water

Article
Applying the Theory of Reliability to the Assessment
of Hazard, Risk and Safety in a Hydrologic System:
A Case Study in the Upper Sola River
Catchment, Poland
Bogdan Ozga-Zielinski 1 , Jan Adamowski 2, * and Maurycy Ciupak 3
1 Department of Water Management and Engineering Systems, Institute of Meteorology and Water
Management-National Research Institute, ul. Podlesna 61, 01-673 Warsaw, Poland;
Bogdan.Ozga-Zielinski@imgw.pl
2 Department of Bioresource Engineering, McGill University, 21 111 Lakeshore Road,
Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC H9X 3V9, Canada
3 Hydrological Forecasting Office, Institute of Meteorology and Water Management-National Research
Institute, ul. Piotra Borowego 14, 30-215 Cracow, Poland; Maurycy.Ciupak@imgw.pl
* Correspondence: jan.adamowski@mcgill.ca




Received: 16 October 2017; Accepted: 25 May 2018; Published: 2 June 2018


Abstract: River basin safety issues and hazards arising from extreme hydrological and meteorological
events pose significant risks to human life and can entail economic and financial losses. In this
study, the practical aspects of reliability theory linked to reliability engineering, and the associated
mathematical tools used to describe technical systems, were applied to explore the structural reliability
of a quasi-natural system—a portion of the Upper Sola River catchment in Poland. As part of this
study, methods such as the Fault Tree Method (FTM), Event Tree Method (ETM), Risk Matrix and
Ranking Method for assessing hazard, risk and losses connected with the occurrence of such events
are suggested to improve flood risk management and enhance the capacity to safeguard against such
events by improving current flood protection protocols in accordance with EC Flood Directives.

Keywords: hydrologic system; river basin; water resources management; safety; security; reliability;
risk; hazard; threat; losses; flood; flooding; extreme events; FTM; ETM; risk matrix; ranking method;
upper Sola River; Poland

1. Introduction
In force since 26 November 2007, flood protection directives within the European Union (EU)
are outlined in the Flood Directive on the assessment and management of flood risks [1], which sets
goals, suggests activities and provides methods to reduce the adverse effects of floods. However,
the implementation of the directive’s recommendations has proven to be a major challenge for a number
of nations within the European Community. The concept of flood risk combines the probability of
flooding (threat or hazard), and the related potential negative consequences with respect to human
health and life, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activities. These consequences reflect
the management of the affected area (exposure), the vulnerability of the elements managed within the
flood event, and the ability of local communities to combat the threat and reality of floods (sensitivity
or resilience). Flooding risk is a function of hazard, exposure and sensitivity to flooding, key factors in
determining, respectively, the magnitude and areal extent of extreme events’ impacts, land-use within
the geographic area of the event’s impact, and the resilience of people and objects to event occurrence.

Water 2018, 10, 723; doi:10.3390/w10060723 www.mdpi.com/journal/water

Water 2018, 10, 723 2 of 24

According to current EU (including Poland) regulations a three-pronged strategy is to be applied in

limiting the effects of floods:
(i) Protecting individuals through hazard mitigation by way of technical protection activities such
as dams and retention reservoirs, polders, relief canals, levees, riverbed regulation, activities for basin
retention development, etc.,
(ii) isolating/limiting individuals’ exposure to flood waters by reducing high risk land uses, e.g.,
moving endangered properties and banning new construction in areas at risk of flooding, and
(iii) developing the ability of individuals and society as a whole to live with floods, e.g.,
hydrological forecasting and warning, preparation and evacuation of endangered populations,
education of society, development of insurance and compensation systems, etc. These strategies
are designed to mitigate the effects of flooding and reduce flood losses.
Though all countries follow the EU Flood Directive, flood loss risk assessment is undertaken
differently in different European countries. In Germany, for example, flood losses are determined
through a loss function dependent on land-use classes and the value of the property and the loss of
the population depending on the depth of inundation of residential buildings [2–4]. In contrast, the
French approach uses norms of sensitivity, developed for rural and urban areas, based on the depth
and duration of flooding and flow velocity [5–7]. Based on the type of statistical-derived probability of
destruction of flood protection structures (objects)—e.g., levees that protect sites vulnerable to river or
storm surge flooding—the approach taken by English and Welsh authorities [8] differs significantly
from those of the German and French authorities. Depending on the magnitude of the flood and
objects’ structural parameters, various scenarios were analyzed with respect to the destruction of
flood protection structures, and the attending economic and social losses in riverine and littoral
areas. These losses were a reflection of the terrain’s configuration, of flow velocity, time and volume,
inundation depth, land-use, as well as the characteristics of the resident human population. Polish
legislation deviated slightly from the German approach in accounting for the specifics of the areas at
risk of flooding. As of 2015, work in Poland had mainly focused on: (i) Determining floodplains in a
preliminary flood risk assessment, (ii) drawing up flood hazard and flood risk maps using numerical
terrain models, GIS tools and hydrodynamic models, and (iii) developing flood risk management
plans [9]. Currently, a second planning cycle is underway, in which heretofore compiled maps and
plans will be verified.
Our proposed methodology sought to improve the safety and reliability of hydrological systems,
by either increasing the reliability of the elements of the system that have a significant impact on
its proper functioning, or by adding other elements to the existing structures in the system, thereby
providing greater reliability. In the case of complex systems, such as hydrological systems, this is
key to planning the construction of technical flood protection works, the modernization of existing
hydraulic structures, as well as in land-use planning and the use of non-technical measures.
The proposal to use the tools of reliability theory in the field of flood protection creates
opportunities for a better description of the reliable functioning of hydrological systems. Moreover,
through hydraulic modeling of river flow and planning activities, it allows for a better use of current
methods of assessing risk, particularly that posed by extreme hydrological events. The methods for
managing the risk of extreme flows and providing protection against floods presented here are not
intended to put into question the European Floods Directive [1] currently employed in EU countries,
but rather to complement them.

2. Theoretical Background
To date, the theory of reliability has mainly been applied to: (i) Describing technical objects in
fields such as aviation, construction machinery and transportation [10–13], building structures [14],
and (ii) describing technical systems, e.g., water-supply and sewage systems [15–17], safety-critical
electrical and electronic systems [18] and flood defense systems (building of levees, dikes and hydraulic
structures [19]. Attempts have been made to apply reliability engineering in the field of water
Water 2018, 10, 723 3 of 24

management, notably for: Water reservoir operation [20], assessment of water resources [21,22], water
resources systems operation [23], and hydrologic design of flood mitigation dams [24].
Reliability theory can also serve as an aid in the analysis of extreme values of river flow and
their impact on the safe operation of a hydrological system, i.e., a functional-spatial system existing
within a river catchment area, including surface and groundwater, the natural environment, technical
and non-technical activities or structures that develop the resources, as well as links between these
elements. The hydrological system is therefore presented and discussed as a water engineering system,
directly related to the issues of risk management of extreme flows.
In the present hydrological study, the primary study object was the river catchment (i.e., watershed
or on a larger scale, river basin), viewed not only as a purely natural hydrological system, but as
a water management system, subject to continuous changes under human influence. Accordingly,
the river catchment was treated as a complex object consisting of elements that are on the one hand,
resources of surface water and groundwater occurring in a natural environment and, on the other
hand, hydraulic structures for using those resources, and the linkages between these elements.
In reliability and safety theory, the term object implies a functional unit, a technical solution,
an organizational solution with specific operating features, which both determines the properties of
the object and provides its terms of use; the term operating features refers to those features relevant
to the user in terms of employing the object [25]. In hydrology, the object is the hydrological system,
a complex object, with an established organization and complement of relationships, composed of a set
of interconnected indivisible elements or objects (e.g., hydraulic structures such as retention reservoirs,
levees, polders, relief canals, etc., as well as a catchment, river valley or river bed retention) which
implement the full system’s functionality and define its operating parameters.
An undesirable event is defined as one causing failure in an object’s operation; such events in
a hydrological context could be extremes of flooding or drought. The term failure of object means
any event that precludes, physically or conventionally, a given object from fulfilling its envisioned
functions [11]. In the case of a river catchment with existing flood protection infrastructure, the failure
of such a complex object will result in the undesirable event of flooding. Depending on the severity
of the hazard brought on by the occurrence of an undesirable event within the hydrological system,
individual elements of its structure may suffer physical and/or conventional failures. The technical
elements present in a hydrological system are considered as indivisible objects that constitute the
technical flood protection infrastructure. In this context, the term damage of object is understood as a
synonym for failure of a technical object, with the damage being the physical failure of said object.
In view of the above terminology, a general definition of reliability can be adopted: An object’s
ability to operate correctly, that is, perform its functions within a specified time and without failure.
Such a definition can be elaborated for a specific object (e.g., a river catchment with existing flood
protection infrastructure such as retention reservoirs, levees) based on information regarding the
object’s features and the elements crucial for its reliability or failure.
Accordingly, a hydrological system’s or river catchment’s reliability resides in its ability, at
any given time, to store potentially flood-causing extreme precipitation in existing, well maintained
(i.e., in a good technical state), operating-as-designed, river bed retention reservoirs or levee-enclosed
floodplains, following state-of-the-art land-use protocols to reduce surface runoff. In other words,
the hydrological system’s reliability is tied to the capacity of the elements from which it is built,
to perform in a specified time, without failure, the functions for which they are designed—without the
occurrence of flooding.
If we accept that the occurrence of flooding constitutes a failure of the hydrological system above
a certain maximum threshold flow, Qaf , given as the mean flow of the largest observed floods, then a
time series analysis will show periods during which the hydrological system functions reliably (τ i ),
moments at which failure occurred (ti ), periods during which failure endures (τ wi ), and periods of
system renewal (ϑi ) during which the system returns to full fitness after the period of failure (end of
flooding) (Figure 1).
Water 2018,
Water 10, x723
2018, 10, FOR PEER REVIEW 4 4ofof 24
24

