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‘Posthumanism in the Work of Jorge Luis Borges’

Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus

This is no longer the earth on which man lives. (Heidegger 1993: 106)

There is no doubt that Jorge Luis Borges is a major literary precursor of

contemporary interactive and multimedia works. It is almost commonplace to see tales

like ‘Funes el memorioso’ [Funes the Memorious], ‘La biblioteca de Babel’ [The Library

of Babel], or ‘El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan’ [The Garden of the Forking Paths] as

prefigurations of cyberliterature. Borges’ webpresence is vast – from sites dedicated to

‘Webmaster Borges’, which claim that ‘the greatest influence on the Argentine writer was

a phenomenon invented after his death [namely: the Internet]’ (Wolk 1999), to the all-

encompassing site of the ‘Jorge Luis Borges Center for Studies and Documentation’

hosted by the University of Iowa.

This chapter aims to demonstrate the depth and importance of Borges’ legacy

not only to cyberliterature but to discussions of the entire contemporary ‘posthuman’

paradigm. Even though Borges rarely speaks in any direct way of technology and of the

cybercultural futures which it makes possible, his speculative fictions and other prose

writings provide glimpses of posthuman conditions that are more fully portrayed by

writers like William Gibson and Philip K. Dick or in films like The Matrix (Wachowski

1999) and Minority Report (Spielberg 2002). His work thereby can stake a claim to a

foundational presence within contemporary debates on the future of the archive, memory

and consciousness, on the machinic and the digital prosthetisation of the human, and on
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the pervasiveness of communications systems and their reshaping of the very notion of

the literary. Much of this has to do with the way in which many of Borges’ writings are

readable as unsurpassable experiments in how to make thinkable the impossible and the

unrepresentable. The current obsession with the posthuman, as that which reconfigures

the actual and the possible once technology re-engineers human potential, institutes a new

physics and redefines inscription itself, is therefore everywhere present in Borges. For is it

not the posthuman order which would make it possible to inhabit infinite libraries and

archives, perceive plenitude in a pinprick, remember all experience, and return to roads

not taken?

Critical Posthumanism

Posthumanism can be understood in at least two ways. Firstly, as the

contemporary critical and theoretical discourse that rethinks what it means to be human

by reengaging with and radicalising a long history of critiques of humanism – of which

the anti-humanist, poststructuralist and postmodern movements of the last third of the

twentieth century were maybe only the most advanced and coherent examples. This

critique has always focused on conceptual flaws within humanist ideals, like the liberal

individual self, realism and representation, essentialism and truth, autonomy and

universalism. The renewed urgency for such a posthumanist critique of humanism arises

out of extensive technological developments both at nano- and cosmic level which

promise to change beyond recognition and maybe even challenge humanity in its survival.

We refer to the discourse that privileges critical continuity in the face of these changes as

‘critical posthumanism’ (Herbrechter and Callus 2003, 2004a, 2004b). It understands the

‘post’ in ‘posthuman’, in analogy with Lyotard’s notion of the postmodern, as the return

of the repressed ‘non-human’ in various forms. Just as the modern is ‘always already’
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marked by its particular anticipated and repressed postmodern, humanism is haunted by

the non-human—the supernatural, animal, lesser-than-human, object—that it continues to

exclude. Therefore in order to evaluate critically the current changes that are driven by

technology and more or less effectively contained by politics, it is necessary to bear in

mind the critical tradition that has been shadowing the rise of the humanist paradigm to its

current point of apparent self-surpassing. We differentiate this critical posthumanism from

the second meaning that posthumanism has acquired and which refers to a much less

critical and more celebratory desire which more or less wholeheartedly embraces the so-

called opportunities which leaving the humanist paradigm behind seems to promise.

