1 PB

POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik
Vol.13, No. 1, 2022

doi: 10.14710/politika.13.1.2022.1-22
Elite in Sub-national Politics: Structure and Continuation

in Post-authoriatarian East Java, Indonesia 1
M. Faishal Aminuddin1 & M. Fajar Shodiq Ramadlan2

1, 2
Department of Political Science, Universitas Brawijaya
Recieved: 14 November 2021 Revised: 11 Februari 2022 Published: 30 April 2022
Abstract:
Study on political elites in sub-national politics in post-1998 Indonesia did not pay
much attention to identify the shifting or continuation of structural change in the post-
New Order authoritarianism. From a case study in East Java, this article shows the change
and continuation of political elite structure. Democratization does not necessarily produce
significant changes that shift the position and privilege of the old political elites. Their
organizational power might have declined, but their control over patron-client relationship
remains strong. This is also finds that the political changes were, institutionally, not strong
enough to cause the significant damage to the patron-client relationship developed
during the New Order era. The democratization pressure has only caused the partial
diversification of elites’ political affiliation while the inter- intra elite power relations model
has not changed much. This explanation provides a new contribution to the
understandings on the dynamics and changes in the structure of political elites in sub-
national politics in the era of democratization in Indonesia.
Keywords:
Political Elite; East Java; Indonesia; Subnational
Korespodensi:
Departemen Ilmu Politik, Universitas Brawijaya, Jl. Veteran Malang Jl. Universitas Brawijaya, Ketawanggede, Kec.
Lowokwaru, Kota Malang, Jawa Timur 65145.
Email: mfaishal@ub.ac.id
Elite in Sub-national Politics: Structure and Continuation in Post-authoriatarian East Java,
Introduction
I
ndonesia’s experience on democratization after 1998 still leaving problems on
the political elite configuration which is the way to explain how far the successfully
democratic values can change the previous authoritarian structure. Study on
Indonesian elite had been located to contribute as part of major exploration on
political conditions. In the early period of New Order regime, there was a lack
between national and subnational elite such
as modal personality or national character establishment (Emmerson, 1976).
What happened at the national level had an impact on local politics which its
level of institutional changes explains the timing of provincial proliferation. Even
the triggers can vary and depend on historical and cultural contexts (Kimura, 2010).
Although, at the local level, government leadership can be an effective, and often
underestimated, reform mechanism, which compensates for weak societal
pressures in early transition periods (Von Luebke, 2007).
In the case of subnational politics, at least three major national phenomena
are interesting to study and reveal the structure and pattern of the political elite at
subnational politics. First, since local direct election (Pilkada) in 2005, there has been an
elite fragmented in political contestation. Local strongmen, journalists, military retired
and former student activists were running as head of local government candidates
through various political parties.
Second, a new political party establishment since the 2004 election which covered
party official switching, party denomination and separation, followed by shifting
political bases and its patron-client model.
Third, military reform during issuance TNI Law 2004 which replaces military to
police to control civilian security and at the same time they also should leave
politics. Military control is getting weaker, followed by releasing their various
networks to elites and its associations in civil society that they previously used
as instruments.
East Java is a strategic province with the second largest voters with more
than 30.9 million voters in 2019, as per KPU data 2018. In addition, the strength and
strong military network where all branches of the armed forces have large bases
of operations and the distribution of land asset ownership makes them connected to
the lives of civilians. In terms of the peculiarities of political culture, there are
different typologies of society that affect the direction and political affiliation as well
as other organizations that provide support for political parties.
Changes in the elite structure, its dynamics and continuity at the sub-national
level are important to explain. Not only to prove that democratization brings
changes in actors,
2 POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik

M. Faishal Aminuddin & M. Fajar Shodiq
structures to sub-national and local levels. But further to answer how far the
changes in the elite structure at the sub-national level can be understood?
Departing from a case study in East Java, this article seeks to understand the
extent to which the elite structure changes at the sub-national political level?
Many studies of national and local elites have been carried out, but they are still
rarely explored at the sub-national level. In general, this article offers an approach
to the study of sub-national politics by providing a framework for interpretation of
political conditions and changes in Indonesia after the New Order.
Elite Studies in Indonesian Politics: An Approach

