Ethnic Federalism as a New State-Building Approach in

Post-1991 Ethiopia: Its Pitfalls and the Way Forward

Dr. Mohammed Dejen Assen

Abstract

In contrast to the imperial and the Derg regimes which were based on assimilation and
authoritarian repression policies against ethnonational demands for autonomy and
self-rule, the post-1991 regime instituted “ethnic” federalism as a new state-building
approach to respond to the demand for accommodation of diversity and equality of all
ethnic groups. Notwithstanding some positive contributions of the new system in
terms of the promotion of cultural rights and the use of local languages in state
bureaucracies, the new system has exacerbated the politicization of ethnic identity
which is inimical to societal integration and state-building. This paper examines the
pitfalls of ethnic federalism as a state building process by focusing on the organization
of regional states and political parties along ethnic lines. Using a qualitative research
methodology and data collected from primary and secondary sources, this study found
that ethnic polarization has increased as a result of the structural and socio-political
emphasis on ethnic identity and ethnic mobilizations by ethnic-based political parties.
Hence, de-politicizing ethnicity through regional state boundary re-adjustments,
along with designing political and legal mechanisms to control the activities of political
parties and prevent them from using ethnicity and other identity markers in their
political campaigns, are crucial for smooth relations between ethnic groups and
effective state-building endeavors.

Introduction

Ethiopia, the second most populous country in Africa next to Nigeria, is an

extraordinarily diverse country in terms of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and
religious identities. It hosts more than 85 ethnic groups, 75 languages, all major
 Proceedings of a convening of scholars on Ethiopia’s constitutional future

world religions, and variety of cultures 1—this diversity is well-captured in the

words of Italian Ethiopianist historian Carlo Conti Rossini, who called it “un
museo di popoli” (a museum of peoples). Despite these bare facts, most of the
imperial rulers of the country (1855-1974) were known for their policies of
assimilation and their disregard for diversity in the name of nation-building. This
policy continued unabated until the overthrow of the socialist-oriented Derg
military regime which ruled from 1974 to 1991.

Multiethnic countries like Ethiopia often face difficulties when dealing with issues
of how best to bring about national unity and build the state. In broad but
simplistic terms, they might have two options: either 1) Elimination (to follow a
policy promoting assimilation to the mainstream dominant culture, language and
religion), or 2) Accommodation (to recognize diversity by establishing a nation
under the notion of multiculturalism and a multinational governance
arrangement). 2 In the former category, countries often use certain litmus tests to
check whether the groups to be assimilated or otherwise integrated are ready for
that process. Among others criteria, language, culture, religion, etc. were
employed to screen out “fit and unfit candidates.” Historically, nation-building
was used to mean religious, cultural, and linguistic homogenization to the extent
where a “nation-state,” or any state for that matter, was understood to mean a
country inhabited by communities with one language, one religion, and a similar
culture. 3

The litmus test for being included in the Ethiopian nation during the imperial
periods was subscribing to the three homogenizing/nation-building elements:
Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity and the Semitic culture. 4 These tests

1
Central Statistics Agency, “Summary and Statistical Reports of 2007 Population and Housing
Census: Population Size by Age and Sex,” (FDRE Population Census Commission, Addis Ababa,
December 2008).
2
Wayne Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation Building, Federalism and Secession in the
Multinational State 39 (2006).
3
Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay & Elliot Green, “Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa,”
6 (The Suntory Centre, London, 2008).
4
See, for example, Eric Horace Gilchrist, “Haile Selassie and American Missionaries: Inadvertent
Agents of Oromo Identity in Ethiopia,” (MA Thesis, North Carolina State University, 2003); John

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 Between Failure and Redemption: The Future of the Ethiopian Social Contract

were widely used despite the presence of more than 85 ethnic groups and varieties
of cultures and religions in the country. As some scholars have noted, among all
African leaders, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was the most aggressive in
forging linguistic and religious homogeneity by declaring Amharic as the sole
language of the country and the Orthodox Church as the only national church,
discouraging and/or banning all other “pagan” languages and religions. 5
Languages, cultures, and religions other than the specified core identities were
seen as antithetical to the Ethiopian nation. Hence, all forms of hyphenated
identities (e.g., Oromo-Ethiopian, Gurage-Ethiopian, Tigre-Ethiopian, Sidama-
Ethiopian, Somali-Ethiopian etc.) were associated with subversion and disloyalty
to the nation-state agenda. Consequently, they were ruthlessly suppressed. 6 This
was the dominant view at the time and continued unabated right up to the 1974
Revolution.

The “melting pot” model of the Ethiopian “nation-state” under the umbrella of
Semitic culture, the Amharic language, and Orthodox Christianity, as envisioned
during the imperial regimes and to a lesser extent during the Derg regime, failed
to materialize in the wake of the rise in ethnic consciousness and mobilization that
the world has witnessed at the close of the 20th century. Various political elites and
community leaders not only resisted assimilation and marginalization but
mobilized their respective ethnic groups (both on primordial and instrumental
bases) to overthrow their assimilators and oppressors. Hence, the broader and
more abstract/imagined “Ethiopian identity” failed to override ethnic divisions in
the country. Due to a combination of factors including ethnic suppression,
alienation, and exclusion—partly on the basis of their identity and partly because
of social and historical factors—ethnic resentment grew and stood against the
oppressive regimes, to an extent that resulted in the restructuring of the “rules of

Markakis Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (1974); and Sara Vaughan, “Ethnicity and
Power in Ethiopia,” (Doctoral Dissertation, the University of Edinburgh, 2003).
5
Bandyopadhyay & Green, supra note 3, 6-7.
6
Christopher Clapham, The Ethiopian Experience of Devolved Government, 1.1 Ethiopian Journal
of Federal Studies 24 (2013).

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 Proceedings of a convening of scholars on Ethiopia’s constitutional future

the game” from assimilation to “ethnic accommodation” under the ethnic-based

federal system post-1991.

Since 1991, effort has been made by the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), to reverse the notion and practice of
nation-building through assimilation. By making ethnicity/identity a core
criterion for state formation, it heralded the formal institutionalization of ethnic
politics and governance in the country. This official policy has heightened ethnic
consciousness and the politicization of ethnicity. Nowadays, it is not uncommon
to observe that a person’s ethnic identity impacts their day-to-day activities,
ranging from holding a kebele 7 identification card, to admission to higher
educational institutions, occupying a high-ranking government position, being
elected to the legislature, or forming/joining political parties. As a consequence of
the ethnic-based political engineering of the Ethiopian state, almost all regional
states, zones, and districts are named after the dominant ethnic group living in
these areas. Several of the political parties—both the incumbent and the
opposition—are exclusively organized along ethnic lines. Inevitably, the policies
set by these ethnic parties and self-ruled regional states reflect ethnic interests,
which often contradict or fail to incorporate the interests of other ethnic groups
and national interests that are vital for state-building.

This paper argues that the structural and sociopolitical emphasis on ethnic
identity is a core challenge for the country’s peace and stability, its state/nation-
building process, and the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups. There is
abundant evidence that ethnic groups are often fighting for their members to
occupy higher government offices by any means at their disposal, including
violence and uprising. Citizens are often discriminated against because of their
ethnic origin in the context of the job market, educational opportunities, access to
public services, political appointment, and recruitment in the military and the
police force. The notion of the “son of the soil” is widely applied in different
ethnic-based regional states, zones, and districts to exclude “non-indigenes”

7
Kebele, an Amharic term, denotes the lowest level of state administration in Ethiopia.

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despite the constitutional provisions for non-discrimination on the basis of, inter
alia, ethnicity, social origin, and place of birth.

