MULGAN-Power and Pork-A Japanese Political Life

ii
iii
Co-Published by ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia
Email: anuepress@anu.edu.au
Web: http://epress.anu.edu.au
© Aurelia George Mulgan 2006

This work is copyright. Apart from those uses which may be permitted under the Copyright Act
1968 as amended, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from
the publisher.
The views in this book do not represent those of Asia Pacific Press or the Crawford School of
Economics and Government at The Australian National University.
National Library of Australia Cataloguing in Publication entry
Mulgan, Aurelia George.

Power and Pork: a Japanese political life

Bibliography.
Includes index.
ISBN 0 7315 3757 2 (pbk)
ISBN 1 920942 33 5 (online)

1. Japan - Politics and government. 2. Japan - Economic
policy. I. Title.

320.952
Editors: Bridget Maidment, Clare Shamier, Paula Sutton

Cover design: Annie Di Nallo Design
Printed in Australia by University Printing Service, The Australian National University, Canberra
First edition © 2006 ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press
iv
CONTENTS
Tables vi
Abbreviations vii
Acknowledgments viii
Preface ix
1 Beyond generalisation 1
2 Becoming a politician 6
3 Accommodating electoral reform 50
4 Exercising power as a nôrin giin 73
5 Exercising power as a nôrin zoku 121
6 The identical twins of Nagata-chô 150
7 Electoral vicissitudes 204
8 Conclusion 251
Bibliography 254
Index 267
v
TABLES
2.1 Farm household composition/votes cast for Matsuoka by

municipality in Kumamoto (1) in 1990 Lower House election 22
2.3 Ranking of Kumamoto Prefecture as an agricultural producer/by
commodity and farm/forestry households (per cent), 2000 39
municipality in Kumamoto (3) in 2000 62
4.1 Matsuoka’s Committee Memberships et cetera 111
6.1 Top 10 contributors to Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century
Politics and Economics Discussion Association 164
6.2 Top 10 individual contributors to Matsuoka Toshikatsu New
Century Politics and Economics Discussion Association 165
6.3 Companies contributing to Matsuoka and Muneo 167
vi
ABBREVIATIONS
AFF Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

ALIC Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
FTA Free Trade Agreement
JCP Japanese Communist Party
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization
JSP Japanese Socialist Party
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LIPC Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MMD Multi-member district
MOF Ministry of Finance
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NHK Nippon Hôsô Kyôkai [Japan Broadcasting Association]
OB ‘Old Boy’
PARC Policy Affairs Research Council
SMD Single-member district
WTO World Trade Organization
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank the National Library of Australia in Canberra
for providing such pleasant sanctuary for several months in 2005, which enabled
much of the research for this book to be undertaken. Under the conditions of
a Harold White Fellowship, the library granted privileged access to the Japanese
Collection. Library staff of the Collection, especially Mayumi Shinozaki, greatly
assisted in obtaining materials from the Diet Library in Japan and in furnishing
all kinds of research advice and support. An Australian Research Council
Discovery Project funded valuable research assistance, which was provided by
Reiko Take. Maree Tait showed great patience and forbearance during the
inevitable hiccups in the publication process, while Richard Mulgan, the
unsung hero of this book, deserves my undying gratitude for the index and his
usual illuminating intelligence, which contributed to the book in so many
different ways. The book is dedicated to Sasha and Basil, who will always be
greatly missed.
viii
PREFACE
Japanese politics is notoriously opaque and corrupt. It is not surprising,

therefore, that few studies reveal what really goes on in the political lives of
Japanese politicians. This is one such exposé, the fruits of intensive research
into the public and private political life of a member of the Japanese Diet. It is
an extraordinary tale about an ordinary politician who exemplifies what it is to
be a parliamentarian affiliated with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
in present-day Japan. Like the majority of LDP Diet members, the politician
at the centre of this study represents a clutch of special interests whilst striving
to direct public resources to his own electorate. As a veteran lawmaker and
policy specialist, he also belongs to a ‘policy tribe’ (zoku), regularly intervening
in the making of government policy and interfering in the administrative affairs
of the bureaucracy. As a tribe Diet member he has achieved the ultimate goal,
appointed as minister over the very ministry that he sought to influence from
within the ranks of the LDP.
This is a story of political failures and of political successes, a tale of ambition
furthered by the successful delivery of benefits to constituents and supporters,
but also thwarted by suspicion and allegations of corrupt behaviour. In the
brave new world of Japanese politics opened up by Prime Minister Koizumi,
such an independent policy entrepreneur and political fixer appeared to
represent the old style of LDP politician, whose days might be numbered.
However, his accession to the ministry in the first Abe cabinet, as this book
went to press, underlines the resilience of traditional patterns of Japanese
politics. Only the final chapter of this political life, which is yet to be written,
will reveal the extent to which a new model of Japanese politics has taken root.
ix
x
BEYOND GENERALISATION 1
1
BEYOND GENERALISATION
The story told in this book—or rather the inside story of a political life that
now spans 16 years—is neither pure biography nor pure scholarly treatise. It
falls somewhere in between. It is not pure biography because it is only concerned
with political phenomena. It focuses on the political career, connections,
performance and activities of one of Japan’s Diet politicians, Matsuoka
Toshikatsu, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member in Japan’s House of
Representatives for Kumamoto No. 3 district. His private life outside politics
is only of incidental interest to this account.
Some may feel that such an approach will omit potentially the most absorbing
and interesting details, but, as this book will show, not only is politics
Matsuoka’s life, but there is intriguing detail aplenty in his political
machinations. The book delves into Matsuoka’s early life and career, but only
to provide important background details and to help explain Matsuoka’s decision
to enter politics. His reputation in Nagata-chô1 for liking women, for greeting
female Diet members with unwelcome comments and for sweet-talking
hostesses in high-class nightclubs2 are the only comments that will be made
about his private predilections. As for Matsuoka’s personality, this is not
explicitly the focus of analysis, but sometimes glimpses of it are revealed—in
the descriptions of his relations with bureaucrats, businessmen, other politicians,
local government figures and organisational leaders, and also in accounts of
what he said and what he did—in words that are his and theirs, not mine.
Indeed, Matsuoka has both a public persona and a private personality, and the
two do not necessarily match. The persona he presents to the outside world is
that of someone who is highly principled, and who works tirelessly on behalf
2 POWER AND PORK
of his constituents, supporting groups and various important causes. Privately,

as a dealmaker and political fixer, by all accounts, he is completely different,
aggressive3 with a reputation for shouting, bullying and violence.
The book is not pure scholarly treatise because it eschews generalisation, or,
at least, uses generalisation only in order to elucidate Matsuoka’s activities and
behaviour, rather than as the main explanatory device. The book does not,
therefore, adopt a scientific approach in the sense that this terminology is
normally used. At the same time, the study aspires to be labelled political
science because it analyses political events and facts, and seeks to understand
the nature of Japanese politics not through generalisation, but rather through
the rich description of individual example.
The methodological approach adopted in this book is that of ‘thick’
description, a research technique borrowed from social anthropology,4 which
weds ‘the tools of modern social science…to the artful narrative skills of the
humanities’.5 Thick description is an approach that goes beyond generalisation
and is designed to yield insights that cannot be captured by universal statements
about particular phenomena. It is possible for an individual story to provide
deeper and more rounded understanding than any generalisation can offer.
Such an approach is underpinned by the realisation that, even amongst scholars
of Japanese politics, we often know the general contours of an institution or
practice, but we do not have a sufficiently precise or inside knowledge of it.
Concentrating on an individual politician is unusual in studies of Japanese
politics unless the work is strictly biographical or focuses on dominant leaders
or iconic figures, such as Tanaka Kakuei.6 Little has been written about the
political lives of individual, ordinary Diet members7 in spite of the fact that, as
everywhere, politics in Japan is shaped by human factors. As Curtis wisely
observed: ‘Decisions made by individuals…are the direct cause of what happens
in politics’.8
While the book offers an account of the political life and activities of an
individual Japanese politician, it is hoped that the analysis will generate insights
into Japanese politics as a whole. Such insights are not explicitly manipulated
into generalisations in the study; they have to be gleaned from the material
that is presented. Nonetheless, understanding how one person thinks, acts
and operates may produce greater understanding of how a political system
functions and even how it is changing. If the book furnishes information that
leads others to make more reliable, illustrative generalisations about the
behaviour of Japanese politicians, then it will have succeeded in its modest

ambitions. It is certainly hoped that this book will provide a counterweight to
the tendency amongst political scientists to try to reduce the detail and variation
in political phenomena to numbers or to highly selective illustrations of
deductive theory.
The particular nature of this study posed some unique research problems,
particularly in obtaining crucial, inside information. This was gathered from a
diverse range of sources: the mass media—newspapers, records of TV interviews,
and industry and investigative journals—as well as from more scholarly articles
and texts, and from Matsuoka’s own website. Recourse was also made to the
Internet where too much credence was not placed in the potentially libellous
words of those engaging in ‘threading’, where individual members of the
Japanese public can vent their spleen about public figures, such as Matsuoka,
with the advantage of anonymity. At no time was the subject of the study
interviewed (for reasons that may become obvious to readers); but those who
had interviewed him were. The study was done at arm’s length—as a book
such as this has to be done.
Why write such a book? The project arose out of earlier research that revealed
the importance of individual politicians in Japanese electoral politics and the
influence individual Diet members in the ruling LDP can exert over government
policy. The book began its life as an examination of the ‘government versus
ruling party’ phenomenon in Japan: the LDP has often maintained different
positions on policy from the bureaucracy and, more spectacularly in recent
times, from the prime minister. What this early research revealed was a great
deal of evidence that individual politicians—ordinary backbenchers in the
LDP—customarily drive government policy in Japan. Indeed, the policy
directions of the LDP frequently seem to be propelled by the policy activities
of individual Diet members, who specialise in particular aspects of policy in a
highly decentralised policymaking apparatus that corresponds to, and is
supported by, the bureaucratic ministries and agencies. As a policymaking
body, the LDP is a decentralised organisation that supports the policy specialism
of Diet members and allows them to exercise their own, individual policy
influence from the bottom up.
The traditional paradigm of Japanese politics is encapsulated in this structure
of individual Diet member-dominated politics. The LDP is, as Machidori
depicts it, ‘a decentralised party dominated by Diet members’.9 With their
4 POWER AND PORK
own individually-centred, secure voting bases, LDP politicians have operated

as their own persons, not completely beholden to their own party, but wielding
power, including policymaking power, in their own right—independently of
both the bureaucracy and the government leadership of the day.
In policymaking, individual LDP politicians—ordinary backbenchers—
instead of being the usual parliamentary fodder that they are in other
parliamentary cabinet systems, wield direct power over policymaking and over
the administrative affairs of the bureaucracy. They actually encroach on the role
of government in two important ways. They are routinely involved both in the
making of government policy and in processes of government administration.
The former amounts to intervention (kainyû) in government policymaking, and
the latter to interference in areas of administrative competence.
Policymaking by ordinary LDP backbenchers takes place within the
committees of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). This allows
the LDP to shape its public policy independently. Moreover LDP politicians
have behaved like individual policy entrepreneurs rather than as members of a
party bound by a commonly agreed policy view imposed by cabinet and the
party leadership. At the same time, individual backbenchers have exerted
influence over specific administrative decisions made by bureaucracy through
direct contacts with ministry officials, completely bypassing the minister. To
analyse politics operating in such a way, an approach had to be adopted that
implicitly recognised Japanese politics as fundamentally individually-based
(kojin honi) rather than party-based (seitô honi).10 The LDP has lacked policy
coherence; it has not moved as one, but as a vast conglomeration of individual
politicians, each pushing his or her own barrow.
Why focus on Matsuoka? Why does he deserve ‘thick’ or ‘rich’ description?
He is so illustrative of a certain genre of Japanese politician, he might have
been created as a composite of the characteristics of the archetypal Japanese
politician. He exhibits all the features for which the LDP is famous and with
which it has traditionally been associated. First, he is strongly representative of
special interest groups as one of the most notorious, influential, outspoken
and colourful representatives of farm, forestry and rural–regional interests in
Japan. Second, he has been implicated in a number of corruption scandals
involving so-called ‘money politics’ that have somewhat dented, but not
destroyed, his political standing. Third, he is a fervent advocate of pork
barrelling, and puts enormous effort into bringing public works back to his
own constituency. Fourth, he has operated within the LDP’s policymaking

process as a direct and indirect representative of the special interests that are
central to his electoral support coalition.
The methodology used in this book—that of thick description—can also
offer insight into the nature of political change in Japan. Does the traditional
model of an LDP politician still apply? Is Japan experiencing the much-heralded
‘regime shift’12 that was flagged more than 10 years ago? How did Matsuoka
adjust to the reforms instituted by the Koizumi administration? Has the proto-
typical LDP politician been eclipsed, or has he merely found new ways of
maintaining his influence?
NOTES
1 This is the area of Tokyo where both the National Diet and the headquarters of the LDP (Jimintô
honbu) are located.
2 These comments were made by a fellow LDP Diet member, and quoted in ‘Han Koizumi Giin no
“Yoru no Kao”’ [‘The “Night Face” of a Diet Member Opposed to Koizumi’], Shûkan Shinchô, 13
December 2001, p. 161.
3 Itô Hirohide, ‘Heisei Jiken Fuairu: Nôrin Jigyô Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka Toshikatsu
Shûin Nôsuiiinchô no Eikyôroku’ [‘Heisei Scandal File: The Influence of House of Representatives
Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries Committee Chairman Matsuoka Toshikatsu Who Monopolises
Agricultural and Forestry Works Subsidies’], Seikai, Vol. 22, No. 6, June 2000, p. 65.
4 Geertz, Clifford, 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York.
5 Rhodes, R.A.W. and Weller, Patrick, 2001. The Changing World of Top Officials: Mandarins or Valets?,
Open University Press, Buckingham and Philadelphia, p. 7.
6 See, for example, Tachibana Takashi, 1976. Tanaka Kakuei Kenkyû: Zenkiroku [Tanaka Kakuei
Research: A Total Record], Kôdansha, Tokyo; Schlesinger, Jacob M., 1999 Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and
Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine, Stanford University Press, Stanford; Hôsaka Masayasu, 1993
Yoshida Shigeru to iu Gyakusetsu [The Paradox of Yoshida Shigeru], Chûô Kôron Shinsha, Tokyo; Shiota
Ushio, 1996. Kishi Nobusuke, Kôdansha, Tokyo; Arai Shunzô, 1982. Bunjin Saishô Ôhira Masayoshi
[The Cultured Prime Minister Ôhira Masayoshi], Shunjûsha, Tokyo.
7 One exception is Curtis, Gerald L., 1971. Election Campaigning, Japanese Style, Columbia University
Press, New York.
8 Curtis, Gerald L. 1999. The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions and the Limits of Change,
Columbia University Press, New York, p. 4.
9 Machidori Satoshi, ‘The 1990s Reforms Have Transformed Japanese Politics’, Japan Echo, June
2005, pp. 38–43.
10 Tatebayashi Masuhiko, 2004. Giin Kôdô no Seiji Keizaigaku: Jimintô Shihai no Seido Bunseki [The Political
Economy of Diet Members’ Activities: An Analysis of the System of LDP Rule], Yuhikaku, Tokyo, p. 7.
11 ibid., pp. 4–5.
12 Pempel, T.J., 1998. Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca.
6 POWER AND PORK
2
BECOMING A POLITICIAN
Born in February 1945, Matsuoka Toshikatsu was the eldest son of an ordinary
farming household in Aso Town in Aso County in Kumamoto Prefecture.1 His
family home (jika) remains there to this day, in the locality that has been
central to his whole political life. The setting is quintessentially rural in the
Japanese style. As Matsuoka himself puts it, ‘in my boyhood, I grew up as a
high-spirited young lad revelling in mother nature at the foot of Mt Aso,
which is an active volcano in Kyushu.’2
EDUCATION AND EARLY CAREER3

After graduating from junior high school, Matsuoka lodged in Kumamoto
City while attending the prestigious Seiseikô Prefectural High School in the
city. He studied hard as well as learning karate, which he continued into his
college days. One of his classmates at junior high school and high school said
of him
[h]e was not a ‘clever student’ but worked quite hard preparing for the university entrance
examination. In a big contrast to now, he was a quite inconspicuous student. In his high school
days, he joined a cheer group and karate club and pretended to be a straight-laced person, but
I often saw him chasing girls. I had a question about his behaviour.4
After graduating from high school, Matsuoka tried for two years to enter
the National Defence Academy. Matsuoka’s choice of university was informed
by his father’s career as a professional soldier (a former member of the military
police).5 However, Matsuoka’s academic record was not good enough for him
to make it into the defence academy. He explained his failure by saying that
although he passed the first-stage examination, he failed the second-stage
BECOMING A POLITICIAN 7
examination, which was a medical test. 6 He stopped taking the academy

entrance examination, but continued to work hard and was accepted into Tottori
University.
While Matsuoka was at Tottori University, he was not an especially remarkable
student. A classmate said
…at that time, the wave of the student movement rushed here later than in the cities. When
we were in our fourth year in spring, our school was blockaded. There were large numbers of
apolitical students, and Matsuoka was one of them. He said, ‘I want to be a soldier’, and was
popular in the karate club. He always wore jeans and shirts, and he attended classes faithfully,
and his academic record was good.7
Matsuoka subsequently graduated with a BA in Forestry from the Faculty of

Agriculture. He sat and passed the national public servant exam (kokka kômuin
shiken) in Forestry and then the interview for entry into the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry (MAF),8 as it was known in the 1960s. Because he
passed the Level One national public servant exam, he became a ‘career’ (kyaria)
government official. However, because Matsuoka was a graduate in Forestry,
his post in the MAF was that of technical official or specialist (gikan), not a
generalist, or policy administrator (jimukan). Unlike gikan, jimukan typically
had university qualifications in law, economics (including agricultural
economics) or administration. They were the ‘élite course’ bureaucrats who
climbed to high-ranking executive positions within the ministry, such as
administrative vice-minister, director-general of the forestry, fishery or food
agencies, or director of a MAF bureau. Matsuoka belonged to the non-élite
technical stream along with others who had qualifications in forestry, civil
engineering, veterinary and livestock sciences, and other technical fields.9 His
employment as a gikan meant that he could only occupy positions within the
ministry designated for technical specialists. Moreover, he could not aspire to
the top administrative posts within the MAF. Technical bureaucrats could
only rise as high as bureau assistant director (jichô) and for this reason were
often considered ‘quasi-career’ bureaucrats.10 Matsuoka’s inability to reach the
highest levels of the ministry was to provide a spur to his political ambitions.
Having joined the MAF in 1969, Matsuoka spent 19 years there. This was
an occupation, in his own words, that was ‘connected to regional areas,
particularly agricultural and forestry industries, and agricultural mountain
villages’.11 A lot of his time in the ministry was spent in the Forestry Agency,12
reputedly a strong-hold of technical bureaucrats with specialist qualifications
8 POWER AND PORK
in forestry. At one time Matsuoka became head of the Planning and

Coordination Office of the Local Forestry Bureau in Akita Prefecture, and chief
of the Teshio County Forestry Management Station in Hokkaido Prefecture.
Hokkaido is Japan’s most important prefecture in terms of the area of forestland
(over 5 million hectares) and in terms of its forestry industry (logging). By
1988, Matsuoka had attained his highest post in the ministry as head of public
relations in the Planning Division of the Forestry Agency.
Besides the Forestry Agency, Matsuoka also worked in the Minister’s
Secretariat, which is officially tasked with acting as a planning and general
coordinating body for the entire ministry. In the Minister’s Secretariat, he was
head of the Planning Office. While working there, he was in charge of
reformulating the ‘Basic Plan for New Industry Cities and Industrial
Infrastructure Special Regions’ (Shinsangyô Toshi to Kôgyô Seibi Tokubetsu Chiiki),
shifting the emphasis from prioritising production to prioritising livelihood-
related facilities (seikatsu kanren shisetsu).13 The new plan proposed the further
conversion of agricultural land, fishing grounds and forests for the promotion
of construction and infrastructure, including the development of 10,200
hectares of land for industrial use, 110 public housing units, 160 hectares for
other residential usage, and water pipes, roads, railways, ports and other
transportation facilities, and health and education facilities.14
Like all bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
(MAFF),15 as it became in 1978,16 Matsuoka was rotated every two to three
years, enabling him, like other officials, to climb the gikan career ladder based
on seniority rather than ability. He was also seconded for a while to the National
Land Agency’s Regional Development Division where he served as assistant
director of the Mountain Village Heavy Snowbelt Development Division (a
position reserved for gikan).17 It was not uncommon for MAFF bureaucrats to
be seconded for a time to positions in the National Land Agency, because
agriculture and forestry are both land-based industries. Matsuoka was also
attached to the Secretariat of the National Land Agency for a time. While at
the Land Agency, he drafted the Peninsula Promotion Law (Hantô Shinkôhô),
a private member’s bill (Diet members’ legislation) incorporating depopulated
area countermeasures.18
After a climb up the career ladder in the MAFF to a moderately high
position, Matsuoka launched himself into politics. Bearing in mind that the
national bureaucracy prefers to recruit law graduates from prestigious Tokyo
University (Tôdai), and that many MAFF gikan with degrees in civil engineering
and agricultural sciences come from the prestigious Kyoto University, one MAFF
‘Old Boy’ (OB) speculated that because a ‘Tottori University graduate is a
“lesser being” in the MAFF, Matsuoka may have realised that the limits of his
ambitions within the organisation’.19 Tottori University was derisively described
as a ‘Mickey Mouse university’ by a Matsuoka critic on a public website.20
Another MAFF OB commented
…because Matsuoka failed to enter a university for two years, younger University of Tokyo
graduates were promoted to important positions ahead of him. For that reason, it seems that
he became a House of Representatives member, reversing his status with the big one, thus
relieving years of pent-up feelings in one go.21
Matsuoka displayed the characteristics of a ‘status incentive politician’,

described as ‘individuals who became politicians because of a need for prestige’.22
They are often former administrators.23
Whatever his true motivations, in 1988 Matsuoka decided to pursue a career
in national politics, resigning from his last post as public relations officer at
the Forestry Agency and returning home to Kumamoto. This was despite the
fact he would have been eligible for a pension had he worked for just one more
year.24 It would seem that he risked everything to enter politics. As he stated
publicly, he was likely to go broke by resigning from his job to enter politics.25
PREPARING TO ENTER POLITICS

Matsuoka’s preparations for the political arena had begun while he was still
working in the MAFF. He gained a reputation for proactive subsidy allocation
to local areas. Such subsidies could later be converted into votes and political
funds—vital for electoral success. There were numerous tales of his ‘heroic’
exploits during his administrative career26 as a devisor of ‘new works’. One
former MAFF OB recounted that while Matsuoka was tackling measures to
deal with heavy snow and problems with state-owned land—during his time
in the Land Agency and Forestry Agency—he started new public works projects
and acquired know-how for securing the necessary budget for these projects
through his connections with politicians.27
Matsuoka also took the first steps along the path to acquiring political funds
by acting as a broker, which was to prove both lucrative and potentially
dangerous for his subsequent political career. In 1986, while a public relations
officer in the Forestry Agency, Matsuoka tried to use his ministry position and
10 POWER AND PORK
contacts to obtain campaign finance to launch himself into politics. He offered

to sell information to Sasaki Kichinosuke, one of the ‘Kings of Real Estate’
during Japan’s bubble economy of the 1980s. At their peak, Sasaki’s total
assets were said to be worth ¥900 billion.28 At the time, Sasaki was making
arrangements for about ¥60 billion in bank loans for a tender to purchase a
Forestry Agency site in Tokyo, located next to the Hotel Okura in Toranomon,
Minato Ward. On the site was a demolished building. The person in charge at
one of the banks, Kokumin Bank, which Sasaki had approached, brought
Matsuoka along to meet Sasaki.29 As Sasaki recalls
Matsuoka said ‘I have the survey map of the Forestry Agency tender site, and I want you to buy
the survey map’. As an experiment, I asked how much the price would be to buy the survey
map. But reversing the question, Matsuoka asked ‘if you want the survey map, say the amount’.
When we asked to copy the map, Matsuoka said ‘Since the map is real, you cannot copy it’.
Because we had this sort of an exchange, I became rather suspicious. I thought that if I had
made a successful bid for the land already, the survey map was important. But if my bid were
unsuccessful, the map was nothing but a piece of paper. A large number of companies were
participating in the tender for the site of the demolished building, and the issue was picked up
by the television program, ‘NHK Special’, thus attracting public attention. However, in the
final analysis, because Kokumin Bank suddenly terminated financing to us, a rival company,
Company A, made a successful bid. I heard that the survey map had been taken to Company
A.30
In December 1987, Matsuoka (who was Forestry Agency public relations

officer at the time) called Sasaki hoping to act as a broker for a local businessman
in Kumamoto. As Sasaki recounts
Matsuoka said ‘to tell you the truth, I have a utterly shameless request but a local construction
company, Company T, needs temporary funds. It owns a mountain, and so do you think there
would be a good buyer in Tokyo’? I had a feeling at the time from what Matsuoka was saying
that they wanted to borrow ¥30 million. The next day, the president of Company T came to
Tokyo and to my company with Matsuoka. As I thought, the negotiation to sell the mountain
became a negotiation to borrow money. Matsuoka pestered me, saying ‘because the company
is a devoted supporter, can you help the company somehow’? I replied, ‘to help the company,
Mr Matsuoka, please become a co-signer for the loan’. I lent ¥30 million for three months at
the annual interest rate of 15 per cent. I accepted the mountain as security for the loan.
However, the bill was not honoured on the day it was due to be settled. The deadline was
changed about 36 times and the bill was even renewed. I found out later that the mountain was
located next to Namino Village, Kumamoto Prefecture, where Aum Shinrikyo31 followers
were living in a group. Therefore, the mountain did not seem to have any value. Later, the loan
was paid off, but Company T went virtually bankrupt.32
In preparation for launching himself into politics, Matsuoka tried not only
to amass the necessary funds but also to cultivate useful political connections.
He formed close relationships with leading members of the agriculture and
forestry ‘tribe’ (nôrin zoku). They were Nakagawa Ichirô from Hokkaido (who
served as Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1977–78, was a candidate
for the LDP presidency and prime ministership in 1982, and who later hanged
himself in January 1983) 33 and Tamaki Kazuo, Director-General of the
Management and Coordination Agency in the Nakasone administration. Both
Nakagawa and Tamaki were members of the Seirankai (Young Storm Society),
an overtly nationalist body with extreme right-wing views. In fact, all the
nôrin zoku at the time, including Watanabe Michio (who took over from
Nakagawa as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in 1978–79),
were members of Seirankai.34 Matsuoka was intimately connected to Nakagawa
through MAFF study groups and in other contexts, and he was also close to
Tamaki.35
An ex-MAFF official, who was Matsuoka’s former boss, revealed some of the
background to Matsuoka’s bid to enter politics.
Ever since he was sent to Land Agency, he wanted to be a politician. About 15 years after he
entered MAFF, he and two Tokyo University graduate career officials who entered the MAFF
in the same year as him, were somehow unpopular with their boss. Matsuoka became disgusted
and started talking about resigning. At the time, he was associated with Nakagawa Ichirô and
Tamaki Kazuo [former Director-General of the Management and Coordination Agency, and
a leader of Seirankai]. He intended to receive their support when he ran for an election.
Unfortunately, just before Matsuoka ran for an election, Tamaki died suddenly [in 1987].36
Arai Satoshi, former MAFF official and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
member of the House of Representatives, recalled that when Matsuoka was a
sub-section chief in the ministry, Arai formed a study group with him. However,
[w]hen former MAF Minister Nakagawa, with whom I got acquainted in a study group, ran for
election as LDP president, I heard that Mr Matsuoka had got into an election car and
supported Mr Nakagawa. I made an international phone call from Sri Lanka, where I had been
sent, and said ‘isn’t that exceeding the duty of a public servant’? Mr Matsuoka replied, ‘since
the LDP presidential election is not subject to the Public Office Election Law (Kôshoku
Senkyohô), there is no problem’.37
Around about the time he stood for election, Matsuoka commented, ‘my
master was Nakagawa Ichirô, and my teacher was Tamaki Kazuo’.38 After both
these prominent politicians died in succession, Suzuki Muneo, Nakagawa’s
12 POWER AND PORK
secretary, who stood successfully for his Lower House seat, stepped into the
breach. He supported Matsuoka and thus took Nakagawa and Tamaki’s places.39
A report also surfaced of Matsuoka’s conducting pre-election campaigning
while he was a government official. A political affairs reporter recounted
[j]ust before Matsuoka ran for an election, when he was the Forestry Agency public relations
officer, he returned to Aso Town, Kumamoto on the weekends and conducted an election
campaign. At the time, pre-election campaigning by a government official became problematic
in another municipality. Questions were raised about Mr Matsuoka’s action.40
Matsuoka was already showing a propensity to bend the rules if it meant

furthering his political career.
THE REQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

Having resigned from the MAFF in 1988 with a view to contesting a seat in
the next House of Representatives election, Matsuoka needed three vital
prerequisites. These were a local support base (jiban), name recognition
(kanban) and money (kaban).
Local support base

Matsuoka’s choice of constituency was preordained. He would stand for election
in the 5-seat district of Kumamoto (1). Kumamoto was his home prefecture and
his home town, Aso Town, in Aso County, was located in Kumamoto (1).
Matsuoka’s electoral challenge was thus mounted from his hometown, Aso Town.
The Aso region would become his main voting base (shujiban).41 This was the
logical place on which to focus and construct his political support base. He
could utilise all kinds of local connections, including family and social ties, links
to local politicians and businesses, and associations with various social and
economic groupings in the area, tapping into the forces of localism that generated
‘hard’ votes based on personal connections and loyalties. By mobilising these
kinds of local community and blood ties, which were traditionally strong in
rural areas, Matsuoka could secure support for a political career.
Matsuoka organised a personal support group (kôenkai) as his primary vote-
gathering machine and body of grassroots supporters. Its main branches were in
Aso Town and Kumamoto City. It was called the ‘Matsutomokai’—the ‘Matsu
Friends Association’. It began with a few thousand members, but expanded as
Matsuoka’s campaign gathered steam. It functioned as Matsuoka’s electoral
organisation, campaign machine and political funding body all rolled into one.
Having chosen to stand for Kumamoto (1), Matsuoka sought official electoral
endorsement from the LDP, which was his natural party given his background
in agriculture and forestry. The majority of Japanese farm and forest owners,
and rural dwellers supported the LDP, and, in those days, ex-MAFF bureaucrats
always became LDP Diet members. However, Matsuoka’s bid for endorsement
by the LDP was unsuccessful.42
Part of the problem of securing the backing of the LDP was the fact that
Matsuoka would be standing for one of the five seats in Kumamoto (1) at the
same time as four sitting LDP members. In the previous Lower House elections
(in 1986), the district of Kumamoto (1) returned four members from the
LDP, plus one politician from the Kômeitô. The losers were candidates from
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP). If the LDP
endorsed yet another candidate, it would potentially split the LDP vote to the
point where perhaps three or less LDP candidates would be successfully elected.
Furthermore, the LDP had performed poorly in the 1989 Upper House election,
and so it was likely that the total LDP vote would be down in the subsequent
Lower House election.
The party also had a rule about endorsing only those candidates who had a
strong local organisation and/or organisational support, name recognition and
money. These attributes were far from assured in Matsuoka’s case. At the same
time, from Matsuoka’s perspective, LDP endorsement was neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for his candidature. Under the Lower House multi-
member district (MMD) system, standing as an Independent would not
necessarily be a barrier to success, because in the personalised, candidate-centred
elections in which LDP candidates from different factions competed against
each other, the party label was of secondary importance.
Matsuoka would run on the basis of a mobilised personal vote, not on the
basis of his party affiliation. His own individual support group could step into
the breach as an organisation providing local backing. In this respect, Matsuoka
was no better or worse off than LDP candidates, who similarly relied on their
own kôenkai to connect with voters. His personal support group would provide
an organisational setting in which he could conduct various campaign activities
directed at local voters in specific regions and occupational fields connected to
his own interests and expertise.43 Even as a member of the LDP, Matsuoka
would not necessarily have had name recognition in the broader electorate,
which he would have had to establish independently of the party.
14 POWER AND PORK
Lacking LDP endorsement, Matsuoka formally stood as an Independent.

This was not unusual for first-time candidates (and others) who could not
secure the backing of the ruling party. Matsuoka’s move to style himself as a
‘conservative Independent’ in the ‘conservative kingdom’ (hoshu ôkoku) of
Kumamoto Prefecture further confirmed this. Independents like Matsuoka
were simply LDP candidates who had been unsuccessful in securing the party’s
endorsement. As everyone knew, they were LDP in all but name.
Name recognition
Matsuoka was already well known in the Aso region because that was where
his family home was and where his mother still lived. His pre-campaign activities,
conducted whilst still in the ministry and in the period between when he
resigned from the MAFF and the election, were directed at getting his name
more widely known across the district. He organised meetings with local voters
to publicise his candidature and to expand and consolidate his political support
base. He painstakingly built a support base and fought an uphill battle against
rival candidates, especially the well-established LDP candidates.
Matsuoka had good connections in Kumamoto City where he had attended
Seiseikô High School, which had an influential alumni association. Reputedly
its OB connections were abnormally influential in elections.44 It was alleged
that ‘behind Matsuoka’s latent power was this Seisei power, and, it is said, his
connections with Seisei-line yakuza.’45 On the other hand, having been a MAFF
bureaucrat bestowed a certain degree of status and respectability as well as
policy knowledge and a natural link to large numbers of farm and rural voters.
Matsuoka claimed to be ‘famous both in name and in reality for being an
expert in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, which are especially the foundation
of the country.’46
The electoral district of Kumamoto (1) was semi-urban. In 1990, it had
413 persons per square km of population density compared with a national
average of 332 persons, and it had five cities including Kumamoto City.47 At
the same time, it had five counties (including Aso County), encompassing
more rural farming districts. The semi-urban character of the constituency
meant that Matsuoka’s election-campaign strategy could not be geared solely
to rural dwellers, including agricultural and forestry voters.
According to the 1990 census, there were 23,121 farm households in the
electorate, which made up 6.4 per cent of the total number of households.48
At an average of 3.7 voters per farm household,49 this comprised a potential

support base of 86,268 farm votes, which was only 13.4 per cent of the total
cast vote in Kumamoto (1).50 Almost every farm household vote would need
to be secured in order to win a seat based solely on the farm household vote.
This made it necessary for Matsuoka to cast the net for potential supporters
much wider.
Money
As previously noted, Matsuoka had already tapped into funds from business
during his years in the MAFF by offering his services as a broker with company
executives in exchange for money. As a declared candidate, however, Matsuoka
established six organisations to gather political funds. Altogether, they collected
a substantial total of ¥131 million for his first election bid.51 The first and
most important of these was his personal support group, the Matsuoka
Toshikatsu kôenkai, which was under the legal jurisdiction of the Kumamoto
Prefecture Election Administration Commission, and which gathered ¥63
million. 52
The balance of officially reported funds was provided by five political funding
groups under the administration of the Ministry of Home Affairs. These groups
were the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economic Discussion
Association (Matsuoka Toshikatsu Shinseiki Seikei Konwakai), the 21st Century
Discussion Association (21 Seiki Konwakai), the Green Friends Association
(Ryokuyûkai) and the Matsuoka Toshikatsu Policy Research Association
(Matsuoka Toshikatsu Seisaku Kenkyûkai). The Policy Research Association
recorded the highest amount at ¥26 million.53
Matsuoka had direct financial support from a key political backer in Tokyo,
who was already an LDP member of the Diet and who wanted to build his
own loyal following amongst LDP Diet members—a vital prerequisite for
becoming a faction leader and holding high political office, including the prime
ministership. Chairmanship of a faction guaranteed one’s candidature for the
party’s presidency. This politician was Suzuki Muneo,54 Nakagawa’s successor
as Matsuoka’s patron. Suzuki made a good substitute for the LDP faction that
would have selected Matsuoka for party endorsement and provided him with
political funds, had Matsuoka been an official candidate of the LDP.
Political revenue and expenditure reports for 1990 reveal that Matsuoka’s
political funding groups received direct donations from Suzuki’s own political
16 POWER AND PORK
funding groups. The Matsuoka Toshikatsu Policy Research Association received

¥5 million from the Osaka Food Distribution Research Association (Ôsaka
Shokuhin Ryûtsû Kenkyûkai), the Green Friends Association received ¥10
million from the 21st Century Policy Research Association (21 Seiki Seisaku
Kenkyûkai) and the 21st Century Discussion Association received ¥10 million
from the Hokkaido Development Research Association (Hokkaidô Kaihatsu
Kenkyûkai).55 The total sum obtained from Suzuki was ¥25 million, and,
despite Matsuoka’s not securing LDP endorsement, Suzuki also came to
Matsuoka’s side during the campaign.56
THE CAMPAIGN
The February 1990 Lower House election followed the July 1989 Upper House
election in which the LDP was ‘defeated’, meaning that it lost its Upper House
majority for the first time since 1955. The ‘defeat’ was caused by three main
factors: voters’ rejection of the consumption tax (introduced in April 1989);
the Recruit scandal tainting a large number of LDP Diet members, including
many of its prominent leaders and cabinet members; and among farmers, a
wholesale rejection of the Takeshita government’s December 1988 agreement
to liberalise the beef and citrus markets. The 1989 election became one of the
JSP’s biggest post-war election victories, with many women candidates scoring
victories over standing LDP members. The same political wave carried over to
the February 1990 election. Matsuoka was able to turn his non-endorsement
by the LDP into an electoral advantage by mounting an anti-LDP offensive,
campaigning against the newly introduced consumption tax and tapping into
farmers’ dissatisfaction with the government’s agricultural policy: an issue on
which the party remained vulnerable.
Matsuoka ran a typically candidate-centred campaign. He presented himself
as ‘an independent political entrepreneur with his own local organisation and
his own marketing strategies’.57 He was able to take advantage of an electoral
system in which the individual basis of the vote (kojin honi) was extraordinarily
strong, and the party basis (seitô honi) was extraordinarily weak.58 His campaign
slogan was ‘Momotaro (peach boy) of the Heisei era’. Momotaro was a hero in
Japanese folklore who destroyed the marauding oni (ogres). Matsuoka’s
catchphrase was ‘Momotaro in Heisei destroys the demons’. 59 Another
prominent Matsuoka campaign slogan was ‘I am mounting a crusade against
misgovernment’ [akusei taiji ni idomu].60
Unlike most former MAFF officials with political ambitions, Matsuoka did
not get the backing of the MAFF for his campaign.61 He did not fit the normal
pattern of an ex-MAFF official seeking national political office. Not only was
he from a low-ranking university in a regional backwater, but also he did not
occupy a particularly high position in the MAFF when he resigned from the
ministry. Perhaps, most importantly, as a gikan, Matsuoka was not an OB
from the Structural Improvement Bureau (now Rural Development Bureau),
with links to the land improvement industry. This industry represented a vast
and lucrative agricultural public works enterprise, which was a very important
source of votes, organisational support and political funds for MAFF land
improvement gikan who entered politics. Matsuoka did not have the advantage
of this kind of leg-up into the political world. He did not possess the right
qualifications to call himself a civil engineering gikan,62 and not being a jimukan,
he could not base his campaign on being an ‘organisational representative’
(soshiki daihyô) of the MAFF in the Diet. He did not, for example, have an ex-
MAFF administrative vice-minister heading up his campaign organisation,
nor did he have campaign functionaries who were MAFF OBs.63 In spite of all
these disadvantages, Matsuoka tried to use his known MAFF connections to
good effect in the election campaign.
In Kumamoto (1), eight candidates were competing for five seats. It was
known as a closely contested constituency.64 The JSP candidate, Tanaka Shôichi,
was campaigning on an anti-consumption tax ticket, targeting housewives.65
On that basis, he was thought to have scored a lead over the conservative
camp. Kitaguchi Hiroshi from the LDP was a former director of Kumamoto
City Agricultural Cooperative (Nokyo) and apparently had the agricultural,
forestry and fisheries votes sewn up; while Noda Takeshi, another LDP Diet
member and former Minister of Construction, reputedly obtained ‘hard’ votes
from Kumamoto City and other urban areas in the electorate.66 He was a
leader of the commerce and industry ‘tribe’ (shôkô zoku), having been chairman
of the LDP’s Commerce and Industry Division and chairman of the Lower
House Commerce and Industry Committee. Noda was well versed in fiscal,
tax and economic policy and was also prominent in the LDP’s Special Coal
Countermeasures Committee, a salient fact in Kyushu given that at the time
coalmines were being shut down in the prefecture.
The rest of the candidates were supposed to be fighting it out for the
remaining votes. This group included the JCP and Kômeitô candidates, and
18 POWER AND PORK
the other two LDP candidates, Uozumi Hirohide and Matsuno Raizô. Uozumi
had infiltrated the commerce and industry vote: he was a large stockholder in a
road paving company, former chairman of the prefectural Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, the former mayor of Kumamoto City as well as a
former prefectural assembly politician. Moreover, he was knowledgeable in
all prefectural issues associated with agricultural policy and regional
development. He was a long-time rival of Matsuoka’s, having attended
Kumamoto High School, a rival school to Seiseikô High School. He also
differed from Matsuoka in having made his way into politics through mayoral
and prefectural office, compared with Matsuoka who was an ex-bureaucrat
seeking a career in national politics.67
Matsuno was a prominent and long-standing LDP politician from
Kumamoto, with a good base of support in both regional areas and in the
cities, where he had been chairman of a brewing company. Matsuno had been
in the Diet almost continuously since 1947, elected in only the second election
after the war. He was so senior in the LDP that he had been minister of almost
everything. He usually received the backing of the agricultural cooperatives
and had been a former Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries in Prime Minister
Sato’s administration. He had also been Minister of Transport, Director-General
of the Defence Agency, and also chairman of the LDP’s PARC and Executive
Council.68 However, pre-election coverage of his campaign by the media
suggested that the Matsuno camp was in crisis mode because of the powerful
rollback in support for Matsuno in local regions.69
VICTORY!
When the results of the election were finally declared, Matsuoka scraped in at
the bottom of the victors’ list (in fifth position), but for him, the most important
thing was that he had won a seat in the Lower House (see Appendix). Matsuoka
described the electoral contest and his subsequent victory in the following
terms: ‘despite being an unknown candidate, I won by a narrow margin in the
most famous, closely contested constituency in the whole country, after defeat
seemed certain’.70 The media reported that Matsuoka had put up a good fight.71
The final result saw the LDP lose two of its seats in Kumamoto (1) with the
usual ranking of candidates in the electorate completely overturned. The two
victorious LDP candidates were ranked lower than the two opposition party
members. The biggest vote-winner was the JSP candidate,72 followed by the
Kômeitô candidate, followed by Noda and Uozumi, with Matsuoka coming

in behind the two LDP candidates.
In winning a seat in Kumamoto (1), Matsuoka was victorious over Matsuno
and Kitaguchi, both well-established LDP Diet members. As he boasted himself,
‘I pushed aside senior (senpai) Diet members and was successfully elected’.73
He scored extremely well against Matsuno, beating him by just over 2,300
votes (see Appendix A).74 In fact, Matsuno’s support was broadly distributed
across the cities and towns of Kumamoto (1). He won more votes than
Matsuoka in all counties and cities of the electorate except Kumamoto City
and Aso County, although he was first–place getter in Oguni Town in Aso
County. In the total vote count, Matsuno’s county vote was lower than
Matsuoka’s, while his city vote was higher.75 It was Matsuoka’s really solid
showing over Matsuno in Aso County (24,905 votes compared with 6,795
votes)76 that gave Matsuoka victory over Matsuno, because Matsuno beat him
in all the other counties and in the total city vote, but by a smaller amount
overall. Matsuoka’s slightly stronger showing in Kumamoto City also helped.
Media commentary concluded that Matsuno’s failure was due to the fact that
he could not win against the tide of generational change. Matsuno himself
also attributed his defeat to the changing of generations.77
Matsuoka won by a smaller margin of around 360 votes over Kitaguchi, a
second-generation politician and son of a Nokyo politician who had previously
held the seat. Kitaguchi was also a Nokyo man through and through and had
some of the agricultural cooperatives in the prefecture mobilising an
organisational vote on his behalf. Despite this, Matsuoka still edged him out.
Kitaguchi was stronger than Matsuoka in the cities including Kumamoto City,
but despite winning more votes than Matsuoka in three counties, he scored a
lower overall vote in the counties.78 Once again, it was Matsuoka’s extraordinarily
strong showing in Aso County that came through for him, producing a much
higher county vote. In fact, no other candidate came anywhere near Matsuoka
as an electoral performer in Aso County. Nevertheless, taking the larger view,
there was not much to separate Matsuoka, Matsuno and Kitaguchi, who won
12.6 per cent, 12.2 per cent and 12.5 per cent of the total vote respectively.79
Matsuoka’s electoral victory could be attributed to a number of key factors.
First, in standing as a conservative Independent, he was not directly identified
with the LDP, and in fact could use his independent stance to attack it for
policies that were highly unpopular at the time. Choosing an Independent
20 POWER AND PORK
candidate who failed to get LDP endorsement was one of the ways that traditional
LDP voters could cast a protest vote against the party. Constituents could still vote
conservative without going the whole way and voting for an opposition party member
in the full knowledge that a candidate standing as a conservative Independent would
invariably join the LDP after the election. This option ‘regularly produced the defeat
of LDP incumbents even as the LDP retained power’.80 Matsuoka gained anti-LDP
protest votes over issues such as agricultural trade liberalisation (in rural areas) and
the consumption tax and money politics scandals (amongst city voters).
Second, as already emphasised, Matsuoka had an extremely solid electoral base
in the Aso region. It was really Aso County with its 24,905 votes that delivered
Matsuoka his seat. Matsuoka won more votes in Aso County than in any other
single county (see Table 2.1). This county alone out of the five counties in Kumamoto
(1) provided Matsuoka with just under a third of his total vote (see Table 2.1). He
was the most popular candidate in 11 out of 12 towns in Aso County (see Table
2.1). Only in Oguni Town did he cede first place to another (Matsuno, as noted
above). Matsuoka was also popular in Ozu Town and Kikuyo Town in Kikuchi
County, where he was ranked first and second-highest vote-winner amongst all the
candidates (see Table 2.1). In fact, Matsuoka was the most popular candidate
overall in the rural counties, winning top place as vote-getter, with a total of 41,690
votes, or 51.5 per cent of his total vote tally (see Table 2.1). Of course, the Aso vote
helped put him into this position, beating both Matsuno and Kitaguchi, who
were also relatively strong in the counties.81 Aso County provided more than half
of Matsuoka’s total vote tally in the counties (41,690). Matsuoka clearly had a
strong, geographically concentrated jiban in the Aso region. The media reported at
the time that Matsuoka’s campaign centred on the fact that he was from the Aso
region.82
Third, Matsuoka was a MAFF OB, which would have gained him the votes of
both current and retired MAFF officials residing in his electorate as well as support
from primary industry voters in the electorate. In addition, given his career
background, some of his votes were undoubtedly generated by his alignment with
and knowledge of agriculture and forestry matters and interests. He certainly stressed
this in his campaign. He described himself in the Diet handbook as follows
[b]ecause of my background as a bureaucrat, I have my own original ideas about policies such
as the consumption tax and agricultural and fisheries policies and so on. If you show considerable
spirit to the citizens, then they will want to make friends with you and will become attached
to you.83
Matsuoka’s success in the rural counties was indicative of strong sectoral

(that is, agricultural and forestry) support. Because Matsuoka had been in the
MAFF, farmers and forest owners regarded him as having useful personal
connections with currently serving ministry officials, which could be mobilised
to secure policy benefits such as subsidies for agricultural and forestry projects
as well as other material benefits in the form of income support and border
protection for agricultural products.
Six ex-MAFF bureaucrats were successful in the 1990 elections, four of whom
represented electorates in Kyushu—including Matsuoka. He joined 115 other
former bureaucrats-turned-politicians in the Diet in 1990, representing 15.2
per cent of the total Diet membership.84 Amongst this group, 15 were from
the MAFF.85 It was not unusual for former bureaucrats to enter Diet politics.
In fact, the central government bureaucracy was one of the main recruiting
grounds for national politicians.
Matsuoka, however, was not your usual bureaucrat-turned-politician. Almost
all former bureaucrats were so-called ‘élite course’ bureaucrats: that is, they
had graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo, and had served
in their ministries as jimukan, not gikan. Matsuoka was from lowly Tottori
University Faculty of Agriculture, with a degree in Forestry. The MAFF OBs
in the Diet in 1990 were all Tôdai Law Faculty graduates, except for one who
was a graduate of Tokyo University’s Faculty of Agriculture, and another who
was a graduate of Kyoto University’s Faculty of Agriculture.86 As already noted,
Matsuoka had an unconventional background for an ex-MAFF Diet member.
Perhaps that is why he was so ambitious and had so much to prove.
Even though Matsuoka was the most popular candidate in the rural counties
in his electorate, and even though he was the candidate with the least number
of votes in the cities (apart from the JCP candidate)87—both of which underlined
his rural orientation—he could not consider himself to be solely a representative
of farm and forestry interests. Indeed, no significant statistical correlation was
observable between the percentage of farm households in a particular
municipality and the percentage of the total vote Matsuoka received from that
municipality.88 This was due to two main factors. Matsuoka could not break
into the electoral power bases of the other LDP candidates, in particular, rural
counties (Kitaguchi was relatively strong in all counties except for Aso County,
but was particularly strong in Tamana County, while Matsuno was quite strong
across all counties but particularly in Kikuchi County). 89 Matsuoka was,
22
Table 2.1 Farm household composition/votes cast for Matsuoka by municipality in Kumamoto (1) in 1990
Lower House election
Name of Municipality No. of Farm Farm Households Votes Cast % of Total % of Matsuoka’s Placing among
Households as % of Total in for Matsuoka Vote Cast Total Vote 8 Candidates
Municipality/ies
Cities 6,002 2.3 39,183 9.7 48.5 7th
Kumamoto City 2,237 1.1 34,704 11.4 42.9 5th
Arao City 475 2.6 1,078 3.1 1.3 8th
Tamana City 1,151 8.7 1,427 5.2 1.8 7th
Yamaga City 1,035 9.9 1,161 5.6 1.4 7th
Kikuchi City 1,104 13.6 813 4.4 1.0 7th
Counties 17,119 17.2 41,690 17.5 51.5 1st
Hotaku County 2,383 18.6 2,084 7.2 2.6 7th
Hokubu Town 601 11.0 945 9.0 1.2 7th
Kawachi Town 857 43.4 292 5.1 0.4 7th
Akita Town 329 11.9 392 6.2 0.5 7th
Temmei Town 596 23.0 455 6.9 0.6 7th
POWER AND PORK
Tamana County 3,525 16.7 2,853 5.7 3.5 7th

Taimei Town 449 11.1 314 3.4 0.4 7th
Yokoshima Town 600 42.3 209 5.1 0.3 7th
Tensui Town 881 49.9 104 2.0 0.1 7th
Gyokuto Town 337 20.5 318 8.0 0.4 7th
Kikusui Town 209 10.5 598 11.7 0.7 5th
Mikawa Town 445 26.2 154 3.6 0.2 7th
Nankan Town 411 11.9 557 7.2 0.7 7th
Nagasu Town 193 3.8 599 5.7 0.7 7th
Kamoto County 3,144 29.8 3,193 8.4 3.9 7th
Kahoku Town 399 26.3 538 12.8 0.7 4th
Kikuka Town 566 27.7 352 6.1 0.4 6th
Kamoto Town 452 17.7 504 8.5 0.6 7th
Kao Town 441 29.4 394 9.4 0.5 7th
Ueki Town 1,286 43.7 1,405 7.9 1.7 7th
Kikuchi County 3,296 10.4 8,655 13.1 10.7 4th
Shichijo Town 483 33.9 222 5.39 0.3 6th
Kyokushi Town 388 28.2 313 8.4 0.4 6th
Ozu Town 697 9.9 3,184 22.7 3.9 1st
Kikuyo Town 575 8.5 2,181 16.8 2.7 2nd
Koshi Town 354 6.7 1,086 16.2 1.3 7th
Shisui Town 478 14.9 412 5.5 0.5 7th
Nishigoshi Town 321 4.8 1,257 9.9 1.6 5th
Aso County 4,771 20.7 24,905 45.5 30.8 1st
Ichinomiya Town 468 15.0 2,845 41.1 3.5 1st
Aso Town 986 17.1 8,741 64.0 10.8 1st
Minamioguni Town 344 25.7 1,261 36.7 1.6 1st
Oguni Town 420 15.0 1,489 21.7 1.8 2nd
Ubuyama Village 196 41.0 566 41.7 0.7 1st
Namino Village 220 40.7 574 40.6 0.7 1st
Soyo Town 479 33.0 1,822 50.4 2.3 1st
Takamori Town 523 21.4 2,468 43.4 3.5 1st
Hakusui Village 439 35.2 1,388 42.6 1.7 1st

Kugino Town 241 35.2 959 51.1 1.2 1st
Choyo Village 191 10.3 1,869 56.6 2.3 1st
Nishihara Village 264 19.8 923 27.1 1.1 1st
Total/average 23,121 6.4 80,873 12.6 100.0 5th
Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuken, Shichôson-
hen 43 Kumamoto-ken, pp. 288-289 and 294-303; Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo, p. 194.
23
24 POWER AND PORK
therefore, competing for the farm vote against Matsuno and Kitaguchi: the two
well-known politicians with established agricultural connections in the electorate.
The other factor was the large number of votes Matsuoka received from
Kumamoto City. This proved to be the fourth and final reason why Matsuoka
was victorious in the election. The cities in Kumamoto (1) generated 39,183
votes for Matsuoka, which amounted to 48.5 per cent of his total vote. The most
important aspect of the distribution of his support was the cluster of votes
Matsuoka won in Kumamoto City, which was his largest single source of support
(34,704 votes, or 42.9 per cent of his total vote as shown in Table 2.1).
The fact that Matsuoka’s city votes were so concentrated in one place suggests
that they were generated less by programmatic appeals (Matsuoka’s criticism
of the consumption tax) than by more traditional kinds of social networks, in
this case, the network centring on Matsuoka’s old high school alumni
association, which reportedly acted as Matsuoka’s biggest vote-collecting
machine.90 One of his old school mates whose support he solicited said of him
[h]e pretended to be a hard-liner, but I got the impression that he was not a fervent soul. He
was definitely not a person who left a good impression. However, since he was running for
election, all his classmates supported him. A rally was held at a hotel. Although people said he
would lose the election, he was able to get elected, and we were glad that it was worth
supporting him. But after he was elected, he did not thank us. I have supported various other
people, but it is unusual for there to be no telephone call to express his gratitude.91
In summary, Matsuoka was able to carve out an electoral niche for himself
in Kumamoto (1) based primarily on his home town and Aso county
connections, and his network of old school ties in Kumamoto City, in addition
to his identification with and career background in the agricultural and forestry
bureaucracy. His victory was constructed on the basis of an electoral coalition,
which combined personal and local connections with the backing of special
interests in agriculture and forestry, which married an area, or geographic zone
(chiiki wari), vote to a sector or policy field (seisaku bunya wari) vote.92 In the
mix were also programmatic (anti-LDP) appeals, particularly on issues such as
the consumption tax and ‘misgovernment’. Because the election was held in
1990, Matsuoka was able to exploit the LDP’s electoral vulnerabilities at the
time.
The Yomiuri Shinbun attributed Matsuoka’s victory to a big rise in the mood
for generational change, given that Matsuno was 73 (which the newspaper
identified as a salient feature of the whole election, given that new candidates
won 25 per cent of the seats in that election).93 Matsuoka himself was 45 years
old, a relatively young age for entering politics, particularly following a
bureaucratic career. The paper referred to Matsuoka’s forming his political
camp for the first time, appealing for political renewal (seiji sasshin) and for
generational change in the representation of the electorate (sedai kôdai), and
his gaining support from his alma mater (his old school in Kumamoto City)
and from Kasumigaseki OBs.94
Although Matsuoka was not endorsed by the LDP, he was seeking support
predominantly from customary LDP voters. The composition of his electoral
support cut across both the two main vote divisions in Lower House electoral
politics—geographic region and sectoral specialisation. In this fashion,
Matsuoka, (albeit standing as an Independent), was able to differentiate himself
from other LDP candidates by pointing out his special characteristics as an
individual candidate (tokka) in terms of both region and policy field.
JOINING THE LDP

After he won his Diet seat, Matsuoka joined the LDP. There was no
contradiction in his having attacked the party during the campaign and joining
it afterwards. Becoming a member of the LDP after the election was the norm
for successful Independents who had sought but failed to get the party’s
endorsement in the election. The custom was for the party to welcome such
Independents into the fold, especially if the size of the LDP’s majority in the
Diet were an issue. The LDP, internally, contained both government and
opposition forces in the form of the mainstream (the factions who supported
the LDP president) and the anti-mainstream (those factional groupings who
opposed his election). These vertical divisions were reinforced by horizontal ones
amongst groups of Diet members representing differing sets of sectional interests,
who often opposed their own administration’s decisions on policy as part of an
entrenched pattern of ‘government versus party’ conflict in policymaking.
Within the LDP, Matsuoka joined the Seiwakai faction led by Mitsuzuka
Hiroshi,95 and received a ¥20 million in political funds from the faction.96
However, it was Suzuki (who was not a member of this faction) and not Diet
members who belonged to the Seiwakai, who took Matsuoka around and
introduced him to each office in the Diet members’ office building.97 Suzuki’s
21 st Century Policy Research Association also donated ¥50,000 towards
Matsuoka’s celebration party.98
26 POWER AND PORK
Moreover, the LDP had lost two of its sitting members in Kumamoto (1),
and so Matsuoka would bolster its ranks. Last but not least, victory in 1990
was a sufficient demonstration to the LDP that Matsuoka was a vote-winner,
especially as Matsuno and Kitaguchi gave up politics altogether. In this way,
Matsuoka gained membership of the LDP via the back door. The LDP endorsed
his candidature in all subsequent Lower House elections—in 1993, 1996,
2000, 2003 and 2005.
Matsuoka also had to join the party of government in order to place himself
in a position to influence policy, particularly measures relating to agriculture
and forestry. Being a member of the ruling party was also vital in order to gain
direct access to administrative officials who exercised discretionary power over
the allocation of public works projects to particular regions and public works
contracts to particular companies, and/or who could grant particular
administrative dispensations to companies, individuals and organisations. This
was virtually impossible for an Independent member of the Diet or a member
of the Opposition to do.
WITH A VIEW TO THE 1993 ELECTION…

The election of 1993—which was the first poll that Matsuoka contested as an
officially endorsed LDP candidate—was very different from the 1990 poll.
On the positive side, Matsuoka started much further ahead than in 1990
when he was a newcomer striving to break into the ranks of Diet members
representing the electorate. In the interim since the last election, Matsuoka
bolstered his name recognition and consolidated his support base in Kumamoto
(1). His first term in the Diet and his membership of the LDP assisted in both
respects, attracting greater numbers into his kôenkai in search of the favours
and benefits that flowed from having a personal, institutionalised connection
and channel of communication with a Diet member.99
Another factor that augured well for Matsuoka was the LDP’s split prior to
the election, which left only two LDP candidates standing in Kumamoto (1)
instead of the customary four. The LDP might have split at the centre, but for
electoral purposes it was always split at the local level, meaning that Matsuoka
was facing no more electoral competition than normal. Matsuoka and Noda
were the only two LDP-endorsed candidates left. Noda’s support base was
primarily in the cities.100 Uozumi had left to join the breakaway Renewal
Party,101 leaving Matsuoka as the strongest LDP candidate in rural areas with
connections to primary industry voters. One of the advantages of standing as

a sector-specific candidate was that Matsuoka could tap into support from
the interest groups operating in the agricultural and forestry sectors.
Representing their interests was a way of harnessing their support over the
entire electoral district and receiving hard support, meaning reliable votes,
in return. 102
Over time, Matsuoka built up stronger connections to the agricultural
cooperative organisations in his district, including the Kumamoto Prefecture
Farmers’ Political League (Kumamoto-ken Nôgyôsha Seiji Renmei, or nôseiren)
as well as at the centre, including the national political arm of the agricultural
cooperatives, the National Council of Farmers’ Agricultural Policy Campaign
Organizations (Zenkoku Nôgyôsha Nôsei Undô Soshiki Kyôgikai), or National
Council (Zenkoku Nôseikyô) for short. This grouping was newly established
in 1989. Matsuoka addressed gatherings of local representatives of the
agricultural cooperatives and attended large functions of the Nokyo faithful
organised by the National Council.
Matsuoka also developed links with specific producer groupings such as
dairy farmers through the prefectural dairy farmers’ political league (rakunô
seiji renmei). He addressed national conventions of dairy farmers and made a
point of attending the joint councils of local and central dairy farmers’ political
leagues. He also built a close relationship with tobacco farmers through the
tobacco cultivation associations (takabo kôsaku kumiai). He became an advisor
to the National Central Union of Tobacco Cultivation Associations (Zenkoku
Tabako Kôsaku Kumiai Chûôkai), which was the mouthpiece for the country’s
23,000 tobacco farmers. It campaigned directly against the Ministry of Health
and Welfare’s plans to cut national smoking rates. The total number of leaf
tobacco farmers was small, but they were strongly unified. Moreover tobacco
farming was important in Kumamoto Prefecture. 103 Tobacco farmers in
Kumamoto (1) thus became a reliable source of votes for Matsuoka.
As an OB of the Forestry Agency, Matsuoka had a natural connection with
the forest associations (shinrin kumiai) that represented forest owners, who
harvested their timber for sale on the domestic market in Japan. 104 In
Kumamoto Prefecture, there were approximately 42,000 members of the forest
associations. Their activities included logging (trees that were more than 40
years old), marketing logs and providing guidance for members about
management of their forestland.105
28 POWER AND PORK
For all of these primary industry groupings, the key issue was the price
received for their product on the domestic market. As most commodities were
subject to administrative price intervention, LDP Diet members could exert
influence on price policymaking, and in so doing, harness the organisational
backing of these groups in elections. Between 1990 and 1993, Matsuoka put
his foot on the lower rungs of all the appropriate ladders in farm and forestry
policymaking in the LDP and in the Diet.106
Going into the election, Matsuoka had much stronger organisational support
from agricultural and forestry groupings than he did in 1990. This also helped
to differentiate him from Noda and Uozumi. Noda, as before, centred his
voting base on urban, commercial interests, and Uozumi, while ex-LDP,
obtained his primary backing from commerce and industry organisations.
On the negative side, one of the other candidates contesting the election
was Hosokawa Morihiro, the very popular ex-governor of Kumamoto Prefecture
(1983–91). This was an election in which Hosokawa, who was playing the
main role in the Japan New Party107 boom, was a powerful force eating into
the support strata of both the LDP and JSP. Indeed, everyone standing in
Kumamoto (1) was affected by the ‘Hosokawa typhoon’. Although Matsuoka
and Noda, as the only two LDP candidates, tried to use the split in the LDP
as some kind of springboard to consolidate their support amongst conservative
voters, some groups, hitherto out-and-out supporters of the LDP such as the
Kumamoto Prefecture nôseiren—Nokyo’s political front organisation—and the
prefectural medical association, decided to support Hosokawa and the Japan
New Party.108 Matsuoka’s face reportedly went very pale when Hosokawa stood
as a candidate.109 The two were reputedly not friendly with each other at all.
The constituency that Matsuoka inherited was from Fujita Yoshimitsu who
was a distant relation of Hosokawa’s. Matsuoka ‘feared that in regional areas
where local connections and blood relations are important, the people he was
counting on for votes would support Hosokawa like tumbling snow’.110 As
one commentator put it, ‘Hosokawa was the “emperor”. He was a famous
governor. He transcended local and blood connections and took votes as if a
typhoon had blown through. Matsuoka of course, went for bribery, and furiously
distributed rice balls with ¥10,000 notes in them. There were police in his
office despite it being during an election period’.111
Hosokawa’s entry into the race, and his absorption of votes that would have
normally flowed to the other parties, meant that the competition amongst the
remaining candidates was made all the more severe. Noda, Matsuoka and
Uozumi in the conservative camp were slightly ahead, while Tanaka and Kurata
Eiki (representing the JSP and Kômeitô respectively) were about even. Noda
had very strong support from the conservative camp, whilst Matsuoka had
thoroughly infiltrated the rural areas. Unluckily for Tanaka, some of the progressive/
reformist vote was also flowing to Hosokawa. Noda Masaharu, standing as an
Independent, was appealing for support for his own independent rice policy.112
BEER COUPONS OR VOTE-BUYING?

