Ethnic federalism and conflict in

Ethiopia

Bekalu Atnafu Taye*

Abstract
The current regime in Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and redesigned
the country along ethnic lines as soon as it took political power in 1991.
The aim of this article is to examine the prevalence of ethnic conf lict in
Ethiopia and to evaluate the potential causes of the conf licts that followed
in the past twenty-five years. There are competing claims, for and against
federalism. And though it may be accurate to state that the founding
principles of federalism have few ideological shortcomings, it may be that
technicality issues (types and forms) may hamper the imposed federal
system in Ethiopian. Thus, ethnic conf licts prevailing in Ethiopia may be
caused by such technicality problems and the ethnic federal arrangement
in Ethiopia needs an urgent reconsideration before the case moves to the
worst scenario.

Keywords: conf lict, ethnic, Ethiopia, federalism, EPRDF (Ethiopian

People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), politics

* Dr Bekalu Atnafu Taye is Assistant professor at Kotebe Metropolitan University, Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia.

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Bekalu Atnafu Taye

Operational definition of ethnic conflict: Ethnic conf lict is a dispute

between two or more ethnic/tribal groups caused by the politicisation of
tribal identity by self-seeking politicians.

1. Introduction
Federalism as an ideology, like socialism, communism and liberalism, is a
pragmatic term which refers to the sharing of power among autonomous
units and is considered to advocate the values of ‘unity in diversity’ or
‘shared rule and self-rule’ (Watts 2008:1) and to give regions some authority
of their own. In his definition of federalism, Watts (2008:9) suggests that
a federal system of government is one in which there is a division of power
between one general and several regional authorities, each of which acts
directly through his own administrative agencies. From a theoretical
stand-point, the importance of a federal system, as shared by all political
theories of federalism, is the sharing of power among regional states.
This division of power may lead to the extinction of tyrannical regimes.

The other reason why a federal form of government is chosen over a

unitary form is to accommodate divergent local interests that cannot bear
centralised rule (Alemante 2003:85). Owing to this, a federal system of
government as a solution was high on the agenda during the early phase
of post-colonial politics in Africa as a potential way to reconcile unity and
diversity. Unfortunately, such attempts ended up being rather short-lived
experiments (Erk 2014). Those countries which employed federal systems
for a short while and then curtailed them were Congo (1960–1965), Kenya
(1963–1965), Uganda (1962–1966), Mali (1959), and Cameroon (1961–1972).
Federalism's track record as a source of instability and secession might well
counsel against choosing this form of government for Sub-Saharan African
states (Alemante 2003:85). Considering the negative experiences, a number
of African countries have ignored a federal system of government. This is
because the socio-cultural set-up of the African states is so hybrid in terms
of identity, language and religion that the existing social realities might not
entertain the federal model. The most striking feature of African identities
and communities was their f luidity, heterogeneity and hybridity; a social

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 Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia

world of multiple, overlapping and alternate identities with significant

movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and
linguistic borrowing (Berman 2010:2).

Notwithstanding such scepticism, three countries in Africa (Ethiopia,

South Africa and Nigeria) have chosen a federal form of government so
as to accommodate ethnic diversity. But there are significant degrees of
difference in the ways ethnic power is allocated and used in the three
federal governments of Africa. The Nigerian federal structure is to give
legitimacy to territory over ethnicity by distributing the core population of
each ethnic group in several states and thus Nigeria's federal structure helps
avoid the crystallisation of ethnic identity around a particular territory
(Alemante 2003:100). The South African constitution-makers rejected the
claims of certain ethnic groups to self-governing status on the basis of their
distinctive ethnic identity, whereas the organisation of the Ethiopian state
is founded upon ethnic federalism, which uses ethnic groups as units of
self-government (Alemante 2003:78).

Seen from the perspectives of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s federal structures,
Ethiopia’s federal arrangement is highly ethnocentric. Implementing the
federal system of government on the idea of ethno-nationalism, as shown
in Ethiopia, could worsen matters. To put the idea more precisely, ethno-
nationalism, a belief claiming the distinctiveness of a particular people
and their right to self-rule in their homeland, will exacerbate community
clashes into clashes of tribalism. Therefore, in order to defend a non-ethnic
federal system and to promote the welfare of the society, federal states
formulate a number of policies. For example, the territorial structure of
Swiss federalism discourages the development of ethno-nationalism across
language community lines (Alemante 2003:101). Similarly, the Ghanaian
Constitution (Article 55:4) strictly prohibits any political party organised
on the basis of ethnic identity. Furthering the discussion, Alemante
suggested that federalism, even when it is not coupled with ethnicity, has
generally not had a distinguished record as a stable form of government, and
referred to the fact that even a ‘philosophically and legally’ sophisticated

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Bekalu Atnafu Taye

federal system – that of the United States – has not been spared the tragedy
of a costly civil war due to separatist demands (Alemante 2003:85).