Figure
Figure 1.
1. Hydrograph
Hydrograph with with periods
periods of
of reliable
reliable hydrological
hydrological system
system operation
operation (τ (τii),),moments
momentsof offailure
failure
occurrence
occurrence (t
(tii),), duration
duration of
of failure
failure (τ wi))tied
(τwi tiedtotothe
theduration
durationofofsystem
systemrenewal
renewal ((ϑ ii).). Q
Qbfbfisisthe
theboundary
boundary
flow
flow of
of the
the river
river flood,
flood, often
often accepted
accepted as as the
the minimal
minimal flow
flow of of annual
annual maximum
maximum floods floods overover the
the
observation period, Qafaf—maximum flow not causing flood losses, often accepted as the mean flow of
observation period, Q —maximum flow not causing flood losses, often accepted as the mean flow of
annual
annual maximum
maximum floods floods for
for the
the observation
observation period
period or
or Q
Qmax,T=2
max,T=2year return
year (Qmax,p=50%
periodperiod
return ).
(Qmax,p=50% ).

For
For hydrological systems,the
hydrological systems, theobject
objectreliability
reliabilityfunction,
function, t), is aiswell-characterized
R(𝑅(𝑡), a well-characterized measure
measure that
that represents
represents the probability
the probability of meeting
of meeting the requirement
the requirement of proper
of proper operation.
operation.
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝜏 > 𝑡) (1)
R(t) = P(τ > t) (1)
where:
where:
𝑡 is time,
𝑡t the
is moment
time, failure occurs,
𝑃(.
ti ) the probability of non-failure
the moment failure occurs, occurrence up to time ti, and
𝜏P(.) the
theduration of object
probability function without
of non-failure failure
occurrence i. time t , and
up to i
τ Expressing an exceedance
the duration probability
of object function with
without respect
failure i. to the range [0, 1] through a non-increasing
function, 𝑅(𝑡) takes on a value of 𝑅 = 1.0 at time 𝑡 = 0, and indicates the object is functioning well
Expressing an exceedance probability with respect to the range [0, 1] through a non-increasing
(i.e., usable). Conversely, if 𝜏 ≤ 𝑡, the object is unfit for operation. Accordingly, the probability of
function, R(t) takes on a value of R0 = 1.0 at time t = 0, and indicates the object is functioning well
object failure to time ti is as follows:
(i.e., usable). Conversely, if τ ≤ t, the object is unfit for operation. Accordingly, the probability of object
failure to time ti is as follows: 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝜏 ≤ 𝑡) (2)
where: F (t) = P(τ ≤ t) (2)

where:is a cumulative distribution function, otherwise known as the object failure function, and
𝐹(𝑡)
𝑅(𝑡) + 𝐹(𝑡) = 1, 𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) or 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑅(𝑡).
F (t) is a cumulative distribution function, otherwise known as the object failure function, and
More
R(t)about
+ F (t)measures
= 1, R(t)of= reliability
1 − F (t) ortheory
F (t) =one
1 − can
R(t)find
. practically in every book or article
concerning this subject for example in [18,25,26] and later on in Section 4.
More about measures of reliability theory one can find practically in every book or article
2.1. The Reliability
concerning Structure
this subject of a Hydrologic
for example Systemand
in [18,25,26] (Reliability
later onBlock Diagram)
in Section 4.

In the
2.1. The case of Structure
Reliability a complexof aobject such as
Hydrologic a hydrological
System (Reliability system, it is important to determine the
Block Diagram)
reliability of the object according to its structure and elements (reliability block diagram). In a model
In the case of a complex object such as a hydrological system, it is important to determine the
of a complex object, the reliability structure often takes on a mixed form composed of various
reliability of the object according to its structure and elements (reliability block diagram). In a model of
structures.
a complex object, the reliability structure often takes on a mixed form composed of various structures.
2.2.
2.2. Mixed
Mixed Structure
Structure of
of aa Hydrologic
Hydrologic System
System
Typically,
Typically, a mixed (composite) structure
a mixed (composite) structure includes
includes serial
serial elements
elements connected
connected with
with elements
elements
operating in parallel (Figure 2).
operating in parallel (Figure 2).
Water 2018, 10, 723 5 of 24
Water 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 24

Figure2.2.Reliability
Figure Reliabilitystructure
structure(reliability
(reliabilityblock
blockdiagram)
diagram)ofofthe
theSola
SolaRiver
Rivercatchment’s
catchment’shydrological
hydrological
systemup
system upto tothe
theZywiec
Zywiecpost.
post. This
Thisstructure
structurereflects
reflectssystem
systemfunction
functionand
andelement
elementreliability
reliabilityand
anddoes
does
not represent the actual location of system elements.
not represent the actual location of system elements.

Assumingthe
Assuming thetime
timeindependence
independenceof ofthe
thefailure-free
failure-freeoperation
operationof
ofaamixed
mixedstructure’s
structure’sindividual
individual
elements, the mixed structure of a hydrological system including the river valley’s retention
elements, the mixed structure of a hydrological system including the river valley’s retention and andone
one
leveeand
levee andone
onepolder
polder(Figure
(Figure2)2)yields
yieldsan
anR𝑅(𝑡) andF (𝐹(𝑡)
(t) and calculated
t) calculated as: as:
serialstructure
serial structure
i=n i =n
F (t) = 1 − ∏ Ri (t) = 1 − ∏ [1 − Fi (t)] (3)
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − i=1 𝑅 (𝑡) = 1 −i=1 [1 − 𝐹 (𝑡)] (3)
i =n
R(t) = ∏ Ri ( t ) (4)
i =1
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑅 (𝑡) (4)
and parallel structure
i =n i =n
R(t) = 1 − ∏ Fi (t) = 1 − ∏ [1 − Ri (t)] (5)
and parallel structure i =1 i =1

i =n
F (t) = ∏ Fi (t) (5)
(6)
i =1
𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹 (𝑡) = 1 − [1 − 𝑅 (𝑡)]
where,

