WAR AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Timo Airaksinen

Source: Current Research on Peace and Violence , 1985, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1985), pp. 37-43
Published by: Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40724999

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 Timo Airaksinen
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki
Finland

WAR AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT*

1 . Introduction and other mutilating conditions. Nuclear weapons

do the same. But they also make their victims ill.
Jonathan Schell has written a Nuclearpowerfulweapons andare disease-promoting; they are
thought-provoking book on the not question
unique sinceof bacteriological weapons and gas-
weapons
nuclear peril and our relation to those are, of course, roughly similar.
catastrophic
possibilities that are created by the new radiation
However, techno-indeed brings about its typical
logy of war. The Fate of the Earthl illustrates
and complicated pattern of symptoms:
equally well its writer's ability toRadiation
argue sickness
per- occurs when the ioniz-
ing radiation
suasively and the inherent difficulties of the sub- of the nuclear explosion injects
sudden excessive energy into the cells of the
ject matter. It seems that the whole idea of
human body. The most vulnerable cells are
nuclear war and its consequences is as new
those that and asdivide and reproduce
rapidly
difficult to handle as the Bomb itself. Our old
themselves, as con-
in the walls of the intestines.
... (and) theby
cept of war is made at last partly obsolete bonemarrow,
the source of the white
blood cells that protect us from infection
new possibility for the extinction of the whole
human race and the environmental changes
Symptoms ofwhich
radiation sickness appear within
30 minutes
can be supposed to result from the large of exposure.
scale use First are sickness and
diarrhoea,
of nuclear weapons - and this is the only which may pass, followed (in
'scale'
we should mention: limited nuclear war seems to
serious cases) by tiredness and loss of ap-
petite, as white blood cells diminish. After two
be a very remote possibility. weeks hair may start to fall; after three weeks
there
Now, my thesis in this paper is that it may be bleeding from the skin and in the
is indeed
mouth, followed
a formidable conceptual challenge to think clearly by throat and bowel bleeding
and a return of diarrhoea. Next comes com-
and consistently about nuclear catastrophes. That and high fever, and by the
plete loss of appetite
kind of war represents a new relationship bet-
fourth or fifth week there is progressive
anaemia (due to the
ween man and his environment, especially loss of red blood cells) and ex-
treme vulnerability to infection (due to loss of
natural environment. We philosophers cannot do
white cells). Many victims die at this point.
too much to promote disarmament. Those
What whowe can remain seriously exposed
recover
do is to show what the conceptual to minor infections.2
problems and
the real issues behind the customary rhetoric
This account, givenare:
by Andrew Wilson, describes
man endangers the environment by
the declaring an in normal weapon-terms,
causes of the illness
all-out war against it. Let us check,
I meanfirst,
in terms some
of injury causing factors: Wilson
uses the and
conceptual signs of this phenomenon words then
"injects sudden excessive
turn to Schell ' s book which in a most
energy'illuminating
' . This is how normal weapons produce in-
way shows, among the many goodjury. things itenergy
Excessive con-causes a breakdown of the
tains, also how not to think about physical
the end of the
structure of the bodily tissue. But after
world. this damage is done the condition of the radiation
victim seems to be analogous to that of any
typically ill person.
2. Injury and Illness I think that this attitude to the effects of the
nuclear weapons is accurate. If I have a gun-shot
Look at the notion of 'radiation sickness': wound,
normal- it is never called 'sickness' even though
ly we think, or we at least should think, that may constitute a (causally) necessary
the wound
weapons bring about injuries, like wounds, burns
condition of, say, fever, which is then triggered