When politics is played out and maneuvers are made under ethnic terms,
unhealthy competition and distrust among ethnic groups is bound to occur. The
hegemonic impulse unavoidably pushes political elites to control the state
apparatus to “benefit their ethnic groups” at the exclusion of others. Though the
federal government is trying to balance ethnic representation at the national level,
again inevitably dissatisfaction among ethnic groups remains a fact of life. Some
are over-represented while others under-represented, if not absent. This under-
and over-representation in turn creates grievances on the part of the former. Even
those represented are dissatisfied with the importance of the positions to which
their co-ethnics are appointed. 8

In politicized ethnicity, literature confirms that political elites mobilize their

respective ethnic groups to control the state machinery. 9 The dominant ethnic
group(s) and ethnic-based political parties may not negotiate for key positions to
be occupied by other ethnic groups or political parties (who are perceived to be
dangerous enemies rather than simple opposition). It comes as no surprise,
therefore, that people in Ethiopia are counting their co-ethnics at the government
offices and “calculating” the weight of the positions held for the benefit of their
ethnic groups. Public perceptions are rising alarmingly that few ethnic groups

8
The positions of the Prime Minister (Head of the Government) and the President (Head of the
State), for instance, cannot be considered equal or equivalent as the authority of the latter is only
nominal. All the powers and functions of the President listed under article 71(1-7) are only
nominal. Opening the joint session of the Upper House and the Lower Chamber of the
Parliament, proclaiming laws and international agreements approved by the House of People’s
Representatives (HPR) in the Federal Negarit Gazeta through his/her signature, appointing
ambassadors and other envoys upon recommendation of the Prime Minister, receiving the
credentials of foreign ambassadors, etc. are all just ceremonial powers. The Prime Minister, on
the other hand, is a real power holder in the country because he/she is the chief executive and the
commander-in-chief of the national armed forces (article 74).
9
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985).

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control the political apparatus and many feel alienated. As a consequence, public
protests and ethnic violence are swiftly spreading across the country.

Now, after three decades of the ethnic-based federal experiment (1991-2022), the
adverse effects of ethnicized politics are clearly felt. What is lacking is a research-
based alternative solution to the problems. This paper is intended to fill this gap.

1. Ethnicity, Identity Politics, Political Parties, and Their

Link with State-Building

1.1. Ethnicity and politics: The link

Scholars have not reached consensus on a universally-accepted definitions of the

terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’. 10 The term ethnicity is used to mean “the
essence of an ethnic group or the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or
group.” 11 Gurr defines ethnic group as “people who share a distinctive and
enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared
experiences and cultural traits.” 12 Max Weber defines ethnic groups as “those
human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because
of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of
colonization or migration, this belief is important for the propagation of group
formation. Conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood
relationship exists.” 13 Hutchinson and Smith define ethnic group as “a named
human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories,

10
John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith, Introduction to John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith
(eds.), Ethnicity 1 (1996).
11
Ibid., 4.
12
Sabine Carey, “A Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in Kenya, Zambia and Former Zaire”
4-5, Parties, Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World, Workshop 13,
Grenoble, 2001.
13
F. O. Ottoh, “Ethnic Identity and Conflicts in Africa,” in S. O. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (eds.), The
Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development, 338 (2018).
https://doi.org/10:1057/978-1-349-95232-8_17

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one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of
solidarity.” 14

Ethnicity can also be defined either from primordialist or instrumentalist

viewpoints. The primordialists define ethnicity on the basis of social bonds such
as religion, culture, language, blood, etc., that are “over-powering and ineffable.” 15
Based on this theory, ethnicity is fixed at birth and, hence, permanent. Because
biological bonds are so strong, as primordialists believe, the best way to resolve
ethnic conflicts is to allow such groups to live in their state of choice, even allowing
them to secede from an existing state. Forcing ethnic groups who are driven by
identity politics to remain within the existing state by any means possible would
inevitably result in civil war and, at worst, state collapse. 16

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, argue that ethnicity is more of a “social,

political and cultural resource for different interests” and, hence, can be changed
on the basis of rational calculations. 17 As per their argument, ethnicity is “rooted
in ‘historical’ and ‘symbolic’ memory created, used and exploited by leaders and
others in pragmatic pursuit of their own interests.” 18 According to this
instrumentalist theory, ethnicity is something subject to change for pragmatic
considerations. Identity politics, for the instrumentalists, is not about biological
determinants but a result of structural social inequalities. In this situation, the
elites from the excluded groups mobilize people to control power and change the
social structure or decide their own fate themselves. Hence, identity politics is the
result of an elite mobilization of marginalized ethnic groups for political power or
a struggle over changing the structure of the state that anchored marginalization
and discrimination. In this case, ethnic conflict is not caused by ethnic differences
but by politics. Since ethnic conflict is caused more by politics than biological or

14
Ibid.
15
Hutchinson and Smith, supra note 10, 8.
16
Mesay Kebede, “The Nature and Challenges of Ethnicity: The Case of Ethiopia,” paper presented
at Ethiopian Forum: Challenges and Prospects for Constitutional Democracy in Ethiopia,
Michigan State University, 2019.
17
Hutchinson, and Anthony D. Smith, supra note 10.
18
Ottoh, supra note 13, 339.

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cultural identification, the solution lies in political arrangements (in the form of
power-sharing or a federal system) that guarantee fair political representation and
resource-sharing for all concerned actors.

These two schools of thought offer diametrically opposed explanations for the
relationship between ethnicity and conflict. While the primordalists argue that
ethnic differences by themselves are causes for ethnic conflict—as it creates
mutual fear and distrust among in-group and out-group members 19—the
instrumentalists argue that ethnic differences by themselves cannot be a cause for
ethnic conflict but can only be a cause when ethnicity is politicized or manipulated
by elites. 20 The primordialists are criticized for only focusing on objective elements
of ethnicity and ignoring other subjective factors and in their claim that mere
biological differences can cause ethnic conflicts. The instrumentalists are also
criticized for only emphasizing the subjective elements of ethnicity by ignoring
the inevitable ties between people through blood, culture, religion, and language
inherited from their ancestors. Although the rational calculation of elites and
ethnicity’s resulting instrumentalization for the purposes of mobilization can
cause ethnic conflicts, these theories fail to explain how the masses simply follow
them to fight without having some affectional relations. 21

In Ethiopian, both definitions are manifested in the 1995 Constitution (Article

39(5)), though it never uses the term “ethnic group”—but instead nation,
nationality, and people. It defines nation, nationality, and people (NNP) as “a
group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar
customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related
identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable,
predominantly contiguous territory.”

Many political scientists and analysts believed at one point that ethnic bonds will
disappear and be replaced by modern liberal democracy as a result of

19
Horowitz, supra note 9.
20
Ibid.
21
Mesay Kebede, supra note 16.

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modernization, urbanization, globalization, and improvements in mass

communications. They assumed that ethnicity will no longer influence the
political processes. 22 Nonetheless, these assumptions remained unrealized. Ethnic
mobilizations occurred in several Western liberal democracies including the UK,
France, Spain, and Belgium, as manifested by the territorially concentrated
linguistic mobilizations of Celtic-speaking populations, Bretons and Corsicans,
the Basque Independent Movement (ETA), and Flemish-Walloon cleavages,
respectively. 23 The Catalonian referendum for independence from Spain on
October 1, 2017, the secessionist referendum of Scotland in the UK, and the
separatist movements of Quebec in Canada are real, high-profile examples of the
growing sentiment of ethno-nationalism and identity politics. In consequence,
there is a shift of focus and attention in the 20th century surrounding the
relationship between ethnicity and politics. Particularly since the 1990s, a
considerable amount of literature has been produced that has influenced state
responses when either devising a mechanism of ethnic repression or opening up
state institutions for the official recognition and accommodation of ethnic groups
and special ethnic representation for effective state/nation-building undertakings.