i is the element number, where i = 1, river valley retention; i = 2, levee; and i = 3, polder (Figure 2),
Fi (t) is the failure function of the ith element,
𝐹(𝑡)and
= 𝐹 (𝑡) (6)
Ri (t) is the reliability function of the ith element.
where,
For the specific case shown in Figure 2, the equations for R(t) and F(t) can be written, respectively, as:
i is the element number, where i = 1, river valley retention; i = 2, levee; and i = 3, polder (Figure 2),
R(t) = R (t) × [1 − ([1 − R2 (t)] × [1 − R3 (t)])] (7)
𝐹 (𝑡) is the failure function of the ith1 element, and
𝑅 (𝑡) is the reliability function of the ith element.
F (t) = 1 − ([1 − F1 (t)] × [1 − ( F2 (t) × F3 (t))]) (8)
For the specific case shown in Figure 2, the equations for 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝐹(𝑡) can be written,
In the case of some objects, such as hydrological systems, a reliability structure can be created by
respectively, as:
elements treated as events that can appear in the object, in addition to elements physically existing in
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑅 way
the object. Accordingly, a convenient [1graphically
(𝑡) ×to − ([1 − 𝑅 (𝑡)] × [1 − and
represent 𝑅 (𝑡)])] (7)
analyze the object’s reliability
structure is the Fault Tree Method (FTM).
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − [1 − 𝐹 (𝑡)] × 1 − 𝐹 (𝑡) × 𝐹 (𝑡) (8)
2.3. The Fault Tree Method (FTM) in the Reliability Analysis of Hydrological Systems
In the case of some objects, such as hydrological systems, a reliability structure can be created
by elements treated
In assessing as events
complex thatreliability,
object can appear if in
itsthe object, in addition
elements—in to elements
particular physically
its physical existing
elements—are
in the object. Accordingly, a convenient way to graphically represent and analyze the object’s
known, then a model of reliability for such an object is easily presented in qualitative form as a structure
reliability
of structure
reliability (Figure is
2) the
andFault Tree Method
quantitatively (FTM).
using measures of reliability (Equations (3)–(8)). For more
complex hydrological systems, an FTM model can be used where the mathematical description of
2.3. The
failure Faultthe
takes Tree Method
form (FTM) in the
of probabilities Reliabilitytop
of so-called Analysis of Hydrological
events and basic events.Systems
A top event is an undesirable
event leading to object failure, e.g., high flows leading to flooding, while a basic (original) event is an
In assessing complex object reliability, if its elements—in particular its physical elements—are
known, then a model of reliability for such an object is easily presented in qualitative form as a
Water 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 24

structure of reliability (Figure 2) and quantitatively using measures of reliability (Equations (3)–(8)).
For 2018,
Water more10,complex
723 hydrological systems, an FTM model can be used where the mathematical 6 of 24
description of failure takes the form of probabilities of so-called top events and basic events. A top event
is an undesirable event leading to object failure, e.g., high flows leading to flooding, while a basic
(original)
event event isthe
or failure ancause
eventoforwhich
failureisthe
notcause of which
considered is not
(e.g., considered
heavy rainfall,(e.g.,
suddenheavy
riserainfall, sudden
in hibernal air
rise in hibernal air temperature with a heavy snow cover over a large area of the catchment, frozen
temperature with a heavy snow cover over a large area of the catchment, frozen soil, levee status,
soil, leveereservoir
retention status, retention reservoirhigh
filled to capacity, filled to moisture
soil capacity, content
high soil inmoisture
catchment content in catchment area,
area, etc.).
etc.).
One of the advantages of describing the reliability of the object structure using FTM (Figure 3) is
One of the advantages of describing the reliability of the object structure using FTM (Figure
the possibility of placing the probabilities of occurrence of individual events on tree branches, leading 3)
is the
up possibility
to the top event,ofthereby
placingallowing
the probabilities
a quantitativeof occurrence
analysis ofofobject
individual events on tree branches,
reliability.
leading
Theup to the top event,
probabilities thereby
P(Ai ) of allowing
undesirable a quantitative
events Ai found in analysis
FTM are of dependent
object reliability.
on the time (t) of
failureThe probabilities
occurrence (e.g.,P(A i) ofundesirable
of the undesirableevent) eventsand
Ai are
found in FTM
equal to: are dependent on the time (t) of
failure occurrence (e.g., of the undesirable event) and are equal to:
P( Ai ) = Fl (t) = 1 − Rl (t) (9)
𝑃(𝐴 ) = 𝐹 (𝑡) = 1 − 𝑅 (𝑡) (9)
where,
where,
R𝑅l ((𝑡) function of
t) is the reliability function of reliability
reliability of
of the
the llthth element
element of
of the
the object,
object, in
in which
which the
thelth
lth failure,
failure,
F
𝐹l ( t
(𝑡) ) appeared at time t.
appeared at time t.

Figure 3. Fault tree for the structure of the hydrological system of the Sola River catchment up to the
Zywiec post.
Figure 3. Fault tree for the structure of the hydrological system of the Sola River catchment up to the
Zywiec post.
For the hydrological system shown in Figure 3, the probability p(A) of top event A (flooding
For thecan
occurrence) hydrological system
be calculated shown
as follows in also
(see Figure 3, the4):probability p(A) of top event A (flooding
Section
occurrence) can be calculated as follows (see also Section 4):
p( A) = p( A1 ) + p( A2 ) = p( A11 ) + p( A12 ) + p( A13 ) + p( A21 ) p( A22 ) + p( A23 )
(10)
= p( A11 ) + p( A12 ) + p( A13 ) + p( A21 ) p( A22 /A21 ) + p( A23 )
Water 2018, 10, 723 7 of 24

All probabilities should be estimated by use of expert knowledge, i.e. team of specialists from
different fields of interest (e.g., Ranking method, see Section 4) or through statistical methods if
sufficient data exists to perform statistical calculations.
Based on estimated probabilities p(Ai ), the value of the reliability function Rl (t) of the lth element
of the hydrological system, in which failure Fl (t) occurred as a result of undesirable events occurring at
time t (Equation (9)), the reliability or failure of the entire hydrological system can be calculated.

2.4. Definition of Risk

Both the definition and mode of assessment of risk varies widely in the literature from different
scientific domains [26–36]. While the term risk is often used interchangeably with that of uncertainty,
these are two distinct concepts: Uncertainty most commonly refers to a state in which future possibilities
and chances are unknown; risk refers to decision-making in situations of uncertainty. Negative
associations tied to the term risk due to its allusion to a lack of safety, impedes its social acceptance.
Generally, the concept of risk is a complement to the closely related concept of safety.
Given that a (hydrological) system’s safety level can be quantified, one hydrological system
and its elements can be deemed safer than another. Given that a functioning hydrological system
implies a certain level of risk, its level of safety can be assessed through its level of risk. The three
categories of risk or levels of safety (e.g., acceptable, tolerable and inacceptable) have fuzzy boundaries,
determined through qualitative rather than quantitative methods of risk assessment. The level of risk
tolerance should be the lowest in accordance with the principle of As Low as Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) [13,37]. The level of tolerable risk depends primarily on the legal provisions in force,
policies adopted for the environment and cultural goods, as well as on the approval of the local
communities according to their unique cultural traditions and ethical values. The European Union
Flood Directive [1,38] defined the risk of flooding as the combined probability of flood occurrence and
the potential, negative flood-related consequences for human health, natural environment, cultural
heritage and economic activity.

2.5. Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment of Risk

The qualitative analysis of risk in a probabilistic sense involves the identification of threats and
assessment of the sequence of events leading to an undesirable event, i.e., an extreme hydrological
event. Such an analysis can be performed by the Event Tree Method (ETM) [24,39], a graphical
representation of a chronological scenario of events that have a significant impact on the system’s
operation, but are ultimately caused by an initiating or ‘basic hazardous event’. This approach assumes
that for system failure to occur one undesirable event is not sufficient, but rather a series of events
is required.
In contrast to block diagrams of system structure and the FTM, ETM is not used to describe an
system’s reliability structure (e.g., physical elements or undesirable events), but rather for risk analysis.
Nevertheless, risk analysis does require knowledge of system structure, so it is reasonable to combine
the two methods to comprehensively describe an system’s operation and its elements. Therefore,
in creating a hydrological system’s event tree, all elements of such a system and their interrelations
should be considered.
After building an event tree to represent foreseeable secondary event scenarios, a probability can
be assigned to every secondary event branch, allowing the probability of entire sequences of events
leading to object failure to be calculated. In this way, a quantitative model of threat (risk) induced by
an initial event can be generated.
In the concepts of FTM and ETM presented in this paper, the reliability function (and/or failure
function) and the extent of risk are considered in a probability domain, as described below.
Water 2018, 10, 723 8 of 24

2.6. Relationship between Measures of Hydrological Risk and Measures of Reliability (Failure)—Threat
and Losses
While the concepts are defined in fundamentally different ways, a close relationship exists between
measures of risk, reliability (failure)—threat (hazard) and losses, and can be written as:

measure o f hydrological risk

(11)
= measure o f reliability (measure o f threat) × measure o f losses

Drawn from the relationship between the hydrological system’s object failure function, F(t), and
its object reliability function, R(t), the probability of occurrence of an undesirable event p( A) = pi
(Figure 4), is quantified in terms of the undesirable event ‘A’ causing losses greater or equal
to l. The relationship in Equation (11), between measures of hydrological risk MHR , failure F
(reliability R)—threat and losses T, can be expressed mathematically as:

M HR (l, t) = F (t) × T (l ) = [1 − R(t)] × T (l ) = P( A) × P[ L(t) ≥ l \ A] (12)

where,

M HR (l, t) is a measure of risk of emergence of losses l in the hydrological system at time t of the
system’s functioning,
F(t) is the system failure function—probability of occurrence of event A at time t,
R(t) is the system reliability function—probability of non-occurrence of event A at time t,
T(l) is the probability that the occurrence of an undesirable event A causes losses greater
or equal to l, T (l ) = P[ L(t) ≥ l \ A],
P( A) is the probability of occurrence of the undesirable event, A, viewed as a measure of
failure F(t) (or reliability R(t)) of the hydrological system,
P[ L(t) ≥ l \ A] is the probability of occurrence of losses greater or equal to l under the condition that
undesirable event A occurred. It serves as the measure of threat of the occurrence of
losses in the hydrological system resulting from its malfunctioning.

