This tort is unique in the common law in providing relief for a mere emotional disturbance

unaccompanied by external physical contact.

Assault seeks to protect the plaintiff's interest in freedom from being subjected to mental anxiety.

Assault is defined in Blackstone's Of Private Wrongs as:

An attempt to offer or beat another, without touching him: as if lifts up his cane, or his fist, in a
threatening manner; or strikes at him, but misses him; this is an assault insult us, which Finch describes
to be an unlawful setting upon one's person. This is also an inchoate violence, amounting considerably
higher than bare threats; and therefore, though no actual suffering is proved, yet the party injured may
have redress by action of trespass.

Basically, an assault is an attempt or threat to cause harm to the other without any actual contact.

As a matter of principle, all the elements, except the physical contact requirement, applicable in the
case of a battery are also essentials for assault.

It would thus require a plaintiff in the case of assault to prove all the elements of battery except the
element of physical contact.

Timorousness on the part of the plaintiff is relevant; provided the defendant excites apprehension or
fear of contact in him, there is assault. But note not just fear; it must be fear of `.

For example, neither a gesture (a) behind bar, or (b) by a person firmly secured from causing harm to
others can constitute assault because any fear one feels of being hurt would be considered
unreasonable in law.

For in the person's situation, he cannot carry out his threat. This means for the threat of battery to
amount to an assault the threat must be real or reasonable.

In Read v Coker (1853), the court held that, the acts of the defendant constituted assault. The principle
is that assault lies where there is an intention to assault and also the ability to carry the threat into
execution.

Per Jervis CJ: "If anything short of actual striking will in law constitute an assault, the facts here clearly
showed that the defendant was guilty of an assault. There was a threat of violence exhibiting an
intention to assault, and a present ability to carry into execution."

It must be noted however that, it is not every threat then which constitutes assault. To constitute an
assault, there must be an act constituting a threat, to do personal violence to the party, complaining,
coupled with a present ability to carry out the threat.

There must be some act done denoting an intention to commit a battery plus the ability there and then
to carry out the threat. The concern therefore is with an intentional conduct which puts a person in
reasonable fear or apprehension of imminent battery.

A vivid analogy is the difference between the BARK of a dog, which equals assault and the BITE which is
battery.
The tort, however stresses two things: (a) an act manifesting an intention or threat of the defendant to
commit battery; and (b) the defendant's ability to execute this intention, that is, the defendant was in a
position to commit and did manifest an intention to commit battery.

Thus, the general principle is that, Assault does not lie where there is no means of carrying into effect
the threatened act.

In Stephens v Myers (1830), per Tindal CJ: "It is not every threat, when there is no actual personal
violence, that constitutes an assault; there must, in all cases, be the means of carrying the threat into
effect. The question I shall leave to you will be, whether the defendant was advancing at the time, in a
threatening attitude, to strike the chairman, so that his blow would almost immediately almost
immediately have reached the chairman, if he had not been stop [sic]; then, though he was not near
enough at the time to have struck him, yet , if he was advancing with that intent, I think it amounts to an
assault in law. If he was so advancing, that, within a second or two of time, he would have reached the
plaintiff, it seems to me it is an assault in law."

In Thomas v National Union of Mine Workers [1986] the court held that the abuses shouted at the
plaintiffs as they passed by to work did not amount to assault. But it was actionable in tort as an
unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the highway.

Also, as a general rule, a threat and ability to carry out the threat, to point an unloaded gun at another
constitutes no assault.

In Blake v Barnard, the court held that, the defendant was liable for assault but not with the pistol. This
is because, for a threat to amount to assault, there must be an intention to carry the threat into effect. If
it was impossible at the time to carry out the threat, there is no assault.

Attempts have been made to diminish the authority of the case on the grounds that it was decided on a
pleading point. But it is entirely consistent with the old law's conception of assault as a threat of battery
plus present ability to effect the threat.

In Osborn v. Veitch, the court held that, the defendants were liable for assault irrespective of the fact
that the guns were only half-cocked, because, to point a loaded gun at another is assault.

