2

The Ottoman
Conquest of Yemen:
The Ismaili Perspective
Samer Traboulsi

T
ayyibi Ismaili cosmological doctrine divides the universe
into two worlds: the world of creation (ʿ ālam al-ibdāʿ ), con-
sisting of a neoplatonic hierarchy of ten intellects and the
ten spheres of the universe, and our world of religion (ʿ ālam al-dīn),
which is organized into recurring cycles and megacycles of proph-
ets, speakers (nāṭiq, plural nuṭaqāʾ ), and imams to mirror those in
the world of creation.1 The worldly cycles alternate between peri-
ods of manifestation (kashf ) and periods of concealment (satr).
Currently, we live in a period of concealment that began with the
occultation of Imam al-Tayyib around 524/1129 in Fatimid Cairo.
Under the leadership of the Sulayhid queen Arwa bint Ahmad (d.
532/1137), the Ismaili communities in Yemen and India opted to
follow al-Tayyib and his descendants in concealment, hence their
designation as Tayyibi Ismailis. 2 During the absence of the imam,
the community is led by a chief dāʿ ī (missionary), the dāʿ ī muṭlaq,
and a number of religious clerics, the ḥudūd, who are distributed
among the community. The period from the time the chief dāʿ ī
took charge of the daʿ w a (proselytizing mission) in Yemen until
the day the Tayyibis decided to move to Gujarat, India, in 974/1567
saw some glory days and numerous setbacks; these led one of the
dāʿ ī s to describe this period of concealment as “the greatest and

41
42 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

hardest of all.” 3 Ironically, the victories and setbacks of the daʿ w a

followed a pattern of seemingly vicious cycles that plagued the
Tayyibi daʿ w a throughout its history. This was mainly due to the
nature of the military and political involvement of the community
on the Yemeni scene.
By the end of the seventh/thirteenth century, the Tayyibi com-
munity was immersed in the political and military affairs of Yemen.
However, despite its military victories, the daʿ w a did not succeed
in becoming an independent power in the region. It played only
a secondary role in the military arena due to its limited human
resources. Thus, the daʿ w a could not survive in the absence of a
centralized state with an active presence in the highlands, be it
the Ayyubids, Rasulids, Tahirids, or Ottomans. For the absence of
such an authority would ultimately lead to— and, indeed, was often
caused by—the rise of a powerful Zaydi imam who oppressed the
Tayyibi tribes.
In short, the daʿ w a was caught between a central state in the
lowlands and a Zaydi imam, or claimant to the imamate, in the
highlands. An alliance with the imam was out of the question
since the Zaydis considered the Tayyibis a heretical sect and the
daʿ w a was in direct competition with the imam over tribal con-
stituents. This left the daʿ w a no alternative but to form a coalition
with whichever lowland Sunni state was predominant at the time.
The good relations are best described in a letter sent from Aden
on 18 Safar 910/31 July 1504 to the wālī, or leader, of the daʿ w a in
India, 4 informing him of the ongoing affairs of the community in
Yemen:

The lands are prosperous, the prices are low, and the
profit is regular (al-thamara mutawassiʿ a). Our lord,
master of our lot, and our [other] masters—I mean our
lords al-Hasan and al-Husayn, 5 may God bless their
souls—are doing well. Between them and [the Tahirid
ruler] al-Malik al-Zafir ʿAmir ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, may
God the almighty render him victorious, there is strong
affection and a certain friendship.6
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 43

Such alliances were purely strategic in nature and did not ref lect
any rapprochement between the Sunnis and the Ismailis at the reli-
gious level. These states would ultimately draw back in the face of
constant Zaydi pressure and retreat to the more stable south. The
Tayyibis would thus be left on their own to pay the price for their
alliance with the imam’s rivals.
The Zaydi imam with whom we are concerned here is al-
Mutawakkil ʿala Allah Yahya Sharaf al-Din (d. 965/1557), who rose
against the Sunni Arab Tahirid dynasty and took the highlands by
force. The daʿ w a went through its darkest days under this imam,
especially since it had no allies to rely upon among the Zaydi
ashrāf,7 or descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and no hope of
receiving support from the Tahirids once the latter had fallen to an
invading army sent by the Mamluk sultan of Egypt in 1507. Hope
this time came in the form of the Ottoman conquest. The Tayyibis
were the Ottomans’ allies from the beginning. They even played
an active role in persuading the Ottomans to invade the hinterland
and put an end to al-Mutahhar, al-Mutawakkil’s son. However, the
honeymoon between the Ottomans and the Ismailis and, ultimately,
Ottoman control over upper Yemen were not destined to last long,
and the daʿ w a had to face its staunch Zaydi enemies yet again.

SOURCES
Tayyibi involvement in the Ottoman conquest of Yemen has not
received much scholarly attention due to the unavailability of
Tayyibi sources on the subject. The information given in the stan-
dard Yemeni sources is scant and does not provide us with a full
picture of Tayyibi activity. This gap has now been partially filled
by two unpublished sources: ʿ I brat al-labīb (The admonition of the
intelligent person) and Qarāṭīs al-Yaman (Yemeni correspondence).
ʿ . Ibrat al-labīb is a history of the Yemeni daʿ w a written by Jabir
ibn al-Fahd al-Makrami, a cleric of the famous Makrami family,
which by the eleventh/seventeenth century had come to monopolize
the office of chief dāʿ ī, giving the community its popular name,
al-Makārima. Unfortunately, nothing is known about al-Makrami’s
44 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