Equation (12) shows that the risk of occurrence of loss within the hydrological system depends
not only on undesirable event A, which creates the threat of occurrence of losses, but also on the failure
or reliability of the complete system or its elements. Failure of the system or its elements has a direct
impact on the possibility of occurrence of losses and their magnitude, i.e., T(l) in Equation (12). The level
of risk also depends to a large extent on the system’s readiness to counteract a threat, both before and
after its occurrence. Emergency and risk management systems include the monitoring/forecasting of
extreme hydro-meteorological events, implementation of warning systems and involvement of fire
departments and medical emergency systems. Factors influencing the safety of hydrological systems
fall into two main categories: (i) Those relating to the reliability of operation of the system and its
elements, and those related to the failure-free functioning of risk management systems, and (ii) those
associated with the occurrence of undesirable events. Even if a complex object’s elements show low
reliability, the object can still be safe if in the planning, design and operational phases, engineers have
ensured that potential damage does not generate large risks.
The proposed approach (Equation (12)) differs from the classical approach because it accounts
for the probabilistic nature of losses, not only the size of losses in the form of a single value, and
simultaneously takes into consideration the reliability (or failure) of the structure of the hydrological
system as a probability of threat. Accordingly, hydrological risk should be expressed by a unit of
probability, and not by a unit of losses expressed in monetary units and/or as a number of human
victims. In the new approach, rather than calculating the extent of losses based on the configuration
of the terrain, flood water velocity, flood timing, volume, and depth, land-use, nature of the resident
human population, and value of human property, the probability of occurrence of losses equal to
Water 2018, 10, 723 9 of 24

or exceeding a certain assumed value (magnitude) is considered. Accordingly, the hydrological

system failure function or the hydrological system reliability function is expressed as the probability of
occurrence orxnon-occurrence
Water 2018, 10, FOR PEER REVIEWof the undesirable event. Given knowledge regarding the reliability 9 ofof24
the system, as illustrated in a block diagram, and a description of the system developed using FTM,
onecan
one canbuild
buildan anevent
eventtree
tree(ETM).
(ETM).ThisThisgraphical
graphicalrepresentation
representationofofthe
theforeseeable
foreseeablecourse-of-events
course-of-events
broughton
brought onby bythe
the occurrence
occurrence of of the
the initialization
initialization event
event allows
allowsthe
theassignment
assignmenttotospecific
specificbranches
branchesof
ofthe
theevent
eventtreetreeofof probabilities
probabilities of of occurrence
occurrence forfor every
every secondary
secondary event’s
event’s occurrence.
occurrence. Then
Thenthethe
probability of the entire sequence of secondary events leading to the failure of
probability of the entire sequence of secondary events leading to the failure of the system can bethe system can be
calculated(Figure
calculated (Figure4).4).One
Onecan
canthereby
therebycreate
create(build)
(build)aaquantitative
quantitative(probability)
(probability)model
modelofofrisk
riskinduced
induced
bythe
by theoccurrence
occurrenceofofthe theinitialization
initializationevent.
event.

Figure4.4.Example
Figure Exampleofofevent
eventtree
treefor
forpart
partofofSola
SolaRiver
Riverbasin
basinsystem
systemininZywiec.
Zywiec.((•—lack ofdisaster,
•—lack of disaster,
#✕—disaster).
—disaster).

2.7.Identification
2.7. IdentificationofofRisk
Risk
Theprobability
The probabilityofofan anindividual
individualincident’s
incident’soccurrence
occurrenceisisassessed
assessedandandthen
thenthethesequence
sequenceofof
events leading to system failure is calculated. Using an event tree, a given sequence’s probabilityofof
events leading to system failure is calculated. Using an event tree, a given sequence’s probability
occurrenceand
occurrence and level
level of of
riskrisk
(RL)(RL)
cancan be calculated.
be calculated. This This allows
allows one toone to create
create a systema system risk which
risk model, model,
which
by by considering
considering possible
possible system systemfailures
element element andfailures and their
their mutual mutual (e.g.,
relationships relationships (e.g.,
intermediate
intermediate
events, events,
secondary secondary
events), evaluatesevents),theevaluates the risk
risk of losses of lossesfrom
resulting resulting from the occurrence
the occurrence of a givenof
a given undesirable
undesirable event. event.
AAsystem’s
system’srisk
risklevel,
level,RL 𝑅𝐿 , inresponse
(k() ,)in responsetotok kundesirable
undesirableevents
eventscan
canbebeexpressed
expressedas: as:

j=mh
(13)
i
= ∑ RL
(k)( ) = ( )) ( )
RL𝑅𝐿 𝑅𝐿(kj ××p𝑝(kj) (13)
j =1

i =n
p𝑝(kj( ) )==∏ pi𝑝(
(kj) )
(14)
(14)
i =1

where,
where,
mm isisthe
thenumber
numberofofsecondary
secondaryevents
eventssequences,
sequences,
nn isisthe
thenumber
numberofofsecondary
secondaryevents
eventsininthe
thejthjthsequence,
sequence,
𝑝( )
is the probability of occurrence of the jth sequence caused by the occurrence of the kth
undesirable event,
( )
𝑝 is the probability of occurrence of the ith secondary event in the jth sequence caused by the kth
undesirable event
𝑅𝐿( )
is the risk level associated with the jth sequence of secondary events caused by occurrence of
the kth undesirable event.
Water 2018, 10, 723 10 of 24

p(kj) is the probability of occurrence of the jth sequence caused by the occurrence of the kth
undesirable event,
(kj)
pi is the probability of occurrence of the ith secondary event in the jth sequence caused by the kth
undesirable event
RL(kj) is the risk level associated with the jth sequence of secondary events caused by occurrence of
the kth undesirable event.

The overall risk to the system from all sequences of secondary events arising from an undesirable
event is given in Equation (13), and represents the risk which may arise when considering a
particular scenario of secondary events seen as the most likely threat posed by m occurrences of
an undesirable event.
For the part of Sola River catchment system in Zywiec, the event tree, which considers measures
of risk level for this object (Figure 4), can be used to calculate the risk associated with initial event IE in
the form of heavy rainfall, as:

RL = RL(1) p(1) + RL(2) p(2) + RL(3) p(3) + RL(4) p(4) (15)

where
p (1) = p 1 p 2 (16)

p (2) = p 1 ( 1 − p 2 ) p 3 (17)

p(3) = p1 (1 − p2 )(1 − p3 ) (18)

p (4) = 1 − p 1 (19)

Because numbered sequences j = 1, 3 and 4 do not lead to interruption of levee function

and attendant flooding disaster, measures of risk level for these sequences are equal to zero
(i.e., RL(1) = RL(3) = RL(4) = 0); therefore Equation (15) takes on the form:

RL = RL(2) p1 (1 − p2 ) p3 (20)

Both the measure of risk level, RL(2) of sequence no. 2 initiated by initial event IE, as well as
probabilities of every secondary event, p1 , p2 and p3 , would be estimated by experts or statistical
methods (see Section 4).

