PRE The Philippine Review of Economics

Vol. LIV No. 2, December 2017 pp. 88-99

The fiscal program in recent Philippine history:

looking back and looking forward

Benjamin E. Diokno*
Department of Budget and Management

For almost four decades, the Philippines has underinvested in public

infrastructure largely due to its poor macroeconomic challenges: low
economic growth, high public debt, low revenues, and high interest rates.
But the macroeconomic picture has significantly improved in recent
years. Growth has accelerated amidst a low-inflation, low-interest rate
environment. The debt-to-gdp ratio has gone down and continues to fall,
while the revenue effort is projected to rise with the tax reform program.
The favorable economic conditions have enabled the government to embark
on an aggressive medium-term fiscal program that focuses on modernizing
public infrastructure and investing in human capital development.
These developments are reflected in the 2017 national budget. Debt
burden as a share of the national budget has gradually declined from 20
percent in 1983-1985 and 30 percent in 1986-1996 to as low as 11 percent
in 2017. By contrast, the share of social services has doubled from 21
percent in 1983-1985 to 40 percent in the 2017 while infrastructure and
other capital outlays has more that quintupled from 1.1 percent in 1983-
1985 to 6.1 percent in 2017. The higher spending will be made possible
by increasing the planned deficit from 2 percent to 3 percent of gdp
combined with the higher revenue effort owing to the tax reform program.

JEL classification: H54, H52, H62, H20, H68

Keywords: fiscal policy, national budget, infrastructure spending, social services,
public debt

1. Introduction

In economics, initial conditions matter. For the last three decades, the
Philippines has not been able to finance its development priorities, particularly
public infrastructure, and it is not surprising why: the level of public debt was
huge; the costs of servicing it was high; and the revenue-to-gdp ratio was low. Of
course, it did not help that a string of fiscal conservatives running its fiscal policy.
* Please address all correspondence to bediokno@gmail.com
 The Philippine Review of Economics, Volume LIV No. 2, December 2017 89

TABLE 1. Selected macroeconomic statistics1 (1983-2017)

Items 1983- 1986- 1997- 2007- 2012- Emerging

1985 1996 2006 2016 2016 2017
actual actual actual actual actual figures^
Debt/GDP ratio 19.2 53.4 59.1 49.6 46.2 42.0
Revenue/GDP ratio 10.6 15.3 14.9 14.9 15.1 15.0
Deficit/GDP ratio 2.0 1.6 2.9 1.8 1.5 2.6
GDP growth rate, percent (4.3) 3.7 4.0 5.6 6.6 6.5-7.5
Inflation rate, percent 27.4 9.4 5.8 3.7 2.7 3.1-3.3
LIBOR rate, 180 days 9.9 6.4 4.1 1.3 0.6 1.4-1.6
T-bill rate, 364 days 30.5 17.0 10.6 3.1 1.7 2.8-3.0
1
This is based on the approved macroeconomic assumptions as of the 171st Development Budget
Coordination Committee Meeting on December 22, 2017.

In the last few years, the macroeconomic picture has changed. The economy
has grown faster amidst a low-inflation environment. The cost of borrowing, both
at home and abroad, is low. The debt/gdp ratio has gone down and continues
to fall. Notwithstanding the increase in revenue effort with the 1986 tax reform
program under the Aquino administration2,3, the revenue-to-gdp ratio remains
sticky at around 15 percent.

FIGURE 1. Falling debt-to-GDP ratio;

unchanging revenue-to-GDP ratio (1983-2017)4

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

-
1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2016

Revenue/GDP Debt/GDP

1
Department of Budget and Management, Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-2017
2
The 1986 tax reform program aimed to improve the revenue yield and the simplicity of the tax system,
among other objectives. Indirect taxation was also revamped with the introduction of the value-added tax.
3
See Diokno [2005].
4
Department of Budget and Management, Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-2017
90 Diokno: The fiscal program in recent Philippine history

Looking at the Philippines’ current state of affairs gives a glimmer of hope. The
country has been growing at a rapid rate in recent years, finally turning the corner
after decades of subpar growth. The Philippine economy grew by an average rate
of 6.2 percent from 2010 to 2015. This was punctuated by a robust 6.9 percent
growth rate in 2016—higher than that of China, Vietnam, and its other peers. The
emerging picture for 2017 only bolsters the Philippine economy’s strong growth
trajectory. Despite coming off an election year, economic expansion for the first
three quarters of the year has averaged 6.7 percent, and it may even go higher
once the fourth quarter figures are available.

