Dept of Justice Filing in Deere Repair Case 411573

Case: 3:22-cv-50188 Document #: 120 Filed: 02/14/23 Page 1 of 28 PageID #:1127
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
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In re: Deere & Company Repair No. 3:22-cv-50188
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Services Antitrust Litigation MDL No. 3030
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Hon. Iain D. Johnston
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
JONATHAN S. KANTER
Assistant Attorney General
DOHA G. MEKKI
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
MAGGIE GOODLANDER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
DAVID B. LAWRENCE
Policy Director
DANIEL E. HAAR
NICKOLAI G. LEVIN
MATTHEW CHOU
ANDREW L. KLINE
MATTHEW C. MANDELBERG
Attorneys
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

San Francisco Office
450 Golden Gate Avenue
Room 10-0101, Box 36045
Telephone: (415) 218-9633
Email: matthew.chou@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States of America
TABLE OF C ONTENTS
Interest of the United States............................................................................................................ 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
A. Background on the Right to Repair ...............................................................................2
B. Allegations in This Case ................................................................................................5
C. Procedural Posture and Deere’s Pending Rule 12(c) Motion ........................................7
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................... 8
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT DEERE’S PROPOSED PRESUMPTION ..9
A. Kodak Should Guide the Court’s Analysis in This Case ...............................................9
B. Deere’s Proposed Presumption Contravenes Kodak ...................................................10
II. CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT DEERE’S PROPOSED PRESUMPTION ..14
A. Seventh Circuit Precedent Does Not Support Deere’s Proposed Presumption ...........14
B. Deere Ignores Circuit Court Precedents Correctly Applying Kodak...........................17
C. Deere’s Other Out-of-Circuit Citations are Inapposite and Unpersuasive ..................19
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 23
TABLE OF A UTHORITIES
Cases
Avana Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc.,

838 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 17
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,

370 U.S. 294 (1962) .................................................................................................................... 9
Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co.,

60 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) ..................................................................................................... 18
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,

504 U.S. 451 (1992) ........................................................................................................... passim
Digital Equipment Corporation v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc.,

73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................... 14, 15, 16
FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists,

476 U.S. 447 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 10
Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc.,

423 F.3d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 2005) .................................................................................. 17, 19, 20
Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak I),

903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................................... 17, 18
Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak II),

125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................. 17, 18
In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig.,

313 F. Supp. 3d 931 (N.D. Ill. 2018) ............................................................................ 16, 20, 21
Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North America,

23 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994) ......................................................................................................... 20
Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States,

268 U.S. 563 (1925) .................................................................................................................. 11
Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago,
649 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................................... 1
ii
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston,

141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) .............................................................................................................. 12
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

351 U.S. 377 (1956) .................................................................................................................... 9
Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution,

513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 19
Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,

138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) ........................................................................................................ 12, 23
PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,

104 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1997) ..................................................................................................... 22
Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc.,

63 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 1999) ................................................................................. 17, 18
Schor v. Abbott Laboratory,

457 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................... 14, 16
SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp.,

188 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1999).................................................................................................. 20, 21
United Farmers Agents Association v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,

89 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1996) ....................................................................................................... 20
US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp.,

938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................................ 19
United States v. Krieger,

628 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................................................... 21
United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n,

