NAME NINOTCHKA D.

ABABA
JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE Stone v. Mississippi
TITLE 101 US 814
DATE May 10, 1880
FACTS The Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society
was established in 1867 by the Mississippi Provisional State Legislature.
John Stone and other members of the society were detained in 1874 for
operating a lottery, even though the society had been chartered with the
authority to do so for the ensuing 25 years. In 1868, the people approved a
new constitution that forbade lotteries in the state. The society argued that the
charter's clauses provided them with protection, but the state asserted that the
grant had been abolished by subsequent enforcement laws.
ISSUE/S Whether or not Mississippi violated the contract clause by repealing the
society’s grant.
RULING The Mississippi designation of lotteries as prohibited acts was upheld by the
court on a unanimous vote. The state legislature lacks the authority to bind
future legislatures and the decisions of the general public. No law, according
to the court, has the power to compromise away public morality and health.
The rights protected by the constitution in contracts are private property
rights, not governmental rights. Because of this, a charter that may be
revoked by the people can only be used to temporarily suspend governmental
rights, in this example, the authority to criminalize actions.

The judgment was, on error, affirmed by the supreme court, and Stone and
others sued out this writ.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE John H. Osmeña, petitioner vs Oscar Orbos, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 99886
DATE March 31, 1993
FACTS PD 1956's paragraph 1c, as amended by EO 137, which allows the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve fuel price increases or impose additional
taxes on petroleum products, is challenged by Senator John Osmeña as being
unconstitutional. The proceeds from these actions go to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF), which was set up to compensate struggling oil
companies in the event of unexpected price increases. According to the
petitioner, the collection on businesses selling oil products represents an
unauthorized and illegal transfer of taxing authority by the legislature. The
petitioner further makes the point that because a "special fund" is made up of
funds obtained through a State's taxation authority, it is the State's property,
even though it can only be used for the specific goal for which it was
 established. The primary justification for the challenge appears to be the
petitioner's claim that the P.D.-awarded powers of the ERB are unlawful. The
nature of the State's ability to levy taxes is part of the 1956 Constitution, as
modified.
ISSUE/S Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the legislative power of
taxation.
RULING None.

While the revenues gathered may be referred to as taxes, it is obvious that

they are actually exacted in the course of the State's policing authority.
Furthermore, the OPSF's status as a special fund is obvious from the
preferential treatment E.O. 137 accorded it. It is separated from the general
fund, and even though it is kept in a structure known as a "trust liability
account" under the legislation, the fund is nevertheless subject to the COA's
examination and review. Regarding the alleged undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court determines that the provision granting the ERB
the authority to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. The Court is
satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a
"special fund." In addition to the basic intent of the law, which is to
safeguard the neighborhood consumer by regulating and subsidizing home
pump rates, P.D. In order to increase the Fund's resources, 1956 explicitly
permits the ERB to impose extra amounts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the

nullification of the reimbursement of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O.
137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE Manila Memorial Park, et al., Petitioners vs Secretary of DSWD, et al.,
TITLE Respondents
G.R. No. 175356
DATE December 3, 2013
FACTS The law must prevail in any disputes. Conversely, a regulation or any
component of it not enacted in accordance with the law is not a regulation
and does not have the same force or effect as a law.

Senior citizens now receive a 20% discount at several businesses thanks to

the passage of RA 7432 (as amended by RA 9257). The Secretaries of DOF
and DSWD released their own Rules and Regulations to carry out RA 9257's
tax provisions. This petition is the result. Insofar as they permit companies to
deduct the 20% discount provided to older persons from their taxes, Section 4
 of RA 7432 and its IRR are challenged by petitioners as being
unconstitutional. Only the tax deduction plan is being questioned; not the
20% senior citizen discount. According to them, it is against the law.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the tax deduction system is a
lawful exercise of the State's police power in violation of Article III, Section
9 of the Constitution, which states: "Private property shall not be
appropriated for public purpose without just recompense."
ISSUE/S Whether or not the 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power
or eminent domain.
RULING Using police power to grant the 20% discount is legal. The ability of the State
to control or impose restrictions on the use of property and liberties for the
benefit of the general welfare is known as police power. A legal subject or
goal and a legal strategy for achieving the goal are required for a police
power exercise to be legitimate. As opposed to that, the State's inherent right
to acquire or seize private property for public use is known as eminent
domain. But according to the Constitution, no one may take someone else's
property without first following the law and providing fair compensation.
Identifying whether a contested government action is a use of eminent
domain or the police authority may not always be simple. In order to make a
wise decision, one should consider the nature and consequences of the
contested government action. The 20% discount is meant to better the lives of
elderly residents who, at their advanced age, are less likely to be in gainful
employment, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and hence in need
of assistance when buying necessities. It honors senior citizens who have
likely dedicated their lives to improving the country. The relevant regulation
also has an impact on a private establishment's profitability through pricing.
The topic regulation is comparable to, but very different from, price control
or rate of return-on-investment control regulations, which are typically
thought of as police power measures.

