego Francisco, both dead, were notified of
the survey as the adjoining owner of the land in litigation. They said both had appeared on the
date of the survey, although being dead, it was, impossible for them to appear. The Santol Creek
was also allegedly notified but that it did not appear as it is not a person or entity, and the one
notified should have been the proper government official or office. Neither petitioner nor any of
her brother or sisters received the purported notice. By thus avoiding the sending of actual
notices to the petitioner and other interested parties as adjoining owner and as actual owner and
possessor of the land in question, applicants were able to have the land in question surveyed. It
was established thru the testimony of the petitioner that she does not read the Official Gazette

When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco, filed their application
for registration on October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining owners at the North,
East, and West, of the land in question. At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was
Diego Francisco, when they knew full well, Diego Francisco died in 1942 .At the East, they
stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P. Cruz, when they knew full well, Jose P. Cruz died in
1952 . At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio Francisco, when in truth
and in fact, as they knew full well, Paula Francisco (sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the
actual occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land.

It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true adjoining owners with the deliberate
intention of preventing notices of their application for registration to be sent to petitioner Fausta
Francisco and to her sister Paula Francisco, and in that way prevent petitioner from appearing in
the land registration case and file an opposition to their application for registration

Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having been separately
properly notified of the application here under discussion? The Court made it patently clear and
emphasized that it is the inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by themselves who are the
occupants and boundary owners of any land being surveyed by them for purposes of registration.
Beyond doubt, had the surveyors of respondents complied with this simple and logical obligation
imposed by the very nature of their professional undertaking, the obvious anomalies extant in the
instant case would not have happened.

While in the ruling case as cited by the CA, Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice
Trent., it was declared definitely that a land registration proceeding is one in rem and notice
thereof by publication binds the whole world it should not be read, as entirely depriving victims
of obvious fraudulent intent of the remedy of having a decree reopened. In Minlay vs. Sandoval
53 SCRA 1, "all that is required is a showing of intention to deprive another of (his) just rights,
which constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud." And in this connection, the Chief
Justice went on thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the Land Registration Act commands that
the applicant 'shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names
and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not
known, it shall state what search has been made to find them “

In this case respondents, if they had "searched" as the law definitely mandates, they would have
known, as it can be presumed they did, that Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, whom they would
name as boundary owners in their application in 1963 had already been long dead and buried.

In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50, (Vol. 17, Phil.)
"By fraud is meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the
word 'fraud' in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not
sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree.
Specific acts intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure
him must be alleged and prove'. As Our Chief Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The
registration of (land) cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith" , just as it
is reiterated in Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498, "it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact,
upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.
The decision of the CA is reversed and the the RTC decision affirmed without prejudice to
petitioner and the trial courtin complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the
corresponding title in favor of petitioner.

16.
REPUBLIC VS. HERBIETO

facts:
The Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David filed with the MTC, a single application for
registration of two parcels of land claiming to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which
they purchased from their parents.

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. All owners of the land
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of the Notice
was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the
bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were
located. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 199915 and
The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default,
with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots.
Finally, on 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of herein respondents.

TOPIC: Publication, Mailing and Posting

Sec 4 and 24, PD 1529

issue:
WON the failure to comply with the publication requirements as mandated by the Property
Registration Decree divest the MTC with jurisdiction to hear and proceed with the case.

held:
Yes, A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the
requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing. All such
requirements, especially publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is
essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with.

In the instant Petition, the publication in the newspaper only commenced more than three months
after the initial hearing indubutably making such publication of the Notice worthless and
ineffective; thereby depriving possible claimants of the due process. Worse, such failure amounts
to default that would forever bar a contesting claimant from respondent’s application and
consequent registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the
MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents'
application for registration thereof ultimately making the judgment and consequent issuance of
decree null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

17.
Albano v. CA, G.R. No. 144708. August 10, 2001

Facts:

To express their piety and devotion to their new faith, sometime in 1908 the Albanos allowed the
IFI to construct a small iglesia within a 1,854-square meter unregistered property in Vintar,
which their family had been occupying for years. Parish priest of Vintar, pleaded with the
Albanos to donate to the congregation the property occupied by the iglesia. On 21 June 1909
Vicente, son of Nemesio Albano, executed an instrument granting the assiduous priest with its
administration. But Fr. Platon wanted more. He pursued the Albanos until the
latter eventually transferred ownership in his favor. Two (2) years later Fr. Platon de Villanueva
passed away. The surviving heirs of the deceased executed a document donating Vintar property
to the IFI. A decade later, Venancio Albano, son of Vicente and Antonina, appealed to the IFI to
allow his brother Rafael to stay within the old brick house. Upon consultation with church elders,
Bishop Lagasca readily acceded to Venancio's request. Forthwith, Rafael repaired the crumbly
brick house and made it habitable. Alarmed by the situation, the IFI summoned its elders and
decided to write a letter of protest to Venancio Albano, Rafael
Albano and Edwin Patricio telling them to desist from interfering with the structures built by the
IFI. After trial on the merits, including an ocular inspection of the premises,5 the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the IFI owner of a portion of the disputed property. On 8 May 2000
the Albanos filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration praying that
their Motion for Reconsideration be admitted into the records despite its being filed out of time.
Counsel for petitioners, explained that although a copy of the Decision was sent to his old
address and received by a reliever guard he was not notified.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents’ motion for reconsideration should be dismissed.

Ruling:
Yes, the motion should be dismissed. The Court ruled that petitioners are on extremely shaky
grounds when they argue that counsel on record are entitled to separate notices of the court's
decision. This argument is obviously inconsistent with Sec. 2, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court
which explicitly provides that if a party has appeared by counsel, "service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel or one of them.” Clearly, notice to any one of the several counsel on
record is equivalent to notice to all and such notice starts the time running for appeal
notwithstanding that the other counsel on record has not received a copy of the decision.
18.
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN,
the incumbent City Mayor of Davao City, Petitioner, v. JULIANA MONTEVERDE-
CONSUNJI AND TOMAS A. MONTEVERDE, JR., Respondents.
On March 13, 1923, the then Court of First Instance of Davao issued a decree granting Tomas,
Candelaria, Vicenta, and Milagros, all surnamed Monteverde, three parcels of land including the
property subject of this controversy, with an area of 72,220 square meters. The title of over the
controverted land was cancelled and a transfer of certificate was issued in favor of the petitioner.
On June 22, 1993, Juliana Monteverde-Consunji wrote a letter to Rodrigo R. Duterte, then mayor
of Davao City, inquiring about the validity of the city’s title to the subject lot because the
research caused to be conducted by her family failed to show any document whatsoever to
support the transfer of the property by her father, Tomas Monteverde, Sr. in favor of the City of
Davao. The respondents alleged that OCT No. 116 was illegally cancelled and TCT No. 1851(T-
480) was spurious on the ground that there was no deed or any other document to support the
cancellation of OCT No. 116. The City of Davao alleged in its answer that its ownership of the
subject property was already existing at the time of the issuance of OCT No. 116 in the name of
the Monteverdes, for which reason it was cancelled and TCT No. 480 was issued in lieu thereof.
Issue: WON the petitioner is the lawful owner of the subject land.
Ruling: Yes, the Court upheld the validity of the City’s title of ownership over the property
The provisions of Act No. 496 stated that the only way whereby one who opposed the
registration of land in the name of another and secure an affirmative pronouncement concerning
his rights and interest was for him to become himself an applicant. It was set upon preventing
affirmative relief to an oppositor such that he must totally change his character as a litigant
before he can secure that advantage.
Thus, although the rights of the City of Davao over the subject property had already been in
existence and recognized at the time of the issuance of OCT No. 116 to the Monteverdes, the
land registration court could not have issued title in its favor under the law applicable at that time
and could only cause the annotation of the same on the face of OCT No. 116.
Moreover, respondents’ claim is barred by laches. The City of Davao has long been in
possession of the property in the concept of an owner, at least from the time TCT No. 1851 (T-
480) was issued in its name on July 26, 1949. Even if respondent Juliana Monteverde-Consunji
discovered the alleged fraud in the transfer of ownership of the property to the City of Davao
only in 1960, the fact is that respondents slept on their supposed rights over the property for 34
years before the filing of the complaint in 1994.

19.
Heirs of Lopez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005
FACTS: Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. ("Ozaeta") filed an application
for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 ("land
registration court"), docketed as Case No. 2858, Land Registration Case No. N-18887 ("LRC
No. N-18887"). The land registration court issued an order of general default and hearings on the
application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted the application. The
decision became final and executory, and the land registration court issued a certificate of
finality dated 8 March 1991.4
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October 1977
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and
Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion
L. Psinakis ("petitioners"), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion6 in LRC No. N-18887.
The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land
registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale7 over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and
their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 petitioners also prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their
names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
The LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens
relative to the pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners’ standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA declared that
petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a proceeding in
rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere
movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the
LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of general default.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE
DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N-18887
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL ORDER OF
DEFAULT.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
In its comment,32 the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of default includes
petitioners. Therefore, petitioners’ failure to move to lift the default order did not give them
standing in the case. As long as the court does not lift the order of general default, petitioners
have no legal standing to file the motion to declare void the decrees of registration issued to the
applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. – If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the
court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to
be recorded and require the applicant to present evidence. By the description in the notice "To
All Whom It May Concern", all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by
the default order
20.
Vergel vs CA

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna an application for registration of a
parcel of land for titling purposes. The Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of
Lands filed an opposition to the application for registration.

