Collopy - 1978 - Theology and The Darkness of Death

THEOLOGY AND THE DARKNESS OF DEATH
BARTHOLOMEW J. COLLOPY, S.J.

Fordham University
difficulty with the contemporary theology of death is that it

A MAJOR
is seldom confounded, seldom at a loss for explanation, seldom
disarmed and left groping. From the very start, most theological analysis
of death displays as assumption that which should more aptly function
as final hope: the belief that death is undone. In this a priori certainty
theology appears to be thoroughly victorious, but to a straightforward
empirical perspective the victory can seem to be simply a turning away
from death's darkness, a denial rather than an exploration of life's end.
To turn away from death is humanly quite comprehensible, but the
move becomes self-defeating for theology when it is carried out under
the rubric of investigating death. When confrontation is reduced to
circumvention, then theology strategically denies whatever is toxic or
terrible in death. In actual practice this denial is usually accomplished
by means of a descriptive model that is empirically aseptic, that shapes
death to consoling purposes, that provides it from the start with a
systematically positive core of meaning.
The first point at issue in this matter is, therefore, theology's use of
pretheological models, models which are not explicitly shaped by theistic
categories or doctrinal logic, but which supply a primary focus for
theological discussion nonetheless. Invariably such models are positive,
"illumined" ones, offering an explication which denies death's darkness
or, by reductionist logic, tempers it. Thus armed, theology begins its
discussion of death with models which are highly insulating, which
protect it from ever being threatened or appalled. In effect, such concep-
tualizations supply theology with an answer to death, a response rather
than a primal description, an image of death already fashioned in positive
terms. Unfortunately, the "help" which positive, illumined models press
upon theology is frequently accepted at the price of theology's investi-
gatory openness and credibility. Thus a critical question naturally arises:
Is it possible to construct a model which would draw theology into the
bleakest and most empty reaches of death? More pointedly, by what
model can death be made woefully dark for theology?
To suggest the terms of such a model, the following pages will first
investigate how the dominant positive models deny death's darkness,
how they supply theology with a presumptive view of death's inner sense
and malleability. It will be suggested that the most grievously positive
model presents death as a "merely" physical or corporeal threat, a power
strong only against the mortal crust of body and matter, not against the
22
THEOLOGY AND DEATH 23
human center of soul or spirit. Such an anthropological dualism of spirit
and matter (a body-soul model) puts death in its place even before any
explicitly theological confrontation can begin.
Other forms of reductionism employ psychological rather than philo-
sophical perspectives. In such models death's darkness is defined as the
inner network of fears, angers, and illusions which prevent an individual
from affirming his own death as a natural quietus, a culmination in
harmony with the primordial rhythm of all life and growth. But if, in
keeping with these categories, death is viewed as part of the natural life
cycle, if its acceptance expresses emotional maturity and psychic integ-
rity, then again neither theology nor religious faith need be threatened.
Death in itself is reduced to manageable categories; its starkness is
broken in the crucible of a natural-acceptance model.
Even models which profess to recognize death's darker elements can
distill these elements into affirmative essence. Thus, in "final option"
and other freedom-based models the power of death is directly admitted,
but the power is then dialectically transferred to the dying person who
"achieves" his death, makes it an act ratifying his whole life's fundamental
purpose and direction. Consequently, what appears to be a dark collapse
becomes, by the dialectical victory of freedom and choice, an act of
affirmation and integrity. Once again, death is made pliable for theology.
The following pages will explore all the above positive models more
fully, attempting to clarify their focal bias, their shaping of theology's
almost irrepressible presumption of death's goodness. This presumption
will, in turn, be challenged by a description of death as distinctly not
good, as radically untheological—a blank, eyeless stare back at all positive
conceptual overtures. Such a dark description will indicate how a pre-
theological model might press theology to give death its due, however
dreadful that might be. The concluding portion of the discussion will
attempt to sketch some general theological responses to a dark model of
death.
THE BODY-SOUL MODEL
Theological models which perceive the human person dualistically, in
terms of an imperishable spiritual element and a quite perishable material
one, unswervingly confess death's intelligibility, its radical sense and
reason. When death is described as the separation of the spiritual element
from the corporeal, the breaking of soul from body, then its deepest
threat is controlled. Only the body is surrendered to the disintegrating
power of the end, and even this surrender may be strategically eased by
depicting the body as a thing of defect and decay, an encumbrance and
prison house to the soul, a dragging hook of temporality and transience
and temptation. Understandably enough, then, the corporeal element
24 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
can be handed over as hostage and victim to death. As long as the soul
perdures, death is still explicable.
Obviously, the theological crux of this dualistic model is the affirmation
that the spiritual core of the person is deathless, that the soul escapes
perishing and emptiness, that it never has to face the full and utter
blankness of being no more. Death, therefore, is no radical, penetrating
threat, no defeat to shard us to pieces, but merely a bodily corruption
which the soul sheds. In the immortality of the soul, then, the body-soul
model pulls back from the whole dark side of death, and theology, in
choosing this model, can claim for itself some massive methodological
prerogatives. The logic of the soul's immortality can be made theology's
own logic. Just as the soul does not descend into the dark vacancy of
death, so too theology need not. It can turn away from mortal darkness,
claim immunity from the unnerving doubt which death breeds elsewhere
in human thought.
Josef Pieper, in his Death and Immortality, offers a sharp example of
how a dualistic description works to deny the dark of death.1 As a case
in point, Pieper's work displays, actually, a kind of methodological
poignancy, for it initially sets itself against all attempts to dispel the
darkness of death. Pieper begins by roundly attacking the "spiritualistic
minimalizing" which separates immortal soul from perishing body.2 He
rejects the programmatic use of immortality as an automatic "answer"
to death, since such reflex answers suggest that "at bottom . . . man
does not 'really* die at all," that simply the body dies.3 Against this
dualistic simplification Pieper argues that death claims the whole man,
body and soul, that it is, therefore, devastatingly thorough, a destruction
and disaster for the whole human person.4
Although Pieper clearly states his intention of giving death its due, he
chooses nonetheless to work with the classical body-soul model. As a
result, his discussion is constricted within a dualism which will not allow
him to speak of the death of the whole person. Ineluctably, the model
works against Pieper's aims, leading him first to replace the terms
"person" or "whole man" with "soul," leading him finally to argue that
the soul "although profoundly affected by death . . . nevertheless persists
indestructibly and maintains itself, remains in being."5 This qualifying
"nevertheless" is, actually, the crucial gear of the body-soul model.
Operating continually, even if implicitly, it determines the ultimate course
of Pieper's discussion, bringing it inevitably to deny that death is a
massive, dark threat to the whole person.
1
Joseph Pieper, Death and Immortality (New York, 1969).
2 4
Ibid. 35 ff. Ibid. 32, 36-46.
3 5
Ibid. 12,117. Ibid. 37.
As Pieper struggles to give death its due within the constricting terms
of the body-soul model, he comes to describe what is perhaps the darkest
limit of the model. The soul is affected by death, he suggests, insofar as
death violently interrupts and destroys "the forming of the body . . .
contrary to the innermost intention of the soul and of man himself."6
But even here, as he attempts to admit darkness into the deathless
chamber of the classical model, Pieper reveals how the soul is radically
untouched, how from its immortal vantage point it simply watches the
body's collapse. Even if it finds its own intentions foiled in the body's
death, in no case is the soul itself directly threatened or terribly darkened.
Moreover, Pieper's very language begins to show the pressures of the
dualistic model. "Man himself" ceases to be a holistic declaration at all;
it becomes instead a modifying addendum (if not a simple synonym) for
"the soul." Thus talk of the whole person inescapably slips into talk of
the soul. The model's inbuilt bias guides the whole discussion away from
the dark, away from what Pieper calls the "concatenations of
matter"—the fiercest of which, of course, is death itself.
The course charted by Pieper is really the only course permitted by
the body-soul model, a model which always insinuates into the discussion
a positive and affirmative bias, a denial of darkness, a persistent apolo-
getic for immortality. As a result, the model allows no real exploration
of death as an incalculably blank prospect, an appalling and fearful
tearing of the whole person.
Because it cannot look, except with conceptual disdain, upon the
devastating work of death, the classical model is empirically and heurist-
ically limited. For an exploration of the dark reaches of death, its dualistic
focus is purblind, unable to discern the experiential threat, unable to
linger on the speculative possibilities of death's power. To see beyond
the limitations of this model, then, to venture into the dark experience
of death, it would be necessary to look in the direction suggested by
Karl Rahner when he urges theology really to give death its due. Theol-
ogy, says Rahner, should not view death as that which "affects only the
so-called body of man, while the so-called soul . . . [is] able to view the
fate of its former partner... unaffected and undismayed as from above."7
Death affects the whole man, says Rahner, the soul included.8
In Rahner's estimate, the classical definition of death, though neither
false nor unjustified on its own terms, is seriously limited by reason of
those terms, by reason of their failure to admit the characteristic feature
6
Ibid. 72.
7
Karl Rahner, "Ideas for a Theology of Death," Theological Investigations 13 (London,
1975) 179.
8
Ibid. See also Rahner's On the Theology of Death (New York, 1965) 30.
of death: "that it is an event for man as a whole and as a spiritual