322 U.S. 533 (1944) .................................................................................................................... 1
Statutes
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 ......................................................................................................................... 1, 5
28 U.S.C. § 517 ............................................................................................................................... 1
iii
Other Authorities
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021)...........................................................1
Federal Trade Commission, Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to Congress on Repair Restrictions
(May 2021)................................................................................................................................2, 3
James M. MacDonald, Robert A. Hoppe, and Doris Newton, Three Decades of Consolidation in
Agriculture, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (2018).............................................................................4
Mae Anderson, Without ‘right to repair,’ businesses lose time and money
(Aug. 10, 2021) .............................................................................................................................7
Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law,
74 Antitrust L.J. 175, 185 (2007) ................................................................................................3
Nigel Key, Jonathan Law, and Christine Whitt, Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Rates Have Increased in
Most Agricultural States, USDA Economic Research Service
(Nov. 30, 2021) .............................................................................................................................4
Nilay Patel, John Deere Turned Tractors Into Computers – What’s Next?,
The Verge (August 10, 2021) ........................................................................................................7
Peter Waldman & Lydia Mulvany, Who Really Owns a John Deere?,
Bloomberg Businessweek (Mar. 9, 2020) .................................................................................5, 6
U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Farm Production Expenditures: 2021 (July 2022) ...............................5
iv
I NTEREST OF THE U NITED S TATES
The United States respectfully submits this Statement under 28 U.S.C. § 517, which
permits the Attorney General to direct “any officer of the Department of Justice . . . to attend to
the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States.” Id. This suit
affects the United States’ interest in promoting a correct interpretation of the federal antitrust laws.
The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division enforces these laws to protect economic freedom
and competition in the marketplace.
Most relevant here, the United States has a strong interest in the correct application of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Plaintiffs’ putative class action arises under Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2 (15
U.S.C. §§ 1–2). Plaintiffs allege that Deere & Company’s anticompetitive conduct has prevented
farmers and independent repair shops from performing certain repairs on Deere-branded
agricultural equipment. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 4, 72–87, 237, ECF No. 85.1
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the policy of the United States is “to enforce the
antitrust laws to combat the excessive concentration of industry, the abuses of market power, and
the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony—especially as these issues arise in . . .
agricultural markets, . . . repair markets,” and elsewhere too. Exec. Order No. 14,036, § 1, 86 Fed.
Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021); see also United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558
(1944) (holding that “Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in
restraining trust and monopoly agreements” with the Sherman Act). The United States thus
1
The United States files this Statement of Interest in response to Deere’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. To resolve this motion, the Court will “tak[e] the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” E.g., Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co.
of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, for the limited purpose of this Statement, the United
States also assumes the facts in the complaint to be true.
1
submits this Statement of Interest to ensure that repair aftermarkets are analyzed under the correct
legal framework to protect against anticompetitive abuses of market power in repair aftermarkets.
B ACKGROUND
A. Background on the Right to Repair
There is a growing body of economic literature and consumer effort to protect consumers’
freedom to repair their own products. This recognition, which is often styled around a “right to
repair,” is rooted in consumers’ seeming lack of options for maximizing the value of products they
already own. Increasingly, product manufacturers have made products harder to fix and maintain.
For example, manufacturers have (1) hindered access to internal components; (2) monopolized
parts, manuals, and diagnostic tools; and (3) used software to impede repairs with substantially
identical aftermarket2 parts. See Federal Trade Commission, Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to
Congress on Repair Restrictions at 18–24 (May 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/nixing-fix-ftc-
report-congress-repair-restrictions (congressionally mandated report based on public comments,
third-party empirical research, and FTC research). There is an important role for competition in
these markets.
Repair restrictions like these can harm consumers, and the public more broadly, in at least
three related ways. First, repair restrictions can drive independent repair shops out of business by
raising their costs or denying them key inputs, which, in turn, leaves consumers with fewer choices.
See id. at 42–44; see also, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 458, 465 (1992) (crediting this harm and denying summary judgment).
2
The term “aftermarket” often refers to goods or services affecting a product that a consumer already owns,
such as repairs of durable equipment—like tractors in this case or photocopiers in Kodak—while the
corresponding term “foremarket” often refers to the initial acquisition of that good or equipment. See
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466, 497 (1992).
2
Second, manufacturers’ restrictions can delay repairs. FTC, supra, at 39. To start, by
forcing independent repair shops from the market, these restrictions can cut the number of repair
shops available to consumers. Consumers (including farmers) then have fewer options for their
time-sensitive repairs. See id. And even if a farmer finds an available independent shop, repair
restrictions can stymie its work. For instance, proprietary software may prevent a tractor’s central
computer from recognizing a replacement part until an authorized technician essentially “unlocks”
the tractor. See id. at 23, 39. Needless delay results if technicians are scarce or demand is high.
And during harvest season, time is of the essence.
Third, restrictions on repair aftermarkets can raise prices and reduce quality.3 For example,
automotive collision repair parts can be twice as expensive to repair through manufacturers versus
independent servicers. See FTC, supra, at 40 n.219. Medical imaging equipment is about three
times as expensive. See id. at 40 ($150–$250 per hour vs. $500–$600 per hour). As to quality,
surveys suggest that “consumers who used independent repair shops were more satisfied with the
repairs than those who used factory service.” Id. at 38 & n.206 (quoting Consumer Reports, Should
you repair or replace that product? (Jan. 2014)) (surveying 29,281 people on home appliances,
electronics, and yard equipment). About 75% of car owners use independent servicers, for
instance. Id. at 38. Yet manufacturers can impose restrictions that prevent independent repairs.