life. We can only assume that he was the brother of Muhammad ibn
al-Fahd al-Makrami (d. 1042/1633), acting dāʿ ī during the minority
of the twenty-ninth dāʿ ī and father of the thirtieth dāʿ ī, the first of
the Makramis to occupy the office.
It should be noted that the Makrami line of dāʿ  ī s in Yemen is
different from the line of dāʿ  ī s in India. Toward the end of the
tenth/sixteenth century, a schism divided the community into a
predominantly Yemeni Sulaymani branch, which accepted Sulay-
man ibn al-Hasan’s (d. 1005/1597) claim to the position of chief
dāʿ  ī, and a largely Indian Daʾudi branch that accepted the claim of
Daʾud ibn Qutbshah (d. 1021/1612) to the same position. The ver-
sion of ʿ I brat al-labīb that has reached us was preserved by the
Daʾudis. Thus, only the section dealing with the Yemeni daʿ w a
prior to the Daʾudi-Sulaymani schism has been preserved, hence
its title: Muntazaʿ min ʿ I brat al-labīb (Extract from ʿIbrat al-labīb).
The remaining section on the Sulaymani dāʿ ī s was dropped as it
was of no interest to the Daʾudi scholars.8 The fact that they were
interested in preserving a Sulaymani text at all shows that little is
available on this period.9
Although it provides us with an accessible narrative of the
period between 922/1516 and 974/1566, the text of ʿ I brat al-labīb
suffers from numerous anachronisms caused by the author’s inter-
est in the big picture rather than factual details. By comparing al-
Makrami’s material with the scarce but chronologically organized
anecdotes in Yahya ibn al-Husayn’s Ghāyat al-amānī (The object
of desires) and the correspondence of the daʿ w a officials to be dis-
cussed shortly, we can see that some events have been erroneously
placed before others. The author was probably aware of the gaps in
the narrative since he avoided, as far as possible, giving the names
of Ottoman officials, other than a vague “the Pasha,” or the dates
of their tenures. Still, ʿ I brat al-labīb remains an important source
on the history of the Ismaili daʿ w a in this specific period.
The second source is Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, a collection of corre-
spondence between daʿ w a officials in Yemen and their counter-
parts in India. The letters cover a wide range of topics, from the
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 45

obvious administrative and religious affairs of the community to

social inquiries about family and friends. Of particular interest to
us are the letters discussing current events, such as developments
on the Zaydi front and relations with the Ottoman administration.
It should be noted that two collections of letters have reached us.
One covers the period between 800–1100/1397–1688 and the other
the period from 906–1100/1500–1688. Unfortunately, I had access
only to the latter edition; thus, I cannot tell if there is a difference
in content between the two.10 The Qarāṭīs suffer from a heavy edi-
torial hand, for not only are the conventional devout openings and
conclusions omitted but also several sentences, and probably sec-
tions, from the body of the text. These are replaced by the formula
ilā qawlih (to his saying). Substantial details have been lost through
these omissions, which seem arbitrary in several cases. Also, not
all the letters are dated, some giving only the day and month; this
prevents us from pinning down the years of particular events not
mentioned in other sources. Based on the evidence of other sources,
furthermore, some complete dates are clearly too late for the events
described.
In order to provide a historical context for the compilation, the
anonymous compiler inserts extensive quotations from al-Makra-
mi’s ʿ I brat al-labīb between letters.11 Clearly, then, al-Makrami’s
text predates this compilation. However, it is interesting to note
that by comparing al-Makrami’s text with some of the letters, one
can see striking similarities in the language—strong evidence that
al-Makrami read the letters. But we do not know if he had access to
copies of the original correspondence or merely to an earlier com-
pilation of the Qarāṭīs.

THE TAYYIBI COMMUNITY

Prior to the Ottoman conquest of Yemen, the Tayyibi Ismaili com-
munity consisted of the Yam branch of Hamdan in Wadi Dahr,
north of Sanaa, and the Yaʿabir in Haraz, farther to the northwest
of Sanaa.12 A number of Indian immigrants were also active within
the community. They were involved mainly in trade, pilgrimage,
46 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

and religious studies. However, the wealth and devotion of some

of the Indian Tayyibis enabled them to occupy high ranks in the
daʿ w a administration.
The most inf luential of these immigrants was Hasan ibn Nuh of
Bharuch, an Indian merchant of great wealth, a regional tycoon by
the standards of the time. His trade covered India, Yemen, Mecca,
and Egypt. As part of his philanthropic activities, he took it upon
himself to feed all Indian immigrant students of the faith. His
financial support for the daʿ w a was vital to its survival in Yemen.
Consequently, he was in a position to manage the transfer of finan-
cial contributions (zakāt) and offerings (qarābīn) from the commu-
nity in India to Yemen through his Indian Ocean trade networks.13
In addition to his entrepreneurial ventures, Hasan ibn Nuh was a
scholar who left us the Kitāb al-Azhār, an unequaled seven-vol-
ume chrestomathy of Ismaili literature which covers the different
aspects of the faith to be mastered by students.

