Armory Report

1 4 2023-00048579
Belton, Rhondesia 900 E MAIN ST Rochester 225
03/05/2023 23:05 Death Investigation
Non-Criminal Death Investigation No
The purpose of this IAR is to summarize the investigation:

Victim(1): (deceased) Rhondesia Belton, Redacted , Buffalo
Victim(2): (deceased) Aisha Stephens (Haskins), Redacted , Syracuse
Victim(3): (deceased) Brandy Miller, Redacted , Rochester
Victim(4): Redacted , Redacted Rochester
Victim(5): Redacted , Redacted , Rochester
Victim(11): Redacted , Redacted Buffalo
Not Applicable (non-crime) Not Applicable (non-crime) Not Applicable (non-crime)
WEIGEL ERIC 1607 03/23/2023 WEIGEL, ERIC C. 03/23/2023
IAR Case Update 2023-00048579 Page 1 OF 4

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There was a rap concert (GloRilla) on the evening of March 5, 2023 at the Armory Concert Hall (900 E.
Main St) from 20:00 to 23:00 hours. RPD had a special event detail in place for outside the venue,
consisting of one sergeant and seven officers or investigators. The Armory had security inside the
venue, provided by Enterprise Security Consulting & Training (ESCT). The performer, GloRilla, also
had her own security, provided by Feel Safe VIP.
At the conclusion of the event, around 23:05, officers on the special event detail observed a crowd
running out of the front of the venue. It appeared to have been a massive flow of people pushing
and shoving their way out in what was described as a stampede. Simultaneously, there were 911
calls and reports for a possible shooting, stabbing, and overdose inside the venue. Due to the mass
exodus, officers were unable to immediately make their way inside. It appeared as though Security
was unable to manage the size and volume of the crowd.
Eventually, as the crowd cleared out and officers were able to make their way inside, they located
several individuals that had essentially been trampled inside during the mass exodus. EMS, RFD
Members and RPD Officers assisted Security who were attempting to provide medical aid to the first
four listed victims who were unresponsive inside the front entryway. (V4) Redacted was removed
from the chaotic scene and transported to URMC by her friends. (V1), (V2) and (V3) were eventually
transported to URMC by AMR. (V1) Belton was pronounced dead shortly after arrival on March 5.
(V3) Miller was pronounced dead on March 6. (V2) Stephens (Haskins) was pronounced on March 8.
The additional listed victims arrived by private vehicles at area hospitals with what were described
as minor non-life-threatening injuries.
The owner of the venue (Scott Donaldson) was on-scene and cooperative with us. He advised the
majority of the video surveillance inside the venue were simply dummy cameras that did not record.
Officers did locate a surveillance system with at least two live view cameras. Technicians were
unable to determine if they recorded at the time but Donaldson provided consent for us to take the
system and follow up.
Donaldson advised the security company he utilized was ESCT (Enterprise Security Consulting and
Training Company). We were provided with 40 names working security for this company the evening
of the concert. Investigators and PSI Supervisors interviewed Security who remained on-scene.
Donaldson was only able to provide an estimated attendance of approximately 3000 people. The
following day, Armory General Manager, Pam Fee, provided an estimated attendance of 3900 people.
Donaldson and Fee also indicated the Armory had a security team consisting of 10-15 individuals
and agreed to provide a list of names. When Investigators attempted to obtain a more accurate
headcount, and the list of Armory Security, they were denied by the owner, acting on advice of his
attorney. Licensing indicated the venue had a capacity of 5000.
During the preliminary investigation we were unable to substantiate any shots fired or stabbing
having occurred inside. Some patrons interviewed reported hearing a couple loud pops, but it
appears these noises were likely confetti poppers at the end of the concert. There were reports,
along with the smell of pepper spray being utilized. There is conflicting information as to the front
doors being closed and locked with chains during the concert. Unlocked chains were observed on
the doors.
Goodman Section completed an ABC referral, CR 23-048650. We requested RFD have a Fire Marshall
check for code compliance during the preliminary investigation. Members of RFD responded the

3 4 2023-00048579
night of and scheduled follow up.