Despite the presence of many good ideas and sound principles in the
ideology of federalism, there are considerable dangers involved in accepting
the idea of federalism in the African context. Here, it should be noted that
federalism is not the only factor that influences conflict; there are also a
number of perceptible modalities that should be taken into account along
with federalism such as the nature of federalism (such as territorial, multi-
national and ethnic), the forms of federalism (symmetric or asymmetric/
congruent or incongruent), the socio-cultural set-up of the society, the
degree of autonomy (given for sub-national government), the gravity of the
regime’s totalitarian institutional structures, and the like. Under the banner
of federalism, the aforementioned factors are easily manipulated by African
leaders for their own advantage, and in so doing they spoil the ideological
foundations of the concept. The politicisation of African states changed to
political ethnicisation as African leaders maneuvered to inherit power (Ake
1993:3). Ethnicity itself (or our natural difference) cannot be a source of
conflict. Rather the forms of the federal structure (when ethnic) coupled with
the politicisation of tribal identity cause such problems. This will receive
more detailed discussion in section four which deals with inappropriate
applications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.

In light of this, the main objective of this article is to show the level of ethnic
conflicts caused by the politicisation of tribal identity in Ethiopia. This article
is organised in the following sections. Section two gives a brief description
of the historical background and the nature of the current political system
in Ethiopia. Under this section, I want to portray background information
about Ethiopia and explain how the current government of Ethiopia came
to power. Section three deals with ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and section
four is about conflict-promoting applications of federalism. The last section,
section five, presents the conclusion and recommendations. Despite some
human rights reports on ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, no one has made an
inventory of ethnic conflicts according to technicality problems of ethnic
federal arrangement in Ethiopia. Thus, analysing such conflicts with more

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rigour made available by the social sciences and modern contemporary

approaches is necessary. The method used in the study is qualitative, and
empirical data such as published documents, letters and reports compiled by
human rights defenders and organisations are used.

2. Historical background
Ethiopia is an ancient country with a number of peculiarities; some of which
are independence (free from colonialism), drought, poverty, and indigenous
scripts. Despite being Africa’s oldest independent country, Ethiopia is one of
Africa’s poorest states, better known for its periodic droughts, famines, and
intermittent civil conflicts.

With regard to modernisation, Emperor Tewodros was recognised as

being the first to begin his modernisation in politics by trying to unify
the fragmented polities of Ethiopia under the banner of ser’at (ordered
governance). Considering the vision of Emperor Tewodros, Emperor Menelik
consolidated imperial authority, defended Ethiopian independence, and
began the process of creating and supporting modern Ethiopia. Alemayehu
(2014) stated that by securing Ethiopian independence and sovereignty,
Menelik united Ethiopia and inaugurated the modern Ethiopian state from
petty feuding kingdoms. Holding a similar view, Bahru (2002:60) noted that
it was to be Menelik’s main claim to historical distinction that he presided
over the realisation of an idea that had first been kindled in the fiery mind
of Tewodros.

The Ethiopia of today, not the ancient Abyssinia, was born as a result of
internal power struggles between Menelik II and forces competing to control
additional territories during the 19th century. In the process of territorial
expansion, regional lords who surrendered themselves to Menelik II, were
allowed to rule their areas by paying a certain amount of geber (tribute
or tax) to the ruler of Shoa (central government). Southern rulers who
peacefully submitted to Menelik II, such as the rulers of Jimma, Wollega,
Bale, Benshangul and Assosa, were allowed to rule their territories by
paying a fixed amount of tribute (Bahru 2002:87). One could take this as

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a historical justification for a federal system since Ethiopians have lived for
longer periods under decentralised forms of government (Assefa 2006:135).
For most of its history, it existed as a de facto federal system in which the
emperor exercised matters of national importance, while regional kingdoms
had power to levy tax, guarantee local security and regulate trade. That is,
the regional rulers had some degree of autonomy to govern their respective
regions, which is the modern essence of federalism. Thus, the nineteenth
century Ethiopian emperor, Menelik, operationalised the federal system of
government that was geography-based, not ethnic. In the light of this, Mesfin
(1999:142) stated that the structure of the traditional Ethiopian state was
federal, having many kings (governing their own provinces) but one king
of kings (ruling the whole state). Emperor Menelik II was credited for being
the first to implement a federal system before the concept of federalism
flourished in the Western political market.

In view of the above, during the imperial periods, a central issue in Ethiopian
politics was the struggle between regional and central forces. For example,
during the imperial era, the struggle was expressed through continuous
disputes between the central king or emperor and the regional lords and
princes (Bahru 2002:61). The former power struggles between the central and
the regional rulers changed from a struggle for territorial expansion into a
class struggle. And the 1974 Revolution which was provoked by the Ethiopian
Student’s Movement was a national class struggle. It was not an ethnic
conflict. During the revolution, a pool of educated elites, mostly Marxists in
orientation, formed a number of political parties and intensified the growing
wave of change. The twentieth century Ethiopian elites, participating in
the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), viewed the problems in Ethiopia as a result of
class conflicts and not as an outcome of struggles between ethnic groups
(Aalen 2002:4).

Among the members of the students’ movement, however, the most ethnically
conscious students were invariably the Tigrigna speakers (Young 2006:82).
Owing to this, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders asserted
that the early 20 th century students’ movement was a struggle among ethnic

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groups. In disagreement with the allegation of the TPLF leaders, however, a

number of scholars teaching at the then Haile Selassie I University (HSIU)
asserted that the reaction to the massive oppression and exploitation of the
people of Ethiopia appeared to be a class struggle (Young 2006:81). According
to Gebru, the peasants rebelled against the state not particularly because it
was controlled and dominated by the Shoan Amhara, but primarily because
it was oppressive (Gebru 1977:215). This movement did not have an ethnic
foundation (Mesfin 2012); the main movement with ethnic-centred politics
at the time was the one in Eritrea led by the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF).
It may therefore be said that the students targeting the ruling class were
against human exploitation irrespective of the rulers’ ethnic background.
Most student activists rejected the assertion that national divisions were
designed to promote tribalism, and were comfortable with the regime's
policy of avoiding references to ethnicity in any context (Young 2006:80).
Not surprisingly, foreign professors teaching at HSIU at this time often noted
the low level of ethnic consciousness of their students (Young 2006:81).