THE LAST OF THE “VICIOUS CYCLES”14

As far as the Yemeni Ismaili daʿ w a is concerned, the last of the
“vicious cycles” began during the mandate of the twenty-first dāʿ ī
muṭlaq, Husam al-Din al-Husayn ibn Idris (d. 933/1527). In 922/1516,
a Mamluk naval force led by officers known as levends (lawands
in the Arabicized version) under Husayn al-Kurdi landed on the
southwestern coast at Zabid. The Tahirid forces, drained by the
continuous fighting with the Zaydi imam Sharaf al-Din, collapsed
in the face of the small number of levends, who were equipped
with firearms, previously unknown in Yemen.15 The levends next
moved toward Sanaa, which they took without much trouble. Their
mistreatment of the city’s inhabitants ultimately led the people of
Sanaa to rebel against the Mamluks and to rally behind the imam-
ate of Sharaf al-Din.16
After consolidating his forces, the Zaydi imam launched a major
offensive against the daʿ w a strongholds in Wadi Dahr, seat of the
Tayyibi dāʿ  ī.17 The Hamdani forts fell one after another, forcing
the dāʿ ī to accept a humiliating ten-year truce that gave the imam
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 47

full control over most of the forts while the dāʿ ī was granted only
the right to collect zakāt and other religious taxes from his follow-
ers.18 Tensions soon rose, leading to the collapse of the truce and a
renewal of hostilities between the two groups. The dāʿ ī therefore
decided to decamp to Masar in Haraz, leaving his son to defend the
fort known as al-Qalʿa. Tayyibi defenses did not last long under the
Zaydi assault. The dāʿ  ī ’s son soon entered into negotiations with
the imam and surrendered the fort on Saturday, 12 Jumada al-Ula
931/3 March 1525, in return for safe passage for him and his men
to Haraz. The settlement was followed by a major exodus of the
Ismaili tribes of the Wadi to Haraz, seeking to escape the oppres-
sion of the Zaydi occupiers. Only those who converted to Zaydism
were allowed to remain in their lands after being branded on their
forearms with the name of Sharaf al-Din’s son and eventual suc-
cessor al-Mutahhar, who was the Zaydi military commander.19 The
victorious imam then decided to advance to the mountainous region
of Haraz. The situation became so desperate there that the dāʿ ī pro-
claimed jihad against the “mighty oppressor Sharaf al-Din.” He
wrote, “It is the duty of every believer to sacrifice himself and his
resources in such a case. If jihad in person is not possible due to
long distance, then it is a duty to perform jihad by spending money
as this is the right time to do so.” 20
Unfortunately, we do not know much about this period
except that there was an epidemic (ṭāʿ ū n) in 933/1526 that claimed
the lives of Dāʿ ī al-Husayn and his son ʿAli, who had succeeded
him but survived for only a month more. 21 They were succeeded by
the twenty-third dāʿ  ī muṭlaq, ʿIzz al-Din Muhammad ibn al-Hasan
(d. 946/1539), whose reign is also undocumented.
According to al-Makrami’s account, Imam Sharaf al-Din sent
an emissary to negotiate the terms of surrender with the dāʿ ī,
who had gathered the shaykhs of the Yaʿabir to discuss the situ-
ation. The shaykhs were willing to give up their forts in order to
avoid a humiliating defeat. But then Hasan ibn Nuh al-Bharuchi
(d. 939/1533), the inf luential Indian merchant mentioned above,
stood up to them and offered to reward the military resistance of
48 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

the Yaʿabir generously from his personal funds. The shaykhs, who
were convinced by his openhanded offer, informed the Zaydi emis-
sary that they would defend their forts to the last man. Realizing
that he could not defeat them, Imam Sharaf al-Din withdrew his
armies, postponing any military action against Haraz.
Leaving al-Makrami’s dramatization aside, the dāʿ ī acknowl-
edged in one of his letters Hasan ibn Nuh’s “financial sacrifices in
the jihad against the oppressors as he is spending for the cause of
God what no one else could afford, something that no one has done
before or could match.” 22 According to al-Makrami, al-Bharuchi’s
death on 11 Dhu’l-Qaʿda 939/4 June 1533 offered Imam Sharaf
al-Din a long-awaited opportunity to resume military operations
against Haraz. 23 In 944/1537, the Zaydi armies launched a major
offensive against the region. The Yaʿabir met the same fate as their
Hamdani brothers in Wadi Dahr. They were defeated and had to
surrender the major strongholds of the daʿ wa: Shibam, al-Dalfaʿ,
al-ʿIyana, and Masar. Yahya ibn al-Husayn informs us that a siz-
able collection of Ismaili literature was seized in Shibam and sent
back to Sanaa. 24
The deteriorating situation prompted Dāʿ ī ʿIzz al-Din to escape
to Zabid, where he stayed with some Ismaili merchants. Before
leaving for the pilgrimage to Mecca, he appointed Yusuf ibn Sulay-
man of Sidhpur in northern Gujarat to succeed him. This was the
first appointment of an Indian dāʿ ī in the history of the Tayyibi
daʿ wa. ʿIzz al-Din wrote the letter of appointment (naṣṣ) in the
presence of several witnesses and made three copies, one for each
of the jazīras (districts) of the daʿ wa: Yemen, Sind, and Hind. 25 ʿIzz
al-Din set sail for Mecca, but he was soon brought back to shore.
Al-Makrami informs us that Imam Sharaf al-Din had instructed a
qāḍī, or judge, in Zabid to poison the dāʿ ī. He died in Zabid on 27
Safar 946/14 July 1539 and was buried there. 26
After receiving his letter of appointment, the twenty-fourth dāʿ ī,
Najm al-Din Yusuf ibn Sulayman of Sidhpur (d. 974/1567), sailed
to Aden, then to Zabid, traveling in the guise of a merchant. The
affairs of the daʿ wa were soon set in order, and the members of the
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 49

