Business History

ISSN: 0007-6791 (Print) 1743-7938 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbsh20

Second-hand vehicle markets in West Africa: A

source of regional disintegration, trade informality
and welfare losses

Abel Ezeoha, Chinwe Okoyeuzu, Emmanuel Onah & Chibuike Uche

To cite this article: Abel Ezeoha, Chinwe Okoyeuzu, Emmanuel Onah & Chibuike Uche (2018):
Second-hand vehicle markets in West Africa: A source of regional disintegration, trade informality
and welfare losses, Business History, DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2018.1459087

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2018.1459087

Published online: 13 Apr 2018.

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Business History, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2018.1459087

Second-hand vehicle markets in West Africa: A source of

regional disintegration, trade informality and welfare losses
Abel Ezeohaa, Chinwe Okoyeuzub, Emmanuel Onahb and Chibuike Uchec
a
Department of Accountancy and Banking & Finance, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria; bDepartment
of Banking and Finance, University of Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria; cAfrican Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article critiques the second-hand vehicle markets in the West Second-hand vehicle
African region, focusing on the triad trading arrangements among market; welfare losses; trade
Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Niger. These countries are connected by informality; integration; West
a number of underlying conflicting interests in the second-hand Africa
vehicles trade. Benin and Togo are incentivised by the revenues
derived from re-export trade and port operations. Niger provides a
proxy market for the illegal re-export of these vehicles to Nigeria, with
the latter suffering huge welfare losses as a major consuming nation.
We conclude that by offering conflicting benefits to the West African
countries, the second-hand vehicle market provides disincentives
against true regional integration.

1. Introduction
Trading in second-hand vehicles is arguably one of the most popular and complex intrare-
gional cross-border businesses on the West African Coast. The popularity is such that two
West African countries (Nigeria and Benin) rank among the top markets for used vehicles
exported from Europe and America.1
Benin Republic alone reportedly harbours the largest market for such vehicles in Africa.2
The economic benefits of the intraregional cross-border trading in second-hand vehicles
are reported in terms of employment generation and increases in public revenue via import
duties. On the other hand, the challenges and complexities of this form of trade have also
been overwhelming – resulting in issues such as environmental concerns, regional disinte-
gration, trade informality, illegality, and welfare losses.
The interplay of costs and benefits of the second-hand vehicle markets in West Africa can
be attributed to the structural formation of the sub-regional bloc itself. In essence, the estab-
lishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 marked the
beginning of an economic and social integration process in that region of Sub-Saharan
Africa. One of the primary goals of ECOWAS is ‘to promote cooperation and development
in all fields of economic activity’ through the ‘elimination of customs duties and other charges
of equivalent effect in respect of the import and export of goods among member states,

CONTACT  Abel Ezeoha  aezeoha@gmail.com

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among member countries,

[and] abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services, and capital between
member states’.3 Achieving this laudable integration goal requires that each of the
Community’s 15 member countries meet the demand and supply conditions for integration.
The demand conditions require that market actors must perceive integration as being equi-
tably in their best interests; while the supply side involves ‘the conditions under which polit-
ical leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for regional institutions at each
step of the integration process’.4 These conditions are challenged in several African countries,
particularly in West Africa where such attempts have been qualified as ‘an integration of
incomplete states’ because the affected states ‘cannot fully lay a claim to complete nation-
hood and suffer from internal insecurities’.5
The resulting effect of the dysfunctional regional structure is that little progress has been
recorded in real terms in the pursuit of ECOWAS’ long-term goal of attaining fully integrated
economic and monetary union. Movement of people, for instance, is free in principle, but
in practice it is besieged with challenges such as hostility from native populations, insecurity
of life and property, and incessant harassment and extortion by border security agents.6
Although the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has recorded significant
progress in terms of attaining the a common currency and free-trade zone since its estab-
lishment in 2000, the progress of its sister body, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
remains virtually the opposite. The two sub-regional blocs remain sharply divided along
colonial lines – the Francophone and the Anglophone ECOWAS member countries.7
In practice, many of the movements of people and goods that take place in the region
are informal, generating global controversies on issues such as human trafficking and the
trading of illicit goods and services. Even before colonialism took hold in the region, there
was a near absence of ‘state interest’ in the ways that people within the region related.
According to Azam, this meant that cross-border trade was based much more on common
ethnic roots than on any formal integration effort.8 The official designation of the border
between Nigeria and Benin, for instance, merely resulted in the Shade Yoruba tribe being
divided into two – one part belonging to French Dahomey and the other to Anglophone
Nigeria.9 Due to strong ethnic ties, border towns and migrants prefer to relate economically
on informal terms rather than by using formal rules. Attempts to enforce national border
policies, in line with the evidence established by Golub Stephen and Mark Pitt, intensify the
degree of informality and encourage large price differences that provide an immediate impe-
tus to trade diversion and smuggling.10 In turn, informality breeds bilateral conflicts, illegality,
and results in a higher degree of welfare losses in the constituent countries.11 Meager’s
observations on the West African border trade show how informality erases the incentive
to cooperate among countries in Africa by weakening the fiscal capacity and monetary
control, undermining domestic productive capacity, and undermining the legitimacy and
probity of the states.12
The second-hand vehicle markets in the West African region therefore present a good
case for how informality can breed disintegration, illegality and welfare losses. The market,
which, by the early 1980s, was limited to a restricted trade within Nigeria has an interesting
history. The items of second-hand trade were originally called Belgium, because most of
them were then sourced from Belgium by West African migrants in Europe. In 1986, the
name changed to Tokunbo cars, derived from a Yoruba personal name Adetokunbo (which
literally means ‘a crown [ade] returns [bo] from overseas [ti] okun), given to ‘a child conceived
 BUSINESS HISTORY   3