1.2. State-building versus nation-building: Conceptual

clarifications

In the study of political science, the state is an abstract entity that can be felt only
through its institutions and organizational structures. A state, according to
Bratton, is “the set of fixed administrative institutions that claim legitimate
command over a bounded territory” using its “coercive arms—army, police,
courts, … [and] specialized bureaucracies governed by norms of law and
reason.” 24 State-building is, therefore, very much connected with the

22
Peter Vermeersch, “Theories of Ethnic Mobilization: Overview and Recent Trends” 3, CRPD
Working Paper No. 3, University of Leuven, 2011.
23
Ibid.
24
Michael Bratton, “State-building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards,
Backwards, or Together?” 1, Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 43. (2004).

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establishment of institutions by the government to deliver services for society in

order to earn legitimacy.

In some instances, there is a tendency to use the terms state-building and nation-
building interchangeably, equating the word “state” and “nation” as if they are
synonymous. Notwithstanding some similarities, the two concepts are different.
State-building is about the construction of institutions for establishing a
functioning state. Nation-building, on the other hand, is about the construction
of a national identity, of course, for the purpose of creating a functioning state.
They converge in their ultimate goal of creating a functioning state. According to
Dinnen, state-building is “the task of building functioning and durable states
capable of fulfilling the essential attributes of modern statehood,” which includes
“providing security from external threats and maintaining internal order, raising
and collecting taxes, delivering essential services such as health and education, the
provision of transport and communications infrastructure, and the prudent
management of the economy.” 25 Nation-building, on the other hand, is “the
process of developing a shared-sense of political community that is capable of
binding together a population of a given state.” Nation-building requires the
coordinated efforts of different stakeholders in the country; the government being
the major one. In comparison, while state-building focuses on establishing or
strengthening state institutions, nation-building concerns the character of
relations between society and state.

Although they are distinct in some respects, they are related to one another in that
both are concerned with creating mechanisms of societal integration. Building
effective state institutions is one important condition for strengthening
nationhood. Put simply, the fundamental attributes of statehood mentioned above
are necessary foundations for “nation-building” processes. Nation-building often
stands for the construction of national identity, while state-building refers to the
institutions and infrastructural capacities of the state. 26 Beyond the orthodox

25
S. Dinnen, “The Twin Processes of Nation-building and State-building” 2, ANU Briefing Note.
Number 1. (2007).
26
DFID Practice Paper, 12, Building Peaceful States and Societies, U.K. (2010).

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“state-building” components, nation-building presupposes shared characteristics

of identity, values, and goals. In a multiethnic context, nation-building is not so
much the homogenization of these characteristics through nation-state logic, but
rather the recognition, acceptance, and toleration of heterogeneity and the
facilitation of inclusion, or “unity in diversity.” For our analysis of the pitfalls of
ethnic federalism as a model for the state-building approach in Ethiopia, both are
relevant and may sometimes be used interchangeably. This paper takes up the
state-building process in Ethiopia in two interrelated dimensions: both enhancing
the capacity of the state to function, and as regards the political processes that
underpin state-society relations or the creation of one political community with
shared vision and goals.

1.3. State-building approaches: Theory and practice

Comparatively, there are several approaches for state-building and nation-

building. McGarry & O'Leary have identified four major long-practiced
approaches. 27 The assimilationist and secessionist approaches are found at the two
extremes of the nation-building spectrum, while the integrationist and
accommodationist are found in between. While the first two deal with the
elimination of diversity, the second two deal with possible ways to balance unity
with diversity.

The first approach, an assimilationist approach wherein citizens are expected to

assimilate to a particular national language, religion, and political culture, is
guided by a nation-state theory. 28 This nation-state building approach is aimed at
conferring indivisible citizenship and a single national identity. This approach
could in turn be divided into Jacobian republicanism (e.g., France) and a cultural
difference-blind or liberal nationalism approach (e.g., the U.S.). For Jacobins,

27
J. McGarry & B. O'Leary, “Federation, conflict-regulation and national and ethnic power-
sharing,” Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, 2003.
28
The nation state theory presents the principle that each nation, embodying a shared community
of culture and blood, is entitled to its own state. Here, the formation of nations preceded the
establishment of states.

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nationalism and federalism were mutually exclusive. They viewed federalism as

antagonistic to cultural and linguistic homogenization, a roadblock in the path of
authentic, indivisible, monistic popular sovereignty. The Jacobins were deeply
hostile to all forms of accommodation that inhibited this goal, including
federalism. The Jacobian approach views federalism as a state-destroying
instrument and unfit for state nationalism and civic equality, while the liberal
nationalism approach or American Model promotes individual liberty and a
difference-blind approach to nation-building processes.

The second is an integrationist approach which tries to provide incentives for

mixing ethnic identities and establishing umbrella parties (e.g., Nigeria). For
Nigeria, though the country is said to be in perpetual search for federalism, 29
federalism is said to be a search for national integration, 30 or an “effective way of
achieving and preserving both integration and stability in deeply divided
societies.” This mechanism focuses in particular on engineering electoral
institutions to create disincentives for political mobilization based on identity,
with the aim of establishing a common identity and balancing multiple interests;
it is basically a project of integrating the interests of members of the majority with
those of the minority in policymaking.

The third is the accommodationist approach, which comes in different forms:

consociationalism, power-sharing, territorial autonomy, or multinational
federalism (e.g., Canada, Belgium, Spain). This approach institutionalizes and
aims to protect at least two national or ethnic cultures on a durable basis. Here,
federalism is viewed as a political and institutional arrangement to accommodate
national/ethnic groups within the boundaries of a given state. This approach does

29
D. Babalola, “Nigeria: A Federation in Search of Federalism,” 50 Shades of Federalism (2017)
http://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/nigeria-federation-search-federalism/
30
National integration in a plural society is when “component parts are reasonably contented in
the polity vis-à-vis equity and justice in resource allocation cum access to equal opportunities.”
See Emmanuel O. Ojo. (2009). Federalism and the search for national integration in Nigeria, 3.9
African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 384, 386 (2009).

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not aim to avoid ethnic differences but to alleviate ethnic grievances by granting
territorial self-rule to geographically concentrated ethno-national groups.

Based on the method of accommodating nationalism and ethnic diversities, two

types of federations—mono-national and multinational—could be identified. 31
From this perspective, while the U.S., Australia, Germany, and Mexico are mono-
national federations, Canada, Switzerland, India, Belgium, South Africa, and
Ethiopia are classifiable as multinational ones. 32 Multinational federations are
polities that hold together at least two constituent national partners; they are based
on the principle that accommodated groups represent people who might be
entitled to rights of self-determination. 33 Put simply, a multinational federation is
“a nation of nations” having one polity but several peoples. 34 In principle, the
purpose of multinational federalism is to enhance people’s sense of ethnic
membership in the state, not to abandon the ethnic or people’s sense of
identification with the overarching state. Such a model of federalism admits the
ethnic or cultural element of the multidimensional concept of national and state
identity.

Such federations not only maintain that dual or multiple national loyalties are
possible and indeed desirable, but conceive of the federation as uniting people
“who seek the advantages of membership in a common political unit, but differ
markedly in descent, language, and culture.” 35 Multinational federations “seek to
express, institutionalize, and protect at least two national or ethnic cultures, on a
durable and often on a permanent basis.” 36 In a multinational federation, a
number of different nations exist, each with their own values, customs, language,

31
McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 27. B.
32
Ibid., 4.
33
Ibid.
34
F. Requejo, Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism: The Spanish Case (2005).
35
Ibid.
36
McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 27.

