CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS v. FELICISIMO OCAMPO, GR No.

L-6120, 1953-06-30
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses,
namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606... in that he knowingly chartered a
vessel of Philippine registry to an alien... without the approval of the President of the Philippines
and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative
Code... in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests... and certain
authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance
from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that
assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said
cases... as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409... which provides that "the aid of
assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First
Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure." 
This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the Philippines.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the
promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1,
1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines...
previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed... that the Supreme Court,
having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of
Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court
Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of
discretion to the respondent Judge.
Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Issues:
I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right,
and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive right, cannot be impaired by
this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.
"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila,
creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by
Rules of Court.
"IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the old Charter of Manila were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the same provisions were
later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila which is now... the
source of the right to trial with the aid of assessors and which refers to the Code of Civil
Procedure merely to indicate the procedure for appointing assessors.
"V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid class legislation and does not
violate the constitutional provision that the rules of pleading, practice and procedure 'shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade.' "
Ruling:
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not
embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
It says that the aid may be invoked in... the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the
aid of assessors had been invoked... the intervention of the assessors is not an empty formality
which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the law.  It is...
another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which
they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings.
bi jus ibi reme
Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on
assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed.  Such is not the case.  We
have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the matter partake of... the nature of
substantive law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court.
It is therefore our opinion that the... respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.

PEOPLE VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO, [ G.R. No.
240053, October 09, 2019 ];

FACTS: Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius)
were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and
susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia.
Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked
Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The
luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled
execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and
traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking of
Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing. 

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant
Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of
Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed
under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will not be
able to testify personally before the court due to her imprisonment.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before
and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not
designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use thereof is
confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate
their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under
Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced
because the affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUES:

[1] Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?

[2] Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused to confront the
witnesses?

HELD: 

On Substantive Matters

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's conviction
by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting
execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of an indefinite reprieve in view
of the ongoing legal proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions
attached to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia,
and any question propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to
have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the State failed to
show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and the suppletory application of
Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional rights of Cristina
and Julius to confront a witness will be violated since safeguards were set in place by the trial
court precisely to protect and preserve their rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , in order for the
testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it
must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date
of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. Therefore, a liberal
interpretation of the Rules should be allowed. We should not silence Mary Jane and deny her and
the People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused. By the
CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect
impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify
through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to prove her
innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to
comply with the conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's testimony as a
prosecution witness proper? Yes.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition,
of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment
and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such
witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is
unable to testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although
the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds
that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court
sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of
Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
The deposition by written interrogatories
is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have
their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a fair process of
decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is
accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a
charge.

No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to
confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil
proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It
has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony
of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of the witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the
prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure
that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial
court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise
objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution.
The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written
verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who
would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the
prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same,
and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be
conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and
a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As
aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be
present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The
parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give
her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still subjected to
cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the
guidelines enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her
credibility. SO ORDERED.

Reyes v. COMELEC GR No. 207264

Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph Socorro B. Tan

Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s
COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status,
residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American
citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her
failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June
5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to
assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

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Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for
office
Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements.
Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved
the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive
acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains
to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the
fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.
G.R. No. 154034             February 5, 2007

FIRST AQUA SUGAR TRADERS, INC. and CBN INTERNATIONAL(HK)

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,1 Respondent.

The only issue before us is whether the notice of appeal was filed on time.1awphi1.net
Yes, The notice of appeal was filed on time, because as the court ruled this case that , the start of
the 15 days allocation in filing appeals and certiorari , will start on the day it was decided or
within the days it was delivered to the respondents.
Petitioners’ notice of appeal filed on February 16, 2001 was therefore well-within the fresh
period of fifteen days from the date of their receipt of the January 30, 2001 order on February 9,
2001.

[ GR NO. 141277, Dec 16, 2005 ]

REYNALDO DELA CRUZ v. GOLAR MARITIME SERVICES

Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of the said motion.

Bearing in mind the abovequoted jurisprudence, petitioner employees 0had a "fresh" 60-day
period from the time they received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration, or from 09 October 1998. Petitioner employees, accordingly,
had 60 days from 09 October 1998 within which to file the petition for certiorari. Said petition
was filed on 08 December 1998, or on the 60th day; hence, without a doubt, the petition was
seasonably filed within the reglementary period provided by the latest amendment aforequoted.

Tan v. CA 373 SCRA 524

We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner
followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the
retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized
with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but as
petitioner claims, "it is the only property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was
felled by an assassin's bullet."14

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the
date of reckoning of the period of redemption is iniquitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot
be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the
petitioner which is already vested.

Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo G.R. No. 226679

Facts: Estipona, was caught in the act of possessing illegal drugs and was accused for violating
sec. 11 of RA 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) , He was also sanctioned with sec. 23 of
RA 9165. (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless
of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. 3

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,  praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
5

of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-
time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued
that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section
2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of
the government.

In a plea bargain, the defendant and the prosecutor reach an agreement in which the
defendant pleads guilty or no contest in exchange for concessions by the prosecutor.
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion
to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights

defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the
probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain.