These repair restrictions can worsen the pressures that farmers increasingly face. For the
past three decades, for instance, U.S. agriculture has required growing investment in equipment—
3
Price and quality are two sides of the same coin. A decrease in quality can harm consumers like an increase
in price. Thus, “[e]conomists commonly say that when they use the term ‘price,’ it is a shorthand for the
relevant price/quality and price/variety combinations.” Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the
“Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L.J. 175, 185 (2007).
3
a substantial fixed cost that can be hard to defray.4 And since 2014, falling commodity and
farmland prices have forced a historic uptick in family farmer bankruptcies nationwide.5
The leading Supreme Court precedent addressing aftermarkets is Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). In Kodak, the defendant manufactured and
sold photocopiers and micrographic equipment, and also offered repair services and replacement
parts for its equipment. Id. at 456. The plaintiffs—a number of “independent service
organizations” (ISOs)—offered repair services for Kodak machines in competition with Kodak.
Id. at 457. To block competition from ISOs, Kodak “implemented a policy of selling replacement
parts . . . only to buyers of Kodak equipment who use Kodak service or repair their own machines,”
which drove many ISOs out of business. Id. at 458, 465. The ISOs sued under the Sherman Act,
raising theories similar to those raised by Plaintiffs here: tying under § 1 of the Sherman Act; and
monopolization under § 2. Id. at 479 (§ 1 tying), 485–86 (§ 2 monopolization and attempted
monopolization); accord Compl. ¶¶ 221–32 (§ 1 tying), 233–66 (§ 2 monopolization, monopoly
leveraging, attempted monopolization in the alternative, and conspiracy to monopolize). As
discussed in more detail in the Discussion below, the Supreme Court held that the ISOs were
entitled to a trial because they had shown that “Kodak’s control over the parts market has excluded
service competition, boosted service prices, and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service.”
Id. at 465.
4
James M. MacDonald, Robert A. Hoppe, and Doris Newton, Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S.
Agriculture at 40, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (2018),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/88057/eib-189.pdf.
5
See Nigel Key, Jonathan Law, and Christine Whitt, Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Rates Have Increased in Most
Agricultural States, USDA Economic Research Service (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2021/november/chapter-12-bankruptcy-rates-have-increased-in-most-agricultural-states/.
4
B. Allegations in This Case
American farmers spend roughly $17.6 billion per year on tractors and other self-propelled
farm machinery.6 See Compl. ¶ 154 (“multi-billion-dollar” repair market). And John Deere
equipment accounts for more than half of this spend, according to some estimates.7
In this case, Plaintiffs are a putative class of farms and farmers that own and use equipment
manufactured by Deere & Company (Deere). Compl. ¶¶ 42–50. They allege that Deere has
violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2) by preventing them from
performing certain repairs on Deere-branded agricultural equipment. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4, 72–87,
237. Plaintiffs allege that Deere’s conduct has restrained trade in, and monopolized, an aftermarket
for “Deere Repair Services.” Id. ¶¶ 58–63.
Plaintiffs allege that Deere has denied customers the freedom to perform certain repairs
without the use of Deere’s authorized network, even when the repair could efficiently be performed
by the farmer or by lower-cost or more convenient independent mechanics. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4–5,
7–16, 72–92. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Deere has deliberately designed its tractors so
that both the diagnosis and the completion of a repair frequently requires [Deere] software tools
and other Dealership-only resources.” Id. ¶ 79. Without this proprietary software and
accompanying instructions, farmers (or independent servicers) cannot troubleshoot the computers
on each tractor that determine how—and if—the tractor functions. See id. ¶¶ 13, 73. Nor may
farmers or independent servicers replace any such computers that break. Id. ¶ 86. These
computers, or Engine Control Units (ECUs), monitor many sensors. See, e.g., id. ¶ 82 (125
6
USDA, Farm Production Expenditures: 2021 at 7 (July 2022),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2022/2021 FarmExpenditures.pdf.
7
Peter Waldman & Lydia Mulvany, Who Really Owns a John Deere? at 43, Bloomberg Businessweek (Mar.
9, 2020); see also Compl. ¶ 187 (Deere’s billions in income growth).
5
different sensors for a combine harvester). If a sensor notices a problem, such as a broken part, an
ECU can throttle the tractor (also known as forcing the tractor into “limp mode”). Id. ¶¶ 82–83.
The same happens if an ECU experiences even a software glitch. Id. In some cases, a tractor can
even become inoperable. Id. ¶ 86.
Restoring the tractor’s functionality can be difficult and expensive. A farmer cannot simply
replace the broken part. Id. ¶¶ 87, 147 (e.g., faulty moisture meter and exhaust filters). Nor can a
farmer ask a local independent repair shop to service the tractor, like someone might ask that shop
to fix their car. Id. ¶¶ 94, 175. Instead, farmers must pay—and wait for—a technician authorized
by Deere. Only Deere technicians have the proprietary software that can fully access an ECU. Id.
¶¶ 4, 11. Thus, only they can command the ECU to, say, recognize a replacement part or reset an
overzealous sensor. Id. ¶¶ 82, 147. The only software available to farmers and third-parties, by
contrast, has limited functionality despite Deere charging about $3,000 per year (originally $8,500
per year before the filing of this lawsuit). Id. ¶¶ 158–162.
The repair restrictions at issue here affect Deere agricultural equipment that are important,
costly investments to the workings of a farm. See Compl. ¶ 1 n.1 (list of equipment), ¶¶ 28, 99
(alleging that tractor prices can “run up to nearly a million dollars”). These various machines, or
“tractors” for short, enable American agriculture. When they break or fail to operate and repair
markets function poorly, agriculture suffers. Crops waste. Land lies fallow. See id. ¶¶ 83, 95.
Even a short delay can result in farmers “watch[ing] their crops rot.” Id. ¶¶ 83, 143.8 Farmers
thus place significant value on not only the quality but also the timeliness of repair services. Yet
8
See also Waldman & Mulvany, supra, at 44 (according to one farmer, “the five-hour wait for someone to
show up and do a half-hour software fix contributed to a loss of at least 15% of the crop”).
6
waits for repair can stretch for valuable hours, if not days or weeks. Id. ¶¶ 87, 117.9 And, as of
2022, the cost for Deere’s repair services was $150–$180 per hour for labor alone, with extra
charges for travel and parts. Id. ¶ 93. Plaintiffs allege that they “are forced to use Deere-affiliated
Dealerships for Repair Services when they would otherwise fix the Tractor themselves or utilize
the services of a lower-cost and/or more convenient independent mechanic.” Id. ¶ 5.
Deere has offered various responses to these allegations. In public, Deere has largely
attributed complaints about repair restrictions to consumers’ unawareness of their right to repair.
See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 142–143. In the words of Deere’s Chief Technology Officer, “98 percent of
the repairs that customers want to do on John Deere products today, they can do.”10 See id. ¶ 142
& n.53. Similarly, in this case, Deere’s pending motion for judgment on the pleadings (filed on
December 8, 2022) claims that only “a small subset” of repairs are restricted to Deere-authorized
dealerships. Deere’s Mem. in Support of its Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1, ECF No. 105
(Mot.). Deere further argues that farmers have long known about those restricted repairs. See id.