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interpretation of history, and sense of their political, economic, and cultural role. 37
The multinational federation falls in line with the view that the state cannot be
ethnically neutral in choosing a language—a key marker of group identity—for
parliaments, courts, education, and the media; 38 and “individual elites do not
come to a polity building culturally naked.” 39 Given that multinational federalism
endorses national pluralism, it is explicitly opposed to the integrationist or
assimilationist objectives of mono-national federalism. 40

From this perspective, despite limitations in the process by which it was formed,
the federation of Ethiopia was established to respond to the “nationalities
questions” raised by the Student Movement of the 1960s. It can be regarded as an
instance of multinational federalism because it grants sovereignty to every
“Nation, Nationality or People,” 41 along with an unconditional right to self-
determination that includes the right to secession. 42 Inasmuch as there is no
significant distinction between the “nation,” “nationality,” or “people” and an
“ethnic group,” the Ethiopian federation has ipso facto endorsed ethnic pluralism
and, with it, ethnic federalism as a state-building approach. It not only recognizes
ethnic diversity but also made ethnicity the organizing principle for state
formation and political party organization, both of which have a bearing on state-
building processes and the unity of the Ethiopian state and people.

1.4. Political parties and state-building

Despite the lack of a universally agreed definition, a political party can be defined
as “a group that is publicly organized with the intention of gaining control of

37
W. Kymlicka, “Emerging Western models of multination federalism: Are they relevant for
Africa?” in D. Turton (ed.), Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in a comparative
perspective (2006).
38
W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity
(2007).
39
Assefa Fiseha, Constitutional Adjudication through Second Chamber in Ethiopia, 16.3
Ethnopolitics 295 (2018)
40
McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 27, 5-6.
41
Article 8 of the FDRE Constitution.
42
Article 39(1) of the FDRE Constitution.

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government to realize certain aims or to obtain personal advantages or both” with

a possibly longer life-span than other forms of societal organizations. 43 One of the
key features of political parties, according to Alan Ware, is that “they seek to
represent more than a single, narrow interest in a society.” 44 There are different
theories of the relationship between ethnicity and political parties or party
systems. All major theories on the determinants of voting behavior relate with
social affiliations. 45 In this regard, ethnicity can be easily integrated with such
affiliations. For example, the micro-sociological approach argues that “a person
thinks politically as he is socially,” 46 implying that ethnic voting is one component.
The macro-sociological cleavage approach strengthens this argument. 47 The
socio-psychological approach asserts that party preferences are very much related
to social ties. 48 The rational choice theory is also related to ethnic voting as voters
calculate the benefits of getting better services if they elect a candidate with the
same ethnic affiliation. 49

In postcolonial Africa, both organizing political parties along ethnic lines and
multi-partyism itself were discouraged, and many of the renowned liberation
movement leaders suggested one-partyism as a means for effective nation-
building. From Ghana to Kenya, Tanzania to Zambia, Zimbabwe to Angola, and
Mozambique to Senegal, all proposed having a single party system as having
several parties would increase ethnic, religious, and regional polarizations and
hinders the process of economic development, social integration, and nation-
building. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah
of Ghana, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia—to mention
only a few—all either discouraged or prohibited multi-party system in general and

43
Osita Agbu, An Overview of Party Formation in Nigeria, 1960-1999 27, Elections and
Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, CODESRIA (n.d.).
44
Carey, supra note 12, 9.
45
M. Basedau and A. Stroh, How Ethnic are African Parties Really? Evidence from Four
Francophone Countries, 33.1 International Political Science Review 5, 6 (2011).
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.

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ethnic parties in particular. Nyerere, for example, contends that “the consolidation
of statehood nation-building required the elimination of polarizing tendencies.” 50

However, though many African states and leaders shied away from
institutionalizing ethnic politics in their legal systems fearing aggravated ethnic
competition, violence, and state disintegration, politics often plays out along
ethnic lines. 51 By analyzing the roles of ethnicity in politics in some African
countries, Sebastian Elischer argues that the salience of ethnicity in the political
system is high in countries lacking a core ethnic group, while it is lower in
countries having one core ethnic group. 52 Mbatia, Bikuru, and Nderitu argue that
nationalist movements and popular ideologies lost appeal in many African states,
prompting politicians to appeal to ethnic identity for political mobilization. If not
checked, they fear that majority ethnic groups will use their numeric advantage to
influence political processes and resource allocation. 53

Post-1991 Ethiopia is an exception in this regard insofar as its supreme law

officially acknowledges ethnic diversity and the institutionalization of ethnic
politics through an ethnic-based federal system. In response to this institutional
set up, parties in Ethiopia—both the incumbent and the opposition—are more
regional and ethnically divided, and are very much fragmented, producing
negative impacts on the state-building process and societal integration.

Scholars argue that the structures of political parties and the way they operate
determines the normal functioning of the institutions of a state. 54 The way the
political parties organize and operate affects the unity or division of peoples and

50
Dima Neggo Sarbo, “Contested Legitimacy: Coercion and the State in Ethiopia” 72 (PhD
Dissertation, University of Tennessee. 2009).
51
Lydia Ludgren, Saul Cunow, & Devesh Tiwari, Beyond Ethnic Politics: An Empirical Test of
Patron-Client Theory in Sierra Leone 2 (2013).
52
Sebastian Elischer, Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation (2013).
53
Paul Mbatia, Kennedy Bikuri & Peter Nderitu, “The Challenges of Ethnicity, Multiparty
Democracy and State Building in Multiethnic States in Africa,” in Kabiri Ngeta, Kimani Njogu,
& Mary Wanjau (eds.), Ethnic Diveristy in East Africa 183 (2010).
54
Aalen Lovise, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000
(Chr. Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human Rights, 2002)

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ethnic groups. If political parties are organized along ethnic lines and their
electorate is concentrated in ethnically organized constituent units, it is more
likely that regional leaders will play ethnic cards to challenge the unity of the state
and peaceful ethnic co-existence. Moreover, political parties serve as institutions
and structures for identity politics. Whenever party organizations are allowed, if
not required, to be based on ethnicity, identity politics and ethnic polarization will
be further aggravated. Proliferation of ethnic political parties in Ethiopia, for
instance, resulted in parties manipulating ethnic differences to obtain votes and
control state power. 55 Ethnic parties, in this instance, are organized not for
championing democracy and the equality of individuals but as a platform to
struggle for controlling political power in the name of their respective ethnic
group; this ultimately endangers the country’s survival and ethnic coexistence, as
will be discussed in the subsequent parts of this paper.

1.5. Identity politics and state-building

Eisnberg and Kymlicka define identity politics as “a process whereby an array of

identity groups have become politicized and mobilized on the basis of gender,
race, language, ethnicity, indigeneity, religion, and sexuality” 56 Identity politics
can be shaped by “aspects of belonging and social organizations” that focus on the
interests and perspectives of groups. 57 As explained by Check, identity politics
“relates directly towards a tendency for people of a particular ethnic group,
religion or social background to form exclusive political alliances moving away
from mainstream political and broad-based political party politics.” 58

Despite the belief of many scholars that ethnic identification and its attendant
identity politics disappears with modernization and urbanization, the relevance of
identity has increased dramatically. The actions of individuals, groups, and parties

55
Arriola, R. Leonardo, Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and Opposition Support: Evidence from
Ethiopia’s 2005 Elections, 10.1 North Eastern African Studies 115 (2008).
56
N. A. Check, “Identity Politics and Wars of Secession in Africa,” in S. O. Oloruntoba & T. Falola
(eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development 321 (2018).
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.

