Can Philosophy of Science Inquire Into History
Can Philosophy of Science Inquire Into History
Can Philosophy of Science Inquire Into History
History?
David Černín
Černín, D.: Can Philosophy of Science Inquire into History? In: Ostium, roč. 11, 2015, č. 3.
Autonomy of history and historiography may rest on a claim that their method is substantially
different from methods of other historical sciences and science itself. History, therefore, becomes
subject of specific kind of research. But that does not mean that we cannot use terms of philosophy
of science to describe actual practice of historians. The aim of philosophy of historiography,
according to its proponents, should be explanation of how historians of different kinds reach their
conclusions. In doing so we may discover that line which separates history from science is rather
blurry. This paper is trying to argue that anti-realist model of inquiry from philosophy of science may
be the best way to explain methods of history and their development, although it may pose some new
difficulties.
Main question of this article should be stated like this: Do methods of history and historiography
belong to methods of natural sciences or to methods of humanities? This question has been
discussed since nineteenth century. In 1893 Bendetto Croce asked similar question in his lecture. Is
history science or art? I am not going to answer either of these questions in this paper. History and
historiography is actual and progressive discipline and philosophers often try to describe its practice
or to gain some knowledge from its findings. But how should we approach this task? Main focus will
be on works of British and American philosophers.
Even present philosophy maintains strong connection with history. Philosophers can of course
research their own history and highlight important thoughts or people. Their area of interest is
usually defined and determined by tradition or school they belong to. We can study texts of
important philosophers and we can study history of problems or intellectual history[1] with broader
scope without being restricted by the list of canonical thinkers who were invited among the great
philosophers. Then there is rather neglected (in analytical tradition) philosophy of history in its
substantive form[2] which coexist mainly with other philosophical traditions like Marxism or
phenomenology. This discipline discredited itself during twentieth century and its methods were
criticized countless of times.[3] Practical disciplines (like politics or ethics) have used historical facts
as an example or an evidence for their claims since the time of ancient philosophy. We can see
similar level of confidence in our knowledge of history in Plutarch[4] as well as in Truth and
Truthfulness by Bernard Williams[5] for example.
All three ways of using history in philosophical work mentioned above have different goals.[6]
Historians of philosophy are interested in past thoughts and their influence alone. Philosophers of
history are studying history partly in order to back up or to sustain specific theory, their point of
view is strongly governed by it. Philosophers of ethics or politics are simply referring to history just
to illustrate their own position and opinions. It seems that the philosophy has much stronger
connection to its past than other sciences. Historians of physics do not usually compare theories of
long deceased nature philosophers to contemporary theories of physics but we can see this quite
often in philosophy. Does this say something important about the nature of philosophy? Not
necessarily.
Among many different philosophical attitudes to history I would like to talk about the one which I
consider to be essential to further discussions. When any philosopher works with history, he or she
has no privileged access to the past itself. They are always using some output produced by the work
of historians or historiographers. American philosopher Leon J. Goldstein made a distinction
between superstructure of history and its infrastructure.[7] Superstructure is represented by
countless textbooks which are meant for layman reader. Infrastructure is a complex network of
evidence, theories and methods which are used by historians in producing historical knowledge. If
philosopher bases his or her historical knowledge on a mere textbook without any critical reflection,
he or she will be dependent on a specific historiographical tradition which produced the textbook
and the historical knowledge in question. It is clear that a philosopher should be conscious of this
danger and should be able to work critically with historical theories. Philosopher usually
presupposes some historical facts like events or persons.[8] But what are these facts? How should
we approach practice of historians? Can we consider the results of their work to be conclusive
enough for us to base more complex theories on them?
During the twentieth century there was an extensive debate on this topic. I would like to depict one
distinction in regard to this question: Do methods of history and historiography belong to methods of
natural sciences or to methods of humanities? We can also say that this distinction overlaps with
that of explanation and understanding. The most prominent defender of the former was Carl Gustav
Hempel. The latter was being held by proponents of hermeneutics.