at 18–19. In short, Deere claims that it has neither deceived nor surprised farmers with its
longstanding repair restrictions.
C. Procedural Posture and Deere’s Pending Rule 12(c) Motion
Deere has filed a motion under Rule 12(c) asking this Court to “dismiss this case on the
pleadings.” Mot. at 2. Most relevant here, Deere asks this Court to apply a factual presumption:
unless Deere had deceived or surprised its customers, competition in the tractor foremarket must
9
See also Mae Anderson, Without ‘right to repair,’ businesses lose time and money (Aug 10, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-9f84a8b72bb6dd408cb642414cd28f5d (cited at Compl.
¶ 87) (four hours for a controller, and a day for installation).
10
Nilay Patel, John Deere Turned Tractors Into Computers – What’s Next?, The Verge (June 15, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/22533735/john-deere-cto-hindman-decoder-interview-right-to-repair-tractors
(cited at Compl. ¶ 142 n.53) (interviewing CTO Jahmy Hindman).
7
have negated any power Deere had in its repair aftermarkets. See Mot. at 18. According to Deere,
“[t]o overcome this presumption—and proceed on a single-brand aftermarket theory—Plaintiffs
must plausibly allege that Deere either [1] hid its repair policies from customers before they bought
a Tractor, or [2] changed those policies after the fact.” Id. This is incorrect.
The United States respectfully submits this Statement of Interest to oppose Deere’s Rule
12(c) motion on this issue.11
D ISCUSSION
The federal antitrust laws have long protected competition in aftermarkets. See Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). But Deere asks this Court to
nullify that protection unless two narrow circumstances are shown. Namely, Deere argues that its
repair restrictions are effectively immune from antitrust scrutiny unless Deere either (1) deceived
Plaintiffs by hiding the restrictions before Plaintiffs bought their tractors; or (2) surprised Plaintiffs
by imposing the restrictions after Plaintiffs’ purchases. See Mot. at 15, 18. Deere proposes a safe
harbor where the law provides none. Deere would have the Court presume that, in every other
circumstance, a competitive foremarket (as Deere argues the tractor market to be) necessarily
shields consumers from any possible market power or monopoly power in a single-brand
aftermarket (such as the market for Deere repair services).
Deere is wrong. As detailed below, Deere’s proposed presumption contravenes the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kodak and the weight of circuit court authority. Although deception
or surprise can be relevant to a proper Kodak analysis, they are not alone dispositive or required.
Indeed, Deere’s requested presumption is very similar to the one sought by the defendant in Kodak
11
The United States takes no position on other issues, such as whether Plaintiffs are direct or indirect
purchasers. See, e.g., Mot. at 6–14.
8
and rejected by the Court in favor of a fact-specific analysis of “actual market realities.” Kodak,
504 U.S. at 466–67.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT DEERE’S PROPOSED PRESUMPTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kodak controls here. Yet, tellingly, in asking this Court
to dismiss this case on the pleadings, Deere fails to even cite it. Far from supporting Deere’s
proposed presumption disfavoring single-brand aftermarkets, Kodak analyzed and protected those
markets much like any other. Among other things, Kodak defined single-brand aftermarkets based
on traditional economic principles, not a formulaic fixation on whether plaintiffs had shown
deception or surprise.
A. Kodak Should Guide the Court’s Analysis in This Case
A “relevant market” or “relevant product market” in antitrust cases refers to the set of
products or services that customers would switch to in the event of a price increase or quality
decrease. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (“The outer
boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.”); United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) (“Th[e] market is composed of products that
have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use and
qualities considered.”).
In a case involving aftermarket parts or repairs for durable equipment, the “relevant
market” or “market definition” analysis also begins with the choices or reasonably interchangeable
“substitutes” available to the owner of that equipment. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481–82 (“The relevant
market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners.”)
In Kodak, the Supreme Court explained that “[b]ecause service and parts for Kodak equipment are
9
not interchangeable with other manufacturers’ service and parts, the relevant market from the
Kodak equipment owner’s perspective is composed of only those companies that service Kodak
machines.” Id. at 482. Plaintiffs in this case have followed these traditional principles in alleging
that repair services and tools for Deere equipment are not interchangeable with services and tools
for equipment from other manufacturers. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 65.
B. Deere’s Proposed Presumption Contravenes Kodak
In Kodak, the plaintiffs’ claims required the defendant to have market power in the
aftermarket for replacement parts, 504 U.S. at 464 (§ 1 tying claim), and monopoly power in
aftermarkets for parts and service, id. at 480–82 (§ 2 monopolization claim). As the Supreme
Court explained, “[m]arket power is the power ‘to force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market.’” Id. at 464 (quoting Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 14 (1984)). The plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence of Kodak’s market power by
showing that Kodak’s conduct had “excluded service competition, boosted service prices, and
forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service” which “was of higher price and lower quality
than the preferred [independent] service.” Id. at 465; see id. at 481 (explaining that this evidence
was also sufficient to show monopoly power); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 460–61 (1986) (explaining that market power can be established through evidence of “actual,
sustained adverse effects on competition”).
Plaintiffs here have made a variety of similar allegations. Plaintiffs allege, for example,
that they are “forced to use Deere-affiliated Dealerships for Repair Services when they would
otherwise fix the Tractor themselves or utilize the services of a lower-cost and/or more convenient
independent mechanic.” Compl. ¶ 5. What’s more, repairs through Deere’s authorized network
are “frequently” performed incorrectly, only after “extensive waits,” and at “exorbitant” cost. Id.
10
¶ 27; see id. at ¶¶ 115–23 (detailing aspects of poor service and higher costs for customers
compared to “what would be offered in a competitive market”); id. at ¶¶ 186–89 (alleging Deere
earns supra-competitive profits from withholding Repair Tools).
Rather than grapple with Plaintiffs’ allegations relevant to Repair Services, Deere argues
that the complaint fails because it does not “plausibly allege that consumers who bought Deere
Tractors did not realize that some Repair Services for their Tractors would need to be performed
by dealers.” Mot. at 18. It may be true that tractor customers will weigh the information they
know about aftermarket parts or repairs at the time they purchase the tractor, and that this may
reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to charge high prices for repairs or replacement parts in the
first place. But to presume this without factual analysis violates Kodak. As the Supreme Court
explained, a “theory, although perhaps intuitively appealing, may not accurately explain the
behavior of the primary and derivative markets for complex durable goods.” Kodak, 504 U.S. at
473. Kodak claims therefore require an actual “case-by-case” [] focus[] on the ‘particular facts
disclosed by the record.” Id. at 467 (quoting Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States,