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based on an identity-based worldview have mounted. In conflict and other

precarious situations in particular, groups and individuals alike want to align with
their in-group members for security reasons by dissociating themselves from
potential or actual rivals. In such situations, political actors and elites manipulate
the in-group in a politically calculated manner to gain an advantage over other
ethnopolitical opposition groups. Scholars argue that “the instrumentalization of
cultural difference stems in most cases from the temptation of power-conscious
leaders to justify differences of position in the struggle for material advantage or
for defending ‘inherited privileges’ or to assert material claims against ‘others.’” 59

In multicultural contexts such as Africa, people are divided along different identity
lines and they attach different weights to such identities. Moreover, people
unavoidably face different forms of inclusion and exclusion because of their
identities. Because of the fallout from identity politics in many countries in Africa,
tragic genocides and mass killings happened. The most extreme events, from
genocide in Rwanda, to civil war in Somalia, to ethnic violence in Kenya, were
related to identity politics. Moreover, several secessionist attempts, with their
attendant negative impacts on state stability, also occurred in Nigeria, Congo,
Uganda, Senegal, and Djibouti. 60

The way differences are managed further exacerbates or moderates identity

politics and conflict in many parts of Africa. Some states followed a policy of
assimilation to create a homogenous nation-state whereas others attempted to
craft institutions for accommodating diversities. Obviously, the methods of
repression and assimilation—more than their undemocratic nature—did not
produce the intended outcome of homogenized states in Africa. Accommodation
of diversity through institutional arrangements like (ethnic) federalism also did
not produce the intended results of ethnic equality and political stability, since this

59
R. Tetzlaff, “Globalization and Nation-building – Not in Contradiction in Terms,” in Jochen
Hippler (ed.), Nation-building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? 19 (2005).
60
Ibid.

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is either implemented as a “divide-and-rule” tactic inherited from the colonial

powers or suffers from weaknesses related to its implementation.

Ethiopia, despite being unique in the African continent as it successfully resisted

colonial rule, did not escape the colonial influence that affected its neighbors. It
followed a policy of assimilation in a state-building project copied from that which
colonial powers practiced in their colonies. Later, however, due to resistance from
different ethnic groups, it reconfigured the state along ethnic lines which
resembles the “divide-and-rule” tactic of colonial powers. Those who controlled
state power in post-1991 Ethiopia—a minority from Tigray, the TPLF—saw ethnic
federalism as the best way to govern the majority with this tactical division. 61

There are scholars who argue that the Ethiopian ethnic-based federal system is not
a genuine response to the self-determination quest of the different national groups
but is instead simply a “divide-and-rule” policy on the part of the TPLF-led
EPRDF regime. 62 For example, Aalen Lovise contends that; “as a minority-based
government, the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) saw ethnic federalism as
the best means to retain a leading position in an Ethiopian State, as an efficient
tool to ‘divide-and-rule.’” She further argues that “the launch to ‘self-
determination for nationalities’ was not primarily an outcome of ideological
conviction or a desire to pacify ethnic wars, but served essentially as an instrument
in securing the new power holders’ control of the state apparatus.” 63 Merera also
argues that “the easiest way to maintain minority hegemony is to use the time-
tested divide and rule policy.” 64

61
See, for example, Aalen Lovise, “Institutionalizing the Politics of Ethnicity: Actors, Power and
Mobilization in Southern Ethiopia under Ethnic Federalism” (PhD Dissertation, University of
Oslo, 2007); Merera Gudina Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for
Democracy, 1960-2000 (2003).
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Gudina, supra note 61, 88.

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By default or design, the Ethiopian ethnic federal system—the divide and rule
tactic of the minority TPLF-led EPRDF regime—pitted ethnic groups 65 against
each other and laid the foundations for disunity. It negatively affected the state-
building project wherein ethnic groups are struggling to maximize their benefits
at the expense of others. Political parties are fragmented along ethnic lines and
citizens are treated differently because of their ethnic background.

Today, Ethiopian politics has graduated from identity politics to “ethnic

nationalism” which ultimately seeks for a sovereign existence as an independent
state separated from Ethiopia. What we can observe as a state of separation from
other ethnic groups—be it at a woreda, zonal or regional level—is a desire for
independent existence from others. 66 There is a persistent quest for statehood by
every ethnic group in the country. Moreover, those ethnic groups which are
granted statehood as per Article 47 of the 1995 Constitution are competing with
the Ethiopian state for sovereignty. Some of them acquired official names that are
equivalent with a nation/country recognized as sovereign under international law.
Article 47(2) lists them as the “State of Tigray, the State of Afar, the State of
Amhara, the State of Oromia, the Sate of Somalia, etc.” in a similar fashion that
independent countries are named. This has emboldened some of the ethnic groups
and political elites who owned such states to demand independent statehood or
secession. The recent war (from November 2020 onwards) between the federal
government of Ethiopia and the TPLF, wherein the latter—former governing
party of Ethiopia—is touting secession is, one manifestation of this process.

65
The TPLF elites worked hard in pitting the Oromos against the Amharas to keep them apart and
prevent them from creating solidarity against the oppressive TPLF-led EPRDF regime. They
propagated the oppression of the Oromos and the suppression of their culture and language by
the previous Amhara-dominated regimes. The state media was encouraged to rehash the
historical domination narrative and, even in some cases, erected statues that commemorate the
brutal nature of the previous regimes against the Oromos.
66
Several zones in Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Regional State are demanding
establishment of their own ethnic-based regional states and secession from the existing state. The
Sidama ethnic group succeeded in forming their own regional state in 2020. Wolaita, Gedeo,
Gurage, and other ethnic groups are demanding statehood.

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2. State-Building Approaches in Ethiopia: Past and Present

The present state of Ethiopia is formed by war and conquest of various previously
autonomous territories and peoples across time and space. Rulers, particularly
from the northern part of the country, conquered large areas in the southern,
western, and eastern parts of present-day Ethiopia. As a result, various ethnic,
linguistic, religious, and cultural groups were brought together, which makes the
country a “museum of nationalities.” 67

Emperor Menelik II (r.1889-1913) is credited for forging the present version of

Ethiopia in its current geographic shape and ethnic make-up. However, it was
Emperor Haile Sellassie I (r.1930-1974) who institutionalized his rule by
introducing a constitution and centralizing power in his hands. With the purpose
of effective centralization and portraying the country as a modern or civilized
state, he introduced the 1931 Constitution. This Constitution contained about 55
Articles, most of which emphasized the semi-divine nature of the Emperor and
the unquestionability of his power. Nothing is said about the different ethnic,
linguistic and religious groups of the country. The Emperor also revised his
constitution in 1955 following the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. No
further improvement has been made to the previous constitution except for the
inclusion of some sort of separation of power (legislative, executive, and judiciary)
and principles of human rights. It even further strengthened the power of the
Emperor. The two constitutions introduced by the Emperor did not recognize the
rights of the different ethnic groups that de facto existed on the ground, as
Ethiopia had to face the heavy-handed centralization and homogenization policies
of Emperor Haile Selassie I. The centralization and homogenization effort of the
Emperor was multifaceted—political, religious, economic, linguistic, and cultural.
In fact, he owed much of the work in these fields to his predecessors. However,
the homogenization efforts of the previous emperors were comparatively
superficial and lacked institutional frameworks. Emperor Haile Selassie embarked
on a more systematic and aggressive process of centralizing and homogenizing the
country’s diverse societies because the unity of the country was believed to be

67
Markakis, supra note 4.

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buildable on the graveyards of such diversities. This conviction of the Emperor

can be seen clearly from the following quote from Bahru Zewde;

The strength of a country lies in its unity, and unity is borne of [common]
language, customs, and religion. Thus, to safeguard the ancient sovereignty
of Ethiopia and to reinforce its unity, our language and our religion should
be proclaimed over the whole of Ethiopia. Otherwise, unity will never be
attained … Amharic and Geez should be decreed official languages for
secular as well as religious affairs and all pagan languages should be
banned. 68