While we entirely recognise the importance of current technological change we also feel

that a long-term critical view of a humanism that always adapts to and incorporates its

repressed posthumanisms will serve as a good vaccine against rampant contemporary

technophilia and technological determinism. In the context of these parameters our project

is to seek past, present and future allies for a critical posthumanism. These allies can be

found in those thinkers and writers that have been working at the edges and margins of

‘Western metaphysics’, and we claim Borges as one such ally – not only as a precursor of

certain contemporary trends that contribute to a posthumanist climate, but far more

importantly, as a critical commentator of our present. We therefore juxtapose Borges with

some of his posthumanist commentators—N. Katherine Hayles in particular—for the sake

of unsettling causality, teleology and finality. Borges, we claim, is an exponent of what

might be called ‘posthumanism without technology’, which brings to the fore the

precariousness of the human; the human not so much threatened by ‘his’ technology but

by ‘its’ very humanity, imagination and ex-istence. What Borges might contribute to

critical posthumanism is a memory of the posthuman long before the invention of any

cyborg-, nano- or biotechnology.

Precursivity and Critical Anticipation

Borges is a prime example of a ‘literary philosopher’ (Gracia et al. 2002), which

places Borges’ work within the vicinity of the fantastic, the mythological and the

postmodern on the one hand, and science fiction and the posthuman on the other. It is

therefore no wonder that he should often be cited strategically at the beginning of

posthuman thought experiments, whether critical, fictional or philosophical. In a sense,

and quite ironically, Borges himself encourages the idea of his prefiguring the posthuman.

It is the very logic of precursivity—for example to contemporary forms of

posthumanism—that is problematised in Borges’ writing. The topos that one man is all

men, that one human is both the archetype, essence and the ‘end’ of all humanity is

ubiquitous in Borges’ fictional and critical essays. For ‘the writer’ this means that the

logic of engendering works backwards rather than merely causatively forwards. This is

most clearly expressed in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ [Kafka and His Precursors], where

Borges concludes by saying that ‘every writer creates his own precursors. His work

modifies our conception of the past, as it will modify the future. In this correlation the

identity or plurality of the men involved is unimportant’ (Borges 1970: 236).

Within this vision of ‘posthuman’ humanity, Borges makes several crucial

appearances in Katherine Hayles’ ground-breaking volume How We Became Posthuman

(1999). Firstly, in the opening pages, he is named as one of a number of precursors to the

cybernetic notion of reflexivity, as Hayles comments that ‘Las ruinas circulares’ [The

Circular Ruins] illustrates ‘the system generating a reality [that] is shown to be part of the

reality it makes’ (Hayles 1999: 8). However, it is possible to go beyond a mere analogy

between Borges’ fiction as precursor to ‘modern-day’ reality, because his ‘dreamed’

reality could easily be extended into the very posthuman condition Hayles is attempting to
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embrace critically in her strategic intervention. It would be difficult to ignore in Borges’

story the parodic anticipation of some of the more naïve creationist scenarios circulated in

posthumanist or transhumanist circles. It may come as no surprise that Borges’ ‘stranger’,

willing to bring about a posthuman ‘dreamexistence’, is a professor dreaming up a

multitude of silent students in what could only be the interdisciplinary ‘(post)humanities

of the future’:

the man was lecturing to them on anatomy, cosmography, magic; the

countenances listened with eagerness and strove to respond with

understanding, as if they divined the importance of the examination which

would redeem one of them from his state of vain appearance and

interpolate him onto the world of reality. (Borges 1970: 73)

The dreamer-demiurge’s narcissistic choice of one single student fails, and subsequently

he reverts to dreaming merely a proto-Deleuzian ‘body-without-organs’: ‘the penumbra of

a human body as yet without face or sex’ (Borges 1970: 75). In order to bring this

altogether non-technological ‘artificial intelligence’, this ‘Adam of dreams’, to life, the

Frankensteinian dreamer invokes the ‘monstrosity’ (not the electricity) of the gods.