3. Methodology
Hydrological system safety depends primarily on procedures and regulations related to extreme
hydrological event (e.g., floods) risk management. These should be included in plans of hydrological
system security, which we propose should be a part of the flood risk management plans implemented
under the Flood Directive. In doing so, the following methodology should be followed:
i Identification of threat formation mechanisms, i.e., threats in the form of a surplus (flooding) of surface
water in three environments: Canals of rivers, natural and artificial (man-made) reservoirs and
periodically on the catchment area. In the example of the Sola River catchment at the Zywiec post
(Section 4), the maximum flows from winter and summer seasons causing floods were identified
as threat in Zywiec town and its surroundings.
ii Determination of defense mechanisms appropriate for specific types of threats, i.e., taking into account
technical and non-technical activities, what should be done? For instance, in the case of a
huge flood, technical flood protection infrastructure can be installed for flood reduction. This
include retention reservoirs with constant flood reserve, dry reservoirs and polders with locks
and spillways as well as objects preventing flooding outside the intended area, i.e., levees, dry
reservoirs and polders without locks, channels of relief and maintenance and adjustment of the
riverbed capacity. Non-technical flood protection activities can include hydrological education
Water 2018, 10, 723 11 of 24

about extreme events, information on the occurrence of risks of flood, appropriate land-use
planning, insurance as well as legal and institutional systems.
iii Identification of the reliability structure of a hydrological system, i.e., creating a reliability block diagram
(see Figure 2) on the basis of existing objects in the studied system. The measures of the reliability
analysis can be evaluated: Reliability function R(t) (Equations (1)–(8), (21) and (26)) and failure
function F(t) (Equations (1)–(8)), function of failure intensity λ(t) (Equation (25)), function of
cumulative intensity of failures Λ(t) (Equation (29)) and the expected value of time the system
functions without failure ET (Equations (27) and (28)). The reliable structure of the hydrologic
system can be described by the FTM as a probabilistic model of the system (see Figure 3 and
Equations (9) and (10)).
iv Qualitative risk assessment and prioritizing risk levels of identified threats, using ETM as a probabilistic
model of risk occurrence in the hydrologic system (Section 2).
v Quantitative risk assessment by evaluation probability of threat and consequences of their
occurrence, using ETM (see Figure 4 and Equations (13)–(20), (43) and (44)).
vi Evaluation of hydrologic risk measures of the entire system and its particular elements of flood protection
infrastructure. The hydrologic risk measure MHR (Equations (11), (12), (22), (24) and (47)) and
Safety Guarantee Indicator (SGI) (Equation (45)) and Flood Risk Indicator (FRI) (Equation (46))
should be estimated.
vii Evaluation of risk of losses in the hydrologic system using FTM and ETM probabilistic models
(Equations (30)–(33) and (40)–(44)) as well as the Ranking Method (see Chapter 4.3. and
Equations (34)–(39)) and Risk Matrix (see Chapter 4.4. Qualitative Method of Risk Assessment).
viii Finally, the risk of hydrological extreme events can be managed.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Place and Data for Case Study

A case study was undertaken for the portion of the Sola River catchment with its outlet at the
Zywiec post (Figure 5). Including three geographical units (Zywiec Beskid, Silesian Beskid and
Makowski Beskid) this Western Carpathian catchment extends over 785 km2 of flysch—thick layers of
sandstone partitioned by layers of slate. The river network is relatively dense. The highest point in
the catchment is Pilsko (1557 m a.m.s.l.), and the lowest Zywiec (342 m a.m.s.l.), with an overall mean
altitude of 683 m a.m.s.l. Land use in the Sola River catchment includes forest (55% by area), arable
farming and grassland (44%), and urban areas (1%).
Conditions of outflow from its drainage area are closely related to its hypsometry. Maximum flow
series from winter and summer seasons over a monitoring period of 1956 to 2012 (t = 57 years) were
used for calculations. Using the analysis of heterogeneity employed in [40], both winter and summer
season series of maximum flows were identified a statistically homogeneous ones.
The calculation of maximum annual floods with a T-year return period (exceedance probability p)
followed the Alternative Events Method [40,41] using English version of FFA Software by [42].
The Maximum Credible Flood (MCF) is the largest flood which may occur under extreme
conditions conducive to the simultaneous occurrence of the Maximum Credible Precipitation (PMC ) and
extremely favorable conditions for run-off, i.e., the smallest possible loss of surface waters depending
on local physiographic conditions and catchment land-use patterns. Arising from a PMC event,
the peak discharge at the catchment outlet during an MCF (Q MCFp ) event was calculated [43]. Therefore,
the Q MCF
p represents the upper limit of flooding which may occur in a catchment where PMC fell.
The value of PMC is defined as the theoretically greatest precipitation within a duration of minutes,
hours, days, etc. which is physically possible to occur over a given area, under given geographical
conditions and in each season. The PMC is therefore an upper limit of precipitation depth and is
determined based on physical characteristics of precipitation formation mechanisms.
Water 2018, 10, 723 12 of 24
Water 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 24

Figure
Figure 5.
5. Sola
Sola River
River catchment.
catchment.

The
The 𝑄Q MCF
p
and
and selected
selected flow
flow characteristics
characteristics of of the
the Sola
Sola River
River monitored
monitored at at the
the Zywiec
Zywiec postpost
station
station over
over the
the observation
observation period
period ofof 1956–2012
1956–2012 are are listed
listed inin Table 1. Under
Table 1. Under economic
economic criteria
criteria for
for
flood
flood protection,
protection, the
the boundary
boundary flow
flow of
of river
river flooding
flooding which
which maymay result
result inin flooding
flooding losses,
losses, 𝑄Qb,, was
was
adopted.
adopted. According
According to to the
thecatchment’s
catchment’stopography
topographyand and land-use,
land-use, Qb𝑄waswas deemed
deemed equivalent
equivalent to:The
to: (i) (i)
The maximum
maximum flowflow not causing
not causing flood flood
losses,losses, , (ii)
𝑄 the
Q a f , (ii) mean the flow
meanofflow of maximum
annual annual maximum floods
floods periods
periods for observation
for a given a given observation
period, Q period,
AMF , or 𝑄
the Q ,
T=or
max the
2 = Q 50%
𝑄
max =
i.e., 𝑄
the %
i.e.,
maximum the maximum
flood with flood with
probability
probability
of exceedanceof exceedance
p = 50%. p = 50%.
For the period of 1956–2012, Q AMF = 354.5 m3 s−1 , and Q50% T =2
max = Qmax = 285 m s
3 −1 at the

catchment outlet (Zywiec monitoring station). In this example, the set of undesirable events was
limited to the largest annual floods monitored at Zywiec between 1956 and 2012 (Figure 6). Therefore,
for the accepted threshold Qb = Q a f = Q AMF = 354.5 m3 s−1 , the number of largest undesirable
events, which might result in losses was calculated [n(l, t) = 21]. This represents the number of floods,
during 57 years of operation of the Sola River catchment’s hydrological system, which potentially
could have caused losses greater or equal to l. For Qb = Q a f = Q50% 3 −1
max = 285 m s , the number of
undesirable events resulting in losses was equal to 27. The largest undesirable events are understood as
floods, whose peak flows were the biggest over a given year. This means that all the largest undesirable
Water 2018, 10, 723 13 of 24

events, N, total 57, since the peak flows of maximum annual floods are considered over 57 years. These
are the peak flows of all maximal floods whose values are equal or exceed Q AMF min = 92.6 m3 s−1 .

Table 1. Values of peak flow of Maximum Credible Flood, maximum flow over the monitoring period
(1956–2012), mean and minimum flow of annual maximum floods, and maximum floods with a T-year
return period in years for the Zywiec post on the Sola River.

Characteristic of Flood Discharge (m3 s−1 )

Peak flow of Maximum Credible Flood (Q MCF
p ) 1833
Maximum flow over the observation period of 1956–2012 (Q56 −12 ) * 1250
p
Mean flow of annual maximum floods 1956–2012 (Q AMF ) 354.5
Minimal flow of annual maximum floods 1956–2012 (Q AMF min ) 92.6
T =2 = Q50%
Qmax 285
max
T
Qmax =10 = Q10% 679
max
T =20 = Q5%
Qmax 850
max
T =100 = Q1%
Qmax 1243
max
T =200 = Q0.5%
Qmax 1410
max
T =500 = Q0.2%
Qmax 1631
max
T =1000 = Q0.1%
Qmax 1797
max
T =10000 = Q0.01%
Qmax 2346
max
Water 2018, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW * occurred in 1958. 14 of 24

Qaf =354.5 m3s-1

Qaf

Figure6.6.Annual
Figure Annualpeak
peakflows
flowsfor
forZywiec
Zywiecpost
poston
onthe
theSola
SolaRiver
Riverduring
during1956–2012.
1956–2012.