In spite of this general atmosphere, however, the Tigrigna speakers who were
ethnically conscious began to spread their particular xenophobia, claiming
that the alleged class struggle was actually ethnic. This was due to resentments
and antagonisms they had against the then rulers whom they assumed to be
Amhara. The Tigrayan nationalists saw the Amhara domination as the major
reason behind the problems in Ethiopian society (Aalen 2002:38). But this
seems to be a grand misinterpretation of Ethiopian history. First, it was not
the Amhara hegemony that caused Ethiopia’s backwardness but rather the
power monger rulers.

Secondly, allegations of purely self-interested resource management

seem to have been unjustly directed at the population of Amhara. But all
Ethiopians or all provinces in the country suffered from lack of schools,
industries, medical centres, other infrastructure and basic social services.
Tigray was not exceptional. Lack of state investment in Tigray might
have limited development, but there is little evidence that Tigray suffered
disproportionately to other parts of non-Shoan Ethiopia in this respect
(Young 2006:89). The corrupt feudal regime of Haile-Selassie and the

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military junta of the Dergue were responsible for the mass oppression, and
all ethnic groups were under the yoke of corruption and misrule. In both
these cases, the leaders endorsed the validity of the statement that political
leadership is a major culprit in the perennial conflict and competition over
resources (Adejumobi 2007:139).

It was in in this context that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
appeared on the scene and was officially established in 1975. Their manifesto
issued in 1976 called for the establishment of an independent republic of
Tigray, but this was later modified to cultural and political autonomy for
the region within a united Ethiopia (Aalen 2002:6). With the support of
the popular mass, TPLF, along with its allies in the form of parties and/or
movements, took power in 1991 and the most nationalist regime in modern
Ethiopian history was removed from power.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a set

comprising four elements; namely, the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo
People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the South Ethiopian People’s
Democratic Front (SEPDF). Despite the aforementioned alliance, however,
TPLF alone dominated the Ethiopian political scenery and drafted and
ratified a constitution in 1994 (Vestal 1999:84). In Ethiopia, political power
is confined to and wielded by a very small circle, dominated by the TPLF –
representing a minority group in the ruling coalition.

The political culture of EPRDF is different; it is very secretive and stubborn.

Reports of murder, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing, public dissatisfaction,
famine and similar problems cannot be brought to the media. The Ethiopian
Broadcasting Corporation has not been allowed to entertain the idea that
accounts of ethnic conflict are worth reporting. Government-controlled media
closely reflected the views of the government and the ruling EPRDF (Human
Rights Watch 2014a:12). The State-run Ethiopian Radio and Television has
had the largest broadcast range in the country and the majority of Ethiopians
do not have any alternative source of information, either from television,
radio or any form of electronic media. The state-owned Ethio-Telecom is

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the only internet service provider in the country. The government monitors
telephone calls, text messages, and e-mails. Moreover, it jams foreign
broadcasts and restricts access to the internet and blocks several websites.
Any independent media agency has to avoid reporting on sensitive topics;
otherwise, the agency would be accused of defamation or subversion charges.
The TPLF-controlled Broadcasting Corporation does not have the real colour
of a broadcasting agency; it has developed the habit of slaying truth with the
swords of falsehood. Citing the International Telecommunication Union,
Human Rights Watch (2014a:14) reported that approximately 1.9 percent of
individuals used the internet in 2013 in a population of over ninety million.
In this regard Amnesty International (2014/15:148) reported that the Media
Law, Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) and Anti-Terrorism
Proclamation (ATP) limit freedom of expression and effective citizens’
participation in political activities. Furthering the discussion, Human Rights
Watch (2014b:2) stated that unlike most other African countries, Ethiopia
has a complete monopoly over its telecommunication sector through the
state-owned operator, Ethio-Telecom. Despite low access, the government
maintains a strict system of controls over digital media, making Ethiopia
the only Sub-Saharan African to implement nationwide internet filtering
(Freedom on the Net 2013:266). In view of this, under the present regime
of EPRDF, Ethiopia has the third worst internet service in the world, after
Somalia and Niger, and is the fourth worst jailer of journalists in the world
and second worst in Africa (Alemayehu 2016). Seen from the Ethiopian
government’s authoritarian policy perspective, being an honest journalist is
terrorism, refusing to cooperate with the government is terrorism, and being
conscious of events in general is terrorism.

In view of the above, what is happening in one corner of the country cannot
be known elsewhere, unless it is recorded and aired by international media
agencies, human rights defenders or the Ethiopian Human Rights Council. It
is in such a restricted scenario that the Ethiopian Human Rights Council has
documented such reports (see the appendix). Therefore, these ethnic conflicts
which have been documented by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council are a
small selection from many. All of them could not be recorded by the Human

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Rights Council due to the government’s restrictions on independent human

rights activists, as well as due to financial and human resources constraints.

3. Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia

Apart from the conflicts stated in the appendix, illustrations provided by
Human Rights Watch (2014a:20), Amnesty International (2014/15:148),
Moresh Wegenie Amhara Organisation (2016), and the Human Rights
Council (1992–2015) stated that there were a number of cases of ethnic
tension and ethnic cleansing happening in the country. Fuelled by ethnic
federalism or the politicisation of tribal identity, the regional government
officials in the Oromia Regional State forcibly evicted about one hundred
thousand ethnic Amhara from their homes. The majority of ethnic Amhara
living in Western Harergie, Western Arsi, Arbagugu, Jimma, Guraferda,
Wellega, Afar, Benshangul, and Western Shoa were displaced, killed or
mistreated because of their ethnicity – which they never had a chance to
choose before birth. According to these sources, the forced exclusion of
people from their places of residence has been continuing (Human Rights
Council 2015b:4b).

As can be seen from the table in the attached appendix, there were
documented conflicts which took place from 1997 to 2015. These were some
of the disputes recorded by the Human Rights Council. The major recurring
causes of the conflict were disagreements about the possession or use of land,
grazing land or water resources, and about settlements, regional hegemony,
access to State resources (funds, jobs, investments) and language policy in
education and administration (Aalen 2002:70). Aalen (2002:70) also states
that in the southern region there is a large potential for inter-ethnic struggles
for regional hegemony because of the region’s ethnic heterogeneity, but that
until now, conflicts over self-government and representation have taken
place only at local level in the zones or woreda. Examples of such conflicts
are the language issue in Wolaita in North Omo zone, the Silte’s request for
independence from the rest of the Gurage zone and conflicts between Suri
and Dizi pastoralist groups in South Omo zone. The western lowland regions
of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella have both a majority consisting of two

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major ethnic groups and a minority of several smaller ones. In Gambella, the
Nuer and the Anwak have fought for regional hegemony. In Benishangul-
Gumuz, the Berta and the Gumuz, who together make up the majority of
the population, have been at odds with each other. In both states, the two
majority groups fought against each other for the control of the regional
government (Aalen 2002:69). In Somali, the conflicts have been between
different pastoralist clans of the Somali tribe. In Afar region, which is also a
pastoralist and clan based society, the same problem has been experienced.

The majority of conflicts in Ethiopia that are dubbed ‘ethnic’, are about land
and the boundaries between territorialised ethnic groups (Abbink 2006:389).
That is, the federal structure which is based on ethnicity contributes to
ethnic tensions and conflicts, widening the disparities among the ethnic
groups. Had it not been ethnic federalism, there could have been a symmetry
model of federalism, with proportional territorial and population size in the
various sub-regional states – which could have had the potential to reduce
conflicts. Now, however, ethnic groups are competing with each other and
several inter-ethnic conflicts have arisen across boundaries of regional states
that are drawn along ethnic lines (Legesse 2015:2; Abbink 2006:390). Ethnic
conflicts particularly led to injury, death and displacements of citizens in
Afar, Gambella, Southern regional state, and Somali Regions (Human Rights
Watch 2014a:20). In the present conditions, we contend that the post-1991
regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to provide solutions,
has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic tensions in the
country, and has basically only ‘decentralised’ the problems by defining the
sources of conflict as local, not national (Abbink 2006:390; Young 1999:329;
Yohannes et al. 2005:10).

4. Conflict-promoting applications of federalism

The so-called ‘EPRDF government’ established a federal system focusing
on ethnic identity after ratifying the new constitution in 1994 (Ethiopia
1994). The ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article 47 (1) classifies the member states
of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ into nine regional states
(refer to appendix II). The indivisibility of the Ethiopian nation which has

51
Bekalu Atnafu Taye

been the result of thousands of years of interaction has been eroded and the
stable ethnic composition has been disrupted by the introduction of ethnic
federalism, so that Ethiopians are now at odds along ethnic lines. Legesse
(2015:5) reckons that Ethiopian ethnic groups are rivals with each other
since the institutionalisation of ethnicity in the early 1990s. Ethnicity which
is driven by the politicisation of tribal identity has the tendency to cause
problems. The critics of ethnic federalism note that the seed of tribalism
which was a cause for ethnic conflict was sown with the coming into power
of the EPRDF.

Since the advent of ethnic federalism that politicised tribal identity, there
have been a number of conflicts, cases of ethnic cleansing and unspeakable
crimes committed against humanity in the country; and all these have taken
place without fair responses from the ‘EPRDF/TPLF government’. Ethnic
politics generates hostility amongst Ethiopia's different ethnic groups that
hinders group interaction and entails ethnic conflicts. Due to the policy of
the ruling party, mutual suspicion and hostility causing ethnic cleansing and
conflict are bound to emerge even at the present time. What then are the
conflict-promoting applications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia?