There is something eerily cyborgian about the dreamed phantom in ‘Las ruinas

circulares’ and something eminently posthuman in the insight that the dreamer in the end

realises that he himself is merely the phantom of another dreamt reality, or, in analogy,

that humans have ‘always already’ been cyborgs, contaminated with their own

posthumanity. What Borges thus ‘prefigures’ is not only the phantasm of the posthuman

but also its very impossibility, which justifies including his writings within a tradition of

critical posthumanism.
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Monsters, according to Zamora, are part of Borges’ ‘lifelong exploration of the

status of the real, and more particularly, his exploration of the relations of philosophical

idealism and literary form’ (Zamora 2002: 48). This monstrous ‘zoología fantástica’

[fantastic zoology] plays an important part in the gradual ‘dehumanisation’ of the

individual human as part of Borges’ ‘intellectual teratology’ (Zamora 2002: 56). Zamora

claims that for Borges monstrosity ‘is a state of being that he defines as the unnatural

combination of natural parts, the possible permutations of which, he tells us, “border on

the infinite”’ (Zamora 2002: 58). In the way Borges’ monsters challenge ‘the Western

binarism between nature and culture’ and ‘inhabit at once the realm of nature and artifice’

as a ‘man-made species’, they clearly prefigure Donna Haraway’s cyborg, who ‘has no

origin story… The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification with nature in

the Western sense. This is its illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion of its

teleology as star wars’ (Haraway 2004: 9).

Not only could Borges be seen as one of the precursors of contemporary

cyberculture, but also Borges’ writing could be understood as a kind of ‘cyborg writing’

as such, which problematises the idea of a self-conscious writing self in charge of the

meaning it produces but rather thinks of itself as ‘a kind of disassembled and reassembled,

postmodern collective and personal self’ (Haraway 2004: 23). What Donna Haraway’s

feminist recuperation of the cyborg in its technological and less technological forms and

Borges’ writings have in common is the suspicion of the (liberal, Western) self. Both see

the breaking away from a strong idea of personality or selfhood as a liberation; and both

see this liberation realised in ‘textuality’ and thus privilege an ontological view of writing:

‘Cyborg writing must not be about the Fall, the imagination of a once-upon-a-time

wholeness before language, before writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is about the

power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the
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tools to mark the world that marked them as other’ (Haraway 2004: 33). Borges’ attitudes

towards the self, impersonality and immortality are widely known and span his entire

writings.

While Haraway is of course mainly concerned with ‘liberal technologies’ and

their ‘phallogocentric origin stories’ to arrive at something like cyborg (or posthuman)

writing, Borges’ critique of identity and origin as a basis for humanist metaphysics

obviously takes a more long-term historical and rather ‘old-fashioned’ spiritual view, thus

bypassing modern technologies altogether. However, if ‘writing is pre-eminently the

technology of cyborgs, etched surfaces of the late twentieth century’ (Haraway 2004: 34),

then, anachronously, Borges will have been among the cyborgesian writers of that late

twentieth century (and beyond). The challenge of the ‘troubling dualisms’ in Western

tradition—‘self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, …reality/appearance, whole/part,

agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial,

God/man’ (Haraway 2004: 34)—is thus not confined to ‘high-tech culture’ but finds its

untechnological anticipation in Borges.

Memories of the Posthuman

Hayles makes further use of Borges in her criticism of Foucault’s abstract

theoretical notion of ‘the body’, to which she prefers a processual idea like ‘embodiment’.

The same criticism is then levelled at ‘theory’ in general which, according to Hayles, ‘by

its nature seeks to articulate general patterns and overall trends rather than individual

instantiations’ (Hayles 1999: 197). Here she strategically uses Borges’ ‘Funes el

memorioso’ to create an analogy between theory and Funes’ ‘number scheme’:

If embodiment could be articulated separate from the body—an

impossibility for several reasons, not least because articulation

systematizes and normalizes experiences in the act of naming them—it

would be like Funes’s numbers, a froth of discrete utterances registering

the continuous and infinite play of difference. (Hayles 1999: 197)

It is worth recalling that the narrator of Borges’ story ironically reports that one Pedro

Leandro Ipuche ‘has written that Funes was a precursor of the supermen, “a vernacular

and rustic Zarathustra”’ (Borges 1970: 87). Funes, in many respects, could be seen as an

‘embodiment’ of the Nietzschean Übermensch but also as posthuman in the sense that the

narrator describes the infallibility of his memory – a perfect recording device that one

might provocatively name ‘cyborg memory’, but without technology. It is all the more

surprising that Hayles does not exploit Borges’ story any further, beyond a rather

tangential number analogy, because Funes actually stresses the embodied nature of his

posthuman memory (Borges 1970: 92). It is precisely the embodiment of what seems to

be the entirety of mankind’s memories that makes Funes experience his memory as a