4.2. General Measures of Reliability, Failure, Risk and Safety

For all occurrences of yearly maximal floods in the observation period (N = 57) and 𝑛(𝑙, 𝑡) = 21
maximal floods that could cause losses of l (system failure), the reliability function R(t) for the
hydrological system is given as:
𝑛(𝑡)
𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − (21)
𝑁
Water 2018, 10, 723 14 of 24

4.2. General Measures of Reliability, Failure, Risk and Safety

For all occurrences of yearly maximal floods in the observation period (N = 57) and n(l, t) = 21
maximal floods that could cause losses of l (system failure), the reliability function R(t) for the
hydrological system is given as:
n(t)
R(t) = 1 − (21)
N
where,

n(t) is the number of events that cause system failure, and

N is the total number of events of the phenomenon affecting the system.

In the present case, R(t) = 0.63 and therefore the failure function F (t) = 1 − R (t) = 0.37. This
indicates that the Sola River catchment area above the Zywiec post, given its physico-geographical
properties, land-use, etc., functioned reliably in only 63% of occasions when undesirable events
occurred, i.e., in 37% of occurrences of the biggest floods with the potential to cause losses from 1956
to 2012, the system was unreliable. This represents a general evaluation of the reliability structure of
the Sola River catchment’s hydrological system, without considering the reliability properties of the
elements that compose it.
The general and empirical hydrologic risk measure, MHR , of maximal floods can be approximately
given as:
n(l, t)
M HR (l, t) = (22)
N
where,

n(l, t) is the number of undesirable events that occurred at time t of system function and caused losses
greater or equal to l,
N is the number of all events occurring at time t.

Accordingly, is M HR = 0.37.
The above-said measure can provide insight into potential risk, expressing the probability of
occurrence of losses L(t) not less than l in the period t = 57 years of system functioning. However,
the hydrological risk measure should be calculated using Equation (12); its reliable assessment is much
more complex. The threshold value l of losses is not explicitly adopted for this example, but can be
specified depending on type of losses (human individual or collective or economic).
In order to check the impact of the adoption of threshold Qb on the system’s R(t) and F(t) and
risk, M HR , caused by maximal floods, the same calculation for Qb = Qaf = Qmax50% = 285 m3 s−1 was
performed, for which the number of biggest undesirable events that may cause losses was equal to
n(l,t) = 27, and R(t) = 0.53 and F(t) = 0.47 and M HR = 0.47. Obviously, with a reduction in the threshold
Qb , the risk of losses as a result of extreme flood occurrence increases, and the Sola River catchment’s
reliability of operation decreases. The adoption of a given threshold level, under which phenomena
will be judged as undesirable events, has a significant impact on the assessment of the hydrological
system’s failure, and consequently on its safety.
The town of Zywiec’s flood protection infrastructure consists of a levee, which protects the city
from flooding. The levee is a class II construction intended for flood protection and was designed for a
flood Qd = Qmax T =100 = Q1% according to Polish design standards [44].
max
The town of Zywiec had 31815 residents on 31 December, 2015 [45]. For the purposes of this
example, it was estimated that 10% of the population lived in areas at risk of flooding in the event
of destruction or overflow of the levee. Therefore, the number of endangered people, nhr, was
3182. It was also estimated that the population living in areas at risk, might suffer losses in category
l5 —fatalities as a result of undesirable event A. Should the levee fail or overflow, the nl5 = 43 would be
the number of potential deaths. The number nA of all occurrences of event A is equal to the number of
flood appearances, where peak flow is greater than the design flood Qd = Q1% 3 −1
max = 1243 m s , for
Water 2018, 10, 723 15 of 24

which the levee was designed and built. Thus far, over the period of 1956–2012, only one flood with
Q56 −12 = 1250 m3 s−1 was greater than the design flood, Q , then n = 1. Accordingly, the probability
p d A
that casualties, L, is greater than or equal to l in category l5 is:

n l5 43
p l5 ( L ≥ l 5 \ A ) = = = 0.0135 (23)
n A × nhr 1 × 3182

In addition, accordingly, the measure of the hydrological risk of the occurrence of fatalities as a
result of event A is given as:

M HR (l5 , t) = P[ L(t) ≥ l5 ] = Pl 5 (l5 \ A) = 0.0135 (24)

These indicators and measures give the overall picture of possible threats connected with the
occurrence of big floods and the local flood protection existing in the form of a levee in Zywiec.
Using the following formula for the function of intensity of damage (failure), λ(t), is given as:

n(t, t + ∆t)
λ(t) = (25)
N (t)∆t

where,

n(t, t + ∆t) is the number of events causing system failure within the time interval from t to t + ∆t,
∆t is the width of the time interval,
N(t) is the number of events impacting the system at time t minus the number of events causing
system failure within the time interval from t to t + ∆t, i.e., the number of events impacting
the system at the beginning of each period ∆t [N(t = 0) = N],
N is the total number of events affecting the system throughout the period of its operation.

The value of λ(t) for the hydrological system under study was calculated for intervals of
∆t = 10 years (Table 2).

Table 2. Values of failure intensity, λ(t), and reliability function R(t) based on λ and λ(t) for consecutive
decades of the observation period 1956–2012 for the Sola River catchment at Zywiec station.

Span of Years
Parameter 1956–1965 1966–1975 1976–1985 1986–1995 1996–2005 2006–2012
λ(t) based on Equation (25)
i 0 1 2 3 4 5
t + ∆t 0 + 10 10 + 10 20 + 10 30 + 10 40 + 10 50 + 7
n(t, t + ∆t) 4 4 4 2 5 2
N(t) * 57 53 49 45 43 38
λ(t) 7.0 × 10−3 7.5 × 10−3 8.2 × 10−3 4.4 × 10−3 11.6 × 10−3 7.5 × 10−3
R(t) based on λ
λ 7.7 × 10−3 7.7 × 10−3 7.7 × 10−3 7.7 × 10−3 7.7 × 10−3 7.7 × 10−3
R(t) ** 0.93 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.64
R(t) based on λ(t)
R(t) 0.932 0.928 0.921 0.957 0.890 0.949
* N (t = i = 0) = N = 57; N (t = i ) = N (t = i − 1) − n(t = i − 1, t = i − 1 + t), i = 1, 2, 3, · · · . ** R(t = 0) = 1.

For the hydrological system studied, the failure intensity can be approximated as a λ(t) value that
is constant in time and equal to the mean intensity λ(t) = λ = 7.7 × 10−3 y−1 .
 

If λ and λt are small, they can be used to approximate the reliability function: R(t) ≈ 1 − λt ≈ 0.56,
and the failure function: F (t) ≈ λt ≈ 0.44. Approximate values of reliability and failure functions are
Water 2018, 10, 723 16 of 24

close to calculated values of these functions for floods defined by threshold of Qb = Q a f = Q50%
max =
285 m3 s−1 .
The reliability function R(t) for consecutive decades of the observation period of 1956–2012 were
calculated as (Table 3): R t
R(t) = e− 0 λ(τ )dτ
= e−λt (26)

The analysis of Equation (26) and the results of calculations reported in Table 2 show that R(t)
depends on the duration that the hydrological system functions and the failure intensity λ(t). At a
constant value of λ(t), the system’s reliability depends on the adopted time of its functioning, and
it becomes increasingly unreliable as the time the system continues to function increases. However,
when λ(t) decreases, a system’s R(t) grows, and the failure intensity of the hydrological system can be
reduced by taking actions that reduce the occurrence and impact of extreme hydrological events. These
are activities related to land-use within the catchment area, increasing the catchment’s capacity for
retention both in the catchment area and in the riverbed (river valley retention), as well as construction
of flood protection infrastructure, e.g., water reservoirs, polders, etc. If the river catchment does not
naturally restore its potentiality of retention and man does not take any action to improve protection
against flooding and reducing flood risk through specific activities, mainly in the field of technical flood
protection, hydrological systems will lose their functional reliability within a certain time (decreasing
value of reliability function over time at constant failure intensity (Table 2)). However, this does not
happen because, despite the occurrence of initial events (e.g., heavy rainfall or sudden increases of
air temperature in spring in the presence of thick snow cover), not all floods—although they are
undesirable events—cause failure of the hydrological system by flooding. Values of the reliability
function for the Sola River catchment at the Zywiec station for respective decades are relatively large
(Table 2), averaging 0.930.
The expected value of time the system functions without failure, ET, is given as:

Z∞
ET = R(t)dt when λ(t) 6= const (27)
0

ET = λ−1 when λ = const (28)

∼ −1
Thus, for λ = 7.7 × 10−3 [y−1 ], ET = λ = 130 years, a value not credible in view of the
occurrence of failure during the 57 years of Sola River system monitoring. A better measure of the
time of hydrological system function would be the cumulative damage intensity, Λ(t), given as:

Zt
Λ( t ) = λ(t)dt = − ln[ R(t)], t ≥ 0 (29)
0

which for λ = 7.7 × 10−3 y−1 is Λ(t) = 0.439 year−1 . Accordingly, the expected time of the system
operating without failure for the Sola River watershed at Zywiec, is ET = Λ1(t) = 2 years 4 months.