4.1 The politicisation of tribal identity (Ethnic federalism)

As stated above, ethnic conflict cannot be blamed on ethnicity, but rather
on the politicisation of ethnic identity by self-seeking politicians. In light of
this, of all the modalities of federalism (territorial, multi-national, ethnic,
quasi-federal), ethnic federalism, with its politicising of ethnic identity, is
obviously the one that can cause inter-ethnic problems. Research studies also
show that if ethnic differences are high and politicised and if ‘federal bargain’
type solutions are difficult to achieve, then decentralisation may result in
greater ethnic mobilisation and may lead to secession (Abbasi 2010:13).
In ethnically polarised countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to vote
for their ethnic party, which increases ethnic grievance and the probability
of civil war (Valfort 2007:5). As can be seen from the table in the attached
appendix, there have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia since the
introduction of ethnic federalism. For instance, due to government-spurred

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divisiveness, the two tribes (Guji and Borena Oromo) that have historically
managed to peacefully alternate control of their own region, have clashed due
to the fact that the ‘EPRDF government’ has allegedly been inciting leaders
of the subgroups (Holder et al. 2006:23). These scholars further state that
the current situation in Ethiopia presents dangers that could affect all ethnic
groups in the future (Holder et al. 2006:10). That is, the federal system of
government with the politicisation of tribal identity could cause deep ethnic
division that brings multiple problems such as secessionist movements and
a culture of mistrust.

As noted in the foregoing paragraph, the ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article

47 (1) classifies the member states of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia’ as nine regional states and divided Ethiopians along ethnic
lines thus institutionalising their divisions. Furthermore, the constitution
itself has the potential to invite conf lict as in the case of self-determinism.
Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution states: ‘Every Nation, Nationality
and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination,
including the right to secession’. Considering article 39 (1), Aalen
(2002:59) states that this is clearly a constitutional anomaly, and does
not have any parallels in other federal systems today. A government that
is concerned with the wellbeing of a nation does not constitutionally
encourage ethnically grouped people to set apart from the whole nation.
Taking this article into account, some groups, such as the Oromo People
Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),
have fought against the federal government claiming the right to self-
determination up to secession. Amnesty International (2014/15:151) points
out that armed opposition groups remained in several parts of the country
or in neighbouring countries although in most cases with small numbers
of fighters and low levels of activity.

Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution has the potential to create lasting
conflict, distrust and hatred among ethnic groups today. Vestal (1999:165)
notes that mistrust and hatred among ethnic groups grow out of the EPRDF's
theory of governance. The ‘EPRDF government’ has sought to govern by
playing upon animosities between Ethiopia's different ethnic groups (Vestal

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Bekalu Atnafu Taye

1999:184). Citing the conflicts between the Dizi and Suri ethnic groups,
the Oakland Institute’s field research (2014:16) indicates that the Ethiopian
government is manipulating existing tensions between and among groups.
The Human Rights Council (2015a:7) in its press release states that in
every ethnic conflict, the hidden hands of governmental officials have been
observed as trying to get political and economic advantages. It was not
only the central policy of ethnic federalism that exacerbated tensions and
conflicts, but decentralised ethnic-based administrations were also sowing
seeds of ethnic awareness and antagonism. In other words, ethnic politics
is able to divide the society, and ethnic groups are likely to develop mistrust
against one another. In this regard, Turton (2006:14) argues that the federal
‘remapping’ of Ethiopia along ethnic lines, by imposing a fixed ethno-
territorial grid on population with a long history of mobility and internal
migration, has led to an increase rather than decrease of inter-ethnic conflict.

To get rid of challenges related to ethnicity, countries tend to prohibit

discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, to provide individuals with equal
rights regardless of their ethnic identity (Alemante 2003:73), and to strictly
ban ethnic politics or parties. For example, the multi-national western
federations (such as Switzerland and Canada) do not support ethnicity as
the chief instrument of state organisation. Even in African countries, such
as Uganda and Eritrea, tribal or religious parties are discouraged (Mesfin
1999:157). The Ghanaian Constitution, Article 55 (4), prohibits tribal or
ethnic-based political parties and it clearly states ‘Every political party
shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on
ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions’. Contrary to this,
the EPRDF Constitution, Article 46 (2), encourages ethnicity and tribal
affiliation, and blatantly declares: ‘States shall be structured on the basis of
settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people’. Ethiopia
and Ghana are multi-ethnic societies with ethnic inequalities and historical
rivalries but in Ethiopia, ethnic politics are the foundation and the lifeline
of the TPLF which requires states to be structured as homogeneous tribal
homelands, in much the same way as the Bantustans of apartheid South
Africa (Alemayehu 2015). Even during elections, Ghanaian candidates are

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required to get a minimum level of support in all regions of the country

(Alemayehu 2015) but the Ethiopian government has been committed to
perpetuating ethnic distinctiveness and political parties organised along
ethnic lines. Accordingly, about sixty ethnically organised parties are found
in the Ethiopian political landscape.

In view of the above, a non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy is

the only viable option that could guarantee stability, equity and economic
development. This can be learnt from comparing Ghana and Ethiopia which
are, respectively, democratic and developed, and undemocratic and poor.

4.2 The design of the federal States

The design of federal units and administrative structures, whether symmetric
or asymmetric, may cause problems and conflict. As observed by Aalen
(2002:66), as well as Yohannes and others (2005:34), the delimitation of the
federal units in Ethiopia has not only created very dissimilar constituent
parts and an asymmetrical federal system, but also many regional states with
ethnic heterogeneity within their borders, and several states in which the
competition between ethnic groups or clans for regional hegemony has led
to destabilisation and weakening of the regional governments. In symmetric
federal arrangements, all federal units have the same powers and the same
number of representatives in a second chamber of parliament but in the case
of asymmetric federation, all federal units do not have the same powers.
For example, Ethiopia and Russia which employ high levels of incongruent
and asymmetric federalism, respectively, have experienced moderate-
to-high levels of conflict since adopting their most recent constitutional
arrangements (Lancaster 2012:60). Under symmetric federalism, sub-
regional states are treated as equals as in the case of the United States but
in asymmetric federalism, sub-national governments are treated differently,
such as in Russia where each ethnic republic has its own president, whereas
the Oblasts and the Krai have appointed governors (Lancaster 2012:7).
A completely congruent system is one in which no federal subunit has a
distinct social or cultural identity. For example, Australia would be a case
in hand for a completely congruent federation, despite the fact that the