268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925)).
For example, Kodak had argued that it “[could not] actually exercise the necessary market
power for a Sherman Act violation” because once customers realized that their service costs were
increasing, Kodak would suffer a “loss in profits from lower equipment sales.” Kodak, 504 U.S.
at 451. But Kodak had not presented any “actual data” to support this claim. Id. at 466. And
given the Supreme Court’s insistence on a fact-bound approach, the Kodak Court rejected the idea
that “competition in the equipment market necessarily prevents market power in the aftermarkets”
as a matter of law. Id. at 470 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained then and since
reaffirmed, “[l]egal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market
11
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.” Id. at 466–67; see also Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (quoting Kodak on this point); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158 (2021) (noting, in a rule of reason case, that “[w]hether an antitrust
violation exists necessarily depends on a careful analysis of market realities”).
Furthermore, Kodak’s argument assumed that price increases in the aftermarket “above
competitive levels” would mean “potential customers would simply stop buying” equipment in a
foremarket. 504 U.S. at 470. But the Court reasoned that there could “easily” be a price increase
in an aftermarket that “would more than compensate for the lower revenues” in the foremarket, id.
at 471, and thus the claim “may not accurately explain the behavior of the primary and derivative
markets for complex durable goods,” id. at 473. In other words, to understand the defendant’s
ability and incentives to exercise market power or monopoly power, the court must understand all
the relevant underlying facts.
A firm’s ability to exercise market power or monopoly power in an aftermarket can depend
on whether there is a “responsive connection” between the aftermarket and the foremarket. Kodak,
504 U.S. at 473. As the Supreme Court explained, “[f]or the service-market price to affect
equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of the ‘package’—
equipment, service, and parts—at the time of purchase; that is, consumers must engage in accurate
lifecycle pricing.” Id. (emphasis added). “Accurate lifecycle pricing,” in turn, requires a
“sophisticated analysis” based on a wealth of information, and the calculation “is likely to be
customer-specific.” See id. at 473–74 (listing over a dozen pieces of necessary information).
“Much of this information is difficult—some of it impossible—to acquire at the time of purchase.”
Id. at 473. And even where the information is technically available, some customers may “choose
not” to perform the necessary calculations because doing so may not be cost efficient or may be
12
inconsistent with a customer’s procurement practices. Id. at 474–75. Thus, in situations where
customers cannot or do not engage in accurate lifecycle pricing, a competitive foremarket may not
discipline anticompetitive conduct in an aftermarket, regardless of whether a defendant may have
“conspicuously made its repair policies known to consumers.” Mot. at 18. Kodak requires this
Court to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims by “examin[ing] closely the economic reality of the market at
issue” and rejecting formalistic distinctions such as whether a defendant made a particular
disclosure. Id. at 466–67.
The Supreme Court’s concern with information costs does not square with Deere’s
proposed requirement of deception or surprise. Indeed, in Kodak, customers had made the “vast
bulk” of equipment purchases after Kodak had stopped selling parts to independent service
organizations in 1985. See id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting factual proffer). So “at least
all post-1985 purchasers of micrographic equipment, like all post-1985 purchasers of new Kodak
copiers, could have been aware of Kodak’s parts practices.” Id. (emphasis added). Yet the Court
held that information costs made purchasers’ awareness of Kodak’s policies merely theoretical,
and thus permitted plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.
Deere’s deception-or-surprise requirement is not just an unduly narrow lens for assessing
information costs. It also is blind to equipment owners’ switching costs, as the Kodak Court’s
analysis shows. The Supreme Court explained that “consumers who already have purchased the
equipment, and are thus ‘locked in,’ will tolerate some level of service-price increases before
changing equipment brands.” Id. at 476. Again, there was no insistence on deception or surprise:
high sunk costs sufficed. See id. at 476–77. Namely, “the heavy initial outlay for Kodak
equipment, combined with the required support material that works only with Kodak equipment,
ma[de] switching costs very high for existing Kodak customers.” Id. at 477. This Court’s analysis
13
of market realities should give due consideration to Plaintiffs’ allegations of switching costs. See,
e.g., Compl. ¶ 28.
More fundamentally, Deere is asking for a version of the type of factual presumption that
the Supreme Court emphatically rejected in Kodak. The defendant in Kodak argued for a
presumption that its “lack of power in the equipment market necessarily precludes power in the
aftermarkets.” Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469. In ruling for plaintiffs, the Kodak Court instead demanded
a fact-bound analysis of the relationship between the market for equipment and the aftermarkets
for parts and service. See id. (“The extent to which one market prevents exploitation of another
market depends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product
in response to a price change in another.”). Deere would have this Court presume that competition
in the foremarket is sufficient to discipline anticompetitive conduct in the aftermarket, unless
Plaintiffs “plausibly allege that Deere either hid its repair policies from customers before they
bought a Tractor, or changed those policies after the fact.” Mot. at 18. This is precisely the type
of formalistic legal distinction that is not only inappropriate in antitrust cases generally, but also
forbidden by Kodak itself.
II. CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT DEERE’S PROPOSED PRESUMPTION
Deere’s proposed presumption also fails to find support in Seventh Circuit precedent. And
Deere ignores precedent correctly applying Kodak, while relying on out-of-circuit cases that are
inapposite or wrong.
A. Seventh Circuit Precedent Does Not Support Deere’s Proposed Presumption
Deere is wrong in claiming that two Seventh Circuit cases—Digital Equipment Corporation
v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996) and Schor v. Abbott Laboratory,
14
457 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2006)—require Plaintiffs to show that they were deceived or surprised.
See Mot. at 15 n.3, 19. Neither case does.
Deere’s reliance on Digital Equipment is misplaced as the case did not involve an alleged
aftermarket. Digital Equipment was a “mundane commercial case” in which a computer
manufacturer sued a distributor in diversity for money owed, and the distributor filed an antitrust
counterclaim that “charged [the manufacturer] with attempting to monopolize the market for
operating systems for [its] own computers.” 73 F.3d at 758, 763. The Seventh Circuit “could
hardly imagine a weaker case” for applying Kodak. Id. at 763. The manufacturer was “selling a
fungible commodity” in a rapidly-expanding market with easy substitution, and “[n]othing in th[e]
record suggest[ed] that [the manufacturer] was able to raise prices, or exploit any customer, by
deciding to include an [operating system] with every machine.” Id. Customers “c[ould] substitute
brands [of computer] without changing operating systems.” Id. Thus, Kodak was readily
distinguishable from the facts at issue.
Digital Equipment nevertheless addressed Kodak and observed that “competition among
manufacturers fully protects buyers who accurately calculate life-cycle costs.” Digital Equip., 73