4.3. Fault Tree and Event Tree Methods for Quantitative Estimation Threat and Risk
To illustrate the employment of Fault Tree and Event Tree Methods in the evaluation of safety
and reliability of hydrological system functioning, it was assumed for purposes of this example, that
the structure of reliability of the Sola River watershed above Zywiec consisted of retention by the
river valley, as well as a levee and polder (Figure 2). This structure can be described using FTM
(Figure 3), in which the following basic undesirable events were identified: A11 —river bed heavily
developed, A12 —bad river regulation, A13 —too small a spacing of levee. The latter caused undesirable
event A1 —lack of river valley retention, as well as basic events A21 —catastrophic flood, A22 —bad
Water 2018, 10, 723 17 of 24

technical condition of levee and A23 —polder misuse. All these together were the cause of occurrence
of undesirable event A2 —insufficient security of protected land when exposed to flooding.
Events A1 and A2 (Figure 3), which together led to the occurrence of top event A (i.e., flooding in
the town of Zywiec) call for the calculation of the probability of occurrence in the case of a serially
structured system:
i =n
P( A) = ∑ P( Aiss ) (30)
i =1

where:

P Aiss is the probability of event Ai at the entrance to a logical sum that describes the serial structure

of system in terms of reliability.

While in the case of a parallel structure:

n  
∏
ps
P( A) = P A i (31)
i =1

where:
 
ps
P Ai is the probability of event Ai at the entrance to a logical product that describes the parallel
structure of the system in terms of reliability.

The probability of occurrence of the top event for the system structures presented in Figures 2
and 3 is then:

p( A) = p( A1 ) + p( A2 ) = p( A11 ) + p( A12 ) + p( A13 ) + p( A21 ) p( A22 ) + p( A23 )

(32)
= p( A11 ) + p( A12 ) + p( A13 ) + p( A21 ) p( A22 \ A21 ) + p( A23 )

where
p( A22 ) = p( A22 \ A21 ) (33)

Without prior knowledge of the probabilities of their occurrence, the probabilities of individual
basic undesirable events A11 , A12 and A13 as well as A21 , A22 and A23 , were ranked by a group of
five experts using the Ranking Method. Based on measured data and using statistical methods,
the head of the team of five experts estimated the probability of events A12 and A21 as p(A12 ) = 0.03
and p(A21 ) = 0.001. These events were denoted B1 and B2 and used to calibrate the equation:

log[ p( Bi )] = ( pos × a0 ) + a1 , where i = 1 or 2 (34)

where,

a0 and a1 are calibration coefficients,

p Ai,j is the probability of undesirable basic event Aij , where p( A12 ) ≡ p( B1 ) and p( A21 ) ≡ p( B2 )
(Table 3),
pos is the mean position of the event in the ranking (Table 3).

To calculate a0 and a1 in this case, we know from Table 3 that p( A12 ) ≡ p( B1 ) = 0.03, p( A21 ) ≡
p( B2 ) = 0.001, pos B1 ≡ A12 = 1.6, and pos B2 ≡ A21 = 5.0. Accordingly, we can write:

log[ p( B1 )] = 1.6a0 + a1 (35)

log[ p( B2 )] = 5.0a0 + a1 (36)

Water 2018, 10, 723 18 of 24

Table 3. Conjunctive table of undesirable basic event Aij and experts’ ranks.

Position (Rank) of Undesirable Event

Expert No.
A11 A13 A22 A23 B1 = A12 B2 = A21
1 4 3 5 2 1 6
2 3 4 4 3 2 4
3 1 5 6 5 2 6
4 3 3 5 4 2 4
5 2 5 4 3 1 5
Sum of ranks 13 20 24 17 8 25
Mean ranking(Σ ranks
 ÷ 5), pos 2.6 4.0 4.8 3.4 1.6 5.0
p Ai,j 0.011 0.0027 0.0012 0.005 0.03 0.001

Then, subtracting Equation (35) from Equation (36), we obtain:

log[ p( B2 )] − log[ p( B1 )] = 3.4a0 (37)

Rearranging and substituting we obtain:

log[ p( B2 )] − log[ p( B1 )] log 0.001 − log 0.03 − 3 − − 1.523 − 1.477

a0 = = = = = − 0.434 (38)
3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Substituting the value of a0 in Equation (36), we obtain:

a1 = log[ p( B2 )] − 5.0a0 = − 3 − (5.0 × − 0.434) = −

3− −
2.172 = −
0.828 (39)

The probability of the top event, p(A) = 0.049 was obtained by inserting into Equation (32)
the estimated values of the probability of events A11 , A13 , A22 and A23 , respectively p(A11 ) = 0,011,
p(A13 ) = 0.0027, p(A22 ) = 0.0012 and p(A23 ) = 0.005 as well as the known values of probabilities
p(A12 ) = 0.03 and p(A21 ) = 0.001.
The value of the reliability function R(t), for the hydrological system with the structure presented
in Figure 2 is calculated as:
R j (t) = 1 − Fj (t) = 1 − P( Ai ) (40)

The reliability function of hydrological system element j, Rj (t), can be estimated from the estimated
probabilities p(Ai ), as can the failure function, Fj (t):

R(t) = 1 − P( A) = 1 − 0.049 = 0.951 (41)

F (t) = 1 − R(t) = 1 − 0.951 = 0.049 (42)

This value of R(t) is close in value to that of R(t) obtained for subsequent decades of the
observation period of maximum floods at Zywiec (Table 2).
A qualitative and quantitative identification of threat and related risk of flooding as result of levee
breakage at Zywiec was made using ETM (Figure 4). The risk level of the hydrological system, RL,
was then calculated (Equations (15) and (20)):

RL = RL(2) p1 (1 − p2 ) p3 = FRI × p( A21 ) × (1 − SGI ) × p( A22 ) (43)

RL = 0.81 × 0.001 × (1 − 0.68) × 0.0012 = 3.1 × 10−7 (44)

Water 2018, 10, 723 19 of 24

where SGI and FRI are defined, respectively, as Safety Guarantee Indicator and Flood Risk Indicator.
Considering the flood protection infrastructure and flooding risk in Zywiec, they are calculated as [43]:

Qd Q1%
max 1243
SGI = MCF
= MCF
= = 0.68 (45)
Qp Qp 1833

Q MCF
p − Qa f Q MCF
p − Q AMF 1833 − 354.5
FRI = = = = 0.81 (46)
Q MCF
p Q MCF
p 1833
Accordingly, the received risk level RL appears to be small. A higher level of risk to the system
is not equivalent to a rise of losses in it upon failure. Generally, it can be assumed that the higher
the level of risk, the greater the probability of a shift from a state of risk into a state of system losses.
Nevertheless, losses may be zero even at a high risk level and greater than zero even if the risk level is
small. Everything depends on the reliability properties of the elements from which the hydrological
system is built and the nature of the undesirable event.
The measure of loss risk in a hydrological system as per Equation (12) is:

M HR (l, t) = F (t) × T (l ) = [1 − R(t)] × T (l ) = 0.049 × 3.1 × 10−7 = 1.52 × 10−8 (47)

It should be noted that the system under study was highly reliable (R(t) = 0.951); its failure
function was estimated at only 4.9%, i.e., the low level of the risk of losses in this occurrence yields a
low probability of losses in this system.

4.4. Qualitative Method of Risk Assessment

On the basis of the magnitude of the probability of occurrence of an undesirable event and the
category of losses and risk matrix (Tables 4–7), the level of risk with respect to the safety needs of the
concerned hydrological system—for which the probability of occurrence of an undesirable top event A,
i.e., flooding, is p(A) = 0.049—is unlikely to lead to significant losses. It can be assumed as a tolerable
level of controlled risk, i.e., tolerable only when the costs of its reduction are adequate to an established
given level of safety, i.e., level of heavy individual losses or light collective losses and/or economic
losses within the range of 104 –105 Euros. One should keep in mind that when determining weights of
scale of the probability category (Table 4) in the process of a quantitative assessment of probability
(frequency) of undesirable event occurrence, the average return period T must be considered and
associated with the probability of exceedance p, i.e., the probability of achieving or exceeding the value
of p in each year the hydrological system functions.
The values of scales in Tables 4, 5 and 7 are contractual and may be accepted depending on
current legal, social and economic conditions, i.e., depending on the adopted policy on safety including
protection of the natural environment and cultural goods (property) and approval by potentially
affected communities.