late dāʿ ī’s family kept the positions they had previously occupied. 27
The daʿ wa thus came to resemble a government in exile.
Zabid had fallen under Ottoman rule in 1538. 28 Unlike the Zay-
dis, the Ottomans were tolerant of the Ismaili presence in the city.
After all, the Ottomans were newcomers to the region and cer-
tainly welcomed new allies among the locals. Our sources tell us
of an Ismaili chieftain, Amir Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil, 29 who was
very close to the Ottoman governor, or wālī, 30 and acted as a liai-
son between the daʿ wa and the Ottoman administration. In a let-
ter sent to Dāʿ ī Yusuf, Amir Muhammad praises the wālī (whom
he calls mawlānā al-bāshā, or “our lord the pasha”) and speaks of
his commitment to the welfare of the Tayyibi community; he fur-
ther mentions that the governor has asked him to join an Ottoman
expedition against Liʿsan, east of Haraz, and Jibal Buraʿ in Tihama
at a daily salary of five Süleymanis.31
This Ottoman backing helped the daʿ wa to recover and to reach
out to the Ismaili tribes back in Haraz and Wadi Dahr. The ground
was set for a major uprising against the Zaydis, as the situation in
those regions had become unbearable. The Yaʿabir and the Ham-
dan, the backbone of the daʿ wa, had been stripped of their weapons
and forced to rebuild and fortify al-Qalʿa, which they had lost to
the Zaydis.32 Several villages had been emptied of their inhabitants,
and the tombs of the dāʿ īs had been desecrated. 33 After issuing an
edict confirming the Hamdan and the Yaʿabir over their territories
in Wadi Dahr and Haraz, 34 the wālī agreed to support an uprising
by supplying the Ismailis with guns and ammunition. The guns
were smuggled to Haraz by a Sufi who had frequented Zabid and
delivered weapons to a couple of Ismaili officials who had settled
there disguised as dervishes. 35 The wālī, however, was reluctant to
involve his troops in the highlands before he was assured of sup-
port from the Yemeni tribes. The dāʿ ī accordingly collected let-
ters of support from the leaders of the Ismaili tribes in Haraz and
from those of the Hamdan, as well as the Zaydi ashrāf in the Jawf,
traditional allies of the Tayyibi daʿ wa. The letters were then sent
to Istanbul and to the governor of Egypt.
50 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

After getting the green light from Istanbul, the Ottomans

launched a major offensive against Haraz from Manakha, taking
by surprise the fort of Shibam. On the southern front, the armies
of Üveys Pasha, recently appointed Ottoman governor of Yemen,
moved from Zabid toward Taizz on 1 Dhu’l-Hijja 952/3 February
1546 with the assistance of the Ismaili amir Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil.
The amir was left to govern the region while the Ottoman armies
proceeded north to take Sanaa and Wadi Dahr. The Zaydi imam
retreated north to Zafir Hajja, where his imamate had begun.36
With the whole region under Ottoman control, Dāʿ ī Yusuf came
up from Zabid to reside in Shibam. But he did not stay there long
because “the cold was too hard for him and for the immigrants
(al-muhājirūn), who came from hot countries, mostly from India,
al-Sham,37 and lower Yemen. “The cold of any region”, al-Makrami
adds, “is lighter than that of Shibam.” 38 The dāʿ ī finally settled in
al-Qalʿa in Wadi Dahr, which had been given back to the Hamdan
after its conquest by the Ottomans.
The daʿ wa enjoyed golden days under the prevailing pax otto-
manica. The dāʿ ī acknowledged the supreme authority of the Otto-
man sultan. In one instance, the dāʿ ī requested the military support
of the governor to capture the summit of Masar, the last stronghold
in Haraz that was not under the dāʿ ī ’s control. After being ham-
mered by the governor Özdemir Pasha’s heavy guns in a ten-month
siege, the inhabitants of Masar agreed to surrender their fort to the
pasha but not to the dāʿ ī, who, however, responded, “We and our
properties belong to the sultanate. Whatever is added to its domains
is ours.” 39 In addition, all taxes levied from the territories of the
daʿ wa were delivered to the governor.40 The daʿ wa’s revenues from
its domains in Yemen were only in kind. Cash was provided from
taxes levied in India.
Despite all this, the wealth of the daʿ wa was great, and the
dāʿ ī ’s income from his trade in food, grain, and cloth was enough
for him to give each Tayyibi household a sheep on the major holi-
days.41 However, his experience with the Yemeni management of
the daʿ wa’s resources was not very rewarding. The dāʿ ī in one
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 51

instance gave the ʿ āmil, or district governor, of Haraz, Shaykh

ʿAbdallah ibn Muhammad al-Mahfuzi, permission to distribute
food from the stores in the fort of Shibam to the Yaʿabir, who had
suffered greatly under the Zaydis. The shaykh’s generosity knew
no bounds, and the stores were rapidly emptied of their contents.
The dāʿ ī ended up taking matters in hand to preserve the wealth of
the daʿ wa. In retaliation, Shaykh ʿAbdallah offered his services to
Özdemir Pasha, who entrusted him with Dhamar.42
After settling in Yemen, Dāʿ ī Yusuf began to rely increas-
ingly on his Indian followers, especially in money matters, which
were handled by Khan ibn Qasim, Daʾud ibn ʿAjabshah, and Myan
Shamʿun ibn Jaʿfar.43 These administrative reforms were essential
for the survival of the daʿ wa, but they ref lected a deep misun-
derstanding of the intricacies of the tribal dynamics within the
Yemeni community. They ultimately led to internal dissensions
between the Yemenis and the Indians, and the resultant collapse of
the daʿ wa’s authority in Yemen.
The catalyst this time was none other than Amir Muhammad
ibn Ismaʿil, who was well regarded by the Ottomans thanks to his
services in their campaign against the Zaydi imam Sharaf al-Din
and his son al-Mutahhar. The amir’s allegiance to both the Otto-
man governor and the dāʿ ī got him into serious trouble. The Otto-
mans recognized him as a leader of the Hamdan, which explains
their interest in winning him to their side. On the other hand, he
was among the highest-ranking officials/clerics (ḥudūd) in the
Tayyibi daʿ wa hierarchy.44 In other words, he owed his position to
the daʿ wa, which considered itself the ultimate authority over the
Hamdan. He was therefore expected to be accountable to the dāʿ ī
since he was his representative to the Ottomans.
It seems that Amir Muhammad was not up to the task as “in
appearance, he used to take things for the [Ottoman] state but
would secretly keep them for himself.”45 The clash occurred when
the amir approached the governor requesting a sanjak, or grant of a
district’s tax revenues (according to the administrative system pre-
vailing in Ottoman Yemen and Egypt). Dāʿ ī Yusuf stood against
52 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