No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty;

acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
offended party  and the prosecutor,
57

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it
is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act

No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Neypes vs. CA G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed
when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration

 The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of
notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. 34

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the
Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.
Herce v. Municipality of Cabuyao G.R. No. 166645 January 23, 2007
Specifically, the ground relied upon by the municipality in seeking the
reopening of the decree of registration is the Report dated December 2,
1980 of the Land Registration Authority in Cadastral Case No. N-B-1, LRC
Cadastral No. N-651 that after plotting the technical descriptions of Lot
3484, in the Municipal Index Map, it was found that said lot is more or less
identical to the parcel of land described in Plan II-2719-A for which no final
decree of registration has as yet been issued.

To hold otherwise would result in a situation wherein the LRA would be

compelled to issue a decree of registration over a piece of land which has
already been decreed and titled in the name of another, if it were found out
that indeed, the property has already been earlier titled in the name of the
municipality.

Considering the existence of two conflicting titles one in favor of petitioner,

and the other in the name of the Municipality of Cabuyao, the court
properly granted the reopening of the decree of title in order to finally settle
the issue of ownership over the property subject of the instant controversy
and to end this litigation which has dragged on for decades.[2]
The foregoing pronouncements of the Court of Appeals do not expressly
state that the property covered by OCT No. 0-2099 and Decree No. N-
216115 issued in favor of petitioner is included and within the scope of
Decree No. 4244 earlier issued in 1911 in favor of respondent municipality.

As we have ruled in the assailed Decision, there is no doubt that Decree No.
4244 issued in favor of the municipality has become indefeasible. However,
based on the records before us, there is insufficient information to conclude
that Decree No. 4244 includes the property covered by OCT No. 0-2099
and Decree No. N-216115. As such, there is a need to remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. As correctly noted by the Court of
Appeals:

Considering the existence of two conflicting titles one in favor of petitioner,

and the other in the name of the Municipality of Cabuyao, the court
properly granted the reopening of the decree of title in order to finally settle
the issue of ownership over the property subject of the instant controversy
and to end this litigation which has dragged on for decades.[3]
It is elementary that a court must render judgment confirming the title of
the applicant only if it finds that the latter has sufficient title proper for
registration. An application for land registration may include two or more
parcels of land, but the court may at any time order an application to be
amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or order a severance of
the application.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is PARTIALLY

RECONSIDERED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Laguna, Branch 24 for the determination of whether the subject property
is included in Decree No. 4244 issued in favor of the Municipality of
Cabuyao.

SO ORDERED.

Sarmiento v. Zaratan G.R. No. 167471 February 5, 2007

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
rules, (d)... a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[24] Elements or circumstances (c),
(d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect
the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file
Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondent's counsel's illness, lack of staff
to do... the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers.
There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal.[25] As it
appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and... the
memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the
circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve
the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
itle: Department of Public Works and Highways v. Quite

G.R. No. 183444 February 8, 2012

Facts:

The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the services of BCB
Construction and Supply (BCB) for the construction of the Naawan-Manticao Road. BCB
then entered into a subcontract with Quite, for the supply of labor and materials for the
project. The subcontractor was able to complete its work and submitted its final billing
to BCB, which was in turn submitted to DPWH for payment. However, DPWH refused to
pay Quite, stating that it had not been included in the original contract and thus had no
direct contractual relationship with the government agency.

Quite filed a case for collection of sum of money against BCB and DPWH before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that it had completed the works and that DPWH had
a legal obligation to pay. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Quite, holding that
DPWH was solidarily liable with BCB for the payment of the amount due to the
subcontractor.

DPWH appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the decision was
affirmed. DPWH then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court (SC).

Issues:

1. Whether or not DPWH is liable for the payment due to the subcontractor, Quite
based on law.
2. Whether or not DPWH is liable for the payment due to the subcontractor, Quite
based on equity.

Ruling:

1. DPWH is liable for the payment due to the subcontractor, Quite, based on law.

Under the law, a government agency may be held liable for the payment of the
obligations of a contractor arising from a construction contract. This liability extends to
the subcontractor if certain conditions are met, such as when the subcontractor is able
to show that the services or materials provided were necessary for the completion of the
project and that the contractor has no available funds to pay the subcontractor.
In this case, the SC found that the services and materials provided by Quite were
necessary for the completion of the project and that BCB had no funds to pay the
subcontractor. Furthermore, DPWH was aware of the existence of the subcontract and
that Quite was supplying the labor and materials for the project. Thus, DPWH is
solidarily liable with BCB for the payment of the amount due to the subcontractor.

2. DPWH is liable for the payment due to the subcontractor, Quite, based on equity.

Equity demands that justice be done in every case, regardless of technicalities. In this
case, the subcontractor, Quite, had already completed its work and submitted its final
billing to BCB. Quite had no direct recourse against DPWH since it was not a party to the
original contract. However, DPWH cannot hide behind technicalities to escape its
obligation to pay for the services rendered and materials supplied for the completion of
the project.

The SC also pointed out that the DPWH has a duty to ensure that all persons involved in
the construction of government projects are paid justly and promptly. The government
agency cannot use the absence of a direct contractual relationship with the
subcontractor as an excuse not to pay for the services rendered and materials supplied
for the completion of the project.

Therefore, DPWH is liable for the payment due to the subcontractor, Quite, both based
on law and equity. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA, holding that DPWH is
solidarily liable with BCB for the payment due to Quite.