TABLE 2. National budget by sectoral allocation (1983-2017)5

Items 1983- 1986- 1997- 2007- 2012- 2017 General

1985 1996 2006 2016 2016 Appropriations
actual actual actual actual actual Act figures2
Economic services (%) 32.2 24.0 22.1 26.9 27.4 27.6
Social services (%) 21.6 23.5 30.2 33.6 36.2 40.3
Defense (%) 9.6 7.2 5.3 4.6 4.3 4.4
General public services 16.3 15.3 17.7 17.6 17.0 17.2
(%)
Debt burden (%) 20.3 30.0 24.6 17.3 15.1 10.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Government authorities
2
Source: Department of Budget and Management data, January 2018

A glance at the sectoral distribution of the national budget across seven

administrations also shows the improved fiscal context of the Philippines. In the
past, heavy indebtedness led to a huge chunk of the budget being devoted to debt
and interest payments. From 1986 to 1996, 30 percent of the national budget
was devoted to servicing public debt, which significantly slashed the productive
spending in the budget. The gradual decline in the share of debt burden, and the
subsequent rise of the share of economic and social services, suggest greater
capacity of the government to invest in priority programs and projects to boost
socio-economic development. In the 2017 General Appropriations Act, the
share of debt burden is one-third of what it used to be two to three decades ago.
Economic services have likewise inched up to 27.6 percent. Meanwhile, the most
significant beneficiary of lower debt service payments is the social services sector,
with its share almost doubling from 23.5 percent in 1986-1996 up to 40.3 percent
in the 2017 budget.

5
Department of Budget and Management, Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-2017
 The Philippine Review of Economics, Volume LIV No. 2, December 2017 91

2. Spending priorities in the medium term

The strong growth performance and much improved fiscal position are among
the reasons the Philippines may be described as the “fastest-growing economy in
the fastest-growing region in the world”.
Nevertheless, the bullish outlook on the Philippine market can only be
sustained if the government is able to finance its development priorities, namely
infrastructure and human capital development.

FIGURE 2. World Economic Forum overall infrastructure rankings among

ASEAN-5 (2009-2017)

Source: World Economic Forum, various years

The Philippines’ infrastructure indicators consistently result in dismal scores

that pull down its overall competitiveness. According to the World Economic
Forum Competitiveness Rankings, we lag behind our asean-5 neighbors in terms
of overall infrastructure, especially Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. What is
worrisome is that the country’s overall infrastructure rank has steeply declined
from 94th in 2009 to 112th in 2017.6
The Philippines failed to invest in infrastructure, and this has resulted in
monumental economic and social costs to the Philippine economy. According
to a study by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency in 2014, the traffic
situation in Metro Manila alone costs the economy ₱2.4 billion daily, or ₱876
billion annually, in terms of vehicular maintenance costs and time costs from the
traffic congestion.7 In dollar terms, this is $17.5 billion annually. More so, the

6
World Economic Forum, The global competitiveness report, 2009-2017
7
Japan International Cooperation Agency and National Economic and Development Authority, Roadmap
for transport infrastructure development for Metro Manila and its surrounding areas, 2014
92 Diokno: The fiscal program in recent Philippine history

terrible traffic congestion hampers the well-being of Filipino commuters, who

have to spend a quarter of their day on the road, and takes away time from more
productive activities.
The same study four years ago projected that if the traffic situation is not
improved, the cost will climb up from ₱2.4 billion daily to as much as ₱6.0 billion
daily by 2030. Accounting for inflation, the cost of traffic congestion is as much
as ₱2.8 billion daily.