F.3d at 762. This observation acknowledges that these calculations may not always be possible.
Indeed, Digital Equipment stated that “not all customers do this [i.e., ‘accurately calculate life-
cycle costs’].” Id. Digital Equipment also did not purport to ignore that buyers may not be
protected when there is insufficient “competition among manufacturers,” such as when
“customer[s are] locked in to [their] equipment.” Id. at 762–63. The Seventh Circuit therefore
appreciated that various market imperfections missing from Digital Equipment can support Kodak
claims. Here, for example, Plaintiffs’ case involves expensive and complex equipment, with
15
uncertain and variable repair costs over its useful life, and customers who are allegedly locked-in.
See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 3, 15, 99–100.
Applying Digital Equipment in an MDL in this District, then-District Judge St. Eve found
that aftermarkets are not limited to cases in which deception or surprise are alleged. See In re
Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 931, 962, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2018). In In re Dealer
Management, plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss against not only a defendant whose alleged
conduct could satisfy a deception/surprise requirement, see id. at 963–64 (defendant CDK), but
also a defendant whose conduct could not, id. at 964 (defendant Reynolds). As the court explained,
these rulings flowed from precedent. Quoting Digital Equipment, Judge St. Eve reasoned that
whenever customers cannot “accurately calculate life-cycle costs”—whether because of
information costs or other “market imperfections”—a supplier-defendant can charge
supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket. Id. at 964 (quoting Digital Equip., 73 F.3d at 762).
Accordingly, just as the Kodak suit withstood summary judgment, a complaint may survive a Rule
12 motion even if it “affirmatively pleads that [defendant]’s closed architecture was generally
known to customers before they purchased the product.” Id. (emphasis added). It would turn the
law on its head to suggest that the act of disclosure by a dominant firm would render an otherwise
anticompetitive and exclusionary act lawful.
Deere’s reliance on Schor is likewise misplaced. The case involved the sale of
pharmaceutical products that could be purchased standalone or in combination with
complementary products, not aftermarkets. See Schor, 457 F.3d at 609–10. And Schor did not
address market definition under Kodak for single-brand aftermarkets. Schor only discussed Kodak
to explain why the decision was not relevant, principally because the Schor plaintiff’s theory of
monopoly leveraging was not addressed in Kodak. See id. at 614 (declining to “generalize” Kodak
16
to “a rule against selling products that complement those in which the defendant has market
power”).
B. Deere Ignores Circuit Court Precedents Correctly Applying Kodak
The weight of authority has recognized that Kodak requires a fact-specific inquiry, not
bright-line tests. In addition to this District in In re Dealer Management Systems, courts in at least
three more circuits have correctly recognized that Kodak requires a fact-specific inquiry, not
bright-line tests.
The Third Circuit has “emphasize[d] [] that an ‘aftermarket policy change’ is not the sine
qua non of a Kodak claim. An aftermarket policy change is an important consideration, but only
one of several relevant factors.” Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 384 (3d
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); accord Avana Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 404 (3d
Cir. 2016). In addition to any surprise or deception, a court should also consider “evidence of
(1) supracompetitive pricing, (2) [a defendant]’s dominant share of the relevant aftermarket, (3)
significant information costs that prevented lifecycle pricing, and (4) high ‘switching costs’ that
served to “lock in” [a defendant]’s aftermarket customers.” Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 384; see
also Section I, supra (summarizing Kodak).
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has never “identif[ied] Kodak’s policy change as an essential
element of the plaintiffs’ aftermarket claim.” Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1218, 1231 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (Levi, J.). This is apparent not only in the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion reviewed in Kodak, but also in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis on remand from the
Supreme Court. See Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kodak I), aff’d, 504 U.S. 451; Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kodak II) (review after jury trial). In Kodak I, the Ninth Circuit relied
17
primarily on evidence of supracompetitive repair prices. See 903 F.2d at 617 (Kodak prices “up
to twice as much” despite “lower quality”); see also Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457, 469 (likewise noting
that Kodak’s prices were substantially higher and had increased). Similarly, in Kodak II, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that Kodak was a liable monopolist12 without mentioning—let alone requiring—
specific timing for Kodak’s policy change. See 125 F.3d at 1212; see also Kodak, 504 U.S. at 492
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing unsuccessfully that timing favored Kodak). And between Kodak I
and II, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on a Kodak tying claim—again without
analyzing the timing of repair restrictions. See Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d
1421, 1426–27 (9th Cir. 1995). Datagate instead considered deposition testimony that (1) the
manufacturer’s tying arrangement deterred a customer from considering a competing option; and
(2) the independent servicer’s prices were lower than the manufacturer’s. Id. at 1426.
In focusing on deception or surprise, Deere has the analysis “backwards.” Red Lion, 63 F.
Supp. 2d at 1230. As a district court in the Ninth Circuit explained correctly, “[Kodak’s] policy
change did not create lock-in; instead, the existence of lock-in—high switching costs—made it
both possible and economically desirable for Kodak to change its policy and exploit aftermarket
consumers.” Id. Thus, there is not “an implicit limitation on aftermarket antitrust claims to
situations involving a change of policy or pricing as to after[]market parts and services.” Id. Such
an interpretation of Kodak, Judge Levi explained, “is not supported by the text or reasoning of that
opinion.” Id. “Kodak [] d[id] not hold that an aftermarket claim is contingent on a change in a
manufacturer’s parts or service policy; it simply acknowledge[d] that Kodak’s ability to make a
12
In Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit reviewed only monopolization claims under Sherman Act § 2. “Before
closing arguments, the [independent servicers] withdrew their § 1 tying and conspiracy claims.” Kodak II,
125 F.3d at 1201.
18
policy change without suffering losses in the equipment market was evidence that the service
market was not disciplined by competition in the equipment market.” Id. (citing Kodak, 504 U.S.
at 477) (emphasis added). Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir.
2008), cited by Deere, is not to the contrary. The Newcal decision analyzed factors beyond surprise
and deception; it held that plaintiffs’ allegations of repair and service aftermarkets for customers
with specific photocopier equipment were sufficient to survive a Rule 12 motion. See id. at 1045–
46, 1050.
More recently, the Second Circuit analyzed a Kodak claim based on the economic realities
alleged in the complaint, rather than deception, surprise, or other formalistic distinctions. In US
Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had “monopoliz[ed]
the Sabre travel agent sub-market,” defined as “the distribution of [global distribution system]
services to Sabre subscribers.” 938 F.3d 43, 64 (2d Cir. 2019). The plaintiff “alleged that travel
agents are locked into the Sabre platform because of the prohibitively high costs of switching to