In that respect, the subject regulation is different from:

1. The enterprises are not prohibited from raising the pricing of their
goods and services despite the discount, and
2. Only the senior citizen class is eligible for the discount; everyone else
is excluded. Nevertheless, the 20% discount may be rightly
considered as falling under the category of price regulation measures
that have an impact on the profitability of establishments subject to
them to the extent that is relevant to the settlement of this case. The
aforementioned regulation appears to be an exercise of police
authority.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA
JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc., petitioner
Vs
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent
G.R. No. 152230
DATE August 9, 2005
FACTS The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a
municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid,
Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located.
The route needed to be at least three meters wide in order for fire vehicles to
pass through in the event of a blaze, as mandated by the Fire Code. The route
was also necessary for the locals to get water and electricity outlets.
Following that, the town agreed to buy 51 square meters of the 1,791 square
meters of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco, and Ernesto Ching
Cuanco Kho's land.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig enacted an Ordinance on April 19, 1993,

allowing the municipal mayor to start expropriation procedures to acquire the
specified property and appropriate the resulting funds. According to the
legislation, the property owners were told of the municipality's intention to
buy the land for use as an access road for the general public but turned down
the offer.

In accordance with Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, also known
as the Local Government Code, the municipality filed a complaint against the
Ching Cuancos on July 21, 1993, which was amended on August 6, 1993.
The plaintiff claimed that it had already notified the defendants, in writing, of
its intention to build an access road on a portion of the property, but they had
refused to sell the same portion.

On the plaintiff's motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the
property sought to be expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendensat the dorsal portion under the
name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated
(JILCS).

The defendants claimed in their response that a deed of sale with the
signatures of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife proved they
had sold the aforementioned property to JILCSFI as early as February 1993.

JILCSFI asserted, via special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiff's use
of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of
the impoverished and the landless. The property that was being asked to be
taken over was allegedly not the best or least burdensome for the road.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the subject property which is intended to be used for public
 purposes may be expropriated by the respondent
RULING No, even though it is intended for the public, the Municipality of Pasig
cannot seize the subject property.

- The Supreme Court ruled that it was insufficient to demonstrate why

the petitioner's land specifically needed the road and not somewhere
else.
- As the petitioner rightly noted, there is no indication in the record that
an ocular inspection was carried out during the trial. If the trial court
did, however, conduct an ocular inspection of the subject property
during the trial, the petitioner was not informed.
- As a result, the petitioner was denied its right to due process. The trial
court's findings based on the ocular inspection's conduct must be
dismissed since the petitioner in this matter was not informed of any
ocular inspections of the property and as a result, any factual findings
based on those inspections have no probative value.
- IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the
complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent
without prejudice to the refiling thereof.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, et al., petitioners vs Intermediate
Appelate Court, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 72126
DATE January 29, 1988
FACTS Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation applied for a permit to fence
a plot of land in 1975 at the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, so that it could store its heavy machinery and different finished
goods there. The Meycauayan Municipal Council adopted a Resolution to
seize the respondent's land parcel in the same year.

Because there was no legitimate need for the respondent's land to be

expropriated by the Municipality of Meycauayan for use as a public road, the
Special Committee advised the Provincial Board of Bulacan to reject or
revoke the resolution. However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan
approved a plan to expropriate the respondent's land once more. The
 aforementioned resolution was accepted by the Provincial Board of Bulacan.
The Municipality of Meycauayan then brought a special civil action for
expropriation before the Regional Trial Court.

The Provincial Assessor of Bulacan was appointed as the court commissioner

who will conduct the hearing to determine the reasonable compensation for
the property by the Regional Trial Court, which issued the decision stating
that the taking of the property was valid.