person."9 In freeing the immortal so easily from the grip of death, the
body-soul model, says Rahner, offers an intellectually and affectively thin
definition of death.10 While Rahner's own attempt to develop a fuller
definition of death will be considered below,11 it might be clarifying to
note here that he suggests by thesis what Pieper does by default: the
classical body-soul model prevents a full-fledged exploration of death's
darkness. This failure indicates that, whatever its speculative attractive-
ness, the model is functionally limited. It simply does not allow theology
to walk in the shadow and blankness of death; it is a censoring model,
excising darkness from its evaluative, soul-biased anthropology of death.
At its worst, then, the body-soul model fails to take death seriously,
refuses to face death's deep threat. At the very least, the model is a
misleading adumbration, offering resolution under the pose of description,
disguising the answer as a question, using body-soul language to mute
death's dark interrogative.
To correct and counterbalance the biases of the classical model, the-
ology must develop models which eye sceptically any diminution of
death's pain or power, any recourse to a priori immortality or imperish-
ably secure spiritual powers. At issue here is not a debate about the
existence of the soul but a question about theology's ability to face death
directly, without immediate recourse to ameliorating models. In other
words, putting the issue by way of question, can theology confront death
without dependency on categories prefitted to Christian belief? Without
the softening assurances of the body-soul model, can theology seek out
death at its worst, look at it not as some religiously ingestible datum,
but as a woefully dark threat, a fearsome drowning of all personal life, a
seizure and breaking of the whole human being? Can death be seen as a
dread thing, a blind alley to conceptual management, a blankness offering
to theology no obvious resolutions, no grand dualistic solution to itself?
Such questions lead into a dark model of death, a model which will be
more properly discussed after the following considerations of "accept-
ance" and "final decision" explications of death.
MODELS WHICH VIEW DEATH AS "NATURALLY" ACCEPTABLE
The metaphysical workings of the body-soul model reduce death to
manageable terms by suggesting that its darkness is merely
apparent—apparent because only the spiritually "dispensable" body is
cast into the shadow of mortality. A similar managing of death can be
found in the reductionism of many "natural" or "life cycle" models of
death. Just as in the body-soul model, death's devastation is here reduced
9
On the Theology of Death 17. " Cf. 35-39.
10
Ibid. 84.
to a surface phenomenon, an ambiguous outer dimension which can be
"seen through" and finally dissolved. Schematically, life-cycle models
suggest that, underneath the cloak of human fright, death is an utterly
natural event, an inescapable fact and part of life. Accordingly, by direct
and honest confrontation, by an open and courageous grasping of life's
own terms, death can be made tolerable, if not actually acceptable.
Strong examples of a psychological founding of such a death model can
be found in the work of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross and Robert Neale; Roger
Troisfontaines, on the other hand, offers a clear example of a full-fledged
theological development of the model.
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's On Death and Dying is rightfully recognized
as a seminal contribution to the contemporary focus on the "death
question" in the United States.12 Her work is both incisive and compas-
sionate, written from deep personal and professional concern for the
ways people struggle to keep death at bay, the ways they deny or kick
against its power. From her personal perspective as a psychiatrist who
has worked intensely with terminal patients, from her wider reflections
on cultural patterns and values underlying death attitudes, Kübler-Ross
probes the death-blocking mechanisms of modern society: institutional-
ized, depersonalized dying, a paralyzing inability to think and speak
about death, to be with the dying, to express grief, to cast off the pretense
which masks the difficulty and darkness of dying.
Within a cultural perspective which turns away from death, Kübler-
Ross attempts to gaze boldly at it. She plots out a psychological trajectory
of dying, a curve of five basic attitudes which she finds traced out, again
and again, in the experience of terminal patients. Linked in progressive
order, these five attitudes describe the experience of dying, an experience
which, in its fullest course, moves from rigidity to resolution: from initial
denial of death's imminence, through consequent stages of anger, bar-
gaining, depression, to final acceptance. The first four stages (denial,
anger, bargaining, depression) are all dark and inhibiting; they are ele-
mental refusals, struggles against the inevitable conclusion of life. In
Kübler-Ross's scheme these stages are psychologically understandable,
but they are also destructive if not eventually resolved, if not passed
through and left behind on the way to acceptance of death.
Thus, for Kübler-Ross, the path from denial through depression should
be deeply and positively cathartic. Denial and anger, bargaining and
depression are not viewed as discrete, static points but as an attitudinal
spectrum; they trace a development, a "loosening," in which the individ-
ual, stage by stage, lets go of life's continuance and comes to accept its
conclusion. There is no guarantee, however, that this will happen. Each
12
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York, 1970).
stage is wedged tight with unadmitted dread, with unspeakable fears

and flights of pretense, refusals of life's movement toward death. Given
this psychological impaction, each stage is potentially crippling. The
individual can journey to acceptance, then, only by taking on at each
stage a particular and difficult struggle, only by working through the
darkness, resolving it, passing beyond it.
It is worth emphasizing here that Kübler-Ross does not perfunctorily
pass over or dismiss these dark stages. On the contrary, her analysis of
them is careful, compassionate, clearly aware of the suffering and isolation
which make dying so awful. This awareness is expressed in what is
actually a reverence for human dying, a reverence which defends the
individual's right to a death free of anyone else's forging or meddling.
Any attempt then to pressure a dying person out of the dark stages into
the light of acceptance is, in Kübler-Ross's view, simply wrongheaded,
even destructive. Nevertheless, despite this great sensitivity to the dark
stages and their therapeutic needs, Kübler-Ross persistently interprets
these stages as preparatory and provisional. As a result, the schematic
terms of her discussion constantly present acceptance of death as the
norm, as the attitudinal stage in which psychic maturity and self-under-
standing break through to the most balanced and valid perception of
death. Kubler-Ross's five stages, therefore, trace a clearly normative
progression, a movement in which acceptance of death is the final,
therapeutically desirable goal. Whatever the cautions and concerns of
her praxis (with its acute awareness of and response to each stage), her
systematic explanation gives an absolute priority to the stage of accept-
ance.
Obviously, Kübler-Ross's acceptance model does not depict death as
an ultimately dark and destructive reality. Whatever darkness attends
death comes from our distorted individual perceptions and wider social
practices, from attitudes which are askew with psychic revolt and which
breed us full of denial and anger, hostility and despair. Death looms
forbiddingly primarily because we perceive it through our own conflicted
attitudes, through our failure to accept the natural shape and conclusion
of life. The real truth about death can be found, then, only in the state
of acceptance; for only in this state does inner attitude match outer
reality, only here do we truly see death for what it is—not a negating
collapse, not a dread breaking of life's continuities, but "the final stage
of growth."13
Kübler-Ross's focus on death as naturally acceptable leads her to
develop, at least implicitly, a model which psychologically mediates the
darkness of death. The same kind of mediating resolution can be found
13
Kübler-Ross, Death: The Final Stage of Growth (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975).
in Robert E. Neale's The Art of Dying.14 Neale, like Kübler-Ross, offers
an approach to death which is basically psychological or practically
therapeutic in outlook. For our discussion, however, Neale offers an
added element in that he raises explicit theological issues, particularly
in the final chapter of his book. He offers a transition, then, from a
nontheological development of the "acceptable death" model to its even-
tual theological use.
In agreement with Kübler-Ross, Neale focuses on the psychological
conflicts which make death a tangle of denials, an unspeakable event, a
block to imagination and affectivity and human sharing. Like Kübler-
Ross, Neale knows that human fears about death are deeply rooted,
intricate, not easily unwound. In fact, this is precisely his point: to
identify and, if possible, dispel the blockage which keeps us fearfully
silent and full of denials about death. An irony works its way into Neale's
discussion, however, and it is the same one which undercuts Kübler-
Ross's treatment, which threatens, perhaps, any attempt to confront
death by a model bound to a notion of natural acceptability. Although
Neale strives to face death head on, his therapeutic goal is to exorcise
death of its deep and frightful darkness. He wants to identify and
dismantle the mechanisms of fear and denial which work within human
attitudes toward death. But a massive premise lurks behind this thera-
peutic goal, a conviction that death itself is not dark, that it is not an
alien growth in the marrow of human experience. For Neale, the threat
of death is only a darkness cast by psychic failure, a penumbra of human
fear and fright. According to this scheme, we must admit that we are
afraid of death, but we must then work to dispel the fear; for it is a
clogging and distorting force, engendered from our fears of life and not
from death itself:
... our fear of death is basically our fear of life. If our fears were rational they
would not prevent usfromlooking at the inevitability of our own deaths and
learning about ourselves and our lives. Since our fears are for the most part
irrational, we run awayfromdeath, and what we arefleeingas well is our own
life.15
Neale argues that if our distorted life patterns can be identified, they
can be challenged and corrected—and with them, our dark fears of death.
When life is fully accepted, it culminates in a "finely finished death."16
Thus Neale's psychological interpretation, like Kübler-Ross's, mediates
death's dark aspects, transposes them into the flawed products of our
individual psychic histories. Whatever we perceive as grim and dreadful
in death is really the result of our own inner negations and impotencies.
14
Robert E. Neale, The AH of Dying (New York, 1973).
15 l6
Ibid. 42-43. Ibid. 85, 90.
Reduced to psychic symptoms, the darkness of death is simply human