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by some bacteria and infection. We can make an tions). This means that the wound is itself a major
intuitive distinction between (i) the wound, caus- medical problem. The wound is identical with a
ed by the destructive energy of the bullet, and (ii) medical problem. It is bodily damage, and that is
the sickness, infection, fever etc. to which the in- always bad, even if it were neither infected nor
jected energy and the wound will (causally) con- painful. Radiation sickness is a different case: we
tribute only in part. In the case of nuclear cannot sensibly maintain that the death of (say)
weapons the situation is clearly different: white blood cells is the kind of damage com-
disregarding the direct damage like burns, we parable to a wound. The death of white blood cells
may suggest that radiation sickness is one single and of the cells of our intestines is dysfunctional
condition, or an instance of a typical illness. Part only if large quantities die, in the long run and
of the explanation must be that we cannot visually cumulatively. Compare this to the effects of
perceive the cumulative effects of the radiation alcohol on the human nervous system. When I
energy on the victim's tissues and cells. There is drink I manage to kill each time a large number of
no relevant external injury and, moreover, the nerve cells. Yet I do not call this loss of nerve
condition produced by a nuclear explosion closely cells damage or illness. It becomes damaging and
resembles that of a normal illness with its variable brings about an illness only if I drink too much
symptoms. over a long period of time. Both drinking and ex-
This is not the whole story, however. There cessive radiation bring about symptoms which in-
are other relevant illnesses which resemble the deed constitute a disease. But there is no identity
types produced by radiation. Take for instance between (i) the initial destruction of cells, pro-
the black-lung suffered by coal miners, asbestos- duced by the presence of alcohol or excessive
produced cancer and the lead poisoning typical of energy, and (ii) the relevant medical problems.
workers producing white paint. (Cf. also the vic- This argument shows why we do not call a
tims of bacteriological and gas war!) All these are bullet wound an illness even if we call some
diseases, and yet even the 'injected excessive relatively rapid radiation effects an illness, or
energy' -condition is missing. All those diseases, 'radiation sickness' . The wound is itself a problem
and this applies to many types of cancer, are or, in other words, it is identical with a dysfunc-
harmful and abnormal conditions that are totally tional bodily condition; the dead cells are not iden-
independent of both directed (destructive) energy tical with any harmful bodily state - although they
distributions and microbes. It seems that if those may (contingently) produce symptoms which are
cases like asbestos-produced cancer constitute a harmful, like one's death.
disease, then radiation sickness is also a genuine As my alcohol-example indicates, the whole
disease even without and independently of the issue of the short term vs. long term effects of
damage produced by the energy emanating direct- radiation is not so important. The crucial issue is
ly from a nuclear explosion. Therefore, as I shall that radiation, just like alcohol, has a cumulative
argue, nuclear weapons are also environmental effect on human cells. 'Accumulation' is the key
weapons which kill and maim without necessarily concept here. The result of accumulation is now
producing external damage. They destroy the en- an illness. And the fact of accumulation means that
vironment where we live. This may happen in two some environmental conditions have changed in
basic ways: (i) slowly or (ii) rapidly (and here we such a direction that the harmful substance and
bracket out all the factors which produce external radiation are present in excessively large doses.
and visible bodily damage). Our environment has been partly destroyed. This
Let me first say something about the rapid seems to mean that nuclear war is also a 'war
case. - Nuclear explosions create a short term against the environment', both natural and man-
environmental situation such that certain cells be- made.
come unable to function. We need not think, I have argued above that nuclear weapons have
however, that they are damaged in the same way some typical environmental effects, just like (say)
as a wounded leg is damaged by a bullet. When gas weapons. This means that the victims become
one's leg is wounded, one experiences a physical ill. The relevant notion of illness is different from
condition which is both dysfunctional (say, one that of injury or bodily damage. I have argued that
cannot walk and one suffers great pain) and even some short-term exposures to radiation
vulnerable to further deteriorating effects (infec- should be classified as disease-promoting, better