‘garbage heap’. The key passage of the story, the turning point where the narrator bursts

into commentary mode, again relates not only to Borges’ precursivity to posthuman ideas

but also their critique. In fact, the narrator seems almost surprised by the belatedness of

technology for the posthuman (Borges 1970: 92). What follows is an explanation of the

radical inhumanity of Funes’ ‘computational’ memory: ‘the truth is that we live out our

lives putting off all that can be put off; perhaps we all know deep down that we are

immortal and that sooner or later all men will do and know all things’ (Borges 1970: 92).

However, the real challenge for posthuman memory lies not so much in the embodied

recording or inscription process or with the informational computation, but with the
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aspect of psychical repression necessary to separate actual experience from imagination,

remembrance and invention (Borges 1970: 93). Funes’ vertiginous world of perfect

memory, the narrator reminds us, is incapable of accounting for ‘ideas, of a general,

Platonic sort’ (Borges 1970: 93), and invites one to imagine a posthuman as ‘the solitary

and lucid spectator of a multiform, instantaneous and almost intolerably precise world’

(Borges 1970: 94). Again, this seems to be a case where a seminal work on

posthumanism, mentioning Borges in a seemingly self-contained way, will have to admit

that the thinkability of the posthuman relies heavily on pretechnological conditions

entirely outside its remit.

[Cyber]culture and [Hyper]textuality?

The same pattern, of Borges being an acknowledged but ultimately downplayed

precursor to posthumanism, continues in Hayles’ My Mother Was a Computer (2005).

One of Hayles’ main arguments here is that the digital code is radically different from

linguistic code, or that machines speak an entirely different language than humans, which

therefore poses the urgent problem of ‘translation’. Chapter 4, ‘Translating Media’, begins

by referring to Borges’ ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ [Pierre Menard, Author of the

Quixote] to discuss the ‘transformation of a print document into an electronic text as a

form of translation’ (Hayles 2005: 89). What Hayles calls Borges’ ‘mock-serious fantasy’,

the idea of rewriting Cervantes’ Don Quixote word for word but in a contemporary

cultural context, is taken as a precursive analogy of ‘more mundane operations carried out

every day around the globe’ (Hayles 2005: 89). Borges’ premonition of this

hypertextuality, in this and other stories, raises the same question: namely, whether an

electronic version of a work would still be the same work, or indeed, whether
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hypertextuality is merely another form of textuality or something qualitatively, or even

ontologically, entirely different.1

Hayles duly admits that Borges’ ‘idea of translation’—as interpreted by Efrain

Kristal in Invisible Work (2002)—is a proto-deconstructive approach that sees translation

as at once the general condition of textuality (the impossibility of an original, including

Borges’ logic of precursivity) and the text as a (Deleuzian) ‘assemblage’ and ‘rhizomatic

network’ (Hayles 2005: 114-115). In line with her previous strategy, Hayles praises

Borges for his foresight but then quickly moves on: ‘that Borges arrived at this view while

working exclusively in print should caution us not to overstate the fluidity of electronic

texts compared to print… It remains the case, however, that the resources of print are

different than the resources of electronic textuality, and that each medium interacts with

and influences the others’ (Hayles 2005: 115).

However, sticking with Borges’ ‘Pierre Menard’ would inevitably lead to

another encounter with the posthuman without technology. As the narrator clearly states,

Menard was doing something radically different from rewriting the same story in another

medium, namely reinventing the original (Borges 1970: 65-66). It is not a question of

recreating the same, a perfect ‘simulacrum’, or of ‘becoming Cervantes’ (Borges 1970:

66); the challenge is to reproduce a singularity, one might say, or a perfect ‘contingency’

(Borges 1970: 67), or, indeed, an absolute identity, without repetition.