misperception, an indication of personal resentment against the nature
of life, an immaturity determined to "hold on" even against life's very
own terms. Such psychological interpretation clearly demythologizes
death's darkness, but it does so by a high rationality, by a robust
disallowance of loss and lament, a strategy which runs the risk of
minimalizing death, of reducing its dark prospect to the quirks and tics
of human personality. Neale himself alludes to the danger:
What are we to make of all this psychologizing to the effect that fear of death is
related to perception of oneself as inadequate and unloved? Our fears about
living do lead to irrational fears of death. But stress on our irrational fears of
death may serve as a way of minimizing our rational fear of it.17
Neale's caution about minimalizing death is certainly to the point,
but it fails to exert final control on his operative model. The basic thrust
of the model is not checked; death is still seen as apparently dark,
apparently incomprehensible. In the end the darkness, the incomprehen-
sibility turn out to be a reflection of our inner failures and inadequacies.
And once death ceases to be mirrored out of our own fears, once we see
it in inself, we will recognize its pattern as the basic pattern for all
psychological maturity—the pattern of growth through change, through
flux, through movement and process. The change of life's end, suggests
Neale, is one with all the other "deaths" and rebirths of life.18 Because
the elemental rhythm of life includes separation and ending, a fearful
refusal of death simply indicates an inability to accept what is natural:
change, movement, rebirth into the unknown.
Neale's discussion does, of course, suggest some specific theological
uses. In company with Kübler-Ross's treatment, it reveals how accept-
ance models can articulate death so that a theology drawing upon them
need not risk any dark and numbing struggle. By describing death
through a positive, growth-enunciating logic, these models resolve the
problematic and offer systematic explication. Death is the last rhythm
of life, the final possibility, the ultimate potency of being human, the
climactic move into what is unknown and "new." Immortality, in some
form, is only a breath away.
Roger Troisfontaines's work J Do Not Die provides an example of
how an acceptance model can make an easy move into immortality and
explicit theological service.19 Employing a model whose premises parallel
those of both Kübler-Ross and Neale, Troisfontaines describes all human
17
Ibid. 43.
18
Ibid. 95-143.
19
Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., I Do Not Die (New York, 1963).
life in terms of two natural components or curves: the downward curve
of the body's diminishing powers and the upward curve of the human
spirit's growing potential. Although the natural dynamic of life is plotted
by two countercurves, by concomitantly fading and growing powers (the
body's inescapable descent and the spirit's persistence toward apogee),
the two trajectories are not simply equal. For Troisfontaines, it is the
spirit's curve, positive and upward, which plots the really significant line
of life and offers the primal clue to the meaning of death. According to
Troisfontaines, the upward journey of human spirit imposes on each
individual
a forever-binding obligation to tear himself away, willingly or reluctantly, from
an environment where his equilibrium [is] more passive, more external, and to
enter into a more vast, more complex new situation, where he is bound to fail
unless he enters deeper and deeper into his own self and is united ever more
intimately to the being he discovers step by step.20
Seen in these terms, all meaningful human growth is a "tearing away"

from environments "which have become like so many prisons."21
Throughout the course of life, spirit moves primarily by separation, by
a series of dislodging births, womb-leavings. Within this paradigmatic
scheme death itself is conjugated as the final birth, the last womb-
leaving, the climactic outward surge of growth. As such it is no diminish-
ment at all: "Is not this body, whose power is constantly diminishing, an
indispensable but only provisional womb? Does it not have to be relin-
quished if the person, developed through its means, is to be born?"22
Charting life by the "natural" curves of diminishment and growth,
defining growth, moreover, as the primary curve, pre-eminently the curve
of spirit, a curve traced by separation and tearing away, Troisfontaines is
able finally to describe death within totally positive bounds:
As the butterfly leaves the cocoon where it has developed as a chrysalis, as the
fetus breaks the amnion at birth, so also, when we step into the final state of
our destiny, we leave this body which has been the primary condition of our
personal ripening.23
When the umbilical cord breaks at the moment of birth, a new, vast horizon
opens out. It will continue to extend. This earthly body, this placenta of the
spiritual person, is a nourishing as well as restrictive agent. It will be abandoned
insofar as it means limitation; as a result, the soul will find that its relationship
with the world becomes easier and more universal. Death enlarges our "situation"
indefinitely.24
20 23
Ibid. 133. Ibid. 140.
21 u
Ibid. 135. Ibid. 146.
22
Ibid.
In the end, Troisfontaines's model strategically transforms death into

an event more fetal than fearsome, a natural culmination to the interplay
of life's ascending and descending curves. In death the falling curve of
bodily energy fades completely and ceases any longer to chart a course
for human experience; at the same time the rising curve of inner devel-
opment reaches apogee, becomes the only possible tracing of human
meaning. Death, then, is neither choke nor cudgel, but rather something
supremely natural and fitting, a surrender which brings all our human
growth to term. Whatever strikes us as bane or penalty is merely an
appearance, an outer grimness which hides the inner grace of death. On
the whole, Troisfontaines's reclamation of death is accomplished through
an unblinking philosophical optimism. As life's final and fullest "birth,"
death is wholly conceivable and tolerable, heartening, thoroughly a piece
of sense. Seen as another birth, indeed as life's ultimate birth, death
offers no obstinacy, no brutal blockage to religious faith or theological
systematicizing. It does not pull theology toward any darkness, toward
any dread sphinx of a question.
In his reductively positive view of death Troisfontaines is in resonance
with both Neale and Kübler-Ross. All three approaches—the life-curve
approach of Troisfontaines, the acceptance models of Neale and Kübler-
Ross—finally present an image of death conquered. Like the classical
body-soul model, these models programmatically resolve death by de-
picting its "inner meaning," byfindingthat inner meaning to be consistent
with the values and verities of life. Quite definitely, all these models in
their closure to death's destructive, emptying aspects offer theology little
journey into the dark reaches of death. If theology is to explore the
terrible aspects of mortality, then, it can hardly follow such models,
hardly begin with death as an end product of resolution and comprehen-
sion. At the very least, it must counterbalance these positive models
with negative ones, with models which do not bind death's naturalness
to the logic of acceptance and affirmation. Most certainly, acceptance is
a true human possibility, even a rich one, fulfilling, worthy of effort,
therapeutically desirable. But if "acceptable death" becomes the single,
normative possibility, then theological sight is systematically fixed on
the ideal death we should die, not the awful deaths we actually suffer.
If theology is bound to models in which death is only acceptable and
intelligible in itself, then theology is heuristically hobbled, unable to
venture into death experienced as dark danger. Surely, though, theology
can explore this too, can explore a vision of death that has no intelligi-
bility, no inner secret hidden under its blank surface. At least for inves-
tigative purposes, theology can avoid the monochromatic, though con-
soling views of the acceptance models. It can choose to gaze on the
bleak side of death, to brood on all the human experience which simply
cannot come to terms with death, which sees it as a hostile, destructive

power, a threat provoking denial and anger, desperate bargaining and
despair.
There is a countermodel, then, which rises out of the very limits of
the positive models. Pressing an "unresolved" view of death, this coun-
termodel frames some pointed questions: Is death theologically perceiv-
able, a "properly" religious datum, only when it is predictably acceptable?
What would it mean for theology to perceive death darkly, as unmanage-
able, unacceptable, not merely as a climactic caesura in the rhythm of
life? What can theology say to a death which is awful to the core, in
itself, not simply in our imperfect perceptions of it? What if, despite all
our psychic integrity and wholeness, death is still a dread fracturing of
us? What might theology confront in a death which shows itself to be
incomprehensible and systematically unamenable, a sheer stone to all
human schemes, a dread silence before all inquiry?
DEATH AS FINAL DECISION
The psychological models developed by Kübler-Ross and Neale envi-
sion death in terms of psychic integrity, in terms of our ability to confront
and accept the mortal nature of human life. A shift into comparable
philosophical categories elevates "acceptance" from a psychic attitude
to an essential anthropological attribute, from a psychological possibility
to a metaphysical property. Thus a model develops in which acceptance
is not merely a possible stance toward death but an intrinsic element in
the very definition of death. In these terms, death ceases to be an event
which befalls us, which "happens" to us; instead, it becomes the central
inner act by which we finally accept and affirm ourselves. It becomes
the act in which we at last "take" our lives, actively grasp and affirm
them for what they are. The power of death is, therefore, not alien and
intrusive but personal and fulfilling. By entering into death, by making
it our own personal act, we seek out authentic existence, give our Uves
their ultimate shape.
One highly enthusiastic (and often quoted) exponent of this approach
is Ladislaus Boros. His writing develops a "final option" model in which
death is "man's first completely personal act, and is, therefore, by reason
of its being, the place above all others for the awakening of consciousness,
for freedom "25 Death is the place where we ultimately opt for who
we are. Such a model depends on an anthropological scheme which
focuses on the radical incompleteness of human life. This philosophical
sighting finds that all the central areas of human existence—knowledge,
25
Ladislaus Boros, S.J., The Mystery of Death (New York, 1965) ix, 84. Cf. also "Death:
A Theological Reflection," in The Mystery of Suffering and Death, ed. Michael J. Taylor,
S.J. (New York, 1973) 140.
volition, self-awareness, affectivity—are radically limited by life's fini-

tude, by the essentially partial, transitory acts of the human person.26
During life no individual human act is ever fully expressive of the person;
no act ever brings about and states, once and for all, the final and
complete meaning of the individual. Accordingly, it is only death which
offers finality, which breaks the stuttering of finitude and speaks the
completeness of life. "The first integral act of knowing will be possible
for us only at the moment of death."27 Only in this moment will we
have life's final option, only here will we decisively shape ourselves,
achieve the self-integration which the passing and incomplete condition
of life always denied us.
Death of this sort is not concussive but culminating, not disintegrating
but decisive. It is the moment when the deepest levels of the person are
fused and freed from the shifting, mutable patterns of life:
Here the streams of life meet together. [The individual] "is" finally; he no longer
lives like a rushing mountain brook, but like a calm mountain lake, clear and
deep, reflecting the whole world in its profusion. But this moment can occur
only in the moment of death. For only in death can there simply be no more
"further" in the same direction, into the empty openness of time Only in
death, therefore, does man reach the total unity of his being; he gets away from
the universal constriction and unease and enters into the depths of the world,
into the heart of the universe.28
The conceptual constructs of this final-option view define death in