FIGURE 3. Infrastructure and other capital outlays as share of GDP (1983-2017)8

7

1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 2016

Source: Government authorities

Low public spending on infrastructure development has exacerbated this

issue. The Philippines has consistently fallen short of the suggested threshold for
developing countries of five percent of gdp for infrastructure spending. In 2011
to 2016, government spending on infrastructure as percentage of gdp averaged
a three percent. If other capital outlays are considered to account for fixed asset
expenditures like equipment, machinery, and other facilities, it has averaged a
lowly 3.4 percent.
For a country whose Achilles’ heel is infrastructure development, this level is
unacceptable and the present government intends to turn things around.

TABLE 3. Infrastructure and other capital outlays

as percentage of GDP (1983-2017)9

1983- 1986- 1997- 2007- 2012- 2017

1985 1996 2006 2016 2016 adjusted
actual actual actual actual actual figures
Infrastructure and other 1.1 1.4 1.5 3.0 3.7 6.1
capital outlays (%)
Source: Government authorities

8
Department of Budget and Management, Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-2017
9
Department of Budget and Management, Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-2017
 The Philippine Review of Economics, Volume LIV No. 2, December 2017 93

Much of the infrastructure gap in the Philippines can be explained by the

historical underinvestment in roads, railways, bridges, among other infrastructure
facilities. From 1983 until 2006, infrastructure and other capital spending
amounted to less than 3 percent of gdp. It doubled to 3 percent from 2007 to
2016, although such a level is still well below the suggested 5 percent of gdp
threshold for developing countries.
At the same time, it does not need much convincing that the Philippines
needs to invest heavily in its young population. For a developing country whose
median age is 23 years old10, the government must ensure that its young people,
especially the poor, have access to quality and affordable education, healthcare,
and social protection. Such interventions early on will secure for the country an
agile, competitive, and productive workforce capable of driving growth.

FIGURE 4. Medium-term fiscal program (2017-2022)11

Given the ambitious goals of the administration in closing the infrastructure

gap and developing the country’s human resources, critics have raised red flags
regarding the fiscal sustainability of such initiatives. But, the government is ready
to overcome these fears through a proper strategy.

10
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority, 2012
11
This is based on the approved medium-term fiscal program as of the 171st Development Budget
Coordination Committee (dbcc) Meeting on December 22, 2017.
94 Diokno: The fiscal program in recent Philippine history

First, it has increased the planned deficit from 2 percent to 3 percent of gdp.
The deficit will be financed through borrowings following an 80 to 20 mix in
favor of domestic sources.12 This financing mix is intended to minimize exposure
to foreign exchange fluctuations and enable government to better manage the
debt. Furthermore, based on strengthened friendships with Asian neighbors,
particularly China and Japan, access to official development assistance will
greatly reduce the costs of financing major infrastructure projects.

TABLE 4. Budget deficit financing mix (1983-2017)13

1983- 1986- 1997- 2007- 2012- 2017

1985 1996 2006 2016 2016 emerging
actual actual actual actual actual figures
Gross domestic borrowings (%) 73.3 55.0 54.1 73.6 78.0 81.0
Gross foreign borrowings (%) 26.7 45.0 45.9 26.4 22.0 19.0
Total gross borrowings (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Government authorities