Trial court issued a motion to set aside order of default and motion to suspend the proceedings
filed by movant is denied for lack of merit.

Respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration which trial court denied for
lack of merit.’

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court
judge "acted capriciously and without or in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the
exercise of his discretion" in issuing the two orders."

The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial court’s orders and consequently,
setting aside the trial court’s order of general default in Land Registration Case with respect
to Respondent. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court’s order of
general default in the land registration case involved without making a specific finding of fraud,
negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and
speedy determination of the controversy would be better attained in lifting the order of general
default, to enable a claimant to oppose and to establish a case of ownership in herself?

Yes, the CA arbitrarily set aside the trial court’s order of general default without factual
basis save for its own gut feeling.
The law states that if no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court
shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to be
recorded and require the applicant to present evidence.

Therefore, appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general default in the case,
without making a specific finding of fraud accident or excusable neglect that prevented
respondent from timely opposing the application.

21.
22.
G.R. No. 96259 September 3, 1996
HEIRS OF LUIS J. GONZAGA, namely ROMANA, FERNANDO, PAZ, LUISA and LUIS
ANTONIO, all surnamed GONZAGA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES JOSE
LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA

FACTS: Jose Eugenio had once been the registered owner of lot nos. 3619 and 3620. He sold the
two lots to Luis J. Gonzaga, who sold the two lots to Mascariñas. However, another subsisting
Torrens title covers the same two lots subject of the sale between Eugenio and Gonzaga and that
between Gonzaga and petitioner Mascariñas. This other title is in the name of Lilia Sevilla,
married to Jose Seelin, which covers lot nos. 65 and 66 which are identical with lot nos. 3619
and 3620 embraced by the titles issued in the names of Eugenio, Gonzaga and Mascariñas.
Sevilla purchased the two lots described as Lots No. 65 and 66 from Felicidad Rivera, Benito
Rivera and Victoria Rivera, the legal heirs of Bartolome Rivera, as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. She then filed a complaint for annulment of Gonzaga's Torrens title including
petitioner Mascariñas as party-defendant. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners have the legal and valid title to the two lots in question?
RULING: Yes, petitioners have the legal and valid title to the two lots in question. Even though
both titles were valid, a strict observation to solve the issue should be adequately substantiated
through relevant and competent evidence. There being no valid ground why the torrens title
should not be issued to the petitioners, considering the deed of sale executed by the Riveras in
favor of petitioners which were duly acknowledged before a notary public and found to be
regular in due form, it is only correct to uphold petitioner's rights and title over the properties in
question since the technical descriptions have been approved and verified by the Bureau of
Lands.
While it is true that defendants' title was issued by a Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. 34,
which was subsequent to the Land Registration Case No. 4429 of 1917, however, it is well-
settled in a catenna of cases, the doctrine that in a cadastral case the Court has no jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is NULL and VOID. Hence, the Supreme Court empathized
with petitioner Mascariñas who may be a purchaser for value and in good faith, but whose title,
which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994, could not possibly be of force and effect
more than its parent title because the spring cannot rise higher than its source.

23. G.R. No. 98920 July 14, 1995

JESUS F. IGNACIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former First Division), RENATO G. YALUNG and
MARINA T. YALUNG, respondents.

Facts:

On December 24, 1987, petitioner, in consideration of P1,000,000.00, purchased under a pacto

de retro contract from private respondents a house and lot in Pasig, Metro Manila covered by
TCT. The agreement was evidenced by a public instrument entitled "Deed of Sale Under Pacto
de Retro" . parties agreed that private respondents be granted the right to repurchase the property
sold within 90 days from December 24, 1987, for the same consideration plus 5% interest
thereon. Private respondents failed to repurchase the property within the 90-day period despite an
extension granted them.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, , Pasig a petition for consolidation of ownership,
entitled "In Re: Petition to Consolidate Ownership Under Pacto de Retro Sale, Jesus F. Ignacio,
Petitioner versus Renato Yalung and Marina T. Yalung, Respondents." The petition was filed as
a land registration case.