terms of finality, thoroughness, completeness, release from time's frag-
mentary modes, from what is "mere" process and possibility. Although
Boros does not outrightly deny the painful and destructive aspects of
death, the positive valence of his model allows these aspects little sys-
tematic impact. In thefinal-optionhypothesis which he proposes, death
is notionally purified; all its darkness is blanched, all its disharmony
muted. Nothing makes this more dramatically clear than Boros' attempt
to render death from "within":
I plunge more and more deeply into the misty darkness. Where, in fact, am I
being hurled? Out beyond all earthly shores. But the amazing thing is that I do
not find it strange to be hurled out in this way. I am plunging into something I
have always known. It is as if I already once experienced this—and, indeed, not
only once, but often in my life. I am being carried away to where I have always
been in my dreams, in my longings, to that region which I have always divined
behind things, persons and events.
This perception now strikes me with singular clarity. All around me now is light.
The dominion of darkness has now ceased. Everything that I ever wanted in my
26 28
Mystery of Death 31-47. "Death: A Theological Reflection" 141-42.
27
Ibid. 35.
life is now here. Here there awaits me the first smile that I ever perceived on
the face of someone I loved. Here there awaits me that greatness which I sought
in love, fatherhood, motherhood and friendship All this now becomes one,
submerged in a wondrous light, a light that does not dazzle but heals. Everything
is here. All that was beautiful and precious on earth Ifindhere again. Everything
merges into one, marvelously radiant; everything glows, beats like a single heart;
everything surges and blazes up. I am at last at home and hold fast the universe.29
Boros here displays the major difficulty within the final-option ap-
proach: its refusal to contemplate the blank face of death, its seeming
ignorance of death's cruelty. In his development of the final-option
hypothesis, Boros refuses to attend to death's sepsis of fear and grief.
Yet ironically, for all his lush consolations, Boros' model is curiously
disdainful and discomforting. By concentrating all the decisiveness of
life in the philosophically high moment of death, Boros broadly and
consistently disvalues the quotidian sums of human effort and choice.
Death's positive meaning is built upon a systematic derogation of the
rest of life.30 All "predeath" experience fumbles incompletely in time
and space, trudges through disparate, transient attempts at integration,
produces no systematic completeness. Only death, then, can offer final
seriousness; only death can be the locus of full personal integration.
Obviously, the apotheosizing tendencies of the final-option model can
be highly protective to theology, offering death fully transformed, death
turned into a supermystical moment, into an event freed from all the
flawed history and poor stuff of life. In such a model, death's strangling
becomes a release from time's inadequacies and discrepancies. If theology
chooses to work with such a highly selective and transformed version of
death, it chooses by premise and principle to have nothing to say about
the darkness of human dying. Confronted with death's void, theology
will, then, steadfastly and systematically look the other way.
Realizing the affirmatively distortive extremes to which the final-
option hypothesis is prone, Karl Rahner attempts to describe death as
an integrating decision, without at the same time dismissing or concep-
tually dissolving its darkness. Accordingly, Rahner calls death the "rad-
ical spoliation" of man, "destruction, a rupture, an accident which strikes
man from without, unforseeable," "a blow of fate, a thief in the night."31
What death offers for reflection, then, is its own "empty, unsubstantial
uncanny character, a kind of de-personalization, loss of self, destruction."32
Before all this the human creature shrinks back in horror;33 and the
29
Ibid. 152-53.
30
For an incisive critique of Boros* questionable handling of the "seriousness of life,"
see Matthew J. O'Connell, "The Mystery of Death: A Recent Contribution," TS 27 (1966)
439-41.
31 w
On the Theology of Death 40. Ibid. 55.
32
Ibid. 41.
horror is apt, for the dark elements are not mere surface qualities, not
peripheral and dismissible, but anthropologically central, rooted in the
unity of person and nature, the interpénétration of freedom and fate.
The inescapable tension between choice and constraint, between the
individual's inner freedom and the world's ineluctable determinations,
is, for Rahner, a primary principle of human existence. From this tension
a dialectic develops in which the individual experiences both potency
and obduracy, the malleability and intransigency of life, the pathos of
an external fate running counter to inner choice and meaning.34 In the
predicament of death this pathos comes to its highest pitch. Here the
individual's choice and self-determination are checked by a massive clot
of fate; here person succumbs to nature; the individual sinks into a
passivity that is not merely corporeal but that envelops his whole being.35
Rejecting any reductive view of death as a mere bodily fate, Rahner
describes it as an event into which the whole person sinks. This holistic
perception is in keeping, of course, with Rahner's criticism of the classical
model for compartmentally sending the body to the grave while sealing
the soul in immortality. In contrast to this separation, Rahner consis-
tently speaks of the whole person's freedom and fate, activity and
passivity, not the soul'sfreedomand the body's fate, or the soul's activity
and the body's passivity. In addition to refusing dualistic solutions,
Rahner avoids the terms of the acceptance models; nowhere does he
resurrect death into a disguised birth or reduce death's dreadfulness to
the psychological defects and misperceptions of human personality.
Moreover, in distinction from Boros, he does not bind himself only to
thefinal-optioncategories offreedomand act; he postulates no unencum-
bered final decision which breaks free from life's history of struggled
choices.
Granting all of this, however, it is crucial to note that in his major
essays on death in Volumes 4 and 7 of the Theological Investigations,
as well as in his monograph On the Theology of Death, Rahner's theo-
logical passions and strengths are exercised predominantly in favor of
the "active" side of death. Although he admits the darker side far more
readily and thoroughly than anyone else we have considered, he uses it
mostly as a methodological check, a braking reminder within a model
that is systematically propelled toward a positive interpretation of death.
Even though Rahner calls death a humiliating passivity, he also, and
more significantly, names it a noble action—in fact, "the noblest action"
of the human person,36 "an act that man interiorly performs,"37 "an
active consummation from within brought about by the person himself,
a maturing self-realization which embodies the result of what man has
34
Ibid. 26-31, 38-46. * Ibid. 55.
35 37
Ibid. 31. Ibid. 30.
made of himself during life, the achievement of total self-possession, a
real effectuation of self, the fullness of a freely produced personal real-
ity."38
For Rahner, the tension between freedom and fate, between the
person's inner act and his outer passivity, supplies the essential dynamic
for resolving death. Resolution comes as the dialectic of act and passivity
reaches toward some conclusion, some final statement and meaning.
What that meaning will be in any individual's case we cannot at all
know, for it is buried deeply within the individual. But while the individ-
ual, particular death remains opaque to us, death itself, in essential and
universal terms, is illumined. It is not merely end but also fulfilment, an
event in which the person, by confronting the terms of life's collapse,
"brings the total result of his life's activity to its final state."39 Thus the
tension between personal act and natural fate becomes itself the locus
of freedom. The individual's positive or negative stance toward this
tension, the mode by which the person accepts the plight brought by
nature—this will speak the individual's last freedom, finally bring the
tension of act and passivity to conclusion.
It is this declarative side of death, this integral conclusiveness, that
Rahner is most concerned to affirm and explore. Consequently, his model
gives primary emphasis to death as a final, personal, culminating act.
Methodologically, such a focus is in accord with Rahner's systematic
concern for the philosophical and theological ideal, his search for a
quintessential paradigm, a model which might capture the deepest pos-
sibilities of human death. Fittingly, then, Rahner's model is directed
toward resolution; death is not an unmitigated tension between passive
and active elements; it is no dialectical "draw," no question left hanging
between freedom and fate, between the forces of blind, external collapse
and purposeful, inner choice. The tension is resolved; the dialectic brings
all questions to term; the struggle with darkness and fate finally reveals
its own deep intelligibility. From a formal, systematic perspective, death
is ultimately declarative, not interrogative; it is a climactic expression of
what it means to be human, to be fully and finally human.
In Rahner's model the blankness and impenetrability of death is
limited to the individual, experiential level, to the history of each partic-
ular human death, which is marked by unresolved ambiguities. But on
the systematic level these ambiguities are penetrated and death reveals
itself as the ultimate human act, a quintessential expression of all human
action, of all choice and determination; death is a primal speaking of
self (positively or negatively) in the midst of life's most questioning
circumstances. In its culminating vision this model of death displays the
38
Ibid. 31; cf. also 32, 40, 84-85.
39
Ibid. 32.
conceptual grace and scope of Rahner's systematic approach. At the