For Matsuoka, money was another issue altogether. In 1991 and 1992 (non-
election years) official donations to his political funding groups and personal
support organisation dipped—from ¥131 million in 1990 to around ¥110
million and ¥104 million respectively.113 As 1993 was an election year, funding
levels rose again—to around ¥126 million.114 The largest portion flowed to
the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economics Discussion
Association (¥75 million), with ¥56 million donated to Matsuoka’s kôenkai.115
Kumamoto was infamous for the old-fashioned vote-buying system of
finding a ¥10,000 note in a cabbage delivered to voters’ houses. Even in the
1990s, this system was still in evidence. 116 Buying votes with money was
described as ‘commonsense’ in some local towns and villages of the
prefecture.117 Kumamoto was also famous for the distribution of soy sauce
and pickled leaf mustard at election time.118
One month before the 1993 election, Matsuoka ordered ¥25 million worth
of beer coupons contained in 10 boxes that were delivered to his Diet office.
To obtain the beer coupons, he used Mitsukoshi Department store’s reception
system that allows unlimited credit for certain special customers.119 Matsuoka
had been introduced to Mitsukoshi by Hirota Daisuke, another user of the
system. Hirota, a self-proclaimed construction consultant, was a character with
a history.120 Rumours connected him to a former politician’s secretary, Ozaki
Mitsurô, who was arrested over a scandal and who was also audited by the
National Taxation Office.121 Hirota was chairman of a company called Miyauchi
Denkô, which changed its name to Japan Orando.122 Matsuoka became a
reception client in June 1993, and almost immediately issued his first order for
beer coupons. Because it was such an expensive order, the store liaison officer
assigned to look after Matsuoka initially thought to himself, ‘you must be
joking’.123 However, when he checked with Matsuoka’s office, Matsuoka’s
30 POWER AND PORK
secretary brushed aside his reservations saying, ‘there’s no time. We need it

next month’ (July 1993, when the Lower House election was due to be
held).124 The beer coupons, like tailoring coupons, were extremely convertible,
and so Mitsuokoshi did not want to go ahead with the expensive sale.125
To make matters worse, when the time came for payment, Matsuoka did
not honour the debt. Mitsukoshi repeatedly pressed him for payment, including
a threat to go to his office in Kumamoto. The department store finally received
a promissory note in lieu of payment. The drawer of the promissory note was
Hirota.126 However, accepting such a note was not store policy, and when the
store officer visited Matsuoka’s home in Tokyo, he was given cash to cover the
debt owed (approximately ¥25 million). The band around the cash was from
the Sanwa Bank. At the time, Hirota had been using the Sanwa Bank for his
business transactions, and so the Mitsukoshi people assumed that the money
had originated from Hirota.127
Matsuoka continued to make purchases using the reception system and also
continued to default on payment. Hirota again covered Matsuoka’s bill with a
promissory note. When the store objected to this system of payment, Hirota
was enraged. He phoned and visited the Mitsukoshi Head Office along with
an influential right-wing figure. He also stopped paying his account. When
interviewed, Hirota declined to acknowledge even knowing Matsuoka, saying
that all the transactions had been made through a representative of Matsuoka’s
kôenkai, a Mr T, who had subsequently died. Matsuoka himself also denied
knowing Hirota and denied making any of the transactions, blaming Mr T.
who clearly could not answer for himself.128
THE 1993 ELECTION RESULTS

When the results of the 1993 election were declared, Matsuoka was ranked third
amongst the five successful candidates (see Appendix). This was two rungs higher
than in 1990, but was well behind the very popular Hosokawa, who was way out
in front of everyone else with 213,125 votes (see Appendix). Overall, the Japan
New Party won 25.16 per cent of the votes, while the LDP secured 20.83 per
cent. It was the first time that the LDP had vacated its position as the leading party
in Kumamoto (1) since the amalgamation of the conservatives in 1955.129 For the
LDP, the entire election was held in the shadow of the Japan New Party boom.
Hosokawa claimed nearly 40 per cent of the votes in Kumamoto City and
was also the most popular candidate overall in the rural counties, which
meant that Matsuoka ceded top ranking to Hosokawa in regional areas. In

fact, Hosokawa had broad support across all parts of the electorate, suggesting
strong personal popularity.
Next in ranking to Hosokawa were Noda Takeshi in second place with 93,824
votes and Matsuoka with 82,620 votes. The split in the LDP and Uozumi’s
defeat left Matsuoka as the only LDP politician with strong connections to
farm and forestry voters across the entire electorate, given that Noda’s
connections were mainly with business, although he gained respectable support
from county voters.130 The election results thus served to reinforce Matsuoka’s
sectoral differentiation strategy.
All up, Matsuoka’s vote tally was only a small improvement on his 1990
performance, with 12.95 per cent of the total cast vote (see Appendix). This
suggested a stable support base, with supporters who were not easily deflected
by Hosokawa’s appeal. On the other hand, Matsuoka appeared to have hardly
gained in electoral performance in spite of his having secured a position in the
LDP and in the Diet over the previous three years.
Apart from Hosokawa’s taking a large slice of the total vote, the rankings
amongst the various party candidates settled back more into the normal
order of things with the JSP and Kômeitô candidates coming in behind
the LDP candidates (in fourth and fifth position respectively) in contrast
to the 1990 election (see Appendix). This was despite the fact that the
LDP, as a whole, lost its majority in the Lower House in this election,
gaining only 223 seats in the 511-seat Diet. The JSP as a party also went
down to a massive defeat with only 70 seats. These figures provided the
context in which a non-LDP coalition took power for the first time since
1955.
The two dominant features of Matsuoka’s electoral performance—the fact
that his total vote tally hardly changed and the fact that distribution of his
support was broadly similar to the 1990 election result—suggested that the
composition of Matsuoka’s vote was hard rather than soft or floating. Matsuoka
was not a politician that attracted floating votes. Nor, it would seem, did he
have much personal popularity, the kind that produced such high levels of
support that Hosokawa enjoyed for instance.
The only movement in Matsuoka’s votes was the decline in voting support
in the cities (where his overall support fell by 3000 or so votes) and the somewhat
larger gain in rural votes (see Table 2.2). In Kumamoto City alone, Matsuoka’s
32
Name of municipality No. of farm Farm households Votes cast for % of total % of Matsuoka’s Placing among
householdsa as % of total in Matsuoka vote cast total vote 8 candidates
municipality/ies
Cities 6,002 2.3 36,021 8.4 43.6 6th
Kumamoto City 2,237 1.1 27,249 8.2 33.0 6th
Arao City 475 2.6 2,107 6.4 25.6 6th
Tamana City 1,151 8.7 2,608 10.0 3.2 4th
Yamaga City 1,035 9.9 2,852 14.0 3.5 3rd
Kikuchi City 1,104 13.6 1,205 6.7 1.5 6th
Counties 17,119 17.2 46,599 22.5 56.4 2nd
Hotaku Countyb N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tamana County 3,525 16.7 7,518 15.3 9.1 3rd
Taimei Town 449 11.1 1,621 17.2 2.0 3rd
Yokoshima Town 600 42.3 811 20.1 1.0 3rd
Tensui Town 881 49.9 549 10.9 0.7 4th
POWER AND PORK
Gyokuto Town 337 20.5 613 16.4 0.7 3rd

Kikusui Town 209 10.5 368 7.5 0.4 4th
Mikawa Town 445 26.2 1,362 32.2 1.6 1st
Nankan Town 411 11.9 1,140 15.1 1.4 3rd
Nagasu Town 193 3.8 1,054 10.2 1.3 4th
Kamoto County 3,144 29.8 5,162 14.1 6.2 4th
Kahoku Town 399 26.3 687 16.9 0.8 3rd
Kikuka Town 566 27.7 717 13.5 0.9 4th
Kamoto Town 452 17.7 1,057 19.1 1.3 2nd
Kao Town 441 29.4 728 18.1 0.9 3rd
Ueki Town 1,286 43.7 1,973 11.2 2.4 4th
Kikuchi County 3,296 10.4 8,649 12.6 10.5 4th
Shichijo Town 483 33.9 443 11.2 0.5 3rd
Kyokushi Town 388 28.2 491 13.9 0.6 3rd
Ozu Town 697 9.9 2,882 19.6 3.5 2nd
Kikuyo Town 575 8.5 2,133 15.8 2.6 2nd
Koshi Town 354 6.7 885 7.6 1.1 6th
Shisui Town 478 14.9 642 8.3 0.8 5th
Nishigoshi Town 321 4.8 1,173 8.8 1.4 6th
Aso County 4,771 20.7 25,270 47.7 30.6 1st
Aso Town 986 17.1 8,300 62.2 10.0 1st
Oguni Town 420 15.0 2,616 39.4 3.2 1st
Soyô Town 479 33.0 1,688 49.1 2.0 1st
Takamori Town 523 21.4 2,128 40.3 2.6 1st
Hakusui Village 439 35.2 1,490 47.2 1,8 1st
Kugino Town 241 35.2 975 52.8 1.2 1st
Chôyô Village 191 10.3 1,521 46.4 1.8 1st
Nishihara Village 264 19.7 1,001 29.8 1.2 1st

Total/average 23,121 6.4 82,620 12.95 100.0 3rd
Notes: a Farm household data are for 1990. b Hotaku County was merged into Kumamoto City on 1st February 1991.
Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuken, Shichôson-
hen 43 Kumamoto-ken, pp. 288-289 and 294-303; Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 40-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo, p. 153.
33
34 POWER AND PORK
vote tally fell by more than 7,000 votes, suggesting that some of his original
supporters had switched their allegiance to Hosokawa. The even split between
city and rural votes for Matsuoka in the 1990 election expanded to a 10,000
or so vote margin in 1993, with county support clearly starting to predominate.
His county vote tally rose by 5,000 or so votes overall. Only in Kamoto County
did his votes fall appreciably.
Aso County, on the other hand, went from strength to strength, supplying
25,270 votes, or just over 30 per cent of Matsuoka’s total vote (see Table 2.2).
This result pointed to continuing solid local support from his home county.
Matsuoka was uniformly ranked top vote-winner in all the towns and villages
of the county (see Table 2.2) suggesting a hardening of his jiban.
THE ‘KARATE KINGS’ FIGHT IT OUT

Top of the list of losers in the 1993 general election in Kumamoto (1) was
Uozumi, who had joined the Renewal Party. Matsuoka reportedly destroyed
Uozumi’s jiban in the election, with the result that Uozumi performed poorly,
coming just below last on the elected list by a margin of 2000 votes (see
Appendix). 131
In the 1994 mayoral election for Kumamoto City, Uozumi and Matsuoka
engaged in an unscheduled but publicly televised karate fight in the square in
front of the election office of one of the candidates. The two men had very
different backgrounds and career histories and were also on bad terms and
arch rivals. Matsuoka was known as a conservative, whereas Uozumi had followed
Ozawa Ichirô, the flag-bearer of reform, and split from the LDP. Matsuoka
had become excessively agitated at the gathering in the square, and, when
Uozumi tried to restrain him, Matsuoka jumped on Uozumi. They exchanged
karate slaps, Matsuoka’s glasses went flying and he ended up with a cut lip.132
What surprised the Asahi journalist who investigated the event was that there
was so little sympathy for the victim, Matsuoka, who was slapped by Uozumi,
and very little criticism of Uozumi, the perpetrator of the slap.133
The local media were covering the event, but only the Asahi reported it.
The response from other media groups was that ‘this is within the limits of
normal in Kumamoto’.134 Kumamoto had a reputation as a land of political
strife and fierce electoral contests in which all-night vigils were held around
fires in steel drums to prevent people from crossing over to the ‘enemy’s’ side.
As for Matsuoka, he went on to acquire a reputation for being hot-blooded,
argumentative and a hard drinker.135 What is more, he became known in Nagata-

chô as the one man who hit his secretaries with his fists.136 Other reports also
surfaced of Matsuoka’s physical altercations with Diet members.137
REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS
Over two elections, Matsuoka had constructed an electoral coalition centring
on his jiban, agricultural and forestry interests and sections of the city vote.
This coalition required careful attention to a range of interests – local, sectional
and client-based.
Local interests
Of all the victorious candidates standing in Kumamoto (1) in the 1990 and
1993 elections, Matsuoka had the most regionally concentrated vote, with
wide variations in the percentage of the total vote he obtained across the cities,
towns and villages that made up Kumamoto (1). Matsuoka’s political stronghold
was clearly in the Aso region. That was where his primary jiban was located.
He was consistently the most popular candidate there over two elections. He
also gained a substantial percentage of his total vote from Kumamoto City. In
fact, these two sources of support comprised just under two-thirds of his vote
tally (74 per cent in 1990 and 64 per cent in the 1993 election, as shown in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2).
Such regionally concentrated support encouraged Matsuoka to make a strong
commitment to a specific locality and to engage in policy activities that delivered
‘regionally concentrated policy services’ (chiiki shûchûgata seisaku sâbisu).138
This meant directing pork-barrel benefits, particularly public works projects,
to his jiban.139
For politicians such as Matsuoka, the beauty of public works was that they
could be guided to a particular place—they were location-specific, and so
their beneficiaries could be identified and votes could be harvested in return.
Public works were different from general policy benefits that were delivered
uniformly to broad sub-categories of voters, such as all rice farmers, or all dairy
farmers wherever they were located.
By guiding benefits (rieki yûdô)—such as public works—to a specific locality,
Matsuoka could secure high support rates within his jiban and a strong personal
vote.140 A large part of Matsuoka’s policy activities were, therefore, geared to
getting public resources directed to particular regions, such as funds for
36 POWER AND PORK
agricultural, forestry and rural infrastructure development, including

agricultural and forest roads, and community facilities of various kinds.
At the same time, such projects doubled as support for construction
companies in the electorate. They advantaged not only the beneficiaries of the
facilities that were built, such as road users, school children, and the patrons
of sports and cultural facilities, but also the executives of both large and small
construction companies and their employees, many of whom were locally-
based, including part-time farmers. In this sense, public works projects had
high utility as an electoral strategy geared to the mobilisation of both votes
and political funds. In geographic terms they could also be used to service
both Matsuoka’s urban and rural support bases, because some construction
companies were located in Kumamoto City. Public works thus provided, for
Matsuoka, a bridge between urban and rural areas.
Public works also served indirectly as industry promotion policies and policies
to promote the regional economy. They generated wider spin-offs for industry
and business in the area—not just local, but also regional and prefectural—as
well as for employment and regional development as a whole. Kumamoto was
well known as a region with a culture of dependency on public works,141 and
Matsuoka claimed to be especially concerned with the development of
Kumamoto Prefecture as his ‘birthplace’.142
The incentive generated by the distribution of Matsuoka’s voting support
was, therefore, for him to engage in politics that benefited local interests in
regional areas (rieki yûdô seiji)143 and to become a ‘benefit-guiding type of
politician’ (rieki yûdôgata no seijika). Matsuoka continued the ‘long-established
tradition in which the gaining of subsidies and public works was seen as a
good achievement’.144 By providing voters and local industries in his home
region with public works, Matsuoka could secure in exchange his own interests
such as votes, funding and support.145
Rieki yûdô seiji was also an important means for Matsuoka to build a strong
following amongst local politicians in a line from the centre (Matsuoka as a
Diet politician) to the periphery (prefectural and municipal politicians,
including mayors and assembly members, who were dependent on the flow of
funding from the centre for their own public works programs). Such projects
helped local politicians obtain support from voters in local elections. They
enhanced the image of particular local politicians as effective representatives
who could draw government resources back to their local areas. They also
demonstrated the utility of the local politicians’ links to national Diet politicians
and thus their standing and importance. The return for Matsuoka was the role
local politicians played as kôenkai kingpins, election campaigners and generators
of support amongst voters loyal to them. Through this system, it was Matsuoka,
the individual Diet member, not the party (LDP), who delivered benefits to
his local politician supporters and to localities that were the most important
to him politically.
Directing public works projects to his local region required Matsuoka to
engage in policy interference, that is, interference in the administrative affairs
of the bureaucracy. It meant interceding with and exerting influence over officials
in the MAFF (and other ministries such as the Ministry of Construction and
the Ministry of Transport), because it was government officials who decided
where particular public works projects would be located.
Because Matsuoka had not been a mainstream career official in the MAFF
and only had a BA in Forestry from Tottori University, he did not have an
automatic foothold for influence within the MAFF when he started out as a
politician. His big break was the Uruguay Round Agriculture Countermeasures
Expenditure (UR Nôgyô Taisakuhi) package. It provided an opportunity for
him to start exercising enormous power over the distribution of special
agricultural and rural public works projects funded either totally or partially
by the package.146 Officially the policy was designed to compensate farmers
for greater exposure to international trade competition as a result of the
Hosokawa administration’s agreement to the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA) finalised in March 1994 for initial implementation in
the 1995 fiscal year. The total budgetary allocation for the countermeasures
package was ¥6.01 trillion over six years (1995-2001). In practice, the package
provided a huge financial boost for local public works projects.
Since the nature of the expenditure package represented just a ‘grab for
money’ (tsukamikin), how it was to be used was not clear. Matsuoka himself
said that ‘there is an abundance of funds. There was no choice but to use the
money for projects’.147 With that money, Matsuoka constructed large-scale
facilities in his constituency.148
Sectional interests
Matsuoka’s strong support from rural counties made it inevitable that he would
represent agricultural and forestry interests in the party and in the Diet. One
38 POWER AND PORK
of his primary policy-related activities in Tokyo was policy intervention, whereby

he would participate in the making of policy decisions for the agriculture and
forestry sectors—in the committees of the LDP’s PARC, in Diet standing
committees (Kokkai iinkai), and in Diet members’ activities (giin katsudô) in
the Diet members’ leagues (giin renmei).
Agriculture and forestry policy included both distributive measures (those
involving the allocation of public funds) and non-distributive measures (those
relating to the regulation of markets etc.). For the most part, however, agriculture
and forestry policy, even when it was distributive, was not locality-focused,
but targeted to broad groups of farmers such as rice producers. Agricultural
subsidies for price support schemes, for example, applied not only to particular
types of producers in Matsuoka’s electorate, but also across the entire Kumamoto
Prefecture, and in most cases across the entire nation. Such benefits could not
be restricted to farmers in certain localities or electoral jiban. They contrasted
with subsidies for agricultural and rural public works, which, although included
under the broad umbrella of agricultural policy in the aggregate (that is,
allocating total quantities of funds annually), were essentially geared to an
electoral strategy focusing on local, rather than sectional interests.
Moreover, broadly focused agricultural and forestry policies, including
subsidies, applied to all members of a group irrespective of whether or not
they supported Matsuoka. The incentive was for Matsuoka to try and influence
these policies as a means of maximising farm and forestry votes, but he could
not withhold benefits from those who did not support him. The connection
between voter and politician, in this case, was indirect. In this respect,
agricultural policies possessed the characteristics of programmatic policies, even
though they applied to a specific group of producers. Nonetheless, though
indirect, the electoral benefit from supporting industry-wide policies was
potentially substantial.
The combination of high levels of rural support and Matsuoka’s career
experience in the MAFF practically preordained his political career as a typical
agriculture and forestry Diet member (nôrin giin), with a primary specialism
in agriculture and forestry policy, a niche in which he could bring his specialised
knowledge of agricultural and forestry administration to bear. Creating an
identity as a nôrin giin also served to distinguish Matsuoka from other LDP
rival candidates and politicians from Kumamoto (1). Support generated by
agricultural and forestry-related policy activities was derived from all those
areas of his electorate where people were gainfully employed in agriculture

and forestry. It was not specific to his jiban in the Aso region.
A sectionalist orientation was also important in enabling Matsuoka to
maintain profitable relations with the interest groups operating in this field.
These could sometimes be the specific beneficiaries of policy measures and
subsidies for their own organisational purposes. In return, producer groups
could be mobilised to provide various forms of organisational backing, including
campaign assistance, votes and funds.
Representing agricultural and forestry interests enabled Matsuoka to exploit
the organisational muscle of farm and forestry-related interest groups. The
biggest and most comprehensive grouping, which mobilised the most primary
industry votes in the electorate, was Nokyo. Within Nokyo, the Kumamoto
Prefecture nôseiren was the most important group for Matsuoka; it had branches
in each county of his electorate and sub-branches in the municipalities.
Table 2.3 Ranking of Kumamoto Prefecture as an agricultural producer/

by commodity and farm/forestry households, 2000 (per cent)
Product/households Ranking
Rushes (for tatami mats) 1st (95%)
Corn 1st (35%)
Tomatoes 1st (11%)
Tobacco 2 nd
Strawberries 3rd
Ginger root 3rd
Japanese mandarins (mikan) 4th
Number of beef cattle-feeding households 4th
Sweet potatoes 5th
Raw milk production 6th
Wheat and barley 9th
Chinese cabbages 9th
Japanese radishes 10th
Carrots 10th
Rice 14th
Total number of farm households 13th
Farm households in prefecture (per cent) 13th
Total number forest households
(67% joint farm-forest households) 16th
Source: Nôrinsuisanshô, Tôkei Jôhôbu, 2003. Dai-77 Nôrinsuisanshô Tôkeihyô [The 77th Yearbook
of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan], 2000-2001, Tokyo, Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai,
pp.4, 160-230, 426.
40 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka’s sectionalist orientation ensured that he undertook activities

designed to deliver policy benefits not only to farm and forest owners in general,
but also to specific sub-groupings of producers within this larger occupational
category. The production profile of Kumamoto Prefecture as a whole indicated
that certain commodities were going to be more important to Matsuoka than
others (see Table 2.3). The prefecture was well known for its production of
rushes for tatami mats, tobacco, corn, horticultural products such as tomatoes,
strawberries and ginger root, fruit such as mikan, livestock products such as beef
and milk, and sweet potatoes. As Table 2.3 shows, Kumamoto Prefecture had
the second highest number of tobacco farms of any prefecture in Japan in 2000.
Forests were also a feature of Kumamoto’s primary industry landscape. More
than two-thirds (67 per cent) of farm households were also forest households
(rinka),149 meaning that agricultural landholders also owned some forestland.
Of the 24,049 forest households in Kumamoto Prefecture in 2000, 15,221
owned 1-3 hectares.150 Only 1,223 households were making sales of forestry
products, although 7,278 household members were engaged in forestry.151
Matsuoka also emphasised forestry policy because he had spent most of his
time in the MAFF in the Forestry Agency, where he had been posted to
prefectures such as Hokkaido and Akita. However, forestry policy was not
restricted to taking care of the interests of small-scale forest owners in his
electorate, just as his agricultural policy specialism did not apply simply to
farmers in his own constituency. Forestry policy meant looking after the interests
of timber companies that logged the forests, including state forests, and
companies wanting to convert forestland to other uses such as factories and
industrial complexes, residential sites, golf courses and leisure facilities,
agricultural land and public land. In addition, forest policy extended to the
construction of forest roads (rindô) through non-state-owned forests with the
assistance of national government (and, to a lesser extent, prefectural
government) subsidies. The Kyushu region had more forest roads than any
other region except for Tohoku even though its forest area was relatively small,
and almost all of these roads were managed by municipal governments. Forestry
public works, as with all public works, took the representation of forestry
interests out of the realm of sectional interests, and into the sphere of local
interests and also into clientelistic politics, where Matsuoka could intercede
on behalf of individual clients or small groups of clients.
Clientelistic interests
The search for votes and political funding encouraged Matsuoka to undertake
deals for particular clients, usually through direct, personal contacts between
himself and those seeking his intermediation on their behalf.152 In this role,
Matsuoka acted as a political broker or private mediator for individual clients,
who sought personal, private favours, and as a political ‘fixer’ for small groups
of clients who petitioned for particular policy favours. The key aspect of such
clientelistic relations was the personalised connection between Matsuoka and
those seeking his mediation, and the delivery of the requested favours as political
patronage. Matsuoka’s conduct of politics on an individual basis (kojin honi no
seiji) led inevitably to a political culture of patronage (onkoshugiteki na seiji bunka).153
Matsuoka’s ability to deliver such benefits was critically dependent on Japan’s
system of discretionary governance by the central government bureaucracy
and on the ability of ordinary ruling party backbenchers to maintain direct
channels of communication with, and influence over, serving government officials.
Bureaucrats had the power to grant the favours; they decided which public
works projects should go where (kashozuke),154 and which private companies
should undertake these projects. Using their discretionary powers, bureaucrats
could even use the promise of subsidies to influence local governments in their
selection of which tradespeople they would select to work on projects.155
Bureaucrats were also responsible for deciding whether, or how much of, a
particular subsidy would be provided to a particular group, and for a host of
other kinds of administrative decisions that impacted on the lives of individuals
and the incomes of companies and producers of various kinds. Government
officials could arrange for exemptions for particular individuals, groups or
companies from certain administrative rules and regulations.
Within their administrative fiefdoms, bureaucrats were the government,
and politicians such as Matsuoka were able to use their position as Diet
members to prey on government in this sense. In his role as broker or ‘fixer’,
Matsuoka’s job was to solicit, obtain or extract administrative favours from
bureaucrats. He maintained a parasitic relationship with them, feeding off the
benefits they provided and converting these benefits into political goods for
his own purposes.
Central government dispensations and subsidies, including those for
particular public works projects such as roads, sports and tourist facilities,
42 POWER AND PORK
served as a basis for Matsuoka to build a range of clientelistic relationships

with supporters. He established personal links with individual local politicians,
local businessmen and company executives, as well as with the leaders and
officials of local groups and sectoral organisations, who were dependent on
central government administrative discretion and largesse and who could supply
votes and funding in exchange for favours mediated by Matsuoka.
In this context, Matsuoka functioned as a ‘benefit and concession-guiding
type of politician’ (riken yûdôgata no seijika). 156 Whilst benefits involved
directing public works to particular local regions (rieki yudo seiji), ‘concessions’
(riken) usually meant obtaining specific favours for particular clients. A large
majority of such favours in Matsuoka’s case were for construction companies
and other businesses servicing the public works industry.157 Public works
contracts provided these companies with business opportunities they would
not otherwise have had. Through his involvement in the public works industry,
Matsuoka was able to build personal links with construction company executives
and others who then became a major source of political funding in return for
the delivery of political patronage in the form of public works contracts.158
The system worked as follows: Matsuoka would ‘drop funds from the agriculture,
forestry and fisheries budget into the locality (jimoto), Matsuoka would then allow
local companies to get involved in the public works projects funded by this budget,
and finally, Matsuoka would then receive political funds from these companies’.159
Matsuoka’s services as a broker were, however, not totally dependent on the
provision of central government largesse. In his search for votes and political
funds, he was encouraged to field personal requests for favours not only with
bureaucrats, but also with other politicians and political leaders, with members
of administrative staffs and organisational officials, and even with business leaders.
Some of Matsuoka’s key linkages and activities as a mediator or political
broker were generated via his kôenkai, which served as a communications hub
between Matsuoka, the Diet politician, and those local entities who submitted
various requests for his patronage. His kôenkai provided a mechanism for
channelling the particularistic demands of private individuals, local politicians,
company executives and organisational officials directly to Matsuoka, the
politician. Through his kôenkai, Matsuoka undertook direct associations with
his supporters and offered them his patronage in the form of various services
and policy activities in exchange for votes and political funds. The kôenkai
thus institutionalised clientelism and its inevitable corollary—patronage politics.

Matsuoka personally delivered favours to particular clients in exchange for
their personal loyalty and support.
This was essentially a feudal system of politics. Matsuoka was treated like
an overlord whom supplicants approached seeking favours in exchange for which
they pledged their loyalty (in the form of votes and/or political funds). The
behaviour in which it resulted was covert and completely lacking transparency:
it easily led to corruption.
NOTES
1 Kumamoto Prefecture is located in the northeast of the large island of Kyushu, which lies at the
southwestern end of the main Japanese island of Honshu.
2 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho’ [‘Curriculum Vitae of Matsuoka
Toshikatsu’]. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/008.html
3 Some of the following details were obtained from ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho’. Available from
http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/008.html
4 Nakanishi Akihiko and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’ [‘The
Suspicious Person Called Matsuoka Toshikatsu’], Bungei Shunjû, 1 September 2002, pp. 184–85.
5 ibid., p. 184.
6 ibid., p. 185. According to two other reports, Matsuoka spent two years at the National Defence
University and then withdrew.
7 ibid., p. 185.
8 The Japanese title was Nôrinshô.
9 The National Personnel Authority divides MAFF entrance exams into three levels. The MAFF applies
the following categories of levels as follows: Level I is the highest and encompasses both jimukan (law,
economics and administration), and gikan (agronomy, forestry, engineering, human sciences, livestock
science etc.). Levels II and III cover all fields. Special exams are also offered for livestock science and
veterinary science. In addition, the MAFF has its own interview tests to those who pass these exams.
Available from http://www.maff.go.jp/saiyou/saiyou_top.html
10 Nishikawa Shinichi, ‘Tako Tsubo ni Tojikomotte Ôkoku o Gyûjiru Nôgyô Doboku’ [‘The Agriculture
Civil Engineering Technical Bureaucrats Stuck in a Foxhole and Controlling Their Kingdom’],
Shûkan Daiyamondo, 20 April 2002, p. 48.
11 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru’ [‘Profile’], in Seisaku Jihôsha, Seikan Yôran [A Handbook of Politicians
and Bureaucrats], 1990, First Half Year Edition, Tokyo, Seisaku Jihôsha, March 1990, p. 269.
12 The Japanese title is Rinyachô. Along with the Food Agency and the Fisheries Agency, this has been
one of the three agencies of the MAFF, although the Food Agency, which, from 1942 onwards bought
and sold rice and regulated rice marketing throughout Japan as well as regulating rice production since
1969, has now been disbanded. What was left of its rice-market and production-related functions
were taken over a new Food Department of the MAFF.
13 Matsuoka Toshikatsu, ‘Shinsan-Kôtoku Chiiki no Shinkihon Keikaku no Gaiyô’ [‘Outline of the New
Industry-Industrial Special Regions New Basic Plan’], Rinya Jihô, April 1977, p. 4.
14 Matsuoka, ‘Shinsan-Kôtoku Chiiki no Shinkihon Keikaku’, p. 35.
15 Its Japanese title is Nôrinsuisanshô.
16 It became the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries at the height of international negotiations
over the law of the sea, when Nakagawa Ichirô was minister and led the Japanese side in these
44 POWER AND PORK
negotiations. At the time, the ministry thought it would be a good idea to emphasise the fact that
fisheries were part of its administrative domain.
17 The National Land Agency is now incorporated into the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
as a result of the reorganisation of the central government bureaucracy in January 2001.
18 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 185.
19 Nakanishi Akihiko and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Riken no
Kyôbô’ [‘Suzuki Muneo and Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Conspiracy for Concessions’], Bungei Shunjû,
May 2000, p. 100.
20 ‘Ni Chaneru Kako Rogu’ [‘Channel 2, Previous Entries/Log’], Giin Section. Available from http://
piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html
22 Book review by Brad Glosserman of Ofer Feldman, The Japanese Political Personality: Analyzing the
Motivations and Culture of Freshman Diet Members, St Martin’s Press/Macmillan Press, 2000, The
Japan Times, 13 July 2000.
23 ibid.
24 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Rirekisho’. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//
public/008.html
25 See http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
public/008.html
27 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 100.
29 ibid., p. 181.
30 ibid.
31 Aum Shinrikyô was a religious group, whose followers carried out a poison gas attack on the Tokyo
subways in March 1995, which killed 12 people.
33 Nakagawa died in circumstances that remain obscure. Various rumours circulated following his death.
One held that Nakagawa had feuded with faction leader Mitsuzuka Hiroshi and/or Suzuki Muneo,
who was his secretary at the time. Another rumour held that Nakagawa might have been killed by the
CIA or the Soviet’s KGB. Tokyo Shinbun, 3 August 2005.
34 Nakanishi Akihiko and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 105.
36 ibid., p. 185. See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.
37 Nakanishi Tomiki, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu (Jimin Daigishi): Igai na Sugao to Shûkin Ryoku’ [‘Matsuoka
Toshikatsu (LDP Diet Member): An Exceptional “Warts and All” and Money Collecting Power’],
Shûkan Asahi, February 2002, p. 28.
39 ibid.
40 ibid.
41 Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 February 1990.
42 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru’, p. 269. Even though this is what Matsuoka is quoted as saying in
the Diet handbooks, other sources suggest that he did not want endorsement from the LDP.
43 Machidori, ‘The 1990s Reforms Have Transformed Japanese Politics’, p. 39.
44 See http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html
45 ibid.
public/008.html
47 Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, 1991. Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkokusho Nihon no Jinkô (Shiryô Hen)
[1990 National Census Closing Report Japanese Population (Data Edition)], Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku,
Tokyo, pp. 2–3, 526–27; Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, 1991. Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai
3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuken, Shichôson-hen 43 Kumamoto-ken [1990 National
Census Report, Vol. 2, Second Basic Statistical Results 2 Prefectures and Municipalities, Edition 43 Kumamoto
Prefecture], Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, Tokyo, pp. 288–89 and 294–303; and Vol. 3, pp. 2–3.
48 Heisei 2-nen Kokusei Chôsa Saishû Hôkoku Dai 3-kan Dai 2-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka, pp. 288–89 and
294–303; and Vol. 3, pp. 2–3.
49 Calculated from nationwide average figures in Nôrinsuisanshô, Tôkei Jôhôbu, 1992. Dai-66
Nôrinsuisanshô Tôkeihyô [The 66th Statistical Yearbook of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries],
1989–90, Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, Tokyo, pp. 5 and 20.
50 For the total cast vote in the district of Kumamoto (1) in the 1990 Lower House election, see the
Appendix.
51 Kitamatsu Masahiko et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki: Sono Ôsei naru Shûkin
Nôryoku no Kiseki’ [‘An Exhaustive Analysis of Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Member: The Tracks of a
Vigorous Money-Collecting Ability’], Zaikai Tenbô, December 2002, p. 47.
52 ibid.
53 ibid.
54 See Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-cho’ for an elaboration of Matsuoka’s relationship
with Suzuki Muneo.
55 Kitamatsu, et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 46.
56 ‘“Nishi no Muneo” Matsuoka Toshikatsu no Sokkin Hisho mo Yukue o Kuramashita’ [‘“Muneo of the
West” Matsuoka Toshikatsu’s Close Associate and Secretary Also Disappears’], Shûkan Bunshun, 4 July
2002, p. 38.
57 Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, p. 143.
58 Tatebayashi, Giin Kôdô, p. 4.
61 Personal interview, Ministry of Finance official, January 2003.
62 These are known as civil engineering ‘types’ (dokenya), who form the most powerful subgrouping of
gikan within the MAFF. Their business is public works including land improvement. Because of their
command over a large slice of the MAFF budget, ‘they have an air of arrogance and so are easy to spot
in the MAFF’. Itô Terî and Editorial Department, ‘O’warai Nôrinsuisanshô’ [‘The Comical MAFF’],
Shûkan Daiyamondo, 20 April 2002, p. 73.
63 In the 2001 Upper House election, for example, MAFF OB Fukushima Keishirô, who stood for the
national (PR) constituency of the Upper House, received such support. His campaign organisation
was headed up by Takagi Yûki, who had just retired as MAFF administrative vice-minister. Takagi was
subsequently appointed as President of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation,
a top ‘descent from heaven’ (amakudari) post for MAFF OBs.
66 ibid.
67 ‘Karate 4-dan (Shinseitô) ga 2-dan (Jimintô) o Haritao shita Yoru’ [‘The Night that the Karate 4th Level
from the Renewal Party Pushed Over the Karate 2nd Level from the LDP’], Shûkan Asahi, 9 December
1994, p. 32.
68 In 2005, at the age of 88, he was advisor to the prime minister, former chairman of the Japan Karate
Association and advisor to the Karate no Michi (The Karate Way) World Federation.
69 Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 February 1990. Matsuno was ranked fifth amongst vote-winners in the 1986
elections, and although he increased his vote slightly in the 1990 elections, it was still not enough to
get him over the line. See below.
public/008.html
46 POWER AND PORK

72 The JSP won 136 seats in this election, a substantial increase on the 83 seats it had at the time of the
Diet’s dissolution. The Asahi newspaper described the JSP’s electoral victory in 1990 as a ‘huge
onslaught’ (daiyakushin). It followed the JSP’s outstanding performance in the Upper House elections
of 1989.
73 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru’, p. 269.
74 Matsuno was not the only senior LDP politician with ties to farm and rural-regional interests to be
defeated in this election. So were two other big names in the agricultural scene in Kyushu—Etô Takami
from Miyazaki (1) and Yamanaka Sadanori from Kagoshima (3). Etô was Minister of Transport at the
time, while Yamanaka was the chairman of the LDP’s Tax System Investigation Committee. He was
held personally responsible for the introduction of the consumption tax. In fact, he was described as
‘the real parent of the consumption tax’ (shôhizei no umi no oya), despite this, he lost by only 28 votes.
Other losers of note were Horinouchi Hisao, former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,
as well as other senior LDP politicians who had held posts such as Minister of Construction, Director-
General of the Science and Technology Agency, and the Director-General of the Defence Agency. The
election result produced a real clean-out of LDP ‘big shot Diet members’ (daibutsu giin) and caused
quite a stir at the time.
75 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, 1990, Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo (Heisei 2-
nen 2-gatsu), Dai 15-kai Sangiin Tsûjô Senkyo (Heisei Gannen 7-gatsu) [Asahi General Survey of
Election: The 39th House of Representatives General Election (February 1990), The 15th House of
Councillors Regular Election (July 1989)], Asahi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, p. 194.
76 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 39-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo, p. 194.
79 ibid.
80 Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, p. 59.
83 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru’, p. 269.
84 Calculated from data in Seikan Yôran, 1990, First Half Year Edition, pp. 472–75.
85 Seikan Yôran, 1990, First Half Year Edition, pp. 472–75.
86 Of the two former MAFF gikan in the Diet in 1990—a graduate from Tokyo University’s Faculty of
Agriculture, and a graduate from Kyoto University’s Faculty of Agriculture—both were agricultural
engineering Diet members (nôgyô doboku giin).
88 I am grateful to Yusaku Horiuchi for calculating the correlation coefficient between the percentage of
farm households in each municipality and the percentage of the total vote Matsuoka received. The
correlation coefficient was 0.162 (insignificant). The regression coefficient was also insignificant
(0.220).
90 ‘Karate 4-dan’, p. 34.
92 These terms are borrowed from Tatebayashi, Giin Kôdô, p. v. He argues that some Lower House
electorates were divided up geographically (chiiki wari) along the lines of different candidates’ jiban,
while others were partitioned along policy sector (seisaku bunya wari) lines. Some were divided up by
a mixture of both as in the case of Kumamoto (1). The division along the lines of each candidate’s jiban
amounted to a strategy of mutual respect for each candidate’s geographic sphere of influence. In the
elections, each candidate committed himself to representing a specific locality. The sectoral (policy
field) division cut across the geographic division and was a strategy to fill in particular policy gaps
across the entire electorate, which was partitioned according to the policy fields in which the candidates
specialised. This often amounted to a division by economic or industry sector, such as agriculture,
commerce, construction and small business. Giin Kôdô, p. 49. According to Tatebayashi, these two
major kinds of vote divisions were designed to mitigate competition amongst candidates from the same
party (i.e. LDP) and to maximise the number of LDP candidates elected from the district. Giin Kôdô,
p. v.
94 ibid.
95 The factional lineage extends from former Prime Minister Kishi through to former Prime Minister
Fukuda and Abe Shintarô. Its most recent leader is former Prime Minister Mori. Matsuoka joined
when Mitsuzuka Hiroshi was faction leader after Abe died. Other Diet members representing Kumamoto
(1) were from the Watanabe and Takeshita factions, so the Mitsuzuka faction was a logical choice for
Matsuoka. Mitsuzuka was also a member of Seirankai to which Nakagawa and Tamaki, Matsuoka’s
original Diet member patrons belonged.
96 Kitamatsu et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, pp. 46-47. See also below.
97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 See also below.
100 In the 1993 elections Noda won just over two-thirds of his total vote in the cities of Kumamoto (1).
101 Its Japanese title was Shinseitô. In December 1992, the Takeshita faction (Keiseikai), which was the
largest in the LDP, split into two with the departure of the group led by Hata Tsutomu and Ozawa
Ichirô. In June 1993, 44 LDP Hata faction members resigned from the LDP and formed the Renewal
Party led by Hata, with Ozawa as secretary-general, and 10 junior more left-wing LDP members left
to form the New Party Harbinger (Shintô Sakigake) led by Takemura Masayoshi. In the subsequent
(July) Lower House election, the LDP failed to win a majority.
102 This point is generalised by Tatebayashi, Giin Kôdô, p. 49. He argues that the different groups that
supported the LDP were thus distributed amongst the various Diet members according to a policy
division of labor. Giin Kôdô, p. 34.
103 See below.
104 There were 1.67 million forest-owner members of the 990 forest associations in Japan (see http://
www.zenmori.org/profile/gaiyou1.html). By 2003, their numbers had fallen to 1.64 million individual
members of 970 forest associations (personal communication, General Affairs Department, National
Federation of Forest Associations, December 2005). Even though, unlike the agricultural cooperatives,
they are not called ‘cooperative unions’ (kyôdô kumiai), they are in fact cooperatives organised along the
same structural and functional lines as Nokyo. As the majority of forest owners in Japan are small-
scale, like farm owners, they establish forest associations and cooperate for the purpose of forest
management, the purchase of production and harvesting inputs, and the sale of timber. Prefectural
federations of forest associations operate in every prefecture, and a national federation, the National
Federation of Forest Associations (Zenkoku Shinrin Kumiai Rengôkai), or Zenshinren is the national
body.
105 See http://www.kumamori.or.jp
106 See Chapter 4 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Giin’.
107 Its Japanese title was Nihon Shintô.
108 Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, 1993. Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 40-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo (Heisei 5-
nen 7-gatsu), Dai 16-kai Sangiin Tsûjô Senkyo (Heisei 4-nen 7-gatsu) [Asahi General Survey of Election:
The 40th House of Representatives General Election (July 1993), The 16th House of Councillors Regular
Election (July 1992)], Asahi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, p. 19.
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 July 1993.
114 ibid.
48 POWER AND PORK
115 ibid.
116 ‘Karate 4-dan’, p. 34.
117 Hasegawa Hiroshi, ‘Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô’ [‘Wriggling Through the Gaps of
Bureaucratic Demands and Requests’], Aera, 18 February 2002, p. 25.
118 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, pp. 185–86.
119 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Nishi no Muneo no Gyôten Sukyandaru: Mitsukoshi “Nisenmanen Bîruken”
Fumitaoshi Kosaku’ [‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Muneo of the West’s Astonishing Scandal: The Plot Not
to Pay for the Mitsukoshi “¥20 Million Beer Coupons”’], Shûkan Bunshun, 5 September 2002, p.
168.
120 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Nishi no Muneo no Gyôten Sukyandaru’, p. 169.
121 ibid.
122 ibid.
123 ibid., p. 168.
124 ibid.
125 ibid.
126 ibid., p. 169.
127 ibid.
128 ibid., p. 170.
129 Asahi Shinbun Election Headquarters, Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 40-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo, p. 19.
130 ibid., p. 153.
131 ‘Karate 4-dan’, p. 32.
132 ibid.
133 ibid., p. 34.
134 ibid., p. 35.
136 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi ni Hisho no Taishokukin & Kyûyo Pinhane Giwaku’ [‘Suspicion that
Matsuoka Toshikatsu is Raking Off His Secretary’s Retirement Money & Allowances’], Flash, 5
February 2002, p. 15.
138 Tatebayashi generalises this point. See Giin Kôdô, p. 2.
139 ibid., p. 49.
140 ibid.
141 Hasegawa, ‘Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô’, p. 23.
142 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kumamoto-ken kara no Seisaku Teian’ [‘A Policy Proposal from
Kumamoto Prefecture’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
143 For a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, see Kôno Takeshi and Iwasaki Masahiro, 2004.
Rieki Yûdô Seiji—Kokusai Hikaku to Mekanizumu [Politics That Benefit Local Interests—Mechanism
and International Comparison], Ashi Shobô, Tokyo.
145 Nakano generalises this point. See Nakano Minoru, 1992. Gendai Nihon no Seisaku Katei [Policy-
Making Process in Contemporary Japan], Tôkyô Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, p. 124.
146 Matsuoka was made chairman of the LDP subcommittee disbursing this expenditure. See Chapter 4
on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Giin’.
148 For details, see Chapter 4 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Giin’.
149 This meant that they owned one hectare or more of forestry area.
150 Nôrinsuisanshô, Tôkei Jôhôbu, Dai-77 Nôrinsuisanshô Tôkeihyô, p. 427.
151 ibid., pp. 428, 430.
152 For the definitive study of clientelism in Japanese politics, see Scheiner, Ethan, 2006. Democracy
Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State, Cambridge University
Press, New York.
154 Kashozuke means the designation (by bureaucrats) of an area that will become a place where public
works subsidised by central and prefectural governments (usually a combination thereof ) will be
carried out. As Itô explains, ‘politicians, through their introduction of budgets to local areas
(constituencies,) which are called the designated places (kashozuke), respond to the expectations of
companies and voters’. Itô, ‘Heisei Jiken Fuairu: Nôrin Jigyô Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka
Toshikatsu’, p. 64.
155 For example, for a long time, in relation to the MAFF’s agricultural structure improvement (nôgyô kôzô
kaizen) projects (jigyô), ‘a system of “group leader administration” (hanchô gyôsei) operated in which
the opinions of the assistant divisional chiefs in charge (tantô kachô hosa), namely gikan, were particularly
influential. This was because the standards for authorising (nintei) the project district (chiku) and for
allocating the project cost were not transparent. Such a process created room over a long period for new
selections and budget allocations to be made at the discretion of the person in charge, who had greater
specialised knowledge and experience.’ See the interim report of Watanabe Yoshiaki, who chaired the
MAFF’s ‘Committee for Investigations Relating to Agricultural Structure Improvement Public Works’,
which was established in late 1999. The report was quoted in Ishii Kôki, ‘Nôsuishô Osen: Amakudari
Konsarutanto ga Genkyô da’ [‘MAFF Contamination: The Amakudari Consultants Are the Ringleaders’],
Bungei Shunjû, May 2000, p. 199.
156 ‘Za Sankuchuari: Jimintô “Nôrin Zoku”’ [‘The Sanctuary: LDP “Agriculture and Forestry Tribe”’],
Sentaku, Vol. 30, No. 2, February 2004, p. 59.
157 In Japanese, the concept of riken often involves the idea of businesses colluding with public organisations
and politicians.
158 See Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.
50 POWER AND PORK
3
ACCOMMODATING ELECTORAL
REFORM
Matsuoka, like every other Lower House Diet member, faced a vastly altered
political world and electoral landscape as a result of the overhaul of the Lower
House electoral system in 1994. The most important aspect of the changes
was the restructuring of the Lower House electoral system into a combination
of 300 first-past-the-post single-member districts (SMDs) and 11 regional
blocs electing 200 candidates on a proportional representation (PR) basis.1
The electoral boundaries in Kumamoto Prefecture were redrawn, which
changed its electoral composition from two MMDs to five SMDs. Now that
Matsuoka was contesting a seat as the only LDP candidate, the altered electoral
arrangements directly affected his electoral prospects and required some
adjustment to his campaign strategy.
CONSTITUENCY REORGANISATION
The reorganisation of seats in Kumamoto Prefecture transferred Matsuoka from
Kumamoto (1) with five seats to Kumamoto (3) with one seat. He was no
longer competing against members of his own party, but in order to win the
seat, he had to obtain a plurality—the most votes of any candidate standing
for the seat. Matsuoka himself was opposed to the small constituency system,
possibly fearing that it would make electoral battles even tougher, stating that
‘candidates will alter their opinions and behaviour in line with whoever is
powerful at the time’.2
Kumamoto (3) was located in the middle of Kyushu at the North Eastern
part of Kumamoto Prefecture, known as ‘fire country’ (kaji no kuni) because of
Mt. Aso. It was relatively large in geographic size in comparison to the other
ACCOMMODATING ELECTORAL REFORM 51
SMDs in the prefecture, which was indicative of its lower population density.
Only Kumamoto (5) at the western end was bigger in area.
The electoral reorganisation not only sought to equalise the value of votes as far as
possible across the new SMDs, but also to draw the geographic boundaries of the
new districts around the jiban of sitting members. While the overall size of electoral
districts might have shrunk, electoral restructuring was implemented in such a way
that politicians such as Matsuoka were able to maintain their geographically
concentrated voting bases. Kumamoto (3) encompassed Matsuoka’s hometown (Aso
Town) in his home county (Aso County), and it also retained Kamoto County and
Kikuchi County as well as two cities, Yamaga City and Kikuchi City.
CHANGING THE CHARACTER OF THE ELECTORATE

The key consequence of electoral reform for Matsuoka was that his constituency
became more rural. Kumamoto (3) lost Kumamoto City, with farm households
constituting only 1.1 per cent of total households (see Table 2.1). It also lost
the highly urbanised areas of Arao City and Tamana City (see Table 2.1).
Kumamoto (3) had only two cities, Yamaga City and Kikuchi City, which had
higher proportions of farm households (see Table 2.1). Matsuoka could now
forget about having to battle it out for votes in the big cities of Kumamoto
Prefecture, including Kumamoto City.
At the time of the electoral reorganisation, Kumamoto (3) was classed as
semi-rural (junnôsonteki senkyoku),3 which was defined as an electoral district
with more than 20 per cent of the population employed in primary industry.4
Thus, Matsuoka’s electorate changed in socio-economic character from semi-
urban Kumamoto (1) to semi-rural Kumamoto (3). His constituency became
more rural and agricultural because it encompassed mainly rural counties.
Matsuoka went from an electorate with an average of 6.4 per cent farm
households out of the total across all municipalities in 1990 to one with an
average of 19.9 per cent farm households across all municipalities in 2000 (see
Table 2.2 and Table 3.1). The electorate’s average figure of 19.9 per cent farm
households compared with the national average of only 2.75 per cent.5 Similarly,
population density in Kumamoto (3) at 160 persons per square km was less
than half the population density across the whole country at 340 persons per
square km in 2000.6
Matsuoka’s constituency was a good example of an electorate that became
more homogeneous in socio-economic composition and occupational character
52 POWER AND PORK
as a result of the electoral reorganisation. His smaller constituency of Kumamoto

(3) was much less diverse than the larger one of Kumamoto (1). The redrawing
of electoral boundaries meant that agricultural and forestry interests became
more concentrated in his electorate.
The practical effects of electoral reorganisation were, therefore, to divest
Matsuoka’s constituency of a large number of urban voters. This enabled him
to concentrate on representing rural regions and farm and forestry interests.
Instead of turning Matsuoka into a something-for-everyone kind of politician,
electoral reform, by changing the composition of his constituency, actually
enhanced Matsuoka’s position as a rural-regional representative and nôrin giin.
This outcome ran directly counter to the conventional wisdom about the
impact of the 1994 electoral reform. The former MMD system, in which
different candidates from the same party (the LDP) could offer specialised
representation of particular interests, had changed to an SMD system in which
the party candidate needed a plurality to win the seat. This was expected to
force party candidates to develop wide appeal that would attract a range of
voters and their interests. In theory, the changeover to the new system should
have meant that Diet members representing SMDs, including Matsuoka, could
no longer afford to rely so heavily on farm and rural votes. Because their special-
interest supporters could not deliver a plurality they would have to broaden
their appeal to a wider cross-section of voters.
In Matsuoka’s case, however, electoral reform had the reverse effect. The
composition of his new electorate supported even stronger sectoral specialisation.
He was able to project himself more starkly as a representative of agricultural
and forestry interests. The practical effects of the new system were to make the
electoral battle easier for Matsuoka because he had a logical appeal for the
large proportion of naturally conservative voters (many with agricultural and
forestry interests) in his newly constructed electorate. Whereas in the past he
had to fight hard for city votes (especially against candidates such as Noda,
Hosokawa, Uozumi and the JSP and Kômeitô candidates), his prospects were
now for an easier time appealing largely to rural county voters.
The impact of electoral reform for Matsuoka demonstrated that the new
electoral system did not turn all SMD candidates from policy specialists into
policy generalists. In some cases, the electoral reforms supported an even stronger
policy specialism, and the incentives for Matsuoka to represent sectional interests
were reinforced. Moreover, Matsuoka retained his jiban in the new electorate,
to which he was encouraged to supply regionally concentrated policy services.

So the incentives for localism also remained.
Thus, being a nôrin giin and being a politician who had a strong
geographically focused jiban served Matsuoka well in the changed system. He
was able to continue to base his electoral appeal on what he could personally
deliver to his constituents in the way of pork-barrel benefits as well as agricultural
and forestry policy concessions, and not cleaving to some general manifesto of
the LDP as a whole.7 Although Matsuoka was the only candidate now standing
for the LDP in Kumamoto (3), his election campaign remained centred on his
personal vote-seeking style and was conducted primarily on an individual basis
(kojin honi). Such an orientation was further encouraged by the fact that his
main opposition was now his old rival Uozumi, ex-LDP, standing for the New
Frontier Party,8 which effectively split the conservative vote in Kumamoto (3).
ORGANISING THE VOTE

For Matsuoka, as for all LDP election candidates following electoral reform,
his kôenkai remained the principal means by which he mobilised votes and
organised campaign activities.9 Not only did he maintain his kôenkai, but he
also strengthened it. The LDP’s Kumamoto Prefecture No.3 Electoral District
Branch (Jiyûminshutô Kumamoto-ken Daisan Senkyoku Shibu) became the
Kumamoto branch of Matsuoka’s kôenkai, located in Kikuyo Town in Kikuchi
County. There were two other branches, the Johoku branch located in Yamaga
City and the Aso Office in Minami Aso Village, Aso County. The kôenkai had
both a Youth Division (Seinenbu) and a Women’s Division (Fujinbu), which
Matsuoka addressed from time to time to rally support. He also arranged for
delegations of both groups to visit Tokyo from time to time for study tours of
the Diet and LDP headquarters.
The kôenkai contained a very tight network in Aso Town, which was the
core of Matsuoka’s jiban. The town mayor, Kawasaki Atsuo, was chairman of
Matsuoka’s kôenkai in that town. Kawasaki’s father became the first town mayor
when Aso Town was created out of the amalgamation of five towns and villages
in 1954, and he occupied that position for four terms. Extending over a period
of 36 years (although not continuously) Aso Town politics was firmly within
the grasp of father and son.10
Moreover, the local administrative set-up within Aso Town became virtually
synonymous with Matsuoka’s electoral organisation, extending right down to
54 POWER AND PORK
the grass roots and forming the core of his personal supporters’ organisation. A
branch of the Aso Town Associates’ Group (Dôshikai)—previously called the
Aso Town Construction Associates Group (Kensetsu Dôshikai)—entrenched
itself in each of the town’s 52 wards. Each branch had a head separate from the
head of the ward (kuchô), which was an administrative position. Members of
the group filled most of the important positions in the town office. The group
was formed in the current mayor’s father’s generation, and according to its
treasurer, about half the voters were members. It functioned as a mechanism
for Matsuoka to organise voting support. The Dôshikai’s president in 2003
was the president of a local construction company who had also served as
chairman of the local assembly, and who was the vice-president of the local
branch of Matsuoka’s kôenkai.11
Over a long period, the Dôshikai was considered to be synonymous with a
political control regime linking Matsuoka to affiliated prefectural assembly
members and town mayor Kawasaki. The section head of the group reputedly
had more power than the ward head, while its president, along with mayor
Kawasaki, headed up Matsuoka’s election countermeasures organisation (senkyo
taisaku soshiki) within his kôenkai. The organisational chart of the Dôshikai
corresponded exactly to Matsuoka’s election organisation.12
The Dôshikai also allegedly controlled the way people voted in Aso Town.
According to an influential figure privy to the internal affairs of the Matsuoka
political control regime, ‘at election time, a “trustworthy” person was sent
with a “dangerous” person to a polling station. The “dangerous” person had to
show the “trustworthy” person how they voted. If they hadn’t done the right
thing, they would be ostracised in the village. It’s not like it is in the cities’.13
A former member of the Dôshikai, who was previously involved in election
campaigns, recounted a similar story, describing how, in some localities,
members would go to vote in groups and show their ballot papers to each
other.14 As Hasegawa observes, ‘this behavior is reflective of a closed society
that puts a priority on regional and blood relations. As long as it continues,
the Matsuoka-affiliated prefectural assembly member-mayor Kawasaki regime
will be supported by its bedrock.’15
Such a system not only operated in national elections, but also in Aso Town
elections, helping to entrench the Matsuoka political control regime even more
deeply. The Dôshikai decided in detail how many votes would go to which
candidate in the town elections. As a result, 16–17 members of the group
were always elected to the 18-member town assembly. Such behaviour

represented a form of political vote-rigging (dango). The town assembly
members, who were elected through this kind of vote distribution, were unable
to say anything against Matsuoka’s regime, and so it became even more
embedded in the local political scene. What is more, town office officials (most
of whom were members of the Dôshikai) carried out vote counting in elections.
When a young, would-be lawyer and leader of a citizens’ movement, Izeri
Seigo, stood for the mayoralty against Kawasaki in April 2002, he was defeated
by only nine votes. A number of locals expressed their suspicions about unfair
counting in the election.16 Iseri was heard to comment that ‘the rule of law
was merely something that I studied in law school; it did not exist in reality’.17
This was a vote-gathering regime that centred on Matsuoka alone, not his
party. It was designed to attract a personal vote to Matsuoka himself, not to
the LDP, with the glue being the pork-barrel benefits Matsuoka could deliver
to his jiban and the patronage that Matsuoka could provide to his cabal of
personal supporters. He provided a crucial link for town locals to the centre of
power in Tokyo, and to the prefectural political world.
ORGANISING THE FUNDS18

Electoral reform occasioned a major restructuring of Matsuoka’s fund-gathering
arrangements. The big difference between the pre and post reform periods was
the rationalisation of Matsuoka’s political funding groups and his acquisition
of government subsidies through the party branch. This all took place in 1996,
the first year in which a national election was fought under the new system.
The previous year (1995) was effectively a transitional year, the first year in
which a formal report was made of political funding (¥10 million) flowing
through the local party branch, the LDP Kumamoto Prefecture No.3 Electoral
District Branch to Matsuoka.19 In 1996, the party branch became a much
bigger source of funding at ¥55 million.20 Matsuoka, as chairman of the local
LDP branch, was legally qualified to use funds from the public subsidy paid
to the branch by LDP headquarters. He could use the money to support his
kôenkai activities. In fact, the address of the local party branch of the LDP was
the same as Matsuoka’s kôenkai address in Kikuyo Town, Kikuchi County.
In 1996, Matsuoka’s political funding groups were all rolled into one: the
Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economics Discussion
Association, which collected the largest amount of any of his funding sources
56 POWER AND PORK
in that year—¥128 million. 21 Matsuoka’s kôenkai also generated a

substantial amount—¥97 million. 22 This three-fold structure remained
thereafter, with varying proportions of the total official funding gathered
from the three sources each year. Generally speaking, the largest amounts
came from Matsuoka’s political funding group, except for 2000 when the
biggest quantity was sourced from the LDP party branch (¥155 million). 23
In that year, Matsuoka’s kôenkai ranked second with ¥132 million and his
political funding group ranked third with ¥120 million. 24 Matsuoka also
received money from his faction, the Mitsuzuka faction.
Matsuoka remained in the Mitsuzuka faction until 1998, when he moved
to the Etô-Kamei faction (Shisuikai) led by Kamei Shizuka and Etô Takami.
The faction was composed of members of the Kamei group, which had
spun off from the faction headed by former Prime Minister Mori, and
former Nakasone faction members. Etô was a prominent member of the
nôrin zoku who became joint leader of the faction. Kamei was known to
hand out ‘pocket money’ to get his faction members to vote in the way he
wanted. In 1998 when Matsuoka joined, he received a ¥2 million
contribution from Kamei’s kôenkai. 25
Suzuki Muneo also remained an important source of financial backing
for Matsuoka. Suzuki’s 21 st Century Policy Research Association donated
a total of ¥6 million to Matsuoka’s New Century Politics and Economics
Discussion Association over four years: ¥2 million in 1996, ¥1.5 million
in 1997, ¥2 million in 1998 and ¥500,000 in 1999. 26 In addition,
Matsuoka received ¥500,000 from the LDP’s Hokkaido House of
Representatives Proportional Representation District No. 1 Branch in
1999. The LDP Kumamoto Prefecture Electoral District No. 3 Branch
also received ¥6 million in 2000. 27 This made the total amount ¥12.5
million from Muneo over this period.28
Matsuoka’s political funding group did not record the exact amount
received in several lots from Suzuki’s 21 st Century Policy Research
Association in 1995: ¥2 million in August 1995, ¥3.5 million in
September 1995 and ¥3 million in December 1995—for a total of ¥8.5
million. It only recorded a total of ¥2 million. 29 Taking the additional
amounts into account produced the grand sum of ¥19 million.
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AFTER THE REFORM

The 1996 Election
In the intervening period since the previous general election in which the
Japan New Party boom overhang continued to be felt, Matsuoka, who was re-
elected in 1996—the first poll held after the electoral reorganisation—increased
his voice in the Federation of Kumamoto Prefecture Liberal Democratic Party
Branches (Jiyû Minshutô Kumamoto-ken Shibu Rengôkai).30 He achieved a
closely fought victory over Uozumi standing for the New Frontier Party (see
Appendix). In the final vote count, Matsuoka beat Uozumi only by a whisker
(1,275 votes). It was Matsuoka’s continuing support in Aso County, where
Uozumi could only obtain around a third of the votes secured by Matsuoka,
which once again stood him in good stead and saved him from defeat. It was
fortunate for Matsuoka that the ever-popular Hosokawa stood for re-election
in Kumamoto (1) rather than in Kumamoto (3).
The most outstanding feature of the 1996 election was that it once again
underscored Matsuoka’s dependence on the voters of Aso County. Overall,
Matsuoka won 64.9 per cent of the total vote cast in Aso County, supplying
just under 40 per cent of his total vote. He won first place in all the towns and
villages in the county (see Table 3.1), with the proportion of his vote ranging
from 56.7 per cent in Nishihara Village to 75.9 per cent in Kugino Village.
His vote tally in Aso Town was higher than ever at 31,081 votes, which was
72.2 per cent of the total vote. The figures pointed to Matsuoka’s successful
consolidation of his jiban in Aso County and his increasing reliance on this
region for electoral support. Clearly Matsuoka had successfully made the
transition from Kumamoto (1) to Kumamoto (3), transferring the hard vote
based on his hometown and home county into the new electorate. He retained
the part of the electorate that had always supported him strongly and it became
an even bigger rock on which his electoral performance rested.
Matsuoka gained uniformly second place in all the towns and villages of
Kikuchi County, with Uozumi beating him into 1 st place. Nevertheless,
Matsuoka’s vote tally in Kikuchi County was nearly three times what it had
been three years earlier in 1993 (compare Table 2.2 and Table 3.1). Matsuoka
was even more popular in Kamoto County where he won first place in all the
towns except for Ueki Town (see Table 3.1).
58
Name of municipality No. of farma Farm households Votes cast for % of total % of Matsuoka’s Placing among 4
households as % of total in Matsuoka cast vote total vote candidates
municipality/ies
Cities 3,224 16.1 11,637 33.3 14.4 2nd
Yamaga City 1,490 13.2 7,365 41.2 9.1 2nd
Kikuchi City 1,734 20.0 4,272 25.0 5.3 2nd
Counties 17,293 20.7 69,088 47.9 85.6 1st
Kamoto County 5,052 29.5 14,233 43.1 17.6 1st
Kahoku Town* 795 54.3 1,798 49.5 2.2 1st
Kikuka Town* 1,158 55.6 2,632 52.9 3.3 1st
Kamoto Town* 603 22.8 2,464 47.7 3.0 1st
Kao Town* 695 47.2 1,821 49.3 2.3 1st
Ueki Town 1,801 19.1 5,518 35.5 6.8 2nd
Kikuchi County 4,570 11.1 23,774 37.6 29.5 2nd
Shichijo Town 618 39.4 1,438 49.5 2.2 2nd
POWER AND PORK
Kyokushi Village 533 36.8 1,477 52.9 3.3 2nd

Ozu Town 1,148 12.6 5,681 47.7 3.1 2nd
Kikuyo Town 729 8.0 4,710 49.3 2.3 2nd
Koshi Town 505 7.4 3,672 35.5 6.8 2nd
Shisui Town 620 14.8 2,663 49.5 2.2 2nd
Nishigoshi Town 417 4.7 4,133 52.9 3.3 2nd
Aso County 7,671 31.1 31,081 64.9 38.5 1st
Aso Town 1,643 27.6 8,867 72.2 11.0 1st
Oguni Town 854 28.5 3,701 62.0 4.6 1st
Soyo Town 733 49.8 2,304 74.3 2.9 1st
Takamori Town 616 25.1 2,806 60.0 3.5 1st
Kugino Village 420 57.1 1,412 75.9 1.7 1st
Choyo Village 401 18.7 1,690 57.6 2.1 1st
Total/average 20,517 19.9 80,725 45.1 100.0 1st
Notes: a Farm household data are for 2000.
Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, 2001. Heisei 12-nen Kokusei Chôsa Hôkoku Dai 2-kan Dai I-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuken, Shichôson
Hen-43 Kumamoto-ken [Year 2000 National Census Report Vol. 2 Primary Basic Statistical Results 2 Prefectures and Municipalities Edition 43 Kumamoto
Prefecture], Tokyo, Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, pp: 288–91 and 294–303; Asahi Shinbunsha Senkyo Honbu, 1997. Asahi Senkyo Taikan: Dai 41-kai
Shûgiin Sôsenkyo (Heisei 8-nen 10-gatsu), Dai 17-kai Sangiin Tsûjô Senkyo (Heisei 7-nen 7-gatsu) [Asahi General Survey of Election: The 41st House of
Representatives General Election (October 1996), The 17th House of Councillors Regular Election (July 1995)], Tokyo, Asahi Shimbunsha, p. 278.
ACCOMMODATING ELECTORAL REFORM
59
60 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka’s total county vote shot up considerably in the 1996 election,

rising by more than 20,000 votes. It supplied 85.6 per cent of Matsuoka’s
supporting votes (see Table 3.1). The most substantial increases occurred in
Kamoto County and Kikuchi County. The smaller proportional rise in Aso County
suggested that Matsuoka’s level of support there was just about at saturation
point. The general picture of Matsuoka’s electoral performance in the counties
underlined his position as the farm and rural-regional representative.
Amongst voters in urban areas, Matsuoka gained second place (to Uozumi)
in Yamaga City and Kikuchi City, winning 41.2 per cent of the vote in Yamaga
City but only 25.0 per cent in Kikuchi City (see Table 3.1), where Uozumi
was more popular. Overall, city votes shrank to 14.4 per cent of Matsuoka’s
total vote (see Table 3.1), underscoring once again Matsuoka’s unequivocal
conversion to farm and rural-regional representative of the district.
Based on these figures, the composition of Matsuoka’s voting support was
clear: strong backing from rural counties, and especially strong support from his
jiban, which was a reliable and continuing source of votes. Not surprisingly, in
Kumamoto Prefecture Matsuoka came to be known as ‘Aso’s Matsuoka’. His
slim margin of victory also served to underscore the regionally concentrated
nature of his support base.
In the campaign itself, name recognition was no longer an issue. Matsuoka
was a third-time candidate who had already made a name for himself in both
policy activities and in rieki yûdô seiji.31 His public promises (kôyaku) prior to
the election contained the usual all-embracing goals of ‘establishing stable
politics’, ‘implementing social welfare policies’, ‘reviving agriculture, forestry
and fishery industries and agricultural, mountain and fishing villages’,
‘promoting administrative reform, including educational reform’, and
‘maintaining basic transport and information networks’.32
As for money, figures reveal that financial support skyrocketed in 1996
compared with earlier years. However, the election was marred by violation of
the Public Office Election Law by one of Matsuoka’s local secretaries, and the
issuing of a subsequent search warrant against his name. When interviewed
about it, Matsuoka said, ‘I’m very disappointed. So that it never happens
again, we’re making sure that everyone in the [electoral] office knows [the
rules], and we’ve put up notices around the office’.33
Matsuoka was recommended by the Nokyo National Council in the 1996
election, but did not appear on a list of prefectural nôseiren-endorsed candidates.34
A member of a Kumamoto agricultural cooperative posted a comment about

Matsuoka on the Internet, which said, ‘Matsuoka sensei is really terrible. When
the votes for the LDP in the Kumamoto PR electorate were low, he put incredible
pressure on each unit agricultural cooperative. Most people were voting for
Hosokawa sensei [who was standing for the New Frontier Party]. We really had
lots of trouble in the election when Hosokawa sensei gained a lot of votes…’35
For Matsuoka to receive electoral support from the prefectural nôseiren, he
had to demonstrate sympathy for, and understanding of, the organisation’s
agricultural policy campaigns (nôsei undô), and to make a public promise of
adherence to a position that would reflect the intentions of Nokyo along with
farmers in politics. In exchange for recommendation and authorisation (kônin
mo suishin mo), he would have to sign a policy agreement with the organisation
and become a staunch friend (meiyû) of the league.36
After the election, Matsuoka, along with 139 other successful Diet members
who had been recommended by the National Council, fronted up at a
‘Gathering to Talk About the Future of Japanese Agriculture’ hosted by the
National Council and the National Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives
(Zenkoku Nôgyô Kyôdô Kumiai Chûokai, or Zenchû). The management of
each prefecture’s nôseiren was also in attendance. Because Matsuoka was
chairman of the LDP’s Agriculture and Forestry Division (Nôrin Bukai) at the
time, he featured prominently in the speechmaking.
He also attended a ‘Meeting to Talk with Diet Members’ hosted by the
Kumamoto Prefecture nôseiren and the Kumamoto Prefecture Nokyo Central
Union (Kumamoto-ken Nôgyô Kyôdô Kumiai Chûokai) in September 1997.
The four LDP Diet members officially endorsed and recommended by the
prefectural nôseiren in the 1996 elections reportedly attended this meeting.
Each of the Diet members who participated issued their national policy reports
and exchanged opinions with Nokyo officials on topics and issues relating to
farmers in Kumamoto including rice production adjustment (gentan), the
quantity of rice for government purchase (seifumai), the new basic law for
agriculture, and the management of farms producing buckwheat noodles (soba)
and igusa as well as livestock products.37
THE 2000 ELECTION

The Lower House election in 2000 represented the peak of Matsuoka’s electoral
performance in his entire Diet career. He was up against a bunch of new
62
Name of municipality No. of farm Farm households Votes cast for % of total % of Matsuoka’s Placing among
households as % of total in Matsuoka cast vote total vote 4 candidates
municipality/ies
Cities 3,224 16.1 17,832 56.4 16.3 1st
Yamaga City 1,490 13.2 10,427 62.0 9.6 1st
Kikuchi City 1,734 20.0 7,405 50.0 6.8 1st
Counties 17,293 20.7 91,295 65.2 83.7 1st
Kamoto County 5,052 29.5 21,919 69.2 20.1 1st
Kahoku Town* 795 54.3 2,657 76.2 2.4 1st
Kikuka Town 1,158 55.6 3,753 77.8 3.4 1st
Kamoto Town 603 22.8 3,532 71.4 3.2 1st
Kao Town 695 47.2 2,499 71.7 2.3 1st
Ueki Town 1,801 19.1 9,478 63.5 8.7 1st
Kikuchi County 4,570 11.1 35,339 56.2 32.4 1st
Shichijo Town 618 39.4 2,279 66.4 2.1 1st
Kyokushi Village 533 36.8 2,239 72.3 2.1 1st
POWER AND PORK
Ozu Town 1,148 12.6 7,594 59.0 7.0 1st

Kikuyo Town 729 8.0 7,295 56.4 6.7 1st
Koshi Town 505 7.4 5,475 51.3 5.0 1st
Shisui Town 620 14.8 4,147 58.1 3.8 1st
Nishigoshi Town 417 4.7 6,310 49.7 5.8 1st
Aso County 7,671 31.1 34,037 74.7 31.2 1st
Aso Town 1,643 27.6 9,275 79.2 8.5 1st
Oguni Town 854 28.5 4,161 74.1 3.8 1st
Soyo Town 733 49.8 2,257 77.3 2.1 1st
Takamori Town 616 25.1 3,104 70.5 2.8 1st
Choyo Village 401 18.7 1,999 73.8 1.8 1st
Total 20,517 19.9 109,127 63.6 100.0 1st
Note: a Farm household data are for 2000.
Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, Heisei 12-nen Kokusei Chôsa Hôkoku Dai 2-kan Dai I-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuken, Shichôson Hen-43
Kumamoto-ken, pp: 288–91 and 294–303; Kumamoto-ken Hômu Pêji/Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, (Dai 42-kai) Shûgiingiin Sôsenkyo (Shôsenkyoku)
Kaihyô Kekka: Heisei 12-nen 6-gatsu 25-nichi [(The 42nd) House of Representatives General Election (Single-Member Districts), The Results of the Vote
Count: 25 June 2000], p. 3; <http://www.pref.kumamoto.jp/gyousei/senkan/osirase/no42/pdf/04.pdf>.
ACCOMMODATING ELECTORAL REFORM
63
64 POWER AND PORK
candidates, all relative unknowns (see Appendix) against whom he was a clear
favourite. For the first and only time, Matsuoka won first place in all the towns
and cities of Kumamoto (3) (see Table 3.2).
Because Uozumi (having lost the last election to Matsuoka by a whisker)
had moved to the Upper House, a split in the conservative vote was avoided.
The absence of Uozumi as an electoral rival meant that Matsuoka won close to
80 per cent of the LDP vote. This did not stop him, however, from
simultaneously standing on the LDP party list in the Kyushu bloc.
In addition, Matsuoka benefited from being a jointly endorsed LDP-Kômeitô
candidate (the average increase in support for LDP candidates across electorates
from this arrangement was reportedly 20,000-30,000 votes). These were not
personal votes, but party-influenced votes. Even so, the distribution of Matsuoka’s
support remained relatively the same across the electorate. As Table 3.2 indicates,
Aso Town in Aso County remained Matsuoka’s most reliable source of support,
providing the highest number of votes ever for Matsuoka (34,037) and almost a
third of his total vote with 74.7 per cent of votes in that county going his way.
Clearly Matsuoka’s jiban in Aso County remained absolutely unshakeable and
unassailable. This was despite a deliberate effort by the DPJ candidate, Hamaguchi
Kazuhisa, to try and pick up the anti-Matsuoka vote by holding large-scale
gatherings in Matsuoka’s home district of Aso Town.38
The key differences between the 1996 and 2000 elections were the rise in
Matsuoka’s support in Yamaga City and Kikuchi City (no doubt partly due to
Kômeitô’s endorsement) and the massive increase in support for him across
the counties (by more than 20,000 votes in total) (compare Table 3.1 and
3.2). The latter could be attributed to the consolidation of Matsuoka’s power
as a nôrin giin and his attainment, by 2000, of agriculture and forestry tribe
Diet member (nôrin zoku) status.39 In the interim, Matsuoka had played a key
role in guiding benefits to the localities of Kumamoto (3) and in influencing
agriculture and forestry policymaking in LDP and Diet committees. Matsuoka’s
own public election promises, with echoes of 1996, contained the usual mix
of bland generalities and motherhood statements, such as ‘reviving the market
and economy’, ‘implementing a social welfare policy’, ‘implementing
educational reform and public safety countermeasures’, ‘rejuvenating regional
areas’, and ‘strengthening international and diplomatic undertakings for
resolving population, food and environmental problems’.40
Matsuoka was the only candidate standing in Kumamoto (3) to receive the
official recommendation of the Nokyo National Council and the Kumamoto
Prefecture nôseiren in the 2000 election. In order to receive the recommendation,
Matsuoka had to pass through a comprehensive vetting process by the Nokyo
organisation. Several steps were involved: approval of his answers to a public
questionnaire set by the organisation and the signing of a policy agreement
relating to political topics, which demonstrated Matsuoka’s real understanding
of the concerns of the organisation, and an application by the prefectural nôseiren
to the National Council for recommendation by the entire body—both national
and prefectural—operating in a unified fashion.41
Less obvious to the public view was Matsuoka’s ever-tighter network of
contacts with construction industry executives in his electorate. According to
the son of one such executive, these ‘recruits’ to Matsuoka’s cause were not
always willing. During the election, the president of a concrete company found
his name on a list of Matsuoka promoters. When he went to Matsuoka’s
campaign-launching ceremony as instructed by his secretary, he was asked to
take a position on the podium. The president got fairly angry at this kind of
treatment and consequently voted for the DPJ. 42
THE QUINTESSENTIAL SPECIAL-INTEREST POLITICIAN

In winning and retaining the seat of Kumamoto (3) in the 1996 and 2000
elections, Matsuoka’s political and policy behaviour were once again
predominantly shaped by local and sectional interests as well as by the personal
interests of certain clients. These interests were significantly but not
substantially affected by electoral reform.
Local interests
Winning the seat of Kumamoto (3) meant that Matsuoka had to work really
hard as the representative of that electoral district. The SMD system intensified
the electoral competition that Matsuoka faced while concurrently shrinking
the geographic size of his electorate, which encouraged an even stronger
predisposition towards localism.43 The new electoral system thus entrenched
rather than curbed Matsuoka’s ‘constituency-service-oriented politics’. 44
Matsuoka was a good example of how electoral reform in Japan had the contra-
indicated effect of unleashing the unrestrained forces of localism.
66 POWER AND PORK
Another significant difference was that the new electoral system encouraged
Matsuoka into a whole constituency-service orientation rather than simply a
predominant focus on his jiban. While the latter remained extremely
important, the need for a plurality meant that Matsuoka had to direct his
appeals to the entire electorate and not just to a specific part of it. This
meant doing whatever he could to direct public resources across the whole
electorate. In this way, Matsuoka attempted to demonstrate that he was the
most effective representative of that district.
The changeover to the new electoral system thus strengthened the
incentives for Matsuoka to engage in pork-barrelling, to make promises about
what he was going to do for his constituency and to broaden regionally
concentrated policy services beyond his jiban. Although Matsuoka’s primary
electoral payback was to the voters of Aso County, he could not afford to
neglect the rest of the electoral district because of his need for a plurality.
One of the most significant impacts on Matsuoka’s representation of interests
was, therefore, the incentive to engage even more intensively in rieki yûdô seiji.
To differentiate himself from his rivals (from different parties) under such a
system, he had to demonstrate the advantages he had as an incumbent. Guiding
benefits to the whole district was the best way to do this. Moreover, because
he was now the only member of the LDP elected from his Kumamoto
constituency, his power strengthened in the prefecture.44
Through his successful acquisition of public works projects for a number of
areas in his constituency, but particularly for the towns and villages of Aso County,
Matsuoka consolidated his reputation as a politician who guided benefits to
local areas (rieki yûdôgata no seijika).45 Matsuoka was described as ‘very useful’ in
alerting the central agencies to local interests and in securing budgets and
projects.46 In fact, in his constituency, Matsuoka’s record of obtaining funds for
various public works projects was soon unsurpassed. As far as the residents in the
deserted rural and mountainous villages of Kumamoto were concerned, where
agriculture was in decline and where young people had all left for the cities,
public works were indispensable as the only industry in town. For them, it was
said, ‘Matsuoka was a necessary evil’.47 Matsuoka commented during a general
meeting for party reform at LDP headquarters in November 1997: ‘If you want
to call me a “civil engineering Diet member” (doboku giin), then do that. There
are no Diet members who aren’t thinking about elections’.48 In this sense,
Matsuoka ‘did not hide the fact that he was a “concessions king”’.49
Matsuoka became a great believer in getting down to the grass roots and
conducting on-the-spot investigations of particular issues of concern to locals.
His website exhibited photographs of numerous visits to this place or that,
discussing matters with farmers and others. Matsuoka always returned to his
locality at the end of each week and met up with local people, talking to them
and getting to know what they wanted.
Besides bringing public works back to his electorate, representing local interests
was crucial to Matsuoka’s electoral fate in other ways. Localism was more than
just rieki yûdô seiji. It required him to exert influence on behalf of local politicians
in his constituency over particular matters of concern to them, such as budget
allocations to particular municipalities, local government amalgamations, the
impact of the central government’s decentralisation policies and the distribution
of fiscal powers between central and local governments. Matsuoka was often
visited by delegations of local leaders and politicians from his electorate, wanting
him to intercede with the central government on issues affecting local government
in their area. For example, some municipalities in Kumamoto (3) were alarmed
about the potential impact of local government mergers on government spending
in their localities, such as cuts in public works that could undermine the regional
economy. In February 2003, LDP Diet members representing Kumamoto
Prefecture, including M atsuoka, met to exchange opinions with municipal
mayors. A majority of the local mayors felt that consideration should be given to
the distinctive situation in each district in the local government merger process.
The LDP Diet members’ group confirmed that they would consider the earnest
opinions of regional representatives and strive to reflect them in policies.51
Matsuoka also regularly hosted study tours of the Diet by his local constituents.
He was happy to show groups of visitors from his jiban various aspects of Diet
and party operations in Tokyo. The Aso branch of the association of ward heads,
for example, visited Matsuoka in Tokyo and asked to be shown around the Diet.
Matsuoka was able to say that he hoped everyone had gained some idea of where
he worked and how important his job was as a Diet member.52 Another such
tour included 18 people from Oguni Town, Kikuchi City and Omori Town.
Matsuoka showed them around the Diet and introduced them to various Diet
members.
Sectional interests
Because of the predominantly rural nature of his support base, Matsuoka was
concerned with conditions in rural-regional industries. After electoral reform,
68 POWER AND PORK
his support rate in individual municipalities of Kumamoto (3) became highly

correlated with the percentage of farm households in that municipality. For
example, a significant correlation in the 2000 poll results could be observed
between the percentage of farm households in a municipality and the percentage
of the total vote Matsuoka received.53
The switch to a single-member electorate did not, therefore, force Matsuoka
to sacrifice his agricultural and forestry policy specialism in order to broaden
his appeal to a wider cross-section of voters. He retained and indeed consolidated
his representation of farm and forestry interests. If anything, an agricultural
and forestry policy niche beckoned him even more strongly. There were many
farm votes to be retained as well as new ones to be won in his new constituency.
Indeed, he had to cater to farm households and forest owners even more
assiduously in Kumamoto (3) than in Kumamoto (1).
As a nôrin giin, Matsuoka combined two predominant types of
representation. The first was representation of large aggregated interests such
as agriculture and forestry in terms of advancing particular macro-policy
objectives, often defined in cooperation with large integrative interest groups
such as Nokyo or the forest associations. Matsuoka made a point of attending
‘request roundtables’ of the Kumamoto Nokyo organisation at which he
listened to what locals were saying about particular problems.
The second was representation of special interests through the application of
micro-policies and/or allocations of specific-purpose subsidies to particular groups
of beneficiaries. Agricultural and forestry policy generated a lot of pork-barrel
benefits including subsidies for agriculture and rural infrastructure that could
benefit particular localities, or agricultural cooperatives or other groups of farmers.
So it doubled as policy that could also serve local interests in the electorate.
On the other hand, as the sole Diet representative from Kumamoto (3),
Matsuoka had to take care of all aspects of the lives of his supporters in those
municipalities where he won a plurality of votes—their welfare, economic,
social and livelihood needs and so on. When his margin of victory was so
small, as his generally was, every vote counted. He could not afford to concentrate
exclusively on regional areas and agricultural and forestry issues and ignore the
cities. After all, supporters in Yamaga City and Kikuchi City delivered 14.4
per cent of his total vote in the 1996 elections and 16.3 per cent in 2000. So
Matsuoka had to be concerned with city businesses and other economic and
social issues of concern to urban voters.
Such policies were, however, a sideshow to the Matsuoka’s main orientation

towards localism and sectionalism. These were the primary strategies by which
he sought electoral success. The strongly bifurcated rural-urban split in his
electoral strategy adopted during his days as Diet representative for Kumamoto
(3) was abandoned. Once again, Matsuoka’s changed electoral circumstances
challenged predictions that the new electoral system would exclusively produce
policy generalists rather than policy specialists, and median vote-seekers rather
than special-interest vote-seekers. Quite the reverse, Matsuoka’s specialism
became more pronounced in keeping with the more homogeneous nature of
his constituency in rural counties, which provided the large majority of his
supporting votes.
Every New Year Matsuoka delivered a National Policy Report to the inner
circle of his kôenkai in the Aso Town Gymnasium.54 The report referred to
Matsuoka’s achievements in all areas of public policy, but particularly to the
agriculture and forestry policies that he had influenced and to his achievements
in terms of bringing pork-barrel benefits back to his electorate.
Clientelistic interests
Because the new electoral system intensified competition amongst candidates
for a plurality, Matsuoka had an even stronger incentive to offer his services
as a mediator to those seeking personal favours in order to secure votes and
political funds. Matsuoka faced an environment of heightened competition
for bribery and ‘financial influence corruption’.55 Electoral reform failed to
convert Matsuoka into a new style of politician, primarily concerned with
programmatic policies rather than with special interests and individually
brokered deals.
Such activity involved engineering benefits not only for the leaders of
particular interest groups and other public, semi-public and private
organisations, but also for businessmen as well as for local government politicians
and officials. Matsuoka constantly received petitioners in his Diet office seeking
his patronage in the form of favours regarding various matters. Matsuoka’s
natural expectation was to deliver benefits in exchange for money or votes.
Once when an executive of a public interest corporation (shadan hôjin) visited
Matsuoka to petition him for a favour, Matsuoka shouted at him, ‘I am not
doing this job as Diet member for a hobby. If you don’t bring money, bring
votes’.56 Such a comment revealed the depth of Matsuoka’s orientation towards
70 POWER AND PORK
clientelistic interests and his propensity to act as a political broker. As one

member of the Japanese public averred, ‘he is a conscientious person who
will do anything if you give him money’.57 When the Mediation for Profit
Prohibition Law (Assen Ritoku Kinshihô), which made it a crime for politicians
to receive compensation for mediating with bureaucrats and others over matters
such as public works contracts, was debated in the Diet in 2000, Matsuoka
opposed the bill. He remarked that ‘denying mediation results in the denying
of the politicians themselves. It is erroneous to assert that mediation is evil’.58
He also commented on the subject of collecting contributions from
construction companies, saying that these were effectively ‘a repayment for
services rendered’.59
NOTES
1 The figure of 200 was reduced to 180 prior to the 2000 election.
2 Nakanishi, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 28.
3 Shigeki Nishihira, ‘Shosenkyoku Bunrui Kijun no Teian’ [‘Proposals for a Classification Standard for
the Single-Member Electorate System’], Chûô Chôsahô, No. 449, March 1995, p. 5; electoral data
kindly supplied by author, worksheet, p. 2.
4 A total of 26 SMDs out of the total of 300 were categorised in this most rural of electoral categories. The
percentage of population employed in primary industries in Kumamoto (3) at the time was 25.0 per
cent (ibid.).
5 This figure was calculated from data available at http://www.pref.kumamoto.jp/statistics/siryo/
h15nenkan/xl_data/nenkan_data/nenkan-SB1.xls. The figures are based on the 2000 census.
6 Data was obtained from http://www.pref.kumamoto.jp/statistics/siryo/h15nenkan/xl_data/
nenkan_data/nenkan-SB1.xls and http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2000/kihon1/00/zuhyou/
a001.xls
7 As Curtis has aptly commented, where candidates in the new Lower House electoral districts ‘differ
tends to depend more on the kind of constituency they are running in than the party they belong to.
Elections take place in separate districts. They are rarely nationwide referenda on broad policy issues.
In a country such as Japan…where parties are loosely structured, what candidates say their policies are
depends on what they think will get them elected in their particular districts’. The Logic of Japanese
Politics, p. 164.
8 Its Japanese title was Shinshintô.
9 Ellis S. Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, ‘Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet
Charm of the LDP’, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 30, No.1, Winter 2004, pp. 10–13.
10 Hasegawa Hiroshi, ‘Jimin “Gajô” no Chikaku Hendô’ [‘A Tectonic Shift in an LDP “Stronghold”’],
Aera, 24 November 2003, p. 26.
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.