or born away from home, generally [for Nigerians] in Europe’.13 The Tokunbo name is tagged
to the fact that second-hand vehicle imports from Europe and America were mostly by the
Nigerian diaspora, who used that as a source of repatriating wealth.
Arguably, more than any other country in the region, Nigeria suffers huge welfare losses
as a result of the booming cross-border trade in second-hand goods. The country’s large
population, high incidence of poverty, endemic official corruption, and existence of porous
borders, all join to make it highly vulnerable to negative externalities associated with the
importation of used vehicles into West Africa. In the words of Fadahunsi and Rosa, ‘the
Nigerian cross-border trade is particularly interesting, as it takes place in an environment of
long-standing illegality and corruption’.14 While Benin and Togo (the major re-exporting
countries) benefit immensely in terms of increased employment and government revenue,
Nigeria suffers huge losses arising from a decline in customs’ revenue, environmental risks,
frustration of domestic industrial development plans, and increasing waves of illicit trade.
By focusing on the cross-border consequences of the second-hand vehicle trade in the
West African region, our study provides a meaningful contribution to the literature on the
international trade in second-hand goods. Over 35 years into its existence, the regional body
(ECOWAS) is yet to attain a reasonable level of trade and economic integration. This is evident
from the 2016 Africa Regional Integration Index, which placed it second to last among the
eight officially recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. We attempt to
contextualise the skewed welfare losses/gains, illegality, and informality resulting from the
cross-border second-hand goods trade and posit that they are among the key factors mili-
tating against the regional integration efforts by member countries. We also argue that the
second-hand vehicle trade discourages bilateral cooperation and intensifies trade wars
among West African neighbours. In effect, no optimal policy options appear to be on the
ground, either at country level or at sub-regional level, to deal with the threats and challenges
associated with the expanding influence of the second-hand vehicle trade in the West African
region. We show how the welfare effects of the intraregional second-hand vehicle market
in West Africa are asymmetrically distributed, not just between buyers and sellers, but also
between countries. Following this approach, we structure the rest of the article as follows:
Section 2 summarises issues relating to port politics and development in West Africa; section
3 critiques the trade policy and port governance issues in the second-hand vehicle markets
in the region; section 4 illustrates how the market for second-hand vehicle induces infor-
mality and illegality in cross-border trade; section 5 examines the welfare losses associated
with second-hand vehicle trade; and section 6 concludes the article.

2.  Ports Politics and Development in West Africa

Seaport systems and operations play a dominant role in intraregional trade relations in the
West African region. This is because most of the constituent countries are not industrialised
and, as such, rely on imports from outside the region to meet domestic needs. Countries
with deep-sea resources are always seen to have more competitive advantages than their
inland counterparts, mostly because such resources offer opportunities for increased tran-
shipment welfare benefits. Post-independence port policies are therefore ostensibly
designed to capture a larger share of regional transhipment activities. This trend surfaced
in the 1980s, when many of the countries started repositioning their ports systems around
the benefits of transhipments. The most ambitious project, according to Iheduru, was
4   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

Senegal’s Port Autonomie Dakar (PAD), which was built in 1988 to serve as a sub-regional
load centre, including feeder services to Mali, Mauritania, Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-
Bissau.15 Other concurrent seaport expansion programmes in the region within the same
period include that of Ivory Coast (in 1987) and Ghana (in 1988 and 1990). A report on the
ambitious move of the Ivorian government typifies the intense competition that existed
over transhipment businesses. According to the report,
Cote d’Ivoire’s rush to install new gantry cranes in Abidjan in 1987, against professional advice,
typified its desire to garner as much of the sub-region’s transshipment trade as possible.
According to an Ivorian official, those cranes were installed simply ‘“because Lagos [Nigeria]
had one”’.16
Nigeria and Benin are equally involved in the competition for transhipment businesses
in the region. The influence of Nigeria is informed by the country’s size and history. Before
the start of seaport expansion programmes in other West African countries, Nigeria was
already known as a major hub for transhipments in the region – both in commodities and
in slave trades. For instance, in its pre-independence periods, surf ports were established at
Quidah and Cotonou, in the then Kingdom of Dahomey (now Benin Republic) as the ‘slave
coast’, in order that European traders could compete with the nearest rival, Lagos.17 This act
marked the first major attempt by the government of Dahomey to counter the influence of
the Nigerian port system on regional trade flows. Between 1945 and 1956, Dahomey – and
Niger-bound imports were diverted through Lagos’ ports due to long delays in the loading
and discharging of ships at Quidah and Cotonou (which sometimes stretched to 556 idle
days).18 But the costly nature of the Lagos-Porto Novo route eventually forced the French
colonial government to expand the Cotonou port and improve the rail-road route from
Cotonou inland to the Niger Republic19. This move was part of a strategy to divert a substan-
tial proportion of the latter’s imports through Lagos. The expansion did not, however, resolve
the issue of congestion, especially as trade volumes continued to increase along with eco-
nomic modernity in neighbouring countries. This explains why, after independence in 1959,
the Beninese government deemed it a viable policy option to rely on the engagement of
private port operators to cope with increasing trade flows.
Because of their strategic role and influence in transhipment businesses in the region,
both Nigeria and Benin have tended to compete along different lines, based on their respec-
tive port policies and reforms. In contrast to the situation in Benin, where private sector
operators were part of the post-independence history of sea port development, in Nigeria,
until the mid 2000s, the port system was monopolised by the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA).
This monopoly was further reinforced by Decree No. 38 of 1999, which reinvigorated the
power of the NPA to control all public and private tasks in the water transport sub-sector.20
This means that, comparatively, the port systems in Benin and in other West African countries
have historically had a more flexible outlook than in Nigeria. The dry port policy adopted
by the Nigerian government in March 2006 (as a public–private partnership arrangement21),
was a strategic reaction to the keen competition between Benin Republic and Nigeria for
the maritime needs of Niger Republic and probably Chad Republic. This is reinforced by the
fact that of the six designated dry ports, only Kaduna (an industrial state at the heart of
Nigeria’s north central region) was operational at the end of 2015. The effectiveness of this
policy was however limited by the matched concessionary policy adopted by Benin, follow-
ing the Beninese government’s award of a 25-year concession to the French company
 BUSINESS HISTORY   5

Groupement Bollore, in November 2008, ‘to build and operate the South Wharf Container
Terminal’.22
As highlighted above, competition in seaport reforms and operations in West Africa is
not restricted to Nigeria and Benin. For instance, a plan to build a shared port at the common
frontier of Togo and Benin Republic failed because of the differing economic interests of the
two Francophone neighbours. This was despite the French government’s commitment to
fully finance the project. Whereas the major incentive behind port development in Lomé,
Togo was to achieve independence from Ghana in the provision of port services, Benin
Republic was interested in liberating itself from the dominance of Lagos ports in the handling
of its shipments and those of her Francophone neighbours, Niger Republic.23 The divergent
interests in bilateral relations among countries in West Africa essentially constitute a key
part of the narrative on how intraregional commodity trading can be a basis for regional
disintegration, trade informality and welfare losses. As enunciated by Okello Oculi, ‘informal
cross-border trade is claimed to have been fuelled, since the 1970s across West Africa, by
small and weak economies of Benin, Togo and the Gambia which adopted the strategy of
low-tariff policies to attract foreign imports from outside Africa for transit to richer neigh-
bouring economies of Mauritania, Senegal and Mali (for Gambia); Nigeria and Burkina Faso
and Niger (by Togo and Benin)’.24