Hempel thought that the methods of history are the same as of other natural sciences. The goal of a
historian is to find a link between two events in history and thus explain changes in the state of
world. History is a kind of reverse causal prediction in probabilistic terms: “Historical explanation,
too, aims at showing that the event in question was not „a matter of chance,“ but was to be expected
in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The expectation referred to is not
prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of general
laws.”[9]
Today we can see that Hempel’s account of history was declined. He could not explain the actual
practice of historians. Hermeneutics and its emphasis on understanding proved to be more
successful. Difference between causal explanation and understanding was shown at length by many
philosophers but to contrast Hempel’s view I choose to present work of Georg Henrik von Wright.
He has tried to show that many historical theories do not conform to some covering law but they
must be understood as an act of sentient being with free will and they express some inherent logical
dependence of practical syllogism. “But it seems to me clearer to distinguish here between
interpretation or understanding on the one hand and explanation on the other. The result of
interpretation are answers to a question “What is this?” Only when we ask why there was a
demonstration, or which were the “causes” of the revolution, are we in a narrower and stricter sense
trying to explain what there is, the facts.”[10]
Although hermeneutics was undoubtedly more successful and influential in its attempt to capture
basis of historical knowledge, I wish to argue that it shares same vice as the positivistic account of
history. Both lack actual contact with daily problems of historians and they do not appreciate how
historical knowledge comes to be. The context in which historical theories are formulated is rather
specific in respect to its epistemic status. Let us follow third line of thoughts about place of history
and historiography. This line borrows something from both theories and considers history to be a
very specific human activity with its own challenges.
1. G. Collingwood was overshadowed by his more famous colleagues from Cambridge and during
his life he was better known for his work in archaeology of Roman Britain. Therefore, he had
very specific insight into challenges encountered by historians, which is greatly shown in his
posthumously published book “Idea of History”. I would not like to delve into the problems
concerning his method of re-enactment, which is very unclear and obscure, but let us consider
a few of his notes on task of historian.
“History, then, is a science, but a science of a special kind. It is a science whose business is to study
events not accessible to our observation, and to study these events inferentially, arguing to them
from something else which is accessible to our observation, and which the historian calls ‚evidence‘
for the events in which he is interested.”[11]
Goldstein in his Historical Knowing (1976) criticized meta-assumption, which is being held by many
philosophers and theorists till today. One more recent definition of this assumption follows: “I begin
by assuming that every history is a history of some entity that existed for a reasonably long period of
time, that the narrator wishes to state what is true of it in a manner that distinguishes him from a
teller of fictitious or false stories, and that his task is to give a connected account of the entity’s
development in time.”[16] White himself distinguishes between a history (an explanation) and a
chronicle (a conjunction of statements) and he focuses his attention on the construction of narrative
history and the competition between different accounts of the same subject. Construction of
chronicle is not considered to be problematic. There are some real entities in the past, we can make
some statements about them and then we can assign truth value to those statements. This
understanding of history is quite common.[17]
But what really are those entities in the past? If we pursue this question long enough, we will
encounter serious problems. There is no way how to observe vast number of those entities. Our
inference of the “chronicle” and its fact is definitely not as trivial as it may seem. Usually both
traditions distinguished above do not respect this problem. Historical characters and events are
considered to be real entities and we can learn something about them by means of evidence. But do
we have enough bases to postulate such entities? Or can we save history without statements about
real people, places and actions? Do we deduce them by evidence? Such description is very simplistic
in many cases. There is no clear logical link between pot-shreds of roman vase found in The South
Moravia and roman garrison in 2nd century. Inferential process between those statements is more
complex. There is too much room for various sceptical doubts. We cannot access immutable past. We
do not have any privileged point of view. There is no way how to verify many statements about past
but still we can see that historians have success in their line of work and we cannot deny that there
is a progress in historiography. On the other hand, according to Goldstein, we must agree that
realism in history leads to scepticism. Morton White could see similar problems at some point and
therefore he awards some importance to subjectivism: “Therefore, a historian’s total judgment of
what should be recorded in a history, and by implication in a chronicle, is a blend of two judgments:
one of truth and one of memorability. Truth may be the stronger claimant and the more objective,
but memorability is always a factor in spite of being subjective. The absence of an objective criterion
of historical importance makes it very difficult to show that historical truths about a society’s
economy or politics are more memorable than those about its philosophy.”[18] This emphasis on
subjectivity stems from realism about history. Goldstein would like to restrict subjectivism in history:
“For it is simply not the case that only external reality can prevent our falling into the morass of
subjectivism with its danger of scepticism. We are not here limited to the choice between a realism,
which is in the end not to be had, and a relativism which takes a subjectivist form. We still have the
alternative of taking seriously the discipline of history as it is practiced and what it has
accomplished, attempting to understand how it works, how it enables its practitioners to avoid
subjectivist scepticism and provides the criteria for historical truth.” [19] For an alternative we
should turn to anti-realism about history.