On a petition for review, the intermediate appellate court upheld the

judgment of the trial court. However, the ruling was reviewed and overturned
after the Philippine Pipes requested reconsideration.
ISSUE/S Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exercise its power of
eminent domain to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public
road?
RULING This Court ruled that a genuine need must exist in order to exercise the right
to eminent domain, and that need must have a public purpose. Only if it is for
the benefit of the community and there is a real need of a public nature can
private property be condemned. As a result, the courts have the authority to
investigate the legitimacy of the use of the eminent domain right and to
assess if there is a real need for it. If there is a genuine need for another
connecting road, there is no explanation in the petition as to why the more
suitable lot for the proposed road, which was put up for sale, has not been the
target of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

questioned resolution of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Spouses Cabahug, petitioners vs. National Power Corp., respondent
G.R. No. 186069
DATE January 30, 2013
FACTS Two pieces of land in Leyte belong to the Cabahugs' spouses. They were
among the defendants in a Special Civil Action complaint for expropriation
that NPC had previously brought before the RTC.

In accordance with RA 6395, "An Act Revising the Charter of the NPC," the
NPC chose to settle with the landowners and the lawsuit was subsequently
dismissed. The landowners received an easement fee equal to 10% of the
value of their property. The value of the impacted properties was set by the
Leyte Provincial Appraisal Committee at P45.00 per square meter.
 Two agreements titled "Right of Way Grant" were signed by Jesus Cabahug
in the NPC's favor. Jesus Cabahug also gave NPC a perpetual easement of
right of way for the latter's transmission lines and their appurtenances in
exchange for and in consideration of the easement fees.

Jesus Cabahug promised not to build any kind of construction or plant

anything in the Right of Way that would harm or impair the NPC
transmission line, with the exception of agricultural crops whose height will
not rise over three meters. Based on the Supreme Court's decision of January
18, 1991, Jesus Cabahug reserved the right to request further payment for the
easement fee.

Couples Cabahug asserted that they had been completely denied access to the
parts of land covered by their TCTs and filed a complaint against NPC
seeking the payment of just compensation, damages, and attorney's costs.
NPC's response: they had already paid the full easement fee.

The Spouses Cabahug won the RTC decision. The NPC easement of right of
way, which permanently strips the owner of their proprietary rights over their
property, is covered under the eminent domain power.

In ruling that the RA 6395 only permits NPC to get an easement right of way
over properties that are crossed by its transmission lines, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC decision. For lack of merit, MR was rejected.
ISSUE/S Whether or not CA reversibly erred in sustaining NPC’s reliance on Section
3-A of RA 6395 which states that only 10% of the market value of the
property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right of
way.
RULING Yes.

The use of said provision by NPC has been repeatedly overturned by this
Court in a number of cases because said easement is subject to the eminent
domain authority. A statute, decree, or executive order cannot specify that its
own conclusion shall take precedence over the court's findings when
determining appropriate compensation in eminent domain cases. Any
definition of what constitutes just compensation set forth in the law may only
be used as a general guideline or as one of the considerations in making that
determination; it may not be used in place of the court's discretion in
determining the appropriate amount to award and the methodology for doing
so. Section 3A of the R.A. This Court is not bound by No. 6395 in its altered
form.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the CA's

assailed 16 May 2007 Decision and 9 January 2009 Resolution are,
accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
REINSTATING the RTC's 14 March 2000 Decision, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the awards of attorney's fees, actual damages and/or
 litigation expenses are DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, petitioner
TITLE Vs
Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation, respondent
G.R. No. 192100
DATE March 12, 2014
FACTS Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation was the subject of expropriation
actions brought by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) through the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). The San Simon Interchange's expansion will
pass through the impacted region. Following that, the petitioner filed an
urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, claiming that
it had deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines an amount equal to
100% of the value of the property based on the most recent BIR zonal
valuation and that the court therefore had a ministerial duty to grant the
petitioner possession. The trial court granted the petitioner's application and
instructed the Pampanga Register of Deeds to cause the annotation of the writ
of possession. Respondent questioned the TRB's power to seize the subject
property and opposed to the petitioner's offer of compensation, which
respondent deemed unfair because it was based on the BIR zonal valuation,
an unofficial valuation.