Menard’s venture seems to involve the oxymoronic creation of an identical

singularity under radically different conditions, or the creation of a perfect repetition

while accepting radical contextuality. It is true that this idea could be used as an

illustration of the Derridean understanding of the im/possibility of translation: translation

as that which is impossible but at the same time most necessary or desirable. In this sense,

it is no paradox to say that ‘Cervantes’s text and Menard’s are verbally identical, but the
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second is almost infinitely richer. (More ambiguous, his detractors will say, but ambiguity

is richness)’ (Borges 1970: 69). This seems to capture precisely the impossibility cum

desirability of ‘perfect’ machine translation: the resistance of and to ambiguity. Instead,

Borges’ view seems much more radically posthuman than mere technological

intermediality. The question whether textuality can be translated from print into electronic

format, from the lettered to the digital, involves the idea of a ‘palimpsest’ of singularities

which nevertheless cohere and form a unified experience within a ‘subject’.

Independently of technoculture, and in a ‘deconstructive’ vein, Borges’ Menard thus

found a posthuman ‘technique’ that bypasses the modern logic of originality and the

technology of translation: ‘Menard (perhaps without wanting to) has enriched, by means

of a new technique, the halting and rudimentary art of reading: this new technique is that

of the deliberate anachronism and the erroneous attribution’ (Borges 1970: 71).

Rather than seeing Borges’ texts as merely a proponent of hypertext avant la

lettre, what makes Borges a critical posthumanist is that he anticipates not only the

potential but also the limitations of the digital. While Borges does conceive of a cyborg

textuality, this cyborg textuality is very different from what usually ranks as

cyberliterature. While, in ‘El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan’ for example, he

‘discovered the essence of bifurcation theory thirty years before chaos scientists

mathematically formalized it’ (Weissert 1994: 223), and while he ‘does not hesitate to

postulate that an infinite number of alternative events coexist, as in so many multiple

universes or so many infinite sets’ (Thiher 2005: 239), Borges’ fiction nevertheless

merely insinuates ‘the possibilities of self-generative readings’ which produce ‘a

multiply-interpretative and highly self-conscious reader’ (Stoicheff 1994: 93). If Borges’

‘metafiction sensitizes the reader to transcoding rather than to certainty’, it is rather to the

literary legacy than to ‘fiction as yet unwritten’ that it urges the reader to turn (Stoicheff
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1994: 94). The implication of this is that it may be rather problematic to see Borges as a

straightforward precursor of cyberliterature with its promise of liberated, self-generated

textuality and reader interactivity, and with boundless rhizomatic narrative networks and

interconnectivity at a formal, textual level. Borges’ ‘promise’ rather occurs at a

discursive, conceptual level. While his stories depict conceptual complexity ad infinitum,

formally, their narratives show almost classical restraint. If Borges’ scenarios were to be

implemented within the new (digital) media and cyberliterature, then this could not

merely happen at a conceptual but mainly at a formal level, which until now has rarely

been the case, and it is not at all clear whether digital technology is in fact a good

‘translator’ or mediator of textual information. Instead of convergence between Borges

and cyberliterature there might in fact be contradiction. This is why, when we speak of

Borges as an ally for a posthumanism without technology, it is also in order to do justice

to an imaginary that resists technological determinism, and which resists its own

technologisation, digitalisation and translation into (mere) ‘fantasy information structures’

(Murray, in Wardrip-Fruin and Montfort 2003: 3).

Science ‘as’ Fiction, or Technognosis

Returning to Hayles, her most sustained engagement with Borges had already

occurred in The Cosmic Web (1984), where she relates the mathematical ‘field concept’ to

literature on the basis of the two ideas of interconnectivity and self-referentiality.

Comparing Borges’ with Nabokov’s responses to the field concept, she argues that Borges

is attracted to the field concept, ‘because its discontinuities reveal that everything,

including itself, is no more than a game’ (Hayles 1984: 138). In line with her strategy of

showing an inspirational link between science and literature, Hayles dwells on Borges’

discussion of Cantor’s set theory and how this ‘led directly to the discovery of paradoxes
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of self-referentiality’, ‘indefinite expansion’ and the possibility for creating ‘new kinds of

Strange Loops’ in his writings (Hayles 1984: 142-143). For Hayles, Borges uses these

paradoxes to exploit rather than to suppress any inconsistencies, ‘because he hopes to use

them to reveal the essential fictionality of the model. His intent is thus subversive’

(Hayles 1984: 143). She refers to Borges’ strategy in a combination of Baudrillardian

(‘seduction’) and Deleuzian (‘fold’) terms.