3.  Policy and Port Governance Issues in the Second-hand Vehicle Trade
The second-hand vehicle market in West Africa generally operates based on a sovereign
triad structure. At one point of this triad is Nigeria, with its protectionist port operation and
import policies, which is explained by the fact that the country constitutes the final desti-
nation for a greater proportion of second-hand vehicle imports into West Africa. The national
interest from this perspective is to control and, if possible, prevent the shipment of defective
and old vehicles into the country; this calls for a series of high-import tariffs and the impo-
sition of non-tariff protections. At another point is Benin and Togo, whose fiscal operations
are tied to revenue from re-export trade and port operations. In pursuit of this common
interest, the governments of these countries deliberately put in place liberal trade policies,
considered to be among the freest in the Sub-Saharan African region. Their respective trade
policies allow for the importation of goods of all kinds into the countries and the subsequent
re-export of such goods to neighbouring West African countries.25 Evidence suggests, for
instance, that of the total imports of used cars into Cotonou Port in Benin, about ‘90 percent
are destined for Nigeria, with 5 percent for Niger and 5 percent for the domestic market’26;
and that out of every set of four vehicles for the Nigerian market, three are discharged in
Cotonou.27
For second-hand vehicles imported through Benin and Togo, no formal arrangements
are in place to guarantee their quality and condition, mostly because these imported vehicles
never leave the ports and find their way onto the streets and cities of Benin and Togo. An
aspect of the Beninese trade policy, for example, prohibits the sale of Nigerian-bound
imported goods within the Benin territory, and the importer of such goods are given ‘only
three days to get his cargo across the border’.28 In effect, the re-exporting and port opera-
tional role of both Benin and Togo earns them the sobriquet ‘Warehouse States’ – a term
originally used to refer to the role of Benin in West African trade relations.29
6   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

At the last point of the triangular West African second-hand vehicle trade arrangement
is Niger. Benin and Niger are members of the WAEMU customs union,30 which means that
the countries are economically more integrated in terms of free movement of persons, goods,
services and capital. Benin is endowed with deep-sea resources, which makes it a strategic
location for serving the export and import trading needs of its landlocked neighbours, such
as Burkina Faso and Niger. Niger, in contrast, is a landlocked country with no sovereign access
to seaports. Port shipment to Niger is therefore through Benin, with minimal (or, in some
cases, zero) import duty charges, based on the WAEMU free-trade and common currency
arrangements. Interestingly, both countries share common land borders with Nigeria.
Technically, this geographical proximity facilitates Niger as an alternative channel for moving
goods from Benin to Nigeria. Consequently, Niger is recorded as having provided a proxy
market for second-hand vehicles destined for Nigeria since 2003. The widely acclaimed view
is that, in practice, to avoid duties, vehicles designated as transit to third countries ‘are some-
times placed under the transit regime to Niger, and then unofficially diverted to Nigeria’.31
This strategy allows the importers and the Beninese authority to conceal the identities of
the original destination and to circumvent the Nigerian government’s ban on second-hand
vehicle importation via land routes.
Lack of transparency in the second-hand vehicle imports created an opportunity for
money laundering and trading in illicit commodities.32 The case of money laundering was,
for example, implicated in an investigation report by the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). The report indicted ‘two Lebanese exchange houses, Kassem Rmeiti
& Co. For Exchange (Rmeiti Exchange) and Halawi Exchange Co. (Halawi Exchange), as con-
duits through which hundreds of millions of dollars are moved in cash into the U.S to buy
cars which are then shipped to Cotonou where most ‘Tokunbo’ cars on Nigerian roads are
brought into the country’.33
As expected, increased seaport politics among the West African countries complicated
port management systems, resulting in indiscriminate importation and dumping of sec-
ond-hand goods, congestions, and repression of domestic industries’ productive capacity.34
The first major port congestion crisis, considered as one of the worst in the world,35 occurred
in Nigeria between 1975 and 1977, and was matched by the government’s attempt to expand
and modernise the country’s port facilities. The second such port congestion crisis took place
in the mid 1980s and an attempt to resolve it focused mostly on the use of fiscal policy based
on the expansion of the country’s import ‘prohibition list’. In particular, the Nigerian govern-
ment attempted to resolve the problem of port congestion by imposing stringent import
restriction policies that resulted in a ban on certain commodities or, in some cases, the
imposition of exorbitant tariff structures. Against the principles of economic integration,
unconventional trade wars grew among West African countries, with national trade policies
overriding regional interests.
A major tool for the trade wars is fiscal policy. In Benin, in 1985, an erstwhile ‘fiscal policy
on state monopoly on imports was abolished and replaced by a license system’; and in 1987,
‘the licensing requirements were further abolished’.36 In 1993, the Beninese government
stretched its trade liberalisation policies by abolishing all other restrictions,37 with the pri-
marily target of boosting export revenue via increased flow of trade. From then on, the
government has maintained a system of fiscal policy and port governance measures that
are not only deliberately targeted at wooing Nigerian importers, but have equally resulted
in making the Port of Cotonou one of ‘the best ports in the region in terms of the speed at
 BUSINESS HISTORY   7

which cargo is unloaded’.38 According to Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, in both Benin and
Gambia ‘since the early 1970s, the authorities have sought to maintain trade taxes below
those of neighbouring countries in a deliberate attempt to re-export to their larger neigh-
bours’.39 Togo and Benin also compete in terms of fees and speed of service discharge.
Describing this tariff-linked competition, contends that whereas ‘Benin sacrificed some of
its transit trade in order to collect a larger amount of revenue’, ‘Togo collects very little rev-
enue on transit and re-exports, in order to boost competitiveness’.40
The pursuit of divergent policies was also a common characteristic of the Nigeria-Benin
bilateral trade relations.41 From Nigeria’s perspective, the argument for the second-hand
goods market, which include anti-dumping and protection of infant industries, finds strong
merits in the economic externalities theory. Equally, on the side of Benin (and Togo), increased
trade flows of second-hand vehicles is promoted as a strategy for increasing public revenue
for national development. For Nigeria, there are more incentives to control the importing
of used cars than there is for Benin, Gambia, and Togo. Nigeria has an infant auto industry
that consistently begs for protection and promotion. An example is the National Automobile
Policy which was introduced in 2014 as a strategy for localising automobile manufacturing
in the country. Neither Togo, nor Benin has such an automobile industry policy framework.
As an end-user of imported second-hand vehicles also, Nigeria is more exposed to the envi-
ronmental and health risks associated with such products than any of the neighbouring
countries, which, in most cases, operate as transit ports.