The parties agreed during the pre-trial meeting that TRB had the right to
expropriate the subject property, but they couldn't agree on the just
compensation sum. Finally, the parties reached an agreement to refer the
question of appropriate compensation to three commissioners, including the
Provincial Register of Deeds for Pampanga, the RTC Branch Clerk of Court,
and the Municipal Assessor of San Simon, who will serve as Chairman and
Members, respectively. The P607, 200.00 the petitioner had deposited with
the LBP as a portion of just compensation was removed at the request of the
respondent, which was approved by the trial court. According to their
closeness to national, municipal, and barangay highways as well as the
improvements or developments made, commissioners proposed a price per
square meter ranging from P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 (Philippine peso). The
Republic, on the other hand, argued that the valuation ought to be P300 per
square meter. It is rated extremely low by the trial court. The CA upheld it
after receiving an appeal on it. According to the petitioner, the evidence used
to calculate appropriate compensation in expropriation instances should be
based on the criteria listed in Section 5 of R.A. 8974. Given these elements
 and the evidence the parties presented to the trial court, the petitioner
contends that just compensation for the subject property should not exceed
the zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter), and under no circumstances
should it exceed the market value of P1,300.00 per square meter determined
by the trial and appellate courts. Apparently 433.4% more than the 1998 BIR
zonal value for an undeveloped industrial site at the time of its taking,
according to the petitioner, was paid for a section of the respondent's 17,175
square meter property measuring just 2,024 square meters.

Respondent, however, argues that after taking into account all of the
petitioner's arguments and the evidence in the case, the CA did not make any
reversible errors in affirming the trial court's judgment. It claims that the
central issue of just compensation and the trial court's conclusions on it,
which were upheld by the CA, are a matter of fact that this Court shouldn't
disturb. Additionally, the respondent argues that the trial court's decision
deserves the utmost respect because the judge personally knows the state of
the subject property because he or she conducted an ocular examination on
September 23, 2004.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the issue of just compensation is a question of fact
2. Whether or not the trial court is bound by the recommendations
submitted by the commissioners.
RULING 1. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court petitions for review often exclusively
address legal issues. In the course of exercising its review authority,
this Court is not authorized to evaluate or rule on issues of fact. It is
established how legal and factual issues differ from one another.
When a disagreement or uncertainty surrounds the application of the
law to a particular set of facts, there is a legal question. Contrarily, if
the uncertainty relates to the veracity or untruth of the asserted facts, a
question of fact is present. Due to this, the factual conclusions reached
by the CA are definitive and final, and this Court will not examine
them on appeal.

A question cannot be one of law if it considers the admissibility of

any of the parties' or any other's evidence. The law's provisions for the
specific set of facts must be the exclusive basis for the issue's
resolution. The only legal question in this case that the petitioner has
raised is whether the trial court based its judgment of just
compensation on the grounds supplied by current statutes and
jurisprudence.

2. The trial court was found to have made an erroneous determination of

the fair market value of the subject property because it neglected to
take into account other important elements such the zonal valuation,
tax declaration, and current selling price supported by documentary
evidence. Indeed, reasonable compensation must be determined after
consideration of several variables rather than arriving at it randomly.
 The trial court did not have to follow the commissioners' evaluation
report; instead, it had the option to reject it and substitute its own
judgement of its worth based on the evidence in the record, or it might
accept the report/recommendation in its entirety and base its decision
on it. However, the court's judgment must be supported by all
accepted guidelines, sound legal precepts, and reliable evidence. It is
forbidden for the court to make decisions based on assumptions and
suppositions.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated July 21, 2009 and Resolution dated April 28, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90539 are hereby SET ASIDE.

This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation, in conformity with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Wenceslao Pascual, petitioner-appelant
Vs
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, et al., respondents-
appellees
G.R. No. L-10405
DATE December 29, 1960
FACTS The governor of the Province of Rizal, the petitioner, filed a declaratory relief
with injunction action on the grounds that RA 920, Act Appropriating Funds
for Public Works, which provided P85,000 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension, and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals, was nothing more than projected and planned subdivision roads
within Antonio Subdivision. The respondent, Jose Zulueta, a senatorial
candidate from the Philippines, is the owner of Antonio Subdivision. The
council accepted the respondent's offer to surrender the aforementioned
feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig in exchange for a plan submission
and an agreement to rename two streets. Zuleta wrote a letter to the district
engineer bringing attention to the approval of RA 920 after the contribution,
however, was not carried out. On the other hand, the district engineer did not
concur with the letter claiming that because the aforementioned feeder roads
were privately owned at the time RA 920 was passed and approved, the
appropriation for their construction was unlawful and, as a result, void from
the start. The petitioner requested that RA 920 be declared void and that the
purported deed of donation be ruled unlawful. The case was dismissed by the
 lower court, and the preliminary injunction writ was revoked.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated
in RA 920 are constitutional.
RULING According to the prevailing case law, the legislature lacks the authority to
appropriate public funds for any purpose other than those that are public. The
ability to tax may only be used for the benefit of the public, and the funds
obtained through taxes may only be used for those purposes.