the amir’s ambition as he feared that the daʿ wa could not handle
such unnecessary responsibilities. After being granted the sanjak,
“the amir became puffed up and looked at us dismissively,” com-
ments a daʿ wa official.46 Consequently, he was dismissed by the
dāʿ ī from his responsibilities over the Hamdan and replaced by his
cousin and rival Muhammad ibn ʿAbdallah.47 Later, Dāʿ ī Yusuf for-
bade the amir to lead prayers after he incited the governor Rıdvan
Pasha against his cousin and convinced him to eliminate him.48 As
a result of the assassination, Muhammad ibn ʿAbdallah’s brothers
shifted sides to the rising Zaydi leader al-Mutahhar, son of Sharaf
al-Din.49
Alienating Amir Muhammad, who had an insider’s knowledge of
the daʿ wa’s resources, had dreadful consequences for Dāʿ ī Yusuf.
The amir continued inciting the governor to extort money and land
from the dāʿ ī, who ended up leaving Wadi Dahr for Haraz. 50 But
this was not the end of the matter, for Ottoman çavuşes, or messen-
gers, followed him into the mountains with additional demands. 51
The amir ended up rallying the Hamdan against the dāʿ ī, whom
he accused of being “a foreign Indian man who is not one of the
dāʿ īs and does not represent them.”52 He also stormed Saʿdan in
Haraz, capturing Shah Malik, the dāʿ ī’s brother, and other Tayyibi
notables. The dāʿ ī ’s resistance to Ottoman extortion attempts ulti-
mately led to the involvement of Ottoman troops and the capture
of the dā ʿ ī ’s brother, who was released three months later only
after paying 1500 gold ḥarf. Tensions had reached such a level
that a number of tribal leaders intervened in an attempt to medi-
ate between the two parties. They finally reached an agreement
according to which the amir apologized for his actions, accepting
the authority of the dāʿ ī, while the dāʿ ī reinstated him as chief of
the Hamdan. 53
Dāʿ ī Yusuf seems to have realized by then that the future of
the daʿ wa in Yemen was not bright. He reportedly declared, “God,
the most glorious, said: ‘And God summons to the abode of Peace’
[Qurʾan 10:25]. The message is transferred from one people to
another, so why should the daʿ wa not move from Tayba?54 India
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 53

is older than Tayba, and it is in the position of the brain. The East
is also older than the West, and the monsoon winds blow from its
direction.”55 The move was ultimately prompted by the spread of a
disease called al-ṣubāʿ  in the region of Dar Shaʿl in Haraz, where
most Indian immigrants were based. The disease caused the death
of many high-ranking Tayyibi notables, among them four of Dāʿ ī
Yusuf’s sons. Those who survived the epidemic returned to India,
thus depriving the dāʿ ī of his Indian supporters. Adding to this, a
growing number of Hamdanis were shifting allegiance to Imam al-
Mutahhar ibn Sharaf al-Din due to the oppression that they were
facing from Tayyibi officials who remained loyal to the Ottoman
state. 56
The dāʿ ī retired to Saʿdan, where he died in 974/1566 after
appointing Jalal ibn Hasan (d. 975/1567), the head of the commu-
nity in India, as his successor. 57 The appointment of the first Indian
dāʿ ī to rule from India was well-timed, as Sanaa and the whole
of upper Yemen fell in 975/1567 to the Zaydi tribes led by al-
Mutahhar ibn Sharaf al-Din. Tayba was consequently besieged, and
Amir Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil and his sons were taken captive by
the Zaydis. The amir died in prison four years later in Dhu’l-Hijja
979/April–May 1572.58

CONCLUSION
It is safe to say that the Ottoman conquest of Yemen extended the
Tayyibi daʿ wa’s lifespan in the region. The Ismailis were hoping
that the establishment of stable Ottoman rule would give them the
security they had enjoyed under previous ruling dynasties. This is
why they aggressively campaigned to persuade the Ottomans to
expand into the highlands and destroy the forces of Imam Sharaf al-
Din. However, the Ottoman takeover coincided with the crumbling
of the internal structure of the daʿ wa. The increasing involvement
of Tayyibi notables in the Ottoman administration created con-
f licts between the interests of the tribes, on one hand, and those of
the daʿ wa, on the other. This placed the community in an unenvi-
able position.
54 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