In the case of Indonesia, studies of elites are mostly carried out by paying
attention to the relations and roles of elites in sustaining the political regime. The
era of “Guided Democracy” in the 1950’s had resulted in a regime with strong
patrimonial characteristics (Crouch, 1979). The New Order began in the 1970’s
where the regime has sought to consolidate its power in patrimonial style. Efforts
have been made to depoliticize the masses while confining political competition to non-
ideological jockeying for power within the elite.
However, the New Order’s dependence on economic development to obtain
support from key groups outside the military elite has tended to push the regime
toward increasing regularization and bureaucratization and growing conflict within the
military elite (Crouch, 2011). In this era, elites also played a role in creating capitalist
hegemony which had led to the regime ultimately having political stability supported
by effective personal leadership factors and able to reduce elite competition and
conflict in ensuring control over society. This is a unique process when comparing
with Thailand, for example, which has a divided elite and episodic social
pressure (Case, 1994; Shin, 1991).
On the other hand, those social forces that were marginalized under the New
Order, for example, organized labour, remain politically excluded as country neighbor
Malaysia (Hadiz & Teik, 2011). It argues that while personal self-enrichment remains a
key motivation for military leaders, party politicians and bureaucrats to collect off-
budget funds, there are also other crucial factors.
Most importantly, all the three actors aim to control independent funds in
order to maintain or strengthen their autonomy from other state institutions, such as
parliamentary budget commissions, executive monitoring bodies or official auditing
boards. By engaging in extensive self-financing practices, however, the three political
actors undermine their own professionalism, functional effectiveness and internal
coherence, and obstruct Indonesia’s process of democratic consolidation (Mietzner,
2008). In the otherwise deeply disparate cases of Indonesia and Bolivia, the origins
of promiscuous power-sharing can be traced
POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 3
to similar periods of high political uncertainty surrounding crisis-wracked

transitions to democracy (Slater & Simmons, 2013).
The impact of the 1998’s political reform and democratization on the
fragmentation of national elites was not necessarily followed by fragmentation with
the same pattern at the subnational political level. It takes time to implement new
regulations from the central government that are directly related to changes in
political and governance aspects. One of these regulations is the enactment of
the Law on Regional Autonomy in 1999.
Until 2004, the changes brought about by the law had not touched much
on the massive changes in the elite structure. This means that changes occur only at
the level of government structures where local governments have greater authority to
manage their territories. The power of each elite structure has not shifted much
where military actors and politicians from Golkar still hold power in the
government. The shift in the map of the political elite at the sub-national level can
only be seen after 2004, which is marked by the emergence of Pilkada regulations.
This regulatory factor does not work alone but is followed by dynamics in the
increasingly diverse patterns of support of political parties.
Pilkada becomes the new epicenter where all local political elites who are
not accommodated in national political events try to win the competition as regional
leaders. In the case in Batam municipality, the direct Pilkada demonstrated that a
wealthy and politically influential local elite dominated the electoral process. In
another study in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, it was found that the local political
elite in Indonesia not only consisted of those who inherited the New Order
structure or the old elite, but also the emergence of new elite groups and various
backgrounds or new elites (Choi, 2007, 2014). In South Sulawesi, the Pilkada has
shown that candidates with strong personal networks at the sub-district level
have a greater chance of winning the candidacy (Buehler, 2007; 2014: 158).
Several other important studies show a change in the pattern and role of
elites in politics, especially nationally. Then slowly followed by changes at the sub-
national and local level. Intended change specifically, during democratization, there
are changing conditions in which relations among the elites that dominate the state
apparatus have subsequently altered state-society relations. In local politics, the
enactment and implementation of new laws are likewise described as decisively
shaped by the interplay of competing interests of rival business and criminal cliques
rather than by the broader interests of the local population (Sidel, 2005).
Consequently, informal power is rising up. For example, in the Province of
Banten, local leaders came from gangsters to strong local politicians (Masaaki &
Hamid, 2008). Village elites and their relatives are more likely to receive welfare
programs from the government
than non-elites where those in formal positions receive more benefits than non-
formal leaders (Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., Purnamasari, & Wai-
Poi, 2013). In a more open political space, elite contestation provides an
opportunity for anyone to rise and survive as a new elite.
Meanwhile, the old elite must update its strategy and network in order to
survive. Government decentralization has also been shown to dramatically change
local political configurations where local elite networks are able to build
negotiations with the central government. This causes the state authority in the
border area not to run absolutely (Eilenberg, 2009).
From various studies that have been conducted to look at elite relations in
political change, this article offers three things. First, of course, to describe the
extent to which elite-mass relations have changed in politics at the sub-national
level, as has not been done much. Second, it offers an analytical perspective to
complement the analytical framework in identifying and measuring the relationships
and links between elites and their subordinates. Third, provide a better explanation
in looking at the relationship between actors, formal and informal institutions
and elite structures in sub-national politics.
The study in this article explains empirically how the portrait of changes and
dynamics of the political elite can be explained in case studies at the sub-national
politics. We take the conception of the political elite as a group of people,
corporations, political parties or civil society organizations that control, regulate and
organize the government or broadly as a manifestation of its political power. A group
of people through their strategic position, through certain organizations or movements
that have an impact on political outcomes, either regularly or substantially
(Pakulski & Higley, 2007; Vergara, 2013: 33).
We define it as a group of people within a limited group who are in control
and are very decisive in the political process and power management. Specifically,
the political elite can be identified in the formal figure of the regional head as the
holder of political power in the government and the politicians who sit in the
legislative body at the provincial level. This study pretends to complement previous
studies in explaining the extent of changes in the structure of the political elite
and how they maintain their influence in society.
The question is how does structure affect agency? Changes in the national
political structure have an impact on sub-national agencies and changes in the national
elite structure have an impact on sub-national elites. In answering this question, we
use a morphogenetic approach. This approach states that structure and agency can
be analyzed in every space and time with two basic propositions. The first is structure
necessarily precedes action that leads to its reproduction or transformation.
Second, structural and cultural elaboration must be carried out after these actions
(Archer, 1995: 16). This approach departs from the