The validity of the appropriation of the feeder roads in the current case
depends on whether or not those roads were public or private property at the
time the bill was passed by Congress or when it took effect. The
appropriation of Zulueta's land for a private purpose rendered it invalid. The
judicial nullification of the said contribution need not come before the
declaration that the said appropriation was illegal because it did not remedy
the nullity of the appropriation. The decision that was appealed is overturned.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It
is so ordered.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Romeo P. Gerochi, et al., petitioners
Vs
Department of Energy (DOE), et al., respondents
G.R. No. 159796
DATE July 17, 2007
FACTS The Electric Power Industry Act of 2001, also known as RA 9136, was
passed by Congress on June 8. The EPIRA Law's Section 34 is challenged by
petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and co. as being invalid since it unreasonably
delegated the authority to tax. After a (1) year after the EPIRA Law becomes
effective, Section 34 allows for the imposition of a "Universal Charge" on all
electricity end customers. For a maximum of three years, the universal charge
would be used to cover all government debts, missionary electrification,
equalization of taxes and royalties levied on imported and renewable energy,
environmental charges, and a charge to account for all cross-subsidizations.
The ERC is required to levy the universal fee to each end user on a monthly
basis. The universal charge will subsequently be maintained by the PSALM
Corp. through the establishment of a unique trust fund.
ISSUE/S Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the
part of the ERC.
RULING No. Legislative authority has not been unreasonably delegated to the ERC.
 According to section 34, the universal charge is an exaction of the state's
regulatory (police) power rather than a tax. The provision that is being
challenged does not generate revenue and cannot be viewed as a tax because
the universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the ERC's regulatory
responsibilities. Instead, it is an example of how the state is exercising its
police authority through regulation, not through the imposition of a tax.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Manila International Airport Authority, petitioner
Vs
Court of Appeals, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 155650
DATE July 20, 2006
FACTS The City of Parañaque sent MIAA Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The unpaid real estate taxes
owed by MIAA were reportedly worth P624 million.

The Airport Lands and Buildings were the subject of notices and warrants of
levy issued by the City of Parañaque through the City Treasurer. If MIAA
doesn't pay the back taxes on its real estate, the mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatens to sell the airport's land and buildings at public auction.

An original petition for prohibition and injunction with a request for a

preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order was submitted by
MIAA to the Court of Appeals. The Airport Lands and Buildings were to be
exempt from real estate taxes, levying actions, and public auctions when the
City of Parañaque filed the petition.

Parañaque's Argument: Upon the Local Government Code's implementation,

Section 193 expressly revoked the privileges of "government-owned and-
controlled corporations" regarding tax exemption. Respondents also contend
that the direct mention of one item, person, or action precludes all others,
which is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation. One of the
exceptions listed in Section 193 of the Local Government Code is not an
international airport. Respondents allege that MIAA cannot therefore assert
that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
 The Republic owns the land and buildings at airports, according to MIAA.
Taxation by the government is impossible. Due to the fact that in this
scenario the tax debtor is also the tax creditor, taxing public property would
not benefit the general public.
ISSUE/S Whether or not Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax under existing laws?
RULING Yes.

Since MIAA is a national government agency and not a government-owned

or controlled enterprise, it is not subject to local taxation. Due to the absence
of a capital stock that is divided into shares, MIAA is not a stock corporation.
There are no stockholders or voting shares of MIAA. Because MIAA has no
members, it is also not a non-stock corporation. Members are necessary for a
non-stock corporation. MIAA is an agency of the government having
corporate rights to carry out its governmental duties effectively. The fact that
MIAA has corporate powers is the only distinction between it and other
government instruments.

Governmental agencies do not turn into corporations when the law grants
them corporate powers. If a government instrumentality does not have a stock
or non-stock organizational structure, it continues to have both governmental
and corporate powers. As a result, MIAA uses its legal jurisdiction to levy
taxes and charges, wield police power, and take property. In addition, MIAA
"exercises all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar
as such powers are not contradictory with the requirements of this Executive
Order."