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than injury promoting. Nuclear explosions pro- point (2). An additional difficulty as to (2) comes
duce illness more directly than 'ordinary' explo- from epistemic considerations: it is almost im-
sions do: 'ordinary' explosions produce, first, possible to predict scientifically what will happen
damage on man or his environment and, then, il- if nuclear weapons were used. The possibility of
lness follows (like infected wounds or avoiding extinction comes to one's mind quite
smoke-poisoning). Nuclear explosions tend tonaturally. Perhaps we can and perhaps we shall
produce illness in a more direct way. survive? Let me start my study of Schell's
arguments from (3), simply because this point is
the simplest one.
2. Prudentiality and War Point (3) is treated in two different places in
The Fate of the Earth (p. 119 and p. 184).
Referring to Schell' s The Fate of the Earth I Schell maintains both that (i) extinction can be
shall next try to show in what sense a nuclear war avoided but (ii) individual death cannot. He also
is an ecological catastrophe and, moreover, why says that the global living environment is more
this fact is more important than any aspect of or- like a person than like a cell (or, any other scien-
dinary war. Schell's main point is entirely correct. tific object of research) (p. 78). This
But, alas, he confuses the implications of his main person-like quality is supposed to entail in-
thesis quite badly. It seems useful to try to cut dividuality, absolute value and ultimate cognitive
through this jungle of reasoning to see what the unpredictability (cf. point (2)). But, now, if extinc-
difficulties are. tion is the death of the whole environment and
Schell writes: this is like the death of a person, how could this
The issue is the habitability of the earth, and 'second death' be avoidable (cf. (ii) above)? The
it is in this context, not in the context of the
'second death' should be sufficiently different
direct slaughter of hundreds of millions of peo-
ple by the local effects, that the question of from the death of a human person to warrant our
human survival arises. 3 acceptance of Schell's argument. He says that ex-
The main points to be discussed below are the tinction can be avoided; but no person is eternal.
following: 1) individual death vs. the extinction of Individuals always die.
the species (especially of human beings); 2) the As I see it, it is a simple logical confusion to
problem of making rational decisions concerning state both that environmental death is avoidable
the issues relevant to point 1; and, finally, 3) the and that individual death is not. There are many
possibility of avoiding extinction. reasons why we die; some of them are avoidable,
Schell introduces two powerful figures of some are not.

speech to convey his ideas: 'the republic of in- I can avoid dying just now (I simply stand still;
sects and grass' is what the natural environment I check that no one is going to shoot me, and that
will become after a nuclear war. Only grass and the house is not collapsing), and we all can avoid
insects are sturdy enough to live after a full-blown extinction just now (leave all red buttons alone!);
nuclear war. Next, a 'second death', or as Schell nevertheless, I cannot ultimately avoid my death.
puts it, "the death of death" will take place after Similarly, the human race and the (fictional) en-
a nuclear war: after we are dead once and for all vironmental global person cannot avoid extinction
there will be no more deaths. And so the second and their second death (the Sun will explode or
death is a kind of merciful goal, paradoxically cool off etc.). We cannot avoid the republic of in-
enough. No more suffering will ensue. However, sects and grass and our second death.
we seem to require intuitively that we judge the Clearly, the idea of the personalized world and
extinction of the human race and the emergence its death in the role of the second death is a
of the republic of insects and grass to be worse mistaken proposal. Another related idea is this:
than any individual human death. How is this Schell says that because extinction means that we
possible? Why should any single individual admit shall get no second chance, therefore we should
that his own personal death is less bad than the never gamble with nuclear war:
death of all individuals? Perhaps one should admit
To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say
no more than that one's own death is indifferent
that although the risk of extinction may be
in its personal (dis)value to the death of all fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, in-
(oneself included, of course). This leads us to finite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In