4.  Welfare Effects of the Second-hand Vehicle Trade

The second-hand vehicle market generates both welfare gains and losses. On the positive
side, in Africa, such markets satisfy the need for low-priced, high-quality goods. It equally
generates other forms of positive externalities, especially in terms of employment, entre-
preneurial engagement, and opportunities for increased public revenue. Problems arise
because the welfare benefits of the second-hand goods trade are, in most cases, unevenly
distributed among trading partners. At the national level, the benefits are skewed in favour
of the dealers, who presumably have information advantages over the sellers, and the welfare
losses are skewed against the buyers, who traditionally lack information. At the regional
level, the welfare benefits favour the transhipment or re-export countries, whereas the losses
are focused on the buying countries. In this section, we show how the uneven distribution
of the benefits and losses arising from the second-hand vehicle trade stifles trade formalities
and regional integration. In doing this, we discuss the welfare effects of second-hand trade
in terms of trade illegality and informality, the consequences on regional economic integra-
tion, and the welfare losses to different stakeholders.

4.1.  Illegality and informality in second-hand vehicle markets

The rhetoric in the extant literature emphasises that: second-hand markets for vehicles pro-
vide incentives for smuggling, crimes, trade diversion and money laundering;42 and that the
markets stunt regional industrial growth by crowding out and dis-incentivising the growth
of domestic manufacturing firms. This is because, at the regional level, the economic costs
of the second-hand markets spread from just the consequences on microeconomic agents
(buyers and sellers) to macroeconomic burdens on the government and society at large.
8   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

In Nigeria, a ban on the importation of cars by land routes from neighbouring countries
has been in force since 2004. Movements of imported second-hand cars from Benin, Togo
and other West African countries into Nigeria are officially adjudged illegal from the point
of view of the Nigerian authorities. In a BBC African Business Report, a World Bank senior
economist in Benin said that ‘the Beninese legally import the vehicles from Europe, but then
export them illegally to Nigeria’.43 From the Nigerian perspective, the massive markets for
second-hand vehicles between Nigeria and its West African neighbours are mostly illegal
because the trade is banned by law, and informal because there is no official documentation
process to support or facilitate the trade. In contrast, the Beninese and Togolese governments
have no significant restrictive policies in place to control the flow of second-hand vehicles
and other consumer goods – a stance that makes the market legal from the perspective of
Benin and Togo.
Ironically, the process of illegally diverting Benin-bound imported vehicles to Nigeria is
formalised. This is evident in the existence of
a well-established set of procedures for obtaining documents from customs authorising the
diversion of cars to Nigeria, where the fees and taxes for obtaining the authorisations amount
to about CFAF400,000 per car. This includes a fee for a customs escort to accompany the car to
the Nigerian border,44
This was acknowledged by one of the dealers, who was quoted as saying that: ‘As a way
of encouraging us to continue to patronise them, the Benin government offers rebate to
Nigerian importers’; and ‘apart from paying what is generally viewed as a healthy tariff sys-
tem, the Nigerian importer in Benin is further granted 15 percent tariff less what is paid by
his Beninoise counterpart’.45 Consequently, buyers of such cars ultimately save ‘up to 30%
buying cars in Benin, rather than buying it directly in Nigeria’.46
Erosion of confidence in the Nigerian port governance system, due to corruption and
arbitrary service charges, is also implicated as a major cause of trade diversion.47 It has, for
instance, been argued that ‘like a ripple, high port charges led to customer apathy which in
turn led to cargo diversion wherein millions of metric tonnes of Nigeria-bound freight were
diverted to neighbouring ports of Cotonou, Lome, Tema, Accra, and the rest.’48 The barriers
imposed by the Nigerian government provide a huge incentive for Beninese and Nigerian
smugglers to persistently ‘conduct informal trade across the borders on products ranging
from agricultural commodities to used cars’.49

4.2.  Consequences on regional economic integration

The complexities in the regional market for second-hand vehicles in West Africa are aggra-
vated by the near absence of effective institutional counteracting mechanisms for fair trade.
Consequently, trading in second-hand vehicles is shrouded in illegitimacy and deliberate
attempts to circumvent official trade rules and tariffs.50 The existing counteracting mecha-
nisms are either weak or costly and their signalling power is inadequate in terms of enhancing
the competitiveness of good products.51 In other regions, economic integration has proved
to be an effective tool for discouraging trade informality and reducing the costs of formal
importation and exportation with enhanced compliance to existing regulations.52 However,
in the West Africa sub-region, attempts to use such frameworks to promote smooth regional
trade are often faced with compliance problems. Due to lack of cooperation, an individual
country’s policy efforts trigger opposing counteractions from neighbouring countries.
 BUSINESS HISTORY   9

Table 1. Quantitative Restrictions on Second-hand vehicle Import (based on allowable age-limit of cars
into Nigeria).
Year Allowable Age Limit
1994 −2002 8 years
2002–2004 5 years
2004–2008 8 years
2008–2009 10 years
2010–2013 15 years
2014–2015 10 years
2016 15 years

