Immanuel Kant Final

Rembran R.
Maruhom Philo – 3B
I. Aesthetic
(D) Explain why Kant thinks that sense faculty as being in itself is a passive power of receiving
representations.
- Everything that the sense wants our mind to know is a mere appearance only. On these sense, the
proposition of the object must conform to our knowledge prior in experiencing what our senses wanted
us to believe. We need to experience for us to understand what makes an object thinkable, through our
senses we will be able to find out how liable our experiences to make any object a representation of
what we really need to know. Our mind wants to really know what a certain object wants to represent
and it is in these case that our senses is a passive power receiving representations because it is
guaranteed with evidences. Senses are helpful in gathering data such as we can never really know a
certain object if our sense have not represent it on our minds it must be that all things that our mind
says to us is something we have experienced. Like for example, how we can know an idea of a pencil if
we never have the experience to know its appearance. Therefore, sense can be of help for us to
understand pretty well all that our minds wanted us to conform with.
II. Deduction of Categories
(A) Explain why understanding and sense are equal and interdependent
- Understanding and sense are both the basis of truth in knowing the object. Everything was already in
our mind so everything is a mere appearance and since it was just an appearance understanding and
sense gives us reason to fully understand the truthness of a thing. Senses must always conform to our
understanding for it allows our mind to be equipped with the knowledge of knowing how and why a
certain object exists. We must study both the senses and understanding through the use of our
observation. Observation here plays a great role in identifying what makes a thing really a thing and in
that case both understanding and sense are equal regardless of the approach we are going to use.
Certainly, we are in need to evaluate the object by using our understanding and senses. Experience also
validates these representations and is enough reason to ground all that the world wanted to be
experienced by us. As much as want, understanding alone cannot justify if our sense have not
responded any of those representations quite easy to understand that in order for us to understand we
must sense it first.
III. System of Principles
(C) Explain the first principle of Kant’s transcendental analytic that all experiences are extensive
magnitudes.
-The first principle of Kant’s transcendental analytic that all experiences are extensive magnitudes
attempts to prove what we can call the ‘principle of intensive magnitudes’, according to which every
possible object of experience will possess a determinate ‘degree’ of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for
this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations they have intensive
magnitudes to a metaphysical thesis about external objects they also have intensive magnitudes. Most
commentators dismiss the argument as a failure. Kant's argument that attempts to rehabilitate the
argument back into his broader transcendental theory of experience. I argue that we can make sense of
the argument's central inference by appeal to Kant's theory of empirical intuition and by an analysis of
the way in which Kant thinks sensory matter constitutes our most basic representations of objects.
IV. Paralogisms of Pure Reason
(D) Explain how ideas of pure reason are arrived at.
- Ideas of pure reason are arrived at the origin of certain concepts and principles” independent from
those of sensibility and understanding. Kant refers to these as “transcendental ideas” or “ideas of
pure reason. The treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure
reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we shall be
at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to
an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most
elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and compelled to
retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having
attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the
dark. In these circumstances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply
indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results—even if it should be
found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its
attainment.
V. Antinomies of Pure Reason
(A) How did Kant argue when he said that any attempt by reason to form ‘cosmical concepts’, was
bound to lead to irresoluble contradiction?
- Kant argue when he said that any attempt by reason to form ‘cosmical concepts’, was bound to
lead to irresoluble contradiction by portrayal of "reason" as "pure spontaneity" or "activity,"
with "needs," "interests," and "dissatisfactions" peculiar to itself, but also his various
comparisons of that activity to organic growth, house-building, and the like metaphors familiar
to even the most casual readers of Kant but rarely subjected to such systematic philosophic
analysis. Reason is a purposive principle of agency whose fundamental need to find meaning and drive
toward unity makes it both a guide to understanding that is indispensable for the constitution of experience,
and that by virtue of this very drive reaches beyond experience through its projection of ideas, including,
above all, that of the world as a totality. Insofar as it remains tethered to the understanding to directing the
latter's use, the totality in question is called nature, or the totality of all possible experience, which reason
holds out before us like an ever-receding horizon that encompasses nonetheless a whole enclosed upon
itself. But precisely because reason is not reducible to understanding, pure reason even in its speculative
use cannot be confined, as much conventional scholarship is wont to do, to a merely negative role. To be
sure, Kant, on the author's account, himself contributes to that misunderstanding in a number of ways and
for reasons he explores at length. Not least is ambivalence on Kant's part as to the relation between
criticism and metaphysics proper, which Kant at times tends to conflate and at other times emphatically
distinguishes, an ambivalence that may be grounded, in the nature of reason itself.

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Rembran R.

II. Deduction of Categories

IV. Paralogisms of Pure Reason

(D) Explain how ideas of pure reason are arrived at.

V. Antinomies of Pure Reason

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