Do we explore real history in our research? We can say that we have no direct link to res gestae,
except for evidence. Then we should examine our notion of historical evidence closer. How do we
recognize historical evidence? We can imagine museums and archives filled with various artefacts
but those things have been already identified as relevant for historical research. Criterion for
identification regularly changes as central paradigm in historiography shifts. It is trivial to say that
methods of historians mutate and there are many studies of this phenomena. Collingwood tried to
show this,[20] Daniel Špelda followed changes in history of science[21] etc. This development partly
correlates with new things and texts being accepted as an evidence.[22] Such view of historiography
can easily explain revolutions in methodology of historians. We are not just finding new pieces of
evidence but we also identify familiar objects as an evidence. Although nothing is the evidence per
se and any evidence is evidence just in relation to some theory: “It is possible to argue that material
preserved in archives, newspaper morgues, and the like is not historical evidence until historians
learn how to deal with it in ways which make it capable to contributing to the solutions of their
problems, that is, until historians are able to asks questions such that answers may be elicited from
those thing that have survival.”[23]
After we specify relevant evidence for our case, we may look for the best possible explanation of
given set of evidence. We postulate number of events and actions which make such evidence
possible and accessible to us. Hypothetical construction of some state of world to explain artefacts
around us seems like true account of history. There is no need to deny past ontologically but we can
deny statement that historians inquire into real past. Epistemic limits are too strong and they may
be confusing if we ignore them. However, many difficult questions remain: How do we recognize the
best possible explanation of given set of evidence? I do not find satisfying to say that only criterion is
consensus and pragmatic value but it certainly seems so. I consider this to be the best account of
practice of historians: “Historians tend to add underdetermined theoretical backgrounds to their
shared theories and evidence to infer new hypotheses. Such theories increase their scope by
decreasing their accuracy, creating vague large scope theories that form the intellectual basis for
schools. Members of schools interpret ad hoc the vague theory they share to fit local narrow scopes
of evidence.”[24] By this definition we can explain nature of evidence, differences between various
schools and traditions, status of theories and their commensurability. Aviezer Tucker suggests
examining history and historiography with tools specific to philosophy of science. He calls this
discipline philosophy of historiography and I believe that discipline like this is painfully needed in
modern philosophy. It may help us banish possibly dangerous theories based on narrow view of
history and protect us against ubiquitous abuses of historical theories. History and historiography
may not be sciences in strict and exact sense, but they are still instruments by means of which we
arrive at important knowledge about our world. In this respect we can definitely take advantage of
tools provided to us by philosophy of science.
I tried to show some possible misconceptions which are quiet common among philosophers
concerning history, historiography and work of historians. I argued that we should approach this
discipline in a spirit of naturalized epistemology and focus on relation of evidence and theory. By
this method we should be able to appreciate all peculiarities of history and ward off danger of
abusing historical theories for political or other goals by limiting role of subjectivity and relativity.
References
BATES, D.: Rediscovering Collingwood’s Spiritual History (In and Out of Context). In: History and
Theory, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1996, pp. 29-55.
COLLINGWOOD, R. G.: Idea of History. New York: Oxford University Press 1994.
GOLDSTEIN, L. J.: Historical Knowing. Austin and London: University of Texas Press 1976.
HEMPEL, C. G.: The Function of General Laws in History. In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39, No.
2, 1942, pp. 35-48.
MURPHEY, M. G.: Truth and History. New York: State University of New York Press 2008.
O’SULLIVAN, L.: Leon Goldstein and the Epistemology of Historical Knowing.
In: History and Theory, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2006, pp. 204-228.
POPPER, K.: The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge Classics 2002.
SCHNEEWIND, J. B. – SKINNER, Q. – RORTY, R.: Philosophy in History. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1984.