thesis that social formation is generically shaped by social institutions and their
interactions (M. S. Archer, 2021).
However, this approach is also useful for calculating changes and stability in the
forms and types of social institutions. It is also a tool to see changes and
developments in social processes, practices, and policies and even their rejection.
Archer in Róna & Zsolnai (2020). What is the configuration of the local political elite
structure? In order to gain an assessment of the change and sustainability of elite
patterns and structures, an analysis that includes the previous regime period is
needed. The aim is to provide an overview of the important events that led to a
shift in the pattern. We begin by explaining the evolutionary phase of the political
elite structure in East Java which is related to the national political conditions.
We conducted the analysis at three levels. First, analysis of data on the social,
political and professional backgrounds of municipal and regency heads and
members of the provincial parliament. This data is collected from official sources
and mass media with simple verification as an entry point to explore the structure
of the political elite and the evolution of its formation. Analysis of this data
produces a pattern that will be the basis for the second level of analysis.
The second analysis builds a framework to see how structural change affects
agency. This analysis produces a model of the evolutionary phase of structural
change. Extracting the structure of the political elite by providing an explanation of
the workings of elite control mechanisms over their institutions and
subordinates.Third, an analysis of the map of socio-cultural actors who have
connections with political elites and how they are used as tools of subordinate
actors for vote mobilization in elections and local elections.
Insight from East Java

How far can the effectiveness of the vertical mobilization of political elites be
known? We conducted an analysis of three rounds of post-conflict local elections after
2005 and five years after. We divide it into three periodizations, namely period I
(pre-2004), II (2005- 2010), III (2010-2015) and IV (2015-2017). In tracing the
background of the political elite who were elected as regional heads of regents and
mayors, there are important findings regarding the shift in the background of
the political elite.
In the period I, regents/mayors only came from military or police figures who
were still actively serving. This became part of the general policy of the New Order
government which is defined as dwi fungsi (dual function) in military doctrine which
allows the military to actively occupy positions in the administration of civilian
government. Even after 1998, democratization led to the election of regional heads
through the DPRD which gave rise to a limited number of non-military/police

figures.

In period II, the bureaucratic background dominated the position of regional

head replacing the military. In this transition period, bureaucrats have a better
chance because they have experience mastering the bureaucratic structure of
government for a long time. Most of them are former regional secretaries as the
highest bureaucratic positions in local government.
During the period of regional head elections by the DPRD, bureaucrats can
beat the dominance of military retirees because they are more communicative
with civilian politicians who control the DPRD. In addition, the phobia of military
leadership in the early period of reform was also an important factor in explaining the
dominance of bureaucrats.
In period III, the data show more diverse variations. Bureaucrats no longer
dominate but share almost equal numbers with politicians and businesspeople.
In period IV, in several areas, new figures emerged who initially did not
have a clear track record, but had kinship relations with the previous regent or
mayor. Both in the capacity as husband or wife, biological children and close
relatives. In terms of the sustainability of incumbents, only a few regions have
regional heads with the same work background. Meanwhile, they have varying
backgrounds in periods II and III in most regions. This explains that the mobility
and shift of the political elite in each region tends to be dynamic.
Table 1 Background of Regional Heads and Members of the East Java

DPRD
Periods 2004-2009 2009-2014 2014-2019 2019-2024

DPRD DPRD DPRD
Head Local Head Local Head Local Head Local
Background Provincial Provincial Provincial
Government Government Government Government
Member Member Member
Military/
Police 11 2 0 0 0 0 1
Retirees
Politician 0 9 60 9 41 6 71
Bureaucrat 26 15 2 10 3 8 4
Businessman 0 3 11 7 15 6 9
Employee 0 1 5 2 14 1 6
Professional 0 2 14 3 18 2 17
Society
1 4 7 4 4 6 8
Figures
0 2 1 3 5 9 4
Total 38 38 100 38 100 38 120
Source: Counting from official data from Local Election Commission and verified
through other mass media