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals of 5 October 2001 and 27 September
2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66878. We DECLARE the Airport Lands and
Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority EXEMPT from the
real estate tax imposed by the City of Parañaque. We declare VOID all the
real estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax
delinquencies, issued by the City of Parañaque on the Airport Lands and
Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority, except for the
portions that the Manila International Airport Authority has leased to private
parties. We also declare VOID the assailed auction sale, and all its effects, of
the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport
Authority.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA
JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Ernesto S. Mercado, petitioner vs Eduardo Barrios Manzano, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 135083
DATE May 26, 1999
FACTS Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for Manzano's disqualification on the
grounds that he is not a Filipino citizen but rather a citizen of the United
States. The Makati charter and Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
both prohibit people having dual citizenship from standing for any elective
position, and the second division of the COMELEC agreed with Mamaril's
appeal and ordered the cancellation of Manzano's certificate of candidacy on
that basis. The Commission discovered that Manzano was born in 1955 in
San Francisco, California, to a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. Because
of the jus soli rule, he is therefore both an American citizen and a Filipino
citizen by virtue of his Filipino parentage.

Motion for reconsideration was submitted by Manzano. In anticipation of

such a motion, the Makati city elections of 1998 were held, with Manzano
receiving the most votes for vice-mayor. Until the matter was resolved, his
proclamation was put on hold. The disqualification case was interfered in by
petitioner Mercado, who received the second-highest number of votes behind
Manzano. Manzano's motion was not addressed by the COMELEC en banc,
which overturned the decision of the COMELEC second division and
determined Manzano was eligible to run for vice-mayor. In order to have the
COMELEC en banc's decision overturned, Mercado petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari.
ISSUE/S Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.
RULING No. Dual allegiance and dual citizenship are two distinct concepts. The
former happens when a person is simultaneously regarded as a national by
two or more states due to the application of their respective laws
simultaneously. An instance of such a circumstance is when a person is born
in a state that upholds the doctrine of jus soli but whose parents are nationals
of a state that upholds the idea of jus sanguinis. Such a person is
simultaneously regarded as a citizen of both states ipso facto and without
taking any voluntary action on his own. The following categories of Filipino
nationals may hold dual citizenship in accordance with the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries

which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country;
 (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

A Filipino citizen may become a citizen of another country without doing

anything, however the aforementioned scenarios are undoubtedly plausible
given the constitutional rules on citizenship.

On the other hand, dual allegiance describes the circumstance in which a

person simultaneously owes, by some concrete act, loyalty to two or more
states. Dual allegiance results from a person's free choice, unlike dual
citizenship, which is forced upon them.

The Constitutional Commission was concerned with naturalized citizens who

continue to be loyal to their countries of origin even after becoming citizens
when they added 5 to Article IV on citizenship, not dual citizens per se. This
is why R.A. uses the term "dual citizenship." 40(d) of Public Law No. 7160
and R.A. "Dual allegiance" is what No. 7854, 20 is supposed to be referring
to. Because of this, those who only hold dual citizenship are not excluded.
For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon filing their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship given that their condition is the
inevitable result of conflicting laws of various states. This is in contrast to
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs Li Ching Chung, respondent
G.R. No. 197450
DATE March 20, 2013
FACTS Chinese national respondent Stephen Lee Keng, also known as Bernabe Luna
Li, submitted his Declaration of Intention to Become a Citizen of the
Philippines to the OSG on August 22, 2007. Respondent submitted his
Petition for Naturalization before the RTC on March 12, 2008, or roughly
seven months after submitting his Intention to Apply.

The RTC approved the respondents' application for naturalization as a

Filipino citizen on June 3, 2009. The RTC ruling was challenged by the OSG
 to the CA. The OSG contends that the petition for naturalization should not
be approved due to several jurisdictional flaws, including the following: 1) it
was filed within the one (1) year period after the filing of the declaration of
intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is necessary for the validity of the
declaration of intention, was attached to the petition; and 3) the respondents
failed to meet the publication and posting requirements outlined in CA 473.

The RTC ruling was upheld by the CA. The CA ruled that this flaw was not
fatal even though the petition for naturalization was submitted less than one
(1) year after the OSG's request for a statement of intent. In addition, despite
the OSG's claim that the respondent failed to present his Certificate of
Arrival, the fact of his arrival could be easily verified based on the
Certification, dated August 21, 2007, issued by the Bureau of Immigration, as
well as the stamp in the respondent's passport indicating his arrival on
January 26, 1981. The Republic took part in each stage of the procedures
below, according to the CA. It was given the opportunity to follow the law,
which it did vehemently throughout. Whatever irregularities there may have
been in the procedure, if any, they had no impact on the outcome of the case
or the Republic's ability to meaningfully exercise its right to due process.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision and denying the
appeal by the OSG.
RULING Yes. CA ruling overturned and set aside.