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Bekalu Atnafu Taye

Northern Territory has the highest proportion of indigenous Australians in

any Australian state; on the other hand, the Ethiopian and Belgian examples
represent nearly completely incongruent federalism, with the boundaries
for those states drawn up on ethno-linguistic lines (Lancaster 2012:24). The
principles behind asymmetric federalism’s potential to mitigate civil conflict
in a state are similar to those of incongruent federalism (Lancaster 2012:22).
Ethiopia and Russia are somewhat similar in their designs of provincial units
with Ethiopia a nearly incongruent federation featuring ethnically based
subunits while Russia has extensive asymmetry with a nontrivial amount
of subunits given special status in relation to the other federal subjects and
the central government. On the other hand Brazil demonstrates completely
congruent and symmetric federalism.

Along with their forms of federation, Ethiopia and Russia have experienced
civil conflicts at various junctures but Brazil has so far been a peaceful and
stable federal state. Citing the quantitative sections of the study, Lancaster
(2012:41) has shown that both incongruence and asymmetry have statistically
significant effects on increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and the
severity of conflicts. Groups that are not recognised under incongruent or
asymmetric federations may organise protests to try to gain a greater level
of recognition constitutionally (Lancaster 2012:60). A case in point is the
Sidama ethnic groups in Ethiopia having three million people and failing to
get the status of a regional state whereas the Harari whose overall population
is 185 000 has been accorded a regional state. In the 2006–07 Ethiopian fiscal
years, the Harari region received approximately 90 million Ethiopian birr
(ETB) (Lancaster 2012:46) but the Sidama Regional Zone got less since it did
not have the regional status level. Inequitable distribution of wealth and poor
fiscal management are said to cause problems in federalism. The troubles
that these particular ethnic groups display show that incongruent and
ethnic federalism can be a recipe for grievance and potentially for conflict
if an ethnic group is not recognised as important enough by the federal
government (Lancaster 2012:46).

Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia does not consider the existing social reality
of a society so intertwined that it is hard to draw a line between or among

56
 Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia

the various ethnic groups. In the Ethiopian context, most ethnic groups
could not inhabit territorially defined geographical areas. Pointing out the
limitations of the federal system in Ethiopia, Assefa (2006:135) argues that a
significant number of Ethiopians do not live in the places where the majority
of the members of their ethnic group are to be found; they have moved, either
voluntarily, in search of better opportunities, or by force, due to the Dergue’s
resettlement and villagisation.

4.3 Fiscal federalism

Another important issue that needs much attention is the way in which money
is distributed from the federal government to various regional states. In
federation, central governments distribute funds to sub-national governments
and there is a need to have effective systems of revenue sharing between
the central and regional governments that could increase the effectiveness
of the federal system. In distributing funds to sub-national governments,
the central government could use a variety of fiscal federal criteria such as:
population size, level of poverty and revenue generation capacity (Lancaster
2012:45). In Ethiopia, the powers of sub-national states are constitutionally
protected, but in reality the forms of decentralisation are quite limited by
fiscal, political and administrative centralism (Dickovick 2014). Due to
the subjectivity of the parameters and the autocratic nature of the federal
government, the fiscal federal funds are not distributed to the sub-regional
governments in a genuinely fair way. Regional states in Ethiopia have alleged
in the past that the EPRDF is mainly focused on disproportionately helping
out the Tigray region (Lancaster 2012:45). Since the key federal government
positions have been monopolised by one ethnic party, the TPLF of Tigray,
there has never been a fair mechanism of allocating the finance. The balance
of power clearly lies with the TPLF and the resulting inequalities give rise to
situations of violent conflict. The management of the national resources does
not serve the national objectives of realising genuine development, reducing
poverty and increasing the standard of living. In the absence of an effective,
transparent and accountable system, the federal government dominates the

57
Bekalu Atnafu Taye

process of fiscal distribution, which creates a sense of discontent among the

various ethnic groups.

For the structures of fiscal federalism to function properly, there needs to be

a fair and equitable distribution of financial resources between the central
government and the states (regions). Where this does not happen, there
will obviously be a strong potential for conflict. For instance, a great deal
of dissatisfaction in the federal-provincial relationship in Pakistan has been
observed around the distribution of financial resources (Abbasi 2010:36). In
the Ethiopian context, regional states have a weak fiscal autonomy and they
have to depend on the federal government’s allocation of funds, which is
quite unbalanced (Lancaster 2012:45).

4.4 Dominant-party governance

In a similar vein, dominant-party control along with an undemocratic
nature of a given state could be another factor that could create conflict
among ethnic groups. Both the EPRDF in Ethiopia and the ANC in South
Africa have dominated elections since the advent of federalism in the 1990s,
but South Africa is relatively democratic and Ethiopia authoritarian; South
Africa has a relatively advanced economy, but Ethiopia does not (Dickovick
2014). When the less secure People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria is
also taken into account, it may be said that dominant-party governance holds
across the range of regime types from a relatively democratic South Africa
through the flawed democracy in Nigeria to the exclusionary authoritarian
system in Ethiopia (Dickovick 2014). The Ethiopian federal structure appears
to be that of one-party state governance, which is characterised by highly
concentrated and centralised powers maintained by totalitarian institutions
such as the military, other security organs and state-controlled mass media.