In the following data, namely the composition of the political elite who occupy
seats in the East Java DPRD, there are no less important findings. In table 1, data
was taken starting in 2009 when the polarization of political elites from civilian
circles began to be identified. In the 2009-2014 period, politicians dominated the
council seats, followed by professional and business backgrounds. In the following
period, 2014-2019 and 2019-2024, the background of politicians, businessmen and
professionals became the main actors of the domination of the board.
Of course, the biggest ones are still politicians. In contrast to the
configuration of regional heads, the backgrounds of East Java DPRD members are
dominated by politicians who are career politicians – who experience vertical
mobility because previously they were DPRD members at the district/city level, or
those who were previously active in mass organizations, youth organizations and
student alumni organizations. Another interesting thing is that at least the East Java
DPRD members have business backgrounds. Although so far entrepreneurs have had
large capital compared to elites with other backgrounds, the lack of capital in
elections is not the only factor without a network at the grassroots level.
Evolutional Phase of Ruling Elite

In the 1980s, the New Order’s centralized political power reached its
peak. It is characterized by the complete control of the military over the civilian
government. The military at the provincial level, the Regional Military
Command (Kodam) is the main instrument. The consolidation of the political elite
is carried out through Golkar, which is in control of the political process in the local
provincial parliament (DPRD Provinsi). While the bureaucracy is fully controlled by
the governor who comes from the military. We call this phase State-Centric. In this
phase, the patron-client relationship and elite circulation are converging on state
authority.
With the fragmentation of the New Order’s militaristic power in the early
1990s and the collapse of their 32-year rule in 1998, the structure of the political
elite has not yet fully experienced serious setbacks. Even so, the changes at the
provincial level were actually recognizable at the end of 1996 which we call the
Meso-leader phase which lasted until 2004 when the 2004 TNI Law was passed and
the Pilkada was held immediately. In this phase, the local elite is still dominated
by military retired leaders and their combination with the bureaucratic elite. They
still enjoy privileges and fairly effective control over their territory. They can easily
get a victory when the DPRD is still holding the elections for governors or
regions below.

Even after the 1999 election, the composition of the DPRD was shaped by the
entry of politicians with a high diversity of backgrounds. However, they can still be
easily subdued by commanders and officials who are still perched at the top of the
power pyramid. In this phase, middle-up bureaucrats share with civilian
politicians who initially emerged because they had strong political support. Power
was managed by using political policy instruments with mass mobilization as
pressure.
Graph 1: Evolutional elite organization
Source: Author, 2021
In the phase after 2005, what worked was a cartel model characterized by the
military no longer having control over the civilian government. Then Golkar,
which no longer dominates and the 1998-2004 period experienced political
demoralization, even though it persisted and in the 2009 national elections, began
to squirm with its new image.
The process of forming a new political cartel outside the military’s influence
and the Golkar network shows a revitalization in current politics as seen from the
strengthening of the nationalist party represented by PDIP and other parties based on
Islamic constituents such as PKB, PAN and PKS. In the era of strengthening the
role of the regions after the enactment of the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law, the
bureaucracy was able to appear as a separate and relatively stronger class and have a
bargaining position against the elite or ruling class. Meanwhile, the business group
has a continuous agenda as funding support for politicians who are fighting in
elections to get a concession.

Tabel 3: Phases and its mechanism
Phase Actor Mechanism

State Apparatus: - Using bureaucratic instrument followed
State-centric Military + by coercive approach.
Bureaucratic elite - Fully control exists under military
leaderships.
- Using political instruments to force
Craftsman Leader:
public policy followed by mass pressure.
MESO-LEADER Middle Bureaucrat +
- Partially control exist under politician
Civilian Politician
leadership.
Collegial Power: - Using money instruments to connect
Politician + actor interest followed by opinion making
Cartel
Businessman + through mass media.
Bureaucrat - Controlled by balance tension between
actors
Source: Author, 2021
After 2005, there was a change in the structure to become a cartel where the
composition of the DPRD was dominated by political groups which could be called
revitalizing of the political stream (Politik Aliran). In this phase, the bureaucracy
appears as a new ruling elite that is relatively more independent from the government
leaders. The inclusion of business groups as suppliers to support funding needs in
the local elections is a new important variable where their position as actors
begins to gain a place.
Most of them do not seek security for their business but trade from the
investment of funds that have been spent on government project concessions. This
phase shows that raising support for the government is no longer mostly done by
mobilizing the masses, but rather mobilizing public opinion through the mass
media, which has a higher cost. In general, there is a balance between political
actors, businesses and pressure groups, especially the mass media.
Each phase has a main actor who plays a role in carrying out control
mechanisms over the society. The state-centric phase is supported by the state
apparatus, namely the military and the bureaucratic elite, both of which have
structures that reach the community to the lowest level. They have guarantees from
the state to take coercive approaches and actions in order to meet government
goals. In the 1980s, this phase reached its peak where the face of the New Order
political regime reflected an authoritarian character. In the Meso-leader phase, the
main actors are categorized as craftsman leaders, namely the middle elite positions