same time, however, it presents theology with a death which, on its own
terms, is ultimately manageable, ultimately in control of what is destruc-
tive and dreadful.
In its paradigmatic power Rahner's model is bound to ideal possibilities,
to speculative coherence, to terms which disclose (within death itself) a
conceptually schematic and positive resolution. In the end such a model
dispels all negative categories and presses towards a "good death" remi-
niscent of the acceptance models:
When a man dies patiently and humbly, when death itself is seen and accepted,
when it not merely "happens" in the course of striving for something else and
when perhaps death is not envisaged through blind eagerness for something
(flight from shame, something obstinately sought, etc.), when death is loved for
its own sake, and explicitly, it cannot but be a good death.40
As he speaks of the "good death," Rahner reveals his model's ultimate
philosophical cast—and its theological readiness. The conceptual intent
and scope of his system create a methodological bias against death's
disabling aspects, its incoherence, its brutish tearing through order and
explication. The noetic terms of the model inherently abhor death's lack
of sense.
Rahner shares with Boros a conviction that death is a locus of meaning,
a source of its own explanation, answer as well as question. Within
death, both theologians find an intelligible and systematic center of
meaning: the individual's last act, the individual's final decision to be
this particular person, to affirm, even at death, this particular grasp of
the tension of being human. Because Rahner and Boros find this deep
inner structure, this stability, unshaken by all the rending of life's end,
their models are radically knowing about death. Consequently, their
metaphysical descriptions of death provide an amenable departure point
for theological reflection. On the other hand, from within a dark experi-
ence of death their models can appear to be too programmatically
positive, too relentlessly affirmative. Even as enthusiastic an interpreter
of Rahner as Robert Ochs admits this when he laments that Rahner
does not admit more often and more clearly that "there is no good
death."41
Surely, methodological variety and heuristic enthusiasms should sug-
gest that theology not limit itself to descriptions in which death is
conceptually manageable and ultimately explicable on its own terms.
Whatever the advantages of explicative, declarative models, there are
40
Ibid. 111. Cf. also "On Christian Dying," Theological Investigations 7 (New York,
1972) 288.
41
Robert Ochs, S.J., The Death in Every Now (New York, 1969) 50.
other contrapuntal possibilities—interrogative and exploratory models,
models which are not readily adjutant to theological purposes, which
press theology to bear the brunt of death, to walk nakedly into its worst
dark. To break into these dark recesses, to persist there, theology would
have to seek out models which do not "resolve" death in the manner of
Boros and Rahner. If Rahner's active-passive dialectic resolves into an
affirmation of act, then theology might also consider the opposite out-
come: a dialectic working emptily, spinning into passivity and negation.
This would entail viewing death from the dark side, working with a
model in which death makes no promises to philosophic systems or
religious faith, a model in which death remains a persistent void of a
question.
LINEAMENTS OF A DARK MODEL
To combat, or at least to counterbalance, its penchant for positive
models, theology can choose instead to work with descriptions of death
as something tangled and unresolved, sharply barbed to the grasp of
immortality and final options. Such methodological choice might seem
single-mindedly negative, morbid even. On the other hand, there is no
reason why death should be presumed to supply positive vantage points,
why it must present itself to theology in amenable guise. Moreover,
there would seem to be no absolute requirement that theology confront
death's darkness by proxy, by the intermediary of models which resolve
the dark elements. In fact, if theology is truly jealous to fight its own
battles, it must seek out all of death, avoid any symbiotic dependency
on a range of models which supply it principally with positive perspec-
tives.
Moving in a dark direction, theology would have to seek out a partic-
ularly spare kind of model, one that would be bare, lean, toughly impatient
with all benign diagnoses of death. Such a model would not describe a
systematically complete or normatively ideal death, nor would it attempt
to unveil death's "inner" logic or sense. Instead of offering deep secrets,
it would simply remind theology that death is constant scoff and hatched
to human understanding. From beginning to end, a dark model would
present death as relentless and implacable, a breaking of the whole
human person, an unacceptable and repugnant event, disintegration
rather than achievement, afinalfall into the weakness of being human—a
fall even for religious faith and theological articulation. With such a
model, theology would be called into grievous and desperate struggle.
Death Breaks the Whole Person
As we have seen, the body-soul model proves inadequate to the
demands of a dark perspective. By consigning the body to mortality and
granting unabated life to the soul, the model produces a selective reading
of death, a propaedeutic reduction which announces that death's grasp
is not anthropologically total. Here, then, theology finds a strongly
positive description, a prepossessing solution to death, a model which
locks out all deeply perturbing darkness.
In contrast to the body-soul model, a truly dark model rejects all
dualistic resolutions and presses toward the worst and grimmest possi-
bility, namely, that death threatens even the deepest reaches of the
individual, the inner poise and balance of all human meaning. When no
part of the human being possesses an a priori guarantee of life, then
death strikes most menacingly. In consequence, theology is forced to
step into the darkest place. It cannot hold back, "outside" death, in the
soul. Death's threat is holistic, caustic to all conceptualizing, a fist in
the face of all dualistic explanation.
Viewed through a dark model, death is a raw datum of experience,
unmediated, unillumined, unarticulated into any system. The human
person rigored into cadaver speaks no explanation of death, unfolds no
meaning, no palpable promise. Only a question is forthcoming—ironically
out of silence, out of the sad emptiness which has replaced the person.
In its broken and dumb evidence, death raises unbelieving questions
about immanent meaning and transcendent possibility. It reveals no
hints of a soul's escape, no signs of God's work. So theology finds death
a clueless dark. Within this dark it must wait, in wake, and mourn. It
must do this, it must mourn first, because death produces no denials
about itself, no voluble assurances about immortality, no solutions about
bodies and souls. It offers theology no reasons, no self-explanations, only
the husking of denial: a stripping away of all personal elements, a
blanking of all affective, volitional, intellectual activity, a breaking of all
sensate presence and participation in the world. In its darkness, death is
the cold fact of human dispensability in the universe, the empirical proof
that human life is finite, markedly inabsolute, eminently transient. As a
truly dead limit, death offers no internal shape or form, no heart of the
matter to see into, to describe, to imagine even.42
A model which presents death as such a clueless and impenetrable
fact can make no claim to reveal the inner workings of body and soul.
On the contrary, death is seen as the inert end of the whole person, a
collapse in which there is no evidence of surviving inner structure. There
simply are no "innards," no deep configuration which explains what
happens to the person "inside" death. In fact, death is awful precisely
because it is such a dread silence about the person, such an impenetrable
42
For a sharp critique of existentialist attempts to "see" into death, cf. Paul Edwards,
"Existentialism and Death: A Survey of Some Confusions and Absurdities," in Philosophy,
Science and Method, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser (New York, 1969) 473-505.
end to human intricacy and intimacy. In death's stifling, the person
vanishes from living reach and touch; he sinks into memory, into images
dependent on the stirring and shaping of our recall. He is given over to
the past and the subjunctive, buried in what once was, projected into
what might have been different, into what might have been said or done
but never was. From death comes no present, no declarative.
For a truly dark model, then, death is an iron wedge driven into life
and sense. Stupid, brutally dull to all human desire and meaning, death
reveals no intelligibility working away beneath surface obscurity. It offers
no hints about human elements that live on, that escape the blocked
corpse of death. In the conceptual asceticism of a dark model, then,
theology finds no evidence for the presuppositionally charged language
of body and soul. Exploring darkly, theology strains to see what death
offers as its primary and most powerful evidence, what it shows, in its
own terms, about the whole person—nothing. Nothing at all. Confronting
this nothing, the explanation of the body-soul model can appear decep-
tively voluble, loquacious about the mutest fact, eloquent about what is
experientially empty. A counterbalancing choice of model would seek,
on the other hand, to be darkly careful, reticent. Daring no words but
those broken by the rod of death, it would begin by saying that death
strikes and takes the whole person, leaving, by way of explanation, only
absence and void.
Death Is Unacceptable
In construing death's darkness, it is not enough for theology to avoid
dualistically resolved models of death; for even holistic models can reduce
death to manageable terms, thereby presenting theology with explicated,
"clean" deaths. As we have seen, the models proposed by Kübler-Ross,
Neale, and Troisfontaines admit death's impact on the whole person.
Yet these models view death as pre-eminently natural, acceptable, even
as culminating and beautiful. Thus the dark aspects of death are sche-
matically absorbed, reduced to provisional, anticipatory stages or to
(correctable) failures in psychological growth and maturity. If theology
is to explore death's poignancy and pain, however, it must put aside
models which reduce death to one of the natural (and therefore accept-
able) rhythms of life or to a problem in psychological development. Such
reductions generally rehabilitate death by focusing on its inevitability.
Because death is inevitable, it is seen as natural; because it is natural, it
is (and must be) acceptable. This mortaring of inevitability and accept-
ability builds a highly rational and affirmative structure, one that blocks
off all the dyslogical shadow of death. The blockage comes from the
model's selective conceptualizing; for death is not "natural" in the sense
of being a simple continuation of the rhythms and involvements of life,
a clear and obvious extension of its most valued meanings and intelligi-
bilities. On the contrary, in its dark aspects death is much more clearly
a climactic discontinuity, a sundering of life's patterns.
Of course, to explore death's discontinuity means to reject univocally
positive models, such as Troisfontaines's, whichfindwithin the seemingly
harsh husk of death a kernel of birth and renewal. "Natal" death of this
sort displays the ultimate transformation of the acceptance model. It
argues that all human experience (even death) can be monistically
deciphered, since in essence it is a movement of risk and rebirth, a
growing out of the known into the unknown, a leaving of the past for
what is new in the future. Such definition absorbs crucial differences,
turns metaphor into literal logic, and romanticizes the pain and puzzle-
ment of death. Its very waxing about death stirs the scepticism of a
dark approach; for if death is so religiously pliable, then theology will
never show any scars, any marks of death's grip, any signs of elemental
struggle. From the very start death can be defined in confidently affirm-
ative terms, which deny any need to explore death's darkness. This is
perhaps most obvious in the case of Troisfontaines, but the approaches
of Kübler-Ross and Neale also "positively" limit the scope of death,
reducing its threat to provisional or psychically unintegrated stages of
human development. For them, death is fearful principally because
individuals have blocked responses to it, misperceptions which envision
it darkly instead of "naturally." Such psychological reductionism easily
tempts theology to canonize acceptance as the normative and only fully
human response to death. When this happens, especially when it happens
by way of methodological or systematic premise, there is little chance
that theology will explore death's darkness fully or openly.
In contrast to the acceptance models, a dark model eschews ideal
terms, does not find that death is intrinsically intelligible, deeply conso-
nant with and expressive of life's central meaning. Altogether forsaking
a "high thanatology," an understanding of death "from above," that is,
from the vantage point of some all-embracing scheme, a dark model
says simply that death is a low business, that it lacks sense and comfort,
that it suffocates life's meaning and breaks life's covenants. In such
terms death affects the whole person in ways that are naturally tearing
and unacceptable. There is no psychological superperspective which
might disarm human rejection and fear of death, for death is a true
inner tangling. Human denials and anger, desperate bargaining and
despair, stem not simply and solely from failed vision and inner imbal-
ance, but also (and fittingly) from a piercing sense of death's loss and
blankness.
Obviously, a dark model of death counterbalances the paradigms
offered by Troisfontaines, Kübler-Ross, and Neale. More accurately, it
harries these positive models, presses them interrogatively, asks them
to confront the unreasonable face of death, the cold fact which prompts
human panic and psychic impropriety, which makes us resist the "medi-
cation" of death's naturalness. A dark model asks why theology should
not explore the fearful side of death, the place of stones and bruising
and crying out. It asks why theology should not take human fright at
death seriously, why it should not struggle from a difficult perspective,
why, simply, it should not grieve.
If theology follows the questions which lead away from acceptance
models, it finds death as rupture and discontinuity, death which is no
metaphor for change or development, but is sheer vacancy, blankness,
unspeakable poverty. When theology explores the steep and dark side
of death, it finds not part of life, not a final and fitting event, but an
alien, dismembering force. Here human Uves are cast into a void which
offers no inner view, no explanation, no experiential quantum at all, only
disappearance and absolute closure. On these terms death is intrusive,
overwhelmingly negative, impenetrable. It delivers human lives into
emptiness, often suddenly, "needlessly," without warning, by error and
accident and cruelty, by all the pointless workings of the universe. Even
when death comes slowly, with warning, with time and energy for
reflection, for "coming to terms," even here death is loss and separation,
stoppage and disintegration. Whatever sense we find is not in the stuff
of death itself but in some human leap from the evidence, some selective
reading of ifr, some sight or hope which has another source than death's
blankness.
If theology wants to feel death's full impact, therefore, it cannot simply
back away from what is brutal, from death as deep threat to the whole
human person, an end to all experience of growth and development and
interaction. The radical no of death must be felt as a beaked fact which
tears the modes and meanings of life, as a radical negation whose very
unacceptability challenges theistic faith and theological explication.
Death Is Optionless
Theology gives death its due when it tries to conceive, as intensely as
possible, the empty darkness of life's end. In doing this, it must look
sceptically at schemes which claim to unveil death's "inner workings,"
which propose that the true center of death is choice, freedom, personal
culmination, final integration, decisiveness. When the dark collapse of
life's end is interpreted as an act of self-affirmation and identity, indeed
as the fullest and most resounding act of integration, then death is made
gracious for theology, described in terms already refined and ready for
theological articulation. As long as death's "proper" meaning lies under
(and contrary to) its "surface" negations, then the experiential threat of
death will be conceptually bypassed. As long as death possesses an inner