Despite the fact that the EPRDF has had a federal-like system in theory, the
centralised power coupled with authoritarianism and undemocratic nature
of the regime equates the government with the communist party of USSR.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia created
a situation in which the effectiveness of constitutional federal structures

58
 Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia

has been questioned. Some scholars have argued that democratic deficits
in communist countries as well as federal systems, which were organised
around national groups, promoted nationalist movements to their eventual
fall as federations (Bunce 2004 cited in Abbasi 2010:7).

One of the most significant reasons for the formation of a federal government
has been to combat tyrant regimes by decentralising the powers of the
government. But an attempt to mix Marxist ideology of one-party rule
with federalism is believed to create contradictory scenarios. The former
indoctrinates centralisation of political power while the latter teaches
decentralisation of power. As it is quite evident today in Ethiopia, the
blending of two contradictory ideologies coupled with the modalities of the
federal structures (such as ethnic federalism, asymmetric and incongruent
forms of federalism, dominant-party governance) provide valid reasons for
the prevailing ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

An attempt has been made here above to give an overview of federalism,

mainly focusing on its forms and types. In a nutshell, in a multi-national and
multi-cultural country, federalism might be an effective method of bringing
about political stability and order. However, inappropriate application
of the principle in a specific context, such as that of an authoritarian and
undemocratic government, may yield just the opposite results, which may
contribute to ethnic clashes and conflicts, and to disintegration of national
unity.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

Entertaining ethnic diversity in multi-lingual and multi-cultural societies
using federalism is a bone of contention for most scholars in the area. Some
scholars choose the federal system of government to accommodate ethnic
diversity but many commentators have observed that a federal system of
government is inherently fragile even without adding ethnicity into the mix
(Alemante 2003:56). There is considerable evidence to suggest that ethnic
federalism entails conflict since it politicises tribal identity and scholars
soundly refute its applicability, especially in the Ethiopian context. When it

59
Bekalu Atnafu Taye

was introduced and developed, social critics and intellectuals have stated the
negative consequences of ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian context since
this nation is an ancient country having multi-cultural and multi-lingual
societies that have been assimilated due to thousands of years of continuous
interaction, intermarriage, trade, migration, and other social activities. But
the ‘current government’ has imposed a federal structure and has politicised
human diversity.

Federalism, not ethnic, if appropriately applied, ‘might be an effective method

of bringing about political stability and order’ but in the Ethiopian case, the
politicisation of ethnic identity by self-seeking political leaders causes political
instability. The desire of the self-seeking political leaders is manifested through
the politicisation of tribal identity – in their design of the federal states, their
fiscal federalism and their dominant-party system. All these (politicisation
of tribal identity, design of the federal states, fiscal federalism and dominant-
party) cause ethnic conflict and anomaly in the country.

To remedy this acute systemic illness, the ‘government’ has to stop politicising
human diversity and the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia needs an
urgent reconsideration. A non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy has
to be established as the only viable option that could more effectively address
the typical causes of conflict and guarantee stability, equity and economic
development.

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Appendix 1: List of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia from

1997 to 2015 during the EPRDF regime
Note: This list is not complete but sums up the main incidents.
The references ‘HRC’ refer to Ethiopian Human Rights Council 1992–2015.

Time
Consequences of
of the Places of the conflict Causes of the conflict
the conflict
conflict

One hundred and forty Ethnic-based leadership

July Between Guji Oromo and people died and one instead of competence-
1997 Gedion people hundred thousand people based leadership (HRC, 35th
were displaced. special Issue, p. 133).

Many people died and a Ethnic-based leadership

December Between Wolaita and
number of people were (HRC, 35th special Issue,
1999 Gamo ethnic groups
injured. p. 133).

Ethnic-based leadership
In Northern Shoa between Many people died and a
February (HRC, 35th special Issue,
Amhara and Oromo number of people were
2000 p. 133).
ethnic groups injured.

Ethnic-based leadership
In Eastern Wollega, Many people died and a
September (HRC, 35th special Issue,
between Amhara and number of people were
2000 p. 133).
Oromo ethnic groups injured and displaced.

One hundred people were Regional leaders decided

In Eastern Wollega, killed; four people were to cleanse Amhara ethnic
February
between Amhara and injured; ten thousand nine groups from the region
2001
Oromo ethnic groups hundred Amhara were (HRC, 68th special Issue,
displaced. p. 158).

Sixty people were killed;

forty one people were
injured; eight thousand Ethnic competition between
seven hundred and eighty Agniwak and Nuwier ethnic
August In Gambela, between
people were displaced and groups on administrative
2002 Agniwak and Nuwier
eight districts were burnt matters (HRC,55th special
and unknown number of Issue, p. 341).
people sank in Baro River
and died.
Thirty-one individuals were
killed and five people were Due to the politicization of
February In SPNN, between Dizie injured; one hundred and ethnic identity (HRC, 59 th
2003 and Surma ethnic groups fifty-two residents were special Issue, p. 24).
burnt; one hundred and
sixty-six cattle were stolen.
Forty-one individuals were
In SPNN, among Dizie, Ethnic competition (HRC,
October killed; one thousand four
Manit and Surma ethnic 66 th special Issue, p. 143).
2003 hundred and eighty people
groups
were displaced.