alternative booking channels and incentive payment structures.” Id. at 66. Applying Kodak, and
without mentioning deception or surprise, the court held that the plaintiff had pled a valid “Sabre-
only market” that was “capable of being monopolized under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” Id.
In sum, in-circuit and out-of-circuit precedent follows Kodak itself in “emphasiz[ing] []
that an ‘aftermarket policy change’ is not the sine qua non of a Kodak claim.” Harrison Aire, 423
F.3d at 384. What Deere calls “lock-in” is not needed for Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims to proceed.
C. Deere’s Other Out-of-Circuit Citations are Inapposite and Unpersuasive
Deere’s remaining authority is from the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. See Mot. at 15 n.3.
None is persuasive.
19
To start, Deere’s cited Fifth Circuit case is inapposite. In United Farmers Agents
Association v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the court found that plaintiffs’ alleged aftermarket
was “essentially an intracompany dispute over how to run a computer system.” 89 F.3d 233, 236
(5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). At issue was how much Farmers could charge its insurance
agents for computers to access its systems with policyholder information. But Plaintiffs here do
not work for Deere, nor are they agents or franchisees of Deere. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found
that plaintiffs “cited no evidence that information or switching costs were high for most agents.”
Id. at 237. The allegations here are different. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 99–101, 141–154.
The First and Sixth Circuits’ cases have addressed inapposite facts and pronounced
holdings broader than necessary to resolve the claims at hand. Respectfully, to the extent those
circuits’ cases can be said to undercut Kodak, they have misinterpreted Kodak and taken the wrong
side of a circuit split. See, e.g., In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys., 313 F. Supp. 3d at 964 (analyzing Harrison
Aire, 423 F.3d at 384). They purport to demand that plaintiffs show a bait-and-switch—namely,
that a manufacturer’s repair restrictions would have been unknown to a perfectly rational consumer
at the time of her purchase—but this demand contravenes Kodak.
The First Circuit instigated the doctrinal clash in a tying case about college health
insurance, Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 23 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994). See also SMS
Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Lee for “bait
and switch” requirement); Mot. at 15 (quoting SMS Sys.). Lee stated that “the timing of the ‘lock-
in’ at issue in Kodak was central to the Supreme Court’s decision.” 23 F.3d 14 at 20. That is, the
First Circuit assumed that Kodak would have been decided differently “[h]ad previous customers
known, at the time they bought their Kodak copiers, that Kodak would implement its restrictive
parts-servicing policy.” Id. Later, in SMS Systems, the First Circuit relied on Lee in rejecting an
20
“odd” claim against warranties bundled with equipment—warranties which did not stop consumers
from using independent servicers. 188 F.3d at 14. In SMS Systems too, part of the First Circuit’s
reasoning was the timing of any policy change. See id. at 19.
The First Circuit’s timing assumption was wrong. It stemmed from the dissent in Kodak,
Lee, 23 F.3d at 20 (citing Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2095–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), not the majority
opinion. But in the controlling view of the Kodak Court, the dissent “urge[d] a radical departure
in th[e] Court’s antitrust law.” Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29. This Court is bound by the majority
opinion “unless and until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules a case.” United States v. Krieger,
628 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 2010).
Indeed, the Kodak majority rejected timing as dispositive. Specifically, the dissent had
argued that “the only thing lacking” from Kodak’s defense was “concrete evidence that the
restrictive parts policy was announced or generally known.” Compare Kodak, 504 U.S. at 492
(Scalia, J., dissenting), with id. at 477 n.24 (opinion of the Court). The Supreme Court majority
vigorously disagreed. Kodak needed to “provide evidence” on the multifaceted factual question
of “whether the equipment market prevents the exertion of market power in the parts market.” Id.
at 477 n.24. Such evidence would compel “careful consideration . . . give[n] to the particular
facts.” See id. at 467 n.13.
In addition, most consumers in Kodak bought their equipment after Kodak stopped selling
parts to independent servicers in 1985. See id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting servicers’
factual proffer). Thus, “at least all post-1985 purchasers of micrographic equipment, like all post-
1985 purchasers of new Kodak copiers, could have been aware of Kodak’s parts practices.” Id.
(emphasis added); accord In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys., 313 F. Supp. 3d at 937, 964 (denying Rule 12
motion despite defendant’s “long-standing” policy predating the lawsuit by at least 8 years). Even
21
so, the Supreme Court denied summary judgment for Kodak. Summary judgment would have at
least required evidence of actual widespread consumer awareness—not merely the public timing
of repair restrictions. See, e.g., Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473–75 (analyzing the nature of consumer
knowledge and “the number of sophisticated customers”). All told, the First Circuit’s reasons for
limiting Kodak were wrong in many respects.
Deere’s reliance on PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811 (6th Cir.
1997), is unavailing for similar reasons. There, to apply Kodak at summary judgment, the Sixth
Circuit relied on the fact that “nothing in the record or [plaintiff’s] brief” suggested that Honeywell
exploited any information asymmetries or charged supracompetitive prices. Id. at 820–21
(emphasis added). To the contrary, Honeywell empowered customers to “more accurately []
estimate the cost of the equipment” and engaged them in “lengthy negotiations” before sale. Id.
at 820.
Despite these factual defects in the Honeywell plaintiffs’ claims, the Sixth Circuit
unnecessarily tried to go further. It relied on Lee to prescribe a bright-line test like Deere’s: “an
antitrust plaintiff cannot succeed on a Kodak-type theory when [1] the defendant has not changed
its policy after locking-in some of its customers, and [2] the defendant has been otherwise
forthcoming about its pricing structure and service policies.” Id. at 820. This statement is best
read in the context of the case, where “[plaintiff] ha[d] not alleged or shown that Honeywell ha[d]
market power in the relevant market.” Id. at 821. To read it more broadly would risk defying
Kodak. Out of context, the first prong ignores that, in Kodak, the company had imposed its repair
restrictions before consumers made most of their purchases. See supra Discussion I-B. The other
prong ignores the Kodak Court’s admonition that “even if consumers were capable of acquiring
and processing the complex body of [lifecycle] information, they may not choose to do so” for
22
various reasons. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474. And overall, the test wrongly sacrifices “actual market
realities” for “legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions.” E.g., Am. Express Co., 138
S. Ct. at 2285 (quoting Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466–467).
C ONCLUSION
This Court should reject Deere’s argument that deception or surprise is required to
delineate a repair aftermarket.
Respectfully submitted,
JONATHAN S. KANTER
Assistant Attorney General
DOHA G. MEKKI
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
MAGGIE GOODLANDER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
DAVID B. LAWRENCE
Policy Director
DANIEL E. HAAR
NICKOLAI G. LEVIN
MATTHEW CHOU
ANDREW L. KLINE
MATTHEW C. MANDELBERG
Attorneys
Dated: February 13, 2023 /s/ Matthew Chou