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 other words, once we learn that a holocaust pain and horror can be produced by guns, knifes
might lead to extinction we have right to gam- and fire; anxiety and panic is achieved by means
ble, because if we lose, the game will be over,
of death squads and the random bombings of
and neither we nor anyone else will ever get
another chance. Therefore, although, scien- civilian populations. And there is no difference
tifically speaking, there is all the difference in between the quality of death, at the individual per-
the world between the mere possibility that sonal level, produced by bullets or radiation, in-
the holocaust will bring about extinction and
fected wounds or radiation sickness. And the hor-
the certainty of it, morally they are the same,
and we have no choice but to address the issue ror of seeing the secret police at the front door is
of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a as terrible as any mushroom clouds can be. This
certainty that their use would put an end to our is the case at the personal, prudential level, in the
species. In weighing the fate of the Earth and,
sense that one thinks in terms of one's own (and
with it, our own fate, we stand before a
mystery, and in tampering with the earth we one's family's, perhaps) expected utility and
tamper with a mystery. We are in deep preference satisfaction. There simply is no dif-
ignorance.4 ference between the normal and nuclear war, and
His point seems to be that whatever the subjec- the first and second death at this stage of one's
tive probability of actual nuclear war may be, the thinking. Once you are dead, there is no en-
nature of the threatening loss is such that no risk vironment to worry about. Once you are dying
should be taken or accepted. Now, given that the yourself, there is no reason to worry about the
total environment is indeed like a person, it overall scale of destruction.
follows that only if it is irrational to accept the per- Prudentially speaking, your own death can be
sonal risk of death is it also irrational to accept the taken to be the maximum but finite loss and,
risk of extinction through a nuclear war. But cer- therefore, if you gamble with your own death you
tainly we risk our lives almost all the time, and we can rationally gamble with the second death, too.
know that if the risk backfires we shall get no se- Actually Schell says that the effects of a nuclear
cond chance. We drive cars and we drink beer. war entail a deep mystery. This is now beside the
Accidents and brain haemorrhages threaten us all point: there is apparently no mystery in extinc-
the time. Therefore, I cannot see why we could tion. We know what it will be like. Its probability
not risk a nuclear war, if its outbreak is im- might be difficult to estimate but it involves no
probable enough and the net profit we expect to mystery. It is just another scientific question
gain will be large enough (such as national pride which is very difficult to handle and very impor-
and prosperity for all). And it seems to me that tant to ask.
one's willingness to risk one's life in so many
ways clearly indicates that the value of individual
life should be taken to be a finite quantity. I really 4. Morality and War
cannot understand what one's life is like if it is
based on the notion of its actually infinite value. We cannot avoid moral philosophy when we ask
Another, related point is this: the global value of once again why exactly we should accept the idea
all human lives need not be infinite, especially if that the second or ecological death is a moral
the value of each individual life is finite. Again, it issue and, in this sense, worse than one's own
may be prudential to risk extinction, just as it is personal death.
to risk one's individual life in some circumstances. When one thinks of a nuclear war one may think
(However, if one bluntly maintains that the value either in terms of one's own prudential good or in
of life is infinite no risk of nuclear war can be, terms of universal moral values. The latter per-
prudentially, rationally accepted. Discussion must spective is not reducible to mere prudentiality. (I
then stop here.) cannot argue for this familiar but very broad thesis
One may also think, quite consistently, in the here.) The main reason, I should say, for making
following way: a nuclear war has no such possible a clear difference between nuclear war and or-
effects on individual persons that would not be dinary war is that any nuclear war is an ecological
matched by the effects of a normal war. I mean disaster, and it is such independently of its scale
some suitably defined quantitative effects: any (see above). All this has the kind of moral implica-
number of deaths can be achieved by means of tions which are difficult to avoid or turn into
napalm and explosives; any thinkable degree of prudential considerations.