Table 4. Scale of probability (frequency of event occurrence).

Qualitative Evaluation of Quantitative Evaluation of Probability

Weight
Probability (Frequency of Event Occurrence)
Frequent F T = more often than once a year 5
Very Likely VL T = once a period from 1 year to 10 years, p ∈ (1, 0.1] 4
Probable P T = once a period from 10 to 20 years, p ∈ (0.1, 0.05] 3
Unlikely U T = once a period from 20 to 100 years, p ∈ (0.05, 0.01] 2
Nearly Impossible NI T = once a period from 100 to 1000 years, p < 0.01 1
T—mean return period, p—probability of exceedance, T = 1/p.
Water 2018, 10, 723 20 of 24

Table 5. Scale of losses and damages.

Category of Losses and

Consequences Weight
Damages
Collective losses including fatalities, very big economic losses
Disastrous D 5
above 106 Euro
Individual losses including fatalities or severe collective losses
High H 4
excluding fatalities, big economic losses in range 105 –106 Euro
Heavy individual losses or light collective, economic losses in
Significant S 3
range 104 –105 Euro
Light individual losses and no collective losses, minor
Small SM 2
economic losses in range 103 –104 Euro
Negligible N Lack of casualties, economic losses below 1000 Euro 1

Table 6. Risk matrix.

Category of Losses
Category of
D=5 H=4 S=3 SM = 2 N=1
Probability
Risk Levels
F=5 F·D = 25, UR F·H = 20, UR F·S = 15, UTR F·SM = 10, CTR F·N = 5, CTR
VL = 4 VL·D = 20, UR VL·H = 16, UTR VL·S = 12, CTR VL·SM = 8, CTR VL·N = 4, AR
P=3 P·D = 15, UTR P·H = 12, UTR P·S = 9, CTR P·SM = 6, CRT P·N = 3, AR
U=2 U·D = 10, CTR U·H = 8, CTR U·S = 6, CTR U·SM = 4, AR U·N = 2, AR
NI = 1 NI·D = 5, CTR NI·H = 4, AR NI·S = 3, AR NI·SM = 2, AR NI·N = 1, AR

Table 7. Risk levels resulting from ALARP principle.

Risk Levels Scale of Risk Levels Interpretation

UR 20–25 Inacceptable Risk
Uncontrolled Tolerable Risk, tolerated only if risk reduction is difficult
UTR 15–19 to achieve or costs are disproportionately high in relation to benefits,
i.e., to potentially obtain an improvement of safety.
Controlled Tolerable Risk, tolerated only when costs of its reduction are
CTR 5–14
adequate for the established level of safety.
AR 1–4 Acceptable Risk

Depending on the difference between the level of risk arising from potential threat and the level
of unacceptable risk adopted in accordance with ALARP principles, methods for risk assessment
adequate to the size of threats should be applied. If the difference is smaller, the chosen method of
risk assessment should be more accurate. In cases of major threats and small differences, the principle
should be to apply quantitative methods such as ETM (Figure 4). In the case of a significant difference
between the unacceptable level of risk and level of risk arising from a potential small threat, qualitative
methods can be used, e.g., Risk Matrix (Table 6).

5. Summary and General Conclusions

An attempt to provide a mathematical description of the reliable functioning of a river catchment
was undertaken using reliability engineering tools drawn from practical aspects of reliability and
safety theory. The river catchment was treated as a hydrological system, in which various kinds of
threats could arise from interactions between objects (elements) that together constitute the system
and affect human safety and the environment in which man functions. Relationships between these
elements were described from the point of view of extreme hydrological events occurring in a river
catchment, i.e., flooding as result of extreme meteorological events.
Extreme hydrological phenomena leading to flooding were treated as undesirable events from the
point of view of human safety (e.g., threat to life, health and property), and as a manifestation of the
Water 2018, 10, 723 21 of 24

hydrological system’s lack of fitness for reliable operation. Mechanisms of extreme hydrological threats
and the technical and non-technical measures to meet them should be identified first. The hydrological
system’s reliability structure should then be specified and described by a mathematical model. A Fault
Tree Method was proposed which would allow for a probabilistic description of undesirable events
occurring in a hydrologic system. Using an Event Tree Method to develop a hydrological system
reliability model, one can evaluate probability of threats and related risk resulting from extreme
hydrological events. Measures of reliability and threats were used to make a quantitative assessment
of risk probability. Having identified the measure of risk of hydrological extreme events, one can
manage it, i.e., knowingly (consciously, deliberately) diagnose and control this risk to ensure the safety
of people and the hydrological system itself [38].
Threats occurring within the hydrological system can be of natural origin or of anthropogenic
origin. The occurrence of natural hazards is independent of man and, in principle, man can only
monitor and attempt to mitigate their effects. While the presence of anthropogenic hazards is associated
with human activities in the river valley and in the catchment area, humans also build all sorts of
technical objects. Therefore, these threats can largely be controlled and their risk of occurrence may be
managed. In the case of natural hazards, including extreme hydrological and meteorological events,
managing risk is much more difficult.
Safety and reliability of river catchment operation and its application to flood protection
depends on comprehensive and sustainable human activities in the riverbed and catchment area;
i.e., investments in water engineering infrastructure undertaken by humans, civil objects infrastructure
(spatial planning) and land-use of catchment area (development of natural catchment retention and
river valley retention). Poorly planned investments, particularly in the field of technical defense
against floods, will deteriorate effectiveness of flood protection instead of improve it, and will thereby
generate social costs in addition to investment costs, which may significantly exceed potential benefits
and cause the level of protection against flooding to fall below public expectations.
It should be stressed that the approach to flood risk assessment proposed in the present
paper should be considered as complementary to the procedures outlined in the Flood Directive.
The intention of the authors is not to replace methods currently in use, but rather to present a different
perspective on the evaluation of hazard, risk and reliability of the hydrological system itself as a whole
and its elements separately, as affected by extreme events such as floods. As all calculations are made
in the probability domain, they do not take into account the time, velocity and depth of flooding,
as is done in the classical approach, which is very important when losses are assessed. However,
the proposed approach answers the following crucial questions: What is (i) the probability of flooding,
taking into account the structure of the particular hydrological system (reliability block diagram),
(ii) the possible risk of secondary events and of the peak event engendered by the initial event, and
(iii) what is the probability of occurrence of losses equal to or greater than a certain threshold value
that decision-makers and affected community agree on. According to the Flood Directive’s so-called
classical (traditional) approach: Flood risk means the combination of the probability of a flood event and of the
potential adverse consequences, and the f lood hazard maps, shall cover the geographical areas which could be
flooded according to the following scenarios:

(i) Floods of low probability, or extreme event scenarios; representing, as per [46], areas where the
probability of flooding is low and is ≤0.2% (return period T = 500 years), or there is a non-zero
probability of occurrence of extreme events in the area;
(ii) floods with a medium probability (likely return period ≥ 100 years); areas where the probability of
floods is average and is 1% (T = 100 years);
(iii) floods with a high probability, where appropriate; areas where the probability of flooding is high and
is 10% (T = 10 years).

The approach proposed in the present paper considers not only the probability of an initial event
but also the probabilities of secondary events that lead to failure of hydrological system elements
Water 2018, 10, 723 22 of 24

and that of the whole system. In the first stage of analysis (termed initialization) the initial event is
identified, i.e., the event that can potentially trigger scenarios of secondary events leading to system
failure. At this stage, the analysis also considers the conditions that must be met for the initial event
to occur. In a further stage, termed ‘response’, all possible (probable) scenarios (sequences) of events
are analyzed, regardless of whether they lead to failure of the system or not. In a third stage, termed
‘implications’, the probability of losses caused by the lack of efficiency of the system and its elements
is assessed. Finally, the last stage consists of a risk assessment that allows for recognition of risk
in quantitative terms (in a probabilistic sense). Therefore, the authors’ opinions presented in the
present paper fit into a holistic approach to flood-reliable operation of a hydrologic system and its
elements [36].

Author Contributions: All three authors contribute to the following statements in same percentage.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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