As shown in Table 1 above, against the desired policy goal, the more the Nigerian gov-
ernment eases its quantity restrictions on the age limits of vehicles permitted to be imported
into the country, the more viable the alternative Beninese and Togolese cross-border trading
routes become. This is also considering the fact that prices are naturally negatively correlated
with the age of commodities.
Regardless of the trade policy of Nigeria, the Cotonou second-hand vehicle and consumer
product markets are officially structured and governed around the overwhelming demand
for second-hand products in Nigeria. This is especially in light of the fact that up to three
quarters of consumer goods officially imported through the port of Cotonou are re-exported
to the Nigerian market.53 Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye specifically report that the high
demand by Nigerians has fuelled second-hand vehicles markets as ‘Benin’s most significant
re-export since about 2000’; and that the trend also resulted in steep increases in imports
of vehicles from 50,000 in 1996 to an ‘all time high of 300,000 in 2007’.54 A 2014 BBC report
also alleged that as many as 25,000 vehicles are re-exported into Nigeria from Benin on a
monthly basis.55
As part of the formalisation process of the second-hand vehicle re-export business, and
in circumvention of the Nigerian government’s trade restriction rules, Benin also takes advan-
tage of the strategic location of Niger. It does so by ensuring that used car imports officially
destined for Niger are diverted to Nigeria. In support of this claim, Benjamin, Golub, and
Mbaye provide evidence that shows that “of 230,000 cars declared for shipment to Niger in
2001, only 15,000 ended up there”; ‘“almost all the rest wound up in Nigeria”’.56
Apart from the competitive and strategic trade policies of Benin and Togo, the port gov-
ernance system also contributes to illegalising and de-formalising the import of second-hand
vehicles into Nigeria. In contrast to what pertains in Benin, a great deal of mis-governance
takes place at the Nigerian end of the trade. In effect, ‘the unofficial re-export trade operates
in a thinly disguised collusion with high government officials in Nigeria’.57 Where collusion
is difficult, smuggled vehicles are escorted or self-driven by security agents across border
posts, which makes interception very difficult and eases evasion from immigration. This is
again a reaction to the high level of inefficiency in the port governance system.58 Unlike the
case in Nigerian seaports, where official agents and unofficial touts compete in the sec-
ond-hand vehicle market space, at the Beninese and Togolese end of the market, customs
is the only uniformed agency an importer has to contend with, and there is absolute order
in the entire port clearing system.59 The Beninese-Togolese-Nigerian second-hand vehicle
trade relation is thus a good demonstration of how divergences in trade policies can frustrate
regional economic cooperation among neighbouring countries.
10   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

4.3.  Welfare Losses from Second-hand Vehicle Trade

At the regional level, the economic costs of the second-hand markets have wider conse-
quences. There are the burdens of increased environmental externalities, the cost of regu-
lating informality and illegality, and, above all, problems associated with trade creation and
trade diversion.60 In the words of Chu and Delgado:
the illegal importation of used vehicles falls outside formal economic activities, which in turn are
not taxed, negatively affecting government revenue inflows. Additionally, informality removes
the incentive for businesses to improve their customer service and productivity. Thus, growth
potential is reduced; fewer jobs are created, driving more people into the informal sector, further
limiting growth in a self-reinforcing cycle.61
Trade creation and diversion constitute by far the most significant manifestation of the
regional market for used vehicles. In this case, trade creation arises when cheap imports
from neighbouring countries increase to replace inefficiently produced, high-cost domestic
products.62 On its own, trade diversion implies shifting the source of imports from lower-cost
sources outside the regional bloc to a higher-cost source within it.63 Because of the quality
uncertainty associated with the second-hand vehicle trade, especially in poor developing
regions, the positive welfare effects of trade creation and diversion are rarely recorded at
the macroeconomic or regional level. Asante attributes this to the fact that existing external
trade is usually large, relative to their domestic production and the fact that intragroup trade
is a minor component of their total trade.64
Specifically, the welfare losses from the market for second-hand vehicles can be analysed
from the perspective of individual and deadweight losses. The individual losses accrue to
buyers and dealers as specific economic agents in the market, while the deadweight losses
relate to the consequences of informality and illegality (in terms of public revenue losses,
retardation of domestic industries, and unemployment), as well as the negative externalities.
Agbo summarised these losses to include the influx of ‘all sorts of abandoned, discarded,
wrecked, ruined, or worn out vehicles or end-of-life vehicles’, revenue loss to the government,
increased border crimes, and deflation in the capacity of the country’s infant domestic auto-
mobile industry.65

4.3.1.  Welfare losses to the government

As mentioned above, top of the list of welfare losses accruing to government and society at
large include: the huge costs of fighting border crimes and maintaining border security;
negative economic externalities relating to environmental damage caused by the importa-
tion of defective vehicles; and loss of public revenue due to trade diversion. On the fiscal
side, evidence reveals that Nigeria lost a stunning N136 billion (over US$900 million) in 2013
as a result of the diversion of cargo to other ports in the sub-region.66 The World Bank also
reported that over $400 million, representing about 25 percent of the 2010 total annual
revenue collected by the Nigerian Customs Service, is lost through smuggling activities
across the land frontier borders.67 Mostly in the case of Nigeria, corruption by port officials
renders any form of fiscal policy objective unrealizable and provides incentives for the sus-
tenance and protection of illegal re-exports.
Growth in the regional market for second-hand vehicles and consumer goods has also
transformed a number of countries in the West African sub-region into a haven for smuggling
businesses. ‘So extensive is current smuggling that it has transformed border crossings into
 BUSINESS HISTORY   11

booming towns and markets’.68 The enormous extent of smuggling activities is also well-doc-
umented historically. It is reported, for instance, that ‘in 1981, the value of smuggled goods
between Nigeria and Benin was an estimated 12 billion francs CFA ($US58 million)’, and that,
seeking to evade import controls, Nigerian businessmen used Benin’s Port of Cotonou as
their major conduit for illegal overseas imports.69 Accounting for this is the existence of
complex border-linked trade routes between Nigeria and its neighbours.70 This makes unof-
ficial re-exports easy to move, either by road or water, with the existence of numerous and
ever-changing tracks along the long borders with Nigeria.
The growing intensity of the smuggling business in Nigeria creates incentives for other
crimes such as human trafficking, piracy, money laundering, and a transformation of the
buying countries into a dumping ground for all sorts of defective and environmentally haz-
ardous goods.71 Nigeria, for example, is credited with being ‘the main source of piracy in the
region, accounting for 29 piracy incidents, including two hijackings, 11 ships boarded, 13
vessels fired upon and three attempted attacks’.72 The cost of fighting smuggling-related
border crimes imposes a large-scale financial burden on the government. Lack of cooperation
in border security management among neighbouring countries also weakens efforts at
integration.
No doubt, the welfare losses incurred by Nigeria in the regional second-hand goods
market constitute major welfare gains to Benin and Togo. The market for used cars in Benin
is phenomenal, accounting for 43 percent of trade flows, about 45 percent of Cotonou’s port
revenues,73 as well as nearly 75 percent of the GDP.74 However, the transit policy in the country
is believed to be a source of revenue leakage to the government, leading to a situation where
used cars (and other goods) marked for transit to landlocked countries, in order to suspend
tax payments, are diverted and smuggled to Nigeria.75 Togo’s economy is traditionally centred
on the activities at the Port of Lomé, with re-export trade at the port accounting for more
than 25 percent of total exports.76 Benin has a relative advantage over Togo. First, Benin is
the closest CFA country to Lagos, and as such maintains an ‘important role for trade between
Nigeria and many of the countries of the region’.77 Whereas there is a direct border link
between Benin and Nigeria, this is not the case with Togo and Gambia, who do not share a
direct geographical border with Nigeria. Trade flows are carried out through Togo by longer
land routes, which invariably increase the cost of shipping over and above costs incurred in
Benin.
While there are some welfare gains for Togo and Benin, the neighbours are constantly
locked in trade wars, using tariffs as a key strategic tool and working completely against the
tenets of WAEMU. Moreover, mass cross-border migration and trafficking also makes conflicts
contagious – as in the case of the Boko Haram insurgency, the impacts of which were as
severe in some neighbouring countries as they were in Nigeria.