20 ibid. See also below.
21 ibid.
22 ibid. All these figures were confirmed by the nationwide analysis of political funding conducted by the
Asahi Shinbun in 1998. See ‘Seiji Shikin Zenkoku Chôsa Kekka: 96-nen Sôsenkyô, Shôsenkyoku
Kanren Tôsensha 384 Ninbun o Kôkai’ [‘Results of the National Investigation of Political Funding’:
Disclosure of 384 Successfully Elected Persons in the 1996 General Election’]. Available from http:/
/www.asahi.com/paper/special/shikin/
24 ibid.
25 ibid., p. 48.
26 ibid., pp. 48–49.
27 These are the years in which they were reported; they were actually received in the preceding year.
28 Kitamatsu, et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, pp. 48–49.
29 ibid. p. 49.
30 Itô, ‘Heisei Jiken Fuairu: Nôrin Jigyô Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 65.
32 See http://www.kumanichi.co.jp/senkyo/senkyo-33.html
33 See http://www.kumanichi.co.jp/senkyo/senkyo-33.html
34 Dai 41-kai Shûgiin Giin Sôsenkyo: Fuken Nôsei Undô Soshiki Suishin, Shiji Tôsen Giin Ichiran’
[‘The 41 st House of Representatives General Election: A Summary of Elected Diet Members
Recommended and Supported by Prefectural Agricultural Policy Campaign Organizations’], Nôsei
Undô Jyânaru, No. 10, November 1996, p. 22.
35 See http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html/
36 ‘Genchi Rupo—Kumamoto ken’ [‘On the Spot Report—Kumamoto Prefecture’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru,
No. 24, March 1999, p. 29.
37 ‘Suishin Giin to Meiyû no Paipu o Futoku’ [‘Fattening the Staunch Friend Pipe with Recommended
Diet Members’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 15, September 1996, p. 23.
38 Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 2000.
39 See also below, Chapter 4 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Giin’, and Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power
as a Nôrin Zoku’.
40 See http://www.kumanichi.co.jp/senkyo/senkyo2000/kouho/kouho31.html
41 ‘Dai 42-kai Shûgiin Sôsenkyo ni mukete’ [‘With a View to the 42 nd House of Representatives
Election’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 30, April 2000, p. 3.
43 As Curtis observes, ‘[a]s a general matter, the smaller the district, the greater is the tendency for
candidates and voters to be concerned with local issues’. The Logic of Japanese Politics, p. 163. As he
points out, ‘the U.S. House of Representatives—with single-member districts—is better known for
pork-barrel politics than for sober consideration of how best to design policies to serve the broad
national interest’. The Logic of Japanese Politics, pp. 163–64.
44 ibid., p. 164.
46 ‘“Muneo no Bôrei”’ni Maketa Meiyû “Matsuoka Toshikatsu”’ [‘The Sworn Friend “Matsuoka Toshikatsu”
Who Lost to “Muneo’s Ghost”’], Shûkan Shinchô, 20 November 2003, p. 28.
49 Mainichi Shinbun, 18 November 1997.
51 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Sessoku na Shichôson Gappei no Saikô o’ [‘Reconsidering the
Hasty Municipality Mergers’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/003.html
72 POWER AND PORK
52 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kokkai Kengaku’ [‘Diet Study Tour’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
53 The correlation was r=0.629. The regression coefficient between percentage of population in farm
households and the percentage of the total vote received by Matsuoka was 0.535, which is also highly
significant. This data was obtained from Horiuchi Yusaku who kindly did the calculations for the
author.
55 ‘Karate 4-dan’, p. 35.
EXERCISING POWER AS A NÔRIN GIIN 73
4
EXERCISING POWER AS A NÔRIN GIIN
Where and how Matsuoka would exercise power in Japanese politics was to
some extent predetermined. His career background, political connections and
electoral support dictated both the policy interests that he represented and
the policy activities that he pursued. These factors led him inexorably to his
role as a nôrin giin, a representative of agricultural and forestry interests in the
party and in the Diet.
PARTY COMMITTEE
As soon as Matsuoka entered the Diet in 1990 (see Table 4.1), he joined the
LDP’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (CAPIC)
(Sôgô Nôsei Chôsakai), one of the investigation committees of the PARC.1 CAPIC
was formed in 1968 to discuss medium and long-term policy issues for agriculture.
Since that time, it had remained one of the two most important agricultural
policy committees of the PARC (the other was the Agriculture and Forestry
Division). CAPIC was concerned with the larger questions of agricultural policy
such as the structure of agriculture, the future of Japanese agriculture and
agricultural policies as well as rice production and pricing in the context of these
larger, sector-wide issues. For that reason, CAPIC was generally considered to be
the ‘strategy division’ of agricultural policy, whilst the Agriculture and Forestry
Division was the ‘tactics division’.2 Unlike the division, whose membership was
capped, LDP Diet politicians could freely register to join CAPIC, which had a
very large membership as a result (around 245 in 1990).
Matsuoka joined CAPIC for several very important reasons. First, he wanted
to demonstrate his credentials as a politician representing agricultural interests.
74 POWER AND PORK
Membership was a good indicator of his intended policy direction and activities.
It showed the strength of his interest in a specific policy domain. 3 By
representing his farming constituents in the party Matsuoka also helped to
secure his re-election. Only by winning successive elections could he build
seniority in the party, thereby fulfilling one of the most important qualifications
for appointment to higher office, both in the party and in government.
Second, membership of CAPIC provided a means by which Matsuoka could
take positions on particular policies in which his constituents and supporting
organisations had an interest.4 These standpoints were vital in allowing others
to grasp his ‘revealed policy preference’.5
Third, because Matsuoka had spent 19 years in the MAFF, he considered
himself well versed in agricultural policy, so it was natural for him to gravitate
toward a committee that considered government measures for agriculture.
Besides exhibiting the characteristics of a ‘status incentive politician’, Matsuoka
also demonstrated the features of ‘single-issue incentive politician’. As
Glosserman explains
…members of this group focus on a single policy issue…Many were dissatisfied with their
previous lifestyle; all of them took up politics out of a desire to be involved in policy on issue
in which they had a long-standing interest.6
Fourth, CAPIC was where Matsuoka could refine his expertise and skills in
the domain of agricultural policy.7 Developing his agricultural policy niche
would furnish additional means for career progression and thus increase his
power and influence in the party. Regular membership of a committee would
qualify him for an executive position in that committee, which in turn would
provide a ladder to higher office including sub-cabinet posts and ultimately
ministerial positions. Membership was also proof to party executives and faction
leaders of his actual activities in policy domains.8 It allowed Matsuoka to
demonstrate to party leaders that he had policy ability, which would be linked
to future re-election and a successful career.9
Fifth, becoming a member of CAPIC was a vital step in putting Matsuoka
into a position where he could influence party policy on agriculture and forestry,
and thus government policy. If an ordinary LDP backbencher such as Matsuoka
wanted to shape government policy, he had to join an LDP policy committee.
Materialising policy influence for LDP backbenchers took place primarily in
the committees of the PARC, which was the party’s deliberative organ for
policy decisions.10 The party policy committees performed the crucial functions
of ‘advance scrutiny’ (yotô shinsa) and ‘prior approval’ (jizen shônin) of
government policies and bills. Being on a committee enabled Matsuoka,
individually, to exert influence on government policy. The exercise of such
influence was vital in enabling him to claim credit for particular agricultural
policy measures. CAPIC discussed both government bills and policies and
amended them to take account of the interests of the special-interest members,
such as Matsuoka. Even as a first-term legislator, Matsuoka would be free to
participate in the debates in the committee and thus influence policy outcomes.
He could even exercise denial rights (hitei riken) over a government-proposed
policy.11 Because decisions in PARC committees were taken on the basis of a
consensus, a single individual such as Matsuoka, or a handful of like-minded
politicians could hold up the business of government.
Sixth, being on a PARC committee enabled Matsuoka to directly
communicate with and influence bureaucrats, who monopolised key steps in
the policymaking process, such as policy formulation and bill-drafting. In
particular, CAPIC would be a key locus of interaction between Matsuoka and
MAFF officials, who often attended committee sessions and provided input
into the decisions taken by the committee.
Finally, getting a start in an agricultural policy committee of the PARC was
mandatory if Matsuoka were ever to take the additional step from nôrin giin to
nôrin zoku. As an agricultural and forestry zoku, Matsuoka could exercise
unparalleled influence both within party circles over agricultural policies and
over bureaucrats in the allocation of subsidies and public works to his constituency.
This was vital if Matsuoka were to guide benefits back to his jiban and his wider
electorate, as well as to provide favours to key backers as a broker.
In 1991, Matsuoka made a logical progression in his memberships of key
PARC committees relating to agriculture. He gained entry into the Agriculture
and Forestry Division (see Table 4.1). LDP members of the Lower House
Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (AFF), to which Matsuoka
was appointed in that year, automatically became members of this division.
Together with his continuing membership of CAPIC, joining the division gave
him coverage of the two most important PARC committees on agriculture.
The division was also concerned with forestry policy matters: an area in which
Matsuoka could claim a great deal of expertise and career experience.
76 POWER AND PORK
DIET COMMITTEES
Besides the PARC agricultural committees, Matsuoka’s ambition was to become
a member of the Lower House AFF Committee. Diet committees were formal
bodies without decision-making power, and a place for opposition party, rather
than ruling party, policy activity. In practice, the PARC committees were a
more significant locale for LDP politicians to exercise policy influence because
they provided an opportunity for them to amend government bills and proposed
measures. Nevertheless, being a member of the AFF Committee would reinforce
Matsuoka’s policy specialism and represent an important step towards becoming
a nôrin zoku.
Because of the popularity of the AFF Committee amongst LDP Lower House
Diet members, Matsuoka was not able to join right away. As his former LDP
colleague from Fukushima (2) explains
[t]here is no way a first-term Diet member can join the agricultural and forestry committee or
the construction committee. The older Diet members monopolise posts where there is a
possibility of links to concessions (riken) and which are advantageous for elections. New Diet
members have to wait their turn.12
Such norms meant that new members and young members of the ruling party
such as Matsuoka had no right of choice. The distribution of memberships
across the various Diet committees reflected the will of senior Diet members
who had won a number of elections.13 Membership of PARC divisions and
investigation committees were much more a matter of individual choice.
When he entered the Diet, Matsuoka was first allocated to the Lower House
Regional Administration Committee (see Table 4.1), which was concerned
with policies relating to regional development (public works projects such as
road construction and airports), as well as regional industries such as agriculture
and forestry. This policy domain, along with that of the Construction
Committee, was closely linked to rural areas, which had relatively higher
proportions of agricultural, forestry and fisheries population.14 For Matsuoka,
the Regional Administration Committee was a stepping-stone to the AFF
Committee.
In 1990, Matsuoka was also appointed to the Diet’s Special Committee
Relating to Land Problems etc. (see Table 4.1), which was also indirectly
concerned with agriculture and forestry because these were land-based
industries. Also, given his professional career experience in the National Land
Agency, Matsuoka could put his expertise to good use in this special committee.
In 1991, Matsuoka achieved his ambition of AFF Committee membership

(see Table 4.1). Getting on to this committee in only his second year as a Diet
member was a significant coup for Matsuoka. It complemented his membership
of the equivalent PARC committees, it helped to build his agriculture and
forestry policy specialism further, and it was a necessary condition for his later
accession to membership of the nôrin zoku.
MAFF PARLIAMENTARY VICE-MINISTER

In August 1995, in his second term, Matsuoka was appointed MAFF
parliamentary vice-minister (see Table 4.1) in the reshuffled coalition cabinet
of former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, who headed a coalition
government of the LDP and former JSP until January 1996. From Matsuoka’s
perspective, a parliamentary vice-ministership was another vital step on the
ladder of political advancement.
Formally speaking, the position accorded Matsuoka considerable power over
the MAFF. According to Clause 3, Article 17 of the State Administration
Organisation Law (Kokka Gyôsei Soshikihô), the post of parliamentary vice-minister
had more power and authority than a ministry’s own administrative vice-minister,
which was the top position in a ministry. The relevant clause stated that the
parliamentary vice-minister’s role was to assist the minister, to participate in the
planning of policies and plans, to manage affairs of state, as well as to receive
orders from the minister and to undertake the duties of the minister in his or her
absence. The parliamentary vice-minister could stand in for the minister in
undertaking ministerial duties, while the administrative vice-minister could not.15
In practice, however, the council of parliamentary vice-ministers, which
was a sub-committee of the cabinet, met only one or twice a month and did
not decide anything. It just listened to explanations from bureaucrats and
was more of an arena to exchange opinions. 16 A parliamentary vice-
ministership was considered a junior learning position within a ministry, a
post reserved for second or third-term Diet members. Because it was a post
that normally went to relatively junior politicians, parliamentary vice-
ministers could not do important business.17
Nevertheless, being appointed to such a position in his second term was a
tribute to Matsuoka’s standing in agricultural and forestry policymaking circles
and his demonstrated expertise on the various relevant committees. The position
enabled him to hone his policy skills and to develop closer personal links with
78 POWER AND PORK
serving MAFF officials, as well as to consolidate his ties to all the relevant
interest groups operating in the sector. In this respect, for Matsuoka as for
other politicians, a parliamentary vice-ministership was a crucial step in breaking
into the structure of concessions (riken kikô) in his chosen policy sector. In
that respect, it gave him a leg-up to becoming a zoku giin.18 In fact, the LDP
reportedly used the parliamentary vice-minister’s post as a mechanism for
cultivating zoku giin, by linking politicians with specific ministries in this
way.19 The parliamentary vice-ministership thus served as a pointer to Matsuoka’s
political career and his political ambitions in the agriculture and forestry sector.
Moreover, it was common for the parliamentary vice-minister to become a
director of the corresponding Diet committee, facilitating the passage of draft
bills that the ministry had submitted for party perusal, and conducting
negotiations with the opposition parties. In exchange, the ministry provided
various benefits for their parliamentary vice-minister’s electorate and for the
industry world with which they had connections.20 Both of these advantages
suited Matsuoka’s own ambitions and interests.
Accordingly, in 1995, Matsuoka became one of the directors of the AFF
Committee to match his appointment as MAFF parliamentary vice-minister
(see Table 4.1). He held this position until 1999—well beyond the end of his
parliamentary vice-ministership. Formally, becoming a director was a matter
of election by the members of the committee, but Matsuoka was actually
nominated by the chairman according to his factional affiliation. Selection on
this basis ensured a factional balance amongst the directors from the LDP.
There were usually four LDP directors of the AFF Committee with the balance
coming from the opposition parties. The directors were like vice-chairmen and
a stepping-stone to the chairmanship. The directors played an important role
in managing the conduct of committee business, meeting both before and
after committee discussions in order to draft the agenda, to draw up the
consensus of the meeting and to undertake crucial coordination functions.
Becoming MAFF parliamentary vice-minister in 1995 was serendipitous
for Matsuoka because it was the interim period between the passage of the
New Food Law (Law for Stabilisation of Supply-Demand and Price of Staple
Food, or Shuyô Shokuryô no Jukyû oyobi Kakaku no Anteihô) in November 1994
and its implementation a year later in November 1995. The new law engineered
the most radical change in the nation’s Food Control system governing rice
pricing and distribution in the post-war period. Under the law, the Food Agency
devolved some of its controls over rice marketing to non-government players,

and so Matsuoka was parliamentary vice-minister at a crucial time. When
various questions were put to Matsuoka about rice under the new regime, he
dutifully became a mouthpiece for the MAFF, commenting
[w]e have to make [rice] production adjustment a success and keep a balance between demand
and supply [in order to prevent producer rice price falls in a more liberalised market]. The
government and the ruling parties have decided on some assistance for production adjustment,
including compensation measures. As the government, we need to secure the budget to be able
to do these sorts of things, and that’s what I’ll be endeavouring to do from now on.21
Like the MAFF spokesman that he was, Matsuoka opposed the idea of giving
government assistance to all farmers participating in the planned distribution
system for rice (keikaku ryûtsûmai), which was the distribution route that remained
under government management. In Matsuoka’s view, only those producers
undertaking production adjustment should get assistance. He also pointed out
that if imported rice affected the consumption of domestic rice, it would be
necessary to think about developing new kinds of demand for processed rice.22
In 2000, Matsuoka became chairman of the AFF Committee (see Table
4.1). He had to be elected to the position in the plenary session of the Diet,
but his party (effectively his faction) put his name forward after an internal
discussion, and he received a formal nomination by the chairman of the Diet
(gichô). As AFF Committee chairman, it was Matsuoka’s job to report back to
the plenary session on the committee’s investigations of various aspects of the
legislation submitted to it by the cabinet and by individual Diet members.
Each party then made its final decision on the legislation based on this report.
LDP COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE 1995–2000

In 1995, Matsuoka became chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee
(Nôgyô Kihon Seisaku Shôiinkai) of CAPIC (see Table 4.1). It was his first executive
position on an LDP agricultural policy committee. The subcommittee handled all
matters relating to agricultural basic laws (kihonhô) and basic plans (kihon keikaku),
as well as broader policy issues relating to agricultural production policy, technical
development of farming, and rice policy, including rice production adjustment.
Matsuoka remained chairman of the subcommittee almost without interruption
until 2003, a long time in which to serve in the same executive position (see Table
4.1). Over this period, Matsuoka fashioned the Agricultural Basic Policy
Subcommittee into his own policy kingdom.
80 POWER AND PORK
In 1998 and 1999, as chairman, Matsuoka played a leading role in the

formulation of LDP policy on the new agricultural basic law23 to replace the
existing Agricultural Basic Law (Nôgyô Kihonhô) of 1961, as well as the
forerunners to the new law, the ‘Agricultural Policy Reform Outline’ (Nôsei
Kaikaku Taikô) and the ‘Policy Program’ (Seisaku Puroguramu). In interviews
with Nokyo’s National Council on these issues, Matsuoka called, amongst
other things, for mutual understanding amongst the LDP, MAFF and farmers,
for the need to entrust prices to markets but to protect farm incomes through
policy measures, to maintain rural communities and to promote concrete policies
leading to the establishment of new income policies for farmers, particularly
for farmers operating under disadvantageous conditions in mountainous areas.24
Matsuoka assiduously attended national gatherings of Nokyo representatives
focusing on these policy issues, where the views of farmers and farm households
could be directly transmitted to LDP agricultural committee executives.
Matsuoka directly invited farmers and agricultural organisations to make input
into the new basic law.
The LDP considers this [law] to be the most important issue [in agricultural policy], and
continues to discuss it in the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee. In order to realise the
policy that we are aiming for, I would like to request that farmers and agricultural groups
tackle it with us in order to complete the basic law outline.25
Complementing Matsuoka’s rising power as a nôrin giin was his accession to

the chairmanship of the Uruguay Round-Related Countermeasures
Implementation Subcommittee (UR Kanren Taisaku Jisshi Shôiinkai) in 1995
(see Table 4.1). The UR committee was a subcommittee of the Nôrin Bukai.
Its main task was to decide the allocation of ¥6.01 trillion on projects and
other policy measures for farmers and rural dwellers under the UR
countermeasures policy and to make sure that all the funds were spent.26
The chairmanship of the subcommittee put Matsuoka in charge of subsidies
for agricultural and rural development projects funded by the UR countermeasures
expenditure.27 Because of public criticism of the lavish amount of government
subsidies being scattered (baramaki) in rural areas, Matsuoka made a very defensive
speech about the countermeasures policy in front of 30 young men from the
local agricultural cooperatives in Kumamoto, saying, ‘[a]griculture is always
victimised as a “rogue” and bad people say nasty things about it. City dwellers
do not understand anything. I will not allow even one yen to be cut from the
¥6.01 trillion’.28 He claimed to have ‘defended the package 100 per cent’.29
When the money was being distributed, Matsuoka and his close political
associate, Suzuki Muneo (later indicted and convicted on political corruption
charges),30 ran the show pretty much as they liked. The farmers’ organisation
of the JCP (Nôminren),31 complained on its website that, even though Muneo
and Matsuoka obtained around ¥6 trillion in subsidies to compensate farmers
for the liberalisation of rice imports, Matsuoka used part of the subsidies for
construction work on building spas, some of which had closed in the red, and
other facilities that were using up the budget of Aso Town, his hometown. In
Nôminren’s view, the UR agricultural countermeasures expenditure had been
turned into engineering works.32
The spas referred to by Nôminren were hot spring resorts called ‘Refresh
Villages’,33 which were built in various places across rural areas of Japan,
including Kumamoto.34 In Matsuoka’s hometown, a theme park called ‘Hana
Aso Bi’ was constructed at a cost of ¥920 million, with ¥460 million coming
from the UR countermeasures package. According to one report, the structure
was excellent, but stepping inside, some people said that it looked no different
from a ‘drive-in’ souvenir store on a highway.35 Another facility built with UR
countermeasures expenditure was a ‘Tofu Museum’, which, according to some,
was on a par with a junior high school laboratory. It was questionable what, if
any, benefits those employed in agriculture actually gained from facilities such
as these.36
In addition to these projects, total expenditure on a hot spring resort called
‘Mizube Plaza Kamato’ amounted to ¥1 billion, with approximately ¥500,000
allocated from the UR countermeasures package.37 Another resort, or ‘general
exchange terminal’,38 which included hot spring facilities, a direct selling market
and restaurants etc., called ‘Sanfurea’ was built in Kikuyo Town, Kikuchi County.
Budgeted as an ‘agricultural improvement project’, which would bring rural
and city residents together, it cost ¥1.2 billion with more than ¥600 million
coming from the UR countermeasures budget.39 The town office sang its praises
as the ‘Kikuyo Hot Spring’.40
Both Sanfurea and Mizube Plaza Kamato were located in Matsuoka’s electorate.
The UR countermeasures package was distributed most heavily to zoku Diet members who
say what the MAFF wants. Local people involved in agriculture commented sarcastically: ‘the
only people who were strengthened by the UR budget were zoku Diet members and civil
engineering and construction types. We haven’t heard anything about agriculture in Kumamoto
being strengthened’.41
82 POWER AND PORK
Others commented that although the UR countermeasures expenditure was

officially funding for ‘agricultural’ measures, it was just a bonus to general
contractors (zenekon).42
The construction works for the Kikuyo Hot Spring were successfully bid for
by a zenekon with a head office in the heart of Tokyo (Toyo Construction,
which was said to be on friendly terms with Matsuoka).43 According to company
executives who were connected to Matsuoka’s electorate, the Matsuoka office
in Kumamoto City intervened in the choice of the sub-contractors in the works,
and, indeed, in the actual orders from the zenekon. Although these facts were
denied by Matsuoka’s office and by the Kikuyo Town office, they were verified
by Araki Katsutoshi, a construction company executive, Kumamoto prefectural
assembly member, and one of Matsuoka’s most important political followers.44
Many rural prefectural assembly members like Araki ran construction
companies that relied on public works orders from both the central and local
governments for their business and profitability. When Araki asked Tominaga
Kiyotsugu, mayor of Kikuyo Town, whether they would use local businesses as
sub-contractors, the mayor replied: ‘Matsuoka’s office deals with those sorts of
issues’.45 Araki then spoke to a secretary in Matsuoka’s Kumamoto City branch
office about the matter. He was also advised by a Kumamoto Prefecture
Agricultural Department official to go and pay his respects to Matsuoka if he
wanted to participate in the project.46 As another person in the construction
industry elaborated about Matsuoka and the role he played in the allocation
of construction contracts.
Being a hardliner with a big voice, a considerable part of the public construction in Kumamoto
Prefecture now ‘consults’ Matsuoka’s office. With respect to construction in Kumamoto (3),
as in Aso Town, ‘consultation’ must be close to 100 per cent. He has become that influential.47
Matsuoka also fiercely defended the UR countermeasures expenditure against

budget cuts. In February 1997, when Prime Minister Hashimoto, in answer
to a question in the Lower House Budget Committee, said that not only the
UR countermeasures expenditure but also agriculture, forestry and fisheries-
related expenditure would not be treated as a ‘sacred area’ in the government’s
fiscal reconstruction program, the LDP set up another subcommittee chaired
by Matsuoka. This Uruguay Round-Related Works Implementation Promotion
Subcommittee (UR Kanren Jigyô Jisshi Suishin Shôiinkai) was established by
a joint council (gôdô kaigi) of CAPIC and the Nôrin Bukai (Matsuoka was also
chairman of this committee at the time). The new subcommittee conferred on
the conditions for implementing the countermeasures (that is, ensuring that
expenditure targets could be found) and reviewed the contents of the works
funded by the UR package. It came to a number of resolutions, including that
‘the full amount of ¥6.01 trillion in expenditure should be preserved and
special measures should be taken to secure the budget in the future’.48 The
group then lobbied the government’s Fiscal Structural Reform Council (Zaisei
Kôzô Kaikaku Kaigi) as well as the party’s executive to get its objectives met.
When later interviewed by the National Council about whether agriculture
and forestry-related public works should be excluded from public works,
Matsuoka responded as follows
[e]ver since the Hosokawa Cabinet, fiscal reform has been discussed under the principle of
‘economy for economy’s sake’ and discussion has been led by the financial world (zaikai). This
was the background against which the idea that agriculture-related public works should be
excluded from public works originated. Because the role that agriculture and forestry plays is
indispensable to the lives of the people, nothing is more closely related to the public benefit
than agriculture and forestry. Therefore, I strongly believe that agriculture-related public
works have to be included in works for public benefit. The Uruguay Round was an international
treaty that Japan agreed to for the benefit of the entire nation’s trading interests, but that
means we must take measures for agriculture. At the time, the Hosokawa Cabinet promised to
undertake assistance measures for agriculture, and after that, I and others made similar promises
now that we’re back in power. Excluding agriculture and forestry-related public works from
public works is the last thing we can give in to…[Finally] the important thing is to demonstrate
the position of agriculture in farm households. In other words, it is necessary to show clearly
how to ensure farm household income. It is necessary at least to show that you can get this
much if you produce this much.49
In 1996, Matsuoka became acting chairman then chairman of the LDP’s

Agriculture and Forestry Division, a position he held until 1997 (see Table
4.1). This was an appointment made by the LDP’s Executive Council, as were
all the top executive appointments in the PARC, including the chairmanships
of other agricultural committees, such as CAPIC, the Forestry Policy
Investigation Committee (Rinsei Chôsakai), and the Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishery Products Trade Countermeasures Special Committee (Nôrinsuisanbutsu
Bôeki Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai, or Bôtaii).
Customarily, junior and middle-ranking Diet members were appointed as
division chairmen. The divisional chairs were distributed according to faction
but factors such as how many times they had been elected, their contribution
to the division and whether they had shown ‘presence’ (sonzaikan) were also
taken into account.50
84 POWER AND PORK
When someone asked Matsuoka, ‘what are the divisions of the LDP all
about?’, he answered
[a]s the ruling party, each division in the LDP drafts (ritsuan) numerous policies. Large
numbers attend the divisional meetings and active debate takes place, especially in the
agriculture and forestry-related divisional meetings. Although society might misunderstand
the role of the divisions, in reality, it is quite obvious that policies are formed (seisakuka) as
intense debate takes place and accumulates.51
Immediately after the 1996 Lower House election the LDP set up a new
executive regime relating to agriculture and forestry, to which Matsuoka, as
chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division, was appointed along with
three other LDP agriculture committee chairmen, including the chairman of
CAPIC. The purpose of the new executive was to push various agricultural
policy issues rapidly to a conclusion. For Matsuoka, his accession to the divisional
chairman’s position was a trigger for his elevation to higher status in the party’s
agricultural and forestry policymaking machinery. According to one MAFF
OB, ‘in 1995, at the time that Matsuoka became parliamentary vice-minister
of the MAFF, he didn’t have that much power, but in the following year (1996)
when he became the party’s Agriculture and Forestry Division chairman, he
suddenly became powerful’.52
Electoral reform appeared to have no impact whatsoever on Matsuoka’s policy
specialism. In fact, he retained and strengthened it, following the same career
track that he would have without electoral reform and remaining a nôrin giin.
It was at this time in 1996, when the first Lower House election was held
under that new system, that Matsuoka’s seniority in a range of committees
enabled him to exert wide-ranging powers over all major agricultural policies.
He participated in the joint council (gôdô kaigi) of the Agriculture and Forestry
Division and CAPIC, which played a vital role in the final stages of agricultural
budget formulation. Participating in the joint council provided a means whereby
the LDP agricultural policy executives, who were also Diet members pressured
by Nokyo and its National Council, could directly influence the MAFF minister
on the verge of cabinet negotiations on the final budget draft.
Matsuoka also secured membership of the LDP’s general agriculture and
forestry executive (nôrin kanbu), consisting of the chairmen of all the important
PARC committees on agriculture and forestry. The executive was in charge, for
example, of deciding the LDP’s producer rice price in the ultimate stage of
decision-making within the party on the issue. In 1996, it was active in realising
Nokyo’s producer rice price demand in defiance of the government’s (MAFF’s)

plan to lower the basic rice price amidst a severe over-supply situation. The
government-LDP negotiations ground on to the very last minute, producing
an additional package of ¥10 billion for ‘special countermeasures works’, which
met producers’ expectations.
While serving as acting chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division
in 1996, Matsuoka also became chairman of the Livestock Commodity Prices
Etc. Subcommittee (Chikusanbutsu Kakakutô Shôiinkai). It was normal for
nôrin giin to become chairman of an Agriculture and Forestry Division
subcommittee first, and then move on to become chairman of the division
itself, if they proved successful in their subcommittee post.
This subcommittee traditionally formulated party policy on the price stabilisation
bands for beef, the indicative stabilisation price for dairy products and the guaranteed
price for raw milk for processing. Like CAPIC’s Rice Price Committee (Beika Iinkai),
the livestock price subcommittee played a key role in determining the LDP’s position
on support prices for these products. Provision was made at its meetings for the
submission of producer requests from Nokyo representatives.
When, in March 1996, Matsuoka was asked by the National Council what his
views were on livestock prices, he commented that the beef liberalisation in 1991
and the URAA of 1994 was a ‘double punch’ as far as livestock and dairy farmers
were concerned. He trotted out the usual homilies about the most important
policy issues being how to promote motivated farm households, to modernise the
dairy and livestock industries, and to expand production. He thought greater
consideration should be given to the fact that the dramatic reduction in production
costs (which were driving down the administrative prices for livestock commodities)
could be attributed to the rise in the value of the yen. On the cost side for farmers,
Matsuoka noted the expense of disposing of animal waste, which he thought should
also be taken into account in determining the administrative prices. In calculating
livestock prices for that year, Matsuoka thought that farmers’ feelings were the
most important factor. He undertook to apply himself to the livestock price decision
whilst giving consideration to concrete problems.53
In May 1996, when the National Council again provided a vehicle for the
publication of his views on the livestock price issue, Matsuoka commented
that ‘we have to put our best efforts into obtaining a price decision that doesn’t
weaken the motivation of livestock farmers’.54 He added that it was necessary
to find a solution for dairy beef farmers so that they could cope with the
86 POWER AND PORK
liberalisation of beef. Fluctuations in the cost of feed also had to be taken into
account in determining prices for livestock commodities. Another factor was
farmers’ debt levels. These had been declining, not because management was
prospering, but because farmers had stopped investing in facilities owing to
the uncertain business conditions. In order to give farmers certainty in the
future, Matsuoka commented that
[w]e have to make livestock price decisions that don’t weaken the motivation of livestock
farmers. Because of this, I, as LDP Livestock Commodity Prices Etc. Subcommittee chairman,
will decide to maintain the current prices, and will also undertake a radical review of the
formula for calculating prices and the way in which production cost investigation is done,
which up until now, has been extraordinarily disadvantageous to farmers.55
In 1997, Matsuoka took over as chairman of the Rice Price Committee, which
was concerned with the producer rice price and production issues such as rice
production diversion programs (gentan). One of his main tasks in that committee
was to establish a New Rice Policy (Arata na Kome Seisaku) designed to compensate
farmers for falls in rice prices. In this capacity, Matsuoka attended a ‘National
Gathering of Representatives for the Establishment of a Rice Policy and the
Stabilisation of Rice Crop Management’, organised by the National Council
and Zenchû in October 1997. Approximately 1,200 representatives attended
from local agricultural cooperatives nationwide, and they made a direct request
to the participating LDP Diet politicians for a New Rice Policy that would
include income compensation for rice farmers. Because of the sense of crisis in
national rice policy caused by falls in prices for rice farmers, a large number of
LDP Diet members took part in the meeting. Matsuoka attended as chairman
of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee and gave a speech. In it, he stated
that ‘expanding production adjustment is the only way to deal with the problem
of excess rice. We must collect as big a budget as possible in order to do this’.56
At a similar meeting organised in November by Nokyo groups to demand
the necessary funding for a New Rice Policy, Matsuoka again emphasised the
need for production adjustment.57 The National Council followed up with a
direct approach to the nôrin kanbu, in which council representatives sat down
with LDP politicians at a roundtable conference in the LDP headquarters.
Matsuoka attended as the chairman of the Rice Price Committee along with
the chairmen of the other main LDP agricultural policy committees, including
the CAPIC chairman, and the chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division,
a position that Matsuoka had relinquished by November 1997.
A week later a much larger rally of Nokyo representatives was held at LDP
headquarters. Matsuoka, as chairman of the Rice Price Committee, delivered
some of the main greetings. He spoke about his resolve and the political
judgement that it was necessary to get ¥40 billion as a countermeasures policy
to compensate farmers’ income for falls in the price of rice for the current year’s
crop. However, there were insufficient funds to cover this expenditure.58
Matsuoka was interviewed by the National Council on the 25 November
1997, six days after the new policy was announced. He began by pointing out
that
[b]ecause of bumper harvests, the government’s rice stocks have risen to more than 3.5 million
tonnes and as a result, market prices for rice have plummeted. It seems that everything goes
against rice farmers, and the main reason for establishing a New Rice Policy is to how to break
through this situation. In order to reduce the amount of rice in stock (where the balance
between supply and demand has not recovered), only three choices are possible: a) rice should
be exported overseas, b) demand and consumption should be increased in other areas, and c)
production should be controlled. Because the first two options are problematic, emphasis
should be placed on production control (gentan). We asked for a large number of opinions
from various fields and established a framework that guaranteed farmers’ income. I strongly
demanded that the MAFF raise the necessary funds. This was done by pulling money from
various sources: by getting ¥25 billion from the Ministry of Home Affairs as their contribution,
by the Food Agency making efforts to cut its expenditure by 5 per cent, and by getting ¥45
billion in new sources of revenue from various places. Putting all these funds together including
those from the agriculture and forestry budget produced a total of ¥610.1 billion over two
years.59
The National Council issued a special ‘thank you’ to the three agricultural and
forestry executives (nôrin sanyaku), including Matsuoka, for their great efforts
in finalising the New Rice Policy. Importantly, the UR agricultural
countermeasures expenditure was left untouched.
From 1997 to 1999, Matsuoka served as acting chairman of the Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Countermeasures Special Committee.
Its task was to tackle agriculture, forestry and fisheries trade-related issues
for the LDP. In August 1998, the trade committee set up a Study Team
(Nôrinsuisanbutsu Bôeki Chôsakai Sutadei Chîmu) initially to analyse and
investigate in detail the contents of the URAA and report back to the larger
committee. It also set about constructing a strategy for the next round of
agricultural trade negotiations in close consultation with the government
(MAFF), LDP and Nokyo organisations. This was the World Trade
88 POWER AND PORK
Organization (WTO) tripartite council (WTO sansha kaigi), a consultative

council established by the MAFF in late 1998 to facilitate the formation of a
consensus amongst agricultural bureaucrats, the LDP’s nôrin kanbu and
representatives of agricultural, forestry and fisheries groups on trade-related
issues. The executive leadership of the trade countermeasures special committee
was put in charge of positively advancing ‘Diet members’ diplomacy’ (giin
gaikô)60 on trade issues, by sending delegations to Asia, the European Union
and other countries about the upcoming negotiations on agricultural trade
under WTO auspices.
At one time in 2000 Matsuoka served in seven executive posts in LDP
agriculture61 and forestry62 policy committees, as well as being AFF Committee
chairman and, once again, chairman of the Rice Price Committee (see Table
4.1). In 2000 and 2001 he also became acting chairman of the Mountain
Village Development Countermeasures Special Committee (Sanson Shinkô
Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai) of the PARC (see Table 4.1). This committee was
concerned with matters relating principally to special support for agriculture
and other industries in mountainous regions as well as with the provision of
public works and community facilities for farmers and rural dwellers.
In December 2000, Matsuoka became chairman of the Management Income
Study Meeting (Keiei Shotoku Sutadei Kaigô) (see Table 4.1), a group within
the LDP’s Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee, which Matsuoka also chaired
at the time. The group was set up to tackle a new policy that would provide
direct income subsidies to farmers. These would be called ‘agricultural
management income stabilisation countermeasures’ (nôgyô keiei shotoku antei
taisaku) and they would be in line with similar systems already introduced in
the United States, Canada, and the European Union.63 Other proposals discussed
by the group called for encouraging farmers to expand the size of their land
holdings and to boost per capita productivity.
At the time he took up the chairmanship of the Management Income Study
Meeting, Matsuoka had just been appointed MAFF deputy minister in the
second Mori Cabinet (see Table 4.1). On the very day he was appointed, he
led a meeting of a newly formed group, which came up with a set of proposals
to ‘raise farmers’ incomes by channelling agricultural subsidies directly to them
instead of by buying produce at government-set prices’.64 The policy ‘targeted
400,000 farmers earning their living solely through agriculture or who had
made farming their main source of income’.65
The development of this proposal into a formal government policy was

overtaken by the advent of the Koizumi administration four months later in
April 2001, and Koizumi’s commitment to structural reform. Koizumi
campaigned first for the presidency of the LDP and then in the 2001 Upper
House election on a platform of dismantling the old order, principally the
political and bureaucratic institutions blocking economic reform. Thereafter,
direct income subsidies had to be instrumental in achieving structural reform
of the farm sector.
Being an executive of particular LDP agriculture and forestry committees
did not prevent Matsuoka from attending the meetings of other committees
in which he did not play an executive role. The most crucial issue for Matsuoka’s
farm vote-gathering strategy was policy that affected farm household incomes
from agriculture. He had to demonstrate a commitment to maximising incomes
for farmers in order to retain high levels of voting support from farm households.
This meant poking his head into the proceedings of any committee that was
deliberating on matters relating to farm incomes. For example, he attended
discussions of the LDP Farmers’ Pension Subcommittee (Nôgyôsha Nenkin
Shôiinkai) and was vitally concerned with the prices of all agricultural
commodities. For this reason, he regularly participated in all the major
agricultural and forestry committees concerned with pricing issues. For example,
when the Vegetable, Fruit Tree and Upland Field Crops etc Countermeasures
Subcommittee (Yasai, Kaju, Hatake Sakubutsutô Taisaku Shôiinkai) met to
decide prices for upland field crops, and to discuss production countermeasures
for wheat, soybeans, sugar beets and sugar cane, Matsuoka was there making
his contribution to the decision.
Matsuoka was also an especially prominent figure in both rice and leaf tobacco
price decisions; the producer rice price because it captured the largest number
of agricultural producers, and tobacco because it was especially important in
Kumamoto. By 1995 the prices of farm products such as rice were being
increasingly marketised. Leaf tobacco was the last fortress for the LDP to exercise
decision-making authority over the price. The normal procedure was for Japan
Tobacco Inc. (JT) (Nihon Tabako Sangyô Kabushiki Kaisha)—which was the
monopoly buyer of domestically produced leaf tobacco—to submit its proposed
purchasing price to the government’s Leaf Tobacco Advisory Council (Hatabako
Shingikai), which would recommend a certain purchase price. It was customary,
however, for ‘tobacco-related Diet members such as Matsuoka to decide [the
90 POWER AND PORK
tobacco price] by nemawashi [preparing the groundwork] before the council.

Some would say that this ‘constituted not only “prior examination” (jizen shinsa)
as Prime Minister Koizumi described it, but also “prior decision” (jizen
ketchaku)’.66 When the leaf tobacco price was lowered substantially in 1995,
Matsuoka hurled an empty can of juice at a JT executive, yelling, ‘what is the
salary of the president? Say it!’67
Matsuoka was also opposed to an increase in the tobacco tax in 1999. He
made a special visit to the Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei) to talk
to Aoki Mikio who was chief cabinet secretary at the time. Matsuoka suggested
to Aoki that a pachinko tax should be introduced instead of a tobacco tax in
order to avoid a decline in the consumption of domestically produced tobacco
leaves. A Matsuoka critic lamented, ‘[w]hile this guy is around, there is no
way Japan will establish an anti-smoking right or a policy to lower the smoking
rate. It seems that the concession for the tobacco farmers is more important
than the health of the citizens’.68
MAFF DEPUTY MINISTER

In December 2000, in former Prime Minister Mori’s second cabinet, Matsuoka
was appointed to the newly created position of MAFF deputy minister,69 taking
up the position on 6 January 2001, when the restructuring of government
ministries and agencies took effect. In keeping with tradition, Matsuoka was
nominated to the post by his faction boss, Kamei.70
Matsuoka’s accession to the deputy minister’s post was a pointer to how
important he had become as one of the LDP’s leading politicians on matters
relating to agriculture and forestry. As deputy minister, Matsuoka had the power
to act on behalf of the MAFF minister. He could explain draft bills to the Diet
from the state minister’s gallery and also in the Lower House AFF Committee.
He could answer questions in the Diet on behalf of the minister, substituting for
the practice of bureaucrats answering these questions in lieu of the minister
(seifuiin). He could also attend deputy ministers’ councils in the Kantei.
As one of the two new deputy ministers in the MAFF (the other was Tanaka
Naoki), Matsuoka was assisted by two parliamentary secretaries (Kaneda
Hideyuki and Kunii Masayuki): all LDP Diet members. They were all expected
to ‘exert political weight on the bureaucracy’71 by providing additional expertise
and support for the MAFF minister, thus bolstering his position against the
bureaucratic weight of his own ministry.
Matsuoka, however, was very keen to exert his own power over the MAFF.72
Two days after the government reorganisation took effect, Matsuoka told Kyodo
News that the new MAFF deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries would
set up a council at the ministry to resolve key policy issues and problems. The
council would meet on a weekly basis. There were no such fora in any ministry
or agency before the reorganisation. Matsuoka’s plan was to lessen the party’s
reliance on bureaucrats in policy formation and reduce their power.
Some MAFF bureaucrats called the initiative an attempt to create an extra
organ, since there already was a top meeting for ministry officials.73 Matsuoka
pressed on regardless. As he explained, ‘[d]epending on the agenda, the council
will call for participation of directors-general from the Food, Forestry and
Fisheries agencies and may include Agricultural Minister Yoshio Yatsu’. 74
Matsuoka remarked at the time that politicians ‘have knowledge and ability in
dealing with the ministry’s administrative affairs and are competent enough to
equal bureaucrats in handling policy matters’.75
Leading the way for the other central ministries and agencies, a meeting of
MAFF deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries was held in the MAFF
on 9 January 2001, three days after bureaucratic reorganisation came into
effect. At the meeting
[e]ach MAFF bureau director and directors-general of the MAFF’s agencies reported respectively
on important policy issues relating to their areas of administration. On the basis of their
reports, the deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries gave the necessary directions (shiji)
and executed the required coordination (chôsei), thus putting into practice policy planning
(ritsuan) under political leadership.76
Matsuoka led the meeting along with Deputy Minister Tanaka, as well as the
two new parliamentary secretaries. He was jubilant after the meeting, claiming
‘[w]e politicians now directly engage in the task of formulating policies…We
are here to do the job of working out important policies. No policy can be
decided on without being discussed at our meetings’.77
In terms of actual policies, Matsuoka’s biggest impact as deputy minister
was felt in the area of agricultural trade. He travelled with MAFF Minister
Yatsu for the purpose of conducting foreign (agricultural trade) policy activities
(gaikô katsudô) overseas. On his return to Tokyo, he reported back to the LDP
committees concerned with agricultural trade issues (the WTO sansha kaigi,
the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Investigation Committee
Study Team, and the committee itself ).
92 POWER AND PORK
His greatest coup, however, was his pivotal role in the government’s decision
to invoke safeguards on imports of rushes for tatami mats (igusa), raw shiitake
mushrooms and leeks from China. Matsuoka exerted direct influence on the
MAFF to agree to provisional safeguard measures (emergency import restriction
measures) being invoked for 200 days under WTO rules against imports of
these commodities from China. The decision was officially justified as a response
to rapidly expanding import volumes of these products between 1997 and
1999. Matsuoka told the press, ‘I want to invoke the [safeguard] measure’.78
Even prior to his becoming deputy minister, Matsuoka had pushed this option
strongly in the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee, presenting a report
on the provisional invocation of safeguards.79
Matsuoka’s constituency was in Kumamoto Prefecture where 95 per cent of
domestic rushes were grown. Reports suggest that he was under severe pressure
from igusa farmers in Kumamoto Prefecture as well as the prefectural Nokyo
organisation and the National Federation of Igusa Production Groups (Zenkoku
Iseisan Dantai Rengôkai). 80 There was even a rumour that the Kumamoto
Nokyo threatened not to support him in the next election ‘unless he made
significant efforts’.81 In 2000, when safeguards were becoming an issue, the
LDP’s Kumamoto Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch (effectively a
branch of Matsuoka’s kôenkai) received a political donation of ¥1.8 million
from the prefectural nôseiren. Previously Matsuoka had received only ¥100,000
from the nôseiren, obtaining most of his donations from the construction
industry.82 The Kumamoto Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch also
received ¥1 million from the nôseiren branch in Yatsushiro region, where most
of the igusa was produced. It was the first time that Matsuoka had obtained
donations from this region, which was in fact located in Kumamoto (5).83
According to a former leader of Yatsushiro Nokyo, ‘the donation was made
with getting Matsuoka to make efforts for agriculture in general in mind, but
there was some anticipation in regards to the safeguards. While we hadn’t
made any [donations] before, we decided that this was an opportunity, and
the donation was made on the decision of the league head’.84
Another Diet member commented that Matsuoka’s ‘standpoint was as if his
single-handed efforts led to the invoking of the safeguards’.85 Matsuoka lobbied
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) hard, saying ‘what can you do?’ in relation to invoking
the safeguards.86 At one point he was reprimanded by Minister Yatsu, who
warned, ‘you are the deputy minister so this attitude will not do. If you made
any mistakes, it would be disastrous’.87 However, raw shiitake mushrooms were
of primary concern to MAFF Minister Yatsu, and leeks were added to the list
in order to symbolise action against the influx of Chinese vegetable imports.
Also in the minister’s and deputy minister’s minds was the fact that an Upper
House election was looming in July 2001.
On 23 April 2001, the Japanese government imposed emergency import
restrictions for 200 days (until 8 November) on the three products. It was the first
time that the Japanese government had imposed ordinary safeguards under WTO
rules. The measures imposed punitive tariffs on imports above a certain volume,
which was designed to bring the prices of the three products up to levels in Japan.
When the Chinese government hinted at retaliation, Matsuoka was
despatched to China to explain the Japanese decision and to try and find a
compromise. The Japanese government was hoping that negotiations might
induce the Chinese side to voluntarily restrict exports. Matsuoka urged China’s
vice minister of foreign trade and economic cooperation to restrict exports of
the products. He also conferred on matters relating to tree-planting cooperation
as part of a greening project in China. Matsuoka told the Chinese that the
rapid increase in imports of leeks, shiitake mushrooms and tatami rushes into
Japan had had a bad influence on Japanese farmers. He also explained that the
Japanese government had conducted the requisite investigation and examination
in order to increase tariffs immediately.88
The Chinese government retaliated against the safeguards by imposing 100 per
cent tariffs on Japanese motor vehicles, mobile phones and air-conditioners, exports
of which virtually stopped. The loss to the Japanese car industry amounted to
¥51.2 billion, which, when added to the countermeasures budget for the three
safeguard categories, came to ¥85.5 billion.89 Such considerations made it impossible
for the Japanese government to institute full safeguard measures in December
2001 after the expiry of the provisional safeguard measures in November. The
Koizumi government backed down in the face of the Chinese action, which was
illegal under WTO rules, but, at the time, China was not a member of the WTO.
This did not stop Matsuoka doing his best to pressure his own government
to institute full safeguard measures.
Matsuoka and others repeatedly demanded that the government present a firm attitude.
Matsuoka argued that ‘there were no cases where full safeguards were not implemented after
the invocation of provisional safeguards. It is a national disgrace. Implement the full safeguards’.90
94 POWER AND PORK
This opinion was not necessarily shared by other leading nôrin zoku, such as
Yatsu and Nakagawa Shôichi. They reasoned with Matsuoka that ‘if the regular
invocation is implemented, Japan will lose at the WTO panel. If Japan loses,
the three farm products can enter from China at a stroke’.91
Matsuoka’s position as deputy minister lasted only from January 2001 to
April 2001 because Koizumi became LDP president and prime minister in
April 2001 and appointed a new cabinet. This meant that Matsuoka was only
in the position for just over three months, which limited the extent to which
he could exercise his new-found power.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POSITIONS FROM 2001

After stepping down from his post as deputy minister, Matsuoka resumed his
executive posts in LDP agricultural and forestry committees: as chairman of
the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee as well as acting chairman of the
Mountain Village Development Countermeasures Special Committee and
chairman of the State-Owned Forests Problems Subcommittee (see Table 4.1).
Rice policy reform

Matsuoka continued to lead the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee through
2002 (see Table 4.1). In that role, he was right at the centre of party deliberations
on rice policy reform. He was made chief of the survey group conducting
investigations relevant to the reform in Hokkaido. At the local level, the survey
group listened to explanations from agricultural cooperative representatives,
and exchanged opinions with them.92 Matsuoka’s Hokkaido group was one of
several local survey groups reporting back to the subcommittee, which called
on the government to listen to voices at the grassroots level and which also
indicated the directions of the plan for rice policy reform.93
In July 2003, Matsuoka attended the ‘National Nokyo Representatives
Convention on the Rice Policy Reform Countermeasures’ along with Horinouchi
Hisao, chairman of CAPIC. In the final stages of formulating rice policy reform,
Matsuoka resolved to guarantee about ¥300 billion to fund the new policy,
with the subcommittee leaving the final decision to the top three agricultural
and forestry executives (nôrin sanyaku)94 and the nôrin kanbu.95
After the final decision was made on concrete policy for the so-called New
Rice Policy Reform (Arata na Kome Seisaku Kaikaku), a roundtable of ‘three
related parties’ was held. The three parties were Matsuoka, Horinouchi and
the chairman of Zenchû. Horinouchi and Matsuoka presented a report to the

Zenchû chairman, outlining the contents of the decision. Because the ¥300
billion to fund the policy, which had been requested by Nokyo, had been
secured, the chairman expressed his thanks for Matsuoka’s efforts.96 The next
day the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee acknowledged the final decision
on the policy. Horinouchi and Matsuoka then reported back to a combined
meeting of CAPIC and the Agriculture and Forestry Division, which also
acknowledged the new policy.97
In November 2003, Matsuoka was instrumental as chairman of the
Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee in determining the amount of acreage
to be taken out of rice production. This was a political issue because it influenced
the price of rice for both producers and consumers by impacting on the amount
of rice circulating in the domestic market. In 2003, the committee decided to
leave the gentan acreage at the same level as in the previous year in order to
maintain, as the subcommittee described it, a stable ‘consumer’ price.98
Trade policy
In 2003, Matsuoka established an executive connection with the LDP’s
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Investigation Committee in
the key post of secretary-general (see Table 4.1). From the time of its inception
in 2001,99 the trade investigation committee took over as the main PARC
committee dealing with Japan’s agricultural trade negotiating position at the
WTO and on bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Both sets of international
trade negotiations put pressure on Japan’s agricultural sector for market-opening
concessions. In the position of secretary-general, Matsuoka became one of the
group of executives (kanbukai) of the committee, and thus played a pivotal
role in its proceedings. In this position, he was also assiduous in attending
gatherings of Nokyo representatives on agricultural trade matters, especially
those organised by Zenchû.
In 2004, when Matsuoka was still secretary-general of the committee, officials
from the Ozu branch of Kumamoto Prefecture nôseiren visited him in Tokyo
and he allowed them to attend one of the committee’s meetings. Afterwards,
the officials commented very favourably on how Matsuoka had conducted the
committee proceedings as the organiser of the debate and how Matsuoka had
made the relevant ministries and agencies come up with countermeasures on
the spot. One of the officials said: ‘I now understand very well how a policy
96 POWER AND PORK
will be realised in that way. I did not know how expert Diet representative
Matsuoka was in policy until I actually saw it with my own eyes’.100
In March 2004, the committee approved the Japan–Mexico Free Trade
Agreement. This was Japan’s first free trade agreement encompassing the
agricultural, forestry and fisheries sector. The judgement of the committee was
that the bilateral agreement was a well-balanced settlement, which protected
areas that should be protected and included some acceptable market opening
in other areas. Because further liberalisation of oranges and orange juice was
permitted under the agreement, the committee verified that all possible
domestic countermeasures would be taken.101
Tobacco price
In 2003, in recognition of his interest and role in LDP committee proceedings
on the producer price of tobacco, Matsuoka became chairman of the Leaf
Tobacco Price Investigation Subcommittee (Hatabako Kakaku Kentô Shôiinkai)
(see Table 4.1). This subcommittee examined the Leaf Tobacco Advisory
Council’s report on what the producer price of leaf tobacco should be. The
price was decided annually each November. After receiving the report, the
subcommittee held hearings at which it received submissions from organisations
of tobacco farmers and Japan Tobacco about matters such as its (JT’s) buying
price of tobacco and so-called production countermeasures (seisan taisaku) for
farmers.
In November 2003, the committee undertook a comprehensive examination
of tobacco farm management. This was considered necessary in light of the
drastic fall in tobacco farmers’ income because of fire damage, the rapid change
in the situation surrounding tobacco in recent years and other factors. The
subcommittee decided to leave the cultivated area of tobacco and the purchase
price of leaf tobacco produced in 2004 where they were. This decision was in
line with the report of the Leaf Tobacco Advisory Council.
Avian flu countermeasures

In March 2004, Matsuoka was made secretary-general of the newly
established LDP Avian Influenza Countermeasures Headquarters (Tori
Infuruenza Taisaku Honbu) (see Table 4.1). It was set up to alleviate the anxiety
of both consumers and producers about the outbreak of avian flu in Oita and
Yamaguchi prefectures. The headquarters deliberated on matters such as
amending the 1951 Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Law (Kachiku

Densenbyô Yobôhô). Matsuoka had earlier visited Oita Prefecture in February
2004 with a group of LDP Diet representatives and delegates from the party’s
Oita and Kumamoto federation of branches. Based on the results of the
investigation, Matsuoka felt a strong need for a response from the whole party.
The headquarters was thus created on the basis of his proposal, enabling
Matsuoka to claim the credit.102
After Matsuoka was appointed secretary-general of the committee, he asked
questions on two occasions in the Budget Committee of the Lower House
about what was going to be done to stop the spread of avian flu. His questions
followed a new outbreak in Kyoto Prefecture, and there were fears that the
infection could spread. Matsuoka demanded that the headquarters and the
government face the problem cooperatively to the best of their ability.103
The headquarters later organised emergency measures for avian influenza
and, on the basis of these countermeasures, a part of the Livestock Infectious
Diseases Prevention Law was revised. The amendment institutionalised subsidies
to livestock farmers who cooperated with restriction orders on the movement
of birds. It also increased the fines and penal restrictions on traders and others
who neglected to notify the government of infected birds.104 However, this
did not stop the spread of avian flu to Ibaraki Prefecture in 2005.
In June 2005, Matsuoka received a direct delegation from the Japan Egg
Producers Association (Nihon Keiran Seisan Kyôkai). They were concerned
about the impact on egg production and egg-producing farm households of
the recent outbreak of avian flu in Ibaraki Prefecture, saying it would cause
trouble for their management (that is, their income). They wanted government
‘countermeasures’—financial compensation of some sort. Matsuoka commented
that measures for consumers were also in order to allay any concerns they
might have. 105
Mountain village development

In 2004, Matsuoka became acting chairman of the Mountain Village
Development Countermeasures Committee (see Table 4.1) because Uesugi,
the former chairman, lost his seat in the November 2003 election. In 2005,
the committee was retitled the Mountain Village Development Committee
(Sanson Shinkô Iinkai). The committee dealt with matters relating to the
administration of the Mountain Village Promotion Law (Sanson Shinkôhô),
98 POWER AND PORK
which was originally passed in 1965 by bipartisan consent with a 10-year

period of application. It had already been extended three times and was due to
expire again at the end of 2004. It had been principally concerned with the
provision of infrastructure (kiban seibi) in mountain areas where there were
farmers. Such infrastructure included agricultural and forestry roads, as well as
‘livelihood facilities’ in rural villages in mountainous areas under the rubric of
‘the development of the rural living environment’. This referred to the provision
of mobile phone access, electricity, and medical, nursing and welfare facilities
for mainly old people left in these villages. The committee also concerned
itself with expenditure for mountain village development in the MAFF budget.
Matsuoka, as acting chairman, engineered a visit by key members of the
committee to Kumamoto at the end of January 2005. He chaired a meeting of
the committee in Oguni Town, Aso County, in the electorate of Kumamoto
(3) (which, along with Minami Oguni Town, were the only places in Aso
County that failed to elect Matsuoka in first place in the 2003 election, as
shown in Table 7.1). The idea behind holding the meeting in Oguni Town
was to get a sense of what the locals wanted from their political representatives
and the relevant government ministries and local public officials.106 The meeting
was officially to hold an on-the-spot investigation and to exchange opinions. It
lasted for two and a half hours in a hotel with about 90 people present, including
the chairman of the Kumamoto Prefecture branch office of the National
Mountain Village Promotion League (Zenkoku Sanson Shinkô Renmei), as
well as Nokyo and forest association officials, and local municipal mayors.
Matsuoka presided at the meeting, which was also attended by relevant officials
of the MAFF, Ministry of Land, Transport and Infrastructure (MLIT), and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC), and the prefectural
government. Uozumi attended as vice-chairman of the committee. Most of
the discussion was about public works projects, including a transport centre,
the Oguni Dome and other public buildings and amenities. 107 Local
representatives demanded an extension and revision of the Mountain Village
Development Law and the establishment of a cellular phone communication
base since there were many areas where it was not possible to use cellular
phones. Women attending the meeting demanded better medical treatment,
nursing, and welfare facilities.108 The meeting provided Matsuoka with an
opportunity to engage in some surrogate election campaigning. Voters could
see him as an influential LDP Diet politician who was not only committed to
his constituents and local issues but also effective in bringing subsidies and
projects back to the local area.
A week after the meeting was held, an outline of amendments to the law
was discussed and approved by the Mountain Village Development Committee.
It was then presented to the Diet as Diet members’ legislation requiring
cooperation from the opposition parties. Successful passage of the amended
law extended it for another 10 years. It allotted a greater role to municipalities
in the implementation of development plans for mountain villages as a hallmark
of greater decentralisation. Under the amendment, the power to formulate
these plans was passed from prefectures to municipalities. In addition, the
amended law strengthened countermeasures against damage done by birds
and animals and also extended to installation of information and
communications infrastructure.
Forestry policy
In 2004, Matsuoka became chairman of the LDP’s Forestry Policy Basic Problems
Subcommittee (Rinsei Kihon Mondai Shôiinkai) (see Table 4.1), a subcommittee
of the Forestry Policy Investigation Committee. The subcommittee had the task
of holding annual hearings on how much timber should be used each year by
government bodies.109 In October each year the subcommittee also met with
the Forestry Policy Investigation Committee in a joint council (gôdô kaigi) for
purposes of discussing the contents of budget demands for the following year.
Working on this committee was advantageous for Matsuoka because it put
him in direct contact with the leadership of the forest associations and its national
body, the National Federation of Forestry Associations (Zenkoku Shinrin
Rengôkai, or Zenshinren). Matsuoka’s position as chairman continued into 2005
when the committee reviewed the issue of reform of the forest associations. It
listened to explanations from Forestry Agency officials on the issue as well as
representations from the head of Zenshinren. The subcommittee also took up
the issue of the development of the forest and timber industry in Japan. Matsuoka
used the committee as a venue from which to push his environmental message
about the value of forests in protecting the environment.110
Direct income subsidies