center composed of act, of final option and decision, then death can be
readily understood and explained through the basic continuities and
strengths of life. Theology does not have to brood, disturbed, on broken
fragments and unjoinable gaps. Theology is easily free of the dark
clutching and breaking of death.
In his hypothesis of the final option, Boros proposes just such a
positively "freed" model of death. Rahner's approach is far more complex,
far more sensitive to the dark elements in death, but in the end he too
defines death through the categories of human freedom and integration,
categories which are shaped more by the rich anthropological focus of
his system than by the meager empirical leavings of death. Rahner and
Boros both, therefore, choose explicatory models, models in which death
itself offers resolution. Within death, within its deep, inner structure,
they both find an anthropologically coherent system, an intelligible and
unifying meaning, a culminating act of integration and choice. Although
this center of decision is empirically obscure, hidden beneath all the
twists and ambiguities of experience, it is still, in principle, accessible to
reflection, to analysis which examines the essential constituents of human
being. Insofar as freedom, choice, self-determination, self-integration, the
interplay of person and nature, action and passivity, all describe the
basic continuities of human meaning, they also describe the meaning of
death. According to this approach, death must be, on some deep level,
the interaction of those principles which are essential to being human.
The elements which are primordial to life must operate within death.
Whether this is a piercing metaphysical insight or a premise questionably
gravid with assumptions is not the point at issue here. The point is that
such a model, whatever its intrinsic validities or dubieties, is simply a
poor guide for exploring death's darkness. Given its programmatic biases,
an act-centered model necessarily perceives death as conceptually co-
herent and manageable, possessed of an intrinsic meaning which is
continuous with the categories of life. When theology comes to such a
model, it finds that a way around darkness has already been charted by
death itself as it were, by death's revelation of its own inner sense and
structure.
Of course, if death offers such perspicuous meaning, theology need
only appropriate this meaning, fitting it into religious categories and
schemes. There is no need to struggle with death's tearing stupidity.
Theology can remain unshocked and unshaken. But it is precisely this
protected status which imprisons theology, keeping it distant, even if
secure, from the full reality of death. It is precisely this nurtured isolation
which points to the need of negative models, models which might force
theology to wander death's worst straits, to confront its blankness, its
unillumined redundancy, its deadness—that nothing which death is in
itself, that total silence it gives back to our proposals about freedom
and final options.
Described for theology in a dark vein, death is a defeating struggle for
human volition and self-determination. Even when choice and option,
freedom and self-focus, are used as the conceptual probes of death, they
chart sadness and despondency; for, empirically, death is a fall into
human inoperancy and inaptness, a sinking of all the person's constitutive
powers. Although the individual struggles, even heroically, to die his
own death, to grasp the ending of life in a way which is coherent with
his past, with the deepest convictions and character of his being, still, in
the end, death brings this effort to nothing. Death's nothing. The nobility
of dying passes into the emptiness of death, and the starkness of this
"resolution" is a dark message about human finitude.
What death does to human choice and freedom is to take no notice of
it, to deny it, to leave it to chamal pointlessness. In death the individual
is unable any longer, even in the most paltry way, to hold on to the self
which he has been all the years of his life. In its blankness and silence
death in no way affirms the self, offers no evidence that the dialectic of
dying has ended in anything but the depletion and disappearance of the
person. In a dark model, then, death remains thoroughly impassive and
unpromising. Even the intensity of the struggle between person and
nature only underscores the poignancy of the situation; despite all of
the person's inner wrestling, the dialectic of action and passivity, of
freedom and fate, still ends thwartingly in death—in unillumined fate
and empty passivity. A dark model focuses on this empirically bleak,
ineluctable fact, this unqualified and unabating negation, rather than on
any hidden, positive "secrets" such as those hypothesized by the models
of final option andfreedom.At the very end there are no options. Death
means the loss of all personal holds—sensate, emotive, intellectual, voli-
tional. A dark model nowhere attempts to forge such poor stuff into
climactic option and self-definition. It simply accepts the evidence of
impotency, simply stands and broods before utter void. And no assurance
comes forthfromthis emptiness, no semiconcealed message about lasting
freedom and vindicated choice. Freedom is finished, choice gone. In a
dark model this is what theology must work with.
Death Is Untheological
Seen in its darkness, death is the human person husked into nothing.
It is a fall into stringent silence, inertness, unreachableness; it marks an
end to life's needs and gifts, to all plans and relationships, to whatever
is fine or flawed in a given individual. Fittingly, though most painfully,
the human cadaver is the dramatic sign of this. Farfrombeing a "mere"
bodily fact which theology might disdain or high-mindedly pass over,
the repelling yet poignant corpse is a primal countersign, an awful

contradiction to the once-living person, a negation impassable to human
bargaining and reasoning. Any truly dark definition not only admits this
but expounds its empirical ramifications, reminding theology that death
is a dread disintegration coming perhaps in a slow wasting that must be
watched, paid for in pain and regret by the one who dies and those who
share the dying with him; at other times death descends suddenly, in
massive physical brutality, by inner breakdown or outer violence, bringing
an unexpected, unprepared, disruptive end to life. In either instance it
is, experientially, an awful closure, and its natural inevitability is small
answer to our sense of being robbed, cheated, left wanting life back,
wanting something beyond the impassive and unfulfilled thing which is
any person's death. In making this experiential point, a dark model
describes death as a total cipher. Within that cipher we have no eyes
with which to see. Death only takes away; it reveals nothing, says nothing
to us. It is a silence we cannot coax into any self-revelation.
It is perhaps repetitiously clear by this point that a chief characteristic
of a darkly developed model is its refusal to give theology an obvious
foothold. Approached by way of its darkness, death is not only experien-
tially unamenable, systematically impenetrable, but totally without res-
onance to religious faith or theological concern. Death is radical disso-
nance, void, vacancy, unaltering and constant nada. Any attempt, there-
fore, to seek within death's own terms for an understanding and articu-
lation of theistic faith is doomed. A model constructed from death's
darkness offers not the slightest evidence of immortality or new birth,
of natural culmination, final options, freedom—of anything which might
support theology's confession of a God whose involvement with each
individual is unbroken by mortality. In death's darkness there is no clue
about the possibility of such involvement, no clue about survival, contin-
uance, "inner" victory, deliverance, personal salvage of any sort from
what is, empirically, unconditional loss.
In its attempt to affirm an elemental covenant of life between God
and humanity, theology finds death a clenched dumbness—no light, no
word, no stirring. In its dark intransigence, death signals no perduring
existence for the individual; its blank facticity challenges any thought of
a transcendent meaning for personal life and experience. Death simply
implies that life is without any covenant except the fragile, transient
ones of space and time. Here, then, theology faces a stark threat, the
human experience of an end which negates any suggestion that there
might be, amazingly, a Lord of this awful death-loss, a savior from it.
A dark model offers theology no network of hypotheses, only the
nettle of a most unworkable human thing—final darkness and emptiness,
a desperate collapse which leaves no clue about the person, nothing that
theology might have faith in or count on. And if human death is so