4.3.2.  Welfare losses to consumers in the market

The welfare effects of the second-hand vehicle market to consumers can equally be positive
or negative. The positive effects include the ease of accessibility and affordability that such
markets provide. It has been posited, for instance, that the utility preferences of consumers
in developing countries are enhanced in the global market for used vehicles because of the
limited supply of new vehicles, price differentials and differing depreciation rates across
countries.78 It is arguable that without the existence of this market, very few persons in poor
regions like West Africa could own a vehicle. On the other hand, welfare losses to consumers
12   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

of second-hand vehicles come in the form of the higher likelihood of buying defective cars
at exorbitant prices, as well as the associated costs and risks of using such cars. As earlier
identified, the market for second-hand vehicles in the West African sub-region is traditionally
characterised by a large information deficit and price-quality disparities against buyers. Due
to quality uncertainty, most of the time end-users who buy such vehicles lack the capacity
to actually determine their worth and so often pay more than they should. The loss in con-
sumer surplus increases in step with the number of intermediaries, more so because each
intermediary rationally struggles to maximise its own utility surplus.
Consistent with the analytical framework used by Abimbola for second-hand clothing,
in practice, the buyers know nothing about the quality of the vehicles in the source countries
in Europe and in America, and are ignorant of the damage that may have occurred as the
vehicles exchange hands from the Beninese importers to the Beninese re-exporters and
finally to the Nigerian dealers.79 In the case of Nigeria, where most of the cross-border sec-
ond-hand vehicle trade is informal and illegal,80 due to legal restrictions by the Nigerian
government, there is an absence of effective formal counteracting mechanisms for protect-
ing consumers (such as formal rules, insurance, and warranties). Buyers are also reportedly
incentivised to transact informally to minimise costs and avoid paying double import duties,
to the transshipment country and the home country. In the presence of illegality, the dealers
along cross-border routes invest little in building their reputations. Rather, they wilfully
exacerbate quality uncertainty and undermine transparency in the trading process.
As Golub argued, the consumer welfare losses associated with the second-hand vehicle
trade in West Africa are felt more in the buying countries (such as Nigeria and Niger) than
in the re-exporting countries (like Benin, Togo and Gambia).81 This is because, in the absence
of effective harmonisation in regional trade policies and rules, the re-exporting countries
have little incentive to expend resources on guaranteeing the quality control and standards
of used vehicles in transit to neighbouring countries.

4.3.3.  Welfare losses to producers and dealers in the market

The welfare effects of the second-hand vehicle trade are also skewed against producers and
dealers in importing and re-exporting countries. On the positive side, evidence shows how
the market has induced entrepreneurial growth in the region. In essence, the blurring of
legality and illegality in the market provides a wider profit margin for the traders – making
it possible for them to ‘target any goods irrespective of their legal status if potential profit
margins are high’.82 The immense job losses in the regional markets, occasioned by the recent
economic recession in Nigeria, underscores the importance of the market for generating
entrepreneurial growth in the West African sub-region. A recent report illustrates how
‘mechanics, drivers, electricians, and painters have all lost their jobs’ due to the absence of
Nigerian buyers in the Beninese and Togolese markets.83
The most significant welfare loss accruing from the second-hand vehicle market is the
crowding-out effect. A report in the Nigerian newspaper BusinessDay exemplified this crowd-
ing-out effect by highlighting that the dependency on imported new and used cars has
brought about a situation where, in recent years, ‘the pioneer car assembly plants have fallen
into disrepair’.84 The producers’ welfare losses, in the case of West Africa, are worsened by
the fact that the economic policies in place to protect the industry are either poorly designed
or inefficiently implemented.85
 BUSINESS HISTORY   13

5. Conclusion
Nigeria has the largest demand for second-hand vehicles in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ironically,
the Nigerian government imposes the stiffest tariffs and non-tariff measures against the
importation of such commodities. There is currently a restrictive ceiling of ten years age limit
for vehicles permitted into the country, and vehicles that are within this bracket attract an
import tariff of 35 percent, the highest in the region. The prevailing harsh business environ-
ment in the country invariably makes the survival of domestic vehicle assembling plants
near impossible and newly assembled vehicles out of the reach of most citizens. Additionally,
port congestion and administrative bottlenecks make Nigerian seaports unviable due to
the delays in the clearing of legally imported goods. The structural defects in the Nigerian
trading policies and port operational system are the main reason for the booming sec-
ond-hand vehicle markets in the sea-rich neighbouring West African countries of Benin and
Togo. To take maximum advantage of the situation in Nigeria, these countries operate some
of the freest and most liberal trade policies in Africa. There are few or no restrictions and no
formal arrangements in place to guarantee the quality and conditions of the second-hand
vehicles imported into these countries, mostly because the imported vehicles never leave
the ports and reach the streets and cities of Benin and Togo.
Historically, the second-hand markets have been a source of social integration and tend
to serve the specific goal of satisfying the need for low-priced, high-quality goods. A major
problem identified in this article is the uneven distribution of the resulting benefits and
losses. Whereas the interests of Benin and Togo are commonly tied to the associated revenue
potentials from re-export trade and port operations, Nigeria suffers huge welfare losses
relating to public revenue losses, environmental risks, frustration of domestic industrial
development, and increased waves of illicit trades. Differing benefits and losses result in
differences in trade and monetary policies. Due to the associated welfare losses, Nigeria’s
trade policy is highly restrictive on second-hand vehicles. In contrast, the huge welfare ben-
efits accruing to Benin and Togo provide them the incentive to operate liberal trade policies.
The differences in policy thrusts provide significant incentives for informality in the market,
whereby such vehicles are traded legally in Benin and Togo, but illegally in Nigeria. Benin
uses its common border with Niger as a proxy market to circumvent the Nigerian govern-
ment’s high tariff and non-tariff restrictions on the importation of second-hand vehicles.
By offering conflicting benefits to the West African countries, the second-hand vehicle
markets provide a major disincentive against true regional economic integration; and an
attempt to achieve effective regional integration among ECOWAS member countries would
require a true harmonisation of all aspects of trade policies on influential commodities such
as second-hand vehicles. Such regional efforts should centre primarily on harmonising coun-
try-specific policies and trade rules relating to age limits of vehicles, health and quality
specifications, transshipment and re-export policies, and the applicable national tariff struc-
tures. Currently, the ECOWAS liberalisation policy and common external tariffs (CET) system
have no explicit pronouncements on controlling the growing influence of the ubiquitous
second-hand vehicle trade. The common import tariffs adopted by the member countries
to curb smuggling and enhance intraregional trade flows are yet to be fully implemented.
When the tariffs come into force, member countries can enforce them only when the gains
and losses from sub-regional trade are relatively evenly distributed.
14   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