In 2004, Matsuoka became chairman of the LDP’s Management
Countermeasures Project Team (see Table 4.1), a subcommittee of CAPIC (of
100 POWER AND PORK
which Matsuoka was also acting chairman at the time). The project team was
established to deliberate on the policy proposed by the MAFF under the ‘New
Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Plan’ (Arata na Shokuryô, Nôgyô, Nôson
Kihon Keikaku), or New Basic Plan (Shin Kihon Keikaku). This policy would
replace price-related subsidies with direct income subsidies to farmers as the
main method of supporting farmers’ incomes—a so-called Japanese style direct
payments system. Matsuoka was made chairman of the project team because
he was one of the prime movers in the December 2000 LDP proposal to
provide direct income support to farmers facing declines in agricultural prices
led by the rice price.111
The project team’s job was to discuss various proposals and views advanced
by the MAFF, which were presented to the committee, investigate how similar
policies were implemented in other countries, particularly in the United
States and in the European Union, review the implications of such a system
for Japan’s food self-sufficiency and come up with its own views about what
form the new policy should take and then present them to CAPIC. The
MAFF wanted to restrict the payments to ‘core farms’—farms of larger size—
with the idea of encouraging the amalgamation of farm plots and the structural
reform of agriculture. However, many LDP farm politicians in Matsuoka’s
committee saw the policy as potentially ‘destroying’ small-scale farmers.
As the new scheme represented a radical departure from the government’s
past policy of assisting all agricultural producers regardless of farm size, farmers
were also pressing for the widest possible eligibility for the new subsidy program.
In April 2004, an explanatory meeting (setsumeikai) concerning the details of
the LDP version of the New Basic Plan was presented by the agricultural and
forestry executive (including Matsuoka as chairman of the project team) to
representatives of agricultural, forestry and fishery groups. About 100 of these
representatives attended.
The government delayed the decision about which farms would be eligible
for the new form of state support while Matsuoka’s project team tried to
ensure that small-scale farmers would not be left out. The team came up
with a series of farm management income stabilisation countermeasures, with
Matsuoka making proposals to the team. It was only prepared to consider
policies that would not exclude small-scale farm households. It wanted to
make sure that the new policy for direct income subsidies did not destroy
this type of farming.
The project team took its proposals into the larger Agricultural Basic Policy
Subcommittee, which also received representations from Nokyo spokesmen
about how the management stabilisation countermeasures should be applied
as part of the revised basic plan. The subcommittee was in charge of deciding
the policy for the LDP. In July 2005, a meeting of the subcommittee was held
at LDP headquarters in which there were explanations about the formulation
of the New Basic Plan, which had begun in March. Matsuoka emphasised
that he wanted to ‘establish a farm industry with strong legs and loins and
positively promote high quality agricultural products that could be exported’.112
Matsuoka was reappointed as chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy
Subcommittee after the 11 September 2005 election (see Table 4.1). He
acknowledged that it was a post that carried heavy responsibilities, but he said
that he had to listen to the opinions of many people.113 As chairman of the
subcommittee, Matsuoka presided over the final agreement within the party
on the direct payments system, and between the party and the MAFF.
The subcommittee’s immediate task (until the end of October) was to wrap
up discussion on the conditions for ‘bearers’ of agriculture to receive direct
income subsidies from the government. In a late September meeting, the
subcommittee decided to thrash out the bearer issue.114 In the same month,
Matsuoka also conferred directly with executives from the National Council of
Nokyo Youth Organisations (Zenkoku Nôkyô Seinen Soshiki Kyôgikai) about
which farmers should be the target of the new direct payments system. The
board of directors of the organisation proposed that the government should
consider the targets of the New Basic Plan with some flexibility so that hard-
working farmers would not miss out.115
The following month the subcommittee held hearings on the policy for the
purpose of eliciting the opinions of key agricultural organisations on the issue.
Appearing at the hearings were representatives from Zenchû, the Japan Chamber
of Agriculture (Nôgyô Kaigishô), the Nokyo Youth Council (Zenseikyô) and
agricultural production corporations in Niigata and Aomori, two prominent
rice-producing prefectures.
In early October, the subcommittee firmed up a concrete plan for the direct
payments system, while the LDP’s nôrin kanbu deliberated on the essentials of
the draft.116 In late October the subcommittee convened a meeting to conclude
the party’s final draft of the ‘Japanese edition direct payments system’ (Nihonhan
chokusetsu shiharai). In the final days of deliberation on this draft, the
102 POWER AND PORK
subcommittee met every day at 8.30am. Matsuoka noted that, as chairman of

the subcommittee, it was his responsibility to decide the essentials of the draft
plan after discussion in the subcommittee.
The subcommittee drafted a final report and presented it for approval to
the combined council of the Agriculture and Forestry Division and CAPIC.
The subcommittee then held a press conference in the Diet building about
the ‘Management Income Stabilisation Countermeasures Outline’ (Keiei Shotoku
Antei Taisaku Taikô) and explained its contents.117
After the government and LDP agreed on the new policy in November, Matsuoka,
as head of the LDP’s subcommittee, explained that the new policy would target a
50 per cent integration of farm households in terms of cultivated land area by fiscal
2007.118 He was referring to those farm households that would be forced to
amalgamate (either through conversion to community farms or farm corporations)
in order to be eligible for direct farm subsidies under the new policy.
SECOND-STRING INTERESTS
Matsuoka’s committee memberships reveal an unerring commitment to
agriculture and forestry policy, and reflect a policy specialism gained over a
number of decades. His chosen policy field was the escalator that took him to
the top executive positions in the relevant Diet and party committees. He
used these to build his political reputation, standing and influence as a
policymaker. However, like any successful politician, Matsuoka developed
second-string and third-string interests that complemented his major policy
focus on agriculture and forestry. Significantly, his secondary interests were in
disaster and environmental policy—areas that were closely related to agriculture
and forestry.
In his second year in the Diet, Matsuoka joined the Lower House Special
Committee on Disaster Countermeasures (Saigai Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai),
rising to be a director in 1992 and staying on the committee in this executive
position until 1999 (see Table 4.1). Disaster policy was attractive to Matsuoka
because it was lucrative in terms of bringing subsidies (including for public
works) back to his electorate in order to rectify the damage caused by
earthquakes, storms and typhoons. Typhoons, torrential downpours and
earthquakes did a lot of damage to farms and forests. Nine typhoons struck
Japan between June and October 2003 causing a total of ¥7.4 billion worth of
damage to agricultural, forestry and fisheries, including crops, agricultural
land and agricultural, forestry and fishery facilities. In the same year, a large
earthquake in Niigata caused ¥96.8 billion worth of damage to agricultural,
forestry and fisheries industries, the most since the war.119 Under government
policy, those affected in these industries had to be compensated in addition to
the reconstruction involved, so disasters became an important rationale for
public works and subsidy outlays.
Whenever a natural calamity hit his local electorate, Matsuoka made a point
of conducting on-the-spot investigations of the damage, liaising with local
government politicians and officials, and working hard to get funds from the
disaster restoration budget directed to areas that had suffered damage. In July
2005, for example, Matsuoka visited Oguni Town in his electorate following a
torrential downpour that did substantial damage in the town. He listened to a
description of the damage at the town office, and then visited each of the wards
in the town to see for himself.120 In September of the same year, he visited
Oguni Town again to hear requests from the town assembly members about
restoration of the damage done by the heavy rain, along with representatives of
the MAFF, the MIAC, the Cabinet Office and MLIT.121
After the meeting, he attended the ordinary general meeting of the Japan
Flood Control and Riparian Works Association (Nihon Chisan Chisui Kyôkai).
As he liked to preach about the importance of industries he was inclined to
support for political reasons, he stated on his website that
[f ]lood control and riparian works are extremely important for creating safe land that is not
damaged. The idea that looking after mountains and water is looking after the country has
been around since the feudal times of the Sengoku era…It is part of the heritage that we carry
on today.122
Besides being formally a part of the membership and executive of the Lower
House committee on disasters, Matsuoka was active in attending the relevant
LDP divisions and committees of the PARC when disaster struck in his area of
Japan in order to show that he was responding to the needs of his constituents
suffering disaster damage. In July 2003, following torrential downpours that
did terrible damage to areas in the mid-western part of Kyushu, Matsuoka
attended a joint council (gôdô kaigi) of the LDP’s Special Committee on Disaster
Countermeasures (Saigai Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai) and its Cabinet Division
(Naikaku Bukai). The joint council received a report from the ministries
concerned in the presence of the PARC Chairman Asô Tarô. The council
confirmed the need to tackle countermeasures in a unified fashion with the
104 POWER AND PORK
government after discussing matters such as the disaster prevention radio

system in the disaster-stricken area and to what degree forecasts of precipitation
were possible in advance.123
Matsuoka also entered the realm of environment policy by joining the Diet’s
Environment Committee, rising to be a director in 1994 and chairman of the
LDP’s Environment Division in the same year (see Table 4.1). A divisional
chairmanship was a senior position for a second-term Diet member, but the
division was not very popular because it was recognised as ‘high politics’ and
not directly connected to votes.124 As a result, competition for executive positions
in this policy sector was not high. The environment was also a policy set
generally recognised as representative of urban interests.125
Matsuoka was interested in it, however, because it was connected, indirectly,
to both the agricultural and forestry industries. Environmental policy related
to agriculture because one of the main arguments used by Matsuoka and others
for continued support and protection of the Japanese farming sector was that
it preserved the environment. The same could be said for forests, which had
well-acknowledged environmental functions. Their positive environmental value
was one of the main rationales for maintaining them. Moreover, environmental
arguments resonated amongst the broader public, including urban dwellers,
and thus offered powerful national-interest grounds on which to defend both
Japan’s agriculture and its forests. In this way, environmental policy could be
used as a bridge between city and urban areas.
THIRD-STRING INTERESTS
Matsuoka acquired not only a second but also a third string to his policy bow.
One area of interest from relatively early in his Diet career was communications.
He became a member of the Lower House Communications Committee (Tsûshin
Iinkai) and the corresponding LDP Communications Division (Tsûshin Bukai)
in 1992 and became vice-chairman of the LDP’s Communications Division in
1993 (see Table 4.1). The Communications Division (prior to the amalgamation
of the Ministry of Home Affairs with the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications in January 2001) handled matters relating to posts and
telecommunications as well as broadcasting issues—everything under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.126
Given his family connections to the military and his youthful ambition to
join the National Defence Academy, Matsuoka also showed an interest in defence
policy in his second term by joining the National Defence Division (Kokubô
Bukai). He became the vice-chairman of the division in 1994 (see Table
4.1). Defence put some balance into his policy focus by broadening his
scope to encompass issues outside Japan, but given his background and family
connections in this area, Matsuoka preferred defence policy to foreign affairs.
He only began to attend meetings of the Foreign Affairs Division (Gaikô
Bukai) later in his career in order to provide support for his main LDP backer,
Suzuki Muneo.
Matsuoka also served on Diet and party policy committees on accounts and
administration, ethics in public elections and others (see Table 4.1), including
the Special Committee on Okinawa and the Northern Territories (Okinawa
oyobi Hoppô Mondai ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai). Here he could again
provide backup to Suzuki,127 who was very influential in this area and who, at
one time, served as director-general of the Hokkaido Development Agency.
In 1996, Matsuoka rose to be vice-chairman of the LDP’s Diet Policy
Committee, which was concerned with advancing the parliamentary legislative
process. Its task was chiefly one of coordination: with bureaucrats, who wanted
to get their legislation passed,128 and with opposition parties, whose cooperation
was needed for the smooth passage of legislation through the Diet.
In 2003, Matsuoka served as vice-chairman of the LDP’s Special Committee
on Aviation Problems (Kôkû Mondai Tokubetsu Iinkai),129 which later set up
a subcommittee called the Aviation Industry Countermeasures Subcommittee
(Kôkû Jigyô Taisaku Shoiinkai) in order to come up with solutions to the
downturn in the aviation industry. At one of the subcommittee meetings,
Matsuoka, as a market interventionist, proposed that special financing should
be made available to each (aviation) company via the policy investment bank.
In his view, support for the aviation industry in Japan was important ‘so that
globalisation of the country would not stagnate’.130
In 2004, Matsuoka became vice-chairman of the LDP’s Medical Treatment
Basic Problems Investigation Committee (Iryô Kihon Mondai Chôsakai) (see
Table 4.1). He claimed to have some knowledge and interest in this area,
particularly as it could be applied to his local constituency. In the past,
Matsuoka had held meetings on medical issues in Aso County Medical Hall so
that voters could evaluate him as a political representative on medical issues.
He discussed initiatives such as the introduction of an emergency helicopter,
his involvement in reviewing medical laws, the entry of joint-stock companies
106 POWER AND PORK
into medical fields (as a deregulation measure) and problems of Japan’s low
birth rate and aging population.131
Matsuoka laid claim to some of the success in achieving the implementation
of a national paediatric emergency telephone consultation service in 2004,
which he asserted had been one of his pet projects for some time. He had
tackled the problem for the first time 20 years previously when he was assistant
director of the National Land Agency’s Regional Development Division. During
that period, he said he had ‘keenly felt the need for an emergency medical
system specialising in paediatrics’. 132 Since then, the fulfilment of an entire
emergency medical system had been one of his policy objectives including the
introduction of an emergency helicopter and local medical treatment in areas
such as remote islands and mountain village regions. Matsuoka claimed credit
for the fruits of his ‘inconspicuous but energetic and patient efforts in all
directions’,133 which had finally started to produce results.
In another social welfare policy area, Matsuoka stepped into the lead position
on an LDP panel on Minamata disease (see Table 4.1), the Minamata Problem
Subcommittee (Minamata Mondai Shoiinkai). Minamata disease was a form
of mercury poisoning that broke out in the 1950s and Minamata Bay was
located in Kumamoto Prefecture. As chairman of the subcommittee, Matsuoka
claimed credit in 2005 for breaking the deadlock between the national
government and Kumamoto prefectural government on the issue of who should
foot the bill for medical costs for patients with Minamata disease. He instructed
the Environment Ministry and other ministries and agencies concerned to
work out a compromise under which the national government would bear
more of the costs than local government.134
Matsuoka also stepped into important positions in the Diet committee system.
In November 2003, in the early days of his fifth term, Matsuoka was elected
director of the Lower House Budget Committee (Yosan Iinkai) (see Table 4.1).
The Budget Committee’s purview is all-encompassing. It not only deliberates
on the government’s budget bill, but also on all other important policies with
fiscal implications, such as the dispatch of Self-Defence Force (SDF) troops to
Iraq, pension issues, the economy, postal privatisation, foreign policy and so
on. The committee also serves as the main arena for question time between
government and opposition party leaders. This function put Matsuoka, as
vice-chairman, in the thick of government business in the Lower House. In
this role, Matsuoka attended meetings of Budget Committee directors, which
were held in order to organise the committee agenda as well as to discuss items
for examination undertaken after the close of the Diet session.
At the very first meeting of the Budget Committee of the special Diet in
September 2005, Matsuoka was reappointed as a director of the committee
(see Table 4.1). At the same time he was reappointed as chief of the LDP’s
Information Research Bureau, a position he first took up in 2004 (see Table
4.1). This made him one of five LDP bureau chiefs. The bureau provided data
to determine the basic policy of the party through the collection and
arrangement of all sorts of information necessary for LDP activities.135
Within the executive ranks of the ruling party, Matsuoka rose to be deputy
secretary-general of the LDP in 2000 and held other leading positions in the
LDP’s organisation (see Table 4.1). The highest general policy position he
held was as a member of the Executive Council in 2001–03, reflecting his
seniority. The council was the supreme decision-making body of the LDP and
the clearing-house for all PARC policy decisions. It had 31 members, all senior
members of the party appointed mainly through coordination amongst the
party factions.136 Article 38 of the party rules stipulates that the role of the
Executive Council is to ‘deliberate on important bills relating to party
management and Diet activities and determine whether to support the bills or
not.’ No policy could become party policy without the approval of the Executive
Council, which gave Matsuoka the opportunity to act as a supreme veto point
on policy within the party.
ACTIVITIES IN DIET MEMBERS’ LEAGUES

Matsuoka’s public profile as an agitator on behalf of agricultural interests was
further boosted by his high-profile activities in more informal organisations
known as Diet members’ leagues. From the time he entered the Diet in 1990,
Matsuoka remained resolutely resistant to agricultural trade liberalisation and
was not open to persuasion. He was very strongly protective of his constituents,
and became the leader of a movement (within the LDP) to block the opening
of the rice market during the UR negotiations. In 1992, he mobilised the
Special Action Diet Members’ League to Protect Japanese Agriculture (Nihon
no Nôgyô o Mamoru Tokubetsu Kôdô Giin Renmei), a group of 32 politicians
who had only been elected once. The group spearheaded the anti-rice
liberalisation lobby within the LDP. Matsuoka was its representative organiser
(daihyô sewanin). The group went into action whenever the government showed
108 POWER AND PORK
a softening attitude towards liberalising imports of rice. In late 1992, it

threatened to request the immediate resignation of Prime Minister Miyazawa
if the government changed its approach to the rice import issue. It also proposed
sending its own mission to Geneva to appeal to the Japanese GATT negotiators
to prevent comprehensive tariffication of agricultural import barriers.137 As
the leader of the group, Matsuoka, in his own words, ‘made a signed pact with
fellow Diet members and conducted a sit-in protest in front of the Diet’.138
He sat down in front of the Diet building and refused to move.
Matsuoka also demonstrated a similar commitment to defending the interests
of his farm supporters in 1996. While holding the position of chairman of the
Agriculture and Forestry Division, he simultaneously participated in the LDP’s
‘action corps’, which aligned with agricultural groups to secure the agriculture
and forestry budget and which included a number of senior LDP nôrin giin.
These are both examples of informal, but organised, policy activities
characteristic of special-interest politicians such as Matsuoka. The most transient
groups are called ‘action corps’, but the more substantial groupings in which
Matsuoka has been involved, some with an almost semi-permanent existence,
are Diet members’ leagues (giin renmei).
The leagues engage in very public activities that enable Matsuoka to promote
particular policy causes and to lobby the party leadership, the ministries and
the government leadership. Such activities are essentially a form of public
relations. They present a good image to voters, and are designed to demonstrate
Matsuoka’s experience, knowledge, sense of duty and commitment, as well as
his policy interests and credibility. Activities in the leagues raise Matsuoka’s
public profile and visibility, particularly in his electorate, showing how
energetically he is working in giin katsudô on behalf of his supporters, how he
is engaging with other like-minded legislators on issues in which they are in
common agreement and how they are working for common objectives in a way
that cuts across both factional and sometimes party membership. The leagues
enable Matsuoka to operate as part of an internal pressure group within the
Diet and ruling party.
Some of the leagues in which Matsuoka has participated are related to
agriculture and forestry, directly or indirectly. Matsuoka became acting
chairman of the LDP’s Dairy Policy Association (Jimintô Rakuseikai), a group
of LDP farm politicians who represented constituencies where dairy farming
was important, and who had close links to the dairy farmers’ political leagues.
In the role of acting chairman, Matsuoka attended the permanent and central
combined council of the dairy farmers’ political leagues and made his greetings
to the attendees as acting chairman of the LDP group. He saw this as necessary
order to demonstrate his continuing support for dairy farming.139
Matsuoka also assumed the position of acting chairman of the Forests, Forestry
and Forestry Industry Activisation Promotion Diet Members’ League (Shinrin,
Ringyô, Rinsangyô Kasseika Sokushin Giin Renmei),140 which maintained links
to the Forests, Forestry and Forestry Industry Activisation Promotion Assembly
Members’ League (Shinrin, Ringyô, Rinsangyô Kasseika Sokushin Giin Renmei)
organised by regional prefectural and municipal assemblies. In his executive
role, Matsuoka liaised between the two leagues and attended roundtable
conferences of the prefectural group.141 These activities provided him with direct
links to prefectural politicians concerned with regional forestry issues.
In an agriculture-related role, Matsuoka became chairman of the Diet
members’ league called the Association for Researching the Food Labelling
Problem for Consumer Protection (Shôhisha Hogo no tame no Shokuhin Hyôji
Mondai Kenkyûkai), which focused on the issue of labelling food with the
regional district in which it was produced. It also dealt with the lack of precise
regulations on food-producing district labelling for supermarkets and others.
Meat companies were able to label imported beef as domestic beef during the
domestic bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scare in order to obtain
subsidies from the government, a sham in which Matsuoka was indirectly
involved.142 Matsuoka claimed that ‘through the enthusiastic action of the
Diet members’ league the government has started to adopt strict criteria for
producing district labelling and penal regulations for offenders’.143
Matsuoka also established the Diet Members’ League to Promote the Export
of Farm Products Etc. (Nôsanbutsutô Yûshutsu Sokushin Giin Renmei) in
December 2003, with the catchphrase ‘agricultural policy on the offensive’
(seme no nôsei). He later became leader of the LDP’s Agricultural Products Etc.
Export Promotion Research Association (Nôsanbutsutô Yûshutsu Sokushin
Kenkyûkai), which was formed in February 2004 with approximately 40
members from the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet. The association was
established with the objective of encouraging people in other countries to
taste authentic Japanese food using genuine Japanese foodstuffs, to understand
and like Japan’s culture more, and to make Japanese agriculture into an export
industry. The foundation general meeting of the association expressed the view
110 POWER AND PORK
that the amount of exported farm products should rise from the existing level
of ¥270 billion to ¥1 trillion over five years in cooperation with the Japan
External Trade Organisation (JETRO) and other groups.144
Through his membership of Diet members’ leagues, Matsuoka managed to
span the range of other core LDP interests as well, with small business, traditional
Japanese culture, consumer and welfare interests, and health and aviation policy
figuring in his membership. For example, through league activities, Matsuoka
became something of a small business advocate. He became chairman of the
LDP’s Small and Medium Enterprise Area Coordination Law Subcommittee
(Chûshô Kigyô Bunya Chôseihô Bunkakai), which was a subcommittee of a
larger Diet members’ league, the Association to Foster Small and Medium
Enterprise to Revive the Japanese Economy (Nihon no Keizai o Kasseika shi
Chûshô Kigyô o Sodateru Kai),145 commonly known by the sobriquet ‘Association
to Reconsider Deregulation’ (Kisei Kanwa o Minaosu Kai).
Matsuoka also served as chairman of another subcommittee of this larger
Diet members’ league, the Coexistence with Large-Scale Stores Problem
Subcommittee (Daikibo Tenpo to Kyôson Mondai Bunkakai). On these
committees, Matsuoka went out of his way to speak for the owners of the old-
fashioned Japanese ‘mom-and-pop’ stores, the traditional small business owners
who sheltered behind a welter of regulations preserving their profits, and who
formed a very important bailiwick for the LDP throughout Japan. Because the
push for deregulation could affect small businesses in regional areas, Matsuoka
railed against the iniquities of deregulation on his website. He cited the example
of Germany where, he argued, unregulated development had not been allowed
to take place in regional cities, and where a large-scale supermarket opening in
a rural district was forced by regulation to deal in products other than those
supplied by regional shops.
Thus agriculture and forestry have not been Matsuoka’s exclusive interest or
zone of political activity. He has had other policy concerns and became a
member and executive of committees that were completely unrelated to his
primary specialism. In fact, on his website, he claimed ‘to be active in a wide
range of areas and to be a rarely gifted person…with an extraordinary ability
to execute actions’. Furthermore, as Matsuoka gained seniority in the Diet
and in the party, he spread his wings further in preparation for, as he saw it,
higher office. This required him to gain knowledge and expertise in a wider
range of committees, and to demonstrate that he was not simply a narrowly
focused, special-interest politician. His agricultural and forestry specialism was

the dominant but not the sole dimension of his policy activities. No politician
in Japan could afford to be one-dimensional in his representation of agricultural
and forestry interests because of the number of votes connected to primary
industries was declining all the time.
However, the key difference between Matsuoka’s memberships of agriculture
and forestry committees and all the rest (apart from the Lower House Special
Committee on Disasters where he demonstrated rather more dedicated
attachment because of its connection to public works in regional areas) was
that his participation was not continuous. It was Matsuoka’s persistent
attachment to agriculture and forestry committees and the variety of committees
in this policy sector on which he served and directed, which pointed to his
policy specialism and primary area of interest representation.
Table 4.1 Matsuoka’s Committee Memberships et cetera

Lower House committee memberships
Regional Administration Committee 1990
Special Committee Relating to Land Problems 1990
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee 1991–94
Member/Director 1995–96
Director 1997–99
Chairman 2000
Special Committee on Disasters 1991, 1995–97, 1999
Director 1992–1994, 2003, 2005
Communications Committee 1992–93
Environment Committee
Member/Director 1994
Director 1995
Land, Infrastructure and Transport Committee 2001–2002
Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories 2001
Director 2002
Special Committee on Ethics in Public Elections 2002–2003
Budget Committee 2003, 2005
Director 2004–05
Accounts and Administration Committee 2004
Special Committee on Postal Privatisation
Director 2005
112 POWER AND PORK
LDP (PARC) policy committee memberships

Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee 1990–94
Agriculture and Forestry Division 1991–95
Chairman 1996–97
Communications Division 1992
Vice-Chairman 1993–94
Defence Division 1993
Environment Division 1993
Chairman 1994
National Defence Division
Vice-Chairman 1994
Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee
Chairman 1995–2003, 2005
Uruguay Round-Related Countermeasures
Implementation Subcommittee
Chairman 1995
State-Owned Forests Problems Subcommittee
Chairman 1995, 1997, 2000–01
Livestock Product Price Sub-Committee
Chairman 1996
Diet Policy Committee
Vice-Chairman 1996
Rice Price Committee
Chairman 1997
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade
Countermeasures Special Committee
Acting Chairman 1997–99
UR-Related Works Implementation Promotion Subcommittee
Chairman 1997
Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee 1997
Acting Chairman 2004–05
Committee Concerned with the Rice Price
Chairman 2000
Mountain Village Development Countermeasures Special Committee
Acting Chairman 2000–01, 2004
UR-Related Countermeasures Implementation
Promotion Subcommittee
Chairman 2000
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Administrative
Reform Investigation Team
Chairman 2000
Management Income Study Meeting
Chairman 2000
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade

Investigation Committee
Secretary-General 2003–05
Chairman 2006
Leaf Tobacco Price Investigation Subcommittee
Chairman 2003
Forestry Illegal and Unlawful Logging Countermeasures
Investigation Team
Chairman 2003
Special Committee on Aviation Problems
Vice-Chairman 2003
LDP Avian Influenza Countermeasures Headquarters
Secretary-General 2004
Management Countermeasures Project Team
Chairman 2004–05
Forestry Policy Basic Problems Subcommittee
Chairman 2004–05
Illegal Logging Countermeasures Investigation Team to
Protect the Global Environment
Chairman 2004–05
Agriculture and Forestry Executive
Acting Chairman 2005
Tobacco and Salt Industry Special Committee
Chairman 2005
Forestry Management Activation Council
Chairman 2005
Forestry Policy Investigation Committee
Vice-Chairman 2005
Mountain Village Development Committee
Acting Chairman 2005
Roads Investigation Committee
Vice-Chairman 2005
Minamata Problem Subcommittee
Chairman 2005
Social Welfare System Investigation Committee
Vice-Chairman 2005
Special Committee on Aviation Countermeasures
Vice-Chairman 2005
Human Rights Problem Investigation Committee
Vice-Chairman 2005
Committee to Rapidly Promote Exports of 2006
Japanese Agricultural Products etc.
114 POWER AND PORK
Cabinet and sub-cabinet positions

Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: Murayama Cabinet 1995
Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: Second Mori Cabinet 2001
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2006
Party organisation/ executive posts

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Bureau
Assistant Director 1993
Communications and Information Bureau
Assistant Director 1993
Construction Bureau
Chief 1994
National Organisation Committee
Vice-Chairman 1994
Construction Bureau
Chief 1995
National Land and Construction-Related Groups Committee
Chairman 1997
Deputy Secretary-General 2000
Executive Council 2001–03, 2005
Information and Investigation Bureau
Chairman 2004
PARC Deliberation Commission 2005
Organisation Headquarters
Vice-Chairman 2005
Sources: MAFF mimeo, Jiyû Minshutô Seimu Chôsakai (ed.) February 1992. Jiyû Minshutô Seimu
Chôsakai Meibo, Heisei 4-nen, 2-gatsu, 3-nichi Genzai [Liberal Democratic Party Policy Affairs
Research Council Membership List 3 February 1992 to the Present], pp: 63, 70, 90; Seikan Yôran,
various issues, Kokkai Benran, Tokyo, Nihon Seikei Shinbunsha, various issues; Matsuoka
Toshikatsu Website, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, various issues. <http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
index1.html>; <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/giindata/matsuoka-to.html>.
NOTES
1 These investigation committees (chôsakai) are also called ‘research commissions’.
2 Tachibana Takashi, Nôkyô: Kyodai na Chôsen [Nokyo: The Enormous Challenge], Tokyo, Asahi
Shinbunsha, 1980, p. 337.
4 ibid., p. 63.
6 Book review by Brad Glosserman, The Japan Times, 13 July 2000.
7 See the discussion in Machidori, ‘The 1990s Reforms Have Transformed Japanese Politics’, p. 39.
9 ibid.
12 Quoted in Tatebayashi, Giin Kôdô, p. 68.
14 ibid., p. 132.
15 Kan Naoto, 1998. Daijin [Ministers], Iwanami Shôten, Tokyo, p. 160.
16 ibid., p. 35.
17 ibid., pp. 162–63.
18 Kan generalises this point. See Daijin, p. 162.
19 ibid., p. 163.
20 ibid., pp. 162–63.
21 ‘Shinshokuryôhô Ketchaku’ [‘’The New Food Law Launched’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 5, January
1996, p. 12.
22 ibid., p. 12.
23 This was the New Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Law (Shokuryô, Nôgyô, Nôson Kihonhô) of
July 1999.
24 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Jimintô Nôgyô Kihon Seisaku Iinkai Iinchô ni Kiku’ [‘Listening to Matsuoka
Toshikatsu, Chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 23,
February 1999, pp. 12–3.
25 ‘Seidoteki na Shikumi wa Dekita. Nôgyô Genba no Jikkô ni Kitai Shitai’ [‘A Systematic Framework has
Emerged. I Expect that This Will be Executed at the Agricultural Grass Roots’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru,
No. 16, November 1997, p. 18.
26 See also the discussion in Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Zoku’.
28 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 103, citing the
Asahi Shinbun, 2 August 1997.
29 ibid.
31 This is short for Nômin Undô Zenkoku Rengôkai (National Federation of Farmers’ Campaigns). It
claims that it does not support any particular political party, but it is generally regarded as affiliated
with the Japan Communist Party. See http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/aboutus/soshiki/gaiyo.htm
32 See http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/dat/200208/2002081202.htm
33 These were ‘health resorts’ equipped with hot springs, places for doing holistic chi-kung and other
places for people to stand together in large numbers. Hasegawa Hiroshi, ‘Nôsuishô o Haishi seyo’
[‘Abolish the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries’], Aera, 1 April 2002, p. 37.
36 ibid.
116 POWER AND PORK
37 ‘Onsen de Kokusai Kyôsôryoku Kyôka Nôgyô Yosan Muda Tsukai no Kôzu’ [‘Internationalisation
Strengthened Through Hot Springs—The Composition of Wasteful Spending in the Agricultural
Budget’], Shûkan Daiyamondo, 20 April 2002, p. 52. The resort provides a wide range of leisure
facilities in addition to a hot spring, including restaurants, shops, hotels. See http://www.mizube-
plaza.co.jp/
38 The idea behind this terminology is to ‘promote interaction between urban and rural areas, while at the
same time securing employment opportunities for farm villages. ‘Onsen de Kokusai Kyôsôryoku
Kyôka’, p. 52.
41 ‘Onsen de Kokusai Kyôsôryoku Kyôka’, p. 52.
42 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 183. Zenekon
is an abbreviation of zeneraru kontorakutâ, (general contractor), which directly contract construction
works from clients and conduct all aspects of construction work. Zenekon consist of the top construction
companies in Japan such as Takenaka Corporation, Obayashi Corporation, Shimizu Corporation,
Kajima Corporation and Taisei Corporation, which are sometimes called Super Zenekon. Even though
the core business of these five corporations is the execution of construction works, the corporations also
have design, engineering, and research and development sections and possess extensive technological
resources for construction. In this respect they are different from ordinary (small-scale) construction
companies (kensetsu kaisha).
43 Itô, ‘Heisei Jiken Fuairu: Nôrin Jigyô Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 67. Toyo
Construction also secured the contract for a cultural exchange centre in Kikuyo Town. Originally a
different general contractor involved in the planning stages was going to take the job, but the bid went
to Toyo Construction.
44 Hasegawa, ‘Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô’, p. 23. See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins
of Nagata-chô’.
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
48 ‘UR Taisaku 6 Chô 100 Oku En tô Nôgyô Kankei Yosan Kakuho e Jimintô Sôgô Nôsei Chôsakai,
Nôrin Bukai Zenryoku’ [‘The LDP’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee
and Agriculture and Forestry Division Put All Power Into Securing the UR Countermeasures ¥6.01
Trillion Agriculture-Related Budget’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 13, May 1997, p. 4.
49 This is an abridged version of Matsuoka’s response, reported in ‘Zaisei Kôzô Kaikaku ni kakawaru
Nôgyô Kankei Yosan Kakuho Taisaku no Torikumi ni tsuite’ [‘About Grappling with Countermeasures
to Secure the Agriculture-Related Budget Endangered by Fiscal Structural Reform’], Nôsei Undô
Jyânaru, No. 14, August 1997, p. 5.
51 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Jimintô no “Bukai” tte??’ [‘What are the LDP “Divisions??”’], in
Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/
053.html
52 ‘Kinkyû Nyûin shita “Suzuki Muneo” no Funkei no Tomo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi no Taiho
Jôhô’ [‘“Suzuki Muneo’s” Eternal Friend is Admitted to Hospital in an Emergency: A Report of
Matsuoka’s Arrest’], Shûkan Shinchô, 4 July 2002, p. 26.
53 ‘Dai 136-kai Kokkai Nôrinsuisan, Yosan Iinkai Shitsumon Ôtô’ [‘The 136 th Diet Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries and Budget Committees’ Responses to Questions’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No.
7, May 1996, pp. 28–9.
54 ‘Jimintô Chikusanbutsu Kakakutô Shôiinchô, Matsuoka Toshikatsu, “Chikusan Nôka no Iyoku o so
ga nai Kakaku Kettei ni Zenryoku”’ [‘LDP Livestock Commodity Prices Etc. Subcommittee Chairman,
Matsuoka Toshikatsu, “Full Power for a Price Decision that Does Not Weaken the Motivation of
Livestock Farmers”’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 7, May 1996, p. 11.
55 ‘Jimintô Chikusanbutsu’, p. 11.

56 ‘Inasaku Keiei Antei, Kome Seisaku no Kakuritsu e’ [‘Towards the Establishment of a Rice Policy and
Stabilisation of Rice Crop management’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 16, November 1997, p. 20.
57 ‘Kome Seisaku Kakuritsu e Zaigen Kakuho Motomeru 1300 nin Kesshû shi Zenkoku Daihyôsha
Shûkai’ [‘A National Gathering of Representatives Uniting 1300 People Demand the Securing of a
Source of Revenue for the Establishment of a Rice Policy’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 16, November
1997, p. 21.
58 ‘Jimintô ni Girigiri made Yôsei, Tôhonbu ni Kesshû shi Sôkekki Shûkai’ [‘Taking Requests to the
LDP, A General Uprising Meeting Concentrating on the Party Heaquarters’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru,
No. 16, November 1997, p. 24.
59 ‘Seidoteki na Shikumi wa Dekita’, p. 18.
60 See Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Zoku’.
61 In 2000 Matsuoka served as chairman of the LDP’s Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Administrative
Reform Investigation Team (Nôrinsuisan Gyôkaku Kentô Chîmu).
62 In 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2001 Matsuoka served as chairman of the State-Owned Forests Problems
Subcommittee (Kokuyû Rinya Mondai Shôiinkai), which was a subcommittee of the Forestry Policy
Investigation Committee. The subcommittee was, for example, concerned with the Forestry Policy
Reform Outline (Rinsei Kaikaku Taikô). It was under Matsuoka’s chairmanship in 2000 when the
plan for the Forestry Policy Reform Outline was advanced. ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’
[‘The Steps of Agriculture-Related Policy Decisions’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 35, February 2001,
p. 29.
63 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 35, February 2001, p. 29.
64 The Japan Times, 6 December 2000.
65 ibid.
67 ibid., p. 102.
69 This position is also described as ‘senior vice-minister’.
70 This was also a position that came to be reserved for Diet members serving their fourth term.
71 Nikkei Weekly, 14 August 2000.
72 See also Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Zoku’.
73 The Japan Times, 8 January 2001.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 ‘Chûô Shôchô Saihen Sutâto’, [‘Reorganisation of the Central Ministries and Agencies Starts’], Nôsei
Undô Jyânaru, No. 35, February 2001, p. 13.
77 Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 January 2001.
78 The Japan Times, 21 March 2003.
79 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 37, June 2001, p. 30.
80 Wada Yoshitaka, ‘Kenshô: Sêfugâdo wa Naze Hatsudô sareta ka?’ [‘Investigation: Why Were the
Safeguards Invoked?’], Ekonomisuto, 23 April 2002, p. 91.
81 Wada, ‘Kenshô: Sêfugâdo wa Naze Hatsudô sareta ka?’, p. 91.
82 ibid. See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
85 ibid., p. 92.
86 ibid., p. 91.
87 ibid.
88 Embassy of Japan in China, ‘Nihon to Chûkoku no Kankei: Saikin no Ugoki – Matsuoka Nôrinsuisan
Fukudaijin ga Hôchû, Yunyû Yasai ya Ryokuka Kyôryoku ni Tsuite Kaidan’ [‘Japan-China Relations:
Recent Activities – Deputy Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Matsuoka on a Visit to China,
118 POWER AND PORK
Talks concerning Vegetable Imports and Cooperation in Tree-Planting’]. Available from http://
www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/jp/2nd%20tier/05jckankei/j-c010320jjj.htm
89 Wada, ‘Kenshô: Sefugâdo wa Naze Hatsudô sareta ka?’, p. 93.
90 Ayukawa Saiji, ‘Jimintô de mo Shinkô suru “Matsuoka Hazushi”’[‘“Removal of Matsuoka” is Even in
Progress in the LDP’], Fôsaito, May 2002, p. 20.
91 ibid.
92 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 46, December 2002, p. 29.
93 ibid.
94 They were the chairmen of CAPIC, the Agriculture and Forestry Division, and Agricultural Basic
Policy Subcommittee.
95 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 51, October 2003, p. 29.
96 ibid..
97 ibid.
98 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kome Seisan Chosei Menseki Sueoki o Kettei’ [‘The Decision to
Leave the Area for Rice Production Adjustment As It Is’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/048.html
99 It replaced the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Countermeasures Special Committee.
100 ‘Jimintô no “Bukai” tte??’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/053.html
101 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Nihon, Mekishiko FTA (Jijû Bôeki Kyôtei) Gôi’ [‘The Japan-
Mexico FTA (Free Trade Agreement) Reached’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/053.html
102 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘“Jimintô Tori Infuruenza Taisaku Honbu” Tachiageru’ [‘“LDP
Headquarters for Avian Influenza” Established’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
103 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tori Infuruenza Yosan Iinkai de Shitsumon’ [‘Interpellating on
Avian Influenza in the Budget Committee’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
104 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘“Tô Tori Infuruenza Taisaku Honbu” Kachiku Densenbyôo Yôbôhô
Kaiseian o Ryôshô’ [‘“The LDP Avian Influenza Countermeasures Headquarters” Approves the
Revised Bill for the Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Law’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/053.html
105 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tori Infuruenza wa Banzen no Taisaku de’ [‘All Possible
Countermeasures Against Bird Flu’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
106 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Oguni Machi de Genchi Chôsa’ [‘On-the-Spot Investigation’ in
Oguni Town’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
site002//public/060.html
107 See http://www.sanson.or.jp/sokuhou/no_901/901-3.html
108 ‘Oguni Machi de Genchi Chôsa’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/
060.html
109 For more discussion of Matsuoka’s activities on forestry-related committees, see Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral
Vicissitudes’.
110 See Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral Vicissitudes’.
111 ‘“Keiei Seisaku Taikô” o Matomaru—“Kôzô Kaikaku” no Gutaika Sutâto’ [‘“Management Policy Outline”
Decided—The Start of Concrete Measures for “Structural Reform”’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 39,
October 2001, p. 20.
112 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Chihô Rinkatsu Giren Sôkai’ [‘A General Meeting of the Regional
Forestry Activisation Assembly Members’ League’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available
from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
113 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tokubetsu Kokkai no Kaikaishiki’ [‘Opening Ceremony of the Special
Diet’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
114 ibid.
115 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Nihongata Chokusetsu Shiharai o dô subeki ka’ [‘How Should
Japan-Style Direct Payments Be?’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
116 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Jyunêbu kara Kaette Kimashita’ [‘I Returned from Geneva’], in
Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
117 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Nihonhan Chokusetsu Shiharai no Saishûan Happyô’,
[‘Announcement of the Final Draft of the Japanese Edition Direct Payments’], in Katsudô Hôkoku
[Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
118 Nikkei Weekly, 14 November 2005.
119 ‘Taifû to Jishin de Nôgyô ni Daihigai’ [‘Great Damage to Agriculture in the Typhoons and Earthquake’],
Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 58, December 2004, p. 20.
120 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Shûchû Gôu no Higaichi o Chôsa Shimashita’ [‘I Investigated
Areas Damaged by Concentrated Heavy Rain’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
121 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Oguni-machi Gikai’ [‘Oguni Town Assembly’], in Katsudô
Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
122 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kuni no Moto, Chisan Chisui’ [‘The Foundation of the Country,
Food Control and Riparian Works’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
123 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kyûshû no Shûchû Gôu Higai Taisaku on Kinkyû Giron [‘Urgent
Deliberation on Localised Torrential Downpour Damage Countermeasures in Kyushu’], in Katsudô
Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/041.html
125 ibid.
126 Personal communication, Professor Ellis Krauss, June 2005.
128 Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, pp. 119–20.
129 Elsewhere this committee is listed as the Special Committee on Aviation Countermeasures (Kôkû
Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai). See Seikan Yôran, 2004, Spring Edition, p. 564.
130 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kôkû Gyôkai no Anteika Shien o Yôsei’ [‘Requesting Support for
the Stabilisation of the Aviation Industry’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http:/
/matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/041.html
131 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Shi ni Kiku (Aso Gun Ishi Renmei Shiryoo no Peiji)’ [‘Ask Mr Toshikatsu
Matsuoka (The Data Page of Aso County Doctors Federation)’]. Available from http://www.geocities.jp/
e_osan/ishirenmei_aso03_T_Matsuoka.html
132 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘“Shoni Kyukyu Denwa Sodan Jigyo” Jitsugen e!!’ [‘Realising “The
Paediatric Emergency Telephone Consultation Project”!!’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available
from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/053.html
133 ‘“Shoni Kyukyu Denwa Sodan Jigyo” Jitsugen e!!’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
sit002//public/053.html
134 Manichi Daily News, 31 March 2005.
135 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Shûgiin Yosan Iinkai “Riji” ni Shûnin’ [‘Taking up the Post of
“Director” of the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/048.html
136 Under Prime Minister Koizumi, the members of the Executive Council are officially elected in the
following way: 14 members are publicly elected from the LDP Lower House membership; six
members are publicly elected from the LDP Upper House membership; and 11 members are
designated by the LDP president. Jiyû Minshutô Sômukai [The LDP Executive Council]. See http://
ja.wikipedia.org
137 Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 December 1992.
138 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru’, Seikan Yôran, 1995, First Half Year Edition, p. 269.
120 POWER AND PORK
139 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Jizokuteki na Rakunô Shien o’ [‘Continuing Support for Dairy
Farming’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
index1.html
140 Activities in other forestry leagues are examined in Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral Vicissitudes’, as are
Matsuoka’s promotion of environmental causes through league activity.
141 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tokubetsu Kokkai ga Owarimashita’ [‘The Special Diet Ended’],
in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
143 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Giin Renmei Katsudô’ [‘Diet League Activities’]. Available from
http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/wite002//public/033.html
144 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Anzen, Anshin de Sugureta Nihon no Nôsanbutsu o Sekai ni’
[‘Safe, Secure and Prominent Japanese Farm Products to the World’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
Report]. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/051.html. See also Chapter
5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Zoku’.
145 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Chiiki no “Sakaya San” Sonzoku no Tame ni’ [‘For the Existence of
Regional “Sake Shops”’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
public/008.html
EXERCISING POWER AS A NÔRIN ZOKU 121
5
EXERCISING POWER AS A NÔRIN ZOKU
Matsuoka followed the classical career pattern for a zoku. His long-standing
membership of PARC and Diet committees on agricultural and forestry, his
attainment of the top executive positions in the key committees as well as his
subcabinet positions on agriculture, forestry and fisheries earned him
membership of the LDP’s agriculture and forestry ‘tribe’. Acquisition of formal
policy positions over a period of time indicated an accumulated level of expertise
and influence in a particular policy domain as well as the possession of close
relations with the ministry responsible for administering that sector. As
Matsuoka aspired to senior executive positions in the party and leadership
positions in the government, he was aiming to use his status as a ‘tribe Diet
member’ (zoku giin) as a means of furthering his ambitions to even higher
office.
BECOMING A ZOKU
It is difficult to pinpoint when Matsuoka actually became a nôrin zoku.
According to some commentators, he had the right to be called a nôrin zoku
right from the start of his political career ‘because he had received support
from the late Tamaki Kazuo and because he represented the traditional locality
of Kumamoto’.1 Certainly, by the mid 1990s, Matsuoka’s power to plunder
the pork barrel had become widely known as a result of the projects built in
his own district funded by the UR countermeasures package.2 By 2000, ‘while
being a middle-ranking Diet member elected four times, his career history as
a nôrin zoku stood out’.3 Matsuoka allegedly monopolised agricultural, forestry
and fisheries public works subsidies as chairman of the Lower House AFF
122 POWER AND PORK
Committee.4 In 2000, Nokyo’s National Council recognised Matsuoka as a

key member of the next generation of agricultural leaders.5
Others, however, have not been quite as willing to accord Matsuoka the
status of a nôrin zoku. He was described as ‘not a traditional nôrin zoku, because
he was not supported by the MAFF. He did not get the backing of the MAFF
to stand in politics’.6 Furthermore, Matsuoka never had an easy relationship
with MAFF officials, which was the norm for zoku. As Nakanishi comments,
the ‘best nôrin zoku are those who speak for the MAFF’.7 In practice Matsuoka
only defended the MAFF’s interests when they aligned with his own. A typical
example was his support for the MAFF in forcing through Nagasaki Prefecture’s
Isahaya Bay Drainage Project.8 A DPJ executive observed that ‘Matsuoka was
joked about as “the caretaker of MAFF interests” (Nôsuishô no shôeki no bannin)
because he resisted all opposition to the Isahaya Bay project, which reclaimed
part of the Ariake Sea in Isahaya Bay’.9 The Ariake Sea was a nearly land-locked
body of water bordered by the prefectures of Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Saga and
Fukuoka. The ¥250 billion public works project filled in Isahaya Bay by
reclaiming the land to create farmland and a large reservoir. The project area
was surrounded by a 7 km-long main dyke whose gates were closed in 1997 to
keep out seawater in order to facilitate the fill-in work.10 Matsuoka was reported
as saying that ‘as long as the LDP exists, we will not open the dyke (drainage)
gate(s)’.11 He also commented, ‘there are only a few people who oppose it [the
Isahaya Bay project] locally. They are only doing it for their own benefit. They
live in the hills and worry about damage to the water, and making a living by
taking photos of mudskippers’.12 Locals, however, complained that the initial
justification for the project (reclamation in order to create farmland) changed
to ‘water damage countermeasures policy’.13 In fact ‘the only real purpose
seemed to be to complete a large-scale public works project and so the official
objective of the project did not really matter’.14
‘GODFATHER’ OF THE NÔRIN ZOKU

Despite Matsuoka’s disputed zoku status, it is clear that Matsuoka was no
ordinary nôrin zoku. In fact, by 2000, Matsuoka was regarded not just as a
zoku, but as a zoku boss. He had become known as the ‘new godfather’15 and
‘Don’ (as in Don Corleone) of the nôrin zoku.16 Being a ‘Don’ was equivalent
to being a nôrin zoku boss, the most influential of veteran lawmakers. It bestowed
extensive powers in a range of different domains. As ‘a dominant nôrin zoku
figure, he had influence over related groups, in budget acquisition, and in

personnel affairs relating to politicians and bureaucrats’.17
Many of the references to Matsuoka’s being a ‘godfather’ were to his leading
position in the field of forest policy. He was called the ‘Don’ of forestry
administration (rinya no don)18 and ‘an influential tribe Diet member’ (yûrokyu
zoku) from the Forestry Agency’.19 One journalist in charge of MAFF issues
said, ‘because he is the only Diet member from the Forestry Agency, it is fair
to say that in regard to forestry issues, he is a godfather-like figure’.20 Nakanishi
et al. wrote in 2002, ‘Diet member Matsuoka has rapidly expanded his
influence over the last few years as an influential tribe Diet member from the
Forestry Agency and has come to be called “the boss of forestry”. His influence
extends from the budget and personnel affairs to the distribution of projects
by the Forestry Agency’.21 Itô agreed that on forestry administration, Matsuoka
‘had no equal’.22
INFLUENCE OVER MAFF BUREAUCRATS

As a zoku, Matsuoka was expected to be both a protector and a beneficiary of
the MAFF. As one of the gatekeepers of the political process, Matsuoka’s job
was to shepherd MAFF-drafted policy measures and bills through the party
and the Diet as well as to lobby for the ministry’s budget as a member of the
ministry’s supporters’ group (ôendan).23 In exchange, ministry officials, through
the exercise of their discretionary powers, could arrange favours and benefits
that would become the patronage Matsuoka dispensed to clients and supporters,
and which were important ingredients in Matsuoka’s electoral and political
survival. Ideally, the relationship between Matsuoka and the MAFF should
have been one of equality and mutual dependence.
However, the Matsuoka–MAFF connection did not quite fit this pattern.
Because Matsuoka had strong ideas, MAFF officials said they had difficulties in
dealing with him, and that he was not easy to talk to.24 It was far from unusual
for Matsuoka to shout and put pressure on MAFF executives in divisional
meetings, which were held almost every day when the Diet was in session.25 He
was regarded ‘as someone who did what he liked, and while, from the MAFF’s
perspective, he could be a reliable person, he could also be really annoying’.26
As far as the ministry was concerned, Matsuoka had only two positive
attributes. First, as ‘a bureaucratic OB, he studied policy extensively’.27 Second,
he ‘was a convenient person for the MAFF to organise the Etô-Kamei faction’,28
124 POWER AND PORK
which was dominated by LDP ‘Old Guard’ politicians and which ‘had many
loud-mouthed agriculture and forestry “tribe” members’.29 These included
Yatsu Yoshio, the faction’s secretary-general and one-time MAFF minister, and
Furuya Keiji who acquired his jiban from his nôrin zoku father Furuya Keiyû.30
The Etô-Kamei faction inherited the mantle of the leading nôrin zoku faction
from former Prime Minister Suzuki, whose faction (Kôchikai)31 had been a
nôrin zoku stronghold. After Suzuki retired in 1990, Etô Takami took over as
leader of the nôrin zoku.32 This group was known as the ‘fighting faction’ (butôha)
amongst the nôrin zoku.33
When it came to links with bureaucrats, Matsuoka had extremely close
connections to some officials in the MAFF. The term ‘Matsuoka children’ was
even used to describe the ministry.34 Matsuoka’s personal connections in the
MAFF spanned both career and non-career officials.35 His senpai (seniors) were
former Administrative Vice-Minister, Tanaka Hironao (who entered the MAFF
in 1956), former Director-General of the Food Agency, Ishihara Mamoru (who
entered the MAFF in 1970, close to when Matsuoka entered it), former
Livestock Department Director, Nagamura Takemi (who entered the MAFF
in 1972, but who resigned over the BSE problem) and others. Matsuoka also
had a close relationship with the former Director-General of the Hokkaido
Forestry Management Bureau, Ogawa Yasuo (who entered MAFF in 1968),
and who was called ‘the Boss of Hokkaido Forestry’.36 Matsuoka reportedly
made the best use of these ‘Matsuoka children’.37
Matsuoka also had extremely intimate relations with non-career officials
such as a former assistant divisional director of the Agricultural Structure
Improvement Bureau, Satô Masato. Satô had a cosy relationship with the
company building ‘Refresh Villages’ using UR countermeasures money
provided under pressure from Matsuoka, zoku giin and agricultural groups.38
Satô was reportedly at Matsuoka’s beck and call in relation to the expenditure
of the UR countermeasures funds.39 Matsuoka was also close to a party official
in LDP headquarters (a Mr Y), forming what was known as the ‘Matsuoka—
the LDP’s Mr Y—the MAFF’s Satô’ line. 40 As a former MAFF executive
explained
[i]t is true that Satô was close to Matsuoka. Satô was a jimukan from Hokkaido and a dazzling
and dynamic type of person. He was quite proficient at his work and obtained and handled
budgets skilfully. His boss evaluated him highly. Since he just worked on structural improvement
projects, he was rather puffed up with pride. He became a sort of ‘structural improvement
zoku’. He did not listen to what his division chief said, and he conducted everything by himself.
According to rumour, he selected projects in a self-willed manner, and was entertained by a
large number of companies and prefectural government officials. However, three to four
years ago, corruption in structural improvement projects came to light. A MAFF investigative
committee was launched, and punishments were imposed. In consequence, MAFF officials
conducting structural improvement were all replaced, and Satô was transferred to a local
office.41
After Satô was punished and transferred to the Tokai Agricultural Administration
Bureau (Tôkai Nôsei Kyoku), 42 Matsuoka tried to get him returned to
headquarters (the MAFF main ministry in Tokyo). He repeatedly told the
Director-General of the Structural Improvement Bureau, Yamamoto Tôru, in
the presence of others, to return Satô to the bureau in the MAFF.43 However,
another ex-MAFF Diet member opposed Satô’s return, and the plan failed.44
Instead of being returned back to the MAFF in Tokyo, Satô was transferred to
the Kanto Agricultural Administration Bureau so Matsuoka could save face to
a certain extent. 45 However, it was through his relationship to Satô that
Matsuoka was able to wield so much influence over the allocation of the UR
countermeasures package.
MAFF officials also had long memories about the way Matsuoka behaved
when he was deputy minister in 2001. Matsuoka saw the deputy minister’s
position as an opportunity to throw his weight around his old ministry and to
subject the ministry to his power. He wanted to create a more hierarchical
relationship, in which officials in the ministry were subordinated to politicians
in the LDP. Matsuoka’s behaviour naturally created a lot of resentment amongst
officials in the MAFF. Surprisingly perhaps, it also created resentment amongst
other nôrin zoku because it overturned customary decision-making norms and
the traditional working relations between the party and the bureaucracy.46
Matsuoka’s treatment of MAFF officials while he was deputy minister was
commonly attributed to various grievances that he had held during his time in
the ministry. One official reasoned that because Matsuoka was a gikan while
in the MAFF, he gave the jimukan a hard time when he became deputy
minister.47 As a Forestry Agency OB explains
Matsuoka was a gikan who graduated from Tottori University. Even though he was a high-
ranking gikan (jôkyûshoku), he was often dismissed and treated coldly by career bureaucrats
(jimukanryô) in the main ministry. So behind his yelling at the bureau chiefs who once looked
down on him, there is a bitterness from that time (when he was in the Forestry Agency).48
126 POWER AND PORK
According to some MAFF officials, Matsuoka had very strong views on

agricultural policy and was infamous for calling up MAFF bureaucrats and
yelling down the phone at them.49 Even the WTO section of MoFA received
many phone calls from him. It ‘was so easy for Matsuoka to threaten officials,
he could do it before breakfast’.50 Few MAFF officials could have anticipated
his eventual appointment as minister in 2006.
POLICY INTERVENTION
As an agricultural ‘tribe’ Diet member, Matsuoka exercised considerable
influence over agricultural and forestry policy. At one time he held all the
main PARC agricultural and forestry committee executive posts, which put
him in a position to exercise power at critical stages of the policymaking process.
His two most active and influential posts as a nôrin zoku were as chairman of
the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee and as secretary-general of the
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Investigation Committee.51
In the subcommittee, Matsuoka played a pivotal role in the making of all
aspects of rice policy and rice policy reform. In the trade investigation committee,
Matsuoka was a key figure in formulating Japan’s position in agricultural trade
negotiations.
Through his committee executive posts, Matsuoka also earned membership
of the nôrin kanbu, which gave him broad powers over all important agricultural
and forestry policies. This made him a target for petitioning groups of all
kinds across a range of policy areas. He regularly hosted groups of petitioners
in his parliamentary office.
For example, in July 2005, Matsuoka received a delegation from Kumamoto
Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, which made a number of policy
requests. Following the visit, Matsuoka publicly committed himself to
‘protecting Japanese agriculture for safe and anxiety-free food’.52 In August of
the same year he received a delegation from Kyushu forestry-related groups.
They spoke to him about a budget proposal for the 2006 supplementary budget,
which would provide compensation for the damage caused by heavy rain.
Matsuoka agreed that he would tackle disaster restoration as an important
issue.53 In October, he received a number of representatives from agricultural
groups. They wanted to present a number of requests relating to
countermeasures for wheat and soybeans produced in 2006.54
Matsuoka’s giin gaikô

As secretary-general of the trade investigation committee Matsuoka gained
international notoriety as one of Japan’s leading nôrin zoku through his conduct
of giin gaikô. Because the LDP had to develop and hold its own position on
agricultural trade policy matters independently of the government (meaning
the MAFF) and the Koizumi administration, Matsuoka saw overseas delegations
as part of his executive role in the committee. He claimed even to have spent his
own money in exchanging opinions with a large number of countries concerned.55
Wherever he went, Matsuoka conducted a type of parallel diplomacy,
designed not only to provide backing for the official Japanese government
negotiating position but also to press WTO officials and representatives of
foreign governments to his and the LDP’s position on agricultural trade. This
position was rabidly anti-free trade and pro-protection. Matsuoka was
unrelenting in pushing his opposition to agricultural trade liberalisation at all
points. According to one representative of a foreign trading power, ‘he was not
backward in saying how he wanted to run the world. He was absolutely
committed to his [constituents’] cause. Discussions with him were conversations
that went nowhere. He was like a travelling salesman who offered the same
message all the time.’56 His message ran along the following lines
[a]gricultural production and food self-sufficiency are very important for Japan. This is especially
true for cereals (meaning rice) because of the global shortfall. Cereal production can be
expected to decline for every degree of global warming. The environment and food have
become big problems. This makes the issue of ‘bearers’ of production in Japan a significant
theme. It is imperative that we foster bearers in the current situation of the global retreat of
Japanese agriculture. Urban dwellers have strong expectations of agriculture, and I’ve always
backed the idea of urban dwellers’ cultivating farm plots and their becoming ‘quasi-farmers’
(jun nôgyôsha) and for city people to have connections with agriculture and rural society. This
is one way of resolving the problem of the shortage of cultivatable land. The cities and rural
areas will become as one through agriculture. The multifunctionality of agriculture and rural
areas and agricultural, mountainous and fishing villages are connected to the totality of people’s
lives and get the support and understanding of all people. We’re being gradually pushed by
foreign production, which must not be allowed to harm domestic production. If we consider
the problem of food safety, because our country’s agricultural products are superior in terms of
safety, quality and taste, we should aim for exports. We are world leaders in product improvement
and agricultural technology.57
In early February 2003 Matsuoka exchanged opinions with the Australian

ambassador to Japan, John McCarthy, about the WTO negotiations. As
Matsuoka put it
128 POWER AND PORK
[t]he stance towards the WTO negotiations between Japan and Australia is very different. For
Australia and the United States, food is just another traded commodity. However, for Japan
and the great majority of European countries, consideration is given to the aspect of food as
playing a role in land and environment conservation. Their opinions are different on the point
whether a country should make farm products free trade products or not. I made sure that the
Australian ambassador understood the policy of the Japanese side.58
In February 2003 Matsuoka also participated in an International Assembly

of the Parliamentarians’ Association for Agriculture and Fisheries (PAAF) in
Seoul. The league brought together parliamentary members from 46 countries
around the world. Matsuoka was serving as both chairman and deputy chairman
of the association. The meeting was held because the WTO was entering the
critical phase of establishing ‘modalities’ (agricultural trade liberalisation
criteria)59 in March. The second proposal for the ‘modalities’ was due to be
announced in March 2003. Members attending the conference ‘reconfirmed
their intention to join together to appeal to the WTO to realise fair and justified
trade rules enabling different agricultures to co-exist, and not to destroy
agriculture in each country given that farming was based on differences in
natural conditions and historical backgrounds in each country.’60
Earlier, in Bangkok, Matsuoka had attended the Asia Population
Development Conference, where he had exchanged opinions with others
about the problem of pressure on food security from advancing globalisation
and future increases in global population, including in Asia. The conference
ended with a resolution to consider the perspectives of population and
environmental problems in WTO negotiations.61
Matsuoka’s most assiduous courting was of WTO officials. He wore a path
between Tokyo and Geneva in his endeavour to convince WTO officials of the
need to protect Japanese agriculture. In the 2003 new round of agricultural
trade negotiations, ‘the Japanese with the best-known names in Geneva were
Sakurai Shin [the chairman of the trade investigation committee] and Matsuoka
Toshikatsu.’ 62 Sakurai and Matsuoka became well known in the WTO as
‘arrogant nôrin zoku’.63 They were called ‘Sakura to Matsu’ (Cherry and Pine).64
In February 2003, Matsuoka conferred with WTO Director-General,
Panitchpakdi Supachai, and Chairman of the Agriculture Special Sessions,
Stuart Harbinson, when they visited Japan to participate in a WTO mini-
ministerial-level conference in Tokyo. Matsuoka advanced claims for inserting
considerations relating to the environment and population problems into the
trade-negotiating framework. However, Supachai and others would only

acknowledge that ‘we are fully aware that each country’s claim is different’.66
At one point during Supachai’s visit to Japan, Sakurai, who was chairman of
the trade investigation committee,67 and Matsuoka, who was secretary-general,
went for direct talks with Supachai. They gatecrashed the Imperial Hotel where
he was staying, despite the fact that Supachai had refused an interview on the
grounds that he was busy.68
In early March 2003, in the lead-up to the final WTO negotiations on the
modalities, Matsuoka visited Geneva and Paris together with Sakurai as
representatives of the ‘Diet Members’ Group to Support WTO Negotiations’
(WTO Kôshô Shien Giindan) under the direct control of the LDP PARC
chairman. Matsuoka claimed that he was appointed head of the delegation
because of his ‘connections with top-level executives of the WTO and the
countries of the European Union and [his] achievements in Diet members’
diplomacy over a long period especially in this field’.69
In Geneva Matsuoka and Sakurai once again held talks with WTO Director-
General Supachai and exchanged opinions with the ambassadors of the United
States, Australia and European Union. In the discussions with the ambassadors,
whom Matsuoka described as representing ‘only a minority of WTO member
nations’,70 he argued that a negotiating framework ‘that failed to consider the
earth’s environmental problem and the food problem of poor nations harmed
the benefits of the countries in the world in the long run’.71
In the discussion with Supachai, Matsuoka and Sakurai issued a strong
demand that the director-general take the interests of Japan and other countries
that imported farm products into account in the negotiations.72 Matsuoka
pitched the debate in terms of a dispute about how to deal with conserving
the earth’s environment as the point at issue in agricultural trade negotiations
between the European Union and Japan on the one side, and commercial
food-exporting countries such as the United States and Australia on the other.73
He asserted that trade in agricultural products ‘cannot be liberalised in the
same way as liberalising trade in industrial products’.74 Farming had more
than an economic function since it helped to protect the environment and
prevent natural disasters.
In fact Sakurai and Matsuoka attracted a lot of negative press as a result of
their visit and their tactics. They were described as ‘storming’ Geneva and
arguing furiously with Supachai,75 ‘saying “we are putting ourselves out on a
130 POWER AND PORK
limb [by directly approaching you] on this one” and spouting statements
such as “it is a crisis of the existence or death of the Japanese race”’.76 Sakurai
said, ‘Japan should not compromise in the international task of liberalising
trade in farm products because the survival of (the Japanese) people is at stake’.77
Matsuoka made a similar comment, arguing that ‘trade in agricultural products
cannot be liberalised in the same way as liberalising trade in industrial products
because of the multifaceted functions of agriculture in a nation’s economy. In
Japan, rice paddies play the same roles as dams in that both can prevent natural
disasters’.78 Supachai was shocked, saying ‘I thought Japan was an advanced
industrial country, but what comes here are just loud-mouthed agricultural
and forestry tribe members’.79 A Japanese popular weekly magazine commented
[a]t the end of the day, the activities of the over-the-top agricultural and forestry ‘tribe’
members are, after all, no more than a political performance for the benefit of domestic farmers
and agriculture-related groups. Sakura and Matsu have no power to influence foreign
policy….They don’t have the energy or force of the previous agricultural and forestry tribe
members who could boast 300 rice Diet members.80
In fact, the director-general of a bureau in METI was quoted as saying,

‘they think they are in charge behind the scenes, but in reality, they’ve become
the laughing stock of the international negotiations.’81
On his return from the Geneva trip, Matsuoka attended a meeting of the
trade investigation committee study team and reported back the results of the
conference with the WTO director-general, the ambassadors of the European
Union and others. With respect to the agricultural trade negotiation framework,
Matsuoka and Sakurai affirmed the importance of even stronger cooperation
with the countries of Europe in the agricultural trade negotiation process.82
In May 2003, Yatsu Yoshio (who was head of the trade investigation
committee study team) and Matsuoka once again trekked to Europe, this time
for WTO non-farm products (forest and fishery products) market negotiations.
Their purpose was to convey their perspective on Japan’s standpoint on market
access negotiations for non-farm products. Matsuoka exchanged opinions with
the Chairman of the WTO Non-Agricultural Market Access Negotiating Group,
Ambassador Girard, who said he planned to promote debate on the issue for
the benefit of all member nations including Japan.83 Matsuoka made the usual
points about the need for co-existence and co-prosperity, and a realistic
settlement of non-agricultural market access issues.84 After returning home,
he and Yatsu reported back to the trade investigation committee.
When the WTO Doha Round reached its anti-climatic ministerial-level

conference in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, Matsuoka was on hand,
pushing the agricultural protectionist line. He gave a speech to the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting, which was being held at the same time.
His speech was in English and, in it, he appealed for understanding of Japan’s
agricultural trade negotiating position as head of the Japanese joint Lower and
Upper House Representatives’ delegation. He reported that he received ‘big
praise from the participants of each country’.85 When he returned to Japan he,
along with MAFF Minister Kamei Yoshiyuki and chairman of the trade
investigation committee (Sakurai) gave an account of the WTO meeting in
Cancun to a meeting of the sansha kaigi.86
The intrepid trippers, Sakurai and Matsuoka, went back to Geneva in
December 2003 to conduct further ‘Diet members’ diplomacy’. Once again
they conferred with WTO Director-General Supachai and Chairman of the
General Board of Directors, Carlos Pérez del Castillo, and others. Matsuoka
reiterated the Japanese point of view, which, he claimed, was the same as some
countries in Asia and the European Union.87 Essentially, this was the standpoint
that there should be a ‘coexistence of diverse agricultures’, which acknowledged
the importance of the conservation of the earth’s environment. Matsuoka
demanded that ‘future discussions at the WTO should not lean towards only
the ideology of food exporting countries’ side’. 88 On their return home,
Matsuoka and Sakurai once again reported back to a meeting of the trade
investigation committee.
In March 2004, under the theme ‘Internationalisation and Japanese
Agriculture’, Sakurai and Matsuoka reported on the ‘Diet members’ diplomacy’
they had been conducting to the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee.89
Matsuoka also gave a lecture on the results of the Diet members’ diplomacy
that they had been undertaking in relation to the WTO agricultural negotiations
to the ‘Young Diet Members Agricultural Policy Study Association’ (Wakate
Giin Nôsei Benkyôkai).90
In the same month, as leader of a Lower House delegation, Matsuoka attended
the Steering Committee of the ‘Parliamentary Conference on the WTO’ held at
the headquarters of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva. The purpose of
the conference was to supervise the activities of the WTO. The gathering discussed
how to strengthen its influence over international commercial issues starting
with the WTO.
132 POWER AND PORK
On the same trip, Matsuoka conferred with the chairman of the WTO
Agriculture Negotiation Group, as well as the chairman of the Non-Farm
Products Market Access Negotiation Group, and other WTO leaders. He made
representations to the effect that export promotion measures such as export
subsidies by industrialised nations should be immediately removed, and that
Japan was unable to comply with any further liberalisation without consideration
being given to forestry and fishery products.91
In June 2004, Matsuoka made three trips in a crescendo of agricultural
trade diplomacy, two to the United States and one to South America on the
WTO agricultural trade negotiations. Each time, Matsuoka was dispatched
by the Trade Investigation Committee along with Chairman Sakura, and Acting
Chairman Yatsu. In the United States they conferred with the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and the chairman of the House Agriculture
Committee in order to emphasise the importance of rice paddy agriculture in
Japan, particularly with respect to conserving land and the environment. In
Matsuoka’s view, the representatives of America’s farm sector that they met
gained a considerable understanding of the importance of rice paddies in Japan.92
The meetings were held on the understanding that Matsuoka would report to
the US Ambassador to Japan, Howard Baker, on his return to Tokyo. Matsuoka,
Sakurai and Yatsu later held discussions with Ambassador Baker on the outline
agreement of the WTO agriculture negotiations scheduled for July 2004.93
Matsuoka’s visit to the countries of South America started in Brazil, which
was one of the pivotal players in the G20 group (the major developing nations)
within the WTO. His aim, once again, was to achieve wide recognition of
Japan’s negotiating position at the G5 ministerial-level conference of the WTO
(consisting of five major nations and regions—including the United States,
the European Union and Brazil). This was due to be held immediately before
the presentation of the draft of the outline agreement by the WTO Committee
on Agriculture Chairman, Tim Groser, scheduled for early July 2004.94
In Matsuoka’s discussion with Brazil’s foreign and agriculture ministers, he
immediately identified Japan and Brazil’s common interests at the WTO: the
complete abolition of agricultural export subsidies, the drastic retrenchment
of the domestic agricultural support policies of the United States and others,
and the problems for developing nations such as Brazil in securing export
quotas to developed nations. Matsuoka also underlined the importance of rice
paddies in Japan. Both ministers agreed that the claims made by Japan were
completely consistent with the claims made by Brazil. The Japanese and
Brazilian sides confirmed that they would negotiate in cooperation. Both the
Brazilian ministers said that they would act as goodwill ambassadors for Japan
at the G5 in relation both to rice tariff problem and the environmental
preservation functions of rice paddies.95
After Brazil, Matsuoka went on to Chile and Argentina where he met their
foreign and agriculture ministers. Both countries supported Japan’s claims at
the WTO agriculture negotiations, and all promised to engage in mutual
cooperation in order to resolve the WTO agricultural negotiation problem.96
In July 2004, Matsuoka was a member of a larger group of LDP Diet
politicians who made the trip to Geneva, the LDP WTO Agriculture
Negotiations Diet Members’ Group (Jimintô WTO Nôgyô Kôshô Giindan).
The group was dispatched in the lead-up to the announcement of the WTO
General Council’s Doha Agenda work program (the ‘July package’) containing,
amongst other things, a ‘Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture’.
The group included all the top guns of LDP agricultural policymaking. Its
leader was Sakurai as chairman of the trade investigation committee. Others
included Norota Hôsei (CAPIC chairman), the head of the Study Team (Futada
Kôji), the chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division (Nakagawa Yoshio),
and the vice-chairman of the PARC.97
In January 2005, Tim Groser visited Japan. He exchanged opinions on the
WTO agricultural negotiations with Matsuoka and other executives of the
Trade Investigation Committee at LDP headquarters. Groser had come to Japan
with the establishment of the modalities for the next WTO Ministerial
Conference in mind. Matsuoka and his colleagues strongly pressed Groser for
modalities that took into account the co-existence of diverse agricultures and a
balance of interests between agricultural importing and exporting countries.
He was reminded by Matsuoka that the Japanese government and LDP treated
important items such as rice in a separate framework. The LDP agricultural
leaders appealed for sufficient guarantees for a number of sensitive items, and
for the establishment of rules to lower tariffs that applied to sensitive items less
than those that applied to general items.98
In April 2005, it was decided that Matsuoka would chair the group leading
delegations to South America (Brazil and Argentina) on FTA issues. The following
month he reported back to the committee on his trip to South America.
In June 2005, Matsuoka met again with the Australian ambassador, this
time Murray McLean, who came to Matsuoka’s office in the Diet building. As
134 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka recalls, he got the ambassador to understand the reality of Japanese

agriculture. He emphasised that the mission of the LDP was to protect Japan’s
farm sector in world trade rules, and that he worked like a beaver as a
representative of the LDP’s mission in this respect.99
In July 2005, the executives of the Trade Investigation Committee, including
Matsuoka (along with Sakurai and Yatsu) visited Geneva again. They conferred
with Groser with a view to getting special treatment for sensitive products in
the light of the scheduled issuing of the committee chairman’s draft for
negotiations. Matsuoka and his colleagues explained Japan’s standpoint. They
said that Japan could not expand the tariff quota for rice while consumption
was declining and requested Groser’s understanding of Japan’s position. They
reported that they had received sufficient acknowledgement from other countries
as to the sensitive nature of rice for Japan, adding that there was no necessity
for any improvement in market access for rice in order to conclude
negotiations. 100
Back home, Matsuoka (representing the LDP) attended a meeting with
representatives of agricultural groups from foreign countries hosted by Zenchû.
The representatives agreed that trade rules should be formulated that allowed
the co-existence of diverse agricultures.
In September 2005, Matsuoka, as the representative of the Japanese Lower
House, travelled to Geneva again, this time to attend a management committee
meeting of the IPU’s council relating to the WTO. Matsuoka delivered another
speech in English in which he put Japan’s position on agricultural trade, including
the need for trade rules that prioritised environmental preservation under the
title ‘how agricultural trade rules should be’.101 After Matsuoka’s return to Japan,
he attended the LDP’s Trade Investigation Committee to give his report on the
negotiations that he had conducted in Geneva, including with the head of the
IPU’s management committee, the chairman of the WTO’s Committee on
Agriculture and the assistant director-general of the WTO. In Matsuoka’s report,
he declared that he had told the WTO officials that market access, export subsidies
and domestic support were the three areas for simultaneous resolution and that
Japan had lowered its domestic support more than other countries (for example,
Britain had increased its domestic support), and he reported that both officials
showed understanding of what he had said.102
Following his successful re-election to the Lower House in September 2005,
Matsuoka publicly committed himself to a position on the WTO agricultural
trade negotiations. In his own words, this position would ‘take the circumstances
of our country’s agriculture into consideration, and would assert what Japan needs
to assert in international society and do our best for a harmonious settlement’.103
In October, Matsuoka once again flew to Geneva in order to attend the Five
Interested Parties (FIPs—the United States, European Union, Australia, India
and Brazil) meeting. In response to the proposal for uniform tariff reductions
on agricultural products, he again reasserted Japan’s position, which held that
sensitive products such as rice should be excluded from tariff reductions. He
pointed out that recent proposals from developing countries such as Africa
were close to the Japanese position, but there remained a big gap between the
United States and European Union proposals, and the question remained
whether there would be agreement at the WTO Ministerial Conference held
at the end of the year in Hong Kong.
Immediately prior to his departure for Geneva, Matsuoka attended the
National Council’s ‘WTO Agricultural Negotiations Emergency
Countermeasures, Basic Agricultural Policy Establishment National
Representatives Gathering’, and took on board the views expressed at that
meeting. He attended the same gathering in the following month, and as
secretary-general of the LDP’s Trade Investigation Committee, he reported on
his recent trade diplomacy in Geneva. Also, as chairman of the Agricultural
Basic Policy Subcommittee, he explained the contents of the direct payments
system. He noted that it was a problem in which all farmers were intensely
interested. He made a full report on the WTO agricultural negotiations that
he had undertaken in the party’s trade investigation committee later that
morning. 104
With all this frenetic travelling and advocacy, Matsuoka certainly made sure
that the LDP’s hardline opposition to agricultural trade liberalisation was widely
heard around the world. How much this contributed to actual negotiation
outcomes is hard to gauge, but at least it advantaged him personally. He was
able to demonstrate his commitment to farmers and to agricultural organisations
in his constituency, which supported his re-election.
Promoting Japan as an agricultural exporter