reticent about the human person, it most surely speaks no syllable about
God. It is, in fact, the elemental case against God, at least against a God
who would be radical affirmation and grasp of all human being, who
would not let any person sift into nothing. Precisely because death is
nothingness, the eradication of all personal dimensions, it is a corrosive
argument against meaning, not to mention benevolence, in a universe
measured by personal being. What theology comes upon, then, is not a
religiously malleable and edifying fact but the most sparse and mean
datum of human experience: death inflexible and inert, death cracking
no bit of light for theology, death refusing to relent one moment so that
faith might ascend to certainty or even to comforting probability.
Within the terms of a dark model, death says nothing for the logic of
God; in fact, it discourages God-talk, actually calls God into stark ques-
tion. Thus theology is spared nothing, offered no resolution, no intrinsi-
cally comforting solution to death. Instead, it is summoned to a task
dramatically different from that suggested by all the "illumined" models.
While the latter present death as conceptually "ready," open, plausible
to theology's purposes, a dark model portrays death as closed, uncon-
cerned, intractable. It offers no theological amenities or affinities, no
clues about the person, about God, about what words might ever join
the two, might make some sense, across the gap of death.
SOME INITIAL THEOLOGICAL REPERCUSSIONS
A dark model calls theology to task, asks it to brood on the absence
of immanent purpose and transcendent possibility in the empirical fact
of death. A full-fledged theological response to the dark dimensions of
death is beyond the scope of these pages, which have attempted, as an
initial step, merely to plot out the configurations of a dark model, to
suggest the particular kind of setting such a model would provide for a
theological discussion of death. By way of conclusion, however, it might
be helpful to indicate some tentative "leads" for a theological response
to a rigorously dark model of death.
In the first place, when theology takes up a dark model, it must clearly
admit its own humble place within human fear and loss, within the
tearing perplexity of death. In no way can it remain conceptually aloof
from threat and risk. Dialectical flourishes, "knowing" analyses, have no
place here. Because death is stolidly untheological, it cannot be reduced
to liminal status, to a conceptual passageway through which religious
categories might easily pass, through which these categories might en-
hance their logic and power. On the contrary, death is a harrowing of
religious categories. Thus, in exploring death, theology takes on primor-
dial test and struggle. It must stand before the last poverty and nakedness,
the bare testimony of dead bone and spiritless flesh. From this abject
position theology must try to speak of the plentitude of God, try to make
consonance between the provoking senselessness of death and the prom-
ise given to faith.
Methodologically, then, a dark model presses theology to recognize
empirical bounds, to deal with human experience that does not readily
supply religiousframeworksand explanations. But this is not a subversive
pressure; for if religious faith involves a seizing and risking of an individ-
ual's whole life, then, inescapably, whatever is humanly flawed and
fearsome must be included. In fact, it might be argued that theology
should be particularly drawn to whatever resists religious formulation.
Rather than avoiding such experience, theology might explore it as the
heart of its problematic, the heart of its attempt to understand a world
which is not simply synonymous with religious faith.
In a dark model of death, theology confronts the radically alien possi-
bilities of human experience. In this confrontation the gap between
religious faith and empirical fact is not diminished by anything in the
nature of death. Death does not speak of faith or from faith. It remains
singularly dumb and uncommunicative, and it thereby forces theology
to demarcate most carefully the difference between the stark "stimulus"
of death and the "response" of faith. A dark model, therefore, clarifies
faith by refusing to mingle its perspective into the data of death, by
refusing to find the awful human fact already infused by theologically
amenable forms. In short, death is not merely apparently or superficially
dark (but in essence illuminated); it is unrestrictedly and deeply dark.
Theology does not merely pretend at a difficulty which, in the end, will
be revealed as no difficulty at all, but as a provisional unclarity, part of
a theological equation that was simply on the way to solution.
Workingfroma dark model, theology receives intense formal or meth-
odological pressure. It is pressed to exhibit, at every possible turn, the
difficulty of its task, the elemental mystery it attempts to articulate.
Theology must strain to show its strain—not an easy accomplishment,
for even the discursive forms of theological language tempt it into an
explicatory and assertive manner that can quickly belie the difficult
burden of death. A dark model makes theology sensitive to all of this,
constantly reminding it that it must show the weight it bears in speaking
about death and faith.
In a darkly-set investigation, theology must face the full force of death;
it can count on no philosophical or psychological remission within death's
malignancy; it is not allowed any response which is not clearly the
response of faith, a response which must come across an awful and
inimical gap. From an investigatory perspective, therefore, faith stands
before death as nonfaith does; within death itself faith finds no revealing
fact which disbelief overlooks. Death's emptiness is common and univer-
sal, it holds no hidden theological lode. In death, theology must deal
with the unfaithfulness of human existence, with the lack of any proof
or promise that this existence includes individual survival and ultimate
meaning. Within this infidelity, however, there lurks a more difficult
question: that of God's faithfulness. If death in itself is unresolved
darkness, what can it mean to speak of God? If death is negation and
unresolved darkness, if it is utterly faithless, by definition a breaking of
life, removal, silence, an empirical sign only of loss and emptiness, then
it holds no theistic hints. For faith, it is a dark unknown, proclaiming
indeed that there is nothing to know. From the human side, then, death
radically questions faith. It reveals nothing that would serve as the
barest ground of trust in God.
When death is viewed as unmitigated darkness, the very existence of
God becomes a moot question. For even if God exists, says death, God
makes no difference to the dead, no difference that can in any way be
perceived, described, understood. In death's collapse of the human person,
faith is therefore drastically questioned. At the same time, however, the
primal shape of faith is revealed; the essential task of theology comes to
the fore, the task of showing how, before death, faith is an empirically
unprotected and humanly uncontrived possibility. When death is seen
as uncompromising negation, then faith is no sensible human judgment,
no syllogistic contraption, and theology is no drawerful of answers. Death
clears out all rationalizations, all the human construction which would
soothingly pass for faith. Confronted point blank in its darkness, death
is no comfort to faith and no help to theology. Thus faith has only itself
to rely on; the faithful person has only the sheer promise of God to rely
on. And it is this which theology seeks to speak about, even as death
takes within its darkness all the language of promise and hope.
Because death is so utterly untheological, such an awful silence about
human continuance and God's meaning, it dramatically clarifies the
scope and risk of faith, its descent even into a Sheol of nothingness and
vacancy. In this dark descent faith is revealed for what it is at its very
center: a stark empirical risk, a counting on God when every reason for
such counting is clearly and deeply challenged. Conceived in these terms,
faith is not a stance assumed from human conclusions or sustained
through the strength of human conceptualization and analysis. As it
closes in on death, faith must increasingly, even frighteningly, cling to
the God who is in no way affirmed by the darkness ahead. The dark
model thus draws faith to naked self-awareness of itself. Because death
offers nothing but denial and disbelief, faith can count on nothing that
would assert death's perspicuity to human mind, death's malleability to
human will. Faith is consummately seen, then, for what it is, a risk-
laden response, a holding to the truth of God—but the holding is no