Notes
1.  UNECE. ‘Used Vehicles: Global Overview’UN Environment Background Paper, 2017 https://www.
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2017/itc/UNEP-ITC_Background_Paper-Used_Vehicle_
Global_Overview.pdf; Also see Coffin, David, Jeff Horowitz, Danielle Nesmith, and Mitchell
Semanik. ‘“Examining Barriers to Trade in Used Vehicles.”’
2.  Ribstein, Sophie and Jason Boswell. 2014. ‘Benin’s Second-hand Car Trade’, BBC African Business
Report, September 5, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29061377
3.  Anyanwu, Monetary Economics: Theory, policy, and Institutions, p. 389.
4.  Matthews, Regional integration and food security in developing countries.
5.  Qobo, Mzukisi. “The challenges of regional integration in Africa: In the context of globalisation
and the prospects for a United States of Africa”, p. 16.
6.  Adepoju, Aderanti. “Migration in West Africa”, 37–41.
7.  Uche, “The politics of monetary sector cooperation among the Economic Community of West
African States members.”
8.  Azam, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
9.  Blum, “Cross-border flows between Nigeria and Benin: what are the challenges for (human)
security?”.
10. Golub, Stephen. “Informal cross-border trade and smuggling in Africa”, 179.-200; Pitt. “Smuggling
and price disparity.” 447–458.
11. Golub, Stephen. “Informal cross-border trade and smuggling in Africa”; Fadahunsi and Rosa,
“Entrepreneurship and illegality: insights from the Nigerian cross-border trade”, 397–429.
12. Meager, Kate. ‘A back door to globalisation? Structural adjustment, globalisation and transborder
trade in West Africa’, 57–75.
13. Guyer, Jane I. Marginal gains: monetary transactions in Atlantic Africa, p. 87.
14. Fadahunsi and Rosa. “Entrepreneurship and illegality: insights from the Nigerian cross-border
trade”, 397–429.
15. Iheduru, The political economy of international shipping in developing countries, p. 154.
16. Cited in Iheduru, p. 155.
17. For evidence of this, see 0821415719_intro.pdf.
18. White, “New ports in Dahomey and Togo”,  p. 161.
19. Ibid., p. 162.
20. Federal Government of Nigeria, ‘Draft National Transport Policy’. 2010.
21. Online source: Oxford Business Group, 2016.
22. White, “New ports in Dahomey and Togo”.
23. For details, see Ibid.
24. Oculi, “Cooperation and Integration in African: The Case of Informal Cross Border Trade”, p. 3.
25. Beuving, “Nigerien second-hand car traders in Cotonou: A sociocultural analysis of economic
decision-making”, 353–373.
26. Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, “Informality, trade policies and smuggling in West Africa”,  381–
394.
27. This latter view is indeed an open secret widely expressed in the local media. See for instance
Leadership [Nigeria] newspaper of 5 September 2016, ‘Customs Loses N600bn to Diverted
Vehicle Imports’; and New Telegraph [Nigeria] newspaper of 12 October 2016, ‘Benin republic
Controls 63% of Nigeria’s Vehicle Imports’.
28. Daily Trust [Nigeria] newspaper, ‘Nigeria’s Chaos, Benin Republic Gains’, 19 February, 2012.
29. LARES. Le commerce frontalier entre le Bénin et le Nigeria. Rapport de synthèse. CFD : février
1995, 60 p.
30. Other members of West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU) are Burkina Faso,
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, and Togo.
31. Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, “Informality, trade policies and smuggling in West Africa”, p. 390.
32. Beuving, “Nigerien second-hand car traders in Cotonou: A sociocultural analysis of economic
decision-making”.
 BUSINESS HISTORY   15