This was especially true after the introduction of the Indian ele-
ment into the daʿ wa administration, particularly with the appoint-
ment of the first Indian dāʿ ī in the history of the Tayyibi daʿ wa.
The Indian presence in Yemen before that had been mainly for
“hijra, ziyāra, and tijāra,” that is, immigration, pilgrimage to
sacred tombs, and trade. 59 Under Dāʿ ī Yusuf, key positions that
had previously been held by members of venerable Yemeni fami-
lies, such as the Walids, Hatims, Mahfuzis, and Sulayhis, were
given to Indian newcomers. The loyalty of these Indian officials
to the dāʿ ī and the daʿ wa was absolute. After all, the daʿ wa had
prompted them to come to Yemen, and they had no ties to the local
community.
The Yemenis must have felt an increasing rivalry with their
Indian brothers. They therefore had to find new positions within
the Ottoman administration. This conf lict of interest resulted in
their dual allegiance to the tribe and to the daʿ wa. An internal clash
such as the one between Amir Muhammad and Dāʿ ī Yusuf divided
the Yemeni believers’ allegiance between the two camps. In short,
the Tayyibi daʿ wa, as a centralized institution that revolved around
the person of the dā ʿ ī, could not tolerate competition from the loose
tribal system of the Yemeni highlands. Continuous challenges to
the authority of the dāʿ ī, the sole deputy of the Tayyibi imam in
his satr, ultimately destroyed the basis on which the entire daʿ wa
structure was based. In this regard, Gujarat was definitely a more
suitable place for the daʿ wa’s survival.

Endnotes
1. The ten ḥudūd (ranks) forming the daʿ wa hierarchy are also con-
ceived to mirror the ten intellects but are linear in nature rather than
cyclical. For a description of the development of the system of hierar-
chies of the daʿ wa and their cosmological correspondents, see Simo-
netta Calderini, “ʿ Ālam al-Dīn in Ismāʿīlism: World of Obedience or
World of Immobility?” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies 56 (1993): 459–69; Samer Traboulsi, “The Formation of an Is-
lamic Sect: The Tayyibi Ismāʿīlīs in Medieval Yemen,” unpublished
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 55

Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2005, 80–171.

2. See Samer Traboulsi, “The Queen was Actually a Man: Arwa bint
Ahmad and the Politics of Religion,” Arabica 50 (2003): 96–108.
3. See al-Husayn ibn ʿAli ibn al-Walid, Al-Risāla al-waḥīda fī tathbīt
arkān al-ʿ aqīda [The singular treatise on conirming the pillars of the
faith], Institute of Ismaili Studies (London), MS 135/924, fol. 10r; ʿAli
ibn Muhammad ibn al-Walid, Risālat tuḥfat al-murtād wa-ghuṣṣat al-
addād [Treatise on the bounty of the seeker and the agony of the op-
ponents], ed. Rudolf Strothmann, in Strothmann, Gnosis-Texte der
Ismailiten (Göttingen, 1943), 169.
4. The daʿ wa in the Indian subcontinent dates back at least to the days of
the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir (d. 487/1094). The Fatimids, through
their daʿ wa networks, established a trading colony on the western
coast of the subcontinent in the region of Gujarat. The community
developed there under the Yemeni Sulayhid dynasty and the Tayyibi
daʿ wa; the Sulayhids ran its affairs through an appointed wālī or
ʿ.  āmil.
5. These are the twentieth dāʿ ī muṭlaq Badr al-Din al-Hasan ibn Idris
and his brother, aide, and successor, Husam al-Din al-Husayn ibn Id-
ris.
6. Qarāṭīs al-Yaman [Yemeni correspondence], Tübingen University Li-
brary, MS Ma VI 330, fols. 5r–v.
7. The Zaydi ashrāf of the Al Hamza from the Jawf region were tra-
ditionally opposed to the Zaydi claimants to the imamate from the
northern highlands. As a result, they allied themselves with which-
ever state or regional power was competing with the Zaydi imam in
northern Yemen.
8. The Sulaymani collections are very dificult of access since the pres-
ent-day community is located predominantly in Najran in Saudi Ara-
bia. The Saudi religious authorities are not open to outside scholars’
establishing contact with the Makārima.
9. For more information on ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, see Ismail Poonawala, Bio-
bibliography of Ismāʿ īlī Literature (Malibu, CA, 1974), 248.
10. Ibid., 326–28.
11. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fols. 19v–26v and 29r–33v.
12. Due to the entrepreneurial activities of the Tayyibi community, small-
er numbers have resided in the urban centers and seaports, especially
Sanaa, Aden, and Mocha. The twenty-third dāʿ ī, for example, had a
personal residence in Sanaa that was frequented by his fellow mer-
chants and immigrants.
56 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

13. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fols. 13r and 18r.