He declared Amharic as the national language and Orthodox Tewahedo

Christianity as the official religion of Ethiopia. 69 Despite apparent diversities, the
Emperor tried to construct the Ethiopian nationhood based on this narrow but
supposedly “core ethnic identity, core religion and core language.” 70 Abebe
Fisseha, illustrates the Emperor’s policy of homogenization under the three
“pillars of unity” when he writes;

[Haile Selassie] began pursuing the goal of transforming the heterogeneous

empire into a homogenous state based on three concepts, which were
translated into the notion of ‘one nation, one people’. These concepts were
[ye haimanot andinet (religious homogeneity), ye kuankua andinet
(linguistic uniformity) and ye zer medebalek (ethnic intermixing). 71

Like his predecessors, Emperor Haile Selassie believed that “Amharaization and
Christianization of the periphery” would be the prerequisite for national unity. 72

68
Vaughan, supra note 4.
69
Revised Constitution of Imperial Ethiopia, articles 125 & 126 respectively.
70
Wudu Tafete Kassu, “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian State and the Alexandrian
See: Indigenizing the Episcopacy and Forging National Identity, 1926-1991” (PhD Dissertation,
University of Illinois, 2006).
71
Quoted in Ibid.
72
For almost all Ethiopian emperors consecrated with the blessing of the Church, unity and
uniformity were seen as one and the same, as if the unity of the country were impossible without
homogeneity in language, religion, culture, and political outlooks.

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Despite his many legal and practical measures to impede the flourishing of
diversity, Haile Selassie was very ‘ingenious’ as a leader insofar as he never
displayed the policy of ethnic and religious assimilation as a public concern.
Instead, he tried to show these differences to be irrelevant for devising public
policies. What matters more, as he said himself, was the holistic conception of
‘ኢትዮጵያዊነት (ʼiteyopẹ yāwinate)’—literally meaning “Ethiopian-ness”—rather
than the particularistic conception of Muslim or Christian, Oromo, Tigray, or
Amhara. 73

Due to popular protest, opposition from the different sectors of the society and
the Ethiopian Student Movement, the Emperor was deposed by the Military
Regime (Derg) in 1974. However, the military regime, was not less oppressive than
the imperial regime. Although constitutionally speaking, 74 the provisions of self-
determination for nationalities and the equality of languages, cultures, and
religions among the different nationalities was introduced in 1987, it was not
implemented in practice. 75 Those who demanded the implementation of their
constitutional rights to self-determination were labelled reactionaries (against the
Socialist Revolution) and narrow nationalists. Hence, they were both publicly and
systematically eliminated from the scene. Except some concessions in the form of
recognition of multi-religious and multiethnic Ethiopia, the Derg’s policy towards
the accommodation of diversity was more or less similar to the imperial regime.
It promoted Amharic and the indivisible Ethiopian identity at the expense of other
languages and ethnic identities.

The policy of assimilation seems to have been reversed following the adoption of
a federal system of governance de facto since 1991 and de jure in 1995. The new
system, with its constitutional federal state structure, not only recognizes but also

73
Ibid.
74
Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provides the
right to self-determination of the different ethnic groups of the country. It states that the
nationalities are equal and ensured the equality of nationalities through combating chauvinism
and narrow-minded nationalism. It advanced the claim that this can be achieved by enhancing
the equality and respectability of the languages of nationalities as well as through equal
participation in economic, social, and cultural fields and the realization of regional autonomy.
75
Gudina, supra note 64.

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uses ethnicity and language as the bases for state formation. The previous core
identities used as foundations for nation-state building just became one
component of the “multi-linguistic, multicultural, multi-religious and multiethnic
state of Ethiopia” under the umbrella of ethnic-based federalism. 76

3. The Legal Framework for Accommodating Diversity in

Post-1991 Ethiopia
Under the new Ethiopian federal system, the importance of ethnicity is on the rise.
In sharp contrast to the policies of the former regimes, the new system recognizes
and even rewards ethnic-based organizations (be they political, social, or
economic). The new Constitution constituting the ethnic-based federal system
envisaged a “mother-state” for all the ethnic groups of Ethiopia by dividing
internal sovereignty between the central (federal) government and regional
states. 77

To reiterate the official idiom, ethnic federalism is intended to redress past

injustices and cultivate a sense of unity in diversity by granting ethnic groups a
full measure of the self-rule rights manifested through establishing one’s own
state. In principle, the Constitution guarantees all NNPs of Ethiopia their own
home-state within the federation. If we take this constitutional declaration
seriously, the country will be divided into at least 85 78 ethnic-based regional states
for achieving various purposes: 1) to fulfill their unconditional right to self-
determination up to and including secession; 2) to guarantee the right to a full
measure of self-government in their own territory; 3) to realize the right to speak,
write, and develop their own languages and express, develop, and promote their

76
The Ethiopian variant of federalism is sometimes termed as ethnic federalism as it uses, among
other things, ethnicity as the basis for establishing constituent units of the federation.
77
Articles 50, 51, and 52 of FDRE Constitution.
78
Following a political reform in 2018 under the leadership of PM Abiy Ahmed, several ethnic
groups are claiming their constitutional rights to establish their own state. The Sidama ethnic
group has attained its own regional state status. Wolaita, Gamo, Gofa, and Kambatta ethnic
groups are also heading towards the same end. Others will definitely follow suit after taking into
account the benefits they could get from establishing their own state.

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culture and preserve their history; and 4) to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts
by creating homogenous states. In practice, however, only nine regional states 79
are in place for the more than 85 ethnic communities in the country; all others
subsumed under these states with the status of zone, wereda (district) or kebele 80
administrations.

The desire to create a homogenous administrative state for each of the more than
85 ethnic groups in the country is impractical, if not impossible. Hence, it failed
to create autonomous and homogenous regional states for each and every ethnic
group in Ethiopia. It is not a surprise therefore that none of these regional states
are homogenous. Almost all states have a minimum of more than one ethnic
group. Some of them, such as the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s
Regional State (SNNPRS) are even extraordinarily diverse and called a “museum
of ethnic groups” or a “federation within a federation” themselves. 81 The SNNPRS
alone consists of 56 ethnic groups (more than half of the country’s ethnic
communities). 82

Apart from the impracticability of granting a home state to all ethnic groups, the
territorialization of ethnicity resulted in the exclusion of a large portion of the
Ethiopian people who are residing outside of their so-called home-state from
political and economic benefits and stirred up tensions and conflicts across the
country. It also exacerbated the politicization of ethnicity, dichotomizing people
as owners and outsiders, newcomers and indigenes, titulars and non-titulars, etc.

79
At the time of the writing this paper, the number of regional states most recently reached 11 with
the establishment of Sidama and the South-West Ethiopia Peoples’ Regional States in June 2020
and November 2021, respectively. Both are separated from the multiethnic Southern Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State. All other major ethnic groups, such as the Wolaita,
Gedeo, and Gurage are making similar moves for their own independent statehood within the
federation. The federal government is planning to divide the region into different clusters but
faces stiff resistance from the local population and the political elites.
80
Kebele is the lowest level of state administration in Ethiopia
81
Assefa Fiseha Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative
Study (2007).
82
Central Statistics Agency, supra note 1.