A look at the historical budget deficit financing mix indicates the government’s
gradual shift to domestic borrowing sources as opposed to foreign sources.
Thirty years ago, as much as 45 percent of total gross borrowings were financed
through foreign sources. Such a heavy reliance on foreign borrowings increased
the country’s vulnerability to foreign exchange volatility. The financing mix
was rebalanced to about 74 percent to 26 percent from 2007 to 2016, and the
government is keen to maintain such a strategy. For instance, the emerging figures
on deficit financing for 2017 indicate that 81 percent of total gross borrowings
were accounted for by domestic sources, whereas only 19 percent came from
foreign sources.
The bigger deficit and borrowings may not sound appealing to some, but the
situation is manageable with adherence to fiscal responsibility. The debt-to-gdp
ratio will continue to fall as gdp growth is projected to outpace the rise in debt
accumulation. The debt-to-gdp ratio is expected to shrink from 42 percent in
2017 to 38 percent in 2022.14 With this debt profile, the Philippines will become
the envy of many developed and developing countries in the world facing much
higher debt-to-gdp ratios.
Second, borrowings will be complemented with increased revenue collections
resulting from tax policy and tax administration reforms. The tax reform program

12
This is based on the approved medium-term financing program as of the 171st Development Budget
Coordination Committee Meeting on December 22, 2017.
13
Department of Budget and Management, Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-2017
14
This is based on the projections of the Bureau of Treasury (btr) as of the 171st Development Budget
Coordination Committee (dbcc) Meeting on December 22, 2017.
 The Philippine Review of Economics, Volume LIV No. 2, December 2017 95

of the government not only intends to raise additional revenues but also aims to
institutionalize a fairer, simpler, and more efficient tax regime. It will also put in
place a tax system that is more in sync with the country’s asean-5 peers, making
the Philippine economy more competitive to investors.
The first package, alongside pending legislative measures (more commonly
known as Package 1A and 1B of tax reform), are estimated to contribute an
additional ₱130 billion in 2018 up to ₱220 billion in 2022. In total, it will rake
in about ₱1 trillion over the medium term and bring annual revenues of about 0.7
to 1.0 percent of gdp.15 Conservative targets for revenue effort are pegged at 16
percent of gdp in 2018 rising to 17.3 percent of gdp in 2022.16 This can go higher
if the tax reform program proceeds according to plan, especially in the legislature.
Hence, the two-pronged approach of expanding the deficit ceiling and
enhancing revenue effort will enable the government to finance the country’s
pressing expenditure needs without sacrificing the its fiscal health.
Such a fiscal strategy will make possible the ambitious infrastructure program
of the Duterte administration, dubbed “Build Build Build”. It will enable the
government to spend about ₱8 trillion to ₱9 trillion for public infrastructure in
the medium term, with the infrastructure budget reaching 5.4 percent of gdp in
2017 and rising to as much as 7.3 percent of gdp by 2022. This is a monumental
step towards modernizing the country’s public infrastructure given its historical
underinvestment in the said realm.
At the same time, such a fiscal strategy will provide resources for the
government’s flagship social service programs, including but not limited to
the conditional cash transfer program, subsidies for health insurance through
PhilHealth, universal access to quality tertiary education (by virtue of ra 10931),
among other interventions. The expanded fiscal space will enable the government
to sustain this level of support, with social services accounting for as much as 40
percent of the national budget, to its constituents.
Through these measures, combined with speedy and efficient implementation,
the groundwork shall be laid for the “golden age of infrastructure” in the
Philippines preparing the young men and women of the country to be future
drivers of growth.

3. Concluding remarks

With sound macroeconomic fundamentals and prudent fiscal policies, the

Philippines is poised for an economic breakthrough.

15
Source: Department of Finance data, December 2017
16
This is based on the approved medium-term revenue program as of the 171st Development Budget
Coordination Committee (dbcc) Meeting on December 22, 2017.
96 Diokno: The fiscal program in recent Philippine history

The country now has the right ingredients and leaders to catch up with its
asean-5 peers and to ultimately transform the Philippines into the “Asian tiger”
it is capable of becoming. With the right fiscal policy strategy, the country is
poised to be an upper-middle income economy with poverty incidence down to
14 percent by 2022.