Matsuoka has become a central figure in Japan’s agricultural export offensive, a
cause that he pursued as a form of disguised protectionism. When Matsuoka
talked to two Japanese housewives in a highly publicised meeting in April
136 POWER AND PORK
2004, he explained to them the importance of increasing the food self-sufficiency

rate in the same breath as the LDP’s plan to export Japanese food overseas.105
Matsuoka later embarked on a personal crusade for agricultural exports.106
He obtained the all-out approval and consent for his initiative from Prime
Minister Koizumi. In fact, in late 2004, the prime minister cited the anecdote
of Japanese apples being sold for ¥1000 a piece in China.107 Japanese rice has
also become popular as a ‘brand food’ in the countries of East Asia including
China.108 Koizumi later held a meeting with apple growers, and unveiled a
vision to increase exports of farm products to the ¥1 trillion a year level. He
invited pioneer farm operators to the Kantei to exchange views. Learning that
one of the attendees was running a farm underground in an office building in
Ôtemachi, the central business district in Tokyo, the prime minister visited it
in February 2005, praising the unique enterprise saying: ‘Agriculture is a new
industry. Agriculture has limitless possibilities’.109 Koizumi was reported to
be pinning his hopes on agriculture as the ‘trump card’ to turn around the
construction-based rural employment structure, and to revamp his own image
as someone who had ‘turned a cold shoulder to rural areas’.110
In February 2005, during question time in the Lower House Budget
Committee, Matsuoka made a pitch for the LDP, government and concerned
groups to unite in an agricultural farm export offensive instead of staying in
the usual defensive mode. He commented, ‘it is time for Japanese agricultural
products to shift from defence to offence’.111 His view was that
‘Made in Japan’ agriculture, forestry and fishery products should be actively treated as export
items since these products are fully competitive internationally. Like industrial goods, ‘made in
Japan’ agriculture, forestry and fishery products are outstanding ‘products’, which have passed
through the ‘baptism’ of the severely selective eyes of Japanese consumers. Although there is
the criticism that these goods are ‘high cost’, the exceptional quality of some agricultural
products such as apples and pears makes them increasingly in demand in some niche markets
in Asia and elsewhere, where affluent consumers seek good-tasting delicacies.112
Matsuoka’s activities in this area culminated in two delegations of politicians

which he led to Beijing in January and June 2005 in order to make a pitch for
exports of high quality Japanese rice to China, including some of the top
Japanese brands of rice from Niigata and Kumamoto prefectures. Japan had
still to obtain approval for rice exports to China. Even though selling rice to
China would be like sending coals to Newcastle, Matsuoka argued that the
kind of rice Japan wanted to export to China was top quality. Rice exports
would, therefore, constitute a kind of ‘niche’ marketing. Matsuoka was quoted

as saying, ‘Japanese agricultural products should be the equivalent of the
Mercedes-Benz or Rolls Royce of the automobile sector’.113 Obviously he was
making a pitch to the wealthy consumers of Asia. Moreover, if Japanese
agriculture became an export industry, it would give the impression that farming
in Japan was an internationally competitive industry worth promoting. It would
go someway towards countering those who constantly criticised Japanese
agriculture for being inefficient and lagging in productivity compared with
other Japanese industries and with farm sectors in other developed countries—
especially those that exported into the Japanese market. Matsuoka was very
happy to see that his policy activities somehow contributed to ‘the expediting
of agricultural, forestry and fishery exports’ being included as one of the major
elements in the government’s 2005 New Basic Plan, which provided an
agricultural policy blueprint for the next 10 years.
In April 2005, the Japanese government launched a government-private sector
council called the National Council for Promoting Exports of Agricultural and
Marine Products. Its objective was to push exports of domestic farm products,
aiming to double the value of agricultural exports over five years. Ideas included
developing types of crops that catered to overseas markets. The council brought
together representatives of the MAFF, METI, MoFA, local governments, agricultural
cooperatives and food manufacturers. At the plenary session to launch the council,
the prime minister noted, ‘Japanese agricultural products, which are expensive
but tasty, are fully exportable. Agriculture is a promising industry’.114 He urged
the farm sector to switch from its defensive approach to an aggressive one.115
In June 2005, Matsuoka received a delegation of agricultural groups from
Kumamoto in his Diet office. They sought the implementation of fruit
tree countermeasures. Matsuoka acknowledged that in Kumamoto, fruit
tree agriculture was a key industry. He agreed that it was important to
adopt a policy that would reward farmers’ efforts. His way of approaching
the issue, however, was to ‘expand “agricultural policy on the offensive”
(seme no nôsei) through farm product exports as well as expanding the
demand for domestic fruit.’ 116
Following his successful re-election in 2005, Matsuoka once again took up
the ‘agriculture as an export industry’ theme. He declared that Japan must
‘put into effect an “agricultural policy on the offensive” in order to establish
Japan’s high-quality agricultural products as a large-scale export industry.’117
138 POWER AND PORK
POLICY INTERFERENCE
Whereas intervening in policymaking via the PARC’s agricultural and forestry

committees largely facilitated Matsuoka’s representation of sectional interests,
his interference in the administrative decisions of the bureaucracy enabled
him to guide benefits to specific localities and to obtain favours for particular
clients. It was in the area of public works and associated construction contracts
that the relationship between Matsuoka and the MAFF was observed to be the
closest and even one of ‘adhesion’ (yuchaku).118 The direction of mediation
flowed from companies to politicians and then to government officials,119
prompting some commentators to ask whether Matsuoka was a Diet
representative or a political broker.120
In order for Matsuoka to undertake activities as a political broker, it was
‘indispensable to have a “fat pipe” that controlled government offices’.121 One
political reporter described how Matsuoka interfered in the MAFF’s
administrative affairs
Even in relation to small matters, his secretary always rings up the MAFF division in charge.
Matsuoka then invites the divisional director or bureau director to an expensive Japanese-style
restaurant. If they don’t do what he says, he browbeats them. But if they are obedient, he
suddenly changes and tames them with food and drink. In the fiscal 1999 supplementary
budget, for example, Matsuoka made them allocate almost 20 per cent of the structural
improvement works budget for the whole country to Kumamoto Prefecture, saying ‘allocate
¥10 billion from the agricultural, forestry and fisheries budget to Kumamoto Prefecture. It’s
serious because hothouses were destroyed by a typhoon.’122
As a zoku, Matsuoka’s powers to undertake policy interference were

considerably enhanced because the nôrin zoku were the most influential actors
in steering MAFF-drafted policies and bills through the PARC’s committee
process. They were the kingpins on whom MAFF officials were most dependent
and to whom they were the most indebted. Zoku status bestowed much greater
access to bureaucrats and thus recognition by those seeking favours that
Matsuoka was a key person to approach. As a zoku, Matsuoka wielded
unparalleled influence in mediation activities, and hence acquired the ability
to collect the most money in exchange for favours.
Generally speaking, policy intervention and policy interference led to very
different political and policy behaviours. In pursuit of sectional interests,
Matsuoka conducted public lobbying activities, in party committees, in Diet
members’ leagues, vis-à-vis bureaucrats, and vis-à-vis party executives and the
government leadership. In contrast, in pursuit of concessions and favours for
himself and his clients, Matsuoka conducted private lobbying or petitioning
activities mainly vis-à-vis bureaucrats. Policy intervention was overt and even
propagandised (Matsuoka acted as a policymaker in formal policymaking
contexts and claimed public credit for what he did), while policy interference
was generally covert and lacking in transparency (Matsuoka acted as a broker
or mediator in the pursuit of benefits for certain localities or favours for
individuals, be they company executives, group leaders, local politicians, friends,
or relations or whatever). When locals, including businessmen, came to Tokyo
to petition for favours, they needed an agent or ‘broker’ who could act for
them, someone who could intercede with bureaucrats. Matsuoka was the person
who got things done for them. This meant interceding with the MAFF in
areas of the ministry’s allocatory or regulatory discretion; it was a part of
Matsuoka’s activity that did not usually see the light of day, and only recently
became subject to attempted government regulation.123
The more public policy interference conducted by Matsuoka largely involved
his leading delegations from his regional area to administrative offices in Tokyo,
and his claiming of credit for the delivery of public works to his electorate. In
December 2003, Matsuoka accompanied a delegation from the Central Kyushu
Regional High Standard Road Promotion Association (Naka Kyûshû- Chiiki
Kôkikaku Dôrô Sokushin Kiseikai)—chaired by the mayor of Aso Town—on a
visit to MLIT. Their purpose was to request that the ministry construct the
highway cutting across the centre of Kyushu. The association consisted of the
municipalities in Kumamoto and Oita prefectures along the road. The
delegation met the MLIT administrative vice-minister, chief engineer, technical
officer, director-general of the Road Bureau and others individually. While
expressing understanding of the fact that conditions for public works were
severe, as the ‘voice’ of the people living in the area, the delegation told the
MLIT officials that they looked forward to the early construction of the road
and requested the cooperation of the ministry.124
In a similar episode in the following year, Matsuoka received a delegation
from Nishihara Village assembly. Nishihara Village was in Aso County, and its
assembly members continued to think of Matsuoka as their political
representative, even though he had lost the seat of Kumamoto (3) in the 2003
election and switched to representing the Kyushu regional bloc.125 It was
140 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka’s reputation for bringing public works projects back to his local
constituency that drew the delegation to Matsuoka’s office. They demanded
the provision of subsidies to construct a gymnasium in Nishihara Municipal
Junior High School as well as prefectural road 206. Matsuoka commented on
his website that
[t]he provision of regional social capital is the hope of residents in that town. Although
realisation of the demand is doubtful under the Koizumi administration’s ‘uniform budgetary
cutback for all ministries and agencies’, the construction of the gymnasium and prefectural
road 206 are essential projects, which all residents of Nishihara Village are hoping for and want
to realise at any cost. I promised to do all I could to realise this demand as soon as possible.126
Matsuoka’s record of public works achievements reveals many egregious

examples of the fruits of his policy interference. In Matsuoka’s own constituency,
in addition to projects funded by the UR countermeasures package, there
were other equally infamous cases.
In Soyô Town located in the foothills of Mount Aso in Aso County, the town administration
spent ¥13 billion (of which ¥5.7 billion came from central government subsidies) on rebuilding
a primary school that only had 67 students. This was nothing but a project that aimed to
generate profit for particular construction companies, and had nothing to do with raising the
standard of education in the town at all. It was a representative example of the construction
politics (doken seiji) that thrived not just in Kumamoto (3), but in the whole of Japan.127
In the same town, Matsuoka supported successive mayoral elections of Gotô

Keiki, one of his affiliated local politicians, by helping to secure subsidies for the
construction of the new Soyo Town Hall in 1999 and the rest and recreation
facility called Soyô Kaze (Light Breeze) Park, managed by the Soyô Kaze Yûgaku
(Study Away Association), a limited liability company (yûgen gaisha) that was
financed totally by Soyo Town.128 Both Matsuoka and his faction boss, Kamei,
were present at the lavish opening ceremony of the new Soyo Town Hall ‘displaying
the closeness of the incumbent mayor to two prominent members of the Lower
House’.129 Until the 2003 Lower House election when Matsuoka’s support rate
in Soyo Town fell to 51 per cent, he obtained consistently high support rates in
this town (77 per cent in the 2000 elections, as shown in Table 3.2).
In addition, Matsuoka has also been an avid promoter of a major dam project,
the Kawabe dam in Sagara Village in Kumamoto Prefecture, and he proudly
claims to be quite important as a leader of the movement to promote the
Isahaya Bay project.130 His involvement with the construction industry has
been described as so close that ‘he appears to hold two posts: as a nôrin zoku
and as a member of the construction “tribe” (kensetsu zoku).’131 His reputation

for promoting public works is such that ‘[e]ven many MAFF people and other
nôrin zoku frown on the comments and conduct of Matsuoka, with the comment,
“although Matsuoka talks in grandiose terms, in fact he spends money recklessly
(baramaki) on farmers and on companies purely for his own election”’.132
There are, however, two sides to Matsuoka’s policy interference. On the
positive side, he has been an active sponsor of particular projects in particular
districts. On the negative side, he has used his influence to prevent particular
projects in particular districts from going ahead. The need for a plurality has
put a premium on his exerting both kinds of influence. As Arai Satoshi, MAFF
OB and former DPJ member of the Lower House for Hokkaido (3) in 1993-
2005 explains
[t]he pressure from the zoku giin began to intensify when I was an assistant divisional director
in the MAFF in the early 1980s. When my seniors were in the same position in the MAFF,
politicians did not stick their noses into the details of subsidised public works projects, but
they began interfering even at the town and village level. Looking at this local scene, I began
to think, ‘if we leave this as it is, the Japanese political administration will start to destroy
Japan itself ’. Therefore, I try as much as possible now not to involve myself in MAFF-related
areas even after I became a Diet member. The pressure from the zoku became even more
intense under the SMD system. Under the MMD system, Diet members restrained each
other, and it did not become very unfair. Now in order to get one’s opponents to lose,
candidates have begun to say things like ‘do not conduct a project in that town’ and ‘don’t use
companies that support his opponent’.133
Matsuoka became expert at blocking budget allocations to those who

opposed him by ordering MAFF officials to stop subsidies to his opponents.
His ‘arrogance was such that he pressured relevant places so that the leaders of
opposing factions—his rivals for election in Kumamoto (3)—didn’t get any
subsidies.’134 In this way, he could also reward or punish counties and towns
according to the votes he received from them. For example, Matsuoka requested
the MAFF to stop public works and providing budgetary funds to municipalities
where he obtained lower votes or where people had expressed opposition to
him. A blacklist was circulated in the MAFF’s Structural Improvement Bureau
of those municipalities where Matsuoka instructed the ministry officials to
terminate public works projects. The existence of such a list was revealed by a
MAFF official working in the bureau. He disclosed that ‘shortly after he became
an assistant divisional director at the Structural Improvement Bureau in 1998,
his immediate superior casually instructed him along the following lines, “[t]here
142 POWER AND PORK
are the names of towns and villages Matsuoka sensei told us. Do you know the
names?”’135 Apparently, the relevant MAFF officials had earlier visited Matsuoka’s
office in the Diet members building in Nagata-chô. They had taken along the
list of places where various subsidised projects were going to be undertaken in
the municipalities of Kumamoto (3). The list of projects was part of the 1998
MAFF budget and they explained the list to Matsuoka. The list showed which
municipality was going to receive what subsidies (i.e. the geographic distribution
of subsidies). 136 Matsuoka then demanded that projects in numerous
municipalities on the list not be executed. The officials made up a list of the
blacklisted municipalities and distributed it to the relevant posts in the MAFF.137
The reason why Matsuoka blacklisted particular localities was not clear to the
MAFF officials. They assumed that one reason could be that Matsuoka’s voting
rate in those particular municipalities was low compared with other municipalities
and that the head of the municipality had antagonised Matsuoka.138
One project in Ichinomiya Town, Aso County, was on the blacklist. The
MAFF official in question called up the Kyushu Agricultural Administration
Bureau and the Kumamoto Prefecture Agricultural Administration Department
telling them the details of Matsuoka’s demand and asking them to give up the
project.139 When asked to confirm or deny the existence of the blacklist,
Matsuoka stated, ‘[e]ven if the sun rises from the west, there is no such case’.140
A similar denial was issued by the administrative vice-minister of the MAFF at
the time, Takagi Yûki.
The circumstances of the abandoned public works project in Ichinomiya
Town, however, were revealed by other sources. According to Nôminren
[a] local newspaper wrote that a direct sales facility for farm products was about to be created
as a town project in Ichinomiya Town in Aso County. Because the town mayor did not pay his
compliments to Mr Matsuoka for the project, Mr Matsuoka pressured the prefecture and
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to trash the budget for the project.141
The project would have been funded from the MAFF’s structural improvement
budget as a mountain village promotion project. Prefectural officials reportedly
pressured town assembly members who supported mayor Ichihara Norita (who
was anti-Matsuoka), to persuade the mayor to pay his respects to Matsuoka.142
As Ichihara himself explains
[i]n 1992, Matsuoka asked me to join his kôenkai. Since I was under the good offices of another
Diet representative, I declined the request. In the mayoral election that year, I was defeated by
an opponent supported by Matsuoka. After this opponent became the mayor of the town, he
was diligent in constructing large-scale facilities in the town. However, in 1998, the mayor was
arrested for bribery in relation to a meal-providing centre, and I took up my old position.
Probably early in April, a government official of Kumamoto Prefecture Aso Office began saying
‘would you please call on Mr Matsuoka to pay your respects?’ I asked ‘for what reason?’, then
the official said ‘because otherwise we cannot obtain approval for mountain village development
works’….I thought ‘nonsense’ and did not visit Matsuoka. Then, the budget was actually
stopped. During the time of the Matsuoka faction mayor, the budget went ahead normally.143
Matsuoka apparently demanded that the Structural Improvement Bureau

‘reserve its resources’ and gave the Ichinomiya Town project as an example. In
response, the Kyushu Agricultural Administration Bureau reserved the budget
for the Ichinomiya Town project in a private notification to the prefectural
budget. 144
The whole episode ‘provides a glimpse into Matsuoka’s attitude as a Diet
member: he treats warmly those who ingratiate themselves with him, but he
takes away the livelihood of those people who disobey him completely.’145
Matsuoka applied pressure using the subsidised project as bait and government
officials as mere pawns, although in a series of interviews, Matsuoka claimed
that ‘he had not done such a thing at all.’146
The fact that MAFF officials acted as Matsuoka’s agents in not allocating
the budget for particular projects in particular municipalities reveals his powers
of policy interference. Matsuoka’s personal intervention became the guideline
that MAFF administrators followed.147 Such interference presented ‘a clear
case of “privatisation” (shibutsuka) and “monopolisation” (rôdan) of bureaucratic
administration by zoku giin’.148 Even though he was a zoku, Matsuoka was still
a backbencher, and it is clear that he had free and direct access to bureaucrats
in the ministry and could make demands on them. This constituted an
unusually direct line of contact between individual backbenchers and individual
bureaucrats, which is normally outlawed in parliamentary cabinet systems
where politicians deal with the bureaucracy only through the relevant ministers.
NOTES
1 Nakanishi Akihiko and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 105.
3 Itô Hirotoshi, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi no “Maboroshi no Hon” to Nôsuishô Baiomasu Jigyô
to no Fushigi na Kankei’ [‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Member’s “Phantom Book” and Its Strange
Connection to the MAFF’s Biomass Business’], Zaikai Tenbô, January 2003, p. 53.
5 ‘“Nôrin Giin” mo Kôkeisha Fusoku?’ [‘“Agriculture and Forestry Diet Members” Also Lack
Successors?’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 30, April 2000, p. 1.
144 POWER AND PORK
6 Personal interview, MOF official, January 2003.

8 Hasegawa, ‘Kanjûdanomi no Hazama de Shundô’, p. 24. See also below and Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral
Vicissitudes’.
10 The Japan Times, 24 May 2005.
12 Mainichi Shinbun, 17 May 1997.
14 ibid.
15 Itô, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi’, p. 53.
17 ‘Za Sankuchuari’, p. 59.
18 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 100; Nakanishi
and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 179.
20 ‘“Nishi no Muneo”’, p. 38.
22 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi’, p. 53.
24 ‘“Muneo no Bôrei”’, p. 28.
25 Ayukawa, ‘Jimintô de mo Shinkô suru “Matsuoka Hazushi”’, p. 20. See also Chapter 6 on ‘The
Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.
28 This became the Kamei faction after Etô retired from politics at the time of the 2003 Lower House
election. Kamei himself left the LDP in August 2005, when he failed to secure LDP endorsement in
the Lower House election. He became a member of the Kokumin Shintô (People’s New Party) and now
serves as its acting head. See also Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral Vicissitudes’.
30 ibid.
31 The Kôchikai was an LDP faction originally founded by Ikeda Hayato, and was subsequently led by
Ôhira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenkô and Miyazawa Kiichi, all four of whom served as prime minister. Its
leadership was then passed on to Katô Kôichi, followed by Ozato Sadatoshi and then Horiuchi Mitsuo.
32 The Etô-Kamei faction’s position as the nôrin zoku-dominant faction was attributed to the electoral
demise of some prominent agriculture and forestry ‘tribe’ Diet members from other factions in the
2000 elections as well as the previous departure from the LDP of leading agricultural policy experts,
who had experience of being MAFF Minister such as Hata Tsutomu, Kanô Michihiko and Tanabu
Masami. These developments reportedly gave rise to a dearth of human resources amongst the LDP’s
nôrin zoku, with the result that the Etô-Kamei faction came to the fore. ‘Za Sankuchuari’, p. 60.
33 ‘Kaibunsho ga Tobikau Inshitsusa Nûsui “Jinjii Kûsû” no Uchimaku’ [‘The Insidiousness of Mysterious
Documents Flying About: Inside Information on MAFF “Human Resource Battles”’] Shûkan
Daiyamondo, 20 April 2002, p. 56.
35 The career class is made up of those officials, like Matsuoka, who have passed the Level 1 entrance exam
for the public service, while the non-career class are those who have passed the Level II and III exams.
They are known as middle-ranking (chûkyûshoku) officials.
37 ibid., pp. 183–84.
38 Hasegawa, ‘Nôsuishô o Haishi seyo’, p. 37.

40 ibid., pp. 183–84.
41 ibid., p. 183.
42 It is also reported that he was sent to the Kyushu Agricultural Administration Bureau. Hasegawa,
‘Nôsuishô o Haishi seyo’, p. 37.
43 ibid., p. 37.
46 Ayukawa, ‘Jimintô’, p. 20.
47 Personal comment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, March 2005.
48 ‘Kinkyû Nyûin shita’, p. 28.
49 ibid.
52 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Hisaichi no Genchi Chôsa ni Hairimasu’ [‘Participating in On-
The-Spot Investigation of a Disaster Area’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http:/
/matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
53 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Gomeifuku o O’inorimasu’ [‘I Pray for his Happiness in the Next
World’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
54 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Yûsei Mineika Tokubetsu Iinkai no Shidô’ [‘The Special Committee
on Postal Privatisation Starts’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
55 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tô Nôrinsuisanbutsu Bôeki Chôsakai de WTO Kôshô no Jôkyô
Kaiseki’ [‘Situational Analysis of WTO Negotiations at the Party’s Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
Products Trade Investigation Committee’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http:/
/matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
56 Personal communication, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Australia) official, June
2005.
57 This is a summary of Matsuoka’s views revealed in an interview and reported on Rensai Kikaku [Serial
Project]. Available from http://www.nca.or.jp/shinbun/20040213/nouiin040213_2_rensai.html
58 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Kôshô ni tsuite Chûnichi Ôsutoraria Taishi to Iken Kôkan’
[‘Exchanging Opinions with the Australian Ambassador to Japan About the WTO Negotiations’], in
Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/
003.html
59 The modalities are a rough negotiating framework showing in what areas agriculture should be
liberalised, but largely without specific numbers. In Matsuoka’s own words, ‘the modalities are
applied to all WTO member nations and regions, and decide the numerical value of the reduction in
domestic protection such as lowering tariffs and domestic subsidies by what extent over what years.’
Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Gurôsâ WTO Nôgyô Iinkai Gichô to Kaidan’ [‘A Talk with Groser
WTO Committee on Agriculture Chairman’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/059.html
60 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Nikkanchû Kokusai Nôgyô Kaigi o Kaisai’ [‘Holding a Japan-
Korea-China International Agricultural Conference’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available
from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/003.html
61 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Ajia Jinkô Kaikatsu Kaigi ni Sanka (Bangkok)’ [‘Participating in the
Asia Population Development Conference (Bangkok)’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available
146 POWER AND PORK
63 ibid.
64 ibid., p. 58.
65 ibid., p. 59.
66 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Supachai WTO Jimukyokuchô to Mendan’ [‘Talking Personally
with WTO Director-General Supachai’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
67 Sakurai was also from the Etô-Kamei faction. He lost his Lower House seat in the 2000 elections
because of a scandal, but cleared himself of disgrace by getting back into the Diet in the House of
Councillors in 2001 as a member for the PR (national) constituency.
69 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Ôzume no WTO Kôshô e Shûgiin yori Daihyôdan Haken’
[‘Dispatch of the Delegation from the House of Representatives for the Final Phase of the WTO
Negotiations’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
70 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Jyunêbu Hômon no Seika o Hôkoku’ [‘Reporting the Results of
the Geneva Visit’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
71 ‘Jyunêbu Hômon’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/041.html
72 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Kôshô Nikkan Daihyô Giin Jyunêbu e’ [‘Japan and South
Korea Assembly Delegation Group for WTO Negotiations Go to Geneva’] in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
73 ‘WTO Kôshô Nikkan Daihyô Giin Jyunêbu’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002/
/public/003.html
74 The Japan Times, 5 March 2003.
76 ibid.
77 ‘LDP Claims Survival of Japanese at Stake in WTO Farm Talks’, Kyodo News. Available from http://
www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=1&id=251497
78 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
82 ‘Jyunêbu Hômon no Seika o Hôkoku’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/
041.html
83 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Hi Nôsanhin Shijô no tame Saido Hôô’ [‘Revisiting Europe
for WTO Non-Farm Products Market Negotiations’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available
84 ‘Yatsu Yoshio Shûgiin Giin, Matsuoka Toshikatsu Shûgiin Giin to Jirâru Gichô to no Kaidan no Kekka
Gaiyô’ [‘The Summary of Conference Result among House of Representative Member Yatsu Yoshio,
House of Representative Member Matsuoka Toshikatsu and Chair Girard’]. Available from http://
www.rinya.maff.go.jp/kouhousitu/wto/files/0305ym.htm
85 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘IPU (Rekkoku Gikai Dômei) de Shûsan Daihyô toshite Supîchi’
[‘Speech as the Representative of the House of Representatives and House of Councillors at the IPU
(Inter-Parliamentary Union)’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
86 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 52, December 2003, p. 31.
87 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Jimukyokuchô ra to Kaidan’ [‘Talks with the WTO Director-
General and Others’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
88 ‘WTO Jimukyokuchô ra to Kaidan’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/

048.html
89 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 54, April 2004, p. 29.
90 ibid.
91 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘“WTO ni kansuru Giin Kaigi” Unei Iinkai e Nihon kara Shûgiin
Daihyôdan o Haken’ [‘The Dispatch of the House of Representatives’ Delegation from Japan to the
Steering Committee of the “Parliamentary Conference on the WTO”’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
92 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Nôgyô Kôshô ni mukete Tô Hakken ni yoru Giin Gaikô o
Tenkai’ [‘Developing Diet Members’ Diplomacy Through Dispatch by the Party for the WTO
Agriculture Negotiations’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
93 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Bêkâ Bei Chûnichi Taishi to Kaidan’ [‘Conversation with the U.S.
Ambassador to Japan, Ambassador Baker’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http:/
/matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/054.html
94 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Kôshô e muke Nanbei Shokoku e Giin Gaikô Tenkai’
[‘Development of Diet Members’ Diplomacy to the Countries of South America for the WTO
Negotiations’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
95 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO Kôshô, Nanbei Shokoku Giin Gaikô Gaiyô’ [‘Summary of
Diet Members’ Diplomacy to the Countries of South America for the WTO Negotiations’], in
Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/
056.html
96 ibid.
98 ‘Gurôsâ WTO Nôgyô Iinkai Gichô to Kaidan’. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
99 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Chûnichi Ôsutoraria Taishi Raisho’ [‘The Australian Ambassador
to Japan Comes to the Office’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
101 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tokubetsu Kokkai Kaikai kara Jyunêbu e’ [‘From the Opening
Session of a Special Diet to Geneva’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
102 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Jyunêbu de WTO Giin Gaikô no Hôkoku’ [‘Report of WTO Diet
Member’s Diplomacy in Geneva’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
103 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi kara Minasama e’ [‘To Everyone
from Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Member’]. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site003/
/public/077.html
104 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘WTO mo Chokusetsu Shiharai mo Ôzume’ [‘The Final Wrap Up
of Both the WTO and the Direct Payments’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
105 Deirii Jimin [Daily LDP]. Available from http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/daily/04_04/21/160421b.shtml
106 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Oishikute Anshin na Nippon no Nôrinsuisanbutsu o Kaigai e!’
[‘Delicious and Quality Assured Japanese Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Products for the Overseas
Market!’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
107 Tokyo Shinbun, 9 March 2005.
148 POWER AND PORK
108 ‘Oishikute Anshin na Nippon no Nôrinsuisanbutsu o Kaigai e!’. Available from http://
www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/053.html
109 Tokyo Shinbun, 9 March 2005.
110 ibid.
111 ‘Oishikute Anshin na Nippon no Nôrinsuisanbutsu o Kaigai e!’. Available from http://
112 Nikkei Weekly, 29 August 2005.
113 The Japan Times, 21 January 2005.
114 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 28 April 2005.
115 ibid.
116 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Yushutsu Sokushin de Juyô Kakudai’ [‘Expanding Demand by
Promoting Exports’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
index1.html
117 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi kara Minasama e’. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
120 ibid.
121 ibid., p. 183.
122 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 103. The same
source revealed information gained from the Japan Communist Party newspaper (Akahata), published
on 4 January 2000 to the effect that Kumamoto Prefecture was allocated ¥9.3 billion or 17 per cent of
the fiscal 1999 supplementary budget for structural improvement and mountain village development,
while Hokkaido, in second place, obtained 10.6 per cent, or ¥5.8 billion. While this distribution was
influenced by the terrible damage done by a typhoon,’ the public agreed that the “power” of Matsuoka
contributed to this distribution’.
124 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Naka Kyûshû Ôdan Dôrô’ [‘For the Early Realisation of the
Central Kyushu Crossing Road’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
126 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Chiiki no Shakai Shihon Seibi wa Jûmin no Negai’ [‘The Provision
of Regional Social Capital is the Hope of Local Residents’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/053.html
128 Mayor Gotô invited a former assistant police inspector who was in charge of investigating election
violations in Soyo Town to become director and vice-president of the company. When the mayor
stepped down as president, the former assistant police inspector replaced him. Hasegawa, ‘Jimin
“Gajô” no Chikaku Hendô’, p. 27.
129 Hasegawa, ‘Jimin “Gajô” no Chikaku Hendô’, p. 27.
130 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu: Purofuiru’, Seikan Yôran, 1998, Latter Half Year Edition, p. 188.
131 ‘Hini Kaku “Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi” no Patoron no “Yappari”’ [‘“The Expected” from the
Dignity-Lacking Patrons of “Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Member”’], Shûkan Shinchô, 13 December
2001, p. 58.
136 ibid.
137 ibid.
138 ibid.
139 ibid.
140 ibid.
141 See http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/dat/200208/2002081202.htm. The 30 th December 1999 issue
of Akahata also reported this affair.
143 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, pp. 103–4.
148 ibid., p. 35.
150 POWER AND PORK
6
THE IDENTICAL TWINS OF
NAGATA-CHÔ
Matsuoka’s motto is ‘straight truth and take great care of those who take care
of you’.1 An example of ‘taking care of those who take care of you’ is Murakami
Kôsuke, who served for two years as head of the Kumamoto Prefecture
Agricultural Policy Department until 2000, and who became ‘policy advisor
in charge’ (seisaku tantô komon) of the Kumamoto Prefecture Central Union of
Agricultural Cooperatives and related prefectural Nokyo federations. He said,
‘Matsuoka looked after me a lot, and I am grateful to him.’2
As for Matsuoka’s commitment to ‘straight truth’, when, in 2001, journalists
from the Bungei Shunjû started investigating a rumour of favouritism in NHK
where Matsuoka’s son worked, Matsuoka called up one of the journalists. Besides
issuing a detailed denial of the allegations, he said
[h]ow old are you, where were you born, do you have parents, where do
they work?....You are searching for private information. I have the right to
ask you the same questions!....Is this your life’s work? If any funny articles
get out, I’m going to run you down! You had better be prepared!
Understand?....You are all worse than cockroaches! You cockroach rascal! I
hope you realise this.3
After spitting out these words with such force that it seemed that saliva would
come flying out of the receiver, he slammed the phone down. In a subsequent
interview a year later, Matsuoka said, ‘Bungei Shunjû are always publishing
lies’.4
An Asahi journalist also reported having received threats of legal action from
Matsuoka after he interviewed MAFF Production Bureau Chief Sugata Kikuhito
and Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC) Chairman of
the Board of Directors Yamamoto Tôru (who had previously been the director-
THE IDENTICAL TWINS OF NAGATA-CHÔ 151
general of the MAFF Structural Improvement Bureau). Yamamoto was the

director-general of the Forestry Agency at the time of the Yamarin affair, in
which Matsuoka allegedly received a ¥2 million bribe.5 ALIC was also the
corporation that paid the BSE subsidy to meat traders, in which further bribery
allegations were made against Matsuoka, stemming from the fact that both
Suzuki Muneo and Matsuoka were directly involved in implementing this
subsidy and both were closely connected to the meat industry.6 Matsuoka
accused the journalist of being ‘“a parasitic worm who preys on the MAFF”, to
which the journalist retorted “You are the parasitic worm who preys on the
MAFF”’.7
THE TERRIBLE TWOSOME

Many reports have surfaced in the Japanese media about Matsuoka’s relationship
with Suzuki Muneo, and the way in which he and Muneo supported each
other in politics and policymaking. Matsuoka was widely known in Nagata-
chô as the Diet member who was closest to Muneo.8 He was described as the
‘No. 1 follower’ (hitotsu no kobun)9 of the politician who, at one time, ‘was
considered a future candidate for prime minister’.10
Matsuoka and Suzuki’s first meeting goes back to 1975, not long after
Matsuoka joined the Forestry Agency. At the time, Matsuoka was executive
manager of a MAFF divisional assistant directors’ study group. MAFF Minister
Nakagawa was invited to lecture to that group and Suzuki came along as his
political affairs secretary. Matsuoka recounted that ‘we sat at a desk, side by
side. We were sworn brothers’.11 Matsuoka frequently talked about the fact
that he and Suzuki drank with Nakagawa. He had even boasted earlier that
although he was working in the Forestry Agency, he would become the minister’s
secretary when Nakagawa became MAFF minister.12
A slightly different story was recounted by a person connected to the Forestry
Agency. He suggested that it was during Matsuoka’s time as chief of the Forestry
Management Station in Teshio that Matsuoka realised the opportunities that
could be had through his association with Nakagawa and Muneo. As the official
recalls
[d]uring his time as forestry office chief, he became close to Muneo, who was just out of the
Fisheries Agency and working as Nakagawa Ichirô’s secretary. At the time, Nakagawa was a
rising politician in Hokkaido, and furthermore, had a firm footing amongst the godfathers of
the Fisheries Agency zoku, and so for a young chief-of-office from the central agency, it was a
152 POWER AND PORK
good opportunity for promotion. I have heard that it was during this period as forestry office
chief that Matsuoka decided to aim to become a politician.13
Matsuoka’s sworn friendship with Muneo began during this period.14 Ever
since that time, according to some commentators, ‘Matsuoka and Muneo worked
together as a duo, running around Kasumigaseki and Nagata-chô and dashing
along the highroad to success’.15
Various terms have been used to describe the Muneo-Matsuoka relationship.
Journalists have coined the terms ‘identical twins of Nagata-chô’ (ichiransei
sôseiji) 16 as well as ‘fraternal twins’ (niransei sôseiji) and ‘sworn brothers’
(gikyôdai)17 in an attempt to capture the closeness and similarities between
Matsuoka and Muneo and their modus operandi as politicians. An agricultural
and fisheries-connected Diet member observed, ‘they are just like twin brothers.
What they say and the way they talk are identical.’18 Matsuoka was also called
a ‘brother-in-law’ of Suzuki, and Matsuoka himself called Suzuki ‘more than a
sworn friend relation’ (meiyû ijô no aidagara)19 and a ‘sworn friend of 30 years
standing’ (sanjûnenrai no meiyû).20 Nôminren questioned whether it could
trust Matsuoka—Muneo’s follower—on rice policy matters even though he
was chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee at the time.21
The farmers’ group implied that given Matsuoka’s close association with Muneo,
he would turn a deaf ear to farmers in spite of being a ‘boss of the nôrin zoku’.22
Summing up the relationship, one veteran political journalist said: ‘Muneo
and Matsuoka are really very similar. They are like copies of each other. From
their political methods and fundraising to their threatening tone, who draws
influence from whom, they are exactly alike in everything.’23 Matsuoka’s political
methods ‘go beyond the unreasonable because they are the same as Muneo’s,
and they have been made fun of as the “threatening duo”’.24 Matsuoka has
been called the ‘wild boy’ of the agriculture and forestry tribe (nôrin zoku no
abarenbô),25 while his mate has been labelled the ‘department store of suspicion’
(giwaku no depâto)26 and even worse, the ‘general trading company of suspicion’
(giwaku no sôgô shôsha).27 One political reporter commented
[a]ccording to a MAFF official, Matsuoka became bad (waruku naru) around 1995 after he
became chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee. When he was first elected,
Matsuoka was nice and honest, but in his second term, he began to go along with Muneo after
he was elected for a second time in 1993 with LDP endorsement. It was then that his
behaviour degenerated.28
People asked how someone such as Matsuoka, who had only been elected four
times (in 2001) and who had held only two government positions (parliamentary
vice-minister and deputy minister) could manage to wield so much political
power. Why had he, as someone whose national name value was inferior, attracted
attention?29 Much of it was attributed to Matsuoka’s association with Suzuki
and how he modelled his political behaviour on Suzuki’s. What Matsuoka learned
from Suzuki was that a sure-fire way to secure money and votes and to realise his
ambitions in politics was to become an influential politician (yûryoku seijika)
who could deliver public works projects to his local district. It ‘was Matsuoka’s
guiding of the budget to Kumamoto, his use of influence over public works in
the prefecture and his provision of patronage to agriculture and forestry-related
groups that gave Matsuoka a presence in the agricultural sector that was more
than expected.’30 One of Suzuki’s most famous sayings was ‘chihô e no reiki yûdô
de wa nai, “kôsei haibun” de aru!’, meaning ‘it is not guiding benefits to the
regions, it is “fair distribution”!’31 In fact, Suzuki had in common with Kamei
and Tanaka Kakuei an infamous reputation as a rieki yûdô seijika.32 Kamei is
reported to have said unashamedly: ‘What’s wrong with guiding benefits [to
local regions]? We’re doing politics for the people.’33
THE ‘SPECIAL ACTION SQUAD’

In the Diet, Muneo and Matsuoka were known as the ‘special action squad’.34
The two of them exercised their power in various divisions and committees,
whilst mutually complementing each other.35 For over ten years, Matsuoka
allegedly dominated Japanese agricultural policymaking along with Suzuki.
He was able to ‘control agricultural policy using the forceful political power of
“the MM (Matsuoka-Muneo) duo” as a weapon’.36 Matsuoka and Muneo were
known to have ‘joined hands as nôrin zoku for some time’.37
Matsuoka and Muneo’s modus operandi was to ‘make deals with producers and
companies (about what they wanted) beforehand. They then implemented the
deal by forcing it through the relevant division. They cleared the party procedures
by force, took the credit for policy, and then obtained the division’s consent to
leave the matter entirely to their own discretion’.38 As one LDP executive elaborated
Muneo and Matsuoka completely controlled the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Division.
When a meeting was held, they would bring Diet member followers called ‘the special action
154 POWER AND PORK
squad’ and make the squad speak in a way that was convenient for them. Especially when the
budget and rice price were decided, the squad not only spoke out but also blocked the remarks
of those Diet members who were opposed to the opinions of Muneo and Matsuoka. The
squad threatened the Diet members by saying ‘if you say that sort of thing, we will make you
lose the next election. We will go to your electoral district and expose today’s statement’. The
squad even said to government officials that they ‘would get them fired’.39
In trying to explain how Muneo and Matsuoka were able to wield so much
power as ‘the worst tribe Diet member duo’,40 one veteran political reporter
went back to the splintering of the LDP in June 1993. Muneo and Matsuoka’s
generation was advantaged by the split in the party because members of the
LDP’s ‘comprehensive agricultural policy faction’ (sôgô nôseiha), such as Hata
Tsutomu and Ishiba Shigeru, left the party. Hata was one of the two leading
lights amongst nôrin zoku at the time. By ‘stepping into the vacuum, Muneo
and Matsuoka gained power as the mainstay nôrin giin’.41 As Matsuoka was
not a member of the breakaway group from the Takeshita faction, leaving the
LDP was not an option for him. He was a member of the Mitsuzuka faction at
the time, which came through the Fukuda Takeo-Abe Shintarô line. As the
mass media commented ‘Muneo giin and Matsuoka giin inherited the rights
and interests of the “tribe Diet members.”’42
An influential MAFF executive provided a similar explanation
[i]n the past, Nakagawa Ichirô and Watanabe Michio were nôrin zoku. After that, Katô Kôichi
and Hata Tsutomu took over. In the time of Katô and Hata, they listened properly to the
opinions of both farmers and the MAFF and understood the need for compromise. However,
those Diet members, who hold power now, play quite different roles. Compared with 10 years
ago, these current Diet members attach greater importance to the opinions of the producer
side and try to accommodate their demands just as they are. The names of these Diet members
are Mr Matsuoka, Mr Muneo and Mr Etô Takami. Mr Matsuoka has the experience of
holding the positions of Agriculture and Forestry Division Chairman and Agriculture Basic
Policy Subcommittee Chairman (this committee decides rice production adjustment). His
advantage is that he has connections with dominant figures such as Mr Nonaka Hiromu and
Mr Muneo, and they are skilful in controlling people and parliamentary proceedings. In 1993,
Hata and others left the LDP, and the LDP broke up. The LDP slid down to the opposition
party, and the Matsuoka class gained strength in the vacuum. The declining power of Ministry
of Finance greatly influenced this movement. Recently, sensei (Diet members) are showing
their influence by saying ‘we ignored the intention of Ministry of Finance. We will control
things’. Since they will make Ministry of Finance (in the financial crisis) spend money, deficit
bonds increase. Previously there was a very natural discussion along the lines that ‘if we formed
a budget for rice, budgets could not be spent on other things’. It would be better if they were
a little bit more intelligent in their approach, but…43
By drawing on each other’s influence, Muneo and Matsuoka allegedly

manipulated policies in the way they wanted and strengthened their political
power.44 Matsuoka’s political style of yelling at the bureaucrats in LDP divisional
meetings was just like Muneo’s and earned him the nickname ‘Muneo of the
West’.45 Matsuoka would raise his voice, threaten people and shut them up.46
As a MAFF OB explained
[t]aking his cue from his sworn friend Muneo, saying ‘I will listen to the voices of consumers
and producers’, Matsuoka intervened in leaf tobacco and rice price decisions, and yelled at
bureaucrats. Since he’s become powerful, the Agriculture and Forestry Division itself has taken
on an abnormal atmosphere. At my place, a phone call came from the current bureau director-
general in an exhausted voice. Today he also called saying that he got yelled at by Matsuoka,
who said, ‘you’re an idiot’. He’s just like Muneo.47
Muneo was also known to get angry and shout a lot.48

[an] official in the Fisheries Agency committed suicide, it is said, because of repeated harassment
from Muneo. The official was seen as a hardworking and good man, a law-abiding citizen who
did not want to bend the rules for Muneo, but who had to endure threats such as ‘I’m going
to wreck your life’ and ‘I’ll make sure you don’t get promoted’.49
Suzuki was also known as ‘the behind-the-scenes foreign minister’ who

threatened MoFA officials and forced his views through during the Okinawa
summit in 2000.50 When LDP Diet member, Hirasawa Katsuei, openly called
Suzuki the ‘behind-the-scenes’ foreign minister on a TV show, Suzuki later
accosted him in the corridor of the Diet members’ offices, saying in yakuza-
like tones, ‘Oi… Hirasawa-kun, what do you mean by my being the behind-
the-scenes foreign minister?’51 Hirasawa shouted back, ‘How am I wrong?’52
Just as the two were about to launch into each other, someone came along and
so the fistfight did not amount to anything.53
Political journalist, Yamamura Akiyoshi, commented on Muneo and
Matsuoka’s bullying tactics
[s]ix or seven years back, the LDP’s Agriculture and Forestry Division was divided into pro and
anti-Muneo factions, and with the backing of Nonaka’s power, the Suzuki-Matsuoka
combination would yell at, belittle and get rid of Diet members who disagreed with them.
They would bring the MAFF officials in charge over to their side and manipulate things to their
liking. Already in the last three or four years, there is no one who goes against them.54
Nonaka, Suzuki and Kamei (Matsuoka’s faction boss) all had in common
the fact that they grew up in poverty, which reportedly made them into ‘tough
and shrewd political players’.55
156 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka and Muneo would regularly call on each other when they thought
they might need backup. When Muneo got into strife for interfering in MoFA
affairs (in this case, influencing the ministry not to permit NGOs to participate
in an Afghanistan aid donors’ conference in Tokyo), Matsuoka directly attacked
Muneo’s main political critic (Hirasawa) in the Executive Council of the LDP,
alleging that Hirasawa’s statements had ‘slandered the party itself ’.56 When
journalists approached Matsuoka directly for comment, he retorted: ‘What?
You’re so rude!’57
One of the techniques of the terrible twins was to send the ‘shock troops’
under their command (about 10 other Diet member-followers) to back each
other up. In October 2000
Matsuoka turned up at the Foreign Affairs Division with more than 10 of his followers. This
was at Suzuki’s request in order to back him up on the issue of sending surplus rice to North
Korea, an idea originating with Nonaka, a Suzuki backer, who was deputy LDP secretary-
general at the time. Suzuki told Matsuoka to say, ‘rice support for North Korea is important’.
This would help solve the rice surplus problem at the time. After Muneo argued that rice
support was necessary for the progress of Japan-North Korea relations, Matsuoka stated: ‘We
understand the sentiment of abducted families, but we want the decision of Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Kôno Yôhei, as the majority.’ Whereupon, his followers said, in a previously
arranged chorus, ‘that’s right, that’s right, that’s right’. The voices of those who opposed rice
support for North Korea were drowned out. The general position of the party was decided
after the divisional meeting. Half a million tonnes of rice were subsequently sent to North
Korea. 58
On another occasion, Suzuki provided backup for Matsuoka. In October

2001, Matsuoka asked Muneo to join a dinner party one evening in Akasaka.
Executives of the Kumamoto Prefecture construction industry association
were holding a meeting to petition LDP Diet members representing
Kumamoto Prefecture. Six Diet representatives were there.59 Strictly speaking
this was just a dinner party for members of the Diet from Kumamoto
Prefecture.
[when] one of the association executives, who was known to oppose Matsuoka, asked about
the Diet politician (Kaneko Yasushi) who had stood as an Independent in the 2000 general
election in Kumamoto (5) and who had defeated the LDP candidate, both Muneo and
Matsuoka were outraged. Matsuoka shouted at the executive that he would destroy his
company and make a show of his power. The executive retorted, ‘go ahead and destroy it!’,
whereupon a shouting match ensued, which continued for 10 minutes. It was touch and go for
a while, not forgetting that Matsuoka was a member of a karate club in his high school days.60
DIVISION OF LABOUR
As a zoku Diet member, Suzuki secured a strong foothold in both the MAFF
and MoFA.61 Nokyo’s National Council admitted
on the policy front, particularly in regards to price decisions on wheat, sugar beet and raw milk
for processing, which are all closely connected to his local region in Hokkaido, he would go to
all the LDP subcommittee meetings and by violently pressuring bureaucrats, he would guide
policies. Suzuki was not a member of the agriculture and forestry executive, but his influence
was such that crop and dairy prices could not be decided without his agreement.62
However, Suzuki gradually made room for Matsuoka as a nôrin zoku, with a
division of labour gradually appearing between the two.
His and Matsuoka’s respective spheres of influence were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries respectively. Matsuoka was to the MAFF what
Suzuki was to MoFA. The two of them controlled the LDP’s Foreign Affairs Division and the
Agriculture and Forestry Division. Suzuki used to run the Agriculture and Forestry Division,
but he stopped coming seven or eight years after he started to dabble in diplomatic affairs. He
basically left the running of the division to Matsuoka and one other LDP nôrin giin, Futada
Kôji from Akita, thinking that it would be in safe hands. Muneo probably thought ‘I can leave
the role to this man’.63
Muneo’s former protégé, who was an official in MoFA, called Suzuki the
‘Rasputin of the Foreign Ministry’64 in his memoirs. As Reed writes
Suzuki was remarkably powerful. He was more in control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
than the Foreign Minister, at least with respect to Russia, Africa, expenditures on the northern
islands, and bureaucratic personnel decisions. He directed MOFA expenditures to companies
that contributed to his campaign and probably directed a significant amount directly into his
own pocket.65
It is said, however, that Matsuoka’s power over the MAFF surpassed that
of Suzuki over MoFA.66 Matsuoka’s ‘threatening attitude frightened the people
in the MAFF and in construction companies.’67 This did not always make
Matsuoka very popular. Government officials within the MAFF, construction
contractors and others frowned on his intimidating behaviour.68 An influential
construction company executive in Matsuoka’s electoral district elaborated
on Matsuoka’s behaviour under Suzuki’s influence.
Matsuoka’s face has gradually become evil. Just after he was elected, he still retained a young
and pleasant impression. Doesn’t he realise this himself? His face does not look like a Diet
member. I have seen tens of House of Representatives members so far, but Matsuoka is
158 POWER AND PORK
completely different from other politicians. He has a different quality altogether. He wants to
do everything by himself. At any rate, he is not satisfied unless everything centres on him. He
says: ‘I don’t approve of anything unless I permit it’. This is Matsuoka’s style. Wherever there
are public works, Matsuoka pokes his nose into the majority of them. Several years ago,
Matsuoka controlled public construction works in Kumamoto Prefecture. Fundamentally,
Diet members should not intrude into public construction works in a prefecture. I advised
him, ‘if you scatter money to only one company, only one out of ten companies can make a
living. If you treat only one company nicely, you will have nine companies for enemies. If you
continue that, you will be totally surrounded by enemies.’ After I gave him this advice,
Matsuoka said ‘I understand’, but…69
In 2000 a weekly magazine conducted a questionnaire asking the question

‘which politician do government officials want to lose the election?’ According
to the results, Matsuoka’s close political ally, Suzuki came in first, while
Matsuoka himself came in eighth as someone who ‘uses personnel matters and
the budget for his own interests’.70
THE MATSUOKA-MUNEO FUND-GATHERING AXIS

Matsuoka had in common with Muneo a strong ability to collect political
funds, especially an ability to obtain a great deal in company contributions.71
Matsuoka’s pulling power in terms of funds, along with this oyabun (patron)
Suzuki, was the real origin of the saying ‘[i]n the east Suzuki, in the West
Matsuoka’.72 Matsuoka tapped into a very lucrative vein of political funding
by deploying the same kind of methodology as Muneo, that is, blatant influence
peddling and exercising influence wherever he could—from obtaining central
and local government public works funding to the selection of companies to
do the public works.73
The pattern of Matsuoka’s fund gathering reveals several conspicuous aspects.
First, he demonstrated extraordinary money-collecting power early on in his
Diet career. In 1994, as a fourth-year Diet Member, he raised about ¥10
million from two fund-raising parties (hagemasukai, or seiji shikin pâtî). This
was rare for such a relatively junior Diet member.74
Second, Matsuoka’s fund-gathering ability improved along with his experience
in the political world, that is, as he gained seniority and status as a Diet member
and as he acquired important agricultural and forestry committee posts and sub-
cabinet positions. There were quantum leaps in donations from 1996, especially
between 1996 and 2000, when Matsuoka progressed to third and fourth-term
Diet membership and gained a footing as a ‘backbone’ Diet member (chûken
giin).75 Highly significant in this regard was Matsuoka’s successive holding of

various important posts such as MAFF parliamentary vice-minister (in 1995)
and his appointment as chairman of the UR-Related Countermeasures
Subcommittee. As already pointed out, Matsuoka was deeply involved in the
distribution of the ¥6.01 trillion in UR countermeasures expenditure. Then in
December 2000, Matsuoka was made MAFF deputy minister in the second
Mori Cabinet and firmed up his position as a nôrin zoku.76
Third, Matsuoka’s fund collecting was comparatively large relative to other
Diet members, not only those of equivalent experience, but also those of
considerable influence and standing. According to political funds for 1996
data for 1996 collected by the Asahi Shinbun, the total amount Matsuoka
received from the LDP No. 3 Electoral District Branch, via his kôenkai and via
his political funds management group, the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century
Politics and Economics Discussion Association, amounted to ¥280 million,
which was well in excess of the average for all politicians elected to the Lower
House in that year (¥160 million).77 Amongst 384 successfully elected SMD
Diet members in 1996, Matsuoka was ranked forty-first.78 For a politician
elected only three times, this was extraordinary. Those higher on the list were
all well-established, famous Japanese politicians, most of whom were faction
leaders, party leaders, and current, former or future prime ministers. Up there,
of course, was also Muneo, who was one of the LDP’s top fund raisers ‘and the
only one of the top five not a faction leader.’79
The same kind of data in 1997 listed the top 50 political fund management
organisations of LDP Diet members. Matsuoka’s political fund management
organisation, the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economics
Discussion Association, was ranked twenty-sixth with around ¥79 million.
This was the income from fund-raising parties alone.80 Once again, all those
above Matsuoka on the list were senior LDP figures including past, present
and future prime ministers, as well as factions and the New Party Harbinger
(Shintô Sakigake). It was, therefore, an extraordinary amount for a third term
Diet member who was not a faction leader, and who was nowhere near a
ministerial or prime ministerial post, or the party leadership.
In 2000, Matsuoka collected ¥104.13 million in company donations and
was ranked 13th on the list of Diet politicians in terms of amount collected.81
While this was short of first-placed Suzuki with ¥250 million, it exceeded that
collected by the leader of a political faction, former Prime Minister Mori.82
160 POWER AND PORK
Fourth, Matsuoka’s career connections with the Forestry Agency, his personal
influence as the ‘Don’ of forestry policy, and his links with the forestry industry
proved highly productive in terms of financial contributions. The New Century
Politics and Economics Discussion Association received large quantities of funds
from forestry-related political groups. In 1998 alone, looking at just the major
contributions from this source, Matsuoka collected ¥4.4 million from the
National Mountain and Forest Roads Political League (Zenkoku Chisan Rindô
Seiji Renmei), ¥2 million from the National Forestry Civil Engineering and
Construction Industry Political League (Zenkoku Shinrin Dobuku Kensetsugyô
Seiji Renmei), ¥1.88 million from the Japan Timber Industry Political League
(Nihon Ringyô Seiji Renmei), and ¥1.24 million from the Forestry Proprietors’
Political Association (Ringyô Keieisha Rinseikai). These amounts also included
payments for tickets to fund-raising parties. In addition, the National Mountain
and Forest Roads Political League contributed ¥8 million to the LDP Kumamoto
Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch represented by Matsuoka. Although
these groups made donations to many politicians, they were particularly
generous to Matsuoka.83
Other investigations revealed similar funding links between Matsuoka and
forestry-related organisations. The National Political Federation of Forest Civil
Engineering and Construction Companies (Zenkoku Shinrin Doboku
Kensetsugyô Seiji Renmei) donated ¥14 million to Matsuoka, the National
Political Federation of Afforestation and Forestry Roads (Zenkoku Chisan Rindô
Seiji Renmei] ¥8.46 million and the National Timber Industry Federation
(Zenkoku Mokuzai Sangyô Renmei) ¥4 million.84 These groups made up more
than half of the number of political groups contributing to Matsuoka’s political
funding organisation.85 Matsuoka was assiduous in attending meetings of the
Japan Association of Forestry Civil Engineering Leagues (Nihon Ringyô
Doboku Rengô Kyôkai), which claimed that protecting forests also protected
national land, especially if there were a lot of damage from typhoons. Protecting
forests also raised issues of flood control and forestry roads (that is, public
works). In 2000, Matsuoka received a total of ¥70 million in donations and
party tickets from forestry-related industries.86
Matsuoka also had financial ties to extra-departmental groups (gaikaku
dantai) of the Forestry Agency, which were dependent on the agency in terms
of contracted business. Of particular interest was the sum of ¥360,000 donated
to Matsuoka in 1996 by the Japan Forest Technology Association (Nihon
Ringyô Gijutsu Kyôkai), which was simultaneously receiving large amounts of

subsidies from the MAFF (amounting to as much as ¥40 billion in 1996 and
1997).87 Making such political donations was, strictly speaking, contrary to
Article 22 of the Political Funds Regulation Law (Seiji Shikin Kiseihô), which
bans bodies that receive grants from the state, such as subsidies, from making
donations to political campaigns for a year.88
In another case, Matsuoka received a large political contribution from an
organisation that was involved in bid-rigging (dangô), that is, illegal collusion
amongst companies in order to share out government contracts. The
organisation in question was a public interest corporation (kôeki hojin) under
the jurisdiction of the Forestry Agency called the State-Owned Forests Survey
Works Cooperation Association (Kokuyû Rinya Sokuryô Jigyô Kyôryokukai).
Qualification for admission to the association was being a Forestry Agency
OB, meaning that it was a ‘descent from heaven’ (amakudari) corporation.
The association received an exclusion advice from the Fair Trade Commission
because of undertaking repeated dangô in tenders for surveys and investigations
of state-owned forests and making unfair profits. Matsuoka received a total of
¥9.42 million in contributions over five years in the period 1996–2000 from
this association. JCP House of Councillors member Ôgata Yasuo took up the
issue in the Economy, Trade and Industry Committee of the Upper House.
He denounced ‘a public-interest corporation involved in dangô and making
unfair profits. Some of these unjust profits were “returned” to Matsuoka, who
had strong influence over forestry administration.’89
In 2000, a leading article appeared in the Asahi Shinbun on 24 March
stating that two incorporated foundations attached to the Forestry Agency
were donating money to a Forestry Agency OB who was a Diet member. The
organisations were the Forestry Benefit Association (Rinya Kôzaikai)90 and the
Forestry Civil Engineering Consultants (Ringyô Dôboku Konsarutantsu). Both
were gaikaku dantai of the Forestry Agency, in this case incorporated
foundations (zaidan hôjin) charged with forestry research, surveying and
planning. Most of the executives and staff of the organisations were Forestry
Agency OBs, making them amakudari corporations of the Forestry Agency.
The benefit association donated ¥480,000 each year to Matsuoka’s political
funding group in the period 1996–98 (see also Table 6.1), and in 1996 bought
¥400,000 worth of party tickets. 91 The consultants’ group contributed
¥480,000 each year in 1996 and 1997.92 In total, these two groups donated
162 POWER AND PORK
¥2.8 million to Matsuoka between 1996 and 1998. The Asahi Shinbun took
up the ethics of a cycle whereby kôeki hojin that obtained jobs from the MAFF
then gave political donations to OB Diet members.93
Moreover, while both were kôeki hôjin as incorporated foundations, ‘they
had investments in private companies that also made financial contributions
to Matsuoka in direct conflict with the 1996 cabinet decision about “the
standards of permission for establishing and guiding public interest
corporations”’.94 In addition, both incorporated foundations sub-contracted
works worth ¥2.1 billion (in the case of Rinya Kôsaikai), and ¥140 million (in
the case of Ringyô Dôboku Konsarutantsu) to these companies. As DPJ Lower
House member, Ishii Kôki, observes, ‘this kind of three-sided financial
connection represents a typical politics-bureaucracy-industry triangle.’95 In
fact, the ‘collusive structures’ centring on the MAFF’s agricultural civil
engineering bureaucrats and the land improvement and rural development
industries are replicated in the Forestry Agency.96
A far more serious case of adhesion reputedly centred on a forestry company
called Kyôrin Consultants (Kyôrin Konsarutantsu), in which various forestry public
interest corporations had invested, with 25 per cent financed by the Rinya Kôzaikai
and 18 per cent by an incorporated association (shadan hôjin), the Japan Forestry
Technology Association (Nihon Ringyô Gijutsu Kyôkai).97 Although technically a
private company, Kyôrin Consultants employed Forestry Agency OBs as executives
and obtained jobs from the bureaucratic agencies. It was effectively a subsidiary
company of Forestry Agency amakudari corporations. As a bureaucratic consulting
firm and subsidiary company of Forestry Agency gaikaku dantai and amakudari
corporations, it was part of a typical pyramid structure that spread down from the
Forestry Agency to amakudari corporations, then to subsidiary amakudari companies
and finally to private subcontractors of amakudari corporations. The web of networks
spread across the regional areas of Japan.98
Matsuoka had this pyramid system at his beck and call, and was given
political donations by the amakudari corporations, the subsidiary companies
and even the private subcontractors.99 A previous chairman of the subsidiary
company Kyôrin Consultants, Nakamura Yasushi, later became a policy
secretary of Matsuoka’s.100 Nakamura channelled donations to Matsuoka from
the Japan Forest Technology Association, which held 18 per cent of the shares
of Kyôrin Consultants, via Kyôrin, which was technically a private company
and therefore, in this way slipped under the Political Funds Regulation Law
(which banned public organisations from making political donations).101
Fifth, contributions from companies and organisations (kigyô, dantai) in
the construction industry made up a large proportion of donations to Matsuoka’s
political funding organisation. 102 Matsuoka’s political funds revenue and
expenditure report (seiji shikin shûshi hôkoku) in 2000103 revealed significant
contributions from construction companies.104 On the contributors list were
major general contractors (zenekon), civil (agricultural) engineering companies
(doboku kaisha) and construction companies (kensetsu kaisha) that received
contracts for the projects in which Matsuoka was involved.105 Companies and
places of business on the list numbered just under 500.106 Most were, in
short, construction companies (doken gyôsha), or construction material suppliers
such as glass companies.107 The ‘donations varied from around ¥100,000 to
¥5 million at the most, but it demonstrated how loyal to Matsuoka the small
and medium-sized civil engineering construction industry was, and how big
their expectations were of him.’108
One company executive said, ‘[p]ublic works projects make up 90 per cent
of our business. With this recession, I’d say all of the civil engineering and
construction companies in Kumamoto are in much the same position’.109
Another said, ‘[s]tructural improvement projects from the MAFF come to us
thanks to Mr. Matsuoka. He’s doing his best to ensure that construction
continues for both the Kyushu bullet train and the Kawabe River dam
projects’.110 For example, Matsuoka received ¥33.85 million from 42 companies
that were contracted by MLIT to construct the Kawabe River Dam.111 Another
person connected to the political world commented that ‘Mr Matsuoka
advocates increases in the national debt and expansion of the supplementary
budget, and there is no doubt that behind his opposition to decreases in the
budget [under Prime Minister Koizumi], there is the “pressure” of donations’.112
Looking at the overall picture, over the six years between 1995 and 2001, a
total of 483 companies and organisations contributed more than ¥50,000 a
year to the Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economics
Discussion Association.113 Including donations of under ¥50,000, a total of
¥211,860,160 was contributed to Matsuoka’s political funding group from
companies and organisations located across 22 prefectures. 114 The top 10
companies and organisations contributing to Matsuoka’s political funding group
164 POWER AND PORK
in order of amount between 1996 and 1999 are listed in Table 6.1.115 As the
table shows, 60 per cent of the top-ten listed donors were construction
companies in Kumamoto Prefecture.
Most of the companies on the list also contributed to the LDP Kumamoto
Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch, of which Matsuoka served as the
branch representative. In 2000, Matsuoka collected about ¥920,000 from
two political fund-raising parties, and the LDP’s Kumamoto Prefecture No. 3
Electoral District Branch collected ¥104 million donated by about 500
companies connected to public works such as civil engineering and construction
material companies.117 According to rumour, a construction company also
shouldered Matsuoka’s secretary’s salary.118 A spokesman from one of the
companies on the list of Matsuoka donors said ‘a contribution amounting to
hundreds of thousands of yen per year is insignificant for us. We believe
Matsuoka sensei has contributed to the development of forestry. The fact is, we
contract forestry-related work’.119
Table 6.1 Top 10 contributors to Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century

Politics and Economics Discussion Association
Rank Name of company and organisation (location) Amount contributed (¥)
1 Mitsuhashi Company 2,000,000
(Shibetsu City, Hokkaido Prefecture)
2 Sugimoto Construction 1,792,000
(Aso Town, Kumamoto Prefecture)
3 Jotoh Logistics Warehouse 1,720,000
(Ozu Town, Kumamoto Prefecture)
4 Japan Conservation Engineers 1,680,000
(Minato Ward, Tokyo)
5 Forestry Benefit Association 1,440,000
(Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo)116
6 Dai Ichi Kiko 1,260,000
(Kumamoto City)
7 Ishizaka Company 1,200,000
(Kikuka Town, Kumamoto Prefecture)
8 Mori Industry 1,152,000
(Aso Town, Kumamoto Prefecture)
9 Renda Gumi 1,100,000
(Hondo City, Kumamoto Prefecture)
10 Otsubo Construction Industry 1,080,000
(Hakusui Village, Kumamoto Prefecture)
Matsuoka’s New Century Politics and Economics Discussion Association

also benefited from contributions from 115 individuals, amounting to a total
of ¥44,355,000 between 1996 and 1999. These contributions were
approximately 25 per cent of the total donated by companies and organisations.
However, the number of individuals was still large. The top 10 contributors
by total over the period 1996-2001 are listed in Table 6.2.120
The main contrast between Table 6.1 and 6.2 is the fact that individual
contributors came from a greater range of geographic locations (50 per cent
were from Kumamoto, and 20 per cent were from Hokkaido) compared to the
company and organisations that contributed to Matsuoka.
As head of the LDP branch in Kumamoto (3), Matsuoka received the bulk
of contributions, which were collected in small amounts but from large numbers
of construction-related companies in Kumamoto Prefecture.121 Even Matsuoka
admitted that ‘although individual contributions are small, the company
contribution is large overall. Contributions are the result of the fact that various
people support me.’122
In the LDP’s Kumamoto No. 3 electoral district revenue and expenditure
report, companies from Hokkaido, where Suzuki’s electoral district was located,
Table 6.2 Top 10 individual contributors to Matsuoka Toshikatsu

New Century Politics and Economics Discussion
Association
Rank Name of individual (location) Amount contributed (¥)
1 S. N (Kushiro City, Hokkaido Prefecture) 2,500,000
2 M. N (Kushiro City, Hokkaido Prefecture) 1,000,000
3 T. U (Enzan City, Yamanashi Prefecture) 500,000
4 K. S (Akita City, Akita Prefecture) 480,000
5 T. S (Ito City, Shizuoka Prefecture) 480,000
6 M. N (Miyagawa Village, Mie Prefecture) 480,000
6 M. A (Kikuka Town, Kumamoto Prefecture) 480,000
6 K. M (Menda Town, Kumamoto Prefecture) 480,000
9 K. I (Aomori City, Aomori Prefecture) 400,000
10 H. K (Yatsushiro City, Kumamoto Prefecture) 360,000
10 S. M (Kikuchi City, Kumamoto Prefecture) 360,000
10 T. H (Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture) 360,000
10 H. M (Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture) 360,000
10 T. N (Tsunagi Town, Kumamoto Prefecture) 360,000
166 POWER AND PORK
were also prominent.123 In fact, a large number of companies contributed to

both Matsuoka and Muneo. Table 6.3124 lists companies contributing more
than ¥50,000 per year and the amounts received by Muneo between 1995
and 1999 and by Matsuoka between 1996 and 1999. The amounts were
donated to Muneo’s 21st Century Policy Research Association and Matsuoka’s
New Century Politics and Economics Discussion Association. A total of 24
companies had the same company name and place. Most were forestry or
construction-related companies located in Hokkaido Prefecture.
First place on the list was Mitsuhashi Company, which was a leading timber
company in Hokkaido Prefecture. It also made annual contributions of
¥500,000 to the LDP’s Kumamoto No. 3 Electoral District branch every year
even after 2000.125
Matsuoka’s revenue and expenditure report was similar to Muneo’s report in
that there was an overwhelmingly large number of contributions around
¥100,000. Moreover, many of the same names contributing ¥100,000 were
listed in Matsuoka’s revenue and expenditure report almost every year.126
In 2005, details of Matsuoka’s political funding income report for 2004
were revealed. The Matsuoka Toshikatsu New Century Politics and Economics
Discussion Association was ninth on the list of the top 10 recipients of
donations from fund-raising parties. Those ahead of Matsuoka’s political
funding group were LDP factions (old Hashimoto faction (first), Mori faction
(fifth), Horiuchi faction (seventh) and Kamei faction (eighth)), political parties
(the DPJ (third)), an industry league (the Pharmaceutical Industry Political
League (sixth)), and two leading LDP politicians (Hiranuma Takeshi (second)
and Nakagawa Hidenao (fourth)).127
STEALING FROM THE PUBLIC PURSE?