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 One possible argument focuses on our respon- can also imagine a moralist advancing the conclu-
sibility for other and especially for future genera- sion, outside of both egoism and merely pruden-
tions, starting from our children and close friends. tial thinking, that there are cases in which nuclear
You may rationally want to make yourself ill, pro- war must be risked. Let me sketch both these
vided that the initial risk is a sensible one. But you cases.

will go beyond all the limits of prudentiality The first case is intended to show that nuclea
towards simple egoism if you maintain that you war is indeed morally worse than any ordi
could take such environmental risks as are war may be. Because of the ideological effects
represented by the use of nuclear weapons. peace propaganda this may look like an easier
Prudentiality is simply not a correct or adequate than it actually is. We need some real argume
attitude in the present context. You simply have and not only ideological commitments. I do
no moral right to gamble with other people's want to maintain that the latter might no
vital future interests. perfectly justified. The problem is simply
This is, however, a rather simplicist solution. peace propaganda is not what we want just no
One needs to know more about those alleged I suggest the following. As a background po
moral rights and their implementation. For exam- recall that ordinary war may produce the ext
ple, no democratic consensus-thinking can work. tion of the human race, and certainly it
Some of the voters are not yet present. They will destroy the future generations (by killing
be present only after the risks have been decided. children). Ordinary war can also be as painful
If you took a successful risk so that a nuclear war horrible as any nuclear war. Therefore, we sh
did not actually ensue, they might well accept the focus on the disease-promoting environmenta
idea of your wager. In case the bet did not work fects of a nuclear war. If we suppose that ext
and a nuclear war followed, what would they have tion is actually avoided then the state of the E
said? We don't know; perhaps they would say, in is still made disease-promoting for us,
an altruistic fashion, that you did the right thing children and future generations. They hav
and that the second death (or their cancerous and choice. They (and we the survivors) will live i
mutilated, sick life) was morally justifiable. They environment which makes everyone mutil
would accept the fact that they were not born, or and sick. After a normal war this is not the ca
were born deformed. It is also conceivable that the environment might be ruined and people
they would blame you. Anyway, by risking a nu- and injured, but the rest have a chance of rep
clear war in order to win something, however ing their environment and of making it livable
precious it is for yourself and for your own perience tends to show that recovery is norm
generation, you must make an extraordinary quite rapid. After a nuclear war this is impossi
moral decision: you must think of whether the un- regardless of the survivors' efforts their envir
born generations could morally accept your deci- ment will make them ill and the future genera
sion to risk a nuclear war even in case it actually deformed.
produced their second death, the ultimate The crucial point is, as Schell says, that
destruction of the environment of life. I think death of millions is not decisive; bu he lapses
something like this is what Schell is after in his romantic exaggeration when he later maint
discussion we partially reviewed above. Yet, the that the 'second death' and the 'republic of
whole point above is too fictional: it is difficult to sects and grass' are at the heart of the moral
know what the rights of the unborn are and im- blem. They are not, simply because after
possible to imagine what they would say. ultimate catastrophe we cannot distinguish
However, Schell implicitly suggests that we end state from that produced by normal weap
could intuitively and convincingly, and without and non-nuclear pollution. Once we have killed
arguments, draw the conclusion that any sensible solutely all, the moral losses are exactly the s
person would reach the moral conclusion that one regardless of the methods and weapons use
should say 'no' to any risks in relation to the use In sum: nuclear war is morally worse than n
of nuclear weapons. I can indeed imagine some mal war because in such a case where the
seemingly moral grounds on which we can try to destruction is less than total the survivors
reach the conclusion that nuclear war is morally through a succession of generations must live in
wrong, regardless of any situational variables. I a disease-promoting environment, one which is