who always improvise to ensure that they can consolidate power. They consist of
middle class bureaucrats who head technical areas within government

agencies who can play a role to serve the top level bureaucracy and politicians in
the local parliament at the same time.
In addition, the emergence of civilian politicians who dominate parliamentary seats
also expands the negotiation space in the allocation and priorities of the public
budget spent on building their political constituency. Politicians ultimately need a
consolidated mass with incentives from various government aids and programs to
become a pressure force.
In the cartel phase, power rests on collegiality between three actors, namely
politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. They met in general consensus that money
was an important part of political mobilization. Money is also an important factor in
the formation of public opinion. There is a trade between authority commodities
owned by the bureaucracy, masses or constituents owned by politicians and
money owned by entrepreneurs in this phase. The third transaction creates a new
balance in maximizing profit sharing together.
From the explanation of the three phases above, it can be seen that bureaucratic
actors and institutions are players whose roles are not displaced. They occupy a
central point that always persists in every change. Unlike the military, which lost
control of politics in a democratic era. Bureaucracies can play a relatively stable role
by asserting their control over the public budget. Politicians cannot act by
themselves without positioning them as implementing instruments. Likewise,
entrepreneurs still need them as a medium for policy formulation. The bureaucracy
has formal tools through networks and hierarchies of government structures. Political
elites, party politicians mobilize through political parties that have networks as formal
tools. Then, to what extent are politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen using
informal networks to maintain their power?
Maintaining Power: Clicks with Actors and the Informal Institution

After the 1998 reform, the existence of the state apparatus to effectively
control the political mobilization of the people experienced a decline. Formally,
bureaucratic networks or political parties experience obstacles due to the
fragmented dynamics of the patron- client structure. This causes the elite to use
informal channels of actors and institutions by activating their existence. Either
those who were forced to remain silent during the New Order era or the new actors
who emerged later. Political elites are interested in maintaining their connectedness
with civil society organizations and their communities.
They need support to strengthen social, cultural, religious and ethnic
identification that can be converted into voting support. Stronger networks can be
built later which can be used to legitimize public policies. Political elites who hold
power, whether executive or legislative, have the authority to control government
institutions or other formal institutions to implement their capacity provided by

regulations. Apart from going through formal institutions, leaders also have access
to manage support from informal institutions or actors. In East Java, at least seven (7)
significant informal actors have a symbiotic relationship of mutualism with the elite.

Tabel 4: Informal actor as elites subordinate
Name of
Informal Region Role Key Function
Actors
- Community
Head of the village who group network
collects votes during
Klebun Madura - Political mobilization
elections through traditional
network
and local violent groups.
- Support mobilization
Gambler who
Java - Capital accumulation and
supports candidates
Botoh Mataraman distribution
for financial benefit.
(rural) - Support Mobilization
They distribute money
to voters
Supernatural adviser who
Dukun Entire came from abangan or santri - Traditional Consultant
mystical groups.
Small contractor who gets
government projects through
Surabaya their connection with
Bangku
and big politicians. They run - Financial support
Panjang
cities projects with a high benefit
rate under the distribution
to politician constituents.
Unrecognized activist. They
established a temporary - Community
Surabaya organisation. They move group network
AKTIVIS
and big in order to hit someone
Rea-Reo - Information sharing
cities or other organisation
under a politician, - Political fund distribution
police or bureaucrat
request.

Name of
Informal Region Role Key Function
Actors
religious elites who have
influence in society as
guardians of norms, and - Cultural broker
Entire are able to mobilize - Traditional
Kyai
(Rural) political support both community group
publicly network
and symbolically, - Support Mobilization
through religious forums,
lectures, and recitation
Elites at the organizational
district, sub-district and
Java village levels. The bigger - Community
Pencak
Mataraman the members of the pencak group network
Silat Elite
(Rural) silat, the greater the - Support mobilization
influence in the
mobilization of votes at
the local level.
Sources: Compiled by authors
The informal powers in table 3 above represent the power variants other than
local strongmen or local bosses. In East Java, local strongmen are formally affiliated
with power tools, both the government bureaucracy and law enforcement officials.
While local bosses refer to economic elites who cultivate the loyalty of their
followers with both rewards and threats. The actor is an informal elite who is
categorized as a downliner of the political elite. We have not found local bosses
as political elites in the sense of having networks in independent communities. They
become independent actors who can transact their power.
On the other hand, some local strong people work as religious/community leaders
who win political contests and become motivators. Looking at the context of East
Java, seven important informal actors are strong subordinates of the political elite,
both for mobilizing voters in elections and securing regulations made.
First, in the Madura region, the strongest informal actor is klebun – to mention
the position of village heads in the Madura (especially in Sampang and Bangkalan
regency). However, from its cultural roots, klebun is mainly dominated by blater –
social status as a local hero, which is owned because of certain courage,

especially in doing carok (holy and bloody fighting). This is the cultural difference
between the position of village heads in