14. The Tayyibi community would face more hardships under Zaydi rule
until the fall of the imamate. I consider this the last of the vicious cy-
cles because it led the daʿ wa to relocate to India.
15. In a letter dated 1 Jumada al-Ula 926 (four years after the events de-
scribed!), Dāʿ ī al-Husayn writes that the Egyptian soldiers have tak-
en Zabid, Tihama, and Taizz while the Tahirids have been reduced to
Aden and some areas in the mountains. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol.
12r.
16. Imam Sharaf al-Din rose to the imamate in Zair Hajja in 912/1506.
See Muhammad ibn Muhammad Zabara, Tārīkh al-aʾ imma al-zay-
diyya fī al-Yaman ḥattā al-ʿ aṣr al-ḥadīth [History of the Zaydi Imams
of Yemen up to the modern era], ed. and expanded by Muhammad
Zaynahum Muhammad ʿAzab (Cairo, 1998), 118. According to Yahya
ibn al-Husayn, the defeated levends requested the dāʿ ī’s permis-
sion to pass through his territories on their way out of Sanaa. He re-
sponded that he would grant them safe passage only if Sharaf al-Din
agreed. For more information on the Mamluk levends, see Yahya ibn
al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī fī akhbār al-quṭr al-yamānī [The ob-
ject of desires: Annals of the Yemeni region], ed. Saʿid ʿAbd al-Fat-
tah ʿAshur, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1968), II: 642–58.
17. Al-Makrami states that the imam launched his campaign on the pre-
text of revenge against certain Ismaili chieftains for their collabo-
ration with the Tahirids against their Zaydi neighbors in the Wadi.
Shaykh Hasan ibn ʿAbdallah al-Mahfuzi had previously sought the
help of the Tahirid sultan ʿAmir ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab against the Zaydi
shaykh Muhammad al-Nahri, who was based in the fort of Qasr Si-
din at the bottom of Wadi Dahr. They defeated him and destroyed his
fort. After the rise of Imam Sharaf al-Din, al-Nahri refused all com-
pensation from the dāʿ ī and insisted on making al-Mahfuzi pay for
his action. This ultimately led to the military intervention of Imam
Sharaf al-Din. See Jabir ibn al-Fahd al-Makrami, Muntazaʿ min ʿIbrat
al-labīb [Extract from the admonition of the intelligent person], man-
uscript copy in my private collection, fols. 7–9.
18. See Yahya ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 664.
19. See Qutb al-Din Muhammad al-Nahrawali, Al-Barq al-yamānī fī al-
fatḥ al-ʿ uthmānī [The Yemeni lightning: The Ottoman conquest], ed.
Hamad al-Jasir (Riyadh, 1967), 168.
20. The believers who cannot perform jihad due to distance are the Indian
followers in India. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 14v.
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 57

21. On the epidemic, see Yahya ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 669–
70.
22. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 15r.
23. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fols. 11–14.
24. Ibid., fols. 14–17; Yahya ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 683.
25. The district ( jazīra) of Hind in the Ismaili daʿ wa’s geographical di-
vision of the world corresponds roughly to present-day Gujarat while
Sind corresponds to western Pakistan. Correspondence with Hind
and Sind was conducted through traders during the monsoon season
(mawsim). See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 18.
26. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fols. 18–19. His tomb is a pilgrimage
site for the present-day Bohra community, who recently built a dome
over the grave.
27. One can safely assume that Dāʿ ī Yusuf had no choice but to conirm
everyone in his position as he was a stranger to Yemen and had no al-
ternative personal retinue in which to place his trust.
28. On the Ottoman conquest of Yemen, see J. Richard Blackburn, “The
Collapse of Ottoman Authority in Yemen, 968/1560–976/1568,” Die
Welt des Islams new series 19/1–4 (1979): 119–76.
29. We know practically nothing about the previous career of Muham-
mad ibn Ismaʿil. He may have been an Ismaili notable based in Zabid
and conducting Indian Ocean trade. In the Qarāṭīs, he is referred to
as Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil, which means that he occupied a
high rank in the daʿ wa hierarchy.
30. Al-Makrami states erroneously that the Ottoman wālī at the time was
Iskender Pasha. This must be a confusion with Iskandar Mawz ibn
Muhammad al-Qaramani (d. 943/1536), who was raised to power by
the Mamluks and was based in Zabid. Amir Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil
may have been close to him, but by the time of the accession of Dāʿ ī
Yusuf in 946/1539, Zabid was already in the hands of Süleyman Pa-
sha, who had recently returned from a failed expedition to India. The
wālī in question may be either Mustafa Pasha (947–48/1540–41) or
Mustafa Pasha al-Nashshar (948–52/1541–45). See Shams al-Din
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Samad al-Mawzaʿi, Al-Iḥsān fī dukhūl mam-
lakat al-Yaman taḥta ẓill ʿ adālat Āl ʿ Uthmān [The beneicence: The
entry of the country of Yemen under the shadow of justice of the
House of Osman], ed. Frédérique Soudan (Cairo, 1999), 53, 15–18.
31. The wālī in question could be Üveys Pasha, who launched the irst
major inland campaigns in Yemen. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 28r;
al-Nahrawali, Al-Barq al-yamānī, 95–96.
58 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

32. According to Yahya ibn al-Husayn, al-Qalʿa was renamed Tayba by

Imam Sharaf al-Din, who entrusted his son al-Mutahhar with the task
of rebuilding it: Yahya ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 666. See
also Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fols. 13r–14r.
33. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fols. 23–26.
34. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 28r–v.
35. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 27.
36. On the campaign of Üveys Pasha, see al-Nahrawali, Al-Barq al-
yamānī, 95–96; al-Mawzaʿi, Iḥsān, 20–21.
37. Al-Sham refers to the regions north of Saʿda, where the tribe of Yam
has a strong presence. See Muhammad ibn ʿAli al-Akwaʿ’s comment
in his edition of Idris ʿImad al-Din, Rawḍat al-akhbār wa-nuzhat al-
asmār fī ḥawādith al-Yaman al-kibār wa-al-ḥuṣūn wa-al-amṣār [The
garden of events and the diversion of evening conversations: Great
occurrences in Yemen and its fortresses and towns] (Sanaa, 1995),
227 n. 1.
38. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 34.
39. Ibid., fol. 39; Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 34r–v.
40. According to al-Makrami, this was done following the sunna of the
Imam ʿAli ibn Abi Talib, who wrote to his governors, “You have no
access [to the resources of the land] that our horses do not protect and
our men do not defend.” On the other hand, al-Nahrawali states that
the daʿ wa did not pay taxes (taslīmāt) in recognition of its support for
the Ottoman state in its war with the Zaydis. Most probably, the two
authors are talking about different types of duties levied by the state.
See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 39; al-Nahrawali, Al-Barq al-
yamānī, 165.
41. Al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 34.
42. Ibid., fols. 36–37.
43. Daʾud ibn ʿAjabshah (d. 999/1591) would become the twenty-sixth
dāʿ ī muṭlaq in India. Myan Shamʿun ibn Jaʿfar is probably identical
to Shamʿun ibn Muhammad al-Ghuri, author of the legal compendi-
um Kitāb al-Suʾ āl wa-al-jawāb [The book of question and answer],
a.k.a. Al-Masāʾ il al-shamʿ ūniyya [The Shamʿūnic responsa]. See al-
Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 40.
44. He appears in the Qarāṭīs as Shaykh Muhammad. See al-Makrami,
ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 45; Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fols. 36v, 38r, and 39r.
45. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 44.
46. The letters do not give any details about the nature of the sanjak in
question. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 37r.
 the ottoman conquest of yemen 59