Private respondents claimed, however, that the parties only intended to enter into an equitable
mortgage to secure prompt payment of the loan given them by petitioner . The trial court  found
that both parties clearly and unquestionably intended a sale under pacto de retro, not an
equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel TCT No. 64873 and
issue another transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of
the land registration court over the case. Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed the
decision of the trial court, declaring that the RTC sitting as a land registration court had no
jurisdiction over the petition for consolidation of title, which is an ordinary civil action pursuant
to Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling: (underlined for digest)

There is no dispute that an action for consolidation of ownership for failure of the vendor to
redeem the mortgaged property must be filed as an ordinary civil action, not as a land
registration case

Generally, an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action under the general jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court should not be resolved in a land registration proceeding. However in
this jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court also functions as a land registration court. If the parties
acquiesced in submitting the issue for determination in the land registration proceeding and they
were given full opportunity to present their respective sides and evidence, then the defendants
are placed in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the said court to pass upon the issue

In the case at bench, private respondents did not move to dismiss the petition before the land
registration court. They, in fact, filed a Manifestation admitting the due execution and
genuineness of the "Deed of Sale Under Pacto de Retro" and invoking the jurisdiction of the
court to declare the said deed as one of equitable mortgage. They went to trial and presented
evidence consisting of documents and the testimony of respondent Renato Yalung . It was only
after the decision of the land registration court and in their appeal before the Court of Appeals
that they challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court. They are now deemed to have waived their
right to question the jurisdiction of said court.

Moreover, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the Regional Trial Court and
its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court, has been eliminated by P.D. No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree of 1979 . This amendment was
aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits and at expediting the disposition of cases. Regional Trial
Courts now have the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also
over all petitions filed after the original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or petitions. Indeed, the land registration court can now
hear and decide controversial and contentious cases and those involving substantial issues.

In the instant case, the trial court, although sitting as a land registration court, took cognizance of
the petition as an ordinary civil action under its general jurisdiction. The court did not decide the
case summarily, but afforded both petitioner and private respondents the opportunity to present
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. Ordinary pleadings and memoranda were
likewise filed. The decision of the trial court squarely addressed all the issues raised by the
parties and applied substantive law and jurisprudence.

Reviewing the records, we agree with the trial court that the "Deed of Sale Under Pacto de
Retro" cannot be considered as an equitable mortgage. The mere fact that the price in a pacto de
retro sale is not the true value of the property does not justify the conclusion that the contract is
one of equitable mortgage In a pacto de retro sale, the practice is to fix a relatively reduced price
to afford the vendor a retro every facility to redeem the property. When the terms of a contract
clearly show that it is one of sale with right of repurchase, it must be interpreted according to its
literal sense, and held to be such a contract .

24. PNB VS INTERNATIONAL

facts:
The Balingit spouses failed to settle their loan obligation with petitioner hence the latter
extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended, the sixteen parcels of land covered by the
real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of petitioner. The sheriff’s certificate
of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds, with a subsequent memorandum of Notice of
Levy thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the foreclosed
properties.

Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption period, petitioner consolidated in its name
the ownership of all the foregoing mortgaged properties for which new transfer certificates of
title were issued in its name. However, the annotation of the notice of levy in favor of private
respondent was carried over to and still appears as the sole annotated encumbrance in the new
titles of petitioner.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance However
this was opposed by the International Corporate Bank, as successor in interest of the defunct
Continental Bank, contending that, since it was not informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, the new and consolidated titles over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of
herein petitioner are null and void

TOPIC: Initial hearing and presentation of evidence

issue:
WON the notice of levy should be cancelled as sought by the petitioner by the court as a land
registration court or a court of general jurisdiction

held:
The rule that the regional trial court sitting as a land registration court has limited jurisdiction
and has no authority to resolve controversial issues, which should accordingly be litigated in a
court of general jurisdiction, no longer holds.

Under PD 1529, regional trial courts acting as land registration courts now have exclusive
jurisdiction not only over applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, but also over petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Sec
110 of Act 496 (land registration act) also provides that the court of first instance, sitting as a
land registration court, has the authority to conduct a hearing, receive evidence, and decide
controversial matters with a view to determining whether or not the filed notice of adverse claim
is valid. The distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court
is removed and therefore, the court below has ample jurisdiction to decide the controversy raised
by the present petition.

The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate to the
mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto
acquires title free from the subordinate liens. Otherwise, the value of the mortgage could be
easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one would purchase at a
foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim.

Therefore, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising from the
judgment in a previous Civil Case is already without force and effect. Moreover, the annotation
in the certificates of title was more than ten years without being duly implemented, it is well-
settled that properties levied upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period
of ten years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.