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The “son of the soil” criterion is being applied throughout the regional states
where access to services is given to the “indigenes” at the expense of “settlers” or
“outsiders.” It has increasingly become difficult for an Amhara, Tigray, Oromo,
Wolaita, Gurage, or a member of any other ethnic group to access political
appointments, jobs, or educational opportunities in “other” ethnic-based regions,
zones, or woredas other than their “own.” Because of the notion of “the son of the
soil” adopted in the ethnic-based regional states, one cannot be considered
“indigene” irrespective of the number of years, or generations for that matter, he
may have lived in that particular area. The primacy of the indigene and non-
indigene categorization is made salient by the regional state constitutions wherein
there is no way for the latter to be converted to the former to benefit from
citizenship entitlements. In other words, the regional state constitutions
exacerbated ethnic differences and the indigeneity versus non-indigeneity
dichotomy by inscribing cleavages that ended up dividing instead of uniting the
various sections of the society.

The troubling dimension of identity politics in Ethiopia is that it became the basis
for inclusion and exclusion in the regional states’ body politic. In this case, the
designation of indigeneity is the basis for citizenship rights, entitlements, and
access to opportunities. A substantial number of Ethiopians who are residing
outside of their so-called home-states are confronting the deliberate denial of job
opportunities, political appointments, and economic opportunities. As a result of
the propagation of identity politics in ethnic-based regions, there is rising tension
and hostility between the indigenes and non-indigenes. 83 The hostilities and
violence against non-indigenes has taken an ethnic form. Non-indigenes are being
singled out and attacked by organized groups. This, ultimately, strengthens ethnic
solidarity, which undermines national integration. As elaborated below, the scale,
intensity, and frequency of identity/ethnic conflicts increased in post-1991

83
A study conducted by the FDRE Identity and Boundary Commission (2021) across the country
confirm that conflicts between Gumuz and highlanders in Benishangul-Gumuz; Aynuaa, Nuer
and highlanders in Gambela Region, and indigenes and non-indigenes in other regions formed
along ethnic lines.

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Ethiopia following the adoption of ethnic-based federalism. 84 The conflicts range

from so-called indigene versus indigene conflicts, to indigene versus non-indigene
conflicts and are widespread across the country from the east to the west and from
the north to the south. Evidence is abundant showing that many of the conflicts
are identity-based and manipulated by political leaders, either from the incumbent
or opposition parties, affecting not only the state-building process but also
communal and peaceful co-existence.

4. Implications of Politicized Identity on Ethnic Coexistence:

Evidence from the Regions
Despite the 1995 FDRE Constitution provisions for non-discrimination 85—be it
on the basis of race, nation, nationality or other social origin, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, property, birth, or other status—several
regional states constitutions, if not all, inserted provisions that discriminate
against people on the basis of, inter alia, ethnic origin.

The preamble of the 2003 Revised Constitution of the Gambela People’s National
Regional State, for instance, begins with “We, the Anyuaa, Nuer, Majang, Opo and
Omo nationalities (ethnic groups),” excluding other ethnic groups that constitute
around a quarter of the region’s population. It confirms that these ethnic groups,
using their right to self-determination and with their full consent, ratified the
constitution believing it to redress the historical, economic, and social injustices
imposed by previous Ethiopian regimes. In this inscription, it is understandable
that only the five ethnic groups are the owners of the region. They are entitled to

84
This does not mean that there were no conflicts in Ethiopia before the adoption of ethnic
federalism. There were conflicts across the country but they were mainly related to either
controlling natural resources or political power. However, after the adoption of ethnic
federalism, conflicts took the form and shape of ethnic conflict as the manners to control
resources and power came to be shaped by ethnic identity. Conflicts arise when political elites
appeal to ethnic support either during election campaigns or whenever they feel themselves
losing political legitimacy. As a result, those resource-related conflicts in the past changed into
ethnic conflicts as the rules of the political game dictate the organizations and struggles to be
along ethnic lines.
85
1995 FDRE Constitution, Article 25.

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different opportunities offered by the region at the exclusion of other ethnic

groups. An Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, Wolaita, Gurage, or any other ethnic group
other than the five expressly mentioned “indigenous ethnic groups” is always to
be considered an “outsider” or “settler,” 86 if not oppressor, in the region because
the constitution already identified and accorded “indigenous ethnic group status”
to the five ethnic groups. The political power is exclusively controlled by the
indigenous ethnic groups.

The instrumentalization of identity is applied by organizing and mobilizing the so-

called indigenous ethnic groups against so-called oppressors, highlanders/settlers, or
non-indigenes. Although the five ethnic groups speak different languages, they are
merged together as “indigenous and oppressed.” This narrative is used as justification
for “special entitlements” to political appointment, job opportunities, political
representation, and other benefits offered by the regional state. These ethnic groups
themselves compete with one another for control of the political powers in the region
and the available natural resources such as land and pasture.87 The Anyuaa, for
example, claim to be the original inhabitants of the region while the Nuer are
considered newcomers who emigrated from South Sudan during the Sudan Civil
War.88 However, when it comes to the struggle against outsiders, they come together
to exclude the non-indigenous.

Contrary to the equality of citizens provided under the 1995 Constitution of

Ethiopia, any political appointment and representation is exclusively provided for
the five indigenous ethnic groups to the total exclusion of settlers/highlanders or
non-indigenous groups. In this sense, the mobilization of ethnic groups is not

86
All ethnic groups or individuals other than the five indigenous ethnic groups are named
differently, which means the same thing for the purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the political
and economic opportunities of the region. The most commonly used terms include, among
others: non-indigenous, outsiders, settlers, highlanders, non-titulars, newcomers, the red
(referring to their light skin compared with the dark skin of the indigenous), non-natives, etc. In
this paper, I use all of these terms interchangeably to mean the same thing with regard to special
constitutional entitlement or exclusion.
87
Dereje Feyissa, Playing Different Games: The Paradox of Anywaa and Nuer Identification
Strategies in the Gambela Region, Ethiopia (2011).
88
Ibid.

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about the recognition of equal rights or the protection of individual rights but the
ultimate goal is to control and own the state. 89 The ethnic criterion is simply set to
disqualify other ethnic groups who do not share the same ethnic background or
speak a similar language. Moreover, the sense of victimhood is heightened in this
mobilization to instrumentalize their identities for the purpose of excluding so-
called oppressors. The political parties organized along ethnic lines and select
elites further stir up anger against outsiders/non-indigenes. Even worse, members
of the ruling party in the region are accused of involving themselves in chasing the
newcomers by supporting the local communities.

Similarly, the 2003 Revised Constitution of the Benishangul/Gumuz Regional

State lists the “owners of the regional state.” Article 2 of the Constitution,
captioned “owner nationalities (ethnic groups) of the region” provides that
“notwithstanding the presence of other ethnic groups, regional ownership right
belongs to Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo.” This dichotomization is
often accompanied by preferential treatment in all aspects of publicly funded
resources (education opportunities, job provision, political representation,
linguistic rights, and the provision of other public services). The so-called settlers
in the Benishangul/Gumuz Regional State, for example, account for about half of
the Region’s population. They were excluded from the political representation
altogether until the issue was later solved by the House of Federation through its
power of Constitutional adjudication or interpretation. 90

The constitutions of other regional states which are considered relatively

homogenous, are not better than the constitutions of heterogeneous states as
regards dichotomizing individuals or groups into “insiders” and “outsiders” or

89
Mesay Kebede, supra note 16.
90
This case was initiated by a group of persons from the Bambasi and Assosa woredas of the
Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State who claimed to belong to and represent the Amhara,
Oromo, Agew, and Tigray residents of the area. They contested the constitutionality of both a
decision by the Election Board—banning them from running for election on grounds of not
speaking the language of the electoral district—and Article 38 of Proclamation 111/95. In
delivering its final verdict the HoF declared the alleged proclamation constitutional and the
decision of the Board to exclude those candidates running for the federal parliament
unconstitutional.