In 2000, the Kumamoto Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch collected
¥12,100,000 in contributions from individuals.128 Of this, ¥5,000,000 was
donated by a single individual, Yoshii Junichi, who had been with Matsuoka
since his first election in 1990. Yoshii came to be employed in the publicly
funded position of No. 1 secretary after Matsuoka was first elected in 1990.
He stayed in that position until 2000.
The exact amount that Yoshii donated was ¥5,127,427. His annual salary in
2000 was estimated to be ¥8,850,000, and so ¥5,000,000 represented a sizeable
slice of his annual income. Investigative journalists dug around and came up
Table 6.3 Companies contributing to Matsuoka and Muneo

Company name Location of Amount contributed Amount contributed
head office to Matsuoka (¥) to Muneo (¥)
Mitsuhashi Company Shibetsu City, 2,000,000 2,500,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Yamarin Obihiro City, Hokkaido 720,000 600,000
Prefecture
Taiyoo Development Yatsushiro City, 720,000 360,000
Kumamoto Prefecture
Ikoma Gumi Asahikawa City, 480,000 1,800,000
Corporation Hokkaido Prefecture
Kuramoto Ikutahara Town, 360,000 720,000
Sangyo Co. Hokkaido Prefecture
Matsumoto Gumi Hakodate City, 240,000 1,800,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Daido Industry Shirataki Village, 240,000 360,000
Development Hokkaido Prefecture
Hokusei Co. Tobetsu Town, 140,000 500,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Takaya . Iwamizawa City, 130,000 120,000
Doken Co Hokkaido Prefecture
Saito Gumi Ashoro Town, 130,000 1,940,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Kikuchi Teshio Town, 120,000 720,000
Construction Hokkaido Prefecture
Kikuchi Gumi Takinoue Town, 120,000 480,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Kyo Construction Ebetsu City, 120,000 600,000
Industry Hokkaido Prefecture
Sanjo Construction Kitami City, 120,000 1,760,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Yamamoto Gumi Teshio Town, 120,000 360,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Kagoshima Teshio Town, 120,000 120,000
Construction Hokkaido Prefecture
Morinaga Gumi Asahikawa City, 120,000 240,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Ishiyama Gumi Teshio Town, 120,000 360,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Daiho Corporation Chuo Ward, Tokyo 120,000 720,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Tanimura Gumi Iwamizawa City, 120,000 630,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Tsujihiro Gumi Fukui City, 120,000 660,000
Fukui Prefecture
Tanaka Industry Shibetsu City, 120,000 1,800,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Shimada Construction Abashiri City, 120,000 2.500,000
Hokkaido Prefecture
Marufuku Construction Kagoshima City, 100,000 120,000
Kagoshima Prefecture
168 POWER AND PORK
with some interesting facts. Apparently Yoshii had temporarily retired after the
June 2000 general election, but was almost immediately re-employed in July
2000. When he resigned he received a retirement allowance of approximately
¥6 million. When asked whether he had contributed his retirement allowance
to Matsuoka, he acknowledged, ‘I suppose that’s the case…I quit once because
there was an election on’.129
When Matsuoka was approached directly at the Diet members’ dormitory
in Tokyo to confirm or deny this, he answered, ‘I don’t know. This is the first
I’ve heard of it. I don’t know.’130 However, when he was told that Yoshii had
admitted it, he said, ‘[t]hat’s a procedural matter. That’s what I’ve heard. I
don’t know anything about matters concerning Yoshii….I don’t know anything
about the retirement fund issue.’131 Following this encounter with journalists,
he got straight into his car, still carrying the bag of garbage that he was intending
to throw into the rubbish.132
The same night journalists accosted Matsuoka in the Diet members’
dormitory, they received a phone call from Yoshii. He elaborated on the details
of receiving the retirement allowance, and, regarding the donation to Matsuoka,
he said, ‘it’s something that I did of my own accord as a means of settling
things and taking responsibility now that I was re-employed.’133
A similar suspicion arose that Matsuoka generally raked off the allowances paid
to his state-supplied secretaries. According to a person connected to the local political
world, Matsuoka would keep the allowances of his state-funded first and second
secretaries, and then redistribute the money to five or six secretaries including his
privately funded secretaries.134 When asked about this point also, he totally denied
it, saying ‘that’s not the case at all. We don’t do that.’135 It would seem, however,
that raking off secretaries’ allowances is a semi-norm in Nagata-chô.136 More than
80 per cent of Diet member’s offices do it, according to Arima Harumi, a political
commentator with experience as a Diet member’s secretary.137
FACTION-BUILDING
Muneo and Matsuoka thought they were so politically successful that they
could attract a tribe of followers who could always be bribed by political funding
into following politically powerful Diet members. They had an eye on
generational succession and the reorganisation of factions, and they worked
together to gather young Diet members and hold a study group.138
In August 2000, rumours circulated that the traitor Muneo was aiming to
create a separate faction of his own. Information came to light about a meeting
held at Ishingô, a Chinese restaurant in Akasaka, Tokyo. A total of 25 people
turned up, 14 from the Etô-Kamei faction, to which Matsuoka belonged, and
11 people from the Hashimoto faction to which Suzuki belonged. The prospective
name given to the group was the Suzumatsukai, taking the initial syllables of
both Muneo’s and Matsuoka’s names. It was the beginning of a new faction
under Suzuki’s leadership but people did not find the name very inspiring.
Suzumatsu was very close to another Japanese word ‘suzumushi’ meaning a
‘cricket’, and reference was made to the ‘two crickets’ singing in unison.139
The new grouping was supposed to take over from the group called the
‘Society to Create Tomorrow’s LDP’ (Jimintô no Asu no Tsukurukai), which
was an embryonic grouping attracting younger Diet members after the 2000
general election when the Mori-Nonaka executive structure in the LDP
loosened.140 One of the participants commented
I do not care for this society. Its members are only flattered by the mass media. We are
conducting activities in the Suzumatsukai with the intention of creating the mainstream of the
next regime. For the name of the association, there was a discussion to call it the Suzumatsukai,
taking the names of both Suzuki and Matsuoka. However, some thought that “the name was
uninspiring and a bit too conspicuous” and so the name was not decided. It was designed to be
an association in preparation for the formation of the Suzuki faction, and aimed to draw in
other members by adding politicians from other factions.141
The new grouping was due for official inauguration by September 2000, adding
Diet members from other factions.142
After the meeting ‘a reporter asked Matsuoka, “Will you create a faction?”,
to which he replied, “We are considering that option. It may end up being
that way.”’143 Matsuoka was known to be a follower (kobun) of PARC Chairman
Kamei. Asked about this, he gave the following explanation.
To start with, we need to back up the Nonaka-Kamei executive regime. Next, we will create
the Kamei faction in opposition to YKK (Yamasaki, Katô and Koizumi). Then sooner or later,
we aim to create the Suzuki faction. My plan is to stabilise the LDP through cooperation
between the Shisuikai faction and the Hashimoto faction.144
When asked whether he wanted Suzuki to become prime minister, Matsuoka

said, ‘Mr Kamei is my boss. First, I want Mr Kamei to do his best to become
prime minister…Since Mr Suzuki is also a competent politician, he will naturally
170 POWER AND PORK
become a candidate for prime minister later’.145 Suzuki was more reluctant
publicly to acknowledge the existence of the embryonic new faction. He affirmed
that he was from the Hashimoto faction and a close advisor of former LDP
Secretary General Nonaka, while his friend Matsuoka was a close advisor and
follower of PARC Chairman Kamei.146
In spite of Matsuoka and Muneo being labelled ‘the identical twins in Nagata-
cho’, one point of difference between them really stood out. Muneo was well
known for distributing political funds to Diet members and prefectural assembly
members in order to build-up a tribe of followers. His style was aggressively to
distribute money to other politicians. Politicians who received money from
Muneo formed the core of his ‘Munemune Kai’ (Munemune Association). In
1996 (an election year) he reportedly gave ¥7.1 million to this group, ¥1.2
million in 1997, ¥2.7 million in 1998, ¥2.5 million in 1997, ¥2.7 million
in 1998, ¥2.5 million in 1999 and ¥2.3 million in 2000.147 Matsuoka was a
member and reportedly received ¥7.5 million in funding from the association
over a period of two years.148 The same kind of money flows were not matched
by Matsuoka. He was less keen on distributing his own funds.149 Despite this,
a report surfaced in late 2001 that outside the top factions, only Matsuoka
and Suzuki had distributed mochidai (rice cake money) to young Diet members,
which suggests that Matsuoka was being reckless beyond his means.150
Documents presented to MIAC by Matsuoka’s political funding group
confirmed that he received donations from Suzuki’s political funding groups.151
The Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s
Office also uncovered the fact that Suzuki did not record all the necessary
financial details in his revenue and expenditure reports, including outlaying
funds for activities that were not political activities such as contributing funds
for the cost of construction of Matsuoka’s own house.152
According to one source, amounts flowing from Muneo to Matsuoka between
1990 and 2000 amounted to ¥44 million.153 The ¥12.5 that Matsuoka received
from Muneo over the period 1996–2000 was more than six times the amount
that Matsuoka received from Kamei in 1998. 154 Then, in 2001–2002,
Matsuoka received funding worth ¥7,050,000 from Muneo.155
Discrepancies were observed in Muneo’s recorded outgoings compared to
Matsuoka’s recorded incomings. In one case, Matsuoka did not record Muneo’s
contribution at all.156 Overall, the amounts were so large, they confirmed the
existence of the Munemune Kai, in short, the Suzuki Muneo faction. 157
Moreover, they also underlined the very special relationship between the
Matsuoka and Muneo. No Diet politician contributed so generously to another
without regard to some purpose or other. Muneo reputedly ‘used his money
and his power ruthlessly…using the familiar tactics of money and
intimidation.’158 He had ‘twice been voted the most corrupt politician in all
Japan.’159 As a construction company executive observed
[t]here are two paths. One is a shorter way, but there is a cliff in the way. If the cliff collapses,
the path is dangerous. The other path takes time, but it is safe. If someone is an ordinary
politician they don’t take the dangerous path. However, I got the impression that Matsuoka
and Muneo are advancing along the most dangerous, shortest distance path.160
BORDERLINE BRIBERY: MONEY FOR FAVOURS

Various political contribution scandals suggest that what Matsuoka engages
in goes well beyond the boundaries of political brokerage. It skirts the fine
line between legal and illegal activity and, on some occasions, arguably
crosses over the line: ‘Matsuoka is asked to mediate and accept a bribe in
the guise of a political funding contribution in return’.161 Several examples
of this kind of activity have come to light during Matsuoka’s political career.
Such activities can only be described as ‘borderline bribery’, or ‘money for
favors’. They have been a staple of Matsuoka’s Diet career.
Matsuoka’s clientelism has extended well beyond activities that could
be called ‘policy interference’. The deals he has engineered on behalf of
clients have sometimes been matters of public policy over which bureaucrats
exercised discretion, but he has also mediated in a much wider circle that
just bureaucrats. The common feature of such activities is that they are
conducted in order to solicit money from individuals. Matsuoka has sold
his influence as a mediator to various clients who solicited favours (engineered
by Matsuoka) for money. He has provided his clients with inside
information, with powerful contacts, with loans, with government contracts,
with exemption from the application of specific administrative regulations,
or simply his continuing services as a broker.
In 1993, when Matsuoka was a second-term Diet member, he called the
King of Real Estate, Sasaki, from a telephone booth at Haneda Airport,
saying, ‘I’m about to go to Kumamoto. Can you lend me ¥30 million?’162
Sasaki’s answer was, ‘“Sensei, since I learned a lesson from Company T, I
cannot lend you money any more.” Matsuoka said, “you can’t lend me the
172 POWER AND PORK
money?” and I declined by saying “not this time”. Then he said, “there is
nothing I can do about it” and hung up the phone.’163 On this occasion,
Matsuoka was clearly seeking a loan for himself, just as he earlier had mediated
a loan from Sasaki to Company T.
The dividing line between a loan and a financial contribution is, in Matsuoka’s
case, often quite blurred. In 1996, Sasaki received a witness summons to the
‘Jûsen (Housing Loan Company) Diet’. From about five days before the
summons day, Matsuoka starting calling Sasaki. As Sasaki recalls
Matsuoka called 4 or 5 times a day and said ‘I borrowed, not received the money from you,
right? Please do not talk about anything suspicious (in the Diet).’ Indeed, there is no such case
that Matsuoka received the money from me, and I thought he misunderstood. I recalled that
I calmed him down by saying ‘I know that, sensei’. Since this continued for three to four days,
I thought Matsuoka was saying a peculiar thing.164
Matsuoka was subsequently named in a statement from a major financing

company president’s to the jûsen inquiry as having been ‘asked a favour’.165
In 2002, Matsuoka had another encounter with Sasaki at the Capital Tokyu
Hotel in Nagata-chô. As Sasaki recalls
[w]hen I went to the restroom, Matsuoka called out ‘long time no see’, and we shook hands
by chance. Then, Matsuoka was all smiles and said ‘is there any good chance to make a bit of
money?’ I replied with a joke that ‘if there were a good chance to make a bit of money, I would
call at his office soon’.166
Other information suggests that Matsuoka’s mediation for bribes was

structural, meaning institutionalised in his political organisation. A Mr
‘K’, who was the former chief of Matsuoka’s local office (and whose later
position was described as office counsellor) reputedly controlled Matsuoka’s
electoral district. Numerous people with local political connections in
Kumamoto testified
[w]hat ‘K’ is doing is the same as what Satô Saburô167 is doing in Katô Kôichi’s office. It is a
mystery why the mass media takes no notice of this matter. He [‘K’] is a purely a broker
secretary, and what he is doing is the same as the sensei. The year before last, on the occasion
of the prefectural gubernatorial election, the LDP’s federation of branches asked for cooperation
from general contractors without knowing that they were already contributing money to
Matsuoka. ‘K’ was said to have been enraged that they were interfering with their source of
finance.168
THE FUJI BANK SCANDAL

In 1991, not long after Matsuoka was elected, his name surfaced in the Fuji
Bank Fraudulent Loans Scandal. This ‘drew attention very early on to Matsuoka’s
“big shot” ways.’169 The Fuji Bank Akasaka Branch public relations section
chief undertook ¥700 billion in illegal loans, with ¥260 billion vanishing into
the night. ‘Zennippan’, a resort development company, was one of the companies
financed by Fuji Bank.170 Investigations into the affair revealed that Matsuoka
received approximately ¥9 million from the resort development company (which
he later returned).171 The former president of Zennippan, Hanada Toshikatsu,
looks back on Matsuoka’s connection with the Urausu Resort Development in
Urausu Town, Hokkaido Prefecture
I met Matsuoka for the first time just after he became a Diet member. My first impression of
Matsuoka was just as I saw him. People call Matsuoka a mini-Muneo and say he shouts in
(LDP) divisional meetings. But, he was cringing to me, and I got the impression that he was
just a typical government official. His personality was straightforward. I was introduced to
Matsuoka by Sonoda Hiroyuki (House of Representatives member, representing Kumamoto)
who brought him to a high-class Japanese-style restaurant in the Ginza in the daytime saying,
‘please take care of Matsuoka’. Mr Sonoda introduced Matsuoka while we were eating and
drinking. He said Matsuoka might be useful for something in relation to resort development.
My association with Matsuoka went as far as that. Even in relation to the report that I
shouldered the salary of Matsuoka’s secretary, because Sonoda asked me to do it, I just paid.
I paid not because Matsuoka asked me for the support. Well, it is true that I paid a total of
¥19.2 million (in political contributions, party tickets, secretary’s salary), but in what order?
Since the Asahi Shinbun investigated the matter and wrote about it in an article, it is true.
Generally, since Matsuoka is timid, he cannot tell a lie. Although I told Matsuoka ‘you do not
have to pay the money back’, he made a point of paying the money back in full by money
transfer. For that reason, Matsuoka is timid.172
The scandal involved the removal of protected forests for the Urausu resort
development. As Hanada continues
I did not make any requests to Matsuoka in relation to the removal of protected forests for the
resort development. Matsuoka himself explained, ‘when I inquired [with the Forestry Agency],
(the application was already submitted and) the arrangement of the content was already
completed. I did not do anything more than that’. This is also true. However, since I ran into
trouble by failing to meet the deadline for the bank financing contract, I asked Matsuoka to
‘cooperate in a businesslike manner.’ Matsuoka said, ‘since the application has already been
submitted, if the schedule is delayed, please let me know.’ I did not say anything. He was just
smiling. At such a time, a politician does not say anything. After that, there were no reports
from Matsuoka regarding his inquiries to the Forestry Agency.173
174 POWER AND PORK
The Asahi Shinbun (dated the 7 of November 1991) reported that

‘Matsuoka made inquiries to the Forestry Agency regarding the removal of
protected forests for Urausu Resort, asking questions such as “how are you
handling it?” around June 1990.’174
THE BSE SCANDAL

In September 2001, the first outbreak of BSE occurred in Japan, and the
whole of Japan fell into a BSE panic.175 The origin of the BSE problem was
traced to the ‘dysfunctional’ MAFF.
It was insensitive to the BSE warning from the EU and triggered the disease because of cosy
relations with and fear of zoku giin, and hatred between executives….Talented staff were
neglected and forced to retire at an early age by the MAFF administrative vice-minister and his
group. Although their precise number was unknown, problems with personnel even extended
to the suicide of some staff.176
One MAFF OB argued that

[c]orruption within the MAFF was the main reason why the ministry was unresponsive to the
warning from the EU regarding the outbreak of mad cow disease in the UK and the information
about human infection with Creutzfeldt Jacob disease (CJD). Agricultural administration was
paralysed by mutual animosity between officials, the continuous occurrence of various scandals,
the fear of zoku Diet members as well as the adhesion with them. The MAFF’s state of absent-
mindedness caused the outbreak of mad cow disease.177
The most problematic aspect of this whole issue was the purchase by the
government and disposal by incineration of domestically produced beef, which
allowed for the fraudulent substitution of foreign for domestic beef by meat
trading companies. The beef buy-up policy was put in place even before the
blanket inspection of cows for Mad Cow Disease was implemented, which began
on 18 October 2001.178 At first, MAFF Minister Takebe Tsutomu commented
‘the beef before the inspection is also safe’,179 and the MAFF was negative about
the government’s purchasing the beef. However, the LDP’s nôrin zoku refused to
go along with this.180 As a result, the MAFF did a complete policy switch. Its
original position was that beef should be safe as long as the internal organs such
as the brain and intestines were removed. This was behind ‘Minister Takebe’s
foolish performance in eating fried beef (yakiniku) during the BSE debacle’.181
Muneo and Matsuoka were two of the principal dealmakers in a critical
phase of compiling measures to cope with the BSE outbreak in late 2001.182
When the outbreak first occurred, Muneo and Matsuoka pressured the MAFF
to purchase beef from the meat companies that held a large quantity of stock.
The LDP’s BSE Countermeasures Headquarters (BSE Taisaku Honbu), which
had been set up to deal with the problem, held a meeting on 17 October 2001.
At the time, one cow had been found to have BSE, all beef deliveries had been
stopped and meat companies had 13,000 tonnes of processed beef in stock. Beef
traders, who were holding the slaughtered beef that had been excluded from the
market, complained, ‘if the MAFF’s investigation of Japanese beef cattle proceeds,
the price of the 13,000 tonnes of beef excluded from the market will fall to zero,
and beef traders will be forced into an awkward situation.’183
The meeting of the countermeasures headquarters was attended by various
nôrin zoku, the MAFF deputy minister, the MAFF Production Bureau director,
the MAFF Livestock Department director184 as well as other MAFF officials,
together with officials from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. The MAFF was loath to incinerate
the meat because it looked like an admission that the beef was not safe.185 Muneo,
Matsuoka and others shouted that ‘all the beef should be purchased before the
inspection’.186 According to a journalist attached to the MAFF, Matsuoka and
Muneo said, ‘the state has to bear the burden of the whole amount of the
incineration fee and the purchase cost of the 13,000 tonnes of beef.’187 Muneo
argued (in words that were to become infamous),188 ‘[t]he state just has to say
they will take the 13,000 tonnes. That is all that needs to be done. All right? It’s
a simple solution. It’s just a matter of ¥26 billion if it’s ¥2000 a kg, or ¥13
billion if it’s ¥1000 a kg. You can get Etô (Takami) sensei or somebody to make
the budgetary measures. Got that?’189 Muneo reportedly intimidated the MAFF
bureaucrats present at the meeting,190 including his shouting at Production
Bureau Director-General Kobayashi Yoshio.191
Matsuoka also made his point strongly from the very beginning of the
meeting, saying‘the state should purchase all the beef even if it costs more
than ¥10 billion. In fact, even if it costs ¥100 billion as in the EU, we should
do it. We should do as much as if not more than the EU.’192 The essence of his
subsequent remarks went as follows.
Who will purchase the stock, the MAFF or the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare? I’ll get
everyone to decide here and now before you leave the room. Even the EU conducted intervention
purchasing. Even though we said we would do the equivalent of the EU, why are you leaning in
the direction of the Ministry of Finance? Doing roughly equal to the EU is the consensus of the
division. The point is to produce an outcome. Just talking and listening is no good.193
176 POWER AND PORK
According to one report, ‘since there were deputy ministers from two
ministries there, Matsuoka wanted them to make the state take care of it
politically. Another thing Matsuoka wanted was for the prime minister to
make a safety declaration in two days time.’194 CAPIC advisor, Etô Takami,
said to the assembled MAFF officials, ‘I do not ask you to take responsibility.
We should purchase under the ruling party’s responsibility’.195 When Muneo
turned up at the meeting the following day, he backed Matsuoka up by saying
the same things as Matsuoka had already said, ‘[a] safety declaration is
exceedingly essential. It should be performed by prime minister.’ 196 The
‘MAFF’s policy was overturned as if it were nothing, without a chance given to
officials to put a counterargument.’197
The scene at the LDP BSE Countermeasures Headquarters in mid-October
2001 where Matsuoka, Muneo and Etô sent for MAFF bureaucrats and
demanded the buying up of beef by the state was shown over and over again in
the media.198 Etô, Suzuki and Matsuoka became well known as the three key
people at the centre of the emergency countermeasures project. Having received
their instructions, the MAFF immediately instituted the all-head inspection
of beef cattle, and the processed meat in the warehouses was purchased by the
government and incinerated.199
However, it did not take long for the smell of corruption to hover over the
beef deal. As one media source commented
[a]s tribe Diet members, this [countermeasures project] may have been an ‘honest and decent’
thing to do, but if there were any begging from special industry members involved, it becomes
a crime. Furthermore, there were many businesses bumping up their stock with imported and
meat cut-offs and rushing to cut up beef before the buy-up began on 25 October.200
As it turned out, prior to the countermeasures meeting, the amount and

manufacturers’ asking price for the beef in stock had been passed on by a big-
shot beef executive directly to MAFF officials in a meeting in the MAFF
building. This big shot and representatives of three related meat groups had
pre-decided the allotted amounts for each group in a room in the ministry,
and passed this on secretly to the bureau in charge. The MAFF (Meat and Egg
Division) said this was not in fact so, and also denied any pressure from tribe
Diet members and beef traders.201 MAFF Minister Takebe also declared openly,
‘the MAFF is responding firmly to unreasonable opinions from politicians.’202
Nevertheless, the MAFF official who drew up the beef buy-up scheme was
reportedly opposed to it, suggesting that he gave in to pressure from the zoku
giin led by Muneo and Matsuoka, who had taken on board the views of those
in the meat industry.203 The scheme provided for government purchase of
13,000 tonnes of frozen meat for ¥29.3 billion in a total budget of ¥200
billion for BSE countermeasures.204
Matsuoka was a member of the three-man LDP Europe Research Group (Ôshû
Chôsadan) headed up by former MAFF Minister Yatsu. The group travelled to
Europe to see how the Europeans had dealt with the BSE problem. When the
group returned to Japan it reported back to a meeting of the Agriculture and
Forestry Division and the BSE Countermeasures Headquarters.205
There was a strong suspicion of adhesion between Muneo and the meat
industry concerning the system by which the MAFF enforced the purchase of
domestically produced beef.206 Everyone recognised that Muneo and Matsuoka
accorded priority to the meat distribution industry in the BSE countermeasures.
Suzuki’s electorate was the Hokkaido PR bloc, while Matsuoka’s was in
Kumamoto Prefecture, both prominent beef-producing regions. Livestock
producers were important sources of support for both politicians.207 On top of
this, major meat companies donated money to one of Muneo’s political funding
groups.208 One popular magazine in Japan (Shûkan Bunshun) disclosed that
‘Suzuki Muneo and “Muneo of the West” (Nishi no Muneo)—Muneo of the
East and West—had orchestrated the scandal of the BSE beef buy-up’.209
The May 2002 issue of the magazine Sentaku commented, ‘both are known
for their intimate relations with major meat wholesale companies such as Hannan
in Osaka City and Fujichiku in Nagoya City.’210 The links went back to the
time of Nakagawa Ichirô.211 Former chairman of the Osaka meat company
Hannan Corporation, Asada Mitsuru,212 known as the ‘Don’ of the meatpacking
industry, was reportedly a supporter of Nakagawa and when Nakagawa died,
he became a supporter of Suzuki.213
Another source in the LDP elaborated
[t]he Hannan and Fujichiku big meat groups originally had good relations with one-time nôrin
zoku godfather, the late Nakagawa. After the death of Nakagawa, while his first son Shôichi
kept his distance from the meat industry, it was Muneo Suzuki, who had been Nakagawa’s
secretary, who began to deepen friendly relations. Muneo invited Asada to his eldest daughter’s
wedding as the guest of honour. It is said that the two companies and Muneo were intimately
bound up in each other’s dealings.214
The close relationships between Asada and Muneo centred mainly on

financial support, such as making donations, providing luxury cars, paying
178 POWER AND PORK
consultants’ fees (¥300,000 for half a year)215 and providing Suzuki with a
kôenkai office, the Osaka Food Distribution Research Institute (Ôsaka Shokuhin
Ryûtsû Kenkyûjo). Through Suzuki and his sworn friend Matsuoka, Asada
had a direct pipeline to the political world.216 According to one report
‘Muneo of the West’, Matsuoka, joined up with Muneo, Hannan, and Fujichiku. In the 1990
Lower House elections, Muneo introduced Matsuoka to Asada as his influential backer. Ever
since, a division of labour apparently had been promised: Hannan has been Muneo, and
Fujichiku has been Matsuoka.217
Prior to the October 1996 election, Matsuoka went to pay his respects to
Asada, and to ask for his help when running in the election.218
Hannan Corporation was not only involved in the distribution of beef, but
also in beef production, rearing 5,800 head of beef cattle, and producing more
than 470,000 tonnes of meat annually. Total sales of the group exceeded ¥300
billion. 219 The extent of Hannan’s involvement in beef production and
distribution accords it considerable market power. It even ‘has the power to
influence beef prices.’220 Because of this power, an official of the Livestock
Department of the former Livestock Bureau of the MAFF commented that the
MAFF could not neglect the ‘Asada Pilgrimage’.221
Fujichiku leads the beef industry in the Nagoya area, and Asada was also an
executive of the company. A person in the meat industry explained, ‘[t]here isn’t a
business that can stand up to the Hannan-Fujichiku alliance, and their presence is
such that even the government administration acknowledges their superiority.’222
Asada’s portion of the beef buyback scheme was 1700 tonnes—or more than
10 per cent.223 All up, a total of 40 groups nationwide were involved in the
government-funded beef buy-up scheme, but of these, the three meat-trading
groups in the Kansai region (Osaka, Aichi and Hyogo) offered suspiciously large
amounts of beef for purchase when compared with other groups.224
The beef inspection regime became much stricter in early 2002, moving
from sampling all lots to inspecting all boxes in order to check whether imported
beef was definitely not included in the beef for incineration. Not surprisingly,
six beef groups petitioned MAFF Minister Takebe for a relaxation in the
inspection regulations and a return to less severe sample inspections. The groups
at the centre of the request were the National Federation of Meat Industry
Cooperative Associations (Zenkoku Shokuniku Jigyô Kyôdô Kumiai Rengôkai,
or Zennikuren), the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Unions
(Zenkoku, Nôgyô Kyôdô Kumiai Rengôkai, or Zennô) and others. Their
representatives went to the MAFF to discuss the issue. Asada, who disliked appearing
in official and public capacities, was involved in the request behind the scenes.225
A highly significant meeting took place in Minister Takebe’s office in April
2002. A report that made mention of the meeting was compiled by the
chairman of Zennikuren for the chairman of the Prefectural Federation of Meat
Industry Cooperative Associations (Todofuken Shokuniku Jigyô Kyôdô Kumiai
Rengôkai), its prefectural organisation. At the meeting in the minister’s office,
the meat industry lobbied the government for necessary countermeasures in
response to the distressing situation in the meat marketing industry. It was
opposed to the MAFF’s announcement at the end of March that it would
subject all beef boxes for sale for examination, switching from sample box to
all-box testing. From the MAFF side, the minister, and others such as the
Production Bureau director-general, the Livestock Bureau director-general and
the Meat and Egg Division director were present. From the industry side,
executives from Zennikuren and 19 other executives from companies such as
the Japan Ham and Sausage Industry Cooperative Association participated.
Of these, 14 were members of Zennikuren. According to one report, the group
included big wigs from the meat industry such as Asada and Nagoya’s
Fujichiku’s President Fujimura Yoshiharu.226 A MAFF official recalled, ‘they
pressed Minister Takebe, saying “explain yourself about the all-box
examination!!!” and “do you mean to treat the industry like criminals?!” Muneo
reportedly made the arrangements for this group negotiation’.227
Because Asada and Fujimura were big wigs of the meat industry, who
sponsored powerful MAFF Diet members, Minister Takebe could not easily
reject the ‘request activities’ associated with these two.228 However, he ‘lost his
temper at the meeting with the meat industry executives, saying: “Why do I
have to be spoken to in such a way?!” He declared he would “do the box
examinations no matter what!” Thus the meat industry’s plan to stop the box
examinations collapsed’.229
As it turned out, the major meat-wholesaling company, the Osaka-based
Hannan Corporation with which Matsuoka and Muneo were deeply connected,
was later found to have received the subsides for BSE illegally.230 In August
2004, Asada pleaded guilty to swindling the government out of ¥5.03 billion
through the beef buy-back scheme.231 He pleaded guilty to conspiring with
others to label imported and other types of ineligible beef falsely as domestic
meat in order to qualify for government subsidies. 232 The ¥5.03 billion
180 POWER AND PORK
amounted to about a quarter of the ¥21 billion in BSE-related subsidies that

the government paid out.233 Asada reportedly gathered advance information
on the government’s program from politicians ‘with whom he was friendly’234
as well as from MAFF officials.235 He purchased 94.5 tons of imported beef
from Heisei Foods in Hiroshima Prefecture. This meat was then sold under
the buyback plan as domestic beef. It originally came from a meat processor in
Kumamoto City.236 In total, Asada falsely labelled about 434 tonnes of unsold
imported beef, which was ineligible for the buy-back, and ordered his group
companies to procure more of it.237 This was not the first occasion in which
Asada had broken the law. He was arrested in 1987 for bribing a Livestock
Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC) official, Aoyama Yutaka. Veteran
journalist, Mizoguchi Atsushi in his book Emperor of Meat: A Man Who Made
A Fortune, Asada Mitsuru (Shokuniku no Teiô: Kyofu o Tsukanda Otoko, Asada
Mitsuru), ‘depicts Asada as a powerful political fixer. He is portrayed as a man
who works secret deals with politicians such as former Liberal Democratic
Party heavyweights Muneo Suzuki and Hiromu Nonaka, and is a close friend
of Yamaguchi-gumi boss Yoshinori Watanabe.’238
The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department conducted a secret investigation
of Hannan and its links to politicians. While the investigation began with
Suzuki as their prime target, their focus gradually shifted to Matsuoka. An
executive of the Metropolitan Police Department stated, ‘[w]e have received
instructions from the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office in code saying,
“give us M, whatever it takes”, but there are some who are saying, “we are
getting confused as to whether M is “Muneo” or “Matsuoka”’.239
The Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public
Prosecutor’s Office maintained top-secret documents called ‘The Politicians’
File’. It contained records allegedly pertaining to Nonaka, Kamei, Suzuki and
Matsuoka, including the personal connections and flow of money relating to
these four. An OB of the Special Investigation Department commented, ‘we
exposed Kanemaru (Shin, former LDP deputy-president) for tax evasion, and
then Takeshita (Noboru, former prime minister) died. There is a possibility
that we might get two of the four (Matsuoka and Muneo) left in the file’.240
One MAFF OB was scathing about Matsuoka’s role in engineering the
domestic beef buy-up scheme, thereby arranging concessions for people in the
meat industry who were a source of financial backing. In this respect, Matsuoka’s
skill reputedly far exceeded that of Muneo.241 This was despite an assertion from
Matsuoka’s Diet office that ‘[t]he BSE Countermeasures Headquarters created

the system of the state buy-up of beef, not Matsuoka. Therefore, to say that he is
receiving a portion of that money as political donations is groundless.’242
After his behaviour in the LDP’s countermeasures committee, the MAFF began
working towards a parting of the ways with Matsuoka, and even the LDP tried
to get rid of him as a ‘noise-maker’.243 At the beginning of March 2002, the first
meeting of Special Committee Concerning Securing Food Safety (Shoku no Anzen
Kakuho ni kansuru Tokumei Iinkai), under the chairmanship of former Defence
Agency Director-General, Norota Hôsei, was held. The committee was launched
by the LDP to debate the review of food safety administration. In reality, the
special committee represented the first attempt by the party ‘to remove the
noise-makers such as Muneo and Matsuoka’.244 The special committee was an
organisation under the direct control of PARC Chairman Asô. The special
committee comprised senior LDP figures who set about appointing PARC chairs
and deputy chairs not only for agriculture, forestry and fisheries divisions, but
also for health, labour and welfare, environment, cabinet and other related
divisions. An influential Diet member, who was a core member of the committee,
explained that ‘this is Matsuoka’s removal.’245
THE SYRIAN EMBASSY AFFAIR

Matsuoka’s name also surfaced in relation to a dubious affair involving the Syrian
Embassy in Tokyo. A building in Azabu-Nagasaka-chô, which the embassy was
leasing, was presented for auction in July 2001. The building’s owner had gone
bankrupt, and a real estate company made a successful bid for it at the auction.
The company subsequently asked the Syrian Embassy to vacate the building.
When the embassy refused, the company requested an eviction notice from the
Tokyo District Court. The court decided that the eviction was not possible under
the Vienna Convention. However, the High Court,246 to which the real estate
company appealed, argued that the compulsory execution (of the eviction) was
possible, based on the fact that the person renting the building in question was
an individual, a Mr Kabul, the temporary acting Syrian ambassador, and therefore,
diplomatic extra-territoriality did not apply in this case.247
The High Court decision made the eviction possible and in December 2001,
the compulsory execution of the eviction began. The public safety authorities
inspected the rooms and peeled off every single piece of wallpaper, saying that
Syria was an anti-American, Islamic country.248 However, a Japanese person
182 POWER AND PORK
claiming to be connected to the Syrian side appeared at the real estate company
and requested suspension of the execution. An hour later, another person called
Izumi Hideki, who claimed to be the Diet secretary of Tanikawa Kazuo,249 also
appeared and demanded, ‘[s]top the compulsory execution! A political settlement
has been made over this property.’250 However, a court official ‘indicated that
the court had a handle on the fact, saying, “[t]he enforcement officers turned a
deaf ear to that individual, and the building was vacated, as ordered.”’251
It was later learned that Izumi had been fired from Tanikawa’s office for
embezzling tens of millions of yen 10 years earlier. There had been no contact
between Tanikawa’s office and Izumi since, and he had been requested to stop
using name cards claiming to be Tanikawa’s secretary.252 Izumi later appeared
suddenly at MoFA with Matsuoka and the temporary acting Syrian ambassador.
At the time, Matsuoka was allegedly working for the temporary acting
ambassador in relation to the Syrian Embassy’s building problem. Matsuoka
belonged to the Japanese-Syrian Friendship Diet Members’ League (Nihon
Shiria Yûkô Giin Renmei), which was practically defunct, but the Syrian side
calculated that the services of Matsuoka as a broker were for sale and that he
would be able to squeeze MoFA. 253 Matsuoka and Izumi pressed the
administrative vice-minister, saying, ‘we ask you to please do your best in
regard to the Syrian case’.254 However, their request was to no avail. MoFA had
decided against the Syrian Embassy in relation to the leasing issue,255 and as a
result, the embassy felt betrayed by MoFA.256 It decided to resort to power
politics, seeing MoFA as an imaginary enemy.257
Following the court order for eviction issued by the Tokyo High Court, the
Syrian Embassy also filed a special appeal. The Supreme Court rejected this
appeal on 23 January 2002.258 On the evening of 24 January, the Director-
General of the MoFA Minister’s Secretariat, Komachi Kyôji, and the Director-
General of the Middle East and Africa Bureau, Shigeie Toshinori, were
summoned to a dinner hosted by Matsuoka at an Akasaka restaurant in Tokyo,
the Tsuruhachi. Waiting at the restaurant259 were the Syrian Chargé D’Affaires,
Mr Haida, and two Japanese people who claimed to be connected to the Syrian
Embassy, one of whom was Izumi. Others at the meeting reportedly included
yakuza and the embassy’s Egyptian interpreter, who used a false name and
who had acted as a go-between for Middle Eastern ambassadors and Japanese
traders and brokers, and who had possible connections with yakuza. He had
been involved in many embassy-related troubles.260 As one journal reported
[a]fter an hour, Matsuoka arrived at the restaurant and the group decided to move to a larger
private room. However, suddenly there was a commotion. Chargé D’Affaires Haida had asked
Matsuoka to put in a good word to MoFA on the issue of the Syrian Embassy move, to which
Matsuoka said, ‘I was in my electorate until yesterday, and I just came back. I promise I’ll do
it’ and apologised. Haida reported that he had been warned: ‘You shouldn’t rely on dodgy
connections’ and that his application was refused at the gate when he went to MoFA to
register the number plate of his official car. After the translator had finished relating the story,
Matsuoka exclaimed: ‘What!?’ He then made several angry phone calls on his mobile phone,
leaving his guests waiting in the large room. Then, in just under an hour at about 9pm the
Director-General of the MoFA Ministers Secretariat Komachi and the Director-General of
the Middle East and Africa Bureau Shigeie appeared.261
Matsuoka reportedly shouted at the MoFA officials at the restaurant. He

said to Shigeie
‘[y]ou always tell lies, don’t you?....You said you had an appointment with Nogami, but he said
he didn’t recall having made such arrangements. Were you not going to come if I didn’t find
out?’ Shigeie could only reply ashamedly. At this point, Matsuoka broached the issue of the
Syrian Embassy. Komachi replied: ‘There is not much we can do about the judgement of the
law…’ But as if to cut him off, Matsuoka said harshly, ‘There is something wrong here. This is
a diplomatic issue. Don’t you know how important Syria is to Japan?’262
After this, Muneo arrived with some of his close associates (MoFA division
directors), including the Director of the MoFA Policy Planning Division, Uemura
Tsukasa, former administrative secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanaka
Makiko.263 Matsuoka ‘who had wanted to give the MoFA bureaucrats a scare, had
summoned Suzuki, who was holding a thank-you party for the International
Conference on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan at a nearby steak restaurant.
Uemura reportedly turned pale upon seeing Komachi and Shigeie.’264 Matsuoka
told Suzuki of MoFA’s clumsiness in dealing with the issue and the meeting ended
at 11pm. With nothing resolved, however, the only purpose of the dinner party
appeared to be Matsuoka’s intention to demonstrate his influence. Komachi and
Shigeie were later reshuffled from their posts.265 When later questioned about why
he had called Komachi and other MoFA officials to the restaurant, Matsuoka replied,
‘[a]t the meeting, the Syrian Embassy produced documents on the building in
English. So we decided to call in specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’266
He also explained the situation (and his part in it) in the following way
[t]he previous chargé d’affaires at the Syrian Embassy warned me last year that this might
escalate into a bilateral problem. So I talked several times to Foreign Ministry officials, such as
Mr Shigeie, to look for ways to reach an amicable settlement. The Syrian side has blamed the
Foreign Ministry for the consequence (forcible eviction). (The Syrian side) protested that its
184 POWER AND PORK
flag had been taken away. They also said: ‘Our president is angry because Syria’s dignity has
been undermined’….The intensity of the discussion on the Syrian side was serious. They
showed their discontent and anger even over drinks. They were quite prickly.267
A later report revealed further contact between MoFA officials and Matsuoka
and Izumi. The Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Matsunami Kenshirô,
division chiefs and bureaux directors-general had a meeting with Matsuoka
and Izumi in February after the restaurant incident.268
The episode raised questions about Matsuoka’s true purpose in acting as a
mediator for Syria.269 Asked why he had become involved in the issue, Matsuoka
replied that he belonged to the Japanese-Syrian Friendship Diet Members’
League and was asked for guidance as Kabul was an acquaintance. He claimed
that the first time he met Izumi was on the 24 January at the dinner. He
denied that he had taken Izumi to MoFA before that, although he admitted
that Izumi might have been there at the time.270 He said that he had never
heard of the ‘political settlement’ that Izumi demanded should prevent the
execution of the eviction and also flatly rejected any suggestion that there was
any ‘giving and receiving of money’. 271 As a result of the affair, some
commentators asked whether Matsuoka was taking over from Muneo in having
MoFA under his thumb because Muneo was on the verge of sinking (into
political oblivion) as a result of corruption scandals.272
THE YAMARIN SCANDAL

In 2002, reports surfaced that a Hokkaido logging company by the name of
Yamarin,273 which was at the centre of a political bribery probe, had paid
Matsuoka ¥2 million in 1998. At the time, Matsuoka was chairman of the
State-Owned Forests Problems Subcommittee. The payment was not recorded
as income by his political funds management group.274 Earlier (in 1996 and
again in 1997), Yamarin had officially contributed ¥360,000 to Matsuoka.275
Such funds were reported under the Political Funds Regulation Law.
In June 1998, information came to light that Yamarin had carried out illegal
logging from around 1992 and the Forestry Agency was considering a severe
administrative punishment for the company.276 According to one report
Yamarin went into a mountainous area in the middle of the night and cut trees down with
chainsaw. As far as we know, Yamarin stole 7,062 trees. In fact, this had been a daily occurrence
by Yamarin over a long period. The illegal logging had been exposed twice, and a total of 10
people had been arrested. At the same time, a total of nine executives from a local forestry office
had been appointed to high positions in Yamarin. Someone formerly connected to the forestry
industry commented, ‘Yamarin and the local forestry office are completely companions in crime.
The public prosecutor ignored the issue. This collusion went as far as the local forestry office
lending even its official seal to Yamarin, in order to send the logs to the market’.277
The Forestry Agency later imposed a seven-month administrative

punishment on Yamarin for illegal logging in national forests. The sanction
froze its qualification to participate in tenders for the purchase of logs from the
Obihiro Forestry Management Branch Office, a local outpost of the Forestry
Agency. Yamarin had no choice but to withdraw from bidding for the public
sale of logs by the Obihiro office.278 The Yamarin President Yamada Isao (85
years old) then petitioned Matsuoka279 about the matter and gave him the ¥2
million donation. Two days after Matsuoka received the money he spoke with
senior officials of the Forestry Agency and asked for leniency for Yamarin.280
According to a person connected to the local political world
Yamada served as the chairman of Suzuki Muneo’s kôenkai. He has been deeply involved in
politics up to now. If Yamarin were excluded from tenders for cutting down trees in state
forests by the Forestry Agency, its business would not be viable. So Matsuoka desperately
attempted to rally his strength by using his political power.281
The fact that Matsuoka had received a donation from Yamarin came to light
in the process of the investigation of Muneo by the Tokyo District Public
Prosecutor’s Office.282 Matsuoka’s office denied receiving money from Yamarin,
saying that the matter was still ‘under investigation, but there were no incidents
where he had asked for favours or had approached people’.283 One of his secretaries
[c]laimed that the money Matsuoka had received from Yamarin was a ‘political donation’
[which was, therefore, above board and not tied to any political favour]. However, the secretary
could not confirm the date and amount of money involved, saying that all the relevant
documents had been ‘scrapped’.284
The secretary also said that Matsuoka ‘had no recollection [of the donation]
whatsoever’.285 His ‘office replied to a newspaper interviewer that Matsuoka
had returned the money by the end of the year, but his office “did not
remember” the date or the method of receiving the money.’ 286 A sports
newspaper, Nikkan Sports, commented that two days after receiving the donation
on 4 August 1998, Matsuoka ‘called the Forestry Agency director-general and
appealed to him to take the “appropriate” steps for his punishment, but the
director general refused.’287 Another source disclosed that Matsuoka returned
the money to Yamarin in early 1999 after illegal logging in government forests
in Hokkaido became an issue in the Diet.288
186 POWER AND PORK
Matuoka’s receipt of political funds from Yamarin was allegedly part of a

bigger deal involving Muneo, who was later prosecuted for accepting a ¥5
million bribe from Yamarin. Muneo accepted the bribe in exchange for seeking
favourable treatment for the company from the Forestry Agency.289 According
to sources at the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office, President Yamada
met with Suzuki on 4 August and asked him to get the Forestry Agency off
the firm’s back. Four executives from Yamarin, including Yamada, visited
Suzuki’s office in the Kantei (Suzuki had just been appointed deputy chief
cabinet secretary). They asked him to pressure Forestry Agency officials to
sell Yamarin trees on national land after the end of the ban. The ‘company
wanted the agency to sell it an amount of trees equivalent to what it was
unable to purchase under the ban and to do so outside the public bidding
process.’290 The ban on Yamarin’s participating in tenders had been extended
for a month and its main forestry businesses were greatly affected.291
At Suzuki’s behest, President Yamada allegedly delivered ¥5 million in
cash to one of Suzuki’s secretaries in his Diet office on the same day. Having
received the donation, Suzuki called a senior Forestry Agency official on
the spot to ask for better treatment for Yamarin but the request was
denied. 292 Later that same day, Yamada and other executives met with
Matsuoka and gave him the ¥2 million. According to a statement by
Yamada handed to the Lower House by Muneo in mid 2002, the Yamarin
president recollected that on 4 and 5 August, he had also made a donation
of ¥2 million to Matsuoka and ¥500,000 to Matsushita Tadahirô,293 who
was the MAFF parliamentary vice-minister at the time, and who represented
the Kyushu PR constituency. Yamada’s statement also said, ‘[the Public
Prosecutor said to me] they were only after Suzuki. I understood this to
mean that although I had given donations to Matsuoka and Matsushita on
4 and 5 August, their cases would not be subject to investigation’.294 Even
so, when the Muneo scandal broke, Matsuoka, clearly under strain,
reportedly ‘raised his voice to government officials and bureaucrats of special
public corporations, and sometimes even to his fellow Diet members’. 295
Matsuoka and Matsushita were questioned by the Special Investigation
Department and were reported to be ‘trembling in fear’.296 Officials in the
Ministry of Justice were heard to say ‘[i]f anything, (Matsuoka’s) aims are
more obvious than Mr Suzuki’s, and in terms of dirty money finding its
way to him, he has great aptitude’.297
It was on 7 July 2002, three weeks after Muneo’s arrest that Sankei Shinbun
reported Matsuoka’s threatening of Kitamura Naoto, an LDP Lower House
Diet member representing Hokkaido (13), in a headline saying ‘Matsuoka:
Election Defeat Rather Than Crush Yamarin’.298 Kitamura had reportedly
whistle-blown to MAFF officials at that time that Matsuoka was pressuring
the Forestry Agency regarding Yamarin. Matsuoka became angry because
Kitamura had told some top officials in the MAFF that ‘[both Muneo and
Matsuoka] had pressured the Forestry Agency on Yamarin’s behalf’.299 Matsuoka
called up Kitamura and threatened him ‘[i]f you intend to smash Yamarin, I
will make you lose in the next election.’300 Matsuoka was already daggers drawn
with Kitamura because Kitamura had defeated Muneo twice—in 1996, as a
candidate from the New Frontier Party and again in 2000, as a member of the
LDP, forcing Muneo to retain his Diet seat only by virtue of the LDP party list
in the Hokkaido PR bloc. Kitamura had refused to move over for Suzuki as the
LDP’s endorsed candidate in Hokkaido (13).
In fact, the ties linking Yamada with Muneo and Matsuoka ran very deep.
According to a person with connections to the Forestry Agency
Yamarin was an influential company in the east of Hokkaido which developed all-out
support for Nakagawa Ichirô from the time it was called Yamada Forestry [Yamada Ringyô].
President Yamada supported Muneo after Nakagawa’s death, and even served as chairman
of Muneo’s supporters’ organisation, but there was a head clerk in his company called
Akahori. He was the person involved and present at the bribe at the deputy chief cabinet
secretary’s office, and is still the president of a company related to Yamarin. This person
is actually a classmate of Matsuoka from Tottori University.301
Both Akahori and Matsuoka were in the Department of Forestry302 at Tottori

University, and both Matsuoka and Muneo were known to value friendships
with old classmates.303 According to another classmate
[i]f I remember correctly, the two [Matsuoka and Akahori] were a year apart. Akahori was
Matsuoka’s junior, but he hardly came to university and had to repeat about four years. So they
actually graduated about five years apart, but the Forestry Department of Tottori University has
a very strong alumni network. The department established an alumni association called ‘Sarenkai’
in various places, its name taken from the crest that the Tottori sand dunes create. There are very
few OBs in Hokkaido, so this probably made their sense of camaraderie all the stronger.304
According to a person related to Yamarin

Yamarin was totally under the control of President Yamada Isao, his second son President
Yamada Satoshi and the director at the time, Horiuchi. On the second floor of the headquarters,
188 POWER AND PORK
their three desks were arranged facing the company employees, and everything was decided by
these three, from important directions of the company projects to donations to politicians.
Akahori was the only outsider out of all the Yamada family firms to rise through the ranks, and
he was particularly trusted by President Isao. Akahori is a classmate of Matsuoka, so the
relationship is pretty obvious. So in regards to the August 1998 lobby that has now become an
issue, it was natural for Yamarin to go to Matsuoka.305
A journalist attached to the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office also revealed
[f ]or Matsuoka who has served as the chief of a forestry office in Hokkaido, this region is like
a ‘second base of operations’ (konkyochi), it also being Suzuki Muneo’s sphere of influence. In
reality, in Matsuoka’s political funding reports, donations from Hokkaido forestry-related
businesses are far greater than others.306
When Matsuoka was chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee

in 2002, he made a point of conducting an on-the-spot survey of Hokkaido himself
as part of the LDP’s input into the new Rice Policy Reform Outline (Kome Seisaku
Kaikaku Taikô). Other agricultural heavyweights went to other prefectures.
Furthermore, ‘the [bribery] affair involved Matsuoka’s closest business link where
he also had a classmate, so of course, he was going to fret. I don’t think it was a
coincidence that he “took refuge” in hospital the day after the Yamarin reports.’307
Matsuoka’s office admitted that Matsuoka was a former classmate of Akahori
of Yamarin and that through Matsuoka’s period of attachment in Hokkaido,
the relationship was such that ‘Matsuoka was supported by Akahori’. 308
However, the office elaborated
[w]ith respect to the donation, it is said that (Yamarin) came to the office on 5 or 6 August
1998, but since it was a problem of people cutting down other people’s trees, we would have
not accepted it, even if there were an offer of a donation. We do not keep a record or list of
visitors here at the office so (the visit and the donation) cannot be confirmed.309
In March 1999, Matsuoka reportedly travelled to Hokkaido to support the

election of Hokkaido Prefecture assembly member, Yamada Rintarô, who was
the eldest son of President Yamada, in his bid for a second term. One local
political personage commented
[t]he rally for Yamada Rintarô was splendidly conducted at Culture Hall in Obihiro City.
First, the support video by Muneo was put on the screen, and subsequently, Matsuoka said:
‘Well, I came to act on behalf of Suzuki Muneo. I am the first follower, Matsuoka’. At the rally,
local forestry office executives lined up in a row in an anteroom, and all the executives
kowtowed to Matsuoka. It seemed as if the rally was also a lobbying rally by forestry persons
to Matsuoka. However, Matsuoka’s support had the opposite effect to what was intended.
The district was the electoral district of Nakagawa Shôichi (the first-born son of the late
Nakagawa Ichirô), who was an old enemy of Muneo. (In such a district), support from
Matsuoka (Muneo’s friend) had a rather negative impact on the election campaign. Because of
Matsuoka’s support, Yamada Rintarô lost the election.310
The scandal involving Yamarin was one of the scandals that ultimately felled
Muneo. There was an order from the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office to
the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office to ‘get Muneo, no matter what’.311
Suzuki had received an ‘unlawful request’ from Yamarin and obtained a
substantial amount of money in return. Even ‘though it was a formal political
donation, like the Recruit scandal involving former Chief Cabinet Secretary,
Fujinami Takao, a corruption case can be made if a donation can be linked to
a specific request. The Special Investigation Department [of the Public
Prosecutors Office] was clearly aiming for a case of mediation bribery.’312
Three of Suzuki’s aides were also arrested ‘on suspicion of failing to declare
around ¥100 million in donations to Suzuki’s political fund management
group. All three were suspected of violating the Political Funds Control
Law.’313 They were all previously secretaries of Nakagawa Ichirô, and after
Nakagawa committed suicide, they transferred to Suzuki when he successfully
ran for Nakagawa’s seat. Prosecutors were also poised to charge Suzuki himself
with ‘instructing his aides to conceal the donations.’314
Muneo left the LDP under a cloud in March 2002 but remained a Diet
member in spite of a Diet resolution urging him to give up his seat.315 He
was arrested on 19 June 2002 on suspicion of the crime of accepting bribes
for mediation (assen shûwaizai).316 Asada, however, continued to act as his
patron, providing him with a car to his office right in the middle of the
scandal. 317 Moreover, Matsuoka was summoned as a witness in the
investigation of Suzuki, and afterwards, he was given a ‘thank you’ party by
Suzuki. 318
The ramifications of Muneo’s arrest went far and wide and also caught
Matsuoka potentially in the net. There were reports that Matsuoka would be
next to be taken to court for committing a mediation bribery crime in relation
to both Yamarin and the BSE issue.319
The day after the scandal broke in the Yomiuri, Matsuoka disappeared. It
was later disclosed that he had gone to hospital for haemorrhoid surgery.320
The Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office investigated Matsuoka as a witness
to the Yamarin affair and the circumstances of the Yamarin donation to
Matsuoka but decided not to prosecute. It was a huge relief for Matsuoka. He
190 POWER AND PORK
telephoned one of his influential supporters in his electoral district and said,
‘[e]verything is over. We do not have to worry any more’.321
At the same time, reports surfaced that an important private secretary of
Matsuoka, ‘K’—his ‘Satô Saburô’—had escaped overseas.322 Rumours also
surfaced of a flood of politically defamatory literature about Matsuoka in Nagata-
chô. Local news section reporters were rushing from place to place to get the
information.323
Muneo’s arrest and Matsuoka’s patent difficulties had implications that went
well beyond the Yamarin scandal itself. As a veteran political reporter from a
national newspaper explained
[i]n the city [newspaper] desk way of thinking, arresting a House of Representatives member
over a ¥5 million bribery is a ‘small incident’, but it is ‘a big incident’ for Nagata-chô. This is
because Diet members’ daily political activities under certain circumstances are equivalent to
‘accepting bribes for mediation’.324
The Suzuki case set a stricter benchmark for judging what did and did not
constitute political bribery, which would be prosecuted under the Political
Funds Regulation Law. As a political journalist explained
[p]reviously, political pressure from zoku giin when they mediated for companies was not
considered to amount to a crime of bribery if the money were legally processed in conformity
with the Political Funds Regulation Law. It was a system for receiving money lawfully by which
they solicited political donations from a large number of companies and groups in small
amounts over a long term. However, by making Muneo’s case a criminal case, even if the
money provided by companies were reported to Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
as political funds, the money was recognised as constituting bribery. This is an epoch-making
decision by the Special Investigation Department. This is the essence of the Yamarin
scandal…The major premise, on which the money that was received was skilfully and legally
processed, collapsed. This great change had an impact on Nagata-cho.325
In ‘arresting Suzuki, the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo

District Public Prosecutor’s Office handed down a “no” to the old method of
political funding’.326 Even though formal (and even reported) donations might
be involved, a corruption case could be made if the donation could be linked
to a specific request.327 Henceforth, the major premise of activities where the route
of mediation went from companies to politicians to government offices collapsed.328
This was not the only repercussion from the Yamarin affair. People speculated
about who would be taking the lead in the sorts of agricultural policy areas in
which Suzuki specialised, such as price decisions, and about future power relations
between the MAFF and nôrin giin.329 By leaving the LDP, a decline in Muneo’s
power in relation to bureaucrats and policy decisions was unavoidable, given his
substantial influence over the MAFF and also over MoFA.330
While Muneo’s arrest for accepting bribes from Yamarin caused huge ripples, in
reality, however, it was Muneo’s friend, his sworn brother, Matsuoka, who exercised
enormous power over those connected to the Hokkaido forestry industry.331 As the
president of a reforestation company in Ohihiro, Hokkaido, commented
Matsuoka, who is from the Forestry Agency, is an extremely influential presence for the
Hokkaido forestry industry…He has experience as chief of the Teshio Forestry Office in
Hokkaido when he was a young bureaucrat of the Forestry Agency. He was only in his mid–
30s, but local businesses treated this chief-of-office from the central Forestry Agency as a
precious guest. The executives in the forestry office and the central Forestry Agency were
valued contacts for the forestry businesses, so of course, they were treated well.332
Nevertheless, after the Yamarin episode, Matsuoka hunkered down and went
pretty quiet. His appearances on the TV program ‘Sunday Project’ (Asahi National
Broadcasting), on which, at one time, he appeared regularly as a representative
of the ‘resistance forces’ (teikô seiryoku) to Prime Minister Koizumi333 declined as
criticism of Muneo increased.334 As the media commented, ‘[r]ecently, Matsuoka
is quite silent in Nagata-chô. His and Muneo’s high-handed methods have become
unacceptable. The significance of Muneo’s arrest was that their “methods” were
possibly becoming illegal.’335 Somebody else said that
[i]n a sense, Matsuoka was like a mudskipper in Isahaya Bay. The water level in the bay had
sunk after the water gates on the dyke to the bay were built, and the mudskipper dried up after
his environment was degraded. It is a really ironical consequence for Matsuoka, who supports
the development of Isahaya Bay land reclamation by drainage (laughter).336
THE ACTIVITIES AND WHEREABOUTS OF MR ‘A’, OR IS IT

MR ‘K’? 337
When the Yamarin scandal broke and investigations were underway, the
movements of one of Matsuoka’s close advisors attracted attention in
Kumamoto. This person (referred to only as a ‘Mr A’) apparently disappeared,
and speculation was rife about whether he had truly disappeared or was in
hospital. Mr A had reputedly supported Matsuoka since he first went into
politics, and had, at one time, even served as chief of his Kumamoto electoral
office.338 A staff member of Matuoka’s office in Kumamoto City confirmed
192 POWER AND PORK
that the current (2002) job description of Secretary ‘A’ was ‘LDP Kumamoto
(3) Branch Office Chief ’.339
According to a person knowledgeable about local politics in Kumamoto
[Mr A] rides expensive cars, and is very influential. In particular, he is strong in the Kyushu
Agricultural Administration Bureau, although he has a bossy tone and has many enemies.
There were even accusations within Matsuoka’s kôenkai that ‘A’ was mediating deals and
meddling, and prefectural assembly members linked to Matsuoka protested loudly about it at
a meeting.’340
Mr A’s business card later showed that he was no longer Matsuoka’s branch
office chief, but described himself as a ‘consultant’ to Matsuoka’s kôenkai.341
An executive of Matsuoka’s kôenkai said, ‘I don’t know what he is doing now.
I don’t like that guy. He reeks of concessions (riken). I always thought he was
a dodgy type.’342
When journalists asked Matsuoka’s Kumamoto office about Mr A, they said,
‘[h]e hasn’t disappeared, but I don’t know when he will next come to the
office. I don’t know whether he is the office chief. I don’t even know whether
he has the business cards of advisor [to Matsuoka].’343 The Diet did not know
of his whereabouts either.
In 2000, a report surfaced of a heated confrontation that took place in
Kumamoto Castle Hotel between Araki Katsutoshi on the one hand, and
Matsuoka and Secretary ‘A’ on the other.344 Araki had formed the Matsuoka
faction (i.e. those who followed Matsuoka) in the prefectural assembly.
The faction was called the Matsushôkai, meaning the Matsuoka ‘Winning’
Association. Araki served as chairman of that association and was seen as
the most influential supporter of Matsuoka in that region. 345 Araki was
formerly co-president of Araki Group constructions, which was a joint-stock
construction company. The Araki Group’s main company headquarters and
Araki’s residence was in Shisui Town in Kikuchi County, which was located in
Matsuoka’s constituency of Kumamoto (3). Araki admitted that ‘it might be
possible that the Araki Group had raised money for Matsuoka.’346
At this meeting, however, Araki was upbraiding both Matsuoka and Mr A,
his secretary. Araki was saying
Matsuoka, are you making him do it, or is ‘A’-kun doing it on his own accord? If we take money
from companies, we will get a bad reputation. We can’t get sufficient votes even though we’re
trying hard, and the reason is because you guys are taking money from business people. If this
is the case, I can’t support this.347
In short, Araki was berating both Matsuoka and Mr A for the way they were
collecting political funds, although he did not touch at all on why he accused
the two of such things.348 The occasion was a breakfast meeting of the Matsuoka
‘Winning’ Association being held at the hotel. Of the 56 prefectural assembly
members, 10 were present. Because Araki was angry, the whole place became
deathly silent. Secretary ‘A’ made a statement denying that he had taken such
action, but there was a short interval of silence. Matsuoka kept his mouth
shut. Those present were impressed by Araki’s courage, and word of the incident
immediately spread to the construction company world in the prefecture. Araki
became chairman of the prefectural assembly after this, and stopped being
chairman of the Matsuoka ‘Winning’ Association. However, he remained the
leading light of the Matsuoka faction.349
Later in 2002, ‘details of a bribery case in Fukuoka District Court uncovered
a memo written by the chairman of a construction firm in Fukuoka Prefecture.
The memo revealed that ¥300 million in cash had been handed to a secretary
of Matsuoka’.350 The chairman was being charged with a different bribery
case, and was later found guilty. The court judged, however, that the memo
was highly reliable. Matsuoka’s secretary later told the press, ‘I don’t remember
whether I met him [the chairman]. That’s absolutely groundless’.351
AFTERWORD ON SUZUKI
When Muneo split with the LDP in early 2002, the National Nokyo Council
in a commentary summed up the particular attributes of Muneo, viz., ‘putting
pressure on bureaucrats, guiding benefits to local regions and collecting political
funds in a way that invited suspicion.’352 It added that the people had said a
resounding ‘No’ to these kinds of political methods and that Suzuki had been
virtually drummed out of the LDP because of what many saw as his
objectionable behaviour.353
However, it takes more than political oblivion and a prison sentence to keep
a politician like Suzuki down. After his release from prison, he was quoted as
saying that a Diet member is the representative of his region and that there was
nothing wrong in arranging favours and getting advantages for local districts.354
His political career was resurrected in the 2005 Lower House election and he
returned to the Diet as head of the New Party Mother Earth.355 He succeeded
only in the Hokkaido PR bloc, which means that he has no local district as such,
but can work for industries and companies based in the prefecture.
194 POWER AND PORK
Although it is difficult to gauge Suzuki’s status and future at this point,

given that it is customary for corrupt politicians to leave the LDP, get re-
elected (as a kind of cleansing process) and come back as cleanskins, he may be
able to revive his political fortunes. On the other hand, Suzuki’s power will be
limited by the fact that he is out of the LDP and is only a second-ranking PR
politician from a minor party.
Moreover, MoFA has no wish to return to the bad old days. After Suzuki
was re-elected, it issued a formal manual instructing the ministry’s officials on
how to handle Suzuki. The manual, entitled ‘How to deal with Lower House
member Muneo Suzuki’, urged officials not to dine with Suzuki and to submit
a report whenever they met him.356 Suzuki and his aides reacted strongly to
the ministry’s moves, saying ‘[w]e will reveal the true state of the Foreign
Ministry and ministry bureaucrats’.357
NOTES
public/008.html
3 ‘Nishi no “Muneo” Matsuoka Toshikatsu wa Kisha “I” o “Gokiburi ika” to Kimetsuketa’ [‘“Muneo” of
the West Matsuoka Toshikatsu Asserts Journalist “I” is “Lower than a Cockroach”], Shûkan Bunshun,
27 March 2003, p. 29.
4 ‘Nishi no “Muneo” Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 29.
5 See below.
6 ‘Kinkyû Nyûin shita’, p. 28. See also below.
7 Hasegawa, ‘Nôsuishô o Haishi seyo’, pp. 35–36.
8 ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’ [‘Muneo of the West:
The Extremely Evil Personal Connections that Surround Matsuoka Toshikatsu’], Shûkan Bunshun, 21
March 2002, p. 167.
12 ibid.
14 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 98.
19 ibid., p. 94.
20 ibid., p. 99.
22 ibid.
24 Itô Hirotoshi, ‘“Muneo no Meiyû” no Arata na Taidô: Matsuoka Toshikatsu ga Shikakeru Kokka
Purojekuto o Oe’ [‘The New Movements of “Muneo’s Sworn Friend”: Follow the State Project that
Matsuoka Toshikatsu is Going to Do’], Gendai, June 2004, p. 287.
25 Itô comments that formerly amongst the nôrin zoku, there were many abarenbô, such as Watanabe
Michio, but that they had become weaker with the demise of Japanese agriculture. ‘Heisei Jiken
Fuairu: Nôrin Jigyô Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 64.
30 ibid.
31 Hashimoto Naoyuki, ‘Letter from Yochomachi’, Posted 11 September 2005. Available from http://
homepage.mac.com/naoyuki_hashimoto/iblog/C47j8131471…
32 In Kamei’s electorate of Hiroshima (6), there are two stations where the Shinkansen stops. He is famous
for building big roads that few cars use, as well as bridges and gigantic dams. These are criticised as being
of no use to the local people, but constructed for the benefit of local general contractors with the country’s
money. See http://www.ch-sakura.jp/bbs_thread.php?ID=224796&GENRE=sougou
33 See http://picard.blog.bai.ne.jp/?eid=14991
36 Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, pp. 183–84.
37 ‘Seijika o Katte ni Kenkyû Suru: Matsuoka Toshikatsu’ [‘Researching Politicians Arbitrarily: Toshikatsu
Matsuoka’], Yûkan Fuji News, 9 August 2000. Available from http://ww.fujinews.com/today/2000-
08/200000809/0809-08.htm
41 ibid.
42 ibid., p. 105.
45 ‘Nishi no “Muneo”’, p. 38. One local inn owner in Matsuoka’s electorate also dubbed him ‘Muneo
Suzuki of the West’ (Nishi no Suzuki Muneo). Hasegawa, ‘Jimin “Gajô” no Chikaku Hendô’, p. 27.
47 ibid.
48 Kokita Kiyohito, ‘Suzuki Muneo no Tsukurareta’ [‘How Suzuki Muneo was Made’], Aera, 18 February
2002, p. 19.
49 ‘Suzuki Muneo ni Dôkatsu sareta Jisatsu shita Nôsuishô Kyaria Kanryô’ [‘The MAFF Career Bureaucrat
Threatened by Suzuki Muneo Who Committed Suicide’], Shûkan Bunshun, 21 February 2002, pp.
26–27.
50 Itô, ‘Shinbun ga Zettai ni Hojinai’, p. 82.
51 ‘Hirasawa Katsuei Vs Matsuoka Toshikatsu: “Makiko-Muneo” no Dairi Senso”’ [‘Hirasawa Katsuei
Versus Matsuoka Toshikatsu: “The Makiko-Muneo” Proxy War’], Shûkan Shinchô, 21 February
2002, p. 45.
52 ‘Hirasawa Katsuei Vs Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 45.
55 Tokyo Shinbun, 3 August 2005.
196 POWER AND PORK
57 ibid.
58 Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, pp. 100–1. Matsuoka’s
motives were attributed to his desire to repay favours back to Nokyo and to sell old rice at retail prices.
See http://piza.2ch.net/giin/kako/987/987905181.html
59 Absent was Matsuoka’s old arch-enemy, Uozumi Hirohide, a member of the House of Councillors at
the time.
61 Itô Hirotoshi, ‘Shinbun ga Zettai ni Hojinai “Gyuniku Giso” no Anbu’ [‘The Black Spots of the “Beef
Camouflage” that the Newspapers Absolutely Don’t Report’], Gendai, October 2002, p. 82.
62 ‘Suzuki Muneo Giin no Ritô to Sono Yoha’ [‘Suzuki Muneo Diet Member’s Split From the Party and
its Aftermath’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 42, April 2002, p. 1.
64 Satô Masaru, 2005. Kokka no Wana: Gaimushô no Rasupuchi to Yobarete [National Trap: The So-Called
Rasputin of the Foreign Ministry], Shinchôsha, Tokyo.
65 Reed, Steven R., ‘Revelations About Suzuki Muneo’, 13 March 2002. Available from ssj-forum@iss.u-
tokyo.ac.jp
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
71 ibid.
72 ‘Matsuoka Daigishi ni Hisho no Taishokukin’, p. 15.
74 ‘Hini Kaku “Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi” no Patoron’, p. 59.
76 ibid.
77 ‘Seiji Shikin Zenkoku Chôsa Kekka’. Available from http://www.asahi.com/paper/special/shikin
78 ibid.
79 Reed, ‘Revelations’. Available from ssj-forum@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
80 ‘Seiji Shikin Pâtî ga Dai Seikyô’ [‘Great Success of Political Funds Parties’]. Available from http://
www.kenkin.com/etcetra/sikinparty.html
83 Ishii, ‘Nôsuishô Osen’, p. 194.
84 Kitamatsu, et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 48. The dates are not given but
it is assumed that the years were 1996–2001.
85 ibid.
86 ‘Nishi no “Muneo”’, p. 39.
87 For example, the association received subsidies of ¥35.4 billion to ‘contribute technological development
and data necessary for drawing up plans for forestry management in tropical rainforests’. Ishii,
‘Nôsuishô Osen’, p. 195.
88 ibid., p. 194.
89 See http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/dat/200208/2002081202.htm. See also Nakanishi and Journal
Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 179.
90 This organisation was established in 1946 as a gaikaku dantai of the Forestry Agency for the purpose
of developing the forestry industry and undertaking welfare works for the staff and retired officials of
the Forestry Agency. See also Table 6.1.
92 ibid.
93 ibid.