simple certitude and the truth is no function of human logic and evidence.
From still another perspective, a dark model of death can be method-
ologically purgative for theology. In its empirical blankness, its totally
untheological nature, death threatens all faith with godlessness, with the
cynical charge of being simply a contrivance of human wishing, imagining,
delusion. In this dark questioning death warns theology of the anthro-
pomorphic risk of all its images, of the tendency of all human thought
(even theological) to be self-protective, to build abstract refuges from
the chill and grief of experience. The concerted formal effect of a dark
model is, then, to make theology sensitive to its own paradoxical process:
the constant "pulling back," the indispensable ebb of self-scepticism
which should mark all theological schemata. This inner questioning and
sense of incompleteness is theology's confession, by form, of the incom-
prehensibility of God, the deep danger of faith, the danger that it might
be illusion, idolatry, a peddling of easy answers to human pain and
puzzlement.
The advantage of a dark model of death is that in its speculatively
ascetical terms it presses theology to cast off all conceptual presump-
tuousness, all assumptions that would make God a calculated and obvious
comfort, that would make death a test fulsome with piety. From a dark
perspective death is simply a block of silence, and theology's only words
must come from the side of faith, where there is nothing but God. The
result, therefore, is not sweeping explanations of death but a heightened
sense of God's mystery, a sense that is not delivered as conclusion but is
only shown and grasped in the theological painfulness of struggling with
dark death. Because death gives faith no theistic clues, nothing it might
cling to or find comforting, theology must show that faith simply waits
for God to be God, on God's terms, in a freedom of being beyond all
human sight and experience. But this is no soft mystery, no sweet
"mystic" breathing about God's being. It is a realization of transcendence
shaped by a via negativa, by admission that human understanding is
unwound in death, that human argument and analysis, language and
imagination herefindnothing to fatten on. Again, the dark model stresses
that faith has no option, that it must go into death's hold, must suffer
the blind void, hoping that still, even here, its God will indeed be God,
hoping that the empirical blank of death, the lack of all discernible
survival, will not be the only truth.
Given a dark model of death, faith can look to nothing that experience
discerns or can call its own, nothing it can clutch to itself by the claims
of human verification, nothing it has ever depended on so totally before,
nothing it has ever needed in such desperation. Faith goes into the
nothing of death, clinging to God's mystery, but this clinging is so
paradoxical that it comes only when all the normal ways of clinging are
sheared off. In the darkness of death faith grasps nothing that experience
can point to or verify, nothing it can explain from "within" death, nothing
it can rationally prove, nothing it can control or possess. As theology
traces out these dark terms, it describes, in a kind of negative braille,
the transcendence of God.
A dark model shows how, even by the route of the most scant possibility
(the rigid blankness of death), theology must still come to the transcen-
dence of God. Of course, this coming to transcendence, to God's otherness,
God's freedom from human inspection and determination, can be terri-
fying, as Rudolf Otto, among others, has pointed out:
Taken in the religious sense, that which is "mysterious" is—to give it perhaps
the most striking expression—the "wholly other" . . . that which is quite beyond
the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls
quite outside the limits of the "canny," and is contrasted with it,fillingthe mind
with blank wonder and astonishment The truly "mysterious" object is beyond
our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain
irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently "wholly
other," whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before
which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb.43
Whatever the impact of God's transcendence, purely as a theological
theme or schema, darkly perceived death stuns thought with the visceral
impact of this otherness. In the opaqueness of death the otherness of
God is faith's only possibility, for all human possibility has perished.
There is either God or nothing. The cliff of fall, to transpose Hopkins, is
"frightful, sheer, no-man-fathomed." And theology struggles to depict
this, to show that faith counts totally on God, that this counting, by all
empirical norms, is the barest, thinnest thing, fragility beyond all hyper-
bole, a hanging between the promise of God and the obvious nothing of
death. All is risk. From the perspective of a dark model of death God's
transcendence is the end of empirical plausibility and protection, an end
starkly clarified by the naked need which is human death. Collapsing
into this dark, faith can only wait for the mystery of God to declare
itself—against all evidence, beyond all empirical clues, despite the for-
saken, godless thing which death so clearly is. Such a waiting is closer
to the mystics' dread and dark night than it is to the deaths wrought by
hagiography.
In addition to urging upon theology a distinct approach to the discus-
sion of God's transcendence, a dark model offers as well a particular
perspective on the question of God's immanence. The perspective arises
from the Christological ramifications of the dark model, from the prospect
43
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (New York, 1958) 26, 28.
of Jesus' death as bleak and emptying. When the terms of death itself
are unrelievedly dark, faithless, untheological, then the death of Jesus
becomes paradoxically crucial for theology. At the place of human col-
lapse where there is only choked and beaten silence, here faith dares to
confess the counterpresence of God. In the death of Jesus the two are
joined: the awful, blind, blank thing of death and word of a wholly Other,
death's very denial. Pursuing a dark model of death, theology seeks no
easing of the paradox. The blankness of death does not disappear within
the promise of faith. Instead of mere dissipation and denial of darkness,
faith sees Jesus die a truly hard human death, sees him fall into frightful
loss, into the forsaken end which he fears and prays against in the
garden, which he succumbs to, crying out, in the passion narratives of
Matthew and Mark.
Focusing on the darkness of Jesus' death, the paradox of God and
negation brought together, theology feels and shows an apt Christological
tension: it is stunned in its own conceptualizing, forced to struggle with
God's passion to grasp the human condition, on its own terms, even to
the point of death. Thus a dark model nourishes a Christology constructed
"from below," one that is rooted in the humanity of Jesus, that searches
out the revelation of God within all the forms of human history, even
within the ragged unravelling of death. Within such a perspective the
death of Jesus cannot be reduced to an act of expiation, an event
principally concerned with sin and its satisfaction. Far less humanly
schematic and manageable than that, the death of Jesus is a contradic-
tion, rationally untrackable, a paradox for faith, the word of God's
descent to the very last place, to the human nothingness of death. For
Christian theology, there is no further length to which God could go, no
more removed possibility, no end more dead. In this last place faith
finds a primordial and perplexing sign, a paradoxical binding of God's
mystery and death's darkness.
God's immanence within death's emptiness is literally inconceivable,
indescribable, empirically unverifiable. Yet this is precisely what the
death of Jesus proclaims, that God has entered into human dying, into
the fright of dead body and traceless spirit, into the whole welded
awfulness of death—the body's broken limbs and sunken features, the
stiff gape and parody of death, the spirit's separation and loss, the dread
slippage from oneself and others, the slide forward into a terrible un-
known. That God bears this, this brunt of human being, is of utmost
significance to faith, but only because death is a massive burden, so
massive that theology's thinking is dumbstruck to explain how God's
immanence achieves in Jesus even this. Bereft of inner explanation,
unable to produce plausibilities and proofs about God's immanence in
Jesus' death, theology comes again to faith's idiosyncratic terms, its
thoroughly paradoxical shape: the promise of God is bound to what is
empirically the end of all promise.
In the death of Jesus, theology finds the elementally taut quality of
faith, the sheer risk of its covenant, the scandal of Jesus, God's Word,
being broken in death. Thus theology must struggle to plot out what it
means to have faith in a God who does not hold backfromthe godlessness
of death, from that dark which is no proof or case for God's existence,
that blankness which is also no proof or case for faith's validity. The
paradox amazingly binds God to the place of faith's darkest difficulty.
Moreover, it demands that theology emphasize the unfacile and concep-
tuallyfractiousnature of God's immanence—the closeness of God cloaked
in the human event of utter removal, the human medium, death, straining
away at every point from the revelation, God. As the dark of death is
held in unbroken tension with Christological confession, theology ex-
presses the primary mode of faith: mystery, but not mystery as some
catchword or master key or easing of the tension. Death's bleakness
gives no ground before catchwords. And knowing this, faith holds to a
God whose closeness is stunning but never simply apparent, never directly
held in the grasp of human experience.
As Christian theology attempts, through a dark vision of death, to
confront these central issues, it looks, of course, to the primal clue which
comes from faith's side: the resurrection of Jesus. Working with a dark
model of death, theology must, however, affirm that the resurrection is
no perspicuous anthropological possibility, no obvious, perceivable, "nat-
ural"fruitof death. It is, instead, a counterclaim, a message as empirically
unverifiable in its illumination as death is empirically unknowable and
blank in its darkness. As such, the resurrection of Jesus does not serve
as a shelter from the awful cost and cruelty of death, from its hollow
beckoning, its experiential breaking of us. The resurrection does not
dispatch death's emptiness and supply in its place a death replete with
meaning and good sense. Precisely because death is such a burial of
human experience, such a burial of the possibility of God, precisely
because of this does the resurrection stand as a shocking and scandalous
counterclaim.
Confronting the dark, contentless shape of death, faith looks to the
resurrection of Jesus as the promise that God will be God even in the
massive nullity which no human experience can breach, the nullity of
life's end. Given the stringencies of the dark model, the resurrection is,
however, experientially astounding and schematically uncontrollable. It
is Jesus' not-fitting into the web of death, the web of all human experi-
ence, the stretch of all human reason and proof. Again, the otherness of
God's word speaks paradox—comfort and disturbance, a promise about
human experience which runs deeply counter to this experience, a mes-
sage which radically counters death but leaves it empirically unaltered

for us. Because death itself offers not the slightest, faintest hope, the
resurrection of Jesus makes human experience gasp in hope; it asks
human mind and heart to take the risk of faith beyond all calculation,
beyond any protection against the nay-saying of death. In the stringent
terms of the dark model, faith clings to the word of the resurrection
even as it sees the awful shape of death. Death's darkness does not
diminish; faith is simply clarified for what it is—a reaching whose logic
tears against human definition and counts on the paradoxical word
spoken in the death and resurrection of Jesus.
Needless to say, these last pages of theological "repercussions" do no
more than indicate some general directions which a dark model of death
might give to theological discussion. Although it would be an extensive
task to plot out these leads more completely, it might also be a productive
task, contributing to theology's sense of what is atonal and disharmonie
in human experience. At times—at least in death—faith's struggle with
these discordancies can become a descent into epistemic and spiritual
poverty, a journey into loss and lament, a deep risk that theology can
trace only in contrarieties, only in faith's search through forbidding
places.

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THEOLOGY AND THE DARKNESS OF DEATH

BARTHOLOMEW J. COLLOPY, S.J.

difficulty with the contemporary theology of death is that it

of death: "that it is an event for man as a whole and as a spiritual

stage is wedged tight with unadmitted dread, with unspeakable fears

Reduced to psychic symptoms, the darkness of death is simply human

Seen in these terms, all meaningful human growth is a "tearing away"

In the end, Troisfontaines's model strategically transforms death into

cannot come to terms with death, which sees it as a hostile, destructive

volition, self-awareness, affectivity—are radically limited by life's fini-

The conceptual constructs of this final-option view define death in

conceptual grace and scope of Rahner's systematic approach. At the

death will be conceptually bypassed. As long as death possesses an inner

the repelling yet poignant corpse is a primal countersign, an awful

theology might have faith in or count on. And if human death is so

laden response, a holding to the truth of God—but the holding is no

sage which radically counters death but leaves it empirically unaltered

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