It is fascinating to see that in this early text on Borges, Hayles does in fact credit

him and his stories with the (subversive) power to create a kind of dialogic imagination

between literature and science, fiction and reality. Her readings of ‘El Aleph’ [The Aleph]

and ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ are at once powerful, detailed and persuasive. However,

it can already be seen that, by focusing on Borges’ ‘literary strategy’ in his ‘metaphorical

appropriation’ of scientific models, the flow of the argument will inevitably return to

science: ‘where Borges’ fiction differs from scientific models of the field concept,

however, is in using the concept to suggest that everything, including reality, is a fiction’

(151). Hayles ends by challenging Borges’ ‘Nueva refutación del tiempo’ [A New

Refutation of Time] (Borges 2001: 317-332) on the grounds that Borges remains unable

to free himself from the very ‘Newtonian’ notion of time he tried to escape. By imposing

a circular structure on the infinite series, according to Hayles, he has to admit the

limitations of his own artistic project (Hayles 1984: 166). However, Borges’ stories, and

‘El Aleph’ in particular, might be more powerful in their self-referentiality than they

seem. Although there is a circular structure that seems to try to recapture the runaway

infinite series, it nevertheless never manages to do so without a ‘twist’ – a Heideggerian

‘Verwindung’, or a ‘Strange Loop’ rather in the manner of a Möbius strip, which,

precisely, does not turn into a simple ‘cybernetic’ feedback structure. Hence the

ineffability of the Aleph as explained by the narrator—the simultaneity that like Hayles’
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intermediality, in a sense, does not translate into a successive medium like language—

might just be another realist lure (Borges 1971: 26).

The ‘unimaginable universe’, the total vision of the whole and all its parts at

once, this piece of ultimate nanotechnology without technology, is undialectisable for the

human mind, just like Cantor’s Mengenlehre [theory of assemblages] mentioned in the

‘Postscript’ which insists on distinguishing between the nature and the name of the Aleph

(Borges 1971: 29). Instead of resolving the final paradox between the fictionality or

reality of the Aleph, Borges’ story instead adds to the confusion: the narrator questions

the truthfulness of the Aleph whose reality has given rise to the rival’s fiction (Borges

1971: 29-30).

Let us repeat that our argument is not that Hayles’ use of literature to elucidate

scientific metaphors is wrong or that a link between scientific ideas and literary strategies

does not exist, or should not be made; rather, in line with the idea of a critical

posthumanism, one must ask whether the very link is not ‘contaminated’ by

unacknowledged humanist assumptions. It might be argued that at the heart of the desire

to resolve the difference between literature and science is an irreducibly humanist model

in which both literature and science are ultimately seen as serving an end to human

understanding or human self-legitimation – an anthropomorphism difficult, and maybe

impossible, to avoid as long as literature and science (co)exist. It should be remembered

that in this context a writer like Borges may be legitimately called posthumanist in the

sense that his choice of genre to a certain extent seems to unhinge both the fictionality of

‘literature’ and the factuality of ‘science’. As Deborah Knight, in her critique of ‘humanist

ethical criticism’, asks: ‘what sense will [humanistic ethical criticism] be able to make out

of the mock-essay, that fabulous Borgesian genre, that completely subverts both the

expectations of realist literary fiction and any straightforward application of the idea that
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as readers we are in communication with an author (however implied) who is merely

communicating things to us known as fact?’ (in Gracia et al. 2002: 23-24). To see Borges

as a kind of ‘science fiction writer’ could therefore be justified as long as one takes the

phrase literally (science ‘as’ fiction and vice versa). Science fiction is one of the most

important fictional genres that underpins the cultural dynamic and the cultural imaginary

of posthumanism. It is also one of the main genres that engages with the representation of

contemporary cultural and social change. Even though Borges is certainly not a

straightforward political writer, at a deeper, metaphysical level his texts do of course

engage with the notion of utopian and dystopian visions of change in cultural values,

namely through the articulation of spirituality, eternity and the fantastic.