25.
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987
Facts:

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the
last war in Cadastral Case No. 19. Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a
petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC to perfect their rights and register their titles to
said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase
from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein
Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the
concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years. The lower court issued an Order setting the
petition for hearing and directing that the Republic of the Philippines be notified thereof by
furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, a copy of
said Order together with Respondents’ petition by registered mail. On September 1, 1967, the
Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his
opposition to the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in fact, public land and as
such cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496. On May 7, 1979,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of
LDirector of Forestry, through the Solicitor- General, filed a petition for review of the decrees of
registration and the corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds that the entire
proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of
the petition for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING FOR REOPENING OF THE
CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE LOTS IN QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK OF
NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.

Ruling:
Yes, records show that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial hearing on the
petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of subsequent hearings as well as
a copy of the decision itself promulgated by the lower court was sent instead to the Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan. It will be observed however that later decisions of the Supreme Court tend to be
more strict in the matter of giving notice to the Solicitor General. It was established that the
Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases and as
such, he alone may withdraw the Government’s appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is
entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions and as held the
reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor-
General’s Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the special counsel
or the fiscal was served with that order. Thus, representatives of the Solicitor General in the case
at bar, had no power to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. They should have
referred the matter to the Solicitor-General and without copies of court orders, notices and
decisions, having been provided by either the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to the
Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.
26. Republic v. CA and Lapiña, G.R. No. 108998. August 24, 1994
FACTS: On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship
through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial.
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it
not been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights
over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to
justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION SHOULD BE
GRANTED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
HELD: YES, THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
Private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition
of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-
in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house
of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it
is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private
land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII
of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period
and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

27.

Santiago vs SBMA

Facts:

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Property, filed by Victoria
M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against respondent
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) before the RTC and included in said complaint was a
prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.

Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez,
leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land
of Hermogenes Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title.

By virtue of the lease contract, Santiago is presently occupying the parcel of land consisting of
2.5 hectares, more particularly the improvements located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.

Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two aforesaid parcels of land leased to
plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo, defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over
them and using these parcels of land for its own commercial and other purposes.

Victoria Rodriguez desires to recover possession of the property from the defendant so that she
could comply with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.

RTC issued its order denying and dismissing the application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and complaint respectively, since the alleged right of complainant
Rodriguez stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of
1891, it cannot be considered a right in esse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in denying the application for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as well as dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action?
 No, as the assailed orders of dismissal of the complaint and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, respectively, of the RTC had already become final and executory against
Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the case.

The law states that where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default
order shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.

As such, petitioner Santiago being a mere lessee of Rodriguez is equally bound by the
final and executory order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.

28.
29.
G.R. No. L-18814 July 31, 1962
ANACLETO P. NAVARRO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS: Sometime in 1950, the Director of Lands instituted a cadastral proceeding to settle and
adjudicate title to the same lots now in litigation. The Republic of the Philippines claimed them
as part of the public domain. One Caridad Guillen Cortez filed an answer and was later on
substituted by appellant Anacleto P. Navarro, who sought registration of the properties in his
name pursuant to the provision of Section 48, paragraph (b), of the Public Land Act. In the
Court's decision, his claim was denied and the two lots were declared public lands which was
affirmedby the Court of Appeals. Navarro elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review by
certiorari, but the petition was dismissed for being factual and for lack of merit.

ISSUE: W/N the lots applied for can be registered by petitioner under his name?

RULING: No, the lots applied for cannot be registered under his name because the declaration
by final judgment in the cadastral proceeding that they are public lands settled this issue once
and for all. Inspite of the averment that the two lots in controversy constitute privately owned
property, the evidence is unanimous to the effect that none of the alleged owners ever declared
the land for taxation purposes. None of them ever paid taxes on the property. It has been
truthfully said that tax declarations and tax receipts constitute evidence of great weight in support
of possession or ownership. This obligation could perhaps have escaped the attention of one
person. But to say that all the alleged owners from Juana Guinto, thru Margarita Jimenez and her
husband Francisco Arceo, Bernardino Landeta, Caridad Guillen Cortez and finally appellant
Anacleto P. Navarro forgot to declare the property for taxation purposes and to pay the taxes
thereon, is utterly unbelievable. It is clear that petitioner had not possessed the lands in question
for even the thirty years now asserted by him since such finding is conclusive on the question of
possession and precludes any new litigation concerning it.
Having sustained the plea, that this case is already barred by prior judgment, the Supreme Court
deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the second legal point raised by petitioner, namely, that the
lots in question being residential in character, do not fall within the purview of Section 48,
paragraph (b), of the Public Land Law, and hence cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title.