Investigators Barber and Gotham, and Sergeants Reff and Weigel followed up on numerous tasks
related to this investigation in the subsequent days after March 5.
Investigators initiated contact with family members of the three deceased victims. They facilitated
locating and returning any lost property to them and addressing any concerns or follow up.
Investigators also followed up with re-interviewing the additional eight victims.
All lost property which was initially collected by staff at the Armory was collected by Investigators,
photographed and cataloged before being turned in to the Property Clerk’s Office. This in addition
to all footwear and cell phones collected the night of the incident by the Technician’s Unit.
Members of PSI conducted interviews of Security personnel who were not interviewed at the Armory.
Interviews were also conducted of dozens of concert-goers and tipsters in the subsequent days.
Follow up interviews were also attempted with all of the 911 callers. Investigators met with or
corresponded with attendees who lost property, attempting to reunite them with their respective
keys, coats, jewelry, shoes, clothing items, phones, etc.
The primary security company contracted by the Armory was ESCT, they conducted pat frisks at the
main entrance, and security throughout the venue. Additionally, GloRilla had private security
provided by Feel Safe VIP, also a local company, who remained backstage and left immediately at the
conclusion of the concert with the performer.
The Technician’s Unit utilized DVR Examiner on the DVR system collected and learned there was no
video of the incident, and it was determined to have no videos saved since 2014. The two ATM
machines on the concert floor and one machine in the lobby were all learned to not have video
recording capabilities. There were no external video sources on the Armory or any independent
sources in the immediate neighborhood around the Armory. Several videos and posts on social
media were reviewed and uploaded to C3. All BWC video taken during the incident was also
reviewed.
On March 13, 2023 members of the RPD CAB, RFD, Buildings and Zoning (Code Enforcement), PSI
and Donaldson’s attorneys conducted a walk-through of the Armory. The Director of Buildings and
Zoning completed an assessment and list of violations.
RPD Officers interviewed dozens of Armory Staff leaving the facility in the early hours of March 6,
coupled with the numerous interviews conducted by PSI, over 100 people in total were interviewed.
Many people had little or no information to provide to the investigation. Many people heard second
hand, the report of shots fired or loud “pops,” however, no person interviewed was able to provide a
first-hand account of any of these claims. Several people interviewed opined on what transpired or
why, but aside from speculation, no facts were learned. Furthermore, there was no physical
evidence to support gunshots having been fired inside the venue. Although there were some claims
of gunshots fired immediately in front of the Armory, RPD members outside their vehicles in front of
the venue were able to refute this assertion.
Investigators re-interviewed several Security Guards from ESCT, many of which claimed to have no
knowledge of what precipitated the rush of people toward the front door. There were a few Security
Guards, stationed near or at the front door, who provided essentially the same version of events.
They reported a large number of people, possibly 200, were outside on the front steps attempting to

4 4 2023-00048579
gain entry with less than 20 minutes remaining in the show. Some of these people were insistent
upon being permitted to enter claiming they possessed VIP tickets. Security attempted to allow
entry to these VIP ticket holders, while conducting pat-frisks and checking tickets. Some reported
the tickets were not scanned. Eventually, all of the approximately 200 people were able to overtake
Security and gain entry to the foyer. Security attempted to create a stronghold on the inner, wooden
doors, to maintain this crowd in the entryway. As the concert concluded, thousands of people were
attempting to exit via the front/main doors and were met with a crowd attempting to enter. This
“traffic jam” is one of the likely contributing factors to the stampede as people still within the main
concert hall began to push toward the front doors. Additional reports provided the crowd was
exiting the front doors when an unknown issue, further inside the Armory, created a rush or surge of
people pushing violently toward the exit.
On March 20, I was contacted by the Director of Investigations for the New York State Department of
Health. He indicated he was issuing a subpoena to the Armory’s Owner and the Promoter to
establish an accurate head count of attendees. Additionally, these results would be shared with PSI
when they become available.
At this point in the investigation, PSI has not located any physical evidence, video evidence, nor eye
witness account of a criminal act which caused hundreds, if not thousands of people to engage in a
mass exodus of the Armory. We have also not found any evidence the front doors were locked at the
time the concert concluded, conversely any eye witness with knowledge or observations of the front
doors stated they were all (four) open.


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1 4 2023-00048579

Belton, Rhondesia 900 E MAIN ST Rochester 225

03/05/2023 23:05 Death Investigation

Non-Criminal Death Investigation No

The purpose of this IAR is to summarize the investigation:

Not Applicable (non-crime) Not Applicable (non-crime) Not Applicable (non-crime)

WEIGEL ERIC 1607 03/23/2023 WEIGEL, ERIC C. 03/23/2023

IAR Case Update 2023-00048579 Page 1 OF 4

WEIGEL ERIC 1607 03/23/2023 WEIGEL, ERIC C. 03/23/2023

night of and scheduled follow up.

WEIGEL ERIC 1607 03/23/2023 WEIGEL, ERIC C. 03/23/2023

WEIGEL ERIC 1607 03/23/2023 WEIGEL, ERIC C. 03/23/2023

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