47. Amir Muhammad ibn ʿAbdallah was a key ally of the Ottomans in
Yemen, which explains the rivalry with his cousin Muhammad ibn
Ismaʿil. The amir was instrumental in facilitating the Ottoman sub-
jugation of deiant local chieftains such as Amir ʿAli al-Nuzari, who
refused to surrender Hisn Habb to Mahmud Pasha. The Ismaili amir
mediated between the two parties, trying to reach an honorable con-
clusion to the siege of the fort. The pasha promised the chieftain safe
passage but massacred him soon after he left the fort and enslaved
the women in his party. Yahya ibn al-Husayn blames the incitement
of the Ismaili amir for the pasha’s treachery. Al-Nahrawali speaks of
the amir’s role in the negotiations without holding him responsible
for the pasha’s actions while the Qarāṭīs speaks of Ottoman atrocities
without implicating any Ismaili chieftain in the massacre. See Yahya
ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 719–20, 727–28; al-Nahrawali,
Al-Barq al-yamānī, 130–33; Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 37v.
48. The death of Muhammad ibn ʿAbdallah in Rıdvan Pasha’s prison hap-
pened exactly ive years after the treacherous killing of al-Nuzari in
Hisn Habb. Five years later, his cousin Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil met
his fate in al-Mutahhar’s prison. The amirs’ fates were therefore com-
mensurate with their actions, Yahya ibn al-Husayn concludes. See
Yahya ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 728.
49. See Yahya ibn al-Husayn, Ghāyat al-amānī, II: 727–28.
50. It took the dāʿ ī two months of continuous visits to Sanaa and a bribe
of 100 gold ḥarf to receive a license ( fash), the nature of which is un-
clear in the letter, from the Ottoman administration. See Qarāṭīs al-
Yaman, fol. 38r–v.
51. In an attempt to appease Mahmud Pasha, Dāʿ ī Yūsuf presented him
with a horse worth 7,000 Süleymanis. Its trappings cost an addition-
al 3,000. In addition, the dāʿ ī had to pay off the pasha’s retinue. See
Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fol. 38r–v.
52. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 47.
53. See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fols. 39r–40v.
54. Tayba is a small village overlooking Wadi Dahr that was a traditional
stronghold of the daʿ wa.
55. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 48.
56. Al-Nahrawali states that the Tayyibi community split into ive differ-
ent camps: the majority followed Amir Muhammad ibn Ismaʿil (whom
he mistakenly considers their dā ʿ ī) while some followed Amir Mu-
hammad ibn ʿAbdallah, who led Rıdvan Pasha’s campaign against the
dāʿ ī’s forts (here, al-Nahrawali must be confusing Muhammad ibn
60 the arab lands in the ottoman empire

Ismaʿil with his cousin and rival Muhammad ibn ʿAbdallah, who died
in Rıdvan Pasha’s prison). In addition, there were those who refrained
from joining any group following the dāʿ ī’s orders, those who shift-
ed sides to al-Mutahhar, and those who left for India after the death
of Dāʿ ī Yusuf in Rıdvan Pasha’s prison, an eventuality not attested
in any Tayyibi source. Al-Nahrawali’s summation of the state of the
Tayyibi community prior to the relocation of the daʿ wa to Gujarat is
very interesting, but it shows the limitations of his understanding of
the internal affairs of the community. See al-Nahrawali, Al-Barq al-
yamānī, 170.
57. Al-Makrami claims that Jalal ibn Hasan was in Yemen when he suc-
ceeded Dāʿ ī Yusuf after the latter’s death. He asked his family wheth-
er they wanted to stay in Yemen or go back to India. When they all
expressed their wish to return to Gujarat, he exchanged their proper-
ties in Yemen for ones of equal value in India and sailed back home.
This account is incorrect since Jalal ibn Hasan was the wālī of the
daʿ wa in Gujarat during the rule of Dā ʿ ī Yusuf. He had served in
Yemen under Dā ʿ ī Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and oversaw the safe
transmission of the leadership of the daʿ wa according to the naṣṣ un-
til Dāʿ ī Yusuf’s arrival from India. He then left for Gujarat to assume
his new position as wālī of Hind. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb,
fol. 51; anonymous, Muntazaʿ  min Badīʿ al-akhbār [Extract from the
wondrous events], manuscript copy in my private collection, fols. 41–
42, 46–47, 52–53, and 135–36.
58. The amir’s son wrote a letter to the dāʿ ī in India announcing the death
of his father and brother in the “prison of the forsaken (makhdhūl).”
See Qarāṭīs al-Yaman, fols. 52r, 55v, 64v.
59. See al-Makrami, ʿ Ibrat al-labīb, fol. 43.