References

Department of Budget and Management (dbm) Fiscal statistics handbook, 1983-

2017.
Development Budget Coordination Committee (dbcc) [2017] Approved medium-
term fiscal program and macroeconomic assumptions, December 2017.
Diokno, B. [2005] “Reforming the Philippine tax system: Lessons from two tax
reform programs”, Discussion Paper No. 0502, School of Economics, University
of the Philippines.
Diokno, B. [2008] “The Philippines: fiscal behavior in recent history”, Discussion
Paper No. 0804, School of Economics, University of the Philippines.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (jica). [2014] Roadmap for transport
infrastructure development for Metro Manila and its surrounding areas.
World Economic Forum (wef) The global competitiveness report 2009-2017.

Appendix
TABLE 1. Selected macroeconomic statistics (1983-2017)

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

Debt/GDP ratio 13.8 21.3 22.5 55.7 56.2 34.2 57.6 52.5 46.9
Revenue/GDP ratio 11.2 9.8 10.9 11.7 13.6 12.7 14.9 15.2 16.0
Deficit/GDP ratio 1.8 1.7 1.8 4.6 2.2 2.6 1.9 3.1 1.9
GDP growth rate, percent 1.9 (7.3) (7.3) 3.4 4.3 6.8 6.2 3.0 (0.6)
Inflation rate, percent 9.5 50.0 22.6 1.0 4.0 14.1 12.0 12.3 19.4
LIBOR rate, 180 days 9.9 11.2 8.6 6.8 7.3 8.1 9.3 8.3 6.0
T-bill rate, 364 days 14.9 41.5 35.2 13.2 14.1 16.2 20.4 26.1 23.9

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Debt/GDP ratio 61.0 66.1 56.8 53.0 47.9 53.0 48.4 52.8 56.0
Revenue/GDP ratio 16.2 15.9 17.9 17.1 17.1 17.5 15.7 14.7 14.4
Deficit/GDP ratio 1.1 1.3 (0.9) (0.5) (0.3) (0.1) 1.7 3.4 3.7
GDP growth rate, percent 0.3 2.1 4.4 4.7 5.8 5.2 (0.6) 3.1 4.4
Inflation rate, percent 8.6 6.7 10.5 6.7 7.5 5.6 9.3 5.9 4.0
LIBOR rate, 180 days 3.9 3.4 5.1 6.1 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.5 6.6
T-bill rate, 364 days 18.0 14.1 14.0 13.4 13.4 13.6 17.4 11.7 11.8
 The Philippine Review of Economics, Volume LIV No. 2, December 2017 97

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Debt/GDP ratio 61.3 67.9 66.7 63.7 62.7 58.1 58.0 53.6 52.5
Revenue/GDP ratio 14.6 13.8 14.1 13.8 14.4 15.6 16.5 15.6 14.0
Deficit/GDP ratio 3.8 5.0 4.4 3.7 2.6 1.0 0.2 0.9 3.7
GDP growth rate, percent 2.9 3.6 5.0 6.7 4.8 5.2 6.6 4.2 1.1
Inflation rate, percent 6.8 3.0 3.5 6.0 7.6 6.2 2.8 9.3 3.2
LIBOR rate, 180 days 3.7 1.9 1.2 1.8 3.8 5.3 5.3 3.0 1.1
T-bill rate, 364 days 12.0 6.8 7.5 9.2 8.7 7.0 4.9 6.5 4.6

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Debt/GDP ratio 51.7 49.3 51.9 47.1 45.1 44.7 42.1 42.0
Revenue/GDP ratio 13.4 14.0 14.5 14.9 15.1 15.8 15.2 15.0
Deficit/GDP ratio 3.5 2.0 2.3 1.4 0.6 0.9 2.4 2.6
GDP growth rate, percent 7.6 3.7 6.7 7.1 6.1 6.1 6.9 6.5-7.5
Inflation rate, percent 3.8 4.6 3.2 3.0 4.1 1.4 1.8 3.1 – 3.3
LIBOR rate, 180 days 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.4-1.6
T-bill rate, 364 days 4.3 2.3 2.0 0.7 1.8 2.1 1.76 2.8 - 3.0

TABLE 2. National budget by sectoral allocation (1983-2017)