95 ibid.
96 Nishikawa, ‘Tako Tsubo’, p. 48.
98 ibid., p. 197.
99 ibid.
100 ibid., p. 194.
101 ibid., p. 195.
103 Politicians must submit such a report to MIAC at the end of September each year.
107 ibid.
108 ibid., p. 59.
109 ibid., pp. 58–59.
110 ibid., p. 59.
111 JCP Lower House member Ozawa Kazuaki survey. Available from http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/dat/
200208/2002081202.htm
113 Under the Political Funds Control Law, the donation threshold at which the name of the donor must
be disclosed is ¥50,000.
115 The table was obtained from Kitamatsu, et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 48.
116 The Forestry Benefit Association, also on the above list, claimed that it did not associate with Matsuoka
after 1999. Kitamatsu, et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 48.
117 ‘Matsuoka Daigishi ni Hisho no Taishokukin’, p. 15. See also below.
121 This information was revealed in the LDP’s Kumamoto No. 3 Electoral District Branch revenue and
expenditure report. Nakanishi, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 29.
123 ibid.
126 ibid.
127 Sankei Shinbun, 30 September 2005.
129 ibid. All secretaries of Lower House members are automatically relieved of their posts when the house
is dissolved, but are automatically rehired within 40 days of the election, if a form is submitted.
Beyond that deadline, they are deemed automatically retired, and their retirement allowance is paid.
131 ibid.
132 ibid.
133 ibid.
134 ibid.
135 ibid.
136 The state subsidises three secretaries for each Diet member.
198 POWER AND PORK
139 Yûkan Fuji News. Available from http://www.fujinews.com/today/2000-08/20000809/0809-08,htm.

140 ibid.
141 ibid.
142 ‘Seijika o Katte ni Kenkyû Suru’. Available from http://ww.fujinews.com/today/2000-08/200000809/
0809-08.htm
143 Yûkan Fuji News. Available from http://www.fujinews.com/today/2000-08/20000809/0809-08,htm
144 ibid.
146 ibid., p. 28.
147 Editorial Group, Ushiroda Ryôe, ‘Okinawa de Mitsuketa Umami’ [‘The Allure Found in Okinawa’],
Aera, 11 March 2002, p. 16.
153 ibid., pp. 46 and 48.
154 It was ¥2 million. Kitamatsu et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 48.
155 ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
156 Kitamatsu et al., ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Tettei Bunseki’, p. 49.
157 ibid., p. 48.
158 Reed, ‘Revelations’. Available from ssj-forum@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
159 Reed, Steven R., ‘More Muneo’, 20 March 2002. Available from ssj-forum@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
163 ibid.
164 See also Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, pp. 180–
82.
167 Satô Saburô was Katô Kôichi’s secretary, to whom he was extremely close, and who was prosecuted for
evading taxes amounting to ¥100 million. Katô put a lot of trust in Satô, who was like his double. Katô
was reported as saying, ‘what Sato says, you can think of as being said by me’, although he denied
being involved in Satô’s tax evasion scandal. ‘Katô Kôichi yo Semete Muneo yori Hayaku Yamenasai’
[‘Katô Kôichi, You Need At Least to Resign Earlier Than Muneo’], Shûkan Bunshun, 21 March 2002,
p. 166.
172 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 182.
173 ibid.
174 ibid.
175 ‘Sôsa Shinsa Repôto: Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu—Kesareta Shokuniku Rûto’ [‘Report from
the Depths of the Criminal Investigation: Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu—The Meat Route
that Has Been Wiped Out’], Shûkan Bunshun, 19 September 2002, p. 150.
177 ibid. For a similar account of institutional factors within the MAFF, which were responsible for the BSE
outbreak in Japan, see ‘Nôsuishô “Chikusan Riken”: Inamikitta “Niku” to “Uma” Gyôsei’ [‘The
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ “Livestock Concessions”” The Totally Denied “Meat” and
“Horse” Administration’], Sentaku, May 2002, pp. 126–29.

179 ibid.
180 ibid.
183 ‘Sôsa Shinsa Repôto’, p. 150.
184 The Meat and Egg Division of the Livestock Department of the Production Bureau had official
responsibility for administering the beef industry.
188 ‘Nôsuishô “Chikusan Riken”’, p. 127.
190 ibid., p. 150.
193 ibid., pp. 101–2.
194 ibid., p. 102.
204 ibid., p. 150; ‘Nôsuishô “Chikusan Riken”’, p. 127.
205 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 42, April 2002, p. 29.
212 Asada was implicated in a corruption scandal involving the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation
in 1987, and was arrested on suspicion of bribery. Itô, ‘Shinbun ga Zettai ni Hojinai’, p. 76.
213 ibid., p. 82.
216 Itô , ‘Shinbun ga Zettai ni Hojinai’, p. 82.
218 Hasegawa Hiroshi, ‘Kokusan Gyûniku Kaiage no Nazo’ [‘The Mystery of the Buy-up of Domestic
Beef ’], Aera, 8 July 2002, p. 22.
219 Itô, ‘Shinbun ga Zettai ni Hojinai’, p. 77. See also ‘Nôsuishô “Chikusan Riken”’, p. 127.
221 ibid., p. 77.
224 Hasegawa, ‘Kokusan Gyuniku Kaiage no Nazo’, p. 21.
200 POWER AND PORK

227 ibid.
228 ibid., p. 152.
229 ibid.
230 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi Hannan nado Giwaku Sanseki’ [‘Suspicions Accumulate About Diet
Member Matsuoka Toshikatsu Such As Hannan’], Kokumin Shinbun, July 2002. Available from
http://www5f.biglobe.ne.jp/~kokumin-shinbun/H14/1407/140769matsuoka.html
231 He was later sentenced to seven years in prison.
232 The Japan Times, 27 June 2004; 28 August 2004.
233 ibid., 21 August 2004.
234 ibid., 27 June 2004.
235 ibid., 21 August 2004.
236 ibid., 24 April 2004.
237 ibid. 28 May, 2005.
238 ibid., 23 April 2004.
239 ‘Posuto “Muneo Sôsa” no Shôten e: Tokusôbu ga Kanshin o Motsu Matsuoka Toshikatsu no “Kôdô”’
[‘The Focus of the Post “Muneo Investigation”: The “Action” of Matsuoka Toshikatsu in Which the
Special Investigation Department Has an Interest’], Themis, July 2002, p. 35.
240 ibid.
241 ibid.
242 ibid.
244 ibid.
245 ibid.
246 According to another source, this was the Supreme Court, not the High Court. Tokyo Shinbun, 20
February 2002.
247 These details were obtained from ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku Amari ni Kuroi
Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
248 ‘Muneo “Waido”: “Usotsuki Toshu Otoko” to Kakarete Honshi o Utaeta “Suzuki Muneo” no Sente
Shisaku’ [‘Muneo “Wide Show”: Having Written That He Was an Habitual Liar”, The Failed First
Move of “Suzuki Muneo” in Suing Our Magazine’], Shûkan Shinchô, 14 March 2002, p. 48.
249 Tanikawa retired from the Lower House in 2003.
250 ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku Amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’ p. 167. He also
reportedly said: ‘Keep your hands off because this property (building) has been settled politically, and
the Foreign Ministry knows it.’ Tokyo Shinbun, 20 February 2002.
251 Tokyo Shinbun, 20 February 2002.
252 ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku Amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
253 ‘Muneo “Waido”’, p. 48.
254 ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku Amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
255 ibid.
257 ibid.
259 The list of people attending the dinner party varies depending on the source. See also Tokyo Shinbun,
20 February 2002.
262 ibid.
265 ibid.
267 ibid.
268 ‘“Nishi no Muneo”: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku Amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
270 ‘“Nishi no Muneo”: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku Amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
271 ibid.
273 Yamarin’s main office is in Obihiro City in Hokkaido. It is a leading timber company, built up over
the lifetime of its president, Yamada Isao. Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu
to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p. 179.
276 ibid., p. 179.
277 ibid., pp. 179–80.
278 ‘Posuto “Muneo Sôsa”’, p. 34.
280 The Japan Times, 27 June 2002.
285 ibid.
288 See http://news.kyodo.co.jp/kyodonews/2002/suzuki/news/20020626-492.html
290 ibid.
295 Itô, ‘“Muneo no Meiyû” no Arata na Taidô’, p. 286.
296 ‘Sukûpu! Mitsui Bussan Kanbu Shain o Taiho: Chiken Tokusôbu ga Jimintô Daigishi Futari o
Chôshu’ [‘Scoop! The Arrest of Mitsui Co. Executives: The Special Investigation Department of the
Public Prosecutor’s Office Listens to Two LDP Diet Members’], Shûkan Gendai, 20 July 2002, p.
55.
299 ibid.
302 ibid.
303 Kokita, ‘Suzuki Muneo no Tsukurareta’, p. 19.
305 ibid.
306 ibid.
307 ibid.
308 ibid.
309 ibid.
202 POWER AND PORK
311 Itô , ‘Shinbun ga Zettai ni Hojinai’, p. 82.

313 The Japan Times, 24 July 2002.
314 ibid.
315 ibid.
316 Suzuki was subsequently accused of four crimes, including accepting a bribe in return for services
promised and accepting a bribe as a mediator. On 5 November 2004, he was convicted in the Tokyo
District Court on all charges and sentenced to a two-year prison term and a fine of ¥11 million. The
chief judge stated that ‘although the defendant held an important post in the cabinet and was expected
to show a high degree of morals and honesty, he took a bribe from his supporters in order to pursue
his own interests and betrayed the citizens’ trust. In spite of this, he dared to make false statements in
the criminal investigation and in the trial. Therefore, he should face a goal sentence.’ Asahi Shinbun,
5 November 2004. Suzuki stood unsuccessfully in the July 2004 Upper House election, having been
forced to resign his Lower House Diet seat in 2002. He successfully regained a seat in the Lower House
in September 2005. See below.
318 ‘Nishi no Muneo: Matsuoka Toshikatsu o Torimaku amari ni Kuroi Jinmyaku’, p. 167.
319 ‘Muneo no Meiyû “Matsuoka Toshikatsu” Jr. no Igai na Kekkon Aite’ [‘The Unexpected Marriage
Partner of Muneo’s Sworn Friend “Matsuoka Toshikatsu” Jr.’], Shûkan Shinchô, 28 November 2002,
p. 32.
321 Nakanishi Akihiko and the Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Iu Giwaku Nin’, p.
178.
322 Rondan, Kisha Kurabu [Discussion, Press Club]. Available from http://www.rondan.co.jp/html/kisha/
0206/020625-3.html. Refer to the discussion concerning Mr ‘A’.
323 ibid.
325 ibid.
329 ‘Suzuki Muneo Giin no Ritô’, p. 1.
330 ibid.
332 ibid., p. 27.
336 ibid.
337 It is unclear whether Mr ‘A’ is the same as Mr ‘K’. Certainly there are strong similarities. The
investigative journal might have used Mr ‘A’ in the sense of Mr ‘A’ and Mr ‘B’, that is, in order to
preserve his anonymity.
341 ibid.
342 ibid.
343 ibid.
345 ibid.
346 ibid., p. 24.
347 ibid., p. 23.

348 ibid.
349 ibid.
350 Sankei Shinbun, 24 September 2002.
351 ibid.
352 ‘Suzuki Muneo Giin no Ritô’, p. 1.
353 ibid.
354 ‘Rieki Yûdô’ [‘Guiding Benefits’], Wikipedia. Available from http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/
%E5%88%A9%E7%9B%8A%E8%AA%98%E5%B0%8E
355 Its Japanese title is Shintô Daichi. The professed ideals of the party are ‘to return to the land’, ‘to learn
from the land’, ‘to respect nature and be thankful for it’. To achieve these goals ‘reform of consciousness
is necessary. Real reform is not from authority but from the people’ (see http://www.muneo.gr.jp).
Suzuki won 433,938 votes, slightly less than half the LDP’s tally in the Hokkaido bloc. Muneo’s party
fielded two other candidates (both graduate students, one of which was an Ainu) in the Hokkaido
regional bloc, but only Suzuki won a seat. It also fielded a candidate (a former Olympic ski-jumping
athlete) in Hokkaido (1). He came last with 16,000 votes.
356 Mainichi Shinbun, 4 October 2005.
357 ibid.
204 POWER AND PORK
7
ELECTORAL VICISSITUDES
The fallout from the Muneo affair and various scandals continued to swirl around
Matsuoka in 2002 and 2003. He tried to rehabilitate his reputation in various
ways, but in the end he paid a political price in the 2003 Lower House election.
Paradoxically, this was also an election in which brakes were put on the popularity
of Prime Minister Koizumi, whom Matsuoka openly opposed.1
THE SCARY ‘RESISTANCE FORCE’ POLITICIAN

Matsuoka became well known to the broader electorate in Japan as one of the
most outspoken members of the teikô seiryoku. In a blatantly self-serving fashion,
he went around preaching the errors of Koizumi’s reforms.2 He spoke out
against these reforms both inside and outside the party.3 In taking such a
stand he ‘demonstrated both his conservative side and his action side’.4
Matsuoka’s first confrontation over Koizumi’s economic reform policies went
back to June 2001, only three months after Koizumi became prime minister.
At the Executive Council of the LDP, of which he was a member at the time
(see Table 4.1), Matsuoka, in his vocal role as a nôrin zoku, criticised Koizumi
for ‘pandering to the interests of urban voters’.5 The council under Koizumi
had become the main battlefield between the government and the ruling party
in determining the nation’s policies.6 Many of Matsuoka’s fellow rural stalwarts
in the Executive Council were shouting and banging their desks in protest
against Koizumi’s proposals to benefit urban voters, such as diversifying the
use of a special revenue source previously used exclusively for building roads,7
cutting tax grants to local governments and giving more Diet seats to urban
areas. If implemented, these proposals would have all hit rural regions hard.8
ELECTORAL VICISSITUDES 205
In the Executive Council meeting, Matsuoka openly opposed the proposal

to expand the use of tax revenues earmarked specifically for road construction,
claiming that ‘earmarked taxes like the one for road construction should be
used for their original purposes’.9 He was quoted as saying, ‘roads are the
lifeblood of regional areas!’ [dôro wa chihô no mei da!].10 He had earlier argued
against budget expenditure cutbacks ‘without sanctuary’ (seiiki naki) under
the Hashimoto administration, arguing that ‘there are not yet sufficient roads
in local regions’.11 He also opposed any increase in the rate of consumption
tax. 12
Matsuoka, as part of the bigger group of LDP resistance forces led by the
road policy clique, successfully derailed Koizumi’s plan to overhaul the tax
revenues exclusively reserved for road construction. Koizumi aimed to turn
such dedicated revenues into general revenues in the process of compiling the
national budget for fiscal 2003.13 However, Matsuoka always claimed that ‘his
objective [in opposing Koizumi’s reforms] was not to guide benefits and
concessions [to local areas]’.14
Matsuoka served on anti-reform, anti-Koizumi LDP committees whenever
he got the chance. He became the mascot (ojisan) of the teikô seiryoku within
the LDP15 and the leader of a study group that rose in open revolt against
Koizumi’s reforms in November 2001. The name of Diet members’ league
to oppose Koizumi’s ‘structural reforms without sanctuary’ (seiiki naki kôzô
kaikaku) was the ‘Diet Members’ League to Save Japan From Crisis and
Realize Real Reforms’ (Nihon no Kiki o Sukui, Shin no Kaikaku o Jitsugen
suru Giin Renmei), giving themselves the title ‘Save the Nation League of
Diet Members’ (Kyûkoku Giren) for short. However, there was an immediate
change of name to ‘Diet Members’ League for the Realization of Reforms
and the Creation of a Bright Future’ (Kaikaku o Jitsugen shi, Akarui Mirai o
Sôzô suru Giin Renmei),16 or ‘Future-Creating Diet Members’ League’ (Mirai
Sôzô Giren) for short. The reason for the change was because it was felt that
the anti-Koizumi colour was too strong in the ‘Save the Nation League of
Diet Members’, and so the words ‘Creation of a Bright Future’ were added,
which also required a change in the abbreviated name.17
Matsuoka served as one of the representative executives of this league. In it
were 13 Diet members from the Hashimoto faction (an anti-Koizumi faction)
and 16 Diet members from the Etô-Kamei faction.18 The Eto-Kamei faction
was generally regarded as anti-Koizumi and anti-reform, like the Hashimoto
206 POWER AND PORK
faction. It represented the conservative ‘old guard’ of the LDP. Kamei, like Matsuoka,
was an active leader of the anti-Koizumi force. He was very angry with Koizumi for
including so few members of the Etô-Kamei faction in his first cabinet.
In December 2001, along with LDP Highway Investigation Committee
Chairman and former party Secretary-General, Hiromu Nonaka, and Upper
House Secretary-General, Aoki Mikio, Matsuoka opposed Koizumi’s proposal
to reform inefficient government-affiliated public corporations. These included
the four hugely indebted public corporations related to highway construction,
which the Koizumi administration wanted to amalgamate and privatise. At a
meeting of the Mirai Sôzô Giren, Matsuoka stated that one of these public
corporations, the Japan Highway Public Corporation (Nihon Dôrô Kodan),
was highly regarded overseas, which was just the opposite of Koizumi’s
assessment.19 Matsuoka appeared on the TV program, ‘Takeshi’s TV Tackle’
hosted by Beat Takeshi. When ‘he was asked the question: “Where do you
want to build an expressway most?” he answered unashamedly, “everybody
wants to build near themselves, such as Kumamoto, Kyushu”’.20 The public
was reportedly scandalised by his blatant sentiments in favour of guiding benefits
to local areas (rieki yûdô ishiki).21 An urban voter who undertook his own
investigation of Matsuoka commented
[h]is eyes look scary, his expression looks scary, I bet he speaks scarily. In any case, he looks
scary. This is my honest impression when I first saw Matsuoka on TV…That’s the kind of
presence he has and that’s the kind of force he exudes from his whole body. Because of how he
looked in interviews as an opposition force when the Executive Council was reviewing the
revenue source for road-building, the media portrayed him unequivocally as a ‘baddie’
(akuyaku).22
After Koizumi appointed Inose Naoki to head up a panel to look into

reform of the Japan Highway Public Corporation and the three other road-
building public entities, Matsuoka criticised Inose on the Asahi TV program,
‘Sunday Project’. Matsuoka mentioned that he had quarrelled with Inose on
the issue, and that Mr Inose was formerly a member of a radical student
organisation (Zenkyôtô)23 in Japanese universities in the 1960s. He later
commented, ‘I finished him’. 24 The discussion went on a bit and at one
point, Matsuoka said: ‘I will destroy Yamasaki’, 25 in a reference to the
secretary-general of the LDP at the time. Matsuoka reportedly did not show
any sign of worrying about being called a ‘resistance force’ or being considered
anti-Koizumi.26 As one commentator observed, ‘for Matsuoka, appearing on
TV saying such things is really a way of conveying a message to Koizumi

that he opposed his policies.’ 27
By openly criticising Koizumi on television, Matsuoka became known as
the new voice of opposition to the prime minister.28 Initially the ‘face’ of zoku
power and the conservatives and the advertising pillar of the teikô seiryoku had
been Muneo. Matsuoka took over this role in the world of television,29 becoming
the ‘face’ of opposition to Koizumi’s reforms. His stubbornness in rejecting
Koizumi’s programs was said to be similar to the old JSP’s approach.30 Occasionally,
Matsuoka presented convincing arguments, such as the one he presented against
the government’s big-boned policy to cap the issuance of national bonds to ¥30
trillion (saying, ‘[d]on’t just put the money together, make policies that deal with
the causes of problems’),31 but ‘these were only fleeting’.32
When the resistance forces came under criticism, around the time the
name of the Diet members’ league was changed, Matsuoka began to make
insincere statements, such as, ‘our enemy is recession and the employment
problem, not the Koizumi cabinet.’33 Before long, he went as far as to say,
‘I’m all for reforms, but if its done just on the mood of things, it will leave
the root of evil.’ 34 After that he dropped all pretence and emerged as an
unequivocal resistance force. He claimed to be advocating what he called
‘the spirit of the one hundred barrels of rice’, which meant investing further
than for what was just immediately ahead. On that basis, he argued, ‘it
would be wrong to stop [the construction of ] highways. It would be like
putting rice away in a warehouse if you don’t build highways and just
prioritise immediate debts’.35 As one commentator observed, ‘[i]n Matsuoka’s
mind] there is no financial difficulty at all. Just build highway around the
country by means of public works projects’.36
In December 2001, Matsuoka made several other public comments that
were critical of Koizumi. He said that the Koizumi administration would not
last long unless it shifted to a policy of aggressive public spending to shore up
the economy: ‘If the Koizumi Cabinet keeps running on the wrong track, we
will have to have second thoughts [about supporting the prime minister]…That
would be in the best interests of the public.’37 He added that
[t[he greatest achievement of the prime minister and leader of the LDP in his first eight months
of office was that he had led the party to a resounding victory in the Upper House election in July
2001. I would give 150 points to Koizumi for winning a victory for the LDP in the Upper House
election, but I would also give him minus 100 points for causing the economy to deteriorate.38
208 POWER AND PORK
As far as the prime minister’s high support rate was concerned, Matsuoka
suggested that more people [who did not have a clear reason for supporting
him] were becoming passive supporters of Koizumi: ‘At first, the public was
actively supporting Koizumi…But now people have no choice but to support
him although he has achieved almost nothing to put the economy on a recovery
path’.39 Matsuoka argued: ‘If the prime minister leaves the economic situation
as is, further deflation and recession is inevitable’.40 He suggested that Koizumi
would lose public support, and thus the power to remain at the helm, if the
economy deteriorated further in the following year.41 In an interview with a
journalist, he stated
Koizumi’s economic policy is wrong. When a country is in deflation, first it is necessary to
adopt a policy to stimulate demand in order to grow out of deflation. Structural reform should
focus first on bad debt management. The responsibility of executives should be clarified, and
public funds should be thrown into banks in one hit.42
When asked whether he was sufficiently opposed to Koizumi to be called a

resistance force, Matsuoka replied
[i]t would be a lie if I said I don’t have feelings of opposition. However, no matter how much
people speak ill of me, I have the courage to keep going. Thanks to our Diet members’ league,
Mr Koizumi is increasing his popularity. We are caught in a dilemma… Although more than
90 per cent of LDP Diet members do not officially voice their objections, they are not thinking
that Koizumi’s reforms are right. If they listen to the context carefully, they understand that
what I say on television is a sound argument.43
Matsuoka was critical of the Koizumi administration’s budget for fiscal 2002,
saying that it lacked sufficient measures to tackle the nation’s serious unemployment
problems. The real issue of the budget for a politician like Matsuoka, however, was
that it promoted Koizumi’s structural reform agenda, which aimed to slash spending
on public works and therefore cut back on the projects Matsuoka could bring back
to his own electorate. Matsuoka joined a number of other LDP Diet members in
openly rejecting the Koizumi administration’s cuts in public works spending because
they shrank the pork barrel.
In Matsuoka’s way of thinking, the problem with the Koizumi
administration’s reform policies was that they took direct aim at the type of
politician that he was. They jeopardised the vote-winning contract he had
with farmers and rural dwellers, as well as the financial supply contract he had
with his company clients. The cuts in public works spending, including
allocations to agricultural and rural public works, cramped Matsuoka’s electoral
style. Similarly, the ‘trinity reform’—which aimed to devolve authority and

spending-power from central to local governments and fix the debt-ridden
finances of both44—threatened to destroy the long-standing structure of vested
interests tying together bureaucrats in the ministries, politicians (Diet members
and local politicians), and industries (companies and individuals) benefiting
from these subsidies. Matsuoka’s primary support was based on a collection of
special interests—local, sectional and client-based—rather than broad, policy-
based programmatic appeals as a vote-collector for his party (the LDP) and its
leader (Koizumi). If Matsuoka could not deliver on local projects, he was of
little use to the particular clutch of vested interests that supported him.
Koizumi was also open in his advocacy of another crucial goal that took
direct aim at the exercise of policy influence by individual Diet members such
as Matsuoka—that of ‘destroying the LDP’ (Jimintô o kowasu). By this, the
prime minister meant tackling the autonomous policymaking authority of
PARC committees that undermined the power of the prime minister and
cabinet, and which Matsuoka and the other members of the teikô seiryoku used
to challenge Koizumi’s reform initiatives. Destroying the LDP also entailed
undermining the fundamental basis of the party’s independent policymaking
authority—the means by which LDP Diet politicians acquired this power—
that is, their independent electoral support coalitions, which locked them
into representing, promoting and protecting special interests as well as the
interests of specific regional localities.
Matsuoka was identified with the LDP ‘old guard’, who were loath to change
the established ways of doing things, who wanted to keep pork barrel politics
alive, and who wanted to keep government subsidies flowing to rural-regional
areas. For this type of LDP Diet member, politics was just ‘distribution’ (haibun).
They functioned to distribute funds sucked up in the form of taxes to regional
areas. For Matsuoka, ‘[t]he best part about being the LDP was the business of
distributing resources through prior scrutiny’.45
Koizumi, on the other hand, was aiming for the more equitable distribution
of diminishing public resources.46 He provided less room in the political system
for politicians like Matsuoka, and less potential for guiding benefits from the
central government to local areas because of his crackdown on public works
spending and the indiscriminate scattering of subsidies (hojokin no baramaki)
to rural-regional areas. This substantially weakened the appeal of politicians
like Matsuoka who relied on this mechanism to win votes amongst locals.
210 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka, on the other hand, warned that Koizumi’s top-down style of

decision making—often ignoring traditional procedures within the party—
might lead to ‘self-righteousness or despotism’.47 He criticised the LDP regime
under Prime Minister Koizumi as the ‘Taliban regime’.48 He accused Koizumi
of ‘trying to establish cabinet decision-making as the way of doing things,
thus bypassing the process of prior scrutiny by the LDP.’49 Matsuoka stood for
the old policymaking model, naturally enough, because under it, he exercised
personal influence over policy through LDP committees. However, the
‘traditional practice of having policies cleared by the LDP before submission
to the cabinet for its approval… [was] incompatible with the sort of cabinet-
led policymaking process that Koizumi…was trying to achieve’.50
In taking such a stand against Koizumi’s top-down decision-making style,
Matsuoka echoed the views of other members of the LDP’s ‘old guard’. Former
LDP Secretary-General Nonaka, who had previously been chief secretary of
the cabinet under Prime Minister Obuchi, said that Koizumi was a fascist in
the way that he tried to ram his own policies through the party. Matsuoka’s
view was that ‘[a] real leader should be able to wrap up various opinions within
the group. That is what democracy is all about’.51 Matsuoka said that he did
not care if Koizumi called him and other LDP politicians opposed to his reforms
‘resistance forces’. He retorted, ‘[w]e will continue to make proposals to Koizumi
even if we are labelled the “bad guys”’.52
For example, Matsuoka and his close associates confronted Koizumi directly
over FTAs, which became one of the big ‘reform’ issues in agriculture during
the Koizumi administration. The prime minister saw FTAs as an instrument
of ‘structural reform’ of agriculture, which meant making the farm sector more
internationally competitive by expanding the scale of farming. Koizumi kept
on saying that reform was needed in agriculture and that it could not be
allowed to hold up agreements on trade.
Matsuoka and others had a major tussle of wills with the prime minister
over this issue. Koizumi set up all manner of policy groups essentially to bypass
opposition to FTAs from the nôrin zoku. In 2002, he attempted to wrest control
from the nôrin zoku by establishing a special LDP committee to study FTAs
(FTA Tokumei Iinkai) chaired by his appointee as PARC Chairman, Nukaga
Fukushirô, a commerce and industry zoku. The committee’s task was to work
with METI to formulate basic party policy on FTAs.53 But the nôrin zoku
were bitterly opposed to the formation of this special LDP committee to study
FTAs, saying, ‘[u]nder Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system, the party decides
policy, not the Kantei. The FTA Special Committee neglects the traditional
way of deciding party policy, which gathers the opinions of each division such
as the Agriculture and Forestry Division’.54
In December 2003, after the failure first of WTO negotiations at Cancun
in September and then the bilateral Japan-Mexico FTA negotiations in October,
the prime minister sought to avoid the possibility of Japan’s being left on the
sidelines of regional progress on FTAs. He set up an FTA Kankei Shôchô Kaigi
(Council of Related Ministries and Agencies on FTAs) under Kantei leadership.
For Koizumi, the nôrin zoku, who seemed to display blatant disregard for the
national interest, had become the object of his irritation. He declared, ‘[a]fter
this, I cannot leave it to the MAFF and the norin zoku’.55
However, Matsuoka and the other norin zoku bosses were not going to take
Koizumi’s moves lying down. Immediately after Koizumi’s announcement of
the new council on 11 December, they gatecrashed the Kantei for discussions
with Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo. They went with the aim of
correcting the foreign policy position of the prime minister on FTA negotiations.
CAPIC Chairman Norota Hôsei and Acting Chairmen Yatsu and Ôshima
Tadamori, together with Chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
Products Trade Investigation Committee, Sakurai, and Matsuoka as secretary-
general as well as Chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division, Nakagawa
Yoshio, assembled in full force and raised the stakes. They demanded to Fukuda:
‘you should not progress FTAs over the heads of the party…to swallow all the
demands of other countries is weak diplomacy…as we’ve said up to now, you
should move forward in consultation with the party’.56 They proposed to
Fukuda that it was necessary for the government and the ruling parties to
unite as one, hold the same opinion, and face negotiations in the future so as
not to be taken unfair advantage of in the negotiations with the partner
country.57 In short, they demanded their rights of intervention in the matter.
Fukuda tried to placate them by saying that of course the party would be
consulted. He showed a certain understanding of their position with his
comment that ‘although the prime minister instructs in many ways when
necessary, it is taken for granted that the prime minister discusses issues with
others…The prime minister does not consider that only he leads on all points’.58
Details of the Japan-Mexico FTA that was signed in March 2004 revealed
that a compromise on agricultural market access had been made, falling well
212 POWER AND PORK
short of endangering domestic agricultural producers in Japan or bringing

about free trade in agriculture between the two countries. Not only did Japan
commit itself to removing tariffs on just 86 per cent of all imports from Mexico,
rather than the required 90 per cent, but politically sensitive commodities
such as pork, orange juice, beef, chicken, and fresh oranges remained subject
to special arrangements that would continue to protect the producers of these
commodities. After the FTA agreement was signed with Mexico, Matsuoka
stated: ‘The agreement is balanced. We can stage FTA negotiations with other
countries, based on this example’. 59 The precedent of only very limited
concessions on agriculture in the Mexican agreement was very important. Not
only did it introduce the notion that phased (i.e. incremental) liberalisation
was compatible with bilateral FTAs, but it also allowed for liberalisation to
occur over a long time period and/or be subject to quota limitations.
JUMPING ON THE BIOMASS BANDWAGON

During the 2002–2003 period, Matsuoka branched out by becoming the major
political sponsor of the biomass industry in Japan, his ‘new green revolution’,
which planned to generate energy from food, animal and timber waste. Matsuoka
was hopeful of the promise of converting agricultural products such as sugar
cane and corn and even timber into a source for ethanol gasoline and thus
contributing to the development of agricultural and mountain village regions.60
Because biomass was relatively new and unexplored territory, pursuing this
cause would make Matsuoka the first in the political world to be involved in
it.61 His primary reasons for jumping on the biomass bandwagon, however,
were financial. From his own self-interested perspective, Matsuoka eyed the
biomass industry not only as a potential source of budget outlays for public
works projects in Kumamoto Prefecture, but also as a new business for
companies on which he could prey for political funds.
The project followed the pattern that, whatever venture Matsuoka backed,
there were usually advantageous corporate connections in the background. In
this case, the executive of ‘a particular company that could be said to be
Matsuoka’s “sworn friend” decided to make biomass into an industry’.62 In
fact, a group of companies with links to Matsuoka suddenly showed heightened
interest in the biomass project. These companies had their main offices in
Shinjuku in Tokyo and they all suddenly ‘converted’ to the business of the
industrialisation of biomass.
One company was called Japan Geo-System Approach (as of 1 January 2003).
Its previous company name was Japan Amusement System Incorporated (later
Nazca), a company established to make pre-paid pin-ball (pachinko) cards.63
Another company in the group was Caldean Integrate Incorporated that had
provided information and communication services for computer users, and
which changed its name to Green Energy Research Association Incorporated
on 19 August 2002. With the change of name, it added ‘research and
development of biomass methanol and ethanol and its production/sale’ to the
details in its business purpose column.64
The person acting as the representative of the group of companies was
Mitsuzuka Kôkichi, a nephew of retired former Minister of Finance and LDP
faction leader, Mitsuzuka Hiroshi (Matsuoka’s old faction leader). Mitsuzuka
Kôkichi was three years younger than Matsuoka, but he was Matsuoka’s
influential sponsor at one time. He aggressively expanded his real estate business
during the bubble period and became friendly with Matsuoka when Matsuoka
left the Forestry Agency for the political world and achieved his first election
victory in 1990. After that, the two remained close.65 Mitsuzuka took pride in
being a ‘cheer squad’ (ôendan) for Matsuoka.66
In addition to Japan Geo-System Approach and Caldean Integrate
Incorporated, Mitsuzuka owned Japan Technoblast Incorporated for purposes
of construction engineering and architectural contracts and consulting, and
Mitsue Incorporated, a real estate business. Both Japan Technoblast
Incorporated and Mitsue Incorporated also wrote ‘research into biomass and
its production and sales’ in the company purpose column during September-
October 2002. What is more, Japan Technoblast had amongst its employees,
Ikeda Kazutaka, Matsuoka’s policy secretary.67
According to a source in the real estate industry, Mitsuzuka, whose companies
had not done well since 1990, seemed energised by his move into biomass
saying, ‘I’m going with biomass from now on’.68 Mitsuzuka apparently did
not keep company with anyone from the Mitsuzuka (now Mori) faction: ‘After
mixing with several Diet members, the person whom he thought “would be
useful” was Matsuoka’.69 Mitsuzuka was reportedly energetic at both work
and play, and he and Matsuoka would bar-hop across four or five expensive
clubs in Kabuki-chô, ending the evening with noodles (ramen).70 The ‘force of
Mitsuzuka [reportedly] matched with the force of Matsuoka, known to make
bureaucrats and local industries in Kumamoto flinch’.71
214 POWER AND PORK
It was suspected that Mitsuzuka had advised Matsuoka to shake himself

free of the ‘concessions triangle’ of money (kane), votes (hyô) and business
(shigoto) between politicians and the construction industry.72 It was also said
that because Matsuoka’s blatant guidance of benefits to his local Kumamoto
Prefecture was becoming an issue, Mitsuzuka had advised, ‘[i]t is no longer
the era of construction public works politics. Why don’t you sponsor businesses
in new areas like those related to biomass environment and energy equipment
and organise that’?73 Mitsuzuka himself was concentrating all his management
resources and putting all his bets on biomass and was busy securing funds to
invest in the industry.74 He also tried to participate—in various forms—in
biomass-related subsidised projects that had begun nationally.75
As far as Matsuoka was concerned, the biomass project killed a number of
birds with one stone. First, it generated ‘new works’ in the MAFF budget to
support the development of research and technology for utilising biomass,
and the construction of action models across the whole country and the
development of facilities. These facilities could be to Matsuoka’s political
advantage if they were located in Kumamoto.
The MAFF launched a ‘Biomass Nippon Comprehensive Strategy Project
Team’ in June 2002. It received the green light from the Koizumi
administration’s ‘big-boned policies number two’ in the same month. Matsuoka
had struggled to get his pet project into the big-boned policies by desperately
badgering Prime Minister Koizumi.76 The team consisted of seven MAFF
officials under an office chief, with their own room on the first floor of the
MAFF. The initial budget for the project allocated ¥22 billion, with most of it
going to the MAFF under the government’s so-called New Energy Strategy.77
The team then asked for ¥29 billion in the draft budget for 2003 to promote
the realisation of ‘Biomass Nippon’, a ‘society that uses biomass to its fullest
extent with a view to halting global warming and constructing a cyclic society’.78
The total budget for ‘Biomass Practical Use Frontier Infrastructure Works’ in
2003 was ¥22.2 billion while ¥22.6 billion was allocated in 2004.79 A MAFF
official said, ‘in the future, it will increase to many billions of yen’.80
Unsurprisingly, Kamoto Town (in Matsuoka’s electorate) was chosen for the
construction of a plant for processing livestock and food waste at a cost of ¥8.9
billion, under the budgetary rubric of ‘Biomass Practical Use Frontier
Infrastructure Works’.81 Because Kumamoto had an extensive livestock industry,
the biomass centre for processing livestock waste was ostensibly located there.
However, ‘it was logical to think that the location was no accident—that it had
been engineered by Matsuoka—although this was denied by the town mayor’.82
Second, from Matsuoka’s perspective, the biomass project justified a new public
value for both farming and forestry—as a source of energy. Not only Matsuoka
but also other nôrin giin saw biomass as a means of revitalising agriculture and
rural areas. In 2002, a new book on biomass entitled ‘21st Century: Escaping
from Limitations and Chaos’ under Matsuoka’s authorship was about to be
published. The subtitle was ‘Environmental Regeneration and the New Energy
Revolution’. The authors were Matsuoka and the Biomass Methanol Research
Association (Biomasu-Metanôru Kenkyûkai). The timing of its intended
publication matched the launch of the MAFF’s ‘Biomass Nippon’ project.
Besides extolling the global environmental crisis in the afterword, Matsuoka
wrote ‘this book is not only a warning bell, it is also a book that suggests policies’.83
He wrote in the epilogue (dated on an auspicious day in April 2002)
[a]s you can see from reading this book, it has its starting point my feelings of ‘crisis’ in regards
to limitations and chaos manifested in the 11 September terrorist attacks…in all circumstances
politicians have the responsibility to present measures to resolve a problem. This book developed
an argument for the potential of a second industrial revolution based on biomass methanol.84
The book was extremely hostile to the idea of a market principles and economic
orthodoxy because of the way these principles treated ‘losers’ and those deemed
‘unfit for the market’. In the book, Matsuoka called for economic principles
that that were kind to the ‘losers’ in a system.85
For some reason, the book was not published, even though a publication
party was planned. The binding had virtually finished but the publication
was cancelled.86 It was truly a phantom book.87 Matsuoka’s office denied any
connection with it, although given that he wrote part of the book and that he
was the most prominent politician-promoter of the biomass industry himself,
this was incorrect. Matsuoka’s prominence in pushing the issue was the reason
why he was approached to participate.
It seems that the Muneo scandal was the reason why the book was not
published. Muneo was arrested on suspicion of accepting bribes for mediation
on 19 June 2002. His arrest was not simply a matter involving Matsuoka’s
sworn friend. There was danger for Matsuoka in it as well. The flurry of criticism
extended to him as well, 88 encouraging him to keep a low profile. The
publication date of the book was 16 July 2002, right in the middle of the
maelstrom of the Muneo scandal, and the book clearly could not be published
216 POWER AND PORK
in the circumstances.89 Despite having pushed so hard for the biomass project
to get off the ground, Matsuoka refused all interviews on the subject. According
to his policy secretary, Ikeda Kazutaka, he was so careful that he would not
even issue a comment of ‘No comment’.90
GREENWASH
Matsuoka took direct action to revamp his political reputation, which had
been so sullied by his association with Muneo and by the BSE and Yamarin
scandals, by becoming an outspoken advocate of interests that appeared directly
to contradict his earlier, self-interested activities. He appeared on the program
‘Jam the World’ (J-WAVE FM radio) in Tokyo in February 2004. The topic of
conversation was the import ban on American beef after the outbreak of BSE
in the United States91 and the disappearance of gyûdon (beef bowl) from popular
restaurants. In his comments, Matsuoka took a hardline stance from a consumer
perspective, which was not hard to do given the issue. Matsuoka explained
that
[a]lthough Japan gave notice to the United States to secure the safety of its beef and to
implement cow inspections along the same lines as Japan and other countries are doing, the
United States did not do so for various reasons. So for Japan, the essential problem was that
consumer safety cannot be guaranteed. As long as safety and security cannot be demonstrated,
Japan cannot comply with the U.S. unilateral demand to resume imports.92
In the wake of this appearance, Matsuoka reported that he received ‘favorable

comments from urban listeners, who were not usually familiar with agricultural
issues, but who said that his comments were good and very easy to
understand’. 93
Matsuoka’s main efforts, however, were directed to revamping his image in
the area of environmental policy. He undertook a rather transparent effort to
rehabilitate himself through a process of ‘green-wash’,94 which involved the
public relations ‘greening’ of his image. Matsuoka had always professed
environmental credentials, showing his (opportunistically) environmentalist
side in a number of policy activities, including, of course, biomass and the
cause of agricultural protection.
Matsuoka’s professed environmentalism was well publicised on his website.
The headlines screamed: ‘Protecting Water and Greenery and Food’, and
proclaimed that Matsuoka was tackling ‘global-scale population, food and
environmental problems in the twenty-first century with all his power (zenryoku
de)’.95 Matsuoka asserted that he was playing a major role in the ‘Green Energy
Revolution’ (Midori no Enerugî Kaikaku) in order to protect the global environment.
This stance he justified in terms of achieving the ‘vitalisation’ (kasseika) of regional
people and agricultural and forestry industries that bring forth green resources.96
It was the Yamarin scandal that was the spur to Matsuoka’s apparent, full-
blown conversion to ‘green’ environmentalism. Following the scandal, Matsuoka
went to great lengths to strengthen his environmental credentials in the
international campaign against illegal logging. The need for Matsuoka to
promote such an environmental cause was blatant, given his association with
Yamarin’s illegal logging. Matsuoka tried to bury his past record by becoming
a champion of the fight against illegal logging, not only in Japan but also
around the world. He changed from someone who received political donations
from a company engaged in illegal logging in Japan to someone who actively
campaigned against it, particularly outside Japan.
In 2003, Matsuoka became chairman of the LDP’s Forestry Illegal and
Unlawful Logging Countermeasures Investigation Team (Shinrin Ihô, Fuhô
Bassai Taisaku Kentô Chîmu). It discussed reports from the Forestry Agency and
the Ministry of Environment about discussions in the WTO Trade and
Environment Committee, and the results of the third meeting of the Asia Forestry
Partnership and the Japan-Indonesia Illegal Logging Cooperation Action Plan.97
In 2004, the committee changed its name to Illegal Logging Countermeasures
Investigation Team to Protect the Global Environment (Chikyû Kankyô o
Mamoru Fuhô Bassai Taisaku Kentô Chîmu), more in keeping with the times.
Matsuoka attended an International Symposium on Countermeasures for
Illegal Logging in Tokyo in June 2003. The symposium was organised by the
Japan Federation of World Timber Industry Associations (i.e. the main users of
tropical timbers). At one point during the proceedings, Matsuoka made a
rather vacuous speech, talking about his hopes for efforts to be taken against
illegal logging, about Japan and Indonesia’s efforts to stop illegal logging, and
the fact that Diet members were prepared to form an international confederation
of parliamentarians against illegal logging.98
On domestic forestry policy, Matsuoka participated in a meeting of the
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Joint Council (Nôrinsuisan Gôdô Kaigi) in
July 2003. This was a joint council of the two main agriculture committees in
the PARC, the Agriculture and Forestry Division and CAPIC, as well as of the
main LDP policy committee on forestry policy, the Forestry Policy Investigation
218 POWER AND PORK
Committee, and the main party committee on fisheries policy, the Fisheries
Comprehensive Investigation Committee (Suisan Sôgô Chôsakai). The joint
council met to receive an interim report of the Forestry Agency’s Research
Association for Citizens’ Support for Promoting the Absorption Source 99
Countermeasures to Prevent Global Warming (Chikyû Ondoka Soshi
Kyûshûgen Taisaku no Suishin no tame no Kokumin Shien ni kansuru
Kenkyûkai). The meeting acknowledged the need to work even more positively
for the introduction of preferential measures for forest preservation through
tax reform and securing revenue sources, because forests were a primary source
of absorption of greenhouse gases. 100 In Matsuoka’s view, Japan’s forest
maintenance program should play the biggest role in absorbing carbon dioxide.
However, forest preservation had not been positively promoted. It was suffering
from the long-term deterioration in the domestic forest industry, a shortage of
forestry workers and the uniform cutback policy for public works etc.101 When,
in 2004 Matsuoka became chairman of the Forestry Basic Problems
Subcommittee, one of its key tasks was to discuss the future development of
‘Forestry Absorption Source Countermeasures’ (Shinrin Kyûshûgen Taisaku),
and to ensure that finance for the countermeasures was included in the Forestry
Agency’s draft budget for 2005.
Another issue of concern for the Forestry Basic Problems Subcommittee was
that ministries and agencies should use domestic timber in the provision of their
services and public works. Each year, the committee received a report from
ministries and agencies on this matter, and its members energetically promoted
the utilisation of regional timber products in government-sponsored public works.
Yet another task for the committee was ensuring that new production systems
were budgeted for, which, according to Matsuoka, would trigger the regeneration
of the forestry industry and green employment projects as well as projects for
‘successors’ (kôkeisha) to forest owners. A meeting of the committee was held
about this in October 2005 in order to secure funding for such works.102
In 2003–5, Matsuoka served as chairman of the LDP’s Countermeasures
Investigation Team to Protect the Earth’s Environment from Global Scale Illegal
and Unlawful Deforestation, Import and Export and so on (Sekai Kibo no
Shinrin no Ihô, Fuhô na Bassai oyobi Yushutsunyû tô kara Sekai Kanyô o
Mamoru tame no Taisaku Kentô Chîmu). Its motto was: ‘Stop the Destruction
of the Environment, Solve the Problem by Using Domestic Timber!’. In May
2004, the investigation team held hearings with representatives of NGOs on
ways to counter illegal deforestation in Southeast Asia, including a call for Japanese
foreign aid to pay for the planting of nursery trees in areas that had suffered illegal
deforestation as a result of demand from timber companies in Japan for wood.103
In August 2004, Matsuoka gave the keynote speech at a Regional Workshop
on Strengthening the Asia Forest Partnership (AFP) organised by the Ministry
of Forestry of Indonesia. Both Matsuoka and one of the other recipients of
funds from Yamarin, Matsushita Tadahirô, attended, along with two other
Lower House Diet members and officials from the Forestry Agency. Matsuoka’s
keynote speech described ‘the current activities in Japan through the AFP for
promoting sustainable forest management and controlling illegal logging and
its associated trade’.104 After the workshop, Matusoka led a delegation of 10
Japanese Diet members to East Kalimantan, promising local officials that they
would help the local government combat illegal logging in the province.
Matsuoka ‘said the legislators were seeking information as to those areas to
which they could contribute in the fight against illegal logging’.105 On several
earlier occasions Matsuoka had made public presentations on the decline in
the world’s forestry resources and its impact on water resources, and on illegal
deforestation problems and related issues.106
In 2005, Matsuoka became chairman of the LDP’s Illegal and Unlawful
Logging Countermeasures Investigation Team (Ihô, Fuhô na Bassai Taisaku
Kentô Chîmu). The team discussed putting effort into the positioning of
countermeasures against illegal logging in the G-8 summit in England in 2005.
At a meeting in March 2005, government spokespersons provided details of
the United Kingdom and European Union’s illegal logging countermeasures,
and discussed proposals for the summit. In following month, Forestry Agency
officials talked to the group about the timber trade in Japan and conditions of
domestic distribution. A few days later, they held hearings where timber-
importing companies made representations, followed by timber groups and
NGO groups, and they discussed future action. They conferred on topics to
be investigated concerning illegal logging and approved them. They agreed to
firm up their standpoint, which would be transmitted to MoFA for the G-8
summit. In the team’s view, illegal logging should be on the main agenda of
the G-8 in Gleneagles, along with aid to Africa.
In June 2005, Matsuoka chaired a meeting of the investigation team, in
which he formulated a system to remove illegally deforested timber from Japanese
government procurement as a measure to protect the earth’s environment.
220 POWER AND PORK
One way to do this was through a traceability system for timber to prove its
legality. Matsuoka claimed to have great responsibility for this issue since the
illegal deforestation problem, he hoped, would be an important item on the
agenda of the United Kingdom summit in July 2005.107 The meeting was
followed up later in the year with another, which discussed how timber logged
illegally should be excluded under the government’s Green Purchasing Law
(Gurîn Kônyûhô), which made it a duty to consider the environment when the
government procured goods.108
Matsuoka visited Britain at the invitation of the Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs Minister Morley on how to put the deforestation problem on the
agenda of the G8 Summit to be held in the United Kingdom later in the year.
Matsuoka also held discussions with NGOs, interested groups and government
officials concerned with supply policy and trade measures for obtaining timber
from sustainable forests, and limiting timber supply for the central government
to legitimate timber, a policy that the United Kingdom already had in place.109
During the same visit to the United Kingdom, Matsuoka attended a meeting
sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs on ‘Forest Governance
and Trade – Japan, the United Kingdom and Eureopean Union Initiatives’. The
formal objectives of the meeting were ‘to share information about efforts by United
Kingdom and European Union governments and the private sector to combat
illegal logging and associated trade and to discuss policy options available to the
Japanese Government and Japanese private sector’.110 In his speech, Matsuoka
emphasised the vital importance of international cooperation and sharing of experience and
best practice in tackling illegal logging….Leadership on the issue by the G8 was felt to have
great potential and to fairly reflect the responsibilities of consumer nations [i.e. Japan]. Japan’s
engagement with the East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Conference and the
Asia Forest Partnership were noted, as well as bilateral efforts to work with Indonesia through
a Memorandum of Understanding.111
A few days prior to Prime Minister’s Koizumi departure for the G8 summit,
the investigation team briefed him on measures for protecting the earth’s
environment from illegal logging. It presented a series of recommendations,
one of which was that the government should only procure timber that could
prove that it was logged legally, and that support for exporting countries should
be strengthened. Matsuoka said to the prime minister, ‘I want you to assert
[these policies] as the government-LDP draft at the summit’,112 to which
Koizumi replied: ‘you can rely on me to do this’.113
The team was very pleased to see that tackling illegal logging was part of the
Action Plan coming out of the G8 summit. Item 37 of the Action Plan
acknowledged that tackling illegal logging was an important step towards the
sustainable management of forests, and that tackling this issue effectively
required action from both timber producing and timber consuming countries.114
After the summit, Matsuoka attended a meeting with representatives of the
timber industries of Canada, India, Indonesia and Norway and of Japanese
groups. He also made an on-the-spot survey in Indonesia in his capacity as
chairman of the investigation team, as well as attending a regional workshop of
the Asia Forest Partnership. In Matsuoka’s view, illegal deforestation was not
only an important discussion item at the summit, but measures against it
were an essential part of the solution to global-scale environmental deterioration
and a means of reviving the domestic forestry industry. As he claimed
[i]n 2001, I organised an investigation team in the LDP and have continued to appeal [for this
cause] not only in Japan but also to countries around the world. Bit by bit, the problem has
been recognised even in international conferences. Finally, illegal deforestation measures have
become one of the main items at the summit this time.115
For Matsuoka, the answer was for ‘countries not to use timber that was logged
illegally. Such a system was already in place in the United Kingdom and in other
countries that had removed illegally deforested timber from government-procured
materials. He wanted to move the Japanese government finally to follow suit’.116
Matsuoka later reported on illegal logging countermeasures to the Forestry
Management Activization Council (Shinrin Keiei Kasseika Kyôgikai), a group of
Diet members in the LDP, of which he was the chairman. The council represented
the forestry and the timber industry in Japan with a view to getting funding allocated
in the Forestry Agency’s draft budget for a forestry management revitalisation fund.
To further his international work on forestry, Matsuoka became the acting
chairman of the supra-partisan Japan-China Tree-Planting Promotion Diet
Members’ League (Nicchû Ryokuka Suishin Giin Renmei). It promoted a
tree-planting project in China using Japanese expertise on how to revive Chinese
forests. Forest devastation was a leading cause of large-scale floods in China.117
The league also aimed to assist the Japan-China Tree-Planting Fund (Nicchû
Ryokuka Kikin) established by the late Prime Minister Obuchi. This fund
was developing a tree-planting campaign in China, where land impoverishment
had become a serious problem. The executive committee of the league decided
to raise independent contributions focussing on Diet members and actively to
222 POWER AND PORK
support the campaign. 118 In discussions with the Chinese ambassador,

Matsuoka took the opportunity to discuss subjects such as environmental
problems, FTA negotiations, the Green Energy Revolution119 and the idea for
exporting farm products to China, which Matsuoka had proposed earlier.120
Quite apart from the blatantly self-serving nature of Matsuoka’s leadership
of the campaign against illegal logging, the sincerity of his environmental
credentials can be questioned on a number of other grounds. First, for Matsuoka,
environmentalism was really disguised agricultural protectionism. One of the
main arguments that Matsuoka consistently advanced in opposition to
agricultural trade liberalisation was the environmental one. Supporting and
protecting the domestic farm sector was justified on environmental grounds
insofar as agriculture was deemed to possess various environmental values. This
fervently held position was one reason why Matsuoka pursued a position in
environmental policy committees from an early stage in his Diet career (see
Table 4.1). The other reason was his involvement in the forestry industry that
had diverse, officially recognised environmental functions. There was a large
area of ‘protection forest’ in Japan, intended to serve the interests of the public.
‘Protection forests’ included ‘headwater conservation forest’, ‘soil run-off prevent
forest’, ‘landslide prevention forest’ and so on.
Second, Matsuoka had actively worked as a Forestry Agency bureaucrat,
sponsoring the construction of unnecessary forest roads that required the cutting
down of areas of forest.121 While the Forestry Agency’s mission was to protect
mountains and forests, it specialised in the felling of trees to build forest
roads.122 Further, as a politician, Matsuoka worked as political broker for
construction companies wanting to get involved in the construction of forest
roads, and for developer-clients who sought to convert forestland to other uses.
During the period of Matsuoka’s close association with forestry administration
and forest policy, Japan’s domestic forestry industry steadily declined with
mountain forests, in particular, falling into ruin.123
Matsuoka saw nothing contradictory about promoting higher prices for the
timber sold by domestic forest owners on the Japanese market, while at the
same time telling them that they and their organisations protected the green
spaces of Japan.124 Nor did he see any contradiction in utilising forests for
timber while husbanding them as a national resource. He acknowledged that
forests were diminishing around the world, but he sought to promote the use
of Japanese timber by the Japanese government.125 In this case, the economic
self-interest of Japan’s forest owners and Matsuoka’s political self-interest took

precedence over any environmental cause. Matsuoka’s position as a chairman of
the Forestry Policy Basic Problems Subcommittee was a venue in which he could
push this line, arguing that as forests were a resource that were cultivated
domestically, they should be positively utilised.126
From his vantage point as chairman of the subcommittee, Matsuoka made
common cause with the head of Zenshinren about the need to expand the demand
for the timber sold by the forest associations. At the same time, he was fond of
motherhood statements such as ‘making forests healthy protects our lives and the
earth’, by helping to protect against global warming. Those with a vested interest
in Japan’s domestic forestry industry (which, ironically meant felling rather than
conserving trees)—such as Matsuoka and Zenshinren – latched on to the cause of
‘global warming’, and sought to harness it for their own political purposes, just as
the agriculture lobby harnessed the issue of food self-sufficiency and food security.
Third, as Matsuoka’s involvement with the biomass project demonstrated,
some aspects of Matsuoka’s environmentalism were more about boosting
government spending in the agriculture and forestry sector, including for
public works projects in Matsuoka’s own electorate and thus gaining personal
political advantage, than about supporting any particular environmental
policy principle. Matsuoka became secretary-general of the Diet Members’
League for Promoting the Green Energy Revolution (Midori no Enerugî
Kaikaku Suishin Giin Renmei). The foundation general meeting of the league
was held in the LDP headquarters on 24 January 2003. In Matsuoka’s words,
the league ‘was established to promote the use of biomass and to aim to
manage both the rehabilitation of the earth’s environment and new energy
production’.127 Chairing the proceedings was Diet member Arai Hiroyuki,
while the first person to offer greetings was Etô Takami.128 Amongst those
attending were members of both houses of the Diet as well as officials of the
MAFF, the Natural Resources and Energy Agency and the Ministry of
Environment, with the bureaucrats attending as observers. Matsuoka made
a progress report to the gathering and read out the ‘foundation purpose
document’ of the league, which stated
[i]n the twenty-first century, the regeneration of the earth’s environment, which is the foundation
of existence, is the greatest theme for human kind….It is estimated that the scale of green
energy-related industries is about ¥700 billion and the anticipated impact on industry is ¥1.3
trillion, and through this, the steady decline in our primary industry can be reversed into a
large-growth industry.129
224 POWER AND PORK
A total of 91 LDP Diet members participated in the foundation general meeting

of the league.130 The MAFF had high hopes for the league to become its main
link to the political world.131
The meeting agreed to hold study groups to which academic experts were
invited to speak about various aspects of the ‘green revolution’. For example, in
July 2003, they invited two academics to talk to them on the subject of biomass
energy.132 They hoped to make a case for supporting and protecting Japanese
agriculture on the grounds that it would be a source of biomass energy, saying
‘[u]ntil now, local administration and farm products policy have always been
on the defensive. However, adopting a policy to utilise biomass energy effectively
will create an opportunity to be at the forefront of the times’.133 The study
group resolved to work hard with the ministries and agencies concerned to
realise a concrete biomass policy.134
Matsuoka was the driving force behind the league, having the most knowledge
and understanding of the issue amongst Diet members.135 Even Etô Takami,
who attended the general meeting as a representative promoter, said, ‘biomass is
Mr Matsuoka’s endeavour. You need to ask Mr Matsuoka for details [not me]’.136
Matsuoka, however, continued to refuse all interviews about biomass.137
Internationally, it was another matter. Matsuoka visited Brazil for agricultural
trade diplomacy in June 2004, but he took the opportunity to discuss the
Green Energy Revolution with the Brazilian ministers. The interest in the visit
was Brazil’s ethanol application policy.
Matsuoka was also a member of several Diet members’ leagues focussing on
the environment, including GLOBE Japan (Global Legislators Organization for
a Balanced Environment, or Chikyû Kankyô Kokusai Giin Renmei), which held
its first general meeting in June 2004. 138 Around 42 non-partisan Diet
representatives with an interest in environmental problems participated in GLOBE
Japan. The league was part of an international grouping consisting of
parliamentarians hoping to build international cooperation for dealing with global
environmental problems. It comprised volunteer legislators from parliaments in
Japan and the European Union, as well as the United States Congress.
However, it is, perhaps, the project to reclaim Isahaya Bay that most reveals
Matsuoka’s shallow environmentalism. Local residents and fishermen have
strenuously opposed the project, the fishermen arguing that it damaged the
local fishing industry as well as the seaweed catch. In late 2000, an out-of-
season red tide occurred in several places in the Ariake Sea. The discolouration of
cultured seaweed (nori) crops began to be noticeable, and this started to worry some
MAFF bureaucrats. A bad nori harvest also ran the risk of influencing the support
bases of Koga Makoto (secretary-general of the LDP) from Fukuoka, Matsuoka from
Kumamoto, and Noda Takeshi, secretary-general of the Conservative Party.139
The MAFF set up a committee of specialists in order to review the project.
Most of the members were sceptical about it, and most wanted the dyke gates
opened and investigated.140 There was a distinct split in the committee between
MAFF jimukan, who were critical of the project, and MAFF gikan, who backed
it with support from nôrin zoku including Matsuoka. The gikan on the
committee resisted proposals to freeze the reclamation works that were affecting
the water quality and an investigation into the dyke opening. They said that a
huge budget would be needed to remove 4 million cubic metres of mud before
the dyke could be opened.141
In August 2001, the jimukan officials proposed a large review of the project,
which would mean cancelling it and leaving the dyke gates open for the time
being. However, because this would require new expenditure, the plan failed
to get MOF approval, and a decision was taken to leave the dyke gate unopened
and to reduce the area of reclamation by half.
THE 2003 ELECTION

As a member of the LDP resistance forces, Matsuoka tried to exercise denial
rights over Koizumi’s reform proposals. Because of the lack of policy cohesion
within the LDP caused by the party’s decentralised policymaking process, it
was not only possible but also acceptable for individual LDP Diet politicians
like Matsuoka openly to oppose the prime minister and the Kantei. However,
Matsuoka’s individual power base in his own electoral district, from which he
mounted his attacks on Koizumi, turned out to be not quite so secure after all,
as the results of the 2003 election showed. As one political journalist pointed
out
Scary resistance politicians, such as Suzuki and Matsuoka, are completely disliked by the
population. In particular, since the establishment of the Koizumi government, their role as the
baddies has stuck, so they must be fairly anxious….[Their attacks on pro-Koizumi politicians]
probably come from this sense of anxiety, but in the end, they are just strangling themselves
with their own hands.142
226 POWER AND PORK
Matsuoka initially capitalised on his opposition to Koizumi (by gaining

public prominence) but then suffered as a result. He lost the seat of
Kumamoto (3) in the November 2003 election, in spite of the fact that the
Komeitô once again endorsed his candidacy143 and organisations connected
to agriculture campaigned vigorously in support of him. One election rally
in Kikuyo Town in Kikuchi County drew 3000 people, with the banners of
the Kômeitô, the Kumamoto Prefecture Farmers’ Political League and local
government organisations all visible in the throng. The rally was to hear
LDP Secretary-General, Abe Shinzô, give a speech in support of Matsuoka.
Other people also spoke, including the heads of the LDP’s federation of
Kumamoto Prefecture party branches and Nokyo-related groups. They
unanimously praised Matsuoka.144 However, one construction company owner
lamented on the eve of Abe’s visit to Kikuyo Town to support Matsuoka’s
campaign, ‘[w]hy must Abe support such a human being’?145 Nevertheless,
Abe’s appearance on the hustings helped to cement Matsuoka’s loyalty and
eventual backing for Abe’s bid to succeed Koizumi, which was rewarded, in
turn, with Matsuoka’s elevation to the position of MAFF minister in the first
Abe cabinet.
In line with the growing custom amongst the competing parties in the
election, Matsuoka drew up his own policy manifesto, which was broadly
publicised on his website, in order to convince voters to vote for him rather
than for one of the other candidates. Not only did Matsuoka’s advocacy of a
policy manifesto suggest that he was still operating as an independent political
entrepreneur with his own political marketing strategy, ‘combining “position
statements” on the big issues of the day…with special favours to local
interests’,146 but it also indicated that he was, or assumed himself to be, in a
position to deliver on the promises contained in his manifesto.147
The results of the election in Kumamoto (3) were very close: Matsuoka
lost his seat by only about 3000 votes. He won 76,469 votes, or 40.9 per
cent of the total cast vote of 186,857 (see Table 7.1), whilst his main rival,
standing as an Independent, won 79,500 votes (42.5 per cent of the total).
On the other hand, Matsuoka’s vote tally was a precipitous decline of 32,658
votes on his 2000 win (see Appendix), with the loss interrupting five
consecutive election victories in his local Kumamoto electoral district since
1990. Even in his jiban of Aso County, which, although it remained a rock
solid base of support supplying about one third of his total vote, Matsuoka
won only 51.9 per cent of votes (an overall decline of around 10,000 votes),
compared with just under 74.4 per cent in 2000 (see Table 3.2 and Table
7.1).
Matsuoka’s total county vote dropped by a third (see Table 3.2 and Table
7.1), representing less than half of the total cast vote (40.6 per cent) compared
with almost two-thirds in 2000 (see Table 3.2 and Table 7.1). It was in the
counties as much as in the cities where Matsuoka failed to gain his customary
levels of support. The most telling decline was in Matsuoka’s proportion of the
total vote won, which fell from 63.6 per cent in 2000 to 40.9 per cent in
2003 (see Table 3.2 and Table 7.1).
Even Matsuoka’s most fervent supporters seemed to catch a whiff of
impending disaster. In the early morning of polling day, a prominent member
of the Dôshikai in Aso Town visited someone who had strongly criticised the
Matsuoka-prefectural assembly member-Kawasaki regime, notifying him of
Matsuoka’s impending defeat.148
Fortunately for Matsuoka, he was saved from electoral oblivion by the PR
district system, scraping in at the bottom of the party list as one of three LDP
SMD candidates in Kyushu who lost their seats but who were ‘revived’ (fukkatsu)
by the party list in the Kyushu regional bloc constituency. The ‘best loser’
provision of the Public Office Election Law allowed losers in SMDs such as
Matsuoka to be elected under PR if they received more than a legal minimum
of votes (which was at least 10 per cent of the total vote in the SMD in which
they stood). The LDP’s overall vote tally in the Kyushu bloc was 36 per cent,
which entitled it to eight PR seats. Matusoka was ranked eighth.149 He only
managed to retain a Diet seat because he won 96.1 per cent of the victor’s
vote, which placed him third on the list of SMD losers. The party rewarded
only those SMD losers ‘who came closest to winning in their local district
races’.150 The top five on the party list were ranked by officials of the party
executive and were not standing in SMD seats. They were given priority over
Matsuoka and others who were simultaneously running in Kyushu SMDs.
Given his low ranking on the winners’ list, the 2003 Lower House election
was hardly a resounding victory for Matsuoka. This did not stop him and his
followers letting off loud fireworks in Aso Town in the early dawn hours of the
day after the election, to the anger and disgust of some of the residents.151
During the campaign, Matsuoka’s supporters had also put up posters of
Matsuoka and Abe in each of the polling stations in Aso Town, which some
228 POWER AND PORK
residents argued violated the Public Office Election Law. They had to go
through the town office to get them removed, resentful that Matsuoka and his
followers acted as if they owned the town.152
The 2003 election thus made Matsuoka into a PR bloc politician rather
than a local constituency politician. It meant that he was held in lower regard
compared to his standing as a representative of Kumamoto (3). His position in
the Diet and in the party was not as strong as it had been previously. He
joined the group of ‘zombie’ candidates (who had risen from the dead),153
winning only a bronze medal compared with the silver medalists (purely PR
candidates with strong party endorsement) and gold medalists (those successful
in the SMDs in their own right).
The loss of Matsuoka’s SMD seat was a big shock, not only to Matsuoka
himself but also to his supporters and to other nôrin giin in the party. Just past
1am on 10 October (the day after the election), a haggard Matsuoka emerged
in his electoral office and according to one source in his kôenkai said, ‘he
reflected that “what was misunderstood was my own lack of power”’.154
Some observers interpreted it as a ‘tectonic shift’ in an LDP ‘stronghold’
portending that ‘in the undercurrents in Japan, something was trying to
change’.155 The election results seemed to suggest that ‘the need for construction
companies to engage and invite Matsuoka’s attention appears to be diminishing.
Matsuoka is becoming a “has-been” for a wide range of social classes’.156 One
old timer in Aso Town commented, ‘[a]n unusual and big change has
occurred…it is a change that I haven’t witnessed before in my lifetime’.157
Matsuoka’s loss was symptomatic, amongst other things, of the punishment
that Japanese voters frequently mete out to notoriously corrupt and tainted
politicians. Matsuoka was seen as a typical conservative reactionary by many
non-rural and non-farm voters, who disapproved of his brush with the political
corruption scandal involving Muneo and Yamarin, and hints of others. After
Muneo was arrested and had to give up contesting his seat in the 2003 Lower
House elections, Matsuoka had gone quiet
[and] it seemed that the unfavorable wind against Matsuoka had stopped. However, as if to be
cursed by Muneo’s ghost, he tragically lost his seat in the Kumamoto (3)…For Matsuoka, he
was fighting the election amidst unfavourable winds….[In the campaign], Matsuoka appealed
to his past record over four terms, but the topic of Muneo was brought up again and again,
underlining Matsuoka’s strong image as ‘Muneo of the West’, which was a negative image that
worked against him. Matsuoka was fairly annoyed by this whole scenario.158
Matsuoka’s electoral record between 1990 and 2000 suggested that he had
never been very popular personally and that he had never really established an
impregnable electoral position in either Kumamoto (1) or in Kumamoto (3).
For example, in 1993, Hosokawa garnered over 200,000 votes, while Matsuoka
only secured just over 80,000 (see Appendix). It would seem that Matsuoka’s
supporters had only voted for him out of self-interest, which was not a sufficient
basis for sustained electoral popularity.
What was particularly galling about the 2003 election result for Matsuoka
was that he had not lost to someone from the main opposition DPJ whose
candidate garnered only 26,317 votes (just over a third of Matsuoka’s vote
tally) but to an Independent candidate called Sakamoto Tetsushi, a man who
was little known outside his local district of Kikuchi County.159 Sakamoto was
a former journalist for the Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, and a former four-
term LDP/Independent member of the Kumamoto prefectural assembly,
endorsed by the prefectural nôseiren. He had to split from the LDP prior to
the election because the party’s endorsement went to Matsuoka. LDP
supporters in the local area were reportedly in the habit of neatly dividing the
political world into two halves: ‘national politics = Matsuoka, and prefectural
politics = Sakamoto’.160 However, because Sakamoto stood as a candidate for a
Diet seat (thereby breaking the unspoken contract), the mud-slinging began.161
As Sakamoto was 53 years old, Matsuoka pilloried him saying, ‘you are a
betrayer. What can you do becoming a national Diet member past 50?’.162
The Sakamoto camp retorted, ‘Matsuoka’s method is just consistently to throw
mud’. 163 It also alleged: ‘Mysterious documents [libelling Sakamoto] were
distributed and there were as many as seven versions since the opening of the
electoral office. They were distributed over the entire electorate, so they would
amount to a few hundred thousand copies’.164
The campaign turned out to be a fierce contest between Matsuoka and Sakamoto.
Matsuoka reputedly carried about 50 per cent of the LDP vote, and 60 per cent of
the Kômeitô vote. In contrast, Sakamoto’s support was a mixture of about 20 per
cent of the LDP vote, 30 per cent of DPJ supporters, and 50 per cent of Social
Democratic Party (SDP) supporters. According to the Asahi, Sakamoto gained
great strength from criticising Matsuoka and made inroads into unaffiliated voters
and supporters of the DPJ.165 The DPJ candidate (like Matsuoka, also from the
Aso region) was winning only about 50 per cent of the DPJ vote.166
230
Name of municipality No. of farm Farm households Votes cast for % of total % of Matsuoka’s Placing
householdsa as % of total in Matsuoka cast vote total vote among 4
municipality/ies candidates
Cities 3,224 16.1 14,019 42.3 18.3 1st
Yamaga City 1,490 13.2 7,414 41.7 9.7 1st
Kikuchi City 1,734 20.0 6,605 43.0 8.6 1st
Counties 17,293 20.7 62,450 40.6 81.7 2nd
Kamoto County 5.052 29.5 15,993 48.1 20.9 1st
Kahoku Town 795 54.3 2,173 60.9 2.8 1st
Kikuka Town 1,158 55.6 2,579 52.7 3.4 1st
Kamoto Town 603 22.8 2,492 48.6 3.3 1st
Kao Town 695 47.2 1,873 52.9 2.4 1st
Ueki Town 1,801 19.1 6,876 42.7 9.0 1st
Kikuchi County 4,570 11.1 21,706 29.8 28.4 2nd
POWER AND PORK
Shichijo Town 795 39.4 1,658 45.9 2.2 1st