33. Freeman, Michael, and Moyara Ruehsen. “Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview/

Perspectives on Terrorism”.
34. Dossou,  Sinzogan; and Mensah, ‘Economic Growth in Benin: Lost Opportunities’, 87–118.
35. Akinwale and Aremo. “Concession as a catalyst for crisis management in Nigerian Ports.” 117–
126.
36. Sacerdoti, Emillio. ‘Benin: recent economic developments’, 96–102.
37. Ibid.
38. See a USITC cable titled Study on Benin: Effects of Infrastructure Conditions on Export
Competitiveness, Wikileaks, October 3, 2008. The Port of Cotonou acts has a free port status,
which implies that trade is permitted before custom declaration.
39. Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, “Informality, trade policies and smuggling in West Africa.”
40. Golub, “Informal cross-border trade and smuggling in Africa”, p. 198.
41. Sacerdoti, Emillio. ‘Benin: recent economic developments’.
42. Blum, “Cross-border flows between Nigeria and Benin: what are the challenges for (human)
security?”.
43. Ribstein, S. and Boswell, J. ‘Benin's second-hand car trade’ Africa Business Report, 5 September
2014.
44. Benjamin, Mbaye, and Diop. The informal sector in Francophone Africa: firm size, productivity,
and institutions, p. 203.
45. Daily Trust “Nigeria”s Chaos, Benin Republic’s Gains’, Shehu Abubakar, Cotonou Feb 19 2012.
46. BBC News (2014), ‘Benin's second-hand car trade’, African Business Report, September 5.
47. Marjit, Sugata, Sudeep Ghosh, and Amit Biswas. ‘Informality, corruption and trade reform’,
777–789.
48. Nigerian Ports: The Perils Of Demurrage, by Chigozie Chikere http://247ureports.com/nigerian-
ports-the-perils-of-demurrage-by-chigozie-chikere/
49. United States International Trade Commission. ‘Export Opportunities and Barriers in African
Growth and Opportunity Act Eligible Countries’, Inv. 332–464, DIANE Publishing, 2005, 5–7.
50. Cantens, Thomas, Robert Ireland, and Gaël Raballand. “Introduction: borders, informality,
international trade and customs.” 365–380.
51. See for instance Bond, ‘A direct test of the’ Lemons’ model: The market for used pickup
trucks.” 836–840.
52. Lesser and Moisé-Leeman. ‘Informal cross-border trade and trade facilitation reform in Sub-
Saharan Africa’, p. 6.
53. Soule, Obi, and Club. Prospects for Trade between Nigeria and its Neighbours.
54. Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, “Informality, trade policies and smuggling in West Africa.” p. 203.
55. Ribstein, Sophie and Jason Boswell, ‘Benin's second-hand car trade’ BBC Africa Business Report,
5 September 2014.
56. Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, “Informality, trade policies and smuggling in West Africa.”, p. 227.
57. Ibid.
58. Daily Trust “Nigeria”s Chaos, Benin Republic’s Gains’, Shehu Abubakar, Feb 19 2012.
59. Ibid. “Sunday Trust was on the entourage of the Senate Committee on Transport investigative
committee to Benin Republic recently”.
60. Golub, Stephen. “Informal cross-border trade and smuggling in Africa”.
61. Chu and Delgado. “Used vehicle imports impact on new vehicle sales: The Mexican Case”, p. 351.
62. Andic, Fuat, Suphan Andic, and Douglas Dosser. A theory of economic integration for developing
countries: illustrated by Caribbean countries.
63. Robson, Peter. Integration, development and equity: economic integration in West Africa, p. 6.
64. Asante, Samuel KB. Regionalism and Africa’s development: expectations, reality and challenges.
65. Agbo, COA. “Recycle materials potential of imported used vehicles in Nigeria.”  118–128.
66. Administrator, “How TEMA May Emerge West African Hub Port’, The Journal of Freight and Energy,
July 31, 2014. http://www.journalngonline.com/2014/07/31/how-tema-may-emerge-west-
african-hub-port/
67. Daily Trust, ‘Nigeria’s Chaos, Benin Republic’s Gains’, Shehu Abubakar, February 19 2012.
16   A. EZEOHA ET AL.

68. Sandbrook and Barker. The politics of Africa's economic stagnation, p.141; For more evidence
on this claim, see Golub (2012)
69. Sandbrook and Barker. The politics of Africa's economic stagnation.
70. Azam, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
71. Folami and Naylor. “Police and cross-border crime in an era of globalisation: The case of the
Benin–Nigeria border”,  859–879.
72. Administrator (2014), How TEMA May Emerge West African Hub Port, The Journal of Freight and
Energy, July 31, http://www.journalngonline.com/2014/07/31/how-tema-may-emerge-west-
african-hub-port/
73. Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye, “Informality, trade policies and smuggling in West Africa.”
74. Blum, “Cross-border flows between Nigeria and Benin: what are the challenges for (human)
security?”.
75. Goretti, Manuela, and Hans Weisfeld.  Trade in the WAEMU: Developments and Reform
Opportunities.
76. W TO, ‘Trade Policy Reviews: First Press release,’ Secretariat and Government Summaries, January,
1999.
77. Azam, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
78. Coffin, Horowitz, Nesmith, and Semanik. “Examining Barriers to Trade in Used Vehicles.”
79. Abimbola, Olumide. “The international trade in secondhand clothing: managing information
asymmetry between West African and British traders.” 184–199.
80. Fadahunsi and Rosa, “Entrepreneurship and illegality: insights from the Nigerian cross-border
trade”, 397–429.
81. Golub, Stephen. “Informal cross-border trade and smuggling in Africa”.
82. Fadahunsi and Rosa, “Entrepreneurship and illegality: insights from the Nigerian cross-border
trade”, p. 397.
83. Allegresse, Sasse and Paul, Carsten. 2017. ‘Nigeria recession deals blow to smuggling hub’ Benin
Reuters World News, March 30. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-benin-smuggling/
nigeria-recession-deals-blow-to-smuggling-hub-benin-idUSKBN17125X
84. Ekere, Ndy. 2016. ‘Options for developing the Nigerian automotive industry’, BusinessDay Day,
December 19. http://www.businessdayonline.com/options-developing-nigerian-automotive-
industry/
85. Chu and Delgado. “Used vehicle imports impact on new vehicle sales: The Mexican Case”, 
347–364.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Abel Ezeoha holds a parallel academic position in the Department of Banking & Finance and the
Department of Economics at Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria. His main research interests
include: international capital flows, economic and financial reforms, and development banking in Africa.
He has published extensively in these areas; and his forthcoming book is titled: Corporate Nationality
& Financing in Africa: Context, Issues and Theories (Cambridge Scholars).
Chinwe Okoyeuzu is a faculty member in the Department of Banking and Finance, University of Nigeria
Enugu Campus. She holds a PhD in Finance. She has served as a consultant in various organizations.
Her major research interests, where she has published widely, include: Financial management, invest-
ments, Banking, and Financial Derivatives.
Emmanuel Onah is a lecturer in the Department of Banking and Finance, University of Nigeria Enugu
Campus. He holds a PhD in Banking and Finance. He has published extensively in the areas of Transport
Finance and Economics, Pension Finance and Economics, Agricultural Finance and Economics,
Investment Analysis, Project Analysis, Portfolio Management.
 BUSINESS HISTORY   17

Chibuike Uche is the chairholder of the Stephen Ellis Chair for the Governance of Finance and Integrity
in Africa. He has extensive research experience in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone in the fields of polit-
ical economy, business and financial history, financial institutions regulation and regional integration.
His current research interest is foreign business operations in Africa. He leads the research consortium
Dutch Multinational Businesses, Dutch Government and the Promotion of Productive Employment in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which is part of the research agenda of INCLUDE and NWO-WOTRO.

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