Political Law- declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the
filing of the petition for naturalization.

Tan v. Republic stated that "the period of one year required therein is the
time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the qualifications of the
applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no
sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and
gather evidence thereon." The period is intended to give the government
sufficient time to screen and examine an applicant's qualifications as well as
to gauge the latter's good intentions and sincerity of purpose. If no time is
given for the State to gather evidence that it may present to contradict any
evidence that the applicant may adduce in support of his petition, an
applicant may then impose upon the courts.

Or, to put it another way, the waiting period will reveal the true motivations
of those who seek Philippine citizenship for only their own benefit, such as,
but not limited to, those who are merely interested in protecting their wealth,
as opposed to those who have grown to genuinely love the Philippines and its
culture and who want to participate in nation-building on a genuine basis.

It is required by law that the declaration of intention be submitted one year

before the petition for citizenship. Furthermore, considerable compliance
with the criterion is insufficient, as was decided in Republic v. Go Bon Lee.
In this instance, Go submitted his application for Philippine citizenship on
May 23, 1940. He submitted his application for naturalization on April 18,
1941, after a period of eleven months.

Section 6 of CA No. 473, to be precise, states that Section 6 is the only

exception to the need of filing a declaration of purpose. People who are not
required to declare their intentions. People who were born in the Philippines,
regardless of race or nationality, and who completed their primary and
secondary education in public or government-recognized institutions as well
as those who had lived continuously in the country for at least thirty years
prior to filing their application are eligible to apply for naturalization without
having to make a declaration of intention as long as they meet all other
requirements of this Act. In addition to these requirements, the applicant
must also provide documentation proving that all of his children had primary
and secondary education in public or privately accredited institutions,
regardless of race or nationality. The same shall be deemed to apply to the
widow and minor children of a foreigner who has proclaimed his intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines but dies prior to his actual naturalization.

Without a doubt, the respondent does not fit into the category of exempt
people who would exempt him from having to submit a declaration of
intention one year prior to submitting a petition for citizenship. Contrary to
the CA's conclusion, it is fatal that the respondent filed his petition for
citizenship too soon, before the allotted year had passed.

It is the applicant's responsibility to demonstrate complete and total

compliance with all legal requirements during the naturalization process. The
possibility for a foreigner to acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization
is merely a matter of grace, favor, or privilege provided to him by the State;
the applicant does not have any inherent, natural, existing, or vested right to
do so. The only right that a foreigner has to be given the chance to become a
Filipino citizen is the one that the law grants him, and in order to obtain that
right, he must rigorously adhere to all the statutory conditions and
requirements. The petition will be rejected or the naturalization procedure
will be severed if even one jurisdictional prerequisite is missing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition for naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung,
otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, docketed as Civil
Case No. 08-118905 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila, is
DISMISSED, without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.
NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA
JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Casan Macode Maquiling, petitioner vs Commission on Election,
respondents
G.R. No. 195649
DATE April 16, 2013
FACTS This Resolution answers the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration from
May 10, 2013, as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration from
May 20, 2013.

We are aware that the municipal politicians elected in the May 2010 elections
had their terms of office end on June 30, 2010. As a result, Arnado has
successfully completed his tenure in office. Despite the fact that the requested
remedy cannot now be given, the decision on the application for
reconsideration is crucial because it will either confirm the legitimacy of
Arnado's election or confirm that Arnado never met the requirements to run
for public office.

In his request that this Court's April 16, 2013, decision be overturned, the
Respondent failed to make any justifications. Instead, he listed his
accomplishments as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and he
reiteratively stated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not once, not
twice, but six times. To be clear, the issue at hand is not whether he took the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but rather whether his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship was effective. The issue before this
Court is unaffected by his achievements as mayor, either.
ISSUE/S Whether or not dual citizens are ineligible for local public office.
RULING It is undeniable that dual citizens are ineligible to compete for local elective
office under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

There is also no question that having a passport serves as a clear indication

that one is a citizen of the nation that issued it, or that a passport
demonstrates that the nation that issued it accepts the holder as a citizen.

Arnado's citizenship as a naturalized American or as a citizen of the

Philippines is undeniably true. There is no question that he relinquished his
American citizenship and reclaimed his Filipino citizenship by swearing the
Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines. It is also undeniable that Arnado used
his American passport at least six times after renunciating his citizenship.