Madura and other areas in East Java. Blaters mostly control the villages in Madura
with roots, networks and social influence in the village community (Rozaki, 2009). This
is because the one-sided blater group can present themselves as protectors, with an
image that has a smooth, polite, and respectful attitude to others.
On the other hand, they are also synonymous with images of violence, trouble
and various criminal activities. In the opening of post-Reformasi 1998, the political
competition allowed blaters to emerge to gain political support in the cultural or
business areas of violence and security and formal politics from villages to
districts. With a solid and broad network, the involvement of the blater is often a
determinant of the success or failure of holding elections (especially in village head
election - pilkades), and determining whether or not a candidate for village head or
regional head is elected in the region.
Candidates for village heads, legislative candidates or regional heads, as well as
party officials in the regions, even though they are not part of or have a blater
background, must be able to get along with the blater group. Therefore, the
services of blater and klebun are used to mobilize support in elections through
networks at the village level. In some cases, it can be easily seen that the
mobilization of the klebun in the general election or local elections has a
pattern of support for certain political elites.
In the 2014 election in Bangkalan Regency, the son of former regent Fuad
Amin, who is affiliated with Gerindra, bought the party’s votes in the national
legislative election and Presidential Elections. Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa’s votes
received between 95-98 percent of the total voter lists at polling stations. Mobilization
can be carried out effectively because of pressure as well as job incentives for
klebuns who fail or succeed in meeting targets (Pribadi, 2014).
Second, botoh, in Javanese means gambler. With this meaning, botoh is
synonymous with transactional and pragmatic behavior to influence election
results. The usual practice is through money politics. Botoh is synonymous with non-
electoral actors, usually informal (such as businessmen, landlords) – although also
formal (such as village heads or bureaucratic officials), who are believed to
influence the political behavior of voters and influence vote acquisition. Referring to
these activities, botoh is actually not only understood as a gambler, but also refers
to the practice of brokers or vote brokers. The goal is to obtain financial
benefits from the elections, either directly or indirectly. This practice was previously
common in village head elections, both in the Mataraman sub-culture area of East
Java and the Madura subculture in Tapal Kuda. Their practice was widespread when
the Pilkada was held in Indonesia.

Because it is part of a network maintained for a long time, candidates also use
botoh services to win elections. The method of vote mobilization carried out
by botoh is to accumulate capital by buying and selling votes with many candidates,
channeling it through money practices in a retail, structured and timed manner
that is considered strategic. Although the practice of botoh can occur in several
areas, this group is more commonly found in the areas of Tulungagung,
Trenggalek, Blitar, and Kediri.
In 2013 Tulungagung’s Pilkada, the botoh network was claimed to be the
decisive factor in Syahri Mulyo’s victory where his father named Dasar, was a
big botoh in the region. A similar thing happened in the 2018 Pilkada which made
Syahri elected for the second time (Abbiyyu, 2020). Pilkada is considered more
effective in measuring the role of botoh because the distance between candidates,
voters and botoh can be closer where transactions can be carried out directly. This is
due to the botoh network that reaches down to the household level in the village.
The role of botoh as a political broker and gambler is caused by the pilkada event
which has a large amount of money bet. The rewards from the candidate as part of
the success team and the direct election system make candidates trust botoh to fill
their winning team because they are considered to have an understanding of the
characteristics of voters (Yohanes, 2013).
Third, dukun or shamans, as part of a social phenomenon in Indonesia, have
strong roots of belief and tradition despite modernization, technological developments
and rapidly developing science. As a person or group who is believed to have
supernatural powers, shamans are also believed to be able to treat, increase
authority and beauty, or even put other people in miserable situations. In East
Java, belief in shamans is still preserved in all sub-cultures. In elections, shamans
are believed to be able to help and promise victory and luck to politicians. Shamans
are often in strategic power circles among officials or candidates.
Uniquely, he was never seen, hidden, but had influence in guarding the
contest, besides politicians also doing rational political work. Before there were
modern political consultants, shamans were traditional consultants who first existed
in election contests. Shaman groups can be found in all areas in East Java.
However, the use of their services in elections is easy to find in the southern and
northern coastal areas of East Java. In Kediri, the role of shamans in Pilkades is
to help candidates to neutralize the bad influence of magical powers sent by
political opponents. They will also give amulets, certain rituals and other magical
objects to increase the candidate’s confidence (Trihartono, 2021). In addition, the
shaman is also tasked with warding off witchcraft and fencing the candidate and his
family to survive from spiritual attacks. One of the shamans in Sidoarjo had to
retire early from his formal job in the company because of the large number of
clients who asked for his help in the elections (Hidayat, 2019).
Fourth, bangku panjang or long bench. Long Bench refers to associations or
groups of small entrepreneurs engaged in construction services, residential
developers, business centers and real estate. This group is more accurately referred
to as an association because of its more dynamic and fluid interactions than formal
professional associations structured with certain rules of the game. As a group of
entrepreneurs, their role is more to provide capital assistance for political
activities of candidates. As a large capital stock group, candidates who need
financial assistance see the long bench group as a strategic partner for political
funding.
For entrepreneurs, this assistance is considered a medium-term investment, with
the hope that when the candidate they support wins, they can take up various
infrastructure development projects in an area, or further, accommodate their
interests in the preparation of development plans and urban spatial planning. The
existence of a long bench in winning is usually only on capital. However, it is not
uncommon for long bench groups to invest in more than one candidate. In some
local elections, the long bench also calculates who to give their capital to. The
decision is usually determined by hiring the services of a survey agency to
determine the electability of a candidate. The existence of these groups can be
found in large urban areas in East Java, or areas with centers of rapid regional
and economic growth.
The actors of this group can be included in the management of professional
employers’ organizations even if it is only a formality. Meanwhile, their political
activities are carried out informally directly with the candidates. In some cases, they
set up small organizations that became lifeboats to speak out in the mass media.
Official professional organizations could not easily express their support openly
because they were considered partisans. In the 2020 Surabaya Pilkada, there was
support from entrepreneurs who directly expressed their support for one of the
candidates. This choice is certainly risky if made through a formal organization
statement with a reputation (Azmi, 2020; Wijayanto, 2020).
In the Pilkada, candidates are allowed to receive funds from only three
sources: individuals or groups, corporations, and non-government enterprises. In
reality, most funds are sourced from unofficial channels, namely from
businesspeople. At the local level, they are mostly form contractors. The connection
between contractors and local politicians was found in many areas, including in
Surabaya(Savirani, 2019).