Per Wiles J "Pointing a loaded gun at a person is in law an assault. It is immaterial that it is at half-cock;
cocking it is an instantaneous act, and there is a 'present ability' of doing the act threatened, for it can
be done in an instant."

In Miller v. A-G, per Abban J (as he then was) stated that, to point a loaded revolver at another in such a
hostile manner and within shooting distance and which conduct puts that other person in reasonable
fear or apprehension of a battery constitutes assault.

In R. v. St. George, the court held that, the defendant was liable in assault. To point a gun at another is
assault, whether the gun is loaded or not, provided the plaintiff perceives it to be loaded.

Per Parke B"It is an assault to present a pistol at ail, whether loaded or not. If you threw the powder out
of the pan, or took the percussion cap off, and said to the party, 'This is an empty pistol,' then that
would be no assault; for there the party must see that it was not possible that he should be injured; but
if a' person presents a pistol which has the appearance of being loaded, and puts the party into fear and
harm, that is' what it is the object of the law to prevent."

In Mortin v Shoppee (1828), the court held that, this was an assault. To cause a person to run for fear of
being beaten is assault.

Per Tenterden CJ: "If the defendant rode after the plaintiff, so as to compel him to run into his garden
for shelter, to avoid being beaten, that is in law an assault."

Can mere words constitute an assault?

In the old law, words per se, no matter how menacing, did not constitute assault. This was justified on
grounds that merely saying and not doing does not constitute trespass.

In R v Meade and Belt (1823), the court held that, no assault was committed. This is because mere
words do not amount to assault.

Per Holroyd J: "No words or singing are equivalent to an assault."

In R v Wilson [1955], the court held that the defendant committed common assault because mere words
could constitute assault.

Even if words alone cannot constitute assault, words accompanying an act can negate assault, so it was
held in Tuberville v. Savage that, words negating an intent to carry out a threat make the threat no
assault.

The court noted that, "Therefore if one strike another upon the hand, or arm or breast in discourse, it is
no assault, there being no intention to assault; but, if one, intending to assault, strike at another and
miss him, this is an assault; so if he holds up his hand against another in a threatening manner and says
nothing, it is an assault."

Bruce v. Dyer, provides a reasonable rationalisation of the controversy over loaded and unloaded guns,
toy weapons and words.

The court basing on the principle; where a person reasonably believes that he is in fact in danger of
violence, actual intent or power of the defendant to carry the threat to its effect may not be necessary,
held that, the plaintiff had first committed assault on the defendant that justified his use of force to
prevent further assault.

Per Ferguson J: "SO an attempted assault is itself an assault; so, an attempt to strike another is an
assault even though no contact has been made. Usually, when there is no actual intention to use
violence there can be no assault. When there is no power to use violence to the knowledge of the
plaintiff there can be no assault. There need not be in fact any actual intention or power to use violence,
for it is enough if the plaintiff on reasonable grounds believes that he is in fact in danger of violence. So,
if a person shakes his fist at another the person so assaulted may strike back, if he, on reasonable
grounds, believes that he is in danger."

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES

The general rule is that, assault and battery are actionable per se.
Once the tort is acknowledged, damages are at large.

Any consequential loss, e.g. damage to chattels or physical injuries, is recoverable, if it is not too remote.
But the quantum of the damages, depend on proof of actual loss.

In Nsiah v. Ampratwum, Apaloo J (as he then was) assessed general damages at £1,500 in favour of the
plaintiff because he found the "assault was outrageous in the extreme and was, entirely unprovoked.
The plaintiff was severely beaten and left for dead and with a stroke of bad luck, may well have died. In
all the circumstances of this case, and bearing in mind that the first defendant used these sanitary
labourers as tools to vent his private vengeance on the plaintiff and did so callously."

In Asare v Ofosuhene (1980), the court held that, the courts would award exemplary damages to
vindicate the strength of the law and not to justify such awards as a liberal measure of compensation to
the plaintiff. The award of exemplary damages was limited to three categories of cases; viz (i) where
there had been oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by servants of the government; (ii)
where the defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make profit for himself which might well
exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (iii) where statute expressly authorised such an
award.