If there is any unanswered question, it relates to Arnado's usage of his

American passport after renunciating his citizenship in the country. A person
must formally and completely renounce their foreign citizenship. The
necessity that the renunciation must be made through an oath highlights the
solemn responsibility of the person making the oath of renunciation to uphold
his commitments. Making the oath void by permitting later use of a foreign
passport out of convenience is against the law. By turning swearing into a
mere ceremonial ritual, it diminishes the significance of the act.

The dissent claims that Arnado has been effectively left "a man without a
nation" by the court, although in reality, the court has determined that Arnado
has more than one. Nowhere in the ruling is it stated that Arnado is not a
Filipino citizen. The judgment just makes note of the fact that he was a
citizen of a different country at the time he submitted his certificate of
candidacy.

It is well-established that administrative bodies' findings of fact will not be

overturned by the courts absent a serious abuse of discretion on the part of
those bodies or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. These findings are given not only great respect but even
finality, and they are binding upon this Court, unless it can be demonstrated
that the administrative body had willfully ignored or misapplied the evidence
that was presented to it.

To be clear, COMELEC First Division determined that Arnado exploited his

U.S. At least six times after giving up his citizenship in the US. This was
refuted by the COMELEC En Banc, which discovered that Arnado had only
used his American passport four times and agreed with Arnado's explanation
that he had only done so because his Philippine passport had not yet been
granted. On the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31
March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010, Arnado,
according to the COMELEC En Banc, was able to demonstrate that he
traveled with his Philippine passport.

None of these dates line up with the other two dates listed in the Bureau of
Immigration certification proving that Arnado entered the Philippines on
January 21, 2010, and March 23, 2010, using his U.S. passport. His
nationality is listed as USA-American in his passport, with the number
057782700. These two travel dates, along with the travel history provided by
the Bureau of Immigration demonstrating that Arnado also produced his U.S.
passport four times (upon departure on April 14, 2009, arrival on June 25,
2009, departure on July 29, 2009, and arrival on November 24, 2009), bring
the total number of incidents to six.

The COMELEC En Banc came to the following judgment: "The use of the
US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport had not
yet been issued to him for his use." The evidence does not support this
conclusion, though. According to Arnado, his Philippine passport was issued
on June 18, 2009. Records reveal that he carried on using his American
passport even after getting his Philippine one. His American passport was
presented on November 24, 2009, January 21, 2010, and March 23, 2010,
according to Arnado's travel records. Arnado never challenged these truths.
 Because of this, the COMELEC En Banc's decision was made based on the
incorrect assumption that Arnado's use of the U.S. passport had ended when
he received his Philippine passport. Contrary to what the dissent wants us to
think, Arnado's continuing use of his US passport cannot be viewed as a
series of isolated incidents.

The idea that only people who identify as purely Filipino are eligible to run
for public office is at issue in this case, it must be emphasized. If we give
dual citizens who want to run for public office the option to renounce their
foreign citizenship while continuing to use their foreign passports afterward,
we are effectively giving these dual citizens a special privilege and nullifying
the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

NAME NINOTCHKA D. ABABA

JD1-C
Constitutional Law 1
CASE TITLE Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, petitioner vs Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 125793
DATE August 29, 2006
FACTS Filipino national Joevanie Tabasa was the petitioner. Petitioner became a
citizen of the United States when he became seven years old, after his father's
naturalization.

The petitioner was caught and arrested by a Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation (BID) officer when he entered the Philippines as a "balikbayan,"
and he was subsequently probed. The petitioner's passport has been canceled
as a result of a federal arrest warrant that is still on the books, according to
 information provided by the US embassy. Deportation to the US was
subsequently ordered for him.

According to the petitioner's Supplemental Petition, he was granted Filipino

citizenship through repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171
(RA 8171), and as a result, he is no longer subject to deportation or detention
by the Bureau that is the respondent.
ISSUE/S Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA
8171?
RULING He doesn't. There is no question that the petitioner in the current case was
born a Filipino and obtained American citizenship when he was still a child.
He cannot assert that, as the child of natural-born Filipinos who fled the
nation out of political or economic necessity, he is entitled to automatic
repatriation.

Individuals who are eligible for repatriation under RA 8171

To reiterate, only the following individuals are eligible for repatriation under
RA 8171:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to

aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

He obviously lost his Philippine citizenship through operation of law and not
as a result of political or financial pressures. The decision to file for
naturalization may have been made by his father for political or economic
motives. The choice was made by his parents, not him. The privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is provided directly to natural-born Filipinos who
can show they did so for political or economic reasons, and it is indirectly
extended to any minor children at the moment of repatriation.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7,

1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.