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“indigenes and non-indigenes.” They are designed in a way intended to create

“nation-states” at the local level, in sharp contrast to the multiethnic and
multicultural nature of the Ethiopian state and people. The 2002 Revised
Constitution of Oromia National Regional State, for example, begins with “We,
the Oromo People,” in sharp contrast to the “We, the Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples of Ethiopia” of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution that recognizes and
acknowledges diversity. The Constitution of Oromia recognizes only the Oromo
people as “holders of sovereign power,” ignoring, if not excluding, members of
other ethnic groups and individuals residing in the region. 91

Due to factors related to the constitutional exclusion of other ethnic groups and
the mobilization of the Oromos against so-called oppressors, attacks and killings
happened in several parts of the region. The Bedeno and Arbagugu killings, mostly
targeting Amhara and Christian settlers in Oromia National Regional State at the
beginning of the EPRDF era, was an early signal that the politicization of ethnicity
was a “threat” to Ethiopia’s future stability and peaceful coexistence among
different ethnic groups. 92 It was believed that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),
an ethnic-based faction that occupied some key positions during the Transitional
Period (1991-1994) and left the stage in 1992 due to disagreement with the EPRDF
on power sharing arrangements, has encouraged the local Oromo people to rise
up against the Amharas. The Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO),
a member of the EPRDF coalition, later took it farther and manipulated ethnic
differences to instigate ethnic conflicts directed against “newcomers” or “settlers.”
The Amhara settlers were often depicted as oppressors and even colonizers who
came from the north to subjugate and plunder the resources of the Oromo
people. 93 The federal government intervened very late with reluctance and little
vigor to stop the mass killings. Several people were killed and evicted, leaving their
homes and properties behind. Attacks and killings targeting other ethnic groups,

91
According to the 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia, about 15% of the population
in the region belong to non-Oromo ethnic groups (9.1% Amhara, 1.3% Gurage, and 4.6% others)
(CSA, 1994).
92
Moresh Wogenie Amhara Organization, A Study Summary on the Crime of Ethnic Cleansing
Perpetrated on The Amhara of Ethiopia, 1991-2016, (2016), https://moreshwogenie.org.
93
Asafa Jalata, Oromia & Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868-1992 (1993).

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particularly the Amharas in Oromia, continue to this day. In a more recent ethnic-
based attack, scores of Amharas were killed in the East Wollega Zone of Oromia
region. The government of Ethiopia blamed the OLF-Shene, while the OLF rebel
group implicated the Ethiopian government for the killings.

Similarly, the 2002 Revised Constitution of Somali National Regional State confers
sovereign power to the Somali people, excluding other ethnic groups or
individuals belonging to non-Somali ethnic groups. It tries to create a Somali
“nation-state” at the regional level, contradicting the multiethnic and
multinational nature of the Ethiopia. The list goes on. Other constitutions of the
regional states such as the SNNRS, though aiming to embrace the rights of all
ethnic groups, designates the zonal & woreda units exclusively for the “owner
ethnic groups” at the exclusion of others. In sum, the way regional constitutions
are designed and operationalized violates the rights of ethnic groups or individuals
who do not belong to the so-called indigenous ethnic groups. This
dichotomization ultimately resulted in discriminatory treatment of Ethiopian
citizens across regions and damaged social cohesion and the state-building project
in the country.

Conclusion the Way Forward

As shown in this paper, identity politics or the politicization of identity in the

current Ethiopian ethnic-based federal system is inimical to the state-building
process and the societal integration necessary to develop one political community
with shared vision and goals. Respect for one’s cultural and linguistic rights is
desirable and commendable. However, in the Ethiopian context, it goes beyond
this and became a source of contestation and a basis for inclusion and exclusion
in the Ethiopian body politic that has exacerbated conflicts that take ethnic form.
Ethnicity and other primordial elements of differences are instrumentalized by
political elites to gain material and psychological advantages over perceived or real
“enemies.” Ethnic differences are sentimentalized and manipulated by political
elites to secure cheap political popularity and advantage at the expense of societal
coexistence, political stability, and state-building. As long as ethnic-based regional

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states and ethnic political parties continue in their present form and shape,
Ethiopia’s state-building efforts and the peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups will
remain negatively affected.

The real choice here is not between a return to the imperial regime that envisaged
a homogenized nation-state through assimilation or an authoritarian Derg-like
government that denies the right to self-determination of ethnic groups. That has
already brought devastating consequences to the country. The real question rather
would be: How can we optimally use the benefits of a federal state arrangement to
accommodate the demands and preferences of various ethnic groups without
politicizing identity and endangering the unity of the country and its people? It
can be done in different ways. Without necessarily imposing it by law, the
government, in consultation with the general public and opposition parties, can
discourage party organizations along ethnic lines. There is an attempt by the PP
to make ideology and national outlook a basis for political party organizations. To
make parties’ ideology and organization transcend ethnic boundaries, the
electoral system can be devised in such a way that it encourages them to be non-
ethnic. The final option would be prohibiting ethnic parties by law.

As Ethiopia is recognized as a multiethnic state that requires ethnic federalism to

guarantee autonomy and self-rule rights for all ethnic groups, all regional states
and subnational units should follow its footsteps. Adopting a ‘nation-state model’
at regional levels is not only at odds with the overall principle of the Ethiopian
ethnic federalism that entertains multinationalism and multiculturalism but also
discriminates against ethnic groups or individuals who are different from the
owner ethnic groups of the regional states. If Ethiopia is multiethnic, then by
implication the constituent units/regional states that form the Ethiopian
federation are multiethnic. Hence, regional states are required to respect the
autonomy and self-rule rights of other ethnic groups or individuals residing in
their jurisdictions.

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As the way forward to make the present federal system workable for the benefit of
the Ethiopian people as a whole, the implementation of the following
recommendations is suggested:

- Amendments to some of the regional state constitutions and the federal

constitution are required. Those provisions that encourage ethnic
polarization and secession need to be amended.

- Design institutions that require the cooperation of ethnic political parties

that aspire to occupy higher political positions. In this case, any political
party aspiring to control power at the federal level needs to appeal to other
ethnic groups for support in order to win election. The Nigerian case is a
good example in that anyone aspiring to be president needs to secure the
support of the majority of states and ethnic groups, implying that he/she
has to work hard to earn the support of the majority of ethnic groups other
than his/her own ethnic group. Shifting to a presidential system is one such
institutional arrangement. Unlike the parliamentary system, where
members may be elected by the various ethnic groups in their localities, the
presidential election requires universal suffrage where all ethnic groups are
directly involved in the election of the president. Universal suffrage and
majority vote guarantees both group and individual rights and pressurizes
the president to be a moderate candidate who can appeal to all ethnic
groups in the country. Prohibition of political party organization along
ethnic or other sectarian lines by law is the last option if the other measures
do not work.

- Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to control the activities of

politicians and government officials who use ethnicity and other identity
markers in their political campaigns to create hostilities and divisions
among different communities.

- Regional state boundaries need to be redrawn so as not to align with ethnic

or any other primordial division among people. In this regard, those larger
ethnic groups and regional states should be redrawn to avoid the
temptation of acting as a sovereign state and to minimize the tendencies of

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secession. Put simply, reform is needed in the administrative boundaries of

regional states/zones or woredas so as to respond to changing
circumstances and depoliticize ethnic identity. Nigeria is an example where
regional state boundaries are not necessarily intertwined with ethnic
identity. Some bigger ethnic groups are divided into several regional states.
Switzerland is another example in that Cantons’ boundaries are not
matched with linguistic identifications. The German-speaking community
are divided into several cantons. The same is true for French-speaking Swiss
community. An ongoing effort by the government to investigate problems
related to boundary demarcation and the implementation of self-
government rights at local levels via the Identity and Boundary
Commission is a good start. The findings could serve as a steppingstone for
boundary adjustments that would reduce politicized identity and ethnic
conflicts associated with boundary related disputes.

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