Fifth, Rea-Reo Activists. This group consists of various actors with NGO
activist backgrounds or political party partisans. Networking among them
becomes important

because of the circulation of important and strategic information between them

and networks with several communities they know through advocacy activities in the
past, or communities they have facilitated to obtain social assistance from the
government.
Through their information and community networks, they can become
service providers for regional head candidates or legislative candidates to build a
mass base that can be mobilized for support during elections. This network of activists
often moves around in helping regional head candidates, legislative candidates or
political parties. Loyalty is short-term and pragmatic, depending on the employer
(regional head candidate or legislative candidate). Their ability to connect candidates
with certain community groups is considered important for candidates who are trying
to build electability and mass base. Because it is a group with a rational character
in helping to win candidates, this group is easier to find in big cities in East Java
where there are a lot of elites with big capital.
This group has a permanent organization but most of them are organs that
appear suddenly where the activist can use several names of organs to speak in
public according to their interests and orders. They are aggressively building public
opinion by supporting a candidate. Even in some cases, they can also be used to
attack other candidates. In several Pilkada in Lamongan in 2020 and Gubernatorial
election of East Java 2018, for example, activists who became exponents of
permanent community organizations and those who set up new organs, mobilized
votes with their organizational tools or recruited new people to move to persuade
voters to carry out guarding until they arrived at the village ballot box (Effendi,
2018; J., 2020).
Sixth, Kyai, a cultural actor who is considered very important in building
electability and mobilization of vote support. The role of the kyai can be seen as a
cultural broker, bridging, connecting and mediating between community groups and
political actors with the same or various backgrounds for certain purposes. Respectful
social status, either because of descent or recognition of religious scholarship, as
well as being a central figure in Islamic boarding schools, makes kyai as actors who
become the main reference for voters in some areas in East Java in making
choices.
The way the kyai shows their support is usually conveyed symbolically through
religious events attended by many people, such as recitations or religious
lectures. In contrast to other informal actors operating in the area of money
politics, kyai play a role in building the popularity and electability of candidates
through building the candidate’s personal image. Departing from the widespread