SKINNER, Q.: Meaning an Understanding in the History of Ideas. In: History and Theory, Vol. 8, No.
1, 1969, pp. 3-53.
ŠPELDA, D.: Proměny historiografie vědy. Praha: Filosofia, Nakladatelství Filosofického ústavu AV
ČR 2009.
TUCKER, A.: Our knowledge of the Past, Philosophy of Historiography. New York: Cambridge
University Press 2004.
TUCKER, A.: The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography. In: History and Theory, Vol. 40, No. 1,
2001, pp. 37-56.
WHITE, M.: From a Philosophical Point of View, Selected Studies. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press 2005.
WILLIAMS, B.: Truth & Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press
2002.
WRIGHT, G. H.: Explanation and Understanding. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1971.
Poznámky
[1] See SCHNEEWIND, J. B. – SKINNER, Q. – RORTY, R.: Philosophy in History. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1984.
[2] See TUCKER, A.: The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography. In: History and Theory, Vol. 40,
No. 1, 2001, pp. 37-56.
[3] One of the important critics was K. Popper with his Poverty of Historicism. See POPPER, K.: The
Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge Classics 2002. More recent critics are Quentin Skinner
(Meaning an Understanding in the History of Ideas. In: History and Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1969, pp.
3-53) and Aviezer Tucker (The Future of the Philosophy of Historiography). Proponents of philosophy
of history range from Marxist historians or various miners for perennial truths to various
futurologists.
[4] Plutarch extensively uses examples from his Parallel Lives in his moral philosophy.
[5] See especially chapter 7; pp. 149-161 (WILLIAMS, B.: Truth & Truthfulness: An Essay in
Genealogy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2002).
[6] I am going to use this distinction vaguely because there are no clear borders between those
disciplines. They are usually deeply intertwined but I would like to highlight some differences.
[7] See GOLDSTEIN, L. J.: Historical Knowing. Austin and London: University of Texas Press 1976,
p. 141.
[8] This is meta-assumption in many philosophical works concerning history and it is typical for
historical realism. Morton White holds this in many of his papers. R. G. Collingwood and J. L.
Goldstein argued about this with many historians and philosophers like A. M. MacIver or M. C.
McCullagh. See also O’SULLIVAN, L.: Leon Goldstein and the Epistemology of Historical Knowing.
In: History and Theory, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2006, pp. 204-228 or MURPHEY, M. G.: Truth and History.
New York: State University of New York Press 2008.
[9] HEMPEL, C. G.: The Function of General Laws in History. In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39,
No. 2, 1942, p. 39.
[10] WRIGHT, G. H.: Explanation and Understanding. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1971, p. 134.
[11] COLLINGWOOD, R. G.: Idea of History. New York: Oxford University Press 1994, p. 251.
[12] See BATES, D.: Rediscovering Collingwood’s Spiritual History (In and Out of Context). In:
History and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1996, pp. 29-55.
[13] COLLINGWOOD, R. G.: Idea of History, p. 202.
[14] Wright mentions Collingwood many times in his Explanation and Understanding in different
contexts. Though he usually argues against him, he accept his concept of intentionality.
[15] Quentin Skinner accepts some Collingwood’s thoughts in his works. Even in his famous
Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas 1969. See page 38.
[16] WHITE, M.: From a Philosophical Point of View, Selected Studies. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press 2005, p. 40.
[17] For other defence of historical realism see MURPHEY, M. G.: Truth and History.
[18] WHITE, M.: From a Philosophical Point of View, p. 50.
[19] GOLDSTEIN, L. J.: Historical Knowing, p. 61.
[20] Especially first half of his Idea of History.
[21] ŠPELDA, D.: Proměny historiografie vědy. Praha: Filosofia, Nakladatelství Filosofického ústavu
AV ČR 2009.
[22] Other factors may include the role of history at given time, technical equipment available etc.
[23] GOLDSTEIN, L. J.: Historical Knowing, p. 88.
[24] TUCKER, A.: Our knowledge of the Past, Philosophy of Historiography. New York: Cambridge
University Press 2004, p. 261.
Mgr. David Černín
Katedra filozofie
Filozofická fakulta Ostravské univerzity v Ostravě
cernin.d@gmail.com