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Bekalu Atnafu Taye

Nineteen people died;

Competition between
In Western Hararga, in twenty-one people were
the two ethnic groups on
November Meisa, Woreda between injured; thirty-four
regional hegemony (HRC,
2003 Oromo and Somalia camels were stolen;
71st special Issue, p. 227).
ethnic group twenty-seven residences
were burnt.

Ethnic identity was

politicised by the govern-
Ninety-three people were ment and there were
December In Gambela, between
killed; forty-two people competitions among
2003 Agniwak and Nuwier
were injured. ethnic groups on regional
power (HRC, 72nd special
Issue, p. 233).

Thirteen people died;

Competition between
twenty people were
the two ethnic groups on
December In Gambela, between injured; one hundred and
regional hegemony (HRC,
2003 Agniwak and Nuwier ninety three shops were
73rd special Issue, p. 248).
robbed; six thousand
families were displaced.

Fourteen people died and

ten people were injured; Claims on ethnic
one thousand six hundred boundary (HRC, 82nd
In Eastern Harerga,
January and twenty-eight people special Issue, p. 443).
between Oromo and
2005 were displaced; sixty
Somalia ethnic groups
cattle, four donkeys and
twenty-six camels were
stolen.

The adoption of ‘sons-

March Between Guji and Gebra Twenty-four individuals of-soil’ orientations by
2005 ethnic group died and ten were injured. regional states (HRC, 87th
special Issue, p. 514).

Sixteen people died;

twenty-five people were
A claim to have boundary
injured; property esti-
Between Guji and Gebra enlargement
June 2005 mated to be fifty-four
ethnic groups (HRC, 87th special Issue,
thousand two hundred
p. 506).
and fifty-five birr were
destroyed.

Conflicts over ‘autoch-

thony’, literally being
In Eastern Wollea, in
Over one hundred people ‘sons of the soil’, caused
August Gidie Kirimu Woreda
died and four people were by the politicised men-
2006 between Oromo and
injured. tality of the ‘so-called’
Amhara ethnic groups
indigenous people (HRC,
98th special Issue, p. 757).

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 Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia

In Oromia Regional Claims on ethnic

State, Guji Zone, Bulie boundary (HRC, 111th
February Two people died; eight
Hora Woreda, between special Issue, p. 91).
2007 people were injured.
Burji and Guji ethnic
groups

One student was killed

Tribal identity has been
and five students injured;
October politicised since EPRDF
Adama University nineteen students
2007 took power (HRC, 96 th
were expelled from the
special Issue, p. 736).
University

Ten students were injured Tribal identity has been

and thirty students politicised since EPRDF
Haromya University
were expelled from the took power (HRC, 96 th
University. special Issue, p. 738).

Tribal identity has been

Around twenty students politicised since EPRDF
Jimma University
were jailed. took power (HRC, 96 th
special Issue, p. 741).

Over one hundred people

In Benishangul, between A claim to have agricul-
died; twenty-five injured
May 2008 Gumiz and Oromo tural areas (HRC, 110 th
and over one thousand
ethnic groups special Issue, p. 82).
people were displaced.

Claims on ethnic
In Benishangul, between Sixteen people died;
March boundary (HRC, 27th
Gumiz and Oromo twenty people were
2009 regular Issue, part two,
ethnic groups injured.
p. 173).

Boundary dispute on
In SPNN, among
Seven people were killed water and agricultural
May 2015 Hamer, Kara and
and nine were injured. land resources (HRC,
Arbolie ethnic groups
134th special Issue, p. 3).

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Bekalu Atnafu Taye

Appendix 2: The nine regional states and the two

chartered cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) of
Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime
Yemen
Eritrea

Sudan Tigray

Afar
Djibouti
Amhara
l
gu
an
sh uz
ne m
Be Gu
Dire Dawa

Addis Harari
Ababa

Gambella
Oromiya
(R3) Somali
Southern Nations,
Nationalities and
South
Sudan Peoples’ Region

Somalia

Uganda Kenya

Appendix 3: Administrative regions and zones of

Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime
Yemen
Eritrea
North-
western Central
Sudan Western Tigray Tigray
Eastern
Tigray
Tigray Afar
Zone 2
Southern
Tigray
North Wag
Gondar Hemra
Afar
Zone 4 Afar
Zone 1 Djibouti
South North Wollo
Gondar Oromiya
Bohir Dor
West (R3)
Gojam
South Wollo
Metekel Agew
Awi Afar
East Zone
Asosa 5
Gojam Shinile
North Afar
North Shewa
Kamashi East Shewa (R3) Zone Dire Dawa
Welega (R4) 3
Addis
Tongo Jigjiga
Ababa
West West Harari
Welega Shewa
West East Hararghe
East Hararghe
Illubabor Shewa
Gambella Gambella Degehabur
Zone 3 Zone 1
Yem Gurage
Arsi
Gambella Jimma Fik
Zone 2 Hadiya
Gambella Keficho KAT
Zone 4 Shekicho Hadiya Warder

Bale
Sidama Korahe
Bench Gode
Maji North Omo
South
Dirashe Gedio
Sudan
Amaro
South Omo Burji Afder

Konso
Borena
Liben

Somalia

Uganda Kenya

66