Islamic culture and education, kyai are informal actors or groups in almost all
East Java areas. The openly mobilization of Kyai can be seen when the candidate
is a figure in Nahdlatul Ulama religious organization or is promoted by its political
parties such as PKB and PPP. Recently, the Gerindra and PDIP parties have

also emerged. The East Java Governor Election contest is a “war” event amongst Kyai
who support the candidate. In the 2008 Gubernatorial Election, the Kyai Alawy from
Sampang, who supported the Khofifah-Mujiono candidate, issued a fatwa that
women also have the right to be elected like men and rejected the view that
forbids them from becoming leaders (Pribadi, 2014).
Seventh, Elite Pencak Silat, martial arts organization. Another informal actor who
has significant influence in the East Java area with the Mataraman subculture is the
elite from martial arts. In areas with the largest organization base in East Java, such
as Setia Hati Terate, Kera Sakti, Setia Hati Winongo. Compared to other organizations
which are also large, the organizations that have developed in the Mataram area of
East Java have strong cultural and historical roots, an organized mass base and
traditions that are routinely carried out to recruit new members or maintain their
loyalty. With a structure that is spread from village to national level, the existence
of martial arts elites at various levels has a strong influence, especially in areas
with a large and solid number of “warriors’’.
Our experience in areas with these characters shows that a candidate for village
head or local government head can win without spending a large amount of money
and without vote buying. The existence of martial arts can be found in areas
becoming the center of annual activities, such as in Madiun, Magetan,
Ponorogo, Nganjuk and Ngawi. In the 2018 gubernatorial election, thousands of
members of the Setia Hati Terate and Winongo in Magetan were mobilized to win
the Saifullah Yusuf-Puti Guntur Soekarno. Previously, East Java Setia Hati Terate
elders also declared Didik Mukrianto to run for the 2018 gubernatorial election
while claiming there were 2-3 million members throughout East Java, including
around more than 40 thousand people in Bojonegoro, around 150 thousand
people in Lamongan and Tuban (Azis, 2018; Hakim, 2017).
The seven elites in these informal institutions are not permanently affiliated with
one or a group of political elites within the party or regional head of government.
They have bargaining positions that vary according to the interests and benefits
they want to get in the duration of the partnership which can be short when
mobilizing support in elections or building long-term alliances to secure public
policy from the ruling political elite.
Conclusion
The existence of political elites in sub-national politics has different dynamics from
those in national politics. In Indonesia’s democratization era, this study shows that
subnational politics is more open to changes in the characteristics and types of

political elites in formal institutions. Patron-client relationships that are built with
elites in informal institutions are also more transactional, giving rise to exchange
mechanisms in relationships that are

not fully co-optative. This has led to the emergence of new elites with different
social, economic and cultural backgrounds who enliven sub-national political
contests and are unique in each region.
This study proves that the structure of the political elite has changed from
being concentrated on personal figures tied to military and bureaucratic institutions to
becoming more fragmented with the strengthening of the elite of civilian politicians,
businessmen and public figures from various professions. These changes produce
dynamics in the building of interactions between elites and their exchanges so that
the organizing mechanism, the basis for the legitimacy of political elites and their
resilience in holding the reins of political power cannot be easily predicted.
An important contribution made from this study is that there are significance
of the elite roles in Indonesian subnational politics. Paying attention to the study of
their central role in sub-national politics in the case in East Java can prove that there
is a shift in the elite structure that affects their working mechanism in moving their
subordinates. Nevertheless, there is continuity in the use of the middle actor network
from the political elite to mobilize voters. Some elites in informal institutions are old
clients of political elites who come from the bureaucracy. The rest are new actors born
from political openness and greater freedom in capitalizing on social, economic
and cultural capital.
Funding
The author does not receive financial assistance for research, authorship, and
publication from any party
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Authors
M. Faishal Aminuddin is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science,
Universitas Brawijaya Malang.
M. Fajar Shodiq Ramadlan is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science,
Universitas Brawijaya Malang.

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik

Vol.13, No. 1, 2022

Elite in Sub-national Politics: Structure and Continuation

M. Faishal Aminuddin1 & M. Fajar Shodiq Ramadlan2

Recieved: 14 November 2021 Revised: 11 Februari 2022 Published: 30 April 2022

2 POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik

Elite Studies in Indonesian Politics: An Approach

to similar periods of high political uncertainty surrounding crisis-wracked

6 POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik

Insight from East Java

POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 7

8 POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik

In period II, the bureaucratic background dominated the position of regional

Table 1 Background of Regional Heads and Members of the East Java

Periods 2004-2009 2009-2014 2014-2019 2019-2024

POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 9

Evolutional Phase of Ruling Elite

1 POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik

Graph 1: Evolutional elite organization

Source: Author, 2021

POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 1

Tabel 3: Phases and its mechanism

Phase Actor Mechanism

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 1

Maintaining Power: Clicks with Actors and the Informal Institution

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Tabel 4: Informal actor as elites subordinate

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 1

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 1

POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 2

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because of the circulation of important and strategic information between them

POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 2

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 2

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 2

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 2

Hidayat, E. (2019). Village Democracy and Winning Strategies based on Power in

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POLITIKA: Jurnal Ilmu Politik 3

Wijayanto. (2020). Komit Naikkan Level, HIPMI Dukung Machfud Arifin di

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