Kyokushi Village 1,158 36.8 1,607 47.1 2.1 1st
Ozu Town 603 12.6 3,586 22.6 4.7 2nd
Kikuyo Town 695 8.0 3,936 26.4 5.1 2nd
Koshi Town 1,801 7.4 3,604 29.7 4.7 2nd
Shisui Town 795 14.8 3,094 38.9 4.0 2nd
Nishigoshi Town 1,158 4.7 4,221 28.3 5.5 2nd
Aso County 7,671 31.1 24,751 51.9 32.4 1st
Aso Town 1,643 27.6 7,510 62.7 9.8 1st
Minamioguni Town 578 38.3 1,287 41.9 1.7 2nd
Oguni Town 854 28.5 1,803 31.7 2.4 2nd
Soyo Town 733 49.8 1,544 51.3 2.0 1st
Takamori Town 616 25.1 2,370 52.7 3.1 1st
Choyo Village 401 18.7 1,444 49.0 1.9 1st
Total 20,517 19.9 76,469 40.9 100.0 2nd
Notes: a Farm household data are for 2000.
Sources: Sômuchô, Tôkei Kyoku, Heisei 12-nen Kokusei Chôsa Hôkoku Dai 2-kan Dai I-ji Kihon Shûkei Kekka Sono 2 Todôfuken, Shichôson Hen-43
Kumamoto-ken, pp. 288-91 and 294-303; Kumamoto-ken Hômu Pêji/Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, (Dai 43-kai) Shûgiingiin Sôsenkyo (Shôsenkyoku) Kaihyô
Kekka: Heisei 15-nen 11-gatsu 9-ka [(The 43rd) House of Representatives General Election (Single-Member Districts), The Results of the Vote Count: 9
November 2003], p. 2; <http://www.pref.kumamoto.jp/gyousei/senkan/osirase/h15kekka/pdf/no43_03.pdf>.
ELECTORAL VICISSITUDES
231
232 POWER AND PORK
On the other hand, in strong contrast to Matsuoka, Sakamoto, as vice-

president of a body called ‘Group Reform’ (Gurûpu Kaikaku), was the only
candidate who campaigned on a platform of open support for Prime Minister
Koizumi’s reform program. Sakamoto’s policy platform advocated the
decentralisation of taxing and subsidy powers from central to local governments,
which was one of the main planks in Prime Minister Koizumi’s reform program.
Sakamoto claimed that he was running for the Diet to change politics and also
enthusiastically represented causes such as cleaner politics and ‘politics for the
people’.167 His successful election was an implicit criticism of Matsuoka.168
An LDP prefectural assembly member and supporter of Matsuoka explained
his defeat in the following terms
[w]e were defeated by our opponent’s strategies. We were accused of benefit and concession
politics, and I suppose this mudslinging confused the influential people. Because of the Yamarin
affair, we were predicting a difficult election, but we didn’t ever think that we’d lose. The LDP
also was not a monolithic union. While saying that they would support Matsuoka, about half
of the assembly members supported Sakamoto. There was also some rebellion as Matsuoka
was only favoring a few specific industries. The Sakamoto camp also distributed three or four
(libellous) documents. Sakamoto was elected, but the influential people didn’t care who got
elected. It means that they gathered the anti-Matsuoka vote.169
A journalist concurred, saying ‘the anti-Matsuoka vote that flowed to Sakamoto

is most likely the reason for his win’.170
Although Sakamoto subsequently joined the LDP’s parliamentary caucus
(kaiha) in the Lower House, meaning that he was considered an Independent
member of the ruling camp, and even though he joined the Yamasaki faction,
he remained an Independent for electoral purposes at the local constituency
level. From the perspective of the local LDP organisation in Kumamoto (3), he
was, therefore, not recognised as the LDP member for that constituency.
Sakamoto himself acknowledged that, although he was in the LDP kaiha in
the Diet, he was not recognised as a member of the LDP. Because of that, he
received no subsidy from the party.171 In fact, Matsuoka continued to give the
address of the LDP’s party branch in Kumamoto (3) as an address of his kôenkai.
This alone suggested that, from Matsuoka’s perspective, Sakamoto was merely
keeping the seat warm until Matsuoka won it back at the next election. It also
meant that Matsuoka would receive the party subsidy for Kumamoto (3) in
any subsequent campaign. On top of this, Matsuoka remained secretary-general
of the association of LDP Kyushu Diet members.
Even after his defeat, Matsuoka continued to cultivate the Kumamoto LDP
federation of branches assiduously. A photograph on his website showed him
addressing the women’s division of the federation.172 Clearly, the next Lower
House election would be a test to see whether Sakamoto could withstand a
renewed onslaught from Matsuoka.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MATSUOKA-SAKAMOTO

CONTEST
The significance of the electoral battle between Matsuoka and Sakamoto in
the 2003 election lay in the fact that it was a contest between the old and
new style of politics, a microcosm of the contest that was being played out
on the national political stage under Prime Minister Koizumi. The new style
of politician relied primarily on programmatic appeals, with a focus on
unaffiliated voters. Such politicians were not so reliant on the traditional
electoral ingredients that LDP candidates had so often drawn on for success
—a strong local jiban and kôenkai, the backing of various interest groups,
plentiful political funding as well as the advantages of incumbency, which
enabled them to guide benefits to local areas (rieki yûdô), to act as political
brokers for individual clients and to represent organised interest groups. As
one journalist commented, ‘the Matsuoka camp fortified itself through these
unchanging traditional, stable organisational votes centering on groups such
as the construction world and the agricultural political league. The Sakamoto
camp launched an election campaign that targeted not only these industries
but also more widely’.173
Matsuoka’s defeat was interpreted as a rejection of his political methods
and style. Those voting against him were appealing for another kind of politics,
condemning ‘the kind of political methods that relied on state power politics
and guiding benefits to local interests as bad’.174 Matsuoka’s defeat showed
that a political rival making programmatic appeals could win out over an
old-style LDP politician. Undoubtedly, Sakamoto’s victory was testimony to
voter support for Koizumi and his policy program. Sakamoto backed Koizumi’s
reforms, knowing that Matsuoka did not. In voting for Sakamoto, voters
were voting for a reform program and the prime minister. A politician like
Matsuoka could stand on a platform that opposed his party leader if the
electoral coalition supporting him were strong enough. Such independence
reflected the lack of policy cohesiveness in the LDP, its decentralised
234 POWER AND PORK
organisation, the weak link between the party and its own Diet members,
and the extent to which LDP candidates relied on their own individual power
bases.
Fundamentally, the loss of Matsuoka’s SMD seat could be explained by
his being exposed on two fronts. He was squeezed between the preferences of
non-rural and non-farm voters in Kumamoto (3), who were plumping for
change by voting for a candidate who had a strong reform image, and
dissatisfied farmers and rural dwellers opposed to the Koizumi
administration’s structural reform orientation and its cuts in public works
spending - policies that were contributing to the widespread perception in
regional areas that the administration’s economic policies, particularly cuts
in subsidies and public works, had caused economic recession to deepen in
regional areas.175
An investigative journalist from the Asahi journal Aera, visiting Kumamoto
in 2002, encountered several people who supported Matsuoka’s opposition to
the structural reforms in his electorate and neighbouring electorates.176 Even
former Chairman Araki of the Araki Construction Group in Kumamoto, who
was aware of Matsuoka’s bad reputation, made his support for Matsuoka clear
in his capacity as a representative of local construction businesses: ‘I am opposed
to the Koizumi government’s structural reforms. When there is a change of
government I want Matsuoka to be prime minister. I respect his anti-reformist
position very much’.177
However, not all local opinions were positive about Matsuoka. Yamaguchi
Rikio (54), who was born and lived in Aso Town, was a well known farmer
who ran a private facility called ‘Farmer Village’ that took in people who wanted
to experience farming life. He said
[e]ven people who live in this area do not really think that character [Matsuoka] is good. Even
the locals know that there are all sorts of rumors. These kinds of people thrive because our
choices are being eliminated by the small electorate system. We’re stressed about that. He’s
only riding on a system where the LDP and central government control the regional areas.
He’s only a pawn being used by the central government, and is nothing but an insignificant
member sacrificed so that the larger organisation can survive.178
Yamaguchi’s real gripe was the fact that he had to vote for Matsuoka, whom he
really disliked, if he wanted the LDP to win the seat of Kumamoto (3) because
the SMD system gave him no other choice.179 Such a view reflected a perception
of one commentator that
Matsuoka was a person who was immersed in the negative political structures of the country
where the bureaucracy, LDP and nôrin zoku teamed together to organise policy outcomes in
their own interests and were doing nothing but hanging on. If you walk around Kumamoto (3)
electorate, criticism of Matsuoka’s crawling around and participating in the execution of
projects based on bureaucratic demand echo everywhere.180
Another stated ‘Matsuoka isn’t even liked in his local area, but there’s an
atmosphere of being unable to oppose him’.181 His ‘presence is like a local
mafia boss. If someone humiliates Matsuoka on television, that person really
might get stabbed’. 182
TOEING THE KOIZUMI LINE

The biggest lesson for Matsuoka from his electoral loss and the main message
that he took from it was that if he wanted his old seat of Kumamoto (3)
back, he had to relinquish his anti-Koizumi, anti-reform position, and
present a reformist face to the greatest possible extent that was consistent
with his fervently held policy standpoints. This meant trading away
everything but the core positions that retained the backing of his core
supporters such as farmers.
The implications for Matsuoka’s giin katsudô of his status as a PR member
were also significant. His switch to the Kyushu regional bloc constituency
produced a Kumamoto-wide policy focus. Matsuoka threw himself into a
number of causes that were attractive to a wider range of voters.183 However,
because Matsuoka had an eye on winning back his old seat, he kept his main
focus on his old electorate.
On issues where his local supporters opposed Koizumi, he chose the role of
coordinator and mediator of the two sides, acknowledging their differing
positions but also emphasising the need for compromise. In May 2004,
Matsuoka travelled to Kumamoto along with all the other LDP Diet
representatives from the prefecture to attend a conference. The meeting was
held to discuss local issues with municipal mayors, the chairman of municipal
assemblies and town and village associations, and the chief of the secretariat of
the association of assembly chairmen. Topics included administrative problems
in the prefecture such as deteriorating fiscal conditions, the prolonged deflation-
recession, anxiety about employment and the impoverished regional economy.
The town and village representatives heartily complained that, if the Koizumi
administration’s ‘trinity reform’ were forcibly imposed without proper
236 POWER AND PORK
consideration of its impact on local government budgets, which were heavily

dependent on subsidies and tax revenue allocated by the central government,
even minimal residents’ services could not be guaranteed.184 Matsuoka’s solution
was for the national and local governments to acknowledge the problem and
work together strongly to solve it.185
Matsuoka went on gently questioning the wisdom of fiscal reforms that
would give rise to inequities between regions.186 His manner was a far cry from
the strident criticism that he had levelled at the Koizumi government’s policies
prior to his defeat in 2003. Matsuoka admitted that the ‘trinity reform’ was
designed to restore fiscal health to the regions, but he also expressed real concerns
for the agricultural and mountain village regions of Kumamoto where fiscal
resources would become scarcer. It was, therefore, necessary to produce a reform
plan that would make both cities and regional areas better, not worse.187
The loss of his 2003 seat reminded Matsuoka of his vulnerability in the
SMD poll, and of the fact that he was beaten by someone who was a Koizumi
supporter. He might also need LDP endorsement as a safety net in case he
failed to win a plurality in Kumamoto (3) in the next Lower House election
and put himself up again as a dual candidate on the party list.
Accordingly, Matsuoka abandoned his membership of the resistance forces
and began toeing the Koizumi line. The big test was his position on postal
privatisation, which ended up being Koizumi’s test of LDP endorsement in the
2005 Lower House election. In 2005, Matsuoka was made a director of the
Lower House Special Committee Relating to Postal Privatization (Yûsei Mineika
ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai). He claimed to be surprised at his nomination,
asserting that it was a complete bolt from the blue.188 Once he became a director
of the committee, he said that his responsibility was to make sure that deliberations
on the bill proceeded smoothly.189 However, because some members of the LDP
opposed the bill, committee deliberations did not proceed smoothly. Matsuoka
said, ‘my heart is full of anxiety in accepting such a difficult duty. However, since
postal privatisation is a campaign pledge of Prime Minister Koizumi, I will do
my best to manage the committee smoothly by making good use of my experience
in various Diet deliberations up till now.’190
This was an important committee in discussing and progressing the postal
privatisation bills, not only between the ruling and opposition parties but
also amongst the LDP Diet members themselves, some of whom were
opposed to Koizumi’s pet project. In his position as director, Matsuoka
was in frequent contact with Koizumi and became an ostensible convert to

the cause of postal privatisation. He admitted that being a director, and
thus being involved in managing the committee proceedings was hard, ‘I
am stuck all day in the Diet, coordinating etc. with the opposition, from
briefing before the committee meetings to the meeting of directors after
the committee meetings’. 191
The committee kept him exceedingly busy through 2005, leading to the
passage of the postal privatisation bills in the Lower House in October 2005.
Matsuoka was in the front line of all the discussions, negotiations and
coordination on the issue, describing himself as representing the LDP as a ‘top
batter’ in asking questions on the issue.192 His support for postal privatisation
would have put him in a very difficult position, given that his faction boss,
Kamei, was one of the chief hold-outs on the issue. In fact, as soon as there was
agreement that a dissolution of the Lower House was inevitable, Matsuoka
came out more strongly in favor of postal privatisation and parted company
from Kamei. Most anti-postal privatisation Diet members were either from
the Kamei or Hashimoto factions, both of which were generally critical of
Koizumi’s structural reform drive. A total of 12 out of the 37 Lower House
members who had voted against the postal privatisation bills were from the
Kamei faction.193 Because of the speed of Matsuoka’s departure from the Kamei
faction, he was labelled a ‘betrayer’ by Kamei faction insiders.194 Matsuoka
voted for the postal privatisation bills along with 197 other LDP Diet members.
Blatant self-interest was behind Matsuoka’s support for Koizumi’s postal
privatisation project. He was hoping for the position of MAFF minister in the
next Koizumi Cabinet, which would have realised a long-held ambition.195
During the subsequent September 2005 election, Matsuoka confidently
asserted to those around him that he wanted to ‘win votes fit for the position
of a minister. The post I want is Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries’.196 In Nagata-chô, however, the probability of Matsuoka’s achieving
his ambition was put at only about 30 per cent. It was generally thought that
MAFF Minister, Iwanaga Mineichi (who had been elevated to the position
from deputy minister, following MAFF Minister Shimamura’s sacking in August
for opposing the Lower House dissolution) would naturally accede to the
position. The fact that Matsuoka’s name came up in connection with the Yamarin
scandal caused by his sworn friend Muneo was generally thought to be
Matsuoka’s ‘Achilles heel’. The majority view was that ‘[the scandal] is too
238 POWER AND PORK
fresh [for Matsuoka] to become Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and

Fisheries’.197 A Kasumigaseki bureaucrat observed that even if Prime Minister
Koizumi gave Matsuoka a position based on merit, the best he could hope for
would be ‘about Minister of Environment’.198 As it turned out, the MAFF
minister’s position went to ex-METI Minister, Nakagawa Shôichi, Matsuoka’s
long-term rival and Muneo-hater. Matsuoka was totally passed over for
ministerial preferment.
THE 2005 ELECTION

In the September 2005 election, Matsuoka was again competing against the
incumbent, Sakamoto, and a newcomer from the DPJ, Nakagawa Kôichirô. At
a meeting in Koshi Town, the night after the dissolution of the House of
Representatives, a Bon dance festival was held. Both Sakamoto and Matsuoka
fronted up, and Matsuoka greeted the public by saying, ‘[f ]or 16 years, it has
only been me in the LDP’.199 On the podium, Matsuoka and Sakamoto’s eyes
barely met. Matsuoka kept on repeating: ‘This time round, I am the
challenger’.200 After the Diet’s dissolution, Matsuoka spent most of his time
in his local district, frequently making appearances at gatherings of his
supporters. At his electoral office, his secretaries made the rounds of various
areas in order to give out invitations to regional mayors and prefectural assembly
members requesting cooperation with Matsuoka’s re-election. There were also
phone calls from supporters saying ‘do your best’!201
The head of Matsuoka’s election office, Murata Kazuyoshi said, ‘[w]e want
to dig up support in an honest way’.202 At a sumô competition in Koshi Town,
there was spirit and determination in Matsuoka’s expression as he shook hands
with each person present. He reflected, ‘[l]ast time, Sakamoto stood; and from
my local area Aso, there was a Democrat candidate. I was in an adverse situation’.203
This time, Matsuoka emphasised his achievements as the chairman of the LDP’s
Special Committee Relating to Postal Privatization. He campaigned as ‘a helper
in Koizumi’s reform’ and strove to revamp his image.204 He began his campaign
outside the Aso Shrine, saying ‘[t]he catchphrase “reform leader” indicates my will
to see through reforms and not to give in to difficulties, no matter what. I want to
develop agriculture into a No. 1 export industry and to lead and carry out reform
of agriculture so that it will no longer need subsidies’.205
A week before election day, Matsuoka went down on his bended knees at an
individual speech event for the LDP candidate for Kumamoto (3). It was held in
the Aso City Gymnasium.206 The supporters who flocked to the gathering could
not believe their eyes when they saw the behaviour of the candidate who made an
impassioned speech, saying ‘this is a once-in-a-lifetime request’.207 Matsuoka went
down on both hands and knees and lowered his head deeply. The hall went silent
for a moment, and then there was big applause.208 Matsuoka conducted his campaign
as ‘a fight in which he risked his political life and which he could not lose’.209
In an exceptional case of ‘burning his bridges’, Matsuoka withdrew his joint
candidacy in the PR Kyushu bloc saying that ‘last time was a 50 per cent
victory; this time I will aim for a 100 per cent victory [meaning, winning back
his SMD seat]’.210 His withdrawal from the bloc seat was the trigger for Prime
Minister Koizumi to show his support for Matsuoka, which enabled Matsuoka
to secure votes from unaffiliated voters.211 It also put even greater pressure on
Sakamoto.212 The head of Sakamoto’s election office said: ‘We’d like to fight it
out on policy issues this time. We will strive for an election that doesn’t use
money’.213 Sakamoto pushed his reform message again, saying ‘[l]et’s carry
out real reforms, improvements and politics’.214
Matsuoka’s loyalty on the postal privatisation issue was rewarded with LDP
(and Kômeitô’s) endorsement in the 2005 election. The latter’s endorsement
was reputedly worth about 2000 votes.215 The organisation representing retired
special postmasters and their families (Taiju) in Kumamoto issued a
recommendation for a ‘free vote’ because all the LDP candidates from the
prefecture had supported postal privatisation.216 In a public meeting in his
electorate, Matsuoka stated that he was ‘in favour of privatisation’, as did
Sakamoto.217 This made the competition between them even more severe as
the differences in their policies were not clear. Matsuoka was described in the
press as having infiltrated Kômeitô supporters, while Sakamoto reputedly
broadened his support amongst unaffiliated voters and made inroads into
supporters of the DPJ.218 Sakamoto sent his election car out into the rural
areas, travelling in search of houses on narrow roads and steep mountain paths.
When he found someone, ‘he would run towards them and shake their
hands’.219 In fact, he had ‘continued to do the rounds of the local area every
week even after he was elected last time, greeting his supporters. He claimed
that “support is slowly being established”’.220
Matsuoka was able to capitalise on the fact that Sakamoto’s attitude to postal
privatisation was somewhat inconsistent, opposing it right up until just before
the Lower House vote. Sakamoto acknowledged that this would have an impact
240 POWER AND PORK
on his support, but claimed that, as the son of the chief of a privately owned post
office, he knew the post office best. Sakamoto also reportedly gained strength
from criticising Matsuoka. Kumamoto (3) was widely portrayed in the press as
an electorate where a fierce battle for victory was being fought between Matsuoka
and Sakamoto, and where the new DPJ candidate could hardly get a look in.221
Sakamoto, however, had difficulty in raising sufficient funds, and put out a
call on his website for financial backing for his support association. He explained
that he received no subsidy from the LDP, in spite of the fact that he was a
member of its parliamentary caucus. He said that he was not a member of the
party itself (seitôin), and, as an Independent, he could not receive contributions
from corporations. He had to rely totally on donations from individual
persons.222 Sakamoto also objected in principle to corporate donations in line
with his promotion of clean politics and breaking up the adhesion between
politicians and corporations.223
All the LDP candidates standing for SMDs and the Kyushu bloc from
Kumamoto received the recommendation from the prefectural Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. They exchanged policy agreements that committed
them to wide-ranging coordination in the event that large stores would be built
in local areas and to making efforts to secure budgetary funds and implementing
countermeasures for the vitalisation of small and medium-sized businesses.224
As was customary, Matsuoka also received the backing of the local agricultural
cooperatives. The nôseiren recommended all the candidates in Kyushu except
for one in Kagoshima, an Independent standing in opposition to the postal
privatisation bills. The reason given was that the candidates had strong ties
with the nôseiren, and ‘importance was placed on already established
pipelines’.225 Many Nokyo organisations in 2005 made opposition to a plan
to break up agricultural cooperatives as a condition for their support of LDP
candidates running in their constituencies. Although in Kumamoto there were
no LDP incumbents who had voted against the postal services bill, the
prefectural nôseiren, which feared that ‘after the postal service the agricultural
cooperatives will be targeted for reform’,226 presented a memo signed by the
chairman of the nôseiren, Sonoda Toshiyuki, and the six LDP-endorsed
representatives from the prefecture who were recommended by the organisation.
The memo pointed out that the government’s Deregulation and Privatisation
Promotion Council (Kitei Kaikaku/Minkan Kaihô Suishin Kaigi) was
attempting to announce the separation and division of the agricultural
cooperatives, and on this basis they claimed that ‘it is unwarranted intervention
and should be withdrawn and reconsidered’.227 Sonoda stated
Koizumi is out to crush vested interests by saying he is going to ‘destroy the old LDP’.
Normally where the brakes would work, he puts forward an argument, and pushes [changes]
through, and does not hide his feelings of caution. If he proposes it in the Diet, he’ll face
opposition that will far and away exceed the levels of the postal service.228
However, the prefectural nôseiren rationalised its support for the LDP by
saying that ‘the stability of the political situation is essential’.229 The memo
was a desperate measure taken under the pressure of necessity.230
Matsuoka won 86,688 votes or 43.7 per cent of the total cast vote (see Appendix).
This was a little over 10,000 more votes than he received in 2003, but it made all
the difference between victory and failure by putting him well ahead of Sakamoto.
It was this surge in support that won Matsuoka the seat, because Sakamoto’s vote
tally changed very little (78,796 votes compared with 79,500 votes in 2003).231
The Sakamoto camp bemoaned the fact that ‘most of the Kômeitô’s votes went to
Matsuoka as the cause of their defeat’.232 In defeating Sakamoto, Matsuoka reputedly
‘vindicated his honor’, while in Kumamoto as a whole, LDP candidates were so
successful that a new ‘conservative kingdom’ appeared in the offing.233
Following his victory, Matsuoka bowed his head deeply saying, ‘I am full
of thanks and appreciation that cannot be expressed in words. I would like
to repay everyone’s kindness through my political activities’.234 He declared
that he would ‘faithfully carry out the judgement of the people on
administrative, fiscal and political reform, starting with postal privatisation’.235
His post 2005 election victory statement stressed his pairing of environmental
and regional economic objectives
Amidst the stagnation of regional economies, by practising the ‘Green Energy Revolution’ that
uses regional greenery as an energy resource, I will make efforts to make possible the combination
of environmental preservation and the stimulation of the regional economy.236
However, Matsuoka won his seat back primarily because he was now seen
publicly to be allied with Koizumi’s reform program. Koizumi himself came to
Kumamoto to publicly campaign with Matsuoka. On his website, Matsuoka
proudly displayed a photograph of himself and Koizumi holding up their arms
together on top of a campaign platform. Moreover, photos of Matsuoka with
Koizumi were used extensively for Matsuoka’s election posters. In Matsuoka’s
election speeches, he stressed his ‘closeness of distance with Prime Minister
Koizumi’ by frequently raising his name.237 Election analysts commented that
242 POWER AND PORK
in Matsuoka’s victory, there was certainly a ‘Koizumi effect. Unaffiliated voters

were mobilised by the national surge of Koizumi’s LDP superiority’.238
Some of the gloss on Matsuoka’s victory was subsequently tarnished by the
arrest of one of his campaign workers, Ieiri Katsukichi, a resident of Nishimachi
in Aso City, for vote buying and thus violating the Public Office Election Law.
According to the investigations that led to the charge, Ieiri plotted with Ichihara
Shiegyuki, unemployed of Aso City, along with others from Aso City at the
beginning of September to ask several voters to gather support for Matsuoka.
They were suspected of giving voters several tens of thousands of yen each.239
The election result meant that Matsuoka’s closest mates were now out of the
party, including his old faction boss, Kamei, who stood and won for the People’s
New Party (Kokumin Shintô) in his constituency of Hiroshima (6). Kamei described
Koizumi as ‘worse than Hitler’ for having sent the rebels ‘to a gas chamber’.240 Ibuki
Bunmei took over Kamei’s faction (the Shisuikai) and Matsuoka joined it, along
with other nôrin zoku such as Yatsu Yoshio, Nakagawa Shôichi and Kawamura Takeo.
Following the election Matsuoka had to find a place for himself in the new,
much more unified and policy-cohesive LDP under Koizumi, in which the
dual structure of LDP—bureaucracy policymaking continued to be
undermined by the shift towards a more prime minister-centred policymaking
system. On the other hand, even though the LDP as a party became less
dependent on organised interests in the election and although Matsuoka picked
up the pro-Koizumi LDP vote, he was still dependent to a large degree on his
customary supporters. In spite of his apparent conversion, Matsuoka remained
very much a traditional LDP member, dependent on agricultural cooperatives,
construction industry groups and other special-interest groups as well as his
own supporters’ association for his political base, with only a little help from
unaffiliated voters. That help, however, could well have made the difference
between success and failure, a lesson that would not be lost on Matsuoka.
In the wake of the 2005 election, and with his ambition to secure the post
of MAFF minister still unrealised, Matsuoka tried to demonstrate his leadership
potential and ability to act as a policy coordinator on issues such as agricultural
trade. Appointed as chairman of the LDP’s Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
Products Trade Investigation Committee, and in the newly created position of
chairman of the LDP’s Committee to Rapidly Promote Exports of Agricultural
Products, Matsuoka endeavoured to find a compromise between maintaining
agricultural protection and responding positively to a policy environment that
was increasingly favorable to bilateral trade deals. The incoming prime minister,
Abe Shinzô, had already indicated his strong support for FTAs with other
countries in the Asia Pacific. Matsuoka, wearing his hat as a special-interest
farm politician, demanded an expansion in the MAFF’s agricultural export
promotion budget to more than ¥2 billion.241 However, wearing his hat as an
agricultural trade policy leader, he sought to exploit the opportunities presented
by further liberalisation, proposing that Japanese agricultural processors add
value to foreign farm imports and then export them to other countries. His
public acceptance of trade bilateralism, together with his long-standing loyalty
to Abe were finally rewarded with appointment to the position of Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in Abe’s first cabinet. However, Matsuoka
remained a very traditional politician pretending to be a new style of politician
in order to secure the position of minister.242
In an interview with the press shortly after his appointment, Matsuoka
reiterated his trademark themes of aggressively promoting Japanese agricultural
exports and expanding biomass energy-based production.243 On trade matters,
he blamed the United States for the failure of the WTO Doha Round whilst
declaring that he was committed to the defence of Japan’s position244 and to
adopting a stance of ‘taking whatever we can and accepting whatever we
should’.245 On FTAs, he professed a ‘give and take’ approach, admitting to
being less than enthusiastic about trade agreements with countries that would
not reciprocate by taking Japanese agricultural exports.246
NOTES
1 Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 November 2003.
5 The Japan Times, 23 May 2001.
6 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 19 May 2005.
7 The ‘special road revenue comes mainly from gasoline and vehicle weight taxes. It has been instrumental
in improving the nation’s roads and highway networks since WWII. However, critics argue that for
many years, it has been used by LDP elements for pork-barrel politics.’ The Japan Times, 23 May
2001.
9 ibid., 23 May 2001.
10 This policy objective emerged as a Koizumi administration priority policy task following postal
privatisation after the September 2005 Lower House election. Tamagawa Tôru, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu
Giin no “Senryaku”’ [‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Member’s “Strategy”’]. Available from http://www.tv-
asahi.co.jp/scoop/update/director/20011201_010.html
12 ibid.
13 Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 September 2005.
244 POWER AND PORK

17 ibid.
18 ‘Nihon no Kiki o Sukui Shin no Kaikaku o Jitsugen shi Akarui Mirai o Sôzô suru Giin Renmei (Mirai
Sôzô Giren) Sankasha Risuto’ [‘Participants List of Diet Members’ League to Create a Bright Future by
Saving Japan and Realising True Reform (Future Creating Giin League)’]. Available from http://
www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/naito38/mirailist.htm
19 ‘Nihon no Kiki o Sukui Shin no Kaikaku o Jitsugen shi Akarui Mirai o Sôzô suru Giin Renmei (Mirai
Sôzô Giren) Sankasha Risuto’. Available from http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/naito38/mirailist.htm
21 ibid.
22 ‘Seijika o Kattei ni Kenkyû suru’ [‘Researching a Politician Off My Own Bat’]. Available from http:/
/www.geocities.co.jp/WattStreet-Stock/4518/matsuoka_t.html
23 The formal English translation of the title of this group is National Joint Struggle. It was the leading
group in the Japanese university students’ movement in the 1960s.
25 This was a reference to Yamasaki Taku, who was secretary-general of the LDP at the time. Nakanishi and
Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 99. Yamasaki was Prime Minister
Koizumi’s right-hand man in pushing his structural reform program. After a sex scandal cost him his
seat in the Lower House in 2003, the former LDP vice-president and secretary-general in the first
Koizumi administration won back a seat in the Lower House in a Fukuoka (2) by-election in April
2005, although Yamasaki had remained special advisor to the prime minister after losing his seat.
26 Tamagawa, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Giin no “Senryaku”’. Available from http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/
scoop/update/director/20011201_010.html
27 ibid.
29 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
38 ibid., 29 December 2001.
39 ibid.
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
43 ibid.
44 The trinity reform of central and local fiscal and taxation systems aims to cut national subsidies to local
governments (used for public services, including works projects, education and welfare), to review tax
allocations from the central government to municipalities (including a review of allocating taxes to all
municipalities on an equal basis), and to cede some tax collection authority (that is, over income,
consumption, corporate, liquor, petroleum and tobacco taxes) to municipalities. The reforms are
intended to reduce the budget deficits of both central and local governments while promoting
decentralisation. In the view of the Koizumi administration: ‘Too much money in the form of
subsidies and tax grants to municipalities pamper them…If each local authority has to raise its own
revenue, this will reduce unnecessary projects for roads and infrastructure’. The Japan Times, 14 June
2003. In late 2004, the government hammered out a trinity reform framework that called for cutting
¥4 trillion in state subsidies over the three years that ends in fiscal 2006 and transferring ¥3 trillion
in tax revenue sources to local governments. Asahi Shinbun, 5 October 2005.
45 ‘Jimintô to iu Kettei Hôhô’ [‘The LDP Decision Method’], in Director’s Eye. Available from http://
www.tv-asahi.co.jp/scoop/update/director/20011201_010.html
46 ibid.
48 Tamagawa, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Giin no “Senryaku”’. Available from http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/
scoop/update/director/20011201_010.html
49 ‘Jimintô, to iu Kettei Hôhô’. Available from http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/scoop/update/director/
20011201_010.html
50 Okano Sadahiko, ‘Progress Toward a New Policy-Making Process’, Japan Echo, Vol. 10, October
2005, p. 41.
52 ibid.
53 Several comments critical of the government’s handling of this issue were made at a December 2003
meeting of the panel, such as ‘the government lacks an FTA strategy’ and ‘its response is haphazard’.
Asahi Shinbun, 4 December 2003.
54 ‘Kantei Shudô no FTA Suishin ni Hanpatsu shi Kessoku mo, Kyûshinryoku Kadai’ [‘The Prime
Minister’s Official Residence Leadership’s FTA Promotion, Centripetal Force Topic’], Nôsei Undô
Jyânaru, No. 53, February 2004, p. 1.
56 ibid.
57 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘“FTA Kôshô no Kantei Dokusô” o Kensei’ [‘Restrain the “Unilateral
Action of the Prime Minister’s Official Residence on FTA Negotiations”’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
58 ‘“FTA Kôshô no Kantei Dokusô” o Kensei’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//
public/048.html.
59 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 11 March 2004.
60 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Midori no Enerugî Kakumei ga Zenshin’ [‘The Green Energy
Revolution Advances’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
62 ibid.
63 ibid., p. 289.
64 ibid.
65 ibid.
66 ibid., p. 291.
67 ibid., p. 290.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 ibid..
71 ibid.
72 ibid., p. 291.
73 ibid.
74 ibid., p. 292.
75 ibid.
76 ibid., p. 288.
77 ibid., p. 286.
246 POWER AND PORK

81 Itô, ‘“Muneo no Meiyû” no Arata na Taidô’, pp. 292–93.
82 ibid., p. 293.
89 ibid., p. 288.
90 ibid., p. 287.
91 The first BSE case was discovered in the United States in December 2003.
92 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Gyûdon Fukatsu no Hi wa Itsu?’ [‘When Will the Day Come
When Beef Bowl Comes Back?’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://
matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/051.html
93 ibid.
94 Indonesia’s timber king, for example, has been active in the same process of ‘green-wash’, as well as in
the International Olympics. Personal communication, Paul Gellert, Visiting Fellow, Institute of Asian
Cultures, Sophia University, 1 April 2005.
96 See http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/giindata/matsuoka-to.html
97 ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’, Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 53, February 2004, p. 23.
98 ‘“Stop the Illegal Logging” Summary’, International Symposium on Countermeasures for Illegal
Logging. Available from http://www.zenmoku.jp/sinrin/symp2003_rep_e.html
99 The significance of the words ‘absorption source’ is that forests are a source of absorption of greenhouse
gases, thus helping to prevent global warming.
100 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Ondanka Bôshi no Kagi o Nigiru “Shinrin Seibi” no Kakujû o’
[‘Expansion of “Forestry Maintenance” Holds the Key to Preventing Global Warming’], in Katsudô
Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/041.html
101 ‘Ondanka Bôshi no Kagi o Nigiru “Shinrin Seibi” no Kakujû o’. Available from http://
matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/041.html
102 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Tô no Nôrin Kankei Kaigi ga Meijirooshi’ [‘The Party’s Agriculture
and Forestry-Related Council Stands Close Side by Side’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
103 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Sutoppu the Kankyô Hakai, Kokusan Zai o Tsukaeba Mondai
Kaiketsu’ [‘Stop the Destruction of the Environment, Solve the Problem by Using Domestic Timber’],
in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/
054.html
104 ‘Results of the Regional Workshop on Strengthening the Asia Forest Partnership’, MAFF Update, No.
563, 27 October 2004. Available from http://www.maff.go.jp/mud/563.html
105 See http://www.illegal-logging.info/news.php?newsId=456
106 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘“Mizu to Shinrin no Taisetsusa” Sekai e Uttaeru’ [‘An Appeal on the
“Importance of Water and Forests” to the World’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from
107 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Mokuzai ni mo Torêsabiritei o’ [‘Traceability Even for Timber’],
in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
108 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Gurîn Kônyûhô de mo Ihô Bassai Taisaku o’ [‘Illegal Logging
Countermeasures Even Under the Green Purchasing Law’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
109 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Eikoku Môrî Kankyô, Shokuryô, Nôson Chiikishô Kakugai Daijin
no Shôsei o Uke Hôei’ [‘A Visit to the United Kingdom at the Invitation of Minister Morley, Minister
of State for the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity
Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/059.html
110 ‘Forest Governance and Trade – Japan, the UK and EU Initiatives’, Chatham House, London.
Available from http://www.illegal-logging.info/events/Japan_meeting_notes.doc
111 ibid.
112 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Shinbun Kiji ni Miru Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi no Seiji
Katsudô’ [‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Diet Members’ Political Activities Seen in a Newspaper Article’].
Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/069.html
113 ‘Shinbun Kiji ni Miru Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi no Seiji Katsudô’. Available from http://
114 Gleneagles Plan of Action, Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development. Available
from http://www.g8.gc.ca
115 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kinkyô Hôkoku’ [‘A Report on Recent Doings’]. Available from
116 ibid.
117 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Nitchû Ryokka Suishin Giin Renmei, Yakuinkai nite Konnendo
no Shien Katsudô’ [‘The Diet Members’ League to Promote Japan-China Tree-Planting Checks This
Fiscal Year’s Support Activities at an Executive Committee’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/003.html
118 ibid.
119 See below.
120 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Chûnichi Chûgoku Taishi to no Iken Kôkan’ [‘Exchanging
Opinions with the Chinese Ambassador’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http:/
/www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/059.html
121 Even while the Forestry Agency carried a debt burden of ¥3.7 trillion, it continued to cut down forests
all around Japan and build unnecessary roads. One of the ‘forestry area development roads’ running
through the mountain forests of Fukushima Prefecture caught media attention. It lay unfinished
under the snow. After 30 years it was still only 50 per cent complete. The total cost of the road was put
at ¥46.5 billion, approximately ¥34 billion of which was provided by central government subsidies.
‘Rinya Gyôsei ga Baramaki Tsuzukeru Dôtô Kensetsu Hojokin to Sugi Kafun’ [‘Forestry Administration
Continues to Scatter Road Construction Subsidies and Cedar Pollen’], Shûkan Daiyamondo, 20 April
2002, pp. 66 and 69.
122 ibid., p. 67.
123 ibid., pp. 66–69.
124 ‘Aso Shinrin Kumiai Sôdaikai’ [‘A Representatives’ Meeting of the Aso Forestry Association’], in
Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
125 ‘Oguni-machi Gikai’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
126 ibid.
127 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Midori no Enerugî Kakumei Suishin Giin Renmei Hossoku!!’
[‘Launching the Diet Members’ League to Promote the Green Energy Revolution!!’], in Katsudô
Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/003.html
129 ibid.
130 ‘Midori no Enerugî Kakumei’. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//public/
003.html. Another source put the figure at 93. Itô, ‘“Muneo no Meiyû” no Arata na Taidô’, p. 290.
132 Biomass energy is created from the fermentation of animal dung, which produces biogas—methane and
carbon dioxide—for use as fuel. The researchers are professors belonging to the Society for the Study of
Green Energy founded by Mitsuzuka. They, along with about eight other professors, are researching
biomass energy. The society also accepts executives from Mitsuzuka’s businesses and from general construction
companies and engineering companies. Itô, ‘“Muneo no Meiyû” no Arata na Taidô’, p. 292.
248 POWER AND PORK
133 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Midori no Enerugî Kaikaku Suishin Giren Dai-2 Kai Benkyôkai’
[‘The Second Study Group of the Diet Members’ League for Promoting the Green Energy Revolution’],
in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/
041.html
134 ibid.
136 ibid.
137 ibid.
138 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘GLOBE Japan (Chikyû Kankyô Kokusai Giin Renmei) Sôkai
Kaisai’ [‘General Meeting of GLOBE (Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment’)
Held]’, in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/sit002//
public/054.html
139 asahi.com. See http://mytown.asahi.com/saga/news01.asp?c=5&kiji=725
140 ibid.
141 ibid.
143 In the 2003 elections, Kômeitô supported 198 out of 277 LDP candidates in SMDs. Nikkei Weekly,
24 November 2003.
145 ibid.
146 Self, Peter, 1993. Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice, Macmillan, Houndmills, p. 31.
This is how Peter Self describes the rational choice theory of Mayhew (Congress: The Electoral Connection,
Yale University Press, 1974) about how Congressmen in the United States seek ‘to get and stay elected’.
147 These promises included the following: realising the Green Energy Revolution; establishing welfare
systems such as reliable pensions, medical and aged care, and nursing systems; establishing a new
education system that would become the basis for building the country in the twenty-first century;
establishing a society in which everyone could feel safe; promoting policies for an aged society and for
the participation of women; establishing a base for economic activities and daily living; and establishing
a base for the regional economy. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html. A
similar list of commitments can be found at http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/giindata/matsuoka-to.html
149 There were 10 more LDP SMD losers below him, six of whom lost to the DPJ.
150 Machidori, ‘The 1990s Reforms Have Transformed Japanese Politics’, p. 40.
152 ibid.
153 Krauss and Pekkanen, ‘Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform’, p. 7.
155 Hasegawa, ‘Jimin “Gajô” no Chikaku Hendô’, pp. 25–27.
156 ibid., p. 27.
157 ibid., p. 25.
161 ibid.
162 ibid.
163 ibid.
164 ibid., pp. 28–29.
165 asahi.com. See http://www2.asahi.com/senkyo2005/local_news/kumamoto/SEB2…
166 Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 November 2003.
167 ‘Sakamoto Tetsushi o Sasaerukai Nyûkai no Goannai’ [‘Information for Becoming a Member of
Sakamoto Tetsushi’s Support Association’]. Available from http://www.tetusi.com/sasaeru/index.html

169 ibid., p. 29.
170 ibid., p. 28.
171 See http://www.tetsusi.com/sasaeru/index.html
174 ibid.
175 ‘Sôsaisen, Sôsenkyo, Tsugi no Rîdâ…’ [‘Election for the President, General Election, The Next
Leaders…’], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 50, August 2003, p. 1.
177 ibid.
178 ibid., pp. 24–25.
179 This reflects wider frustration amongst farmers and rural dwellers, who, according to research done by
Robin Le Blanc, are ‘frustrated by the reduced selection of LDP-type candidates. Where two very
different LDP members from two distinct factions had represented the area prior to the 1990s, voters
now have to choose from a list typically including a single LDP candidate, a Communist, and a DPJ
candidate’. ‘The Small District System’. Available from http://ssj-forum@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp, 13 October
2005.
182 ibid.
184 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Kumamoto Kenka no Zen Chôson to no Iken Kôkankai’ [‘Meeting
to Exchange Opinions with All Towns and Villages in Kumamoto Prefecture’], in Katsudô Hôkoku
[Activity Report]. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/site002//public/053.html
185 ‘Kumamoto Kenka no Zen Chôson to no Iken Kôkankai’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
186 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Chiikikan Kakusa o Umu Zaisei Kaikaku de yoi ka?’ [‘Are Fiscal
Reforms that Produce Differences between Regions Good?’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
187 ‘Chiikikan Kakusa o Umu Zaisei Kaikaku de yoi ka?’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
index1.html
188 ‘Kinkyô Hôkoku’. Available from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
189 ibid.
190 ibid.
191 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Hakunetsu shita Yûsei Mineika Hôan Shingi’ [‘Deliberations on
the Postal Privatization Bills Have Reached a Climax’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report]. Available
from http://matsuokatoshikatsu.org/index1.html
192 Matsuoka Toshikatsu Official Site, ‘Yûsei Mineikahô Yoyatôan no Shingi’ [‘Deliberations of Government
and Opposition Party Drafts of the Postal Privatization Laws’], in Katsudô Hôkoku [Activity Report].
193 Sankei Shinbun, 6 July 2005.
194 Mainichi Ekonomisuto, 18 October 2005.
195 ibid.
196 ibid.
197 ibid.
198 ibid.
200 ibid.
201 ibid.
202 ibid.
250 POWER AND PORK
203 ibid.
204 ibid.
205 Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 August 2005.
206 On 11 February 2005, Aso Town became Aso City by merging with Ichinomiya Town and Namino
Village.
213 ibid.
217 ibid.
218 ibid.
219 ibid.
220 ibid.
221 ‘2005 Sôsenkyo’ [‘2005 General Election’], asahi.com. Available from http://www2.asahi.com/
senkyo2005/local_news/kumamoto/SEB2…
222 See http://www.tetusi.com/sasaeru/index.html
223 ibid.
224 asahi.com. See http://www2.asahi.com/senkyo2005/local_news/kumamoto/SEB2….
225 ibid.
226 ibid.
227 ibid.
228 ibid.
229 ibid.
230 ibid.
231 ‘2005 Sôsenkyo’, asahi.com. Available from http://www2.asahi.com/senkyo2005/kaihyo/A43003.html
233 Mainichi Shinbun, 13 September 2005.
235 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Daigishi kara Minasama e’. Available from http://www.matsuokatoshikatsu.org/
238 ibid.
239 Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 October 2005.
240 Los Angeles Times. See http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-japan12sep…
241 Nihon Nogyo Shinbun, 2 August 2006.
242 Personal communication, Japanese government official, 4 October 2006.
243 Yomuri Shinbun, 29 September 2005.
245 Yomuri Shinbun, 29 September 2005.
CONCLUSION 251
8
CONCLUSION
What is it like to be a Japanese politician in the LDP? How do such politicians

fill their days? What kinds of issues motivate them? How do they gather
support? This book has tried to answer these and other related questions by
personalising Japanese politics as a story of an individual politician. Its approach,
although superficially similar to a political biography, is very different in
purpose. While eschewing generalisation, it has aspired to yield the kind of
understanding and insights about Japanese politics that have previously been
derived from more general, orthodox studies. Japanese politics lends itself to
such analysis because of the prominent role of individual LDP Diet members,
which can be seen in several important contexts: in the electoral arena, in the
arena of party politics, and in the arena of policymaking.
The book has told the ‘inside story’ of a Japanese politician, Matsuoka
Toshikatsu. It is primarily based on what Matsuoka has said about himself and
his activities, and what others have said about him. It shows how, as an LDP
backbencher, Matsuoka has lived by the unspoken creed of ‘power and pork’.
The book details Matsuoka’s early background, career progress, support
structures, electoral fortunes, personal connections and policy activities. In
doing so, it documents the very public side of Matsuoka’s life as he has strutted
the political stage, representing special interests, holding court in his Diet
office like a feudal overlord, deliberating on policy measures with other LDP
politicians in PARC committees, lobbying the government for certain causes,
shaping policy outcomes and traversing the world like a salesman ‘selling’ the
cause of Japanese agricultural protection.
252 POWER AND PORK
At the same time, the book exposes more covert aspects of Matsuoka’s political
activities, uncovering some of the deals that have been struck and how Matsuoka
has ‘sold’ his services as a political broker in order to secure political funding.
Not surprisingly, Matsuoka has been called a ‘concession-hunting politician to
the marrow’.1 As mediator and political ‘fixer’, Matsuoka has established a direct
line of influence over public officials, particularly those in the MAFF, which has
often skewed the distribution of public resources in favour of his own electorate.
Matsuoka has exemplified the political phenomena of localism, sectionalism
and clientelism. Those wanting benefits and favours from the central government
either as macro-policies or micro-favours have used Matsuoka as an instrument
of delivering collective or personal gains. In turn, Matsuoka has utilised these
supplicants and supporters as the means of ensuring his own continuing electoral
success and financial strength.
Like politicians everywhere, Matsuoka’s overwhelming concern has been the
realisation of his personal political ambitions, a goal that has encompassed
both electoral survival and career advancement. The details of Matsuoka’s
political activities in this book show that Matsuoka has been prepared to do
practically whatever it takes to achieve his goals. Moreover, given the borderline
criminality of a number of his activities, he has been exceedingly fortunate to
escape prosecution and political demise. Reading between the lines of the
book also reveals evidence of Matsuoka’s character and political style—which
comes across as rather overbearing, self-important and even rather bullying,
but also cowardly when confronted with the prospect of being caught out at
underhand activities.
Matsuoka was chosen for this study because he seemed to encapsulate, albeit
as an extreme case, many of the archetypal characteristics of LDP politicians,
which have been so well documented by other scholars. He is not just any
politician. He is a notorious example of a particular ‘genre’ of politician, obsessed
with money, politics, pork barrelling and the unabashed protection of vested
interests. Matsuoka deserves ‘thick’ or ‘rich’ description because he is so patently
illustrative of a certain political type. Matsuoka exemplifies what one might
call the ‘traditional paradigm’ of LDP politician, which further vindicates the
approach of the book as a study of Japanese politics through a focus on an
individual political actor.
CONCLUSION 253
The question that is implicitly raised in this book is whether such a political
type can survive in the brave new world of Japanese politics shaped by Prime
Minister Koizumi and his successor Abe Shinzô. The projects that have resulted
from Matsuoka’s kind of mediation have consumed the budgets of national
and local governments and wasted tax money. This ‘style and structure of
politics is old and is increasingly not approved of any longer’.2 It is ‘a way of
politics that is now considered “old-fashioned” and is being outlawed, and
seen as unpopular with voters’.3 A shrinking pork barrel is curbing the abilities
of Matsuoka and his ilk to manufacture electoral coalitions that are independent
of the party by handing out economic bribes as incentives to voters. At the
same time, a new policymaking process is gradually being sculpted where zoku
politicians are being bypassed in favour of a more top-down structure where
the prime minister and his enlarged executive are crafting policy initiatives
and forcing them on the party and the bureaucracy.
The old LDP, of which Matsuoka is a prime example, is giving way to a new
LDP, in which individual backbenchers have to yield to a more centrally directed
and cohesive party policy program. The program aims to win voters’ hearts
and minds, not through appeals to special interests but to various policy causes
that will deliver broadly based outcomes affecting all Japanese people and a
more equitable distribution of scarcer public resources. Because the future
contours of the LDP and its public policy philosophy remain unclear, however,
relics of the old LDP such as Matsuoka may survive for a time, even in a new
guise as ministers. In order to maintain his political standing and policy
influence, Matsuoka has had to reinvent himself in an environment that is
increasingly hostile to the old ways.
NOTES
2 Hôsei University Professor Igarashi, quoted in http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/dat/200208/
2002081202.htm
3 ibid.
254 POWER AND PORK
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266 POWER AND PORK

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INDEX 267
INDEX
Abe Shintarô, 154 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),

Abe Shinzô, 226, 243, 253 11, 64, 65, 122, 140, 162, 166,
Agriculture and Livestock Industries 229, 238, 240
Corporation (ALIC), 150–1 Diet, 1, 2, 19, 70, 126
Aoki Mikio, 90, 206 standing committees (Kokkai
Arai Hiroyuki, 223 iinkai), 38, 64, 76–7, 78, 102–7,
Arai Satoshi, 11, 141 121
Araki Katsutoshi, 192–3, 234 members’ leagues (giin renmei), 38,
Arima Harumi, 168 107–11, 184, 205–6, 207, 208,
Asada Mitsuru, 177–80, 189 221–2, 223–4
Aso City 239, 242 see also electoral system, elections,
Aso County, 6, 12, 14, 19, 23, 36, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
51, 57, 60, 98, 105, 139, 142, nôrin giin, nôrin zoku
226 electoral system (Lower House) 13,
Asô Tarô, 103 16, 50–1, 51–6, 65, 68–9, 141,
Aso Town, 6, 12, 51, 53–4, 64, 69, 227
81, 139, 227, 234 elections
Lower House election (1986), 12
Baker, Howard, 132 Lower House election (1990),
BSE scandal, 174–81, 190, 216 16–25, 178
Lower House election (1993), 26,
Cabinet Office, 103 30–2
clientelistic interests, 41–3, 69–70, Lower House election (1996),
123 57–61, 84
Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Lower House election (2000),
Investigation Committee 61–3, 169
(CAPIC) (Sôgô Nôsei Chôsakai) Lower House election (2003),
see under Liberal Democratic Party, 140, 204, 225–35
Matsuoka Toshikatsu Lower House election (2005),
Conservative Party, 225 193, 238–42
dairy farmers’ political league Upper House election (1989), 13,
(rakunô seiji renmei), 27 16
268 POWER AND PORK
Upper House election (2001), 89, Ibuki Bunmei, 242

207 Ichihara Norita, 142
Etô Takami, 56, 123–4, 154, 169, Ichinomiya Town, 142–3
175, 176, 205–6, 223, 224 Ikeda Kazutaka, 213, 216
Inose Naoki, 206
factions Ishiba Shigeru, 154
see under Liberal Democratic Ishihara Mamoru, 124
Party, Etô Takami etc Ishii Kôki, 162
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Iwanaga Mineichi, 237
95–6, 133, 210–12, 243 Izeri Seigo, 55
Fuji Bank scandal, 173–4 Izumi Hideki, 182–4
Fujimura Yoshiharu, 179
Fujinami Takao, 189 Japan Communist Party (JCP), 13,
Fujita Hoshimitsu, 28 17, 23, 81
Fukuda Takeo, 154 Japan New Party, 28, 30
Fukuda Yasuo, 211 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 13, 16,
Furuya Keiyû, 124 17, 18, 28, 31, 52, 77, 207
Furuya Keiji, 124 jiban (local support base), 12–4,
Futada Kôji, 133, 157 20, 26, 35, 52–5, 57, 60, 64,
66, 226, 233
giin gaikô ( Diet members’ jimukan (generalist)
diplomacy) see under Ministry of Agriculture,
see under Matsuoka Toshikatsu Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
gikan (specialist)
see under Ministry of Agriculture, kaban (political funds), 9–11, 15–6,
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) 29–30, 55–6, 60, 92, 158–68,
Gotô Keiki, 140 170–4, 178, 184–91, 193
Groser, Tim, 132, 133, 134 Kamei Shizuka, 56, 90, 123–4,
140, 153, 155, 166, 169, 170,
Hamaguchi Kazuhisa, 64 180, 205–6, 237, 242
Hanada Toshikatsu, 173 Kamei Yoshiyuki, 131
Harbinson, Stuart, 128 Kamoto County, 57, 58, 60
Hashimoto Ryûtarô, 82, 166, 169, kanban (name recognition), 14–5,
170, 237 26, 60, 153
Hata Tsutomu, 154 Kaneda Hideyuki, 90
Hiranuma Takeshi, 166 Kaneko Yasushi, 156
Hirasawa Katsuei, 155, 156 Kanemaru Shin, 180
Hirota Daisuke, 29–30 Kantei (Prime Minister’s Official
Horinuchi Hisao, 94–5 Residence), 90, 186, 211, 225
Horiuchi Mitsuo, 166 Katô Kôichi, 154, 166, 172
Hosokawa Morihiro, 28, 30–1, 52, Kawamura Takeo, 242
57, 61, 229 Kawasaki Atsuo, 53
INDEX 269
Kikuchi City, 58, 64, 67, 68 Executive Council 18, 83, 107,
Kikuchi County, 20, 53, 55, 57, 156, 204–5
58, 60, 67, 81, 193 factions, 25, 56, 83, 123–4, 160,
Kikuyo Town, 53, 55, 58, 67, 81, 166
82, 226 see also Etô Takami etc
Kitaguchi Hiroshi II 17, 19, 20, and Ministry of Agriculture,
23, 26 Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
Kitamura Naoto, 187 14, 17, 127
Kobayashi Yoshio, 175 Policy Affairs Research Council
kôenkai (personal support group), (PARC) (Seimu Chôsakai) 4, 18,
12, 29, 30, 37, 42–3, 53–6, 38, 73, 74–5, 83, 107, 133,
142, 159, 185, 192, 232, 233 143, 169, 170, 210, 217
Koga Makoto, 225 policymaking, 3–4, 5, 28, 83–5,
Koizumi Junichirô, 5, 89, 90, 93, 127, 210, 235, 242
94, 127, 136, 163, 169, 191, split, 26, 28, 31, 154
204–12, 214, 220, 225, 226, see also elections, Matsuoka
229, 233–8, 239, 241–2, 253 Toshikatsu (and Liberal
Komachi Kyôgi, 182–3 Democratic Party)
Kômeitô, 13, 19, 29, 31, 52, 226, Livestock Industry Promotion
229, 239, 241 Corporation (LIPC), 180
Kôno Yôhei, 156
Kumamoto City, 12, 14, 17, 19, Matsuno Raizô. 18, 20, 23–4
24, 30, 31, 36, 82, 192 Matsuoka Toshikatsu
Kumamoto Prefecture, 6, 9, 10, and Agricultural Basic Policy
12, 14, 27, 39, 40, 50, 51, 67, Subcommittee (Nôgyô Kihon
92, 122, 136, 140, 153, 156, Seisaku Shôiinkai), 79–84, 94–5,
164, 177, 212, 214, 226 101, 125, 135, 152, 154, 188
Kunii Masayuki, 90 and avian flu, 96–7
Kurata Eiki, 29 and biomass, 212–6, 223
and BSE scandal, 174–81, 190,
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 1, 216
12, 220, 228, 229, 232, 233–4, clientelistic interests, 41–3, 69–70,
252 123, 139, 171–3, 182–4, 209,
Agricultural Basic Policy 252
Subcommittee (Nôgyô Kihon and Comprehensive Agricultural
Seisaku Shôiinkai), 79–84, 94–5, Policy Investigation Committee
101 (CAPIC) (Sôgô Nôsei
Comprehensive Agricultural Chôsakai), 73–5, 79–90, 94,
Policy Investigation Committee 99–102, 217–8
(CAPIC) (Sôgô Nôsei Chôsakai), and construction companies, 10,
73–5, 79–90, 94, 99–102, 121, 36, 42, 70, 82, 156, 157–8,
176, 211, 217 163–7, 222, 226, 228, 234
270 POWER AND PORK
and dairy farmers, 27, 85, 108–9 and Liberal Democratic Party
Deputy Minister (MAFF), 90–4 (LDP), 11, 13–4, 15, 19–20,
and Diet committees, 64, 76–7, 25–6, 28, 38, 55, 56, 64, 64,
78, 102–7, 121 66, 107, 135, 165, 181, 232–3,
and Diet members’ leagues, 237, 242
107–11, 184, 205–6, 207, 208, see also Comprehensive
221–2, 223–4 Agricultural Policy Investigation
education, 6–7, 9, 14, 24 Committee (CAPIC), Policy
early career, 6–16 Affairs Research Council (PARC)
effects of electoral reform (1994), and local interests, 35–7, 42, 53,
51–6, 65, 68–9, 141 65–7, 69, 206, 209, 226, 252
and Executive Council, 204–5 and Lower House election (1990),
and farm interests, 4, 14–5, 27–8, 16–25, 178
37–40, 52, 67–9, 74, 89, and Lower House election (1993),
99–102, 104, 107–11, 126, 26–35, 229
135–7, 222, 242 and Lower House election (1996),
and Forestry Agency, 7–10, 12, 57–61
27, 123, 151, 160–2, 173–4, and Lower House election (2000),
184–7, 191, 217, 221, 222 61–3
and forestry interests, 4, 27–8, and Lower House election (2003),
37–40, 52, 67–9, 74, 99, 104, 140, 204, 225–35
109, 110–11, 123, 126, 160–3, and Lower House election (2005),
166, 184–91, 217–23 238–42
and Free Trade Agreements and media, 150–1, 156, 168
(FTAs), 95–6, 133, 210–12, and Ministry of Agriculture,
242–3 Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
and Fuji Bank scandal, 173–4 (Ministry of Agriculture and
and giin gaikô ( Diet members’ Forestry (MAF)), 7–9, 11, 15,
diplomacy), 88, 127–35 17, 20–3, 37, 75, 77–9, 87–8,
jiban (local support base), 12–4, 90–3, 100, 103, 122, 123–6,
20, 26, 35, 52–5, 57, 60, 64, 138–43, 151, 154, 155, 157–8,
66, 226, 233 159, 163, 175–81, 187, 237–8,
kaban (political funds), 9–11, 242–3, 252
15–6, 29–30, 55–6, 60, 92, and Ministry of Construction, 37
158–68, 170–4, 178, 181, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
184–91, 193 (MoFA), 182–4, 219
kanban (name recognition), 14–5, and Ministry of Internal Affairs
26, 60, 153 and Communications (MIAC),
kôenkai (personal support group), 97, 103
12, 29, 30, 37, 42–3, 53–6, and Ministry of Land, Transport
142, 159, 192, 232, 233 and Infrastructure (MLIT), 98,
and Land Agency, 8, 9, 11 103, 139, 163
INDEX 271
and Ministry of Transport 37 Taisakuhi), 37, 80–88, 121,

and National Land Agency, 8, 124, 125, 140, 159
106 and Uruguay Round negotiations,
and Nokyo, 17, 19, 27, 28, 39, 107–8
60–1, 65, 68, 80, 84–7, 92, 95, and World Trade Organization
101, 122, 240 (WTO), 87–8, 91–4, 95–6,
nôrin giin (agriculture and forestry 127–35, 243
Diet member), 38, 52, 53, 64, and Yamarin scandal, 184–91,
68, 73–111, 154, 215 192, 216, 217, 210, 228, 237–8
nôrin zoku (agriculture and Matsushita Tadahirô, 186–7, 219
forestry ‘tribe’), 64, 75, 121–43, McCarthy, John, 127
152, 153–8, 159, 204, 209, McLean, Murray, 133–4
225, 235 methodology, 2–5, 251–2
parliamentary vice-minister, 77–9 Ministry of Agriculture and
and Policy Affairs Research Council Forestry (MAF)
(PARC) (Seimu Chôsakai) and see Ministry of Agriculture,
committees, 73–5, 76, 77, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
79–111, 121, 143, 217–8, 251 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and postal privatisation, 236–7, and Fisheries (MAFF), 137,
238–40 154, 157, 174–5, 191, 211,
and public works, 4, 9, 26, 35–7, 214, 223–4, 225
42, 66, 70, 83, 88, 98–9, BSE scandal, 174–81
102–4, 111, 121–2, 138–43, Fisheries Agency, 155
153, 158, 163, 207, 208–9, Food Control system, 78–9
218, 234 Forestry Agency, 7–10, 12, 99,
and rice price, 86–7, 89, 95, 100, 123, 151, 160–2, 173–4, 184–7,
155 191, 217, 219, 221, 222
and sectional interests, 37–40, gikan (specialist), 7, 8, 17, 23,
138–9, 209, 252 125, 225
see also farm interests etc jimukan (generalist), 7, 17, 23,
and Suzuki Muneo, 11, 15–6, 25, 124, 225
56, 81, 105, 151–8, 166, and Liberal Democratic Party
168–71, 175–81, 183, 184, (LDP), 14, 17, 127
185–91, 215–6, 228, 237 Minister’s Secretariat, 8
and Syrian Embassy affair, 181–4 National Land Agency, 8, 9
and teikô seiryoku (resistance and Nokyo, 17, 19, 27
forces), 191, 204–12, 225–6 Old Boys (OBs), 17, 20–3, 25,
and tobacco farmers, 27, 89–90, 84, 123, 125, 141, 154, 161–2,
96, 155 174, 180
and Uruguay Round (UR) see also Matsuoka Toshikatsu (and
Agriculture Countermeasures Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
Expenditure (UR Nôgyô and Fisheries)
272 POWER AND PORK
Ministry of Construction, 37 Nakamura Yasushi, 162

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Nakasone Yasuhirô, 56
Industry (METI), 92, 130, 137, National Land Agency, 8, 106
238 New Frontier Party, 53, 57, 61,
Ministry of Education Science and 187
Technology, 175 New Party Harbinger (Shintô
Ministry of Finance (MOF), 175, Sakigake), 159
225 New Party Mother Earth (Shintô
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Daichi), 193
92, 126, 137, 155, 156, 157, Noda Masaharu, 29
182–4, 191, 194, 219 Noda Takeshi, 17, 19, 28, 29, 31,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 52, 225
Communications (MIAC), 98, Nokyo, 17, 19, 27, 28, 39, 60–1,
103, 170 65, 68, 80, 84–7, 92, 95, 101,
Ministry of Health, Labour and 122, 179, 193, 240
Welfare (Ministry of Health and see also Zenchû
Welfare), 27, 175 Nonaka Hiromu, 154, 155, 156,
Ministry of Home Affairs, 15 170, 180, 210
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Norota Hôsei, 133, 181, 211
Communications, 190 nôrin giin (agriculture and forestry
Ministry of Justice, 186 Diet member), 38, 52, 53, 64,
Ministry of Land, Transport and 67, 73–111, 154, 157, 191,
Infrastructure (MLIT), 98, 103, 228
139, 163 nôrin zoku (agriculture and forestry
Ministry of Transport 37 ‘tribe’), 11, 64, 75, 121–43,
Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, 25, 154 152, 153–8, 159, 174, 175,
Mitsuzuka Kôkichi, 213–4 204, 210–12, 225, 235, 242
Miyazawa Kiichi, 108 Nukaga Fukushirô, 210
‘money politics’, 4, 190–1
see also kaban (political funds) Obuchi Keizô, 210, 221
Mori Yoshirô, 56, 90, 159, 166, Ôgata Yasuo, 161
169, 213 Ogawa Yasuo, 124
Murata Kazuyoshi, 238 Oguni Town, 19, 20, 59, 67, 98,
Murayama Tomiichi, 77 103
Old Boys (OBs) see under Ministry
Nagamura Takemi, 124 of Agriculture, Forestry and
Nakagawa Hidenao, 166 Fisheries (MAFF)
Nakagawa Ichirô, 11, 12, 15, 154, Omori Town, 67
177, 187, 189 Ôshima Tadamori, 211
Nakagawa Shôichi, 94, 151, 189, Ozaki Mitsurô, 29
238, 242 Ozawa Ichirô, 36
Nakagawa Yoshio, 211 Ozu Town, 20, 58
INDEX 273
People’s New Party (Kokumin Takeshita Noboru, 16, 180

Shintô), 242 Tamaki Kazuo, 11, 12, 121
Policy Affairs Research Council Tanaka Hironao, 124
(Seimu Chôsakai) Tanaka Kakuei, 2, 153
see under Liberal Democratic Tanaka Makiko, 183
Party, Matsuoka Toshikatsu Tanaka Naoki, 90, 91
postal privatisation, 236–7, 238–40 Tanaka Shôichi 17, 29
public works, 4, 26, 35–7, 42, 66, Tanikawa Kazuo, 182
69, 83, 88, 98–9, 102–4, 111, teikô seiryoku (resistance forces),
121–2, 138–43, 153, 158, 163, 191, 204–12
207, 208–9, 218, 234 Tominaga Kiyotsugu, 82
Tottori University, 7, 9, 23, 37,
Recruit scandal 16 187–8
Renewal Party, 26
Ueki Town, 57, 58
Sakamoto Tetsushi, 229, 232–3, Uemura Tsukasa, 183
238–41 Uozumi Hirohide 18, 19, 26, 27,
Sakurai Shin, 128–34, 211 28, 31, 36, 52, 53, 57, 64
Sasaki Kichinosuke, 10, 172 Uruguay Round Agriculture
Satô Masato, 124–5 Countermeasures Expenditure
Satô Saburô, 172 (UR Nôgyô Taisakuhi), 37, 79–
Seirankai (Young Storm Society), 11 86, 121, 124, 125, 140, 159
Shigeie Toshinori, 182–3
Shimamura Yoshinobu, 237 Watanabe Michio, 11, 154
Shisuikai 169, 242 Watanabe Yoshinori, 180
Social Democratic Party (SDP), 229 World Trade Organization (WTO),
Sonoda Hiroyuki, 173 87–8, 91–4, 95–6, 127–35,
Sonoda Toshiyuki, 240 217, 243
Soyo Town, 140
Sugata Kikuhito, 150 Yamada Isao, 185–9
Supachai, Panitchpakdi, 128, Yamada Rintarô, 188
129–30 Yamada Satoshi, 187
Suzuki Muneo, 11, 15–6, 25, 56, Yamaga City, 53, 58, 60, 64, 68
81, 105, 151–8, 159, 160, Yamaguchi Rikio, 234
165–6, 168–71, 175–81, 183, Yamamoto Tôru, 150–1
184, 185–91, 193–4, 207, 216, Yamarin scandal, 184–91, 192,
225, 228, 237, 238 216, 217, 219, 228, 232
Suzuki Zenkô, 124 Yamasaki Taku, 169, 206, 232
Syrian Embassy affair, 181–4 Yatsu Yoshio, 91–4, 123, 130,
132, 134, 177, 211, 242
Takagi Yûki, 142 Yoshii Junichi, 166, 168
Takebe Tsutomu, 174–5, 176, Zenchû, 134
178–9

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© Aurelia George Mulgan 2006

National Library of Australia Cataloguing in Publication entry

Mulgan, Aurelia George.

Editors: Bridget Maidment, Clare Shamier, Paula Sutton

First edition © 2006 ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press

2.1 Farm household composition/votes cast for Matsuoka by

AFF Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

Japanese politics is notoriously opaque and corrupt. It is not surprising,

of his constituents, supporting groups and various important causes. Privately,

behaviour of Japanese politicians, then it will have succeeded in its modest

own individually-centred, secure voting bases, LDP politicians have operated

own constituency. Fourth, he has operated within the LDP’s policymaking

EDUCATION AND EARLY CAREER3

examination, which was a medical test. 6 He stopped taking the academy

Matsuoka subsequently graduated with a BA in Forestry from the Faculty of

in forestry. At one time Matsuoka became head of the Planning and

Matsuoka displayed the characteristics of a ‘status incentive politician’,

PREPARING TO ENTER POLITICS

contacts to obtain campaign finance to launch himself into politics. He offered

In December 1987, Matsuoka (who was Forestry Agency public relations

Matsuoka was already showing a propensity to bend the rules if it meant

THE REQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

Local support base

Lacking LDP endorsement, Matsuoka formally stood as an Independent.

At an average of 3.7 voters per farm household,49 this comprised a potential

funding groups. The Matsuoka Toshikatsu Policy Research Association received

Kômeitô candidate, followed by Noda and Uozumi, with Matsuoka coming

Matsuoka’s success in the rural counties was indicative of strong sectoral

Tamana County 3,525 16.7 2,853 5.7 3.5 7th

Hakusui Village 439 35.2 1,388 42.6 1.7 1st

JOINING THE LDP

WITH A VIEW TO THE 1993 ELECTION…

connections to primary industry voters. One of the advantages of standing as

BEER COUPONS OR VOTE-BUYING?

secretary brushed aside his reservations saying, ‘there’s no time. We need it

THE 1993 ELECTION RESULTS

meant that Matsuoka ceded top ranking to Hosokawa in regional areas. In

Gyokuto Town 337 20.5 613 16.4 0.7 3rd

Nishihara Village 264 19.7 1,001 29.8 1.2 1st

THE ‘KARATE KINGS’ FIGHT IT OUT

argumentative and a hard drinker.135 What is more, he became known in Nagata-

agricultural, forestry and rural infrastructure development, including

of his primary policy-related activities in Tokyo was policy intervention, whereby

areas of his electorate where people were gainfully employed in agriculture

Table 2.3 Ranking of Kumamoto Prefecture as an agricultural producer/

Matsuoka’s sectionalist orientation ensured that he undertook activities

served as a basis for Matsuoka to build a range of clientelistic relationships

thus institutionalised clientelism and its inevitable corollary—patronage politics.

71 Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 February 1990.

CHANGING THE CHARACTER OF THE ELECTORATE

as a result of the electoral reorganisation. His smaller constituency of Kumamoto

to which he was encouraged to supply regionally concentrated policy services.

ORGANISING THE VOTE

were always elected to the 18-member town assembly. Such behaviour

ORGANISING THE FUNDS18

in that year—¥128 million. 21 Matsuoka’s kôenkai also generated a

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AFTER THE REFORM

Kyokushi Village 533 36.8 1,477 52.9 3.3 2nd

Matsuoka’s total county vote shot up considerably in the 1996 election,