MATTHEW CHOU
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division
San Francisco Office
450 Golden Gate Avenue
Room 10-0101, Box 36045
Telephone: (415) 218-9633
Email: matthew.chou@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States of America
23

Dept of Justice Filing in Deere Repair Case 411573

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Case: 3:22-cv-50188 Document #: 120 Filed: 02/14/23 Page 1 of 28 PageID #:1127

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

Interest of the United States............................................................................................................ 1

A. Background on the Right to Repair ...............................................................................2

B. Allegations in This Case ................................................................................................5

C. Procedural Posture and Deere’s Pending Rule 12(c) Motion ........................................7

A. Kodak Should Guide the Court’s Analysis in This Case ...............................................9

B. Deere’s Proposed Presumption Contravenes Kodak ...................................................10

B. Deere Ignores Circuit Court Precedents Correctly Applying Kodak...........................17

C. Deere’s Other Out-of-Circuit Citations are Inapposite and Unpersuasive ..................19

Avana Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc.,

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,

Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co.,

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,

Digital Equipment Corporation v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc.,

FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists,

Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc.,

Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak I),

Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak II),

In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig.,

Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North America,

Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States,

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston,

United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution,

Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,

PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,

Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc.,

Schor v. Abbott Laboratory,

SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp.,

United Farmers Agents Association v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,

US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp.,

United States v. Krieger,

United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n,

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 ......................................................................................................................... 1, 5

28 U.S.C. § 517 ............................................................................................................................... 1

Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 9, 2021)...........................................................1

I NTEREST OF THE U NITED S TATES

and competition in the marketplace.

the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony—especially as these issues arise in . . .

A. Background on the Right to Repair

Congress on Repair Restrictions at 18–24 (May 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/nixing-fix-ftc-

report-congress-repair-restrictions (congressionally mandated report based on public comments,

And during harvest season, time is of the essence.

monopolization under § 2. Id. at 479 (§ 1 tying), 485–86 (§ 2 monopolization and attempted

monopolization); accord Compl. ¶¶ 221–32 (§ 1 tying), 233–66 (§ 2 monopolization, monopoly

leveraging, attempted monopolization in the alternative, and conspiracy to monopolize). As

B. Allegations in This Case

for “Deere Repair Services.” Id. ¶¶ 58–63.

even become inoperable. Id. ¶ 86.

per year before the filing of this lawsuit). Id. ¶¶ 158–162.

the services of a lower-cost and/or more convenient independent mechanic.” Id. ¶ 5.

longstanding repair restrictions.

C. Procedural Posture and Deere’s Pending Rule 12(c) Motion

“[t]o overcome this presumption—and proceed on a single-brand aftermarket theory—Plaintiffs

12(c) motion on this issue.11

aftermarket (such as the market for Deere repair services).

Deere is wrong. As detailed below, Deere’s proposed presumption contravenes the