What might make Borges an ally for critical posthumanism—as an engagement

with scenarios of the inhuman, past, present or future—is that the profound existential

anxiety that exists side-by-side with Borges’ irony and nihilism is precisely not resolved

in some return to humanist morality. It might be gesturing towards a posthumanist ethics

instead, which seems to be what Coetzee insinuates in relation to Borges’ gnosticism:

Borges’s Gnosticism – his sense that the ultimate God is beyond good and

evil, and infinitely remote from creation – is deeply felt. But the sense of

dread that informs his work is metaphysical rather than religious in nature:

at its base are vertiginous glimpses of the collapse of all structures of

meaning, including language itself, flashing intimations that the very self

that speaks has no real existence. In the fiction that responds to this dread,

the ethical and the aesthetic are tightly wound together. (Coetzee 2002:

173)
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It is striking how absent technology is from such a vast logistical challenge as posed by

‘La biblioteca de Babel’ – which others call the universe, as the narrator remarks. Nothing

is said about the workings of the latrines, in each of the infinite number of hexagonal

galleries; no details are given about the functioning of the ventilation of the infinite

number of ‘vast air shafts’; and the reference to the ‘powering’ of the Library, especially

its electrical wiring and lighting, remains mysterious: ‘light is provided by some spherical

fruit which bear the name of lamps’ (Borges 1970: 78).

Thus could ‘posthumanism without technology’ be merely some kind of

‘technognosis’, or a simple repression of technological materiality by an irrational

insistence on radical spirituality? Is it simply a negation of the techno-logical that can be

found in so many writers of the first half of the twentieth century? Is it merely a

Heideggerian-like attempt to invalidate technology’s specificity by re-ontologising it and

binding it to the metaphysical longue durée of humanity?2 Or is Borges’ envisaged

posthuman condition merely another techno-apocalyptic scenario in the vein of The

Terminator (Cameron 1984) where an inanimate machine-world ‘survives’ humanity (cf.

Borges 1970: 85)? Is posthuman for Borges merely synonymous with posthumous?

Maybe. But we would like to believe there is another, more serious and critical aspect to

Borges’ irony and nihilism.

Borges’ special value for critical posthumanism lies in the fact that his writings,

in a sense, constitute an archive of the future even before it arrived. He was, for example,

famously unimpressed by the idea of ‘artificial intelligence’ and a machinic future set to

replace humanity, arguing that ‘it would be risky to await revelation from the all-knowing

machine’ (Borges 2001: 155). However, in a typical turnaround move, Borges assigns the

machine with a future for poetry, or the aesthetic imaginary. In fact, the idea of the
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machine as poetic—as the automatic other within the self—makes the poet ‘himself’

machinic (Sarlo 1993: 59-61).

In summary, studying the links between Borges and emerging cyberculture and

its theorisation can provide important and broader statements on the relations between

literature and the post-human(ist). The discourse and the imagination Borges brings to

bear do not only prefigure what the posthuman order might achieve, they also anticipate

its own critique. Even without technology, Borges’ ingenious imaginary arrives at the

posthuman before it, as the very memory of the uncreated and perhaps uncreatable order

which technology might just set about fashioning in the more or less posthuman future.

Bibliography:

Aizenberg, Edna, ed. 1990. Borges and His Successors: The Borgesian Impact on

Literature and the Arts (Columbia: U of Missouri P).

Baudrillard, Jean. 1994. Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Glaser (Ann Arbor: U

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 20

Hayles in fact also discusses ‘La biblioteca de Babel’ in this passage, and speculates about the feasibility of
something like a ‘digital book’ (Hayles 2005: 96).
2
The (re)mythologisation of technology coincides with certain ‘techno-gnostic’ aspects in more celebratory
contemporary posthumanisms. In particular, some of the posthuman desires expressed by so-called
‘transhumanists’ could be described as gnosticism’s reinvention through technology, very similar to
Heidegger’s notion of technology as a kind of ‘techno-gnosis’, from which ‘only a God can save us’ (cf.
Heidegger 1993:105-07).