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beyond repair. Reaganist argument partly collapses.
I think that Ronald Reagan* s ideological views Secondly, the tough-minded rightwing argu-
can be utilized to illustrate the 'positive' nuclear ment seems to have its unwarranted apocalyptic
arguments. (I do not really refer to the man but characteristics (see Appendix): it tacitly presup-
to an instance of the ideology he so proudly poses that once Communism takes over that will
represents.) His line of argument is this: com- be the final stage of the world history. And now,
munism is an atheistic ideology and thoroughly if we are moralists we should not think in terms
wicked in its nature. Actually it is the greatest im- of our egoistic interests: the risk of permanent il-
aginable 'moral' evil. It is also an aggressive one lness and a deformed body violates one's rights
(all evil is). The 'free world' ideology comes very more than the life under Communist rule; in the
close to the best possible one, regardless of some latter case one still has a future choice.
problems concerning its implementation. My conclusion is simple: it is difficult to think
Therefore, if we are driven to such a desperate consistently and in an illuminating fashion about
situation where the only two alternatives (i) ex- nuclear war. The dilemma which we face is that it
tinction through a full-scale nuclear war with pro- is a global moral issue, and as such nuclear war
bability p, when p is fairly large, and (ii) the rule may well seem to be impossible to justify (moral-
and the hegemony of the enemy; it is quite im- ly); but it also seems like one state of affairs
aginable that the unborn generations should ac- among many alternatives on which one may place
cept their own death rather than their inhuman rational bets (prudentially). Certainly a prudential
slavery. Nuclear war might be justifiable. The decision maker may want to risk even a nuclear
following quotations illustrate these ideological war, at least in some special circumstances. And
points: if we try to counter this tendency by maintaining
In effect, the enemy is not pictured as human, that a universal moral perspective should be
in the sense in which the person harboring adopted, then we face the genuine risk that the
such an image is human, with the result that
moralists are imprudential fanatics, once again
the question "How would I feel if ..." has no
relevance. ready to accept the prospects of a nuclear
And: holocaust. I do not think that these issues can be

The diabolical enemy image, like the moral understood any better than we understand our
self-image, which is its constant counterpart own moral thinking, its types and foundations.
(since together they constitute the black-and-
white or good-guys-and-bad-guys image of the
conflict), means that all of the guilt in the situa-
tion is imputed to the enemy and none to Notes
oneself. The assumption is: we have done
nothing that could have aroused in them a ra- This paper was my contribution to the ritth JNor-
tional fear of future aggression by us, or dic Philosophy Conference in Hanasaari, Helsinki,
legitimate anger at any of the things we have August 1984. The research was supported by
done. All of the genuine sins of one's own side Tampere Peace Research Institute by means of a
are denied, rationalized, ignored, or forgotten, generous grant.
and all guilt is projected onto the enemy. 5
1. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth.
It is not clear what such a Reaganist view ac- Picador 1982.
tually implies. Therefore, let me present two
2. A. Wilson, The Disarmerà Handbook.
hypothetical counterarguments. There are two
Penguin 1983, p. 138.
problems: first, this whole nuclear ideology may
rest on the premise that the life after conquest by 3. Schell, p. 21.
the enemy is not human life. The present enemy
is not human, it will make us inhuman, therefore
4. Schell, p. 95.
the unlimited destruction of life does not matter.
5. R.K. White, Emphatizing with the rulers of
However, if we adopt an anti-humanistic the USSR. Political Psychology, No. 4
ecological perspective, we are not really in- (1983), pp. 133-134.
terested in humans and their ideological con-
6. Ronald Reagan, Orlando, Florida, 8 March
ditons. What is important is life as such, and not 1983; quoted from Coexistence, No. 21
only man. Nuclear war cannot be justified. The (1984), pp. 56-57.

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Appendix But I had underestimated him. He went on: 'I
would rather see my little girls die now, still
"A number of years ago, I heard a young believing in God, than have them grow up
father, a very prominent young man in the under communism and one day die no longer
entertainment world, addressing a tremen- believing in God'.
dous gathering in California. It was during the There were thousands of young people in
time of the cold war, and communism and our that audience. They came to their feet with
own way of life were much on people's minds. shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized
And he was speaking to that subject. And, the profound truth in what he had said, with
suddenly, though, I heard him saying, 'I love regard to the physical and the soul and what
my little girls more than anything../ And I was really important."6
said to myself, 'Oh, no. Don't ... say that'.

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