Items 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Economic services (%) 34.9 33.6 28.2 25.9 21.9 19.0 23.4 24.2 24.9
Social services (%) 23.2 19.9 21.7 20.8 22.3 22.6 22.4 22.0 22.3
Defense (%) 10.7 8.4 9.7 7.0 6.9 8.7 7.5 6.5 6.3
General public services (%) 17.1 15.0 16.9 12.3 12.7 13.7 13.1 13.8 14.1
Debt burden (%) 14.1 23.2 23.5 34.0 36.2 36.0 33.6 33.5 32.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Items 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Economic services (%) 22.9 23.4 25.8 27.5 25.3 26.8 24.1 24.0 24.5
Social services (%) 22.9 23.4 23.4 26.9 29.5 32.3 32.6 33.2 31.2
Defense (%) 6.6 7.2 7.0 7.4 7.4 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.3
General public services (%) 16.3 17.4 18.1 17.6 19.0 18.8 18.8 18.2 18.0
Debt burden (%) 31.2 28.6 25.7 20.6 18.7 16.1 18.6 18.9 21.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Items 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Economic services (%) 22.1 20.4 20.6 19.4 18.3 21.2 25.4 27.3 28.1
Social services (%) 30.4 31.1 28.8 28.9 27.0 27.0 27.7 28.0 28.7
Defense (%) 5.1 5.2 5.4 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.4 4.7 4.4
General public services (%) 17.1 17.9 17.1 16.1 17.8 17.1 17.5 18.1 19.0
Debt burden (%) 25.3 25.4 28.1 30.7 31.8 29.7 24.0 21.8 19.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
98 Diokno: The fiscal program in recent Philippine history

Items 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual adjusted
Economic services (%) 25.9 23.2 26.8 25.9 24.4 29.3 30.6 27.5
Social services (%) 28.2 34.5 32.4 35.6 37.9 36.7 36.3 40.3
Defense (%) 6.2 4.5 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.4
General public services (%) 19.1 19.0 18.2 17.1 16.8 16.7 17.0 17.2
Debt burden (%) 20.6 18.8 18.6 17.0 16.6 13.2 11.9 10.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

TABLE 3. Infrastructure and other capital outlays

as percentage of GDP (1983-2017)

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Infrastructure and other 1.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.4
capital outlays (%)

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Infrastructure and other 1.7 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.7 1.8
capital outlays (%)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Infrastructure and other 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.7
capital outlays (%)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual adjusted
Infrastructure and other capital 2.1 1.7 2.6 3.5 2.8 4.7 5.1 6.1
outlays (%)

TABLE 4. Budget deficit financing mix (1983-2017)

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Gross domestic 51.3 87.6 81.0 78.4 79.2 73.2 65.1 55.2 73.7
borrowings (%)
Gross foreign 48.7 12.4 19.0 21.6 20.8 26.8 34.9 44.8 26.3
borrowings (%)
Total gross 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
borrowings (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Gross domestic 81.3 (80.0) 27.3 77.7 74.0 (11.8) 68.6 57.1 56.7
borrowings (%)
Gross foreign 18.7 180.0 72.7 22.3 26.0 111.8 31.4 42.9 43.3
borrowings (%)
Total gross 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
borrowings (%)
 The Philippine Review of Economics, Volume LIV No. 2, December 2017 99

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual actual
Gross domestic borrowings 75.1 54.1 54.7 65.8 64.5 56.6 73.4 85.8 56.2
(%)
Gross foreign borrowings (%) 24.9 45.9 45.3 34.2 35.5 43.4 26.6 14.2 43.8
Total gross borrowings (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

actual actual actual actual actual actual actual emerging
Gross domestic borrowings (%) 65.6 65.2 83.6 93.9 73.2 68.9 70.5 81.0
Gross foreign borrowings (%) 34.4 34.8 16.4 6.1 26.8 31.1 29.5 19.0
Total gross borrowings (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0